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8. The applicant, who was born in 1981, was a minor at the relevant time. 9. On 5 April 1997 he was arrested on the suspicion of having destroyed a car with the use of explosives. 10. On the day of his arrest he was brought before an investigator who charged him under Article 333 in conjunction with Articles 330 § 1 and 3 of the Penal Code. The investigator also decided to detain the applicant pending trial. This decision, which apparently was confirmed on an unspecified date by a prosecutor, only referred to Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. On 2 May 1997 the applicant appealed to the District Prosecutor's Office in Plovdiv requesting his release. 12. On 20 May 1997 this request was refused on the ground that the applicant was charged with a “serious wilful offence”, within the meaning of Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 13. On 29 May 1997 the applicant's mother appealed to the Regional Prosecutor's Office against the refusal of the District Public Prosecutor. She requested her son's release on the ground that he needed medical supervision and possibly surgery. A copy of a medical certificate was also produced, indicating that the applicant was suffering from a tumour to his right hand which was reappearing despite two surgical operations for its removal. 14. On 12 June 1997 the applicant's lawyer requested the Regional Investigation Authorities (OSS) to order his client's examination by a medical doctor with a view to establishing his mental state and whether or not the tumour to his hand required treatment. This request was apparently granted. 15. By decision of 4 July 1997 the Regional Public Prosecutor's Office refused to release the applicant. The decision stated that the district prosecutor had erred in relying on Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as the offence of which the applicant had been accused was punishable, in the case of a minor, by up to three years' imprisonment, and therefore Article 152 § 1 of the Code, which concerned “serious wilful offences” (those punishable by more than five years' imprisonment) was not applicable. However, it was clear from the findings of the investigation that there existed a “prima facie” danger of absconding, committing further offences, or obstructing the investigation, such a danger being a ground for detention pending trial under Article 152 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16. On 9 July 1997 the applicant's lawyer submitted to the District Prosecutor's Office another request for release. He stated that the investigation during which the applicant had fully co‑operated and had made confessions, was completed, that the applicant needed medical treatment, that he was psychologically unstable which transpired from the opinion of a psychiatrist who had examined him while in detention, and that Article 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure allowed pre-trial detention of minors only in exceptional circumstances. It is unclear whether this request was examined. 17. On 5 August 1997 the applicant's lawyer appealed to the District Court in Plovdiv against his client's pre-trial detention and requested a public hearing. He relied on the arguments already raised before the prosecutors and emphasised that the provision of Article 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had been disregarded. He also relied on the Convention. 18. On the same day the appeal was sent to the District Public Prosecutor to complete the case file. 19. On 21 August 1997 the District Court received the completed case file, including an appeal for release that had been submitted by the applicant's mother to the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office on 8 August 1997. The District Court listed the case for a hearing on 25 August 1997. 20. On 25 August 1997 the court adjourned the hearing to 16 September 1997, as the applicant's lawyer had not been summoned properly. The court also ordered a medical report and appointed three medical experts. 21. On 29 August 1997 the applicant was brought to a hospital where he was diagnosed as suffering from pleurisy, and later from tuberculosis. He remained in hospital for an unspecified period of time and underwent intensive treatment. 22. On 5 September 1997 the applicant's lawyer submitted to the District Court a request for the appointment of medical experts to examine whether the conditions of detention at the premises of the investigator's office would pose a threat to the applicant's health. This request was granted. 23. On 8 September 1997 the experts found that the applicant needed to stay in hospital for at least 45 days, to be followed by a sanatorial placement. The experts concluded that a renewed detention of the applicant at the premises of the investigator's office in Plovdiv, if ordered within the upcoming six to eight months, would put at peril the applicant's health. 24. On 15 September 1997, the day before the second hearing on his appeal against detention, the applicant's lawyer requested to consult the case file. At that time the case file was held by the judge dealing with the appeal. The judge refused. 25. On the same day the applicant's lawyer repeated his request in writing. The judge refused in writing on 16 September 1997. 26. The hearing before the District Court resumed on 16 September 1997. The applicant and his lawyer were both present. The applicant's lawyer unsuccessfully asked for an adjournment as he had been refused access to the case file. 27. The judge heard the medical expert and decided to substitute the applicant's pre-trial detention by a more lenient measure, “parental supervision”, in view of his medical condition. 28. Rejecting the applicant's argument that his detention had been illegal from the outset, the judge stated that he had been lawfully detained. In particular, although the authorities had initially relied on Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was inapplicable, this defect had been remedied on 4 July 1997 when the competent prosecutor had confirmed the applicant's pre-trial detention under the pertinent rule, Article 152 § 4 of the Code. Furthermore, the substantive elements justifying the applicant's detention had existed. In particular, the nature of the offence he had been charged with was important: it was of the category of offences that imperilled the safety of the public at large. 29. Despite the District Court's decision to release the applicant from pre-trial detention and place him under “parental supervision”, he was not released immediately. 30. On 17 September 1997 the District Court transmitted its decision of 16 September 1997 to the District Public Prosecutor for execution. 31. Since the applicant was detained in premises under the administration of the Regional Investigation Service, the decision was thereupon transmitted to that service. 32. On an unspecified date the applicant's mother signed the necessary papers regarding “parental supervision”. 33. The applicant was released on 23 September 1997. 34. On 29 May 1998 he was found guilty and sentenced to one year imprisonment, suspended.

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9. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Naples. 10. In 1993 he worked as a prosecutor at the Palmi public prosecutor's office. In the exercise of his functions, he had investigated a certain Mr C. The latter had had dealings with Mr Francesco Cossiga, a former Italian President, who at the end of his term of office had become a senator for life in accordance with Article 59 § 1 of the Constitution. 11. In August 1993 Mr Cossiga sent the applicant a fax and two letters. He said he was making him a gift of the copyright in his written, telephone and oral communications with Mr C., “including for the purposes of their stage and film exploitation” (“anche ai fini di eventuale sfruttamento teatrale e cinematografico”), “by way of a very modest contribution towards the costs which [he would] be incurring for [his] transfer from Palmi to Naples” (“come modestissimo contributo alle spese che Ella dovrà affrontare per il suo trasferimento da Palmi a Napoli”). Mr Cossiga also told the applicant that he was going to send him a small wooden horse and a tricycle “for the leisure pursuits which [he] believe[d] [he was] entitled to enjoy” (“per quegli svaghi que credo abbia diritto a concedersi”). Mr Cossiga then actually sent the little wooden horse and the tricycle to the applicant together with a detective game called “Super Cluedo”. With the parcel came the following message: “Have fun, dear Prosecutor! Best wishes, F. Cossiga” (“Si prenda un po' di svago, gentile Procuratore! Cordialmente F. Cossiga”). 12. The applicant filed a complaint against Mr Cossiga, alleging that the communications and gifts described above had damaged his honour and reputation. Proceedings were then brought against Mr Cossiga for having insulted a public official. 13. On 12 July 1996 Mr Cossiga was committed for trial before the Messina District Court. On 23 June 1997 the applicant joined the proceedings as a civil party. 14. In the meantime, the President of the Senate had informed the District Court that the Parliamentary Immunities Commission (Giunta ... delle immunità parlamentari) proposed that the Senate should declare that the acts of which Mr Cossiga was accused were covered by the immunity provided for in Article 68 § 1 of the Constitution. 15. By a resolution of 2 July 1997 a majority in the Senate approved the Parliamentary Immunities Commission's proposal. 16. On 23 September 1997 the applicant submitted a statement to the Messina public prosecutor and District Court in which he attacked the Senate's resolution, observing that there was no discernible link between the acts of which Mr Cossiga was accused (which he submitted ought to be construed as a personal quarrel with a prosecutor) and the exercise of parliamentary functions. On that basis, the applicant alleged that the Senate, in applying Article 68 to circumstances not provided for in the Constitution, had encroached on the powers of the judiciary, and requested that the matter be referred to the Constitutional Court to resolve the conflict of State powers. 17. By a judgment on 27 September 1997, the text of which was lodged with the registry on 10 October 1997, the Messina District Court ruled that Mr Cossiga had no case to answer “pursuant to Article 68 § 1 of the Constitution”. 18. The District Court observed that it was for the Senate, whose resolutions were not subject to review by the courts, to determine whether the conditions listed in Article 68 were met. Moreover, it saw no need to raise a conflict of powers, given that the Senate's decision was neither procedurally flawed nor manifestly unreasonable. 19. On 4 December 1997 the applicant requested the Messina public prosecutor to appeal against the judgment of 27 September 1997. This was intended to pave the way for a conflict of State powers to be raised subsequently before the Constitutional Court. 20. By a decision of 13 December 1997, the prosecutor rejected the applicant's request. He observed that the Constitutional Court did not have jurisdiction to quash the Senate's resolution, but only to assess whether the Senate had exercised its power in an arbitrary fashion by improperly encroaching on the powers of the courts. However, the parliamentary papers revealed that the impugned resolution was based on the following reasons: (i) Mr Cossiga had earlier criticised the investigations conducted by the applicant in a parliamentary question; (ii) the acts of which Mr Cossiga was accused should be construed as polite and ironic criticism of that investigation; (iii) according to the case-law of the legislative chambers, the immunity provided for in Article 68 of the Constitution applied to any political opinion expressed by a member of Parliament which could be regarded as an outward projection of parliamentary activity in its strict sense . 21. According to the Messina public prosecutor, those reasons were neither unreasonable nor manifestly arbitrary.

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9. The applicant was born in 1949 and is currently detained in Maastricht. 10. The applicant was detained on remand (voorlopige hechtenis) on 11 September 1995. The criminal proceedings against him, in which he stood accused of a number of offences including murder, manslaughter/grievous bodily harm, rape and narcotics offences, came to an end on 26 March 2002, when the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) confirmed the judgment of the ‘s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of 6 March 2001 in which the applicant had been sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment. In imposing that sentence, the Court of Appeal had taken into account the fact that the applicant had spent much of his pre-trial detention in maximum security. In addition, the Court of Appeal had imposed a TBS order (placement at the disposal of the Government – terbeschikkingstelling) with confinement in a secure institution (met bevel tot verpleging van overheidswege). 11. The applicant was initially detained in ordinary remand institutions (huizen van bewaring). In a letter dated 7 October 1997 to the governor of the remand institution where the applicant was detained at that time, the National Public Prosecutor stated: “... I wish to inform you that a seriously increased safety risk exists in relation to [the applicant]. The Detainee Intelligence Information Service [Gedetineerde Recherche Informatie Punt – “GRIP”] has obtained information – which has been examined by myself and which I have found to be sufficiently relevant, reliable and concrete but which should be protected for reasons of security – to the effect that [the applicant] is intending to escape from detention and to that purpose is managing to make contacts outside the penitentiary. An escape or breakout is liable to be accompanied by assistance from the outside and violence directed at others. I would further draw your attention to the fact that it also appears from the aforementioned information that [the applicant] has approached persons, or has had them approached on his behalf, in a threatening and intimidating manner. I advise you to take the appropriate measures to ensure the uninterrupted continuation of the [applicant’s] detention as well as appropriate measures to prevent any damage, and in particular damage to persons, occurring outside the penitentiary.” 12. On 14 October 1997 the governor of the remand institution where the applicant was detained proposed to the special selection board of the maximum-security institution (Extra Beveiligde Inrichting – “EBI”) that the applicant be placed in the EBI which is part of the Nieuw Vosseveld Penitentiary Complex in Vught. At a meeting of the selection board on 24 October 1997 the applicant was selected for placement. He was transferred to the EBI on 29 October 1997. 13. In a letter of 4 November 1997 the Minister of Justice confirmed the applicant’s placement and informed him of the reasons which had led to that decision having been taken. Reference was made to the letter (referred to as the “official report” (ambtsbericht)) of 7 October 1997. In respect of the threats and intimidation, the Minister of Justice wrote that these had not only been brought to bear on fellow inmates but also on persons outside the remand institution. The applicant was further informed that his escape would pose an unacceptable risk to society. The Minister had also decided that the so-called “A regime” should apply to the applicant in view of the latter’s threat that he would commit suicide if placed in the EBI. 14. In January and March 1998 the applicant lodged two requests for a transfer to an ordinary remand institution with the ‘s-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal. The first request was declared inadmissible and the second was rejected. The Court of Appeal based its second decision on the information obtained by GRIP, which had been further elucidated to the court, in confidence, by the Procurator-General at a hearing on 26 March 1998. Neither the applicant nor his counsel were allowed to hear what the Procurator-General had told the Court of Appeal. After the applicant and counsel had once again been admitted to the hearing, the Court of Appeal very briefly provided them with some information of what it had been told by the Procurator-General but this did not contain anything about the provenance of the information obtained by GRIP or the dates on which this information had been provided to GRIP. 15. On 29 October 1998 the Minister of Justice decided that the applicant’s placement in the EBI should be continued. The wording of that decision was almost identical to that of the decision of 4 November 1997. However, the Minister decided that the applicant should no longer be subjected to the A regime. 16. On 17 December 1998 the applicant again requested the ‘s‑Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal to order that he be transferred to an ordinary remand institution, arguing that his placement in the EBI had been unlawful. The applicant explicitly relied on Article 8 of the Convention. He submitted that his placement in the EBI had had serious consequences for his possibilities of enjoying private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention: both privacy and contact with the outside world were severely limited in the EBI. Thus, EBI inmates were only allowed visits from spouses, parents and children without a glass partition between the inmate and the visitor once a month, on which occasions the only physical contact allowed was a handshake at the beginning and end of the visit. Visits from other relatives (including siblings) were only allowed with such a partition in place. In addition, it was only possible to contact relatives by telephone twice a week for ten minutes at a time. 17. At the hearing which took place on 18 February 1999 before the Court of Appeal in camera, the applicant also submitted that the conditions of his detention in the EBI constituted inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. In this connection he referred to the findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT – see below). 18. The Court of Appeal in camera rejected the request in a decision dated 16 March 1999. The Court of Appeal held that the reasons set out in the Minister’s decision of 29 October 1998 justified the applicant’s continued placement in the EBI. It further held that the conditions of detention in the EBI did not breach Article 3 since the EBI regime had a basis in law and the treatment of the applicant under this regime could not be regarded as amounting to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. As regards Article 8, finally, the Court of Appeal held that the interferences with the applicant’s rights under that provision were justified as they were in accordance with the law and necessary in the interests of, inter alia, public safety. 19. When the applicant’s placement in the EBI was once again extended, in a decision of 10 November 2000, he lodged an appeal with the Appeals Board (beroepscommissie) of the Central Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice (Centrale Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing). On 12 February 2001 the Appeals Board dismissed the appeal. Although it held that he could no longer be considered extremely likely to attempt to escape, it did find that the applicant, in the event of an escape, would pose an unacceptable risk to society in view of the nature of the offences of which he stood accused and of the effects on society and public opinion. 20. In May 2001 the applicant was transferred to a prison with an ordinary regime in Maastricht. 21. The applicant submitted that during his stay in the EBI he had been confronted with feelings of disempowerment and depression. The applicant’s psychological condition was examined by the Penitentiary Selection Centre (Penitentiair Selectie Centrum – “the PSC”) on a number of occasions, prior to a decision on the prolongation of his placement in the EBI. The following paragraphs contain excerpts from reports of a number of these examinations, drawn up by Mr V., the head of the Psychological Department of the PSC. 22. Report of 28 October 1999: “The PSC most recently issued an advisory opinion relating to [the applicant] on 21 April 1999 ... The conclusion reached at that time was the following: ‘Having regard to [the applicant’s] personality and the course of his detention, [the applicant] should be deemed capable of acts of desperation. Within the EBI, such acts will almost certainly (have to) be directed against himself. Under a less strict regime, he could vent his emotions on others. For the time being, extra attention remains a necessity. The question arises whether in the long run, despite all the efforts made, the EBI is capable of offering the care required. If the risk of escape no longer necessitates keeping [the applicant] in the EBI, a transfer to a Special Individual Care Unit [bijzondere individuele begeleidingsafdeling – “BIBA”] might be considered.’ The report of the last six months confirms this picture of [the applicant]. His psychological condition displays ups and downs. There has been a period of depression. A number of factors have a part to play in these psychological low points, such as the fact that [the applicant] misses his family (his detention in the EBI certainly contributes to this), the continuing strain of the appeal on points of law (after all, a great deal is at stake for [the applicant]), his relatively poorly integrated personality (his psychological stability is low), as well as his cognitive capacities, which are not judged to be very high. [The applicant] has been residing in the EBI for two years now and he obviously has difficulties coping. Added to this, a number of personal characteristics and the insecurity about his fate in detention place a heavy demand on [the applicant’s] limited strength. I would prefer placement in a BIBA but this is unfortunately not feasible given that [the applicant] is detained on remand. As far as the present prolongation is concerned, I advise that when the decision about continued detention in the EBI is made, the aforementioned aspects will weigh relatively heavily in relation to current information about a possible risk of his escaping.” 23. Report of 13 April 2000: “It appears from reports of the course of [the applicant’s] detention that prior to his placement in the EBI he was seen as a dominant man familiar with the daily routine in detention. There were regular signs that he exerted much (negative) influence, involving, inter alia, threats. These signs resulted in frequent transfers. Ever since he has been staying in the EBI, a more unstable, downcast side of [the applicant] has become much more apparent. [The applicant] is described by the prison’s medical and health care team as a vulnerable man tending to depression, who takes medication for these complaints. A number of reasons may explain the contrast between [the applicant’s] behaviour in detention prior to his placement in the EBI and his current behaviour. In the first place there is of course the threat of being sentenced to imprisonment (for life). The fact that his appeal on points of law was upheld caused a strong resurgence of hope, but after he had again been sentenced to life imprisonment, [the applicant] was extremely upset. According to the members of the medical and health care team, he is beginning to recover. In the second place, there is the EBI regime itself which [the applicant] has difficulties coping with. [The applicant] used to be a person who was not constrained by any moral code of behaviour and who did not consider the rights of others. In the EBI, there are clearly defined limits and dependence. [The applicant] finds this loss of control over his own life difficult to accept and it looks as if this is a contributing factor to the development and continuation of the complaints linked to depression. Another relevant factor is contact with his family; personnel in the EBI have the impression that this is deteriorating and that increasingly a distance is beginning to develop. The report of the last six months confirms this picture of [the applicant]. His psychological condition displays highs and lows. There has been a period of complaints linked to depression. These lows are often mainly reactive in nature (bad news, problems with other detainees, the loss of a ‘mate’ within the unit, etc.). There is still the continuing strain relating to the outcome of the criminal proceedings (after all, a great deal is at stake for [the applicant]), and this should be seen against the background of the relatively poorly integrated personality of [the applicant] (his psychological stability is low) and his cognitive capacities, not judged to be very high. In view of all his problems, regular attention is paid to [the applicant] by the medical and health care team. There is regular contact with the psychiatrist, the psychologist and social workers. Albeit somewhat intermittently, [the applicant] is prepared to take medication, which does have a positive effect on his mood. The fact remains that [the applicant] is having a hard time and that he has difficulties coping with the constraints of the EBI. If information about the risk of his escaping and the associated unacceptability of the risk to society is deemed such that it is no longer strictly necessary to detain [the applicant] in the EBI, there should be an alternative available in a secure facility which offers the possibility of creating a certain space in relation to the setting of limits. A BIBA would be suitable but, given that [the applicant] is detained on remand, placement there is not yet possible. I am nevertheless of the opinion that the unavailability of the most ideal detention facility where [the applicant] should be placed next should not be a decisive factor in the decision-making process on whether or not to prolong his placement in the EBI.” 24. Report of 18 April 2001: “The most serious problems which [the applicant] says he is experiencing in the EBI are the conditions under which visits take place and the fact that he is not seeing some of his children. [The applicant] becomes visibly emotional when talking about this. He complains of eating a lot, listlessness, being worried and sleeplessness. As confirmed by earlier reports, [the applicant] gives the impression of a vulnerable man who yearns for contact and tends towards gloominess, and who has difficulties coping with his detention. There is no appearance of serious psychopathology such as psychosis, severe depression or severe anxiety. Only mild to moderate depressive symptoms and an unstable affect are visible. It appears from the reports drawn up by the staff at the secure unit over the past six months that [the applicant] has functioned well. He enjoys contact with certain co‑detainees. Judged by his own standards, he has participated to a reasonable degree in the programme on offer. He is, however, perceived as someone who complains a lot and who likes to lodge complaints about all manner of things. The conclusion is drawn that in the period under review [the applicant] appears to have found his feet. The medical and health care team reports that [the applicant] has regular contact with the social worker. Having regard to all of the above, [the applicant] has thus functioned well in the past six months. The imposition of a fifteen-year prison sentence and a TBS order, which, as opposed to life imprisonment, offer a certain perspective, has certainly contributed to the improved level of functioning. ... Whether or not his placement in the EBI should be extended is determined in the first place by the level of risk of [the applicant] escaping. ... Although [the applicant] has difficulties coping with his placement in the EBI, the findings are not of such a nature as to constitute strong contraindications militating against a prolongation of his placement.” 25. At the request of the investigating judge in the criminal proceedings against the applicant, a report was drawn up concerning the applicant’s mental faculties by a psychologist and a psychiatrist on 21 November 2000, following a period during which the applicant was held in a psychiatric observation clinic. The following excerpt has been taken from the chapter of the report describing the applicant’s meetings with the psychiatrist. “It is remarkable that soon after his admission to the psychiatric observation clinic, [the applicant’s] appearance seems a lot more presentable: with his hair cut short, clean-shaven and wearing fresh clothes, he gives an altogether different impression from that at the first meeting. [The applicant] says the regime in the EBI did not encourage him to look after himself properly: sometimes days would go by without him speaking to anybody, he found the continuous strip-searching humiliating, and as a result he preferred not to go to the hairdresser’s or to get showered. [The applicant] describes his treatment in the psychiatric observation clinic as ‘heaven’ compared to his treatment in the EBI, and he says that as a result he feels a lot better in the psychiatric observation clinic.”

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9. The first applicant is Mr Jacobus Lorsé, who was born in 1945. The second applicant, Mrs Everdina Lorsé-Quint (born in 1961), is the wife of the first applicant. The third, fourth and fifth applicants, Pieternella Johanna Lorsé (born in 1985), Paula Martina Lorsé (born in 1987) and Jacobus Lorsé junior (born in 1992), are the children of the first and second applicants. The sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth applicants, Maria Petronella van Esch (born in 1965), Johanna Maria Lorsé (born in 1966), Neeltje Maria Lorsé (born in 1968) and Hubertus Joseph Lorsé (born in 1970), are children of the first applicant born out of previous relationships. The first applicant is currently serving a prison sentence in Dordrecht. The other applicants are all resident in Maastricht, with the exception of the ninth applicant who resides in Rotterdam. 10. The first applicant, hereinafter referred to as Mr Lorsé, was taken into police custody (in verzekering gesteld) on 24 July 1994 and subsequently placed in detention on remand (voorlopige hechtenis). He was initially detained in ordinary remand institutions (huizen van bewaring). 11. Mr Lorsé was convicted of drugs and firearms offences. He was sentenced at first instance to twelve years’ imprisonment and a fine of one million Netherlands guilders (NLG). On appeal the prison term was increased to fifteen years’ imprisonment, the fine remaining the same. His conviction and sentence became final on 30 June 1998 when his appeal on points of law was rejected by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). He is now serving that sentence. He will be eligible for provisional release no sooner than July 2004. It would appear that he has been sentenced in Belgium to a six-year prison sentence for drugs-related crimes but that the proceedings there are still pending. 12. On 14 September 1994, while the criminal proceedings were still pending, Mr Lorsé handed his counsel a letter from the prison authorities from which it appeared that it was intended to place him (Mr Lorsé) in an extra security institution. On 27 September 1994 Mr Lorsé was transferred to the Temporary Extra Security Institution (Tijdelijke Extra Beveiligde Inrichting, “TEBI”), part of the Nieuw Vosseveld Penitentiary Complex in Vught. 13. By a letter of 28 September 1994 the Minister of Justice informed Mr Lorsé that apart from the fact that he was suspected of very serious crimes, official information (ambtsberichten) was available from which it appeared that he was likely to use violence in an attempt to escape. Reference was made to the fact that he had already once managed to avoid being arrested, endangering human life in so doing. Reference was also made to the prison sentence awaiting him in Belgium. In these circumstances it was considered that public order would be severely affected should Mr Lorsé manage to escape. 14. Mr Lorsé was subsequently notified, by letters couched in similar terms and dated 21 November 1995, 29 May 1996, 5 December 1996, 16 June 1997, 9 December 1997, 19 June 1998 and 21 January 1999, of the prolongation of his detention in the TEBI and – following the rejection of his appeal on points of law on 30 June 1998 – in the Extra Security Institution (Extra Beveiligde Inrichting, “EBI”). 15. On a number of occasions Mr Lorsé made use of legal remedies to protest against his placement, and the prolongation of that placement, in the EBI. On 1 February 1999, for example, Mr Lorsé, through his counsel, lodged an appeal to the Appeals Board (beroepscommissie) of the Central Council for the Administration of Criminal Justice (Centrale Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing) against the decision of 21 January 1999 to prolong his placement. In addition to stating that there was no factual justification for his continued detention in the EBI, he complained about the regime which he described as “ill-befitting a state governed by the rule of law”. Privacy was entirely lacking. Human contact with his wife and children was excessively restricted, any kind of intimacy with them being impossible. His psychological and physical health were affected, the symptoms being daily headaches, shaking and loss of concentration, and he had had to seek the help of the prison psychologist. He referred to the findings of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT – see below). 16. The Appeals Board gave its decision on 31 May 1999. It noted that there had been no new information since May 1996 which would tend to justify the fear that Mr Lorsé might attempt to escape. Moreover, the remainder of his sentence had significantly decreased and that, together with the nature of the offences of which he had been convicted, reduced the prospect that public order would be affected if he did escape. Finally, his behaviour was reported to be good. In these circumstances any doubt should benefit Mr Lorsé. Accordingly, the competent authorities were ordered to reconsider their decision within three weeks taking the decision of the Appeals Board into account. 17. On 15 June 1999 a placement officer of the Penitentiary Selection Centre (Penitentiair Selectie Centrum – “PSC”) recommended that Mr Lorsé should remain in the EBI. Mr Lorsé’s situation was described as “relatively stable”, the fact that his prolonged detention in the EBI was becoming more and more of a burden to him being “a normal reaction to a situation that [was] in many respects relatively extreme (waarbij het feit dat een verblijf in de EBI steeds zwaarder gaat wegen een normale reactie is op een in veel opzichten betrekkelijk extreme situatie). 18. The Minister of Justice gave a new decision on 17 June 1999, again prolonging Mr Lorsé’s detention in the EBI. It was stated that a new decision had been made taking into account advice given by the governor of the Nieuw Vosseveld penitentiary complex and the decision of the Appeals Board. In addition, reference was made to official information dated 4 June 1999 from which it appeared that there was new and recent information to the effect that Mr Lorsé still constituted an increased security risk. The nature of this information was not disclosed but it was concluded that Mr Lorsé was planning an escape with help from outside the institution and possibly involving the use of violence against persons. Reference was also made to the prison sentence which he would have to serve in Belgium. Finally, the Minister was of the opinion that in view of inter alia the seriousness of Mr Lorsé’s offences, public order would be seriously affected if Mr Lorsé managed to escape. Thus, although account had been taken of the decision of the Appeals Board, this latter decision could not prevail over the new official information. 19. Mr Lorsé’s detention in the EBI was again extended on 24 December 1999, since official information of June and November 1999 indicated that he still posed an increased security risk. In its decision of 16 March 2000 on Mr Lorsé’s appeal against the prolongation of his placement in the EBI, the Appeals Board noted his arguments to the effect that his protracted stay in the EBI had negative effects not only on him but also on his relatives, and that he had referred to the present complaint lodged with the Court. Mr Lorsé had also submitted the report of the psychiatrist Dr S. (see paragraph 26 below). The Appeals Board rejected the complaint, finding that in the absence of facts or circumstances militating against a continuation of Mr Lorsé’s detention in the EBI, the decision to prolong his placement was lawful and that, weighing up all the interests involved, it could not be considered unreasonable or unjust. The Appeals Board noted that it had taken into account the arguments raised by Mr Lorsé relating to his psychological condition. 20. By a letter dated 10 July 2000 the Minister of Justice informed Mr Lorsé of a further prolongation of his detention in the EBI. Reference was made to inter alia official information of June and November 1999 according to which Mr Lorsé still posed an increased security risk. There were indications that an attempt at escape would in all likelihood involve the help of co-detainees and/or persons outside the institution and the use of violence, inter alia through explosives, against persons. 21. On 18 July 2000 Mr Lorsé lodged an appeal against the prolongation of his detention at the EBI with the Appeals Board, arguing that the official information of June and November 1999 had no basis in fact and further submitting that his continued detention at the EBI constituted a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, not only with respect to himself but also with respect to his wife and children. 22. On 22 November 2000 the Appeals Board rejected the appeal, finding that the risk that Mr Lorsé might escape was still too great to justify detaining him anywhere else than in a maximum security institution. It further considered that its task was to examine the decision to prolong Mr Lorsé’s detention in the EBI, and not the regime pertaining in that institution as such. For that reason, the Appeals Board declined to rule on the complaint under Article 3 of the Convention. As to the complaint of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention, the Appeals Board considered that the second paragraph of that provision allowed for an interference with the right to respect for private and family life as long as such interference was in accordance with the law and was necessary in a democratic society in the interest of, inter alia, the prevention of disorder and crime. The Appeals Board concluded once more that in the absence of facts or circumstances militating against a continuation of Mr Lorsé’s detention in the EBI, the decision to prolong his placement was lawful and that, weighing up all the interests involved, it could not be considered unreasonable or unjust. 23. Besides lodging appeals with the Appeals Board to contest the extension of his maximum security detention, Mr Lorsé, while still detained on remand, also applied for an interim injunction (kort geding) against the State on two occasions, arguing that his placement in the EBI was unlawful. Both applications were rejected, in 1996 and 1998 respectively. 24. On 15 January 2001 Mr Lorsé was transferred from the EBI to a prison in Maastricht with a different regime. Of all prisoners who have been subjected to the maximum security regime in the Netherlands, Mr Lorsé was by far the longest-serving. 25. Mr Lorsé’s psychological condition was examined on a number of occasions. On 14 December 1999 Mr V., the head of the Psychological Department of the PSC, submitted an advisory opinion to the Minister of Justice concerning the prolongation of Mr Lorsé’s placement at the EBI. His report of that date stated: “... The PSC has previously reported on [Mr Lorsé] on 15 June 1999 ... At that time it was reported that [Mr Lorsé], who has been detained in the EBI since 27 September 1994, was finding it increasingly difficult to cope with his stay there. [Mr Lorsé] appeared to have reversed his day-night rhythm. [Mr Lorsé] had no contacts with the prison’s medical and mental health care team. It was reported that, all in all, a picture was beginning to emerge of a man for whom the stay in the EBI was becoming increasingly difficult to bear, with adverse consequences for his functioning. It was advised that an attempt be made to restore contacts with the medical and health care team so that the reaction to a renewed perspective of a further long stay in the EBI might be monitored. The report of the last six months shows ups and downs with more pronounced and more frequent mood swings, especially lately. Apart from the long duration of the stay in the EBI and the lack of contact with the family, the changes in the composition of the [EBI] population also... appear to play a role. All in all, I am of the opinion that the stay in the EBI is increasingly difficult to bear for Mr Lorsé, and, barring concrete evidence regarding the likelihood of an escape attempt, that a transfer is to be preferred on psychosocial grounds alone.” 26. On 14 December 1999 Mr Lorsé was seen, in the EBI, by an independent psychiatrist, Dr S., at the request of his lawyer. Dr S. reported as follows: “I am unable to make a definite psychiatric diagnosis from a single psychiatric examination; in particular, there are insufficient indications to diagnose a depression. There are, nevertheless, a number of indications suggesting that [Mr Lorsé] is suffering under the protracted isolation; he thus describes memory and orientation disorders as well as signs of depersonalisation which clearly point to that being the case. [Mr Lorsé] is a man ... who has learned to survive through toughness. It is debatable whether the psychological carapace he has built up over the years will be capable of withstanding the current extreme isolation, and it is, in my opinion, important therefore that a close eye be kept on him. Should he decompensate in a depressive sense – the risk of which is certainly not hypothetical – this will not be without danger: in such a situation a risk of suicidal actions is not to be underestimated.” 27. On 20 March 2001, some two months after his transfer from the EBI, Mr Lorsé was seen by a different independent psychiatrist, Dr C., who had been requested by his lawyer to examine the psychological consequences of Mr Lorsé’s stay in the EBI. According to Dr C., Mr Lorsé was suffering from a moderately serious (matig ernstig) depression with endogenous features, moderately serious panic attacks and a conditioned avoidance response. Although Mr Lorsé was not found to be suicidal, he was troubled by nightmares relating mainly to suicide. He was also irritable and suffered regular panic attacks. One of the reasons for this psychiatric condition was the fact that contact with his wife and children was seriously disrupted. He was incapable of working, either alone or with others, and his activity level was very much reduced. Dr C. expressed the opinion that there was a causal link between the outward symptoms of the depression as well as the psychiatric disorders he found and Mr Lorsé’s long period of detention in the EBI. These disorders were becoming more marked now that Mr Lorsé had more opportunities to have contacts with other people following his transfer from the EBI. His isolation in the EBI meant that his complaints were less visible to the outside world and he was in a better position there to fight against them. Now that he was receiving more attention, including some from social workers in the prison, there was a lowering of his resistance and fighting spirit against his helplessness and feelings of abandonment. 28. After Dr C.’s report had been transmitted to the Government, they requested Dr D., a forensic psychiatrist employed by the Forensic Psychiatric Service of the Ministry of Justice, to examine Mr Lorsé in order to find out whether he was indeed suffering from the psychiatric disorders described by Dr C. and, if so, whether these disorders were related to his detention in the EBI. Dr D. saw Mr Lorsé twice, in June and July 2001, and she noted in her report of 9 July 2001 that during these meetings he had not displayed any symptoms of a disturbance of a depressive nature. She replied to the questions put by the Government that at the time of her examination, Mr Lorsé was not suffering from a “moderately serious depression”. Although immediately after his transfer from the EBI he had had mild symptoms of an unspecified adjustment disorder, this was now in complete remission. Dr D. acknowledged that this disorder was probably directly related to his prolonged detention in the EBI, but noted that most people who were detained in semi-isolation or maximum security facilities reacted in a similar manner. In Dr D.’s opinion, Mr Lorsé would have presented a similar profile if he had been detained in any other closed penal institution with rules similar to those in the EBI or semi-isolation facilities. 29. In a note dated 16 November 1999, the general practitioner of the third, fourth and fifth applicants described these children as being seriously traumatised as a result of the lack of contact with their father. 30. At the request of Mr Lorsé’s lawyer, the probation services (Reclassering) issued an advisory report on 18 November 1999 describing the situation of Mr Lorsé’s wife and their three children (i.e. the second to fifth applicants). Superficially, they seemed to have managed to cope with the problems they had faced in recent years. However, the very limited possibilities for contact with Mr Lorsé were causing problems. The fourth applicant had developed anorexia nervosa three years previously. The second applicant felt unable to discuss relationship problems with her husband knowing that everything that was said would be recorded and could be used against her husband. In the report, the family was described as “psychological wreckage” (psychisch wrakhout). The process which the three children were going through in relation to their father was likened to a process of mourning. In conclusion, the probation services supported the appeal which Mr Lorsé had instituted against the prolongation of his placement in the EBI. 31. In an information report (voorlichtingsrapport) of 20 March 2001, again requested by Mr Lorsé’s lawyer, the probation services stated that the term “psychological wreckage” was still fully applicable to Mr Lorsé’s family.

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8. The applicant was born in 1979 and lived at the time of the events in Vöcklabruck (Austria). He presently lives in Banova Jaruga (Croatia). 9. In February 1991 the applicant arrived in Austria together with his brother, born in 1985, and joined his mother who had already been living and working there. Subsequently his mother remarried. The applicant's family now consists of his mother, his stepfather, his brother and two half sisters, born in 1993 and 1995. 10. On 14 January 1994 the Police Authorities filed a criminal complaint against the applicant on suspicion of burglary. On 14 March 1994 the Wels Regional Court (Landesgericht) provisionally discontinued the criminal proceedings and ordered the applicant to compensate the victims for the damage caused. On 11 May 1995 the Vöcklabruck District Administrative Authority issued a prohibition to possess arms (Waffenverbot) under the Weapons Act (Waffengesetz) against the applicant as he had, in April 1995, attacked several persons with an electroshock device. On 31 May 1995 the applicant was remanded in custody on suspicion of having committed some fifty burglaries. 11. On 28 August 1995 the Wels Regional Court convicted the applicant of burglary and sentenced him to five months' imprisonment, suspended for a probationary period of three years. On the same day the applicant was released from detention on remand. 12. On 28 September 1995 the Vöcklabruck District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) issued a ten year residence prohibition against the applicant. Having regard to the above events and in particular the applicant's conviction, it found that his further stay in Austria was contrary to the public interest. These considerations were not outweighed by his family links in Austria. On 16 October 1995 the applicant, assisted by counsel, appealed against this decision. Relying on Article 8 of the Convention he submitted, inter alia, that the District Administrative Authority had failed to take sufficiently into account his private and family situation. 13. On 18 December 1995 the applicant was again remanded in custody on suspicion of having committed further burglaries in December 1995. On 26 February 1996 the Wels Regional Court again convicted the applicant of burglary and sentenced him to a further term of imprisonment of ten weeks, suspended for a probationary period of three years. On the same day the applicant was released from detention on remand. 14. On 2 May 1996 the Upper Austria Public Security Authority (Sicherheitsdirektion) dismissed the applicant's appeal against the District Administrative Authority's decision of 28 September 1995. As regards the applicant's family situation, the authority noted that the applicant's mother, his brother and two half sisters were living in Austria. However, having regard to the applicant's serious criminal behaviour the issue of a residence prohibition was nevertheless necessary in the public interest. 15. On 21 June 1996 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) against the residence prohibition. On 30 September 1996 the Constitutional Court declined to deal with the matter for lack of prospects of success and remitted the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). 16. On 9 December 1996 the applicant supplemented his complaint to the Administrative Court which dismissed it on 19 February 1997. It found that the authorities had correctly found that the residence prohibition was necessary in the public interest and did not constitute a disproportionate interference with the applicant's family situation. 17. On 4 April 1997 the applicant was taken into detention with a view to his expulsion and, on 9 April 1997, he was deported to Sarajewo.

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8. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Aridaia. 9. The applicant and Mr D. Varsamas requested the Prefect (Νομάρχης) of Pella to grant them permission to search for ore minerals in two specific areas. On 26 September 1983 and 10 October 1983 the Prefect of Pella issued them with two such licences. 10. On 21 November 1985 and 4 December 1985 the applicant and Mr Varsamas, after conducting ore mineral research in the said areas, asked the Prefect of Pella to cede to them approximately 100.000 sq. meters of each area for exploitation. According to the Mining Code, minerals are owned by the State and may be assigned by it to any person, in accordance with the provisions of the law. The two applications were transmitted to the Minister of Industry. 11. On 14 April 1986 the Minister of Industry, following an opinion of the Geological and Mineral Research Institute (Ινστιτούτο Γεωλογικών και Μεταλλευτικών Ερευνών), rejected the applications on the ground that the raw material traced in the area by the applicant and Mr Varsamas was not ore minerals but rather quarry matter. 12. On 26 May 1986 the applicant and Mr Varsamas challenged before the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens the refusal of the authorities to cede the areas requested. 13. On 27 February 1987 the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens rejected their action (decision no. 3324/1987). 14. On 24 March 1987 the applicant and Mr Varsamas appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens. 15. On 30 November 1987 the latter quashed the decision of the first instance court on the ground that the Minister of Industry should have prolonged the initial licences to conduct research instead of rejecting the applications for the cession of the areas in question (decision no. 4298/1987). 16. The State, the applicant and Mr Varsamas appealed in cassation to the Council of State on 21 and 22 January 1988 respectively, on the ground that the Administrative Court of Appeal had not interpreted and applied the relevant legislation correctly. The State requested the confirmation of the decision of the first instance court while the applicant and Mr Varsamas requested the cession of the relevant areas. 17. On 30 September 1991 the Council of State accepted the appeal of the State, set aside the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal on the ground that it had not interpreted and applied the relevant legislation correctly and referred the case to the Administrative Court of Appeal for re‑examination of the factual background. Having accepted the appeal of the State, the Council of State did not consider it necessary to examine the applicant's appeal (decision no. 2674/1991). 18. The Court of Appeal registered the case on 26 November 1991. On 3 April 1992 it delivered an interlocutory decision ordering the hearing of university professors who had examined samples of the ores (decision no. 1839/1992). 19. On 16 December 1992 the Court of Appeal considered that the disputed area should have been considered as containing ore minerals (decision no. 4367/1992). 20. On 4 March 1993 the State appealed on points of law against the latter judgement questioning the interpretation of the relevant legislation and the adequacy of its reasons. 21. In 1994 Mr Varsamas died. 22. On 18 January 1995 the Council of State quashed the decision of the Administrative Court of Appeal and sent the case back to it in order for the reasoning to be supplemented on certain factual matters. The Council of State considered that the Court of Appeal had not clarified why the exploitation of the ore minerals would be economically profitable (decision no. 247/1995). The Court of Appeal registered the case on 27 March 1995. 23. On 29 December 1995 the Administrative Court of Appeal delivered an interlocutory decision ordering the applicant to produce further evidence concerning the economic profitability of the exploitation of the ore minerals (decision no. 6145/1995). 24. On 23 December 1996, the Administrative Court of Appeal, having reconsidered the case, concluded in favour of the State, because the applicant did not adequately prove his allegations concerning the economic profitability (decision no. 5337/1996). 25. On 15 April 1997 the applicant appealed again to the Council of State arguing that the Court of Appeal did not provide adequate reasons, did not interpret the applicable legislation correctly and breached the res judicata principle. 26. On 17 December 1998 the Council of State dismissed the appeal in cassation (decision no. 4817/1998). The applicant received a copy of that judgment on 4 February 1999.

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6. The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Rome, which they had let to G.R. 7. In a registered letter of 15 October 1990, the applicants informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. The tenant told the applicants that he would not leave. 8. In a writ served on the tenant on 2 February 1991, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 23 May 1991, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992. 10. On 8 January 1993, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 11. On 29 January 1993, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 25 February 1993. 12. Between 25 February 1993 and 29 January 2000 the bailiff made thirty-seven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 13. On 26 January 2000, the applicants recovered possession of the apartment.

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9. The applicant was born in 1977 and lives in Spain. 10. On 1 October 1997 the applicant was charged (under Articles 193, first alternative, and Articles 229 and 233, first and second sub-paragraphs of the Penal Code-straffeloven) of having committed on Saturday, 6 May 1995, offences of violent assault, sexual assault and homicide against his cousin Ms T. (aged 17). 11. The Karmsund District Court (herredsrett), sitting with 2 professional judges and 3 lay judges, held a hearing from 20 October to 19 November 1997, during which 84 witnesses and 5 experts were heard. On 27 November 1997 the District Court convicted the applicant of the charges and sentenced him to 14 years’ imprisonment. Moreover, under Article 3-5 of the Damage Compensation Act 1969, the District Court ordered the applicant to pay NOK 100,000 in compensation to Ms T.’s parents for pain and suffering and additional inconvenience. 12. The applicant appealed to the Gulating High Court (lagmannsrett), which held a hearing between 4 May and 18 June 1998, during which it took oral evidence from 115 witnesses, 2 of whom were experts appointed by the High Court. Statements by 10 expert witnesses were submitted. Giving its verdict, the jury answered all the questions put to it in the negative. When the jury’s verdict is that the person is not guilty, but the court finds that he is undoubtedly guilty, the court may unanimously decide that the case shall be retried before other judges. The professional judges withdrew and deliberated for approximately 50 minutes, before they came back to announce that they accepted the jury’s verdict. The High Court thence acquitted the applicant of the charges. 13. On the following day, after hearing the pleas of counsel for the applicant and for the victim’s parents lasting approximately one hour, but without further evidence being submitted by the parties or taken by the court, the High Court judges unanimously upheld the District Court’ decision to award NOK 100,000 in compensation to Ms T.’s parents. On this point the High Court relied on the following considerations: “It has been established in case-law that in such a serious case as the present one, and where the question of guilt has been decided in favour of the accused, a condition for making an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damages is that it must be clear on the balance of probabilities that the accused has committed the infringements specified in the indictment, see Norsk Retstidende 1996:864. Considering the evidence adduced in the case as a whole, the High Court finds it clearly probable that [the applicant] has committed the offences against Ms T. with which he was charged and that an award of compensation to her parents should be made under Article 3-5 (2) of the Damage Compensation Act. With respect to the compensation matter the High Court finds the following circumstances established. On Friday, 5 May 1995 the applicant went to the cinema in Kopervik with some of his friends. Around midnight he was in the centre of town. The same night Ms T. had attended a Christian event at Avaldsnes. After this event she hitchhiked to the centre of Kopervik, where she arrived around midnight. She talked to some friends who were in the main street of Kopervik and then left the centre at approximately 12.10 a.m. About the same time [the applicant] left the main street and went for a short while to one of his friend’s house. Thereafter he cycled towards his home. He caught up with his cousin, Ms T., and they continued together. [They] lived about 1 km from one another. They took a road called Gamle Sundsveg. This is a short cut to Ms T.’s home, but a detour for [the applicant]. ... When they approached the habitation in Sund they stopped. [The applicant] stroked Ms T.’s breasts. She rejected him, kicked his bike, yelled at him and continued on her own. [The applicant] feared that, should Ms T. find his conduct completely unacceptable, it would have disastrous consequences for him when his conduct would be known. He thought about earlier incidents of flashing and obscene behaviour and got scared of the consequences. He charged after her and performed the acts described in the indictment. The High Court considers that his acts had their origin in an explosion of emotion, combined with a sexual attraction to Ms T. According to forensic expert statements, it is established that by the time she was on the road she had already suffered lethal injury. It has not been fully ascertained whether she was dead when he dragged her from the road to the bushes in a field. Here he lifted a 23-kg stone and hit her at least twice on the head. There was blood on both sides of the stone. The accused himself stated that he had the evil idea to conceal her face, so she could not tell anyone, by any means, what he had done. He then left the scene, washed himself clean from the blood and earth in [a lake] nearby and then cycled at random towards Kopervik. After a while he cycled towards his home and encountered a witness. ... She stated that this was at around 1.45 a.m. A neighbour, who was the owner of the field, found Ms T. the next morning. ... The police were called. An extensive investigation was carried out and [the applicant] was summoned for questioning at an early stage. He was considered suspect, particularly because the police had some knowledge about his previous sexual acts, of which one incident had led to a formal complaint. At the end of January 1997 [the applicant] gave a new statement to the police and changed his version as to the time of his arrival at home and his choice of roads from the town centre back home. It was inter alia against this background that [the applicant] was apprehended on 8 February 1997. On 10 February 1997 he was placed in custody with a prohibition on correspondence and visits. At the court hearing he accepted his remand in custody. Ten days later [the applicant] delivered to his defence counsel at the time two notes stating that he had killed Ms T. Counsel is thought to have asked the defendant whether he could recall this. He denied it and counsel handed the notes back to [the applicant]. A few days later he confessed and gave detailed information about the course of events and the background. During questioning on 2 March 1997, after having gone through the statements with his counsel, he declared that he was guilty of a crime in accordance with the confession. Approximately one month later the confession was repeated to psychiatric experts. After having been transferred to Bergen regional prison, he began to doubt the accuracy of his confession. ... During a police inquiry on 11 August 1997, his counsel gave notice that [the applicant] would not maintain his previous statement.” 14. The applicant sought to appeal against the High Court order that he pay compensation, according to the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure 1915 (tvistemålsloven). Ms T.’s parents and the applicant, represented by their respective counsel, took part in these proceedings, but not the prosecution. On 1 February 1999 the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts kjæremålsutvalg) refused the applicant leave to appeal in so far as it concerned the High Court’s assessment of the evidence, but granted leave in so far he was challenging the High Court’s procedure and interpretation of the law. 15. By a judgment of 24 September 1999 the Supreme Court, by 3 votes to 2, rejected the appeal. 16. The majority, Mr Justice Skogstad, joined by Mrs Justice Gjølstad and Mrs Justice Coward, stated: “Appeal concerning the procedure Apart from the fact that neither the wording of the Code of Criminal Procedure nor the preparatory works suggest that an authorisation to pass judgment on civil claims in spite of a defendant’s acquittal should depend on the reasons for the latter, I cannot find any real grounds to support this proposition. Although it is evident that – in cases like the one at hand – it must be a condition for passing judgment on compensation for non-pecuniary damage that it is clear on the balance of probabilities that the act has been committed [handlingen er begått], the evidentiary standard is not as strict as that applying to a criminal conviction. I have problems seeing that in cases where the defendant has been acquitted, because it has not been found proven that the act has been committed [handlingen er begått], should be placed in a somewhat different position than where there are other grounds for acquittal – as for example where the conduct is not punishable, where it has not been established that the defendant acted with the required criminal guilt, where the defendant is not found to be liable under the criminal law, or where there is self-defence or any other ground of exemption from criminal liability. Should it not be permissible to adjudicate civil claims in criminal proceedings in which the defendant has been acquitted because it has not been established that he has committed the act that was the factual basis for the indictment [begått handlingen], the consequence would be that the claim must be brought up in separate civil proceedings. However such a lawsuit is both time consuming and expensive [and] .... the aggrieved party’s possibilities to pursue such claims will depend on his economic situation. I find no attraction in such a solution. I should also point out that if one were to operate a rule whereby an acquittal on the ground that it has not been established that the defendant has committed the act that was the factual basis for the indictment [har begått den handling han er tiltalt for] is treated differently than acquittals on other grounds, it might give rise to difficulties in instances where the case has been tried by a High Court sitting with a jury, as in the present case. A verdict of conviction requires that at least seven of the ten jurors have answered ‘yes’ to the question of guilt and, regardless of whether the jury has answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’, no grounds are given for the verdict. In most instances one will have more or less well-founded perceptions, but never total certainty, as to why the jury has answered in the negative. On several occasions the courts have had to deal with the question whether a civil claim can be adjudicated in spite of the defendant having been acquitted in the criminal case. On those occasions, where the question has been submitted to the Supreme Court or the Appeals Selection Committee, it has not been a condition for dealing with the civil claim in connection with the criminal case that the [criminal] court ... has found it established that the defendant has committed the act that was the factual basis for the indictment [har begått den handling tiltalen gjelder]. ... In my opinion, in the light of existing legal sources, there cannot be any doubt that, under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1981, it is not a condition for adjudicating a civil claim in connection with criminal proceedings that the court in [the latter] proceedings has found it proven that the defendant has committed the act that was the factual basis for the indictment [har begått den handling saken gjelder]. ... Consequently, no procedural errors were committed when the High Court, in spite of [the applicant’s] acquittal in the criminal proceedings, passed judgment on the civil claim. ... Appeal concerning the application of the law The appellant has based his appeal on law on the argument that it would be contrary to the presumption of innocence in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention if the court, after the defendant has been acquitted in the criminal case, passes judgment for compensation for non-pecuniary damage in the same case. In any event, he submits, it must be contrary to the presumption of innocence to give such reasoning on the compensation matter as done by the High Court. ... [Article 6 § 2] is primarily addressed to judges in criminal proceedings and its main message is that judges shall not prejudge the defendant as having committed the crime of which he is indicted, or that there shall be no prejudgment through statements by public authorities (see Frowein/Peukert: “Europäische Menschenrectskonvention”, “ECHR”, 2. edition (1996) page 280 and following, and Rehof/Trier: Menneskerett – Human Rights (1990), page 164). Both according to legal doctrine and the case-law of the Strasbourg institutions, the provision may also have importance after the criminal case has been terminated (see Harris/O’Boyle/Warbrick: “Law of the ECHR” (1995), pages 246-247 with further references to practice). For instance, in the Sekanina v. Austria judgment, the Court stated that if the defendant has been acquitted by a final judgment, the courts might not, in a subsequent case concerning compensation for unjust prosecution, base its judgment on the fact that the accused is guilty. However, how far these points of view go is somewhat uncertain. While it is the accused and the State who are parties to the compensation proceedings regarding unjust prosecution, such proceedings can be seen as a prolongation of the criminal case. In my view, however, the presumption of innocence can hardly apply to civil proceedings between the accused and the person who has been prejudiced or has suffered damage by the act [which was] the factual basis for a criminal charge in respect of which the defendant has been acquitted [en handling som siktede er frifunnet for]. In any event, it must be evident that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention cannot bar the courts – in a civil case (for example a case for compensation; on dismissal or parental responsibilities) – from establishing facts regarding the course of events in question, even if it should disclose the occurrence of a criminal offence and even if the person against whom the claim is directed has been acquitted of the offence in a preceding criminal case (see, inter alia, Lorenzen/Rehof/Trier: “Den Europæiske Menneskeretskonvention med kommentarer” “The ECHR with comments” (1994), page 199, and Frowein/Peukert, op. cit. page 285). Should the presumption of innocence apply at all to civil proceedings between the aggrieved party and the accused, it must at any rate be a condition for finding a violation of Article 6 § 2 that a decision establishing criminal guilt has been taken. Were the court in a civil case not permitted to base its decision on the fact that the person acquitted of a criminal offence, has in fact committed the act [begått handlingen], the acquittal would deprive the victim, or the person who has suffered damage, of the possibility to obtain a judicial review of claims that he or she might have against the accused. This would, in my view, be contrary to the fundamental right to a fair hearing in Article 6 § 1. [The applicant] has argued that a distinction must be made between cases where a civil claim is being reviewed together with the criminal matter and cases where the claim is examined in separate civil proceedings. I do not agree that there is any basis for making such a distinction. The system whereby civil claims may be raised in the criminal case is based upon well-founded considerations of procedural economy and ... can also benefit the defendant. In criminal proceedings the accused is, as a main rule, entitled to defence counsel paid for by the State and, bearing in mind also the thoroughness with which evidence is presented in a criminal trial, the accused, in the event of a civil claim being determined together with the criminal matter, enjoys particular protection against being wrongly judged. If the defendant is acquitted in the criminal case but is ordered to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage, the accused will be left with a feeling of not having been ‘totally acquitted’. But it should not matter to him whether the compensation claim is determined in connection with the criminal proceedings or in ensuing civil proceedings. ... As mentioned above, the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention can, in my view, hardly be applied in a civil case between the person acquitted and the aggrieved party. Bearing in mind the nature of this case, I do not, however, find it necessary to take a definite stance on this question, the High Court did not in my view base its decision in the compensation claim on a finding of criminal guilt, which under any circumstance must be a condition for a violation of Article 6 § 2. ... The appellant has pleaded that the courts in practice will have difficulties in applying different evidentiary standards to criminal conviction and compensation. Moreover, he has submitted that when, as in this case, it is a requirement for making an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage that it is clear on the balance of probabilities that the the accused has committed the act [begått handlingen], the evidentiary requirement is so close to that applying to a criminal conviction that this in itself contributes to casting a suspicion of criminal liability. I have difficulties in understanding these arguments. The fact that the evidentiary requirements are different in various relations is nothing special for cases such as the present one. ... [I]t is based on the general view that a qualified probability is required in order for the court to ground its decision on a fact that is strongly incriminating ... The fact that a stricter standard of proof applies in order to protect the interests of the defendant cannot entail a breach of the Convention.” 17. The minority of the court, Mr Justice Flock joined by Mr Chief Justice Smith in the main reasoning and the conclusion, expressed the following opinion: “I am ... of a different opinion as to the main issue in the case. In my view, the appeal on procedure ... should be upheld. When a court primarily has found that the defendant was not the perpetrator of ‘the act with which the case is concerned’, the court may not, in my opinion, in the same judgment order the defendant to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage on the ground that he nevertheless has performed the same ‘act’. Under the 1981 Code of Criminal Procedure – as noted by the first voting Justice – it was authorised to pass judgment on civil claims even though the defendant had been acquitted of the criminal act. ...The former [limitation in this respect] was repealed. However, in my view, the far reaching application of the new rule made by the High Court in this case does not necessarily follow from the statute or from former Supreme Court rulings. Besides, it would be more consistent with the presumption of innocence under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, now incorporated into Norwegian law, if the court did not both brand the defendant as the perpetrator of the act under civil law and acquit him of criminal liability in the same judgment. Against this background, the best solution would be to interpret the possibility – and the corresponding duty for the courts – under the statute to adjudicate civil claims in the criminal case with the qualification that the most extreme consequences should be avoided. Below I shall deal with each of the reasons for my position. When the 1981 Code improved the possibilities of the aggrieved party to have civil claims determined in connection with the criminal proceedings, some instances were mentioned in the preparatory work of claims that could be adjudicated even though the defendant had been acquitted. This was, inter alia, where the purpose, intent or gross negligence required by the Penal Code had not been proved but where it had been shown that the defendant had displayed sufficient negligence to be held liable to pay compensation. However, the preparatory works did not include ... those instances where the defendant had been acquitted because it had not been established that he or she had performed the act as cited in the indictment. This would be the most frequent reason for acquittal in, for example, cases of aggravated sexual assault against minors ... and where compensation for non-pecuniary damage is a recurrent issue. Special questions arise in this kind of acquittal. A conviction and an order to pay compensation are not only different legal consequences based on different aspects of the case, but also, in the same case and on the same evidence, the court assesses the evidence twice with the possibility of reaching different results. Legally, this would be justified by the fact that the evidentiary requirements for criminal conviction are stricter than those with respect to an order to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage. However, this situation is so special – and was excluded under the former legislation – that one would expect that the subject be discussed, or at least be explicitly mentioned, in the preparatory works. As this was not the case, it can be deduced that the legislators probably did not have such cases in mind, or at least did not regard them as essential when the rules were amended in 1981. It is undoubtedly correct that the Supreme Court – and other courts in our country – in certain rulings have noted that an award can be made for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage even if the defendant has been acquitted in the same case. ... However, ... I can hardly see ... that there is such an established case-law in this area as to prevent certain limitations being made in the interpretation of the law. As regards the presumption of innocence in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, it is somewhat uncertain how far this requirement extends in Norwegian law. ... When taking a decision in the present case, one is faced with the need to strike a balance between, on the one hand, the accused’s interests and, on the other hand, those of the victim and his or her closest relatives. It is important to take into account the fact that the 1981 revision was intended to strengthen the victim’s position. However, I find that an acquittal for having committed the incriminated act – and in particular an act of murder – must clearly appear from the judgment. This is such a prominent consideration that it should in my view be predominant in the interpretation of the law. ... In following this reasoning, some issues of delimitation will arise as to when the court should abstain from determining civil claims together with an acquittal. The limitation, that is implied in my opinion, on the possibility to adjudicate such claims is inter alia that it must be ascertainable that the acquittal is based on a finding that there is insufficient evidence to show that the accused committed the offence of which he/she was charged. This might be a problem in all cases before the High Court where the question of guilt is decided by a jury, without a reasoned verdict.”

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9. On 15 March 1986 the applicant sued for damages the Warsaw-Mokotów District Office (Urząd Dzielnicowy), the Warsaw Architecture Office (Urząd Stołecznej Architektury) and three of his neighbours, A.H., H.H. and T.H., in the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki). The applicant sought 1,000,000 old Polish zlotys (PLZ) for the loss that he had allegedly sustained on account of various impediments to the construction of his house. 10. On 4 January 1988 the applicant withdrew his claims against the first two defendants. Since then, the proceedings have been directed only against his neighbours A.H., H.H. and T.H. 11. Between 1988 and March 1992 the Regional Court listed 8 hearings. It also ordered that 3 reports from construction experts be obtained so as to assess the value of the financial loss sustained by the applicant. The last of those reports was submitted to the court in December 1992. 12. At the hearing held on 29 September 1993 the court heard evidence from Z.S., an expert. Later, both parties contested Z.S.' s report. The applicant nevertheless asked the court to give a ruling on his claim, stressing that the length of the proceedings had to date exceeded 8 years. On 18 November 1994 the court ordered that fresh evidence be obtained from Z.S. 13. In December 1994 the presiding judge stepped down and the case was referred to another judge. 14. On 27 February 1995 the applicant complained to the President of the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) about – in his words – “an exceptional delay in the proceedings”. In a letter of 26 April 1995 the President admitted that the procrastination in the proceedings had indeed been caused by the fact that the Regional Court had failed to keep the proceedings moving along procedural lines. He apologised to the applicant in the name of the administration of justice. 15. On 16 May 1995 the applicant complained to the President of the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) about the inactivity of the Warsaw Regional Court. On 13 June 1995 the President referred the complaint to the Minister of Justice, an authority responsible for monitoring the conduct of court proceedings. He observed, however, that despite the case having already been brought under the Minister's supervision, since 29 September 1993 no hearing had taken place before the Regional Court. 16. Subsequently, the applicant made three further similar complaints to the President of the Warsaw Court of Appeal. In a letter of 4 August 1995 the President again apologised to the applicant and admitted that the monitoring of the conduct of the proceedings had not been very successful. He also informed the applicant that the President of the Warsaw Regional Court had been instructed to take steps in order to accelerate the proceedings. 17. On 4 October 1995 the court held a hearing and served copies of Z.S.'s fresh report on the parties. Since the inflation rate and purchasing power of the Polish currency had meanwhile changed substantially, the court ordered the applicant to state the exact amount of damages claimed in the light of current circumstances. 18. On 11 October and 17 October 1995 the applicant filed two pleadings with the court and stated that the current total value of his claim was 355,585.59 new Polish zlotys (PLN). 19. On 6 March 1996 the court held a hearing. It ordered the applicant to pay court fees of PLN 14,342 for having lodged, in the court's view, a new and higher claim, and on pain of the statement of claim being returned to him. 20. On 31 May 1996, on an appeal by the applicant, the Warsaw Court of Appeal quashed the contested order as being premature. It found that the lower court had misconstrued the applicant's pleading and ordered it to obtain from the applicant a clear statement of the amount currently claimed. 21. Meanwhile, on 5 May 1997, the applicant had complained to the court about the lack of progress in the litigation. He stressed that as of that date the length of the proceedings was about 12 years, but his claim was still far from being determined. He repeated that he had not increased, and was not going to increase, the value of the claim. 22. At the hearing which was held on 26 May 1997 the court ordered Z.S. to prepare yet another report and to determine the current value of various items included in his report of 28 February 1995. That order was a consequence of the fact that, since the beginning of 1995, the inflation rate and the purchasing power of the Polish currency had again changed considerably. 23. On 27 August 1997 the court held the next hearing. 24. On 9 September 1997, the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Court, submitting that the length of the proceedings in his case had exceeded all reasonable limits. On 22 September 1997 the Case-law Department of the Supreme Court informed him that he should address his complaints to the Minister of Justice, who was responsible for monitoring the conduct of the proceedings. 25. On 3 October 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court ordered that evidence from yet another construction expert be obtained. On 20 December 1997 K.S., an expert, submitted his report to the court. 26. On 20 April, 24 June and 14 September 1998 the Regional Court held hearings. 27. On 15 October 1998 the applicant submitted a pleading to the court, pointing out that K.S. had based his findings on inaccurate indexes of the value of the construction works and had, therefore, come to wrong and unfair conclusions on the assessment of his loss. 28. On 2 November 1998 he submitted his comments on the value of certain construction works, as assessed by K.S. He further asked the court to proceed with his case and to give “any ruling terminating the proceedings that have so far lasted 13 years”. 29. On 26 November 1998 the applicant again asked the court to give a ruling. 30. The next hearing took place on 8 February 1999. The court heard evidence from K.S. and adjourned the proceedings to enable the expert to prepare a supplementary report. 31. At the hearing held on 26 April 1999, the court ordered K.S. to prepare yet another supplementary report. 32. Subsequent hearings were held on 25 August and 22 November 1999. The court heard evidence from the expert and, on 22 November 1999, once again ordered the applicant to specify his claims. On 10 January 2000 the applicant informed the court in writing that he had already specified his claims on three occasions. 33. On 15 May 2000 the court held a hearing, but then adjourned the proceedings sine die. The next hearings were listed for 10 April and 5 July 2001 and, subsequently, for 14 February and 14 May 2002. 34. In the light of the material before the Court, it appears that the proceedings are still pending in the court of first instance.

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9. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Norway. 10. By an indictment of 23 June 1993, the applicant and his father were charged under Articles 195 § 1 (sexual relations with a minor) and 207 (sexual relations with a close relative) of the Criminal Code (straffeloven) with having committed sexual offences during the periods from 1985 to 1989 and 1988 to 1991 respectively against the applicant’s daughter, L., who was born on 18 October 1981. 11. By a judgment of 1 June 1994, the Eidsivating High Court (lagmannsrett), sitting with three judges and a jury, noted that the jury had answered the questions on the charges in the negative and therefore acquitted the applicant and his father. No appeal was lodged against the judgment, which consequently gained legal force. 12. Subsequently, on 29 August 1994, the applicant and his father filed a petition with the High Court requesting compensation under Articles 444 and 446 of the 1981 Code of Criminal Procedure (straffeprosessloven) for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused by the criminal proceedings against them. The father sought, in the alternative, compensation under Articles 445 and 446. 13. In the compensation proceedings, the High Court, sitting with the same judges as in the trial, received written pleadings but did not hold an oral hearing. By a decision (kjennelse) of 25 January 1995, it rejected the applicant’s claim but awarded his father 30,000 Norwegian kroner in compensation under Articles 444 and 446. In the introduction to its decision, the High Court reiterated certain information derived from the criminal proceedings, notably the specific contents of the charges of sexual abuse, the jury’s verdict and the acquittal by the High Court. As regards the applicant’s claim, the High Court stated, inter alia: “The High Court notes that, pursuant to Articles 444 or 446 ... of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is a condition for obtaining compensation that it must be shown to be probable that the accused did not carry out the act which formed the basis of the charge. Accordingly, in order to award compensation it must be shown on the balance of probabilities that the accused did not commit the acts in respect of which he has been acquitted. The High Court finds it probable that the victim [L.], born on 18 October 1981, has been subjected to sexual abuse in the form of sexual intercourse. Reference is made to the medical examination carried out ... on 21 November 1991 ... [L.’s] father and mother separated in 1989 when the mother moved to Oslo together with [L.] ... As a witness, the mother made statements about [L.’s behaviour] before as well as after the separation. This could indicate that she has been subjected to sexual abuse. The child’s behaviour resulted in the mother contacting the ... institute in the summer of 1991 where [L.] underwent individual and family therapy, as did her mother and her cohabitant. As a witness during the trial, Ms Anne Okstad, a psychologist, ... explained [L.’s] behaviour. In the light of this and of talks and symbolic games with [L.], Ms Okstad concluded that there was no doubt that [L.] had been subjected to sexual abuse. The question is therefore now whether on the balance of probabilities other persons than the defendants are behind the abuses. In this respect the judicial examinations of [L.] are of central importance and the witness evidence as to what [L.] has stated is significant. From the outset there had been no concrete information in this case about other offenders. [L.] has been subjected to judicial examinations three times ... In connection with the first examination the judge recorded that no information had been submitted which could justify a concrete suspicion of sexual abuse having been committed against [L.]. During the second examination [the applicant] was mentioned in connection with a description of immoral sexual relations and during the third examination even the grandfather was mentioned. During the examinations the information was submitted, without spontaneity, in part under pressure from the examining judge, and in part through writing down names and events on pieces of paper. According to the mother’s and her partner’s statements, [L.] had referred to both [the applicant] and the grandfather. It appeared as if the child had been under pressure to speak in order to enable the family to calm down. Ms Okstad stated that [L.], in the course of a realistic conversation, had referred to ‘intrusions, pawing, threats and aggression by [the applicant]’ and that she had spontaneously confirmed that abuse had taken place several times. She also appeared to have been agitated both during and after these conversations. Considering the case as a whole, the High Court does not find it shown on the balance of probabilities that [the applicant] did not engage in sexual intercourse with his daughter. ... [The applicant’s] claim for compensation is thus dismissed. In the light of this conclusion, there is no reason to order the reimbursement of his costs.” 14. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett). On 20 April 1995 the Appeals Leave Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts kjæremålsutvalg) upheld the High Court’s decision, stating, inter alia: “The High Court has correctly taken as its starting-point the view that under Articles 444 and 446 ... of the Code of Criminal Procedure it is a condition that it must be shown to be probable that the accused did not carry out the act which formed the basis for the charge against him and that this implies that on the balance of probabilities [sannsynlighetsovervekt] the accused did not commit the acts in respect of which he was acquitted. In this connection the Committee refers to [its decision reported in] Norsk Retstidende 1994, p. 721, where the first voting judge stated, with the approval of the other judges, inter alia: ’Compensation pursuant to Article 444, first sentence, must – when the accused is acquitted or the case against him is discontinued – cover the financial losses he has suffered if “it has been shown to be probable [gjort sannsynlig]” that he has not carried out the act which formed the basis for the charges. It is the accused who carries the burden of proof that he did not carry out the act. It is sufficient that it is more probable than not. I do not agree with counsel for the defence in that the accused has discharged the burden of proof where both alternatives, on the basis of the available evidence, appear to be equally likely. In this assessment the ordinary standards of evidence must apply and the requirements in respect of the strength of the evidence must then to some extent be adapted to the ability of the accused to show that he did not carry out the act. Given the manner in which the provision has been formulated, the situation may easily arise that an acquittal is not sufficient to justify a compensation claim where the accused is unable to discharge the burden of proof. I should like to stress that the refusal of a compensation claim does not imply that the previous acquittal is undermined or that the acquittal is open to doubt. The compensation claim must be determined on an independent basis and the rules of evidence applying in such compensation cases do not differ from those which apply to ordinary compensation claims. The legislator has as a starting-point opted for a solution whereby the financial burden caused by the institution of criminal proceedings which are discontinued or which end with an acquittal must be borne by the accused unless he is able to show that it is probable that he did not commit the act.’ The High Court has found it probable that [the applicant’s] daughter was subjected to sexual abuse ... Considering the case as a whole, the High Court has further concluded that it has not been shown that on the balance of probabilities [the applicant] did not engage in sexual intercourse with his daughter. The Appeals Leave Committee finds no reason to depart from the High Court’s assessment of the evidence, which is based on the judges’ participation at the trial hearing in this case, where it must be deemed vital that the court had the opportunity to hear directly the accused and the witnesses – something which the Committee is not empowered to do ... The Appeals Leave Committee accordingly finds that the evidence is not such as to fulfil the conditions for compensation under Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; nor, as a consequence, are the conditions for awarding damages under Article 446 satisfied.”

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8. The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Ozorków, Poland. 9. The applicant is the owner of a plot of land in Ozorków. Since 1989 construction works have been carried out by the applicant’s neighbours (J.C. and Z.W., F.W.) on their plots of land, adjoining his property. 10. On 4 July 1989 the Mayor of Ozorków (Naczelnik Miasta) issued a planning permission concerning the construction of an outhouse (plan realizacyjny budynku gospodarczego) in favour of J.C. The applicant appealed. On 30 August 1989 the Łódź Municipal Office dismissed the applicant’s appeal. On 1 June 1990 the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) quashed the contested decision. 11. On 16 October 1992 the Mayor of Ozorków (Burmistrz) granted J.C. a building permit concerning the construction of an outhouse, a garage, a vestibule and a toilet adjacent to the existing house. 12. On 18 June 1993 J.C. requested the Mayor of Ozorków to grant her a fresh building permit. This was granted on 23 June 1993. The new building permit was to “annul and replace” (“unieważnia i zastępuje”) the one issued on 16 October 1992. Both the applicant and J.C. appealed against the building permit of 23 June 1993. 13. On 20 August 1993 the Łódź Governor (Wojewoda) quashed the decision of 23 June 1993 and remitted the case to the Mayor of Ozorków. 14. In the meantime, on 21 June 1993, the Zgierz District Office (Urząd Rejonowy) had inspected J.C.’s construction site. On 24 June 1993 it ordered that the construction works concerning the adjacent dwelling be stayed. 15. On 23 July 1993 the Łódź Governor reopened the proceedings relating to the building permit of 16 October 1992. On 17 September 1993 the Mayor of Ozorków issued two building permits in favour of J.C. The first permit allowed her to continue the construction of an adjacent dwelling and approved the planning permission. The second permit allowed J.C. to build an outhouse and a garage and approved the planning permission. 16. The applicant appealed against both these decisions. He failed, however, to pay the fees due for lodging an appeal. As a consequence, on 6 November 1993, the Łódź Governor returned the appeal to the applicant. 17. Later, the applicant appealed to the Minister of Construction (Minister Gospodarki Przestrzennej i Budownictwa). On 24 December 1993 the Minister set aside both decisions and ordered that the Łódź Governor should examine the merits of the appeal, notwithstanding the applicant’s failure to pay the fees. On 2 February 1994 the Łódź Governor upheld the contested decisions. 18. On 3 October 1994, upon the applicant’s appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision relating to the issue of the building permit in respect of the adjacent dwelling and declared null and void the building permit relating to the outhouse and the garage. The court found that the original decision of 16 October 1992 was still in force as the decision of 23 June 1993 had been quashed on 20 August 1993. 19. As a consequence, on 15 February 1995, the Łódź Governor quashed the decision granting the building permit of 16 October 1992 and remitted the case to the Mayor of Ozorków. 20. On an unspecified date the applicant filed a complaint with the Łódź Governor, alleging inactivity on the part of the Mayor of Ozorków. On 1 June 1995 the Łódź Governor found that the applicant’s complaint was indeed well-founded and obliged the Mayor of Ozorków to render a decision before 14 June 1995. 21. On 9 August 1995 the Mayor of Ozorków issued a building permit authorising J.C. “to continue the construction of the outhouse and the garage”. The applicant appealed against this decision. 22. On 18 September 1995 the Łódź Governor set aside the impugned decision and discontinued the proceedings before the Mayor of Ozorków. 23. On 17 October 1995 the Mayor of Ozorków issued a decision authorising J.C. to use the adjacent dwelling. The applicant appealed against this decision. 24. On an unspecified date the applicant filed a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging inactivity on the part of the Mayor of Ozorków. The complaint was dismissed on 10 January 1996. 25. On 29 February 1996 the Chief Inspector of the Construction Supervision (Główny Inspektor Nadzoru Budowlanego), of his own motion, declared the decision of 15 February 1995 null and void. 26. On 26 July 1996 the Łódź Regional Office (Urząd Wojewódzki), having regard to the latter decision, stayed two sets of proceedings instituted upon the applicant’s appeal against the decisions of 9 August and 17 October 1995. The applicant appealed against these decisions but his appeals were dismissed on 29 and 30 August 1996 respectively. 27. On 14 November 1996, upon the applicant’s request, proceedings leading to the verification of the validity of the decision of 29 February 1996 were instituted. 28. It appears that at the same time the applicant repeatedly requested the authorities to intervene with regard to the construction in question and to order a so‑called “compulsory demolition” (przymusowa rozbiórka). On 9 December 1996 the Ozorków Municipal Office refused to take any steps in respect of the applicant’s above request. 29. Apparently, the works were continued at least until 24 May 1997 when the Mayor of Ozorków ordered that they be stayed. The applicant appealed against this decision and requested that a demolition order be issued. On 13 June 1997 the Łódź Governor set aside the decision staying the construction and discontinued the proceedings. 30. On 28 May 1997, after having reopened the proceedings, the Mayor of Ozorków set aside the building permit issued on 16 October 1992 and discontinued the proceedings in this respect. 31. On 16 September 1997 the Łódź Governor decided, of his own motion, to resume two sets of appeal proceedings, which had been stayed on 26 July 1996. On 18 September 1997, the Łódź Governor set aside two decisions of the Mayor of Ozorków of 9 August and 17 October 1995. The Łódź Governor discontinued the proceedings in these two cases. 32. On 22 October 1997 the Mayor of Ozorków issued a building permit authorising J.C. to continue the construction of the outhouse and the garage. 33. On 25 October 1997 the Mayor authorised J.C. to use the adjacent dwelling. 34. On 26 January 1998 the Łódź Governor rejected the applicant’s appeal against both decisions of the Mayor. The applicant filed two further appeals with the Supreme Administrative Court against the decisions of the Governor. 35. On 18 May 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court set aside the decision of the Łódź Governor and the earlier decision of the Mayor of Ozorków of 22 October 1997. The case was remitted to the Mayor of Ozorków. 36. It appears that the proceedings are pending. 37. Z.W. and F.W. built a house under a building permit issued on an unspecified date before 1990. Apparently, they also built an outhouse (budynek gospodarczy), adjoining the applicant’s dwelling house. On 7 March 1990 the Mayor of Ozorków ordered that the outhouse be demolished. 38. On 6 December 1990 the Mayor of Ozorków decided to reopen the proceedings relating to the demolition order and altered the decision of 7 March 1990. He authorised Z.W. and F.W. to use the outhouse. 39. On 6 March 1991, upon the applicant’s appeal, the Łódź Governor quashed the contested decision and discontinued the proceedings. On the same date the Łódź Governor quashed the demolition order of 7 March 1990 and remitted the case to the first-instance organ. 40. On 17 January 1992 the Mayor of Ozorków granted Z.W. and F.W. a permit to use the outhouse and the garage. 41. On 17 March 1992, upon the applicant’s appeal, the Łódź Governor quashed the contested decision and referred the case to the Zgierz District Office (Urząd Rejonowy). 42. On 28 April 1992 the Zgierz District Office ordered that the outhouse and the garage be demolished by 30 September 1992. 43. On 29 June 1992, upon an appeal filed by Z.W. and F.W., the Łódź Governor upheld the demolition order. 44. Since Z.W. and F.W. had not complied with the order, enforcement proceedings were instituted by the Zgierz District Office on 29 December 1992. On the same date the Zgierz District Office imposed a fine on Z.W and F.W. for non-compliance with the order. The Łódź Governor dismissed their appeal against this decision on 30 March 1993. 45. On 16 April 1993 the Zgierz District Office again imposed a fine on Z.W and F.W. Their appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Łódź Governor on 12 July 1993. 46. On 14 July 1993, upon Z.W.’s and F.W.’s request, the Łódź Governor reopened the proceedings concerning the construction of the outhouse and the garage and referred the case to the Mayor of Ozorków. 47. On 16 July 1993 the Mayor of Ozorków issued a decision authorising Z.W. and F.W. to use the outhouse as a dwelling. The applicant appealed against this decision. 48. On an unspecified date, upon Z.W.’s and F.W.’s requests, the Zgierz District Office instituted proceedings concerning the discontinuation of the enforcement proceedings instituted under the demolition order of 28 April 1992. On 27 August 1993 these proceedings were stayed since the legality of the permit of 16 July 1993 had in the meantime been called in question by the Ozorków Municipal Office (of its own motion). 49. On an unspecified date the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging inactivity on the part of the Łódź Governor. The complaint was rejected on 3 October 1994. 50. On 4 October 1993 the Łódź Governor, acting of his own motion, declared the permit of 16 July 1993 null and void. 51. On 1 March 1995 the Chief Inspector of the Construction Supervision quashed the decision of the Łódź Governor of 4 October 1993 and discontinued the proceedings. The Chief Inspector found that since the applicant had appealed against the decision of 16 July 1993, his appeal should have been examined. On 9 June 1995 the Łódź Governor set aside the contested decision and discontinued the proceedings. 52. On 26 June 1995 Z.W. requested the Chief Inspector of the Construction Supervision to declare the demolition order null and void. On 25 November 1995 her request was dismissed. Z.W. appealed but on 6 February 1996 the Chief Inspector upheld his decision. 53. Later, Z.W. filed a further appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. On 30 December 1997 her appeal was dismissed. 54. On an unspecified date the applicant requested the Zgierz District Office to enforce the demolition order. On 30 April 1998 the District Office informed him that his request could not be dealt with within a statutory time-limit of one month as the explanatory proceedings had to be carried out; however, the request would be dealt with by 30 May 1998. 55. On 7 May 1998 the Zgierz District Office imposed yet another fine on Z.W. and F.W. for non-compliance with the demolition order. On 22 October 1998 the Łódź Governor upheld the decision of 7 May 1998. 56. On an unspecified date in 1998 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme Administrative Court, alleging inactivity on the part of the Head of the Zgierz District Office (Kierownik Urzędu Rejonowego) in enforcing the demolition order. 57. On 17 November 1999 the Zgierz Local Inspector of Construction Supervision (Powiatowy Inspektor Nadzoru Budowlanego) issued a writ of enforcement (tytuł wykonawczy) against Z.W. and F.W. It also imposed a fine on them. 58. On 23 February 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint about the inactivity of the Zgierz District Office in enforcing the demolition order. It found that the enforcement proceedings had lasted unjustifiably long and that they should be completed as soon as possible. However, the Supreme Administrative Court considered that the inactivity of the respondent authority was not established and that the District Office had recently taken decisions aimed at enforcement of the demolition order which could lead to its actual execution in the nearest future. 59. It appears that the proceedings are still pending.

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10. The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Bjugn. 11. On 10 March 1992 the head of the social services in the municipality of Bjugn contacted the local police after having received reports from Botngård kindergarten indicating that the applicant, who was an assistant at the kindergarten at the time, had sexually abused one or more of the children there. Subsequently, a criminal investigation was carried out. On 13 March 1992 the applicant was interrogated. He denied the accusations. On the same date he was suspended from his post. 12. On 1 September 1992 the applicant was formally indicted with respect to various offences under Articles 195, 198 and 228 of the Penal Code (straffeloven) concerning the sexual abuse of minors, allegedly committed against two children at the kindergarten, and under Article 192 of the Penal Code with respect to one of them. On 12 October 1992 the indictment was extended to 14 children at the kindergarten and, on 21 October 1992, a new indictment was issued involving 15 children. On 9 January 1993 the indictment was again extended to offences of sexual abuse of 36 named children and an unknown number of children at the kindergarten. 13. On the latter date, 6 further persons were indicted for sexual offences in relation to the same matter: the applicant's wife, two employees at the kindergarten and the local sheriff. 14. As a result of the above, the applicant spent three periods in pre-trial detention – respectively 7, 7 and 32 days – a total of 46 days. In the course of the investigations, three searches were carried out at the applicant's home. 15. On 22 September 1993 the applicant was formally indicted under Articles 195, 198 and 213 of the Penal Code for having allegedly committed various offences of sexual abuse against 10 kindergarten children. 16. On the same date the charges against the six other accused persons were dropped. They later claimed compensation under Articles 444 to 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (straffeprosessloven). The local sheriff obtained a settlement of NOK 200,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage; the five others obtained a court order requiring the State to pay NOK 200,000 to each of them. The applicant's wife obtained, in addition, NOK 140,000 in compensation for pecuniary damage. 17. The applicant's trial took place before the Frostating High Court (lagmannsrett), sitting with three judges and a jury, over a period of 43 days, between 15 November 1993 and 31 January 1994. After the jury had answered all of the 25 questions relating to the indictment in the negative, the applicant was acquitted by a judgment of 31 January 1994. 18. The applicant subsequently filed a petition with the High Court, claiming compensation under Articles 444 to 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court, sitting with two of the judges who had taken part in the trial and a new judge (replacing the judge who had presided at the trial, disqualified from sitting in the compensation case), held an oral hearing between 13 and 15 February 1995. In its decision of 28 February 1995, the High Court ordered the State to award him the entirety of his claim of NOK 45,000 in compensation for pecuniary damage under Article 445, according to which provision such “compensation for special or disproportionate damage as a consequence of the criminal prosecution” could be awarded as was “reasonable in the circumstances”. Moreover, under Article 446, cf. 445, the High Court awarded him NOK 125,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage suffered as a result of the prosecution. However, on the basis of an assessment, the relevant parts of which are quoted in the Supreme Court's (Høyesterett) decision cited below (paragraph 23), the High Court rejected his claim for supplementary compensation under Article 444, it not having been shown probable that he did not commit the act which was the basis of the charge. The High Court referred to the evidence presented during the trial hearing between November 1993 and January 1994 and during the oral hearing in the compensation case in February 1995. 19. The applicant appealed against the High Court's decision of 28 February 1995 to the Appeals Selection Committee of the Supreme Court (Høyesteretts kjæremålsutvalg). He complained that the High Court's decision contained assumptions of criminal liability and that, consequently, it violated Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. He requested the Supreme Court to quash the High Court's decision. 20. By a decision of 8 June 1995, notified to the applicant by mail on 20 July 1995, the Appeals Selection Committee, considering that the applicant's appeal concerned the High Court's application of Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, rejected the appeal. 21. In its reasoning, the Appeals Selection Committee first recalled that in its decision reported in Norsk Retstidende 1994, p. 721, the Supreme Court had stated (at p. 725): “It is the accused who carries the burden of proof that he did not carry out the act. It is sufficient that it is more probable than not. I do not agree with counsel for the defence that the accused has discharged the burden of proof where both alternatives, on the basis of the available evidence, appear to be equally likely. In this assessment the ordinary standards of evidence shall apply and the requirements in respect of the strength of the evidence must then to some extent be adapted to the possibilities for the accused to show that he did not carry out the act. Given the manner in which the provision has been formulated the situation may easily arise that an acquittal is not sufficient to justify a compensation claim when the accused is unable to discharge this burden of proof. I should like to stress that the refusal of a compensation claim does not entail that the previous acquittal is undermined or that the acquittal is open to doubt. The compensation case must be determined on an independent basis and the rules on evidence applying in such compensation cases do not differ from those which apply to ordinary compensation claims. The legislator has as a starting point opted for a solution whereby the financial burden caused by the institution of criminal proceedings, which are discontinued or which end with an acquittal, must be borne by the accused unless he is able to show that it is probable that he did not commit the act.” 22. The Appeals Selection Committee further recalled that in the above case the Supreme Court considered the relationship between the conditions for compensation under Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, in particular the Sekanina v. Austria judgment of 25 August 1993 (Series A no. 266-A). The Supreme Court concluded that the rules in Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not, as such, contrary to Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Appeals Selection Committee affirmed that it would base itself on this view in its assessment of the present case. It further recalled that, in the 1994 decision, the Supreme Court had expressed the following view on the Sekanina judgment: “[In this case] decisive importance was attached to the reasoning in the particular case for rejecting the compensation claim. If in the reasoning for refusing compensation doubt is voiced as to whether the acquittal was correct or if the reasoning contains assumptions about criminal liability, then the relationship to Article 6 § 2 of the Convention would be problematic.” 23. Then the Appeals Selection Committee went on to state: “As pointed out by the prosecution in its reply to the appeal, the High Court had to justify why it considered that the conditions for making an award for compensation under Article 444 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been fulfilled. The Appeals Selection Committee must determine whether the reasoning of the High Court conflicted with the requirements of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Committee refers to the fact that the reasoning must be formulated in the light of the conditions for compensation as mentioned above. It is further clear that the High Court ... was aware of the rules in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, the European Court's Sekanina judgment and the 1994 decision of the Supreme Court. In its decision concerning compensation under Article 444, the High Court, after having quoted the provision, specifies the subject-matter of the case as follows. 'Following the High Court's acquittal, Mr Hammern is not guilty under the criminal law. This question has not been submitted to the High Court which will not deal with it. The present case is a compensation claim brought by Mr Hammern. The question is whether he, in view of the rules of evidence under the law of compensation, is able to show that he did not carry out the acts which were referred to in the indictment.' The Committee points to the fact that here the High Court clearly specifies that Mr Hammern is not liable under the criminal law. Furthermore it is specified that the compensation claim must be determined on the basis of the rules of evidence applying under the law on compensation. The High Court then concludes, against the background of the evidence adduced, that considering the case as a whole, Mr Hammern 'has not shown it to be probable that he did not carry out the acts which grounded the charge.' Moreover, in the concluding remarks, it is stated: 'When the High Court, considering the case as a whole, reached the conclusion that Mr Hammern had not discharged his burden of proof, account was also taken of the fact that the requirements as to the strength of the evidence must to a certain extent be adapted to the possibility which he has for showing that he [Mr Hammern] did not commit the acts.... Nevertheless, in the assessment, it is the usual rules on evidence which should apply....' In support of his submission that the High Court's reasoning contains assumptions about criminal liability, he points to certain intermediate passages in which the High Court states: 'Medical experts have in the light of their investigations reached conclusions which in practice imply a very high degree of probability that the 10 children referred to in the indictment have been exposed to sexual abuse. The medical experts have discounted the possibility of self-inflicted injuries, that the injuries are caused by pathological conditions or conditions at variance from the norm. As pointed out by the prosecution, the children themselves gave statements to their parents, during the judicial examinations and to a psychologist, about abuse by Mr Hammern. Through the video recording of the judicial examinations of the children, the Court has been able to see how the children expressed themselves. The Court has been able to apprise itself of how the children during the examinations changed their behaviour when presented with questions of sexual abuse. Nor does the following fact make it less likely that he carried out the acts for which he was charged: the children markedly changed their behaviour, inter alia, in the form of bedwetting, refusing or expressing fear about going to the kindergarten, several children had a sore crotch, sore abdomen and, on one or several occasions, blood on their underwear, circumstances which essentially occurred after Mr Hammern started to work at the kindergarten and which diminished after his departure. The High Court further finds it established that at the kindergarten it was possible to perpetrate such abuse without it being revealed either from a technical or practical point of view. In the aftermath, several of the employees at the kindergarten have pointed to a few surprising situations: for instance the governor's eyewitness evidence, her perception of the situation, when she came over to Mr Hammern while he was washing a child in the crotch under peculiar circumstances. The High Court does not find any reason to go further into the discussion about the possibility of paedophilia. It is not only the so-called real paedophiles who commit abuse against children. Nor can a diagnosis which excludes paedophilia be deemed accurate, or notional paedophilia be defined precisely.' Having regard to the fact that the High Court clearly specified that its assessment was confined to the compensation case which was to be determined on the basis of the rules of evidence applying in such cases, the Appeals Selection Committee finds that the High Court' s reasoning does not go further than is necessary to carry out a careful examination of the compensation claim and that it does not entail any infringement of the presumption of innocence laid down in the Convention. The Committee once more emphasises that a refusal to award compensation under Article 444 does not imply that the previous acquittal is being undermined. In the light of the foregoing, the appeal must be rejected.”

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10. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Oslo. 11. On 24 June 1993 the applicant was charged under Articles 192 and 195 of the Criminal Code (straffeloven) with the sexual abuse of a minor, G., born in December 1979, during the period from 1986 to 1990. Under these provisions he was charged with having, on one or several occasions, threatened to hit G. if she cried out, and/or having held her tight, whereupon he had introduced his penis into or pointed it towards her sex and/or made her masturbate him. At the time, G.’s father was cohabiting with the applicant’s mother. The alleged offences were said to have occurred in the applicant’s home when the child visited her father. 12. Criminal proceedings were instituted before the Eidsivating High Court (lagmannsrett) which heard the case between 16 and 18 February 1994, including G.’s compensation claim of (up to) 110,000 Norwegian kroner (NOK) for non-pecuniary damage, made under section 3-5 of the Damage Compensation Act 1969 (skadeerstatningsloven), and joined to the trial in accordance with Article 3 of the 1981 Code of Criminal Procedure (straffeprosessloven). By a judgment of 18 February 1994, the High Court, noting that the jury had answered the questions concerning criminal guilt in the negative, acquitted the applicant of the charges. Moreover, it decided to reject G.’s compensation claim. 13. G. subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court (Høyesterett) under the rules of the 1915 Code of Civil Procedure (tvistemålsloven) against the refusal to award compensation. The Supreme Court then ordered the taking of oral evidence by the Oslo City Court (byrett). Evidence was taken between 26 and 30 June 1995, 18 and 20 October 1995, 20 November 1995 and 3 January 1996, during which time more than twenty witnesses were heard. 14. In the appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court, G.’s lawyer requested that documents produced in the context of the criminal case be submitted as evidence to the Supreme Court. These included records of the judicial examination of G., medical certificates, letters and witness statements given to the police in connection with the criminal proceedings. The applicant’s lawyer, relying on Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, objected to this request. 15. By a decision of 29 May 1996, the Supreme Court authorised the documents from the criminal case to be joined to the case file in the compensation proceedings. Its decision included the following reasons: “In their pleadings, the lawyers for the parties have dealt extensively with the issue under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The only question for the Supreme Court to determine is whether the submission of the criminal-case documents in the civil case would as such violate this Convention provision. The question as to the significance of this provision for the decision on the compensation claim falls to be considered in connection with the decision on the merits of the appeal. The use of documents from the criminal case as evidence in this case does not in my view fall foul of the requirement in Article 6 § 2 ... The submission of the documents does not as such imply that the acquittal in the criminal case is open to doubt. The statement in the Sekanina case, which the lawyer for the defendant has referred to, must be read in its context. The ruling cannot be perceived as a general procedural bar against the production of the case documents from criminal proceedings in a later case. Furthermore, I should like to add that, although this is not decisive for my view on the issue under Article 6 § 2, both parties were given the usual opportunity to supply evidence in connection with the taking of evidence by the Supreme Court. In my view, the request for submission of the criminal-case documents in question must therefore be granted.” 16. The Supreme Court examined the case under the rules of civil procedure. After hearing the parties and a large number of witnesses, the Supreme Court, in a judgment of 5 June 1996, ordered the applicant to pay NOK 75,000 to G. in compensation for non-pecuniary damage, under section 3-5(1)(b) of the Damage Compensation Act. 17. The first voting judge, Mrs Justice Gjølstad, stated on behalf of a unanimous court, inter alia: “In so far as the appeal concerns the merits, two general questions arise, namely the relationship to the acquittal in the criminal case (see Article 6 § 2 of the Convention) and the requirement of proof in such cases. Under Chapter 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, civil compensation claims may ... be made in criminal proceedings by the prosecution or by the injured party. This arrangement is intended to make it easier for the injured party to have a civil compensation claim examined, but it does not preclude the possibility of making such a claim in separate civil proceedings instead. Contrary to what followed from the old Code of Criminal Procedure, it is not a condition for the examination of civil compensation claims that the accused person should have been convicted in respect of the charge. Thus, it is in principle possible to either reject or uphold a civil compensation claim, irrespective of the decision concerning criminal liability. This has its background in the fact that the injured party, who does not enjoy rights as a party in the criminal case, should not forfeit his or her compensation claim as a result of an acquittal in the criminal case. Although it will hardly be a frequent occurrence that the decision on the civil compensation claim goes in a different direction from that on criminal liability, this may happen for various reasons. Amongst others, the requirement of evidence for the criminal and the civil consequences of an action ... is different. By Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, a person who is charged with a criminal offence is to be deemed innocent until proved guilty. The presumption of innocence applies even after an acquittal (see in this connection the Sekanina case and the decision reported in Norsk Retstidende 1994, p. 721, dealing with the significance of the presumption of innocence in a case concerning the right of the accused to compensation after an acquittal). However, in my opinion it must be clear that the said provision cannot constitute an obstacle for a person injured by an act to claim compensation from the alleged perpetrator, even though the latter has been acquitted of a criminal offence, and that the court in such a case can rely on a finding that the defendant has in fact committed the act in relation to which he has been acquitted. Even assuming that the Convention provision applies to the treatment of such claims, it has not been infringed as long as no disagreement or doubt has been expressed with regard to the decision on criminal liability. I cannot see that the arrangement under Norwegian criminal procedural law, whereby it is possible to have civil compensation claims determined after an acquittal, gives rise to any particular problems in relation to Article 6 § 2 [of the Convention]. Moreover, in the case at hand, it is above all the High Court’s decision concerning compensation which has been brought before the Supreme Court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.” 18. As regards the requirement of evidence, Mrs Justice Gjølstad noted that under the law on compensation the test was normally the balance of probabilities. However, bearing in mind the burden which an allegation of reprehensible conduct might have for the defendant and the serious consequences it might have for his or her reputation, the requirement as to the strength of the evidence had to be stricter than that which applied to the test of the balance of probabilities. Nevertheless, the requirement could not be as strict as that which applied for establishing criminal liability. In a case of the kind under consideration, the test had to be whether on the balance of probabilities it was clearly probable that the alleged abuse had been committed. 19. In dealing with the particular facts of the appeal concerning compensation, the Supreme Court had regard to the video recording of the judicial examination of the alleged victim in the criminal proceedings before the High Court. The Supreme Court did not share the High Court’s view that the evidentiary value of the video recording was diminished by certain misgivings concerning the lack of synchronisation of sound and picture when shown to the High Court. Those shortcomings had been remedied before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also had regard to evidence taken by it from this person, which deviated slightly from the judicial examination before the High Court. It further had regard to the statements of an expert witness and the statements of a therapist who had treated the alleged victim. Considering the evidence as a whole, Justice Gjølstad found that the evidence satisfied the standard of proof, establishing that sexual abuse had occurred and that, on the balance of probabilities, it was clear that the applicant was the abuser. Accordingly, there was a basis for awarding the victim compensation under section 3-5(1)(b) of the Damage Compensation Act. However, Justice Gjølstad emphasised that this decision was taken independently of the decision in the criminal case and that it did not undermine the acquittal. Finally, as regards the amount of compensation, she observed, inter alia, that she based her assessment on her finding that several infringements had occurred and that, even though their extent was not possible to ascertain with precision, there had been serious violations involving a certain use of force or threats, as a result of which G. had sustained damage.

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10. On 17 February 1987 the applicant, who had qualified as a doctor in Algeria in 1969 after graduating in medicine from the University of Algiers, applied to the Bouches-du-Rhône département council of the ordre des médecins (Medical Association) for registration as a member of the ordre. 11. The département council refused her application on the ground that, although she was French, she did not have a French medical qualification. The applicant subsequently made eleven unsuccessful applications to the Minister for Health for authorisation under Article L. 356, point (2), third paragraph, of the Public Health Code. 12. On 1 June 1995 the applicant again applied to the département council, relying on the Government Declarations of 19 March 1962 on Algeria, known as the “Evian Accords”, and in particular on the Government Declaration on Cultural Cooperation between France and Algeria (“the 1962 Government Declaration”), of which Article 5 of Part I provides: “Academic diplomas and qualifications obtained in Algeria and France under the same conditions as regards curriculum, attendance and examinations shall be automatically valid in both countries.” 13. Her application was rejected on 16 June 1995 by the Bouches-du-Rhône département council of the ordre des médecins, which refused to register her. 14. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur-Corse regional council of the ordre des médecins. In a decision of 17 December 1995 the regional council upheld the decision to refuse her registration. 15. On 13 February 1996 the applicant applied to the disciplinary section of the National Council of the ordre des médecins. In a decision of 20 March 1996 the disciplinary section refused her application on the ground, inter alia, that the terms of Article 5 of the 1962 Government Declarations could not by themselves confer the right to practise medicine in France on all those who had obtained medical qualifications in Algeria after that date, and therefore could not be used in support of an application for registration. 16. On 3 June 1996 the applicant applied to the Conseil d'Etat for judicial review of that decision. 17. On 29 October 1998, at the request of the Conseil d'Etat, the Legal Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted observations on the applicant's application. It stated: “This application calls for the following observations on my part, which, as you requested, concern the provisions of Article 5 of the Government Declaration of 19 March 1962 on Cultural Cooperation between France and Algeria, one of the declarations making up the 'Evian Accords'. ... 1. Nature of the provisions The Conseil d'Etat, acting in its judicial capacity, has already had occasion to rule on the nature of the provisions of the 'Evian Accords'. Agreeing with the Department's position, it held that the Accords constituted an international treaty (see the Conseil d'Etat's Moraly judgment of 31 January 1969, Recueil des arrêts du Conseil d'Etat [Reports of the judgments of the Conseil d'Etat], 1969, p. 50). 2. Applicability of the provisions The Government Declarations of 19 March 1962 were approved in a referendum held on 8 April 1962 and were subsequently published in the Official Gazette on 20 April 1962. They came into force on 3 July 1962 following an exchange of letters between the President of the French Republic and the Chairman of the Provisional Executive of the Algerian State. Since no measures have been taken to suspend their application or to revise their content, the provisions in question must be regarded as having been in force on 17 December 1995 and 20 March 1996, when the impugned decisions ... were taken. However, the reciprocity requirement in Article 55 of the Constitution cannot be regarded as having been satisfied at that time, since those provisions had not been applied by the Algerian authorities in respect of applications by French nationals with qualifications obtained in France. Consequently, they cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. 3. In the alternative, the scope of the provisions Article 5 § 1 of the Declaration ... lays down the principle that French and Algerian qualifications are automatically equivalent, without there being any need for implementing regulations, provided that the curricula followed are similar. Regard being had, in particular, to the precision of their content and the lack of any reference to implementing measures, the provisions in issue appear to be directly effective. However, they cannot be regarded as establishing an unconditional right for anyone having obtained medical qualifications in Algeria to be registered as a member of the French ordre des médecins. In assessing candidates for registration as a member of the national ordre, reference should be made to the domestic legislation in force, in particular Articles L. 356 et seq. of the Public Health Code, the requirements of which, in the case of foreign nationals, go beyond the production of a French medical degree or a recognised equivalent qualification, as candidates must also undergo professional aptitude tests.” 18. After being apprised of those observations, the applicant produced to the Conseil d'Etat declarations from various Algerian authorities certifying that qualifications obtained in France by French practitioners were recognised as being automatically valid in Algeria. 19. In a judgment of 9 April 1999 the Conseil d'Etat, acting in its judicial capacity, did not follow the submissions of the Government Commissioner, Mr Rémy Schwartz, and dismissed the application in the following terms: “... As regards the argument based on Article 5 of the Government Declaration of 19 March 1962 on Cultural Cooperation between France and Algeria: ... Article 55 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 provides: 'Treaties or agreements that have been lawfully ratified or approved shall, upon publication, prevail over Acts of Parliament, subject, in respect of each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party.' It is not for the administrative courts to determine whether and to what extent the manner in which a treaty or agreement is applied by the other party is capable of depriving the instrument's provisions of the authority conferred on them by the Constitution. In observations produced on 2 November 1998 the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the aforementioned provisions of Article 5 of the Declaration on Cultural Cooperation between France and Algeria could not be regarded as having been in force on the date of the decision complained of, seeing that on that date the reciprocity requirement laid down in Article 55 of the Constitution had not been satisfied. [The applicant] is accordingly not entitled to rely on those provisions. As regards the other arguments: ... Although [the applicant] submits that the disciplinary section of the National Council of the ordre des médecins infringed the Council of the European Communities' Directive of 21 December 1988 on the recognition of diplomas, she has not produced any information from which it may be ascertained whether that argument is well-founded. The Council of the European Communities' Recommendation of 21 December 1988 does not impose on the member States any obligations on which [the applicant] could rely. As [the applicant] was unable to show either that she had obtained the French qualification for practising as a doctor or any of the qualifications listed in Article L. 356-2 of the Public Health Code or that she had been granted the special ministerial authorisation provided for in Article L. 356 ... for persons with foreign qualifications, she could not expect to be registered. Consequently, her argument that the disciplinary section did not take into account her ability and her clinical and academic experience is irrelevant. ...” 20. In a ministerial order of 22 January 1999, published in the French Official Gazette on 30 January 1999, the applicant was authorised to practise as a doctor in France with effect from 1997, under Article L. 356, point (2), third paragraph, of the Public Health Code. On the basis of that order, in a decision of 12 April 1999, the Bouches-du-Rhône département council of the ordre des médecins registered the applicant as a member of the ordre. On 9 August 1999 it recognised the applicant's abilities as an orthopaedic surgeon by designating her as a doctor specialising in orthopaedic surgery, on the basis of her qualifications and professional experience.

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9. The applicant, Mr Rémi Bertuzzi, was born in 1951 and lives in Saint-Laurent (département of Vosges). 10. He applied to the Metz tribunal de grande instance for legal aid to bring an action in damages against Mr T., a lawyer, for failing to represent him properly in court proceedings. He was granted full legal aid on 1 June 1995. 11. Three lawyers were assigned in turn by the president of the bar council to represent the applicant under the legal-aid scheme, but they applied for permission to withdraw from the case, owing to personal links with the lawyer the applicant wished to sue. The last of them withdrew from the case in late October or early November 1995. 12. On 23 November 1995 the applicant asked the president of the legal-aid office to assign a fourth lawyer. On 27 November 1995 he made a like request to the president of the bar council. The registry of the legal-aid office forwarded the applicant's letter to a lawyer who had been delegated by the bar council to the legal-aid office. 13. On 12 December 1995 that lawyer wrote to the president of the bar council in Metz to request the appointment of a fourth lawyer. The latter took no immediate action on the request, other than to seek information about the nature of the applicant's case, which he was given. 14. In the absence of a reply, the applicant wrote to the Minister of Justice on 14 June 1996. All he received in reply was a letter which arrived on 21 June 1996 informing him that his request had been transferred to the Director of the Civil Affairs Department. The applicant pointed this out in a letter to the minister dated 23 November 1996. 15. In March 1997 the applicant received a reply from the president of the bar council informing him that the grant of legal aid dated 1 June 1995 had lapsed. Consequently, he was advised to make a fresh application if he wished to pursue his claim against Mr T. The applicant did not reply to that letter.

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9. The applicant is a French national who lives in Paris. 10. She was born in the fourteenth administrative district of Paris on 23 March 1965. Her mother requested that the birth be kept secret and completed a form at the Health and Social Security Department abandoning her after signing the following letter: “I abandon my child Berthe Pascale. I certify that I have been informed that after one month the abandonment of my child will become irreversible and that the authorities reserve the right to have her adopted. I decline the assistance that has been offered to me. I request that this birth be kept secret. I certify that I have received the form setting out information on abandonment. Paris, 24.5.[deleted] Berthe” 11. The applicant was placed with the Child Welfare Service at the Health and Social Services Department (Direction de l'action sanitaire et sociale – “the DASS”) and registered on 1 July 1965 under no. 280326 as being in the care of the département of Seine. Subsequently, a full adoption order was made on 10 January 1969 in favour of Mr and Mrs Odièvre, under whose name she is now known. The operative provisions of the Paris tribunal de grande instance's judgment ordering her adoption read as follows: “... The operative provisions of the judgment to be delivered shall be entered in the prescribed manner and time ... in the register of births, deaths and marriages held at the town hall of the fourteenth administrative district of Paris; This entry shall serve as the child's birth certificate; The original birth certificate and the birth certificate drawn up pursuant to Article 58 shall at the public prosecutor's behest be endorsed with the word 'adoption' and shall be deemed to be null and void.” 12. In December 1990 the applicant consulted her file as a person formerly in the care of the Children's Welfare Service of the département of Seine and managed to obtain non-identifying information about her natural family: “Record of information on a child admitted to the Saint-Vincent-de-Paul Hospital and Nursing Home provided by: CONFIDENTIAL Date of admission [date deleted] Detailed explanation of the reasons for the child's admission (if the child has been or may be abandoned, provide full information on such matters as the mother's, and if possible the father's, physical appearance, mental outlook, health, social background and occupation in order to enable the authorities to find the best possible placement) Abandonment: The parents have been cohabiting for seven years. Two children have been born of their relationship: an elder child, who is 21 months old, and Pascale, whom the mother has today abandoned and placed in our care. The couple have been put up by a woman for two years, but she now faces eviction. The father is a Spanish national and works as a painter and decorator. His monthly wage is approximately 1,200 [French] francs. He is married and has a legitimate daughter, who is being brought up by her mother. According to Pascale's mother, her partner refuses to have anything to do with Pascale and says that he cannot take on this new burden. She (Ms Berthe) appears to have no will of her own and is content to go along with her partner's wishes. She has not visited her daughter at the clinic, saying that she does not wish to become attached. She did not see her daughter until today and greeted their separation with total indifference. Ms Berthe does not work and looks after her son and her landlady's child. A request has been made for the birth to remain secret. Description of the mother: 1.63 m tall, slim, regular features, clear-skinned, heavily made-up brown eyes, long, thick brown hair, in good health, ambivalent attitude, very limited intellect. Description of the father: average height, blond hair, brown eyes, in good health, sober. Pascale was born 1 3/4 months premature and weighed 1,770 grams. She now weighs 3,100 grams. Her stay in the incubator room at ... was trouble-free. She has now reached term and presents no neurological or organic anomalies. Information noted on the medical certificate supplied to the nursery department. 25 May ... Birth certificate requested 14 June ... Certificate appended 18 June ... Proposal for category A registration.” 13. On 27 January 1998 the applicant applied to the Paris tribunal de grande instance for an order for the “release of information about her birth and permission to obtain copies of any documents, birth, death and marriage certificates, civil-status documents and full copies of long-form birth certificates”. She explained to the court that she had learned that her natural parents had had a son in 1963 and two other sons after 1965, that the DASS had refused to give her information concerning the civil status of her siblings on the ground that disclosure would be a breach of confidence, and that, now that she knew of her siblings' existence, she was entitled to seek an order for the release of information about her own birth. 14. On 2 February 1998 the court registrar returned the case file to the applicant's lawyer with the following letter of explanation: “Following examination of your file by Mrs B., Vice-President of the First Division, it appears that the applicant should consider applying to the administrative court to obtain, if possible, an order requiring the authorities to disclose the information, although such an order would in any event contravene the law of 8 January 1993.”

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9. The applicants are Turkish nationals and live in Diyarbakir. At the material time, they worked as journalists on Ülkede Gündem, a Turkish-language daily newspaper based in Istanbul. Publication of the newspaper ceased on 24 October 1998 and it was replaced initially by Özgür Bakis and subsequently, on 27 April 2000, by another daily newspaper, 2 Binde Yeni Gündem. That newspaper was replaced on 31 May 2001 by a weekly periodical called Yedinci Gündem. 10. At the material time one of the applicants, Mr Çetin, an independent journalist, wrote a column entitled “Notes from Diyarbakir” (Diyarbakir'dan Notlar), which was published on Tuesdays in Ülkede Gündem. Mr Bakaç was Ülkede Gündem's representative in Diyarbakir. He currently works as a press officer for the Diyarbakir Urban District Council. 11. As for the other applicants, Mr Bagir is now the mayor of Lice, Mr Kaya is a lawyer and Mr Sahin and Mr Kiliç both teach in schools in eastern Turkey. Mr Sünbül continues to work as a journalist with the weekly publication 7. Gündem, while Mr Dag currently works as a press officer for Kayapinar Town Council. 12. The main point at issue in the present case is a ban that was imposed on 1 December 1997 by the governor of the state of emergency region on the distribution of Ülkede Gündem in that region. 13. According to the applicants, the distribution of Ülkede Gündem was impeded by the security forces in the period from September to November 1997, and the governor of the state of emergency region subsequently imposed a ban on its publication and distribution in the region where the state of emergency had been declared (see paragraph 24 below). On 13 November 1997 the proprietor of Ülkede Gündem sent a letter to the Ministry of the Interior informing it of the disruption caused to the distribution of the newspaper and demanding an end to these unlawful acts. He also sought compensation for the loss sustained. 14. On 19 November 1997 the governor of the state of emergency region wrote to the proprietor of Ülkede Gündem to say that his office was not responsible for the acts mentioned in the letter. He enclosed the seizure orders that had been made by the relevant authorities. 15. The Government have produced to the Court seventy-two warrants issued by judges of the Istanbul National Security Court for the seizure of various issues of the newspaper in the months of September, November and December 1997. 16. On 4 November 1997 Mr Bakaç and Mr Bagir lodged a criminal complaint with the Diyarbakir public prosecutor's office because of the alleged disruption to the distribution of the newspaper. 17. On 25 November 1997 the public prosecutor's office ruled that it had no power to deal with the complaint and referred it to the Diyarbakir Administrative Council under the Prosecution of Civil Servants Act. 18. On 5 February 1998 the Diyarbakir Administrative Council held that there was no case to answer in view of the seizure warrants that had been issued by the Istanbul National Security Court. Its decision was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 3 March 2000. 19. On 1 December 1997 the governor of the state of emergency region imposed a ban on the publication and distribution of Ülkede Gündem in that region. 20. On 4 December 1997 the Diyarbakir Security Directorate wrote to Mr Bakaç, in his capacity as Ülkede Gündem's representative in Diyarbakir, informing him of the ban. Its letter read as follows: “Regard being had to Directive no. 1344 issued by the governor's office of the state of emergency region on 1 December 1997, With effect from 1 December 1997 the publication and distribution of the daily newspaper Ülkede Gündem in the provinces in which a state of emergency has been declared under the aforementioned directive (Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli and Van) shall be prohibited.” 21. Likewise, on 5 December 1997 the Tunceli Security Directorate wrote a letter to the company responsible for distributing the newspaper, Birlesik Basim Dagitim A.S., based in Adana, in the following terms: “Regard being had to Directive no. 1344 issued by the governor's office of the state of emergency region on 1 December 1997, With effect from 1 December 1997 the publication and distribution of the Istanbul daily newspaper Ülkede Gündem in the provinces in which a state of emergency has been declared under the aforementioned directive (Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Siirt, Sirnak, Tunceli and Van) shall be prohibited, pursuant to Article 1 of Legislative Decree no. 430 and section 11(e) of the State of Emergency Act.” 22. On 7 May 1999 the governor of the state of emergency region imposed a ban pursuant to Article 11 (e) of Legislative Decree no. 285 on the publication and distribution of Özgür Bakis, the daily newspaper that had replaced Ülkede Gündem. Similarly, on 1 June 2000 he issued an order prohibiting the publication and distribution of the daily newspaper 2 Binde Yeni Gündem in the state of emergency region. Lastly, on 27 June 2001 the weekly publication Yedinci Gündem, which had replaced 2 Binde Yeni Gündem, met the same fate, with a ban being imposed on its publication and distribution in the region. 23. The applicants have produced a notice dated June 2000 which shows that at different times the governor of the state of emergency region imposed bans on the publication and distribution of seventeen periodicals, including Ülkede Gündem, Özgür Bakis and 2 Binde Yeni Gündem.

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10. The first applicant, Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party – “Refah”), was a political party founded on 19 July 1983. It was represented by its chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, who is also the second applicant. He was born in 1926 and lives in Ankara. An engineer by training, he is a politician. At the material time he was a member of Parliament and Refah’s chairman. The third applicant, Mr Şevket Kazan, who was born in 1933, lives in Ankara. He is a politician and a lawyer. At the material time he was a member of Parliament and a vice-chairman of Refah. The fourth applicant, Mr Ahmet Tekdal, who was born in 1931, lives in Ankara. He is a politician and a lawyer. At the material time he was a member of Parliament and a vice-chairman of Refah. 11. Refah took part in a number of general and local elections. In the local elections in March 1989 Refah obtained about 10% of the votes and its candidates were elected mayor in a number of towns, including five large cities. In the general election of 1991 it obtained 16.88% of the votes. The sixty-two MPs elected as a result took part between 1991 and 1995 in the work of Parliament and its various committees, including the Committee on Constitutional Questions, which proposed amendments to Article 69 of the Constitution that became law on 23 July 1995. During the debate in Parliament on the new sixth paragraph of Article 69 of the Constitution (see paragraph 45 below) the chairman of the Committee on Constitutional Questions explained when he presented the draft it had prepared that the Constitutional Court would not restrict itself to noting the unconstitutional nature of the individual acts of the members of a party but would then be obliged to declare that the party concerned had become a centre of anti‑constitutional activities on account of those acts. One MP, representing the parliamentary group of the Motherland Party, emphasised the need to change the relevant provisions of Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties to take account of the new sixth paragraph of Article 69 of the Constitution. Ultimately, Refah obtained approximately 22% of the votes in the general election of 24 December 1995 and about 35% of the votes in the local elections of 3 November 1996. The results of the 1995 general election made Refah the largest political party in Turkey with a total of 158 seats in the Grand National Assembly (which had 450 members at the material time). On 28 June 1996 Refah came to power by forming a coalition government with the centre-right True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi), led by Mrs Tansu Ciller. According to an opinion poll carried out in January 1997, if a general election had been held at that time, Refah would have obtained 38% of the votes. The same poll predicted that Refah might obtain 67% of the votes in the general election to be held roughly four years later. 12. On 21 May 1997 Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation applied to the Turkish Constitutional Court to have Refah dissolved on the grounds that it was a “centre” (mihrak) of activities contrary to the principles of secularism. In support of his application, he referred to the following acts and remarks by certain leaders and members of Refah. – Whenever they spoke in public Refah’s chairman and other leaders advocated the wearing of Islamic headscarves in State schools and buildings occupied by public administrative authorities, whereas the Constitutional Court had already ruled that this infringed the principle of secularism enshrined in the Constitution. – At a meeting on constitutional reform Refah’s chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, had made proposals tending towards the abolition of secularism in Turkey. He had suggested that the adherents of each religious movement should obey their own rules rather than the rules of Turkish law. – On 13 April 1994 Mr Necmettin Erbakan had asked Refah’s representatives in the Grand National Assembly to consider whether the change in the social order which the party sought would be “peaceful or violent” and would be achieved “harmoniously or by bloodshed”. – At a seminar held in January 1991 in Sivas, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had called on Muslims to join Refah, saying that only his party could establish the supremacy of the Koran through a holy war (jihad) and that Muslims should therefore make donations to Refah rather than distributing alms to third parties. – During Ramadan Mr Necmettin Erbakan had received the heads of the Islamist movements at the residence reserved for the Prime Minister, thus assuring them of his support. – Several members of Refah, including some in high office, had made speeches calling for the secular political system to be replaced by a theocratic system. These persons had also advocated the elimination of the opponents of this policy, if necessary by force. Refah, by refusing to open disciplinary proceedings against the members concerned and even, in certain cases, facilitating the dissemination of their speeches, had tacitly approved the views expressed. – On 8 May 1997 a Refah MP, Mr İbrahim Halil Çelik, had said in front of journalists in the corridors of the parliament building that blood would flow if an attempt was made to close the “İmam-Hatip” theological colleges, that the situation might become worse than in Algeria, that he personally wanted blood to flow so that democracy could be installed in the country, that he would strike back against anyone who attacked him and that he would fight to the end for the introduction of Islamic law (sharia). – The Minister of Justice, Mr Şevket Kazan (a Refah MP and vice-chairman of the party), had expressed his support for the mayor of Sincan by visiting him in the prison where he had been detained pending trial after being charged with publicly vindicating international Islamist terrorist groups. Principal State Counsel further observed that Refah had not opened any disciplinary proceedings against those responsible for the above-mentioned acts and remarks. 13. On 7 July 1997 Principal State Counsel submitted new evidence against Refah to the Constitutional Court. 14. On 4 August 1997 Refah’s representatives filed their defence submissions, in which they relied on international human-rights protection instruments, including the Convention, pointing out that these instruments formed part of Turkish written law. They further referred to the case-law of the Commission, which had expressed the opinion that Article 11 of the Convention had been breached in the cases concerning the United Communist Party of Turkey and the Socialist Party, and to the case-law of the Court and the Commission on the restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of association authorised by the second paragraphs of Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. They contended that the dissolution of Refah was not prompted by a pressing social need and was not necessary in a democratic society. Nor, according to Refah’s representatives, was their party’s dissolution justified by application of the “clear and present danger” test laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States of America. 15. Refah’s representatives further rejected Principal State Counsel’s argument that the party was a “centre” of activities which undermined the secular nature of the Republic. They submitted that Refah was not caught by the criteria laid down in the Law on the regulation of political parties for determining whether a political party constituted a “centre of anti‑constitutional activities”. They observed, inter alia, that the prosecuting authorities had not issued any warning to Refah (which had four million members) that might have enabled it to expel any of its members whose acts had contravened the provisions of the Criminal Code. 16. Refah’s representatives also set out their point of view on the concept of secularism. They asserted that the principle of secularism implied respect for all beliefs and that Refah had shown such respect in its political activity. 17. The applicants’ representatives alleged that in accusing Mr Necmettin Erbakan of supporting the use of force to achieve political ends and of infringing the principle of secularism the prosecuting authorities had merely cited extracts from his speeches which they had distorted and taken out of context. Moreover, these remarks were covered by Mr Necmettin Erbakan’s parliamentary immunity. They further noted that the dinner he had given to senior officials of the Religious Affairs Department and former members of the theology faculty had been presented by Principal State Counsel as a reception organised for the leaders of Islamist fundamentalist movements, which had in any event been legally proscribed since 1925. 18. With regard to the remarks of the other Refah leaders and members criticised by Principal State Counsel’s Office, Refah’s representatives observed that these did not constitute any criminal offence. They asserted that none of the MPs whose speeches had been referred to by Principal State Counsel was authorised to represent Refah or held office within the party and claimed that the prosecuting authorities had not set in motion the procedure laid down in the Law on the regulation of political parties so as to give Refah the opportunity, if the need arose, to decide whether or not the persons concerned should continue to be members of the party; the first time Refah’s leadership had been informed of the remarks criticised in the case had been when they read Principal State Counsel’s submissions. The three MPs under attack had been expelled from the party, which had thus done what was necessary to avoid becoming a “centre” of illegal activities within the meaning of the Law on the regulation of political parties. 19. On 5 August 1997 Principal State Counsel filed his observations on the merits of the case with the Constitutional Court. He submitted that according to the Convention and the case-law of the Turkish courts on constitutional-law issues nothing obliged States to tolerate the existence of political parties that sought the destruction of democracy and the rule of law. He contended that Refah, by describing itself as an army engaged in a jihad and by openly declaring its intention to replace the Republic’s statute law by sharia, had demonstrated that its objectives were incompatible with the requirements of a democratic society. Refah’s aim to establish a plurality of legal systems (in which each group would be governed by a legal system in conformity with its members’ religious beliefs) constituted the first stage in the process designed to substitute a theocratic regime for the Republic. 20. In their observations on the merits of the case, Refah’s representatives again argued that the dissolution of their party could not be grounded on any of the restrictions permitted by the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Convention. They went on to say that Article 17 was not applicable in the case, as Refah had nothing in common with political parties which sought to install a totalitarian regime. Furthermore, the plurality of legal systems which their party proposed was actually intended to promote the freedom to enter into contracts and the freedom to choose which court should have jurisdiction. 21. On 11 November 1997 Principal State Counsel submitted his observations orally. On 18 and 20 November 1997 Mr Necmettin Erbakan submitted his oral observations on behalf of Refah. 22. In a judgment of 9 January 1998, which it delivered following proceedings on preliminary issues it had instituted of its own motion as the court dealing with the merits, the Constitutional Court ruled that, regard being had to Article 69 § 6 of the Constitution, the second paragraph of section 103 of the Law on the regulation of political parties was unconstitutional and declared it null and void. Article 69 § 6, taken together with section 101(d) of the same Law, provided that for a political party to be considered a “centre” of activities contrary to the fundamental principles of the Republic its members had to have been convicted of criminal offences. According to the Constitutional Court, that legal restriction did not cover all cases where the principles of the Republic had been flouted. It pointed out, among other observations, that after the repeal of Article 163 of the Criminal Code activities contrary to the principle of secularism no longer attracted criminal penalties. 23. On 16 January 1998 the Constitutional Court dissolved Refah on the ground that it had become a “centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism”. It based its decision on sections 101(b) and 103(1) of Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties. It also noted the transfer of Refah’s assets to the Treasury as an automatic consequence of dissolution, in accordance with section 107 of Law no. 2820. 24. In its judgment the Constitutional Court first dismissed the preliminary objections raised by Refah. In that connection it held that the parliamentary immunity of the MPs whose remarks had been mentioned in Principal State Counsel’s submissions of 21 May 1997 had nothing to do with consideration of an application for the dissolution of a political party and forfeiture of political rights by its members, but was a question of the criminal responsibility of the MPs concerned, which was not a matter of constitutional law. 25. With regard to the merits, the Constitutional Court held that while political parties were the main protagonists of democratic politics their activities were not exempt from certain restrictions. In particular, activities by them incompatible with the rule of law could not be tolerated. The Constitutional Court referred to the provisions of the Constitution which imposed respect for secularism on the various organs of political power. It also cited the numerous provisions of domestic legislation requiring political parties to apply the principle of secularism in a number of fields of political and social life. The Constitutional Court observed that secularism was one of the indispensable conditions of democracy. In Turkey the principle of secularism was safeguarded by the Constitution, on account of the country’s historical experience and the specific features of Islam. The rules of sharia were incompatible with the democratic regime. The principle of secularism prevented the State from manifesting a preference for a particular religion or belief and constituted the foundation of freedom of conscience and equality between citizens before the law. Intervention by the State to preserve the secular nature of the political regime had to be considered necessary in a democratic society. 26. The Constitutional Court held that the following evidence proved that Refah had become a centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism (see paragraphs 27-39 below): 27. Refah’s chairman, Mr Necmettin Erbakan, had encouraged the wearing of Islamic headscarves in public and educational establishments. On 10 October 1993, at the party’s Fourth Ordinary General Meeting, he had said: “... when we were in government, for four years, the notorious Article 163 of the Persecution Code was never applied against any child in the country. In our time there was never any question of hostility to the wearing of headscarves ...” In his speech of 14 December 1995 before the general election he had said: “... [university] chancellors are going to retreat before the headscarf when Refah comes to power.” But manifesting one’s religion in such a manner amounted to exerting pressure on persons who did not follow that practice and created discrimination on the ground of religion or beliefs. That finding was supported by various rulings of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court and by the case-law of the European Commission of Human Rights on applications nos. 16278/90 and 18783/91 concerning the wearing of headscarves at universities. 28. The plurality of legal systems proposed by Mr Necmettin Erbakan was nothing to do with the freedom to enter into contracts as Refah claimed, but was an attempt to establish a distinction between citizens on the ground of their religion and beliefs and was aimed at the installation of a theocratic regime. On 23 March 1993 Mr Erbakan had made the following speech to the National Assembly: “... ‘you shall live in a manner compatible with your beliefs’. We want despotism to be abolished. There must be several legal systems. The citizen must be able to choose for himself which legal system is most appropriate for him, within a framework of general principles. Moreover, that has always been the case throughout our history. In our history there have been various religious movements. Everyone lived according to the legal rules of his own organisation, and so everyone lived in peace. Why, then, should I be obliged to live according to another’s rules? ... The right to choose one’s own legal system is an integral part of the freedom of religion.” In addition, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had spoken as follows on 10 October 1993 at a Refah party conference: “... we shall guarantee all human rights. We shall guarantee to everyone the right to live as he sees fit and to choose the legal system he prefers. We shall free the administration from centralism. The State which you have installed is a repressive State, not a State at the people’s service. You do not allow the freedom to choose one’s code of law. When we are in power a Muslim will be able to get married before the mufti, if he wishes, and a Christian will be able to marry in church, if he prefers.” 29. The plurality of legal systems advocated by Mr Necmettin Erbakan in his speeches had its origin in the practice introduced in the first years of Islam by the “Medina Agreement”, which had given the Jewish and polytheist communities the right to live according to their own legal systems, not according to Islamic law. On the basis of the Medina Agreement some Islamist thinkers and politicians had proposed a model of peaceful social co-existence under which each religious group would be free to choose its own legal system. Since the foundation of the Nizam Party in 1970 (dissolved by a judgment of 2 May 1971) Mr Necmettin Erbakan had been seeking to replace the single legal system with a plurality of legal systems. 30. The Constitutional Court further observed that in a plurality of legal systems, as proposed by Refah, society would have to be divided into several religious movements; each individual would have to choose the movement to which he wished to belong and would thus be subjected to the rights and obligations prescribed by the religion of his community. The Constitutional Court pointed out that such a system, whose origins lay in the history of Islam as a political regime, was inimical to the consciousness of allegiance to a nation having legislative and judicial unity. It would naturally impair judicial unity since each religious movement would set up its own courts and the ordinary courts would be obliged to apply the law according to the religion of those appearing before them, thus obliging the latter to reveal their beliefs. It would also undermine legislative and judicial unity, the preconditions for secularism and the consciousness of nationhood, given that each religious movement would be empowered to decree what legal rules should be applicable to its members. 31. In addition, Mr Necmettin Erbakan had made a speech on 13 April 1994 to the Refah group in Parliament in which he had advocated setting up a theocratic regime, if necessary through force: “The second important point is this: Refah will come to power and a just [social] order [adil dozen] will be established. The question we must ask ourselves is whether this change will be violent or peaceful; whether it will entail bloodshed. I would have preferred not to have to use those terms, but in the face of all that, in the face of terrorism, and so that everyone can see the true situation clearly, I feel obliged to do so. Today Turkey must take a decision. The Welfare Party will establish a just order, that is certain. [But] will the transition be peaceful or violent; will it be achieved harmoniously or by bloodshed? The sixty million [citizens] must make up their minds on that point.” 32. The reception given by Mr Necmettin Erbakan at the Prime Minister’s residence to the leaders of various religious movements, who had attended in vestments denoting their religious allegiance, unambiguously evidenced Refah’s chairman’s support for these religious groups vis-à-vis public opinion. 33. In a public speech in April 1994 Mr Şevki Yılmaz, MP for the province of Rize, had issued a clear call to wage a jihad and had argued for the introduction of Islamic law, making the following declaration: “We shall certainly call to account those who turn their backs on the precepts of the Koran and those who deprive Allah’s Messenger of his jurisdiction in their country.” In another public speech, also in April 1994, Mr Şevki Yılmaz had said: “In the hereafter you will be summoned with the leaders you have chosen in this life. ... Have you considered to what extent the Koran is applied in this country? I have done the sums. Only 39% [of the rules] in the Koran are applied in this country. Six thousand five hundred verses have been quietly forgotten ... You found a Koranic school, you build a hostel, you pay for a child’s education, you teach, you preach. ... None of that is part of the chapter on jihad but of that on the amel-i salih [peacetime activities]. Jihad is the name given to the quest for power for the advent of justice, for the propagation of justice and for glorification of Allah’s Word. Allah did not see that task as an abstract political concept; he made it a requirement for warriors [cahudi]. What does that mean? That jihad must be waged by an army! The commander is identified ... The condition to be met before prayer [namaz] is the Islamisation of power. Allah says that, before mosques, it is the path of power which must be Muslim ... It is not erecting vaulted ceilings in the places of prayer which will lead you to Paradise. For Allah does not ask whether you have built up vaulted ceilings in this country. He will not ask that. He will ask you if you have reached a sufficient level ... today, if Muslims have a hundred liras, they must give thirty to the Koranic schools, to train our children, girls and boys, and sixty must be given to the political establishments which open the road to power. Allah asked all His prophets to fight for power. You cannot name a single member of a religious movement who does not fight for power. I tell you, if I had as many heads as I have hairs on my head, even if each of those heads were to be torn from my shoulders for following the way of the Koran, I would not abandon my cause ... The question Allah will ask you is this: ‘Why, in the time of the blasphemous regime, did you not work for the construction of an Islamic State?’ Erbakan and his friends want to bring Islam to this country in the form of a political party. The prosecutor understood that clearly. If we could understand that as he did, the problem would be solved. Even Abraham the Jew has realised that in this country the symbol of Islam is Refah. He who incites the Muslim community [cemaat] to take up arms before political power is in Muslim hands is a fool, or a traitor doing the bidding of others. For none of the prophets authorised war before the capture of State power. ... Muslims are intelligent. They do not reveal how they intend to beat their enemy. The general staff gives orders and the soldiers obey. If the general staff reveals its plan, it is up to the commanders of the Muslim community to make a new plan. Our mission is not to talk, but to apply the war plan, as soldiers in the army ...” Criminal proceedings had been brought against Mr Şevki Yılmaz. Although his antipathy to secularism was well-known, Refah had adopted him as a candidate in local-government elections. After he had been elected mayor of Rize, Refah had made sure that he was elected as an MP in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. 34. In a public speech on 14 March 1993 and a television interview first recorded in 1992 and rebroadcast on 24 November 1996, Mr Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, Refah MP for the province of Ankara, had encouraged discrimination between believers and non-believers and had predicted that if the supporters of applying sharia came to power they would annihilate non‑believers: “Our homeland belongs to us, but not the regime, dear brothers. The regime and Kemalism belong to others. ... Turkey will be destroyed, gentlemen. People say: Could Turkey become like Algeria? Just as, in Algeria, we got 81% [of the votes], here too we will reach 81%, we will not remain on 20%. Do not waste your energy on us – I am speaking here to you, to those ... of the imperialist West, the colonising West, the wild West, to those who, in order to unite with the rest of the world, become the enemies of honour and modesty, those who lower themselves to the level of dogs, of puppies, in order to imitate the West, to the extent of putting dogs between the legs of Muslim women – it is to you I speak when I say: ‘Do not waste your energy on us, you will die at the hands of the people of Kırıkkale.’ ” “... the army says: ‘We can accept it if you’re a supporter of the PKK, but a supporter of sharia, never.’ Well you won’t solve the problem with that attitude. If you want the solution, it’s sharia.” Refah had ensured that Mr Ceylan was elected as an MP and its local branches had played videotapes of this speech and the interview. 35. Refah’s vice-chairman, Mr Ahmet Tekdal, in a speech he made in 1993 while on pilgrimage in Saudi Arabia which was shown by a Turkish television station, had said that he advocated installing a regime based on sharia: “In countries which have a parliamentary regime, if the people are not sufficiently aware, if they do not work hard enough to bring about the advent of ‘hak nizami’ [a just order or God’s order], two calamities lie ahead. The first calamity is the renegades they will have to face. They will be tyrannised by them and will eventually disappear. The second calamity is that they will not be able to give a satisfactory account of themselves to Allah, as they will not have worked to establish ‘hak nizami’. And so they will likewise perish. Venerable brothers, our duty is to do what is necessary to introduce the system of justice, taking these subtleties into consideration. The political apparatus which seeks to establish ‘hak nizami’ in Turkey is the Welfare Party.” 36. On 10 November 1996 the mayor of Kayseri, Mr Şükrü Karatepe, had urged the population to renounce secularism and asked his audience to “keep their hatred alive” until the regime was changed, in the following terms: “The dominant forces say ‘either you live as we do or we will sow discord and corruption among you’. So even Welfare Party Ministers dare not reveal their world-outlook inside their Ministries. This morning I too attended a ceremony in my official capacity. When you see me dressed up like this in all this finery, don’t think it’s because I’m a supporter of secularism. In this period when our beliefs are not respected, and indeed are blasphemed against, I have had to attend these ceremonies in spite of myself. The Prime Minister, other Ministers and MPs have certain obligations. But you have no obligations. This system must change. We have waited, we will wait a little longer. Let us see what the future has in store for us. And let Muslims keep alive the resentment, rancour and hatred they feel in their hearts.” Mr Şükrü Karatepe had been convicted of inciting the people to hatred on the ground of religion. 37. On 8 May 1997 Mr İbrahim Halil Çelik, Refah MP for the province of Şanlıurfa, had spoken in Parliament in favour of the establishment of a regime based on sharia and approving acts of violence like those which were taking place in Algeria: “If you attempt to close down the ‘İmam-Hatip’ theological colleges while the Welfare Party is in government, blood will flow. It would be worse than in Algeria. I too would like blood to flow. That’s how democracy will be installed. And it will be a beautiful thing. The army has not been able to deal with 3,500 members of the PKK. How would it see off six million Islamists? If they piss into the wind they’ll get their faces wet. If anyone attacks me I will strike back. I will fight to the end to introduce sharia.” Mr İbrahim Halil Çelik had been expelled from the party one month after the application for dissolution had been lodged. His exclusion had probably only been an attempt to evade the penalty in question. 38. Refah’s vice-chairman, the Minister of Justice, Mr Şevket Kazan, had visited a person detained pending trial for activities contrary to the principle of secularism, thus publicly lending him his support as a Minister. 39. On the basis of the evidence adduced on 7 July 1997 by Principal State Counsel’s Office, the Constitutional Court held that the following further evidence confirmed that Refah was a centre of activities contrary to the principle of secularism: – In a public speech on 7 May 1996 Mr Necmettin Erbakan had emphasised the importance of television as an instrument of propaganda in the holy war being waged in order to establish Islamic order: “... A State without television is not a State. If today, with your leadership, you wished to create a State, if you wanted to set up a television station, you would not even be able to broadcast for more than twenty-four hours. Do you believe it is as easy as that to create a State? That’s what I told them ten years ago. I remember it now. Because today people who have beliefs, an audience and a certain vision of the world, have a television station of their own, thanks be to God. It is a great event. Conscience, the fact that the television [channel] has the same conscience in all its programmes, and that the whole is harmonious, is very important. A cause cannot be fought for without [the support of] television. Besides, today we can say that television plays the role of artillery or an air force in the jihad, that is the war for domination of the people ... it would be unthinkable to send a soldier to occupy a hill before those forces had shelled or bombed it. That is why the jihad of today cannot be waged without television. So, for something so vital, sacrifices must be made. What difference does it make if we sacrifice money? Death is close to all of us. When everything is dark, after death, if you want something to show you the way, that something is the money you give today, with conviction, for Kanal 7. It was to remind you of that that I shared my memories with you. ... That is why, from now on, with that conviction, we will truly make every sacrifice, until it hurts. May those who contribute, with conviction, to the supremacy of Hakk [Allah] be happy. May Allah bless you all, and may He grant Kanal 7 even more success. Greetings.” – By a decree of 13 January 1997 the cabinet (in which the Refah members formed a majority) had reorganised working hours in public establishments to make allowances for fasting during Ramadan. The Supreme Administrative Court had annulled this decree on the ground that it undermined the principle of secularism. 40. The Constitutional Court observed that it had taken into consideration international human-rights protection instruments, including the Convention. It also referred to the restrictions authorised by the second paragraph of Article 11 and Article 17 of the Convention. It pointed out in that context that Refah’s leaders and members were using democratic rights and freedoms with a view to replacing the democratic order with a system based on sharia. The Constitutional Court observed: “Democracy is the antithesis of sharia. [The] principle [of secularism], which is a sign of civic responsibility, was the impetus which enabled the Turkish Republic to move on from Ummah [ümmet – the Muslim religious community] to the nation. With adherence to the principle of secularism, values based on reason and science replaced dogmatic values. ... Persons of different beliefs, desiring to live together, were encouraged to do so by the State’s egalitarian attitude towards them. ... Secularism accelerated civilisation by preventing religion from replacing scientific thought in the State’s activities. It creates a vast environment of civic responsibility and freedom. The philosophy of modernisation of Turkey is based on a humanist ideal, namely living in a more human way. Under a secular regime religion, which is a specific social institution, can have no authority over the constitution and governance of the State. ... Conferring on the State the right to supervise and oversee religious matters cannot be regarded as interference contrary to the requirements of democratic society. ... Secularism, which is also the instrument of the transition to democracy, is the philosophical essence of life in Turkey. Within a secular State religious feelings simply cannot be associated with politics, public affairs and legislative provisions. Those are not matters to which religious requirements and thought apply, only scientific data, with consideration for the needs of individuals and societies.” The Constitutional Court held that where a political party pursued activities aimed at bringing the democratic order to an end and used its freedom of expression to issue calls to action to achieve that aim, the Constitution and supranational human-rights protection rules authorised its dissolution. 41. The Constitutional Court observed that the public statements of Refah’s leaders, namely those of Mr Necmettin Erbakan, Mr Şevket Kazan and Mr Ahmet Tekdal, had directly engaged Refah’s responsibility with regard to the constitutionality of its activities. It further observed that the public statements made by MPs Mr Şevki Yılmaz, Mr Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and Mr İbrahim Halil Çelik, and by the mayor of Kayseri, Mr Şükrü Karatepe, had likewise engaged the party’s responsibility since it had not reacted to them in any way or sought to distance itself from them, or at least not before the commencement of the dissolution proceedings. 42. As an additional penalty, the Constitutional Court decided to strip Necmettin Erbakan, Şevket Kazan, Ahmet Tekdal, Şevki Yılmaz, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and İbrahim Halil Çelik of their MP status, in accordance with Article 84 of the Constitution. It found that these persons, by their words and deeds, had caused Refah’s dissolution. The Constitutional Court also banned them for five years from becoming founding members, ordinary members, leaders or auditors of any other political party, pursuant to Article 69 § 8 of the Constitution. 43. Judges Haşim Kılıç and Sacit Adalı expressed dissenting opinions stating, inter alia, that in their view the dissolution of Refah was not compatible either with the provisions of the Convention or with the case‑law of the European Court of Human Rights on the dissolution of political parties. They observed that political parties which did not support the use of violence should be able to take part in political life and that in a pluralist system there should be room for debate about ideas thought to be disturbing or even shocking. 44. This judgment was published in the Official Gazette on 22 February 1998.

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8. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Athens. 9. Between 1 February 1961 and 31 May 1981 the applicant paid contributions to the Fund of Typographers and Graphic-Arts Employees for 4,246 working days. Between 1 May 1979 and 30 July 1981 he paid contributions to the Social Security Fund for Technical Staff working in the Athens Press for twenty months and six days. Between 1 August 1981 and 9 May 1988 he paid contributions to the same fund for six years, eight months and three days. Then the applicant requested to be put on retirement under sections 18 § 2 and 10 § 1 of Law no. 1186/81. According to that law, persons who had contributed for at least five years to the Social Security Fund for Technical Staff working in the Athens Press were entitled to a pension if they were made redundant out of no fault of their own or because of the introduction of new technology. Those who had contributed for five to ten years would receive a monthly pension of GRD 10,000. A higher amount was fixed for those who had contributed for more than ten years. 10. On 5 August 1988 the Director of the Social Security Fund for Technical Staff working in the Athens Press decided that the applicant was entitled to the pension provided for those who had worked for five to ten years. 11. On 24 September 1988 the applicant appealed against this decision considering that, under the relevant legislation, the Fund should have also taken into consideration the working days in respect of which he had paid contributions to the Fund of Typographers and Graphic-Arts Employees. His appeal was rejected by the Board of the Social Security Fund for Technical Staff working in the Athens Press sometime in 1988. 12. On 12 November 1988 the applicant challenged this decision before the First Instance Administrative Court of Athens. On 15 December 1989 the court considered that sections 18 § 2 and 10 § 1 of Law no. 1186/81 were provisions of an exceptional nature. As a result, there was no room for applying the legislation concerning the taking into consideration of working days in respect of which contributions had been paid to other funds. 13. On 18 July 1990 the applicant appealed against this decision. 14. On 30 June 1992 the Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens allowed the applicant's appeal. 15. On 8 June 1993 the Social Security Fund appealed in cassation. 16. On 5 May 1997 the Council of State quashed the decision brought before it and referred the case back to the Court of Appeal. 17. On 10 December 1999 the Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens rejected the applicant's appeal. This judgment was notified to the applicant on 19 May 2000.

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8. The applicant is a Cypriot national of Turkish origin who was born in 1950 and is a paediatrician residing in Nicosia, north of the “green line”. 9. In addition to being a critic of the Turkish-Cypriot authorities and of the Turkish military presence in the northern part of Cyprus, which he defines as “occupation”, the applicant is the “Turkish-Cypriot coordinator” of the Movement for an Independent and Federal Cyprus, an unregistered association of Turkish and Greek Cypriots founded in 1989 in Nicosia. The movement has a Turkish-Cypriot coordinating committee in the northern part of the island and a Greek-Cypriot coordinating committee in the southern part. The purpose of the Movement is to develop close relations between the two communities. To that end, it organises bi-communal meetings of a political, cultural, medical or social character. 10. The applicant is normally unable to obtain a permit from the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities to visit the “buffer-zone” or the southern part of the island in order to participate in various bi-communal meetings. Thus, between 8 March 1992 and 14 April 1998, the date of the Commission's admissibility decision, only 6 out of 46 requests for such permits were granted. Further, between 18 April 1998 and 16 October 1999 two more permits were refused, one of which, however, was granted later on. The requests that were turned down concerned, inter alia, a UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) Spring Fair at Nicosia International Airport in May 1992, a bi-communal medical seminar organised by the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in June 1992, a meeting of the coordinating committee for the “Movement for an Independent and Federal Cyprus” at the Ledra Palace in October 1992 as well as two meetings for the reorganisation of this committee in April and July 1994, a seminar on cardiology organised by the UNHCR in June 1994, a general meeting of the New Cyprus Association in December 1997 and a number of receptions organised by the German embassy in Nicosia. Moreover, in May 1992 the above-mentioned authorities refused to allow Greek Cypriots to attend a meeting organised by the applicant in the northern part of the island. 11. The applicant claimed that the Council of Ministers of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”) had adopted a decision prohibiting him from contacting Greek Cypriots. Reference to this decision was allegedly made in a letter dated 3 February 1992 by the Health Minister of the “TRNC” to the applicant, which reads as follows: “According to the information our Ministry has received, you were informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence orally and this has been a decision of the government and we have nothing to add in our capacity as the Ministry.” 12. On 7 May 1992 the applicant wrote to the Prime Minister of the “TRNC” requesting to be informed of the content of the Council of Ministers' decision referred to in the above-mentioned letter, but received no reply. 13. On 29 May 1992 he sent a letter of protest to the Foreign Minister of Turkey, which has also remained unanswered. 14. On 18 May 1994 the Directorate of Consular and Minority Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the “TRNC” informed the applicant that “the permission requested by [his] letter of 19 April 1994 was refused for security reasons, in the public interest and because [he had] made propaganda against the State”. 15. On 24 May 1994 the applicant wrote to the Deputy Prime Minister of the “TRNC”, asking whether the previous decision of the Council of Ministers was still in force since he was not allowed to visit the buffer-zone or cross over into Nicosia. He received no answer and on 19 July 1994 he sent a reminder, which also remained unanswered. However, the applicant claimed that, in an article published in a newspaper on 18 March 1996, the former Deputy Prime Minister (to whom he had sent the above-mentioned letters) had stated that when he had held this position he had requested an explanation by the Prime Minister as well as the President of the “TRNC” in relation to the refusal of permits, but had not received an answer.

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6. The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Pagani, which they had let to R.E. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 December 1983, the applicants informed the tenant of their intention to terminate the lease and summoned him to appear before the Nocera Inferiore Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 12 April 1984, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Nocera Inferiore Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 July 1985. 9. On 13 September 1985, 21 January 1988 and 11 January 1990, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 10. On 12 March 1990, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 6 April 1990. 11. Between 6 April 1990 and 25 June 1990 the bailiff made two attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 12. On 9 September 1999, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 6 October 1999. 13. Between 6 October 1999 and 17 January 2000, the bailiff made three attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 14. On 17 January 2000, the applicants recovered possession of the apartment.

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7. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Naples, which she had let to E.F and then to his widow L.D'A. 8. In a writ of 7 November 1981, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 3 May 1982. She asked the tenant to vacate the premises by that date and summoned him to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 13 October 1983, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 3 May 1984. 10. On 25 November 1983, E.F. opposed alleging the expiry of the lease on another date. 11. By a decision of 23 November 1984, the Naples District Court rejected the appeal of E.F. and served him notice that the order for possession would be enforced on 17 May 1990. 12. On 22 February 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 17 May 1990. 13. Between 17 May 1990 and 15 December 1998, the bailiff made twenty-six attempts to recover possession. 14. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 15. According to law no. 431/98, the Naples Magistrate suspended the eviction proceedings until 15 May 1999. 16. On 1 June 1999, the applicant served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 June 1999. 17. Between 15 June 1999 and 16 November 1999, the bailiff made six attempts to recover possession. 18. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 19. On an unspecified date of 2001, the tenant died and the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.

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9. The applicant was born in 1950 and is currently detained in Carstairs Hospital, Lanarkshire. 10. On 8 September 1967 the applicant, then aged 17, was convicted, after a guilty plea, of culpable homicide. The court was satisfied on the oral evidence of two consultant psychiatrists that the applicant was suffering from “mental deficiency”, a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1960 and such as would warrant his detention (sections 6 and 23(1)). It ordered that he be detained in a mental hospital under a hospital order. It also made an order restricting his discharge from detention without limit of time (sections 55(1) and (7) and 60(1) of the 1960 Act). Although one doctor gave the opinion that the applicant suffered from a psychopathic or personality disorder, this was not the basis for the detention. 11. On 24 April 1972 the applicant escaped from the State hospital but was recaptured the same day. 12. By no later than 1980, he was no longer regarded as suffering from a mental deficiency. The sole medical basis for his detention since that date has been a diagnosis of anti-social personality or psychopathic disorder. 13. After 1983, patients under a restriction order were provided with the opportunity of applying annually to the sheriff to obtain discharge. According to the Mental Health (Scotland) Act 1984 (“the 1984 Act”), the criteria for admission for both civil and criminal patients were amended. Section 17 provided that where the mental disorder from which the person suffered was a persistent one manifested only by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct (that is, a psychopathic or anti-social personality disorder), he could only be detained where medical treatment was likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of his condition. This reflected general medical pessimism as to the benefits of medical treatment for psychopaths. The sheriff was required to release a restricted patient where the patient was not suffering from a mental disorder making it appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment, or it was not necessary for the health and safety of the patient or the protection of other persons that he receive such treatment (section 64 of the 1984 Act). 14. In 1985 the applicant was transferred to an open hospital. On 6 August 1986 he reoffended, was arrested and remanded to prison. He was charged on a summary complaint with the assault and attempted abduction of an 8-year-old child. Psychiatric reports were obtained from two consultant psychiatrists. In their reports of 14 August 1986, both referred to the applicant’s personality disorder but neither considered him to be suffering from mental disorder making it appropriate for him to receive hospital treatment. He was found sane and fit to plead. Accordingly, on conviction of assault and attempted abduction by a sheriff on 26 September 1986, he was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment, not to a hospital disposal. 15. On completion of his sentence in prison, the applicant was recalled to the State hospital by the Secretary of State on the basis of the 1967 hospital and restriction orders, pursuant to section 68(3) of the 1984 Act. This had been on the recommendation of a consultant psychiatrist consulted by the Secretary of State, who in his report of 8 August 1986 found that there was no continuing evidence of mental subnormality or of any evidence of mental illness other than persistent abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct. While he was not convinced that the applicant’s period of treatment in the open hospital had improved his behaviour in any consistent fashion, the only possible reason to continue his detention in hospital was to attempt to modify his aggressive and seriously irresponsible conduct. In his view the only appropriate type of hospital management would be the more secure and structured organisation within the State hospital. It was further noted that the incident with the child raised grave doubts concerning the safety to other people of allowing the applicant to be released from institutional care and it was for that reason that he recommended the applicant’s return to the State hospital. On 7 October 1986, on the day of the applicant’s release from prison, the applicant was transferred back to the State hospital. 16. The applicant sought discharge from hospital on a number of occasions. Between February 1987 and June 1994 he obtained some eighteen reports from six psychiatrists, the majority of which were to the effect that he did not suffer from a mental disorder of a nature or degree justifying continued detention as he was not treatable. Some of the reports indicated that the continuing detention was leading, or was likely to lead, to a deterioration of his condition and that he required rehabilitation from his institutionalisation. Between August 1986 and May 1994, ten psychiatric reports on the applicant were prepared for government agencies by eight psychiatrists, in which varying opinions were also given as to the applicant’s amenability to treatment. 17. The applicant’s appeals to the sheriff on 29 February 1988, 20 October 1988, and 12 May 1992 for absolute or conditional discharge were unsuccessful. 18. On 8 April 1994, the applicant lodged a further appeal with the sheriff under section 63(2) of the 1984 Act. Between May and June 1994, psychiatric reports were prepared. On 14 June and 1 July 1994, the sheriff heard evidence. 19. On 19 July 1994 the sheriff rejected the applicant’s application for discharge. He noted that it was common ground that the onus of proof lay on the applicant to satisfy him, on the balance of probabilities, that the conditions in section 64(1)(a) or (b) were made out (see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below, paragraph 32). He had before him the written and oral evidence of seven consultant psychiatrists. He found that they were unanimous that the applicant suffered from a mental disorder, namely a persistent and permanent psychopathic/anti-social personality disorder, manifested by abnormally aggressive and seriously irresponsible behaviour. In the event of the applicant being released, he found there was a very high risk of his reoffending and that any such offence was likely to have a sexual connotation. He accepted that the evidence was such that the applicant’s disorder would not be likely to justify his admission to hospital had his original offence been committed in 1994 and noted that the majority of the opinions were to the effect that the applicant’s condition was not curable and that the medical treatment provided by the State hospital had not alleviated and would not alleviate his condition. However, he nonetheless found that the applicant’s disorder was severe and that it was appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment. He stated that nowhere in the Act did it state that a criminal ordered by the High Court to be detained without limit of time should be discharged if his condition was not being alleviated. However, in any event, he agreed with Dr White, the medical officer responsible for the applicant, who stated in his report: “... in the structured setting of the State hospital in a supervised environment [the applicant’s] anger management improves, resulting in his being less physically aggressive. There is evidence that when this structure or supervision is lessened [the applicant] poses more of a danger to others e.g. his abuse of parole ... Medical treatment has alleviated his condition and should continue to do so.” 20. The sheriff also referred to Dr Smith’s report which stated: “At that time (1967) he was emotionally immature and illiterate. Since then there have been marked improvements in his educational attainments. He has benefited from nursing and medical care in the stable environment provided by the State hospital.” 21. The sheriff concluded: “The majority medical opinion is that rehabilitation should take place in another hospital. It is a matter for Dr White to consider whether he can prepare the applicant for a transfer; and it is for Dr White to decide and not for me to advise. Presumably rehabilitation will alleviate his condition. ... I am told that psychiatrists would today be unlikely to recommend admission to the State hospital. However, the applicant was properly admitted and detained and I have not been satisfied that he is now not suffering from a mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment.” 22. No appeal lay against the sheriff’s decision. 23. On 28 February 1995 the Secretary of State received notice that the applicant had applied for legal aid to challenge the sheriff’s decision by way of judicial review application. In March 1995 legal aid was refused. On 16 October 1995 the Secretary of State received intimation of the applicant’s fresh application for legal aid. On 17 November 1995 legal aid was granted by the Scottish Legal Aid Board. 24. On 21 February 1996 the applicant lodged a petition with the Outer House of the Court of Session for judicial review of the sheriff’s decision, claiming that the sheriff had erred in law or that he had reached a decision on the appeal which was irrational having regard to the evidence. A hearing took place on 16 May 1996 before Lord Rodger. On 29 May 1996 Lord Rodger dismissed the petition, finding that the sheriff’s conclusion that it was appropriate that the applicant should be liable to be detained in hospital for treatment was entirely justifiable. He dismissed the applicant’s claim that the sheriff had imposed an excessively high burden of proof on the applicant, considering that the sheriff had applied the proper standard and had made a positive finding that he was satisfied that it was appropriate for the applicant to be detained for treatment. 25. On 14 June 1996 the applicant renewed his application to the Inner House of the Court of Session. On 28 June 1996 the case was sisted (adjourned) to enable the applicant to apply for legal aid. On 30 August 1996 the Scottish Legal Aid Board granted legal aid. On 7 November 1996 the applicant applied to end the adjournment. On 12 November 1996 the Inner House recalled the sist. On 23 January 1997 a hearing was set for 24‑26 June 1997. The hearing took place. 26. On 22 August 1997 the Inner House of the Court of Session allowed the appeal and quashed the decision of the sheriff. It held that in the case of a psychopath the discharge criteria in section 64 of the 1984 Act incorporated the “treatability” criterion in section 17 of the Act, namely the criterion that, in the case of a person suffering from a mental disorder manifested only by abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct, the medical treatment must be such as was likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration in his condition. Having reviewed the evidence, it found that the sheriff had wrongly concluded that the applicant was treatable and that the sheriff was obliged to discharge a restricted psychopathic patient who was not treatable. 27. On 11 November 1997 the Secretary of State appealed to the House of Lords. On 9 December 1997 and 25 February 1998 the parties agreed to an extension of time to lodge court documents. On 31 March 1998 the case was set down for hearing on 12 and 13 October 1998. 28. Following that hearing, on 3 December 1998, the House of Lords allowed the appeal. In their judgment, the Lords agreed with the Inner House that the treatability criterion was incorporated into the discharge criteria in section 64 but rejected its approach to the evidence. They held that treatment which alleviated the symptoms and manifestations of the underlying medical disorder of a psychopath was treatment within the meaning of section 17(1), even if the treatment did not cure the disorder itself. They found that the Inner House, on a judicial review application, was not entitled to substitute its own opinion as to the applicant’s treatability for that of the sheriff, although it could have done so on an appeal. 29. Lord Hutton said, inter alia: “It is clear that there was a difference of opinion between the seven psychiatrists who gave evidence before the sheriff. The sheriff recognised this and stated that ‘the majority opinion among the witnesses was that the medical treatment provided by the State hospital had not alleviated and would not alleviate his condition’. But the sheriff referred to the evidence of Dr Chiswick, who was in favour of an absolute discharge of the [applicant], and who stated that ‘Dr White’s plans for anger management etc. would be regarded by him as treatment’. And it is clear ... that the sheriff accepted the opinion of Dr White, who was the responsible medical officer for the [applicant] that the anger management of the [applicant] in the structured setting of the State hospital in a supervised environment resulted in his being less physically aggressive. In other words, it was Dr White’s opinion that the symptoms of his underlying condition were alleviated and this led the sheriff to the conclusion that medical treatment ‘should continue’ to alleviate his condition. Therefore in my view contrary to the opinion of the Inner House the Lord Ordinary was right to decide that, given the evidence which was before the sheriff, it would be wrong to hold that no sensible sheriff could have reached the decision which he did.” 30. Lord Hutton adverted to the danger which could arise under the mental health provisions that a sheriff could be obliged to release an untreatable psychopath who might well harm members of the public. The balancing of the protection of the public against the claim of a psychopath convicted many years ago that he should not continue to be detained in hospital when medical treatment would not improve his condition was, however, an issue for Parliament to decide, not the judges.

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8. The applicants were born in 1945 in 1963 respectively and live in Luxembourg. 9. On 21 July 1998 the first applicant, acting in his capacity as a journalist, published an article in Lëtzebuerger Journal, a daily newspaper, under the headline “Minister W. convicted of tax fraud” (Minister W. der Steuerhinterziehung überführt). He alleged in the article that the minister had broken the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Commandments by committing value-added tax (VAT) frauds. He went on to say that a politician from the right might have been expected to take the rules so carefully drawn up by Moses more seriously. He added that a fiscal fine of 100,000 Luxembourg francs had been imposed on the minister. He said in conclusion that the minister’s conduct was particularly shameful in that it involved a public figure, who should have set an example. 10. The applicants produced documents showing that the fine had been imposed on the minister concerned on 16 July 1998 by the Director of the Registration and State-Property Department (Administration de l’enregistrement et des domaines), pursuant to section 77(2) of the VAT Act of 12 February 1979. The decision had been served on the minister on 20 July 1998. It also appears that on 27 July 1998 the minister appealed to the District Court against the fine. In a judgment of 3 March 1999, the District Court ruled that the fine was not justified as the offence under section 77(2) of the VAT Act of 12 February 1979 had not been made out. An appeal was lodged against that judgment to the Supreme Court of Justice. The parties have not furnished any further information regarding developments in those proceedings. 11. The decision of 16 July 1998 was the subject of comment in other newspapers, such as the daily Le Républicain Lorrain and the weekly d’Lëtzebuerger Land. A Liberal member of Parliament also tabled a parliamentary question on the matter. 12. Two sets of court proceedings were issued following the publication of the first applicant’s article. 13. On 24 July 1998 the minister brought an action in damages in the District Court against the first applicant and Lëtzebuerger Journal, arguing that they had been at fault in publishing the information concerning the fiscal fine and making comments which he said constituted an attack on his honour. In a judgment of 31 March 1999, the District Court dismissed the minister’s action on the ground that the article came within the sphere of freedom of the press. In a judgment of 27 February 2002, the Court of Appeal overturned the District Court’s judgment. 14. On 4 August 1998 the minister lodged a criminal complaint. 15. On 21 August 1998 the public prosecutor requested the investigating judge to open an investigation into a suspected offence by the first applicant of handling information disclosed in breach of professional confidence, and by a person or persons unknown of breach of professional confidence. The public prosecutor stated in his submissions: “The investigation and inquiries should determine which civil servant or civil servants from the Registration and State-Property Department had any involvement in the case and access to the documents.” The public prosecutor also requested the investigating judge to carry out or arrange for searches of the first applicant’s home and any appurtenances, the offices of Lëtzebuerger Journal and the Registration and State-Property Department offices. 16. Various searches were then carried out. 17. On 19 October 1998 the investigating judge issued two warrants for searches to be made of the first applicant’s home and workplace, the investigators being instructed to “search for and seize all objects, documents, effects and/or other items that [might] assist in establishing the truth with respect to the above offences or whose use [might] impede progress in the investigation”. The first order specified that the places to be searched were “Robert Roemen’s home and appurtenances, ..., any place in which he may be found and cars belonging to or used by him”. 18. Both warrants were executed on 19 October 1998, but no evidence was found. 19. On 21 October 1998 the first applicant applied for orders setting aside the warrants issued on 9 October 1998 and all the investigative steps taken pursuant thereto, in particular the searches carried out on 19 October 1998. In addition to arguments based on domestic law, he alleged a violation of Article 10 of the Convention, emphasising that he was entitled to protect his journalistic sources. 20. The District Court, sitting in closed session, dismissed both applications in two orders of 9 December 1998. It noted that the minister had complained of a number of matters, including the unlawful disclosure of information to the first applicant by Registration and State-Property Department officials, which the first applicant had allegedly gone on to use in a calumnious and defamatory newspaper article. Those matters were capable of falling within the definition of various criminal offences, including breach of professional confidence, breach of fiscal confidentiality, theft, handling, calumny and criminal defamation. The District Court said that civil servants were prohibited by Article 11 of the Central and Local Government Service Code (statut général des fonctionnaires) from disclosing any information that was confidential by nature which they had acquired in the course of their duties. It was a criminal offence under the General Tax Act to disclose confidential fiscal information and an offence under Article 458 of the Criminal Code for anyone receiving confidential information as part of their professional duties to divulge it. As to the handling offence, the District Court said that Article 505 of the Criminal Code applied to anyone who, by whatever means, knowingly benefited from the proceeds of a serious crime (crime) or other major offence (délit). According to legal commentators and the leading cases, handling could extend to intangible property, such as claims, but also manufacturing secrets or material covered by professional privilege. In that connection, the fact that the circumstances in which the property had been obtained had not been fully established was of little relevance if the alleged handler was aware of its unlawful origin; the classification of the primary offence was immaterial. The District Court found that the investigating judge in charge of the investigation had been entitled to order an investigative measure to obtain corroboration of the incriminating evidence already in his possession. It added that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, since the searches – which had been ordered to assemble evidence of and establish the truth concerning possible criminal offences that may have led to or facilitated the publication of a newspaper article – had not infringed freedom of expression or freedom of the press. 21. By two judgments of 3 March 1999, the Court of Appeal, sitting in closed session, dismissed appeals that had been lodged against the orders of 9 December 1998. 22. On 19 October 1998 the investigating judge issued a search warrant for immediate execution at the offices of the second applicant, who was the first applicant’s lawyer in the domestic proceedings. 23. In the course of the search, the investigators seized a letter of 23 July 1998 from the Director of the Registration and State-Property Department to the Prime Minister bearing a handwritten note: “To the Heads of Division. Letter transmitted in confidence for your guidance.” The applicants explained that the letter had been sent anonymously to the editorial staff of Lëtzebuerger Journal and the first applicant had immediately passed it on to his lawyer, the second applicant. 24. On 21 October 1998 an application was made to have the search warrant and all subsequent investigative steps set aside. 25. The District Court, sitting in closed session, granted that application on the ground that, in breach of section 35 of the Lawyers Act, the report of the police department that had executed the warrants on 19 October 1998 did not contain the observations of the Vice President of the Bar Council, who was present during the search and seizure operations. The District Court ruled that the seizure carried out on 19 October 1998 was invalid and ordered the letter of 23 July 1998 to be returned to the second applicant. 26. The letter was returned on 11 January 1999. 27. However, on the same day the investigating judge issued a fresh search warrant with instructions to “search for and seize all objects, documents, effects and/or other items that might assist in establishing the truth with respect to the above offences or whose use might impede progress in the investigation and, in particular, the document dated 23 July 1998 bearing the manuscript note to the heads of division”. The letter was seized once again later that day. 28. On 13 January 1999 the second applicant applied for an order setting the warrant aside, arguing, inter alia, that there had been a breach of the principle guaranteeing the inviolability of a lawyer’s offices and of the privilege attaching to communications between lawyers and their clients. That application was dismissed by the District Court, sitting in closed session, on 9 March 1999. It noted, firstly, that investigating judges were empowered to carry out searches even at the homes or offices of persons whose professional duties required them to receive information in confidence and who were legally bound not to disclose it and, secondly, that the provisions of section 35 of the Lawyers Act of 10 August 1991 had been complied with. The search and seizure operations had been executed in the presence of an investigating judge, a representative of the public prosecutor’s office and the President of the Bar Council. In addition, the presence of the President of the Bar Council and the observations he had considered it necessary to make regarding the protection of the professional confidence attaching to the documents to be seized had been recorded in the police department’s report. 29. In a judgment of 20 May 1999, the Court of Appeal, sitting in closed session, dismissed an appeal against the order of 9 March 1999. 30. In a letter of 23 July 1999, the first applicant enquired of the investigating judge as to progress in the case. He complained that no other steps had been taken and reminded the judge that he was not supposed to disregard the provisions of Article 6 of the Convention. He sent a similarly worded reminder on 27 September 2000. 31. On 3 October 2000 the applicants provided the Court with an article from the 29 September 2000 edition of the weekly newspaper d’Lëtzebuerger Land, containing the following extract: “... the inquiry in the W. case has thus just ended with a search of the home of a Registration and State-Property Department official, a member of the Socialist Party, and the logging of the incoming and outgoing telephone calls of at least two other members of the [Socialist Party] ...” 32. On 18 April 2001 the first applicant sent a further reminder to the investigating judge, who stated in a reply of 23 April 2001: “The judicial investigation is continuing.” 33. Following a letter from the first applicant dated 13 July 2001, the investigating judge informed him the same day that the police inquiries had finished and that the investigation file had just been sent to the public prosecutor for his submissions. 34. On 16 October 2001 the first applicant referred the public prosecutor to the terms of Article 6 of the Convention and reminded him that although the investigation in the case had taken three years, he had yet to be charged. 35. On 13 November 2001 the first applicant received a summons requiring him to attend for questioning on 30 November 2001 in connection with the offences referred to in the complaint. He was informed that he was entitled to have a lawyer present. 36. The first applicant was charged by the investigating judge on 30 November 2001 with “handling information received in breach of professional confidence”. 37. The applicants produced an article from the 9 January 2002 edition of the newspaper Le Quotidien, which revealed that the Prime Minister “considered that the methods employed by the investigating judge in the investigation into a breach of professional confidence were ‘disproportionate’ ”. 38. An order made on 1 July 2002 by the District Court, sitting in closed session, reveals that the charges against the first applicant were ruled to be null and void and that the case file was sent to the investigating judge with jurisdiction with instructions either to end or to continue the investigation. 39. On 14 January 2003 the applicant sent the Court a letter from the investigating judge dated 9 January 2003 informing him that “the judicial investigation [had] just ended”.

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8. The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Budapest. His previous applications (nos. 23209/94 and 27313/95) to the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) were joined and declared inadmissible by the Plenary Commission on 13 January 1997. 9. On 18 November 1965 the Budapest Regional Court, in the context of criminal proceedings with certain political connotations, convicted the applicant of espionage and sentenced him to six and a half years’ imprisonment. The Court also ordered the confiscation of his property. On 23 February 1966 the Supreme Court, upon the applicant’s appeal, amended the first-instance judgment in that the criminal offence was characterised as attempted sedition and the prison term was reduced to five years. The remainder of the appeal was dismissed. Subsequently the applicant served his sentence. His property, namely his villa and garden as well as his car and money in a bank, was confiscated. 10. On 25 October 1989 the Attorney General lodged an appeal on legal grounds with the Supreme Court against the judgments of 1965 and 1966, proposing that the applicant’s conviction be quashed as being unlawful and that the applicant be acquitted. On 12 December 1989 the Supreme Court followed this proposal. 11. On 6 February 1990 the applicant instituted proceedings before the Budapest Regional Court claiming restitution of his property. He further claimed compensation as a victim of a miscarriage of justice. On 19 February 1993 the Regional Court awarded him four million Hungarian forints (HUF) as compensation for damage suffered as a consequence of his imprisonment. 12. In the restitution proceedings, between September 1990 and February 1992 the Regional Court held several hearings. Moreover, given that both the confiscated car and real estate had been sold and that, therefore, only compensation was feasible, the court took expert evidence as to the value of this property. The Technical Institute of Judicial Experts prepared an opinion on that question. 13. On 24 February 1992 the Regional Court, following a further hearing, issued an order awarding the applicant HUF 50,000 for the car, plus HUF 6,200,000 in compensation for his losses. The remainder of his claims was dismissed. The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court sitting as a second instance, claiming higher compensation. 14. On 10 December 1992 the Supreme Court considered the case by way of a written procedure and dismissed the applicant’s appeal. 15. On 12 February 1993 the Attorney General, reacting to the applicant’s request to seek review of the Supreme Court’s decision, informed him that restitution proceedings were governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which excluded such a review. 16. On 19 February 1993 the applicant nevertheless lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court, complaining of the Budapest Regional Court’s decision, as well as of the second-instance decision taken by the Supreme Court. 17. On 22 June 1993 the Supreme Court rejected his petition. 18. On 5 April 1995 the Constitutional Court decided that the application of procedural rules assigning restitution cases to the criminal courts – and excluding a review by the Supreme Court – amounted to arbitrary discrimination. The Constitutional Court amended the said rules to the effect that the files should be forwarded to the civil courts with a view to conducting the proceedings. Concerning the applicant’s particular case, it decided that he should be entitled to institute civil review proceedings before the Supreme Court. 19. The applicant’s renewed petition for review dated 8 April 1995 was received at the Supreme Court on 10 April 1995. He filed further submissions on 10 and 13 May 1995. 20. On 19 October 1995 the Supreme Court rejected the renewed petition. It noted the background to the applicant’s case, including its rejection of the applicant’s previous petition. However, as the Code of Criminal Procedure only envisaged the possibility of one such petition, the Supreme Court had to reject any further petition brought by the same person. 21. On 12 February 1996 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s further constitutional complaint. It considered that the applicant’s submissions did not raise any questions of constitutionality within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Constitutional Court Act, but were limited to complaining that the Supreme Court had failed to implement properly the Constitutional Court’s earlier decision. To the extent that the applicant, in his submissions, pursued his petition for review, the Constitutional Court referred the case to the Budapest Regional Court for further action, the latter being the competent court for the civil procedure. 22. On 7 March 1996 the Budapest Regional Court forwarded the files to the Supreme Court for a decision on the applicant’s petition for review. 23. On 12 November 1996 the Supreme Court again rejected the applicant’s petition for review. It explained that, according to the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, no review could take place in proceedings of the present kind. Subsequently the applicant brought a further complaint before the Constitutional Court with a view to the annulment of that decision. 24. On 9 June 1998 the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the procedural situation governing the examination of criminal restitution claims in civil review proceedings. 25. Following the ensuing change in legislation, on 15 February 2000 the Supreme Court annulled its decision of 12 November 1996 and ordered a review of the merits of the applicant’s restitution claims. 26. On 25 June 2001 the Supreme Court’s review bench considered the case by way of a written procedure and dismissed the applicant’s petition on its merits. It held that the lower courts’ procedure, and in particular the manner of taking evidence – although it had been governed by the rules of criminal procedure concerning restitution – had complied with the Code of Civil Procedure. That decision was served on 6 August 2001.

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5. The applicant, Mrs Waleria Kroenitz, is a Polish national, who was born in 1903 and lives in Przemyśl, Poland. 6. In 1948 the applicant’s property was expropriated. On 28 June 1996 the Minister of Economy (Minister Gospodarki) annulled the expropriation order. 7. On 23 December 1996 the applicant brought a claim against a company “Domgos” (Częstochowskie Zakłady Metalowe “Domgos”) before the Częstochowa Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), seeking restitution of her property. The court held hearings on 30 May, 10 July and 17 October 1997. 8. On 30 January 1998 the applicant modified her claim and filed an action for compensation for loss of profits caused by the prolonged impossibility of using her property. 9. On 8 March 1999 the Częstochowa Regional Court held a hearing and gave an interlocutory judgment. It ordered that the property be restored to the applicant. 10. On 9 December 1999 the court was to hold a hearing, but an expert failed to appear because he had not been duly summoned. On 27 January 2000 and 23 March 2000 the court held further hearings. 11. A hearing listed for 15 February 2001 was cancelled since the expert and the defendant failed to appear. 12. The hearing listed for 29 March 2001 was adjourned as the court had ordered the expert to prepare a supplementary report. On 21 February 2002 the court held a hearing. 13. On 8 March 2002 the Regional Court gave judgment and awarded the applicant compensation. Following the defendant’s appeal, the proceedings are pending before the Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 14. On 26 April 1998 the applicant asked the Minister of Economy to award her compensation. On 22 May 1998 the Minister dismissed her request. 15. On 24 June 1998 the applicant filed with the Warsaw Regional Court an action for compensation against the State Treasury the Minister of Economy. The court held hearings on 19 November 1999 and 22 September 2000. 16. On 22 September 2000 the court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed. 17. On 24 January and 7 March 2002 the Warsaw Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) held hearings. On the latter date the court gave judgment. The applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy).

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8. The applicants were born in 1951 and 1953 respectively and live in Florence. 9. Mrs B.P. was the owner of an apartment in Florence, which she had let to M.D.S. 10. In a writ served on the tenant on 21 November 1985, she informed him of her intention to terminate the lease expiring on 31 May 1986 and summoned him to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 11. By a decision of 9 December 1985, which was made enforceable on 11 October 1988, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. 12. On 17 December 1986, the applicants became the owners of the apartment. 13. On 8 November 1989, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 14. On 27 December 1989, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 23 January 1990. 15. On 2 June 1990, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for themselves. 16. Between 23 January 1990 and 17 June 1996, the bailiff made fourteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 17. On 4 September 1996, the tenant vacated the premises.

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9. The applicant is a German national who was born in 1915. He has an illegitimate daughter, Isa, who was born in 1985. Both before and after her birth, relations between the parents were strained. Until the summer of 1989 the applicant saw his daughter regularly, looking after her during the daytime on occasion, even though he lived some 300 km from her home. After a year without any contact, he saw her again at the end of 1990. Thereafter, the mother refused to allow any further contact. 10. In 1991 the applicant applied to the Bonn District Court (Amtsgericht) for an order granting him access to his daughter. On 12 March 1992 the District Court dismissed his application, holding that in view of the strained relations between the parents, the applicant’s obsessional attitude (zwanghaft) towards his daughter and her unwillingness to see him, it would not at that juncture be in the child’s interest, within the meaning of Article 1711 of the Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below) to grant the applicant access. The District Court also found that the applicant could not claim to be the victim of discrimination, as its decision would not have been any different had his daughter been legitimate. The applicant’s appeals to the Regional Court (Landgericht) and to the Cologne Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) were dismissed. On 9 February 1993 the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), sitting as a panel of three judges, decided not to entertain the applicant’s constitutional complaint. On 24 March 1993 the Bonn District Court dismissed a further application by the applicant on the grounds that the relations between the parents remained strained and that a two-year “cooling-off period” (Zeit der Ruhe) was required before the case could be re-examined. 11. On 23 June 1993 the applicant made a further application to the Bonn District Court for access to his daughter. 12. In a letter of 6 July 1993, the applicant informed the District Court that he considered that the judge hearing the case was biased. 13. On 2 November 1993 the District Court rejected the application and adjourned its decision until 12 March 1992. 14. On 20 January 1994 the applicant lodged further particulars of his grounds for challenging the judge hearing the case. On 28 January 1994 the Bonn Regional Court ruled that the challenge was unfounded. On 18 February 1994 the applicant appealed against that decision. 15. On 28 February 1994 he lodged his grounds of appeal and also appealed against the District Court’s decision of 2 November 1993. On 18 March 1994 the Cologne Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the Regional Court’s decision of 28 January 1994. 16. On 25 April 1994 the applicant lodged his grounds of appeal against the District Court’s decision of 2 November 1993. On 30 May and 25 July 1994 the Regional Court heard the child and her mother, followed by the applicant. 17. On 22 September 1994 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. It found that it would not be in the interests of the child’s welfare, within the meaning of Article 1711 § 2 of the Civil Code, to grant the applicant access. In particular, it noted that the situation observed on 25 September 1992 remained unchanged. 18. On 7 November 1994 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal with the Federal Constitutional Court in which he argued that Article 1711 of the Civil Code was unconstitutional. 19. On 22 March 1995 the applicant requested the Federal Constitutional Court to expedite his appeal in view of his age (he was 80 years old) and the fact that he was suffering from a heart condition. 20. Between 1995 and 1998 there was an exchange of correspondence in which the Federal Constitutional Court informed the applicant that his appeal had been put back in order to await the outcome of other appeals that were pending on the issue of the constitutionality of Article 1711 of the Civil Code. It is apparent from two editions of a German legal periodical (Neue Juristische Wochenschrift) of 1994 (p. 1335) and 1997 (p. 1057) that at least one of the sets of proceedings dated back to 1988 (no. 1 BvR 1216/88). In a letter of 15 February 1996, the judge rapporteur in the case advised the applicant that the Federal Constitutional Court was aiming to issue (angestrebt) its decision by the end of the year. 21. On 20 November 1997 the applicant made a further application to the Bonn District Court for access. 22. On 20 January 1998 the Federal Constitutional Court suggested to the applicant that he should declare that his appeal had been disposed of (erledigt), in view of the fact that new legislation on family matters (Kindschaftsrecht – see “Relevant domestic law and practice” below), regulating, inter alia, the relationship between fathers and their illegitimate children, was about to come into force. It pointed out that the outcome of his appeal would be the same if it declared Article 1711 of the Civil Code unconstitutional, as such a finding would merely require the legislature to amend the offending provision within a set period. 23. On 30 April 1998 the Bonn District Court rejected the applicant’s application for access, holding that there had been no change of circumstances that would warrant any other decision. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Bonn Regional Court. Following a hearing on 7 September 1998 the parties agreed that the applicant and his daughter would resume contact. With the support of the Bonn Regional Court, they arranged various meetings, which were subsequently cancelled for reasons attributable to each of the parties in turn. 24. In a letter of 10 August 1998, the applicant stated that he did not accept the proposal made by the judge rapporteur of the Federal Constitutional Court. 25. On 19 August 1998 the judge rapporteur wrote a further letter to the applicant in which he informed him that, as the new legislation had come into force, his constitutional appeal no longer raised a question of general importance (grundsätzliche Bedeutung) and, accordingly, had no prospect of success. He added that the legal costs the applicant had incurred in his constitutional appeal could only be reimbursed if he declared that his appeal had been disposed of. 26. In a letter of 19 October 1998, the applicant declared that his appeal had been disposed of, saying that he had done so solely in order to obtain reimbursement of his legal costs. 27. On 1 December 1998 the Federal Constitutional Court, sitting as a panel of three judges, made an order requiring the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia to reimburse the applicant’s legal costs relating to his constitutional appeal. 28. At the beginning of October 1999 the applicant was allowed to see his daughter again. Shortly afterwards, in a letter of 26 October 1999 and at the request of the Bonn Regional Court, he withdrew his appeal against the Bonn District Court’s decision of 30 April 1998. 29. A further meeting between the applicant and his daughter took place in April 2000 on the applicant’s eighty-fifth birthday. There has been no contact since and the applicant has not asked the Regional Court for a final ruling on his appeal.

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9. In 1983 the applicant was found to be partially disabled. She continued working. On 2 November 1988 the applicant was obliged to sign an agreement with her employer according to which her contract of employment would expire on 30 June 1989. 10. On 4 September 1989 the Social Security Commission in Bratislava declared the applicant fully disabled as from 1 July 1989. A full invalidity pension was granted to the applicant. 11. On 1 October 1990 her former employer rehabilitated the applicant for the persecution to which she had been subjected in the past. 12. After the entry into force of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act (see “Relevant domestic law” below) the applicant claimed that her invalidity pension should be increased. She alleged, in particular, that the termination of her contract of employment in 1989 had been due to political persecution within the meaning of Section 21 of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. 13. On 5 April 1993 the Social Security Administration dismissed the applicant’s claim on the ground that she had failed to comply with the requirements set out in Sections 21 and 22 of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. 14. On 21 March 1995 the Bratislava City Court upheld the decision. The City Court heard the parties and established that the applicant had failed to submit a certificate within the meaning of Section 22 of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act which was a prerequisite for granting her claim. The City Court noted that separate proceedings concerning this issue were pending before the Bratislava I District Court. It was further stated in the reasons for the judgment that the representative of the Social Security Administration had promised to adjust the applicant’s pension upon the delivery of such a certificate. 15. On 26 March 1996 the Bratislava I District Court ordered the successor of the applicant’s former employer to deliver a certificate pursuant to Section 22(1) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act to the applicant. Prior to that the District Court appointed an advocate to represent the applicant at the latter’s request. The applicant received the certificate on 14 October 1996. 16. On 18 October 1996 the applicant again requested the Social Security Administration to adjust her invalidity pension pursuant to the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. The request was dismissed on 30 October 1996. The decision stated, with reference to Section 24(6) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act, that the applicant’s invalidity pension could not be adjusted as her contract of employment had been terminated in the course of the same year when she had acquired the right to an invalidity pension. 17. On 18 November 1996 the applicant challenged the decision before the Bratislava City Court. She also requested the City Court to appoint a lawyer to represent her in the proceedings. She referred to Article 30(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure and explained that her handicap prevented her from coming to the court in person. The applicant further stated that she was indigent and that the case might raise questions of law of a complex nature. 18. In a written submission of 13 January 1997 the Social Security Administration asked the court to uphold the decision challenged by the applicant. This submission was forwarded to the applicant who submitted a written reply on 14 February 1997. The applicant maintained, in particular, that the conclusion of the administrative authority was erroneous and contrary to the pledge which its representative had earlier made (see paragraph 14 above). 19. On 23 January 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court, which took over the case from the former City Court, summoned the applicant to a hearing scheduled for 25 February 1997. A type-written remark on the upper part of the summons read as follows: “We hereby inform you that no compulsory defence is required in the proceedings and that the court cannot, therefore, appoint a defence counsel to assist you. In case that you wish to be represented by a lawyer, you should choose one yourself.” 20. On 14 February 1997 the applicant again requested the Regional Court that a lawyer be appointed to represent her in the proceedings. She explained, in particular, that her health did not allow her to attend the hearing, that her only income consisted of a modest invalidity pension and that she met the requirements for the appointment of a lawyer under the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. She asked the court to notify her of its position on her request “by means and within a period corresponding to the relevant legal rules”. The applicant further requested that the hearing be adjourned as, in her view, the court’s proceeding with the case in her absence would be contrary to her fundamental rights. 21. On 24 March 1997 the applicant informed the Regional Court that her health did not allow her to appear at the hearing scheduled for 1 April 1997. In the letter the applicant stated that a lawyer should be appointed to represent her and complained that her requests to this effect of 18 November 1996 and of 14 February 1997 had not been dealt with. 22. On 1 April 1997 the Bratislava Regional Court upheld the Social Security Administration’s decision of 30 October 1996. The Regional Court noted that the applicant’s contract of employment had been terminated by 30 June 1989 and that she had been declared fully disabled and granted an invalidity pension with effect from 1 July 1989, that is the day following the termination of her employment. The court concluded that her invalidity pension could not be adjusted pursuant to Section 24(6) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. 23. On 24 April 1997 the applicant appealed. She alleged that the Regional Court had decided arbitrarily and that it had disregarded the pledge to grant her claim after the delivery of the certificate made by the representative of the Social Security Administration in the proceedings leading to the City Court’s judgment of 21 March 1995. The applicant further argued that the Regional Court had failed to establish the relevant facts correctly. On 16 June 1997 the applicant submitted further documentary evidence to the appellate court. 24. On 29 September 1997 the Supreme Court upheld the first instance judgment. The Supreme Court reiterated that the applicant had been granted a full invalidity pension as from 1 July 1989, that is the day following the termination of her contract of employment. It therefore considered that the applicant had not suffered any damage which could be compensated pursuant to Section 24(6) of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that the representative of the defendant had apparently overlooked the above fact when she had stated that the claim would be granted upon the delivery of the relevant certificate to the applicant. However, that statement had been made in a different set of proceedings and it could not affect the decision on the applicant’s claim in the proceedings under the consideration. The appellate court decided in camera. 25. On 27 November 1997 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. She complained, inter alia, that the appellate court had not held a hearing in the case and had thus prevented her from submitting her arguments. On the same day the applicant requested the Bratislava Regional Court to appoint a representative to her in the proceedings on her appeal on points of law. She explained that the case was complex, that her handicap prevented her from acceding to the court room and that her only income was an invalidity pension amounting to 4,093 Slovakian korunas. The applicant also maintained that her constitutional right to legal protection had been violated in that her request for a lawyer to be appointed had not been processed in due manner. 26. On 27 January 1998 a different chamber of the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. The Supreme Court found that the applicant had been duly summoned to the hearing before the Bratislava Regional Court held on 1 April 1997 and that she had failed to appear without an excuse. As to the appellate proceedings, the Supreme Court recalled that Articles 250f and 250s of the Code of Civil Procedure permitted the appellate court to decide on the case without hearing the parties. Furthermore, in the course of the proceedings the applicant made proposals as regards the evidence to be taken, she made comments on the case and submitted her arguments to the courts. 27. The Supreme Court further noted that the applicant “had been free to choose a legal representative and to apply for free legal representation”. Since the applicant did not lack legal capacity to act, the courts were not obliged to appoint a lawyer ex officio. The Supreme Court examined the applicant’s appeal on points of law in camera with reference to Article 250s (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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8. The applicant was born in 1966 and lives in Taganrog. 9. The applicant worked for the Taganrog Customs Board, supervising the clearance of imported goods at a seaport customs post. In 1996 criminal proceedings were instituted against him and certain others for the alleged smuggling of considerable amounts of vodka. 10. On 22 May 2000 the Neklinovskiy District Court of the Rostov Region, composed of Judge Kink and two lay judges (народные заседатели), Ms Streblyanskaya and Ms Khovyakova, found the applicant guilty of being an accessory in the avoidance of customs duties and of abuse of office. 11. Immediately upon his conviction, the applicant was dispensed from serving the sentence partly because of the expiry of a statutory limitation period and partly because of a 1997 amnesty law. 12. On 26 and 29 May and 16 June 2000 the applicant and his counsel filed appeals against the judgment. 13. On 17 August 2000 the applicant requested from the President of the Neklinovskiy District Court a list of lay judges currently serving in the court and a copy of the President’s decision selecting those lay judges who were to sit in cases under the presidency of Judge Kink between January and May 2000. 14. On 29 August 2000 the applicant supplemented his appeal with new points. He challenged the bench that had delivered the judgment of 22 May, alleging a breach of the rules on the appointment of lay judges. In particular, the applicant submitted that, whereas the Federal Law on the Lay Judges of the Federal Courts of General Jurisdiction (“the Lay Judges Act”) allowed lay judges to be called once a year for a maximum period of fourteen days, or for as long as a specific case lasted, the lay judges Ms Streblyanskaya and Ms Khovyakova had been engaged earlier in the course of 2000 in several other trials. In addition, it was claimed that Ms Streblyanskaya’s statutory term of office had expired before the day of the applicant’s trial. 15. On 29 August 2000 the Criminal Division of the Rostov Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s appeals. The court also refused an application by the applicant and his counsel for access to copies of earlier judgments delivered by the Neklinovskiy District Court under the presidency of Judge Kink. The court held that the applicant had been informed of his right to challenge the bench at the outset of his trial, but he had failed to do so. No breach of the rules for the appointment of lay judges had been established. 16. On 16 November 2000 the President of the Rostov Regional Court refused an application for supervisory review (принесение протеста в порядке надзора) of the applicant’s case. In his application to the President, the applicant had raised a new argument in support of his allegation that the judges had not been appointed according to the applicable rules: it was claimed that there was nothing to indicate that the judges had been drawn at random by lot as required by the Lay Judges Act. The President rejected the applicant’s earlier argument as to the expiry of the judges’ term, referring to the Presidential Decree of 25 January 2000, whereby the terms of lay judges already in office had been extended pending the appointment of new ones. The President noted that the list of lay judges for the Rostov Region had been drawn up on 18 October 2000, after the applicant’s conviction. No answer was given to the applicant’s allegation that the judges had not been drawn by lot. 17. On 20 February 2001 the President of the Rostov Regional Court refused another application by the applicant for a supervisory review. 18. In August and October 2001 the applicant requested the President of the Legislature of the Neklinovskiy District to provide information concerning the lay judges who had been authorised to sit in cases during the period between 10 and 22 May 2000. 19. On 2 October 2001 the Neklinovskiy District Authority informed the applicant that the pertinent list of lay judges for the Neklinovskiy District had been compiled on 4 February 2000 and confirmed by the Legislature of the Rostov Region on 15 June 2000. 20. On an unspecified date following communication of the present application to the Government, the President of the Rostov Regional Court lodged an application for a supervisory review of the case on the ground that the judgment of 22 May 2000 had not described in sufficient detail the offence committed by the applicant and his accomplices. 21. On 3 May 2001 the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court granted the application, partly quashed the judgment of 22 May 2000 and the appeal judgment of 29 August 2000, and ordered a fresh examination of the case. 22. On 2 July 2001 the Neklinovskiy District Court found the applicant guilty of the same offences but dispensed him from serving the sentence because the case was time-barred. 23. An appeal by the applicant was dismissed by the Rostov Regional Court on 2 October 2001 and the judgment became final. 24. Following another application for supervisory review lodged by the President of the Rostov Regional Court on an unspecified date, the Presidium of the Rostov Regional Court on 31 January 2002 quashed the decisions given on 2 July and 2 October 2001. It found that the courts were not in a position to decide on the applicant’s guilt because the whole case was time-barred. С. Further developments 25. Following the request of the applicant’s lawyer, on 28 August 2002 the Neklinovskiy District Authority informed the applicant that the list of lay judges serving in the district had been adopted by a decision of the District Legislature on 4 February 2000 and confirmed by a decision of the Rostov Regional Legislature on 15 June 2000. 26. On 4 October 2002, the Neklinovskiy District Authority informed the applicant that there was no record of any adoption of lay judges’ lists before 4 February 2000 [The original letter indicated the date as “4 February 2002”, apparently a typographical error].

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9. On 23 September 1992 the applicants lodged an action with the Michalovce District Court. They claimed compensation, under the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act, for both real and movable property which had been taken away from their late father. 10. On 20 January 1993 the District Court submitted the action to the defendant authority for comments. On 6 April 1993 the defendant authority submitted its observations in reply. 11. On 28 April 1993 the District Court adjourned the case and requested the applicants to specify the legal provisions on which their claim was based and to submit further documentary evidence. On 24 May 1993 the applicants submitted further documents. They specified the provisions of the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act on which their action was based on 3 September 1993. 12. On 16 September 1993 the District Court heard the applicants. 13. On 5 October 1993 the judge inspected the real property in question in the presence of the parties. The judge also heard a witness. 14. On 8 November 1993 the applicants withdrew their claim concerning compensation for movable property. On 15 December 1993 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of that claim. This decision became final on 11 February 1994. 15. On 14 April 1994 the court heard two witnesses. 16. On 27 April 1994 the judge visited the real property in question and heard two witnesses and an expert. 17. On 11 May 1994 the applicants proposed that the court hear three witnesses. In September 1994 they requested the court not to proceed with the case between 20 October and 1 November 1994 due to the absence of their lawyer. 18. On 7 March 1995 the District Court heard three witnesses and invited the parties to explore the possibility of settling the case. On 18 May 1995 the applicants informed the judge that they were not opposed to her intention to order an expert opinion with a view to evaluating the property should the attempt to settle the case fail. On 29 June 1995 the defendant ministry refused to accept the applicants’ claims. 19. On 11 October 1995 the Michalovce District Court dismissed the action. The judgment was served on the parties on 1 and 4 December 1995 respectively. 20. On 15 December 1995 the applicants appealed. The defendant authority submitted its observations in reply on 29 January 1996, and on 20 February 1996 the case file was submitted to the appellate court. 21. On 6 March 1996 the applicants submitted further arguments to the appellate court. 22. On 7 October 1997 the Košice Regional Court upheld the first instance judgment. 23. On 7 January 1998 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They challenged the lower courts’ conclusions and complained that the Regional Court had not appointed an expert with a view to establishing the value of the property. 24. On 21 April 1998 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal on points of law. It found that the refusal to order an expert opinion was not a relevant reason for quashing the second instance judgment and held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the appellate court’s finding on the merits.

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8. The applicant left Czechoslovakia for Germany in 1968. After his judicial rehabilitation in 1990 he started living partly in Czechoslovakia and partly in Germany. According to the applicant, he spent the major part of the year 1992 in Czechoslovakia. On 25 September 1992 he registered his permanent residence at his friend’s address in Krompachy. He remained registered at this address until 22 June 1994. 9. On 28 September 1992 the applicant lodged a claim for restitution of his father’s and uncle’s property under the Land Ownership Act of 1991. 10. On 15 May 1996 the Spišská Nová Ves Land Office dismissed the applicant’s claim on the ground that at the relevant time he had not permanently resided within the territory of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic as required by Section 4(1) of the Land Ownership Act. 11. The Land Office established that a registered letter sent on 8 April 1993 could not be delivered as at that time nobody had lived at the applicant’s address in Krompachy. The Land Office had before it also a certificate in which the competent German authority confirmed that the applicant had registered his main abode (Hauptwohnung) in Wendelstein since 1973. The accompanying letter by the Slovakian vice-consul to Munich explained that, unlike in Slovakia, no distinction was made between permanent and temporary residence in Germany. The letter further stated that under German law the main abode was the place of residence preponderantly used by the person concerned in Germany, and that there was no obligation under German law to terminate its registration when a person spent the major part of a year abroad. The vice-consul expressed the view that in case that the applicant’s stay in Slovakia exceeded 183 days a year, his residence there could, theoretically, be regarded as permanent within the meaning of the Citizens’ Residence Registration Act of 1982. 12. In its decision the Land Office referred also to a police report according to which the applicant had not effectively established his permanent residence in Krompachy. The Land Office concluded, with reference to Section 3(2) and (5) and Section 4(1) of the Citizens’ Residence Registration Act of 1982 and to the relevant case-law and administrative practice, that the applicant did not meet the permanent residence requirement. 13. On 19 June 1996 the applicant requested the Košice Regional Court to review the Land Office’s decision. He alleged that since the beginning of 1992 he had resided at various places in Slovakia and submitted witness statements to this effect. The applicant further explained that several times a year he went to Germany where he was undergoing cancer therapy. 14. On 29 November 1996 the Košice Regional Court upheld the administrative decision challenged by the applicant. It noted that by the date of expiry of the deadline for lodging his claim on 31 December 1992 the applicant had not permanently resided within the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic as required by Section 4(1) of the Land Ownership Act. 15. The Regional Court recalled, in particular, that under Section 4(1) of the Citizens’ Residence Registration Act of 1982 citizens cannot permanently reside at more than one address at the same time. As the applicant failed to terminate the registration of his main abode in Germany prior to the registration of his permanent residence in Krompachy, his stay in the then Czechoslovakia was to be regarded as temporary. Reference was made to the relevant case-law and to the practice of the Ministry of the Interior. 16. The Regional Court further held that the applicant had submitted no evidence indicating that his abode in Krompachy met the requirements of a permanent residence within the meaning of Section 3(2) of the Citizens’ Residence Registration Act. Moreover, a police report before the court indicated that the applicant’s registration in Krompachy had been of a formal nature. 17. On 30 July 1999 the Supreme Court refused to re-examine the case as there was no remedy available against the Regional Court’s judgment of 29 November 1996.

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7. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Florence, which she had let to A.L. and F.U.. 8. In a writ served on the tenants on 23 December 1986, the applicant informed them that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and summoned them to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 9. By a decision of 27 January 1987, which was made enforceable on 2 February 1987, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. 10. On 8 June 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. 11. On 8 July 1989, she served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 7 August 1989. 12. Between 7 August 1989 and 18 February 1999, the bailiff made twenty-two attempts to recover possession. 13. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 14. Pursuant to Law no. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 6 September 1999. 15. On 6 July 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.

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8. The applicant was born in 1923 and lives in Palanga. 9. Before the Second World War the applicant's mother occupied a dwelling house (“the house”) on a plot of land measuring 1,422 square metres (“the plot”) in the centre of the tourist resort of Palanga on the Baltic Sea coast. Following the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940, the land was nationalised and the house was demolished in the 1960s. 10. By a decision of 25 September 1992 the Palanga City Council, by reference to the Restitution of Property Act, decided to “restore the property rights” of the applicant and her sister in regard to their late mother's land. No form of restitution was specified in the decision. 11. The decision of 25 September 1992 was not implemented as no land was returned and no compensation was offered. In January 1995 the applicant brought a court action against the local authority, claiming that the plot should have been returned to her and her sister. 12. On 15 December 1995 the Palanga City District Court dismissed the applicant's action. By reference to Article 5 of the Restitution of Property Act (see § 22 below), the court held that the applicant was not entitled to recover the plot, but that she should have been offered an alternative parcel in compensation as required by the law. 13. The applicant appealed, stating that the plot had to be returned to her. 14. On 3 April 1996 the Klaipėda Regional Court quashed the judgment of the District Court. The Regional Court found that the decision of the Palanga City Council of 25 September 1992 did not comply with Article 19 of the Restitution of Property Act as the local authority had not decided whether land or money and, in either case, which land or what amount of money should have been offered to the applicant as a compensation. The Regional Court held that the local authority had to resolve these questions. The court required the administration of Klaipėda County to “adopt, by 30 June 1996, a decision on the request by Stasė Jasiūnienė to restore her property rights in regard to the plot of land (iki 1996 m. birželio 30 d. priimti sprendimą pagal Stasės Jasiūnienės prašymą dėl nuosavybės teisės į žemės sklypą atstatymo)”. 15. However, no such decision was taken as the applicant refused an alternative parcel of land in another area of Palanga. The applicant's sister accepted an alternative parcel. 16. On 13 August 1996 the applicant obtained an execution warrant for the judgment of 3 April 1996. She put the matter in the hands of bailiffs who were unable to execute the warrant against the county administration. The executive authorities took no further decision as the applicant had again refused an alternative parcel of land. 17. By a letter of 15 December 1997, the Klaipėda County Governor stated that the applicant had misinterpreted the judgment of 3 April 1996. In the Governor's opinion, the Regional Court had only required the county administration to adopt a decision in accordance with the Restitution of Property Act. As the applicant had no buildings or other property on the plot, she was not entitled to its return. The Governor requested the applicant to approach planners at the Palanga City Council to choose an alternative parcel. He warned her that a different parcel would be allotted without her consent in order to comply with the judgment of 3 April 1996. 18. On 31 December 1997 the applicant wrote to the Prime Minister, stating that she had been entitled to the plot, that the alternative parcels offered by the local authority were located in the outskirts of Palanga, and that their value was thus not equivalent to the plot in the centre of town. 19. In a letter of 11 February 1998, the Director of the Land Authority of the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry stated that on 25 September 1992 the Palanga City Council had decided to restore the applicant's property rights notwithstanding the fact that there had been a lack of relevant documentation proving her late mother's ownership of the plot. Moreover, the Director stated that from the decision of 25 September 1992 it was “unclear in respect of which owner or land the property rights were restored[;] the form of the restitution of property was also unclear ...”. The Director requested the Klaipėda County Governor to re-examine the lawfulness of the decision of 25 September 1992. 20. Until 1999 the applicant was proposed and refused three offers by the Klaipėda County Governor for alternative parcels of land in various areas of Palanga. 21. By a letter of 30 August 1999, the executive authorities informed the applicant that she had not proved her mother's ownership of the original plot in accordance with the governmental instructions of 13 July 1998, i.e. she had not submitted the original papers confirming the purchase of the plot by her mother, or a court decision proving ownership. The executive authorities held that they could not proceed with a decision on compensation until the applicant presented these papers.

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9. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Košice. He is a businessman. 10. On 2 December 1991 the applicant requested the Košice City Prosecutor’s Office to bring criminal proceedings against H., a businessman from the Czech Republic whom he suspected of having committed fraud. The request was examined by various authorities but no criminal proceedings were brought. 11. On 4 December 1992 the applicant complained to the police that two unknown men had left a message at the entrance to his flat saying that they would break his hands if he did not “abstain from writing”. On 13 April 1993 the applicant complained to the police that a shot had been fired through a window in his flat. He claimed that he was being harassed because he had written articles about several former members of the Communist Party. Subsequently the applicant was informed that the police could not identify the perpetrators. 12. On 5 April 1993 the applicant complained to the head of the Košice Telecommunications Authority that, following a change of the central switchboard, telephone conversations at his agency were frequently interrupted. The applicant stated that there was a noise on the telephone prior to the interruption of a call which was similar to that which had formerly occurred when telephone calls were tapped by the communist secret police. He requested that the fault be remedied. 13. On 10 June 1993 a police investigator brought criminal proceedings against the applicant on the ground that he was suspected of having stolen goods from H. The decision was based on a written communication by the district prosecutor in Semily (Czech Republic). 14. On 1 November 1993 the applicant asked the Košice Regional Prosecutor to discontinue the criminal proceedings against him. In his letter the applicant complained, without providing further details, that the police investigator dealing with his case had obtained information on him by unlawfully tapping his telephone. He requested that criminal proceedings be brought against a person or persons unknown for illegal telephone tapping. 15. On 6 December 1993 the applicant addressed a letter to P., the Košice I district prosecutor. The letter contained, inter alia, the following statements: “Since you have not succeeded, comrade prosecutor, in attaining your aims in one area, you continue energetically, in accordance with the practice of the [former] State Security agents, to fabricate another case [against the applicant] as you have learned to do under the so-called infallible socialist law. On this occasion I can assure you, however, that I have not bowed to the high representatives of the former political system and, in particular, the [former] State Security agents who paid at least as much attention to my person as you do now. I do not intend today to let myself be intimidated, especially not by individuals such as yourself, a person with a dubious past, not to speak of [your] other qualities ... It is not only my earlier experience of managing a detective agency which makes it difficult for me to associate you with objectivity, professionalism and respect for the law. I would therefore like to remind you on this occasion that you are also bound by the law despite the fact that you probably consider yourself ... to be an almighty lord of the Tatra [Mountains] and the Váh [River] and, as such, beyond anyone’s reach as you are, for the time being, under the protective hand of comrade [M.]. Abuse of the law may have very unpleasant consequences for you. For the time being, I will only mention some of the abuses which do not call for any comments.” 16. In the letter the applicant further stated that the addressee was responsible for the dismissal of his criminal complaint against H. and the institution of criminal proceedings against him in 1993, and that he had unlawfully ordered the tapping of his telephone. 17. P. submitted the letter to his hierarchical superior, the Košice Regional Prosecutor. In a letter of 17 March 1994 the latter informed the applicant that it had not been established that P. had given an order to tap his telephone or that he had otherwise acted unlawfully. 18. In the meantime, on 7 March 1994, the applicant complained to the General Prosecutor that P. had committed an offence in that he had misused his authority. The letter read, inter alia, as follows: “[P.] accepted the request of [H.’s lawyer] ... that no criminal proceedings would be brought against [H.] in Slovakia notwithstanding that sufficient evidence existed to do so ... Of course, money paid by [H.] with a view to covering up his fraudulent activity also played a role in the matter. It would therefore be worth examining in this context whether [an offence of bribery was not committed] ... Following a ... threat ... by ... an investigator from the Košice I Investigation Office in the context of the case of [H.] ... I went to the aforesaid office on 10 June 1993. After I had rejected an ‘agreement’ which was proposed to me, [the investigator], a former State Security agent, accused me of having stolen [goods from H.] in 1991. Thus [P.] has been unwilling to bring proceedings against [H.] since 1991, and has arranged, through a police investigator who can easily be blackmailed, for proceedings to be brought against me in revenge for the justified complaints I had lodged against him. [P.] did so contrary to [the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure] because so far ... there is no evidence before [the relevant authorities] from which to conclude with sufficient certainty that I stole anything from [H.] Subsequently I realised that my telephone, which was also used by my detective agency, had been tapped contrary to Article 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 19. On a petition by P., the General Prosecutor’s Office agreed that criminal proceedings be brought against the applicant for insulting a public prosecutor. The case was transferred to a public prosecutor in Liptovský Mikuláš. On 2 June 1994 the applicant was charged with insulting a public official in his letters of 6 December 1993 and 7 March 1994 mentioned above. 20. In a letter of 5 September 1994 addressed to the Košice Regional Prosecutor’s Office, the applicant expressed the view that the purpose of the harassment to which he was subjected in 1992 and 1993 had been to make him withdraw his criminal complaint against H. He requested that an investigation be opened. 21. In September 1994 the newspaper Necenzurované noviny published an article by a third person describing the applicant’s case in detail. It was entitled “How the Red Plague operates in Eastern Slovakia” and contained quotations from the applicant’s letters. The relevant parts read as follows: “... It is on this basis that the district prosecutor’s office in Liptovský Mikuláš started a prosecution against [the applicant] on 2 June 1994. In order to give the reader an idea of what is possible in [Slovakia], I will quote the text which, according to public prosecutor [L.], constitutes a criminal offence. In his message of 7 March 1994 addressed to the General Prosecutor in Bratislava, [the applicant] stated in respect of [public prosecutor P.] that in the criminal case of [H.] he had deliberately acted wrongly so that ‘he could satisfy his friend [M.] from Košice, the former President of the Košice City Court whom the City Committee of the Communist Party of Slovakia had identified as a key official and who is now [H.]’s lawyer, that no criminal proceedings would be brought against [H.] in Slovakia notwithstanding that sufficient evidence existed to do so ... Of course, money paid by [H.] with a view to covering up his fraudulent activity also played a role in the matter. It would therefore be worth examining in this context whether the facts do not fall under Articles 161 and 162 of the Criminal Code [which govern the offence of bribery]’. In the same document [the applicant] stated: ‘Subsequently I realised that my telephone, which was also used by my detective agency, had been tapped contrary to Article 88 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.’ In a letter dated 6 December 1993 and addressed to public prosecutor [P.], [the applicant] stated among other things: ‘Since you have not succeeded, comrade prosecutor, in attaining your aims in one area, you continue energetically, in accordance with the practice of the [former] State Security agents, to fabricate another case as you have learned to do under the so-called infallible socialist law. On this occasion I can assure you, however, that I have not bowed to the high representatives of the former political system and, in particular, the [former] State Security agents who paid at least as much attention to my person as you do now. I do not intend today to let myself be intimidated, especially not by individuals such as yourself, a person with a dubious past, not to speak of [your] other qualities ...’ In the same letter [the applicant] went on: ‘It is not only my earlier experience of managing a detective agency which makes it difficult for me to associate you with objectivity, professionalism and respect for the law. I would therefore like to remind you on this occasion that you are also bound by the law despite the fact that you probably consider yourself to be an almighty lord of the Tatra [Mountains] and the Váh [River] and, as such, beyond anyone’s reach since you are, for the time being, under the protective hand of comrade [M.]. Abuse of the law may have very unpleasant consequences for you. For the time being, I will only mention some of the abuses which do not call for any comments.’ Thus, on the basis of these statements, prosecutor [L.], on the instructions of [the General Prosecutor], started a prosecution against [the applicant]. Every decent person must be astonished to learn of such stupid behaviour.” 22. On 7 November 1994 the applicant stated before the prosecutor in Liptovský Mikuláš that he had intended to criticise P. for his wrongful actions but not to insult him. He further informed the public prosecutor dealing with the case that he had not written any newspaper article on the issue, but had merely provided the author with the relevant documents. 23. On 8 November 1994 the Košice Regional Prosecutor submitted a document to the district prosecutor’s office in Liptovský Mikuláš indicating, with reference to the relevant register, that the Košice I district prosecutor had not ordered the tapping of the applicant’s telephone between 1992 and 1994. 24. On 23 November 1994 the Liptovský Mikuláš district prosecutor indicted the applicant before the Liptovský Mikuláš District Court on the charge of insulting a public official. On 25 November 1994 the Liptovský Mikuláš District Court transferred the case to the Košice I District Court for reasons of jurisdiction. As the public prosecutor affected by the applicant’s statements was responsible for the same district, the Košice Regional Court, on 9 March 1995, transferred the case to the Trebišov District Court. 25. On 25 April 1995 the Trebišov District Court issued a penal order in which it convicted the applicant of attacking a public official, on the ground that, in his letters of 6 December 1993 and 7 March 1994, he had insulted a public prosecutor. The court sentenced the applicant to four months’ imprisonment suspended for a probationary period of one year. 26. The applicant appealed against the order. The case was assigned to another judge. On 25 June 1996 the Trebišov District Court convicted the applicant under Article 156 § 3 of the Criminal Code of insulting a public official and sentenced him to four months’ imprisonment suspended for a probationary period of one year. The judgment stated, in particular, that in his letters the applicant had alleged that the public prosecutor had deliberately acted improperly as regards the applicant’s request of 1991 for criminal proceedings to be brought against H.; that the public prosecutor had done so at the request of the lawyer representing H.; and that H. had paid a sum of money for this purpose. The District Court also noted that the applicant had accused P. of having been unwilling to uphold his criminal complaint, of having ordered criminal proceedings to be brought against him and of having his telephone illegally tapped. 27. The judgment further stated that the applicant had not shown that the public prosecutor in question had failed to act in accordance with the law. The court therefore concluded that the applicant’s statements were defamatory and grossly offensive. 28. The District Court did not accept the applicant’s defence that the sole purpose of his letters had been to have his request for criminal proceedings to be brought against H. dealt with appropriately. The court noted that, besides the two letters in question, the applicant had sent a considerable number of other complaints concerning the same issue which, however, had contained no defamatory or offensive remarks. Both the Košice Regional Prosecutor’s Office and the General Prosecutor’s Office had dealt with the applicant’s complaints and had dismissed them as being unsubstantiated. 29. The applicant appealed, both personally and through his lawyer. He alleged that the purpose of his remarks had been to prevent further delays in the proceedings concerning his criminal complaint of 1991, and not to offend P. He further claimed that the statements in question were not offensive and did not constitute an offence. 30. On 24 September 1996 the Košice Regional Court dismissed the appeal after hearing evidence from the applicant and asking him to substantiate his allegations. 31. The Regional Court found that in the statements made in his letters of 6 December 1993 and 7 March 1994 the applicant had grossly insulted a public prosecutor without justification. In particular, it stated that the applicant had failed to substantiate his allegation that H. had paid a sum of money in order to prevent criminal proceedings being brought against him and reiterated that the General Prosecutor’s Office had not established that P. had acted unlawfully in this or any other respect. 32. The Regional Court further considered defamatory and grossly offensive the applicant’s statements that the public prosecutor had acted in accordance with the practice of the former State Security agents, had a dubious past, not to speak of his other qualities, and possibly considered himself to be an almighty lord of the Tatra Mountains and the Váh River who was “beyond anyone’s reach”. 33. In the Regional Court’s view, the applicant had failed to show that he had a justified reason to make such statements. The court did not accept the applicant’s argument that he had doubts about the past and qualities of the public prosecutor because the latter had studied socialist law, had failed to take appropriate action on the applicant’s criminal complaint of 1991, and initiated criminal proceedings against him. 34. In its judgment the Regional Court pointed out that the applicant had not been hindered in seeking redress before the appropriate authorities for the actions of P. which he considered inappropriate or unlawful. It held, however, that by making defamatory and offensive remarks the applicant had committed an attack against a public official within the meaning of Article 156 § 3 of the Criminal Code. The Regional Court upheld the sentence which the District Court had imposed on the applicant. 35. On 28 October 1996 the Košice IV District Office revoked the trading licence under which the applicant had been authorised, inter alia, to run a detective agency, on the ground that he had been convicted of an offence. On 12 December 1996 the Košice Regional Office dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision. 36. On 4 June 1997 the Košice Regional Court quashed the administrative decisions concerning the revocation of the applicant’s trading licence and remitted the case to the Košice Regional Office. In its judgment the Regional Court noted that both administrative authorities, deciding at lower instances, had failed to establish any relevant legal grounds for their decisions. 37. On 18 November 1997 the Trebišov District Court issued a decision noting that the applicant had not committed any offence during the probationary period and stating that he was to be considered as not having been convicted. 38. As from 1 January 1998 the relevant law was amended in that persons wishing to run private security agencies were required to obtain the approval of the police headquarters. The applicant did not ask for such approval and returned his trading licence of 7 January 1993, under which he had been allowed to run a detective agency, to the Košice IV District Office on 3 June 1998. In the meantime, on 18 February 1998, he registered with the relevant authorities as running a different business. He attached a certificate indicating that his criminal record was clean and received a new trading licence on 6 April 1998.

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6. The applicant was born in 1928 and lives in Nicosia. 7. The applicant was recruited in September 1946 by the Bank of Cyprus (“the Bank”). He retired from the Bank on 31 December 1988. To enhance his career prospects, he continued his studies while working, studying through distance-learning programmes run by British colleges. In 1960 he was granted two-years’ unpaid educational leave to study in London. When he returned he was promoted deputy to the Chief Inspector with the prospect of succeeding the latter. In 1963 the Government established the Central Bank (the State issuing Bank), which published its vacant posts. Interested in one of the four advertised managerial posts, the applicant contacted the Central Bank’s Governor who offered him a post entailing responsibility for banking operations. 8. On hearing about the Central Bank’s offer, the applicant’s Bank, in 1964, offered him orally the post of Chief Inspector on the condition that he followed a six-month training course in London. When the applicant returned from his training, the Bank promoted him to the lower post of Head of Department. In 1967 the Bank amended its Conditions of Service. The applicant was kept in the same grade. In the same year the applicant was transferred on promotion to take charge of the Bank’s Paphos Branch. In 1969 he was again promoted (but not to the post allegedly agreed on). In 1970 he was transferred back to the Head Office, where he alleges he was given various duties below managerial status. 9. The applicant alleges that in 1983 the Chairman of the Bank, in the course of a private meeting, stated that the reason for not promoting him to the post agreed on in 1964 was that the Board of Directors had received from a group of shareholders a number of anonymous letters criticising the Board for bad administration. The Board suspected that these letters had been sent by the applicant. The applicant further alleges that, following this information, he tried hard for almost two years to convince the Bank of his innocence, but to no avail. 10. The applicant claims that in 1987, nineteen months before his retirement, the Bank offered him 32,000 Cyprus pounds with a year’s increment in salary and threatened him that, if he did not accept, the Bank would demote him from Sub-Manager to Head of Department. The applicant refused the offer. 11. In 1988 the Disciplinary Committee of the Bank ordered the applicant’s dismissal with stay of execution. 12. Considering that the Bank had not respected its commitment to appoint him to a senior management position, the applicant instituted proceedings before the District Court of Nicosia claiming damages. 2. The proceedings before the District Court of Nicosia and the Supreme Court sitting as an appeal court (a) The hearing of the action 13. The applicant lodged an action for damages (no. 7439/85) with the District Court of Nicosia on 12 August 1985. On 22 October 1985 he filed his statement of claim and on 15 April 1986 he filed an amended version. 14. On 27 June 1986 the applicant applied for the action to be set down for a hearing. The hearing was fixed for 7 October 1986. One month before the hearing the applicant replaced his lawyer and, following the request of both parties, the hearing was adjourned to 19 February 1987 and then to 10 June 1987. On 3 March 1987 the applicant filed an application to amend further his statement of claim. This application was granted on 23 May 1987. 15. On 6 June 1987 the applicant filed his amended statement of claim. However, on 3 July 1987 the defendant filed an application to have certain parts of the application struck out. The application was fixed for hearing on 21 September 1987, but the hearing had to be adjourned to 20 October 1987 because the applicant failed to file an opposition. On that date it was adjourned again because the applicant had in the meantime replaced his lawyer. On 14 December 1987 the District Court ordered the striking out of certain parts of the statement of claim. On 5 January 1988 the defendant filed its statement of defence. The action was fixed for hearing on 10 March 1988. On 6 February 1988 the applicant’s lawyer withdrew from the case and the hearing had to be again adjourned to 4 May 1988. The applicant appeared in person. On 16 May 1988 he applied for a further adjournment in order to appoint a new lawyer. On 6 June 1988 the new lawyer applied for a further adjournment in order to study the file. On 8 August 1988 the applicant’s lawyer applied for a further adjournment because the applicant was ill. However, the court dismissed the request. The applicant’s lawyer withdrew from the case. 16. On 30 July 1988 the District Court delivered judgment and dismissed the action. (b) The appeal 17. The applicant appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Court. He alleged a violation of Article 30 of the Constitution and of Article 6 of the Convention. 18. The appeal was fixed for hearing for 25 November 1991 but adjourned to 12 January 1992 because the applicant was ill. It had to be adjourned again to 20 March 1992 because the applicant’s lawyer had other commitments. 19. On 20 March 1992 the applicant informed the court that he had dismissed his lawyer and requested a three-month adjournment of the hearing. The hearing was adjourned to 15 October 1992. On that date the applicant appeared in person. 20. On 10 November 1992 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment. It held that the failure of the trial court to grant the adjournment which the applicant had requested on 8 July 1988 had, in the circumstances, led to a violation of the applicant’s right to a fair hearing. 21. The Supreme Court quashed the judgment of 30 July 1988 and ordered a re-trial by another District Court. (c) The second hearing 22. The action was fixed for hearing for 14 December 1992, but on that date the applicant applied for an adjournment in order to appoint another lawyer. On 16 March 1993 the hearing was adjourned to 2 July 1993 with the consent of both parties, and then to 29 October 1993 at the request of the applicant. On that date the court did not proceed with the hearing because the applicant had filed an application for the production of documents. The defendant objected to that application, but its objection was dismissed on 7 December 1993. On 17 December 1993 the applicant applied for an amendment of his statement of claim. His application was granted. 23. On 25 January 1994 the applicant filed an application for disclosure of documents in the defendant’s possession. The application was fixed for directions on 21 February 1994. As the defendant objected to the application, a hearing was fixed. On 20 April 1994 the court granted the application. 24. The hearing of the action commenced on 21 June 1994. The applicant applied for an adjournment because he intended to file an application for amendment of his statement of claim. As a result, the hearing was adjourned to 20 September 1994, and then to 17 October 1994 and 28 November 1994. The application was granted on 19 January 1995 and the hearing of the action continued on 6 February 1995. 25. During the hearing the court issued two interlocutory rulings on procedural matters. On 27 March 1995 the applicant filed two appeals against these rulings with the Supreme Court. He also filed an application for a stay of the proceedings until the determination of the appeals and the conclusion of the investigation of a complaint he had lodged with the police against the defendant. On 8 May 1995 the court dismissed both applications for a stay of the proceedings. The hearing of the action continued on 17 May 1995. 26. On 11 June 1995 judgment was reserved. However, by that time one of the judges of the bench had retired and thus the action had to be re-heard by another bench. (d) The third hearing 27. On 28 March 1996 the hearing of the action was resumed before another bench of the court. However, on 6 May 1996 one of the judges was appointed to the Supreme Court and thus the hearing had to be adjourned to 1 July 1996 in order to be recommenced before a different bench. (e) The fourth hearing 28. The hearing before a different bench was fixed for 12 September 1996, but was adjourned to 22 October 1996. 29. On 11 October 1996 the applicant filed an application to stay the hearing of the action until private criminal proceedings he had initiated against the defendant had been determined. On 11 November 1996 the court dismissed the application. 30. On 23 December 1996 the hearing of the action was concluded and the court reserved its judgment. 31. On 14 January 1997 the applicant filed an application for the re‑opening of the action in order to submit further arguments. On 24 January 1997 the court dismissed the application. 32. On 20 March 1997 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s civil claims. 33. On 15 April 1997 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court. The hearing was fixed for 18 July 1997, but was adjourned to 24 September 1997, and then to 25 November 1997 and 28 January 1998 because the transcript of the trial was not ready yet. The written addresses of both parties were submitted on 17 June 1998. The hearing took place on 22 September 1998 and was concluded on 24 March 1999. Judgment was reserved. However, as one of the judges had resigned, the appeal was assigned to another bench of the Supreme Court, which re-heard the case and delivered judgment on 29 November 1999. 34. The introductory paragraph of the judgment read as follows: “The action, which resulted in the judgment from which appeal is made, was filed in August 1985. The course of the case was exceptionally unfortunate. The responsibility lies, to a much greater extent, upon the court. The trial commenced three times before different benches of the Full Court without resulting in a determination of the dispute. Here we have the appeal against the judgment in the fourth trial.”

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5. The applicant, Mr Oskar Orzeł, is a Polish national who was born in 1978. He is a student and lives in Częstochowa, Poland. 6. Since early childhood, the applicant suffered from chronic inflammation of the vascular coat of his eyes. On 27 December 1984 the Katowice Clinical Hospital (Szpital Kliniczny w Katowicach) began to provide the applicant with both outpatient and inpatient care. After a few months, Professor G.-Ł. was put in charge of the applicant’s treatment. 7. In October 1988 Professor G.-Ł. recommended that the applicant undergo a laser coagulation surgery of his right eye. As she did not have experience in providing that kind of treatment, she decided that Doctor F.‑K. would perform the surgery. 8. In the early morning of 4 November 1988 the applicant, who at that time was ten years old, arrived together with his mother at the Katowice Clinical Hospital. At 11 a.m. Doctor F.-K. started to receive patients. The applicant was received at around 2 p.m. as the last patient. He entered the examination room together with his mother. Except for Doctor F.-K., no other medical staff were present in the room. 9. The applicant was seated in a chair facing Doctor F.-K., whereas his mother stood behind her watching the treatment. The applicant was calm and relaxed. A red light on a laser started to flash indicating that the surgery was underway. Suddenly, Doctor F.-K. shouted in a stern voice “look straight”. At that moment, the applicant’s mother observed that his left eye moved. Soon afterwards, the red light stopped flashing, indicating that the treatment was finished. Doctor F.-K. stood up without saying a word. The applicant and his mother left the room. While putting on his clothes in the hospital corridor, the applicant told his mother that he could not see with his right eye. The mother immediately went back to the examination room and informed Doctor F.-K. about it. She also asked whether this was a normal reaction after the surgery but received no answer. The applicant’s mother asked Doctor F.-K. when the applicant should report for a check-up. She was informed that he should keep his previously booked appointment in a week’s time. 10. On 5 November 1988 the applicant was examined in the ophthalmological ward of the Częstochowa Regional Hospital (Wojewódzki Szpital Zespolony). He was diagnosed with a cataract and a hole in the capsule of the lens. The doctor who examined the applicant considered that his loss of vision was caused by a laser surgery. 11. In 1989 and 1990 the applicant received medical treatment in Germany, Russia and Poland. 12. On 23 March 1990 the applicant, represented by his mother, lodged with the Katowice Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) an action in which he claimed compensation from the Katowice Clinical Hospital. The applicant also asked the court to find the defendant liable for any future deterioration of his health resulting from the alleged medical malpractice. He claimed that because of the negligence of a doctor who carried out the surgery, the capsule of the lens in his right eye had been punctured. It led to a cataract and required further medical treatment. As a result of the medical malpractice the applicant, who was thirteen, was an invalid and had thoughts of suicide. 13. Before 1 May 1993 nine hearings were held and three medical opinions were submitted to the court. 14. On 22 June 1993 the applicant extended his claim. He requested a monthly allowance. The applicant based his claim on the fact that the alleged medical negligence resulted in his permanent disability and thus increased his needs and deprived him of many opportunities to succeed in his life. 15. On 13 July 1993 the Regional Court held a hearing. 16. On 23 November 1993 the trial court received an expert opinion from the Gdansk Medical Academy. 17. On 7 February 1994 the defendant filed with the trial court written pleadings in which it rejected the applicant’s claims. 18. Between 8 February and 18 November 1994 six hearings were held and the court requested two supplementary medical opinions from the Gdansk Medical Academy. They were submitted to the trial court on 17 March 1994 and 16 February 1995. 19. Subsequently, the trial court held hearings on 8 June, 6 July, 28 November 1995 and 22 January 1996. 20. On 31 January 1996 the Katowice Regional Court delivered a judgment. It considered that Doctor F.-K. was “negligent, imprudent, clumsy and careless” in performing a laser coagulation surgery of the applicant’s eye on 4 November 1988. The court assessed her conduct during the surgery against that of a diligent professional (dobry fachowiec) but found on her part several shortcomings, which showed that she failed in her duty of care required under that standard. In particular, the court considered that the doctor did not immobilise the eyeball which was being operated on. The court referred to expert opinions obtained during the proceedings. It awarded the applicant 1,500 Polish zlotys (PLN) by way of pecuniary damage and PLN 15,000 under the head of non-pecuniary damage together with interest. The court dismissed the remainder of the claim for compensation. 21. Both parties appealed to the Katowice Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny). 22. On 17 May 1996 the Katowice Court of Appeal quashed the first‑instance judgment and remitted the case to the trial court. The appellate court considered that some of the shortcomings on the part of Doctor F.-K. found by the trial court were “problematic” and did not have “a direct influence on the resultant damage”. Only the failure to immobilise the eyeball could have constituted relevant negligence. The Court of Appeal also criticised the Regional Court’s assessment of compensation awarded to the applicant and found that some facts had not been properly established. In particular, the trial court had failed to ascertain whether the applicant and his mother had been informed how he was to conduct himself during the operation and about its potential complications. 23. On 1 and 4 October 1996 the Katowice Regional Court held hearings. Subsequently, it requested an expert opinion from the Wrocław Clinical Hospital. The opinion was submitted on 18 December 1996. 24. Between November 1996 and August 1998 no hearings were held. 25. On 11 September and 4 December 1998 the trial court held hearings. Between 3 March and 29 September 1999 the proceedings were stayed. 26. On 29 September 1999 the trial court held a hearing. 27. On 2 October 2000 the expert opinion prepared by Mr E.W. was submitted to the court. 28. Between October 1999 and October 2000 no hearings were held. At the hearing held on 21 November 2000 the court heard the expert witness Mr E.W. 29. The hearing held on 20 December 2000 was adjourned until 6 March 2001. 30. On 6 March 2001 the court decided that it would deliver a judgment on 20 March 2001. However, on the latter date the court resumed the proceedings and ordered a ninth expert opinion. 31. On 23 October 2001 a hearing took place before the trial court. 32. On 6 November 2001 the Katowice Regional Court gave a judgment. The trial court established that the applicant’s surgery in 1988 had been carried out according to medical standards at the material time and dismissed allegations of medical malpractice on the part of the doctor who had performed it. In the court’s opinion the deterioration of the applicant’s health was caused by a rare post-surgery complication aggravated by his illness from which he had been suffering prior to the surgery. Despite finding the defendant not liable, the court established that the applicant sustained damage in connection with the surgery and found it justifiable to award him PLN 50,000 in compensation. The applicant was also awarded a monthly allowance of PLN 100, which in the court’s opinion would compensate his increased needs. The court dismissed the remaining part of the applicant’s action, in particular, relating to the pecuniary damage sought by him. In this respect the court found that the applicant’s breakdown of costs of special eye‑care products, lenses and other medicaments was completely unreliable and that his treatment abroad was unjustified since he could have been treated in Poland. The court also dismissed the part of his action relating to finding the defendant liable for any future deterioration of his health. 33. On 18 January 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal against the judgment. He complained, inter alia, that in spite of the fact that many expert opinions from different medical centres in Poland had been taken, the trial court had based its findings solely on the expert opinion of Mr E.W., who was a colleague of the doctor who had performed the surgery and worked in the same city. 34. On 8 May 2002 the Katowice Regional Court issued a decision in which it declared final the part of its judgment of 6 November 2001 concerning the amount of compensation. The applicant lodged an appeal against this decision. 35. The proceedings following his appeals against the Katowice Regional Court’s judgment of 6 November 2001 and the decision of 8 May 2002 are pending before Katowice Court of Appeal.

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10. The applicants were born in 1936 and 1937, respectively, and live in Tata, Hungary. 11. In May 1987 the Tatabánya District Court granted a request by Mrs. O., the applicants' neighbour, that they be ordered to tolerate a sewer, which emanated from her property, crossing part of their garden. 12. In 1988 the applicants brought an action in trespass against Mrs. O., claiming that, when installing the sewer, she exceeded the scope of the rights granted to her in 1987. 13. In July 1990 the Komárom-Esztergom County Regional Court quashed the District Court's dismissal of the action and remitted the case. In the resumed proceedings, in February 1991 the District Court again dismissed the applicants' action. In October 1991 the Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case for a second time. 14. In the resumed proceedings, on 2 February 1993 the District Court held a hearing and appointed a technical expert. On 9 May 1995 an inspection of the premises was carried out. On 9 November 1995 a further expert was appointed but replaced, on the applicants' complaint, on 22 January 1996. In April 1996 the expert sent the documentation back to the District Court indicating that the applicants had prevented him from inspecting the premises. On 14 November 1996 the District Court appointed the Forensic Technical Expert Institute to give an opinion in the case, which it did on 26 March 1997. A final report was submitted on 23 September 1997. 15. On 13 November 1997 the District Court accepted the applicants' claims, finding that the defendant's installation of the sewer had constituted a trespass and ordered her to remove it. It dismissed the defendant's counter-action brought with a view to establishing rights of servitude. 16. On 15 May 1998 the Regional Court dismissed the defendant's appeal. 17. On 17 June 1998 the defendant brought a petition for review before the Supreme Court. On 28 September 1998 the applicants submitted their counter-arguments. 18. On 19 November 1998 the District Court ordered the competent agent to proceed with the enforcement of its decision. This took place on 4 December 1998. 19. On 10 March 1999 the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the defendant's counter-action on the servitude claim, but quashed the remainder of the first and second instance judgments and dismissed the applicants' action. It held that the extent to which the defendant had exceeded the rights granted to her in 1987 did not warrant the removal of the sewer. In so far as the applicants had disputed her right to install the sewer across their land, the Supreme Court qualified their claims as res judicata. The judgment was served on the applicants on 4 June 1999.

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4. The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Białystok, Poland. 5. In April 1992 the applicant married Mr M.O., a divorcee who had two daughters from his first marriage. In May 1992 the applicant gave birth to a son. On 14 January 1993 the applicant’s husband committed suicide. 6. On 26 January 1993 the applicant initiated court proceedings before the Białystok District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) in order to obtain a decision as to who should be regarded as heirs to her late husband’s estate. She submitted that the estate should be divided between her and her son, according to the holograph will written by the applicant’s husband on 16 October 1992. 7. On 5 February 1993 the first hearing was held. The daughters of M.O. joined the proceedings. Their counsel requested that the inheritance be declared according to statute and therefore be in part accorded to them. 8. During the second hearing, held on 14 April 1993, the deceased’s daughters contested the validity of his will. 9. The Government submit that between April and August 1993 the applicant asked the court to take evidence from eleven witnesses. 10. In 1993 the District Court held five hearings and heard eight witnesses. In September and November 1993 two hearings were adjourned because the applicant had to attend a commission for disability and her counsel was ill. 11. On 18 January, 1 February and 22 February 1994 hearings were held at which both daughters of M.O. requested to hear witnesses living in New York. Subsequently, the applicant applied to the court to hear her father who also lived in New York. 12. At the hearing held on 8 March 1994 the court allowed the applications to hear witnesses with the help of the Polish Consulate in New York. On 26 September 1994 the court received a deposition taken from the applicant’s father. The witnesses requested by M.O.’s daughters were not heard because they did not arrive at the Consulate. 13. At the next hearing held on 26 January 1995, upon the application of M.O.’s daughters, the court requested an expert opinion to establish whether the will had been hand-written by M.O. 14. During the hearing held on 14 September 1995 the court examined the expert opinion which confirmed that the will had been hand-written by M.O. The counsel representing M.O.’s daughters requested another expert opinion to establish the testator’s mental condition at the time of writing the will on the basis of his hand-writing. The applicant contested the necessity for such opinion. Nevertheless, the court granted the application and adjourned the hearing. In November 1995 the Krakow Forensic Medicine Institute informed the court that it was unable to prepare the requested opinion. 15. At the hearing held on 15 December 1995 the court again decided to request a psychiatric opinion based on M.O.’s hand-writing by another expert. The opinion was submitted to the court in October 1996. 16. Between 16 December 1995 and 5 December 1996 no hearings were held. Subsequently, the case was taken over by another judge. 17. On 6 December 1996 a hearing was held. The court decided that an inventory of the estate would be prepared and ordered four expert opinions. 18. In January 1997 the applicant requested the court to exempt her from the costs of the expert opinions. On 11 March 1997 the court dismissed her application. 19. On 8 May 1997 the applicant applied to stay the proceedings because another set of civil proceedings between the same parties was pending. On 9 June 1997 she requested the court to resume the proceedings. 20. In December 1997 and January 1998 both daughters of M.O. were exempted from the costs of the expert opinions. Subsequently, their counsel requested another psychiatric opinion concerning the testator’s mental condition at the time of writing the will. 21. Between 7 December 1996 and 31 May 1998 no hearings were held. 22. At the hearing held on 1 June 1998 the court heard four experts and allowed an application for another expert opinion concerning the mental condition of the testator filed by the daughters of M.O. 23. At the hearing held on 9 July 1998 the court ordered the applicant to apply for the appointment of a guardian for her child. It also set a time-limit for the daughters of M.O. to evaluate one of the objects belonging to the estate and allowed their application to hear an expert. 24. Subsequently, the applicant requested the Court not to schedule any hearings for August 1998 and M.O.’s daughters lodged similar application concerning a period between 2 and 22 October 1998. 25. Subsequently, hearings were held on 24 November 1998 and 14 January 1999. At each of those hearings the counsel representing M.O.’s daughters made applications for the obtaining of new evidence. 26. At the hearing held on 18 March 1999 their counsel again requested that evidence be taken from witnesses who lived in New York and asked for another expert opinion concerning the deceased’s mental health. The court allowed all requests. The applicant’s representative contested the necessity of adducing new evidence and argued that it would lead to further delays. 27. In April 1999 the Polish Consulate in New York informed the court that the information requested could be obtained only by means of international judicial assistance. In May 1999 M.O.’s daughters were finally exempted from the costs of new expert opinions and subsequently they applied to the court to have recourse to international judicial assistance. The court granted this request. However, in April 2000 the United States Justice Department refused to proceed with the application for the judicial assistance because the information provided by the District Court was imprecise. 28. In August 2000 another expert opinion concerning the applicant late husband’s mental health was submitted to the court. 29. Between April 1999 and September 2000 no hearings were held. 30. On 10 October 2000 the court held a hearing. 31. During the hearing held on 17 October 2000 the Białystok District Court gave its decision. It declared that the heirs of the applicant’s husband were, according to statute, the applicant, her son and M.O.’s two daughters. In addition, the court established that the will was valid but it did not cover the whole of the estate. 32. The applicant appealed against this decision to the Białystok Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). 33. The Białystok Regional Court held one hearing. On 20 February 2001 it dismissed the appeal.

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7. On 22 November 1995 the Wrocław-Stare Miasto District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy) charged the applicant with fraud committed together with several accomplices and detained him on remand for three months in view of the reasonable suspicion that he had committed the offence in question and the risk that he might obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. 8. On an unknown later date the applicant appealed to the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) against the order for his detention. On 27 November 1995 he lodged a pleading supplementing his appeal. In that pleading, he submitted that his detention had been imposed by a prosecutor, a party to the proceedings, whereas under the Convention detention had to be ordered either by a judge or by another officer exercising judicial power. 9. On 5 December 1995 a single judge, sitting as the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court, dismissed the appeal, finding that the applicant's detention had an adequate legal basis. The applicant did not participate in the court session, whereas the Wrocław-Stare Miasto District Prosecutor did. 10. On 28 November and 14 December 1995 the applicant asked the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court to appoint a defence lawyer for him. That application was granted on 19 January 1996. 11. On 11 December 1995 the applicant asked the Wrocław-Stare Miasto District Prosecutor to release him. The application was dismissed on 12 December 1995 by the prosecutor at first instance and on 30 December 1995 on appeal. The authorities held that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged. They also considered that holding him in detention was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 12. On 21 December 1995 the applicant made a further application for release. He complained about the prison conditions and maintained that his continued detention had severely affected his health. The prosecution asked medical experts to examine the applicant. The doctors made their report on 22 December 1995. They concluded that the applicant could receive adequate medical treatment in prison. Basing themselves on that report, the authorities refused to release the applicant. The relevant decisions were made on 2 January 1996 by the prosecutor at first instance and on 24 January 1996 on appeal. The prosecutors, referring to the experts' report, held that the applicant's health did not militate decisively against his being kept in detention. 13. In the meantime, the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki) took over the investigation from the Wrocław-Stare Miasto District Prosecutor. 14. On 5 February 1996 the applicant asked the Regional Prosecutor to release him in view of his bad health. He stressed that he was suffering from diabetes, high blood pressure and arteriosclerosis. He maintained that he did not receive proper medical treatment and diet in prison. The application was dismissed on 7 February 1996 by the prosecutor at first instance and on 21 February 1997 on appeal. The main ground on which the authorities relied was that, according to a medical report obtained on 6 February 1996, the applicant's general condition was not an obstacle to keeping him in detention. 15. On 15 February 1996, on an application made by the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 June 1996. The applicant appealed on 26 February 1996. He argued that he had never been brought before a judge at any stage of the proceedings relating to the lawfulness of his detention. On 1 March 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) upheld the first-instance decision. The Wrocław Regional Prosecutor participated in the court session but neither the applicant nor his lawyer did. 16. On 18 March 1996 the applicant asked the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court to release him under police supervision. The matter was referred to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor because at the investigation stage only a prosecutor could deal with an application for release (see also paragraph 82). That application was rejected on 3 June 1996 at first instance and on 28 June 1996 on appeal. The prosecution considered that there was a reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged. They also pointed out that there were no particular circumstances militating in favour of his release, as defined in Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 17. On 6 May and 3 June 1996 the applicant again asked the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court to release him under police supervision. Those applications, after having been referred to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, were dismissed by that prosecutor on 28 June 1996 and, on appeal, on 14 July 1996. The authorities considered that the original grounds given for the applicant's detention were still valid. 18. On 25 June 1996, on an application by the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 September 1996. 19. On 25 July and 5 August 1996 the applicant made further applications for release under police supervision to the Wrocław Regional Court, claiming a breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in that he was neither tried within a reasonable time nor released pending trial. 20. On 30 August 1996 the court held a session and, after having heard the submissions of the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, dismissed the applications in view of the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged and the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 21. The applicant appealed on 5 September 1996. He submitted that the proceedings concerning his applications for release were not adversarial because he could not take part in any court session at which those applications were examined, whereas the prosecution could put forward any arguments they wished in his absence. On 16 September 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny), after having heard the prosecutor's submissions, upheld the first-instance decision and the reasons given therefor. 22. Meanwhile, on 9 August 1996, the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court had considered the applicant's request for release, in which he had alleged a breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in that after having been arrested he had not been brought before a judge. The court dismissed the request and held, inter alia, that the fact that the detention had been imposed by the prosecutor, i.e. a party to the proceedings, was not a factor that would justify releasing him. On 31 October 1996, on an appeal filed by the applicant, the Wrocław Regional Court quashed the decision of 9 August 1996 and held that, in accordance with the Law of 4 August 1996 on Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure (see also “Relevant domestic law and practice” below), only a regional court was competent to deal with the applicant's application for release. The Regional Court further examined that application and rejected it on the ground of the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offence with which he had been charged. It also considered that the need to ensure the proper course of the proceedings and the likelihood of a severe sentence to be imposed on the applicant justified his being held in custody. The Wrocław Regional Prosecutor participated in the court session but neither the applicant nor his lawyer did. 23. The applicant appealed. On 22 November 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal held a session and, after having heard the prosecutor's opinion, upheld the first-instance decision and the reasons given therefor. 24. In the meantime, on 30 September 1996, the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor had lodged a bill of indictment with the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court. The applicant was indicted together with 10 other persons on charges of aggravated fraud, appropriation of public property, receiving stolen goods, making a false declaration, and forgery. The case-file comprised 19 volumes. 25. The trial was listed for 18 and 19 December 1996. Meanwhile, on 21 November 1996 the court appointed a new lawyer for the applicant. 26. On 1 December 1996 the applicant asked the District Court to release him. He maintained that his detention had lasted an excessively long time and, what was more, he had previously been detained in other criminal proceedings for some two years. He had accordingly spent in custody in all more than three years. That, he stressed, had in reality amounted to serving a prison sentence. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. 27. On 4 December 1996 his application was dismissed at first instance and on 31 December 1996 on appeal. The courts considered that the applicant should still be kept in custody in view of the severity of the sentence which might be imposed and the need to ensure the proper conduct of the proceedings. 28. On 18 December 1996 the court postponed the trial to 29 January 1997 because one of the applicant's co-defendants was ill. 29. On 19 December 1996 and, subsequently, on 13, 15 and 29 January 1997 the applicant made complaints about the conduct of his officially-appointed counsel and asked the trial court to appoint a new lawyer for him. 30. On 31 December 1996 the applicant again asked the court to release him under police supervision. On 7 January 1997 the application was dismissed in view of the need to ensure the proper conduct of the trial and the severity of the sentence that might be imposed on him. 31. On 15 January 1997 the applicant appealed, submitting that neither he nor his lawyer had been informed of, or summoned to, the court's session at which his application for release had been examined and that the relevant procedure did not comply with the requirements of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. On the same day he asked the Regional Court to allow him to attend the session at which that court would deal with his appeal so that he could put forward his arguments. 32. On 17 January 1997 the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court refused to proceed with the appeal since, under the recently amended provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no appeal lay in law against a court decision on an application for release. 33. On 29 January 1997 the court postponed the trial to 20 February 1997 because a certain J.F., one of the applicant's co-defendants had failed to appear. The court severed the charges against J.F. 34. On 10 February and on 3, 10, 17 and 25 March, and on 1, 8 and 17 April 1997 the applicant made further unsuccessful applications for release under police supervision to the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court. The applications were dismissed on 12 February and on 10, 12, 20 and 28 March, and on 4, 11 and 22 April 1997 respectively. The court considered that the applicant should still be kept in custody in view of the need to secure the proper conduct of the trial and the severity of the sentence which might be imposed, a sentence that ranged from 1 to 10 years' imprisonment. 35. On 20 February 1997 the trial was to start but the applicant made yet another complaint about the conduct of his officially-appointed counsel and the court adjourned the hearing, finding it necessary to appoint a new defence lawyer for him. 36. On 5 March 1997 the court adjourned the next hearing since E.Cz., one of the applicant's co-defendants, had failed to appear. The court ordered that E.Cz. would be brought by the police to the next hearing, which was listed for 19 March 1997. Yet on the latter date the trial was postponed because the presiding judge was ill. 37. The trial began on 10 April 1997. On 10 and 21 April 1997 the court heard evidence from the applicant. 38. At the hearing of 10 April 1997 the applicant again asked the court to release him under police supervision. The court rejected his application. It found that keeping him in custody was necessary to secure the proper conduct of the trial. The court also stressed that the severity of the sentence that might be imposed on the applicant was an important factor that argued against releasing him. 39. Subsequently and throughout the trial, the applicant made numerous – but likewise unsuccessful – applications for release. Between 14 May and 4 December 1997 he made 26 such applications and appealed against each refusal. The courts reiterated the grounds they had previously given for his continued detention. 40. The applicant also repeatedly challenged the impartiality of the trial judges and complained about the conduct of the registry clerk who was responsible for the record of the trial. From 12 May to 1 December 1997 he made 16 applications for the judges to be disqualified from dealing with his case. 41. After the hearing that was held 10 April 1997 (see paragraph 37 above), the next one was listed for 21 May 1997. On that day, the court heard evidence from the applicant's wife. 42. Subsequently, the court made an application under Article 222 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraphs 90-91 below) to the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), asking it to prolong the applicant's and Cz.S.'s detention for 6 further months. 43. In the meantime, hearings set for 18 June and 3 July 1997, had been cancelled; the former because J.S., one of the applicant's co-defendants, had failed to appear, the latter because the District Prosecutor and another co-defendant, E.Cz. had not been present. 44. On 12 and 13 July 1997 a massive flood-wave inundated the South-West of Poland, severely affecting Wrocław. A considerable part of the city was washed away or destroyed. 45. On 14 July 1997 the applicant complained to the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court that his health was deteriorating very rapidly and that he was seriously affected by the harsh prison conditions resulting from the flood in Wrocław. He asked for release. 46. On the same day the applicant made a petition to the President of the Wrocław Regional Court, the President of Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court and the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court. He complained that on 12 and 13 July 1997 a flood-wave had inundated the prison building up to the third floor. The light, electricity and sewage systems had been destroyed. There had been no drinking water, food or washing facilities. He and his fellow inmates were, in his words, kept like animals in unventilated, overcrowded and stinking cells. He asserted that an official tolerance for that situation amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. 47. Subsequent hearings, which were to be held on 6 and 27 August 1997, did not take place because, on the first date, the defence counsel for J.S. and Cz.S had not been present and, on the second, J.S.'s counsel had not appeared and the police had not brought E.Cz. from prison. 48. The next hearing, scheduled for 9 September 1997, was postponed to 13 October 1997 because E.Cz. failed to appear. 49. On 13 October 1997 the hearing was nevertheless adjourned since E.Cz. and one of the judges sitting in the trial chamber were absent. The presiding judge ordered, however, that E.Cz., on account of his repeated failure to comply with the court order, be searched for by a “wanted” notice and detained pending trial. 50. On the same day the court made the second application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court, asking it to prolong the applicant's and Cz.S.'s detention for a further period of six months. In the reasoning, the court reiterated the grounds previously given for the applicant's detention. It further referred to the risk that he might induce witnesses to give false testimonies or to obstruct the trial by other unlawful means, and the likelihood of a heavy penalty being imposed on him. In that connection, the court stated that the applicant, when giving evidence, had refused to reveal names of certain clients of his company and stated that he would not do so unless he had considered it to be pertinent. The court next pointed out that the applicant's detention should continue because there were no special circumstances justifying his release, as defined in Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It also stressed that it still needed to obtain voluminous evidence. In its opinion, all those above-mentioned obstacles made it impossible for it to give judgment within the terms referred to in Article 222 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 51. On 27 October 1997 the applicant applied to the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, asking that he be brought to the session concerning the prolongation of his detention beyond the statutory time-limit, so that he could present his arguments. He relied on Article 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention and a number of constitutional provisions, notably those stipulating that self-executing provisions of an international treaty took priority over domestic law. He also complained that the District Court had not served a copy of the application of 13 October 1997 on him and that, in consequence, he could not contest effectively the grounds for the prolongation his detention given by that court. 52. On 3 November 1997 the applicant received a copy of that application. On 4 November 1997 he prepared a statement addressed to the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court and once again asked that he be brought from prison to the session concerning the prolongation of his detention. He also complained about the conduct of the presiding judge. He stressed that the judge was not fair in considering that he should be held in custody inasmuch as the trial had to be postponed only because of his released co-defendants' repeated failure to appear before the court. In that context, the applicant pointed out that the court would have avoided the delays caused by the conduct of those co-defendants if it had severed promptly the charges against them. 53. On 6 November 1997 the District Court cancelled a hearing as the Supreme Court had not yet examined the application of 13 October 1997 and had not returned the case-file. 54. On 13 November 1997 the Supreme Court held a session at which it dealt with that application. It prolonged the applicant's detention until 30 March 1998. At the beginning of the session the Supreme Court considered the applicant's motion in which he asked it to be brought before it and allowed to present his arguments. The State Prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy) was summoned to, and took part in, the session. The applicant's representative was not summoned. After having heard the Prosecutor's arguments (who opposed the motion), the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's request. Referring to the grounds for the extension of the applicant's detention beyond the statutory time-limit, the Supreme Court held that the circumstances adduced by the District Court showed that it was likely that he would induce the witnesses to give false testimonies or otherwise obstruct the trial. It further found that, given the fact that the case was of a particular complexity and that the trial court had to obtain various evidence, the applicant should still be held in custody in order to secure the proper conduct of the trial. Lastly, the Supreme Court pointed out that despite the factors that had to date contributed to the prolongation of the trial, the District Court should nevertheless accelerate the proceedings. 55. The trial was to restart on 15 December 1997 but it was postponed to 12 January 1998 because the police had not brought E.Cz. from prison and J.S.'s counsel had not appeared before the court. 56. On 5 January 1998 the District Court dismissed the applicant's application for his detention to be lifted and replaced by another preventive measure. The court considered that the applicant should be held in custody because a severe penalty might be imposed on him. It stressed that the applicable sentence ranged from 1 to 10 years' imprisonment. It further considered that the fact that the applicant had refused to reveal the identity of some of his company's clients showed that, had he been released, he would have induced witnesses to give false testimonies or otherwise obstructed the proper course of the trial. 57. On 12 January 1998 the court cancelled a hearing because the police had not brought the applicant and E.Cz. from prison. On the same day the applicant made an application for release, asking the court to vary the preventive measure imposed on him. He maintained that his prolonged detention was putting a severe strain on himself and on his family. 58. The applicant made a further, similar application on 19 January 1998, stating that he “would be very grateful if [he] could obtain an explanation as to what for and for whom [he] was needed to be prison”. He submitted two further applications in January and two in February 1998. The court dismissed those applications on 20, 28 and 30 January, and on 6 and 18 February 1998, respectively. The reasons for those decisions were in essence identical to those given for the decision of 5 January 1998 (see paragraph 56 above). 59. On 5 February 1998 the court cancelled a hearing. On 23 February 1998 it decided to conduct the trial again from the beginning and to rehear all evidence that had so far been obtained. The presiding judge read out the records of the evidence heard from the applicant on 10 and 21 April 1997. 60. On 9 March 1998 the applicant was released pending trial. 61. On 16 December 1999 the Wrocław-Śródmiescie District Court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to 3 years' imprisonment and a fine. 62. During his detention, the applicant received many letters, including those from his lawyers, without envelopes. From 6 December 1995 to 21 July 1997 the applicant sent 61 letters to the Commission, of which 46 were opened and stamped “censored” (ocenzurowano) by the Polish authorities before being sent on. 63. On 9 February 1996 the Secretariat of the Commission sent to the applicant a letter together with an application form and the relevant enclosures. The official stamps made by the authorities indicated that the letter was delivered to Wrocław Prison on 4 March 1996, sent to the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor on 5 March 1996, and opened and censored by that prosecutor on 6 March 1996. 64. On 18 March 1996 the applicant sent a letter to the Wrocław Regional Bar Council (Okręgowa Rada Adwokacka). On 20 March 1996 the authorities opened the letter and stamped it “censored”. 65. In his letter of 15 April 1996 the applicant complained to the Commission that he would not be able to submit the application form within the period of six weeks referred to in the Commission's letter of 9 February 1996 because the authorities had opened and censored that letter and its delivery had been delayed. He also complained that the authorities of Wrocław prison had refused him any assistance in preparing copies of the relevant documents and that, for that reason, he could not submit the application within the prescribed time-limit. However, he filed the form on 15 March 1996. It was posted, with enclosures, on 15 May 1996. It was received at the Commission's secretariat on 24 May 1996. 66. On 14 August 1996 the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment sent a letter to the applicant. On 28 August 1996 the authorities opened the letter. The envelope bears the stamp “censored”. 67. On 29 November and 2 December 1996 the applicant sent two letters to the Wrocław Court of Appeal. The envelopes were cut open. They bear the stamp “censored”. 68. On 16 January 1997 the applicant sent a letter to his wife. The authorities opened that letter and put the stamp censored on it. 69. On 27 October and 4 and 12 November 1997 the applicant submitted to the prison authorities two letters addressed to the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court. In the letter of 27 October 1997 he asked the Supreme Court to order that he be brought to the session concerning the examination of the application for his detention to be prolonged (see paragraph 51 above). All the envelopes bear the stamp “censored”. The post-mark reveals that the letter of 27 October 1997 was sent out on 4 November 1997 and the two other letters on 25 November 1997. 70. On 27 November 1997 and on 5 January 1998 Mr Cichoń's law firm received letters from the applicant. The postmark on the envelope of the first letter is unreadable. The second letter was posted on 21 December 1997. On both envelopes there were hand-written notes made with a red marker. Those notes read: “censored”. 71. On 1 December 1997 and 16 January 1998 the applicant handed in two further letters to the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court to the prison authorities. On both envelopes there was a hand-written note that read: “censored”. The post-marks show that the letters were sent out on 8 December 1997 and on 23 January 1998, respectively. 72. On 10 August 1996 the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court ordered that the applicant should not be allowed to have any personal contact with his wife in view of the fact that in the meantime she had been charged with fraud in which the applicant had also been involved. That restriction included a prohibition of supervised family visits and of communication by a prison internal phone. Before that date their personal contact had not been restricted. 73. On 30 January 1997 the applicant requested the Wrocław District Court to grant his wife a permit to visit him in prison as they had had no personal contact since 10 August 1996. The application was dismissed on 7 February 1997 without any reasons being given. 74. On 7 February 1997 the applicant complained to the President of the Wrocław Regional Court that not only had all his letters to his wife been censored but some of them also intercepted or delayed and that he had not even been allowed to make phone calls to his wife. He submitted that these facts taken together with the absolute prohibition on any personal contact with her had amounted to inhuman treatment. 75. On 10 February 1997 the applicant unsuccessfully requested the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court to stop the censorship of his letters to his wife. 76. On 24 March 1997 the applicant, likewise unsuccessfully, asked the court to allow his wife to visit him in prison. 77. On 11 April 1997 he made a similar application, submitting that at the hearing of 10 April 1997 the court had heard evidence from him and he had explained all the circumstances relating to his the charges laid against his wife. The court dismissed the application on 18 April 1997. No reasons for that decision were given. 78. Subsequently, on 22 and 28 April and 8, 20 and 28 May 1997 the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court, without giving any reasons for its decisions, dismissed five further applications in which the applicant asked to be allowed to see his wife. He argued that the prolonged and drastic restrictions on their contact were cruel and inhuman and had severely affected his family life. In his application of 22 May 1997, the applicant stressed that since the court had heard evidence from his wife on 21 May 1997 (see also paragraph 41 above), there was no further justification to continue the harsh measures imposed on their personal contact. He relied on Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. 79. On 16 June 1997 the Wrocław-Śródmieście District Court dismissed two further, similar applications made by the applicant on 5 and 12 June 1997, holding that the prohibition on any personal contact between him and his wife was justified by the risk that they might induce one another to give false testimonies before the court or obstruct the proper course of the proceedings. 80. The applicant's wife was allowed to visit him in prison on 9 August 1997. That visit took place in the presence of the prison guard.

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8. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in La Spezia. He is the owner of an apartment in La Spezia, which he had let to B.L. 9. In a registered letter of 21 February 1992, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 August 1992 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 10. On 31 August 1992, he served a notice to quit on the tenant, but he refused to leave. 11. In a writ served on the tenant on 22 February 1993, the applicant informed the tenant of his intention to terminate the lease and summoned him to appear before the La Spezia Magistrate. 12. By a decision of 4 March 1993, which was made enforceable on the same day, the La Spezia Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1993. 13. On 14 January 1994, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 14. On 16 February 1994, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 March 1994. 15. On 30 May 1994, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his mother. 16. Between 8 March 1994 and 14 May 1998, the bailiff made three attempts to recover possession. 17. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 18. On 27 September 1996, the applicant asked the La Spezia Magistrate for police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. The La Spezia Magistrate rejected the request. 19. On 13 February 1998 and on 4 May 1998, the applicant served two notices to quit on the tenant, informing him that the order for possession would be enforced with the assistance of the police. 20. On 14 May 1998, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.

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8. The applicant was born in 1953 and lives in Naples. 9. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Naples, which she had let to L.P. 10. In a writ of 31 January 1984 , the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 11. On 31 April 1984, she served a notice to quit on the tenant, but he refused to leave. 12. In a writ served on the tenant on 30 May 1984, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 13. By a decision of 5 March 1986, which was made enforceable on 7 March 1990, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 5 September 1987. 14. On 4 May 1990, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 27 July 1990. 15. On 6 May 1991, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself. 16. Between 27 July 1990 and 6 December 1994, the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 17. On 4 January 1995, the Naples Magistrate served notice to quit on the tenant, informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 21 March 1995. 18. On 28 January 1997, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.

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8. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Rome. 9. A.G.D. was the owner of an apartment in Rome, which she had let to V.P. 10. A.G.D. informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983, and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 11. By a decision of 21 October 1986, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 April 1987. 12. On 13 November 1986, the applicant became the owner of the apartment and pursued the enforcement proceedings. 13. On 8 May 1987, she served a notice to quit on the tenant, but he refused to leave. 14. On 20 May 1987 she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 7 July 1987. 15. On 3 April 1989, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself. 16. Between 7 July 1987 and 1 December 1999, the bailiff made forty-nine attempts to recover possession. 17. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 18. After reaching an agreement with the tenant, on 18 December 1999 the applicant recovered possession of her apartment.

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8. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Matera. 9. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Milan, which she had let to D.D'A.M. 10. In a registered letter of 3 October 1984, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1985 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 11. On 23 October 1985, she served a notice to quit on the tenant and summoned her to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 12. By a decision of 16 October 1986, which was made enforceable on 19 November 1986, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1988. 13. On 30 June 1988 and on 2 May 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 14. On 1 June 1989, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 27 June 1989. 15. Between 27 June 1989 and 25 November 1997, the bailiff made thirty-one attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 16. On 27 December 1997, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment, because the tenant spontaneously vacated the premises.

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8. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Milan. 9. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 10. Stelios company was the owner of an apartment in Milan which it had let to E.T. 11. In a registered letter sent in December 1990, Stelios informed the tenant that it intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 29 September 1992 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 12. In a writ served on the tenant on 19 March 1991, Stelios reiterated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 13. By a decision of 4 April 1991, which was made enforceable on 30 June 1993, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by the same date. 14. On 15 December 1992, the applicant became the owner of the apartment and pursued the enforcement proceedings. 15. On 15 November 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 16. On 25 January 1994, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 11 February 1994. 17. In a registered letter of 13 March 1995, the applicant proposed negotiations to the tenant in order to settle their dispute, but they failed. 18. Between 11 February 1994 and 15 March 1999, the bailiff made seventeen attempts to recover possession. 19. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 20. On 14 December 1999, the enforcement of the order for possession was suspended pursuant Section 6 of Law no. 431/98 and set for 12 May 2000. 21. On 9 May 2000 and 13 June 2000, the bailiff made two attempts to recover possession. 22. Later in June 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.

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8. The applicant is a company based in Lainate. 9. In 1987, it became the owner of several flats in Milan, which had all been leased by the previous owner. 1) Proceedings against A.D.P. 10. In a writ served on the tenant on 2 October 1987, the applicant communicated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 11. By a decision of 13 October 1987, which was made enforceable on 20 October 1987, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 29 March 1990. 12. On 21 April 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 13. On 11 May 1990, it served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 June 1990. 14. Between 8 June 1990 and 8 November 1999, the bailiff made thirty-five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 15. On 19 May 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 2) Proceedings against J.D. 16. In a writ served on the tenant on 2 October 1987, the applicant communicated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 17. By a decision of 13 October 1987, which was made enforceable on 20 October 1987, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 29 March 1989. 18. On 20 November 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 19. On 10 December 1990, it served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 4 January 1991. 20. Between 4 January 1991 and 11 November 1997, the bailiff made twenty-seven attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 21. In March 1998, the tenant vacated the premises. 3) Proceedings against C.F.C. 22. In a writ served on the tenant on 2 October 1987, the applicant communicated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 23. By a decision of 13 October 1987, which was made enforceable on 20 October 1987, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 29 March 1990. 24. On 21 April 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 25. On 11 May 1990, it served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 June 1990. 26. Between 8 June 1990 and 11 April 2000, the bailiff made thirty-eight attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 27. On an unspecified date, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 4) Proceedings against V.D. 28. In a writ served on the tenant on 2 October 1987, the applicant communicated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 29. By a decision of 13 October 1987, which was made enforceable on 20 October 1987, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 29 March 1990. 30. On 21 April 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 31. On 11 May 1990, it served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 June 1990. 32. Between 8 June 1990 and 8 November 1999, the bailiff made thirty-four attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 33. In June 1998, the tenant vacated the premises. 5) Proceedings against V.L. 34. In a writ served on the tenant on 2 October 1987, the applicant communicated its intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 35. By a decision of 13 October 1987, which was made enforceable on 20 October 1987, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 29 March 1990. 36. On 21 April 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 37. On 11 May 1990, it served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 June 1990. 38. Between 8 June 1990 and 1 February 2000, the bailiff made thirty-eight attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 39. On an unspecified date, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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7. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Samokov. Between 1991 and 1994 he was the mayor of Samokov. 8. On 27 May 1993 the District Prosecutor's Office (Районна прокуратура) in Samokov opened criminal proceedings against the applicant. It was alleged that the applicant in his capacity as mayor of Samokov had bestowed unlawfully benefits to individuals by granting tenancy orders and authorising construction works (abuse of office contrary to Article 282 §§ 1 and 2 of the Penal Code), that he had made a false certification in an official document (Article 311 § 1 of the Penal Code), and that he had used offensive language in respect of several persons (Articles 146 and 148 § 1(3)(4)). 9. As a measure to secure the applicant's appearance before the competent authorities, he was required to sign an undertaking that he would not leave Samokov without authorisation. This undertaking apparently remained in force throughout the proceedings. 10. On 16 June 1993 the case was assigned to an investigator. On 14 July 1993 the applicant was questioned. On 27 July 1993 the investigator heard one witness. On 11 August 1993 the investigator concluded his work on the case and drew up a report proposing the termination of the proceedings, as the applicant's acts did not constitute criminal offences. 11. On 24 September 1993 the District Prosecutor's Office referred the case back for further investigation. On an unspecified date the case was assigned to another investigator. 12. On 18 January 1994 the Regional Prosecutor's Office (Окръжна прокуратура) in Sofia, acting under section 154 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, ordered the suspension of the applicant's term as the mayor of Samokov as there was a danger that he would obstruct the investigation. Upon the applicant's appeal this decision was confirmed by the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office (Главна прокуратура). On 19 October 1994 the municipal council (общински съвет) removed the applicant from the post of mayor of Samokov. The removal was upheld on appeal by the Sofia Regional Court and by the Supreme Court. 13. In the continuing criminal proceedings, on 24 March 1994 the investigator proposed a temporary suspension of the proceedings as an important witness was allegedly in hiding. On 4 April 1994 the case was again referred back for further investigation by decision of the District Prosecutor's Office. 14. On 6 September 1994 the investigator reformulated the charges and, in addition, charged the applicant under Articles 172 §§ 1 and 2 and 282 of the Penal Code in respect of allegedly unlawful payments to dismissed municipal employees and his refusal to comply with a judicial order reinstating an employee. 15. On 31 October 1994 the District Prosecutor's Office terminated the proceedings in so far as they concerned the charges about payments to dismissed employees and in respect of some of the incidents where the applicant had allegedly used offensive language. On the same date the prosecutor drew up an indictment in respect of the alleged crimes under Articles 282 §§ 1, 2 and 3 and 311 § 1 of the Penal Code and also as regards the applicant's alleged failure to comply with a judicial order (Article 172 §§ 1 and 2 of the Penal Code) and the remaining incidents where the applicant allegedly employed offensive language (Articles 146 and 148 § 1(3)(4)). 16. During the preliminary investigation, in the period May 1993 - October 1994, the investigators examined numerous documents and heard ten witnesses. There is a dispute between the parties as to the number of experts' opinions ordered. According to the applicant they were six or seven, whereas the Government mentioned seventy-eight experts' opinions. 17. The indictment was submitted to the Samokov District Court (Районен съд). 18. Between 17 January 1995 and 15 May 1996 the District Court held nineteen hearings. The court heard about one hundred witnesses and many experts and admitted voluminous documentary evidence. The hearings were held at regular intervals and most adjournments were considered necessary to allow for the examination of witnesses that had not appeared or the collection of other evidence requested by the applicant or the prosecution. The District Court imposed fines on witnesses who had failed to appear without good cause and sent urgent requests to the police for assistance in respect of witnesses whose whereabouts were unknown. 19. By judgment of 17 May 1996 the applicant was convicted on some of the charges and was acquitted for the remainder. He was sentenced to one year and three months' imprisonment, suspended. 20. On 29 May 1996 the applicant appealed to the Sofia Regional Court (Окръжен съд). The prosecutor also appealed and requested that the judgement of the District Court be quashed and the case referred back to the investigation authorities. The Regional Court held a hearing on 8 July 1996. 21. By judgement of 23 July 1996 the Regional Court upheld the applicant's conviction under Article 311 § 1 and his acquittal under Article 172 §§ 1 and 2 of the Penal Code, quashed the remainder of the District Court's judgement and referred the latter part of the case back to the investigation authorities. 22. As a result, in respect of the charges of false certification in an official document under Article 311 § 1 of the Penal Code, the proceedings ended on 28 February 1997, when the Supreme Court of Cassation (Върховен касационен съд) dismissed the applicant's petition for review (cassation) against the conviction part of the Regional Court's judgment. As regards the alleged offences under Articles 146 and 148 § 1(3)(4) and Article 282 §§ 1 and 2 of the Penal Code, the criminal proceedings continued at the preliminary investigation stage. 23. The Regional Court remitted this part of the case to the investigation stage as it found a number of discrepancies between the initial charges and the indictment, mainly as regards the references to the legal provisions which the applicant had allegedly breached in abuse of his duties as a mayor. The Regional Court considered that as a result the applicant's defence rights had been curbed. 24. No investigation was carried out between July 1996 and April 1997 since, following the judgment of 23 July 1996, the case file only reached the District Prosecutor's Office in October 1996, but had to be transmitted in November 1996 to the Supreme Court of Cassation in relation to the applicant's petition for review (cassation) of the conviction part of the judgment. After the delivery of that court's judgment on 28 February 1997, the case file reached the competent investigator in April 1997. 25. On each of the dates 7 May, 12 May and 2 June 1997 the investigator heard one witness. 26. By letters of 8 August, 27 August, 23 September and 29 September 1997 the applicant inquired with the District Prosecutor's Office in Samokov about the course of the proceedings and requested the collection of evidence. 27. On 31 October 1997 the investigator reformulated the charges against the applicant. On 7 November 1997 the applicant was informed thereof and was questioned. The applicant had five meetings with the investigator until 25 November 1997. The applicant refused to give explanations. He requested the collection of additional documentary material. 28. On 20 January 1998 the investigator sent requests for documentary material to several institutions. 29. By letters of 26 February and 21 May 1998 the applicant protested against the delays in the proceedings. 30. On 5, 6 and 7 August 1998 the investigator provided access to the case-file to three persons, the alleged victims. On 10 August 1998 the applicant appeared before the investigator, the material in the case was officially communicated to him and he was given the possibility to submit requests or objections. The applicant made a number of requests and remarks. 31. On 21 August 1998 the investigator finalised the case and submitted it to the competent prosecutor proposing indictment. The prosecutor ordered further investigation to which the investigator objected. The ensuing dispute required the interference of the Regional Prosecutor's Office. Having examined the matter, on 11 June 1999 it ordered additional investigation. 32. On 1 October 1999 the applicant was questioned by the investigator. On 5 October 1999 the applicant was provided access to all material in the case and invited to submit his final comments on the investigation. Thereafter, the case was transmitted to the competent prosecutor. 33. By order of 17 November 1999 the District Prosecutor's Office terminated the proceedings in respect of a number of the charges. The applicant appealed stating, inter alia, that the order did not clarify the outstanding charges, so as to enable him to organise his defence. 34. On 17 August 2000 the Regional Prosecutor's Office modified the order of 17 November 1999, accepting that it had been unclear and wrongly reasoned. As a result, the charges on three counts of abuse of office under Article 282 of the Penal Code were dropped on the ground that the acts imputed to the applicant did not constitute criminal offences and some other charges were abandoned as unproven. The remaining accusations were modified. 35. As of March 2001 the proceedings were pending at the preliminary investigation stage. 36. On an unspecified date the competent prosecutor drew up an indictment on 137 counts of abuse of office. The indictment ran on 35 pages and relied on seven witnesses, reports of nine experts and voluminous documentary material. 37. The indictment was submitted to the District Court which held a first hearing on 21 February 2002. On that date the case was adjourned until 22 April 2002. 38. On 27 March 1995 criminal proceedings were opened against the applicant on suspicion that on 7 July 1992, at the time when he was mayor of Samokov, he had contravened Article 282 § 1 of the Penal Code (abuse of office) by ordering unlawfully the restitution of State property, a plot of land, to a private person, a Mr S. 39. The property in question belonged to Mr S. until 1961 when the State had acquired it for the needs of the local post office. In 1992 Parliament enacted a law providing for the restitution of property nationalised under several pieces of legislation passed in the 1940s and 1950s. The plot of Mr S. had been acquired by the State in 1961 under other legislation and thus did not fall within the scope of the 1992 restitution law. Nevertheless, on 7 July 1992 the applicant had granted Mr S.'s request for restitution, citing as legal ground the 1992 restitution law. 40. According to the charges, the procedure for examination of restitution requests by a commission of experts had not been followed. Furthermore, the order had no valid legal grounds and was issued by the applicant with the intention to bestow a benefit on Mr S. 41. In the meantime, on an unspecified date in 1994 the post office brought a civil action against Mr S. claiming the property back. Several months later, in 1995, the Regional Governor quashed the 1992 restitution order issued by the applicant and, upon the appeal of Mr S., separate civil proceedings commenced between Mr S. and the Regional Governor. In a third set of civil proceedings Mr S. sought to prove against the post office that the 1961 acquisition had been null and void. The proceedings involving the Regional Governor ended in 1997, and those between the post office and Mr S. in 2000. The 1992 restitution order was eventually quashed and the plot of land returned to the local post office. 42. In the criminal investigation against the applicant, between 12 April and 31 July 1995 the investigator heard at least fifteen witnesses, questioned the applicant, commissioned three expert reports, and obtained documentary material from several institutions. 43. On 8 November 1995 the investigator concluded his work on the case and proposed to the competent prosecutor to submit an indictment in court. However, the proceedings remained dormant until August 1997. 44. On 4 August 1997 the prosecutor in charge of the criminal investigation against the applicant transmitted the file back to the investigator considering that the accusation was not supported by sufficient evidence and that, therefore, further investigation was necessary. In particular, it was necessary to establish the applicable rules and practice in the examination of restitution requests so as to clarify whether the applicant had acted in excess of his powers. The prosecutor also mentioned that the investigator should verify the outcome of the civil disputes concerning the ownership of the plot of land in question. 45. On 20 August 1999 the investigator drew up a concluding report and transmitted the file to the prosecutor. 46. On 15 October 1999 the prosecutor terminated the proceedings finding that the applicant's intention to bestow an unlawful benefit had not been proven. In his decision, in the summary of facts, the prosecutor mentioned one of the two sets of civil proceedings described above, those opposing Mr S. against the local post office. Those proceedings were still pending at that time. The prosecutor's decision did not contain any statement as to the relevance of the civil case to the criminal proceedings against the applicant.

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8. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Milan. 9. In a letter of 28 June 1982, the former owner of the flat informed R.S. (the tenant) that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 10. In a writ served on the tenant on 16 April 1984, the owner reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 11. By a decision of 20 November 1984, which was made enforceable on the same date, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 10 September 1985. 12. The tenant asked the Milan Magistrate to postpone the enforcement proceedings. The Milan Magistrate set a fresh date for the end of August 1986. 13. On 29 January 1985, the applicant became the owner of the flat and pursued the enforcement proceedings. 14. On 4 July 1986, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 15. On 19 August 1986, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 24 September 1986. 16. Between 24 September 1986 and 22 October 1987, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 17. On 24 March 1987, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. 18. The tenant asked the Milan Magistrate to set again a fresh date for the enforcement for 28 July 1988. 19. On 14 December 1988 and on 14 April 1989, the applicant served two notices on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 20. On 4 May 1989, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 26 May 1989. 21. Between 26 May 1989 and 13 January 2000, the bailiff made forty-four attempts to recover possession. 22. On 13 January 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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9. The applicant is a Netherlands national, born in 1953 and living in The Hague. He has been a practising lawyer (advocaat) since 1979. 10. At the beginning of November 1993, the applicant agreed to act as defence counsel for a Mr K. in criminal proceedings brought against the latter. At that time, Mr K. was in pre-trial detention. In connection with this case, the applicant met several times with Mrs S., who at that time was Mr K.'s wife. 11. At some point Mrs S. told Mr K. that on 9 November 1993 the applicant had made sexual advances towards her. Mr K. informed the police officer investigating his case, Officer N., of this, who in turn informed the public prosecutor in charge of the investigation against Mr K., Public Prosecutor T. The latter gave instructions that a criminal complaint against the applicant should be filed with the vice squad. On this basis, Officer N. contacted both Mrs S. and Officer R. of the vice squad. 12. Mrs S. was initially reluctant to lodge a criminal complaint against the applicant as she feared that her word – the only evidence available – would be insufficient against that of the applicant. 13. Following discussions between Officers R. and R.K. of the vice squad and Public Prosecutor T., the suggestion was made to Mrs S. to connect a tape recorder to her telephone in order to allow her to tape incoming conversations with the applicant. Police officers subsequently connected a cassette tape recorder to Mrs S.'s telephone in her home and suggested that she steer her conversations with the applicant towards the latter's advances. Mrs S. was shown how to operate the device. The police came to her home twice in order to collect the recordings and load new cassette tapes into the tape recorder. 14. Mrs S. recorded three conversations with the applicant, which were transcribed by the police. These transcripts were added to the case-file on the investigation against the applicant. 15. The case was reported in the press. This induced two other women to come forward and lodge criminal complaints against the applicant: one Mrs V., who claimed to have been raped and sexually assaulted by the applicant, and one Mrs C., who also complained that she had been sexually assaulted by the applicant. 16. The applicant was subsequently summoned to appear on 14 April 1994 before the Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) of The Hague on charges of sexual assault and rape. 17. In its judgment of 28 April 1994, following adversarial proceedings in the course of which a hearing was held on 14 April 1994, the Regional Court convicted the applicant of having sexually assaulted Mrs S. and Mrs C., and acquitted him of the charges brought in respect of Mrs V. The Regional Court sentenced the applicant to eight months' imprisonment, four months of which were suspended for a probationary period of two years. 18. Both the applicant and the public prosecutor lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague. 19. In its judgment of 16 June 1995, the Court of Appeal quashed the judgment of 28 April 1994, convicted the applicant of having sexually assaulted Mrs S. and Mrs C. and acquitted him of the charges in respect of Mrs V. It sentenced the applicant to four months' imprisonment, suspended for a probationary period of two years, and a fine of 10,000 Netherlands guilders. It based the applicant's conviction on statements taken from the applicant, Mrs S., Mrs C. and three other persons. The recorded telephone conversations were not relied on as evidence. 20. The applicant's subsequent appeal on points of law was rejected by the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) on 18 February 1997. 21. In so far as is relevant to the case before the Court, the applicant complained under inter alia Article 8 of the Convention that the Court of Appeal had wrongly rejected his argument that the prosecution should be declared inadmissible or that evidence had been unlawfully obtained in respect of the recordings made of his telephone conversations with Mrs S. The Supreme Court dismissed this complaint in the following terms: “6.2.2. It is ... correctly assumed in the grounds of appeal on points of law that no interference by any public authority is permitted in the exercise of the right to 'respect for his private life and his correspondence' guaranteed by Article 8 § 1 of the Convention unless, and to the extent, provided for by law. 6.3.1. What is decisive in the instant case is therefore the answer to the question whether, noting the part played by the police in the recording of the telephone conversations that S. has had with the suspect, there has been an interference by the police in the exercise of the right of the accused to 'respect for his private life and his correspondence'. 6.3.2. Against the background of the facts and circumstances ... the finding of the Court of Appeal that the police has not acted in such a directive manner – in which finding the Court of Appeal apparently had in mind the entire part played by the police in the recording of the telephone conversations by S. – that there has been an interference by any public authority within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention is not incomprehensible, and furthermore it does not reflect an incorrect understanding of the law, in particular, not as regards the contents of that provision of the Convention ... After all, [the case] concerns in essence a (female) victim of a sexual offence, this woman not having any other prima facie evidence than her own account and to whom the police has given information about a possibility for her to obtain additional proof and to whom and to this end the police has subsequently provided practical (technical) aid for performing certain acts – the recording, in her own home and in the absence of the police and with the aid of a device connected by the police to her own telephone line, of an incoming telephone conversation which the perpetrator conducts with her –, which act does not, for that woman, she being a party to the telephone conversation recorded, constitute an act prohibited by law. Nor does the finding that the circumstance that the suspect in his capacity of practising lawyer has a 'privileged status' is not relevant in this matter reflect an incorrect understanding of the law. On the above grounds, the Court of Appeal could conclude that this was not a situation referred to in Article 125g of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The findings of the Court of Appeal are sufficiently reasoned.”

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8. The applicants were born in 1959 and 1952 respectively and live in Szigethalom, Hungary. 9. On 8 February 1993 the applicants were dismissed by their employer, a car manufacturer. 10. On 4 March 1993 the applicants brought an action before the Pest County Labour Court for unlawful dismissal. 11. On 24 November 1993 the Labour Court held a hearing and transferred the case to the Economic Collegium of the Pest County Regional Court. The Labour Court observed that liquidation proceedings were pending against the applicants' former employer. 12. On appeal, on 28 February 1994 the Regional Court quashed the Labour Court's decision and remitted the case to it. 13. On 31 August 1994 the Labour Court decided that the applicants' dismissal had been unlawful. It transferred their pecuniary claims to the Regional Court's Economic Collegium. 14. On appeal, on 27 February 1995 the Regional Court quashed the Labour Court's decision and remitted the case to it a second time. 15. On 28 September 1995 the Labour Court annulled the applicants' dismissal on grounds of unlawfulness. On 25 March 1996 the Regional Court upheld this decision. 16. Subsequently the applicants lodged various pecuniary claims with the Labour Court for outstanding wages and severance pay. On 3 July 1996 the Labour Court held a hearing, ruled that it lacked competence to hear the claims and transferred the file to the Bankruptcy and Liquidation Section of the Regional Court, which was in charge of the liquidation of the defendant company. 17. On 22 October 1996 the Supreme Court, acting as a review instance, quashed the decisions of 28 September 1995 and 25 March 1996. Simultaneously, it discontinued those proceedings and transferred that part of the applicants' claims to the Regional Court. The Supreme Court pointed out that, according to section 38 § 3 of the Insolvency Act, pecuniary claims against a business entity under liquidation could only be pursued in the framework of liquidation proceedings. 18. In the context of the liquidation proceedings, the Regional Court held a hearing on 18 December 1996 and ordered the liquidation trustee in charge of the defendant company to complete the case-file. 19. By a decision of 29 January 1997, the Regional Court annulled the applicants' dismissal. On 24 April 1997 the Supreme Court, acting as a second instance, upheld this decision and ruled that the applicants had been unlawfully dismissed. 20. As regards the quantification of the applicants' claims, the Regional Court held a hearing on 30 June 1997 and, on 3 July 1997, it awarded 1,827,792 Hungarian forints (HUF) to the first applicant and HUF 899,264 to the second applicant, for outstanding wages and severance pay. The decision was immediately enforceable. 21. On 8 September and 24 November 1997 the Regional Court held further hearings. On 28 November 1997, it awarded a further HUF 681,620 to the first applicant and HUF 305,685 to the second applicant, for loss of earnings. The Regional Court dismissed the applicants' claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damage. 22. On the applicants' appeal, on 26 November 1998 the Supreme Court, acting as a second instance, upheld the dismissal of the applicants' claims for compensation for non-pecuniary damages. However, it quashed the remainder of the first instance decision – to the extent that it was disputed on appeal – and remitted the claims in question to the first instance court. 23. The proceedings before the Regional Court were resumed on 24 March 1999. Another hearing took place on 30 June 1999. On 22 July 1999 the Regional Court appointed an expert accountant. 24. On 23 May 2000 the expert presented his report to the Regional Court. On 17 August 2000 the applicants objected to the expert's opinion. On 30 August 2000 the Regional Court held a hearing and ordered the expert to supplement his report within 15 days. On 10 January 2001 another hearing took place. 25. On 29 March 2001 the Regional Court awarded, under various heads, the amounts of HUF 58,200, 69,465 and 549,235, plus accrued interest, to the first applicant, and HUF 40,800, plus accrued interest, to the second applicant. 26. On 18 April 2001 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court. 27. On 15 November 2001 the Supreme Court, sitting as second instance, dismissed the applicants' appeal. 28. On 4 March 2002 the applicants filed a petition for a review with the Supreme Court's review bench. The review proceedings are still pending.

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8. The applicants were born in 1955 and 1953 respectively and live in Sopron, Hungary. Their previous application (no. 27587/95) was declared inadmissible by a Committee of the Commission on 16 May 1996. 9. Seeking judicial review and compensation for damages on account of administrative decisions taken in a protracted dispute over their licence to sell folk-art items on public premises, the applicants brought an action on 9 October 1992 against the Sopron Mayor's Office (“the 1992 action”). The action was first registered at the Sopron District Court, which on 4 November 1992 issued an order for the completion of the file. The applicants complied with this order on 12 November 1992. 10. On 1 March 1993 the District Court rejected the action, holding that it had no competence to hear the case. On 23 March 1993 the applicants appealed. 11. On 5 August 1993 the Győr-Moson-Sopron County Regional Court quashed the District Court's decision. It transferred the case-file to its own competent bench. 12. In the proceedings before the Regional Court, on 16 September and 28 October 1993 orders were issued for the completion of the file. The applicants complied with these orders on 28 September and 5 November 1993, respectively. On 19 November 1993 the defendant authority was eventually notified of the action. 13. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1993, the applicants brought an official liability action in the context of the above-mentioned proceedings before the District Court (“the 1993 action”). The defendant authority was notified of this action on 22 October 1993. On 20 November 1993 the District Court held a hearing and, on 29 November 1993, it transferred the case-file to the Regional Court for reasons of competence. 14. Following a hearing held on 14 December 1993, the Regional Court on 9 February 1994 discontinued the proceedings concerning the applicants' 1992 action. The Regional Court observed that the defendant authority had been notified earlier of the 1993 action and, for that reason, the applicants' claims were to be pursued in the proceedings relating to the latter action. On 21 February 1994 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court, which, on 13 October 1994, upheld the decision to discontinue the proceedings on the 1992 action. 15. Meanwhile, following repeated exchanges of observations between the parties in the proceedings concerning the 1993 action, the Regional Court held hearings on 25 August and 18 October 1994. Another hearing was scheduled for 25 October 1994. In the context of procedural disputes concerning the applicants' motion to hear certain witnesses, their obligation to pay outstanding stamp duties, as well as questions of legal aid, on 2 November 1995 the Supreme Court decided the applicants' procedural appeals. 16. On 9 July 1996 the Regional Court awarded the applicants compensation in a total amount of 300,000 Hungarian forints (“HUF”), plus accrued interest. The Regional Court dismissed the remainder of their claims. Having reviewed numerous related administrative files and decisions, the Regional Court ruled that the defendant authority's conduct had hindered the applicants in the exercise of their rights derived from their licence to trade on public premises. In reasoning its ten-page decision, the Regional Court relied on documentary evidence. 17. On 6 August 1996 the applicants appealed. On 2 September 1996 they supplemented their appeal. 18. On 5 February 1998 the Supreme Court, acting as a second instance jurisdiction, held a hearing. On 13 February 1998 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court's decision. The decision was served on the applicants on 8 April 1998.

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4. The applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Cífer. 5. On 2 January 1995 the applicant filed an action for rehabilitation with the Bratislava City Court. 6. On 7 February 1995 the City Court transferred the case to the Bratislava I District Court for reasons of jurisdiction. On 1 July 1998 the case was assigned to another judge who started proceeding with it on 16 June 1999. 7. On 2 September 1999 the Constitutional Court found that the Bratislava I District Court had violated the applicant's constitutional right to have his case examined without undue delays. In its finding the Constitutional Court noted, in particular, that the District Court had failed to proceed with the case between 31 July 1995 and 3 April 1997 and also between 1 July 1998 and 16 June 1999. 8. On 27 November 2001 the Bratislava I District Court dismissed the action. The applicant appealed on 23 June 2002. The proceedings are pending.

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5. The applicant was born in 1922 and lives in Dřevnovice (Czech Republic). 6. On 9 April 1991 the applicant claimed compensation from a person who had damaged his car. 7. On 3 February 1994 the Košice - okolie District Court allowed the applicant's claims in part. On 6 December 1995 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court quashed the first instance judgment. 8. On 17 November 1999 the Košice - okolie District Court noted that the applicant had withdrawn a part of his action and discontinued the proceedings in respect of the relevant claims. It further dismissed the remainder of the applicant's action. 9. On 3 January 2000 the applicant appealed against the decision to dismiss his action. He also challenged the District Court's decision on the expert's fees. 10. On 23 May 2000 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court upheld the District Court's decision to dismiss the applicant's action. 11. On 27 June 2000 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law. The Supreme Court rejected it, on 28 September 2000, as being inadmissible.

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9. The applicant is a Dutch national, born in 1957 and living in Bregenz (Austria). 10. The applicant is a physiotherapist who completed his professional training in Belgium and received his diploma in 1986. From 1987 to 1993 he worked as a physiotherapist in Austria during which time he was employed by an association working in that field. 11. On 19 February 1992 the Vorarlberg Regional Governor (Landeshauptmann) recognised his diploma with suspensive effect until he accomplished two additional exams. On 11 January 1995 the Regional Governor completed the decree of recognition upon the applicant’s submission of the required certificates. 12. On 4 April 1995 the applicant filed a request with the Vorarlberg Regional Governor for the authorisation to work as a self-employed physiotherapist. He further submitted an employment certificate dated 4 January 1994, which had been issued by the association he had worked for. 13. On 26 July 1995 the Regional Governor refused to grant the applicant’s request. It found that the applicant did not comply with the requirements set out in section 7 § 3 of the Act on Medico-Technical Services (Bundesgesetz über die Regelung der gehobenen medizinisch-technischen Dienste, MTD-Gesetz). According to this provision the right to work as a self-employed physiotherapist may only be granted after three years of authorised professional practice within the last ten years. 14. On 31 January 1996 the Ministry for Health and Consumer Protection (Ministerium für Gesundheit und Konsumentenschutz) partly granted the applicant’s appeal. It found that the Regional Governor should have based its decision on section 68 § 6 of the Nursing Act (Krankenpflegegesetz) according to which the right to work as a self-employed physiotherapist may already be granted after two years of authorised professional practice within the last ten years. It held that, as regards the content, the Regional Government had decided correctly, however, it had based its decision on the wrong legal provision. 15. On 11 April 1996 the applicant filed a complaint with the Administrative Court. He requested an oral hearing and asked the court to seek a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EC Treaty. 16. On 23 August 1996 the applicant filed another request with the Regional Governor in order to be granted the right to work as a self-employed physiotherapist. 17. On 28 November 1996 the Regional Governor also rejected this request. He held that the applicant was authorised to work as physiotherapist in Austria since 11 January 1995 following recognition of his foreign diploma. His employment at the association had been before that time and could not be considered as “authorised” professional practice within the meaning of section 68 § 6 of the Nursing Act. 18. On 28 February 1997 the Ministry for Health and Consumer Protection rejected the applicant’s appeal on formal grounds, applying the principle of res iudicata. 19. On 22 May 1997 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court, requested an oral hearing and asked the court to seek a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EC Treaty. 20. On 10 June 1997 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the applicant’s complaint for lack of prospects of success. It found that his case did not raise serious questions of constitutional law or of the application of Community law and that the matter was not excluded from the competence of the Administrative Court. 21. On 22 June 1997 the applicant filed a complaint with the Administrative Court against the Ministry’s decision of 28 February 1997, requesting, inter alia, an oral hearing. He further asked the court to seek a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice under Article 177 of the EC Treaty on the question whether the refusal to exercise his profession as a self-employed physiotherapist in Austria was in accordance with Community law. 22. On 4 December 1997 the Feldkirch Regional Court, in the course of official liability proceedings instituted by the applicant, also requested the Administrative Court to decide upon the lawfulness of the decision by the Ministry for Health and Consumer Protection of 31 January 1996. 23. On 20 January 1998 the Administrative Court, in a joint decision, dismissed the applicant’s complaints of 11 April 1996 and 22 June 1997 and the request by the Regional Court without holding an oral hearing, relying on section 39 § 2 (6) of the Administrative Court Act. It confirmed the decisions by the Ministry for Health and Consumer Protection as being lawful. It further held that there was no issue that would require a preliminary ruling by the European Court of Justice, since the applicant’s requests did not concern the interpretation of a specific provision of Community law but rather challenged the implementation of national law exercised by Austrian authorities. The decision was served on the applicant’s counsel on 23 February 1998. 24. On 4 June 1998 the Feldkirch Regional Court, dismissed the applicant’s claim relating to official liability proceedings. It found that there was no legal basis in national or Community law, which could support the applicant’s claim.

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6. The applicant is the owner of an appartment in Turin, which he had let to E.M. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 25 February 1993 the applicant informed the tenant of his intention to terminate the lease on 31 December 1993 and summoned her to appear before the Turuin Magistrate. 8. The tenant refused to leave the premises. 9. In a writ served on the tenant on 7 May 1993, the appliquant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Turin Magistrate. 10. By a decision of 19 May 1993, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Turin Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1994. 11. On 27 January 1995 the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 12. On 8 March 1995 the applicant informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 March 1995. 13. Between 28 March 1995 and 13 September 2000, the bailiff made eight attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 14. Pursuant to Law no. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 13 September 2000. 15. On 17 January 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.

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6. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Rome, which he had let to M.D.M. 7. In a registered letter of 8 February 1991, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 8. The tenant told the applicant that she would not leave the premises. 9. In a writ served on the tenant on 15 January 1993, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 10. By a decision of 29 April 1993, which was made enforceable on 12 May 1993, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 29 April 1994. 11. On 18 May 1994, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 12. On 11 July 1994, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 29 July 1994. 13. Between 29 July 1994 and 14 November 2000, the bailiff made twenty-five attempts to recover possession. 14. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 15. On 14 February 2001, the tenant spontaneously vacated the premises and the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.

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8. The applicant is an Icelandic national, born in 1954. He is a practising lawyer and lives in Reykjavik, Iceland. 9. The applicant instituted proceedings against the National Bank of Iceland, claiming compensation under the law of torts, on the grounds that one of the Bank’s legally trained employees had made an incorrect declaration in 1992 which was instrumental in the Supreme Court’s finding that a certain claim was no longer enforceable. As the District Court found for the defendant bank, the applicant, by a summons of 31 May 1996, instituted appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court. 10. In the course of the proceedings before the Supreme Court the applicant was given various dates between 10 July and 30 October 1996 within which to complete his submissions and the respondent Bank was given until 6 November 1996 to submit its reply. Subsequently the hearing was scheduled to open on 14 April 1997. Meanwhile, sometime between early March and early April 1997, the case was included in the Supreme Court’s docket. 11. By a judgment of 25 April 1997, the Supreme Court, by three votes to two, rejected the applicant’s claim. The minority found that the applicant’s claim should be upheld and that the National Bank was liable to pay him ISK 8,746,319 Icelandic krónur (ISK) in compensation, plus default interest from 30 August 1993. 12. One of the three judges forming the majority was Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir. The applicant submitted that after the delivery of the Supreme Court’s judgment, it came to light that Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir and her husband, a Supreme Court lawyer, had a financial relationship with the National Bank of such a nature as to disqualify her from sitting in the applicant’s case. 13. In the spring of 1996 Mr Örn Clausen, husband of Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir, had sought a solution to certain financial problems arising from the inability of a debtor, Mr Edvard Lövdal, to pay certain debts with respect to which Mr Örn Clausen was one of the guarantors, and the inability of other guarantors to honour the guarantee. In early May 1996 twenty-one creditors, one of which was the National Bank, possessed claims under the guarantees amounting to approximately ISK 50,000,000. This included a claim of approximately ISK 16,000,000 by the National Bank. Another large creditor was the Savings Banks’ Hedge Fund which, on behalf of the S-Þingeyinga Savings Bank (Sparisjóður Suður-Þingeyinga – “the Savings Bank”), held a claim of approximately ISK 17,500,000. 14. In order to solve these problems Mr Örn Clausen attempted to reach a settlement with each of the creditors. An economic consultant company, Ráð, agreed to examine his financial situation and to look into the possibilities of obtaining full settlement against partial payment, starting with the two largest creditors and thereafter opening negotiations with the smaller ones, to be completed within six months. A settlement request made by the company to the National Bank’s lawyer on 15 April 1996, included the following observations: “... Mr Örn Clausen has informed us that he had, for the sake of friendship, provided guarantees with respect to Mr Lövdahl’s debts, as they have been friends for decades. He also informs us that he owns no property, and that he will foreseeably have to answer for guarantees on account of Mr Lövdahl in an amount of approximately ISK 49,550,000. His other liabilities amount to approximately ISK 10,000,000 around ISK 8,000,000 of which are taxes. Mr Örn Clausen’s wife owns [two] real properties ... [These] are owned by her separately under their marriage agreement dating from 1967. She has declared her readiness to use their net value by mortgage or sale for settling the debts, provided that Mr Örn Clausen is released from his personal guarantees and that his bankruptcy is avoided. We consequently ask you to recommend to your client, the National Bank, acceptance of 25% in final settlement of the total debt to which Mr Örn Clausen must answer as surety. This would release him from his surety liability. The payment would be made simultaneously with the signature of an agreement to this effect.” 15. On 30 May 1996, in order to obtain funds to pay the creditors, the judge’s husband Mr Örn Clausen issued four debt certificates to Landsbréf hf, Verðbréfamarkaður Landsbankans (Landsbréf, the Securities Market of the National Bank, a financial institution owned by the National Bank), totalling approximately ISK 13,600,000. The debts were secured on two properties owned by Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir, namely the couple’s main residence and one apartment in which her husband had his law office. 16. On 4 June 1996 Landsbréf sold the above four debt certificates to Eignarhaldsfélag Alþýðubankans (People’s Bank Holding Company – “the EFA”), a company specialising in high-risk investments. Ever since, the four debt certificates have been in that company’s ownership. 17. On 4 June 1996, in accordance with a settlement agreement of the same date between the National Bank and Mr Örn Clausen, he paid approximately ISK 4,370,000, of which ISK 3,677,195 were towards his debts to the National Bank and the remainder covering his lawyer’s fees. Moreover, under the terms of the settlement agreement with the bank, he was released from ISK 11,031,584 of debts originating in his guarantees for Mr Edvard Lövdal’s debts, which amounted to ISK 14,708,779. The above settlement was in conformity with a decision taken on 3 June 1996 by the National Bank’s Governing Board. 18. As regards the state of Mr Örn Clausen’s debts vis-à-vis the National Bank, the Government relied on the following information provided on 4 March 2002 by the head of the bank’s legal department: “The National Bank of Iceland hereby confirms that a settlement agreement was concluded with Mr Örn Clausen on 6 June 1996 concerning his undertakings to guarantee the payment of debts to the National Bank, by which the Bank cancelled 75% of its claims against Mr Örn Clausen against a final payment of 25%. We confirm that the Bank did not extend a new credit to Mr Örn Clausen for the said 25%. On 4 June 1996 Mr Örn Clausen’s total debts to the Bank amounted to ISK 17,298,940; his debts that did not come under the settlement agreement were a note issued 12 September 1991 in the amount of ISK 2,090,161.10, and a suretyship obligation for payment of a loan originally in the amount of ISK 500,000, which was not in arrears (remaining amount as at 31 December 1996: ISK 195,656). Mr Örn Clausen’s total debts on 25 April 1997 were a note issued 12 September 1991, in the amount of ISK 2,394,028.60, and a suretyship obligation for payment of a loan originally in the amount of ISK 500,000, which was not in arrears (remaining amount as at 31 December 1997 ISK 27,777).” 19. Under an agreement concluded on 6 June 1996 the Savings Bank too decided to cancel 75% of its claim against a final payment of 25% by Mr Örn Clausen. 20. The fact that the two largest creditors had accepted the settlement arrangements described above was of significant help in Mr Örn Clausen’s efforts to obtain settlement agreements with other creditors, all or most of whom accepted debt cancellation against partial payment. 21. The applicant submitted that there was evidence that on 4 June 1996 the debts of the husband of Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir towards the National Bank amounted to more than ISK 31,000,000. Moreover, in April 1997, at the time when the Supreme Court gave its judgment, the debts in question apparently amounted to approximately ISK 29,000,000. 22. The applicant lodged two petitions to the Supreme Court requesting the reopening of the proceedings in his case against the National Bank on the ground of Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir’s alleged lack of impartiality. 23. The first petition was submitted to the Supreme Court on 9 June 1997. The Supreme Court, sitting as a full court, unanimously rejected it on 10 July 1997. Its decision reads: “In support of his assertion relating to the disqualification of Supreme Court Judge Guðrún Erlendsdóttir, the petitioner refers to four debt certificates issued to the name of Landsbréf, which are secured by mortgage upon two real estates owned by the judge. By reason of the National Bank’s ownership of Landsbréf, the petitioner considers that this situation disqualified the judge from adjudicating the case. The secured debts in question amount to a total of ISK 13,600,000 which, as stated in the certificates, corresponds to approximately 55% of the total assessed sale price of the properties. The certificates were issued in May 1996 for a period of twenty-five years. The petitioner does not maintain that the certificates are in arrears. It is shown from the information provided by the lawyer for the National Bank that the debt certificates are not, and were not at the time when the case was being considered by the Supreme Court, in the ownership of Landsbréf, the National Bank or any [other] company linked to the Bank. Mortgages on the said properties referred to in the petition, which now have been struck out of the records, and secure debts due to other parties are deemed irrelevant here. Although the above-mentioned letter of [the applicant] does not refer to the particular statutory provisions authorising the reopening of proceedings, it is to be assumed that the petition is based on section 169 of the Civil Procedure Act, Law no. 91/1991. The petitioner has not referred to any new fact or adduced any new evidence having a bearing on the merits of the case, cf. section 169(1), sub‑paragraphs (a) and (b) of Law no. 91/1991. In the light of the above consideration concerning the said mortgages, none of the conditions which provide the petitioner with a reason to believe that the said judge was not impartial and therefore disqualified from adjudicating the case have been fulfilled, cf. section 6, subsections (1) and (9), of the Supreme Court Act, Law no. 75/1973; section 5, subsection (g) of Law no. 91/1991, Article 70 of the Constitution of the Republic of Iceland (no. 33/1944), cf. section 8 of Constitutional Act no. 97/1995, and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, cf. Law no. 62/1994. Accordingly, since the legal conditions for granting the petitioner’s request for reopening of the proceedings have not been fulfilled, the request is rejected.” 24. The applicant submitted that, after the Supreme Court had given its decision of 10 July 1997 in the first revision case, he realised that Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir’s husband had additional financial ties with the National Bank. During the period from 1988 to 1991 he had assumed large-scale financial obligations vis-à-vis the bank and for years his debts to the bank had been seriously in arrears. According to the applicant, although this could not be affirmed with certainty, it was possible that the National Bank had released Mrs Justice Guðrún Erlendsdóttir’s husband from a debt of over ISK 11,000,000. 25. On 23 October 1997 the applicant filed a new petition with the Supreme Court, asking for the reopening of his compensation case. The Supreme Court rejected the petition on 20 November 1997 on the ground that, under the relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act, a party may apply only once for re-examination of a case.

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7. The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Livorno, which she had let to P.B.C. 8. In a registered letter of 13 April 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 9. In a writ served on the tenant on 22 April 1989, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Livorno Magistrate. 10. By a decision of 15 May 1989, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Livorno Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 November 1989. 11. On 20 January 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 12. On 31 March 1990, she served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 18 April 1990. 13. Between 18 April 1990 and 18 November 1998, the bailiff made fourteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 14. On an unspecified date of May 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment because the tenant vacated the premises spontaneously.

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8. The applicants are involved in a long-standing dispute with the State concerning the ownership of land in Omorphokklisia in Galatsi forming part of a wider area called the “Veikou Estate” over which the State claims ownership. In 1923, 1928, 1931, 1932 and 1941 the State expropriated large parts of the Veikou Estate for various purposes in the public interest. 9. In an opinion (no. 23/1987) which was approved by the Minister of Finance in 1987 and confirmed by the same minister in 1992, the Public Estates Consultative Board said that the Veikou Estate belonged to the State, since Mr Veïkos’s heirs had failed to prove that they had acquired property rights under title deeds or from adverse possession of the estate. On the basis of that opinion, the State Lands Authority registered the land possessed by Mr Veïkos’s heirs and subsequently all the plots which had been transferred to third parties by the heirs as public estates. Various sets of proceedings brought against the State by Mr Veïkos’s heirs and third parties are still pending in the domestic courts. 10. In 1934 the Minister of Agriculture decided to extend reafforestation in Attica to a region which included the disputed land. According to that decision, the area had “consisted, before the destruction and deterioration of the forest vegetation ..., of pine-tree forest which [had] progressively deteriorated and was starting to disappear ...” (decision no. 108424/1934). 11. However, in a document of the Athens Forestry Commission of 16 November 1968 on city planning, it was stated that half the area concerned was agricultural and the other half scrubland covered by bushes and just five pine trees. The Forestry Commission expressed the opinion that the area had never been forest land and could not be reafforested, since the decision of the Ministry of Agriculture of 1934 excluded from the scope of reafforestation barren land or parcels owned by individuals. The Forestry Commission concluded that the city development plan could be extended to the area concerned. Two previous documents of the Ministry of Agriculture, dated 3 December 1948 and 11 September 1949, and an expert report concerning the Veikou Estate had arrived at the same conclusion. 12. On 10 October 1994 the prefect of Athens decided that an area within the Veikou Estate, including the disputed plot of land, should be reafforested. It was expressly stated in the prefect’s decision that the aim was “... to recreate the forest greenery that [had] been destroyed or [had] deteriorated by illegal quarrying and other illegal actions, such as land clearing and building, over an area covering 935,483,000 sq. m”. 13. On 23 December 1994 the applicants challenged the prefect’s decision of 10 October 1994 in the Supreme Administrative Court. They claimed that they were the owners of properties that had been created by the parcelling of the Veikou Estate and were located inside the area set aside for reafforestation. In particular, they contended that the prefect’s decision sought to deprive them of any rights of possession or ownership in the contested plot. In their additional observations of 26 July 1996, they claimed that the underlying reason for the decision was an attempt by the State to create a dispute over the applicants’ rights of possession or ownership, despite the fact that there was no basis in law for the decision, since the area had never been a forest in the past. 14. On 20 January 1995 the applicants invited the State to purchase the plot in question from them. The authorities did not reply. 15. On 6 April 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court declared the applicants’ appeal inadmissible on the ground that the prefect’s decision was not an operative one, since it simply confirmed the decision that had been issued by the Minister of Agriculture in 1934. In particular, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the 1934 decision remained in force because it had not been reversed by any other act of equivalent importance. Subsequent acts of the authorities, such as the interpretation of some aerial photographs, could not be considered as a fresh assessment of the situation capable of rendering the prefect’s decision operative. 16. On 22 October 1999 the Athens Forestry Commission, following the procedure prescribed by Law no. 998/1979, classified 189,475 sq. m of land located within the area concerned by the prefect’s decision of 10 October 1994. It concluded that only 20,650 sq. m of it was forest land and should be reafforested. The Forest Disputes Resolution Committee upheld that decision and an appeal is now pending before the Appeal Board. 17. In various judgments over the past few years the Greek courts have been called upon to decide the property status of parts of the Veikou Estate (judgments no. 8864/1995 of the Athens Court of First Instance, no. 8314/1996 of the Athens Court of Appeal, and no. 9632/2000 of the Athens Court of Appeal). The courts have recognised that a number of plots which were situated in the greater Veikou Estate did not constitute forest land but were private properties which were included in the city development plan. Other judicial decisions (judgments no. 13789/1977 of the Athens Court of First Instance, no. 7350/1978 of the Athens Court of Appeal, no. 696/1980 of the Court of Cassation, no. 1865/1992 of the Athens Court of First Instance, and no. 1783/1997 of the Athens Court of First Instance) concluded that the greater area, which comprised the properties claimed by the applicants, had never been forest land in the past.

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8. The applicant was born in Lyons in 1962 and lives in Villeurbanne. 9. The applicant lived in France from his birth until 28 February 1995 with all the members of his family, his father and mother and his four brothers and sisters. 10. On 14 May 1986 he married an Italian national who, according to him, now has French nationality, and three children of French nationality were born of the marriage. 11. Following his arrest for offences under drugs legislation (cannabis resin) in December 1989, the applicant was sentenced on 22 January 1991 to six years’ imprisonment. On 4 July 1991 the Lyons Court of Appeal upheld the sentence and ordered the applicant’s permanent exclusion from French territory. 12. After both the Lyons Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation had dismissed his application for the exclusion order to be lifted, the applicant submitted an application (no. 25017/94) on 25 August 1994 to the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) against France under former Article 25 of the Convention. The case was referred to the Court by the Commission on 4 July 1996, and by the Government on 17 September 1996. 13. The exclusion order was enforced on 28 February 1995. 14. In a judgment of 26 September 1997, the Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (Mehemi (no. 1), cited above). It found that the permanent exclusion order was disproportionate to the aims pursued. It found in particular that (pp. 1971‑72, § 37) “... in view of the applicant’s lack of links with Algeria, the strength of his links with France and above all the fact that the order for his permanent exclusion from French territory separated him from his minor children and his wife ... the measure in question was disproportionate to the aims pursued”. 15. On 21 October 1997 the applicant lodged an application for the exclusion order to be lifted with specific reference to the Court’s judgment of 26 September 1997. 16. By a judgment of 24 March 1998, the Lyons Court of Appeal converted the permanent exclusion order into a ten-year exclusion order, on the ground that an exclusion order limited in time no longer constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 17. The applicant appealed on points of law and applied for legal aid. 18. By a decision of 20 May 1998, the legal aid section of the Court of Cassation took a provisional decision to grant legal aid. However it then rejected the application on 10 June 1999, on the ground that there were no genuine grounds of appeal. 19. The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal by a ruling of 26 May 1999. 20. On 21 October 1997 the applicant lodged an application for a pardon which was rejected on 19 July 1999. 21. On 11 October 1997 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the Minister for Foreign Affairs asking what measures he intended to take following the Court’s judgment of 26 September 1997 and under what conditions his client would be able to return to France. On 22 October 1997 Mr Dobelle, Deputy Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, informed him that he had consulted the Minister of Justice, who had jurisdiction over the lifting of the exclusion order, and the Minister of the Interior, who had jurisdiction over the issuing of residence permits, and that he would shortly be replying. 22. On 17 November 1997 Mr Dobelle sent the applicant’s lawyer a letter which included the following: “Although the principle of res judicata precludes the authorities from issuing a residence permit to Mr Mehemi prior to the lifting of the order or the grant of the pardon, the French government wishes to put an early end to the interference with your client’s family life as found by the European Court of Human Rights. Accordingly it is willing to permit Mr Mehemi to return immediately to France, where he will remain subject to a compulsory residence order until either the exclusion order is lifted or he is pardoned. The French consular services in Algiers will be instructed to issue Mr Mehemi with a visa as soon as he requests one.” 23. The applicant’s lawyer wrote to Mr Dobelle on 5, 16 and 24 December 1997 to ask whether there had been any developments. In his last letter, he noted that the applicant had been to the French embassy in Algiers several times but had been told that he could not be issued with a visa unless the appropriate instructions had been received. He also asked what steps needed to be taken to make sure that the visa was issued, lamenting the fact that the applicant had still not been able to return to France and observing that, on the basis of what the applicant had found out from the French embassy in Algiers, the officials concerned seemed to be “passing the parcel” from one service to another. 24. No visa having been issued by the beginning of February 1998, the applicant’s lawyer, after a number of letters and telephone calls, sent a fax on 3 February 1998 to the Algerian Visa Section of the Office for French Nationals Abroad and Foreigners in France of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By a letter dated 4 February 1998, that Office informed him that the applicant’s particular circumstances required a special visa to be issued which needed the Minister of the Interior’s prior consent, and that had not been forthcoming. On 10 February 1998 the Office sent the lawyer a fax worded as follows: “Reference: situation of Mr Ali Mehemi I refer to your fax of 3 February 1998, my fax of 4 February 1998, and your fax of 9 February 1998. As soon as you were kind enough to send me a copy of your client’s passport, the Algerian Visa Section referred the matter to the appropriate services of the Ministry of the Interior. For the name of the person dealing with this file, I suggest that you contact the Office of Public Freedoms and Legal Affairs of the Ministry of the Interior who will be able to give you the necessary information.” 25. On 20 February 1998 the Algerian Visa Section informed the lawyer that it had just received the Minister of the Interior’s consent and that instructions had accordingly been given to the consulate in Algiers. 26. Having obtained a special visa on 25 February 1998, the applicant returned to France a few days later. On 6 March 1998 Mr Dobelle sent the applicant’s lawyer a letter worded as follows: “As you are no doubt aware, our Consulate General in Algiers issued a visa to Mr Mehemi on 25 February. Mr Mehemi will be subject to a compulsory residence order in France until the exclusion order against him is lifted or he is pardoned. Mr Mehemi’s return to France thus brings this matter to a satisfactory conclusion, in accordance with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.” 27. Meanwhile, on 20 February 1998, the Minister of the Interior had issued an order requiring the applicant to reside in the Rhône département, in a place to be determined by the prefect. It included the following passage: “Whereas Mr Ali Mehemi Ali was permanently excluded from French territory by a judgment of the Fourth Division of the Lyons Court of Appeal on 4 July 1991 ... Section 1: Until such time as he is able to comply with the order permanently excluding him from France, the above-mentioned person shall reside where required to by the prefect of the Rhône département. Within the territory of this département, he shall periodically report to the police or the gendarmerie. Section 2: The prefect of the Rhône département shall be responsible for serving and enforcing this order.” 28. The order was served on the applicant in person on 18 March 1998 at 8.30 a.m. The notice accompanying the order listed the possibilities of appeal. Further to that order, the prefect of the Rhône département issued an order dated 25 March 1998 requiring the applicant to reside in the precise area of the Lyons city district (arrondissement) and to report twice a month to the police station at Villeurbanne where he was then living. 29. The applicant was subsequently issued with a provisional residence permit for six months dated 21 April 1998 and expiring on 20 October 1998. The permit stated that he was authorised to pursue an occupation and was required to reside in the Rhône département by ministerial order of 20 February 1998 and prefectoral order of 25 March 1998. The provisional residence permit was then systematically renewed when it was about to expire, on 13 October 1999 until 12 April 2000, on 7 April 2000 until 6 October 2000, and on 30 March 2001 until 29 September 2001. It was last extended on 28 September 2001. 30. On 27 July 2001 the applicant’s lawyer asked the prefect of the Rhône département to issue the applicant with a ten-year residence permit, on the ground that the exclusion order had expired (see paragraph 31 below). Not having received a reply, he sent another letter to the prefect on 28 November 2001 in which he construed the lack of response as an implied refusal and asked the prefect to state his reasons. 31. On 31 October 2001 the Minister of the Interior issued an order revoking the ministerial residence order of 20 February 1998 against the applicant. The revocation order stated among other things that “the permanent exclusion order made initially by the Lyons Court of Appeal on 4 July 1991, which was reduced to ten years by a judgment of 24 March 1998, is deemed to have expired on 10 July 2001”. 32. On the same day, the minister sent a certified copy of the revocation order to the prefect for the Rhône-Alpes region, the prefect of the Rhône département, requesting him to serve it on the applicant with a “very formal warning”. He also requested the prefect to issue the applicant with a residence permit valid for one year endorsed with the mention “salaried”. The minister enclosed a letter addressed to the applicant, which included the following passage: “Following a fresh examination of your file, I have decided by order of today’s date to revoke the order for your compulsory residence in the Rhône département made on 20 February 1998, so that you may live peacefully on French territory. I wish however to warn you formally that if you again fail to abide by our laws and regulations, that will indicate that you are still a threat to public order. I would then ask the prefect for the Rhône-Alpes region, the prefect of the Rhône département, to make the necessary arrangements to bring expulsion proceedings against you.” 33. By a letter of 13 December 2001, the prefect informed the applicant’s lawyer of both the revocation of the ministerial order and the proposed ministerial warning. The police served the 31 October 2001 revocation order on the applicant on 4 January 2002, and he was also invited to go to the prefecture in order to formalise his administrative status. 34. The applicant went to the prefecture on 8 January 2002. His application for a one-year residence permit endorsed with the mention “salaried” was registered and he was issued with a receipt for the application. 35. In reply to the letter of 28 November 2001, the prefect reminded the applicant’s lawyer of the decisions served on the applicant on 4 January 2002. He added: “Mr Mehemi went to the prefecture on 8 January 2002 in order to apply for a one-year residence permit endorsed with the mention ‘salaried’. Pending the issue of his renewed passport, he has been given a receipt valid for three months endorsed with a work permit. On presentation of that document, I shall issue him with the above-mentioned residence permit.” 36. On 2 April 2002 the applicant was issued with a new receipt for a residence permit application valid until 1 July 2002. On 1 July 2002, a new receipt valid until 2 October 2002 was issued. 37. On 2 October 2002 the applicant went to the prefecture again, still without his passport, which had not yet been renewed by the consular services in Algeria. His residence permit was extended until 31 December 2002.

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6. The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Florence, which they had let to M.N. 7. In a writ served on the tenant on 15 February 1986, the applicants informed the tenant of their intention to terminate the lease and summoned her to appear before the Florence Magistrate. 8. By a decision of 13 March 1986, which was made enforceable on 24 March 1986, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. 9. On 13 April 1989, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for their son. 10. On 13 May 1989, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 11. On 14 June 1989, they served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 9 August 1989. 12. Between 9 August 1989 and 1 December 1998, the bailiff made nineteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 13. Pursuant to Law no. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 3 November 1999. 14. By a decision of 3 July 2000, which was made enforceable on 6 September 2000, the Florence Magistrate ordered that the premises be vacated by 15 March 2001. 15. On 1 March 2001, the applicants served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 15 March 2001. 16. Pursuant to Law no. 388/00 and then to Legislative Decree no. 247/01 the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 28 March 2002.

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9. The applicants were born in 1938, 1942, 1948 and 1962 respectively. They are farmers living in Stumm (Austria). 10. On 7 July 1966 the Tirol Regional Government as the Agricultural Authority of First Instance (Landesregierung als Agrarbehörde erster Instanz - “the Agricultural Authority”) instituted land consolidation proceedings (Zusammenlegungsverfahren) involving property belonging to the first applicant, the second applicant’s mother, the third applicant and the fourth applicant’s father. 11. On 18 December 1974 the Agricultural Authority ordered the provisional transfer (vorläufige Übernahme) of compensatory parcels (Grundabfindung). 12. On 28 December 1980 the municipal council amended the area zoning plan (Flächenwidmungsplan) re-designating agricultural land which had, before 1974, belonged to the first applicant, the second applicant’s mother and to the fourth applicant’s father, as building land. 13. In February 1988 the second applicant took over his mother’s farm. 14. On 28 July 1988 the consolidation scheme (Zusammenlegungsplan) was issued by the Agricultural Authority confirming the situation created by the provisional transfer. 15. On 16 September 1988 the third applicant appealed against the consolidation scheme. The first and second applicants as well as the fourth applicant’s father did so on 19 September 1988. 16. In May, June and October 1989, the Provincial Land Reform Board (Landesagrarsenat - “the Provincial Board”), sitting in camera, held hearings on these appeals. Subsequently, the fourth applicant took over his father’s farm. 17. On 26 November 1990 all four applicants filed a request for transfer of jurisdiction to the Supreme Land Reform Board (Oberster Agrarsenat - “the Supreme Board”), which the latter dismissed on 27 February 1991. 18. On 18 April 1991 the Provincial Board, after having held a hearing in camera, dismissed the first applicant’s appeal. 19. On 3 June 1991 the first applicant filed complaints with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) and the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof). In the complaint to the Administrative Court he requested that a public oral hearing be held. 20. On 25 November 1991 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the case and referred it to the Administrative Court. 21. On 16 November 1993 the Administrative Court requested the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act (Flurverfassungslandesgesetz), which provides that changes in value which occur after the provisional transfer cannot be taken into account in the determination of compensation. 22. On 13 October 1995 the Constitutional Court found that section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act was in conformity with the Constitution. 23. On 28 February 1996 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant’s complaint rejecting at the same time, in accordance with section 39 § 2 (6) of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungs-gerichtshofgesetz), the applicant’s request for a hearing. 24. The Administrative Court found in particular that the calculation of compensation as regards the plots of land transferred to the municipality for building a street, had been carried out in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confirmed that the said compensation was in accordance with the relevant law. The decision was served on 24 May 1996. 25. On 18 April 1991 the Provincial Board, after having held a hearing in camera, dismissed the second applicant’s appeal as being unfounded. 26. On 3 June 1991 the second applicant filed complaints with the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court. 27. On 25 November 1991 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the case and referred it to the Administrative Court. 28. On 16 November 1993 the Administrative Court requested the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act. 29. On 13 October 1995 the Constitutional Court found that section 15 § 1 of the Tirol Land Planning Act was in conformity with the Constitution. 30. On 28 February 1996 the Administrative Court quashed the Provincial Board’s decision as far as the second applicant was concerned. It found that the Provincial Board had not given sufficient reasons for calculating the size of a particular part of the applicant’s property involved in the land consolidation proceedings. In this respect, the lawfulness of the compensation could not be assessed. 31. On 25 July 1996 the Provincial Board, after having held a public hearing, rejected the second applicant’s appeal against the consolidation scheme as being inadmissible. It noted that the second applicant and his mother had concluded a contract of transfer of land on 5 February 1988. However, the request to enter the contract into the land register had only been lodged with the competent court on 19 November 1991. Consequently, the second applicant had not been the legal owner of the land at issue and had not been entitled to file an appeal in 1988. 32. On 11 September 1996 the applicant filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court arguing in particular that he had been the legal owner of the land already in 1988 and, therefore, had been entitled to file an appeal. 33. On 9 June 1997 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the complaint and transferred it to the Administrative Court. On 6 October 1997 and on 20 November 1997, respectively, the applicant and the Provincial Board filed further comments. 34. On 10 December 1998 the Administrative Court dismissed the second applicant’s complaint, confirming the reasoning of the Provincial Board. The decision was served on 22 January 1999. 35. On 18 April 1991 in the case of the third applicant and on 20 June 1991 in the case of the fourth applicant, the Provincial Board - in both cases having held a hearing in camera - partly dismissed their appeals. The third applicant appealed in May 1991 and the fourth applicant in July 1991. 36. On 7 October 1992 the Supreme Board dismissed the applicants’ further appeals. It found that the transfer of property to the municipality for building a street was in accordance with the law and that the applicants had been duly compensated. 37. On 21 December 1992 the third applicant, and on 21 January 1993 the fourth applicant, filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court which transferred their appeals to the Administrative Court on 15 June 1993. 38. On 14 December 1995 and on 21 May 1996, respectively, the Administrative Court quashed the Supreme Board’s decision on the ground that the latter had given insufficient reasons for its calculation of compensation. 39. On 6 November 1996 the Supreme Board, having held a public hearing, partly dismissed the applicants’ appeals. 40. On 31 January 1997 the applicants complained to the Constitutional Court which, on 16 June 1997, transferred both cases to the Administrative Court. 41. On 26 February 1998 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants’ complaints. The Administrative Court found in particular that the Supreme Board had carried out the calculation of compensation in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confirmed its finding that the said compensation was in accordance with the relevant law. The decision was served on 18 March 1998.

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7. The applicant lives in Rome. 8. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Rome, which he had let to A.M.S. 9. In a registered letter of 10 April 1987, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date. 10. In a writ served on the tenant on 14 October 1987, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 11. By a decision of 1 February 1988, which was made enforceable on 22 April 1988, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 1 February 1989. 12. On 24 May 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 13. On 18 July 1989 he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 25 July 1989. 14. Between 25 July 1989 and 10 December 1998 the bailiff made fourteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 15. Pursuant to Article 6 of Law no. 431/98, the eviction proceedings were suspended until 30 November 2000. 16. On 11 October 2000, the applicant served a second notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 17. On 3 November 2000, he served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 28 November 2000. 18. On February 2001, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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8. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Rome. 9. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Rome, which had been let to M.R. 10. In a writ served on the tenant on 16 September 1991, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 11. By a decision of 11 March 1992, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 31 July 1992. 12. On 22 September 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 13. On 22 October 1992, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 27 November 1992. 14. On 21 November 1992, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for himself. 15. Between 27 November 1992 and 11 March 1997, the bailiff made twelve attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 16. On 8 April 1997, the applicant repossessed the premises.

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8. The applicants were born in 1954, 1956 and 1952 respectively and live in Rome. 9. The applicants are the owners of a flat in Rome, which they had let to G.D. 10. In a writ served on the tenant on 19 May 1984, the applicants communicated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Rome Magistrate. 11. By a decision of 15 October 1984, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Rome Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 31 May 1987. 12. On 17 June 1987, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises. 13. On 30 July 1987, they served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 14 September 1987. 14. Between 14 September 1987 and 29 February 2000, the bailiff made thirty attempts to recover possession. 15. Each attempt proved unsuccessful as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 16. On 3 July 2000, the applicants recovered possession of their flat.

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7. The applicant was born in 1933 and lives in Monte Porzio Catone (Rome). 8. She is the owner of a flat in Monte Porzio Catone, which she had let to R.L. 9. In a registered letter of 7 July 1986, the applicant informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1987 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 10. The tenant told the applicant that he would not leave the premises. 11. In a writ served on the tenant on 9 December 1986, the applicant reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Frascati Magistrate (Rome). 12. By a decision of 31 March 1987, which was made enforceable on 14 April 1987, the Frascati Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988. 13. On 10 January 1989, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 14. On 4 July 1989, she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 27 July 1989. 15. Between 27 July 1989 and 26 May 2000 the bailiff made thirty-five attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 16. In the meanwhile, on 12 July 1993, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for her daughter. 17. On 8 June 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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8. The applicant, Marianne Petschar, is an Austrian national, born in 1940, and living in Villach. She is represented before the Court by Mr J. Gradenegger. 9. On 10 August 1987 the applicant and other land-owners requested the Villach District Agricultural Authority (Agrarbezirksbehörde) to grant them rights to construct a road for transporting wood over third person’s property (Bringungsrechte). 10. On 28 November 1988 the District Agricultural Authority, referring to the Regional Forestry Roads Act (Güter- und Seilwege Landesgesetz) issued a decree granting the applicant and other land owners a right to construct a road for transporting timber over third persons’ property during six months per year. 11. On 18 September 1989 the Regional Agricultural Authority (Landesagrarbehörde) quashed the District Agricultural Authority’s decision and referred the case back to it. 12. On 4 December 1990 the District Agricultural Authority re-issued an order granting the applicant and other land owners the right to construct a road for transporting timber over third persons’ property. One of the land-owners concerned appealed. 13. On 21 October 1991 the Regional Agricultural Authority quashed the District Agricultural Authority’s decision and again referred the case back to it. 14. On 3 November 1992 the District Agricultural Authority requested the District Administrative Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft) to issue permits required under the Environmental Protection Act (Naturschutzgesetz) and the Forestry Act. 15. On 19 May 1993 the District Administrative Authority suspended the proceedings as the District Agricultural Authority had stated that it would elaborate a new draft project. Subsequently several expert opinions were obtained and the new draft project elaborated. 16. On 13 August 1997 all issues of water rights, forestry and nature conservation affected by the construction of a road for transporting timber were dealt with in a common hearing. In the following months the permits under the Environmental Protection Act, the Water Rights Act and the Forestry Act were given. 17. On 15 September 1998 the Villach District Agricultural Authority granted the applicant and other land owners the right to construct a road and to transport timber over third persons’ property.

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7. The applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Sorrento. 8. She is the owner of a flat in Meta (Naples), which she had let to V.C. 9. In a writ served on the tenant on 24 January 1987, the applicant informed the tenant of her intention to terminate the lease and summoned him to appear before the Sorrento Magistrate. 10. By a decision of 12 July 1989, which was made enforceable on 26 September 1989, the Sorrento Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 4 May 1991. 11. On 18 June 1992, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 12. On 27 July 1992 she served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 12 August 1992. 13. Between 12 August 1992 and 16 June 1998 the bailiff made thirteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 14. On 18 June 1998 the applicant recovered possession of the flat.

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8. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Sorrento. 9. He is the owner of a flat in Sorrento, which he had let to A.E. and F.C. 10. In a writ served on the tenants on 5 November 1983, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned them to appear before the Naples Magistrate. 11. By a provisional decision of 23 November 1983, the Naples Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit, ordered that the premises be vacated by 1 January 1986 and declined jurisdiction on account of the value of the case, indicating that the Naples District Court had jurisdiction to hear it. 12. On 16 January 1984, the applicant resumed the proceedings before the Naples District Court. In a judgment of 10 January 1986, the Court declared that the lease was terminated as of 31 December 1985 and ordered that the premises must be vacated by 30 September 1986. The judgment was made enforceable on 18 January 1990. 13. On 23 January 1990, the applicant served notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. On 9 February 1990, he served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 May 1990. 14. On 8 May 1990, the bailiff made an attempt to recover possession, which proved unsuccessful as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 15. Thereafter, the applicant decided to suspend the eviction attempts, in order to avoid useless costs, given the lack of prospects of obtaining the assistance of the police. 16. On 30 November 1995, the applicant served again notice on the tenants requiring them to vacate the premises. On 18 December 1995, he served notice on the tenants informing them that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 6 February 1996. 17. The bailiff made three further attempts to recover possession in enforcing the order for possession, which attempts proved unsuccessful as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 18. On 10 April 1997, the tenants vacated the premises.

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8. The applicant was born in 1925 and lives in Livorno. 9. The applicant is the owner of a flat in Livorno, which he had let to A.R. 10. In a writ served on the tenant on 16 September 1991, the applicant communicated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Livorno Magistrate. 11. By a decision of 19 October 1991, which was made enforceable on 17 March 1993, the Livorno Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 14 October 1992. 12. On 23 March 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 13. On 6 May 1993, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 8 June 1993. 14. Between 8 June 1993 and 26 June 2000, the bailiff made ten attempts to recover possession. 15. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession. 16. In the meantime, on 27 January 1994, the applicant made a statutory declaration that he urgently required the premises as accommodation for his daughter 17. Pursuant to Section 6 of Law no. 431/1998, the enforcement proceedings were suspended. 18. At the beginning of 2002 the tenant vacated the flat.

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7. The applicant is a Turkish citizen of Kurdish origin and lives in Adana, Turkey. Her husband, Hacı Sait Macir, was a former HEP (Halkın Emek Partisi-People’s Labour Party) and DEP (Demokrasi Partisi –Democracy Party) delegate. At the material time he was a member of the provincial committee of HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi – People’s Democracy Party) and was the president of the party’s commission in the Mutlu neighbourhood. He was also the owner of the Güneydoğu cafe in the Yüreğir district of Adana. 8. On 3 October 1994 the president of the provincial committee of HADEP, Rebih Çabuk and a member of the same committee, Sefer Cerf were shot dead in front of the Güneydoğu cafe. The applicant’s husband witnessed these killings. 9. On the same day the applicant’s husband was taken to the police station to give a statement. He stated that on 3 October 1994, at 9 a.m., he saw Sefer Cerf collapse after he being shot. He did not see the identity of the two gunmen who immediately ran away. The applicant alleges that her husband was taken to the police station on the pretext of giving a statement. However, he was threatened by the police officers and was asked about his association and friendship with Rebih Çabuk and Sefer Cerf. The applicant also alleges that her husband was continuously subjected to harassment after this incident and that the police closed the Güneydoğu cafe for three days without giving any reasons. 10. On 5 October 1994, Ahmet Dizman, who was at the Güneydoğu cafe at the time Rebih Çabuk and Sefer Cerf were killed and took Rebih Çabuk to the hospital in his car, was abducted from the Erzurumlular cafe by plain-clothes policemen. He was taken to a deserted field where he was beaten. During this incident the police asked him if he knew Sait Macir. His abductors told Ahmet Dizman that they would kill Sait Macir. 11. In a record of the investigation into the killing of Rebih Çabuk and Sefer Cerf dated 10 October 1994, the applicant’s husband appeared among the witnesses who had given statements to the police. 12. On 30 December 1994 the applicant’s husband was shot in front of the Güneydoğu cafe. He was taken to hospital, where he died on 1 January 1995. 13. In a police report dated 30 December 1994 it is recorded that one empty 38 calibre cartridge was found at the spot where the applicant’s husband was shot. A sketch of the crime scene was also attached to this document. 14. On 30 December 1994 two eyewitnesses, Ahmet Sarıkaya and Bilal Ünver, gave statements to the police. They stated that they drove the applicant’s husband to hospital. They did not see the identity of the gunmen. 15. On 2 January 1995 the applicant was invited to the hospital to identify her husband’s body. At the hospital the applicant gave a statement to the Adana public prosecutor, Vahit Civelek. She stated that her husband had no enemies and that she did not know who could have killed him. 16. A preliminary autopsy on Sait Macir was carried out on 2 January 1995. It was concluded that he died as a result of gunshot wounds. Blood and organ samples were taken from the body for toxicological examination. 17. On the same day Mr Civelek requested the Adana Forensic Medicine Institution to conduct the final autopsy examination of Sait Macir’s body. 18. By letter dated 9 January 1995, with reference to the findings of the ballistics examination of 10 January 1995[1], the Adana Police Headquarters informed the office of the Adana public prosecutor that Sait Macir’s killers were still unidentified. 19. In a ballistics report prepared by the Criminal Police Laboratory of Adana dated 10 January 1995, it is recorded that one cartridge was submitted for a ballistics examination in relation to the killing of Sait Macir. As to the findings of the examination, the report states that the cartridge examined was a Makarov type, 9 mm and 38 calibre. The cartridge bore no resemblance to any other cartridges from other incidents involving unknown perpetrator killings examined previously by the laboratory. 20. On 17 January 1994 the Adana Forensic Medicine Institution concluded its toxicological examination. No alcohol or toxic material was found in the blood samples. 21. On 18 January 1995 the Adana public prosecutor issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı). The prosecutor decided that, having regard to the evidence in the case file, Sait Macir had been killed by terrorists. The matter therefore fell within the jurisdiction of Konya State Security Court (Konya Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemesi) pursuant to Law no. 3713. The prosecutor ordered that the case file be transferred to the office of the public prosecutor in the Konya State Security Court. 22. On 24 January 1995 the Adana Forensic Medicine Institute (Adana Adli Tıp Kurumu) finalised the autopsy report on Sait Macir. According to the report, Sait Macir died as a result of gunshot wounds. 23. On 27 January 1995 the Konya State Security Court Prosecutor issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction (görevsizlik kararı). The prosecutor stated that there existed no evidence to substantiate that Sait Macir had been killed by a terrorist organisation or for ideological reasons. Therefore, the prosecutor decided to transfer the case file to the office of the Adana Public Prosecutor, as the matter did not fall within the jurisdiction of his office. 24. By letter of 22 February 1995 the Adana Public Prosecutor requested the Adana Police Headquarters to keep him informed of developments in the investigation into the killing of the applicant’s husband every three months. 25. In a letter dated 20 July 1995 the Adana Police Headquarters informed the office of the Adana Public Prosecutor that the investigation was still being pursued and that the perpetrators had not yet been identified. 26. On 15 February 1996 the Adana Public Prosecutor requested the Adana Police Headquarters to keep him informed of developments every three months until the end of the statutory prescription period, namely 20 December 2014. 27. By letter of 19 June 1996 the Adana Public Prosecutor requested the Adana Police Headquarters to see to it that two eyewitnesses, Ahmet Sarıkaya and Bilal Ünver, were summoned to appear before him. 28. On the same date the Adana Public Prosecutor requested the Adana Police Headquarters to inform him of any recent developments in the investigation into the killing of the applicant’s husband and inquired whether the perpetrators had been identified yet.

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6. The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Germany. 7. At the time of the events in question the applicant was detained in the Buca Prison in İzmir. He was accused of being a member of the PKK. 8. On 26 April 1994 the prison warders, instructed by their directors, assaulted the prisoners while the applicant was waiting for his relatives along with other prisoners in the visiting room of the prison. 9. In a report drafted and signed by 14 prison warders and directors on 26 April 1994, it is stated that 11 prisoners who were convicted of being members of the PKK requested that they be moved from their wing because they were afraid of being attacked by other prisoners. As soon as they were moved to another wing some of the prisoners protested against the administration’s decision and demanded that the prisoners be returned to their former wing. When their demand was rejected by the administration the prisoners started to chant slogans in the visiting room and declared that they would not leave the room until the prisoners were returned to their former wing. The warders brought the prisoners to their wing when they failed to persuade them to return. The prisoners resisted and injured themselves by hitting the iron beds in the wing. 10. On 27 April 1994 the applicant’s representative visited the applicant in the prison. She observed that the applicant was suffering from wounds and bruises to his arms, face and eyes caused by blows. 11. On 29 April 1994 the applicant signed a petition along with other prisoners complaining that they had been attacked by prison warders. They alleged that the chief warder of the prison, Ahmet Ayhan, had instructed the warders to attack them. 12. On an unspecified date the applicant petitioned the İzmir Public Prosecutor, complaining of the mistreatment which he suffered at the hands of the warders in the prison. He alleged that he had been severely beaten by the warders and sustained injuries and bruises as a result. The applicant requested the public prosecutor to initiate an investigation and to order a medical examination to be carried out by the Forensic Medicine Institute. 13. On 11 May 1994 the applicant was examined at the İzmir Forensic Medicine Institute. In a medical report drafted by a doctor at the Institute, it is stated that the applicant had a 2 cm scar on the right temporal part of his eyebrow, two 1 cm scars on the crurista and a haematoma on the third finger of his right hand. The report concluded that the applicant would be unfit to work for two days. 14. On 29 September 1994 the İzmir Public Prosecutor decided that no prosecution should be brought (takipsizlik kararı) against the prison administration and warders. According to the prosecutor, the prison administration was authorised to use necessary force in order to maintain peace and order in the prison pursuant to the Directive on the Execution of Punishments (Ceza İnfaz Yönetmeliği). The use of force applied in the incident was in accordance with the provisions of the Directive. 15. On 14 December 1994 the applicant filed a petition with the office of the İzmir Public Prosecutor. He requested a copy of investigation file no. 1994/24153. 16. On the same day the İzmir Public Prosecutor rejected the applicant’s request. 17. On 21 December 1994 the applicant filed an objection with the İzmir Assize Court against the decision of the İzmir Public Prosecutor of 29 September 1994. He complained that the prosecutor accepted the account of the accused warders without giving any weight to finding in the medical report. He also stated that he was denied access to the investigation file. 18. On 13 January 1995 the İzmir Karşıyaka Assize Court rejected the applicant’s objection. On 31 January 1995 the applicant was notified of the decision of the assize court.

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8. The applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Hozat district of Tunceli. 9. On 7 October 1994 military units arrived in the applicant’s village of Kozluca. The security forces surrounded the village and set up a camp around the village. The Gendarme Commander of the village told the villagers to vacate their houses and to leave the village as the security forces were going to burn the houses. 10. The villagers left the village and moved to Hozat, where the District Governor placed the applicant and his family in the municipal wedding hall. Other villagers were housed in tents. After they left their village the soldiers burned the houses. 11. On 14 November 1994 the applicant filed petitions with the Prime Minister’s office, the Tunceli Provincial Governor’s office, the State of Emergency Region Governor’s office and the Welfare and Housing Minister’s office, complaining about the destruction of his home and requesting housing under the provisions of Housing Law no. 2150. 12. On 12 January 1995 the Deputy Governor, wrote a letter in reply to the applicant, informing him that residences demolished as a result of terrorist raids do not come within the scope of the Law on Disasters (Law no. 7629 - 1051). For this reason, the applicant was not able to benefit from the Housing Law. 13. The applicant did not pursue any other domestic remedy. 14. In 1994 security forces took action against PKK terrorists in the province of Tunceli. The PKK terrorists began to threaten and attack villages in order to meet their needs. As a result of the pressure exerted by the PKK, the inhabitants left their villages and fled to larger settlement areas. 15. The applicant left his village along with other villagers and moved to Hozat. The authorities there lodged him and his family in the wedding hall of the Hozat District Municipality. The applicant received financial aid between 1994 and 1996 for food, heating and health-related expenditure. 16. On an unspecified date the inhabitants of the Kozluca village lodged criminal complaints with the Chief Public Prosecutor’s office in Hozat. They complained that the security forces in the region had burned their houses. As the case concerned an investigation of acts allegedly committed by the security forces, the public prosecutor issued a decision of non-jurisdiction and referred the investigation file to the Hozat District Governor’s office in accordance with the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants (Memurin Muhakematı Kanunu). 17. The Hozat District Governor decided to discontinue the investigation on the grounds that the villagers could not identify the perpetrators and the evidence contained in the investigation file led to the conclusion that the village had been burned by PKK terrorists.

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10. The applicants were born in 1953 and 1994 respectively. The first applicant lives in West Bloomfield (Michigan) and the second applicant lives in Graz. 11. The first applicant married an Austrian citizen in April 1994. The marriage was concluded in the United States of America, where the couple set up their common residence. On 11 September 1994 their daughter, the second applicant, was born. The family's last common residence was in Michigan. Under the law of the State of Michigan the parents had joint custody over the second applicant. 12. On 30 October 1995 the first applicant's wife, without obtaining his consent, left the United States with the second applicant and took her to Austria. 13. On 31 October 1995 the first applicant, relying on the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”), requested the Austrian courts to order the second applicant's return. In these and the subsequent proceedings the first applicant was represented by counsel. 14. On 3 November 1995 the second applicant's mother filed an application with the Graz District Civil Court (Bezirksgericht für Zivilrechtssachen) for the award of sole custody over the second applicant. 15. On 20 December 1995 the Graz District Civil Court, after having heard evidence from the first applicant and his wife and the oral statement of an expert in child psychology, Dr. K., ordered that the second applicant be returned to the first applicant at her former place of residence in Michigan. 16. The court, noting that under Michigan law the first applicant and his wife had joint custody of their daughter, found that the first applicant's wife had wrongfully removed the child within the meaning of Article 3 of the Hague Convention. Moreover, it dismissed the mother's claim that the child's return would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. It considered that the second applicant's return could not be hindered by the fact that the mother was her main person of reference and that returning could cause a massive trauma affecting her development. Otherwise, mothers of small children could easily circumvent the aim of the Hague Convention. As to the mother's allegation that the first applicant regularly masturbated in the presence of the child, the court referred to the expert's statement that such conduct would, in view of the child's tender age, not cause immediate harm. The fact that such conduct, if proved, could in the long run be harmful to the child would have to be assessed in the custody proceedings. Finally, it held that the mother could be expected to return with the second applicant to the United States. 17. On 19 January 1996 the Graz Regional Civil Court (Landesgericht für Zivilrechtssachen) dismissed an appeal by the second applicant's mother. 18. The Regional Court confirmed the District Court's assessment as regards the question whether the second applicant's return would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. It noted that the onus of proof was on the person opposing the return, i.e. the second applicant's mother. Further, it noted that the statement of the expert in child psychology had denied that there was any such risk. That statement had been made on the assumption that the mother's allegations were true. However, the Regional Court emphasised that the truth of these allegations had not been proved and that the District Court had had the benefit of hearing the first applicant and, thus, of forming a personal impression of him. 19. On 27 February 1996 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) dismissed a further appeal by the second applicant's mother. 20. On 27 February 1996 the first applicant filed an application for enforcement of the return order of 20 December 1995. 21. Meanwhile, the first applicant had started divorce proceedings before the Oakland Circuit Court (Michigan). By a decision of 16 April 1996, the court pronounced a default judgment of divorce. Further, it awarded the first applicant sole custody of the second applicant and ordered that the second applicant should reside with the first applicant in the event of her return. 22. On 7 May 1996 the file arrived again at the Graz District Civil Court. 23. On 8 May 1996 the Graz District Civil Court ordered the enforcement of the return order under section 19 (1) of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Ausserstreitgesetz). It noted that it was necessary to order coercive measures as there were indications that the mother was obstructing the child's return. She had given an interview to a local newspaper according to which she frequently changed her whereabouts and was determined not to let the child be taken away from her. 24. In the early hours of 10 May 1996, an attempt to enforce the return order was made in accordance with the terms set out in the order of 8 May. A bailiff, assisted by a police officer, a locksmith and a representative of the Youth Welfare Office, appeared at the house where the second applicant and her mother were living. The first applicant was also present. A search carried out in the house, necessitating the use of force against the second applicant's mother and the forceful opening of several doors, remained unsuccessful. On the occasion of the enforcement attempt the Supreme Court's decision of 27 February 1996 and the enforcement order of 8 May 1996 were served on the second applicant's mother. 25. On 15 May 1996 the second applicant's mother appealed against the decision of 8 May 1996 and again filed an application for the award of sole custody of the second applicant. 26. On 29 May 1996 the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, issued an arrest warrant against the second applicant's mother on suspicion of international parental kidnapping. 27. On 18 June 1996 the first applicant made a further application for enforcement of the return order. 28. By a decision of 25 June 1996 the Graz District Civil Court, at the request of the second applicant's mother, transferred jurisdiction to the Leibnitz District Court, in the judicial district of which the second applicant had purportedly established her residence. 29. On 29 August 1996 the Graz Regional Civil Court granted an appeal by the first applicant against the transfer of jurisdiction and, on the mother's appeal, quashed the Graz District Civil Court's enforcement order of 8 May 1996 and referred the case back to it. 30. Referring to section 19 (1) of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act, the court found that, in the enforcement proceedings, the child's well-being had to be taken into account in so far as a change in the situation had occurred since the issue of the return order and the taking of coercive measures. However, under Article 13 of the Hague Convention, this question was not to be examined by the court of its own motion but only upon an application by the person opposing the return. Following the service of the enforcement order of 8 May 1996 the mother had submitted, in particular, that she was the second applicant's main person of reference. Because of the lapse of time, the second applicant no longer recognised her father when she was shown his picture. By being taken away from her mother the child would suffer irreparable harm. The court therefore ordered the District Court to examine whether the situation had changed since the return order of 20 December 1995. It also ordered the District Court to obtain the opinion of an expert child psychologist on the question whether the child's return would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm and whether coercive measures were compatible with the interests of the child's well-being. 31. Between May and December 1996 numerous letters were exchanged between the United States Department of State and the Austrian Ministry of Justice, acting as their respective States' Central Authorities under the Hague Convention. The United States Department of State repeatedly requested information as to which steps had been taken to locate the second applicant and to enforce the return order of 20 December 1995. The Austrian Ministry of Justice replied that the first applicant was represented by counsel in the Austrian proceedings and that it was up to him to take all necessary steps to obtain the enforcement of the return order. It also pointed out that there were only rather limited possibilities to locate a child who had disappeared after a return order had been made. 32. On 15 October 1996 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal by the first applicant and set aside the enforcement order of 8 May 1996. It noted in particular that the notion of the child's well-being was central to the entire proceedings. When ordering coercive measures under section 19 (1) of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act, the court had to take the interests of the child's well-being into account, despite the fact that the return order was final, if the relevant situation had changed in the meantime. Having regard to the aims of the Hague Convention, a refusal of coercive measures was only justified if the child's return would entail a grave risk of physical or psychological harm for the child within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention. 33. The Supreme Court acknowledged that particularly difficult problems arose in cases in which the abductor had created the situation in which the return represented a serious danger to the child's well-being. Where the abductor of a small child was the latter's main person of reference and refused to return with the child, a serious threat to the child's well-being might arise. Nevertheless, Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention made clear that the child's well-being took priority over the Convention's general aim of preventing child abduction. Reasons of general deterrence or, in other words, the aim of showing that child abduction was not worthwhile could not justify exposing a child to a grave risk of physical or psychological harm. 34. In the present case, the mother had claimed that the child, who was now more than two years old, had become alienated from the father. The child's abrupt removal from her main person of reference and her return to the United States would cause her irreparable harm. The Supreme Court emphasised that the particularity of the case lay in the fact that, in the main proceedings, the courts had denied that there was any risk of psychological harm (as a result of the alleged sexual behaviour of the first applicant) exclusively on account of the child's tender age. In these circumstances, it could not be excluded that the child, who was now more than two years old and had been living solely with her mother for more than a year, would suffer grave psychological harm in the event of a return to her father. Thus, the Regional Court had rightly found that the question whether the return order could be enforced by coercive measures needed further examination, including an opinion by an expert in child psychology. It might also prove necessary to assess whether or not the mother's allegations were at all true. 35. In accordance with the Supreme Court's decision, the case was referred back to the Graz District Civil Court. 36. On 23 April 1997 the Oakland Circuit Court issued a “safe harbour” order, valid until 21 October 1997, which provided, inter alia, that pending determination of custody in expedited proceedings, the first applicant would not exercise his right to sole custody of the child; the second applicant would live with her mother away from the first applicant, who would undertake to cover their living expenses; and the arrest warrant against the mother would be set aside as soon as she and the second applicant boarded a direct flight to Michigan. 37. On 29 April 1997 the Graz District Civil Court dismissed an application by the first applicant for enforcement of the return order. 38. In the continued proceedings, the expert on child psychology, Dr. K., had submitted his opinion on 26 March 1997 and the first applicant had been given an opportunity to comment. On the basis of the expert opinion, the court found that since the second applicant's birth her mother had been her main person of reference. However, the first applicant had had regular contact with her until 30 October 1995, the date of her abduction. Thereafter they had had no contact at all. Since the return order had been made, a year and four months had elapsed and the first applicant had become a complete stranger to the second applicant. Given that a young child needed a stable relationship with the main person of reference at least until the age of six, the second applicant's removal from her main person of reference, namely her mother, would expose her to serious psychological harm. Having regard to the considerable lapse of time since the return order had been made on 20 December 1995, the District Court found that there had been a change in the relevant circumstances, in that the second applicant had lost all contact with the first applicant while her ties with her mother and her maternal grandparents had become ever closer. Consequently, her return would expose her to serious psychological harm. 39. The court noted the first applicant's statement of 28 April 1997 and his offer within the meaning of the “safe harbour” case-law but considered that this offer did not guarantee that the second applicant's relationship with her main person of reference would be preserved in the long run. As this relationship was indispensable for her well-being, the application for enforcement of the return order had to be dismissed. 40. On 28 May 1997 the Graz Regional Civil Court dismissed an appeal by the first applicant. It shared the District Court's view that the situation had changed fundamentally since the issuing of the return order. At that time the second applicant had been much younger and, given the short time which had elapsed between her abduction and the issuing of the return order, had not yet lost contact with the first applicant. A return of the second applicant accompanied by her mother could not be envisaged either. Apart from the reasons adduced by the District Court, the mother would face criminal prosecution in the United States and the child would, accordingly, be taken away from her. 41. On 2, 3 and 4 June 1997 the first applicant was granted a couple of hours of supervised access to the second applicant. 42. On 9 September 1997 the Supreme Court dismissed a further appeal by the first applicant on the ground that it did not raise any important legal issues. 43. On 29 December 1997 the second applicant's mother was awarded sole custody of the second applicant by the Graz District Civil Court. It noted that Article 16 of the Hague Convention, which prohibited the State to which the child has been abducted from taking a decision on custody while proceedings for the child's return were pending, no longer applied, as the decision not to enforce the return order had become final. Following appeal proceedings the judgment became final on 31 March 1998.

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8. The applicant was born in 1931 and lives in Saintes (Charente-Maritime). He is a winegrower. 9. On 19 May 1993 plans for improving a major road on the edge of the Saintes urban area were declared to be in the public interest. Completion of this operation required the expropriation of various plots of land, including twenty-one hectares belonging to the applicant. The expropriation liability order was issued on 5 September 1994. 10. On 12 September 1994 the expropriations judge for the département of Charente-Maritime issued an expropriation order giving rise to a transfer of ownership. On 28 September 1994, in the absence of an agreement between the applicant and the State as the expropriating authority (represented by Mr H., an inspector from the Charente-Maritime Revenue Department) on the amount of compensation to be paid, the latter applied to the expropriations judge. In an order of the same day the expropriations judge for the département of Charente-Maritime set 4 November 1994 as the date for the site inspection and stated that the public hearing would be held immediately afterwards. On 3 November 1994 Mr P., Deputy Director of the Charente-Maritime Revenue Department, filed submissions in his capacity as Government Commissioner. The applicant’s lawyer then requested an adjournment because of the lateness of these submissions. The hearing was accordingly fixed for 18 November 1994. In a judgment of 9 December 1994, having heard the applicant, Mr H., the State’s representative in the proceedings, and Mr P., the Government Commissioner, the expropriations judge assessed the compensation payable by the State at 1,441,517 French francs (FRF). 11. On 5 January 1995 the applicant appealed against this decison and filed a memorial with the Expropriations Division of the Poitiers Court of Appeal, in which he assessed the amount of compensation due at FRF 3,763,698. On 13 April 1995 the Charente-Maritime Revenue Department filed a memorial in reply, signed by Mr H., in which it asked that the decision be upheld; a sheet of paper entitled “Study of the local property market”, listing thirteen contracts of sale and one judgment, was appended. On 24 April 1995 the applicant’s representative wrote to the signee of the memorial, requesting that he send a full copy of the contracts and decisions cited. In a letter of 18 July 1995 the Deputy Director of the Charente-Maritime Revenue Department, Mr P., refused to produce the documents on the ground that tax officials were bound by a duty of professional confidentiality. On 17 August 1995 the applicant’s counsel replied to the Deputy Director of the Revenue Department as follows: “... it is regrettable that almost three months were required to send a brief reply to a standard request for production of documents, dated 24 April 1995, even though the case is due to be heard on 22 September. This aside, you are mistaken in failing to distinguish between your roles as Director of the Revenue Department and as representative of the expropriating authority in legal proceedings brought in application of the Decree of 11 December 1973 – Article R. 179 of the Code of State Property. In this latter capacity, you are obliged to respect the fundamental principle of adversarial proceedings and the provisions of the new Code of Civil Procedure which impose a basic obligation on the parties to produce the evidence to which they refer. This principle also applies when you are acting in your capacity as Government Commissioner, which for the moment poses no further difficulties. I might add that had your memorial contained, as a minimum, sufficient indications to enable me to order the contracts from the land registry, I would have refrained from asking you to produce these documents. I am therefore obliged to ask the court ... to order discovery of the documents which you refer to, unless the court prefers purely and simply to discount this evidence, which would mean that it would rule only on the basis of my own terms of comparison ...” On 4 September 1995 Mr P., standing in for the Director of the Vienne Revenue Department in his capacity as Government Commissioner, lodged submissions in support of a cross-appeal with a view to the hearing before the Expropriations Division of the Court of Appeal (initially set for 22 September 1995, the hearing was subsequently postponed at the applicant’s request until 24 May 1996); he assessed the compensation in issue at FRF 1,396,267. The applicant filed a memorial in reply, referring in particular to an infringement of his right to a fair trial in the following terms: “... In the present case, the Director of the Revenue Department representing the expropriating authority and the Director of the Revenue Department acting as Government Commissioner are one and the same person, even if, for form’s sake, the Director of the Revenue Department is represented by two separate individuals, which is a fiction, since, as we have seen, the same person replied to the expropriated party’s counsel on behalf of the expropriating authority and also signed the Government’s Commissioner’s submissions. It follows that the Director of the Revenue Department may take part in the present proceedings only in his capacity as the State’s representative or in his capacity as Government Commissioner, and may not combine the two roles. Otherwise, the parties do not enjoy a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights ...” According to the Government, the registry of the Expropriations Division informed the applicant and the Director of the Revenue Department within the Property Department, in letters dated 9 May 1996, of further grounds of appeal lodged on the same day by the Government Commissioner. 12. In a judgment of 21 June 1996 the Expropriations Division of the Poitiers Court of Appeal established the compensation amount at FRF 1,542,867. It held that the applicant’s request that the court dismiss the intervention by the Director of the Revenue Department in his capacity as Government Commissioner was ill-founded. The judgment stated: “... The [applicant’s] criticisms of the Director of the Revenue Department’s activities and of the dual nature of his functions are unfounded because: (i) The Director of the Revenue Department’s twofold status as Government Commissioner and ... representative of the expropriating authority does not amount to a defect; despite the strangeness of this situation, there is nothing to prevent the Director of the Revenue Department representing the expropriating authority and simultaneously assuming the functions of Government Commissioner. (ii) The Director of the Revenue Department’s joint role as Government Commissioner and representative of the expropriating authority does not deny the expropriated party a fair trial provided that the Government Commissioner does not participate in the decision-making process within the expropriations court. (iii) In any event, in the specific case of this appeal, two Directors of Revenue Departments intervened, namely the Director of the Charente-Maritime Revenue Department, representing the State, and the Director of the Vienne Revenue Department as the Government Commissioner (see the appointments of substitutes dated 25 August 1995 and 2 May 1996 in the case file). Consequently, the [applicant’s] claims on the basis of Article 6 of the Convention ... must be rejected. ... As regards the [applicant’s] request that the State provide him with a copy of the contracts and judgments referred to as terms of comparison, and in the light of the adversarial principle, it seems initially that this request is admissible since it is not ‘a new ground which was not raised at first instance’ but new claims intended to secure dismissal of the other party’s claims (Article 654 of the New Code of Civil Procedure); However, this request [by the applicant] ... must be rejected since the information provided is sufficient to allow identification of the property sold and the price agreed upon together with free discussion of their value as evidence; ...” 13. The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging in particular that there had been a violation of his right to a fair trial. He submitted that it was not necessary for a party to participate in the decision-making process for its intervention to be considered a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, and complained that the Government Commissioner had been the last to speak, after the expropriated party, and that the latter had had no opportunity to reply. The applicant also complained that the Court of Appeal had dismissed his request for production of copies of the terms of comparison cited by the Government Commissioner. On 8 April 1998 the Court of Cassation dismissed this appeal on the following grounds: “... Firstly, the judgment correctly accepts that, since Article 6 of the Convention ... is not applicable, in that the Government Commissioner does not take part in the Expropriations Division’s decision-making process, it is not necessary to find his intervention inadmissible. Secondly, there is no text prohibiting the parties from replying to the submissions made by the Government Commissioner at the hearing. ... The Court of Appeal justified its decision in law ... by accepting in the exercise of its unfettered discretion that the information provided had been sufficient to enable identification of the property sold and the price agreed upon together with free discussion of their value as evidence. ...”

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11. The applicant was born in 1973 and lives in Derik, Turkey. 12. The case concerns the circumstances of the death of the applicant's brother, Mr Yakup Aktaş. According to his death certificate, Mr Yakup Aktaş, who was born in 1964, died in Mardin, Turkey, on 25 November 1990. He left a widow and also a daughter who had been born earlier that year. 13. The applicant alleges that the death of Yakup Aktaş resulted from torture following his arrest. The Government deny this. 14. The facts of the case being in dispute, the Commission appointed Delegates who took evidence in Ankara on 19 and 20 November 1997. They heard the applicant and the following witnesses: the applicant's brother Mr Mahmut Aktaş, the Public Prosecutor Şevki Artar, Professor Dr Özdemir Kolusayın, Dr Hüseyin Sarı and Dr Güneş Pay. 15. On 18 November 1997, while evidence was being taken in a different case, the Acting Agent of the Government submitted that, for their security, ten members of the gendarmerie who had been summoned to appear before the Delegates in the present case should give evidence in the absence of the applicant and his relatives and be shielded from the view of the applicant's representatives by a screen. On 19 November 1997 the Government extended that request to include a further witness: the member of the gendarmerie who had investigated Yakup Aktaş's death on behalf of the Mardin Provincial Administrative Council. Having deliberated, the Delegates decided not to comply with the request for a screen. However, they suggested to the Acting Agent that the eleven witnesses give their evidence on a day when neither the applicant nor his relatives would be present in the Palace of Justice. The Acting Agent informed the Delegates that the eleven witnesses would not give evidence in those circumstances, whereupon the Delegates invited the Government to submit their request to the Commission in writing, giving full reasons for it in respect of each witness. 16. Further documentary material was submitted by the parties during the hearing. On 20 November 1997 the Acting Agent showed four photographs of a body said to be that of Yakup Aktaş. They were not marked with any kind of identifying information, either on the front or on the back. At the conclusion of the hearing the Delegates requested the Government to submit further information, a number of documents and two sets of copies of the photographs with the negatives. That request was subsequently confirmed by a letter dated 26 November 1997. On the same day the parties were also requested to inform the Commission of the names of any witnesses they might still wish to be heard. 17. On 8 December 1997 the Government were reminded of an outstanding request for the name of the doctor who pronounced Yakup Aktaş dead. 18. By a letter dated 23 December 1997 the Government submitted a doctor's note relating to one of the witnesses who had not appeared before the Delegates and a number of other documents. One of these was a copy of a letter dated 10 December 1997 from the Chief Public Prosecutor at Mardin to the Ministry of Justice (General Directorate of International Law and External Relations) to the effect that the requested negatives of the four photographs were not in the file at the Mardin Assize Court or in the possession of the Mardin Provincial Gendarmerie Headquarters. 19. By a letter dated 5 February 1998 the Government informed the Commission that it had not proved possible to trace the name of the doctor who had pronounced Yakup Aktaş dead. 20. On 12 February 1998 the Government were reminded that not all the information and documents mentioned in the Commission's letter of 26 November 1997 had been submitted. In reply, the Government stated in their letter of 20 March 1998 that all requested documents had been provided to the Commission. On 27 March 1998 the Commission provided the Government with a list of the information and documents which had yet to be submitted. 21. On 12 March 1998 the parties were informed that the Commission was expected to examine the state of the proceedings on the application at its session beginning on 14 April 1998 and that, unless a reply to the question concerning witnesses contained in the Commission's letter of 26 November 1997 was received beforehand, it would be assumed that they did not wish any further witnesses to be heard. 22. By a letter dated 15 April 1998 the Government requested that five witnesses, all officers in the gendarmerie, be heard. They stressed, however, that all necessary security measures should be taken. On 20 April 1998 the Government were requested to inform the Commission why such special arrangements were necessary and in what way the present case fell to be distinguished from other cases in which evidence from members of the security forces had been heard. They were further requested to specify the security measures they sought. 23. By a letter dated 20 April 1998 the Government submitted the two sets of copies of the photographs that had been requested by the Commission in its letter of 26 November 1997. 24. By a letter dated 5 May 1998 the Government asked the Commission to hear the five witnesses they had proposed in the absence of both the applicant and his representatives so that they would not be recognised. 25. On 23 May 1998 the Commission examined that request. It decided not to accede to it in so far as it related to the hearing of the witnesses in the absence of the applicant's representatives. The parties were informed of the Commission's decision on 27 May 1998, the Government being requested to confirm that the five witnesses could be heard under normal conditions. 26. By a letter dated 27 May 1998 the Government submitted information that had been requested by the Commission in its letter of 26 November 1997. 27. On 4 June 1998 the Government were again reminded that not all the information and documents mentioned in the Commission's letter of 26 November 1997 had been submitted. 28. By a letter dated 5 June 1998 the Government submitted observations concerning the hearing of the five witnesses. They again requested that the witnesses be heard in the absence of the applicant and his representatives, failing which they would not give evidence. 29. By a letter dated 23 June 1998 the Government submitted information requested by the Commission in its letter of 26 November 1997. They added that some documents referred to in the Commission's reminder letter of 4 June 1998 had already been submitted. 30. On 4 July 1998 the Commission examined the Government's observations of 5 June 1998 pertaining to the hearing of the five witnesses. It decided that it would not reverse its decision of 23 May 1998. The parties were informed of the Commission's decision on 6 July 1998 and were also invited to submit their written submissions on the merits. At the same time the Commission specified a document the Government had not yet provided. 31. By a letter dated 9 July 1998 the Government submitted a number of observations on the merits of the case. 32. By a letter dated 4 September 1998 the Government submitted the document specified in the Commission's letter of 6 July 1998. 33. The applicant's brother Yakup Aktaş was arrested on 18 November 1990 by the Derik district gendarmerie. Prior to his arrest he had been in good health apart from a minor venereal infection for which he had received treatment. After his arrest Yakup Aktaş was taken to Dr Adnan Parkan for an examination. Dr Parkan issued a certificate stating that Yakup Aktaş showed no signs of having been beaten or subjected to force or violence. 34. The next morning (19 November 1990) Mahmut Aktaş, another of the applicant's brothers, visited Yakup Aktaş and saw that he was in good health. Later that morning Yakup Aktaş was transferred to the Mardin interrogation centre, where he was held until his death. He died shortly after 7.30 p.m. on 25 November 1990. A post-mortem examination and a full autopsy were performed at 10 p.m. that same evening. As neither yielded a positive finding as to the exact cause of death, the reports of the two examinations and specimens taken from Yakup Aktaş's body were sent to the Institute of Forensic Medicine of the Ministry of Justice. The forensic examination concluded that it was not possible to determine the cause of death from the information available. 35. The body was returned to the applicant and other members of his family prior to the burial. They observed the injuries which were also described in the reports of the post-mortem examination, the autopsy and the forensic examination. The injuries described were consistent with death by deliberate asphyxiation, and thus with the evidence of the consultant pathologist engaged by the applicant. 36. On 26 November 1990, the day after Yakup Aktaş's death, the applicant lodged a complaint with the public prosecutor at Derik concerning his brother's death. However, the investigation did not begin until 30 November 1990, no search for evidence took place at all and the witnesses were not interviewed until March 1991. 37. The questioning of Yakup Aktaş by the two gendarme officers who were subsequently prosecuted had come to an end on 23 November 1990, that is two days before Yakup Aktaş's death. Yakup Aktaş had shown no signs of illness or pain in the period between 18 and 23 November 1990, either during questioning or between sessions. Had he done so, the regiment's doctor would have been available. Yakup Aktaş's pale complexion and his need to drink large quantities of water suggested a connection with his medical history of two urinary infections. 38. Despite the fact that 25 November 1990 was a Sunday, all measures and precautions required by Yakup Aktaş's sudden illness had been taken in order for him to receive immediate medical attention. Thus, the persons in charge had been alerted to the situation at once and Yakup Aktaş was transferred to hospital without delay. Likewise, an investigation had been commenced immediately and the applicant had subsequently been able to intervene in the criminal proceedings against the gendarme officers. A large number of statements from witnesses had been obtained. The accused officers were acquitted because of a lack of sufficient factual and medical evidence. 39. On 25 November 1990 a post-mortem examination and full autopsy were performed on the body of Yakup Aktaş at the Mardin State Hospital. His body was identified by Captain Mehmet Göçmen, commander of the Mardin provincial central gendarmerie. The report on those examinations (see paragraphs 153-160 below) stated, inter alia, that since the exact cause of death had not been established, tissue samples of internal organs had been taken and dispatched to the Institute of Forensic Medicine. 40. At 8.10 p.m. on 25 November 1990 an inspection of the interrogation centre of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie was carried out by four members of the gendarmerie (see paragraph 61). 41. On 27 November 1990 a public prosecutor at Derik ruled that he had no jurisdiction ratione loci to deal with the applicant's complaint that his brother Yakup Aktaş had died as a result of torture at the hands of intelligence officers at the interrogation centre of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie. The case file was transmitted to the Mardin Public Prosecutor's Office. 42. The Mardin Public Prosecutor Şevki Artar decided on 29 November 1990 that he had no jurisdiction ratione materiae and referred the investigation to the Mardin Provincial Administrative Council. Major Dursun Şeker was appointed to conduct the investigation. 43. On 20 February 1991 the Institute of Forensic Medicine issued a report, from which it appeared that the exact cause of death could not be established (see paragraphs 161-164 below). 44. Between 13 and 20 March 1991 a number of persons, including the applicant, made statements to Major Dursun Şeker. On 21 March 1991 Major Dursun Şeker issued a report (see paragraphs 125-129). The recommendation contained therein, that gendarme officers Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay should not face prosecution, was adopted by the Mardin Provincial Administrative Council in its decision of 6 June 1991. The Council of State overturned that decision on 24 June 1992 on the automatic appeal to which the decision was subject and ordered that Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay be charged with the offence of unintentional homicide (Article 452 of the Criminal Code) and should stand trial at the Mardin Assize Court. In its decision the Council of State held that it appeared from the report of the post-mortem examination and autopsy that Major Özen and Master Sergeant Günay had caused Yakup Aktaş's death by beating him during interrogation. 45. On 23 September 1992 the Mardin Assize Court decided that it was not competent to try the case and transferred it to the Ankara Assize Court. In its decision of 26 October 1992 the latter court also declined jurisdiction and transferred the file to the Court of Cassation in order to have the jurisdiction issue settled. On 29 December 1992 the Court of Cassation quashed the decision of the Mardin Assize Court of 23 September 1992, finding that it did have jurisdiction. 46. The proceedings against Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay on a charge of having caused Yakup Aktaş's death by beating during interrogation commenced at the Mardin Assize Court on 3 March 1993. The applicant was given permission to take part in the proceedings as an intervening party. On 3 March 1993 the Assize Court found that the decision of the Council of State of 24 June 1992, committing the two defendants for trial, did not contain the minimum information required by law concerning the identities of the accused. For this reason it transmitted the file to the Council of State. On 19 March 1993 the Council of State held that its decision of 24 June 1992 contained sufficient information to enable the identities of the defendants to be determined. It returned the file to the Mardin Assize Court. 47. Hearings took place before the Mardin Assize Court on 12 May, 7 July, 21 September, and 23 November 1993, and 2 February, 30 March, and 11 May 1994. On the latter date the defendants Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay were acquitted. 48. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Court of Cassation. It was rejected on 6 February 1995. 49. The documentary evidence obtained by the Commission and the transcript of the hearing before the Commission's Delegates have been transmitted to the Court and are in the case file. 50. The parties submitted various documents to the Commission. These related to the investigation and court proceedings and included statements from the applicant and witnesses concerning their version of the events in issue in this case. The Government also submitted copies of four colour photographs said to have been taken of the body at the Mardin State Hospital. 51. The Commission, when drawing up its report under former Article 31 of the Convention, had particular regard to the following documents: (a) Applicant's statement dated 4 December 1992 to the Diyarbakır branch of the Human Rights Association (hereinafter referred to as “HRA”) 52. At about 4 p.m. on 18 November 1990 the applicant's brother Yakup Aktaş had been apprehended in Derik. While still there, he had been taken to the local health clinic where he had been issued with a medical report stating that he was not suffering from any medical complaint whatsoever. The following morning Yakup had been taken to the interrogation centre at the Mardin provincial gendarmerie headquarters. A week later, on 25 November 1990, the applicant's uncle Süleyman had been informed that Yakup had died. Süleyman Aktaş had taken delivery of Yakup's body at the morgue of Mardin State Hospital on 26 November 1990. 53. As the relatives of Yakup were waiting in a convoy of vehicles the security forces had escorted the hearse to the cemetery at Derik and ensured an immediate burial. During that time, strict security measures had been imposed on the district; entry into or exit from the district was prohibited and helicopters patrolled overhead. A delegation of the Human Rights Association (HRA) had been refused entry to the district. 54. The person who had washed Yakup's body had observed bruises and scratches to both wrists and arms and the back. The back of the head had been entirely crushed and blood was still flowing from it. There was also an injury to the forehead. The authorities had claimed that Yakup had died as a result of a heart attack but the injuries observed on Yakup's body constituted proof of the fact that he had died as a result of torture. (b) Statement by the applicant dated 26 November 1990 to the Derik Public Prosecutor 55. The applicant stated that he wished to file a complaint concerning the death of his brother, Yakup Aktaş, whose body had been delivered to the family that day (26 November 1990). Yakup had been taken to Mardin eight days previously for interrogation and had died under interrogation. In the applicant's opinion, the death was not due to natural causes but had been brought about by torture. A healthy person would not have died for no apparent reason. He demanded the prosecution and conviction of the persons responsible for Yakup's death. 56. The applicant requested that a second autopsy be performed, stating that the original autopsy might have been carried out in such a way as to conceal the real cause of death. (c) Record of mutual identification and confrontation of suspects, undated 57. This record describes how Yakup Aktaş was confronted with a fellow suspect, one Ali Alay. Ali Alay said that Yakup Aktaş was the person who had given him banknotes. Yakup Aktaş confirmed that he had given Ali Alay approximately ten million Turkish liras (TRL) in banknotes wrapped in a newspaper. 58. During a confrontation between another fellow suspect, Osman Önen, and Ali Alay, the latter stated that he had given the money received from Yakup Aktaş to Osman Önen. Osman Önen confirmed having received money from Ali Alay. 59. The record is signed by Captain Mehmet Göçmen as the person who conducted the identification procedure. It further contains the thumbprints of Ali Alay and Osman Önen. A handwritten note underneath the name of Yakup Aktaş states that it had been assumed that Yakup Aktaş would sign the record at a later stage but that his death had prevented him from doing so. (d) Incident report dated 25 November 1990 60. This report is signed by Lance Corporals Ali Yavaş and Mustafa Tüylek and by Master Sergeants Yusuf Karakoç, Mehmet Yılmaz, Mustafa Ten, Süleyman Altuner, Üzeyir Nazlım and Ramazan Baygeldi. It states that at around 7.30 p.m. on 25 November 1990 sounds were heard in cell no. 18. The door of the cell was opened and the occupant was found unconscious, having convulsions and thrashing from side to side. An attempt was made to contact Senior Major Haşim Üstünel, the head of the intelligence unit, but when he proved unavailable Colonel Enver Uysal, commander of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie, was informed. On Colonel Uysal's instructions the detainee, who was established to be Yakup Aktaş, was taken to hospital by car. On examination at the hospital it was determined that Yakup Aktaş had died in transit. (e) Record of inspection of the interrogation centre on 25 November 1990 61. This record is signed by Senior Colonel Pekcan Cengiz (deputy commander of the 22nd Border Brigade), Senior Major Haşim Üstünel, Sergeant Major Ali Yavaş and Master Sergeant Yusuf Karakoç. It states that on the verbal instructions of the Mardin provincial security command the signatories of the record arrived at the interrogation centre of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie at approximately 8.10 p.m. on 25 November 1990. After an inspection and search of the premises it was established that the interrogation centre was equipped with modern equipment and that there were no tools or instruments that could be used to torture, torment or use force against persons interrogated there. It was further established that the interrogations were carried out using modern techniques and in accordance with the instructions. An examination of the detention area showed that the cells, which had been designed for one detainee, could easily accommodate three, that the necessary medical checks were made and that the needs of the detainees were met. The authors of the record concluded that any inhuman treatment of detainees there was out of the question. (f) Letter from the Mardin Public Prosecutor, Şevki Artar, to the Institute of Forensic Medicine dated 26 November 1990 62. The Public Prosecutor, Şevki Artar, informed the Institute of Forensic Medicine that on 25 November 1990 an autopsy had been performed on the body of Yakup Aktaş, who had died that same day at the Mardin State Hospital after having been taken suddenly ill at the Mardin provincial gendarmerie headquarters, where he was detained. Given that it had not proved possible to determine the exact cause of death it had been decided that tissue samples from the body should be sent to the Institute of Forensic Medicine and that the Institute's opinion be sought as to the exact cause of death. (g) Decision issued by the Mardin Public Prosecutor, Şevki Artar, on 29 November 1990 that he had no jurisdiction 63. This decision mentions “gendarme officers serving at the intelligence and interrogation department of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie” as being accused of the offence of torture, and the date of the offence is given as 25 November 1990. It relates how Yakup Aktaş was taken into custody by officers serving at the aforementioned department on 19 November 1990 following rumours to the effect that he had connections with the PKK, an illegal organisation. After Yakup Aktaş's death at Mardin State Hospital, where he had been taken after being taken suddenly ill on 25 November 1990, an inconclusive autopsy had been performed and tissue samples had been sent to the Institute of Forensic Medicine. 64. The decision further refers to the statement made by the applicant before the Derik Public Prosecutor on 26 November 1990 in which the applicant alleged that his brother Yakup had died as a result of being tortured during interrogation. 65. Since the incident involved the conduct of civil servants, it was decided in accordance with Article 4 § 1 of Decree no. 285 to refer the case file to the Mardin Provincial Administrative Council. (h) Statements taken by Major Dursun Şeker in the proceedings before the Mardin Provincial Administrative Council i. Applicant's statement dated 14 March 1991 66. In this statement the applicant is referred to as the “complainant”. The statement which he had made to the Derik Public Prosecutor on 26 November 1990 was read out to him. The applicant stated that his brother Yakup Aktaş had been apprehended in Derik on 18 November 1990 and had been transferred to the Mardin gendarmerie interrogation centre on 19 November 1990. At that time the applicant had been at university in Diyarbakır. He had been informed three days later that his brother had been taken into custody, whereupon he had returned to Derik to run Yakup's grocery shop. On the morning of 26 November 1990 Yakup's body had been brought to Derik and it was then that he had learned of his brother's death. 67. He remembered that Yakup had once had an illness (a pustule on the penis) for which he had received medical treatment, but he could not recall exactly when this had been. Other than this he was not aware of Yakup having suffered any medical complaints. 68. Yakup had died at the interrogation centre and it was very probable that he had been tortured. However, the applicant did not know for certain whether torture was the cause of death. That fell to be decided by the doctors performing the autopsy and the Institute of Forensic Medicine. If Yakup had died as a result of torture, he wanted the culprits punished. However, if death had occurred by natural causes it had been God's will. 69. Finally, it is recorded that the statement was read out to the applicant, who confirmed its accuracy by signing it. ii. Statement of Mahmut Aktaş dated 14 March 1991 70. In this interview Mahmut Aktaş was asked whether he had any complaints in relation to his brother Yakup Aktaş, who had fallen ill on 25 November 1990 at the Mardin interrogation centre and had died in hospital. He was also asked whether Yakup had been suffering from an illness previously. 71. He replied that he did not know whether Yakup had had an illness prior to his arrest. Even if Yakup had been ill and had received medical treatment he had not been aware of the fact. They shared the same house and he did not recall Yakup having any medication at home. On the day of Yakup's arrest, 18 November 1990, two police officers had come to Mahmut's bakery and said that Yakup had to attend the police station to pay a fine. Mahmut had sent an employee to his home to alert Yakup. The police superintendent had taken Yakup to the gendarmerie where Yakup had undergone a medical examination. Yakup had been kept at the gendarmerie overnight. He had visited Yakup the following morning and found him in good health and not suffering from anything. Yakup had been transferred to Mardin the same day. 72. Whilst in Mardin on 26 November 1990 he had been informed that Yakup had died at the hospital after being taken ill at the interrogation centre and that his body had been taken to Derik. If Yakup's death was the result of torture he wanted to see the culprits punished. However, if death had occurred by natural causes then it had been God's will and there was nothing for him to say. 73. It was recorded in the statement that it had been read out to him following which he confirmed its accuracy by signing it. iii. Statement of Ms Dediye Aktaş dated 14 March 1991 74.Ms Dediye Aktaş, Yakup Aktaş's mother, was asked the same questions as Mahmut Aktaş (see paragraph 70 above). She stated that her son Yakup had been called to the gendarmerie on 18 November 1990 upon which he had been apprehended and sent to the Mardin gendarmerie. One week later she had been informed of his death. Her son had not been suffering from any illness when he was arrested. He had not to her knowledge been ill or treated for any illness previously. As she was illiterate, she was not familiar with the content of the medical reports on her son's death, nor did she know what cause of death had been given. She knew that her son had been beaten to death and wished to lodge a complaint against all those responsible. She confirmed the accuracy of her statement with a thumbprint after it had been read out to her. iv. Statement of Alaattin Aydın dated 14 March 1991 75. Alaattin Aydın, a police constable serving with the Derik district police force, stated that on 18 November 1990 the Derik district gendarmerie had requested Yakup Aktaş's arrest. Together with a colleague he had asked Yakup Aktaş's brother Mahmut to tell Yakup to go to the police station to pay a fine for a minor offence. He had met Yakup Aktaş while he was on the way to the police station. He had not noticed anything unusual about him. Yakup Aktaş had been taken to the district gendarmerie headquarters and handed over to Senior Sergeant İlhan Keskin. v. Statement of Senior Sergeant İlhan Keskin dated 14 March 1991 76. İlhan Keskin, a Senior Sergeant in the gendarmerie in charge of administrative affairs at the Derik district gendarmerie headquarters, stated that on 18 November 1990 Major Aytekin Özen of the interrogation centre had telephoned him and given him instructions to arrest Yakup Aktaş. He had contacted the Derik police superintendent and had brought the matter to his attention. In the afternoon two police officers had brought Yakup Aktaş to the gendarmerie headquarters. He had had Yakup Aktaş examined by Dr Adnan Parkan at the district health centre in accordance with usual practice. He had then received the report of the medical examination. Yakup Aktaş's name had been entered in the custody record and he had spent the night in the cells at the district gendarmerie headquarters. 77. The following morning (19 November 1990), the witness had blindfolded Yakup Aktaş and taken him to the Mardin interrogation centre where, some time before noon, he had delivered him into the hands of Master Sergeant Mustafa Ten. In his opinion, Yakup Aktaş had appeared listless, nervous and anxious. Also, Yakup Aktaş had been somewhat overweight. It was an established fact that Yakup Aktaş had provided assistance and supplied guns to the PKK. vi. Statement of Dr Adnan Parkan, undated 78. Dr Adnan Parkan stated that Yakup Aktaş had been brought to him for a medical check-up on 18 November 1990 after his arrest by the district gendarmerie. The signature on the medical report bearing that date was his. He had drawn up the report after asking Yakup Aktaş whether he had been beaten to which Yakup Aktaş had replied that this was not the case. He had not asked Yakup Aktaş to undress and thus had not conducted an external physical examination since the purpose of the check-up had been to ascertain whether or not Yakup Aktaş had been beaten. 79. He did not remember whether or not he had previously examined Yakup Aktaş but, since the data contained in the register of the health clinic were correct, it must have been the case that Yakup Aktaş had come to see him on two occasions. Yakup Aktaş's illness had been diagnosed as urethritis. He did not think that that disease was the cause of death since otherwise it would have been stated in the autopsy report. He knew Yakup Aktaş because he ran a grocery shop in the district. Yakup Aktaş had been a little overweight. He described Yakup Aktaş as a respectful, polite person. vii. Statement of Colonel Enver Uysal dated 18 March 1991 80. Colonel Uysal, commander of Mardin provincial gendarmerie, stated that although the interrogation centre was situated on the premises of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie and although the interrogation unit appeared to form part of the intelligence unit, the position was in fact completely different in practice. The interrogation centre functioned as the interrogation centre for the Mardin provincial security command. Persons to be taken into custody would be apprehended by the Mardin provincial central gendarmerie on the orders of the security command. 81. He would receive a list with the names of the persons who had been taken into custody but it was the personnel serving at the interrogation unit who decided which suspects were to be interrogated by which officers. As provincial gendarmerie commander he would frequently attend interrogations. Such inspections were general in nature. He had never witnessed any ill-treatment being meted out at the interrogation sessions he had attended. 82. Early in the evening of 25 November 1990 Sergeant Major Ali Yavaş had telephoned him to say that a detainee named Yakup Aktaş had fallen ill and that they wanted to take him to hospital. He had ordered that Yakup Aktaş be taken to hospital immediately. Approximately half an hour later Ali Yavaş had informed him that Yakup Aktaş had been hospitalised but had died before the doctor could intervene. Thereupon, the public prosecutor's office had been informed of the incident and the necessary investigations had commenced. He was not aware of the cause of death but did not think that Yakup Aktaş had died as a result of torture. The interrogation building was in complete conformity with sanitary requirements and persons being held for interrogation were never ill-treated. 83. He had subsequently been told by the head of the interrogation unit that Yakup Aktaş had been interrogated by Master Sergeant Ercan Günay and Major Aytekin Özmen. He had never seen Yakup Aktaş. viii. Statement of Captain Mehmet Göçmen dated 15 March 1991 84. In this statement Captain Göçmen is introduced as a gendarme captain, commander of Mardin provincial central gendarmerie. He was asked whether it was correct that Yakup Aktaş had been taken with two co‑accused for mutual identification under his, Göçmen's, supervision. He stated that the interrogation of suspects was carried out by interrogation personnel serving under the command of the intelligence unit of the provincial gendarmerie. Related correspondence bore his signature because he was the officer in charge of judicial matters. Prior to the confrontation for identification purposes of Yakup Aktaş with his two co‑accused he had been asked to go to the interrogation centre. The information included in the mutual identification record had been furnished by the persons identified. The signature at the bottom of that record was his and its content was true. ix. Statement of Senior Major Haşim Üstünel dated 18 March 1991 85. Senior Major Üstünel, head of the intelligence unit at the Mardin provincial gendarmerie, explained that the interrogation centre was one of the five sections attached to his intelligence unit. However, the interrogation centre functioned under the command and direction of the provincial security command. Persons to be interrogated were detained by the provincial central gendarmerie, which was responsible for bringing them before the courts. Therefore, the interrogation centre did not operate under his orders. 86. Interrogations were carried out by interrogation personnel stationed at the interrogation centre. On 25 November 1990 there had been a total of fourteen members of staff at the interrogation centre, consisting of four lance corporals, nine master sergeants and intelligence officer Major Aytekin Özen who had been posted at the interrogation centre since August 1990 in order to direct the interrogation activities and render them more effective. 87. He had been informed of Yakup Aktaş's death by Sergeant Major Yavaş, who had telephoned him at home with the news. Yakup Aktaş had fallen ill and been taken to hospital but had died before the doctor could intervene. Upon hearing this news the witness had gone to the provincial gendarmerie headquarters. Meanwhile, he had given instructions for the public prosecutor to be informed. The provincial gendarmerie commander had also been present at the headquarters. When the public prosecutor arrived they went to the hospital. He had seen the body for the first time at the autopsy but there had been nothing that had attracted his attention. He did not think that Yakup Aktaş had been tortured because during the one and a half years he had been in his post he had never seen or heard of anyone being mistreated, let alone tortured, at the interrogation centre. x. Statement of Sergeant Major Ali Yavaş, date illegible 88. Ali Yavaş stated that he was a gendarme with the rank of lance corporal serving at the intelligence unit of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie and head of the interrogation centre. 89. He stated that he had been on leave on the day Yakup Aktaş was taken into custody (19 November 1990). Upon his return on 23 November 1993 he had visited all the persons detained at the interrogation centre, including Yakup Aktaş in cell no. 18. Yakup Aktaş had been listless, nervous and frightened. No interrogations had taken place on Saturday 24 or Sunday 25 November. The interrogations of Yakup Aktaş had been carried out by Major Aytekin Özen, who was in charge of the coordination of the interrogation centre, and Sergeant Ercan Günay. On 23 November Major Aytekin Özen had gone on leave and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay had gone to Adana on an assignment. Therefore, Yakup Aktaş had not been interrogated on 23, 24 or 25 November. 90. On 25 November, while he was in the canteen, he had been informed by Master Sergeant Yusuf Karakoç, the duty officer at the interrogation centre, that Yakup Aktaş had fallen ill. He had ordered a vehicle and had informed Colonel Enver Uysal of the matter. He had then gone to the interrogation centre and seen Yakup Aktaş being taken out of his cell in a blanket. He had helped Yakup Aktaş onto the back seat of the car. He had observed that Yakup Aktaş was breathing and had checked for and found a pulse. He had taken Yakup Aktaş to the accident and emergency department at the State Hospital, where after an examination, the doctor pronounced him dead. 91. It had been established before Yakup Aktaş was taken to the interrogation centre that he had helped and sheltered members of the PKK. Yakup Aktaş had given TRL 30,000,000 and five Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition to the PKK. xi. Statement of Master Sergeant Yusuf Karakoç dated 13 March 1991 92. Yusuf Karakoç, a Master Sergeant in the gendarmerie serving at the intelligence unit of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie, stated that Major Aytekin Özen had ordered Yakup Aktaş to be brought to the interrogation centre after it had been established from statements made by members of the PKK and documents that had been seized that Yakup Aktaş had provided assistance, shelter and supplies to that organisation. On 19 November 1990 Yakup Aktaş had arrived at the interrogation centre and a medical certificate and permission from the public prosecutor to take Yakup Aktaş into custody had been obtained. He had been the duty officer that day. During his shift he had arranged for the doors of the cells to be opened at around 6 p.m., midnight, 3 a.m. and 7 a.m. to check on the detainees. On each occasion Yakup Aktaş, who was in cell no. 18, had told him that he had no problems. He did not observe anything unusual in Yakup Aktaş's behaviour. 93. He was also the duty officer on 25 November 1990. Both before and after noon he had checked on Yakup Aktaş and had not noticed anything unusual about him. As the evening meal was about to be served, the private distributing the meals had come to see him and told him that he had heard strange voices coming from cell no. 18, that Yakup Aktaş had been banging on the door and that when the private had looked into the cell Yakup Aktaş had told him that he was ill. Upon receiving this information the witness said that he had immediately gone downstairs to the detention area. The private standing guard had opened the door to cell no. 18. When the witness called out to Yakup Aktaş there had been no response. Yakup Aktaş had been seated and had fainted. The witness had immediately taken him out of the cell to make sure that he got some fresh air. A private had supported Yakup Aktaş on one arm but he had been unable to stand up in his condition and had therefore been laid on a blanket. The witness had given instructions for the relevant superiors to be informed and for a car to be made ready. Meanwhile, Sergeant Major Ali Yavaş had arrived. 94. With the blanket serving as a stretcher, Yakup Aktaş had been taken to the car and driven to the hospital. He was still breathing when he was taken outside. Later, the witness had been informed that Yakup Aktaş had died at the hospital. 95. Yakup Aktaş had been interrogated by Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. The witness did not have any information concerning the methods that had been used. While he was certain that Yakup Aktaş had not been tortured, he did not know the cause of his death. xii. Statement of Master Sergeant Üzeyir Nazlım dated 14 March 1991 96. Üzeyir Nazlım stated that he was a Master Sergeant in the gendarmerie serving at the intelligence unit of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie. He had checked on Yakup Aktaş in cell no. 18 while on guard duty on 21 and 24 November 1990. Yakup Aktaş had been listless, nervous and anxious. Master Sergeant Yusuf Karakoç had taken over the guard duty from him on 25 November 1990. On that day he had heard that Yakup Aktaş had become ill and had died in hospital. 97. Yakup Aktaş had been interrogated by Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. He did not know how many times Yakup Aktaş had been interrogated or what methods had been used. He had neither seen nor heard Yakup Aktaş being subjected to torture during interrogation. xiii. Statement of Master Sergeant Ramazan Baygeldi dated 13 March 1991 98. Ramazan Baygeldi, a Master Sergeant in the gendarmerie serving at the intelligence unit of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie, said that he had seen Yakup Aktaş on 19 November 1990 on his arrival at the interrogation centre. As far as he could see, Yakup Aktaş did not appear to be suffering from any kind of illness, although he was somewhat overweight. He had been detained in cell no. 18 and interrogated by Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. 99. The witness had been on guard duty on 20 and 24 November 1990. As part of his duties he had personally asked the detainees about their health five times during the day and the night. The inactivity displayed by Yakup Aktaş had attracted his attention. Nevertheless, when he had asked him if he was ill, Yakup Aktaş had replied that he had no problem. If a detainee complained of aches and pains medical supplies were available at the interrogation centre. Moreover, such detainees were examined by the doctor on duty at the headquarters. 100. He had not heard anything about Yakup Aktaş having been tortured or beaten while in detention and had not seen any such treatment. xiv. Statement of Master Sergeant Mustafa Ten dated 14 March 1991 101. While on guard duty at the detention area of the interrogation centre on 22 November 1990 this Master Sergeant in the gendarmerie had checked on Yakup Aktaş in cell no. 18 a number of times. He had not observed anything unusual. Yakup Aktaş had been interrogated by Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. The witness had neither seen nor heard Yakup Aktaş being subjected to torture. In the evening of 25 November 1990 he had heard that Yakup Aktaş had become unwell and had died at the hospital to which he had been taken. xv. Statement of Master Sergeant Mehmet Yılmaz dated 13 March 1991 102. Mehmet Yılmaz, a master sergeant in the gendarmerie serving in the intelligence unit of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie, stated that he had seen Yakup Aktaş while on guard duty on 22 November 1990. On that day he had ordered the doors of the cells to be opened three times in the morning and twice in the evening and had asked the detainees if they had any problems. He had spoken to Yakup Aktaş who had been in cell no. 18. He had not observed anything unusual in his behaviour and Yakup Aktaş had not complained to him about being ill. As he had been resting in the canteen on 25 November 1990 he had heard the news that Yakup Aktaş had fallen ill and had died at the hospital. He had no information about any torture. xvi. Statement of Master Sergeant Süleyman Altuner dated 14 March 1991 103. This master sergeant in the gendarmerie stated that he could not remember whether or not he had seen Yakup Aktaş, who had fallen ill in his cell on 25 November 1990 and had subsequently died in hospital. Yakup Aktaş had been interrogated by Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. The witness had not heard anything about Yakup Aktaş having been tortured during interrogation, nor had he seen anything of the sort. xvii. Statement of Lance Corporal Mustafa Tüylek dated 14 March 1991 104. Mustafa Tüylek, a lance corporal in the gendarmerie, stated that although he had been at the interrogation centre when Yakup Aktaş had been detained there, he had not been on guard duty at the time and so could not remember having seen Yakup Aktaş, who had been taken ill and had died in hospital. xviii. Statement of Corporal Hüseyin Hamamcıoğlu dated 13 March 1991 105. The witness, a corporal in the gendarmerie, stated that he remembered having been on guard duty at the detention area of the interrogation centre on 20 November 1990. During his turn of duty he had let Yakup Aktaş and other detainees out of their cells at meal times and when they needed to go to the lavatory. He had not observed any signs that Yakup Aktaş might be ill. 106. He had again been on guard duty on 25 November 1990. He had gone to the room where the detainees were served their meals, which was near cell no. 18. He had heard somebody knocking on a cell door. In reply to his question, “Which number?”, he had received the answer, “Number 18”. He had unfastened the bolt on the door and asked what the matter was. In a very low voice Yakup Aktaş had replied that he was ill and in a bad state. Although Yakup Aktaş was standing up the witness realised that he was seriously ill and had immediately gone to inform Master Sergeant Yusuf Karakoç, the duty officer. Master Sergeant Karakoç had informed their superiors of the situation. Yakup Aktaş had been helped into a vehicle that had been summoned and was taken to the hospital. The witness had later heard that Yakup Aktaş had died either in the hospital or on the way there. 107. During the hours he had been on guard duty in the detention area he had not heard any unusual voices in cell no. 18. He had not observed anything unusual about Yakup Aktaş on the occasions he was removed from and returned to his cell, blindfolded. xix. Statement of Private Hüseyin Bekir Günel dated 13 March 1991 108. The witness, a private in the gendarmerie serving at the intelligence unit of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie, stated that as part of his guard duty at the detention area he would let detainees out of their cell when they needed to go to the lavatory or when they went for their meals. He would also give the detainees water if they asked for it. While carrying out those duties he had not observed anything unusual about Yakup Aktaş's behaviour and the latter had not mentioned any sickness to him. Yakup Aktaş had not been taken out of his cell to be interrogated while he was on duty. He had not witnessed Yakup Aktaş being beaten. xx. Statement of Private Ercüment Erbil dated 13 March 1991 109. Ercüment Erbil, a private in the gendarmerie, stated that he had been on guard duty for some of the time that Yakup Aktaş had been detained. While on duty, he would open the doors of the cells when detainees were served meals or water, when they needed to go to the lavatory or when they were sent to the interrogation centre. He had taken Yakup Aktaş from his cell to the interrogation room two or three times. On the occasions he had accompanied Yakup Aktaş from the interrogation room back to his cell Yakup Aktaş had been in the same condition as when he had been taken from his cell. The witness had not seen Yakup Aktaş being tortured by Major Aytekin Özen or Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. Neither had he observed any traces of torture on Yakup Aktaş's body. If Yakup Aktaş had been tortured in the interrogation room, he would, at very least, have heard their voices. Yakup Aktaş had not been taken to the interrogation room on the last days before his death. xxi. Statement of Private Mehmet Bora dated 13 March 1991 110. The witness was a private in the gendarmerie. He stated that he had seen Yakup Aktaş when on guard duty in the period from 19 to 25 November 1990. He had taken Yakup Aktaş out of his cell several times to take him to the lavatory, to the area where meals were served and to the interrogation room. He had not observed anything unusual about Yakup Aktaş. There had been no difference in Yakup Aktaş's appearance between the moment his cell door was opened and he was blindfolded and taken to the interrogation room and the moment he returned from the interrogation room. He had not seen Yakup Aktaş being tortured or observed any signs of torture on Yakup Aktaş. 111. On 25 November 1990 he had been on guard duty between 6 p.m. and midnight. The private serving the meals had told him that the detainee in cell no. 18 had fallen ill and said that they should inform the duty officer, Master Sergeant Yusuf Karakoç. He had gone to cell no. 18, had opened the door and had seen Yakup Aktaş sitting on a blanket. Master Sergeant Karakoç had then arrived. A private had held Yakup Aktaş by one arm and he had been taken out of the interrogation room. He remembered very clearly that Yakup Aktaş had been fine the day before. He was unable to recall whether or not Yakup Aktaş had been taken to the interrogation centre on 25 November 1990. (The Commission understood this last sentence to mean that Private Bora was unable to recall whether or not Yakup Aktaş had been interrogated on 25 November 1990.) xxii. Statement of Private İbrahim Olgun dated 14 March 1991 112. This witness, a private in the gendarmerie, stated that he was the driver of a Renault car belonging to the interrogation centre. On 25 November 1990 he had been informed by Sergeant Major Ali Yavaş that one of the detainees had fallen ill and needed to be taken to hospital. He had helped to carry the detainee from the interrogation centre on a blanket. The detainee had been taken to the hospital in a seated position on the back seat of the car. A few minutes later at the hospital they – it is not clear from the text of the statement who are meant by “they”; presumably hospital staff –had said that the detainee had died. He had not heard anything about the detainee having been tortured at the interrogation centre. xxiii. Statement of Major Aytekin Özen dated 20 March 1991 113. In his statement, Major Aytekin Özen is introduced as an intelligence officer serving in the Gendarme Public Order Command. He explained that following clashes between the PKK and security forces in a village in Mardin province on 1 August 1990 a large number of documents had been seized. It had been possible to determine from the documents, inter alia, which people in the region, particularly in the districts of Kızıltepe and Derik, had collaborated with the PKK. Subsequently, a large number of people, including Yakup Aktaş, had been taken into custody. The task of interrogating them had been divided up between the personnel of the interrogation centre of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie. Although the witness's posting was at the Gendarmerie Public Order Command, he had been assigned to the interrogation centre in order to alleviate pressure of work and had been given the task of interrogating a specific group. 114. Ali Alay, one of the persons who had been taken into custody, had made a statement incriminating Yakup Aktaş. Yakup Aktaş was said to have given financial support to the PKK. The witness had referred the matter to the commander of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie who had instructed him to contact the Derik district gendarmerie after also informing the head of the intelligence unit. In coordination with the Derik district police force the Derik district gendarmerie had then arranged for Yakup Aktaş's arrest and had brought him to the interrogation centre on 19 November 1990. 115. Meanwhile, the witness and his assistant, Master Sergeant Ercan Günay, had interrogated Ali Alay and a person named Osman Önen, who had surrendered to custody voluntarily. 116. He had first interrogated Yakup Aktaş one or two days after his arrest. Yakup Aktaş had denied the accusations made against him by Ali Alay. Ali Alay had then been brought into the interrogation room and had been asked to relate once more his account of Yakup Aktaş's involvement with terrorists. At that point he had observed that Yakup Aktaş had suddenly started to perspire and had turned slightly pale. Yakup Aktaş had asked for water and it had been provided immediately. Although Yakup Aktaş had initially continued to say that Ali Alay was slandering him, he was sweating profusely and eventually confessed his guilt. During this time he had requested seven or eight glasses of water. The witness had asked him whether there was a reason for him drinking so much. Yakup Aktaş had replied that he was a little unwell, that he needed to drink a lot of water and could not go to sleep without having drunk a full jug of water. Because he knew that Yakup Aktaş had had a medical check prior to being taken into custody, he had not made too much of this. 117. Despite his confession it was clear that Yakup Aktaş was nevertheless attempting to conceal the involvement of others. Therefore, the witness had given Yakup Aktaş one day to reflect and sent him back to his cell. 118. The following day, which must have been either 21 or 22 November, they had again interrogated Yakup Aktaş in the presence of Ali Alay. Yakup Aktaş had been overexcited and again wanted to drink water. Finally, Yakup Aktaş had given the name of his accomplice. The witness had thanked Yakup Aktaş for his cooperation and told him that they would not cause him any more discomfort. 119. Meanwhile, he had had a statement prepared concerning Osman Önen, Ali Alay and Yakup Aktaş, whom they had brought face to face at the beginning. He was not sure, however, if the three suspects had signed it, as the interrogation centre had been crowded and matters of signatures were generally dealt with just before detainees were transferred. He nevertheless thought that Osman Önen and Ali Alay had signed the statement. 120. On 23 November 1990 he had gone on one week's leave. While at home in Ankara on 26 November 1990 he had received the news of Yakup Aktaş's death. He had been informed that he had fallen ill and had died on the way to hospital. Nevertheless, the witness said that his conscience was clear: Yakup Aktaş had not been subjected to the slightest physical force. He was certain that neither he nor Master Sergeant Ercan Günay had done anything to precipitate Yakup Aktaş's death. He also did not think it likely that Yakup Aktaş would have been subjected to any kind of torture after 23 November. There had been more than ten ranked members of staff at the interrogation centre and it was impossible that such a thing could have been kept out of sight. xxiv. Statement of Master Sergeant Ercan Günay dated 13 March 1991 121. Ercan Günay, a Master Sergeant in the gendarmerie, stated that he had been serving at the Mardin provincial gendarmerie interrogation centre since 18 September 1990. Together with Major Aytekin Özen he had undertaken the task of interrogating Yakup Aktaş. He did not remember interrogating Yakup Aktaş on the day the latter arrived at the interrogation centre (19 November 1990). The next day Major Aytekin Özen and himself had questioned Yakup Aktaş for one or two hours about the amount of TRL 30,000,000 which Yakup Aktaş was known to have given to the PKK. During this interrogation Yakup Aktaş had appeared frightened and apprehensive; his face had turned white and he had been a little shaky. Yakup Aktaş had rejected all their claims. The following day Yakup Aktaş had been confronted with two co-accused after which he had confessed his guilt. No kind of torture whatsoever had been used on him. The witness did not know whether Yakup Aktaş had suffered from any illness in the past. During his interrogation Yakup Aktaş had asked for water several times. He had also been a little overweight. 122. On 23 November 1990 the witness had been sent to Adana on an assignment and Major Aytekin Özen had gone on leave the same day. Since according to the procedures and distribution of tasks within the interrogation centre detainees could only be questioned by the same officers, Yakup Aktaş had not been interrogated on 23, 24 or 25 November. xxv. Statement of Osman Önen dated 18 March 1991 123. Osman Önen was one of Yakup Aktaş's co-accused. He was asked how long he had been kept in custody at the Mardin interrogation centre, whether he had been confronted with Yakup Aktaş and if so, whether the latter had borne any signs of torture. In reply Osman Önen stated that he could not remember the exact date but that he had been taken into custody at the interrogation centre towards the end of 1990. He had been detained for nineteen days. Over a period of ten days he had been interrogated twice a day. On one occasion the blindfold he had been wearing had been partially removed and he had recognised Ali Alay. He had then been blindfolded once again and for that reason had been unable to see whether there was another person in the room. He did not know whether Yakup Aktaş had been in the room at that time but he had not seen him. His circumstances in custody had been difficult. It was as a result of this that he had made a false statement accusing Ali Alay of giving money to a terrorist. 124. He had been kept in cell no. 19. There were cells adjacent to and opposite his. He did not know whether anyone had been detained in them. After his release he had heard that Yakup Aktaş had died under interrogation at the time when he, Önen, had also been in custody. He had not heard Yakup Aktaş's voice in the interrogation centre. (i) Report by Major Dursun Şeker dated 21 March 1991 125. This report lists the applicant, his brother, Mahmut Aktaş, and their mother, Dediye Aktaş, as complainants. The allegation investigated was that of manslaughter during torture and the accused were Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. The report then lists the identities of 25 witnesses who had made statements before Major Dursun Şeker, followed by a short summary of the incident and of the statements of the accused and the witnesses. 126. The summary of the incident describes how the applicant had alleged that his brother, Yakup Aktaş, had been tortured to death by interrogation personnel of the interrogation centre of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie, where Yakup had been taken on 19 November 1990. On 25 November 1990 Yakup Aktaş had fallen ill in his cell and had died after being admitted to hospital. The summaries of the statements of Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay mention that they had interrogated Yakup Aktaş once and that they had confronted him with his co-accused once. 127. The report then goes on to list as “Other Evidence” the documents that had been examined by Major Şeker, including statements incriminating Yakup Aktaş, duty rosters, the record of the inspection of the interrogation centre (see paragraph 61 above), the entries in the register of the Derik health clinic concerning Yakup Aktaş (see paragraph 151 below), the medical report issued by Dr Adnan Parkan (see paragraph 152 below), the report of the post-mortem examination and autopsy (see paragraphs 153-160 below) and the report issued by the Institute of Forensic Medicine (see paragraphs 161-164 below). 128. In the subsequent “Analysis of The Evidence”, it is stated, inter alia, that Major Özen and Master Sergeant Günay interrogated Yakup Aktaş once for one or two hours and that they supervised the confrontations between Ali Alay and Yakup Aktaş and between Ali Alay and Osman Önen that had been arranged for the purposes of mutual identification. In a paragraph in which reference is made to the fact that Yakup Aktaş had been diagnosed with urethritis, Major Şeker observed that according to the statements made before him, Yakup Aktaş had been excessively thirsty and had drunk a remarkable quantity of water. This section of the report also contains the following paragraph: “During his first interrogation ... Yakup Aktaş denied that he had given financial support to the [PKK] organisation and later, when he was confronted by the person to whom he had delivered money, he confessed to the crime. The witnesses state that from that moment on the aforementioned person (that is to say, Yakup Aktaş) had been noticeably subdued, depressed and nervous. It is very probable that Yakup Aktaş had reached such a mental state as a result of his thinking that the security forces knew that he had bought five Kalashnikov guns from the gun smuggler ... and he went into an extreme mental depression and death occurred in this mental atmosphere.” 129. The report concluded that Yakup Aktaş's death had not been caused by torture, force, violence or harsh treatment and for this reason Major Dursun Şeker proposed that no criminal prosecution be instigated against Major Özen and Master Sergeant Günay. (j) Minutes of the proceedings before the Mardin Assize Court concerning the prosecution of Major Aytekin Özen and Master Sergeant Ercan Günay i. Court sitting on 28 January 1993 130. A pre-trial review was held on this date. The court decided, inter alia, to issue a rogatory letter requesting the Ankara Assize Court to obtain Major Özen's defence submissions and to issue a summons requiring Master Sergeant Günay to appear as a defendant. It adjourned the proceedings until 3 March 1993. ii. Court sitting on 7 July 1993 131. The applicant was present and the court granted him permission to intervene in the proceedings. He was asked to state his complaint and his evidence. He stated that the deceased, Yakup Aktaş, was his brother. Yakup Aktaş had been taken by the gendarmerie for interrogation. After one week the family had received notification that Yakup had died. Yakup had not been suffering from any health problem prior to his arrest. Given that he had died unexpectedly, the family had filed a complaint as they believed that he had been tortured to death during the interrogation. He had not personally seen evidence that Yakup had been tortured and it would have been impossible for him to do so, since the family had been denied access to Yakup while he was under interrogation. Moreover, Yakup was already dead by the time the family arrived at the hospital. He had seen Yakup's body some twelve hours after Yakup's admission to hospital. He had observed abnormal bruising and signs of beating to the outer section of both arms, the forehead and the soles of the feet. Yet shortly after Yakup's arrest a medical report had been issued, in which the presence or absence of any such signs should have been noted. 132. The applicant further confirmed that the content of his statement of 26 November 1990 to the Derik public prosecutor was correct. 133. The report of the post-mortem examination and the autopsy of 26 November 1990 and the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine of 20 February 1992 (which should presumably read 21 February 1991) were read out. The applicant stated that he had no comments on the autopsy report but was not satisfied by the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine. However, he did not think that there was anything else that could be done. 134. The court decided to issue a rogatory letter to the Ankara Assize Court requesting Major Özen's defence submissions and to issue a summons requiring Master Sergeant Günay to appear. It further decided to issue rogatory letters to the Assize Courts of Buldan and Pazaryolu in respect of the public prosecutors Şevki Artar and Ekrem Şendoğan who were to be asked whether, according to the autopsy report, the body of Yakup Aktaş bore any traces of torture within the eight days preceding death. Finally, the court decided to issue witness summons to the other persons whose signatures appeared on the autopsy report, including Dr Güneş Pay and Dr Erol Aksaz, and the witnesses whose statements had been taken by Major Dursun Şeker. The court adjourned the proceedings until 21 September 1993. iii. Court sitting on 21 September 1993 135. The applicant's brother, Mahmut Aktaş, who was also an intervener in the proceedings, stated that his brother Yakup had been in custody for one week when the news of his death was received. Apart from when Yakup was detained in Derik, he had not been able to see him in detention. Yakup had had not been suffering from any illnesses whatsoever. He had washed Yakup's body; there had been a wound on the forehead and traces of beating on the right side of the back and on the arms. He believed that Yakup had died as a result of torture. The report of the post-mortem examination and autopsy and the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine were read out. Mahmut Aktaş stated that he had nothing to say about the autopsy report but that the Institute of Forensic Medicine's report was not true. 136. Counsel for the defendants stated that, in view of the present posting of his client, Master Sergeant Ercan Günay, his defence submissions should be heard by the Ankara Assize Court. The court decided to issue a rogatory letter to that effect. It also decided, inter alia, to instruct the Sivrihisar Criminal Court of First Instance to take a statement from Dr Adnan Parkan. It adjourned the proceedings until 23 November 1993. iv. Court sitting on 23 November 1993 137. The court noted that a number of statements had been received from other courts in Turkey as a result of the rogatory letters that had been issued. The interveners requested that they be granted more time to study those statements. They also said that the defendants had tortured their brother, Yakup Aktaş, for three days and that when he had gone into a coma one of the defendants had taken leave and the other had been transferred to another post. Since they believed that this had been done intentionally they demanded that the defendants be arrested. 138. The court examined three witnesses: a hospital orderly, a clerk and the driver who had taken the autopsy officials to the morgue. Although all three confirmed that their signatures appeared on the autopsy report of 26 November 1990, none could remember the incident in issue. 140. The interveners, including the applicant, did not attend this hearing. The court examined five master sergeants, Yusuf Karakoç, Mustafa Ten, Süleyman Altuner, Murat Gömek and Ramazan Baygeldi. They all stated that a military doctor carried out examinations every day in the detention area of the interrogation centre. Some of them added that the interrogation centre conformed to the requisite standards and that the rooms where interrogations were conducted were not equipped with sound insulation. Therefore, if Yakup Aktaş had been tortured or subjected to violence during his interrogation then the sounds of his cries and screams would have been audible outside those rooms, but they had not heard anything of that nature. According to Master Sergeants Yusuf Karakoç and Ramazan Baygeldi, the defendant Major Özen had gone on leave four or five days before the day Yakup Aktaş had died. As far as Master Sergeant Mustafa Ten could remember, Major Özen had left three to four days before that day but he was unable to recall whether the defendant Master Sergeant Günay had been at his post or out on assignment on the day in question. Master Sergeant Baygeldi said that Master Sergeant Günay had gone on an assignment two or three days before the day Yakup Aktaş died. These five witnesses confirmed the content of the statements they had made before Major Şeker after they had been read out to them. 141. The court further noted that additional statements had been received from other courts in Turkey in reply to rogatory letters. The public prosecutor and counsel for the defendants stated that the principal witnesses had been heard and that those witnesses who had not yet been heard were gendarmes who had said in their preparatory statements – the Commission assumed that “preparatory statements” meant the statements taken by Major Dursun Şeker – that they had no knowledge of the incident. They submitted, therefore, that it would be sufficient for the preparatory statements to be read out. The court accepted that submission and decided not to summon those witnesses; the preparatory statements were read out. 142. In respect of the merits of the case the public prosecutor said that there was insufficient evidence to convict and submitted that the defendants should be acquitted. Counsel for the defendants agreed with the public prosecutor's position, adding that no prosecution need have been instigated and that the Council of State had probably only decided to refer the case to court because of the fact that there had been a death. The court then decided to acquit the defendants as the charges against them had not been proved. (k) Statement taken from Major Aytekin Özen by the Ankara Assize Court on 23 February 1993 pursuant to a rogatory letter 143. The statement was requested by the Mardin Assize Court in its rogatory letter of 28 January 1993. The decision of the Council of State of 24 June 1992 (see paragraph 44 above) was read out to Major Aytekin Özen and he was asked to submit his defence and evidence concerning the charge against him. 144. Major Aytekin Özen denied having struck Yakup Aktaş during his interrogation. Nor had he seen anybody else do so. He had gone on leave to Ankara while Yakup Aktaş remained in custody. On the third day of his leave he had been informed of Yakup Aktaş's death, and had cut short his leave and returned to his post. At a later stage one of Yakup Aktaş's relatives must have filed a complaint against him and he had become the subject of an investigation. The Mardin Provincial Administrative Council had reached a unanimous decision to the effect that he should not be prosecuted. However, the Council of State had subsequently accepted that the report of the post-mortem examination and autopsy constituted evidence against him that Yakup Aktaş's death had been caused by beating. He expressed his amazement that he had been committed for trial given that he had no stage struck Yakup Aktaş. He could also categorically affirm that Yakup Aktaş had not been beaten by Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. Finally, he confirmed that the statements he had made previously were correct. (l) Statement taken from Master Sergeant Ercan Günay by the Ankara Assize Court on 2 November 1993 pursuant to a rogatory letter 145. The statement was requested by the Mardin Assize Court in its rogatory letter of 21 September 1993. The decision of the Council of State of 24 June 1992 was read out to Master Sergeant Ercan Günay. He made a statement in the presence of his defence counsel. 146. Master Sergeant Ercan Günay stated that he had been an interrogating officer on the date of the incident. Together with his colleague, Major Aytekin Özen, he had interrogated Yakup Aktaş, who was suspected of having provided assistance to the PKK on various occasions. However, he had not beaten Yakup Aktaş. He had then been sent to Ankara on an assignment for two or three days. Upon his return to Mardin he had learned that Yakup Aktaş had fallen ill, had been taken to hospital and had died there. Accordingly, he denied the charge against him. His counsel added that it appeared from the report of the autopsy and the report issued by the Institute of Forensic Medicine that the exact cause of Yakup Aktaş's death could not be established. In spite of this the Council of State had decided that the defendants should stand trial. However, his client had not had anything to do with the offence with which he had been charged. (m) Statement taken from Public Prosecutor Şevki Artar by the Buldan Assize Court on 16 September 1993 pursuant to a rogatory letter 147. The statement was requested by the Mardin Assize Court in its rogatory letter of 12 July 1993. Public Prosecutor Şevki Artar stated that the public prosecutor's office had been informed that a person detained at the investigation and interrogation unit of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie had fallen ill and died as he was being transported to hospital. Together with Public Prosecutor Ekrem Şendoğan he had gone to the Mardin State Hospital where he had attended the autopsy that had been performed by medical experts. He confirmed the content of the relevant report. As was mentioned in that report, during the external examination of the deceased, bruising, possibly resulting from trauma, had been observed on the right arm, on the inside of the right arm and near the right wrist. Other than the marks indicated in the report, they had not observed any other signs which could be attributed to torture. (n) Judgment of the Mardin Assize Court dated 11 May 1994 148. The judgment stated that evidence had been taken from the following persons: Master Sergeants Yusuf Karakoç, Mustafa Ten, Süleyman Altuner, Murat Gömek, Ramazan Baygeldi and Üzeyir Nazlım; Lance Corporals Ali Yavaş, Ferruh Çileşoğlu, Mehmet Yılmaz and Mustafa Tüylek; Private Hüseyin Bekir Günel; Police Constable Alaattin Aydın; Captain Mehmet Göçmen; Colonel Enver Uysal; Private İbrahim Olgun; Senior Major Haşim Üstünel; and Corporal Hüseyin Hamamcıoğlu. All these witnesses had testified that the deceased had been detained in order to be interrogated, that the military doctor looked after detainees on a daily basis and that detainees were referred to hospital if they were ill, and that they had never seen any detainees being ill-treated. 149. The Mardin Assize Court referred to the finding of the post-mortem examination that Yakup Aktaş presented cyanosis covering the head and various superficial ecchymotic areas on the head, both arms and the back. Reference was further made to the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine which concluded that it was not possible to determine the exact cause of death. 150. The defendants were acquitted since it had not been possible to obtain wholly incontrovertible evidence that would allow the court conscionably to decide that the defendants had caused death by torture. (o) Medical and expert reports concerning Yakup Aktaş i. Extracts from the register of the Derik Health Clinic 151. The name Yakup Aktaş and the comment “urethritis” are included in the entries for 22 March and 2 October 1990 as nos. 4,489 and 13,452 respectively. ii. Medical report dated 18 November 1990 issued by Dr Adnan Parkan at the Derik Health Clinic 152. This report states that Yakup Aktaş had been brought to the health clinic and that on examination had not presented any signs of beating, or of being subjected to force or violence. iii. Report of the post-mortem examination and autopsy dated 26 November 1990 153. This report states that following information received by telephone at 8.30 p.m. on 25 November 1990 to the effect that an individual had died whilst being taken to Mardin State Hospital after being taken suddenly ill at the investigation and interrogation unit at the Mardin provincial gendarmerie headquarters, the chief public prosecutor had, in view of the seriousness of the incident, instructed Public Prosecutors Şevki Artar and Ekrem Şendoğan to go to the hospital where they arrived at 10 p.m. An expert medical witness, Dr Güneş Pay, was present and, again owing to the seriousness of the matter, a second expert medical witness, Dr Erol Aksaz, was immediately appointed. 154. The body was identified as being that of Yakup Aktaş by Captain Mehmet Göçmen, commander of the Mardin provincial central gendarmerie. Captain Göçmen stated that Yakup Aktaş had been detained on suspicion of involvement with the PKK. Captain Göçmen had been informed that Yakup Aktaş had suddenly fallen ill at approximately 7.30 p.m. and had been taken to the Mardin State Hospital, where he died. 155. Subsequently, the clothes were removed from the body and a photographer brought in from gendarmerie headquarters took a number of photographs from various angles. 156. On external examination of the body the head was observed to be covered with a mask-like mauve discoloration (cyanosis) starting from the upper section of the thorax, 15 cm below the jaw towards the thorax, and covering the complete surface of the neck including the ears and the back of the neck. The head was examined manually and the bone structure was observed to be intact. In the frontal section of the forehead, 3 cm above the middle of the left eye‑brow, was a one- or two-day-old graze measuring 1 x 0,5 cm consistent with trauma. The examination of the neck revealed normal articulation with no breakage or pathological disorder. 157. On the outer section of the left arm humerus and parallel to the axis of the body an area of ecchymosis measuring 10 x 2 cm consistent with blunt trauma was observed. The left forearm and hand, including the fingers, were covered with extensive ecchymoses. On the outer section of the upper right arm humerus and parallel to the axis of the body was an area of ecchymosis measuring 4 x 1 cm consistent with trauma; 5 cm below this was another area of ecchymosis 4 x 2 cm in size. Under the right armpit and starting near the back was a clean cut, 8 cm in length and 3 cm in width, perpendicular to the axis of the body and trailing towards the middle of the armpit. There was a further ecchymotic area on the right forearm near the wrist. One half of the outer surface of the left foot was covered with a widespread ecchymotic area. The soles of the feet were covered with dirt and calluses. The manual examination of the back revealed an 8 cm long scar, seven to eight days old, in the shape of a half moon on the right shoulder blade. Rigor mortis had started to develop. With the exception of the findings stated above, there were no other pathological diagnoses or signs of injuries caused by sharp, pointed instruments, firearms or otherwise. 158. On the basis of these findings the doctors observed that the cyanosis covering the head could be consistent with a heart attack or with another incident occurring either before or after death. The findings of the external examination, none of which were by themselves capable of causing death, did not allow the exact cause of death to be established. For this reason it was decided to perform a full autopsy. The expert medical witnesses estimated that death had occurred three to four hours previously. 159. On the subsequent internal examination of the head, the thorax and the abdomen no abnormalities were observed. The urethra was found to be positioned normally and no pathological finding was made in this respect. In view of the failure to establish the exact cause of death, it was decided to send tissue samples from the body to the Institute of Forensic Medicine in order for the exact cause of death to be determined. Sections from both lobes of the brain, the whole heart, sections from both lungs, sections from the liver and spleen, the whole of the stomach and its contents, a section of the intestine and its contents, sections from both kidneys and a blood sample were taken, placed in glass containers with a formaldehyde solution and sealed. 160. The time indicated at the bottom of the report is 2.50 a.m. It is signed, inter alia, by both public prosecutors and both doctors. iv. Report dated 21 February 1991 issued by the Institute of Forensic Medicine 161. This report, signed by Professor Dr Özdemir Kolusayın and Dr Hüseyin Sarı, refers to the letter of the Mardin public prosecutor dated 29 November 1990 in which it is requested that the exact cause of death be established. There then follows a summary of the report of the post‑mortem examination and autopsy (see paragraphs 153-160 above). 162. In the macroscopic examination of the internal organs, performed at the morgue specialist department of the Institute of Forensic Medicine, the heart was found to weigh 400 grams, no peculiarities were observed in the samples other than hyperaemia, and the lungs were found to be of a hard and solid consistency and of a multicoloured appearance. 163. The report issued by the specialist chemical analyses office dated 28 December 1990 stated that no alcohol, tranquillisers, stimulants or toxic materials had been found in the internal organs. 164. According to the histopathological report dated 12 February 1991 there had been post-mortem changes to the heart, liver, kidneys and brain; hyperaemia and acute swelling were observed in the lungs; the septal capillaries were full of red blood cells; the alveolar septa were torn in places and the alveolar cavities had expanded. v. Report of Dr Christopher Mark Milroy dated 3 April 1995 165. This report was commissioned by the applicant and submitted on 2 May 1995. Dr Milroy was a registered medical practitioner, Senior Lecturer in Forensic Pathology at the University of Sheffield, United Kingdom, and Consultant Pathologist to the British Home Office. 166. On the basis of the report of the post-mortem examination and autopsy and the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine Dr Milroy concluded that no natural disease had been found to contribute to or account for death. The body had shown injuries to the arms and foot which were in keeping with blows to those areas. The extensive bruising of the left forearm could have been due to the deceased having used his arms to try and ward off blows. The injuries in these areas were referred to as defence injuries which typically involved the forearm and hands. They might also involve the feet if the feet were used to shield blows. The cut to the right arm suggested that it had been inflicted with a sharp implement such as a knife. 167. The injuries appeared to have been inflicted whilst the deceased was in custody. The scar described as being seven to eight days old could have been inflicted during custody. Given that dating of scars was not accurate this injury could have been more recent. 168. In the absence of any natural disease process to cause death and with the presence of obvious injuries which were not self-inflicted, the possibility that the deceased was a victim of an unnatural disease process had to be seriously considered. Poisoning as a cause of death could be excluded from the toxicological examination performed. However, there were a number of possible mechanisms to account for the appearances. The first of these was traumatic or crush asphyxia. In this type of death the chest was pinioned in such a way as to prevent breathing. Crucifixion caused death in a similar manner, as did so-called Palestinian hanging where the hands were tied behind the back and the body was suspended from the tied arms which would cause respiratory failure if the position was held for a sufficient length of time. The second possible mechanism was the placing of a plastic bag over the face or head, which was well recognised to lead to death. This would not leave any specific external signs. Finally, in a choke hold or carotid sleeper an arm was held across the neck. In choke holding it was held across the front of the neck, frequently damaging the structures in the neck, particularly the laryngeal cartilages. With carotid sleeper a similar hold was placed, but with the neck being held in the crook of the arm so that the carotid arteries were occluded. Application of either hold could prove fatal. 169. Dr Milroy did not accept that Yakup Aktaş had died as a result of a heart attack. In every death the heart would stop, but this was a mode of death and not a cause of death. Moreover, neither in the autopsy nor in the microscopic (histopathological) examination had any heart disease been found. In the absence of natural disease and with clear injuries present on the deceased, death as a result of torture must be a very strong possibility in this case. 170. In respect of the autopsy Dr Milroy remarked that it was not clear to what extent the physicians performing it had had training and experience in forensic pathology. The autopsy report did not appear to contain a detailed description of the internal appearance of the neck. This was a major omission in detailing a death in custody, especially in view of the description of cyanosis of the head and neck. Moreover, injuries in persons having died whilst in custody should be documented and photographed and unlawful methods of killing had to be considered. It was not clear that such a thorough investigation had been conducted in this case. The inability of the doctors performing the autopsy to conduct a microscopic examination, which was an integral part of any post-mortem examination, suggested that they may have lacked the necessary experience to have conducted this examination. (p) Photographs 171. The photographs show the naked body of a man laid down on what is, presumably, a mortuary slab. The colour reproduction in particular is of poor quality, tingeing everything with a green hue. The first photograph shows part of the chest as well as the left side of the face. A mark is visible on the forehead, between the left eyebrow and the hairline. Cyanosis in the shape of a mask cannot be observed but the left ear appears bluish. 172. In the second photograph, the body lies on its left side and the back of the body is portrayed. It is not possible to see the whole of the right shoulder blade. No half-moon shaped scar is visible. The third and fourth photographs show the body lying on its back. For the third photograph, the photographer would have stood near the feet of the body; the feet are not visible and of the head only the tip of the nose and the bearded chin can be observed. There appears to be a reddish area of discoloration on the left forearm. For the fourth photograph, the photographer would have stood to the right of the body near the knees. The right side of the face, part of the neck and chest, the right arm, a small part of the left forearm, and the rest of the body down to almost the top of the knees can be seen. No cyanosis is visible. On the outside of the right arm there appears to be a welt-like reddish mark stretching down from the middle of the shoulder to halfway to the elbow. The reddish area of discoloration on the left forearm can also be observed in this photograph. 173. The evidence of the six witnesses heard by the Commission's Delegates may be summarised as follows: i. The applicant 174. The applicant stated that he had been born in 1970 and was a lawyer by profession. Apart from Yakup, he had seven other brothers and sisters. He was the second youngest. 175. The last time he had seen his brother Yakup had been one week prior to the latter being taken into custody. Yakup had seemed to be in good health and had in fact never had an illness. He had not heard of an illness called urethritis. 176. He had been in Diyarbakır, where he was studying, when his elder brother had informed him of the fact that Yakup had been taken into custody. He had immediately returned to Derik and had arrived home on the same day as Yakup had been apprehended. 177. Yakup had been a tradesman and a delegate of the True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, “DYP”). He had never been arrested before. 178. The applicant had not seen Yakup in detention. During interrogation a detainee was not allowed any visitors for seven days. The family had gone to Mardin to try and see Yakup many times but had not been allowed to do so. He had gone to the public prosecutor's office in Mardin but this had not resulted in permission being granted to the family to see Yakup and neither had any information of the charges brought against Yakup been forthcoming. Members of the DYP had tried to intercede, but to no avail. At the Derik gendarmerie station the family had been told not to worry as Yakup would be released. 179. A week after Yakup's arrest, his uncle Süleyman had been contacted by the Derik gendarmerie station with the news that Yakup's body could be collected from Mardin. The family had brought the body home on 26 November 1990 and this was where he had seen the body. He had noticed that certain parts had been removed for the autopsy, including parts of the brain. Apart from the scars caused by that, he had seen the mark of an injury on Yakup's forehead. In his opinion this injury had been caused by a blow, as it did not have the appearance of a boil or of an injury that might have come about as a result of scratching, for example. There had also been marks on the hands, under the soles of the feet and on the elbows. 180. Later that day he had gone to the public prosecutor in Derik stating that Yakup's was no normal death. Although at that time he was not familiar with the content of the health report drawn up by Dr Parkan (see paragraph 152 above), he knew that every person taken into custody would first be taken to the health centre for an examination. He did not know what kind of tests this examination entailed. When Yakup's body had been released to his uncle Süleyman, officials had said that Yakup had died of a heart attack. The family had not believed this and he had therefore requested another autopsy. Asked why he had not told the prosecutor of the wounds he had seen on Yakup's body, he said that this must have been because he had been in shock but also because the prosecutor had not asked him about it. Nevertheless, he had clearly stated that Yakup's death had been brought about by torture. He had read and signed the record of his statement to the prosecutor. 181. Yakup's body had remained at the house for one night and the burial had taken place the next day. He conceded that the text of his statement to the HRA (see paragraphs 52-54 above), which he had drawn up himself, was somewhat ambiguous. His family had not been prevented from burying Yakup but pressure had been brought to bear on them to hold the funeral on the same day the body was delivered to the family, that is to say 26 November 1990. This had been because the authorities feared trouble. However, the family and the district chairman of the DYP had pleaded with the chief superintendent of police to be allowed to hold the funeral the next day so that the body could be kept at home for one night in accordance with local custom. There had been security forces all over Derik until the body had been buried. Neither a delegation of the HRA nor the press had been allowed to attend the funeral. 182. Major Dursun Şeker, who had been appointed investigator by the Emergency Region Governor, had summoned his mother, his brother Mahmut and himself to Derik police station on 14 March 1991 to take statements from them. Although as an investigator Major Şeker was supposed to put questions objectively, the interview had not been conducted in such a manner at all. He felt that Major Şeker's questions had been designed to protect Major Şeker's own personnel and to cover up the incident. He felt that psychological pressure had been brought to bear on him. For instance, Major Şeker had asked questions like, “Why are you making a complaint? Why do you not believe that your brother died of a heart attack? Why do you not believe that the cause of death is not torture?” Major Şeker had further commented: “There is no need for you to complain. We would not do such a thing”; and also: “It is wrong for you to think like that about security forces personnel. The allegations of torture are wrong.” 183. Major Şeker had not asked him whether he had seen Yakup's body or what its condition was, but both his mother, his brother Mahmut and himself had told Major Şeker that Yakup's death was a result of torture. It had been his brother Mahmut who had told Major Şeker that Yakup had had a small pustule on his penis for which he had received medical treatment, as the applicant had not been aware of this previously. When the record of his statement to Major Şeker (see paragraphs 66-69 above) was put to him, he denied having said to Major Şeker: “If death has occurred because of natural causes, it is God's will”. Yakup had been a very healthy man who would not have died of natural causes within a week and it was therefore not possible that he would have described Yakup's death as God's will. Moreover, why would he have said such a thing when only two months prior to that he had complained to the public prosecutor of torture? Therefore, the record of his statement to Major Şeker was not completely accurate. He had been told to sign the record and had not read it. 184. Subsequently, the Provincial Administrative Council had decided that no prosecution was to be instituted. That decision had been overturned by the Council of State which had referred the case to the Mardin Assize Court. Although according to the law that court had jurisdiction ratione materiae as well as ratione loci, it had declined to exercise it, for the sole purpose of delaying the proceedings. Following a decision by the Ankara Assize Court that it had no jurisdiction either, the Court of Cassation had decided that it was the Mardin Assize Court which was the competent court to deal with the case. However, in the meantime two years had passed. 185. He had been an intervening party in the criminal proceedings and had attended many hearings. He characterised the trial as disorganised and said that the case had not been actively prosecuted. It was his opinion that the two accused ought to have been in custody while the trial was proceeding but the public prosecutor had told the court that it was not necessary to arrest the two men. In fact, the accused had not attended court even once to give evidence and on some occasions their counsel had also failed to attend. Most of the witnesses had moved to different places and their testimonies had not been obtained. In spite of all the available evidence the two accused had been acquitted. 186. It was put to him that, despite his objections voiced to the Derik public prosecutor on 26 November 1990, he had told the Mardin Assize Court on 7 July 1993 that he had nothing to say about the autopsy report or the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine. He explained that although the report of the Institute of Forensic Medicine had not satisfied him, as he had also pointed out to the Assize Court, according to the law there was no organisation above the Institute of Forensic Medicine. Furthermore, by that time three years had passed and his family had not wanted another autopsy carried out. ii. Mahmut Aktaş 187. As reported by the Commission, several times during his testimony this witness became very emotional and cried. 188. Mr Mahmut Aktaş said that he had been born in 1963. He was an elder brother of the applicant and Yakup Aktaş. At the relevant time, Yakup had been married and had a six-month-old baby. Yakup's widow and child continued to live with him. Following the death of their father in 1987 Yakup and himself had become the heads of the family, looking after the younger brothers and sisters who were still at school. They had lived in the same house. He had been very close to Yakup. They had both been traders and every day they used to go together to the marketplace, where they both had business premises. They had both enjoyed the sport of wrestling and would frequently wrestle together of an evening. Although he was older than Yakup, Yakup had been the stronger. 189. He had last seen Yakup alive on the morning after his arrest. Yakup had been held overnight at the Derik gendarmerie. He had gone there and had found Yakup sitting in the canteen. He had observed Yakup to be in good condition. He had brought Yakup breakfast but because Yakup had been handcuffed he had only given him a glass of milk. Yakup did not know why he had been arrested. He had asked Yakup whether the gendarmes had done anything to him, which Yakup had denied. Then a gendarme had taken Yakup out of the canteen and half an hour later he had observed Yakup being put in a vehicle and driven away. 190. Like Yakup, he was also a delegate of the DYP. He had gone to see the district chairman of the DYP who had found out from the gendarmerie that Yakup had been taken to Mardin. Although the family had attempted to gain access to Yakup this had been refused. 191. At 6 a.m. on Monday 26 November 1990 – although he said 25 November 1990, the Commission considered that this was a mistake since 25 November 1990 was a Sunday – Mr Mahmut Aktaş had gone to the Provincial Governor's office in Mardin, thinking that would be a likely day for detainees to be brought before the court and hoping that he would be able to see Yakup if that happened. Around midday he had been approached by an acquaintance from Derik who had told him that Yakup had died and his body taken to Derik. 192. He had subsequently learned that at around 7 a.m. the gendarmes had come looking for him. As they had not found him at home, they had gone to his uncle Süleyman who had been taken to Mardin State Hospital. At the entrance to the hospital his uncle had been met by the captain of the gendarmerie who had asked what relation Süleyman was to Yakup. When Süleyman said that Yakup was his elder brother's son, the captain had extended his hand and had said, “Please accept my condolences. Yakup died yesterday evening.” Upon this, his uncle had made telephone calls to Derik and all the relatives and many acquaintances had immediately rushed to Mardin: almost half the population of Derik had gone there, including fellow shopkeepers who had closed their shops. In view of the large number of cars, the security forces had brought the body back to Derik under military escort. 193. When Yakup's body had arrived home the chief superintendent of police had demanded that it be buried immediately. Since he had not yet returned from Mardin, his brother had refused. Upon his return in the evening they had pleaded with the chief superintendent, saying that there was not enough light left to arrange a funeral that night. 194. Yakup's body had been laid out in the house. He and the imam had washed the body. Yakup's forehead, above the left eye, had sunk in and appeared as if it had been hit with a piece of metal. The shoulders were bruised and had turned purple and black. On the right hand side of the lower back there had been a mark in the shape of a six-day-old new moon. There had been red and black bruising on the arms and on the back of the legs, from the calves down to the lower legs. There had been blood coming from the tip of a toe. The left hand side of Yakup's face was all bruised. 195. He had not accompanied his younger brother to the public prosecutor but another brother had done so. He had stayed behind to receive the people coming to express their condolences. 196. There had been no problem with Yakup's health or strength. On the day of his arrest, Yakup had been cutting firewood. 197. In March 1991 the witness had been summoned to the police station, together with his mother and brother Eshat. There, Major Dursun Şeker had not asked about the injuries he had seen on Yakup's body but only if Yakup had had an illness. The witness had replied that he had not and had in fact been stronger than he was. Major Şeker had said that Yakup had visited the health centre in relation to a urinary problem. He had said to Major Şeker that this might have been the case. He had also told Major Şeker that Yakup had been murdered by torture and that he wanted the perpetrators prosecuted. The witness said to the Delegates that even if Yakup had gone to the doctor's with a urinary problem this had not been around the time of his arrest. 198. He denied having said to Major Şeker that if Yakup's death was the result of natural causes this would have been God's will. He had not dared or considered reading the record of his statement when Major Şeker had given it to him to sign. iii. Public Prosecutor Şevki Artar 199. Public Prosecutor Şevki Artar stated that he was born in 1961. In November 1990 he had been working as public prosecutor in Mardin. He had left Mardin in 1991. 200. He remembered having attended the post-mortem examination and autopsy that had been performed on Yakup Aktaş's body on 25 November 1990, although he had no clear recollection of the details. He had been telephoned at home by the gendarmerie and been informed that a person had become ill while in custody and had died on the way to hospital. 201. In view of the importance of the incident he had contacted the chief public prosecutor who had instructed him to have a second public prosecutor attend the autopsy also. The seriousness of the incident, referred to in the beginning of the report of the post-mortem examination and autopsy (see paragraph 153 above), had lain in the fact that a person had died while in the custody of the security forces and also in the fact that this kind of incident could cause speculation. He illustrated this by relating how previously there had been speculation that terrorists who had surrendered to the authorities had been killed by the security forces when they had in fact been killed by other terrorists. Moreover, there had been allegations to the effect that when an autopsy report was drawn up by a public prosecutor, only some of the findings would be listed and certain matters would be omitted altogether. If two prosecutors attended, they could act as witnesses for each other if the need arose. 202. The four photographs submitted by the Government (see paragraphs 171-172 above) were shown to him and he was reasonably certain that the body depicted in the photographs was that of the man on which he had performed the post-mortem examination on 25 November 1990. They had been taken by the photographer of the Mardin provincial gendarmerie. The negatives would usually be kept at the offices of the photographer's employer. 203. In a post-mortem examination it was the public prosecutor who would dictate the findings, drawing on the expertise of the doctor present. However, an autopsy would be performed by a doctor. In the present case, it had not been possible to determine the exact cause of death from the post-mortem examination, although the doctors had suggested at the end of the examination that the death could have resulted from a heart attack. For this reason it had been decided that a full autopsy should be performed. As the exact cause of death had not appeared from the autopsy either, a joint decision had been taken to send tissue samples from the body to the Institute of Forensic Medicine. 204. Although they had been able to observe in the process of the autopsy that the heart had been of normal appearance, he did not know whether this meant that cardiac failure had been ruled out. He did not agree with the suggestion that by the end of the autopsy the doctors and he himself would have had good grounds for suspecting that death had been caused by beating. On the contrary, the doctors had determined during the post-mortem examination that the injuries observed on the body could not have constituted the cause of death. 205. He was not aware that the form of torture known as “Palestinian hanging” could lead to death by asphyxiation. As he had never heard of this form of torture, he did not know whether Yakup Aktaş's injuries were consistent with somebody having been subjected to such treatment. 206. If, in the course of the post-mortem examination, any opinion, provisional or otherwise, had been expressed as to the possible cause of the blunt traumata with which some of the observed areas of ecchymosis were consistent, this would have been recorded in the report. Given that such traumata could have many different causes he did not think it likely that the doctors would have been able to determine their exact cause from a post-mortem examination. Forensic experts might be able to establish the exact cause, and this might also be determined in a subsequent judicial investigation. Asked whether it had not occurred to him to enquire of the doctors whether the marks on the body were consistent with ill-treatment while in custody, he said that they had probably assumed that this would be determined by the subsequent investigation. 207. When asked whether it would not have been extremely important to find out immediately whether or not there had been any instrument or object present in the place of detention capable of having produced the injuries found on the body, he said that the cause of those injuries had not yet been established. In reply to the subsequent question whether a search for an object capable of producing such injuries was not precisely how the cause of the injuries might be established, he conceded that this was probably the case. Given that he had had no jurisdiction in the matter, however, he had not given an instruction for the interrogation rooms at Mardin provincial gendarmerie headquarters to be inspected. In any event, it had been established that these injuries were not the cause of death. 208. He had attended the post-mortem examination and the autopsy in his capacity of public prosecutor because time had been of the essence. However, pursuant to Article 4 § 1 of Decree no. 285 establishing a state of emergency regional governorate it was not him but the Mardin Provincial Administrative Council which was the competent authority to investigate the incident. He was familiar with the fact that one of Yakup Aktaş's brothers had lodged a complaint with the Derik Public Prosecutor's Office. The complaint had been transferred to him because the Derik Public Prosecutor had no jurisdiction in the matter. However, the incident would have been investigated regardless of whether or not a complaint had been brought. 209. On 29 November 1990 he had issued a decision of lack of jurisdiction in which he confirmed that the Mardin Public Prosecutor's Office had no jurisdiction. He had transferred the file to the Mardin Provincial Administrative Council. In his opinion, the most important part of the investigation had already been carried out by that stage, namely the examinations to establish the exact cause of death. After that, the only thing left to do was to take statements from witnesses and suspects. 210. In its investigation, the provincial administrative council had the same powers as a public prosecutor. He did not know at what stage the Mardin Provincial Administrative Council had been alerted to the incident – it might have been informed at the same time as he. In proceedings before the provincial administrative council an investigator would be appointed who was responsible for the collection of evidence. He thought that in a case like the present the investigator would not be a member of the gendarmerie in view of the fact that the case involved the gendarmerie. 211. He had only found out that a criminal prosecution had been instituted when he had been asked to testify by a rogatory letter at his new post in Buldan. The Mardin Assize Court had requested the Court in Buldan to take his statement in order to check the accuracy of the autopsy report and to confirm his signature. iv. Professor Dr Özdemir Kolusayın 212. Professor Dr Kolusayın had been an expert in forensic medicine since 1977. He was not a pathologist. He had become a professor in 1988. From 1975 until 1982 he had worked at the morgue specialist department of the Institute of Forensic Medicine, performing autopsies in an expert capacity . From 1982 until 1992, and therefore at the time relevant to the present case, he had been the administrator of the morgue specialist department. From 1992 until 1996 he was President of the Institute of Forensic Medicine (“the Institute”). 213. The witness was asked to explain certain parts of the report issued by the Institute on 20 February 1991 which bore his signature. He confirmed that the findings of the post-mortem examination and autopsy performed in Mardin had been set out at the beginning of that report. 214. In relation to the findings of the post-mortem examination he explained that a “mauve coloured cyanosis” was a dark blue discoloration of the skin. “Thorax” meant chest. An ecchymotic area referred to bruising, ecchymoses constituting the proof of a blunt trauma. The axis of the body was the vertical line that passed through the centre of the body. The humerus was the bone of the upper arm. 215. The hyperaemia, observed in the macroscopic examination of the tissue samples of the internal organs, referred to the appearance of the organs which contained more than the normal amount of blood. This in itself could have many causes, such as illness or poisoning. 216. After the macroscopic examination the samples had been prepared for microscopic examination and sent to a pathologist. The changes to the heart, liver, kidneys and brain that had occurred after death had been observed in this histopathological examination. It had further revealed hyperaemia in the lungs as well as acute swelling, meaning expansion, of the alveoli in particular. In the alveolar septa, that is the walls separating the alveoli, the capillary walls had been enlarged and had contained great quantities of red blood cells. In some places the alveolar septa had been ruptured, causing the alveolar cavities to enlarge. These were not changes that would occur after death. The rupturing of alveolar septa could occur in patients suffering from emphysema or chronically obstructed lungs, but also in persons who had met with a violent death or, as it was known in forensic medicine, a forcibly induced death such as strangulation, hanging or pressure exerted on abdomen or chest. However, in the case of a forcibly induced death one would expect to see red blood cells in the alveolar cavities in addition to tears in the septa, and this had not been observed. 217. The report did not admit of a conclusion as to whether the swelling of the lungs had been due to a disease or had occurred after death. Given that it was limited to the breakdown at cell level it could have been caused by cells decomposing. The fact that the lungs were of a hard and solid consistency had pointed to pneumonia but the histopathological examination had not revealed any infected cells which would have supported such a finding. Despite the fact that the heart at 400 grams had been observed to have been abnormally enlarged, the death had not been attributed to a disease. 218. The public prosecutor at Mardin had requested that the exact cause of death be established. As the findings of the examinations had not revealed very specific information it had not been possible to determine the exact cause. Even in the most advanced centres of forensic medicine approximately 5% of autopsies were inconclusive. Prior to 1990 they would have referred the question of the cause of death to the First Specialist Committee of the Institute if they themselves had been unable to establish the cause of death. However, the policy had been changed and they had been advised that as long as the public prosecutor did not request it, they should not send their reports to this Committee but rather evaluate their own findings and send them to the office of the public prosecutor. If the public prosecutor had only asked for the cause of death, as opposed to the exact cause, the Institute would have provided him with possible causes. In view of the breakdown in the heart and the septa, the witness suggested that death had possibly, but without certainty, been due to heart failure. 219. Furthermore, the Institute could only work on the basis of the information with which it was provided. In the present case, they had been told that Yakup Aktaş had suddenly fallen ill while in detention and had died in hospital. If death had occurred at the place of detention its cause might have been tied to mechanical asphyxia. Mechanical asphyxia was death caused by prevention of breathing by mechanical pressure. Typical examples would be hanging, strangulation by hand or rope, and death caused by pressure on the abdomen/chest. In the latter form of asphyxiation cyanosis of the face, resembling a mask, could appear. 220. When it was pointed out to the witness that according to the report of the post-mortem examination and autopsy Yakup Aktaş had died on the way to hospital (see paragraph 153 above) rather than at the hospital as mentioned in his report, he explained that he must have relied on the information contained in the official summary of the incident compiled by the public prosecutor which would have been attached to the autopsy report when it was sent to the Institute. 221. The marks observed on the body were not from the kind of violent trauma that could cause death. The signs of trauma described in the report were superficial: a skin abrasion on the forehead, ecchymoses on the arms. In the case of severe trauma the ecchymoses would not have been on the surface and there would have been broken bones and internal haemorrhaging. 222. Asked whether the extensive bruising on the left forearm and the hands were consistent with Yakup Aktaş having used his arms to try and prevent blows from striking the rest of his body, the witness said if the bruising had been caused by numerous blows he would have expected there to be spaces between the ecchymoses. He explained that blows delivered by a cane or a stick would result in ecchymoses in the shape of lines, and in the shape of railroad tracks if delivered by a truncheon. 223. The cut described in the report of the post-mortem examination would have been inflicted by an implement with cutting properties. In his estimation, the cut must have been inflicted less than seven or eight days previously, since it should have healed within seven days. 224. When the report was drawn up he had not had access to the photographs taken in Mardin; otherwise they would have been mentioned. On being shown the photographs, the witness remarked that the cyanosis described in the report of the post-mortem examination was not visible. In addition, in deaths caused by heart or lung failure the cyanosis might not be as large as a mask but would be visible on the ears and lips. On the body in the photographs the lips were pale. Also, some of the ecchymoses described in the post-examination report were visible, but not all. 225. Since there was no visible deformation of the head the skull did not appear crushed as alleged by the applicant in his statement to the HRA (see paragraph 54 above). Nevertheless, it would have been possible for the applicant to think that the skull had been fractured if he had seen the body after the autopsy, during which the bony part of the skull had been removed. 226. He confirmed that in every forensic autopsy the neck should be examined internally. v. Dr Hüseyin Sarı 227. Dr Hüseyin Sarı stated that he had been born in 1960. At the beginning of 1991 he had been working as an expert of forensic medicine at the morgue specialist department of the Institute of Forensic Medicine. 228. At the morgue specialist department two types of work were carried out: autopsies, and examination of internal organ samples sent to the department from elsewhere. In the course of autopsies performed by the department photographs would be taken. No general guidelines existed as to how such photographs should be taken; whether, for example, maximum contrast should be shown to delimit areas of discoloration. Those photographs that were considered necessary as evidence later on would be taken. However, it was rare for internal organ samples to be accompanied by photographs. 229. He confirmed that in the present case the Mardin public prosecutor had requested the exact cause of death to be established. However, it was not the case that a public prosecutor would ever ask for a possible or probable cause of death. Therefore, he would have to be certain of the cause of death before offering his opinion. According to international medical literature between 2% and 8% of autopsies were inconclusive. He estimated that the percentage of inconclusive autopsies at the Institute would lie somewhere between those two figures. 230. He described cyanosis as a lesion related to an increased amount of carbon dioxide in the blood. It could only be observed visually and could not be detected by examining samples of skin tissue. Cyanosis did not only occur after death, but in cases where it had occurred before death it had to be clinically verified since the changes of gases which took place after death could result in erroneous positive findings. Therefore, a post-mortem evaluation alone did not always give the correct result and could give rise to the suspicion that the deceased had been suffering from a disease or that death had been caused by asphyxiation. 231. Asked if there was a disease which could cause the lungs to be of a hard and solid consistency and of a multicoloured appearance, as described in the Institute's report, he said that these findings had been made in the macroscopic examination and pointed to lung oedema or pneumonia. A histopathological examination was required to distinguish oedema from pneumonia. In the present case, the histopathological examination had not revealed anything to support those findings. In any event, the fixative used to prevent the disintegration of the internal organs would lead to a hardening of those organs. 232. Although there had thus been no findings made of a disease this did not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the cause of death had been unnatural. For example, the heart, liver, kidneys and brain had undergone post-mortem changes and had not been evaluated. Post-mortem changes occurred for two reasons: one being the time that had elapsed between the death and the autopsy and the other a mishap in the course of transportation of the tissue samples. If the proper fixative was used and proper transportation procedures followed, such a sample would not undergo any change. 233. The marks of the traumata described in the report of the post-mortem examination had been rather small and simple, and most of them had been located on the arms and legs. In his opinion, the cause of death could not be determined from those traumata alone. 235. Dr Güneş Pay said that he had been born in 1967. He had graduated from medical school in August 1990. As part of his medical training he had had one or two months' training in forensic medicine. Only those students wanting to specialise in forensic medicine would be given extensive training. In November 1990 he had been working as a general practitioner at the Mardin State Hospital. 236. The witness confirmed that he had participated in the post-mortem examination and autopsy on the body of Yakup Aktaş and that he had signed the report dated 26 November 1990. Dr Aksaz, with whom he had performed the autopsy, was a surgeon. Since the autopsy had been performed seven years previously he had no clear recollection of the events and based his replies mainly on the content of his report. Moreover, at the present time he was specialising in neurology, not forensic medicine, and it had been years since he had last performed an autopsy. 237. Although he could not remember exactly, he assumed that he must have participated in other autopsies before the one which he performed on the body of Yakup Aktaş. This would be part of a general practitioner's duty if there was no expert in forensic medicine at the place where the general practitioner was performing his obligatory service. While working in Mardin for nearly one year he had performed many autopsies. 238. He was referred to the phrase in the report reading: “With the exception of the findings stated above, there were no other pathological diagnoses or signs of injuries caused by sharp, pointed instruments, firearms or otherwise.” He explained that this did not mean that in those “findings stated above” he had found marks of such instruments. 239. The fact that rigor mortis had begun to set in was one of the reasons why death had been estimated to have occurred three or four hours earlier. However, the purple colour of the corpse had also served as an indication of that. He confirmed that if a person died in hospital, and if it was a properly run hospital, the time of death would be recorded and it would not be necessary to give an estimate of this time in the subsequent examination. 240. He could not remember whether or not an internal examination of the neck had been carried out but he noted that nothing was mentioned about it in the report. He thought that if such an examination had been performed it would have been recorded, but it was also possible that if nothing unusual had been found in the course of that examination it had been omitted from the report altogether. He knew that in theory an internal examination of the neck area would be conducted in cases of death by hanging or by strangulation by hand or by rope. He did not think, however, that he had performed an autopsy on the body of a person having met with such a death. 241. As the autopsy had taken place such a long time ago he was unable to confirm that the photographs shown to him were of the person on whom he had performed the autopsy. The cyanosis described in the report was not visible in the photographs. Nevertheless, he was certain that there had been cyanosis as two doctors had come to that conclusion and had recorded it in the report. All but two of the marks visible on the body in the photographs corresponded with those recorded in the report. The cut, 8 cm in length, was not visible in the photographs and neither was the lesion above the scapula. Perhaps this was due to the quality of the photographs. 242. He had not formed any provisional view as to a likely or possible cause of death in the light of the marks he had seen. (b) Witnesses who did not appear 243. The Commission's Delegates had also called as a witness Süleyman Aktaş, the uncle of the applicant and the person to whom Yakup Aktaş's body had been delivered. During the hearing, the applicant's representatives informed the Delegates that Süleyman Aktaş was too old and frail to travel to Ankara. 244. Dr Erol Aksaz, the second doctor who had performed the autopsy, did not attend the hearing as, according to the explanation given by the Acting Agent of the Government at the hearing, it was not possible for him to leave his post, no replacement being available. On 23 December 1997 the Government provided the Commission with a doctor's note dated 21 November 1997 prescribing Dr Erol Aksaz three days' rest. 245. On 18 and 19 November 1997 the Acting Agent informed the Commission's Delegates that the following members of the gendarmerie would only give evidence if certain security measures were put in place: 246. In that connection, the Acting Agent submitted that most of these gendarmes were constantly exposed to terrorist attacks and would only feel secure if they were able to avoid confrontation with the applicant or his relatives and if a screen were placed between them and the applicant's representatives. 248. Following the hearing in Ankara, the Government requested that five members of the gendarmerie (Senior Major Üstünel, Master Sergeants Günay and Karakoç, Senior Sergeant Keskin and Sergeant Major Yavaş) be given the opportunity to give evidence. They insisted that these witnesses should not be seen either by the applicant or by his representatives and that the hearing should therefore take place in the absence of both.

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5. The applicant was born in 1942 and lives in Závadka nad Hronom. 6. On 27 September 1994 the applicant claimed a sum of money from an insurance company before the Banská Bystrica District Court. 7. On 17 May 1995 the District Court transferred the case to the Banská Bystrica Regional Court for reasons of jurisdiction. 8. On 23 July 1997 the vice-president of the Banská Bystrica Regional Court informed the applicant, in reply to the latter's complaint, that the case could not be proceeded with as the representative of the defendant company had failed to appear at hearings scheduled for 4 June 1996, 26 November 1996 and 6 May 1997. 9. On 27 February 1998 the Regional Court allowed the applicant to amend his claims. 10. On 11 November 1998 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court allowed the applicant's action in part and dismissed the remaining claims. The Regional Court further decided that neither party had the right to have the costs reimbursed. 11. On 8 June 1999 the applicant complained that the judgment with reasons had not yet been served on him. On 20 July 1999 the president of the Regional Court admitted that the complaint was justified and informed the applicant that the judgment would be sent out shortly. It was served on the applicant on 2 August 1999. 12. Both the applicant and the defendant company appealed. On 7 October 1999 the applicant withdrew his appeal. 13. On 30 August 2000 the Supreme Court discontinued the appellate proceedings as the defendant had failed to submit reasons for the appeal.

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9. On 12 December 1995 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court (oблacний суд) convicted the applicant of the murder of four persons, sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. 10. On 22 February 1996 the Supreme Court (Верхoвний суд) upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. The applicant was transferred by the authorities responsible for the isolation block of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (Адміністрація слідчого ізолятору Управління міністерства внутрішніх справ) to one of the cells intended for persons awaiting execution of the death sentence. 11. A moratorium on executions was declared by the President of Ukraine on 11 March 1997. In judgment no. 11pп/99 of 29 December 1999, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the death penalty were contrary to the Ukrainian Constitution. As a result, death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment by Law no. 1483-III of 22 February 2000. 12. On 2 June 2000 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court commuted the applicant’s death sentence to life imprisonment. 13. The facts of the case concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison and the events during his time there are disputed. 14. The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in paragraphs 17 to 23 below. The facts as presented by the Government are set out in paragraphs 24 to 30. 15. A description of the material submitted to the Commission and to the Court will be found in paragraphs 31 to 58 below. 16. The Commission, in order to establish the facts in the light of the dispute over the conditions of the applicant’s detention and the events which occurred in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, conducted its own investigation pursuant to former Article 28 § 1 (a) of the Convention. To this end, the Commission examined a series of documents submitted by the applicant and the Government in support of their respective assertions and appointed three delegates to take evidence from witnesses at a hearing conducted at the Ministry of Justice in Kyiv on 23 and 26 November 1998, and in Ivano-Frankivsk on 24 and 25 November 1998. The Commission’s assessment of the evidence and its findings of fact are summarised in paragraphs 59 to 75 below. 17. On 12 December 1995 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of the murder of four persons, sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. After the first-instance judgment, he was placed in a separate cell. He was not allowed to write to his family, nor could he be visited by his lawyer. He applied several times for permission to meet his lawyer. 18. On 22 February 1996 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. On a decision of the authorities responsible for the isolation block of the Ministry of the Interior, the applicant was transferred to a cell intended for prisoners awaiting execution of the death sentence. On 30 March 1996 the applicant’s lawyer applied to see the applicant in order to give him the Supreme Court’s decision in the case. The prison governor did not grant him permission to do so. 19. Conditions of detention of persons sentenced to death were governed by the Pre-Trial Detention Act 1993 (“the Act”) and by an instruction of 20 April 1998 (“the Instruction”), whose content remained top secret. Under the terms of the Instruction, exercise in the open air, watching television, buying newspapers and receiving food parcels from relatives were prohibited. The Instruction therefore prevented the applicant from enjoying the rights guaranteed by the Act. 20. In a reply by the deputy head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior to a complaint by the applicant’s father concerning the conditions of the applicant’s detention, reference was made to the Instruction. Moreover, according to information received by the applicant’s father from the deputy governor of the prison, it appeared that the Act did not apply to him. Had the Act been applicable to the applicant, he would have been entitled under sections 9(1) and 13 to take daily exercise in the open air, to receive parcels twice a month and to watch television. However, this was strictly prohibited between 1995 and 1998. Up to September 1997 the applicant was also prohibited from sending and receiving letters. It was only then that the deputy governor of the prison orally informed the applicant’s mother that he could send and receive letters. Moreover, his father was refused permission to visit him on 29 May 1995 and 10 June and 31 July 1996 without any explanation from the prison authorities. From July 1996 onwards, instead of monthly visits which would last up to two hours, the applicant’s father had been allowed to visit the applicant only once every three months for not more than one hour. 21. As regards visits from a priest, the applicant’s father and members of the clergy repeatedly but unsuccessfully applied to the prison authorities and those responsible for the isolation block of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for the applicant to be allowed to receive a visit from a priest. 22. The applicant finally stated that he had complained several times about the conditions in which he was being held. He had also unsuccessfully applied to the prison authorities for permission to lodge an application with the European Commission of Human Rights. 23. In a letter to the Commission of 6 March 1998, the applicant’s father stated that on 4 March 1998 he had seen his son, who had told him about a check-up carried out by a commission from the Ministry of the Interior in mid-February 1998. After the commission had left, the applicant had been transferred to a cell that was worse equipped and dirty. The window in the cell had been fully shuttered. The bucket for flushing the toilet had been taken away and the toilet could not therefore be cleaned properly, which had caused an unbearable smell. Moreover, the applicant had been given only 25 cl of hot water to prepare tea and milk. All his dishes had been removed. His Bible had been taken away. He had not been allowed to read periodicals and his notebook and calendar had been confiscated. 24. The Government stated that the legal status and conditions of detention of persons sentenced to death were governed by the Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to section 8 of the Act, a person sentenced to death was kept in custody away from other prisoners. The cell to which the applicant had been transferred after his sentence had become final complied with the sanitary and hygiene rules laid down in section 11 of the Act: the cell measured 9 sq. m and had a bed, a table, a radio, sufficient natural and electric light, heating, running water and a toilet. 25. The applicant was provided with three meals a day, standard clothing and footwear as well as other articles of everyday use. Medical assistance, treatment, prophylactic and anti-epidemic measures were arranged and implemented in accordance with the legislation on health protection. 26. According to section 12 of the Act, prior to the sentence being carried out, prisoners sentenced to death were, as a rule, allowed visits from relatives and other persons not more than once a month, by written permission of the court within whose jurisdiction the case fell. The length of a visit was two hours maximum. After a case had been dealt with by an appellate court, visits by lawyers and legal assistants could be allowed by the head of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, the head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior or his deputy responsible for the isolation block. According to section 12 of the Act, visits by defence counsel were allowed without any limits as to their number and length. 27. On 13 December 1995, after the first-instance judgment, the applicant’s parents and lawyer received permission to visit him. The parents visited the applicant on 15 December 1995 and in January 1996. The applicant’s lawyer visited him on 21 December 1995 and on 7 January 1996. During the period from 22 February 1996 to 29 December 1997, the parents applied to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to visit the applicant on 24 February, 4 March, 5 April, 4 May, 2 July, 1 October, 18 November and 25 December 1996, and on 3 and 20 June and 19 September 1997. They were granted permission for visits on 24 February, 5 March, 5 April, 4 May, 2 July, 4 October and 4 December 1996, and on 4 March, 4 June, 4 September and 4 December 1997. 28. The applicant’s lawyer applied for permission to visit the applicant on 25 April, 11 November, and 18 and 19 December 1996. Permission was granted for a first visit on 7 May 1996 and on the other occasions as requested. 29. Persons sentenced to death were allowed to send an unlimited number of letters. During the period 1995-98 the applicant sent thirty-one letters: twenty-four letters related to his criminal case and seven letters were to his relatives. The applicant applied for the first time to the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to send letters to his relatives on 17 September 1997. Thereafter he sent letters to his parents on 19 and 26 November and 31 December 1997, and on 5, 16, 20 and 30 January, 3 February, 11 March, 6 April, 15 May, 17 June, 6 July, 10 August, 15 September, 22 October, 13 November and 11 December 1998. He received letters from his parents on 18 and 29 September, 19 October, 20 November and 24 December 1997, and on 16 and 26 January, 6, 10 and 23 February, 14 and 16 March, 17 April, 14 May, 1 and 8 June, 1 and 30 July, 20 August, 29 September, 10, 22 and 27 October, 4, 20, 26 and 30 November and 4, 17 and 21 December 1998. 30. The Government further submitted that the Prosecutor-General had conducted a thorough investigation into the applicant’s and his parents’ complaints concerning the application of illegal methods of investigation in the applicant’s case, namely torture and brutal and inhuman treatment. The allegations had not been proved and had been found unsubstantiated. In fact, complaints by the applicant, his parents, his representative and his defence counsel were received on 11 March, 8 April, 13, 14 and 29 May, 24 July, 11 September and 25 October 1996, and on 5 and 17 March, 19 May and 25 July 1997, and answered on 20 and 23 March, 23 and 24 April, 23 May, 27 June, 1 August, 30 September and 14 November 1996, and on 28 and 31 March and 20 May 1997. On 31 July 1997 the exchange of letters and the proceedings concerning the complaints filed by the applicant and his parents were terminated pursuant to section 12 of the Act. 31. In a letter of 26 May 1998 the prison governor replied to a complaint lodged by the applicant’s father on 10 May 1998 informing him that persons sentenced to death were allowed to send twelve letters a year. He also stated that the applicant was aware of his rights and obligations. 32. In a letter of 10 August 1998 the Ivano-Frankivsk regional prosecutor informed the applicant’s father that visits and correspondence of persons sentenced to death were governed by the Instruction and not by the Act to which the applicant’s father had referred in his complaint. 33. In a written complaint of 4 September 1998 addressed to the regional prosecutor the applicant’s parents stated, inter alia, that they had not seen the applicant for three months, that since 5 July 1998 they had not received any letters from him, that on 2 September 1998 they had become aware that the applicant had been beaten and humiliated, that Mr Ivashko, the deputy governor of the prison, had intervened during their visit on 2 September 1998 when the applicant had spoken about his conditions of detention, and that, for a period of one year and six months, the applicant had been denied the possibility of a visit from a priest, despite his requests. 34. In a letter of 10 September 1998 the regional prosecutor informed the applicant’s father that the applicant’s visits and correspondence were governed by the national legislation and that the prison administration had acted within the limits of this legislation. 35. On 10 September 1998 the Ivano-Frankivsk deputy regional prosecutor sent a report to the Prosecutor-General. The report concerned the findings of the investigation carried out following the complaint by the applicant’s father about allegedly unlawful acts by the prison authorities in respect of the applicant’s correspondence and visits. The report concluded that the investigation had not established any violation of the applicant’s rights by the prison authorities. 36. On 11 September 1998 the applicant’s father sent a complaint to Mr Shtanko, the head of the State Department for the Execution of Sentences, to which the latter replied on 12 October 1998. The allegations he raised were similar to those in his complaint to the regional prosecutor of 4 September 1998. Mr Shtanko replied that the applicant had been placed in solitary confinement because he had broken the rules. Furthermore, an investigation had not established that any physical force had been used against the applicant or that the prison authorities had humiliated him or restricted his rights, as was confirmed by the applicant himself. The applicant’s father was also informed that visits, including visits by a priest, could be allowed by the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. 37. On 23 October 1998 the applicant’s parents submitted a request to the regional prosecutor, the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and the prison governor that a commission of independent doctors be set up in order to examine the applicant’s state of health. They alleged that the inmates of the prison had been tortured, which resulted in a suicide attempt by one of them or an attempt on his life. On 3 November 1998 the applicant’s parents were informed by the prison governor that their request had been refused on the grounds that there had been no sign of torture or of the use of any other physical violence against the applicant and that his state of health was satisfactory. 38. On 23 and 24 October 1998 the applicant’s parents sent a letter to Mrs Leni Fischer, then President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. They complained of torture inflicted on the applicant and one of his fellow inmates, Mr Kuznetsov, which had resulted in a suicide attempt by the latter, and alleged that they had been taken to hospital and that Mr Kuznetsov had been paralysed. The parents further complained that they had been prevented from seeing the applicant. 39. In a letter of 26 October 1998 the applicant’s parents informed the Commission that “in establishment BI 304/199 in Ivano-Frankivsk there [had] been an attempt to execute the unjustly condemned M. Kuznetsov and B. Poltoratskiy illegally, and [that] the Government [had] tried to conceal the fact”. 40. A handwritten medical report issued on 28 October 1998 was signed by the applicant. The report stated that the applicant did not show any signs of having been beaten and that his state of health was satisfactory. 41. In a handwritten statement of 28 October 1998 the applicant said that he had been treated properly by the prison authorities, that no physical violence had been employed, that all disciplinary measures imposed on him had been justified and that his parents’ complaints had not been substantiated. 42. The Regional Directorate for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior issued a report on 29 October 1998 in response to the applicant’s father’s complaint about alleged torture and his request for a commission of independent doctors to examine the applicant’s state of health. The report stated that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had been examined by the prison doctors who had found no signs of physical injury. It also stated that the applicant denied that he had been tortured. 43. In a letter of 30 October 1998 the deputy head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant’s mother that her complaint concerning torture to which the applicant had allegedly been subjected had been examined and found to be unsubstantiated. A medical examination of the applicant had not shown any signs of torture. Accordingly, there was no reason to set up a medical commission to investigate the allegations. 44. A letter of 2 November 1998 from the deputy regional prosecutor to the Prosecutor-General reported on the findings of the investigation carried out in connection with the applicant’s father’s complaint about restrictions on the applicant’s correspondence and visits, the interference by the prison authorities during the applicant’s parents’ visit on 2 September 1998 and the physical torture inflicted on the applicant. The letter said that, as regards the restriction on the applicant’s correspondence and visits, the father had wrongly relied on the Act, which did not apply to that category of prisoners, that the interference by a prison official had been justified, and that on 25 September 1998 the applicant had undergone a thorough medical examination which had not established any physical injuries. Finally, it explained that the applicant had been placed in solitary confinement on 26 August 1998 because he had broken the prison rules by refusing to let himself be examined by a prison warder upon his return from a daily walk outside the cell. 45. In a letter of 20 November 1998 the deputy regional prosecutor replied to the applicant’s mother’s complaint about the physical torture allegedly inflicted on the applicant and to her request for a medical examination of the applicant. He stated that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had undergone a medical examination which had established that the allegations were unsubstantiated. The medical report had been confirmed and signed by the applicant. 46. In a letter of 23 November 1998 the regional prosecutor informed the applicant’s father that his allegations about illegal acts on the part of the prison authorities had been found to be unsubstantiated. 47. In a letter of 30 November 1998 the deputy head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant’s representative, Mr Voskoboynikov, that he could not be granted permission to visit the applicant as the latter had already had a visit from his relatives that month. 48. In a letter of 8 December 1998 from the State Department for the Execution of Sentences the applicant’s father was informed that a thorough investigation had proved that his complaint about an illegal attempt to execute his son was unsubstantiated and that his son’s state of health was satisfactory. 49. On 22 December 1998 the applicant requested permission from the head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior to see a priest. His request was granted and he saw a priest on 26 December 1998. 50. In a letter of 15 February 1999 the prison governor informed the applicant’s father that his complaint of 22 January 1999 had been examined. He stated that persons sentenced to death were allowed to receive two parcels a year but no food parcels. 51. In a decision of 5 March 1999 the Senior Prosecutor rejected a criminal complaint by the applicant’s parents against the deputy regional prosecutor. He refused to institute criminal proceedings against the latter on the ground that there was no evidence of his having committed an offence. He stated, inter alia, that the Act did not apply to the conditions of detention of death-row prisoners. These were governed by the Instruction, which was covered by the rules on State secrecy. 52. According to the prison records, the applicant’s parents applied to visit the applicant on 19 September 1997, and on 4 March, 8 April, 19 June, 22 July, 2 November and 1 December 1998. Permission was given on 7 October 1997, and on 4 March, 22 April, 20 August, 17 November and 11 December 1998 for visits which took place on 4 December 1997 and 4 March, 12 June, 2 September and 26 November 1998 and on 4 January 1999. The request of 19 June 1998 was not granted. 53. According to the prison records, the applicant sent letters to his parents on 17 September, 19 and 26 November, and 31 December 1997, and on 5, 16, 20 and 30 January, 3 February, 11 March, 6 April, 15 May, 17 June, 6 July, 10 August, 15 September, 22 October, 13 November and 11 December 1998. He received letters from them and other persons on 18 and 29 September, 19 October, 20 November and 24 December 1997, and on 16 and 26 January (two letters), 6, 10, 17 and 23 February, 6, 14 and 16 March, 6, 17, 20, 27 and 29 April, 14 May, 1, 8 and 30 June, 1, 20 and 30 July, 20 August (two letters), 29 September, 10, 22 (two letters) and 27 October, 4, 13, 20, 26 and 30 November, 4, 17 and 21 December 1998. 54. In an undated document Mr Y.M. Pavlyuk, the deputy head of the isolation block, declared that during the period between 11 September 1997 and 18 December 1998, neither the applicant nor his parents had asked for permission for the applicant to see a priest. He further declared that during the said period no member of the clergy had asked for such permission. He signed the declaration. 55. According to the applicant’s medical card, the applicant was X-rayed and blood-tested on 23 April 1998. On 25 September, 1 and 28 October, 9, 19 and 27 November, 3, 10, 17 and 24 December 1998 the applicant was seen by a prison psychiatrist. 56. In a written request of 2 May 2000 to the head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Boyko, the applicant’s father, in his capacity as his legal representative, asked for a confidential meeting with the applicant in order to discuss issues concerning his application pending before the European Court of Human Rights. On 23 May 2000, following a further request lodged on 15 May 2000, he was granted permission for a normal visit on 5 June 2000. 57. On 16 May 2000 the applicant’s father complained to the Deputy Minister of the Interior that his request of 2 May 2000 for a confidential meeting had remained unanswered. 58. In a letter of 14 July 2000 the deputy head of the State Department for the Execution of Sentences, Mr V.A. Lyovochkin, replied that Mr Boyko had given the applicant’s father permission to visit the applicant on 5 June 2000 and that the visit had taken place as scheduled. He added that in accordance with Article 40 of the Correctional Labour Code, a lawyer could be given permission for a confidential meeting with his client on presentation of his licence and identity card. 59. Since the facts of the case were disputed, the Commission conducted an investigation, with the assistance of the parties, and took oral evidence from the following witnesses: the applicant; the applicant’s parents; Mr Bronislav S. Stichinskiy, Deputy Minister of Justice; Mr Drishchenko, Deputy Prosecutor-General; Mr Ivan V. Shtanko, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Mr Petro A. Yaremkiv, the governor of Ivano-Frankivsk Prison; Mr Bogdan V. Kachur, prison doctor; Mr Stanislav V. Prokhnitskiy, medical assistant; Mr Yuriy M. Pindus, assistant to the prison governor, who was on duty on 3 September 1998; Mr Fedir O. Savchuk, assistant to the prison governor, who was on duty during the night of 2 to 3 September 1998; Mr Igor P. Ivashko, the deputy governor of the prison; Mr Yaroslav M. Pavlyuk, the deputy head of the isolation block; Mr Valentin M. Nabiulin, the head of the Department for Supervision of Isolation Blocks and Prisons of the Directorate for the Execution of Sentences; Mr Oleksand V. Kmyta, the deputy head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior; and Mr Anatoliy O. Boyko, the head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior. The Commission’s findings may be summarised as follows. 60. The applicant gave evidence before the delegates that he had been beaten on 2 September 1998 after the visit from his parents on the same day. During that visit, he had said to his parents that he had been beaten and called a beast. The applicant’s parents stated before the delegates that they had been told by their son on 2 September 1998 that he had been beaten and humiliated. The Commission observed, however, that the applicant denied before the delegates that he had been beaten before 2 September 1998. It considered, therefore, that it had not been established that the applicant had been beaten before 2 September 1998. 61. As to the events on 2 September 1998, the applicant stated before the delegates that, after the visit from his parents on that date, he had been taken to the “cinema room” where four persons, including Mr Pavlyuk, the deputy head of the isolation block on duty, were waiting for him with clubs. He had been asked three times to tell everything, but had refused and had been struck on his legs, hips, back and chest. He had returned to his cell and had written until the morning on four sheets of paper which had been included in a file. 62. The applicant further stated that he had been beaten on 10, 14 and 22 September 1998. One day, during a technical search of his cell, he had been taken out and ordered to get undressed so that his clothes could be checked. When he was naked, he had been beaten. He had been ordered to lie down on the floor with his face to the ground and his hands behind his head. He mentioned the name of K.Y. Hrevnin to the delegates. 63. The Commission considered that the applicant’s account contained a number of details and elements which it would not have expected to find in a fabricated story. It noted, however, that there was no record of any occurrence connected to the ill-treatment described by the applicant. The Commission accepted that the applicant may have been afraid to complain or to write to anyone, as he said. However, it accepted this argument with difficulty, having regard to the fact that he had not been scared when he had told his parents on 2 September 1998 that he had been beaten. Moreover, the prison psychiatrist saw him on 25 September 1998 and had not recorded any problems regarding his state of health or any injuries. The Commission added that the medical report of 28 October 1998, which the applicant had signed, concluded that he did not show any signs of having been beaten and that his state of health was satisfactory. 64. The Commission further noted that the applicant had signed a written statement on 28 October 1998 to the effect that he had been treated properly by the prison authorities, that no physical violence had been used against him, that all disciplinary measures imposed on him had been justified and that his parents’ complaints had not been substantiated. It took into account the fact that, before the delegates, the applicant had denied the contents of his statement, and pointed out that the practice of the prison authorities to require an inmate to confirm in writing that he had been treated properly by prison officers gave rise to suspicion. 65. As to the applicant’s parents’ submission before the delegates that, after the alleged beatings and torture on 2 September 1998, he had been transferred to Chukopovskiy Psycho-Neurological Hospital early in the morning of 3 September 1998 and had been placed in the intensive care unit where he had been given a blood transfusion, the Commission observed that, although the applicant had maintained that he had been beaten after his parents’ visit on 2 September 1998, he had denied that he had been transferred to hospital. This was corroborated by the statements of the prison doctor, the medical assistant, the governor’s assistant on duty at the time and the deputy governor, all of whom had been heard by the delegates. In addition, there was no documentary evidence proving that the applicant had been taken to hospital on the aforesaid date. The Commission did not consider the parents’ evidence on this point convincing or reliable. 66. The Commission found that there was no medical or other material evidence establishing that the applicant had sustained injury as a result of ill-treatment by prison officers in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, as he had alleged. It had regard to the fact that the applicant had denied that he had been beaten before 2 September 1998 and had been transferred to hospital after that date, and that the absence of any use of force by prison officers on 2, 10, 14 and 22 September 1998 had been supported by the oral statements of the witnesses heard by its delegates. The Commission therefore found it impossible to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in prison as he had alleged. 67. The applicant’s parents sent a complaint to the regional prosecutor on 4 September 1998, claiming, inter alia, that they had become aware that the applicant had been beaten and humiliated by prison officers. They made similar allegations to the head of the State Department for the Execution of Sentences on 11 September 1998. On 12 October 1998 the latter informed the applicant’s father that the investigation had not established that any physical force had been used against his son or that the prison authorities had humiliated him or restricted his rights. He also stated that this finding had been confirmed in writing by the applicant himself. 68. On 23 October 1998 the applicant’s parents requested the regional prosecutor, the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and the prison governor to set up an independent medical commission in order to examine the applicant’s state of health. They alleged that the prison’s inmates had been tortured, resulting in a suicide attempt by one of them, Mr Kuznetsov, or in an attempt on his life. On 30 October 1998 the applicant’s mother was informed by the deputy head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior that her complaint concerning the alleged torture of the applicant had been examined and found to be unsubstantiated and a medical examination of the applicant had not revealed any signs of torture. There was, accordingly, no reason to set up a medical commission to investigate her allegations. On 3 November 1998 the prison governor informed the applicant’s parents that their request had been refused on the grounds that there was no sign of torture or the use of any other form of physical violence against the applicant and that his state of health was satisfactory. In a letter of 20 November 1998 to the applicant’s parents, the deputy regional prosecutor confirmed that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had undergone a medical examination which had established that the parents’ allegations were unsubstantiated. Moreover, on 2 November 1998 the deputy regional prosecutor sent a letter to the Prosecutor-General which reported on the results of the investigation carried out in connection with, inter alia, the allegations that the applicant had been physically tortured. The letter confirmed that on 25 September 1998 the applicant had undergone a thorough medical examination which had not revealed any physical injury. 69. The Commission noted that on 8 December 1998 the applicant’s father had received a letter from the State Department for the Execution of Sentences stating that a thorough investigation had proved that his complaint about an attempt to execute his son was unsubstantiated and that the latter’s state of health was satisfactory. The domestic investigation had then ended on 5 March 1999 with a decision by the Senior Prosecutor on the applicant’s parents’ criminal complaint against the regional prosecutor. The Senior Prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings on the ground that no criminal offence had been established. 70. The Commission found that there were no contemporaneous records giving details of any investigation which the domestic authorities had carried out into the applicant’s parents’ allegations of the events in September 1998. It had not seen a single document proving that an investigation had been carried out by any domestic authorities other than those directly involved in the facts of which the applicant’s parents complained. Moreover, the medical report of 28 October 1998 had been drafted almost two months after the applicant’s alleged ill-treatment and the applicant had not been seen by the prison doctor or prison psychiatrist between 23 April and 25 September 1998. 71. The Commission found that the eight death-row inmates at Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, including the applicant, were being kept in single cells without the opportunity to communicate with other inmates. The applicant’s cell measured 2 x 5 x 3 m. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with a cold-water tap, two beds, a table and a little bench, both fixed to the floor, central heating and a window with bars. The applicant had some books, newspapers, a chess set, a stock of soap and toilet paper, some fruit and other food. During the delegates’ visit on 24 and 25 November 1998, the cell had been overheated, particularly in comparison with other rooms in the prison. The light was on twenty-four hours a day and the central radio was switched off at night. The inmates were frequently observed by prison warders through a spy hole in the door of the cell, which deprived them of any kind of privacy. The cell was freshly painted, from which the inference might be drawn that conditions had been worse prior to the delegates’ visit. The Commission accepted the applicant’s evidence that between 24 February and 24 March 1998 there had been no tap or washbasin in his cell, but only a small pipe on the wall near the toilet, that the water supply could only be turned on from the corridor, that the walls were covered with faeces and that the bucket for flushing the toilet had been taken away. The Commission found the applicant’s evidence – which was not contested by the Government – persuasive. 72. The Commission also accepted the applicant’s evidence that, until May 1998, the window in his cell had been shuttered and that he had not been allowed to take daily outdoor walks. 73. Concerning the applicant’s parents’ requests to visit him, the Commission found that, apart from the parents’ request of 19 June 1998, all had been granted. The parents had applied to visit their son on 19 September 1997 and on 4 March, 8 April, 22 July, 2 November and 1 December 1998. Permission had been given on 7 October 1997 and on 4 March, 22 April, 20 August, 17 November and 11 December 1998 for visits which had taken place on 4 December 1997 and 4 March, 12 June, 2 September and 26 November 1998 and 4 January 1999. The Commission noted that the parents’ requests to visit the applicant had mostly been granted for a date two or three months after the request had been made. Moreover, two warders had been present during the visits, who were authorised to interrupt the conversation if they considered that the parents or the applicant had said anything “untrue”. 74. Regarding the applicant’s correspondence, the Commission noted that the applicant had applied for the first time to the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to send a letter to his relatives on 17 September 1997. Thereafter he had sent letters to his parents on 19 and 26 November 1997, 31 December 1997, and on 5, 16, 20 and 30 January, 3 February, 11 March, 6 April, 15 May, 17 June, 6 July, 10 August, 15 September, 22 October, 13 November and 11 December 1998. He had received letters from his parents on 18 and 29 September, 19 October, 20 November and 24 December 1997, and on 16 and 26 January, 6, 10 and 23 February, 14 and 16 March, 17 April, 14 May, 1 and 8 June, 1 and 30 July, 20 August, 29 September, 10, 22 and 27 October, 4, 20, 26 and 30 November and 4, 17 and 21 December 1998. 75. The Commission could not establish with sufficient clarity whether the applicant or his parents had asked for permission for a priest to come to see the applicant. It nevertheless found that while the applicant had seen a priest on 26 December 1998 following his request of 22 December 1998, there had been no regular visits to inmates by any chaplain.

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11. In February 1995 the applicant who was then aged nineteen was arrested by the police on several occasions and on 13 March 1995 he was detained on remand. 12. On 9 February 1996 the Khmelnitskiy Regional Court (обласний суд) convicted the applicant of the murder of two persons and sentenced him to death. 13. On 26 March 1996 the Supreme Court (Верховний суд) upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 14. In September 1997 the applicant was diagnosed as having tuberculosis. 15. On 29 October 1997 the Khmelnitskiy Regional Prosecutor (Прокурор Хмельницькoï oблacmi) informed the applicant’s mother that the domestic legislation did not provide for visits by a notary to persons sentenced to death. On 30 October 1997 the Ministry of the Interior confirmed this information. 16. On 10 December 1997 the Regional Court gave the applicant leave to receive a visit from a notary. 17. On 6 January 1998 the Khmelnitskiy Notary Office (Перша Xмельницька державна нотарiальна контoрa) confirmed that between 5 December 1997 and 6 January 1998 they did not receive any written permission for a visit of the applicant. 18. On 10 February 1998 a notary visited the applicant and certified the applicant’s signature on the power of attorney. 19. A moratorium on executions was declared by the President of Ukraine on 11 March 1997. In judgment no. 11рп/99 of 29 December 1999 the Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the death penalty were contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine. The death penalty was therefore abolished and replaced by life imprisonment by Act no. 1483-III of 22 February 2000. 20. On 21 June 2000 the Regional Court commuted the applicant’s death sentence to life imprisonment. 21. Evidence from the applicant and four other witnesses was taken by a Court delegation in Khmelnitskiy Prison on 7 and 8 October 1999. The statements may be summarised as follows: 22. The applicant stated that he had been informed about his rights and obligations as a convicted person on 23 September 1999, having been given a sheet of paper with the rules containing the rights and obligations of an inmate. He had had to sign this document. 23. He confirmed that he preferred to be detained alone. On the day of the Delegates’ visit to Khmelnitskiy Prison, he was held in a single cell. 24. The applicant did not complain about the medical care in the prison, apart from the treatment of tuberculosis. He had applied for dental treatment, but had been told that during such treatment a warder had to be present and that the treatment was lengthy. He had repeatedly complained about this practice to the head of the prison medical unit and to the medical assistant (фельдшер). However, he had never submitted any written complaint. He had not informed his mother about his dental problems. 25. The applicant stated that he was almost always hungry. Moreover, hot water which had been brought from the prison kitchen was not hot enough to prepare tea. 26. He also stated that the temperature in his cell was satisfactory during summer but that in winter it was very cold. 27. He was allowed to take a hot shower once a week, but according to him, the bathroom was in an unacceptable state. 28. The only lamp in his cell was switched on 24 hours a day, but it did not disturb the applicant too much. The window was opened by the prison staff during his daily walks. He could not open it himself. According to him, the window had been shuttered until 1 October 1999. 29. He said that the toilet in his cell was not covered. He was able to flush it. 30. The applicant stated that the conditions in the cells which he had successively occupied had been similar. 31. He confirmed that on 25 February, 29 April and 27 October 1998 he had written, of his own free will, three statements attesting that he did not have any complaints against the prison administration. He had written these statements at the request of the prison administration without, however, having been told why the statements had been needed. He confirmed that no pressure had been exerted on him in this respect. 32. The applicant said that he had never been punished in the prison. 33. He said that in 1997 he had become aware that the moratorium on execution of the death penalty had been introduced. However, he had not been formally informed about it by the national authorities. (b) Details concerning the applicant’s tuberculosis 34. The applicant stated that he had been placed in a cell with a man, Mr Yusev, who was suffering from tuberculosis and that he had been infected with the same disease. He said that he had undergone his first X-ray examination in March 1995, when he had been admitted to Khmelnitskiy Prison. According to him, between March 1995 and September 1997 he had not been X-rayed. He confirmed that he had been detained with Mr Yusev for five months, between 3 February and 4 July 1997. 35. The applicant stated that the inmates had undergone an X-ray examination every six months and had been given special medication in order to prevent the progress of tuberculosis. However, he did not reply to the Delegates’ comment: “You are saying that you are X-rayed every six months. But this does not apply to the period we discussed before, because you said that you were not X-rayed between March 1995 and September 1997.” 36. According to the applicant, apart from Mr Yusev, nobody else with whom he had shared his cell had been suffering from tuberculosis. 37. He said that the medication for tuberculosis had been provided by his family. His state of health had not improved immediately after the medication had been administered to him. He said: “It got worse from the very beginning. But as soon as I started taking medicine, my health condition improved.” He was not hospitalised. (c) Prison practice concerning the applicant’s correspondence and receipt of parcels and small packets[1] 38. The applicant stated that before his death sentence had become final, he had been allowed to receive monthly one parcel of goods bought from the prison shop. On 5 October 1998 he had received his first parcel from his mother. He wished to receive more parcels or small packets. He had never been punished by the prison administration by means of a restriction on the number of parcels that could be sent to him by his family. 39. The applicant said that prior to 23 September 1999 he had not known that he had the right to send and receive letters and parcels to and from his relatives, but said that he had written one letter a month. (d) Prison practice concerning daily outdoor walks 40. The applicant confirmed that he had started having daily one-hour outdoor walks on 5 May 1998. The walks had taken place every day, but the applicant, not having had a watch, could not say whether they had lasted exactly one hour. He did not have the impression that the walks had been shortened. He had had to walk alone and had been handcuffed during his walks, even during the winter, which had deprived him of the possibility of physical exercise. He said that when he had been detained with another inmate, they had walked together. (e) Visit by a notary to the applicant 41. The applicant confirmed that permission from the prison authorities for a visit by the notary public had been delayed and had been given only after a decision by the Regional Court, and that the notary had visited him on 2 February 1998. He complained that the court decision had been given on 10 December 1997 and permission had been granted two months later. Nevertheless, this delay had not caused any damage to him. 42. According to the applicant, it was his mother who had requested that a notary come to see him in the prison. He personally had not applied for the visit in writing, but only orally. (f) Prison practice concerning visits from the applicant’s relatives 43. The applicant said that his mother tongue was Polish. He had encountered some problems on the part of the prison administration in communicating with his relatives in Polish. He confirmed that the matter had been resolved seven months ago. 44. The witness was the governor of Khmelnitskiy Prison. He had been working as governor for twelve years. a) General conditions of the applicant’s detention on death row 45. The witness said that about 584 persons were detained in the prison of whom 411 were in pre-trial detention and 173 were convicted. Nine inmates were on death row. They were held in a separate corridor in eight special cells intended for that category of prisoners. 46. At the beginning the applicant had shared his cell with another inmate. On the day of the Delegates’ visit, he was held in a single cell. According to him, death row inmates were generally detained in double cells and, at their own request, in single cells. During his stay on death row, the applicant had successively occupied four or five cells. The prison had kept a record of the inmates’ movement. 47. According to him, the applicant had initially been sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in 1994. He had been released under a presidential amnesty. He had been arrested again on 10 March 1995 and detained in Khmelnitskiy Prison since 13 March 1995. 48. The witness stated that inmates had the right to file complaints about their detention conditions through a member of the prison staff responsible for a particular part of the prison who regularly walked around the cells and registered those complaints, forwarding them to the prison governor. The witness confirmed that all internal complaints had been registered. 49. He said that the applicant had never made any written complaints, either to him or to the prosecutor or to the Supreme Court. All the complaints on the applicant’s behalf had been submitted by his mother. During his stay in Khmelnitskiy Prison, the applicant had personally submitted one request to be provided with a mattress. His mother had contacted the witness when complaining about the arrangements concerning parcels and small packets and her meetings with the applicant. 50. In reply to the Delegates’ question: “Have there been any cases, apart from that of the applicant, when a complaint concerning detention conditions or misconduct on the part of staff members has led to consequences such as a reprimand or a penalty?” the witness stated: “No, we have had no such examples.” 51. The witness considered in a positive light the recent improvements concerning the conditions of detention of persons sentenced to death, as a result of the moratorium on execution of the death penalty. (b) Details concerning the applicant’s tuberculosis 52. The witness stated that while in pre-trial detention and after his sentence had been pronounced, the applicant had been held with Mr Yusev. Both of them had been healthy at that time, a fact that had been confirmed by an X-ray examination. 53. On 4 July 1997 a regular medical examination had revealed that Mr Yusev was suffering from tuberculosis, and his treatment had started. At the same time, the applicant had been separated from Mr Yusev and had been given preventive treatment as a person who had been in contact with an infected person. In fact, two months later the applicant had also been diagnosed with tuberculosis and had had to undergo appropriate treatment. 54. In reply to the Delegates’ comments: “The first diagnosis of Mr Yusev occurred on 4 July 1997. At that time, the applicant was X-rayed and there was a suspicion of tuberculosis. Later, on 18 September 1997, that suspicion changed to certainty because the X-ray led to the conclusion that he had tuberculosis,” the witness stated: “I would like you to know that every inmate undergoes a medical examination upon his arrival. He is X-rayed and, according to the results, he is placed in an appropriate cell.” 55. The witness said that the head of the prison medical division had been working in Khmelnitskiy Prison for five years and had been working there as a doctor between 1995 and 1997, when the applicant’s tuberculosis had been detected and treated. 56. He also stated that in 1999, twenty-three persons detained in Khmelnitskiy Prison had been suffering from tuberculosis. They had been held separately and specific measures had been taken to prevent other inmates from any contact with them. (c) Prison practice concerning correspondence and receipt of parcels and small packets 57. According to the witness, the prison kept a register of incoming and outgoing letters. Each inmate had a personal file in which the prison administration kept a record of all his correspondence, parcels and meetings. (d) Visit by a notary to the applicant 58. In reply to the Court Delegates’ comments: “In 1997 the applicant’s mother requested repeatedly that the prison governor certify a power of attorney for her son’s lawyer or allow a notary to visit him in the prison. The notary was allowed to visit the applicant on 10 February 1998, but in comparison with other cases there seems to have been a delay of several months,” the witness stated: “Permission for the notary to meet the applicant was given by the Regional Court. Only after we received that permission could we allow the meeting to take place.” He confirmed that the applicant’s mother had been told that the governor of the pre-trial institution was not empowered to certify the power of attorney. The witness added that according to Ukrainian legislation, if an inmate wanted to see his lawyer, he submitted an application to the prison governor. If the lawyer had all the necessary documents proving that he was a certified lawyer, he was given permission to see the inmate, even every day, without any restriction. However, the regulations governing visits by a notary were different. 59. The Government representative explained that according to the national legislation, a lawyer was entitled to visit his client at any time, without any restriction as to the length of the visits, provided that prior notice had been given to the prison governor. The applicant’s representative before the European Court, Mr Voskoboynikov, was not a lawyer and did not have a legal background. If he were a lawyer, he would not need a power of attorney. 60. The witness further stated that since Mr Voskoboynikov was not a lawyer, he was not obliged to give him any information, including information concerning the regime applicable to the applicant. 61. The witness was the applicant’s mother. (a) General conditions of the applicant’s detention on death row 62. The witness said that the electric lamp in her son’s cell was very bright and switched on all the time. There was no daylight. The cell was very damp and cold. The food was, according to her, also very bad. She said that she had complained about these facts to the prison governor and to the Head of the Department for the Execution of Sentences. 63. She stated that her son had sometimes been provided with hot water instead of tea. 64. In reply to the Delegates’ question: “We were informed that your son had made several statements attesting that he had not made any complaints about detention conditions, medical treatment, etc. Did your son tell you that he had been forced to make such statements?” the witness stated: “After we had applied to the Council of Europe, my son and other inmates wrote the statement saying that they did not want the delegation to come. I spoke to my son and he told me that I did not know many things, and I understood what he meant.” (b) Details concerning the applicant’s tuberculosis and other health problems 65. The witness stated that her son had fallen ill from tuberculosis in the prison. During a meeting he had said that he had coughed up blood. Afterwards, she had applied to the prison governor, claiming that the applicant had shared his cell with a sick person. She had also applied to the authorities for medical assistance. The medication had been partly brought by her and partly provided by the prison medical service. According to the witness, the medical treatment had not been sufficient. 66. The witness said that the applicant had had problems with his liver and stomach and with his teeth. She had applied to the prison doctor but had been told that the prison did not have sufficient financial means to provide the inmates with proper dental treatment. She said that her son had had two teeth extracted without undergoing an anaesthetic, and that she had complained about this orally and in writing. 67. She further said that she had wanted to bring some medicine for her son in prison, but the prison governor had not given the permission to do so. She stated: “The medicine for tuberculosis or flu, general painkillers, I used to bring them regularly. However, the ones like animal fat were first allowed only about two or three months ago.” 68. In reply to the Delegates’ question: “The prison authorities maintain that Mr Yusev was X-rayed on 19 August 1995 and that he was not ill at that time. Considering that they both fell ill, but no infection was passed on from Mr Yusev to your son, do you have any comments on this allegation?” the witness stated: “They found tuberculosis in Yusev first and after they were both detained in the same cell they discovered tuberculosis in my son as well.” In reply to the Delegates’ comments: “Our records indicate that the examination in which it was discovered that Mr Yusev had tuberculosis took place on 4 July 1997 and that your son was detained together with him from 5 February to 4 July 1997. The authorities maintain that as soon as the state of health of Mr Yusev was discovered, your son was put into another cell”, the witness stated: “No, that is not true. Another inmate who was held with Mr Yusev before my son said that even at that time he was coughing up blood.” 69. The witness further said that she had asked to have access to her son’s medical file but had been refused. Her request that her son be examined by a specialist had also been refused. She had been told that an examination of that kind was not possible for this category of prisoners. (c) Prison practice concerning receipt of parcels and small packets 70. The witness confirmed that her son had received his first parcel from her on 5 October 1998. She had applied for permission to send a parcel on several previous occasions since her son had fallen ill, but permission had been refused. Her first application had been submitted a year and a half ago. 71. The witness said that in August 1999 the prison administration had not wanted to accept her parcels for her son. She had been told that his category of prisoners were not allowed to receive normal parcels, but only two small packets per year. She had applied “everywhere” but without any success. (d) Prison practice concerning daily outdoor walks 72. The witness said that the applicant had not been allowed to go for a walk before she had applied to the Council of Europe. According to her, he had been allowed to go for daily walks since April 1998. The witness confirmed that her son had complained to the prison governor that he had been handcuffed during the walks. (e) Prison practice concerning visits from the applicant’s mother 73. The witness said that the applicant had been handcuffed during his meetings with her. Moreover, they had encountered problems when they had spoken Polish together during their meetings. According to her, the prison governor had come to one of their meetings with a tape recorder. 74. The witness was the prison doctor, having been the head of the prison medical unit since 1 June 1999. Previously, he had been working in Khmelnitskiy Prison as a doctor since 1995. 75. He stated that the medical unit included two full-time doctors and a number of part-time specialists: a dentist, a dermatologist, an X-ray specialist, the head of the laboratory and a tuberculosis specialist. It also had two full-time medical assistants and a part-time nurse, an X-ray assistant and a laboratory assistant. He considered this staffing sufficient for the needs and the size of Khmelnitsky Prison. He confirmed that there was no difference between the categories of prisoners in the eyes of the members of the medical unit. Every day the medical assistant walked around all the cells in the prison. If he was able to provide the necessary assistance in distributing medication, he did so. If not, he arranged an appointment with the prison doctor or an appropriate specialist. 76. The witness stated that those inmates who were detained in the prison for more than six months were X-rayed on a regular basis every six months. 77. In reply to the Delegates’ question: “We have information that the applicant and Mr Yusev were X-rayed upon arrival at this prison on 13 March and 19 August 1995 respectively. These examinations did not show any signs of tuberculosis. The applicant and Mr Yusev subsequently shared a cell from 3 February to 4 July 1997. On 4 July 1997 a regular medical examination revealed that Mr Yusev had pulmonary tuberculosis without growth of micro-bacteria. Then the applicant started displaying some symptoms and there was a strong suspicion that he also had tuberculosis. That was confirmed by an X-ray examination of 18 September 1997. We would like to ask you a very important question and we will have to check this with the medical files. Between the initial X-ray examination in 1995 and the examinations which led to the discovery of tuberculosis, first in Mr Yusev and second in the applicant, were the half-yearly regular obligatory X-ray examinations carried out in respect of the two prisoners?” the witness stated: “Not every six months, but once a year.” There had been a difference between the normal prisoners and the death row inmates, who had been subjected to stricter conditions during the period from 1995 to 1996. According to him, conducting half-yearly X-ray examinations could not help prevent the spread of tuberculosis as it was not possible to avoid infection. He said that the applicant and Mr Yusev were the only two cases in which inmates had contracted tuberculosis in the prison. 78. The witness added that the last X-ray examination of the applicant had not shown any signs of nitrification, fibrosis or lung deformation. Mr Yusev’s X-ray had revealed only signs of fibrosis. They were now in a special group of inmates and would be under medical observation for the next five years, during which time they would receive preventive treatment in order to avoid a relapse. 79. In reply to the Delegates’ question: “The applicant complains that he fell ill because he had been kept in the same cell as a person who was already ill. The Government say that the disease was not transmitted because they both became ill at the same time. What do you think about it?” the witness stated: “Yes, they were held together for five months. But when Mr Yusev was diagnosed with tuberculosis, he was immediately put into a separate cell. He was prescribed treatment and the applicant, as a person who had been in contact with him, was given preventive treatment.” According to him, Mr Yusev had undergone an X-ray examination in 1996, after having complained of symptoms of tuberculosis. 80. The witness confirmed that there was a special diet called “8B”for those suffering from tuberculosis. He admitted that there was not always a regular meat supply, but milk and butter were always available for the diet. Moreover, the lack of certain food products was compensated for by what inmates received in parcels from their relatives. 81. He said that the conditions in the cells where the inmates suffering from tuberculosis were held were slightly better than the conditions in other cells. The cells themselves were bigger. 82. The witness further stated that the applicant had complained of his dental problems. Two of his teeth had been extracted because it had not been possible to treat them. He confirmed that teeth were extracted only if they were not treatable. The medical unit had not been able to provide a general anaesthetic, but had used a local one. There was no problem with having false teeth fitted either; the only problem encountered in that connection was lack of money. In such cases the inmate had to pay for the materials because an outside specialist had to come to the prison. 83. In reply to the Delegates’ remark: “Yesterday the applicant complained that in the shower room it is so cold that one can catch a cold. We were there yesterday and it really is cold in there. Have you seen the place?” the witness stated: “Yes. It has got colder since yesterday; before, it was relatively warm. But on 15 October the heating will be switched on.” 84. In reply to the applicant’s representative’s question: “How can you explain this logical contradiction: Mr Yusev had no micro-bacterial growth but after a while he infected the applicant?” the witness stated: “Every human being has the tubercle bacillus. Under certain conditions the bacillus manifests itself. The two inmates stayed together for a long time, for almost two and a half years. And the applicant’s statements concerning his being infected by Mr Yusev are unreliable.” In reply to the applicant’s representative’s next questions: “How can you explain the statements of other inmates who were detained with Mr Yusev before the applicant that they saw Mr Yusev coughing up blood even then? Was not that a symptom of tuberculosis in its contagious form?” the witness stated: “Only a doctor can say. The blood could have come from the gums or teeth, or from the nose. The source can be defined only by a doctor. I do not have any information from other inmates, I know that only the applicant said that. The most recent tests did not detect any bacteria in Mr Yusev.” 85. The witness acknowledged that the prison was not equipped with a laboratory, instead using the laboratory facilities of the militia hospital and, for tuberculosis tests, those in the regional tuberculosis hospital. He said that the prison medical unit sent an inmate to the tuberculosis hospital only if there was a suspicion of illness. The applicant had last been consulted on 7 October 1998. After that, he had been transferred to the second group. The witness had not received any request from the applicant’s mother for detailed tests after the applicant had been diagnosed with tuberculosis. 86. He confirmed that relatives could send additional parcels to inmates suffering from tuberculosis. Permission was given by the prison administration at his suggestion. However, he had not made such a suggestion in the applicant’s case. 87. The witness further confirmed that the medical unit possessed the necessary dental equipment. The inmate’s relatives had to pay the cost of material. If there was money in the inmate’s account, the medical unit could arrange for his dental treatment. According to him, the applicant had officially asked about false teeth two days before the Delegates’ visit to Khmelnitskiy Prison. His mother had not applied to the witness for this treatment, but she might have applied to the prison governor. 88. The Court Delegates visited the cell where the applicant was detained. The size of the applicant’s cell was about 9 square metres. The cell was in order and clean. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with a cold water tap, two beds fixed on the floor, central heating and a window with bars. There were some books, newspapers and a cup for making tea. The cell seemed to be sufficiently heated and ventilated. 89. The Delegates were shown the prison shower cubicle which was about 1 metre square. The ceiling was covered only by bars. It was lit by an electrical lamp and was very cold. 90. The Delegates also visited the prison’s exercise yard. 91. The commission established the following: The applicant was taken to Khmelnitskiy Prison on 13 March 1995. Upon this, he was given a general medical examination by the therapist, who concluded that the applicant was healthy. His first X-ray examination, carried out on 15 March 1995, established that his lungs and heart were in a normal condition. Bacteriological analysis of faeces for dysentery, typhoid and paratyphoid fever did not show any sign of disease. Microprecipitation of the applicant’s blood produced a negative reaction. The applicant was given a complete medical examination and a court psychiatric assessment by Khmelnitskiy Regional Psychiatric Assessment Unit no. 1 in May 1995, and a conclusion of “sane” was reached with regard to psychopathy. On 16 June 1996 the applicant underwent an X-ray examination which did not show any sign of disease of the lungs or heart. From 13 March 1995 to 18 November 1996 he was held in a separate cell. From 18 November 1996 to 23 April 1997 the applicant and Mr Yusev shared a cell. From 23 April to 4 November 1997 they were again kept in separate cells. Afterwards, the applicant was found to be suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and was transferred to the cell of Mr Yusev, who also suffered from tuberculosis. They shared the same cell from 4 November 1997 until 9 June 1998. Since 9 June 1998 the applicant and Mr Yusev have been kept in separate cells. On 11 July 1997, when Mr Yusev was found to be suffering from tuberculosis, the applicant was instructed to undergo one and a half to two months’ anti-recurrence isoniazid treatment. On 7 August 1997 an X-ray examination for the first time showed pathological changes in the upper right lung. On 18 September 1997 Mr O. Sidenko, a tuberculosis specialist from the prison medical unit, diagnosed the applicant as suffering from tuberculosis and he received treatment in a cell designed for prisoners in that condition. His treatment started on the same day. The applicant was X-rayed three times in 1998, twice in 1999 and twice in 2000. The examinations showed no changes as regards active tuberculosis in the lungs and no residual changes were observed in the upper right lung. Between 13 and 15 June 2000 the commission carried out a thorough clinical and laboratory examination of the applicant and Mr Yusev. It agreed with the clinical diagnosis of the applicant given by the prison medical unit in 2000: clinical recovery after focal tuberculosis of the upper right lung, presence of MBT (mycobacterium tuberculosis). Mr Yusev was taken to Khmelnitskiy Prison on 19 August 1995. He was given a general medical examination by a therapist, who concluded that he was healthy. An X-ray examination carried out on 29 August 1995 established that his lungs and heart were in a normal condition. Bacteriological analysis of faeces for dysentery, typhoid and paratyphoid fever did not show any sign of disease. Microprecipitation of his blood produced a negative reaction. He was given a complete medical examination and an interregional court psychiatric assessment by Khmelnitskiy Regional Psychiatric Assessment Unit no. 1 in March 1996. It was concluded that he was reasonably healthy and was sane. X-ray examinations carried out on 20 August 1996 and 14 February 1997 did not reveal any pathological changes in the lungs and heart. Three examinations of phlegm carried out between 11 and 13 February 1997 by the method of bacterioscopy did not reveal any presence of MBT. On 4 July 1997 an X-ray examination of Mr Yusev showed a homogeneous infiltration in the right lung. On 11 July 1997 the diagnosis was, for the first time, infiltrative tuberculosis of the right lung in the phase of decomposition, with the presence of MBT. Mr Yusev received treatment in a cell designed for his category of prisoners. On 23 July 1997 he began intensive chemotherapy treatment. During 1999 and 2000 he received seasonal (in spring and autumn) anti-recurrence isoniazid treatment (each lasting two months). As the result of the ongoing treatment, there had been a substantial improvement in the general state of his health and the main clinical symptoms of the disease had been eliminated. The clinical progress observed by X-ray examinations was the most pronounced during the first four months of the treatment. The X-ray examination on 5 May 1998 revealed limited fibrosis and individual infiltrated nidi in the upper right lung. The X-ray examinations carried out at the end of 1998 and in 1999-2000 showed only limited fibrosis at the site of former lesions. The commission established that it was unlikely that the applicant had contracted tuberculosis from Mr Yusev. In its opinion, the main factor was that the latter did not excrete tuberculosis microbacteria, and therefore did not represent an epidemiological danger. During the first period when the applicant had shared a cell with Mr Yusev, from 18 November 1996 to 23 April 1997, no pathological changes in the lungs had been detected by the X-ray examination of 14 February 1997. During this period Mr Yusev could not therefore have infected the applicant with tuberculosis. The second period during which the applicant and Mr Yusev had shared a cell had lasted from 4 November 1997 to 9 June 1998, that is to say four months after Mr Yusev had been found to be suffering from tuberculosis and his treatment had started, and one and a half to two months after the applicant had been found to be infected with tuberculosis and his treatment had started. In the period when the two inmates were placed in separate cells, Mr Yusev had been subjected to intensive chemotherapy. Moreover, for the first six weeks during which intensive chemotherapy was administered to the applicant, positive progress had been achieved (X-ray examination of 24 November 1997). Therefore, during the period in which the convicts shared the same cell, there would have been a very insubstantial possibility of repeated infection of the applicant by Mr Yusev. The intensive chemotherapy administered to Mr Yusev during the first two months halted bacillus excretion – that is to say, eliminated the epidemiological threat in 90-100 per cent of bacteria producers. The commission took also into account the fact that the applicant was suffering from a mild, very limited form of pulmonary tuberculosis without any excretion of bacteria or any destructive changes in the lungs. It was most probable that the origin and manifestation of pulmonary tuberculosis in the applicant was connected with the poor state of his health and the stress caused by having committed a crime, being imprisoned and, finally, being sentenced to capital punishment. In addition, the applicant and Mr Yusev suffered from two different forms of tuberculosis (the applicant suffered from focal tuberculosis, while Mr Yusev suffered from infiltrative tuberculosis). 92. According to the prison record, the applicant’s mother, sometimes accompanied by his grandmother, visited her son on 16 April, 16 May, 11 June, 12 July, 13 August, 13 September, 14 October, 15 November and 17 December 1996, and on 17 January, 17 February, 20 May, 20 June, 21 July, 27 August, 4 February, 5 March, 8 April, 8 May, 8 June, 10 July, 11 August, 11 September and 12 October 1998. 93. The applicant received a parcel from his mother on the following occasions: 27 February, 27 March and 26 April 1996. He received a small packet (бандероль) on the following occasions: 27 May, 31 July, 2 October and 15 December 1996 and on 5 February, 11 April, 4 June, 4 August, 6 October and 10 December 1997, and on 10 February and 14 April 1998. 94. The applicant’s medical file was created on 10 March 1995. It states that in March and May 1995 the applicant underwent a general medical check-up and X-ray examination. He was found to be healthy. Subsequent X-ray examinations were carried out on 16 June 1996, on 7 August and 24 November 1997, on 10 February, 5 May and 23 September 1998, on 11 January, 15 July and 15 October 1999 and on 21 February and 13 June 2000. On 11 July 1997 the applicant received isoniazid treatment as a person who was in contact with persons suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. On 18 September 1997 he was diagnosed as suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis in its latent form. He was given appropriate treatment. On the same day he underwent a complementary medical examination at the Khmelnitskiy TB Division of the Ministry of Public Health. Further examinations by the Division were carried out on 8 June and 7 October 1998 and on 23 February 2000. Laboratory analysis of the applicant’s mucus was conducted at the Khmelnitskiy Hospital of the Ministry of the Interior on 18, 19 and 20 September, 13, 14 and 15 November 1997, on 25 February, 20 April, 10 July and 23 November 1998, on 24 February 1999, and on 10, 11 and 12 May 2000. The applicant underwent a blood test on the following dates: 15 November 1995, 18 September and 13 November 1997, 25 February, 20 April, 10 July, 15 October and 24 November 1998, 25 and 26 February 1999, and 14 February and 11 May 2000. 95. Mr Yusev’s medical file was created on 3 August 1995. It states that in August 1995 Mr Yusev underwent a general medical check-up and X-ray examination. He was found to be healthy. Subsequent X-ray examinations were carried out on 20 August 1996, 14 February, 4 July and 24 November 1997, on 10 February, 5 May and 23 September 1998, on 11 January and 15 July 1999 and on 1 March and 13 June 2000. The X-ray examinations which took place on 20 August 1996 and 14 February 1997 confirmed that Mr Yusev’s lungs and heart were in a good state. The X-ray examination of 11 July 1997 revealed pulmonary tuberculosis in Mr Yusev. On 23 July 1997 a tuberculosis specialist at the Khmelnitskiy TB Division of the Ministry of Public Health confirmed that Mr Yusev was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis. On that date Mr Yusev was given appropriate medical treatment. On 8 June and 7 October 1998 Mr Yusev underwent complementary examinations at the Division. According to the medical notes of 6 March and 9 June 2000, Mr Yusev’s state of health had improved and the symptoms of tuberculosis had disappeared. Laboratory analysis of Mr Yusev’s mucus took place at the Khmelnitskiy Hospital of the Ministry of the Interior on 11, 12 and 13 February, 20 April, 20 July, 13, 14 and 15 November 1997, on 25 February, 20 April, 10 July and 23 November 1998, on 24 February 1999, and on 10, 11 and 12 May 2000. Mr Yusev underwent a blood test on the following dates: 24 July and 13 November 1997, 25 February, 20 April, 10 July, 15 October and 24 November 1998, 25 and 26 February 1999, and 11 May and 14 June 2000. 96. In a letter of 28 February 1998, addressed to the Prosecutor General’s Office, the applicant stated that he had been detained in Khmelnitskiy Prison since 13 March 1995 and that he had never been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. He also stated that he was satisfied with the conditions in which he was detained and that he had no complaints against the prison administration. He mentioned a letter from his representative, Mr Voskoboynikov, stating that it had been his mother’s idea and that it had only been sent to protect the applicant’s interests. The applicant also stated that neither the prison administration nor the investigators had tortured him during the preliminary investigation. Lastly, he stated, placing noticeable emphasis on the statement, that he had not co-operated with the representatives of the Council of Europe because he had not believed that they could help him. 97. On 29 April 1998 Mr O.V. Reatsky, a prosecutor from the Prosecutor General’s Office, visited the applicant who then made a written statement. The applicant confirmed, inter alia, that he had been detained in Khmelnitskiy Prison since 13 March 1995. He said that he had never been beaten or tortured and he could not remember any episode involving degrading treatment. He also said that he had been given proper medical treatment and that he did not have any complaints against the prison administration. 98. On 27 October 1998 the applicant, visited again by a prosecutor from the Prosecutor General’s Office, made another statement. He spoke in particular about the conditions of his detention in Khmelnitskiy Prison. He mentioned that he had been infected with tuberculosis in 1997 sharing a cell with Mr Yusev, who had earlier been diagnosed with the same disease. The applicant also mentioned that he had never met Mr Voskoboynikov, who had actually been engaged by his mother in order to represent him. The applicant confirmed that a notary had visited him in order to certify a power of attorney for Mr Voskoboynikov. The applicant himself had never applied either to any international organisations or to the notary. The applicant further said that he did not have any complaints concerning his living conditions (single cell, hot food three times a day, special diet), the prison regime (daily outdoor walks, receipt of small packets in accordance to a special regime of detention), or the medical treatment (X-rays, medical check-ups provided at his request), either at present or as regards the period when he had been sharing a cell with other inmates (he had been kept in a single cell since 14 October 1998). 99. According to the prison record, on 18 June 1996 the applicant was detained in cell no. 14. On 18 November 1996 he was transferred to cell no. 16, where he stayed until 3 February 1997, when he was moved to cell no. 14. On 23 April 1997 he was transferred to cell no. 15, and on 4 November 1997 he was moved to cell no. 13. On 20 February 1998 the applicant was again detained in cell no. 14, where he remained until 7 May 1998, when he was transferred to cell no. 13. Three weeks later, on 28 May 1998, he was moved to cell no. 15, and on 9 June 1998 to cell no. 14. 100. According to the prison record, on 9 October 1996 Mr Yusev was detained in cell no. 16. On 3 February 1997 he was transferred to cell no. 14 where he remained until 11 July 1997, when he was moved to cell no. 12. On 29 October 1997 Mr Yusev was transferred to cell no. 15 and on 4 November 1997 to cell no. 13, where he stayed until 20 February 1998. On that day he was transferred to cell no. 14, where he remained until 7 May 1998, when he was moved to cell no. 13. On 28 May 1998 he was transferred to cell no. 15 and on 9 June 1998 he was detained in cell no. 16. 101. In his letter of 7 March 2000 to the Court, Mr Voskoboynikov submitted that in December 1999 the applicant had been disciplined and deprived of the right to receive an extra medical food parcel. On 6 January 2000 the prison governor orally refused Mr Voskoboynikov permission to meet with the applicant and to see documents concerning the applicant’s punishment. Mr Voskoboynikov also submitted that on 17 December 1999 the Head of the Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences upheld the Prison Administration’s denial to allow the applicant’s mother to bring her son a TV set, an electronic game and an extra medical food parcel.

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9. The first applicant, María Iglesias Gil, was born in 1961 and lives in Vigo. She is the mother of the second applicant, A.U.I., who was born in 1995. 10. On 8 September 1989 the first applicant married A.U.A. On 3 June 1994 the couple divorced. Their son A.U.I. was born on 7 December 1995 and A.U.A. acknowledged paternity. In a decision of 20 December 1996, the Vigo Family Court awarded the first applicant custody of A.U.I., and the father access. On 1 February 1997 A.U.A. abducted his son during an access visit and left Spain with him. After passing through France and Belgium, he travelled with the child by air to the United States. 11. The first applicant lodged a criminal complaint with Vigo investigating judge no. 5 alleging child abduction and applied to be joined to the proceedings as a civil party. On 4 February 1997 the investigating judge made orders for a nationwide search to be made for A.U.A. and for the child’s immediate return to its mother. Subsequently, the first applicant also made criminal complaints against various members of A.U.A.’s family who, she said, had assisted in her son’s abduction. 12. During the investigation, the first applicant requested Vigo investigating judge no. 5 to monitor calls on A.U.A.’s mobile telephone and to interview members of A.U.A.’s family. In a decision of 19 February 1997, the investigating judge turned down both requests, the former on the ground that there was no evidence that the mobile telephone number that had been given was A.U.A.’s and the latter because the first applicant had not given precise details of the questions she wished to be put to her former husband’s relatives. The first applicant also asked the investigating judge for a search to be carried out at the registered office of a company belonging to A.U.A. that was responsible for administering his property in his absence, and for the examination of a vehicle he had used to leave Spain. The judge again refused. 13. The first applicant asked the judge to issue an international search and arrest warrant against A.U.A., but in an order of 29 May 1997, he declined, stating: “... 2. As regards the international search and arrest warrant, the offences of coercion and extortion have not been made out. It is debatable whether there has been an offence of criminal contempt, since it has not been proved that the person concerned was ordered to comply with the judgment of the family court and warned that he was liable to commit this offence. In addition, since this offence (Article 556 of the Criminal Code) only carries a prison sentence of between six months and one year, an international search and arrest warrant is not justified, [especially] as the conduct complained of appears to come within Article 622 of the Criminal Code, which characterises it as a minor offence. ... 4. Furthermore, it should be noted that the requested procedural steps are neither lawful, nor adapted to the aim pursued, and must therefore be refused pursuant to Article 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 14. In a decision of 5 June 1997, investigating judge no. 5 turned down further requests by the first applicant for investigative steps to be taken as a result of her former husband’s contempt and failure to comply with the judgment of the family court on the following grounds: “... 2. Investigative steps are taken in order to establish whether an offence has been committed. The investigation is brought to an end by a judicial decision, not at the request of a party (Article 785 Code of Criminal Procedure). 3. The inquiries made to date do not prove that A.U.A. failed to return his son to his mother at the end of the period for which he was entitled to have him to stay. ... 6. A wanted notice has been issued for A.U.A. nationally. As soon as he has been traced, final provision 19 of Institutional Law no. 1/1996 of 15 January 1996 on the legal protection of minors can be applied.” 15. In an order of 25 May 1998, the investigating judge also examined whether a person could be prosecuted for the abduction of a minor for whom he had joint parental responsibility. He found that this was not possible under the case-law, as the only offences that could be committed in such circumstances were criminal contempt and extortion. In a further order dated 1 July 1998 the investigating judge reiterated that no international search and arrest warrant could be issued for the suspected offence of criminal contempt, for the following reasons: “... As regards an international search and arrest warrant against A.U.A., this issue was resolved by the Pontevedra Audiencia in its decision of 23 September 1997. No new facts have emerged since then that would justify reclassifying the offence. Under no circumstances can it amount to ‘false imprisonment’, as the judgment of 5 July 1993 on the abduction of minors makes clear. In that judgment, the court held: ‘The fact that a father has taken his minor child with him solely in order to enjoy its company cannot amount to the offence of child abduction’ ... Lastly, as to the suspected offence of criminal contempt, no international search and arrest warrant can be issued as it is not an offence that comes within the extradition treaties. Consequently, Interpol would not act on such a warrant, as it would not be valid in law.” 16. An appeal by the first applicant was dismissed by the Pontevedra Audiencia Provincial on 17 November 1998. 17. The first applicant sought amparo relief under Articles 24 (right to a fair hearing), 15 (right to life and mental and physical integrity) and 17 (right to liberty and security) of the Constitution, and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989. In a decision of 2 June 1999, the Constitutional Court dismissed her appeal as manifestly ill-founded, holding that she had not stated why she disagreed with the reasoned decisions of the lower courts. 18. At the end of the investigation, on 3 July 1998, Vigo investigating judge no. 5 issued a provisional discharge order dismissing the charges against A.U.A. However, he renewed the orders for a nationwide search for A.U.A. and the order freezing his assets. He also made a final order dismissing the charges against the members of A.U.A.’s family who had been implicated by the first applicant. The reason given by the judge for making the provisional discharge order in respect of A.U.A. was that the latter’s absence from Spain had prevented his being questioned or formally charged in accordance with Article 791 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. An appeal by the first applicant was dismissed by the Pontevedra Audiencia Provincial on 9 November 1998. 19. The first applicant lodged an amparo appeal against those decisions with the Constitutional Court, in which she alleged violations of Article 17 (right to liberty and security), taken together with Articles 18 (rights to private life and family privacy), 24 (right to a fair hearing) and 39 (social, economic and legal protection of the family and children) of the Constitution. She also relied on Articles 5 and 8 of the Convention. In her appeal, she complained in particular of the investigating judge’s systematic refusal to issue an international search warrant for her child, a refusal which, she said, was in breach of the positive duty to protect children and families. She also alleged a violation of Article 11 § 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989, which requires States to take measures to combat the illicit transfer and non-return of children abroad. In her submission, by refusing to take any investigative steps, the investigating judge had directly infringed both her and her son’s right to private and family life, and her right to judicial protection, as guaranteed by Article 24 the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention. 20. In a decision of 17 June 1999, the Constitutional Court dismissed the amparo appeal as unfounded, holding that the first applicant had confined herself to contesting the decisions of the criminal courts which, in reasoned and well-founded decisions, had decided to make a provisional discharge order in respect of her criminal complaint of child abduction, while renewing certain preventive measures. 21. In connection with an appeal by the first applicant to the Pontevedra Audiencia Provincial against one of his decisions, investigating judge no. 5 said in a report to the Audiencia Provincial on 5 September 1997: “... The purpose of criminal proceedings is to prosecute the offence and, if appropriate, to punish the perpetrators. However, an investigating judge cannot, under any circumstances, allow himself to be manipulated by a woman driven by jealousy or hatred against her former husband’s family and take a series of procedural measures that serve no purpose other than to inconvenience third parties uninvolved in the proceedings. In the present case, all that has been proved so far is that A.U.A. did not return his son A.U.I. to his mother at the end of the period he was allowed by the family court.” 22. An application for an order requiring investigating judge no. 5 to stand down was dismissed in a decision of 20 November 1997. In a decision of 22 February 1999, an application for the proceedings to be declared null and void was likewise dismissed. 23. In a judgment of 12 February 1999, the Vigo Family Court withdrew parental responsibility from A.U.A. and awarded the first applicant full parental responsibility. It gave the following reasons for its decision: “... Having considered the evidence, the Court has decided to grant the applicant’s application. ... the case file shows that, after continually failing to comply with the access arrangements (see this Court’s decision of 20 December 1996), the respondent did not return the child to its mother at the end of the period stipulated in the decision of 20 December 1996. Furthermore, since 1 February 1997, the whereabouts of both father and child have been unknown, which means that the child has been removed from the applicant’s custody in breach of a court order. Such conduct can only be described as very serious, as it has entailed the cruel and abrupt removal of the child from the family background in which it was being happily brought up, thereby depriving it both now and then of its mother’s love and protection ... at the most tender of ages, with the serious harm which that entails ... Thus, by putting his own interests before those of his child, [A.U.A.] has acted in a manner that is seriously detrimental to the child’s welfare ...” 24. According to a psychologist’s report produced by the first applicant in April 2000, A.U.A. first made contact with her through a telephone call in which he imposed various conditions for the child’s return, threatened her and used the prospect of her not seeing her son again as blackmail. On 12 June 2000 the first applicant lodged a criminal complaint against A.U.A. alleging threatening behaviour and coercion. On 30 September 2000 Vigo investigating judge no. 6 made a provisional discharge order. On an appeal by the first applicant, that order was quashed by the Pontevedra Audiencia Provincial in a decision of 15 May 2001. 25. On 18 April 2000 the first applicant saw her son for the first time since his abduction in February 1997. On 12 May 2000 A.U.A. voluntarily appeared before the investigating judge, who, after hearing his representations, decided not to order his detention pending trial. Finally, on 18 June 2000 the first applicant was able to recover her child with police assistance on A.U.A.’s return to Vigo with the child. She said that for a time she was forced to go into hiding with her son in a shelter for women. 26. On 14 July 2000 the Family Court granted A.U.A. access. As he was prevented from exercising that right, A.U.A. lodged a criminal complaint with the Vigo investigating judge against the first applicant and her parents alleging aggravated contempt.

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10. On 23 October 1995 the applicant was arrested by the militia and detained on remand in the Isolation Block of the Central Department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (слідчui ізолятор Головного Управління міністерства внутрішніх справ Автономної Республіки Крим). 11. On 26 April 1996 the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (судoва колегія з кримінальних справ Верховного суду Автономної Республіки Крим) convicted the applicant of the murder of two persons and sentenced him to death. 12. On the same day the Administration of the Isolation Block of the Central Department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (адміністрація слідчого ізолятору Головного Управління Міністерства внутрішніх справ Автономної Республіки Крим) decided to move the applicant to a separate cell to await his execution, in accordance with the 1993 Pre-trial Detention Act (hereinafter “the Act”). 13. On 25 July 1996 the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (судoва колегія з кримінальних справ Верховного суду Украïни) upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 14. On 20 February, 27 March, 15 May, 26 June and 23 July 1997 the applicant's mother was permitted to visit her son. On 7 October 1997 she was again allowed to visit the applicant, together with the latter's brother. 15. On 24 October 1997 the Vice-President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine rejected an application for leave to lodge an extraordinary appeal, introduced by the applicant's lawyer. 16. On 23 December 1997 the applicant's mother visited her son again. Her next visit took place on 30 January 1998, when she was accompanied by the applicant's brother. 17. A moratorium on executions was declared by the President of Ukraine on 11 March 1997. In judgment no. 11рп/99 of 29 December 1999 the Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the death penalty were contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine. The death penalty was abolished and replaced by life imprisonment by Act no. 1483-III of 22 February 2000. 18. On 26 June 2000 the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea commuted the applicant's death sentence to life imprisonment. 19. Evidence from the applicant was taken by a Court Delegation in Simferopol Prison on 4 October 1999. The Delegation was composed of Judges M. Pellonpää, J. Makarczyk and R. Maruste. The evidence taken may be summarised as follows: 20. The applicant was admitted to Simferopol Prison on 26 October 1995. On the day of the Court Delegates' visit, he confirmed that he had been informed about his rights and obligations. Actually, three or four days earlier, he signed a sheet of paper containing these rights and obligations. 21. He stated that he had been allowed to have a hot shower every Tuesday and could shave with an individual razor blade. At the same time, his hair was cut. Until autumn 1998, he could wash himself only once every ten days. Since the same date he could use an individual razor. According to him, the death row inmates started having soap and cold water in their cells in 1998. Previously, there had been water taps, but the inmates could not switch them on or off, this being done by a guard for all the prisoners. Small windows had been installed in the cells which the inmates could open to let fresh air in. 22. According to the applicant, an iron sheet covered the window in his cell until summer 1998. He confirmed that, at present, the light was enough to read or write, his cell being equipped by two lamps - a normal one and a dimmed one. He said that as far as his cell was concerned, the installation of the lamps, water taps, mirrors, new iron beds and windows had started two weeks before the Delegates' visit. 23. The applicant did not have any contacts with other prisoners. When he shared his cell with another inmate, they were taken together to the shower or for a walk. To the Court Delegates' question: “What was the longest period for which you did not have any contacts with other prisoners?”, he answered: “That was during the investigation, for about three months.” He also said that during the investigation, which had lasted six months, he had been kept in solitary confinement following a Prosecutor's decision, based on a written complaint about his allegedly inappropriate behaviour towards another inmate. According to him, the prisoners had a choice between being detained in double or single cells. He confirmed that, until the present day, he had been in the double cell. 24. He confirmed that since 1996 inmates could buy books in the prison shop and since 1999 they were allowed to get about ten newspapers. In prison there was a public radio - a loudspeaker, which was switched off at ten p.m. 25. To the Court Delegates' question: “Do you have any complaints about the food?”, the applicant answered: “How can we complain about the food when people who work do not get their salaries?” 26. According to the applicant, inmates had been examined by a medical assistant (фельдшеp) on a daily basis, and once a week by the prison doctor who could also be called in case of emergency. 27. The applicant confirmed that when he broke the rules, he was punished by being barred from having visits and receiving parcels. Since the investigation period, he had not broken any rules. As regards the general situation, he had not heard about other inmates being subjected to such treatment. 28. He also confirmed that he saw the prison governor on Thursdays. If he had some questions or complaints, he could lodge an application. 29. When the applicant wished to see his lawyer, he sent an application to the lawyer through the prison governor. Prison guards were present during the visits of the applicant's lawyer. The applicant did not write any detailed complaints or requests, discussing all those issues with his lawyer during their meetings in prison. (b) Prison practice concerning correspondence 30. The applicant was allowed to send and receive letters at the end of 1998. During his stay in Simferopol Prison, he had received four or five letters. He had written to his mother almost every month. He did not receive his mother's letter sent in September 1999, but he did not know whether it was due to the prison censorship control. (c) Prison practice concerning receipt of parcels and small packets [Nota: Parcels to be forwarded to a prisoner may be sent by post (посилка) or brought in person to the prison (передача). Small items like books or periodicals can be sent by post as a small packet (бaндepoль - literally a “bundle”)] 31. The applicant started to receive packages in approximately September 1998. He stated that he had been allowed to get six parcels (посилка, передaча) and three small packets (бандероль) per year. He considered this number satisfactory even though he would have preferred to receive one parcel every month. He confirmed that his relatives were permitted to send him food. (d) Prison clothing 32. The applicant was not allowed to wear any other type of clothes than those provided by the prison officials, except for underwear and socks. In summer the prisoners had to wear jackets and in winter they were given a warm coat and fur hats. According to him, the winter clothes were sufficient for that season. (e) Daily outdoor walks 33. The applicant confirmed that he had started having daily one-hour outdoor walks in summer 1998. The prison guards had not required the wearing of handcuffs since August or September 1999. 34. The witness was the governor of Simferopol Prison during the time of the applicant's detention there. (a) General conditions of the applicant's detention on death row 35. The witness said that on the day of the Court Delegation's visit, about 3,000 prisoners were serving a sentence in the prison, of whom 30 were on death row. 36. According to him, every death row prisoner was aware of his rights and duties. A copy of the list of rights and duties was posted in every cell. He confirmed that there was no secrecy as to the rights and obligations of prisoners and that after the decree about rights and obligations had been published, the prisoners were fully aware of them. 37. He also confirmed that he saw the applicant once a week which was, according to him, regular practice. He said that the applicant had never complained of the conditions of his detention, but disagreed with his sentence to death. He also said that the applicant had been informed about the new instructions and about the new decree concerning the rights and duties of death row inmates. 38. The witness considered the heating conditions sufficient. The prison had its own boiler and there was a fresh-air ventilation system in the cells. According to him, the prisoners had a hot shower once every seven days, when the bed linen was also changed. He denied the applicant's allegation that all death row prisoners were using the same razor, which would have created health problems on account of the risk of infection. He said that the prisoners shaved separately with blades given to them by the prison administration. 39. He stated that in the daytime there were two lamps lit plus natural light from windows in the cells, which he considered sufficient. At night, they had only one lamp lit. He said that every death row inmate had a cell of not less than 12 square metres. There was a possibility of reading books and literature using both natural and artificial light. 40. The witness said that the inmates underwent an X-ray examination twice a year. Once a week the head of the medical division visited them, and every day a medical assistant conducted an inspection. (b) Prison practice concerning correspondence 41. The witness said that death row prisoners had the right to communicate with the outside world without any limitation, both to send and receive letters. He further said that this situation had improved since May 1999. He admitted that under the existing procedure, inmates' correspondence was censored, but he did not remember any case when an incoming letter had been stopped without being given to its addressee, including letters from the European Commission of Human Rights. He confirmed that the applicant's correspondence had been registered in the journal. Moreover, any death row prisoner could complain of any violation of the right to exchange letters to the governor, to the Prosecutor who supervised the prison, or to any other official in this department. (c) Prison practice concerning receipt of parcels and small packets 42. According to the witness, the possibilities for receiving parcels improved in May 1999. Since then, the prisoners were allowed to receive six food parcels (посилка, передача) and two small packets (бандероль) per year. Previously, they had not been allowed to receive any parcel until the judgment in their criminal case had become final. Moreover, the prisoners could buy food in the prison shop. They could spend Ukrainian hryvnas 55 (UAH) per month at prices which were the same as in state-owned shops from which the prison bought the food. (d) Daily outdoor walks 43. According to the witness, prior to May 1998 the inmates had not been not allowed to go for daily outdoor walks. Since then, they had been taken out for one hour without handcuffs. 44. The witness was the doctor in Simferopol Prison, where he had been working since 1992. 45. He said that the prison medical staff included six doctors (four general practitioners, one psychiatrist and one radiologist), medical assistants (фельдшер), an X-ray laboratory assistant, a pharmacist and a clinical assistant. According to him, medical services were provided 24 hours a day. Any inmate could apply at any time and get urgent medical assistance. The death row prisoners were seen by a medical assistant every day during their daily walk. They could ask him for any medical assistance and, if his help was not sufficient, they could request to see the doctor. Besides, they could apply directly to the doctor. Every inmate had a medical file compiled upon his arrival where all details and results of medical examinations were recorded and which was kept during the period of his imprisonment. 46. The witness said that on 26 October 1995 the applicant, upon his arrival at the prison, had complained about having been beaten. In March 1997 he had requested help because he suffered from a respiratory virus infection. 47. He also said that HIV testing of inmates was not obligatory and was only conducted upon individual request. The test was preceded by a confidential interview between the doctor and the prisoner. The witness did not confirm whether there were inmates infected with the HIV virus, claiming that this was confidential information. The only other person who knew about inmates infected by HIV was the doctor responsible for the testing and the preceding consultations. 48. As far as complaints about hygienic conditions in the prison were concerned, the witness had received no such complaints. He considered that the changes in regime for the death row prisoners, especially the possibility of having outdoor walks and natural light in their cells, had improved their health conditions. 49. The witness was a medical assistant having been working in Simferopol Prison for two and a half years. He was responsible for the daily control of the inmates' health conditions, while the doctor made visits and attended emergency situations. He considered that there were particular problems with death row inmates and, in fact, he worked mostly with them. He accompanied these prisoners during their daily outdoor walks. 50. He confirmed that the improvement of living conditions in the death row prisoners' cells had had a positive influence on their health. Since then he had not received any further complaints from them regarding health and hygiene. 51. The witness stated that he had never seen any signs of guards' brutality against the death row inmates or any bodily injuries. He had never heard about such complaints made to other staff in the prison. He examined the inmates on a weekly basis and he reported to his superiors. According to him, the applicant had not complained more than other inmates. He confirmed that he had been observing the applicant for two and a half years without noticing any changes in his mental state. He had not witnessed any strong symptoms of depression of the applicant. 52. The witness was the applicant's mother. In her letter of 29 May 1998 to the Court she complained that her son had been beaten. She confirmed that during his detention in custody, the applicant had been beaten and had not been provided with any medical assistance. He had been interrogated for two hours and, after another two hours, he had been taken to hospital. She could still see traces of the beatings on his face during her meeting with him six months later. She had been allowed to meet her son for the first time six months after the sentence had been pronounced. In this meeting, she had asked her son about the beatings and he confirmed that he had been beaten. (a) Prison practice concerning correspondence 53. She did not have any complaints about the administration regarding receiving and sending letters. She rather complained generally about the prison system. She started to correspond with her son in 1998. However, she was unable to give any details in this regard. She had written her last letter to her son in mid-September 1999 but to date, he had not received it. On the other hand, she confirmed that letters had never been lost. 54. To the Government representative's questions: “During the last two or three months, how often did you send letters to your son? Can you send them every week?”, the witness answered: “If there is a need, I write him a letter.” To the Government representative's questions: “And how often do you get letters from him? Can he write to you more than once a month?”, the witness answered: “A year ago we were allowed to send one letter a month, and now there are no limitations, we can write letters as often as we want.” (b) Prison practice concerning receipt of parcels and small packets 55. The witness confirmed that she started to send parcels (посилка) to her son in 1998. Since then, she had had no complaints against the prison administration in this regard. (c) Prison practice in connection with visits of prisoners' relatives 56. The witness saw the applicant once a month during a visit lasting for about 15-20 minutes or 30 minutes at the most. She had not complained about the duration of her visits or that they had been suddenly interrupted by a prison guard who was always present, being happy to have even these short visits. She spoke with her son over the telephone, seeing him through the glass. She could not see whether he was handcuffed. 57. To the Government representative's question: “And what do you think about the duration of the meetings? Could you tell, judging by the atmosphere, whether if you had asked for the meeting to be extended to one hour or longer, you would have been allowed?”, the witness answered: “I have never asked to prolong the meetings. I think if the administration says it is over, then it is over.” To the Government representative's information: “You have the right to two-hour meetings now”, the witness answered: “It is difficult to talk through glass for two hours.” 58. The witness said that the applicant had never complained in his letters about ill-treatment, beatings or about the prison administration. He had complained about parcels, letters and visits. She admitted that the situation was improving, and that the prison administration understood that inmates sentenced to the death penalty were like other inmates. 59. On 4 October 1999 the Delegates visited the prison. The size of the applicant's cell area was about 12 square metres. The cell was in order and clean. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with one tap with cold water only, two beds fixed on the floor, central heating and a window with bars. There were some books, a newspaper, a stock of soap and toilet paper. The cell was sufficiently heated and ventilated. 60. The Delegates were shown the prison shower area, which was reasonably clean. They also visited an exercise yard. 61. According to the prison shop records, the applicant bought goods on the following occasions: On 25 September 1997 he bought foodstuffs for 5.47 (UAH), on 6 October 1997 he purchased foodstuffs and matches for UAH 9.34, on 23 October 1997 he bought foodstuffs for UAH 5.61, on 5 November 1997 he purchased foodstuffs paying UAH 5.43, on 20 November 1997 the applicant bought toiletries and foodstuffs UAH 6.40, and on 3 December 1997 he bought foodstuffs for UAH 7.36, on 18 December 1997 the applicant purchased different items for UAH 8.41. On 9 January 1998 the applicant purchased foodstuffs and matches spending UAH 9.7, on 22 January 1998 he bought foodstuffs for UAH 6.06, and on 4 February 1998 he bought foodstuffs and matches paying UAH 15.59. 62. From the applicant's medical file which was created on 26 October 1995 it appears inter alia that the applicant underwent an X-ray examination on 26 October 1995, on 18 May and 12 November 1996, on 23 May and 3 November 1997 and on 30 May and 14 November 1998.

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8. The applicants Andrew George McGlinchey and Natalie Jane Best, born in 1985 and 1990 respectively, are the children of Judith McGlinchey (born in 1968). The applicant Hilary Davenport, born in 1945, is the mother of Judith McGlinchey. 9. On 3 January 1999, Judith McGlinchey died in Pinderfields Hospital, Wakefield, West Yorkshire, whilst in the care of the Home Office of the United Kingdom government as a convicted prisoner. 10. Judith McGlinchey had a long history of intravenous heroin addiction and was asthmatic, for which she had been admitted to hospital on six occasions during the previous year. It is purported that Judith McGlinchey had, prior to being imprisoned, told her mother, who now cares for her children Andrew and Natalie, that she wanted rehabilitation assistance to rid herself of the heroin addiction. She told her solicitor that she had tried to refer herself for help but that it was impossible to obtain appointments without inordinate delays. 11. After having been convicted of theft, Judith McGlinchey was sentenced at Leeds Magistrates’ Court, on 7 December 1998, to four months’ imprisonment, despite an alternative proposal for a probation order with a condition that she be treated for her addiction. Thereafter, she was detained at New Hall Prison, Wakefield. She stated to her solicitor that she intended to use the period in custody as an opportunity to rid herself of her addiction to heroin. 12. At the health screening on her arrival at the prison on 7 December 1998, Judith McGlinchey was noted as not seeming excessively withdrawn, depressed or anxious. She weighed 50 kg. She complained of swelling to her left arm, withdrawal symptoms from her addiction and suffering from severe asthma especially when withdrawing, and was kept in the health-care centre pending an examination by a doctor. That evening, Judith McGlinchey telephoned her mother complaining of her infected arm and asthma. During the night, when she was observed to be wheezing, she was given an inhaler. She was also given paracetamol. 13. The prison medical records showed thereafter that she was complaining of withdrawal symptoms and that she was vomiting frequently. The records consisted of the continuous medical record, prescription and administration charts and the nursing assessment notes. Her blood pressure, temperature and pulse were checked daily. 14. On 8 December 1998 Judith McGlinchey was examined by Dr K., the prison senior medical officer, who prescribed antibiotics for her arm, inhalers for her asthma and medication, Lofexidine, to appease the symptoms of heroin withdrawal. The nursing notes stated that she threw a cup of tea across the cell, was “locked in for education” and that during the night she was very loud and demanding. Lofexidine was not administered at 12 noon. The applicants alleged that this was a punishment, while the Government submitted that it was on the instructions of the doctor due to a drop in Judith McGlinchey’s blood pressure. The entries in the nursing notes show that Judith McGlinchey was seen by a medical officer that morning and the drugs record sheet, signed by Dr K., indicates that after a blood pressure reading of 80/60 the next dose of Lofexidine was omitted at 12 noon. 15. On 9 December 1998 the record noted that she remained demanding. She had been told to clean her cell prior to education, which was a reference to the routine tidying-up of the cell and in accordance with normal practice. It was noted that she refused to comply. She was locked in during the education period and declined every meal. In the evening her weight was recorded as 43 kg. It was noted that she had vomited during the evening and had complained of vomiting during the night. She was encouraged to take fluids and given two doses of a mild anti-nausea drug (magnesium trisilicate) by the nursing staff. 16. Her situation was reviewed by Dr K. on 10 December 1998. As stated later in a statement to the coroner dated 4 January 1999, her medical readings (temperature, pulse and blood pressure) remained satisfactory. She did not appear dehydrated – it was noted that her tongue was moist and clean – but as she was still complaining of vomiting she was given an injection of anti-emetic medication. She complained of diarrhoea and stomach cramps to the nurse on duty during the night. A dose of magnesium trisilicate was given for nausea but it was recorded that this had little effect. 17. On 10 December 1998 Judith McGlinchey called her mother in tears, complaining that despite having been given an injection, she could not stop vomiting and was getting no other medical support to assist her to come off drugs. She said that she was having to clean up her own vomit and thought she was going to die. The Government stated that there was a lavatory in her cell which she would have been able to reach and that the practice was for nursing staff to clean up if vomit landed on the floor or any other area. The only member of staff involved in the care of Judith McGlinchey who remains with the Prison Service and who is head of nursing care at the prison has informed the Government that a prisoner would not have been asked to clean up her own vomit and she has no recollection of Judith McGlinchey being asked to do so. 18. On 11 December 1998 she was recorded as keeping down a cup of tea and a glass of juice but was vomiting again during the afternoon and evening. At 6.10 a.m. she was found smoking in bed and when asked what the matter was, she replied “nothing”. The next day, she was found to be “opiate positive”. 19. The doctor examined her on 11 December 1998. She was given a further injection of medication to help with her symptoms. He found her general condition to be stable. In his statement of 4 January 1999 he noted that, following the injection, she was able to keep down oral fluids during the day, although she vomited again in the evening. The Government stated that the doctor checked her for signs of dehydration but did not find any. This was confirmed by Dr K.’s evidence to the coroner. The notes stated that her tongue was moist and clean. In the case of a person who was severely dehydrated, he would have expected the person to be physically very weak and possibly bedridden, to have a fast pulse rate and low blood pressure and, on examination, the eyes would appear sunken, the tongue dry and cracked, the lips drawn and the skin drawn and thin. 20. On 12 December 1998 she continued to vomit and suffered from diarrhoea and abdominal discomfort. Her weight was recorded as 40 kg. She ate nothing. The nursing notes recorded that she had had a better night. There was a reference: “Continues to vomit on occasions? hand down throat.” The medical record stated that she had been observed with fingers down throat and vomit on her hand. 21. On 13 December 1998 according to the nursing entries, there was no vomiting complained of or witnessed apart from twice at the beginning of the night. It was also recorded that she ate a small dinner and slept for long periods that night. There were no entries in the medical record on this day. The doctor stated in his statement of 4 January 1999 that on 12 and 13 December 1998 her temperature, pulse and blood pressure all remained within normal limits. Oral doses of anti-emetic drugs (metoclopromide) were prescribed to follow the injections, and administered on four occasions between 10 and 12 December 1998. In her evidence to the coroner, the head of nursing care stated that the drugs were not given on 13 December as Judith McGlinchey had stopped vomiting. 22. However, at 8.30 a.m. on 14 December 1998, the following was noted in the continuous medical record: “... went to see inmate in cell, as she got out of bed she collapsed against me vomiting (coffee ground). Laid on floor in recovery position and summoned help. Patient appeared unresponsive and appeared to be having a fit. Ambulance called (999). Regained consciousness, still vomiting, 2 nurses helped her onto bed. Oxygen in situ. ECG taken. Unable to obtain pulse or BP. Unable to gain IV access due to abscesses on arms and previous drug use. Next of kin rung at 0915 hours at Judith’s request, unavailable, son to pass on message within half an hour. Taken to hospital by ambulance. Ambulance arrived at 0845 hours and left at 0853 hours for Pinderfields General Hospital, Wakefield.” 23. Lots of “coffee-ground” vomit (altered blood in the stomach) was recorded as being found on her bed. Pinderfields Hospital medical records showed that she was admitted at 9.18 a.m. Her mother was informed around that time that Judith McGlinchey was in hospital and that she was ill but had stabilised. She was recorded as being “... drowsy but movable and responsive. Staff nurse informed me that the white cell count was raised, with abnormal kidney and liver function ... possible diagnosis of ... drug abuse”. 24. Her mother later learned from the nursing staff that on admission Judith McGlinchey’s hair was matted with vomit. 25. On 15 December 1998 at 8 a.m., the following entry was recorded: “Transferred to Ward 7; Ward 7 contacted in the middle of an emergency with her, arrested, but has been resuscitated (sic) and now is having a blood transfusion and an airway [made] ...” At 10.30 a.m.: “... Ward 7 contacted to ask if relatives have been informed of deterioration, they are with her now, they are going to reassess her in half an hour and if no improvement turn off the ventilator.” 26. The hospital informed the family that Judith McGlinchey was in a critical condition and might have suffered brain damage due to the cardiac arrest. Her liver and kidneys were failing and they could not stabilise her. She was ventilated by hand as there were no beds in the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The doctors said that they would stop the medication to see if she came round and breathed on her own and, if not, they would leave her. A Roman Catholic priest was called. The family was advised to say goodbye to Judith McGlinchey and did. She then recovered a little and at 7.15 p.m. she was moved to Bradford Royal Infirmary where there was an ICU bed available. She was stable on the ICU ward although she was kept on life support and was heavily sedated. 27. On 16 December 1998 at 6.45 a.m., Judith McGlinchey’s condition was recorded as stable but critical. At 1 p.m. she was given a very poor prognosis. By 2 p.m. on 18 December 1998, her condition had improved a little. She remained on a ventilator, although sedation had then been stopped. She made jerking movements at times and appeared to be waking up slowly. On the night of 23 December 1998, she opened her eyes and responded to light, although the brain scan did not reveal any activity. 28. On 27 December 1998 Judith McGlinchey was transferred to Pinderfields General Hospital to the High Dependency Unit and from there to Ward 7. It was recorded on 31 December that although her eyes were open, she remained unresponsive and in a critical condition. On 2 January 1999 her mother visited with the children. Her eyes were open but she appeared dark yellow in colour and making jerky movements associated with brain damage. 29. On 3 January 1999 the hospital advised the family to go to the hospital immediately. The prison medical record stated that Judith McGlinchey died at 1.30 p.m. 30. The autopsy report, following the post-mortem examination of 4 January 1999, noted that Judith McGlinchey weighed 41 kg. It stated that although one symptom of heroin withdrawal can be vomiting, the cause of the applicant’s vomiting was never fully established. Episodes of severe vomiting could have caused a tear in the upper gastro-intestinal tract (“a Mallory Weiss tear”) though this would most likely have healed by the time she died. This was the most likely cause of haemorrhaging in the stomach which could result in coffee-ground vomiting. If she had lost a substantial amount of blood, rendering her anaemic, this could have triggered the cardiac arrest. The cardiac arrest precipitated hypoxic brain damage and multi-organ failure with an inevitably fatal outcome. 31. In a letter dated 18 January 1999, the coroner informed the family that an inquest would be held before a jury. At the inquest, which took place on 6 December, evidence was given by Dr K., the prison doctor, Sister N., the head of nursing care at the prison, the forensic pathologist who carried out the post mortem, three consultants from the Pinderfields and Bradford Hospitals who had been involved in treating Judith McGlinchey and the third applicant, Judith McGlinchey’s mother. The latter was represented during the proceedings by a solicitor who put questions to the witnesses on her behalf. 32. During the evidence it emerged that the scales used to weigh Judith McGlinchey in prison were inaccurate and incompatible, those used on reception being two to three pounds out compared with those used subsequently in the health-care centre. Due to this discrepancy, Dr K. explained that he placed greater importance on his clinical impressions of Judith McGlinchey regarding any effect of possible weight loss, but was aware of the potential problem and had given instructions for her weight to be monitored. Notwithstanding that antibiotics had been prescribed for her septic arm, it was also indicated that these had not been given to her over a number of days – out of twenty doses that she should have received over five days, she received sixteen. The head of nursing care, Sister N., was unable to explain the omissions although she suggested that the nurse could have forgotten to sign the medicine card. 33. Both Sister N. and Dr K. gave evidence that Judith McGlinchey did not give a clinical impression of being very ill during this period, stating that she was up and about and associating with others. Dr K. stated that her symptoms had been diminishing and that given her blood pressure, temperature, pulse and her general condition, he had no concern that she was gravely ill or that there was any need to admit her to an outside hospital. It was revealed that Dr K. did not work in the prison on weekends and was not present therefore on 12 and 13 December 1998 before Judith McGlinchey’s collapse. A part-time doctor attended on Saturday mornings and the prison depended on calling a doctor on agency if required. This explained the lack of any record in the notes for 13 December 1998. Sister N. explained that the entry in the nursing notes on 8 December which stated that Judith McGlinchey had been “locked in for education” referred to the routine procedure whereby those prisoners not participating in the education class were detained in their cells during that period. 34. Evidence was also given by the three consultants who treated Judith McGlinchey in hospital, concerning her state on arrival and her subsequent deterioration. They were unable to say with any certainty what had caused her collapse or the bleeding in her stomach. Dr Tobin considered that she was dehydrated on arrival at hospital but, due to her disturbed state, he was unable to put in a central line which would have allowed an accurate analysis to be made. Under questioning, he stated that the signs consistent with dehydration could also have been caused by fresh bleeding but not by one episode of coffee-ground vomiting. 35. In his summing-up to the jury, the coroner summarised the evidence as follows: “... for the first day Judith was admitted in the Health Care Centre ... she was then seen by the doctor, [Dr K.], on the second day, on 8 December. He examined her and made a note. She was still retained in the Health Care Centre but as the week proceeded, Judith started to become unwell. You have heard evidence of the fact that she was a heroin abuser and it was known that if she was to withdraw from heroin she might develop some unpleasant symptoms ... those symptoms might manifest themselves for example with diarrhoea and vomiting, possible stomach cramps, depleted sleep patterns and the like and in fact the information that Judith gave to her mother when she first rang rather gave you the impression that she knew that possibly she was to have a rough road ahead but she was prepared to put up with that. Certainly throughout that week ... it is well-documented that Judith was vomiting profusely. Although she was given medication for that on occasions it only worked for a very short time and it is fair to say that from about midweek onwards she was vomiting at some stage every day. There was also reference to the fact that she had diarrhoea and she was generally unwell. Her nutritional state may well have been not all that it should have been and although drinks were available for her there was no means of monitoring how much liquid she was taking in. It was not possible to monitor whether she was actually drinking and vomiting it back or not drinking at all. There was no attempt at measuring fluid during the course of that week and her vomiting actually progressed and on some occasions it was described as a lot of vomiting. It was referred to in the notes “vomiting +++” which means rather a lot and although she was seen by nursing staff every day and by the doctor on other occasions the medical staff at New Hall Prison were under the impression all along that Judith was showing no signs of being dehydrated. In other words, she was not being depleted of fluids and [Dr K.] explained in his evidence his findings and the fact that he could see no real evidence that she was dehydrated at the time and felt that even with hindsight there was no necessity for her to be admitted into hospital. Almost a week after her admission to [prison] on a particular morning when she woke up ... she virtually collapsed in the presence of nursing staff and she vomited a large amount of ... coffee ground vomit ... There was some discussion during the evidence ... as to whether Judith had actually had a cardiac arrest at that time. In fact all the doctors who subsequently examined her ... felt that that was not likely to have been the case, although there was certainly a collapse and although she may well have lost a fair amount of blood as a consequence of that. There was no evidence at that particular time that she had experienced a cardiac arrest. She was taken by ambulance to Pinderfields Hospital ... where she was immediately placed under the care of Dr Tobin ... His working diagnosis at the time was that Judith may well have some degree of liver failure and that there could also be some ... bleeding from the upper gastro-intestinal tract, the oesophagus ... because of the fact that she had vomited the coffee ground vomit. The evidence of Dr Naomi Carter, the Pathologist ... found some residual material in Judith’s stomach which could well have resembled blood or changed blood but ... was at pains to explain that she could find no source of any bleeding within Judith’s internal organs ... one possible likely cause of the bleed that had produced itself in the coffee ground vomiting was that the retching which she had sustained... might have caused a small tear either in her oesophagus at the point where it reaches the stomach or alternatively in the lining of the stomach itself ... that is a medical condition known as a Mallory Weiss tear but she could not find evidence of that. Her view was that possibly that small tear might well have healed by the time that she saw Judith’s body which was obviously by then some days later. That is the only explanation as to why there was any bleeding ... The significance of that bleed is appropriate because it is highly likely that as a consequence ... Judith will have lost some volume of blood which will have meant that her heart might have had to work harder in order to overcome that and certainly when she was at Pinderfields Hospital she was extremely unwell. Dr Tobin was of the view that he felt that Judith was in fact dehydrated but he could not prove that specifically because you will recall from Dr Tobin’s evidence that it was not possible for him to insert a central line. Had he been able to do that then it might have been that could have been used as a diagnostic tool ... certainly Dr Tobin was of the opinion that there would seem to be some suggestion that Judith was dehydrated, notwithstanding, according to the medical staff at New Hall, they felt that that was not the case as the week had gone on. On the morning of 15 December ... unfortunately Judith experienced a cardiac arrest and it was felt that as a consequence of that she had become deprived of oxygen and ... there would have been a deprivation of oxygen to her brain which would have caused her to sustain what was called hypoxic brain damage. ... The post-mortem evidence ... explained the cause of death and Dr Carter was able to confirm that the cause of death was hypoxic brain damage, deprivation of oxygen to the brain, caused by a cardiac arrest which Dr Carter felt was as a consequence of an upper gastro-intestinal haemorrhage of an undetermined cause ...” 36. The coroner invited the jury to return a verdict of death through natural causes or an open verdict. The jury unanimously returned an open verdict. 37. Legal aid was granted to the three applicants to pursue domestic remedies for compensation. Their solicitors sent a notice of issue, under cover of a letter dated 12 February 1999, to the Treasury Solicitor requesting disclosure of medical and prison records in view of a claim for damages with respect to the death of Judith McGlinchey. 38. In a report dated 13 September 2000, the doctor consulted by the applicants stated, inter alia, as follows: “It is my understanding that repeated vomiting can be a symptom of heroin withdrawal and while I have no personal experience in managing people undergoing a detoxification programme, I would, however, be very unhappy about managing anyone who was vomiting repeatedly, without the use of intravenous fluids, the intravenous administration of anti-emetic drugs and the facility to monitor blood chemistry frequently. ... Judith was severely under weight. Her poor overall nutritional state was almost certainly longstanding and probably connected to her heroin addiction but any prolonged bout of vomiting, from whatever cause, was likely to cause a serious imbalance of her blood chemistry very quickly. Apart from electrolyte disturbance and dehydration, she would be very likely to have had difficulty maintaining an adequate blood sugar level, as she would have had no reserves in the form of stored carbohydrate substances within the body, that could have been utilised, when she was unable to absorb adequate nutrients from her gastrointestinal system due to her persistent vomiting. In such circumstances a vicious circle can occur. A low blood sugar level itself can cause more nausea and vomiting. Multiple metabolic pathways can be interfered with. The subject can become irritable. The level of consciousness may be severely reduced and coma can even occur. Intravenous access is often very difficult in intravenous drug abusers, even for clinicians such as anaesthetists who routinely insert needles. Central lines are likely to be needed. These are special long catheters, often with more than one lumen, that are inserted into major blood vessels close to the heart. I would not expect the average prison medical officer to be proficient in inserting such a line. It is preferable for these lines to be inserted in hospital, by personnel with the necessary skills. After insertion, the correct positioning ... needs to be checked by X‑ray before it is used to administer drugs and fluids. Once inserted their maintenance requires skilled, aseptic nursing care ... I would be inclined to attribute the agitation and apparent lack of cooperation displayed by Judith after her admission ... and before her second collapse to cerebral irritation. Cerebral irritation is often seen following a period of cerebral hypoxia. Certainly, a degree of cerebral hypoxia probably occurred at the time of her collapse [in prison] and continued up to the time that resuscitation was underway at Pinderfields ... The bleeding that occurred, following a period of persistent and violent vomiting, could certainly have been caused by a Mallory Weiss tear as suggested ... in the autopsy report. If Judith had been admitted to hospital earlier, it might still have proved difficult to control the vomiting and, in view of her poor general and nutritional state, if the cause of her bleeding was a Mallory Weiss tear, this might still have occurred, but she would not have had such a degree of dehydration and/or biochemical disturbance, and the consequences of such an occurrence would probably have been less serious. Alternatively, if her vomiting had been brought under control at an earlier stage, the subsequent sad sequence of events might have been prevented.” 39. In his opinion of 30 October 2000, counsel advised the applicants in the light of this medical report that there was insufficient evidence to establish the necessary causal link between Judith McGlinchey’s death and the allegedly negligent care afforded to her in custody. They did not pursue their claims in negligence.

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8. The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Tallinn. 9. On 1 June 1994 the Tartu police initiated criminal proceedings against the applicant on the suspicion of having committed an offence of satisfying his sexual desire in an unnatural manner. 10. On 25 October 1994 the applicant was formally charged with this offence. On the same day he was subjected to a preventive measure in the form of an obligation not leave his place of residence. On 22 November 1994 the applicant was further charged with attempted rape. 11. On 13 January 1995 the preliminary investigation of the charges was complete. On 18 January 1995, upon approval of the indictment by the Tartu Public Prosecutor, the applicant's criminal case-file was sent to the Tartu City Court (Tartu Linnakohus). 12. On 7 January 1997, by a decision of the City Court judge, the applicant was committed for trial. 13. On 17 February 1997 the judge ordered the serving of the indictment on the applicant who received it on 4 March 1997. 14. On 30 June 1997 the applicant wrote a letter notifying the City Court of his change of residence. However, he did not send out the letter, but handed it to his lawyer. 15. On 13 October 1997 the City Court summoned the parties and the witnesses to a hearing which was scheduled for 16 December 1997. 16. On 7 November 1997 the City Court was informed that it had not been possible to serve the summons on the applicant at the address indicated by him in October 1994. Consequently, the hearing was postponed. In mid-December, the applicant's lawyer delivered to the City Court the applicant's letter of 30 June 1997 about his new address. 17. On 19 December 1997 the City Court scheduled a hearing for 12 February 1998. On 12 February 1998 the hearing was adjourned on account of the absence of the applicant's lawyer for health reasons. 18. On the same day the City Court ordered that the applicant be taken into custody. It noted that the applicant had four prior convictions and considered that he could re-offend. The applicant filed an appeal against the order directly with the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus) which, on 17 February 1998, forwarded it to the City Court as appeals to a higher court must be presented through a lower court. On 5 March 1998 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeal. 19. In the meantime, on 18 February 1998, the City Court scheduled a new hearing for 11 March 1998. On 2 March 1998 the applicant's lawyer requested that the hearing be adjourned as it was not possible for him to attend because of a meeting of the Bar Association. His request was granted. 20. On 4 May 1998 the applicant complained to the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor (Riigiprokuratuur) about the delay in examining his case. On 5 May 1998 he addressed a similar complaint to the Ministry of Justice, which asked the City Court to inform it of the reasons for lack of progress in the case. 21. On 21 May 1998 the City Court scheduled a hearing for 24‑25 August 1998. 22. By letters of 25 May 1998 and 26 May 1998 the Ministry of Justice and the prosecutor's office, respectively, informed the applicant that the reason for the delay in dealing with the case from January 1995 until late 1997 was the City Court's heavy workload. They also stated the reasons for the postponement of the hearings. 23. On 20 June 1998 the applicant requested the appointment of a lawyer by the court as he was dissatisfied with the services of the lawyer chosen by him. 24. The City Court heard the applicant's case on 24-25 August 1998. On 24 August 1998 the applicant sought the adjournment of the hearing, arguing that the preliminary investigation had been incomplete and that he did not have a copy of the indictment, which was in the hands of his previous lawyer. He also disputed the legality of the appointment of his new lawyer and requested the removal of the public prosecutor from the case. His requests were dismissed as unfounded. 25. By a judgment of 26 August 1998 the City Court convicted the applicant of attempted rape and sentenced him to 4 years' imprisonment. The City Court heard the testimonies of the victim and two witnesses and examined two medical expert reports. 26. On 1 September 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal against the City Court judgment, arguing that his trial and conviction had been unlawful. The City Court had infringed procedural time-limits concerning the start of the trial stipulated in Articles 184(1) and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure according to which the court must take a decision to try the accused within 10 days from the seizure of the court, and the trial must start no later than 20 days from the taking of that decision. The applicant pointed out that his criminal case-file arrived in the City Court on 18 January 1995, but the decision committing him for trial was taken only on 7 January 1997. At the hearing before the Tartu Court of Appeal on 28 October 1998 the applicant also pointed to the delay in examining his case at the first instance court. 27. By a judgment of 28 October 1998 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal and upheld the City Court judgment. It admitted that the time-limit for committing the applicant for trial had been exceeded, but found no substantial infringement of procedural law which would have entailed a reversal of the lower court judgment. 28. On 24 November 1998 the applicant filed an appeal with the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) in which he argued that the two-year delay in dealing with his case at the trial court was unlawful. 29. On 9 December 1998 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. 30. On 1 March 1999 the competent prosecutor refused the applicant's request to initiate criminal proceedings against the judge of the first instance court as the failure to comply with the procedural time-limits did not constitute a criminal offence. 31. By a letter of 5 March 1999 the Ministry of Justice informed the applicant that there were no grounds to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the judge since there was no evidence of an intentional infringement of procedural rules by him. However, the judge's attention had been drawn to deficiencies in his work.

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9. On 12 December 1995 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court (oблacний суд) convicted the applicant of the murder of four persons and sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. 10. On 22 February 1996 the Supreme Court (Верхoвний суд) upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. The applicant was transferred by the authorities in charge of the Isolation Block of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior (Адміністрація слідчого ізолятору Управління міністерства внутрішніх справ) to one of the cells for persons awaiting execution of their death sentence. 11. A moratorium on executions was declared by the President of Ukraine on 11 March 1997. In judgment no. 11pп/99 of 29 December 1999, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine held that the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the death penalty were contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine. Death sentences were therefore commuted to life imprisonment pursuant to Act no. 1483-III of 22 February 2000. On 2 June 2000 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court commuted the applicant's death sentence to life imprisonment. 12. The facts of the case concerning the conditions of the applicant's detention in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison and the events during his time there were disputed. 13. The facts as presented by the applicant are set out in paragraphs 16 to 19 below. The facts as presented by the Government are set out in paragraphs 20 to 25 below. 14. A description of the material submitted to the Commission and to the Court will be found in paragraphs 26 to 41 below. 15. The Commission, in order to establish the facts in the light of the dispute over the conditions of the applicant's detention and the events which occurred in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, conducted its own investigation pursuant to former Article 28 § 1 (a) of the Convention. To this end, the Commission examined a series of documents submitted by the applicant and the Government in support of their respective assertions and appointed three delegates to take evidence from witnesses at a hearing conducted at the Ministry of Justice in Kiev on 23 and 26 November 1998, and in Ivano-Frankivsk on 24 and 25 November 1998. The Commission's evaluation of the evidence and its findings of facts are summarised in paragraphs 42 to 57 below. 16. On 12 December 1995 the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Court convicted the applicant of the murder of four persons, sentenced him to death and ordered the confiscation of his personal property. 17. On 22 February 1996 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. Upon a decision of the Administration of the Isolation Block of the Ministry of the Interior, the applicant was transferred to a cell intended for prisoners awaiting the death penalty. According to the applicant, he was deprived of all his rights. 18. The applicant claimed that the Pre-Trial Detention Act (“the Act”) did not apply to him, since the relevant legislation was an Instruction which operated in secret. Pursuant to the Instruction, the applicant was not taken for an outside walk for more than two and a half years. He could be visited by his mother only once a month, he had been refused visits and, since July 1996, the number of visits had been reduced to one every three months. 19. Following his application for confession sent to the Greek Catholic Bishop of the Ivano-Frankivsk diocese, the clergy approached the investigative isolation unit on this matter. Since September 1997 both he and his mother had been forbidden to send any letters to each other. 20. The Government stated that the legal status and the conditions governing the detention of persons sentenced to capital punishment were set out in the Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to section 8 of the Act, a person sentenced to death was kept in custody away from other prisoners. The cell to which the applicant had been transferred after his sentence had become final complied with the sanitary and hygiene rules laid down in section 11 of the Act: the cell measured 9 square metres, it had a bed, a table, a radio, sufficient natural and electrical lighting, heating, running water and a toilet. 21. The applicant was provided with three meals a day, clothing and footwear of standard type as well as other articles of everyday use. Medical assistance, treatment, prophylactic and anti-epidemic measures were arranged and implemented in accordance with legislation on health protection. 22. According to section 12 of the Act, prior to the sentence being carried out, prisoners sentenced to death were, as a rule, allowed visits from relatives and other individuals not more than once a month, by written permission of the court within whose jurisdiction the case fell. The length of a visit was two hours maximum. After a case had been dealt with by an appellate court, visits by lawyers and legal assistants could be granted by the Head of the Central Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, the Head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior or his deputy responsible for the isolation block. Visits by defence counsel were granted without any limits as to their number and length. 23. After the first-instance judgment had been given, on 14 December 1995 and 4 January 1996 the applicant's mother and, on 18 December 1995 and 17 January 1996, his solicitor requested permission to visit the applicant. The mother visited the applicant on 14 December 1995 and on 4 January 1996. The applicant's lawyer visited him on 18 December 1995 and on 18 January 1996. During the period from 22 February 1996 to 29 December 1997, the applicant's mother applied for a visit to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior on 29 February, 15 March, 4 April, 5 and 31 May, 23 September, 18 November and 19 December 1996, 3 and 6 June, 24 September 1997 and 4 January 1998. They were granted permission for visits on 29 February, 19 March, 9 April, 7 May, 7 June, 23 September and 4 December 1996, 4 March, 4 June, 4 September and 4 December 1997 and 4 March 1998. The applicant's solicitors applied for a visit on 12 March, 11 April, 23 September, 2 and 18 December 1996. Permission was granted for visits on 15 March, 29 April, 23 September, 2 and 20 December 1996. 24. Persons sentenced to death were allowed to send an unlimited number of letters. During the period 1995-1998, the applicant sent 24 letters: 16 letters relating to the criminal case and 8 letters to his relatives. On 6 October 1997, for the first time, the applicant applied to the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to send letters to his relatives. Thereafter he sent letters to his mother on 3 and 19 November, 9 and 30 December 1997, 19 and 29 January, 16 February, 12 March, 6 April, 6 May, 10 June, 2 July, 6 August, 1 September, 5 October, 4 November and 4 December 1998. He received letters from his relatives on 24 September, 8 and 24 October, 24 November and 25 December 1997, and 14 and 28 January, 5 and 10 February, 13, 16 and 30 March, 6, 9 and 16 April, 6, 12, 20 and 22 May, 3, 17, 22 June, 1, 15, 20 and 30 July, 19, 25 and 31 August, 15 and 17 September, 1, 10, 14 and 22 October, 10, 21 and 23 November and 4 and 17 December 1998. 25. The Government added that the Prosecutor General had conducted a thorough investigation into issues raised in the applicant's and his parents' complaints concerning the application of illegal methods of investigation in the applicant's case, namely torture and brutal and inhuman treatment. The allegations had not been proved and had been found unsubstantiated. In fact, complaints by the applicant and his mother were received on 18 April, 19 and 29 July and 26 August 1996, 31 January, 5 February, 15, 19 and 21 March, 14 and 16 May, 10 June, 16 July 1997, and were answered on 22 April, 24 July, 26 August, 16 September 1996, and on 4 and 7 February, 31 March, 19 and 20 May, 23 June and 23 July 1997. On 19 May 1997 the exchange of letters and the proceedings concerning the complaints filed by the applicant and his mother were terminated pursuant to section 12 of the Act. 26. On 23 October 1998 the applicant's mother submitted a request to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and the prison governor. They requested that a medical commission of independent doctors be set up in order to examine the applicant's state of health. She alleged that the inmates had been tortured, which had resulted in a suicide attempt or an attempt on the applicant's life. On 3 November 1998 the applicant's mother was informed by the governor of the prison that her request had been rejected on the grounds that there had been no sign of torture or the use of any other physical violence against the applicant and that his state of health was satisfactory. 27. On 23 and 24 October 1998 the applicant's mother sent a letter to Mrs Leni Fischer, then President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. She complained of torture inflicted on the applicant and one of his fellow-inmates, Poltoratskiy, which had resulted in the applicant's suicide attempt and alleged that they had been taken to hospital and that the applicant had been paralysed. The mother further complained that she had been prevented from seeing the applicant. 28. In a letter of 26 October 1998 the applicant's mother informed the Commission that “in establishment BI 304/199 in Ivano-Frankivsk there was an attempt to execute the unjustly condemned M. Kuznetsov and B. Poltoratskiy illegally, and that the Government tried to conceal this event”. 29. On 26 October 1998 the applicant's mother sent a request to the Regional Prosecutor to set up a medical commission in order to examine the applicant's state of health. She stated that she had been informed that her son's health had been in danger. 30. The prison doctor issued a medical report on 28 October 1998. The report concluded that the applicant did not show any signs of having been beaten or tortured and that his state of health was satisfactory. It was confirmed and signed by the applicant. 31. In his handwritten statement of 28 October 1998 the applicant stated inter alia that no physical violence had been used against him, that he had been treated in a proper way by the prison administration, that his rights had not been violated, that he had no complaint to the prison administration, that he did not think about committing suicide again and that the prison administration had not been involved in his suicide attempt. 32. The Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior issued a report on 29 October 1998 in response to the applicant's mother's complaint about alleged torture and her request for a medical commission of independent doctors to examine the applicant's state of health. The report stated that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had been examined by the prison doctors who had found no signs of physical injuries. It also stated that the applicant denied that he had been tortured. 33. In a letter of 30 October 1998 the Deputy Head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior informed the applicant's mother that her complaint concerning torture to which the applicant had allegedly been subjected had been examined and found to be unsubstantiated. A medical examination of the applicant had not confirmed any signs of torture. Accordingly, there was no reason to set up a medical commission to investigate the allegations. 34. In a letter of 2 November 1998 the Ivano-Frankivsk Deputy Regional Prosecutor informed the applicant's mother that her complaint concerning visits to the applicant had been examined and that no violation of the applicant's rights in this regard had been found. 35. In his next letter of 18 December 1998, the Deputy Regional Prosecutor informed the Prosecutor General that there had been several medical examinations of the applicant during the last months in order to establish whether there had been any damage to his state of health caused by the prison administration. The last examination had been carried out on 28 October 1998 with the participation of the staff of the Protection of Health Department of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. The examination had established that the applicant had not been treated in a manner which was degrading to his human dignity. 36. On 21 December 1998 the applicant requested permission from the Deputy Head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, Mr Kmyta, to meet a priest. His request was granted and the applicant met a priest on 26 December 1998. 37. In his letter of 10 January 1999 the prison governor informed the applicant's mother that her son had attempted to commit suicide on 3 September 1998 and that he had been saved. He also said that a copy of the decision on refusal to institute criminal proceedings in connection with her son's suicide attempt had been sent to the Regional Prosecutor. 38. In a decision of 5 March 1999 the Senior Prosecutor rejected a criminal complaint by the applicant's mother's against the Ivano-Frankivsk Deputy Regional Prosecutor. He refused to institute criminal proceedings against the Deputy Regional Prosecutor on the ground that no offence committed by him had been found. He stated inter alia that the Act did not apply to the detention conditions of death row prisoners. These were governed by the Instruction, which was covered by the rules on State secrecy. 39. According to the prison records, the applicant's mother applied to visit the applicant on 24 September 1997, and on 4 and 26 March, 27 June, 27 August, 24 October and 30 November 1998. Permission was given on 7 October 1997, 4 March, 22 April, 1 July, 11 August, 17 November and 11 December 1998 for visits which took place on 4 December 1997 and 4 March, 4 June, 6 July, 11 August and 28 November 1998 and on 5 January 1999. The request of 27 August 1998 was not granted. 40. In an undated document Deputy Head of the Isolation Block, Y.M. Pavlyuk, declared that during the period from 11 September 1997 and 18 December 1998, neither the applicant nor his parents had asked for permission for the applicant to see a priest. He further declared that during this period no member of the clergy had asked for such permission. 41. According to the applicant's medical card, the applicant was found to be suffering from gastritis on 13 May and 16 July 1996. On 31 July, 20 August, 16 September, 1 and 6 November 1996, 10 and 15 January, 23 June, 28 August, 12 September, 30 October and 27 November 1997, 23 January, 1 April, 16 July and 4 December 1998 the applicant was found to be suffering from chronic gastritis. On 3 September 1998 the applicant was hospitalised after his suicide attempt. On 4 September 1998 he returned to prison. Between 4 and 7 September 1998 he was administered medicines. On 7 and 18 September, 1, 18 and 28 October, 9, 19 and 27 November 1998 the applicant was seen by the prison psychiatrist and on 28 October and 4 December 1998 he was examined by the prison doctor. 42. Since the facts of the case were disputed, the Commission conducted an investigation, with the assistance of the parties, and accepted oral evidence taken from nineteen witnesses: the applicant; the applicant's parents; Mr Bronislav S. Stichinskiy, Deputy Minister of Justice; Mr Drishchenko, Deputy Prosecutor General; Mr Dotsenko, Head of the Penitentiary Department of the Prosecutor General's Office; Mr Ivan V. Shtanko, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Mr Petro A. Yaremkiv, governor of Ivano-Frankivsk Prison; Mr Bogdan V. Kachur, prison doctor; Mr Valeriy I. Slobodanyuk, prison psychiatrist; Mr Stanislav V. Prokhintskiy, medical assistant; Mr Yuriy M. Pindus, assistant to the prison governor who was on duty on 3 September 1998; Mr Fedir O. Savchuk, assistant to the prison governor who was on duty on the night of 2-3 September 1998; Mr. Mikhail D. Kozakievich, duty guard on duty on the night of 2-3 September 1998; Mr. Bogdan B. Galyas, duty guard on duty on the night of 3 September 1998; Mr Igor P. Ivashko, deputy prison governor; Mr Yaroslav M. Pavlyuk, Deputy Head of the Isolation Block; Mr Valentin M. Nabiulin, Head of the Department for Supervision over Isolation Blocks and Prisons with the Directorate for the Execution of Sentences; Mr Oleksand V. Kmyta, Deputy Head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior; Mr Anatoliy O. Boyko, Head of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior. The Commission's findings may be summarised as follows: 43. The applicant gave evidence before the Delegates that he had been beaten on 2 September 1998, because of a note which he had passed to another inmate, Poltoratskiy, while he had been mopping the floor in the corridor on 1 September 1998. He had informed Poltoratskiy about a letter he had received from his parents and about its contents. According to him, he had just wanted to communicate because he had been bored sitting alone in his cell. Next morning, he had been called out and beaten by six or seven masked persons with clubs in the “cinema room” on his back, legs and shoulders but not on his head. 44. The Commission noted that the applicant had written and had signed a statement on 28 October 1998, to the effect, inter alia, that he had been treated in an appropriate manner by the prison administration, that no physical force had been used against him and that he had nothing to complain about. It took into account the fact that before the Delegates, the applicant had denied the contents of his statement and pointed out that the practice of a prison authority to order an inmate to confirm in writing that he had been treated correctly by prison officers raised suspicions. 45. The Commission considered that the applicant's account of his beating contained a number of details and elements which it would not have expected to find in a fabricated story. It noted, however, that there was no record of any occurrence relating to the ill-treatment described by the applicant. The Commission accepted the applicant's statement that he had not complained in order not to make things worse. However, his account of the events was not supported by any oral or written evidence produced before the Commission or its Delegates. It also noted that the applicant's examination on 3 September 1998 and his subsequent medical treatment between 4 and 7 September 1998 had revealed no sign of physical injury from the ill-treatment he had described. There was no record of such in his medical file by the prison doctor, the prison psychiatrist or the medical assistant . 46. On 3 September 1998 the applicant was found hanging in his cell, but was resuscitated. According to his mother, his suicide attempt was either the result of his ill-treatment by the prison administration or an attempt to execute him. The Commission accepted the evidence given by Mr Dorotsenko, Head of the Penitentiary Department of the Prosecutor General's Office, that on 3 September 1998, at 8.48, during a routine inspection the applicant had been found with a noose around his neck made out of a piece of blanket. The prison staff had taken all necessary medical measures to save his life. After that he had been taken to hospital, from which he had returned on the following day. His mother had last seen him in August 1998. The witness said that by his attempted suicide the applicant had violated prison rules, and had therefore been placed in solitary confinement for 15 days. 47. The Commission observed that the applicant's mother's account of the suicide attempt was not completely borne out by the applicant himself who had testified before the Delegates that he had hanged himself because of the beating by prison officers on 2 September 1998. However, he had not recalled any detail relating to the events of 3 September 1998. He had submitted that he had been in a nervous state and could not endure any longer the treatment to which he had been subjected. The Commission noted in this regard that the applicant's account that he had attempted to commit suicide was supported by the testimony given by the prison governor, his two assistants and by the two warders on duty between 2 and 3 September 1998. The statements of these witnesses might not have been totally consistent in every detail. However, the Commission found such differences to be of a minor nature when considered against the detailed, precise and globally consistent accounts presented by them. 48. In this respect the Commission also attached relevance to the fact that the applicant had immediately been given external heart massage and mouth-to-month resuscitation which had saved his life. At the same time, the ambulance had been called and after the applicant had been examined by the ear, nose and throat specialist, he was transferred to the psycho-neurological hospital where he stayed one day. The Commission noted that three days after his return from hospital, the applicant had stated that he had not hanged himself at all. It considered, however, that the applicant had been then in a state of shock and of partial amnesia. Moreover, the testimony of the prison psychiatrist who had examined the applicant in detail stated that the applicant used to say that he could not see what had caused him to commit suicide and that he could not even imagine why he had done it. The Commission therefore found that it could not be considered as established beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant had been subjected to ill-treatment in prison on 2 and 3 September 1998. 49. On 23 October 1998 the applicant's mother requested the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior and the prison governor to set up an independent medical commission in order to examine the applicant's health. She alleged that inmates had been tortured which resulted in a suicide attempt by the applicant or in an attempt on his life. She repeated this request to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor on 26 October 1998, stating that she had been informed that the applicant's state of health was in danger. On 30 October 1998 the applicant's mother was informed by Mr Kmyta, Deputy Head of the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, that her complaint concerning the applicant's alleged torture had been examined and found to be unsubstantiated and that the latter's medical examination had not revealed any signs of torture. There was, accordingly, no reason to set up a medical commission to investigate the allegations. On 3 November 1998 the mother was informed by the prison governor that her request had been rejected on the grounds that there was no sign of torture or the use of any other form of physical violence against the applicant and that his health was satisfactory. In a letter of 20 November 1998 to the applicant's mother, the Deputy Regional Prosecutor confirmed that, on 28 October 1998, the applicant had undergone a medical examination which had established that no violation of the applicant's rights in this regard had been found. 50. In the meantime, on 29 October 1998, the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Department for the Execution of Sentences of the Ministry of the Interior had stated in its report, inter alia, that on 28 October 1998 the applicant had been examined by the prison doctors who had found no sign of physical injury. 51. On 18 December 1998 the Ivano-Frankivsk Deputy Regional Prosecutor sent a letter to the Deputy Prosecutor General in which he had stated, inter alia, that there had been several medical examinations of the applicant during the previous months which could have established whether the applicant's health had been damaged as a result of his treatment by the prison authorities. The last examination had been carried out on 28 October 1998, with the participation of the staff of the Protection of Health Department of the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior, and it was found that the applicant had been treated in an appropriate manner. On 10 January 1998 the governor of the prison informed the applicant's mother that the applicant had attempted to commit suicide on 3 September 1998 and that he had been saved. He also informed her that a copy of the decision on refusal to institute criminal proceedings in connection with her son's suicide attempt had been sent to the Regional Prosecutor. The domestic investigations had then ended on 5 March 1999 with a decision by the Senior Prosecutor on the applicant's mother's criminal complaint against the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Prosecutor. The Senior Prosecutor had refused to institute criminal proceedings on the ground that no offence had been established. 52. The Commission found that there were no contemporaneous records giving details of any investigation, which the domestic authorities had carried out into the applicant's mother's allegations of the events on 2 and 3 September 1998. It had not seen a single document proving that an investigation had been carried out by the domestic authorities other than those directly involved in the facts of which the applicant's mother complained. Moreover, although it appeared from the extract of the applicant's medical file and from the evidence given by Mr B.V. Kachur, prison doctor, that the applicant had been under medical care between 4 and 7 September 1998 and had been seen by the prison psychiatrist on 7 and 18 September and 1, 18 and 28 October 1998, the applicant's medical examination with the participation of the staff of the Ivano-Frankivsk Protection of Health Department had been carried out on 28 October 1998, i.e. more than one month after the applicant's alleged ill-treatment. 53. The Commission found that the eight “death row” inmates in Ivano-Frankivsk Prison, including the applicant, were kept in single cells without the opportunity to communicate with other inmates. The applicant's cell measured 2 by 5 by 3 metres. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with one tap with cold water, two beds, a table and a little bench, both fixed on the floor, central heating and a window with bars. The applicant had in his cell some books, onion, garlic, oil, a stock of soap and toilet paper. During the Delegates' visit on 24 and 25 November 1998, the cell had been overheated, particularly in comparison with other rooms in the prison. The light was on 24 hours a day and the central radio was switched off at night. The inmates were frequently observed by prison warders through a spy hole in the door of the cell which deprived them of any kind of private space. The cell was freshly painted, from which the inference may be drawn that conditions had been worse prior to the Delegates' visit. The Commission accepted the applicant's evidence that until May 1998, he had not been allowed to take daily outdoor walks and that the shutters had been removed from the window in his cell in November 1998. The Commission found the applicant's evidence - which was not contested by the Government - persuasive. 54. The Commission further accepted the applicant's mother's evidence that the applicant had been suffering from nervous disorder already before he had been sentenced and detained. On the ground of his mental illness he had been relieved from military service. Moreover, he had been suffering from chronic gastritis. 55. Concerning the applicant's mother's visits, the Commission found that apart from her request of 27 August 1998, all her requests for visits had been granted. The prison records showed that she had applied to visit her son on 24 September 1997 and 4 and 26 March, 27 June, 25 July, 24 October and 30 November 1998. Permission had been given on 7 October 1997 and 4 March, 22 April, 1 July, 11 August, 17 November and 11 December 1998 for visits which had taken place on 4 December 1997 and 4 March, 4 June, 6 July, 11 August, 28 November and 5 January 1999. The Commission pointed out that the mother's requests to visit to the applicant of 24 September 1997 and 26 March 1998 had been granted for 4 December 1997 and 4 June 1998, i.e. about three months after the requests had been submitted. Moreover, two warders had been present during the mother's visits, being authorised to interrupt the conversation if they considered that the mother or the applicant had said anything “untrue”. 56. Regarding the applicant's correspondence, the Commission found that on 6 October 1997 the applicant had applied for the first time to the Ivano-Frankivsk Regional Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior for permission to send a letter to his relatives. Thereafter he had sent letters to his mother on 3 and 9 November 1997, 9 and 30 December 1997, and 19 and 29 January, 16 February, 12 March, 6 April, 6 May, 10 June, 2 July, 6 August, 1 September, 5 October, 4 November and 4 December 1998. He had received letters from his mother on 24 September, 8 and 24 October, 24 November and 25 December 1997, and 14 and 28 January, 5, and 10 February, 13, 16 and 30 March, 6, 9 and 16 April, 6, 12, 20 and 22 May, 3, 17 and 22 June, 1, 15, 20 and 30 July, 19, 25 and 31 August, 15 and 17 September, 1, 10, 14 and 22 October, 10, 21 and 23 November and 4 and 17 December 1998. 57. The applicant gave evidence that his mother had requested permission for a priest to come to see the applicant. However, from the undated document signed by Mr Y.M. Pavlyuk, Deputy Head of the Isolation Block, it appeared that during the period from 11 September 1997 to 18 December 1998, neither the applicant nor his mother nor a member of the clergy had asked for such permission.

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10. On 3 April 1997 the Zaporozhie Regional Court (Запорізький обласний суд) convicted the applicant of the murder of three persons and the attempted murder of one person and sentenced him to death. 11. On the same day the Administration of the Zaporozhie Isolation Block of the Central Department of the Ministry of the Interior (адміністрація слідчого ізолятору Головного Управління Міністерства внутрішніх справ України в Запорiзькій областi) decided to move the applicant to a separate cell to await execution, in accordance with the Pre-trial Detention Act 1993 (hereinafter “the Act”). 12. On 24 July 1997 the Supreme Court (Верховний суд) upheld the judgment of the first-instance court. 13. On 15 August 1997 the Prosecutor General (Генеральний Прокурор), on an extraordinary appeal by the applicant's mother, found that the national courts had properly assessed all the evidence adduced before them and had reached sound legal conclusions. He held that the appeal was manifestly ill-founded. 14. On 27 August 1997 the applicant filed a plea for pardon with the President of Ukraine. 15. On 19 September and 15 December 1997 the Vice-President of the Supreme Court refused two further extraordinary appeals by the applicant's wife and mother. 16. A moratorium on executions was declared by the President of Ukraine on 11 March 1997. In a judgment no. 11рп/99 of 29 December 1999 the Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the death penalty were contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine. The death penalty was abolished and replaced by life imprisonment by Act no. 1483-III of 22 February 2000. 17. On 14 June 2000 the Zaporozhie Regional Court commuted the applicant's death sentence to one of life imprisonment. 18. The evidence of the applicant was taken by the Court Delegates in Zaporozhie Prison no. 1 on 6 October 1999. The Delegation was composed of Judges M. Pellonpää, J. Makarczyk and R. Maruste. The statements of certain witnesses were taken in Zaporozhie Prison no. 2. The evidence taken may be summarised as follows: 19. The applicant was admitted to Zaporozhie Prison no. 1 two weeks before the Court Delegates' visit. Previously, he had been detained in Zaporozhie Prison no. 2, where he had stayed for three years. On the day of the Court Delegates' visit, he confirmed that he had been informed about his rights and obligations. However, the practice in Zaporozhie Prison no. 2 had been different. He described it as follows: “Whenever a commission from Kiev came - they do not care much when the local commission from the supervising prosecutor's office comes - the prison authorities distributed a sheet of paper with rules, posted it on the walls and the next day took it off. Although the paper was not on the walls in the cells, we were informed about it.” 20. In Zaporozhie Prison no. 2, the applicant changed cells every week and later every month, having generally been detained alone. This practice had still been in force six months ago. According to him, the windows in his cells had been covered and there was no water tap. The cells for two inmates were the same size as those in Zaporozhie Prison no. 1, but those for one inmate were much smaller, even twice as small, as the cell where he was detained on the day of the Delegates' visit. The applicant acknowledged that he had been detained alone at his own request. However, when the prison administration of Zaporozhie Prison no. 2 had insisted that he share the cell with somebody else, he had agreed. 21. The applicant had not been officially informed about the moratorium on execution of death sentences, learning about it from the radio and other inmates. 22. When he had been transferred to death row, two inmates had been taken out to be executed. The executions had been carried out in Dnipropetrovsk Prison. Although inmates had rarely been informed about any execution taking place, they could observe that the inmates concerned had been handcuffed and taken away without their personal belongings, which had been recovered by the prison administration officials later. 23. According to the applicant, cells in Zaporozhie Prison no. 2 had been very cold in the wintertime until the heating was switched on and had been hot in the summertime. 24. The applicant had repeatedly complained of the conditions of detention in Zaporozhie Prison no. 2, but had always been told that there were no financial resources for improving them. He alleged that certain of his written complaints had not reached their addressees. 25. He had suffered from stomach aches and high acidity, but the prison medical staff had not given him medication because they did not have any, and had prescribed the wrong drugs, which had not helped him. A medical assistant had usually seen inmates once or twice a week, registering those wishing to see a doctor. However, a visit to the doctor had been permitted upon application to the prison governor. The applicant had visited the doctor outside his cell once or twice during his stay in Zaporozhie Prison no. 2. He said that he had probably applied to see a doctor only once because, on the first occasion, he had been examined not by a general practitioner but by a psychiatrist, and had been told that his stomach was fine, even though during the examination he had felt pain in his stomach. The applicant had then been allowed to have dietary food for one month. 26. The applicant said that some of his teeth had not been treated, but only extracted. His relatives had suggested bringing all the necessary medication for proper dental treatment, but the prison administration had refused. He said that, according to the regime, dental treatment had not been provided by Zaporozhie Prison no. 2. 27. The applicant had not been allowed to watch TV, but his relatives had brought him books and newspapers. He felt that in Zaporozhie Prison no. 1 there was a humane attitude among the prison staff, unlike Zaporozhie Prison no. 2, where he had been psychologically ill-treated. According to him, inmates' relatives had also been treated in a very improper manner. 28. The lamp in the applicant's cell in Zaporozhie Prison no. 1 where he was detained on the day of the Delegates' visit was permanently switched on and daylight was let in through the window. The lamp in his cells in Zaporozhie Prison no. 2 had been much stronger. (b) Prison practice concerning daily outdoor walks and visits from the applicant's relatives 29. The applicant had started to have daily outdoor walks one and a half years before the Delegates' visit. He had been allowed to walk for 20-30 minutes, and sometimes for 50 minutes without handcuffs. The prison administration had not informed him how long walks had to last according to national law. His wife had brought a copy of the prison rules which specified that walks had to last for between one and two hours. To the Delegates' question: “When you were informed by your wife about those rules, did you complain that you had not been allowed to have meetings with your wife for one hour or to have walks according to these rules?” the applicant answered: “We filed complaints. Regarding the meetings, we were told that there were too many inmates, especially those who were still under investigation, and that the prison did not have enough facilities to allow all inmates to have longer meetings.” To the Delegates' next question: “Does that mean that this practice continued all the time?” the applicant answered: “Thanks to my wife, we found out that the prison rules adopted in 1993 allowed us to have one-hour meetings.” 30. When the applicant learnt that walks should last one hour, the prison administration prevented him from taking them. In practice, when other inmates went for an outdoor walk, he was summoned to a meeting. As soon as the meeting was over, the exercise period was over too. This had lasted until the applicant's wife and mother said that they would complain to the Court, and had stopped about one or two months before the Delegates' visit. (c) Prison practice concerning receipt of parcels and small packets [Note : Parcels to be forwarded to a prisoner may be sent by post (посилка) or brought in person to the prison (передача). Small items like books or periodicals can be sent by post as a small packet (бaндepoль - literally a “bundle”).], and correspondence 31. After the applicant's death sentence had become final, he was allowed to receive one parcel every two months. Once he had been given permission to go for outdoor walks, his correspondence had been limited to one letter per month and one small packet weighing up to two kilograms every six months, including food, toiletries and clothes. According to him, these allowances were not sufficient, taking into account the poor quality of the food in prison and the fact that at that time he had not been able to buy goods in the prison shop. He said that six months prior to the Delegates' visit a new rule was introduced allowing him to purchase goods for an amount equal to 70-75% of the statutory minimum wage. The applicant confirmed that he always had sufficient money in his prison bank account to buy goods from the prison shop. 32. As far as correspondence with his relatives was concerned, the applicant confirmed that at the date of the Delegates' visit he could send and receive an unlimited number of letters. He further confirmed that he had the right to receive one parcel of 8 kilograms and three small packets every two months. 33. The witness was the governor of Zaporozhie Prison no. 1. He had a staff of 129 officers. (a) General conditions of the applicant's detention on death row 34. The witness said that there were 836 detainees in the prison, of whom 176 were serving a prison sentence, including 18 on death row. He confirmed that the applicant had been transferred to Zaporozhie Prison no. 1 recently. 35. He confirmed that a document with prisoners' rights and obligations was posted in cells. Inmates could read it and familiarise themselves with the contents of the document. He said that several changes for death row prisoners had taken place since the moratorium on executions had been introduced: previously, they had not been allowed to go for daily outdoor walks and could receive only two small packages per year and one letter per month. He confirmed that the prison administration had informed the death row prisoners about the moratorium. 36. As to the number of prisoners in the cells, the prison administration complied with national law requiring that no more than two prisoners should be held in one cell. The administration respected inmates' wishes to be detained alone, as the applicant himself had requested. During winter, cells were heated to about 22-25o C. 37. Inmates could complain to him or to the public prosecutor, but the witness had not received any complaints. He said that every month an official from the Department for Execution of Sentences and the Deputy Public Prosecutor walked around the cells and collected complaints. Inmates complained of their sentences, but not of the detention conditions. 38. The witness visited death row inmates at least every week. On several occasions he had met the applicant, who had not complained of his detention conditions. 39. He confirmed that a member of the prison medical staff visited the cells on a daily basis. If need be, the inmate was transferred to the prison medical unit for appropriate treatment, or if necessary to a hospital. (b) Prison practice concerning daily outdoor walks, receipt of parcels and small packets and correspondence, and visits from prisoners' relatives 40. The death row prisoners had started to take daily one-hour outdoor walks in March 1998. The changes concerning parcels and correspondence had been introduced on 25 June 1999. The prisoners were not handcuffed during their outdoor walks. Moreover, they had the right to have one two-hour meeting with their relatives per month and could receive six parcels and three small packets per year. 41. He said that outgoing letters were not censored, although they were opened and looked through. Incoming letters from the Court and the Prosecutor General were never opened, as provided for in the Pre-Trial Detention Act. Unlike letters to and from prisoners' relatives, parcels were registered in a special file. The witness said that no inmates had complained that letters had not been sent or received. As far as letters to inmates' legal representatives were concerned, prisoners usually applied for a visit by a lawyer. The witness confirmed that the procedure of not registering letters had been introduced on 25 June 1999. 42. The witness was the prison doctor and had been working in Zaporozhie Prison no. 1 for four years. She knew the applicant personally. She confirmed that the prison administration could provide all necessary dental treatment inside the prison. According to her, there was no difference in the medical regime between death row prisoners and other inmates. 43. The witness was the governor of Zaporozhie Prison no. 2. He took up his duties on 4 September 1998. General conditions of the applicant's detention on death row 44. He said that on the day of the Delegates' visit, 1,735 persons were detained in the prison, all of them in pre-trial detention. He confirmed that the applicant had recently been transferred to Zaporozhie Prison no. 1. 45. The witness personally knew the applicant, who had not complained about his detention conditions, although in early July 1999 he had criticised the duration of his meetings with his relatives, alleging that they should have lasted for two hours. The head of the department and the first deputy to the regional prosecutor had investigated the facts and found that the applicant's complaint was well-founded. However, the prison administration could not grant the applicant longer meetings, having regard to the large number of prisoners waiting for such meetings. In general, inmates' complaints were registered in a journal and, at the same time, in their personal files. A reply was delivered to the inmate concerned for information and signature. 46. The witness confirmed that, before their sentences became final, inmates on death row could not send or receive correspondence, but two parcels per month were allowed. After the sentence became effective the regime changed. 47. The witness said that the applicant had moved from one cell to another every ten days in accordance with the rules, having been confined alone in a double cell as he had requested. He confirmed that all four death row cells in the prison facility were double cells of the same size. On the day of the Delegates' visit two of them were empty. 48. He confirmed that he had met the applicant's wife when she had asked for a meeting with her husband, but he had never heard any complaints from her regarding the applicant's conditions of detention. 49. The witness was the doctor in Zaporozhie Prison no. 2, where she had been working since June 1999. She had heard about the applicant, although he had never applied to her for any medical assistance. 50. She confirmed that every other day the feldscher (фельдшер) (medical assistant) walked around the cells and registered complaints and requests to see a doctor. She had not heard about the applicant's stomach problems, and denied that the applicant would have been refused dental care. According to her, the prison administration had a high-level professional dentist, and all inmates were entitled to his assistance. 51. The prison medical unit contained 15 persons including a radiologist, a dermatologist, a psychiatrist, a dentist, a physician and feldchers. The unit had all the necessary equipment and medication to provide qualified medical assistance. If inmates' relatives brought medicines or vitamins, the inmates received them through the medical unit. The witness confirmed that an inmate's consent was necessary for an HIV test. According to her, it was not possible that an inmate suffering from tuberculosis would be held together with another inmate: on arriving at the prison he underwent an X-ray examination, the results of which were ready on the same day. If he was diagnosed with tuberculosis, he was kept separately. If he came from preliminary detention, he had his medical record with him. 52. The Delegates visited the cell where the applicant was detained. The cell was about 10 square metres. It was renovated, in order and clean. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with a cold water tap, two beds and a table fixed to the floor, central heating and a window with bars. There were some books, a newspaper, and a stock of soap and toilet paper. The cell was sufficiently ventilated. 53. The Delegates saw the prison shower area, which seemed to be renovated and was clean. They also visited the exercise yard. 54. The Delegates visited two cells intended for inmates sentenced to death, which were empty on the day of their visit. The size of the cells was about 12 square metres. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with a cold water tap, two beds fixed to the floor, central heating and a window with bars. The cells were properly ventilated. 55. The Delegates saw the prison shower area shortly after a group of female detainees had taken a bath. The area included two rooms without windows. They were very humid and dirty. 56. The Delegates were not allowed to visit cells which were occupied by death row inmates. 57. According to the prison records, the applicant's wife and mother applied to visit the applicant on 21 August, 23 September, 23 October, 21 November and 23 December 1997 and on 18 and 25 February, 25 March, 18 April and 21 May 1998. They visited the applicant on 23 September, 23 October, 21 November and 23 December 1997 and on 23 January, 25 February, 25 March, 24 April and 26 May, 25 September and 27 October 1998. His mother also visited him on 26 January 1999 and his wife, on 25 December 1998 and 26 February 1999. 58. On 26 August, 27 October and 26 December 1997 and on 27 February, 24 April and 27 October 1998, the applicant received packages from his wife and mother. They generally contained food and toiletries, but also clothes. 59. The applicant regularly purchased goods from the prison shop. According to the prison shop records, in October and December 1997 he spent 16.30 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) and UAH 10.40. In February and March 1998 he bought different articles for UAH 10.25 and UAH 17.50. On 23 June (UAH 45.20), 18 August (UAH 64.66), 10 September (UAH 16.40), 19 October (UAH 18) and 12 November 1998 (UAH 6.20), he purchased food and toiletries. In January and February 1999 he spent UAH 38.94 and UAH 8.70. 60. According to the prison records, the applicant received money in his prison bank account on 3 July (UAH 40), 26 June (UAH 100), 8 September (UAH 30) and 27 October 1998 (UAH 50). 61. According to the prison records, the applicant sent letters on 18 May, 15 June, 19 August, 28 September and 29 October 1998. However, the document submitted to the Court did not specify the addressees. 62. On 12 November 1998 the Zaporozhie Regional Prosecutor informed a certain Mrs Belova that the prosecutor, on a complaint by her, had inspected Zaporozhie Prison no. 2. He had found that none of the death row inmates had complained of any violation of the Convention. As far as the regime and conditions of detention were concerned, the prison administration followed the provisions of the Instruction of 20 April 1998 (see paragraph 73 below). He further said that Mrs Belova's suspicion about tuberculosis being spread in the cells of the death row inmates had not been well-founded. He acknowledged that one inmate had died in March 1998 but his cell and those of his neighbours had been cleaned and disinfected. Moreover, inmates regularly underwent X-ray examinations and, so far, no inmates had had to be treated for tuberculosis.

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10. On 5 March 1996 the applicant was arrested by the Russian police and detained on remand in Krasnodar (Russia). On 7 March 1996 he was transferred to Simferopol (Ukraine) where he continued to be detained on remand. 11. On 10 February 1997 the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (судова колегія Верховного суду Автономної Республіки Крим) convicted the applicant of masterminding and carrying out organised crime and on several counts of aiding and abetting murder and attempted murder, and sentenced him to death. It also ordered the confiscation of his property. 12. On the same day the Administration of the Isolation Block of the Central Department of the Ministry of the Interior of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (адміністрація слідчого ізолятору Головного Управління Міністерства внутрішніх справ Автономної Республіки Крим) moved the applicant to one of the cells for persons awaiting execution of the death sentence. 13. On 15 May 1997 the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of Ukraine (судова колегія з кримінальних справ Верховного суду України) upheld the judgment given at first instance. 14. A moratorium on executions was declared by the President of Ukraine on 11 March 1997. In judgment no. 11рп/99 of 29 December 1999 the Constitutional Court held that the provisions of the Criminal Code concerning the death penalty were contrary to the Constitution of Ukraine. The death penalty was therefore abolished and replaced by life imprisonment by Act no. 1483-III of 22 February 2000. 15. On 8 June 2000 the Supreme Court of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea commuted the applicant's death sentence to life imprisonment. 16. Evidence of the applicant and four other witnesses was taken by the Court Delegates in Simferopol Prison on 4 October 1999. The Delegation was composed of Judges M. Pellonpää, J. Makarczyk and R. Maruste. The evidence taken may be summarised as follows: 17. The applicant stated that he had not been informed that under the general conditions he was entitled to a visit of one to two hours by his relatives. In general, he had been allowed to have one visit per month for 15-20 minutes or half an hour at the most. He said that until the day of the Court Delegates' visit, he had not received a document with his rights and obligations under the prison regime. He further said that he had been moved that day into a newly renovated cell where “something like” that was hanging on the wall. He stated that he had been asked by the prison administration to sign the document, but had refused and had said that he wanted first to be informed about his rights and obligations. According to him, in his previous cell there had been no document listing those rights and obligations. Whenever he had been punished, he had always asked to be shown this document. However, he had been told that it was a secret document. 18. As a punishment, he had once not been allowed to have daily walks for 10 days, he had been kept in isolation under a strict regime, and he had not been allowed to buy food in the prison shop. He had been punished for the first time when he had shared the cell with another inmate; a warder had found “something like a knife” on the other inmate, and the applicant had intervened. On the second occasion, a warder had found a soap of good quality in the cell, had asked where the applicant had found it and had later seized it. The applicant had been punished by being prevented from meeting his two children. 19. According to the applicant, health conditions in the prison were not satisfactory and he was not treated properly as far as his health was concerned. He had never been thoroughly examined, although, according to the rules, inmates had to have a complete medical check-up twice a year. The applicant had complained about food which had caused diarrhoea and stomach-aches, but had been told that such problems were not serious. He had also complained about heart-pains, headaches and toothache and especially problems with his crowns. 20. According to him, inmates were not provided with soap when taking a shower. However, they were allowed to have their own soap. 21. To the Court Delegates' question: “You are complaining about the food. I understand that you consider that the food provided here provokes diarrhoea and stomach-aches. You also complain that you are not allowed to receive parcels of food, vitamins, books and clothes. We learned that the situation had changed recently, last May. Now you can receive parcels and you can buy more goods from the prison shop. Do you confirm that?” the applicant replied: “Yes, more or less. However, what we can get is not sufficient.” In fact, the applicant confirmed that he was allowed to receive one parcel and two small packets every two months. 22. The applicant did not have any contact with other prisoners, apart from the period when he shared his cell with another inmate. 23. To the Court Delegates' question: “Did you ever have a feeling that there was any real attempt by the Government to hinder your complaint to the Strasbourg institutions?” the applicant's lawyer who is also the applicant's wife replied: “Yes, by the Supreme Court. As long I was associated with Mr Aliev, they were reluctant to help me all the time. Actually, he was arrested in Russia, in Krasnodar, but the head of the Simferopol Directorate no. IV, Mr Zverev, personally went there and brought him here without any documents. The applicant was beaten and intimidated. Afterwards, it was recorded that he had been arrested in Simferopol.” (b) Prison practice concerning visits from the applicant's relatives and his lawyer 24. The applicant was handcuffed during his wife's visits. A warden was present all the time, listening to the conversation. He could interrupt the visit. Once, the applicant was allowed to speak for only three minutes. He was not allowed to speak in the Avarian language, which is his mother tongue. The warden interrupted him when he spoke in that language. The applicant did not answer the Delegates' question whether he had complained about the interruption of the visits. On the day of the Delegates' visit, he stated that there was no longer any language ban during his visits. However, in response to the Government representative's question: “Since when? The Government has your letter in which you say that there is no problem with communicating in your native language”, the applicant stated: “Now there is no problem because we do not speak it.” 25. In response to the Government representative's questions: “Have there been any cases when the prison administration refused you permission to meet your lawyer?” the applicant stated: “Yes, that has happened. I was even told that there was some information coming from Kiev about that.” When asked: “When was the last time you met your representative?”, he replied: “Two weeks ago.” When the Government representative said: “So, two weeks ago you met your lawyer. Earlier you said that you had a meeting with your relatives in May 1999, which means you have not seen them for four months. However, your lawyer is in fact your wife”, the applicant's lawyer answered: “I am his lawyer. I am a member of the Russian Regional Bar Association. According to the international legal rules, I can represent my husband's interests abroad, and thus even in Ukraine. However, when I come to the Department for the Execution of Sentences, I always fear that my request to visit him will be refused. Today I found a letter from the Crimean Bar Association saying that, according to the Decree on Bar Associations, Aliev can only be represented by a Ukrainian citizen, so I cannot represent him any more. Owing to legal restrictions I have not, for the last three and a half years, had any intimate contact with my husband. I have two children; my five-year-old child realises that his father is in prison.” 26. To the Government representative's question: “Do you confirm that for the last four months you have not had meetings with your relatives, bearing in mind that two weeks ago you met your wife?” the applicant replied: “I did not have a date with my wife; it was a formal meeting with my lawyer. It is different.” (c) Prison practice concerning daily outdoor walks 27. The applicant had been allowed to have outdoor walks since 24 May 1998. He said that he had been allowed to go for a walk except for the days when he had taken a shower, i.e. once every ten days. He then specified that in September 1999 the prison administration had arranged a shower every seven days, and on that day the inmates could not have a daily walk. He stated that during the walks the inmates had been handcuffed, holding their hands behind their backs. On 31 August 1999 they had been allowed to go for a walk without handcuffs. According to him, in winter they had not gone for walks. (d) Prison practice concerning receipt of correspondence 28. Since May 1998 the applicant was allowed to write one letter per month. His mail was censored, and one letter from his wife had not been given to him, a fact that he learned during his wife's visit. (e) The alleged ill-treatment of the applicant in prison 29. In his original application, the applicant alleged that he had been beaten in January 1998, that some masked men had entered his cell and that the prison governor had also been present. Before the Delegates he stated that only a certain Captain Doroshenko had not been wearing a mask. To the Court Delegates' question: “What, in your view, was the motive for this action?” the applicant replied: “In prison here everything is controlled by fear; nobody tries to educate or rehabilitate people, only to use force.” To the Court Delegates' further questions: “But why did that only happen to you? We have no other complaints. Why did they select you to enforce this 'fear policy'?” the applicant replied: “Many people complain. However, their complaints do not reach the complaints bodies. When someone is afraid, it is easier to control him.” 30. The applicant saw the governor of the prison for the first time on 20 August 1999 after having been beaten because he had not wanted to take off the shorts he had been wearing in hot weather. According to him, beatings had happened quite often before. He had not recognised the people who were beating him, apart from Mr Doroshenko who had not been masked and had given the orders. They had beaten him on his back and had torn his shorts to pieces. The applicant had neither complained to the prison governor nor requested medical assistance considering it to be “useless”. 31. He had also complained to the Prosecutor General's Office, but his letter had not, according to him, reached the addressee, having been stopped by the prison authorities. He said that the Prosecutor General had visited the prison in mid-September 1999, but the applicant was not aware of the results of the visit. The Prosecutor General, accompanied by Colonel Zemlyanskiy from the Crimean Department of the Interior, had asked the applicant about his complaints to the Court. The applicant had confirmed that there had been pressure exerted on him not to complain to Strasbourg. He had expressed fear about the consequences of the Court Delegates' visiting him. 32. The applicant said that prison warders had organised some sort of training three or four times a year or when inmates had seriously violated the prison rules. He described the training as follows: “People in masks come and throw explosive packets with nuts at the cells, making a sound like a grenade. They also shoot with rubber bullets. The inmates are forced to lie down on the floor and the wardens walk through, beating them and pulling some of them to the corridor by the leg.” The applicant had once been burned. According to him, the last “training session” had taken place in February 1999. 33. The witness was the governor of Simferopol Prison. He had been working as governor for two and a half years. (a) General conditions of the applicant's detention on death row 34. The witness said that about 3,000 prisoners were serving sentences of whom 30 were on death row. According to him, all prisoners were aware of their rights and duties. A copy of the list of rights and duties was posted in every cell. He confirmed that there was no secrecy as to the rights and obligations of prisoners and that after the decree about prisoners' rights and obligations had been published, the prisoners were aware of them. 35. The witness said that he regularly visited all death row prisoners once a week. 36. He considered the heating conditions to be sufficient. The prison had its own boiler and there was a fresh-air ventilation system in the cells. According to him, the prisoners took a hot shower once every seven days, when the bed linen was also changed. He denied the applicant's allegation that all death row prisoners used the same razor, which would have created health problems on account of the risk of infection. He said that they shaved separately with blades given to them by the prison administration. 37. He stated that in the daytime there were two lamps lit in addition to the natural light from the cell windows, which he considered sufficient. At night, they had only one lamp lit. He said that every death row inmate had a cell of not less than 12 square metres. It was possible to read books and literature using both natural and artificial light. 38. The witness said that the inmates underwent an X-ray examination twice a year. Once a week the head of the medical division visited them, and every day a medical assistant conducted an inspection. (b) Prison practice concerning correspondence 39. The witness said that death row prisoners had the right to communicate with the outside world without any limitations on either sending or receiving letters. He further said that this situation had improved since May 1999. He admitted that under the existing procedure, inmates' correspondence was censored, but he could not remember any cases when an incoming letter had been stopped without being given to its addressee, including letters from the European Commission of Human Rights. He confirmed that the applicant's correspondence had been registered in the journal. Moreover, all death row prisoner could complain of any violations of the right to exchange letters to the governor, to the Prosecutor who supervised the prison, or to any other official in the relevant department. (c) Prison practice concerning receipt of parcels and small packets 40. According to the witness, the possibilities for receiving parcels had improved in May 1999. Since then, the prisoners had been allowed to receive six food parcels (посилка, передача) and two small packets (бандероль) per year [Nota: Parcels to be forwarded to a prisoner may be sent by post (посилка) or brought in person to the prison (передача). Small items like books or periodicals can be sent by post as a small packet (бaндepoль - literally a “bundle”).]. Previously, they had not been allowed to receive any parcels until the judgment in their criminal case had become final. Moreover, the prisoners could buy food in the prison shop. They could spend 55 Ukrainian hryvnas (UAH) per month at prices which were the same as in the State-owned shops from which the prison bought the food. (d) Daily outdoor walks 41. According to the witness, prior to May 1998 the inmates had not been allowed to go for daily outdoor walks. Since then, they had been taken out for one hour without handcuffs. (e) Alleged ill-treatment of the applicant in prison 42. He denied that any “training” described by the applicant had ever taken place. He said that the Department for the Execution of Sentences had ordered that such training should be carried out without explosives or masks. 43. The witness was the doctor in Simferopol Prison, where he had been working since 1992. 44. He said that the prison medical staff included six doctors (four general practitioners, one psychiatrist and one radiologist), medical assistants (фельдшер), an X-ray laboratory assistant, a pharmacist and a clinical assistant. According to him, medical services were provided 24 hours a day. Any inmate could apply at any time and get urgent medical assistance. The death row prisoners were seen by a medical assistant every day during their daily walk. They could ask him for any medical assistance and, if his help was not sufficient, they could request to see the doctor. Besides, they could apply directly to the doctor. Every inmate had a medical file compiled upon his arrival where all details and results of medical examinations were recorded and which was kept during the period of his imprisonment. 45. The witness had received no complaints about the sanitary conditions in the prison. He considered that the changes in regime for death row prisoners, especially the possibility of having outdoor walks and natural light in their cells, had improved their health conditions. 46. According to him, HIV testing of inmates was not obligatory and was only conducted upon individual request. The test was preceded by a confidential interview between the doctor and the prisoner. The witness did not confirm if there were inmates infected with the HIV virus, claiming that this was confidential information. The only other person who knew about inmates infected by HIV was the doctor responsible for the testing and the preceding consultations. 47. The witness confirmed that the applicant had never applied for medical assistance. Nor had he asked for help because he had been beaten; even if he had done so, the result of his medical examination would have been recorded in his medical file. 48. The witness was a medical assistant who had been working in Simferopol Prison for two and a half years. He was responsible for the daily inspection of the inmates' sanitary conditions, while the doctor conducted visits and attended emergency situations. He considered that there were particular problems with death row inmates and, in fact, he worked mostly with them. He accompanied these prisoners during their daily outdoor walks. 49. He confirmed that the improvement of living conditions in the death row prisoners' cells had had a positive influence on their health. Since then he had not received any further complaints from them regarding health and hygiene. 50. The witness stated that he had never seen any signs of brutality by warders against the death row inmates, or any bodily injuries. He had never heard about any such complaints made to other staff in the prison. He examined the inmates on a weekly basis and reported to his superiors. According to him, the applicant had not complained any more than the other inmates. 51. He further said that for the last one and a half months there had been a dentist in the hospital and that other doctors were able to provide assistance. According to him, the applicant had not applied for dental help. 52. The witness was the senior warder of Simferopol Prison. His duties consisted in observing inmates, ensuring that they abided by the prison regime, receiving applications and complaints from them, and taking them for outdoor walks or to any meetings they had. 53. He had first met the applicant a year and half ago. He said that he had behaved like other inmates, without any distinguishing characteristics. The applicant had never made any complaints to the witness, and the witness had not heard about any complaints made by the applicant to other institutions. He saw him at least three times a day during the breaks for meals and sometimes at other times of the day. 54. The witness had not heard about any serious complaints from other inmates or any complaints about ill-treatment of an inmate. He could not remember if the applicant had ever been punished for violating the prison rules. He was not personally entitled to punish inmates. If an inmate behaved inappropriately, the witness wrote a report to his superior, who took a decision. The witness had never written anything about the applicant. 55. The Court Delegates visited the cell where the applicant was detained. The size of the applicant's cell area was about 12 square metres. The cell was in order and clean. There was an open toilet, a washbasin with a cold water tap, two beds fixed on the floor, central heating and a window with bars. There were some books, newspapers, a stock of soap and toilet paper. The cell was sufficiently heated and ventilated. 56. The Delegates were shown the prison shower area, which was reasonably clean. They also visited an exercise yard. 57. The applicant's medical file was created on 20 March 1996. It includes a list of vaccinations, according to which the applicant was vaccinated on 21 March and 19 September 1997, 20 March and 28 August 1998. Moreover, he underwent a test for detection of tuberculosis on 20 March and 22 September 1996, and on 11 February and 12 August 1999. On 29 April 1998 he underwent a full medical examination. He complained of pain in his hand. He underwent a blood test. The doctor noted that the applicant's state of health was normal and suggested that he take more vitamins. 58. From the documents produced before the Court it appears that the applicant's wife, in her capacity as the applicant's legal representative, made several requests to visit her husband. She received permission to see him on 7, 14 and 21 September 1999. Moreover, on 21 August 1999 she was given permission to visit her client every Tuesday. 59. According to the prison records, the applicant received money in his prison bank account on 22 May (UAH 50), 25 July (UAH 15), 15 August (UAH 20) and 5 September 1997 (UAH 27), and on 20 March (UAH 30), 24 April (UAH 50) and 4 August 1998 (UAH 50). 60. According to the prison shop records, he spent his money purchasing various items in the prison shop on the following occasions: On 4, 8 and 23 July (UAH 14.45, 7.20 and 8.67 respectively), 8 August (UAH 7.77), 2 (UAH 8.91) and 24 September (UAH 6.67), 6 and 22 October (UAH 6.66 and 8.18 respectively), 5 and 20 November (UAH 6.13 and 7.64 respectively), 3 and 18 December 1997 (UAH 7.87 and 7.15 respectively), and on 9 January (UAH 7.48), 23 February (UAH 14.97), 5 and 20 March (UAH 8.00 and 6.99 respectively), 9 and 21 April (UAH 12.08 and 2.91 respectively), 22 May (UAH 14.99), 9 and 17 June (UAH 8.94 and 5.90 respectively), 7 and 21 July (UAH 7.54 and 7.18 respectively), 6 and 26 August (UAH 6.80 and 8.33 respectively) and 11 September 1998 (UAH 9.22). On 8 August and 22 October 1997 and on 11 September 1998 the applicant bought some books. On 1 December 1997 and 27 January 1998 he paid UAH 0.26 and UAH 0.52 respectively for posting two letters.

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8. The applicants were born in 1943 and 1942 respectively and live in Józefów, Poland. 9. The applicants share a house and a plot of land with another family (“the neighbours”). On 2 January 1989 the applicants filed with the Otwock District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a petition in which they requested that the co-ownership of the plot of land and the building be dissolved in accordance with an administrative decision issued in 1983. 10. From 2 January 1989 to 1 May 1993 the court held hearings on the following dates: 23 March, 21 August and 4 December 1989, 15 January, 9 April, 14 May, 21 June, 6 September, and 15 October 1990. 11. On 16 May 1991 the court held a hearing and ordered not to carry out any construction works in the building except for the erection of a wall in the attic. Subsequently, the court held hearings on 16 September 1991 and 16 January 1992. 12. On 30 January 1992 the court stayed the proceedings until the termination of the administrative proceedings concerning the annulment of the 1983 decision. 13. The court held hearings on 11 June and 16 July 1992. 14. On 20 July 1992 the court dissolved the co-ownership of the property. The neighbours appealed. 15. On 30 October 1992 the Warsaw Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) quashed the decision of 20 July 1992 and remitted the case for re-examination. 16. On 6 August and 2 September 1993 the experts’ reports were submitted to the court. The neighbours challenged the report of 6 August 1993. 17. Subsequently, the court held hearings on the following dates: 11 May, 6 June and 25 August 1994. 18. On 25 August 1994 the Otwock District Court quashed in part its decision of 16 May 1991 and allowed the applicants to carry out certain works in the building. The neighbours appealed against this decision. 19. A hearing listed for 20 October 1994 was adjourned as the neighbours’ lawyer was not present. 20. On 5 December 1994 a supplementary expert report was submitted to the court. Subsequently, on 21 December 1994 the court held a hearing. 21. On 4 August 1995, in the course of the administrative proceedings, the Mayor of Józefów (Burmistrz) issued a decision allowing the construction of a wall dividing the building co-owned by the applicants. On 22 January 1996 the Warsaw Governor (Wojewoda) allowed the applicants’ appeal and quashed the decision of the Mayor of Józefów. 22. In the meantime, on 4 January 1996, the court had held a hearing. 23. On 24 January 1996 the neighbours’ lawyer requested the court to stay the proceedings until the termination of the administrative proceedings. On 30 January 1996 the court stayed the proceedings. 24. On 14 February 1996 the neighbours lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) against the decision of the Warsaw Governor. 25. On 15 February 1996 the Otwock District Court resumed the proceedings. On 26 February 1996 the neighbours again requested the court to stay the proceedings. On 15 May 1996 the court held a hearing and stayed the proceedings. On 11 July 1996 the court resumed them. 26. Further hearings were held on 18 October, 23 December 1996 and 27 January 1997. 27. On 27 January 1997 the court issued a preliminary decision (postanowienie wstępne) by which it dissolved the co-ownership of the property and divided it into two separate estates. On 30 January 1997 the applicants’ neighbours appealed. 28. On 6 February 1997 the court stayed the proceedings as one of the neighbours had died. They were resumed on 18 February 1997. 29. On 29 April 1997 the Warsaw Regional Court held a hearing and quashed the decision of 27 January 1997. 30. At the hearing held on 26 September 1997 before the Otwock District Court the applicants presented their proposal for the division of the building. On 17 October 1997 the neighbours rejected the proposal. 31. On 27 November 1997 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision issued by the Warsaw Governor on 22 January 1996. 32. The Otwock District Court held further hearings on 3 February and 24 March 1998. 33. On 30 March 1998 the court ordered that a valuation of the property be carried out by an expert. 34. On 12 February 1999 the court held a hearing. 35. On 12 April 1999 the court requested the Józefów Town Office (Urząd Miejski) to submit an opinion on a plan for the division of the property. On 20 July 1999 the Józefów Town Office submitted its opinion indicating that the division would not be in accordance with a town planning scheme (plan zagospodarowania przestrzennego). 36. On 8 March 2000 there was a fire, which substantially destroyed the part of the building belonging to the applicants’ neighbours. On 26 April 2000 the applicants submitted to the court a proposal for the division of the building, taking into account the new circumstances of the case. 37. On 27 June 2000 the District Construction Inspector (Powiatowy Inspektor Nadzoru Budowlanego) ordered the demolition of the part of the building occupied by the applicants’ neighbours and certain adjustments of the applicants’ part. 38. The next hearing was held on 12 February 2001. The court decided to obtain a fresh expert report in order to determine the division of the property. 39. Subsequently, the court held hearings on the following dates: 4 June, 20 August and 24 September 2002. 40. It appears that the proceedings are pending in the Otwock District Court.

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8. The applicants, Danuta Gryziecka (“the first applicant”) and Henryk Gryziecki (“the second applicant”), were born in 1950 and 1949 respectively, and live in Niedźwiedź, Poland. 9. On 31 August 1981 J.P. (“the plaintiff”) sued the applicants in the Szczecin Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) seeking repayment of the money he had invested in the applicants’ hen house. 10. On 11 September 1981 the case was transferred to the Stargard Szczeciński District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) as the court competent to decide it. 11. On 11 November 1981 the applicants filed their pleadings with the court. They acknowledged the plaintiff’s claim in respect of 728,000 old Polish zlotys. 12. On 17 March 1982 the court stayed the proceedings because the plaintiff had not complied with a certain court order. On 30 September 1982 the plaintiff’s lawyer requested to resume the proceedings. On 7 March 1983 the court resumed the proceedings. 13. On 22 March 1983 the court held the first hearing. Subsequently, from that date to 9 February 1989 the court held approximately nine hearings. In the meantime the plaintiff had modified his claim. 14. On an unknown date in 1984 the applicants transferred the sum of 728,000 old Polish zlotys to the plaintiff’s account. 15. In July 1984 the plaintiff died. Subsequently, his wife and daughter (“the plaintiffs”) joined the proceedings as his legal successors. 16. On 9 February 1989 the court held a hearing. The witness did not appear. The court decided to obtain evidence from a bank. 17. On an unknown date in 1989 the plaintiffs modified their claim. 18. From that date to 9 November 1992 the court held a number of hearings. It obtained three expert reports, held one view of the site and heard some witnesses. The plaintiffs again modified their claim. 19. On 9 November 1992 the court decided to obtain fresh expert evidence in order to determine the value of certain construction works made by the second applicant. The expert report was submitted to the court on 22 December 1992. 20. On 27 May 1993 the expert report was served on the applicants’ lawyer. On 3 June 1993 the applicants submitted their observations on it. On 19 April 1994 the plaintiffs asked the court to set a date for a hearing. 21. On 7 July and on 11 August 1994 respectively the court ordered the parties to produce the evidence in support of their submissions. 22. On 19 May 1995 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from certain witnesses. It also ordered the plaintiffs’ lawyer to specify their claim and to produce the marriage certificate of the late plaintiff. On 5 April 1996 the plaintiffs specified the value of the claim. 23. On 10 and on 21 May 1996 respectively, the plaintiffs requested the court to list a hearing. In the meantime, the case had been assigned to a new judge. 24. On 20 August 1996 the court decided that fresh expert evidence be obtained, in order to determine the value of the land on which the hen house had been constructed. On 12 November 1996 the expert report was submitted to the court. On 11 December 1996 it was served on the applicants. On 27 December 1996 they submitted their observations on the report. 25. On 14 January 1997 the plaintiffs’ lawyer requested the court to list a hearing. On 18 March 1997 the applicants filed their pleadings with the court. 26. On 24 March 1997 the court held a hearing. The applicants requested that the court index the repayment of their bank loan and the payment made to the original plaintiff in 1984. The applicants also requested to obtain documentary evidence from the land register. The court fixed a one-month time-limit for the parties to produce the evidence. Subsequently, the parties filed their pleadings with the court on 22 April 1997. On 22 May 1997 the applicants filed additional pleadings. 27. On 2 June and on 14 July 1997 respectively the court held hearings. On both occasions a certain witness did not appear before the court. The court fined him. On 16 September 1997 the plaintiffs again modified their claim. 28. On 17 September 1997 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from one witness. The applicants requested the court to obtain expert evidence in order to determine an indexed value of the repayment of their bank loan and the payment made by the applicants in 1984. 29. In the meantime the case had been assigned to a new judge. Subsequently, on 22 January 1998 the court held a hearing. 30. On 12 March 1998 the court held a hearing. The plaintiffs withdrew their claims against the first applicant. The court closed the proceedings. It did not obtain any expert report even though the applicants had secured money for such a report. 31. On 26 March 1998 the court gave judgment. It partly granted the claim of the original plaintiff’s daughter against the second applicant and dismissed the claim of the original plaintiff’s wife. The court discontinued the proceedings in respect of the first applicant. None of the parties submitted a notice of appeal.

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12. Mr A.A. Kleyn was born in 1941 and lives in Asperen. He is a managing director of the limited liability company (besloten vennootschap met beperkte aansprakelijkheid) Kleijn Financierings- en Leasemaatschappij B.V. and of the limited liability company Exploitatiemaatschappij De Zeiving B.V. He is also part-owner of the restaurant “De Goudreinet”. Application no. 39651/98 13. Mettler Toledo B.V. is a limited liability company. Its premises are located in Tiel. Van Helden Reclame-Artikelen B.V. is a limited liability company. Its premises are located in Tiel. Its managing directors, Mr A. van Helden and Mrs C.H. van Helden-Schimmel, who were both born in 1946, live next to the company’s business premises. Grasshopper Reclame is a registered partnership (vennootschap onder firma) established under Netherlands law. Its premises are located in Tiel. Its managing directors, Mr A. Hougee and Mrs O.L. Hougee-van Frankfoort, who were born in 1947 and 1948 respectively, live above the company’s business premises. M.C. Gerritse B.V. is a limited liability company. Its premises are located in Tiel. Texshop B.V. is a limited liability company. Its premises are located in Tiel. Restaurant De Betuwe B.V. is a limited liability company. It operates a restaurant in Tiel. Maasglas B.V. is a limited liability company. Its premises are located in Tiel. Mr C.M. van Burk, who was born in 1953, operates a petrol station on the A15 motorway, near Meteren. Kuwait Petroleum (Nederland) B.V. is a limited liability company established in Rotterdam. It owns the petrol station operated by Mr van Burk. Sterk Technisch Adviesbureau B.V. is a limited liability company. Its premises are located in Spijk. Kleijn Financierings- en Leasemaatschappij B.V. and Exploitatiemaatschappij De Zeiving B.V. are both limited liability companies and – together with Ms C.J.P. Kleijn, Ms P.M. Kleijn and Ms C.J. Kleijn, who were born in 1936, 1970 and 1978 respectively – are joint owners of a number of plots of land along the A15 motorway and part- owners of the restaurant “De Goudreinet” that is located on one of the plots. Application no. 43147/98 14. Mr M.A.J.E. Raymakers and Mrs P.W.N. Raymakers-Spreeuwenberg, who were born in 1956 and 1959 respectively, live in Kerk-Avezaath. Application no. 46664/99 15. Mr A.J.Th. Berndsen and Mrs B.A.G. Berndsen-Wezendonk were born in 1950 and 1952 respectively and live in Groessen. Mr P. Bunschoten was born in 1955 and lives in Herveld. Mr W.F. van Duyn was born in 1962 and lives in IJzendoorn. Mr C.J. Hanhart was born in 1938 and lives in Tiel. Mr J.H. Kardol was born in 1938 and lives in Meteren. Mr C. de Kreij was born in 1948 and lives in Giessenburg. Mr G.J. van Lent was born in 1944 and lives in Ochten. Mrs G. van Lent-de Kroon was born in 1910 and lives in Echteld. Mr S.J.B.A. Pompen was born in 1963 and lives in Tiel. Takel- en Bergingsbedrijf Hanhart is a partnership (maatschap) of which Mr C.J. Hanhart and Mr S.J.B.A. Pompen are the partners. Its premises are located in Tiel. Ms C.M.M. Wennekes was born in 1949 and lives in Herveld. Mr M. Witvliet was born in 1944 and lives in Kesteren. 16. The territory of the Netherlands includes the estuaries of the Rhine, Maas and Schelde, all of which flow into the North Sea at or near the town of Rotterdam. These rivers have long been used for the transport of merchandise to and from a large part of the north-western and central European hinterland, and in particular the vast industrial area situated along the River Ruhr in Germany. Over the centuries this geographical situation has allowed the Netherlands to become one of Europe’s major transport hubs, with Rotterdam harbour and Schiphol Airport, near Amsterdam, developing into important transit points for goods. 17. In recent years worldwide economic growth, the opening of the borders between the European Union countries and the opening up to foreign trade of central and east European countries have led to an increase in the quantity of merchandise transported through the Netherlands and, consequently, in the volume of traffic. 18. Since the 1980s the volume of transport by inland waterways, rail and pipelines has largely remained stable. It is essentially road transport which has absorbed the increase. This is due to various factors, such as the greater availability and convenience of roads as compared to railways and waterways and the increased tendency of industry to have raw and unfinished materials delivered as and when needed instead of keeping stocks. 19. In the early 1990s the government decided on a policy of maintaining and further improving the competitiveness of Rotterdam harbour as Europe’s main entry and exit port, as compared to its major rivals, Hamburg, Antwerp, Le Havre, Marseilles and London. At the same time it was considered important to prevent, and if possible reduce, congestion of the roads and damage to the environment. 20. On 1 July 1991, in accordance with section 15 of the Council of State Act (Wet op de Raad van State) and upon a proposal of the Minister for Transport and Communications (Verkeer en Waterstaat) and the Minister for Housing, Planning and Environment Management (Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer), the Queen transmitted the Transport Infrastructure Planning Bill (Tracéwet) to the Council of State for an advisory opinion. 21. The Transport Infrastructure Planning Bill was intended to provide a legislative framework for the supra-regional planning of new major transport infrastructure (roads, railways, canals) and major modifications to existing transport infrastructure with a view to simplifying procedures for securing the cooperation of the provincial, regional and local authorities whose territories might be affected. An additional effect was intended to be the concentration of legal remedies in such a way that only one single appeal could be lodged with the Council of State against a decision of central government and all related decisions of subordinate authorities, obviating the need for a plurality of appeals before both the ordinary courts and the Council of State against decisions and plans of local authorities. 22. The Council of State transmitted its advisory opinion to the government on 9 December 1991. Its opening paragraph reads: “The Council of State fully acknowledges the problems that the signatories to the Transport Infrastructure Planning Bill wish to resolve. It often concerns large, technically complex and expensive infrastructure projects. These must not only be balanced against diverse and weighty interests relating to traffic and transport, road safety, town and country planning and the environment, but in addition it is desirable to have the widest possible public support for these projects. The current decision-making procedure – entailing a non-statutory routing determination following which final decisions are only made in accordance with the town and country planning procedure, against which an appeal may be lodged with a judge – can take much time. Furthermore, where a number of provincial and municipal bodies are involved, the decision-making process is diffused over several regional and local zoning plans. The Council of State therefore shares the government’s concern about the outlined problems. It will examine hereafter whether, in its opinion, the proposals made will in practice sufficiently resolve the problems and whether the concomitant disadvantages are acceptable.” 23. In its opinion the Council of State noted, among other things, the absence of any binding time-limits for the administrative authorities. It expressed doubts as to whether the procedure under the new bill, if enacted, would be any shorter than the aggregate of separate procedures necessary hitherto. It also considered that the new bill created uncertainty at the lower levels of government (the provinces, the regional surface waterboards (waterschappen) and the municipalities) by bypassing the planning structures of those lower bodies; in addition, insufficient weight was given to the justifiable interests of individuals. It found that the considerable limitation of legal protection constituted an important objection to the new bill. 24. Point 8 of the advisory opinion reads: “Having reached the end of the examination of the legal protection in the framework of this bill, from which it can be seen that the Council of State has serious objections to the removal of a routing determination [tracévaststelling] from general town and country planning considerations, it nevertheless wishes to point out that, when the Council of State leaves aside here the problem dealt with under point 2 (length of the decision-making process under the bill), those serious objections would be less weighty if the bill only related to routing determinations of such exceptional (supra‑)national importance that it must be clear to anyone that in the case in question the provincial, regional and local interests should yield to them. In that case, the routing plans [tracés] referred to in section 24b should be explicitly mentioned in the bill. It would be preferable to reconsider the bill in this sense.” 25. The Council of State made a number of suggestions for improving the drafting of the bill before it was transmitted to Parliament. Its final conclusion reads: “The Council of State advises you not to send this bill to the Lower House of the States General until the above observations have been taken into account.” 26. In their reply of 28 January 1992 the Minister for Transport and Communications and the Minister for Housing, Planning and Environment Management noted – as regards the doubts expressed by the Council of State as to whether the new procedure would be appreciably shorter than the former one – among other things that it might take a very long time to obtain the cooperation of the local authorities. It was also stated that the local authorities were involved in all stages of the procedure, being informed and consulted as the need arose; if it was necessary to compel their cooperation, this was done at the final stage, that of the routing decision. Legal protection of the justified interests of individuals was sufficiently guaranteed in the form of a single appeal, on legal grounds, against a routing decision. 27. As to the remarks made under point 8 of the advisory opinion of the Council of State, the ministerial response reads as follows: “With the approval of the Council of Ministers (decision of 24 January 1992), we decided to include in the bill a separate regulation for large projects of national importance. In line with this, the transitory arrangement referred to in section 24b will be concentrated on the high-speed railway and the ‘Betuweroute’ [railway]. The original section 24b was included exclusively in view of these projects and can now be dropped, as a provision will be devoted to these projects. Since, with the inclusion of the special procedure for large projects and the above-indicated transitional arrangement, the bill will be further amended, we find it desirable to consult the Council of State on this. The amendments to the bill will therefore be submitted for advice to the Council of State in the form of a ministerial memorandum of amendments.” 28. The Minister for Transport and Communications made a number of changes to the bill in the light of the Council of State’s criticism. The amendments were submitted to the Council of State for advice on 6 February 1992. 29. In its advisory opinion of 8 May 1992, the Council of State considered, inter alia: “... it desirable to indicate in section 24g that the notions ‘high-speed railway’ and ‘Betuweroute’ railway relate to specific [railway] connections between specifically named places.” 30. The ministerial reply of 19 May 1992 to this recommendation states: “This advice has been followed. It is now indicated in section 24g that the high-speed railway relates to the Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Belgian border route, and the ‘Betuweroute’ [railway] to the Rotterdam-Zevenaar route.” 31. The government then submitted the bill to the Lower House (Tweede Kamer) of Parliament, together with the Council of State’s advisory opinion and the ministers’ comments. The Transport Infrastructure Planning Act eventually entered into force on 1 January 1994. It contains no specific mention of the high-speed railway or the Betuweroute railway, but does provide for a special procedure for projects of national importance. 32. An existing railway through the Betuwe region (the area circumscribed by the rivers Rhine, Lek and Waal) – known as the “Betuwe line” (Betuwelijn) – links the city of Rotterdam to the town of Elst. It was, and still is, mainly used for passenger traffic and is operated at a loss. As early as 1985 a government committee suggested converting it for use solely for the transport of goods, extending it as far as the town of Zevenaar and connecting it to the German railway system. A study commissioned by the Netherlands Railways (Nederlandse Spoorwegen – “the NS”) and published in 1991 concluded that the environmental impact would be unacceptable and that the capacity of such a railway line would be insufficient. 33. This led the government to reject that idea. Instead, the government decided to investigate the possibility of building a new railway through the Betuwe, to be known as the “Betuweroute”, along the A15 motorway. The NS was required to prepare an environmental impact report (milieu-effectrapportage). 34. On 16 April 1992 the Minister for Transport and Communications and the Minister for Housing, Planning and Environment Management together presented the first draft of the outline planning decision (Planologische Kernbeslissing) within the meaning of section 2a of the Town and Country Planning Act (Wet op de Ruimtelijke Ordening), which later became known as “Outline Planning Decision – Part 1”. The environmental impact report prepared by the NS was appended to this document. Pursuant to the then applicable section 2a of the Town and Country Planning Act, it was laid open for public inspection, notice of its publication being given through the Netherlands Government Gazette (Staatscourant) and the media. Anyone interested could then make his or her views known. The time-limit for doing so was 27 July 1992. More than 1,800 reactions were received. 35. On 31 August 1992 the Netherlands Minister for Transport and Communications signed an agreement with his German counterpart, the Federal Minister for Transport, for increased cooperation in the matter of cross-border railway communication. The agreement provided – subject to the conclusion of procedures prescribed by national law – for, inter alia, the building of a new railway from Rotterdam to the German border via Zevenaar. There were to be two border crossings, one at Oldenzaal/Bad Bentheim and the other at Venlo/Kaldenkirchen. The agreement also provided for corresponding measures to be taken on the German side and for a time frame. 36. On 18 April 1993 the government published a document entitled “Reacties op de Ontwerp Planologische Kernbeslissing Betuweroute” (Reactions to the Betuweroute Outline Planning Decision). It contained an overview of the reactions to Outline Planning Decision – Part 1 sent in by individuals and the results of further consultations and discussions with local government bodies, that is provinces, municipalities and regional surface waterboards. Advice obtained from the Netherlands-German Planning Board (Nederlands-Duitse Commissie voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening), the Environmental Impact Reports Board (Commissie milieu-effectrapportage), the Planning Advisory Board (Raad van Advies voor de Ruimtelijke Ordening) and the Traffic Infrastructure Consultation Body (Overlegorgaan Verkeersinfrastructuur) was also included in this document, which became known as Outline Planning Decision – Part 2. 37. On 18 May 1993 the government published their views on the Betuweroute project and transmitted it to the Lower House of Parliament for approval. This document became known as Outline Planning Decision – Part 3. After deliberations, the Lower House of Parliament sent Outline Planning Decision – Part 3 back to the government with its comments. 38. The government made certain modifications. The resulting document, which became known as Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A, was submitted to the Lower House of Parliament on 14 December 1993 for approval. 39. Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A was approved by the Lower House of Parliament on 22 December 1993 and, on 12 April 1994, by the Upper House (Eerste Kamer) of Parliament. It became known thereafter as Outline Planning Decision – Part 4 and came into force after its publication in the Netherlands Government Gazette on 27 May 1994. 40. Outline Planning Decision – Part 4 contained an explanatory memorandum setting out the need for the Betuweroute, as perceived by the government, and giving reasons for the choices made. It was stated that Rotterdam, the Netherlands’ main port, and Schiphol Airport, now served most of the European continent and that the increase in the volume of transport could not be absorbed by inland waterway traffic alone. Moreover, much of the European hinterland could not be reached by water. Road traffic could not be the only alternative, as it was relatively expensive, uneconomical over long distances and environmentally unfriendly. Furthermore, in much of eastern Europe the railway infrastructure was better developed and in a better state of repair than the roads. 41. Other European countries, including Germany, France and the Alpine countries, were investing heavily in railways in order to relieve the roads. Germany had undertaken to connect its railway system to the Betuweroute, and would give effect to this undertaking as soon as the decision to build the Betuweroute was taken. The transport policies developed by the European Economic Community also provided for the development of new railways. 42. The explanatory memorandum contained summaries of studies – additional to that undertaken by the NS in 1991 – that had been commissioned by the government, namely a study on the macro-economic and social effects by Knight Wendling and a micro-economic analysis by McKinsey. Both studies concluded that the Betuweroute would be profitable. They were scrutinised by the Central Planning Office (Centraal Planbureau). The results of this appraisal were also rendered in summary form. The government considered that although the conclusions of the Central Planning Office were rather more guarded, they too indicated that the project was viable. 43. Other alternatives were taken into consideration. These included increasing the capacity of an existing railway running from Rotterdam through the southern province of North Brabant to Venlo and from there into Germany (the “Brabantroute”), used mainly for passenger traffic, and making it more suitable for the transport of goods. This alternative was rejected on the ground that it would require building two extra tracks. Moreover, the urban density along the Brabant route being three to four times as high as that along the projected Betuweroute, this would cause severe and unacceptable problems. 44. Alternatives not involving railways, which had been suggested after Outline Planning Decision – Part 1 had been laid open for public inspection, were discarded in view of the need to connect to the existing railway infrastructure in the rest of Europe. The importance of inland navigation was nonetheless recognised, and it was stated that in both the Netherlands and Germany inland port facilities were undergoing further development. 45. Alternative methods of constructing the railway had been suggested in the wake of Outline Planning Decision – Part 1. Many of those who had stated their views on the matter had expressed a preference for an underground tunnel or for open tracks sunk below ground level. These were considered, but rejected as the cost would be prohibitive. A traditional construction was chosen consisting of rail tracks resting on a sand base and located mostly at ground level, a raised or lowered track being envisaged only for locations where such was called for by considerations of safety or environmental impact. Similarly, conventional rather than innovative technology was chosen. 46. Outline Planning Decision – Part 4 provided for a twin-track railway. Its location was fixed as far as possible within a horizontal band of 100 m. Within this band limited adjustment to local conditions would be possible, it being understood that any additional features such as drainage ditches or other traffic infrastructure might have to be located outside it. The actual route was set out in sketch plans, with reasons being given for the choices made and for the rejection of alternatives. 47. Consideration was given to possible harmful effects. Thus, although under the legislation in force (Article 7 of the Railway Noise Ordinance – Besluit geluidhinder spoorwegen) the maximum permissible noise level was 60 decibel ampere (dBA) on the outside walls of residential buildings, a “preferential noise level” of 57 dBA would be applied in anticipation of stricter standards which were expected to come into force in 2000. Where it appeared in practice that this could not be achieved, noise levels would be reduced by means of screens. Exceptionally, noise levels of up to 70 dBA might be tolerated at specific locations, but even there they were not to exceed 37 dBA inside residential buildings with the windows closed and ventilation apertures open. Although there might be an accumulation of noise from the A15 motorway and the Betuweroute railway, it was considered that the railway would contribute less noise than the louder motorway traffic, so that it would be possible, by screening and other measures, to reduce the combined noise levels to 60 dBA. 48. Some 150 residential buildings were found to be located within 50 m of the projected railway track. It was estimated that approximately one quarter of these were so close to the projected track that noise levels would compel the termination of their residential function. Studies had also been conducted regarding the vibration likely to be caused and the standards to be applied on this point. Further studies would be undertaken with a view to taking constructive measures aimed at reducing vibration levels. 49. The danger that might be result from the operation of the Betuweroute railway was also considered, although not in detail. It was intended to build the railway so that the “individual risk” would be no greater than 10-6 near residential areas. The “group risks” would be kept “as low as reasonably achievable”. Specific measures would be set out in the routing decision. 50. There had been an audit of the costs of the project as proposed by the government, which, as was estimated at 1993 cost levels, would amount to a total of 7,138,000,000 Netherlands guilders (NLG). Of this sum a portion of NLG 1,975,000,000 would be paid out of the State budget. The remaining NLG 5,163,000,000 would be raised from other sources, such as the financial markets, windfall profits from the sale of natural gas and funds supplied by the EEC. The total figure included a sum of NLG 750,000,000 occasioned by changes imposed by the Lower House of Parliament and NLG 375,000,000 required to meet objections and special requests made by individuals and local authorities. 51. A new government took office on 22 August 1994, which in pursuance of agreements reached between the coalition parties reconsidered the Betuweroute plan in its entirety. After obtaining the views of a parliamentary committee (the “Hermans Committee”), the new government decided that the plan should go ahead. Its views were made public in a letter sent by the Minister for Transport and Communications and the Minister for Housing, Planning and Environment Management to the Lower House of Parliament on 21 April 1995. On 29 June 1995 the Lower House of Parliament endorsed the government’s views. 52. In accordance with the procedure for projects of national importance under the Transport Infrastructure Planning Act which had come into force on 1 January 1994, a preliminary draft of the routing decision – containing the determination of the exact routing of the planned railway – was laid open for public inspection in June 1994, together with an addition to the environmental impact report and a survey of expected noise levels. Some 5,500 reactions were received from individuals, non‑governmental organisations and local-government bodies. These led to modifications, which were incorporated into the draft routing decision. 53. The draft routing decision was published on 4 March 1996 and laid open for public inspection until 29 April 1996. More than 600 reactions were received from individuals and local-government bodies. Changes were considered, and eventually incorporated into the final routing decision, in so far as they did not affect the projected route, did not require additional expenditure and did not affect the interests of other parties. Changes made included, for certain locations, noise-reduction measures in addition to those foreseen in Outline Planning Decision – Part 4. 54. The routing decision was finalised on 26 November 1996 by the Minister for Transport and Communications in agreement with the Minister for Housing, Planning and Environment Management. It covered most of the projected track of the new Betuweroute railway, with the exception of a number of locations – not concerned by the present case – for which further planning was required. 55. The routing decision comprises twenty-four Articles, creating a legal framework for the measures required, and a set of detailed maps with explanations. In its published form it is accompanied by an extensive explanatory part setting out the outline of the choices made. 56. A series of tests had been carried out from which it appeared that goods trains made rather more noise than had initially been estimated. It was stated that a reduction of noise levels was expected from modifications to the rolling stock (reduction at source). However, in case these should not be sufficient, screens would be erected where necessary regardless of the expected reductions at source. Further reductions were expected from the use of modern concrete sleepers instead of the conventional wooden ones on which the initial noise level assessments had been based. Finally, if the noise levels still turned out to be too high in practice, other measures would be considered, such as further modifications to rolling stock, avoiding operations at night and lowering maximum speeds. The standards to be applied, including those with regard to the accumulation of noise caused by the new railway and the A15 motorway, were those set out in Outline Planning Decision – Part 4. Stricter standards would be applied in the vicinity of sensitive locations such as hospitals and schools and certain designated rural areas (stiltegebieden – “silent areas”). The residential function of buildings where the noise levels would be excessive would have to be terminated. A detailed report setting out the noise levels for each municipality was appended to the routing decision. 57. Compensating measures for the preservation of the environment and the existing landscape were to include, among other things, the provision of culverts (to enable wildlife and cattle to cross underneath the railway) and of appropriate vegetation. Special measures were also envisaged for the protection of any known archaeological sites. 58. Consideration was also given to special measures required by the nature of the subsoil, which provided less support in the western part of the country than in the east; hence the need for additional supporting shoulders in certain areas. The need, at some locations, for cleaning polluted soil was noted. 59. Indications were given of how noise reduction screens, bridges and viaducts were to be built, and of how the railway would be sunk below ground level where this was unavoidable, an important objective being to limit the railway’s visual and environmental impact while maintaining its visual unity and continuity. Where the Betuweroute crossed existing traffic infrastructure – roads, existing railways, cycle paths – safety was the main consideration. Changes to existing ditches and waterways were unavoidable. Construction details of the electrical installations would, however, depend on the final decision on the electrical system to be used, which would be taken at a later date. 60. A total of 173 appeals against Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A were lodged with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (Afdeling Bestuursrechtspraak) of the Council of State, many jointly by a plurality of appellants. With the exception of the applicants Mr and Mrs Raymakers (no. 43147/98), who only raised objections of a general nature to Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A, all applicants in the present case submitted specific complaints about the proposed route of the railway in so far as their respective interests would be affected. 61. The bench of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dealing with the appeals was composed of three ordinary councillors (Staatsraden) of the Council of State, namely Mr J. de Vries (President), Mr R. Cleton and Mr R.H. Lauwaars (members). Mr de Vries had been appointed Ordinary Councillor in 1982. Mr Cleton and Mr Lauwaars had been appointed ordinary councillors in 1992 and 1994 respectively. 62. On 31 January 1997, after sixteen hearings held between July and September 1996, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division delivered its decision. It rejected all the complaints of a general nature. 63. As to the specific complaints, it noted that Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A was not yet final as regards the definitive route of the railway. It therefore limited the scope of its review, for each separate location, to the question whether the government could reasonably have set the band as it had and, if so, whether it could reasonably have considered that an acceptable route was possible within the band specified or that, in view of possible measures to be taken, the interests of the affected appellants had been adequately taken into account. It reserved its opinion on the definitive location of the railway, which was to be the subject of the routing decision. 64. One group of general complaints addressed, inter alia, the assessment made by the government of the need for a new railway. These were rejected with reference to government policy aimed at maintaining and strengthening the position of the Netherlands as a European hub for transport and distribution. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division concluded that the government’s assessment of the need to construct the railway did not appear incorrect or unreasonable. 65. Another group of general complaints challenged the government’s estimates of the railway’s macro-economic effects and its profitability and the financial calculations underlying the government’s plans. These were rejected on the ground that the said estimates did not appear incorrect or unreasonable in view of the expert reports which the government had commissioned. 66. A further group of general complaints challenged the government’s failure to choose the most environmentally friendly alternative. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division held that the government could reasonably have come to the decision – having weighed alternatives and decided to give priority to human interests – to choose the most cost-effective solution and to use only proven technology. Where specific problems were alleged to arise, these would be dealt with separately. General complaints concerning expected noise and vibration levels, risk assessments, deprivation of property and the likelihood of damage were rejected as being either unfounded on the facts or premature given that these problems would be addressed for specific locations in the routing decision. 67. Specific complaints of twenty-two appellants were accepted as being well-founded, which led to parts of Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A (and therefore Outline Planning Decision – Part 4) being annulled. None of those twenty-two appellants are applicants in the present case. 68. As regards the specific complaints which were rejected, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division held either that it could not be established in advance of the routing decision that the railway could not be located within the band in such a way as to meet the objections, or that the appellants’ objections could not be met in another way, for instance by relocating business premises or offering financial compensation. 69. The decision ran to 292 pages, to which maps were appended indicating locations in respect of which parts of Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A were annulled. 70. In total 147 appeals were lodged with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division against the Betuweroute Routing Decision. Many of these appeals were introduced by a plurality of appellants, including the applicants in the present case. As was the case in the appeals against Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A, a large number of appellants made complaints of a general nature dealing with such matters as the procedure followed. Some challenged the government’s refusal to consider modifications of the routing decision unless the objections put forward were of a very serious nature. Others questioned the need or desirability for building the railway at all or objected to the procedure for assessing expected noise levels. 71. The composition of the bench of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division dealing with the appeals against the routing decision was the same as the bench that had determined the appeals against Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A (see paragraph 61 above). It commenced its examination of the appeals on 18 November 1997. 72. In the course of a public hearing held on 2 December 1997, Mr and Mrs Raymakers challenged the entire membership of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division and, in the alternative, all the councillors of that Division with the exception of the extraordinary councillors (Staatsraden in buitengewone dienst), and in the further alternative, the councillors sitting on the case, on the ground of lack of impartiality. They argued that, since the Plenary Council of State (Volle Raad) was involved in advising the government on proposed legislation, it was inconsistent with Article 6 of the Convention that members of that body should subsequently decide in a judicial capacity on the application of legislation once it had been adopted. 73. A hearing on this challenge was held on 9 December 1997 before a special Chamber of three members of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division who were not involved in hearing the appeal, that is Mr E. Korthals Altes (President), Mr A.G. van Galen and Mr C. de Gooyer (members), all of whom were extraordinary councillors of the Council of State. 74. Mr and Mrs Raymakers cited the European Court’s judgment of 28 September 1995 in Procola v. Luxembourg (Series A no. 326). They noted similarities between the organisation and functioning of the Netherlands Council of State and the Luxembourg Conseil d’Etat and quoted several comments published in the legal press by learned authors. 75. Given that the Council of State’s advice on the introduction of the Transport Infrastructure Planning Act had been worded “in generally positive terms” and therefore conflicted with these applicants’ own interest in maintaining the status quo, they considered that that advice had been contrary to their own position in their appeal. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division was therefore not an “impartial tribunal”. These applicants therefore asked the special Chamber to rule that the Administrative Jurisdiction Division should decline to make any decision in the case. 76. On 10 December 1997 the special Chamber of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division gave its decision. It held that, under section 8(15) of the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene Wet Bestuursrecht), a challenge could only be directed against judges who were dealing with the case of the party concerned. As to the challenge of the entire membership of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, it was pointed out that if the Administrative Law Act had provided otherwise, no member of such a tribunal would in fact be in a position to entertain the challenge. Consequently, in so far as the applicants’ challenge was directed against members of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division who were not involved in hearing the applicants’ appeal, it was inadmissible. The challenge directed against the members who were so involved was rejected in the following terms: “The Division considers that under section 8(15) of the General Administrative Law Act each of the members who decide a case can be removed from it [gewraakt] on the application of a party on the grounds of facts or circumstances by which judicial impartiality might be impaired. The Division deduces therefrom that only a lack of impartiality on the part of a judge can lead to his removal from a case. Neither the wording nor the drafting history of that provision offers support for the contention that a lack of independence of the tribunal to which a judge belongs can constitute grounds for that judge’s removal from a case. For this reason alone the appellants’ submissions at the hearing cannot lead to their application being granted. As to the appellants’ reliance on Procola, the Division considers that the appeal lodged by the appellants with the Division does not raise questions on which the Council of State has, in advisory opinions on the legislation that is at issue in this appeal, expressed itself in a way contrary to the position taken by the appellants in their appeal. There is therefore no reason to fear that the members of the Council of State who are charged with deciding the appeal will consider themselves bound by any position adopted by the Council of State in the relevant advisory opinions.” 77. The hearing on the merits was resumed on 25 February 1998 and, on 28 May 1998, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division delivered its decision, which ran to 354 pages. 78. General complaints relating to the refusal of the government to consider modifications to the routing decision unless the objections put forward were of a very serious nature were dismissed on the ground that this was not unreasonable per se; it was more appropriate to consider the objections in question individually. General complaints relating to the necessity or desirability of building the railway at all – including complaints about the environmental impact report – were also dismissed. These had already been considered as part of the appeals against Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A. The question was no longer whether the building of the Betuweroute was acceptable, but only whether, in coming to the routing decision, the government could reasonably have decided as it had. 79. The complaint made by several appellants that the routing decision was taken before the appeals against the outline planning decision had been determined was rejected by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division. It held that, under section 24(5) of the Transport Infrastructure Planning Act, the period for lodging an appeal against decisions taken in an outline planning decision and against the routing decision based thereon started to run simultaneously and that, therefore, it was normal that a routing decision was already taken before the outline planning decision had become final. It further considered that it did not follow from the Transport Infrastructure Planning Act that where, like in the present case, a separate appeal lay against an outline planning decision, no routing decision could be taken before the outline planning decision had become final. The mere fact that the time-limits for appealing started to run independently did not, according to the Administrative Jurisdiction Division, alter the tenor of section 24(5) of the Transport Infrastructure Planning Act that no final outline planning decision was required for a routing decision to be taken on the basis of that decision. 80. As to noise levels, the various complaints were to be considered individually. General complaints concerning the determination of acceptable noise levels could not be entertained. Reasonable standards had been set by law, and actual noise would be monitored once the railway was in use. The safety studies were not held to have been insufficient. It was noted that there had been an additional study made in respect of areas where the concentration of the population, and therefore the group risk, was greatest. Moreover, the government had specified additional safety measures for these areas in its statement of defence, as well as specific ways of operating the railway so as to minimise the dangers attending the transport of dangerous goods. As to the individual risk, the routing decision provided that new development which would increase it within 30 m from the centre line of the track would be prevented; this made it unlikely that the individual risk would be increased further away from the track. Other objections relating to safety considerations would be dealt with on an individual basis. 81. As to vibration levels, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division held that the government could not be found to have acted unreasonably by basing its assessments on an industrial standard (DIN 4150) rather than a different standard suggested by certain appellants. Nor was the assessment of the likely nuisance caused by vibration unreasonable per se. Moreover, the government had undertaken to provide active monitoring (that is, to measure vibration levels of its own motion) in all residential buildings located within 50 m of the railway once it was in use, and passive monitoring (that is, to measure vibration levels after complaints were received) in residential buildings located 50 to 100 m from the railway. The government would then deal with unacceptable nuisance on a case-by-case basis. Specific problems raised by appellants would be dealt with individually. 82. With regard to general complaints about the arrangements for compensating damage, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division referred generally to the relevant provisions of the routing decision. It further noted that legal remedies were available against any specific decisions taken in this regard. It could therefore not yet be assumed at this stage that acceptable arrangements in respect of damage were not possible. 83. As to the appeal lodged by Mettler Toledo B.V. (no. 39651/98), whose extremely accurate device for calibrating scales was stated to be particularly sensitive to vibration, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division noted that studies were still ongoing as to whether the vibration likely to be caused by the railway would unduly interfere with that company’s business. That being so, Mettler Toledo B.V.’s claims could not be dismissed as unfounded; to that extent, the appeal was allowed. 84. Sterk Technisch Adviesbureau B.V. (no. 39651/98), whose premises would have to be relocated, complained that no sufficient clarity had been provided as to whether a new location of equivalent quality would be made available. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division held this complaint to be well-founded. This made it unnecessary to go into other specific complaints made by this applicant. 85. With regard to a complaint submitted jointly by Mr A.A. Kleyn (no. 39343/98) and Kleijn Financierings- en Leasemaatschappij B.V., Exploitatiemaatschappij De Zeiving B.V., Ms C.J.P. Kleijn, Ms P.M. Kleijn and Ms C.J. Kleijn (no. 39651/98) in respect of the restaurant “De Goudreinet” which they owned and the flat inhabited by Mr A.A. Kleyn, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division found that no investigation had been undertaken as to whether it would be possible for these to continue in use. To that extent the complaint was therefore well-founded. The remainder of their appeal was dismissed. 86. As regards the appeal lodged by Mr M. Witvliet (no. 46664/99), the Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the objections to a possible expropriation, holding that such objections could be raised in the specific procedure set out in the Expropriation Act (Onteigeningswet). As to his complaint about nuisance from noise in a particular area, it was held that this element had been insufficiently examined. To that extent, his appeal was well-founded. The remainder was rejected. 87. The Administrative Jurisdiction Division rejected the appeals lodged by the other individual applicants and applicant companies. 88. In so far as the appeals were considered well-founded, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division annulled the routing decision and made an award in respect of costs. 89. In a letter to the Lower House of Parliament of 13 July 1998 the Minister for Transport and Communications, writing also on behalf of the Minister for Housing, Planning and Environment Management, observed that the decision of the Administrative Jurisdiction Division left 95% of the routing decision intact. It was therefore not necessary either to undertake a radical review of the project or to interrupt the building work. It was expected that the Betuweroute railway would be operational by 2005. 90. In so far as minor parts of the routing decision had been annulled, the reason therefor had merely been that insufficient information had been obtained as to whether the interests of the appellants could be safeguarded. In so far as relevant to the present case, the minister expected that in all but one or two cases changes to the original routing decision would prove unnecessary. 91. New partial routing decisions were taken in the course of 1998. An appeal lodged by Mettler Toledo B.V. was declared inadmissible by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division on 16 April 1999. The appeal lodged by Sterk Technisch Adviesbureau B.V. was dismissed by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division on 25 October 1999. The appeals lodged by Kleijn Financierings- en Leasemaatschappij B.V., Exploitatiemaatschappij De Zeiving B.V., Ms C.J.P. Kleijn, Ms P.M. Kleijn, Ms C.J. Kleijn and Mr A.A. Kleyn were dismissed by the Administrative Jurisdiction Division on 25 July 2000. Mr Witvliet apparently did not lodge an appeal against any of the 1998 routing decisions. 92. In response to suggestions made in the media to reconsider the Betuweroute project, the Minister for Transport and Communications sent a note (Notitie Betuweroute) to the Lower House of Parliament on 6 November 1998. In this note the minister restated the considerations which had led to the decision of 1995 to allow the project to go ahead. She also expressed the view that no new information had become available since the reconsideration of 1995 which would tend to undermine earlier assumptions as to the viability and desirability of the project. On the contrary, developments had been such as to endorse these. 93. On 13 April 1999 the Stichting Duurzame Mobiliteit (Durable Mobility Foundation) – one of the appellants against the routing decision but not one of the applicants in the present case – lodged a request for revision (herziening) of the decisions of 31 January 1997 and 28 May 1998 with the Administrative Jurisdiction Division. This appellant argued that the government had either been insufficiently aware of certain relevant factual information at the time when it finalised Outline Planning Decision – Part 3A or had failed to consider this information. 94. In a decision of 9 March 2000 the Administrative Jurisdiction Division refused to revise its decisions. It found that the information in question was not of such a nature as to justify reopening the proceedings. 95. From August 1999 until February 2000 the Chamber of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer) undertook a study of the Betuweroute decision-making process. It published its report on 22 June 2000 under the title “Beleidsinformatie Betuweroute” (Betuweroute Policy Information). 96. The purpose of the report was to provide guidance for the quality and use of information relied on by the government to ground future policy decisions relating to large infrastructure projects. The central questions were whether the quality of the information relied on in taking Betuweroute policy decisions was assured and whether this information had been used in a responsible way in the preparation of the decision-making process. Developments subsequent to the reconsideration of 1995 were taken into account. 97. The Chamber of Audit found that in the initial stages an adequate analysis of the problems to be solved had not been made. The decision-making process had related one-sidedly to the solution chosen, namely the construction of the Betuweroute railway, it having been decided at the outset that that was beneficial for the national economy and the environment; an expert analysis of the information on which the outline planning decision was based had not been sought. 98. Predictions concerning the expected volume of transport through the Netherlands were considered imprecise and unreliable. The predictions eventually relied on appeared overly optimistic; also, in some cases, it was not clear on what considerations the preference for particular predictions over others was based. Uncertainty remained, inter alia, as to the capacity of the German railway system to absorb the increased volume of goods traffic. The increasing competitiveness of inland navigation had not been considered, nor had the slow progress in some European countries (for example, Belgium and France) of the liberalisation of rail transport. Nor had account been taken of the possible effects of levies on road transport as against the passing on of the costs of railway infrastructure to shippers, the latter possibility being envisaged in a policy proposal of the European Commission. 99. Alternatives to the Betuweroute had not been sufficiently explored. The Chamber of Audit criticised the way in which the use of the existing railway infrastructure in the Netherlands and waterborne inland and coastal transport had been considered in isolation rather than in combination. A thorough analysis of the possibilities of optimising existing east-west transport, including existing railway infrastructure, was lacking. Possible future developments in inland waterway traffic, which already accounted for a greater volume of transport than Netherlands railways, had not been looked into. 100. The assumed environmental benefit had also been misstated. The information concerning the environmental impact of alternatives to the Betuweroute railway had been inadequate and had been used in a selective way. Attention had been focused on the immediate reduction of energy use and noxious emissions without taking into account technical developments such as the increased use of cleaner and more economical engines in alternative transport; insufficient information had been provided concerning such matters as nuisance levels, external safety or soil and groundwater pollution attending alternative choices. 101. A positive feature of the process, given especially the public discussion which had arisen, was that the project had been reconsidered in its entirety in 1995 and that the arguments in favour had been presented anew in 1998 (the Betuweroute Note – see paragraph 92 above). However, the information available at those times and the way in which it had been used was open to criticism. 102. The draft of the report was transmitted in its entirety to the government. The Minister for Transport and Communications, in a reaction submitted also on behalf of the Minister for Housing, Planning and Environment Management, expressed broad agreement with the report although some of the individual findings were contested. The conclusions of the Chamber of Audit were accepted for future reference. 103. Parts of the draft report were transmitted to the NS Railway Infrastructure Division and to Railned, the Netherlands government entity which operated the railway system. The Railway Infrastructure Division disagreed with certain findings of the Chamber of Audit with regard to environmental impact estimates. Railned called into question some of the findings of the Chamber of Audit with regard to the predicted increase in the volume of rail transport. 104. The full report, including the reactions, was transmitted to the Lower House of Parliament (parliamentary year 1999-2000, 27 195, nos. 1‑2).

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4. On 15 January 1996 the applicant filed an action for protection of his good name and reputation with the Košice I District Court. He sued a limited liability company on the ground that a newspaper published by the latter contained articles alleging that the applicant had been an agent of the former secret police. 5. On 9 January 1997 the District Court dismissed the action. On 7 March 1997 the applicant appealed. He further requested that he should be exempted from the obligation to pay court fees. The District Court dismissed the request on 24 July 1997. On 20 August 1997 the applicant appealed against this decision. 6. The case file and the applicant’s above two appeals were transmitted to the Košice Regional Court on 9 September 1997. As the applicant’s brother was a judge of that court the Supreme Court ordered, on 25 November 1997, that the case should be dealt with by the Prešov Regional Court. 7. On 11 February 1998 the Supreme Court excluded the Regional Court’s judge at the latter’s request. The case was assigned to a different judge on 26 February 1998. 8. In March and in May 1998 the Regional Court requested the Košice I District Court to submit a judgment and the file concerning a different case in which the applicant was a plaintiff. The Regional Court received the judgment in question on 15 May 1998. 9. On 20 January 1999 the applicant amended his action in that he reduced the amount of the compensation claimed. 10. On 16 March 1999 the Regional Court accepted the applicant’s request for the action to be amended and discontinued the proceedings in respect of the claim which the applicant had withdrawn. On the same day the Regional Court quashed the remaining part of the District Court’s judgment of 9 January 1997 and sent the case back to the first instance court. It also upheld the District Court’s above decision of 24 July 1997. 11. On 13 October 1999 the Constitutional Court found that the Prešov Regional Court had violated the applicant’s constitutional right to have his case examined without undue delays. In its finding the Constitutional Court found that the case was not complex and that no delays could be imputed to the applicant. The Constitutional Court further held that the Prešov Regional Court had not effectively proceeded with the case between 18 May 1998 and 16 March 1999. 12. On 9 February 2000 the applicant filed a new petition to the Constitutional Court in which he complained about delays in the proceedings before the Košice I District Court. On 28 June 2000 the Constitutional Court delivered a decision in which it held that the above Constitutional Court’s finding of 13 October 1999 covered the overall length of the proceedings before the general courts to the date of its delivery. The Constitutional Court found no undue delays in the proceedings in the subsequent period, that is between 13 October 1999 and 28 June 2000. 13. In the meantime, on 15 March 2000 the Košice I District Court heard the parties, and on 30 March 2000 it dismissed the applicant’s action. The judgment with reasons was served on the applicant on 4 May 2000. On 10 May 2000 he filed an appeal. On 12 May 2000 the applicant also appealed against a decision of the District Court of 26 April 2000 concerning the court fees. 14. On 14 July 2000 the applicant was informed that the proceedings concerning his action were stayed as bankruptcy proceedings had been brought against the defendant company. 15. On 21 February 2002 the Košice I District Court dismissed the applicant’s request for waiver of court fees. On 25 March 2002 the applicant appealed against this decision. He further requested that the proceedings concerning his action be resumed. 16. According to a letter signed by the President of the Košice I District Court on 28 October 2002, the proceedings have been pending before the Prešov Regional Court since 17 September 2002. 17. On 22 October 2002 the applicant filed a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution alleging a violation of his right to a hearing without undue delay. The proceedings are pending before the Constitutional Court.

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8. The applicant was born in 1958 and lives in Gliwice, Poland. 9. In December 1989 riots broke out in the Nowogard prison, where the applicant was serving his sentence in a medical ward due to his mental state. The applicant contends that he was beaten up by the prison officers who had been called to suppress the riots. Subsequently, he was transferred to the Brzeg prison where he was allegedly assaulted by a prison officer. 10. On 14 March 1991 the applicant filed an application with the Szczecin Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) for compensation against the State Treasury. He claimed that he had sustained injuries as a result of the assaults by the prison officers in the Nowogard prison. 11. On 20 March 1991 the court exempted the applicant from payment of court fees. On 29 March 1991 he was granted legal aid. 12. On 27 August 1991 the court held a hearing. 13. At the end of 1991, at the applicant’s lawyer request, the court stayed the proceedings, considering that the determination of the case depended on the outcome of the criminal proceedings against the prison officers involved in the events in the Nowogard prison. 14. On an unknown date in 1992 the criminal proceedings were terminated by the judgment of the Goleniów District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). 15. On 14 October 1992 the applicant’s lawyer requested the Szczecin Regional Court to resume the proceedings. 16. On 10 February 1994 the trial court set a time-limit for the applicant to submit addresses of six witnesses to be heard by the court. On 1 March 1994 the applicant’s lawyer requested the trial court to assist in establishing addresses of the witnesses. 17. On 24 October 1994 the Szczecin Regional Court resumed the impugned proceedings. 18. On 4 January 1995 the applicant complained to the trial court about the excessive length of the proceedings. 19. On 10 January 1995 the court held a hearing. Two witnesses did not appear. The court ordered an expert report by a psychiatrist. 20. On 29 April 1995 the applicant again complained to the court about the length of the proceedings. 21. On 16 May 1995 the court requested prisons in Gdańsk, Siedlce and Sztum to submit information on the whereabouts of three witnesses indicated by the applicant’s lawyer. It also requested the Warsaw District Court, Stargard Szczecinski District Court and Gliwice District Court to take evidence from certain witnesses. 22. On 2 June 1995 the Stargard Szczecinski District Court informed the trial court that its request had not been executed because the whereabouts of the witnesses were unknown. 23. In the meantime, the applicant had changed his domicile by moving to Gliwice. On 13 May 1996 the trial court requested that the Gliwice District Court obtain the expert report due to the applicant’s new domicile. 24. On 29 June 1995 the applicant was heard before the District Court. 25. On 23 October 1995 the trial court requested the Wyszków Regional Court for legal assistance in taking evidence from a certain witness. On 17 November 1995 the Wyszków Regional Court informed the trial court that the requested witness had failed to appear before the court. 26. On 1 February 1996 the Warsaw Regional Court heard a witness. 27. On 8 February 1996 the applicant’s lawyer withdrew the evidence motion due to difficulties in establishing the whereabouts of the witnesses. 28. On 26 February 1996 the applicant complained to the trial court about the excessive length of the proceedings. 29. On 9 April 1996 the Institute of Forensic Medicine of the Silesian Medical Academy informed the court that it was not able to prepare a medical opinion on the applicant’s state of health. 30. On 13 May 1996 the trial court requested the Gliwice Regional Court for legal assistance in obtaining a psychiatric opinion. 31. On 21 November 1996 the expert on psychiatry informed the court that he would not prepare the opinion since the applicant had failed to appear despite being summoned. 32. On 28 March 1997 the applicant informed the court that he had not been properly summoned for the psychiatric examination. On 28 May 1997 the applicant’s lawyer informed the trial court that the applicant had not obtained any summons for the psychiatric examination. 33. On 3 June 1997 the court held a hearing. 34. On 17 September 1997 the presiding judge in the proceedings was changed. 35. On 19 September and 12 November 1997 respectively the applicant complained to the court about the excessive length of the proceedings. 36. On 18 February 1998 the court held a hearing and ordered an expert report by a psychiatrist. 37. On 28 April 1998 the applicant reported to the Knurów Psychiatric Clinic for examination but the doctor who had scheduled the appointment was absent. Later, the examination was carried out. On 8 May 1998 the opinion was submitted to the court. 38. A hearing listed for 3 June 1998 was adjourned. On 10 June 1998 the court held a hearing. 39. On 7 July 1998 the court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed. 40. On 6 January 1999 the Poznań Court of Appeal held a hearing. On 13 July 1999 it upheld the first-instance judgment. It appears that the applicant did not lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy).

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7. The applicants were born in 1945 and 1941 respectively and live in Gdańsk. 8. The applicants share a plot of land and a house with another family (hereinafter: the neighbours). 9. On 17 June 1987 they filed with the Gdańsk District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) a petition in which they requested that the co-ownership of the plot of land and the house be dissolved. 10. On 19 April 1989 the court forbade the neighbours to carry out any modifications in the cellar until the completion of the proceedings. On 27 September 1989 a similar order concerning the whole house was issued in respect of the applicants. 11. On 3 June 1992 the Gdańsk District Court gave judgment. The neighbours appealed and on 11 March 1993 the Gdańsk Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the case for re-examination. 12. Subsequently, the District Court held a number of hearings and ordered several expert opinions. 13. On 28 October 1996 it forbade the neighbours to carry out any works in the house. On 23 May 1997 the Regional Court dismissed their appeal against that decision. 14. In its letter of 30 January 1997 the Ministry of Justice confirmed that the proceedings were lengthy and found that the applicants’ neighbours had contributed to the delay by their petitions contesting the expert opinions. It further noted that since 1994 the President of the Gdańsk Regional Court had supervised the course of the proceedings and made monthly reports on their progress. However, the Ministry found these measures ineffective and decided to take the proceedings under its administrative supervision. 15. The proceedings are still pending.

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6. The applicant was born in 1946 and lives in Reszel, Poland. 7. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8. On 12 July 1994 the applicant filed with the Warsaw District Court (sąd rejonowy) an action in which she sought a declaration that she had inherited the property of her late aunt. 9. The court held hearings on 25 October and 24 November 1994. 10. On 24 September 1996 it refused the applicant’s request for exemption from courts fees. 11. On 11 May 1999 the court held a hearing. It decided to contact the Office of Foreign Litigation in the United States and enquire whether one of the relatives of the deceased summoned to participate in the proceedings had received the summons. The court stayed the proceedings. 12. On 12 April 2000 it appointed a guardian ad litem for that relative. 13. On 19 May 2000 the court resumed the proceedings. 14. The court held hearings on 18 July and 16 November 2000, as well as on 20 March 2002. 15. The proceedings are still pending.

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7. The applicant was born in 1947 and lives in Radom. 8. In 1977 the applicant, while serving a prison sentence, was injured in an occupational accident. He lodged a compensation claim with the Warsaw Regional Court against the State Treasury. By the Warsaw Regional Court’s judgment of 11 June 1980 the applicant was awarded a monthly pension of 500 (old) PLN, payable from 1 February 1978, and a lump sum of 12,000 PLN as compensation. 9. On 21 November 1991 the applicant lodged an action with the Warsaw Regional Court claiming that his pension be increased. On an unspecified later date the Warsaw Regional Court transferred his case to the Lublin Regional Court, considering that it had jurisdiction to entertain the case. Hearings in the case were held before the Lublin Regional Court on 8 February 1993, 5 April, 21 November and 20 December 1994. 10. By a judgment of 30 December 1994 the Lublin Regional Court ruled in favour of the applicant and ordered that a compensation of 107,000,000 (old) PLN be paid to him, as well as 1,629,650 (old) PLN as monthly pension, from 1 September 1995. The defendant State Treasury, represented by the Warsaw Detention Centre, lodged an appeal against this judgment. As a result, on 31 May 1995 the Lublin Court of Appeal quashed the judgment under appeal and ordered the case to be reconsidered. 11. Subsequently, a number of hearings were held before the Lublin Regional Court and expert reports as to the applicant’s health were ordered and considered by the court. 12. On 10 May 2000 the Lublin Regional Court gave a judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim in its entirety. The applicant appealed. 13. On 28 September 2000 the Lublin Court of Appeal held a hearing. By a judgment of 11 October 2000 the court partially altered the judgement of the Lublin Regional Court increasing the applicant’s monthly pension to 280 PLN and awarding him compensation of 4179 PLN. On 5 December 2000 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. 14. The proceedings before the Supreme Court are apparently pending.

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7. The applicant was born in 1936 and lives in Kamień Pomorski, Poland. 8. The applicant was a manager of the Kamień Pomorski health resort. On 14 May 1990 he filed an action with the Szczecin Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), in which he requested that a certain A.P. (“the defendant”) be ordered to stop spreading information damaging to the good name of the applicant and to retract in the press his defamatory statements. 9. Subsequently, the court held hearings on 2 July and 5 September 1990. 10. On 3 October 1990 the court held a hearing. It heard a witness and decided to stay the proceedings until the completion of proceedings concerning the applicant’s dismissal from the position of manager. On 27 December 1991 the dismissal proceedings were terminated. 11. On 30 January 1992 the applicant requested the court to resume the defamation proceedings. On 7 December 1992 the trial court resumed the proceedings. 12. On 5 March 1993 the court adjourned a hearing, because of the lack of the defendant’s pleadings in the case file. 13. On 11 August 1993 the applicant extended his claim. 14. On 21 October 1994 the court held a hearing. 15. On 6 December 1995 the court adjourned a hearing at the defendant’s request. 16. On 24 January 1996 the court closed the examination of the case and announced that the judgment would be delivered on 7 February 1996. On 6 February 1996 the court reopened the examination of the case and decided that the defendant would be heard in Kamień Pomorski. On 19 February 1996 the court heard the defendant. 17. On 28 February 1996 the Szczecin Regional Court gave judgment. It ordered the defendant to retract his statements concerning the applicant in certain newspapers at his own expense. 18. On 8 August 1996 the applicant received a copy of the judgment. Subsequently, the defendant lodged an appeal against that judgment. 19. On 12 November 1996 the Poznań Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) held a hearing and on 21 November 1996 it gave judgment. The court quashed the judgment of the Szczecin Regional Court and remitted the case for re-examination. 20. Despite numerous complaints by the applicant and his lawyer, the Szczecin Regional Court listed no hearing until 12 May 1999. On 12 January 1999 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the President of the Poznań Regional Court about the delay in the proceedings. In a reply of 27 January 1999, the President of the Regional Court admitted that the complaint was justified. 21. On 12 May 1999 the court held a hearing. 22. On 28 June 2000 the Szczecin Regional Court held a hearing. It heard the applicant and adjourned the examination of the case for the purpose of hearing the defendant before the Kamień Pomorski District Court. The defendant was heard on 25 August 2000. 23. The next hearing was listed for 29 December 2000. The court closed the examination of the case and informed the parties that the judgment would be delivered on 12 January 2001. On 26 January 2001 the court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim. On an unspecified date, in the second half of 2001, he appealed against the judgment. 24. It appears that the proceedings are pending.

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7. The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Kaczyn, Poland. 8. On 10 June 1988 the applicant filed with the Kielce District Court (Sąd Rejonowy) an application for distribution of the inheritance left by her late mother. From 19 July 1988 to 30 April 1993 the court held eleven hearings and ordered that seven expert reports be prepared. 9. On 31 August and 14 October 1993 the court held hearings. Subsequently, on 25 October 1993 the court heard a witness at the place of his residence. 10. A hearing listed for 18 November 1993 was adjourned sine die since a witness did not appear. On the same day the court ordered that a supplementary expert report be prepared. 11. On 6 May 1994 the court adjourned the hearing at the request of a lawyer of B.J. (“B.J.”), a party to the proceedings. 12. A hearing listed for 8 June 1994 was adjourned as a witness failed to appear. 13. On 6 July 1994 the court held a hearing and set a time-limit for the parties to submit their requests as to evidence in the case. 14. During the hearing held on 29 July 1994 the court ordered that a supplementary expert report be prepared. On 24 October 1994 it was submitted to the court. 15. On 15 December 1994 B.J. requested the court to secure the claim. 16. On 13 February 1995 the court held a hearing. It set 14 days time‑limit for B.J. to submit his requests as to evidence in the case and for the applicant as to submit her pleadings. 17. A hearing listed for 27 March 1995 was adjourned until 8 May 1995 at the request of B.J.’s lawyer. Subsequently, the court adjourned the hearing scheduled for 8 May 1995 until 22 May 1995. 18. At the hearing held on 22 May 1995 B.J. challenged the expert opinion and requested the court to inspect the site. 19. On 29 May 1995 the court refused to secure the claim. 20. On 10 November 1995 the court held a hearing. A hearing scheduled for 26 January 1996 was adjourned as the expert failed to appear. 21. On 27 March 1996 the court held a hearing. It heard the expert and ordered inspection of the site. The inspection of the site scheduled for 28 June 1996 was postponed because of the bad weather. On 23 August 1996 the court inspected the site. 22. On 7 January 1997 the court ordered that supplementary expert reports be prepared. 23. On 17 March 1997 the applicant and four other parties to the proceedings sent a letter to the President of the Cracow Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) requesting that the proceedings be expedited. In a letter of 13 May 1997 the President informed the applicant that the President of the Kielce District Court would supervise the conduct of the proceedings. He also admitted that the proceedings had been slowed down as a result of changes to the rapporteurs. 24. On 8 May 1997 a supplementary report was submitted to the court. 25. On 14 July 1997 the court held a hearing. It set a two‑week time‑limit for the lawyer of B.J. to submit pleadings. 26. A hearing listed for 5 September 1997 was adjourned sine die. 27. On 6 October 1997 the court ordered that a supplementary report be prepared. On 20 October 1997 it was submitted to the court. 28. The next hearing, listed for 22 November 1997, was adjourned at the request of B.J, as he was ill. 29. On 22 December 1997 the court held a hearing. 30. A hearing scheduled for 4 February 1998 was adjourned at the request of B.J.’s lawyer. 31. On 18 February 1998 the court held a hearing. It ordered that a supplementary expert report be prepared. On 17 March 1998 a supplementary report was submitted to the court. 32. A further hearing, listed for 23 March 1998, was adjourned sine die. 33. On 1 June 1998 the court ordered that a fresh supplementary expert report be prepared within one month. On 10 July 1998 the court obtained a supplementary expert report. On 5 August 1998 the applicant and other parties to the proceedings challenged the expert report. 34. On 30 September 1998 the applicant complained to the President of the Kielce District Court about the delay in the proceedings. 35. On 6 November 1998 the court served the expert report on the parties and ordered that they submit their observations thereon within 14 days. On 18 November 1998 the applicant and other parties to the proceedings challenged the expert opinion and accused B.J. of prolonging the proceedings. 36. A hearing held on 23 March 1999 was adjourned at the request of the applicant’s lawyer due to the possibility of reaching a friendly settlement. 37. The court held a further hearing on 30 April 1999. The applicant’s lawyer informed the court that reaching a friendly settlement was impossible due to the conduct of B.J. 38. On 14 May 1999 the court closed the examination of the case and informed the parties that the final decision would be delivered on 24 May 1999. It later resumed the examination of the case and listed a hearing for 8 September 1999. 39. On 22 September 1999 the District Court gave a decision (postanowienie). On 13 December 1999 B.J. appealed against the first‑instance decision to the Kielce Regional Court (Sąd Okręgowy). 40. On 27 April 2000 the court held a hearing. 41. On 15 May 2000 the court dismissed B.J.’s request for exemption from court fees. 42. On 27 June 2000 the court ordered that three fresh expert reports be prepared within one month. They were submitted to the court on 20 July and 30 August 2000 respectively. 43. On 18 October 2000 the court held a hearing and ordered the parties to submit their observations on the expert reports within 14 days. It adjourned the hearing sine die at the joint request of B.J. and his lawyer. 44. On 1 December 2000 the court held the hearing and heard the experts. It closed the examination of the case and announced that the decision would be delivered on 15 December 2000. On the same day the court resumed the examination of the case following the requests of B.J. and his lawyer and adjourned the hearing sine die. 45. The next hearing listed for 25 January 2001 was adjourned at the request of B.J.’s lawyer as B.J. was ill. 46. On 12 April 2001 the court held a hearing. It gave a decision (postanowienie) and dismissed the appeal. 47. On 23 June 2001 B.J. lodged a cassation appeal with the Kielce Regional Court. On 12 July 2001 the court rejected the cassation appeal. On 28 August 2001 B.J. appealed. On 28 February 2002 the court dismissed B.J.’s appeal and the decision became final.

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10. The first, second and third applicants were born in 1952, 1966 and 1947 respectively and live in Washington (Tyne and Wear), where the fourth applicant, an environmental group set up by the applicants, is also based. 11. The new town centre of Washington is known as “the Galleries” and is located within an area now owned by Postel Properties Limited (“Postel”), a private company. This town centre was originally built by the Washington Development Corporation (“the Corporation”), a body set up by the government of the United Kingdom pursuant to an Act of Parliament to build the “new” centre. The centre was sold to Postel on 30 December 1987. 12. The Galleries, as owned by Postel at the relevant time, comprised a shopping mall (with two hypermarkets and major shops), the surrounding car parks with spaces for approximately 3,000 cars and walkways. Public services were also available in the vicinity. However, the freehold of the careers’ office and the public library was owned by the Council, the social services office and health centre were leased to the Council by the Secretary of State and the freehold of the police station was held on behalf of Northumbria Police Authority. There was a post office within the Galleries and also the offices of the housing department, leased to the Council by Postel. 13. Around September 1997 the Council gave outline planning permission to the City of Sunderland College to build on a part of Princess Anne Park in Washington known as the Arena. The Arena is the only playing field in the vicinity of Washington town centre which is available for use by the local community. The first to third applicants, together with other concerned residents, formed the fourth applicant to campaign against the college’s proposal and to persuade the Council not to grant the college permission to build on the field. 14. On or around 14 March 1998 the first applicant, together with her husband and son, set up two stands at the entrance of the shopping mall in the Galleries, displaying posters alerting the public to the likely loss of the open space and seeking signatures to present to the Council on behalf of Washington First Forum. Security guards employed by Postel would not let the first applicant or her assistants continue to collect signatures on any land or premises owned by Postel. The applicants had to remove their stands and stop collecting signatures. 15. The manager of one of the hypermarkets gave the applicants permission to set up stands within that store in March 1998, allowing them to transmit their message and to collect signatures, albeit from a reduced number of people. However, the same permission was not granted in April 1998 when the applicants wanted to collect signatures for a further petition. 16. On 10 April 1998 the third applicant, as acting chair of Washington First Forum, wrote to the manager of the Galleries asking for permission to set up a stand and to canvass views from the public either inside the mall itself or in the adjacent car parks and offered to pay to be allowed to do so. In his reply of 14 April 1998, the manager of the Galleries refused access. His letter read as follows: “... the Galleries is unique in as much as although it is the Town Centre, it is also privately owned. The owner’s stance on all political and religious issues, is one of strict neutrality and I am charged with applying this philosophy. I am therefore obliged to refuse permission for you to carry out a petition within the Galleries or the adjacent car parks.” 17. On 19 April 1998 the third applicant wrote again to the manager of the Galleries, asking him to reconsider his decision. His letter remained unanswered. 18. The fourth applicant continued to try and reach the public by setting up stands by the roadside on public footpaths and going to the old town centre at Concord which, however, is visited by a much smaller number of Washington residents. 19. The deadline for letters of representation to the Council regarding the building works was 1 May 1998. On 30 April 1998 the applicants submitted the 3,200 letters of representation they had obtained. 20. The fourth applicant has produced a list of associations and others which were given permission to carry out collections, set up stands and displays within the Galleries. These included: the Salvation Army (collection before Christmas), local school choirs (carol-singing and collection before Christmas), the Stop Smoking Campaign (advertising display and handing out of nicotine patches), the Blood Transfusion Service (blood collection), the Royal British Legion (collection for Armistice Day), various photographers (advertising and taking of photographs) and British Gas (staffed advertising display). 21. From 31 January to 6 March 2001, Sunderland Council ran a consultation campaign under the banner “Your Council, Your Choice”, informing the local residents of three leadership choices for the future of the Council and were allowed to use the Galleries for this purpose. This was a statutory consultation exercise carried out under section 25 of the Local Government Act 2000, which required local authorities to draw up proposals for the operation of “executive arrangements” and consult local electors before sending them to the Secretary of State. Some 8,500 people were reported as having responded to the survey.

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11. The applicant was born in 1940 and lives in Rome. 12. He is a journalist by profession and on 21 November 1993 he published in the Italian daily newspaper Il Giornale an article about Mr G. Caselli, who was at that time the Principal Public Prosecutor in Palermo. The article was entitled “Caselli, the judge with the white quiff” and subtitled “Catholic schooling, communist militancy like his friend Violante – Are the charges against Andreotti the start of a new Sogno case?”. 13. In the article the applicant, after referring to the proceedings brought by Mr Caselli against Mr G. Andreotti, a very well-known Italian statesman accused of aiding and abetting the Mafia (appoggio esterno alla mafia) who has in the meantime been acquitted at first instance, expressed himself as follows: “In the last few days Giulio Andreotti has told an Israeli newspaper that he fears he is to be eliminated. If I may be permitted to begin with a digression, I wonder why he was talking to a foreign paper rather than the Italian press. He’s not the only one. It’s getting to be an epidemic. During the same period the industrialist Carlo De Benedetti chose an English newspaper in which to say that Italy is his Siberia. Even Bettino Craxi, when he feels like uttering threats or complaints, generally does so via the Spanish papers. This might be a form of gratuitous snobbery. But it might also be a victimisation syndrome of the type ‘We’re foreigners in our own country and are obliged to raise our voices abroad in order to make ourselves heard at home.’ That’s what Andreotti is suggesting when he adds that he feels like an exile and the victim of a plot, but he doesn’t exactly know what kind of plot. Those who have seen him recently say that he’s pale, his pointed ears are drooping and he’s bent forward to the point of being hunchbacked. He’s worried about his wife Lidia, who’s been plunged in a kind of cataleptic trance since that fateful 27 March. That was the day when the official notification that he was under investigation – a document running to some 250 typewritten pages – turned the most well known Italian politician into the number one godfather of the Sicilian Mafia. Now Andreotti is bewildered. He tries to understand but he can’t. He thinks there must have been some sort of spur-of-the-moment conspiracy. But the antibody that’s eating away at him has been there for some time. It’s been cultured for years in precisely those religious environments that Andreotti likes best. While he was already dominating Rome in the 1950s Giancarlo Caselli, the Principal Public Prosecutor in Palermo, author of the 250 pages which have annihilated him, was learning his lessons at the school of the Salesian brothers in Turin. Giancarlo was a fine, studious boy. Turin is full of people like that because it’s a rainy city and the houses have no balconies to watch the street from, so there’s nothing else for a boy to do but get his head down over his books. That’s why the place specialises in the mass-production of intellectuals. From Bobbio to Conso, the Minister of Justice. It’s a puritan brotherhood. The more Giancarlo progressed towards self-knowledge the heavier his complex about his father weighed on him. The father was a very worthy man but only the chauffeur of a captain of industry. While driving he breathed in the air of the bourgeoisie and then he blew it out again over his son. The boy decided that when he grew up he would pass over to the other side of the fence. No longer subservient like dad, but keeping the upper hand. At university, he drew close to the PCI [the Italian Communist Party], the party which exalts the frustrated. When he was admitted to the State legal service he swore a threefold oath of obedience – to God, to the Law and to via Botteghe Oscure [formerly the headquarters of the PCI, now those of the PDS – the Democratic Party of the Left]. And Giancarlo became the judge he has remained for the last thirty years – pious, stern and partisan. But he cannot really be understood without a mention here of his alter ego Luciano Violante, Caselli’s twin brother. Both from Turin; the same age – 52; both raised by the Catholic teaching orders; both communist militants; both judicial officers; and a deep understanding between them: when Violante, the head, calls, Caselli, the arm, responds. Luciano has always been one step ahead of Giancarlo. In the mid-1970s he indicted for an attempted coup d’état Edgardo Sogno, a former member of the Resistance, but also an anti-communist. It was a typical political trial which led nowhere. Instead of facing a judicial inquiry, Violante found that his career began to take off. In 1979 he was elected as a Communist MP. And ever since then he has been the via Botteghe Oscure’s shadow Minister of Justice. Today he’s the chairman of Parliament’s anti-Mafia committee, the great choreographer of the to-ing and fro-ing of the pentiti [criminals-turned-informers] and the PDS’s strongman. While Violante was climbing the ladder, Caselli had turned into a handsome figure with the shock of prematurely white hair he’s so proud of. If he goes away anywhere, even on a short trip, he always takes his hairdryer with him. During breaks in proceedings he pats his quiff into place on his forehead and pushes his hair over his ears. Afterwards, as you will have noticed on TV, he moves his head the bare minimum, so as not to ruin his handiwork. Vain – he’s vain. When Giancarlo was a member of the National Council of the Judiciary, from 1986 to 1990, his colleagues used to make fun of him, saying ‘Under his hair there’s nothing there’. That’s true up to a point, as a comment on his narcissism and his ideological blinkers. But it’s not true as regards his intelligence, which cannot be faulted. So far, as can be seen, there’s nothing to suggest that one day Caselli’s and Andreotti’s paths would cross. Apart from his spell at the National Council of the Judiciary, Giancarlo continued to live in Turin. He was a judge in the public eye and in the first line of the battle against terrorism. It was he who obtained the confession of Patrizio Peci, whose evidence as a witness for the prosecution devastated the Red Brigades. In the meantime, the PCI set in motion its strategy for gaining control of the public prosecutors’ offices of every city in Italy. That campaign is still going on, as the PDS has picked up the baton. The whole thing was the product of two linked but very very simple ideas Violante had. The first idea was that if the Communists could not manage to gain power through the ballot box, they could do so through the courts. There was no shortage of material. The Christian Democrats and the Socialists were nothing but thieves and it would be easy to catch them out. The second idea was more brilliant than the first: the opening of a judicial investigation was sufficient to shatter people’s careers; there was no need to go to the trouble of a trial, it was enough to put someone in the pillory. And to do that it was necessary to control the entire network of public prosecutors’ offices. And that was the start of Tangentopoli. The Craxis, De Lorenzos and others were immediately caught with their hands in the till and destroyed. But Andreotti was needed to complete the picture. More cunning than the rest, or not so greedy, the sly old Christian Democrat nearly always avoided getting caught up in corruption cases. It was at that precise moment that Giancarlo was getting ready to leave the rain of Turin for the sun of Palermo. A campaign of unsubstantiated allegations saw off the incumbent public prosecutor Giammanco, who crept away with his tail between his legs. And at the start of this year the handsome judge was able to take Giammanco’s place and finally place Violante’s seal on the Palermo prosecution service. Before he took up his new post Caselli was summoned to the Quirinale [the President’s official residence]. President Scalfaro, knowing the type, was concerned. When he had Caselli in front of him he said: ‘Do whatever you think is right, but be objective.’ Once in Palermo his fate and Andreotti’s, which had remained separate for years, became intertwined. Less than two months later the senator-for-life was suddenly accused of belonging to the Mafia. The file was an implausible rag-bag containing statements by pentiti, old and new documents and information given by the same old Buscetta [a pentito] to Violante and the anti-Mafia committee, now used by Caselli as evidence in a kind of game of ping-pong between the two twins. To cut a long story short, even the most long-lived brontosaurus in the Palazzo [i.e. Palazzo Madama – the Senate-House] was destroyed, thanks to the principle that an accusation is sufficient to destroy anyone. In April Caselli flew off to the United States, where he met Buscetta. He offered the informer 11,000,000 lire a month to continue to cooperate. Buscetta could still be useful to him during the investigation, even if the outcome was no longer of much importance. The result sought had already been achieved. What will happen next is already predictable. In six to eight months’ time the investigation will be closed. But Andreotti will not be able to resurrect his political career. What a stroke of luck. Caselli, on the other hand, will be portrayed as an objective judge whose duty obliged him to prosecute but who realised he had been in the wrong. He will become a hero. And that, if there is a God, cries out for vengeance.” 14. On 10 March 1994, acting on a complaint by Mr Caselli, the judge responsible for preliminary investigations committed the applicant and the manager of Il Giornale for trial in the Monza District Court. The applicant was accused of defamation through the medium of the press (diffamazione a mezzo stampa), aggravated by the fact that the offence had been committed to the detriment of a civil servant in the performance of his official duties. 15. At the trial on 10 January 1996 the civil party asked for the report on the evidence given by Buscetta to the New York judicial authorities and a copy of the Italian weekly newspaper l’Espresso in which that evidence had been published to be added to the file. The defence asked for two press articles concerning Mr Caselli’s professional relations with the pentito Buscetta to be added to the file and for the complainant to be required to give evidence. In an order made on the same day the District Court refused these requests on the grounds that the documents in question were not relevant to the object of the proceedings (defamation) and that there was no point taking evidence from Mr Caselli in view of the tenor of the article written by the applicant. 16. On the same day, applying Article 57, Article 595 §§ 1 and 2 and Article 61 § 10 of the Criminal Code and section 13 of the Press Act (Law no. 47 of 8 February 1948), the District Court sentenced the manager of Il Giornale and the applicant to fines of 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 Italian lire (ITL) respectively, payment of damages and costs in the sum of ITL 60,000,000, payment of the civil party’s costs and publication of the judgment in Il Giornale. In its reasoning the District Court included the following considerations: “... The author of this article, taking as his theme the case against Senator Giulio Andreotti, gave a biography of the complainant in terms which emphasised his cultural background and above all his ideological leanings – allegedly close to the PCI (now the PDS) – contending that these leanings had decisively influenced [the complainant’s] professional activity to the extent of making him the instrument of a grand design of that party, namely to take control of the judicial organs, particularly the public prosecutors’ offices. Mr Perna stressed the long-standing friendship between the complainant and the MP Violante, asserting that the latter acted as the head in a strategy where Mr Caselli was the arm. He added to his summary biography phrases with a particularly striking literal meaning such as: ‘When he was admitted to the State Legal Service he swore a threefold oath of obedience – to God, to the Law and to via Botteghe Oscure. And Giancarlo became the judge he has remained for the last thirty years – pious, stern and partisan.’ He accused Mr Caselli of having managed ‘the Andreotti investigation’ in furtherance of a grand political design hatched by Violante on behalf of the PCI/PDS, which was to break up by judicial process the dominant political class at the time, so that the favoured party could take power by non-electoral means. He suggested that the charges against Mr Andreotti, the last politician of any standing not to have been laid low by the ‘clean hands’ [mani pulite] inquiries in progress, should be seen in the context of that exploitation of the investigation. ... The defamatory nature of the article ... is absolutely manifest, given that the text categorically excluded the possibility that Mr Caselli might be faithful to the deontological obligations of his duties as an officer in the State legal service and denied that he possessed the qualities of impartiality, independence, objectivity and probity which characterise the exercise of judicial functions, an activity which the complainant was even alleged to have used for political ends, according to the author of the article. In the present case exercise of the right to report current events cannot be pleaded as an extenuating circumstance, Mr Perna not having adduced the slightest evidence in support of his very serious allegations. Nor can he rely on exercise of the right to comment on them – a right which would certainly be enjoyed by a journalist who, in reporting court proceedings, criticises this or that measure – given that the offending assertions in the article amount to nothing more than an unjustified attack on the complainant, which foully besmirched his honour and reputation. ...” 17. The applicant appealed. Relying on the freedom of the press, and in particular the right to report and comment on current events, he contended, among other arguments, that what he had written about Mr Caselli’s political leanings was true and that the court could have verified that by agreeing to take evidence from the complainant himself; that Caselli and Violante were indeed friends; and that it was likewise true that Caselli had used the help of the pentito Buscetta in the proceedings against Andreotti, and, as the representative of the State, had paid him sums of money, all pentiti being remunerated by the Italian State. Describing himself in addition as an opinion columnist (opinionista), he asserted that he had not intended to give a biography of Caselli but rather to express his critical opinions, in a figurative and forceful way. More precisely, he had made critical judgments, which were admittedly more or less well founded and with which readers might or might not agree, but which were explicitly derived from the factual premise, namely Caselli’s political activity. Lastly, he demanded that evidence be taken from the complainant and from certain journalists and figures in Italian politics who, like Mr Caselli, had been Communist Party militants. In particular, he asked for evidence to be taken from Mr S. Vertone and Mr G. Ferrara and for press articles on interviews in which the two men had confirmed the complainant’s active political militancy to be added to the file. In particular, in an interview published in the daily newspaper Corriere della Sera on 11 December 1994, extracts from which were quoted in the applicant’s appeal, Mr Vertone had stated, inter alia, that the complainant was a brave man of great integrity but that he was influenced by the cultural and political model of communism, that his relations with the former Communist Party had been very close and that he had later all but joined the party. In an interview given to another daily newspaper, La Stampa, which published it on 9 December 1994, Mr Ferrara had asserted that he had taken part in dozens of political meetings with Caselli and Violante among others during the 1970s in the Turin federation of the former Communist Party. He had gone on to say that although Caselli, a man of integrity, had done good work against terrorism as an officer of the State legal service, he was heavily politicised and should therefore avoid speaking like a tribune of the people. 18. In a judgment of 28 October 1997 the Milan Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal, ruling as follows: “... the statements noted in the charges ... are undeniably seriously damaging to the reputation of the injured party. They go further than casting doubt – as the charges say – on Mr Caselli’s loyalty to the country’s institutions, his faithfulness to the principle of legality, his objectivity and his independence; they categorically deny that he possesses those qualities and even attribute to him, among other accusations, instances of conduct which constitute disciplinary and criminal offences.” The Court of Appeal held that it was evident that the article essentially referred to facts, some of which were not in the least defamatory and were therefore not relevant to the decision to be taken. “In particular, the following elements are undeniably facts (not judgments), and one of the appeal pleadings (from lawyer D’A.) refers to them as such: (i) Giancarlo Caselli’s political leanings; (ii) the friendship between Mr Caselli and MP Violante; (iii) the information that as public prosecutor in Palermo Mr Caselli used the statements of the criminal-turned-informer Buscetta in the investigation concerning Mr Andreotti, and the information that the same Buscetta, like other pentiti, is paid by the State. Those elements are facts and in itself merely stating them is not in the least defamatory; they are therefore not relevant to the decision this Court has to take. That seems quite obvious as regards the last two pieces of information above, but is also true of the first (Giancarlo Caselli’s political leanings), since the State guarantees not only freedom of thought and the freedom to express thoughts but also the freedom of association in political parties. It is therefore not relevant to try to ascertain what political beliefs Giancarlo Caselli holds and whether or not he expressed them in specific circumstances (and at all events outside the judicial sphere and the performance of his duties) since that information could not in any case be considered defamatory in itself... There is therefore no basis for the request that the proceedings be reopened, firstly so that Giancarlo Caselli can be heard as a witness, and secondly to obtain the production of the press articles of Saverio Vertone and Giuliano Ferrara, but also so that witness evidence can be taken from them, once again on the subject of [Caselli’s] political militancy or at any rate of [his] ... political participation in the PCI/PDS. First of all, that information, as has already been said, is barely touched upon in the article, and in the second place it cannot in any event be regarded as damaging to the complainant’s reputation and accordingly does not need to be verified.” 19. Other facts imputed to the complainant were, on the contrary, undeniably defamatory. First of all, there was the oath of obedience, which, beyond its symbolic import, bore the precise accusation that Mr Caselli had given a personal and lasting undertaking to “obey”, in the course of his duties, the law, his religious beliefs and “the instructions of the leaders” of a political party. The Court of Appeal continued: “The remainder of the article, which gives a highly defamatory account of Mr Caselli’s alleged obedience to the Communist Party, confirms that the journalist was not expressing judgments or personal opinions but imputing specific conduct to Mr Caselli. Further on the article asserts (i) that Mr Caselli is Mr Violante’s twin brother, ... (ii) that the PCI ... set in motion a strategy of seizing control of all the public prosecutors’ offices in Italy by applying two of the MP’s ideas, the first being to gain power ... by using the judicial machine and the second to resort simply to opening a judicial investigation ... in order to destroy the careers [of political opponents] since there was no need to go to the trouble of a trial, it was enough to put someone in the pillory. It is in that context that the journalist referred to two actions by Giancarlo Caselli: his request for a transfer to the Palermo public prosecutor’s office and subsequent appointment to the post of public prosecutor there and his notification to Mr Andreotti that he faced prosecution for belonging to a Mafia-type organisation. ... The journalist Perna did not therefore express opinions or judgments but attributed to the complainant Giancarlo Caselli in a highly defamatory manner conduct and acts about which – and here we can only repeat what the District Court said – he did not adduce a scrap of evidence; he did not even seek to prove his case, as his lawyers argue that he was merely expressing opinions. ... The journalist [having] attributed specific acts to public prosecutor Giancarlo Caselli without verifying his assertions in any way and in a totally gratuitous manner, his conduct cannot be explained by errors or misunderstandings, but only as a deliberate act. That is confirmed by the literal content of the whole article, in which the person of Giancarlo Caselli is constantly and subtly denigrated, even though a few positive remarks are skilfully mixed in with the attacks. ... The content of the whole article shows that there was no unintentional fault on the defendant’s part but that he was fully aware that he was damaging another’s reputation and even that he intended to do so.” 20. In a judgment of 9 October 1998, deposited with the registry on 3 December 1998, the Court of Cassation upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment, ruling that it was quite correct both as regards the merits and from the procedural point of view. “... Contrary to what has been alleged, the requests for leave to adduce evidence filed by the defence were interpreted in accordance with their exact significance and probative value and were rightly refused because they were totally devoid of relevance to the decision. The appeal written and signed jointly by the defendant Perna and his lawyer Mr Caiazza contains a request for the proceedings to be reopened, with a view, firstly, to ‘taking witness evidence from the civil party’, in particular ‘about the forms and modalities of his militancy, or at least of his political participation in the activities of the PCI/PDS during the period when he was already a public prosecutor, and about all the other points which offended the complainant’. The absolutely vague and irrelevant nature of the request is manifest in the light of the tenor of the phrases used by Mr Perna (in whose article the allusion to Mr Caselli’s militancy is by no means limited, as Mr Caiazza argued in the grounds of appeal, to the assertion that Mr Caselli associated himself with the Communist Party while he was at university, an assertion which would, incidentally, not constitute an insult); the article set out to give a detailed account of the forms taken by that militancy by imputing certain acts to Mr Caselli with the aim of proving that his militancy existed. Consequently, either this point remains vague or the problem is resolved by trying to make the complainant admit the facts noted in the charges, with the result that the burden of proof is shifted away from [Mr Perna and Mr Montanelli]. ... Moreover, the ‘direct witnesses’, Giuliano Ferrara and Saverio Vertone, are mentioned in connection with the above point [the forms taken by the complainant’s militancy]; what has just been said about the vagueness and irrelevance of that point therefore applies equally to those persons. Furthermore, giving further details about facts of which they had direct knowledge would have had no bearing on the trial since these were assertions which the trial court did not consider offensive and to speak of this as exculpatory evidence is accordingly meaningless. Lastly, Mr Caselli’s militancy within the PCI has nothing to do with the specific facts attributed to him, and therefore with his alleged oath of obedience to via Botteghe Oscure (to which, however, this ground of appeal makes no allusion), with the relations between Caselli and Violante and above all with an alleged link with Buscetta. Apart from the procedural aspect of the question, it should be stated at the outset that even the argument that the content of the article was not objectively offensive is absolutely devoid of foundation, as the judgment given by the trial court was justified in every respect as regards the offensive nature, for a man even more than for an officer of the State legal service, of imputations of specific facts implying a lack of personality, dignity, independent thought, coherence and moral honesty, and conduct signifying explicitly that there have been instances of dereliction of professional duty. ... The trial court’s reasoning on the extenuating circumstances of the right to report current events and the right to comment on them is also correct, as evidenced by an appropriate statement of the reasons which was free of mistakes in law and errors of logic. No link can be established, and moreover no link was established by the Court of Appeal, between the personality [of Mr Caselli] and an alleged right to report current events exercised through the offensive imputation of facts which have not been proved to be true and play no informative role. The essential point in the judgment is its categorical exclusion of the idea that the article expressed a critical judgment, hence the rejection of the plea that the right to freedom of expression constituted an extenuating circumstance. And in fact it is precisely by virtue of this comparative parameter and of its accessory powers of cognition that this court must repeat that the reasons given [by the Court of Appeal] are immune to criticism: the article is quite clearly a bare list of acts and conduct imputed to Mr Caselli in which there cannot be seen, even in veiled form, the slightest contribution to thought which might be regarded as a critical judgment, or even the attempt at irony which is said to be hidden in the elusive ‘caustic phrases’ referred to in the grounds of appeal. As the Court of Appeal concluded, this case was not about respect for the limits of formal propriety. It follows from all of the foregoing considerations that, as it is impossible to speak of critical comment, there is no cause to expatiate about exercise of the right to comment, still less about the extenuating circumstance of gross negligence in the exercise of the right to comment or about the hypothetical exercise of that right. ...”

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7. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Aghios Stefanos (Attica). 8. On 30 May 1990 the Commercial Bank of Greece lodged a criminal complaint against a number of its employees, including the applicant, alleging suppression of documents, forgery and uttering, and fraud, offences which it claimed had caused it a loss of more than 20,000,000 drachmas. It accused the employees concerned of having debited the account of Greek Railways (“the OSE”) using seven cheques from a cheque book that had been produced in the railway company’s name but never actually issued to it. On 2 June 1990 the public prosecutor instituted proceedings against the applicant. 9. On 27 March 1991 the applicant was summoned to appear before the investigating judge and was placed in pre-trial detention. On 23 April 1991 he was released on bail, subject to court supervision entailing, among other things, a ban on leaving the country. 10. In a decision of 26 June 1992 the Indictment Division of the Athens Court of Appeal committed some of the accused, including the applicant, for trial in the Athens Court of Appeal, composed of three judges as is the rule for cases dealt with by courts of appeal at first instance. 11. The hearing, initially set down for 27 May 1994, was adjourned firstly until 26 January 1996 because of a strike by members of the Athens Bar and subsequently until 31 May 1996 because of the ill health of one of the other defendants. On that date the hearing was again adjourned, this time until 13 October 1997. 12. On 4 June 1996 the applicant, who before joining the bank had been an officer in the merchant navy, applied to have the ban on his leaving the country lifted so that he could work in the navy again. He argued that he needed to be in gainful employment in order to support his wife and three children and pointed out that the proceedings had been adjourned several times by the court itself. However, his application was refused by the public prosecutor and subsequently by the Indictment Division of the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal having earlier rejected a similar application. 13. The trial finally began on 13 October 1997 – five years, three months and seventeen days after the Indictment Division’s decision of 26 June 1992 and more than seven years after the complaint had been lodged and the proceedings instituted. Hearings were held on 13, 14, 15, 21 and 29 October 1997. One of the co-defendants requested the production in court of the back-up tape for the bank’s computer (but not the cheques in question). Counsel for the bank produced a declaration by the bank’s information technology department attesting that the copies of the computer tapes in the file were authentic. The declaration was read out at the hearing without eliciting any reaction from the defendants. During the trial at least sixty-six documents were read out and evidence was heard from three witnesses. The Court of Appeal gave judgment on 29 October 1997. It convicted the applicant and sentenced him to five years and four months’ imprisonment, to be reduced by the period already spent in pre-trial detention, and ordered the confiscation and destruction of the seven cheques in question. Lastly, it ruled that if the applicant decided to appeal, the appeal would suspend the execution of the sentence. 14. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the appropriate court, namely the Athens Court of Appeal, sitting as a bench of five judges. On 20 February 1998 that court upheld the judgment delivered at first instance but reduced the sentence to four years and ten months’ imprisonment. 15. During the trial the applicant had requested the production of certain extracts from the log file of the bank’s computer and of the original cheques and had asked for a handwriting expert, Mr Chalkias, to be summoned and cross-examined in the presence of another handwriting expert. 16. The Court of Appeal refused those requests on the following grounds: “The precision and authenticity of the extracts from the bank’s central computer records, accompanied by declarations by senior executives of the bank, are beyond dispute, and the production of the extracts is unnecessary. Nor is there any need to summon and cross-examine Mr Chalkias, because he has drawn up a detailed report which was read out at the trial. Lastly, the photocopies of the relevant cheques, which none of the parties disputes are forged, satisfy the needs of the proceedings and production of the originals therefore serves no purpose.” 17. The Court of Appeal read out the items of evidence that had already been adduced at first instance and heard evidence from twelve prosecution and five defence witnesses. 18. It noted that, contrary to what the applicant had maintained, the connection between the cheques in question and the OSE’s account could not have been established by members of the bank’s information technology department, which was empowered only to process data from branches. It further observed that on the date of the offence, the applicant had been the only person to use the computer on which the offence had been committed. The handwriting expert had concluded that characteristics of the applicant’s handwriting and signature were visible on the cheques. Lastly, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant was one of the very limited number of the bank’s employees who knew the OSE’s account number and the names of the OSE employees authorised to issue cheques. 19. The applicant appealed on points of law. On 20 October 1998 the Court of Cassation quashed the judgment appealed against in respect of the charges of suppressing documents and forgery and uttering, and remitted the case to the Court of Appeal in respect of the charge of fraud only. 20. The Court of Appeal held a hearing on 2 December 1998. The applicant again requested the production of extracts from the bank’s log file and sought a declaration from counsel for the bank attesting that the photocopies of the cheques were authentic. The Court of Appeal refused those requests. With regard to the first request, it ruled that it was impossible to recover the extracts from the bank’s log file because the relevant tape reels had not been kept, and added that the authenticity of the documents in question was clear from other pieces of documentary evidence. It construed the second request as an attempt to establish whether the defendant had had an accomplice, whereas his guilt was apparent from other evidence. The Court of Appeal also held that it had not been proved that the photocopies of the cheques had been falsified. It concluded that the defendant had committed the offence on the basis of a pre-defined plan, which he had intended to carry out several times in order to misappropriate funds from Greek Railways. 21. On 8 December 1998 the Court of Appeal found the applicant guilty of fraud within the meaning of Article 386 of the Criminal Code, holding that the loss sustained by the bank had resulted from deception on the part of its employees and that the question whether the computer had been used or not was irrelevant. It sentenced him to three years and six months’ imprisonment (to be reduced by twenty-eight days, the period already spent in pre-trial detention) and ordered the destruction of the forged cheques. 22. On 30 November 1999 the Court of Cassation, on an appeal by the applicant, upheld the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

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9. On 27 January 1994 the applicant filed with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Dubrovniku) an action against R.R. He claimed that in 1986 he and his then wife made a contract with R.R. with the effect that the applicant and his wife would provide R.R. with all care until her death and R.R. gave the applicant and his wife a flat in Dubrovnik for their use. Subsequently, another contract was made to the effect that the applicant and his wife would pay some of R.R.’s debts and that R.R. would make a testament leaving to the applicant’s wife the ground floor of a house in Dubrovnik with a garden. In 1993 the applicant and R.R. made two additional contracts whereby R.R. sold to the applicant a house in Dubrovnik. The contracts were not entered into the land registry. R.R. stayed in the house and denied the applicant’s property rights. By his action the applicant sought a declaration concerning his property rights. He also asked the court to issue an interim measure so as to prevent R.R. from selling the property in question. 10. It transpires from the case file that sometime in 1996 R.R. died but had beforehand sold the property in question to third persons. 11. Before 5 November 1997 when the Convention entered into force in respect of Croatia, several hearings were adjourned because the applicant’s counsel did not appear. 12. The hearing scheduled for 24 February 1998 was also adjourned because the applicant’s counsel did not appear. The postal receipt indicated that he had changed his address but had failed to inform the court. 13. The next hearing scheduled for 8 April 1998 was again adjourned at the request of the applicant’s counsel who informed the court that he had had no contact with the applicant. 14. At the hearing of 19 May 1998 the applicant appeared in person and asked the court to adjourn the next hearing because he had instituted several proceedings with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court and would prefer not to have to travel from Zagreb to Dubrovnik too often. 15. On 22 January 2001 the applicant informed the court that he had obtained Croatian citizenship. 16. On 17 August 2001 the applicant filed a criminal complaint with the Public Prosecutor’s Office against the presiding judge alleging that she committed the offence of negligent performance of duty in dealing with his case. He alleged that the judge had been ignoring his numerous requests to speed up the proceedings and his request for an interim measure. 17. On 18 August 2001 the applicant filed a request with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) seeking that the presiding judge be dismissed from her office and repeating his allegations from the criminal complaint filed against her. 18. On 27 August 2001 the applicant filed a motion with the president of the Dubrovnik Municipal Court challenging the presiding judge for bias and once again repeating his allegations from the criminal complaint against her. 19. On 19 September 2001 the president of the Dubrovnik Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s motion of 27 August 2001 as unfounded. 20. The next hearing was scheduled for 23 October 2001. According to the Government the Dubrovnik Municipal Court attempted to serve the notice of the hearing date on the applicant at the address indicated in his claim. The receipt slip showed that the applicant was unknown at that address. The Zagreb Police Department informed the court that the applicant did not live at the other address where he was registered. The court then posted the notice on its public notice-board. 21. Since the applicant did not appear at the hearing scheduled for 23 October 2001 the court stayed the proceedings (mirovanje postupka). 22. By a letter of 13 February 2002 the Supreme Court informed the applicant that his allegations against the presiding judge had been unfounded. 23. On 4 March 2002 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court terminated the proceedings because the applicant had not sought that the proceedings be resumed. b. Proceedings against Lj.Š. 24. On 11 March 1994 the applicant filed an action against Lj.Š. for payment of 9,718 Croatian Kunas (HRK), with the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu). 25. By default judgment of 17 May 1994 the first instance court granted the applicant’s claim. On 28 October 1997 the appellate court quashed that judgment and remitted the case to the first instance court. 26. On 9 and 29 April 1998 the applicant asked the first instance court to schedule a hearing, but did not submit Lj.Š.’s address. Therefore, the court requested her address from the Zagreb Police Department which was, however, unable to provide the requested address. 27. On 12 May 1998 the court invited the applicant to submit Lj.Š.’s address. The applicant did so on 19 June 1998. 28. As neither party appeared at the hearing scheduled for 12 November 1998 the court stayed the proceedings (mirovanje postupka). 29. On 25 November 1998 the applicant filed a motion to resume the proceedings (prijedlog za povrat u prijašnje stanje). 30. At the next hearing on 25 September 2000 the court heard the applicant and after that resumed the proceedings. 31. The next hearing scheduled for 23 November 2000 was adjourned because Lj.Š. did not appear. The postal receipt indicated that she had changed her address. The applicant submitted her new address. Lj.Š.’s counsel submitted a receipt of payment relevant for the applicant’s claim. The applicant asked the court to adjourn the hearing because he wished to submit his reply. 32. Since the applicant failed to appear at the hearing scheduled for 22 January 2001 the court stayed the proceedings. Lj.Š.’s counsel appealed against that decision. 33. On 9 October 2001 the Zagreb County Court (Županijski sud u Zagrebu) upheld the decision to stay the proceedings. 34. The proceedings were resumed before the Zagreb Municipal Court which scheduled the next hearing for 20 March 2002. At that hearing the court allowed the applicant at his request to submit documentation in support of his claim within fifteen days. 35. The next hearing scheduled for 17 May 2002 was adjourned. 36. At the hearing on 18 September 2002 the court invited the applicant to specify his claim within fifteen days. 37. At the hearing on 24 October 2002 the court heard the applicant and again invited him to specify his claim. 38. The Court notes that neither party has referred to any further steps in the proceedings since the hearing on 24 October 2002 and therefore must assume that the proceedings are still pending before the court of first instance. c. Proceedings against P.D. and D.D. 39. On 1 March 1997 the applicant filed with the Dubrovnik Municipal Court an action against P.D. and D.D. seeking a declaration concerning his property rights. 40. Before 5 November 1997 the court of first instance exempted the applicant from the payment of the court fees and rejected his request to be entirely exempted from the payment of costs and expenses in the proceedings. Several hearings were adjourned. 41. At the hearing on 20 March 1998 the defendants’ counsel asked the court to order the applicant to deposit a security for the defendants’ costs and expenses because the applicant was not a Croatian citizen. 42. At the next hearing on 19 May 1998 the court invited the applicant to submit a certificate on his residence in Croatia. 43. On 6 June 1998 the applicant informed the court that he was unable to submit the requested certificate. 44. On 22 January 2001 the applicant informed the court that he had obtained Croatian citizenship. 45. On 9 November 2001 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court pronounced judgment rejecting the applicant’s claim. 46. The applicant appealed against the judgment. On 13 December 2001 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court rejected the appeal as being out of time. The applicant appealed against that decision. On 4 April 2002 the Dubrovnik County Court quashed the first instance decision rejecting the applicant’s appeal. 47. The Court notes that neither party has referred to any further steps in the proceedings and therefore must assume that the proceedings are now pending before the Dubrovnik County Court upon the applicant’s appeal against the first instance judgment of 9 November 2001. d. Proceedings against K.M. 48. On 20 March 1997 the applicant filed with the Samobor Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Samoboru) an action against K.M. for payment of HRK 1,126.100. 49. On 17 November 1997 the applicant was invited to submit a declaration of means in connection with his application for the exemption from the payment of the court fees. 50. The applicant filed a motion challenging the presiding judge for bias. His motion was dismissed by the President of the court on 2 December 1997. However, the case-file was assigned to another judge. 51. At the next hearing on 17 February 1998 K.M replied to the applicant’s claim. 52. As the judge retired, the case was assigned to another judge. 53. At the hearing on 2 June 1998 the court invited the applicant to specify his claim. 54. The next hearing scheduled for 23 February 1999 was adjourned due to the applicant’s illness. 55. At the hearing of 4 May 1999 the court again invited the applicant to specify his claim. On 7 May 1999 the applicant complied with the court’s request. 56. In July 1999 the judge went on maternity leave. In February 2000 the case was assigned to another judge. 57. The next hearing scheduled for 20 September 2000 was adjourned because K.M. did not appear. 58. At the hearing on 5 October 2000 the court concluded the proceedings. 59. On 13 October 2000 the court pronounced judgment partly granting and partly rejecting the applicant’s claim. 60. On 30 October and 11 December 2000, respectively, K.M. and the applicant filed their appeals against the judgment. 61. On 24 July 2001 the appellate court quashed the first instance judgment and remitted the case to the Samobor Municipal court for re-trial. 62. At the next hearing on 19 March 2002 the court decided to hear the parties at the hearing scheduled for 23 April 2002. 63. At the hearing on 17 June 2002 the court stayed the proceedings because the applicant did not appear. The applicant then asked the court to resume the proceedings. 64. The Court notes that neither party has referred to any further steps in the proceedings and therefore must assume that the proceedings are still pending before the court of first instance. e. Proceedings against A.J.J. 65. On 20 March 1997 the applicant filed with the Zagreb Municipal Court an action against A.J.J. concerning certain compensation claims. 66. The court exempted the applicant from the payment of the court fees. 67. On 24 November 1997 A.J.J.’s counsel filed a request that the applicant be ordered to deposit a security for A.J.J.’s costs and expenses because the applicant was not a Croatian citizen. 68. At the hearing on 3 December 1997 A.J.J.’s counsel repeated the previous request. The applicant opposed that request. 69. It seems that A.J.J. had filed written submissions concerning the applicant’s claim before the hearing on 29 September 1998 when the court invited the applicant to reply to A.J.J.’s submissions within fifteen days. The applicant did not submit any reply. 70. On 1 January 1999 the case was transferred to another judge because the previous judge had resigned. 71. On 7 June 2000 the court rejected A.J.J.’s request that the applicant deposit the security for her costs and expenses. 72. On 14 July 2000 A.J.J. appealed against the above decision. 73. In the meantime, on 12 July 2000, the applicant informed the court that he had obtained Croatian citizenship. 74. On 25 July 2000 A.J.J.’s appeal was sent to the applicant for reply. 75. At the hearing on 22 November 2000 the parties agreed that, since the applicant had obtained Croatian citizenship, there was no need for further examination of A.J.J.’s appeal. 76. At the next hearing on 13 March 2001 the court stayed the proceedings as the applicant did not appear. 77. On 23 March 2001 the applicant filed an application to resume the proceedings. 78. The next hearing scheduled for 11 September 2001 was adjourned because the applicant did not appear. 79. At the hearing on 5 March 2002 the court heard the applicant in connection with his application that the proceedings be resumed. 80. On 15 March 2002 the court rejected the applicant’s request to resume the proceedings and terminated the proceedings. This decision became final on 9 April 2002.

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