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L-NLProc: Legal Natural Language Processing 3

It is companytended by the companynsel on behalf of the Corporation that when two orders for supply of sugar were alleged to have been placed on 02.2.1979 and 09.2.1979 by the plaintiff, the Receiver was in possession and management of the sugar mill. The orders for supply of sugar were placed on 02.2.1979 and 09.2.1979 by the plaintiff after the stay against Ordinance had been vacated by the High Court on 29.7.1974. An attempt has been made to show that the order obtained by the erstwhile owner of the Sugar Mill on 09.7.1971 staying operation of the Ordinance had been vacated by the High Court on 29.7.1974 on the application of the Receiver who was experiencing various difficulties in managing and running the Sugar Mill. The Corporation repudiated the claims made in the two suits pleading inter alia that there was numberprivity of companytract between the plaintiff and the Corporation the Receiver was managing the Sugar Mill on the date of alleged number supply of quantity of sugar the erstwhile owner of the Sugar Mill had filed writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the companystitutional validity of the Uttar Pradesh Sugar Undertakings Acquisition Ordinance, 1971 in which operation of the Ordinance was stayed and the possession of the Sugar Mill was restored to the erstwhile owner on specified terms and companyditions of the order of stay. It is submitted that for transferring and vesting of Sugar Mill in the Corporation, the appointed day fixed under Section 3 of the Ordinance Act was 3.7.1971 but the erstwhile owner of the Sugar Mill challenged the validity of the Ordinance in the Allahabad High Court and obtained a stay order on 09.7.1971 whereunder the Receiver, who was already managing the Sugar Mill as a numberinee of the Collector under section 279 1 g read with Section 286A of the Act of 1950, companytinued in the management of the Sugar Mill for and on behalf of the erstwhile owner. On that date, the Receiver appointed by the Collector under the provisions of 1950 Act was already holding custody of the Sugar Mill and was managing the same. The terms and companyditions of the order reproduced above, restored the de jure possession of the Sugar Mill to the erstwhile owner but de facto possession and management of the Sugar Mill was allowed to remain undisturbed with the receiver although with limited powers to him. The prices of sugar having gone up in the period of supply under the companytract, the Receiver neither sent the quantity of sugar number returned the advance price paid by the plaintiff. From term number 3 in the stay order, it is clear that the Receiver had only power to carry on day to day business of the Sugar Mill and for that purpose, to sell sugar, molasses and waste products. The Receiver was specifically allowed in accordance with term No.3 of the stay order to sell sugar, molasses and other waste products. a day before the appointed day was restored and the erstwhile owner was directed to be put back in possession of the Sugar Mill. Under the terms of the order of stay, operation of the Ordinance was stayed and possession of the mill was restored to the erstwhile owner. On behalf of the respondent plaintiff, an attempt was made to project that the order dated 09.7.1971 granting stay against the Ordinance Act, stood vacated on 27.9.1974 on the application of the Receiver who prayed for unfettered right to manage the Sugar Mill. The learned companynsel for the respondent plaintiff companytended that as the stay against Ordinance Act passed on 09.7.1971 stood vacated on 29.7.1974, the Sugar Mill would be deemed to have stood transferred to and vested in the Corporation on the appointed day 03.7.1971. The Receiver, when entered into the alleged companytract in February, 1979 to supply sugar to the plaintiff respondent was acting as a statutory Receiver who was allowed with added companyditions to companytinue in management of the Sugar Mill by the High Court in accordance with section 279 1 g and Section 286 A of the Act of 1950. The orders were placed by the plaintiff for supply of different quantities of sugar in the year 1979 and advance money was paid to the Receiver for timely supply. 23 of the same name hereinafter referred to shortly as the Ordinance Act, M s Maheshwari Khetan Sugar Mill Pvt. During companyrse of the Writ Petition filed by the owner of the Sugar Mill in which the companystitutional validity of the ordinance Act was challenged, a stay order, on the limited terms and companyditions, was passed on 9.7.1971. 29.7.1974. He was acting number for the Corporation but for and on behalf of the erstwhile owner of the mill who was in de jure possession of the mill as an effect of the order of stay dated 09.7.1971 obtained in Writ Petition No. By Uttar Pradesh Sugar Undertakings Acquisition Ordinance, 1971 which later became an Act No. By virtue of the order of stay passed by the High Court, during pendency of the writ petition, the Receiver appointed under the Act of 1950, companytinued to manage the Sugar Mill subject to the ultimate result of the writ petition. The legal effect of the order of stay quoted above was that the Receiver which was appointed under the Act of 1950, was to companytinue in management of the Mill on the companyditions imposed by the High Court. M s Mahalchand M. Kothari which is a partnership firm carrying on trade in Guwahati in the State of Assam filed two suits in the Court of Assistatnt District Judge, Guwahati for recovery of damages caused to it as a result of number supply of sugar under the companytract entered into by the plaintiff firm with the Receiver who was managing the Sugar Mill. On the date of companying into force of the Ordinance, the Sugar Mill was under management of Receiver appointed on 04.3.1970 by the Collector for recovery of dues of cane growers as arrears of land revenue in accordance with section 279 1 g read with Section 286A of the U.P. Emphasis supplied From the terms and companyditions of the above quoted order of stay passed on 9 7 1971, what seems to us is that the operation of the impugned Ordinance Act was partially stayed on specified companyditions to regulate the power of the Receiver which was already managing the Sugar Mill under section 279 1 g read with section 286A of the Act of 1950. On these facts culled out from the proceedings of the writ petition, it is clear that Receiver entered into alleged companytract for Supply of agreed quantities of sugar to the plaintiff respondent on 2.2.1979 and 9.2.1979 when stay order dated 9 7 1971 passed in the writ petition was in operation. If an inventory is prepared, the Collector shall supply a companyy thereof to the Receiver. The Corporation, therefore, companyld number be held liable towards the losses and damages caused to the plaintiff by alleged breach of companytract companymitted by the Receiver in number supplying the sugar for which orders had been placed by the plaintiff. The Receiver had filed an affidavit on 16.5.1974 in the High Court of Allahabad in which prayer was made to vacate the interim order of stay. The stay order stood vacated only when judgment was delivered on 03.5.1979 and the writ petition questioning the validity of the Ordinance Act was dismissed. The Assistant District Judge, Guwahati by two separate judgements, decreed both the suits holding inter alia that the Corporation cannot avoid its liability towards the claims of the plaintiff as the Sugar Mill stood transferred to and vested in it from the appointed day i.e. It is strenuously urged that there was numberprivity of companytract between plaintiff and the Corporation. 2 herein at Ramkola, District Deoria in the State of Uttar Pradesh, was acquired by the appellant P. State Sugar Corporation shortly referred to as the Corporation. The Receiver shall make numberchanges in the terms and companyditions of any employee, except with the previous permission of this Court. The Collector, Deoria, shall, however, have free access to the factory and will be companysulted by the receiver in matters of management. Next, we have to companysider what is the legal effect of the order of stay passed by the High Court in the writ petition on 09.7.1971. 4193 of 1971 filed in the Allahabad High Court challenging the companystitutional validity of the Ordinance. In the additional documents filed by the parties before us, a companyy of the application filed by the receiver seeking vacation of stay and photocopies of the order sheets of the High Court in the writ petition have been produced. Sapru J., 22.5.1976 An application to vacate the stay order has been filed on 10.5.1976. The Writ Petition ultimately came to be dismissed on 3.5.1979 and the stay order companytaining the terms and companyditions quoted above passed on 9.7.1971 stood automatically vacated. Singh and Hon. On behalf of respondent plaintiff, reliance is placed on the order sheet recorded in the writ petition on 29.7.1974. It reads thus Hon. The order sheet of 22.5.1976 reads thus Hon. Under the terms of the stay order, the status quo as existing on 2.7.1971 i.e. After 29.7.1974, the writ petition stood adjourned to several dates for hearing. The Receiver shall maintain the plant and machinery in good repairs to ensure the satisfactory running of the factory in the companying crushing season. Yashoda Nandan J., Hon. Learned companynsel appearing for the Corporation has taken us through the relevant dates and proceedings of the Allahabad High Court in the writ petition which was filed challenging the Ordinance Act. H. N. Seth J., 8.7.1976 We are informed that the application for vacating the stay order is part heard before a Bench companysisting of Hon. List it for orders on 08.7.1976. 5657/76 dated 10.5.76 to vacate stay In companypliance of companyrts order dated 20.5.1976, neither companynter number rejoinder affidavit has been filed. Learned companynsel appearing for the respondent plaintiff heavily relied on the photocopies of the order sheets of the writ petition No. The Receiver shall number create any long term or unduly heavy liabilities on the property including the mortgage of fixed assets any loans that he may raise shall be only for the purpose of capital investment or working capital of the undertaking companycerned. 4193 of 1971 filed in the Allahabad High Court. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 shortly referred to as the Act of 1950. The Corporation had preferred two appeals to the High Court of Guwahati which were allowed on 26.6.1996 solely on the ground that the suits were number maintainable as the plaintiff was number a registered partnership firm and was, therefore, incompetent to sue as a firm. From the above quoted subsequent orders, it appears that the parties were repeatedly taking time to file additional pleadings and companynters but numberorders on application for vacating stay was passed. The plaintiff then had approached this Court by Civil Appeal Nos. List the writ for hearing on 16.9.1974. The Corporation, therefore, after seeking leave is before this Court in these two appeals. On 08.7.1976, as directed earlier, the case was listed before the Division Bench which recorded the following order Hon. 3.7.1971 under Section 3 of the Act. The Division Bench of the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 16.7.1998 dismissed both the appeals of the Corporation and companyfirmed the decrees granted by the trial companyrt in the two suits in favour of the respondent plaintiff. It will be open to the Collector to prepare such inventory as he desires. The rejoinder affidavit may be filed by 07th of July, 1976. List this application before the bench companycerned at an early date. Mahrotra JJ. Put up for further orders. 3057 and 3058 of 1997 which were allowed on 25.7.1997 as it was pointed out that original certificate showing registration of the firm had been produced before the trial companyrt. Ltd., Respondent No. C.P.S. Both the suits Nos. This Court, therefore, remitted the appeals to the High Court for their decision on merits. Copies of this order may be supplied to the companynsel for the parties on payment of usual charges. Office Report dated 07.07.1976 reads thus Misc. A companynter affidavit has been filed within three weeks. Dharmadhikari J. Gulati J. 11 27 were filed in the year 1982.

train

2004_1019.txt

rakib and sk. ambur of sahapur p. s. khoyrasole and by such clandestine deal in paddy you hindered the procurement of paddy and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community. to sk. by such surreptitious business as a direct purchasing agent you impeded the progress of procurement of paddy by the f.c.i. subhan sk. and thereby acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity. of paddy was found in your godown but you failed to show any record or account book to justify the stock in your godown. these are as follows on 28 1 73 at about 4.30 p.m. you as a direct purchasing agent of the food corporation of india sold out 4 quintals of paddy from the stock held in the account of the f.c.i. it is well settled that in a case of preventive detention under the act it is absolutely necessary to communicate the grounds of detention to the detenu in clear and unambiguous terms giving as much particulars as will facilitate making of an effective representation in order to satisfy the detaining authority that the order is unfounded or invalid. c. mittar for the petitioner. it is therefore number surprising that the petitioner would have made a long representation to the government against his arrest and seizure of paddy and all other allegations which were certainly knumbern to him in the companyrse of the companyrt prosecu tion. chatterjee appearing on behalf of the state of west bengal seeks to support the order on the ground that the detenu fully understood the import of the allegations mentioned in the grounds of detention and submitted a long representation to the government which was however rejected. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by goswami j. by this application under article 32 of the constitution for a writ of habeas companypus the petitioner challenges the validity of the order of detention passed by the district magistrate birbhum on march 21 1973 under section 3 of the maintenance of internal security act 1971 act number 26 of 1971 . the order of detention is passed on the ground that the petitioner has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the companymunity. h. c. mittal learned companynsel for the petitioner appearing as amicus curiae has made several submissions but it is sufficient to companyfine our decision to one principal ground namely that the grounds are so vague and uncertain that it is number reasonably possible for the detenu to make an effective representation against the order of detention. on 28 1 73 at about 10.30 p.m. a stock of 12 qunt 15 kg. k. chatterjee g. s. chatterjee and sukumar basu for the respondent. the impugned order is specifically founded on two grounds companymunicated to the petitioner. original jurisdiction writ petition number 1880 of 1973. petition under article 32 of the companystitution of india.

dev

1974_261.txt

Challenging the award made by the Industrial Tribunal holding that the dismissal of the respondent workman as illegal and directing his reinstatement with companytinuity of service and full back wages and all other attending benefits, a writ petition was preferred. In the writ petition, learned Single Judge who disposed of the matter, numbericed that the Tribunal had upheld the validity of the enquiry ending with the termination of the service of respondent No. However, on merits, the High Court reached the companyclusion that the charges allegations made against the companycerned workman are number proved.

train

2000_1222.txt

Ratnababu died at 1. Accused No. Some 8 72 of the accused turned their attention on Ratnababu. All the accused then ran towards Ratnababu, who was plugging the hole in the siphon. Accused Nos. It has held that the dying declaration of Ratnababu, Ext. Ratnababu, on seeing the accused companying towards his direction, ran to the field of PW 23 where Koteswara Rao with his brother, PW 7, was working. When PW 13 came to help Ratnababu, he was speared by A 18. 6 and 7, who were found guilty of causing simple injuries to Ratnababu, were companyvicted under section 324. Near the cross bund they found PWs 5 to 7, 13 and 23, the deceased Ratnababu and certain others. A 5, A 6, A 7, A 8 and A 10 inflicted spear injuries on Ratnababu. The other seven companyvicted accused, namely, accused Nos. The 5th accused was companyvicted under section 302 for causing the death of Ratnababu and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life. The learned Sessions Judge found that numbere of the accused can be held guilty of the offence of causing the death of Koteswara Rao number for the injuries sustained by PWs 5 and 6. PWs 7 and 13 had received injuries. P 15, and companyvicted accused Nos. The 1 st accused stabbed PW 5 with a spear both on his chest and on his temple. On their refusal A30 attempted to remove the cross bund when at the instigation of PW 23 he was stabbed by one Appa Rao and also attacked by PW 23. The prosecution has stressed as to how these accused received injuries. Even some of the companyvicted accused should have been companyvicted for more serious offences. A 14 stated that he was beaten at the cross bund by PW 23. 18 was found guilty of causing injuries to PW 13 and companyvicted under section 324. Ratnababu was taken to the Government General Hospital, Guntur and, as his companydition was very serious, a dying declaration, Ext. The learned Sessions Judge found that accused Nos. One Gogineni Venkateswara Rao, who gave evidence as PW 7 and who was a brother of the deceased, Koteswara Rao, filed Criminal Revision Case No. All the accused then ran away from the place. 1 to 4 attacked Koteswara Rao and caused his death. 14, 19, 24 and 25 were found guilty of causing injuries to PW 7. C.I./73 But so far as the attack on Ratnababu was companycerned, the learned Judge took into account the evidence of PWs 7 and 8, the medical evidence as also the dying declaration, Ext. The 6th accused stabbed PW 5 on the right palm and the right wrist. The injuries sustained by PWs 5 and 6 being of a very minor nature sustained by them when the said accused acted in self defence, numbere of those accused are guilty of any offence regarding this particular incident. P 15, is admissible even regarding the attack on the other deceased, Koteswara Rao. Apart from the wound certificate issued to Ratnababu, at the time of his admission to the Hospital there is also the description of the injuries sustained by him, as mentioned in the postmortem certificate. P 1, from PW 5 and a statement, Ext. PW 23 also beat him and ran away. The 3rd accused beat PW5 with a spear on his hand. 727 of 1969 and Cr. The 5th accused, however pleaded that on the date of the occurrence he, along with A14 and A30, had gone to water the field of A30. 173 of 1970 is by all the thirty accused against the order in Criminal Revision Case No. Regarding the second stage of the occurrence at the field of PW 23, the Trial Courts view is that the witnesses, who spoke to the same, are PWs 1 to 4, 7 and 13. The 2nd accused was the Sarpanch of the village and the 1st accused was the acting Village Munsif at the time of the occurrence i.e. 1 to 4 stabbed Koteswara Rao on the various parts of his body with spears and after he fell down, they along with A 12, A 13, A 22 and A 23 inflicted further injuries. There is also on record the postmortem certificate issued to the other deceased, Koteswara Rao, which also shows that he had sustained a number of injuries. 727 of 1969 and Criminal Appeals Nos. In companynection with the murder of two persons, Gogineni Koteswara Rao and Venigandla Ratnababu, and the injuries sustained by the prosecution witnesses, PWs 5 to 7 and 13, on August 16, 1968, thirty persons were tried by the learned Sessions Judge of Guntur for offences under section 148 and section 302 read with S. 149 or alternatively under section 302 read with section 34 and sections 323, 324 and 326 of the Indian Penal Code. 727 of 1969 while Criminal Appeal No. A 30 requested PW 23 to remove the cross bund to enable him to take water to his field. Accordingly he acquitted the eight companyvicted accused of all the other charges. At this stage it may be mentioned that the witnesses, who received injuries, namely, PWs 5, 6, 7 and 13 as well as some of the accused, who had received injuries, namely, A 5, A 14, A 29 and A 30, had all arrived at the Government General Hospital, Guntur, at about the same time and were treated by the same doctor. Most of the accused, when they were examined under section 312, pleaded companyplete ignorance about the occurrence. PW 23 was the President of the village Panchayat from 1956 to 1964 after which period the 2nd accused came to power. Sentences of imprisonment of varying terms were imposed on the accused found guilty under sections 323 and 324. P 15 establishes, on the facts of the present case, that accused Nos. 201 and 202 ,of 1969. Koteswara Rao was removed to his house in the village and he died within a very short time. Thus it will be seen that while according to the prosecution the occurrence took place in two stages, one at the place where the cross bund was erected and the other in the field of PW23, on the other hand, according to the defence, the occurrence had taken place at the place where the cross bund was raised by PWs 5 and 6 and that there was numberincident whatsoever near the field of PW 23. Having regard to the evidence adduced in the case, the learned Judge has recorded a finding that numbere of the accused can be held liable for the offence of causing the death of Kuteswara Rao. PWs 1 to 4 had witnessed the entire occurrence. 6, 7, 14, 18, 19, 24 and, 25, filed Criminal Appeal No. After a companysideration of the evidence of PWs 1 to 4, the learned Judge expresses the view that they are tutored witnesses and that they have been selected because they belong to the party of PW 23. 202 of 1969. A sentence of rigorous imprisonment was also imposed on all these eight accused for the offence under section 148. 25 was companyvicted under section 323 while the three others were companyvicted under section 324. P15, recorded by the Magistrate, PW 1 6, at about 8.40 P. M., the same day. 727 of 1969 under sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court against all the thirty accused challenging the several acquittals recorded against them by the learned Sessions Judge. Ultimately the learned Judge held that their evidence cannot be accepted regarding the attack on Kuteswara Rao. About 12 Noon on the same day, PWs 5 and 6 numbericed that there was diminution of water in the canal. 201 of 1969. 201 and 202 of 1969 setting aside the judgment of the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Guntur, in Sessions Case No. 5 to 7, 14, 18, 19, 24 and 25 had participated in part of the occur rence that took place on that day and companyvicted the under section 148. When PW 6 interfered, he was stabbed with a spear on the left chest by A 27 and was also beaten on the head back and leg by A 21. Left with the two other witnesses, namely, PWs 7 and 13, the Trial Court is of the view that they being interested witnesses, their evidence will have to be treated with great caution and that it would be safe to accept their evidence only if it is companyroborated by other independent evidence. Ram Reddy, P. Parameshwara Rao, for respondent No. Similarly he also found that the other twenty two accused were number guilty of any of the offences with which they were charged and accordingly acquitted them. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION criminal appeals Nos. When PW7 attempted to interfere to save his brother, he was attacked by A 14, A 19, A 24 and A 25. The Magistrate had also recorded a statement, Ext. Criminal Appeal No. August 16, 1968. P 16, from A 30. A30 also gave a somewhat similar statement. The High Court allowed the two Criminal Appeals as well as the Criminal Revision and after setting aside the judgment of the Sessions Court, remanded the entire case for retrial. Basi Reddy, K. R. Chaudhuri, Gopalakrishna Murthy and Rajendra Chaudhuri, for the appellant in both the appeals . 121 of 1968 and remanding the entire case for retrial. These two appeals, by special leave, are directed against the judgment and order dated August 25, 1970, of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Revision Case No. 173 174 of 1970. The learned Judge disbelieved their evidence and eschewed the same from companysideration. More or less on this reasoning, the High Court remanded the entire case for retrial. The learned Sessions Judge made a local inspection of the scene of occurrence and has also numbered his observations. 5 challenged his companyviction before the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 173 for respondent in Cr. 29 A.M. on August 17, 1968. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 25, 1970 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad in Criminal Revn. 1 in Cr. A. Nos. The High Courts view also appears to be that the search or companyroboration made by the Trial Court regarding the evidence of some of the prosecution witnesses was unnecessary. If its view was wrong, the High Court companyld have gone into that aspect and differed from this opinion of the Sessions Court if the State had filed an appeal against acquittal. V. S. Narasimhachari and K. Jayaram, for respondent No. 8 L797Sup. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VAIDIALINGAM, J. There was a multi purpose Cooperative Society established in 1963 in the village and the members of both the factions claimed to be the President or Secretary of this society. 2 in Cr. He was also kicked by A 20. The sentences of imprisonment were directed to run companycurrently. The High Court has also expressed its opinion that. There is on record the wound certificates issued in respect of these persons. A. No.

train

1973_105.txt

Consultants made a representation to the IMG. On 21.12.2005 EGOM met to companysider the views of the IMG. EGOM directed IMG to undertake an independent review of the Consultants evaluation with GRCs assistance and give a clear recommendation to EGOM. Bid documents were shown to the members of the IMG. RAL again wrote to the members of the EGOM alleging illegalities in companysideration of the bids. The Consultants submitted their evaluation report. In the meeting queries were raised by IMG members as to whether evaluation was companysistent with the RFP evaluation criteria and the answers given by the Consultants. In the meeting of IMG held on 2.12.2005 reports of Consultants and GRC were placed. On 6.12.2005 a meeting of the IMG was held. An Inter Ministerial Group in short IMG was set up to assist EGOM for re structuring of two airports. On 19.9.2005, a meeting of IMG was held relating to methodology for evaluation of offers and evaluation criteria in RFP documents. Subsequently, EGOM approved the same. On 1.12.2005, GRC submitted its report to IMG. The matter was placed before the EGOM on 5.12.2005. On the next day again RAL wrote to the members of the EGOM regarding the events that had transpired during the opening of bids. GRC endorsed the views expressed in the Consultants Evaluation Reports. In the Evaluation Report a list of evaluation criteria where a different approach has been adopted by the Consultants was indicated. EGOM felt that the GETE had apparently done the evaluation of all the bidders as is evident from the companyclusion drawn about status of the other bidders in para 4.8 of its report. GRC held its meeting on 23.11.2005 and 24.11.2005 to review the Consultants Evaluation Reports. On 20.12.2005 RAL wrote to the Chairman, EGOM criticizing the SKYTRAX Report and denying that Consultants acted in an improper biased manner or that the technical evaluation companyducted by the Consultants was flawed. IMG decided that bid evaluation on all parameters shall be carried out by a companyposite team of GTA, LC and FC. It was numbered that the bid documents companyld be made available to the IMG and they companyld seek clarification from the Consultants. GETE was accordingly appointed to review the Consultants Evaluation Report in short CER on 27.12.2005. On 12.1.2006 a meeting of EGOM was held where GETEs report was companysidered. On the basis of recommendations made by IMG, EGOM approved appointment of Global Technical Adviser, Legal Consultant and Financial Consultant called GTA, LC FC in short respectively . RAL wrote another letter on the same day to the EGOM pointing out its alliance with international players. AAI wrote to RAL setting out the procedure followed while opening and evaluating the financial bids. Certain changes to the draft transaction documents were approved by EGOM. On 28.1.2006 RAL wrote to GOI asking it to adhere to the RFP numberms. On 10.10.2005 Government Review Committee in short GRC was companystituted to undertake an independent review of evaluation report of bids of two airports and re structuring process prepared by the Evaluation Committee Advisers. It was felt that there was numberneed for change in the evaluation criteria as stipulated in the RFP documents. Before such approval, RFP documents of the two airports were forwarded to the bidders. IMG also decided to set up a review companymittee to review the evaluation carried out by GTA, LC and FC. IMG was required to companyplete the exercise in two weeks. On 23.1.2006 RAL Airport Operator wrote to the GOI asserting that it had the requisite qualification. On 24.1.2006 meeting of EGOM was held and several decisions were taken. The COS was set up by order dated 21.12.2005 to assist the EGOM. The Consultants prepared the Invitation To Register An Expression of Interest shortly called ITREOI and the same was endorsed by IMG. Ltd. in short RAL , Airports Authority of India in short AAI , Government of India in short GOI , GMR Infrastructures Ltd. in short GMR , GVK Industries Ltd. in short GVK . On 15.2.2005, EGOM finalized and approved key principles of RFP and draft transaction documents. It is submitted that GETE did number examine the queries relating to GMR as raised by the IMG and the reduction of technical qualification from 80 to 50 was impermissible. It was stipulated that IMG would number undertake any fresh evaluation or allocate marks for any of the criteria and finally the mandate of IMG will be restricted to ascertain as to whether it is in agreement or otherwise with the assessment findings and allocation of marks across various criteria in respect of various bids. On 31.1.2006 Executive Director of AAI informed RAL that GMR would be given a choice of the two airports and whichever airport it chooses, it would be required to match the higher financial bid. The technical bids were opened on 22.9.2005. On that day itself, RAL wrote to the AAI alleging change of procedure and protesting against the same. On 11.9.2003 the GOI approved restructuring of airports of Mumbai and Delhi through joint venture shortly called JV route and companystituted Empowered Group of Ministers in short EGOM to decide the detailed modalities including design parameters, bid evaluation criteria etc. Request for proposal was routed by AAI and the bidders were invited to bid on certain basis and pattern. On 12.10.2004 IMG was re constituted under the Chairmanship of Secretary, Ministry of Civil Aviation. GETE submitted its report on 7.1.2006. EGOM therefore decided that in order to reach a definite companyclusion, GETE was to be requested to do a similar revaluation exercise in respect of other bidders. There were in fact six bidders for Delhi and five bidders for Mumbai. Subsequently, on 15.6.2004, EGOM was re companystituted under the Chairmanship of Minister of Defence. ABN AMRO wrote a letter regarding clarification sought by MCA on determination of bids attached to the criteria used in the technical prequalification of bidders for the two airports. On 30.1.2006 AAI wrote to the bidders informing them that the final bids were to be opened on January 31, 2006. Both GMR and GVK furnished their bid bonds guarantees of Rs.500 crores each on 6.2.2006 and 8.2.2006. The same was also described as an Evaluation Committee in short EC . A report was submitted by the Committee opening the financial bids. On 4.2.2006 GOI informed GMR and GVK that they have been selected as successful bidders for undertaking the restructuring and modernization of the Delhi and Mumbai airports respectively and required them to furnish enhanced bid bonds guarantees for Rs.500 crores. Shareholders agreement with GMR and GVK was signed. A Table showing moderated scores of all the bidders in criteria A Management Capabilities for Mumbai Airport Sl. No details of revaluation were available about the other bidders, as have been provided in respect of RAL. RAL wrote to the Ministry of Civil Aviation in short MCA asking that companyies of its letters dated 20.12.2005 be forwarded to the GETE. Consequently 26 shares in SPV were allotted to AAI and 74 shares allotted to GMR. Supplementary report of GETE was submitted on 17.1.2006. Majority of the members of the Committee felt that if the entire bid process was transparent and GRC was satisfied with the process it would number be necessary to go by the advise of the member of the Planning Commission and the final decision should be left to the EGOM. The RFP documents were issued on 1.4.2005. Certain queries were raised by members of the GRC and the Consultants clarified the position so far as the queries are companycerned. Similarly, 26 shares in SPV were allotted to AAI and 74 shares allotted to GVK. On 17.2.2004, ITREOI was issued for the two airports. 12th, 13th, 14th and 16th December, 2005 meeting of IMG was held. Another meeting was held on 9.12.2005 and the Consultants were directed to re work the marks matrix by strict adherence to RFP numberms. On 1.3.2006 Special Purpose Vehicle in short SPV was formed for Delhi while on the next day SPV was formed for the Mumbai airport. Later on, the financial bids were opened that day. Based on this exercise, the marks secured by the different bidders are given in a tabulated form separately for Delhi and Mumbai Airports. On query from the GETE, they formed that after the technical bids were opened certain clarifications were invited from bidders mainly to sort out discrepancies in their submittals and number for eliciting additional Information or submission of additional documents. The deadline for submissions of bids was fixed as 14.9.2005. In March, 2003 AAI initiated process to companysider modernization of Delhi and Mumbai Airports on the basis of an earlier decision taken on January 12, 2000 by the Union Cabinet relating to re structuring of airports of AAI through long term leasing route. On 30.8.2005 final transaction documents were forwarded to the bidders. an Expression Cum Request for Qualification in short ECRQ and a Request for Proposal in short RFP . Writ Petition was filed by RAL before the Delhi High Court on 2.2.2006. The majority members felt that the terms of the RFP had been adhered to and there had been sufficient transparency in the process. It met and decided to set up two members Committee companysisting of Mr. Sreedharan Mr. Sevadasan hereinafter described as Sreedharan Committee or Group of Eminent Technical Experts in short GETE to recommend to the COS on the overall validation of the evaluation process including calibration of the qualifying cut off and sensitivity analysis. Mumbai and Delhi on a joint venture basis. Ltd in short Airplan, AMSC and ABN AMRO respectively . Weightage 1.1 25.0 6.7 22.5 17.1 19.7 19.6 17.2 1.2 12.5 2.8 9.7 9.7 4.7 9.2 9.5 2.1 12.5 5.4 7.1 11.7 6.7 9.6 8.8 2.2 12.5 5.0 10.0 11.3 5.0 11.3 10.0 3.1 12.5 6.9 10.5 10.9 7.2 10.8 10.5 3.2 12.5 2.5 12.5 5.0 7.5 11.3 11.3 3.3 3.4 12.5 6.3 12.5 7.5 6.3 9.4 8.8 Total 35.6 84.8 73.2 57.1 81.2 76.1 Score as per shift 35.5 84.7 73.1 57.0 81.0 76.0 Moderation due to If equal weightage is given to sub factor 1.2.2 and 1.2.3 0.96 0.21 0.02 0.02 1.09 0.23 If equal weightage is given to sub factor 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 1.85 0.81 0.35 0.32 0.49 0.81 If the marks of sub factor 1.1.6 given to E for number aeronautical revenue less than 40 are reduced from 75 to 50 others numberchange. A meeting of the COS was held on 9.1.2006. They were Airport Planning Ply Ltd., Amarchand, Mangaldas Suresh A. Shroff Co. and ABN AMRO Asia Corporate Finance I Pvt. Splitting up these marks to the different sub factors of sub criteria was done by the E.C. The COS was required to companysider and recommend the selection of appropriate JV bidders for executing the works related thereto. Background facts sans unnecessary details are as follows As a part of the GOIs avowed policy of privatization of strategic national assets, the first step appears to be privatization of two airports i.e. The same was set up under the Chairmanship of Additional Secretary cum Financial Adviser of Ministry of Civil Aviation. based on which JV partners were to be selected. It is to be numbered that one of the members who was the member of the Planning Commission had recorded his personal opinion. based on the mandate given to them by the I.M.G. The tendering process involved two tiers i.e. Decision taken by a group of Ministers in a matter of joint venture partnership as a part of the privatization policy of the Government of India was assailed before the High Court. On 4.4.2006 Operations Management and Development Agreement in short OMDA was signed by the companycerned parties. By the impugned order, RALs writ petition before the Delhi High Court was dismissed by order dated 21.4.2006. On four days i.e. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court. JUDGEMENT ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

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2006_754.txt

Leave granted.

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1996_1781.txt

2 and 3 respectively, situate in the revenue estate of village Shirwame Taluka and District Thane, was owned by the predecessors in interest of the appellants, namely, Kana Ganpat Joshi, Maruti Kana Joshi, Dinanath Ganpat Joshi and Gopinath Ganpat Joshi. A very large chunk of land including the said land stood numberified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act on 6.6.1964 for the establishment of the Ulhas Khore Project i.e. a project for industrial development. Various beneficial schemes were floated by the State authorities in favour of persons who had been deprived of their livelihood and those, whose land had been acquired for the same purpose and under such schemes, such uprooted persons were granted a particular piece of developed land, proportionate to their area acquired. However, numbersubsequent proceedings were taken up thereafter, and the acquisition proceedings lapsed. Actual physical possession of the said land was taken by the State authorities and handed over to the Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation hereinafter called as the Development Corporation in the year 1964 itself. Thus, they companyld be persuaded by the officers of the respondent authorities to hand over possession of the said land. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as under The land in dispute admeasuring 0 2 3 and 0 7 1 9500 sq.mtrs. The predecessors in interest of the appellants were number merely illiterate farmers, but were also absolutely unaware of their rights and hence too inarticulate to claim them. Thus, in respect of the land in dispute, a fresh numberification under Section 4 of the Act dated 14.5.1981 was issued. The respondent authorities realised in 1981 that grave injustice had been done to the appellants. The appellants had been pursuing the authorities persuading them to companyplete the deemed acquisition proceedings, but despite their efforts, even a declaration under Section 6 of the Act was number issued and therefore, such proceedings also died a natural death. However, numberfurther proceedings under the Act were initiated. Similarly situated persons who were also deprived of their rights in a similar manner were granted companypensation vide order dated 17.6.1966. This appeal has arisen from the impugned judgment and order dated 14.11.2011, passed by the High Court of Bombay in Writ Petition No.9513 of 2009, by way of which the High Court has rejected the claim of the appellants for any companypensation due to them for the land taken by the respondent authorities, without resorting to any procedure prescribed by law. Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J. Hence, this appeal. in Survey number. Leave granted.

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2012_472.txt

1 Sureshchandra Kanhaiyalal Kochar. One Raja Bai had executed a gift deed dated June 20, 1957 in favour of respondent No. He also companytended that the donor had number parted with the possession of the property companyered by the gift deed. Initially the appellant filed the suit against the tenants claiming possession thereof but when they pleaded the gifting over in favour of Sureshchandra, the appellant impleaded him as a third respondent who had pleaded in the written statement that Raja Bai had bequeathed the property to him under the gift Deed dated June 20, 1957. 60 of 1984 the learned Single Judge of the High Court and the Division Bench had held that the gift deed was duly executed by Rajabai in favour of Sureshchandra and, therefore, the appellant does number get any right under the Will. About five months prior to her death she executed a registered Will elated 27th December, 1965 in favour of the appellant bequeathing the self shared property gifted over to the first respondent under the Gift Deed dated June 20, 1957. Shri Bobde, learned senior companynsel for the appellant, sought to companytend that the gift deed has number been duly proved. On the other hand evidence on record shows that she remained in possession and enjoyment of the property as the owner. Thereafter the appellant has amended the plaint and sought for a declaration that he is the owner of the property. 1994 SUPPL. In First Appeal No 174 of 1974 and Letters Patent Appeal No. The trial companyrt decreed the suit. 4 SCR 218 The following Order of the Court was delivered The unsuccessful plaintiff is the appellant before us. Accordingly they dismissed the suit. She died on 21 May, 1966. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

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1994_738.txt

This levy of fuel surcharge was in addition to the other charges specified in the tariff schedule. In the final bills issued for the financial year 1979 80 the fuel surcharge was levied at 6.242 paise per unit. Along with the final bill of fuel surcharge for the year 1979 80, a provisional bill of fuel surcharge for the year 1980 81 was also issued to the appellant companypanies demanding payment of surcharge at the rate of eight paise per unit Thereupon the appellants filed Writ Petitions in the High Court of Patna companytending that the provision companytained in Paragraph 16.7 in the Tariff Notification of 1979 for the levy fuel surcharge is devoid of legal sanction and is arbitrary and void. The charge of arbitrariness levelled against the imposition of fuel surcharge was based on the ground that only companysumers of low tension industrial service, high tension service, extra high tension service, and railway traction service had been singled out for being subjected to a levy of surcharge, while companysumers of electricity for domestic, companymercial and irrigation purposes were left unaffected by any such burden. Para 16.7 of the Tariff Notification, 1979, provides that the companysumers of low tension industrial service, high tension service, extra high tension service, and railway traction service shall be liable to pay fuel surcharge at a rate to be determined every year In accordance with the formula set out in sub para 2 of the said paragraph 16.7.2 . During the companyrse of the year 1979, fuel surcharge a provisional rate of one paise per unit was initially levied and that was subsequently increased to three paise per unit, again on a provisional basis. 2857 58/82. 1237 of 1981. After the introduction of the revised tariffs, 1979, all the appellants companytinued to draw and companysume high tension electric energy in their factories. Khaitan for the Appellants in C.A. Vaidyanathan N.R. 2855 56 of 1982. K. Sen, Padam Khaitan, Parveen Kumar and N.R. These appeals by special leave and the Special Leave Petition involve companymon questions companycerning the validity of the supplementary bills issued to the appellants by the 1st respondent Bihar State Electricity Board for fuel surcharge as per the revised tariff dated 1st April, 1979, and hence they were heard together. 2855 56/82. Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Parveen Kumar, Padam Khaitan, C.A. 2859 60/82. Eight writ petitions, of which W.J.C. 2904 of 1982. The said tariff was to take effect from 1st April, 1979. 3503/ 81 504 of 1982. Vaidyanathan for the Petitioner in SLP Nos. The appellants are companypanies having factories in different parts of the State to Bihar and they have entered into agreements with the Board for supply of high tension electric current. 1855/81 out of which C.A. 2857 58 2859 60 of 1982 Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th/10th February, 1982 of the Patna High Court in W.J.C. 1237 of 1981, filed by M s Shriram Bearings Ltd., Ranchi Petitioner in SLP No. By a detailed and well considered judgment, the Division Bench rejected all the companytentions raised by the petitioners and dismissed the Writ Petitions after recording an undertaking given by the Board that certain small amounts which were found to have been charged in the bills in excess of what was payable by the appellants on a companyrect companyputation of the surcharge would be adjusted in the next bills to be issued to them. S. Vaidyanathan, Anil Kumar Sharma, and Mr. Parveen Kumar for the Appellants in CA. In clause 4 of the agreement, it is stipulated that the companysumers shall pay to the supplier Board for the energy supplied and registered by the meters at the rates from time to time in force and paid by similar companysumers. Appeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 9th April, 1982 of the Patna High Court in W.J.C. 28 58/82 arises in a companyy of the agreement entered into by M s Usha Martin Black Wire Rods Ltd. with the Board on 18.8.1961. A further companytention was also raised that the bills issued to the petitioners were number even in accordance with the provisions of the tariff numberification and the demands made against the appellants were in excess of what was warranted even by the impugned numberification. General, Ram Balak Mehto, Pramod Swaru and P.P. Nos. 1026/82,1855/81,1516/81 R , 1355/81 R ., AND Special Leave Petition Civil No. 2904/82. Hence these appeals and special leave petitions by the appellant companypanies. Annexure I in the Writ Petition C.W.J.C. Writ Petitions subsequently filed in the High Court by the appellants in the other appeals were later dismissed in limine by separate short judgments, following the decision of the Divisional Bench in W.J.C. From the Judgment and Order dated the 8th December, 1981 of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. WITH Civil Appeals Nos. K. Venugopal, C.S. N. Sinha, Att. Having regard to the fact that by reason of interlocutory orders passed by this Court, the realisation of large amounts demanded from the appellants by the respondent by way of charges for electric energy supplied by it stood stayed and the companysequent urgency in passing final orders in these cases, as soon as the hearing was companypleted we passed the following order announcing the companyclusion reached by us All these Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petition are dismissed with companyts in each case. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. 2904/1982 was apparently treated by companymon companysent as the main case, and were heard together as one single batch by a Division Bench of the High Court. The agreements so executed are in a standard form companytaining substantially identical terms. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. Singh for the Respondents in all the appeals SLP. No.

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1984_74.txt

However, despite repeated efforts when numberresults were forthcoming, the NHRC companystituted a team to interact with the labourers and submit a detailed report. 9 at a distance of about 22 kms from Vijaywada. The issue was brought to light in 2005.

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2012_431.txt

Cr1. Ajay Kumar Pandey, the alleged companytemner has also filed following Contempt Petitions Cr1. That is how the companytempt proceeding Contempt Petition Cr1. in this Court Contempt Petition Cr1. No.2/96 came to registered against the alleged companytemner in this Court. The alleged companytemner however, despite numberice did number appear in the Court on 22.1.1997. The alleged companytemner, thereafter, filed Special Leave Petition Crl. The Special Leave Petition Cr1. C J M. Contempt Petition Cr1. It was hoped that he would realise the seriousness of the situation and remove all the objectionable expressions from the memorandum of petitions but instead of deleting those objectionable expressions, on the same day, he filled Cr1 P.No. The alleged companytemner did number file his objections or reply to the Rule in the Contempt proceedings and instead filed two applications seeking recall review of the order dated 20th February, 1996 supra . appeared to assist the Court and asserted that the application was misconceived and the alleged companytemner was trying to browbeat the companyrt and misconstruing the indulgence being shown to him. He declined to remove the objectionable expressions and insisted on being heard. Judge, Lucknow. The prayer for recall of the order dated 9th Aug., 1996 under the circumstances has numbermerit and is rejected. On 27.9.1996 while dealing with the applications filed by the companytemner, the following order was made We have examined the application and find that the prayer for recall of the order is misconceived for more than one reasons. No.16199/95 filed on 28th Oct. 1995 Against Mr. Justice Virendra saran, Judge, High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench Contempt Petition Cr1. In the meantime, it transpires from the record that the companytemner, filed an application addressed to the Honble Chief Justice of India, seeking transfer of the case from this Bench to some other Bench. He emphasised that number only has the attitude of alleged companytemner been totally defiant but that he had lost all sense of propriety in filing the applications and Special Leave Petitions companyched in most objectionable language and creating an impression that he companysidered the law as subservient to him. We companysidered the two applications for recall review and by our order dated 9th August, 1996 found that there was numbermerit in those applications and felt pained to numberice that even those application bristled with scandalous remarks and were companyched in objectionable language and that the alleged companytemner, was persistent in his attitude to undermine the majesty of law and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Since, the alleged companytemner had number filed his reply to the show case numberice, the Bench as a matter of indulgence, granted him yet another opportunity to file his reply, if any, within six weeks and adjourned the proceedings to 27th September, 1996. District Judge, Lucknow. The alleged companytemner appearing in person on that date made a request that his cases may be transferred to another Bench as he did number wish to appear before this Bench. The order dated 9th Aug., 1996 is an order in companytinuation of the order dated 20th February, 1996, the prayer to recall which has already been rejected. Despite the fact that on 9th Aug. 1996 Ajay Kumar Pandey had been informed of the date of hearing and was directed to remain present on 27.9.1996 and file his reply by that date, he instead of appearing in person on 27.9.1996, filed yet another application alongwith companyies of certain documents seeking recall of the order dated 9th Aug., 1996. IV Shri B N Pandey, Special Judge, Lucknow. It was also directed that in the numberice it shall be indicated that the alleged companytemner should file reply to the show cause numberice within six weeks and that it was to be companysidered as the final opportunity granted to him for that purpose. We are inclined to initiate companytempt proceedings against the petitioner, but on his request grant him six weeks time to delate all the objectionable expressions used in the petitions and file fresh petitions. The alleged companytemner as already numbericed had number appeared in the Court on 27th September, 1996, but it appears that he was present in the Court premises as soon after the above order was made, he filed an application on that very day explaining the reasons for his absence and praying for recall of the bailable warrants. III Shri Shailendra Saxena, III A D J., Lucknow. The alleged companytemner Ajay Kumar Pandey, a practising advocate, filed a criminal companyplaint against an Advocate Mr. Mahesh Gir and an Additional District Judge, Ms. Saroj Bala, then posted as VII Additional District Judge, Lucknow, under Sections 499 and 500 IPC, after first serving them with a numberice demanding companypensation for defaming him. The case wad, thereafter, posted to 2nd December, 1996 but it appears that the alleged companytemner who was appearing in person had numbernotice of that date and the Bench therefore directed that fresh numberice be issued to him for his personal appearance as well as for filing his reply, if any. Petitions were dismissed by the Bench both on account of the objectionable language used in the memorandum of those petitions as also on merits. The case, was thereafter, adjourned from time to time and on 22nd August, 1997, following order was made when the alleged companytemner once again remained absent despite service Despite service respondent, Sh. By the order dated 9th Aug., 1996 the review petitions filed by the respondent were also dismissed. It appears that the alleged companytemner had filed another companyplaint on 12.9.1994 under Sections 500 and 504 IPC against seven advocates namely 1 Shri Prakash Narayan Awasthi 2 Shri R.P.Misra 3 Shri Vishambhar Singh 4 Shri T.N.Misra 5 Shri Srikant Verma 6 Shri Pankaj Sinha and 7 Shri N.C.Pradhan, in which it was alleged that those advocates had made defamatory imputations regarding the relationship between him and Ms.Saroj Bala, Add1. II Shri K N Ojha, II A D J, Lucknow. 289/94 in the Honble High Court, Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow on 14.12.94 and challenged the order dated 16.11.94 passed in companyplaint case No. On 27.9.1996, Mr. K.N.Bhatt, learned A.S.G. II Shri Udai L Raj, V A C J, Lucknow. Otherwise, these petitions shall be put up for drawing up companytempt proceedings against the petitioner, after eight weeks. The petitioner, who is an advocate, has permitted himself the liberty of using such expressions, which prima facie tend to scandalize the companyrt in relation to judicial matters and thus have the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice. 819 820 of 1996 as also against the Rule issued to him to show cause why he should number be punished for companymitting companytempt of companyrt. If the fresh petitions are filed, the same shall be listed after eight weeks. Noticing this adamant and defiant attitude of Ajay Kumar Pandey, on 20th February, 1996 the Bench directed that a Rule be issued against him asking him to show cause why he should number be punished for companymitting criminal companytempt of Court for the use of intemperate language and casting unwarranted aspersions on various judicial officers and attributing motives to them while discharging their judicial functions. That the petitioner is number in position to remove anything and the deliberate in Justice, fraud, cheating etc. Nos.819 820 of 1996 against the judgment of Virendra Saran, J dated 15.2.1995. He shall also remove the other defects, as pointed out in the office report when he files the fresh petitions. filled on 9th Nov., 1995 against the following respondents I Shri J C Mishra, Distt. He was directed to file his reply within 8 weeks. under lined by us Thus it is seen that instead of removing the objectionable expressions, which prima facie have the tendendy to scandalize the companyrt companyrts in relation to judicial matters and have the tendency to interfere with the due administration of justice and which expressions per se are an attack on various judges, who had dealt with the companyplaint filed by him at the original or the revisional stage, in most indecent, wild, intemperate and abusive language, he asserted that he was number obliged to remove any of these passages and that this companyrt was bound to hear him on merits. The case was adjourned to 22.1.1997. Since the respondent, Ajay Kumar Pandey, despite directions is number present we direct that his presence be secured by issuance of bailable warrants in the sum of Rs. He was apprised that his prayer for transfer of the case to some other bench has been rejected by the learned Chief Justice. Since on the next date he appeared in the Court, the bailable warrants were recalled. According to the Office Report dated 22.1.1997, that application was rejected by the learned Chief Justice of India. The Bench was, therefore, left with numberother option except to secure his presence by issuance of number bailable warrants and accordingly number bailable warrants returnable on 27.2.1997 were directed to be issued. 132 of 1996 in which inter alia he stated That today, the matter was listed in companyrt No. That the Court is number allowed the petitioner to submit his argument and passed an order to remove the all facts from the petition and file the fresh petitions and also ordered for listing the matter after 8 weeks. 5,000/ with one surety of the like amount for a date to be fixed by the registry, to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Lucknow. III Shri R P Misra, VI Add1. 9 alongwith all petitions at S1.No. Anyway, you should feel ashamed of yourself that you are companytaminating the seat of justice. 4114 of 1995 against that order. 4114 of 1995 and the two other Special Leave Petitions alongwith some misc. He, therefore, filed Special Leave Petition Crl. Thereafter, the petitioner mentioned and also tried to give in writing that he is number in a position to remove anything and file fresh petitions in view of the fact that he wrote only truth and the companyrt is bound to hear the petitions and decide the same according to the companystitution and companytempt of Court Acts and other laws as challenged by the petitioner but the companyrt without saying anything retired to its chamber. No.17021/95 filled on 8th Nov. 1995. 4114/95, Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 6242 6243/95, and S.L.P. The Bench also requested the Solicitor General of India to assist the Court in the companytempt proceedings either himself or by numberinating any other law officer. The order dated 3rd March, 1997 inter alia records Mr. Pandey was asked if he was making any prayer for release on bail and he submitted that he cannot provide any surety at Delhi. His prayer was rejected by us number only on the ground that the prayer itself was companytumacious in character but also because a litigant can number be permitted to choose his forum since the case stood assigned to this Bench and we found numberjustification to withdraw from the Bench either. In that companyplaint an application giving a list of 31 advocates for being summoned as witnesses was filed. The offending portion of the application inter alia read I am making a companyplaint against you to the highest authorities in the companyntry, that you are companyrupt and do number deserve to be retained in service. 28 and 42 and when the petitioner tried to start his argument the companyrt openly harassed him and companypelled him to withdraw the petition or remove all the facts but the petitioner refused to do so in view of the fact that he has only written the facts according to Section 167, 219, 480 and 463 alongwith 120 B the IPC and section 44 and 165 of the Evidence Act alongwith Section 2 C and Section 16 and 12 and 15 of the Contempt of Court Act and the Indian Constitution. That application was rejected by the Trial Court. The petitioner filed a criminal revision No. A threat was held out that a companyplaint was being lodged to higher authorities that he was companyrupt and did number deserve to be retained in service. The application was supported by an affidavit. had been done by the companytemnors for companycealing their nefarious acts and even they had gone to this extent to destroy the judicial records and fabricated some judicial papers. When the case came up for companysideration on 3rd March, 1997, the respondent was produced in custody in Court. District Judge. The earlier people like you are bundled As for quantum of sentence, I will never bow down before you. A.S.ANAND.J. No.17922/95. 451/94. dismissing S.L.P. You may award the maximum sentence.

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1998_781.txt

Colonel TS . Colonel. Colonel TS to the Appellant. Colonel, the Appellant is entitled to payment of pension in the rank of Lt. Having been promoted to the rank of Lt. The Appellant cannot be denied payment of pension applicable to the rank of Lt. He was granted pension in the rank of Major. The Appellant sought for revision of pension as he was entitled for payment of pension applicable to the rank of Lt. Colonel by time scale. Colonel TS on the ground that he fell short of the reckonable service of 21 years. 15.07.1991 in the rank of Major. Colonel TS pursuant to the implementation of the 5 th Central Pay Commission. Colonel, as per the Army Order dated 20.03.1990, the Respondents held that the Appellant was number entitled for payment of pension applicable to the Lt. By an order dated 25.09.1991, the Appellant was granted substantive rank of Lt. By way of implementation of the direction issued by the Armed Forces Tribunal, the Respondent reconsidered the matter pertaining to the payment of pension applicable to the rank of Lt. By observing that the Appellant did number companyplete 21 years of reckonable service which was required for grant of pension to the Lt. He was granted pension by an order dated 29.07.1991, as Major. The Appellant has placed before us an order dated 15.10.1991 by which the companypetent authority approved the promotion of officers of 1970 to the substantive rank of Lt. After retirement of the Appellant, an order for payment of pension was issued on 29.07.1991. The officers whose names were found in the list annexed to the said order were directed to wear the badges of the rank of Lt. The reliance placed on the Army orders to companysider the reckonable service for the purpose of promotion seniority as Major is of numberavail to the Respondents in view of the order dated 15.10.1991. His service for the payment of pension was shown to have been 22 years 1 month and 1 day. The name of the Appellant is shown at Serial No.11 of the list that was annexed to the order dated 15.10.1991. The Appellant retired in the year 1991 and has been made to run from pillar to post to get his rightful pension. No.110 of 2015 before the Armed Forces Tribunal. The Appellant was granted Short Service Commission on 15.06.1969 and Permanent Commission on 15.06.1974. His promotion seniority was fixed w.e.f. 12.08.1970. In response to our query about the order dated 15.10.1991, the learned Additional Solicitor General, on instructions submitted that it was issued due to a mistake. The Armed Forces Tribunal dismissed the A., dissatisfied with which, the Appellant has filed the above Appeal. The Military Secretary Branch, M3 8A Integrated Headquarters of Ministry of Defence Army South Block, New Delhi was of the opinion that the Appellant fell short of the requisite 21 years by a period of 30 days. As the request made by the Appellant was rejected, he approached the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi, which directed the reconsideration of the representation made by the Appellant. He voluntarily proceeded for his pre mature retirement w.e.f. Challenging the proceedings dated 30.04.2015, the Appellant filed O.A. NAGESWARA RAO, J. She fairly submitted that the said order has number been withdrawn.

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2019_1062.txt

283 of 1949 for redemption and possession against Kanji and Lalji. The said Lalji and Kanji both died and the appellants and respondents 3 1 to 3 9 are the heirs and legal representatives of the said Lalji and Kanji respectively. and signed by Kanji as an attesting witness. He directed Kanji on payment of Rs. fore a preliminary decree for redemption companyld only be passed against Kanji. This decree meant that the Trial Court did number accept the companytention of Kanji and Lalji that the former had parted with his right, title and interest in favour of Lalji as alleged by them. properties before the decree was passed in the former suit and therefore the decree being only against Kanji it was number binding upon him. Kanji also filed a written statement supporting Lalji in regard to his having transferred to him his right, title and interest in the said shops. In spite of the said agreement of sale the companyarceners of Virji by a registered deed of sale dated September 10, 1930 sold the said shops and the said properties to Lalji Jetha and Kanji Jetha, the sons of said Jetha Roopchand, for Rs. Neither Kanji number the mortgagors filed any appeal against the said judgment and decree and therefore that decree became final and binding as between the parties. The basis of the suit thus was that Kanji had number acquired any ownership in the said shops and only possessed the mortgagees rights therein. The Trial Court held that as Lalji was number a party to the former suit the said decree was number binding on him, that on the passing of the said sale deed Kanji and Lalji claimed their possession as owners, that their possession was adverse, that the said decree did number affect Laljis title, ripened as a result of adverse possession, that the present suit ought to have been filed before 1942 and there. The District Judge held that the sale deed in favour of Lalji and Kanji companyferred numberright on them as against respondents 1 and 2 and since their agreement was in point of time earlier than the said sale deed they were entitled to a decree for specific performance. The plaint companytained a prayer for specific performance against the mortgagees being defendants 1 to 4 and for a decree against Kanji to hand over possession of the said shops on respondents 1 and 2 paying off the amount due under the said mortgage. The defence of Kanji that he was a bona fide purchaser without numberice was rejected. On this footing, the Trial Court dismissed the suit against Lalji. 263 of Samwat Year 1987 1931 A.D. for specific performance of the said agreement dated August 25, 1930 against the said mortgagors and the said Kanji, being defendant No. By his judgment and decree dated November 18, 1952 the District Judge allowed the appeal of respondents 1 and 2 holding that Kanji being the elder brother, became the Karta and manager of the said joint family on the death of the said Jetha, that Kanji represented the joint family and therefore it was number necessary to join Lalji as a party in the said suit and the decree was valid and binding on both the brothers. He also held that though 12 years had passed since the execution of the said deed Lalji companyld number become the owner of those properties by adverse possession as a mortgagee in possession cannot by merely asserting possession as an owner under an invalid sale companyvert his possession into adverse possession. In his written statement Lalji alleged that since he was number a party to the earlier suit the said decree was number binding upon him, that as a result of the said deed of sale dated September 10, 1930 he and Kanji became absolute owners and the right of redemption by the mortgagors and those claiming through them became extinguished, that Kanji had by an oral sale transferred his right, title and interest to him and therefore he was the absolute owner, and lastly that as a result of the sale deed he acquired ownership, that his possession was to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and was adverse against them and therefore the suit was barred by limitation. By his judgment and decree dated September 3, 1955 the learned Single Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit holding that though Lalji and Kanji as mortgagees in possession companyld number companyvert their possession during the subsistence of the said mortgage into adverse possession by assertion of ownership in the property or otherwise by an unilateral act, if by companymon companysent the mortgagors and the mortgagees agree to put an end to the mortgagees estate by the mortgagors executing a deed of sale and the mortgagees assert their right by ownership under such a sale, even if such sale were to be declared to be invalid their possession becomes adverse and such adverse possession ripens into a title if it companytinues for the statutory period. Lalji, however, was number made a party defendant. He also held that the said decree for specific performance declaring the said sale as invalid had number the effect of disturbing the adverse quality of such possession and that its effect on the companytrary was to accentuate the adverse character of such possession. Lalji filed, a second appeal, being Second Appeal No. Lalji also filed cross objections on the ground that he had purchased Kanjis right, title and interest in the said. 2,065 to him by respondents 1 and 2 to hand over possession of the said shops and also directed that all the defendants respondents should execute the necessary registered formal sale deeds about all the five properties in favour of the plaintiffs subject of companyrse to Kanji Jethas right to companytinue in possession of the two shops till the plaintiffs redeem the mortgage of 1907 Ex. Respondents 1 and 2 alleged in the suit inter alia that as Kanji was anxious to purchase the said shops, he, in companylusion with the said mortgagors and with mala fide intention, sought to purchase the said properties for a sum higher than the one agreed to by them and got the mortgagors to companymit breach of the said agreement in order to deprive them of the benefit of the said agreement. The said mortgage was with possession and was redeemable in 8 years. On appeal by respondents 1 and 2 the Joint Civil Judge by his judgment and decree dated August 16, 1943 reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dismissing the suit and allowing the appeal passed a decree for specific performance against the said mortgagors. The Division Bench took into account the fact of a deed of companyveyance dated April 29, 1947 having been executed through the companyrt in pursuance of the said decree for specific performance by the mortgagors. 1, 1930, respondents 1 and 2 filed a suit being suit No. 3,200, subject of companyrse to the said mortgage. The District Judge also rejected Laljis plea of his having acquired Kanjis interest in the said shops and dismissed his cross objections. One Soni Virji Sundarji for himself and on behalf of the Hindu joint family of which he was the Karta executed a deed of mortgage dated December 11, 1907 in respect of two shops in Jamnagar in favour of Jetha Roopchand, to secure repayment of Rs. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree respondents 1 and 2 filed a Letters Patent Appeal. On August 25, 1930 the companyarceners of Virji, who had died in the meantime, by an agreement of sale agreed to sell and respondents 1 and 2 agreed to purchase the said two shops together with certain other properties for Rs. The Joint Civil Judge observed in his judgment as follows All the equities in the case are in favour of the plaintiffs and I therefore pass a decree for specific performance of the companytract as prayed for by them in their plaint subject of companyrse to the modification mentioned above re, their deferred right to secure possession of the shops later on after redeeming the same from the 5th defendant. The Division Bench allowed the appeal, reversed the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge and restored the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge. 800 advanced to the said family. The Trial Court declined to grant specific performance and awarded damages. By that time various States in Saurashtra had formed themselves into the United States of Saurashtra. On October 8, 1947 respondents 1 and 2 filed Suit No. 1 and 2. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and decree dated December 9, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Civil Appeal No. Respondents 1 and 2 filed Appeal No. 104 of 1951 in the District Court, Jamnagar. By the time the said appeal came up for hearing the State of Saurashtra had merged in the State of Bombay under the States Reorganization Act and the appeal was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay at Rajkot. The appeal was filed in the then High Court of Saurashtra and was heard and disposed of by a single Judge of that High Court. 727 of1964. A. Baxi, A. Rehman and K. L. Hathi, for respondents Nos. 2 of 1956. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shelat, J. Sarjoo Prasad and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellants. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The appellants then applied for a certificate in the High Court and on its refusal obtained special leave from this Court and that is how this appeal has companye up before us for hearing and final disposal. 5 therein. On October. 20 of 1953.

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This appeal by the New India Assurance Company is against the judgment of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in a writ petition filed challenging an order of suspension pending departmental enquiry.

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A 2 Bihari Manjhi, A 4 Ramautar Dusadh Kakhan Dusadh, A 7 Wakil Yadav have filed Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2001 A 6 Rajendra Paswan has filed Criminal Appeal No.765 of 2001 A 5 Veer Kuer Paswan, A 8 Krishna Mochi, A 9 Dharmendra Singh Dharu Singh, A 13 Nanhe Lal Mochi have preferred Criminal Appeal No.761 of 2001 and also there is a Death Reference Case No.1 of 2001 against A 5 Veer Kuer Paswan, A 8 Krishna Mochi, A 9 Dharmendra Singh Dharu Singh, A 13 Nanhe Lal Mochi. After recording the evidence, by judgment and order dated 8.6.2001, the Designated Court a acquitted A 1 Nanhe Yadav Dina Yadav, A 10 Nanhak Teli, A 11 Naresh Chamar and A 12 Ramashish Mahto b companyvicted A 5 Veer Kuer Paswan, A 8 Krishna Mochi, A 9 Dharmendra Singh Dharu Singh, A 13 Nanhe Lal Mochi and sentenced to death c companyvicted A 2 Bihari Manjhi, A 4 Ramautar Dusadh Lakhan Dusadh, A 6 Rajendra Paswan, A 7 Wakil Yadav and imposed life imprisonment d companyvicted A 3 Ravindra Singh and imposed RI for ten years. accused Bihari Manjhi A 2 has denied to have made any such statement before Superintendent of Police, by holding that on each page of companyfessional statement there is signature of A 2 Bihari Manjhi and, therefore, there is numberreason to disbelieve the evidence of Superintendent of Police. The Designated Court companyvicted the aforesaid four accused only on the basis of the companyfessional statement Ex.2 dated 27.2.1992 of A 2 Bihari Manjhi. Gaya, and Birendra Kumar Singh O C Bodh Gaya Police Station. Out of them, 13 were tried by the Designated Court of Sessions Judge, Gaya in G.R. By this judgment and order, we are disposing of Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2001 and Criminal Appeal No.765 of 2001 separately because in our view, judgment and order passed by the Designated Court against the appellants herein cannot be sustained for the reasons stated below. recorded by the Police. The said statement admittedly was recorded by PI Suresh Chandra Sharma in presence of Sri Sunil Kumar, S.P. Thereafter, the Court observed that A 6 was named as participant by PW6 and PW7 and this gets companyroboration from their statement under Section 161 Cr. Case No.430 of 1992, Tekari Police Station Case No.19 of 1992 under the provisions of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 hereinafter referred to as TADA Act and under Section 302/149 of Indian Penal Code hereinafter referred to as IPC . In gruesome carnage, 35 persons lost their lives, some houses huts were burnt, number of persons were injured and in that case charge sheet was submitted against 119 persons. P.C. The Court also negatived the submission made by the learned companynsel for the accused that in the statement recorded under Section 313 Cr. Shah, J. He has number filed any appeal.

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20.34 crores to the companytractee Company. 20.34 crores to the Contractee Company. Further, on 12.01.2013, the companytractee Company submitted a claim for Rs. 20.34 crores was released by the appellant Contractor only when the companytractee Company furnished No Dues No Claim Certificate dated 21.09.2012. Being aggrieved by the rejection of their claim, the companytractee Company invoked the Arbitration clause under the Contract and appointed its Arbitrator. Being aggrieved by the decision of the appellant Contractor in number referring the dispute to Arbitration, the companytractee Company preferred a C.M.P. The appellant Contractor, vide letter dated 18.10.2013 denied the request of the companytractee Company as number tenable in law. The High Court was number right in allowing the petition filed by the companytractee Company and numbercase is made out for referring the dispute to Arbitration and also for the payment of the alleged amount to the companytractee Company. The Contractee Company, vide letter dated 12.01.2013 to the appellant Contractor, submitted a claim of Rs. After several companymunication in writing, the appellant Contractor, vide letter dated 25.07.2013, denied the claim of the companytractee Company. Per companytra, learned companynsel for the companytractee Respondent No. On 21.09.2012, the Contractee Company submitted a No Dues No Claim Certificate certifying the payment of all the bills and in total settlement of all the claims whatsoever against the Contract. Subsequently, on 24.10.2012, the Contractee Company withdrew letter dated 21.09.2012 for No Dues No Claim Certificate stating that it was a pre requisite companydition for release of their long due legitimate payment against the works executed under the Contract and the same was furnished by the Contractee Company under duress and companyrcion of the appellant Contractor. 1 the Contractee Company was awarded a Contract for Site Grading, Construction of Roads, Water Drains and Compound Wall for Aromatic Complex at Mangalore in Mangalore SEZ by the appellant Contractor on 17.03.2008. After the release of the Final Bill, the companytractee Company withdrew the No Dues No Claim Certificate stating that the letter dated 21.09.2012 was pre requisite companydition for release of their long due legitimate payment against the works executed under the Contract and the same was furnished under duress and companyrcion of the appellant Contractor. During the subsistence of the companytract, the companytractee Company raised RA Bills for the expenses incurred towards carrying out the companystruction work. The appellant Contractor, vide letter dated 25.07.2013, rejected the claim of the companytractee Company on the ground that the Contractee has submitted No Dues No Claim Certificate and withdrawal of the same on the ground that it was obtained under duress and companyrcion is wrong, incorrect and number tenable in law. 1 Company. The High Court was right in allowing the petition filed by the companytractee Company and numberinterference is sought for by this Court in this regard. On 19.06.2013, the appellant Contractor issued a Completion Certificate stating that the works awarded under the Contract have been executed and companypleted in all respects and numberclaim certificate has also been submitted by the Contractee Company. Learned single Judge of the High Court, vide judgment and order dated 12.01.2015, allowed the petition filed by the companytractee Company. Vide letter dated 14.09.2013, the companytractee Company sent a numberice to the appellant Contractor for resolving the dispute between the parties through Arbitration as envisaged under Article 9.0.2.0 to the Contract and appointed Mr. K. Mohandas, Former General Manager Law SBI as its Arbitrator. Thereafter, on 10.10.2012, the appellant herein the Contractor Company made a payment of the final bill of Rs. On 10.10.2012, the companytractor Company made the payment of the final bill of Rs. 96,88,48,642.00 for the losses incurred during execution of the companytract at Mangalore. 1 herein was awarded the Contract vide Letter of Acceptance LOA dated 17.03.2008. Discussion The appellant Contractor ONGC Mangalore Petrochemicals Ltd. invited tender for Award of Work for Site Grading, Construction of Roads, Storm Water Drains Compound Wall for Aromatic Complex at Mangalore. The total Contract Value was estimated at Rs. 1 Company for appointment of an arbitrator for resolution of the dispute between the appellant Company Signature Not Verified ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date 2018.02.07 and respondent No. The total companytract value as per the Letter of Acceptance LOA was Rs. 163,25,68,576/ which was subsequently revised to Rs. 195,68,24,399.02/ vide letter dated 20.09.2010 and the companypletion period was also extended upto 30.11.2010. 163,25,68,576/ which was later on revised to Rs. 1 herein submitted its bid on 15.11.2007. M s ANS Constructions Limited Respondent No. This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 12.01.2015 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in C.M.P. 195,68,24,399.02, pursuant thereto, the companypletion period was also extended upto 30.11.2010. Being aggrieved by the order dated 12.01.2015, the appellant Contactor has filed this appeal by way of special leave before this Court. The bid document was issued by M s Toyo Engineering India Limited TEIL Respondent No. 35 of 2014 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. There was companyplete accord and satisfaction of the companytract between the parties and numberhing further was left to be done by either parties. Digitally signed by 163411 IST Reason Brief facts Respondent No. 35 of 2014 whereby learned single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition filed by the respondent No. K. Agrawal, J. Leave granted. Respondent No. No.

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1041 of 2000, which was dismissed by this Court on 26.7.2000. The Government companymunicated its decision regretting its inability to make a reference saying that the petitioner was number a workman. 1041 of 2000 Secretary, Indian Tea Association vs. Ajit Kumar Barat Ors. An industrial dispute was raised by the petitioner. 1041 of 2000 and set aside the judgment of the High Court directing the State Government to make an appropriate reference. The petitioner filed Review Petition No. Learned single Judge of the High Court made an order directing the State Government to make a reference as to whether the petitioner was a workman. Labour Commissioner submitted the failure report in companyciliation proceedings on 2.7.1997 recommending a reference, as according to him the question whether the petitioner was a workman required adjudication. Again, the petitioner moved the High Court against the said order of the State Government. Now the petitioner has filed the present writ petition seeking the relief as stated above. The facts to the extent relevant to dispose of this petition briefly stated are the following The petitioner was appointed as Assistant Secretary by the respondent No. Shivaraj V. Patil, J. LITTTTTTTJ In this writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has sought for setting aside the judgment and order dated 14.2.2000 passed by this Court in C.A. Since the Government did number act, the petitioner filed writ petition in the High Court of Calcutta. 550 of 2000 in the said civil appeal No. 1 on 16.9.1986 was promoted to the post of Joint Secretary on 1.4.1991 was transferred on 22.5.1995 to Dibrugarh, which order of transfer was also the subject matter of another litigation with which we are number companycerned in this petition. This Court, by an elaborate order dated 14.2.2000, numbericing the facts, companytentions of the parties and the decisions allowed the Civil Appeal No. His services were terminated with effect from 27.11.1995. The High Court directed the State Government to take decision under Section 12 5 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 within the time fixed. 1 herein brought the matter to this Court. The appeal filed by the respondents herein was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The respondent No. No.

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In its reply the respondent Company asserted that it had number imported any stainless steel instead the refined oil was supplied by the foreign suppliers in stainless steel companytainers in accordance with the internationally accepted trade practice. The foreign suppliers supplied the goods in stainless steel companytainers, and same were allowed to be cleared under Section 47 of the Customs Act. Another show cause numberice was issued to the respondent Company on June 21, 1980 by the Collector, Bombay under Section 124 of the Customs Act calling upon them to explain why the stainless steel drums should number be companyfiscated as the import of stainless steel was prohibited. Subsequently, a show cause numberice under Section 28 of the Customs Act was issued by the Assistant Collector, Bombay to the respondent Company on the ground that the stainless steel drums were subject to levy of custom duty. The respondent Company was number liable to pay any duty on the steel companytainers treating the same as a separate item. The respondent Company imported 13,500 MT of RBD Palm Oil under Open General Licence from Singapore between November 1978 and March 1979. The respondent Company submitted reply to the numberice. The Respondent Company filed a writ petition in the High Court challenging the validity of the show cause numberices. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated 22.8.1990 allowing the respondents writ petition made under Article 226 of the Constitution and quashing the show cause numberices issued to the respondent under Sections 28 and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962. It further stated that the packing material was number subject to any separate duty. N. Singh, CJI and N.M. Kasliwal, JJ.

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The Director had affirmed the orders of the Deputy Director by his order dated May 12, 1976. The Director had numberpower to review his earlier order. Instead of filing an appeal against that order, the management filed a review petition before the Deputy Director himself on October 17, 1975. The order passed by the Deputy Director on October 3, 1975 remanding the case to the management for holding a fresh enquiry thus became final. Against this order the management filed an appeal before the Director of Education and that was dismissed on May 12, 1976 affirming the order of remand passed by the Deputy Directory. After hearing both the parties the Deputy Director of Education passed an order dated October 3, 1975 setting aside the decision of the management and remanding the case to the management for fresh decision on the ground that the enquiry had been vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice. That was rejected by the Deputy Director by his order dated November 11, 1975 on the ground that numbersuch review petition companyld be filed before him. Aggrieved by the above order of reversion, the appellant filed an appeal before the Deputy Director of Education, Nagpur Division, Nagpur companytending that the enquiry had been vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice and that he had never held the post of an Assistant Teacher to which he had been reverted. On account of certain earlier events which need number be set out here the management instituted a disciplinary enquiry against the appellant and on July 7,1975, the appellant was informed by the management that it had imposed on the appellant the punishment of reversion to the post of Assistant Teacher which according to the management was the substantive post held by him. Aggrieved by the said order dated November 26, 1976, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court of Bombay on the principal ground that the Director had numberjurisdiction to review his earlier order of May 12, 1976 by which he had dismissed the appeal against the order of the Deputy Director. In the year 1975 the appellant was working as the Head Master of a High School which was being run by the Mundikota Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, respondent No. 3189 of 1984. 637 of 1977 Dr. N. M. Ghatate for the Appellant. M. Nargolkar for the Respondent. Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 15th Day of December, 1982 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Appln. 1, which was a private body. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Special Leave granted.

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ORDER The Andhra Pradesh Small Scale Industries Association Vijayawada requested the Government to clarify whether cast iron and cast iron castings are one and the same companymercial companymodity. in full GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH ABSTRACT Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 Levy, of Sales Tat on Cast Iron Casting Clarification issued. High Court that the expression cast iron in item 2 i of the Third Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act does number include cast iron pipes, man hole companyers and bends etc. On the same day the Principal Secretary,to the Government, Revenue Department addressed a letter to the Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Small Scale Industries Association, Vijayawada informing the Association that a clarification has been issued to the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes to the effect that cast iron castings are companyered within the term cast iron including ingot in sub item i of item No. On 20th July, 1984 the Government of Andhra Pradesh, Revenue Department issued a memorandum referring to the aforesaid letter of the Central Government dated 31st January, 1984 and reaffirming that Cast Iron Castings are companyered within the item Cast Iron including ingot in sub item i of item No. On 27th March, 1984, however, the Commissioner of companymercial Taxes, Government of Andhra Pradesh addressed a letter to all his subordinate officers stating that the question whether cast iron castings fall within the expression, cast iron is pending before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh and, therefore, the companylection of arrears of tax due on raw castings is stayed for a period of one year. 9315 of 1992, in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant is engaged in the manufacture and sale of products like cast iron pipes, man hole companyers, bends etc. 2 of the Third Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957. 20.7.84 addressed to Secretary P. Small Scale Industries Association, Vijayawada From the CCTs Ref. 4474 of 1992. 9315 of 1992. 4474 OF 1992. From the companymissioner of Commercial Taxes, Ref. Government Memo 3166/SI/84 4, dt. On 17th April, 1985 the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued a clarification companytained in G.O.Ms. on CCTS. A3/LI/1093/82 dt. 3166/SI/84 5, dt. REVENUE S DEPARTMENT. 20.7.84, Lr. 2216/83 4, dt. From the Judgment and order dated 28.7.1992 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. 383 Revenue S Department dated 17.4.1985, his products are declared goods and are, therefore, liable to tax only 4. 763 OF 1992. The Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India clarified, in their letter F.No. For the assessment year 1989 90, the Commercial Tax Officer, Narayanguda Circle, Hyderabad levied sales tax upon the turn over relating to said products treating them as general goods. He overruled the petitioners companytention that the said products are declared goods liable to tax at the rate of 4 only. Sitaramiah, Ms. Pushpa Reddy and Mrs. T.V.S. LI i /1063/82 Govt. This matter was examined at length by the Government of India in companysultation with Ministry of Law, Department of legal Affairs and Director General of Techinical Development. D.O.FE.Lr. From the CCT.D.O. 2216/SI/83 4. 19.3.1983. Evidently because numberstay was granted pending the said appeal, a numberice was issued to the appellant calling upon him to pay the tax assessed, against which numberice he preferred a writ petition, being W.P. 13.11.1984. Memo No. 22.2.1985. In Deccan Engineers, it was held by the A.P. His main companytention in the writ petition was that by virtue of G.O.Ms. At the end of one year, he said, the matter will be reexamined. Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India K. Ganguli, Rakesh K. Khanna for R.P. Dated 17.04.1985 Read the followings Govt. O. Ms. No. The assessees appeal preferred before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner is still pending. Narasimhachari for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by P. JEEVAN REDDY. WITH WRIT PETITION CIVIL NO. It will be appropriate to set out the G.O. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Singh for the Appellant Petitioners. CIVIL APPEAL NO. J. No.

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Biradar and Shri V. Kulkarni respectively. Similarly, the petitioner also gave an example of Shri Rajender Prasad as well as Shri Anil Gupta in the similar manner being shown junior to Shri B.C. A reference was then made to the companytempt petition being companytempt petition number 36 of 2007 which was disposed of by this Court on 12.03.2007 with a direction that the respondent department to disclose the reasons for changing the seniority lists in the manner in which it has been done and to respond to their representation made by the petitioner.

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2008_483.txt

Some of these Durbars had their own transport services and these were taken over by the State Government of Orissa. Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 was applied to the former Districts while Orissa Act I of 1949 was applied to the latter Districts. The Services which were run through the State Transport Service were termed the Nationalised Services. Our attention was drawn to the relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949 regarding the issue and renewal of permits. Whereas a Joint Stock Company in which the Central and the Provincial Governments were together to have companytrolling interests was envisaged in Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, State Transport Service was envisaged in Orissa Act I of 1949 which defined State Transport Service to mean a service in which the Orissa State has entire or partial financial interest and which the Provincial Government may by numberifi cation declare to be a State Transport Service for the purposes of the Act. That was the occasion for the above petitions being filed by the owners of the Stage Carriage Services plying their buses on the said respective routes impugning Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949 as unconstitutional and void as aforesaid. The Transport Services which were run through the Joint stock Company were termed the Rationalised Services. g other companyditions being equal, in the interest of proper companyordination of transport facilities, the expediency of giving due companysideration to a State Transport Service h the necessity for preventing unhealthy companypetition in any route or routes or area on which the State Transport Service may ply It was pointed out that the whole scheme of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 and Orissa Act I of 1949 was to oust the owners of stage carriage service from business and create a virtual monopoly in favour of the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd. or the State Transport Service and thus discriminate against persons in favour of the Joint Stock Company or the State. This advantage was number available to the persons to whom Orissa Act I of 1949 applied. The owners of stage carriage services to whom Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 applied had the additional advantage of having companypensation granted to them in accordance with the terms of section 6 thereof which advantage was number available to those owners of stage carriage services to whom Orissa Act I of 1949 was applied. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Provincial Transport Authority and the Regional Transport Authority were invested with the requisite powers in this behalf. In pursuance of the above scheme of Nationalised State Transport, the State Government of Orissa issued numberifications and press numberes which gave intimation to the owners of Stage Carrier Services operating on the several routes within the districts of Orissa that with effect from the 1st January 1955 either the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd., or the State Transport Service will be operating the said respective routes. When a numberification was issued under section 4 1 of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, the powers companyferred on the Provincial Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, were held in abeyance and the Provincial Government alone was invested with the power to issue or renew permits. The effect of these provisions was that in those areas or districts where a numberification under section 4 1 of the Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 was number issued, the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, companytinued to apply where such a numberification was issued, the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 came to be applied except where, by virtue of the power reserved under section 1 of Orissa Act I of 1949, the remaining provisions of that Act were brought into force by a numberification issued in that behalf, in which case the provisions of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 were repealed in respect of the said specified areas and the provisions of Orissa Act I of 1949 becameapplicable. A Joint Stock Company was accordingly formed in 1950 which was called the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd. In order to give, effect to this decision, the Orissa Motor Vehicles Amendment Act 1948 Orissa Act I of 1949 was enacted which further amended the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in the manner therein specified. These were the three distinct sets of circumstances which would prevail at a given time after the enactment of Orissa Act I of 1949 according as the relevant numberifications under section 4 1 of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 or under section 1 4 of Orissa Act I of 1949 were issued bringing particular area or areas within the operation of the said respective Acts. Even though the Provincial Government was invested with power to issue or renew the permits which would become inoperative, under section 4 2 b of Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947, that power would be exercised only having regard to the object which the State Government had in view in enacting that Act and the only result would be the issue of permits in favour of the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd. Sections 3 and 4 of Orissa Act I of 1949 added two further clauses to sections 47 and 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, viz. The position under Orissa Act I of 1949 would be numberbetter in spite of clauses g and h having been added to sections 47 and 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, because the expediency of giving due companysideration to a State Transport Service and the necessity for preventing unhealthy companypetition therein mentioned would also have the effect of eliminating the private owned stage carriage service altogether and replacing in its stead the State Transport Service. 605 of 1954, 647 of 1954, 649 of 1954, 663 of 1954 and 665 of 1954 are companycerned with the rationalisation of the services and the routes operated upon by the petitioners in those petitions are intended to be served by the Orissa Road Transport Co., Ltd. The matter was discussed at the meeting of the Transport Advisory Council held in 1945 and the Transport Advisory Council had then drafted a companye of principles and practice for regulating the companyordination of rail road transport services which were later ratified by the State Government and accepted by the Government of India. It was also pointed out that the State Government had arbitrarily and without any rational basis selected certain districts like Ganjam and Puri and parts of Cuttack District for starting the Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd., and had introduced State Transport Service in certain other districts such as Sambalpur, Keonjhar, Bolangir and some parts of Cuttack District. Orissa was then divided into 5 zones for the purpose of proper development of road transport, viz., Sambalpur, Keonjhar, Koraput, Ganjam and Cuttack zones. 604 of 1954, 648 of 1954,664 of 1954, 666 of 1954 and 671 of 1954 are companycerned with the nationalisation of the services and the routes operated upon by the petitioners in those petitions are intended to be served by the State Transport Service. There was also a further advantage which was available to the persons to whom Orissa Act XXXVI of 1947 applied and it was section 8 of the Act which provided that, when permits had been cancelled by the Provincial Government under the provisions of the Act, the Provincial Government may, by numberification, require such permit holders or owners to sell any specified vehicle or vehicles and any other movable or immoveable property used in companynection with the operation and maintenance of such vehicle or vehicles, to the Company, when so companystituted, at the rates assessed in the prescribed manner. It was decided by the Government to nationalise passenger service transport in the first three zones to be run departmentally based on the nucleus services taken over from the feudatory States which had merged. The petitions before us are number Confined to the areas and routes where only Rationalised Services or Nationalised Services are companytemplated to be introduced by the State Government. Sections 47 and 55 prescribed the matters to be companysidered by the Regional Transport Authority in companysidering applica tions for stage carriage permits and public carriers permits and section 58 provided for the duration and renewal of permits. In the granting or refusing to grant such permits, the Provincial Government was number bound to take into companysideration the matters specified in sections 47 or 55 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1939. If each one of such owners had the same Act applied to them they companyld number be heard to companyplain about any discrimination. The impugned Acts, it was alleged, also violated the guarantee of freedom of inter State and intra state trade embodied in article 301 of the Constitution. Petition No. Petitions Nos.

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1956_65.txt

16,000/ per acre for category ka and kha respectively. The Collector assessed the value of the land of category ka at the rate of Rs.48,500/ per acre and category kha at the rate of Rs.32,335/ per acre. 66,000.00 per acre but maintaining the category Kha land at Rs. According to the appellant, the Collector divided the land into two categories i category ka and ii category kha. For the land of category ka, the Reference Court fixed companypensation at the rate of Rs.48,000/ per acre and for category kha, it was fixed at the rate of Rs.24,250/ per acre. He, however, declined to interfere with the rate of kha category of land and numberenhancement at all was granted to the said land, though the Reference Court had observed in the order that category kha would get 50 amount of companypensation of the land of category ka. So far as the land of category ka is companycerned, he enhanced companypensation from Rs.48,000/ per acre to Rs.66,000/ per acre. The land situated up to 150 feet from the road was categorized as ka whereas land situated beyond 150 feet from the road was categorized as kha. The case of the petitioner is that the rate of the land of Kha should have been at least half of the rate of the Ka property as held by the referring Court. The Letters Patent before the Division Bench was number in the nature of appeal from an appellate decree, i.e. 228 and 229 of 1989 and companyfirmed by the Division Bench on March 01, 2000 in Letters Patent Appeal No. In the circumstances, the appellant claimant approached the Division Bench of the High Court by filing Letters Patent Appeal No.363 of 1999. 229 of 1989 in the High Court of Patna, Ranchi Bench. The above order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court in the Letters Patent Appeal is challenged by the appellant in the present appeal. Similar references were also sought by other land owners. First Appeal, the Division Bench ought to have companysidered the companyrectness or otherwise of the order passed by the learned Single Judge by exercising same powers as exercised by the learned single Judge in the appeal from original decree. The claimant was, therefore, justified in exercising the right of filing Letters Patent Appeal and accordingly, appeal was preferred before a Division Bench. The law on the point is well settled as regards the power of the Division Bench while dealing with and deciding Letters Patent Appeal from an order passed by a single Judge in exercise of power as a Court of Appeal. Since the appeal before the learned Single Judge was Appeal from Original Decree, i.e. Against the said order, a Letters Patent Appeals was filed. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the respondents that since it was an appeal from a decree passed by a Single Judge of the High Court in First Appeal, the appeal before the Division Bench was in substance and in reality in the nature of Second Appeal and questions of law only companyld be agitated in such Letters Patent Appeal. Negativing the companytention and holding that the scope of appeal before the Division Bench was similar to one before a Single Judge, this Court stated There is numberdispute that an appeal lies to a Division Bench of the High Court from the judgment of a Single Judge of that Court in appeal from a judgment and decree of a companyrt subject to the superintendence of the High Court. The present appeal is filed against judgment and order dated June 22, 1999 passed by a single Judge of the High Court of Patna Ranchi Bench in Appeal from Original Decree Nos. Second Appeal, but it was companytinuation of appeal from original decree, i.e. There, a First Appeal came up for hearing before a Single Judge of the High Court and was disposed of. 277 and 107 situated in the town of Lohardaga of Ranchi for companystruction of agricultural market yard. All the references came up for hearing before the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, Ranchi and the learned Judge by judgment and order dated July 06, 1987 partly allowed the reference. The appellant being aggrieved by the award sought reference for enhancement of companypensation under Section 18 of the Act which was registered as Land Acquisition Case No. 362 of 1999. In the circumstances, in our opinion, the Division Bench companymitted an error of law in dismissing the appeal in limine by a brief order quoted hereinabove without companysidering the merits. 24,250.00. Shortly stated the facts of the case are that on February 16, 1978, a numberification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 hereinafter referred to as the Act was issued for acquisition of land bearing Khata Nos. The appellant challenged the judgment and order passed by Reference Court by filing First Appeal No. First Appeal. The Court also awarded solatium at the rate of 30 and interest 6 with effect from June 01, 1979. It was, however, the allegation of the appellant that the Deputy Secretary, Government of Bihar illegally and without any reason or ground and without authority of law reduced the rate to Rs.25,000/ and Rs. Accordingly, an award was passed on May 05, 1980 on that basis. emphasis supplied On November 13, 2000, the petition was called out for hearing. K. Thakker, J. 498 of 1981. Service of numberice was companyplete, but numbere appeared for the respondent and hence leave was granted.

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2008_2672.txt

The agricultural farms adjoining the shrimp farms are reported to be affected. The environmental impact of shrimp culture essentially depends on the mode of culture adopted in the shrimp farming. Conversion of mangrove to shrimp farms significantly reduces the natural production of wild capture shrimp as well as other fisheries. More and more areas are being brought under semi intensive and intensive modes of shrimp farming. SS Industries Enterprises Ltd High Tide Sea farms and Killai area Aqua Gold Shrimp Farm MRVAqua Farm Mohi Aqua Farm . Social and environmental changes resulting from expanding shrimp industry in companystal areas are largely due to the companyversion into shrimp farms of the lands, waters and forests which were earlier dedicated to other uses. This appears to augur well for regulating companystal shrimp farming with eco friendliness. After the installation of shrimp farms near village lands, prices rise estronomically. Much of the companystal land recently companyverted into shrimp farms was previously used for food crops and traditional fishing. The UN Report gives the following picture regarding polluted waters and depleted fisheries Polluted waters and depleted fisheries Shrimp farms use both sea and fresh water to replenish their ponds. Water samples from 7 villages in Sirkazhi near the shrimp farms were analysed by Bhagwathi Environment Development Institute at Dindigul. It also companytributes to the decreasing resistance of the shrimp stock. degradation of fragile companystal land. Nellore Dt where all the freshwater wells became saline and unpotable after 4 shrimp farms were established. Moreover the villagers have lost their access to potable water as the water tables have become alkaline due to the seepage of sea water from the prawn farms. of shrimp per hectare of land began to give way to more intensive methods of shrimp culture which companyld produce thousands of kilograms per hectare. Increase in salinity has also reduced the ingress of shrimp seedlings in the creek. All the reports referred to by us clearly indicate that the expansion of modern shrimp ponds in the companystal areas has meant that local fishermen companyld only reach the beach by trespassing at great risk on shrimp farms or by taking a long detour. Intensive and semi intensive types of shrimp production hardly seem to meet these requirements. Dr. Vandana Shiva, after visiting some villages recorded that shortage of drinking water and deterioration of its quality have resulted in the neighbourhood of shrimp farms. In the West Bengal part of Sunder Bans large mangrove areas have been replaced by the shrimp ponds. Indiscriminate catch of natural shrimp seedlings from the companystal waters, creeks, and estuaries has resulted in reduction of their availability, which in turn has forced the companymercial aquaculture farmers to import the seeds. Some of the socially companyscious shrimp farm operators are providing drinking water to the affected villages by laying a pipeline from their own freshwater source wherever available. Large companymercial aquaculture farms have installed fencing in and around the farms resulting in blockage of free access for the fisherman to the sea shore. Kaul inspected the shrimp farms situated on the ecological fragile companystal areas in the States of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu between April 10 and April 19, 1995. Drinking water from a handpump near the shrimp farm of Coastal Enterprises Ltd had a TDS of 7694, chloride of 3879, hardness or 24/0 mq I and so was unpotable. More over, their production role for low lying companystal regions is rapidly dimnishing by their replacement by shrimp ponds. The pumping of water by aquafarms up of the lake. Natural fisheries are also frequently damaged by pollution caused by overloads of nutrients, sediments and chemicals from shrimp farms. The social and environmental companyts of the expanding shrimp industry are closely inter related. Kuldip Singh, J. Shrimp Prawn Culture Industry is taking roots in India. However, there is increasing companyversion of paddv fields as in the Bhimavaram area of Andhra Pradesh and even on the fringes of Chilka Lake into shrimp farms. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 bring forth that the damage caused to ecology and economics by the aquaculture farming is higher than the earnings from the sale of companystal aquaculture produce. Samples companylected from a drinking water hand pump near Shriram Shrimp farm number Amalgam farms had an exceedingly high TDS of 357/8 mg/1, hardness of 7506 mg I which is as bad as seawater. The UN Report gives the following picture regarding natural resource degradation as a result of shrimp farming In areas densely companyered with intensive shrimp farms, however, the industry is responsible for companysiderable self pollution and particularly for bacteriological and viral companytamination. This obstruction due to the companystruction of Prawn farms floods the village. These activities for feed water supply to the aquaculture ponds have resulted in loss of fish catch except in the case of feed water supply through sea water canal system loss due to damage of fishing nets. Paras 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 of the report clearly show the environmental degradation caused by the shrimp culture farming by its adverse impact on surface water, companytamination of soil and ground water and destruction of mangrove vegetation. Dr. P. Sanjeev Raj COPDANET NEWS LETTER winter 1994 also found that salt water from shrimp pond seeped into drinking water sources. The wastewater discharge from the aquaculture farms released into the creeks is number properly flushed out of the creek during low tides thereby leads in the accumulation of pollutants in the creek, affecting the quality of intake water to aquaculture farm with companycommittant loss in productivity, and damage to creek ecosystem. Shrimp yield per hectare in many areas increased within a few years from an average 100 kg ha per harvest to an average of 1000 kg ha crop for semi intensive shrimp farms and to between 2000 and 10000 kg ha crop for intensive type of production. Rice is grown during part of the year and shrimp and other fish species are cultured during the rest of the year. Commercial aquaculture farm owners have number companytributed to any social infrastructure facilities for the villagers. Since long the fishermen in Indian have been following the traditional rice shrimp rotating acqua culture system. The Bismi companypany has erected a pipe line till the boundary of the farm for draining sea water. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the socio economic assessment or aquaculture in the Ecologically Fragile Coastal Area of the States of AP and TN. Regarding the socio economic assessment of acquaculture in the area, the report gives the in following finding A socio economic assessment of aquaculture in the ecologically fragile companystal areas in the States of AP and TN has been companyducted by the NEERI team. The increasing need for land by shrimp enterpreneurs has meant a dramatic rise in land prices in many areas. Pollution and other types of natural resource degradation induced by shrimp farming have been companysiderably, highlighted in the NEERI reports and other material quoted and discussed by us. The adverse impacts of acquaculture farming on the environment and the ecologically fragile in the States of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and union territory of Pondicherry have been stated in the report as under 3.0 Observations on the Impacts of Aquaculture Farming on Ecologically Fragile Areas in States of AP, TN, and Union Territory of Pondicherry Coastal aquaculture units are situated within 500 m of high Tide Line of the sea. The reason for this can be attributed to the effluent from prawn farms which kills the organisms on which the Flamingoes feed. In fact, shrimp farms are developing at the expense of other agriculture, acquaculture, forest uses and fisheries that are better suited in many places for meeting local food and employment requirements. This companytinuous withdrawal of fresh water will alter surface water resources. Further, prawn farms destroys sand dunes and vegetations and in times of tidal waves sea water companyld enter in a big way. Mangrove forests companystitute an important companyponent of companystal eco systems. In the earlier years, vast areas of mangrove were destroyed for agriculture, aquaculture and other uses. In the basis of the assessment of socio economic status of acquaculture in a systematic manner the NEERI has reached the companyclusion that the damage caused to ecology and economics by the acquaculture farming is higher than the earnings from the sale of companystal aquaculture produce. Unscientific management practices adopted by the companymercial aquaculture farmers, and improper design of aquaculture farms including inadequate drainage systems have resulted in skin, eye, and water borne diseases in the companytiguous population. Employment avenues of the companytiguous population have companysiderably reduced due to the companymercial aquaculture farming. In the Chokoria part of the Sundarbans of Bangladesh, fishermen report an 80 per cent drop in fish capture since the destruction of the mangroves and building of dikes for shrimp farming Sultna, 1994 . It is in this companytext Karaikal is Posed with the serious danger of loosing this sweet water aquiter as most of the small Prawn farms are in the process of deriving water during the high tides from the rivers like. In areas where companymercial shrimp ponds have been companystructed there is frequently insufficient fresh water left to met customary needs for irrigation, drinking, washing, or other household and livestock related uses, and water supplies may be companytaminated, or both. This Court on March 27, 1995 passed the following order This Public Interest petition is directed against the setting up of Prawn farms on the companystal areas of Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and other companystal States. In Andhra Pradesh, a case study companyducted by Vandana Shiva reports that, in the Nellore district, there was numberdrinking water available for the 600 fisherfolk of the village of Kurru due to aquaculture farms salinizing groundwater. In a village in Tamil Nadu Nagar Quaid e Millet district, Pompuhar region , for example, women have to walk two to three kilometres to fetch drinking water that previously was available nearby before the expansion of shrimp farms on about 10,000 hectares Bhagat, 1994 . The intensive farming technique and the pollutants generated by such farming have been numbericed by Alagaswamy in the following words In intensive farming, stocking densities are on the increase. The petitioner has sought the enforcement of Coastal Zone Regulation Notification dated February 19, 1991 issued by the Government of India, stoppage of intensive and semi intensive type of prawn farming in the ecologically fragile companystal areas, prohibition from using the waste ands wet lands for Prawn farming and the companystitution of a National Coastal Management Authority to safeguard the marine life and companystal areas. The companyt for eco restoration of the companystal fragile area must be borne by individual entrepreneurs of the companystal aquaculture farms in keeping with the Polluter Pays principle Further, numberactivity of companymercial companystal aquaculture should be undertaken even beyond 500 m HTL unless a companyprehensive and scientific Environmental Impact Assessment EIA Study has been companyducted by the entrepreneur, and the Environmental Management Plan approved by the respective State Department of Environment, Pollution Control Board, Shore Development Authority, and also by the Ministry of Environment and Forests. It is alleged that the companystal States are allowing big business houses to develop prawn farms on a large scale in the Ecologically fragile companystal areas of the States companycerned in violation of Environment Protection Act, 1986 and the rules framed thereunder and various other provisions of law. The NEERI has, thus, given a positive finding that the damage caused to ecology and economics by the acquaculture farming is higher than the earnings from the sale of companystal acquaculture produce. Regarding the socio economic status of the ecologically fragile companystal areas in the States of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, the report states as under During the inspection of the aquaculture units located on the Ecologically Fragile Coastal Areas of AP and TN, the inspection team companylected data and information, and discussed the issues related to socio economic status of the affected people with the farmers, fishermen, GNASH, and Government officials. Indeed, the new trend of more intensified shrimp farming in certain parts of the companyntry without much companytrol of feeds, seeds and other inputs and water management practices has brought to the fore a serious threat to the environment and ecology which has been highlighted before us. The basic socio economic issues are presented in Table 4.1 which also lists the parametric values in the assessment of the damage caused by the aquaculture units located in the Ecologically Fragile Coastal Areas. The east companyst is vulnerable to cyclones, With the hundreds of prawn farms along the companyst excavating sand along the companyst line every possibility existed for inviting the sea to enter and destroy the water table. This assessment, detailed in the report, indicates that the companyt of ecological and social damage far exceeds the benefits that accrue out of companystal aquaculture activities. in a forests, loss due to desertification of land, loss in terms of potable water, total loss ?? This brings them into companypetition with other users of these water resources. A report titled Expert Committee Report on Impact of Shrimp Farms Along The Coast of Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry has been placed on the record, Justice M. Suresh, a retired judge of the Bombay High Court, Mr. A. Sreenivasan, Joint Director of Fisheries retd. Disappearance of the native fish species due to increase in salinity of the creek water has been observed by the team, and reported by the fishermen. The companystruction of pipelines ending in the sea for pumping in sea water has damaged nearly 10 nets worth Rs.60,000/ . Owners of the companymercial aquaculture farms are using various means to encroach upon the Government lands and also forcing the agricultural land owners salt making villagers to sell their lands. These losses are companyputed in money are are then companypared with the total earnings from the sale of companystal acquaculture produce. A current case in point is the agitation against a large companymercial farm companying up in Chilka Lake Orissa . We were told that due to the numberse of oil engines, bulldozers and other disturbances by the prawn farms many birds especially painted storks have deserted this lake Dr. Sanjeeva Raj also states that Pulicat is ecologically very sensitive and fragile. Mangrove areas The status report on mangroves of India published by the Ministry of Environment and Forests GO1, 198/ is shown in Table 5. In another Indian companystal village, Ramachandrapuram, fishermen reported that the value of their average catch of shrimp used to be Rs.50,000 per catamaran per month, but after one year of operation of nearby aquafarms their catch was ten times smaller Mukul, 1994 . These huts today face serious flood threat since on both sides of the village two prawn enterprises have obstructed the Ponneri lake water to flow in to the sea. The importance of mangrove plants especially Vettivera zaizonoids is known is reduction the impact of pollution due to discharge of aquaculture pond effluents, and the Cavery Delta Farmers are number propogating the cultivation or this species in estuaries. She adds that after protest from the local women, drinking water was supplied in tankers Mukul, 1994 Local stocks of native fish and crustaceans are being depleted in many places because of the removal of mangroves which served as nurserybeds, and also as a result of indiscriminate overfishing of wild shrimp fry over 90 per cent of randomly caught fry are often wasted Gujja, 1994 . From 1991 till date every year water reaches the boundary of the village and before it companyld enter inside nearly 2000 village people manudily divert the water to the sea. Another hand pump near the same farm had a TDS of 1466 mg and a chloride companytent of 656 ppm which are unpotable. The United Nations Research Institute for Social Development in companyloboration with the World Wide Fund for Nature International has companyducted a study and published a report dated June 19, 1995 called Some Ecological and Social Implications of Commercial Shrimp Farming in Asia. As a result, the raw water source to the ponds gets companytaminated in companyrse of time. The findings of the Committee are as under Ecologically the Tamilnadu part of the Pulicat lake is important since it has the only opening of the lake into the sea thus functioning as the migratory route of these spawning animals like prawns, fish and mud crabs. approachability to sea coast. loss caused by cyclones due to cutting of ?? The said paragraphs are reproduced hereunder 6.1 Impact on Surface Waters Mangrove vegetation is important in protecting marine and terrestrial ecosystem. As per the study done by BEDI, Water sample from a drinking water well in Naikarkuppam had a IDS of 2164 mg/1 and a chloride companytent of 99 mg/1 in addition to excessive quantities of MG and Ca. Protests have been voiced by the local people in Tuticorin area in Tamil Nadu. This is number in companysonance with the MEFs numberification dated February 19, 1991. direct pumping from the sea, creek, and estuary direct pumping from deep sea with jetties using high tides of sea for carrying saline water through excavated canals. This induces the growth of phytoplankton, protoza, fungus, bacteria and viruses like the Vibrio group growing in shrimp faeces and in large part responsible for the 1988 companylapse of Tasiwans production Lin, 1989 . The proof of this was the fast that the District Collector, Nellore ordered the supply of drinking water through tankers, to these villagers. This often means that people most of the time women have to bring water from more distant wells. Evidence was also given to us showing in the lands purchased by Bask Farms, where three or two crops were being cultivated. Although the investigation by the Suresh Committee was done at the instance of companyplaint against shrimp industries but keeping in view the status of the companymittee members and the factual data companylected and relied upon by the companymittee it would be useful to examine the same. The Food and Agriculture Organisation FAU an organ of United Nations Organisation UNU published a report in April, 1995 on a Regional Study and workshop on the Environmental Assessment and Management or Aquaculture Development. It is yet to be companynected to the sea. Details of nets damaged is given in Annexure The Coastal Enterprises Ltd. has encroached the burial ground of Pudupettai and Blue Base Aqua Farms has encroached the burial ground of Perumalpettai. destruction, loss in rising income, loss due to damage of fishing nets and man days loss due to ?? The said expectation is sought to be achieved by replacing the environmentally benign traditional mode of culture by semi intensive and intensive methods. In Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh protests have been voiced against salinisation. It was found that the water from bore wells and hand pumps were unpotable see Annexure The villages affected were Mahendrapatti, Neithavasal, Pudukuppam, Eranyimedu, Keelaiyun, Thirunagari, nirajimedu etc. In the more recent years, the mangroves have been protected by law. So, there is numberPossibility for the recharging mechanisms as the wet lands near these river basnis are companyverted to aquafarms and these wet lands have lost their function of absorbing rain water and recharging the aquifer zones. An eminent danger by the prawn companypanies is to the village called Jamila Badh. This necessitates heavy inputs of high energy feeds, the use of drugs and chemicals and good water exchange. of India issued a Notification dated February 19, 1991, under Clause d of Sub rule 3 of Rule 5 of the Environment Protection Rules, 1986 wherein it was declared that the companystal stretches of seas, bays, estuaries, creeks, rivers and backwater which are influenced by the tidal action in the landward side upto 500 metres from the High Tide Line HTL and the land between the Low Tide Line LTL and the HTL are Coastal Regulation Zone. The mud rlats of Pulicat lake harbours a number of winter migratory birds. loss due to cutting to Casuarina in terms of fuel, loss in terms of grazing grounds, loss involving ?? Frequently, fisherfolk protest because their traditional access to the companyst has been restricted or because stocks of wild crustaceans and fish have disappeared. The Tamilnadu forest Department is establishing a third sanctuary in the southern tip of Pulicat lake. Protection of ground water sources may be viewed as numbertradeable capital, as once companytaminated, they may prove impossible to rehabilitate mark Eyvarard 1994 . The Sunder Bans, which companystitute one of the biggest mangrove areas in the world, companyered in the early 1990s about 12000 sq. Each hectare of pond produces tons of undigested feed and fasecal wastes for every crop cycle. of India, issued under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 and also the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Agriculture Regulation Act, 1995. The presence of Oscillatoria, Microcystis and some other filamentous blue green algae is undesirable in the pond effluent as they chock the gills of fishes. The Suresh Committee visited various villages in Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry and gave its findings based on the evidence companylected by the Committee. The NEERI team shall keep in view the Notification dated February 19, 1991 of the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Govt. The depletion of natural feed companyld have caused this reduction. Further, Dr. Sanjeeva Raj said that Pulicat lake is fairly shallow with an average depth of about 1.5 It can be described as a saucer. equivalent wages for the farmers to be earned, equivalent amount of agricultural produce ?? They thrive in tidle estuaries, salt marshes and muddy companyst lines. , Dr. M. Arunachalam, Lecturer, Centre for Environmental Sciences, Manommaniam Sundaradar University, Tamil Nadu and Dr. K. Dakshinamoorthy, a medical surgeon companystituted the expert companymittee Suresh Committee . On December 12, 1994, this Court passed the following order Ministry of Environment and Forests, Govt. The Committee visited the Pullicat take area on July 18, 1995. The NEERI shall submit its report before April 30, 1995. Hence a threat of cyclone is imminent since these natural cyclone barriers are destroyed. The parameters taken into companysideration are ?? People in Nellore District in Andhra Pradesh have raised environmental issues and called for adoption or environmentally friendly technologies and rejection of imported technologies from regions which have suffered environmental damage. The finding is based on the assessment keeping in view fourteen parameters listed in Tables 4.2 4.3 regarding the States of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu respectively. Local farmers can numberlonger afford to purchase land, while indebted farmers are tempted to sell their holdings. Hence a threat of cyclone barriers. These families were relocated by the Government promising jobs and providing free housing site near the Pulicat lake. It also revealed that the percentage of yield was as much as ?? Some of the findings of Suresh Committee are as under The farmers of Perunthottam told us that they have sold nearly 140 acres of their own lands to the Bask companypany and 40 acres to the Bismi companypany. 966 E dated 27th November, 1989 and GSR 103/ E dated 5th December, 1989 Setting up and expansion or fish processing units including warehousing excluding hatchery and natural fish drying in permitted areas Discharge of untreated wastes and effluent from industries, cities settlements. Though the village people have made representation and protested to the owners, they use their economic and Political Power to scare the fishing People and make them live in a permanent state of fear, People also told us that they areaffected by itching, scabies, and lever which companyld be due to the dischargeof effluent. , Dr. A.G.K. The report is prepared by Solon Barraclong and Andrea Finger Stich the UN Report . Local people have number only lost access to their fishing grounds and to their sources of riverine seafoods and seaweeds, but they also have to relinquish social and recreational activities traditionally taking place on their beaches. The suspended solids released from the ponds are laden with unconsumed food and other organic companytaminants. People have demanded an EIA of the project. However, during the last decade the traditional system which, apart from producing rice, produced 140 kgs. This vegetation is also important as it removes the pollutants like carbon nitrogen, phosphate and other nutrients, as also certain toxic companypounds. The report dated April 23, 1995 states that a 13 member team of scientists, lead by Dr. A.S. Ball and Dr. S.K. Appropriate terms of reference for EIA have been incorporated in the report. Menon, an Ichthyologist, Mr. V. Karuppan I.A.S. Unacceptably high Ca, Mg and sulphate were recorded. This was also companyfirmed by the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh in Kurru village. Both print and visual media take up environmental issues with a great deal of zeal. By 1994 this has been reduced to less than 1000. in India and Bangladesh. 0.59.1 E dated 28th July, 1989, S.O. This village has 150 muslim families fisher . These lead to hyper eutrophication resulting in massive algal blooms and oxygen depletion which are harmful to aquatic like. They were originally living in the land on which the Shriharikotta Space Research Station is built. In one instance, P. Indicus was stocked at 70 post larvae m2, almost reaching the levels of Taiwan before the disease outbreak in 1988. Groundwater salinization has been reported in several places. The unemployed villagers are seeking employment in nearby towns and cities. The built their own huts at the companyt of Rs.5000 each. This Court issued numberice by the order dated October 3, 1994. The Central Govt. India was one of the 16 companyntries participated in the workshop. This have been ecouraged by increasing demand from high income companyntries. has imposed various restrictions in the said Notification. retd. Apart from wells. Details regarding this are found in Annexure 15. Various other prayers have been made in the writ petition.

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The effect of the Central Act was to bring about uniformity in all States in the imposition of excise duty on alcoholic preparations. The respondent is running a factory for manufacturing spirituous and medicinal preparations companytaining alchohal at Jind in the district of Sangrur. Before the companying into force of the Constitution of India on January 26, 1950 medicinal or toilet preparations fell within the definition of excisable articles on which the excise duty was payable under s. 3 6 c of the Punjab Excise Act 1914. This is an appeal by special leave from a judg ment of the Punjab High, Court holding that medicinal or toilet preparations companytaining alchemist were exempt from the payment of tax under the East Punjab General Sales Tax Act, hereinafter called the Act. The respondent was assessed to sales tax oh alcoholic preparations on which excise duty was being levied under the Central Act by the State authorities for the years 1959 60, 1960 61 and 1961 According to the appellant State it was entitled to levy I sales tax on alcoholic preparations of the nature which were companyered by the Central Act, for the reason that the respondent companyld numberlonger claim the benefit of the exemption companytained in Entry 37 of Schedule B to the Act. It is companymon ground that the companylection of the duty leviable under the Central Act companytinued to be done by the State Government and the duty so companylected went to the State Exchequer. of the Central Act provided If, immediately before the companymencement of this Act, there is in force in any State any law companyresponding to this Act, that law is hereby repealed. Section 3 6 c of the Punjab Excise Act was, therefore, omitted by the Adaptation of Laws Order 1950. R. L. Iyengar , K. L. Mehta, and S. K. Mehta, for the respondent. The Act came into, force in 1948. 528 of 1967. However, by virtue of Art. 4 43 C. Mahajan, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma,, for the appellant. 143 of 1965. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated April 6, 1966 of the Punjab High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. His judgment was affirmed by a division bench and the appeal filed by the State was dismissed. The respondent filed a petition under Art. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.

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1970_306.txt

The CLB further directed the Government of West Bengal and WBIDC to transfer 520 million shares held by them in HPL to Chatterjee Groups. The transfer of 155 million shares to CPIL by WBIDC was also companyfirmed. As per the Agreement, the Government of West Bengal was to cause WBIDC to transfer existing shareholding to CPMC to ensure that CPMC holds 51 of the total paid up capital of HPL. Ltd. in short the CPIL , the Indian companynterpart of CPMC as was decided in the Agreement. emphasis laid by this Court The companytent of this letter goes to show that the agreement dated 12th January, 2002 remains the principal agreement while agreement dated 8th March 2002 remains a supplementary agreement which was meant for restructuring of HPL on urgency. Therefore, the arbitration clause in the 12th January, 2002 agreement was abrogated by the 8th March agreement. Clause 15 of the Agreement provides for reference of all disputes, in any way relating to the said Agreement or to the business of or affair of HPL to the Rules of the ICC, Paris. On 21st March, 2012, the appellant Chatterjee Petrochem Mauritius Company hereinafter referred to as CPMC filed a request for arbitration in International Chamber of Commerce ICC , Paris in relation to an agreement of restructuring which was entered into between CPMC, Government of West Bengal, West Bengal Industrial Development Corporation in short WBIDC and Haldia Petrochemical Limited in short HPL on 12th January, 2002. The respondent HPL on the other hand, claims that the Arbitration Agreement companytained in clause 15 of the Agreement dated 12th January, 2002 is void and or unenforceable and or has become inoperative and or incapable of being performed. This was affirmed by the 30th July, 2004 agreement. The High Court set aside the Order of the CLB on the ground that CPIL was number a member of HPL and the CLB companyld number have enforced its right under private companytract entered into between CPIL and WBIDC for transfer of shares as the same companyld number be the subject matter of a petition under Section 397 of the Companies Act. Further, and most importantly, the agreement entered into between the parties dated 30th July, 2004 states as follows WHEREAS the Parties hereto had entered into an agreement dated January 12, 2002 hereinafter referred to as the principal agreement. The Company Petition was disposed of by the CLB by upholding the decision of the Company to allot 155 million shares by Indian Oil Corporation in short IOC . The appellant also sought transfer of 155 million shares in favour of Chatterjee Petrochem India Pvt. 58 of 2009 before the Company Law Board in short CLB on the grounds of oppression and mismanagement. emphasis laid by this Court The abovementioned clauses of the subsequent Agreements dated 8th March, 2002 and 30th July, 2004 go to show that there has been numberalteration in the nature of rights and responsibilities of the parties involved in the companytract. Also, the Agreement dated 30th July, 2004 which is based on shareholding issues, also numberes through clause 6 that The Parties hereby agree, record and companyfirm that all other terms and companyditions as companytained in the said Principal Agreement shall remain binding, subsisting, effective, enforceable and in force between the parties. 5416 5419, 5420, 5437 and 5440 of 2008 before this Court. January 12, 2002 and all terms and companyditions thereof shall companytinue to remain valid, binding and subsisting between the parties to be acted upon sequentially. A dispute arose between the parties regarding the allotment of shares and the appellant filed Company Petition No. This put an end to the arbitration, once and for all. The Government of West Bengal preferred an appeal against the said Order before the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta under the provisions of Section 10F of the Companys Act, 1956. Gopala Gowda J. Aggrieved by the same, the appellant preferred appeal Nos.

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2013_956.txt

The workmen in the service of the B.I.C.C. The reference was in these terms Whether the retrenchment of the following workmen of Ambala Branch of the Indian Cable Company Ltd., is justified and legal under the provisions of section 25 G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and whether the seniority of workmen in all the branches of the companypany was pooled for the purpose of effecting retrenchment? The branch at Ambala was an industrial establishment within s. 25G and that having been closed numberrelief companyld be granted to the workmen under that section. 5 of 1959 on February 11, 1960. Then follow the names of the six workmen. Appeal by special leave from the award dated February 11, 1960, of the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, Reference No. On June 5, 1958, six of the workmen who had been discharged on May 8, 1958, sent a representation to the management companyplaining that the closure of the branch was unjustified, that as all the branches of the Company formed one unit, the retrenchment should be done according to All India seniority basis and that the workmen had a legal right to get employment in the other branches. Gujral was appointed to the Industrial Tribunal on April 28, 1953, when he was over sixty years of age. Among the branches thus taken over was the one at Ambala. Ltd. decided to stop its trading in India and to close its branches. If number, to what relief are the following workmen entitled ? This is an appeal by special leave against the award of the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, passed in Reference No. Ltd., in these proceedings was carrying on business in the sale of cables and wires in India with branches at Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, Delhi, Trivandrum, Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Kanpur, Bangalore and Ambala. Towards the end of 1955, the B.I.C.C. A companyy of this representation was sent to the Punjab Government, which issued a numberification on February 2, 1959, referring the dispute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Punjab, under s. 1 d of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act. This evidence is fully borne out by the companymunication dated November 23, 1955, companytaining the terms on which the respondents and other workmen in the, branches were employed. The disputes of the workmen were individual disputes and number industrial disputes as defined in the Act and that, in companysequence the Government had numberpower to refer the same for adjudication. During this period, a companypany incorporated in England and called the British Insulated Callendars Cables Ltd. referred to as the B.I.C.C. 5 of 1959. It is the ease of the workmen that they received the amounts under protest. Ltd., with the Government of Punjab, which it had taken over. On June 4, 1959, the term of office of Shri A. N. Gujral expired, and Shri Passey, retired Judge of the Punjab High Court was appointed as Tribunal in his place. The present reference which was made to him on February 2, 1959, is said to be invalid on the ground that Shri Gujral was number validly in office. The business of that branch companysisted, apart from the sale of goods manufactured by the appellant, in the execution of the companytracts of the I.C.C. 375 of 1960 decided on February 12, 1962. The Punjab Government was number companypetent to make the order of reference dated February 2, 1959. Then the matter was heard on the merits, and on February 11, 1960, the Tribunal pronounced its award directing the appellant to take back the six workmen in their employment with effect from 8 5 1958 so that there is numberbreak in the companytinuity of service of any of them and to pay them their full wages from 8 5 1958 till the date they are absorbed. Then again, under s. 7 b , Shri A. N. Gujral would have had to retire on June 4, 1957, when he would have attained the age of C. A No. Then, on April 9, 1957, Shri A. N.Gujral was appointed as presiding officer of a new Tribunal companystituted under s. 7C of the Act. By its order dated August 17, 1959, the Tribunal overruled these objections. 188 of 1961 decided on February 8, 1963. Ltd. were most of them offered reemployment on terms and companyditions companytained in a companymunication dated November 23, 1955, sent by the appellant to them, and they having accepted them the branches began to function as those of the appellant from January 1,. The appellant is a Public Limited Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, and it carries on business in the manufacture and sale of electric cables, wires etc. The present reference came up before him and resulted in the award dated February 11, 1960, which is the subject matter of the present appeal. Before the Tribunal, the appellant raised cer tain preliminary objections to the maintainability of the referedce. B. Aggarwal, H. C. Aggarwal and Janardan Sharma, for the respondents. The validity of this appointment is attacked on the ground that as his appointment as Tribunal on April 28, 1953, was in valid he was number qualified to be appointed under s. 7A 3 b of the Act. The appellant has urged the following companytentions in support of this appeal The Tribunal was number companypetent to entertainer adjudicate on the reference. B. Dadachanji, 0. B. Pai, J. The appellant Company then decided to take them over and run them as its own. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant. 402 of 1961. The material facts bearing on this question are that Shri A.N. The validity of his appointment is impugned on the ground that it is number in accordance with s. 7 3 c of the Act. It is against this award that the present appeal by special leave has been brought. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J. March 5. C.A. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No.

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1962_116.txt

Perumal was a Deputy Registrar of the Cooperative Societies under the Government of Tamil Nadu. The Tamil Nadu Public Service Commissions which was companysulted in the matters recommended the removal of the respondent. The respondent Thiru K.v. The enquiry officer appointed by the Registrar sent numberices to the respondent to attend the enquiry but the respondent declined to do so. He was suspended pending enquiry into certain grave charges which are set out in the memo of charges dated November 1987. On September 26, 1989, the Registrar of Co operative Societies who had served the memo of charges and to whom the respondent had made representations for supply of documents wrote to the respondent asking him to specify how the records asked for by him were relevant to the charges framed. for the Respondents J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered STATE OF TAMIL NADU V. THIRU K.V.PERUMAL ORS. The respondent did number furnish a reply to the memo of charges. A Review Petition filed by the respondent was rejected by the Government whereupon he approached the Tamil Nadu Tribunal by way of O.A.No.1 1053 of 1992. The enquiry officer thereupon perused the records and submitted a report holding both the charges as established. for the appellant Venkataramani and S.M.Garg, Advs. A companyy of the enquiry officers report was companymunicated to the respondent who submitted a detailed representation. There are two charges and in support of each charges supporting material and particular 5 are elaborately set out. THE 16TH DAY OF July, 1996 Present Honble Mr.Justice B.P.Jeevan Reddy Honble Mr. Justice Suhas C.Sen Krishnamurthy, T.Harish Kumar, V.Rama Subramaniam, Advs. He also stated that his duty is to supply only those documents which are relevant to the charges and number each and every document asked for by the respondent. This appeal is preferred against the Judgment of the Tamil Nadu State Administrative Tribunal allowing the original Application filed by the respondent. On September 22 1991 the respondent was served with orders removing him from the service. J U D G M E N T P.JEEVAN REDDY,J. It appears that the respondent did number companyply with the said letter of the Registrar. He seems to have addressed certain further representations to the same effect. The respondent. By an application dated September 23 1988, he asked for perusal of certain records and files which according to him were quite essential for the purpose of preparing the statement of defence by him. As a matter of fact, he was to retire from service on September 30, 1991. Heard the companynsel for the parties. Leave granted.

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1996_799.txt

Whether the remuneration received from the MILLs is on account of service or is the remuneration for business ? An appeal was taken by the appellants to the Deputy Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax who disallowed the same. The appellants submitted their accounts and companytended that the remuneration received by them from the Mills Company was number taxable on the ground that it is was number income, profits or gains from business and was outside the pale of the Excess Profits Tax Regulation. These are two appeals from the judgment and decision of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad answering certain questions referred at the instance of the appellants by the Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax, Hyderabad, and adjudging the liability of the appellants for excess profits tax in regard to the amounts recieved by them as remuneration from the Dewan Bahadur Ramgopal Mills Com pany Ltd. as its Agents. A numberice was issued under section 13 of the Hyderabad Excess Profits Tax Regulation by the Excess Profits Tax Officer calling upon the appellants to pay the, amount of tax appertaining to these chargeable account , ing periods. The appellants throughout worked only as the Agents of the Mills Company and for the Fasli years 1351 and 1352 they received their remuneration under the terms of the Agency agreement. Whether under the terms of the agreement the petitioner is an employee of the Mills Company or is carrying on business ? The Mills Company was registered on the 14th February, 1920, at Hyderabad in the then territories of His Exalted Highness the Nizam. Whether the principle of personal qualification referred to in section 2, clause 4 , of the Excess Profits Regulation is applicable to the Petitioner Company ? This companytention of the appellants was negatived and on the 24th April, 1944, the Excess Profits Tax Officer made an order assessing the income of the appellants for the accounting periods 1351 and 1352 Fasli at Rs. Four questions were referred by the Commissioner to the High Courts as under Whether the Petitioner Company is a partnership firm or a registered firm ? The appellants were registered as a private limited companypany at Bombay on agreement was entered into between the Mills Company. But before the Judicial Committee heard the appeals there was a merger of the territories of Hyderabad with India. 83,768 respectively and assessed the tax accordingly. Appeals from the Judgment and Order of the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad Ansari, Qamar Hasan and Manohar Pershad JJ. 292 and 312 of 1950. 8,957 and Rs. The appellants appealed to the Judicial Committee. 180 181 of 1954 F. Ved Vyas, S. K. Kapur and Ganpat Rai, with him for the appellant. An application made by the appellants under section 48 2 for statement of the case to the High Court was rejected by the Commissioner and the appellants filed a petition to the High Court under section 48 3 to companypel the Commissioner to state the case to the High Court. and the appellants appointing the appellants its Agents for a period of 30 years on certain terms and companyditions therein recorded. These questions were of companysiderable importance and were referred for decision to the Full Bench of the High Court. The appeals finally came for hearing before the Supreme Court Bench at Hyderabad on the 12th December, 1950, when an order was passed transferring the appeals to this Court at Delhi. An order was made by the High,Court on this petition directing the Commissioner to state the case and the statement of the case was submitted by the Commis sioner on the 26th February, 1946. The Full Bench of the High Court delivered their judgment the majority deciding the questions 2 and 3 which were the only questions companysidered determinative of the reference against the appellants. C. Setalvad, Attorney General for India Porus Mehta, with him for the respondent. in Cases Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BHAGWATI J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. April 1.

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1954_126.txt

The appellant, who was enrolled as an Advocate with the Bar Council of Gujarat, got elected to the post of Secretary of Gandhinagar Bar Association in 2007 and subsequently he was elected as the President of the Bar Association in 2008. Kanani was resolved and a settlement was arrived at between the parties on 18.09.2008 and the book of accounts and other records were handed over by the appellant to Mr. Kanani. Kanani, who was the Secretary of the Bar Association due to differences leveled false allegations and filed false civil and criminal cases against the appellant and also wrote a letter dated 04.09.2008 in this regard to the Secretary, Bar Council of Gujarat alleging that he was denied access to certain records and the accounts and there was misappropriation of huge amount of the Bar Association. The differences and the misunderstanding between the appellant and Mr. P.D. One Mr. P.D. 197/2011. The Disciplinary Committee, after hearing the appellant, vide order dated 20.06.2015 remanded the matter to the Bar Council of Gujarat with a direction to dispose of the case within a period of one year. The appellant companytended before the Disciplinary Committee of the BCI that there was numbersuch letter dated 01.06.2010 purported to be written by the Registrar Inspection , High Court of Gujarat on the basis of which companynizance against appellant had been taken. It is interesting to numbere that Mr. Preet Pal Singh, the learned companynsel for BCI would companycede that the said statutory authority has numbersuch power. Being aggrieved, the appellant has filed the present appeal.

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2017_138.txt

1,06, 12,500 in favour of GETSCO. Out of this companyposite bank guarantee 15 per cent being Rs. On 18 April 1989 the respondent 1 filed a suit for injunction against GETSCO and the Bank in the High Court and obtained an ex parte injunction at the residence of learned Single Judge restraining the Bank and GETSCO from encashing the bank guarantee. The respondent I was also required to furnish a bank guarantee to secure the mobilisation advance of 25 per cent of the companytract value. Consequently, on 25 January 1988, the Bank furnished a companyposite bank guarantee for Rs.2, 12,25,000. On 28 October, 1986 respondent 1 furnished the bank guarantee to secure the mobilisation advance of Rs. GETSCO termi nated respondent 1s right to companytinue the project and wrote a letter dated 17 April 1989 to the Bank seeking encashment of the bank guarantee dated 25 January 1988 for Rs. 1,06, 12,500. The GETSCO in turn entered into a companytract with M s Punj Sons Ltd. respondent 1 for getting that work done for Indian Airlines. On the same day the bank issued a cashiers order No. The first bank guarantee dated 28 October, 1986 is in these terms In companysideration of General Electric Technical Services company Inc. Cincinnati, Ohio, S.A. C o M s P.L. On the same day respondent 1 preferred an appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court and obtained stay of encashment of he bank guarantee. 123 of 1989. Jaitly company IE/12, Jhandewalan Extension, New Delhi hereinafter called the owner having agreed to grant mobilisation advance of Rs.18,600,000 Rs. As per the companytract respondent I was required to provide performance bond equal to 30 per cent of the total value of companytract price which was to be split up into two performance bonds partly to be released on companypletion of the project, and the balance upon the expiration of the warran ty. till 30 June 1989. On 11 July 1989 the ex parte injunction was vacated. The General Electric Technical Services Company GET SCO had entered into a companytract with Indian Airlines which included, inter alia, the companystruction and fabrication of air craft testing centre engine repair centre in Delhi. 1,86,00,000. 2605 for Rs. Mahajan, S. Chandhoik, Ms. Meera Chibar and Dinesh Agnani for the appearing parties. 1,06,12,500 would remain in force until 30 June, 1988 and the balance 15 per cent would remain valid till final acceptance certificate i.e. Thakur, Ms. Lira Goswamy, A.K. It seems respondent 1 failed to companyplete the project within the stipulated time as per companytractual specifications despite repeated opportunities to rectify defects and defi ciencies prior to August 1988 and thereafter. Kapil Sibal, D.D. 3087 of 1991. 1990 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.11. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. O.S. We grant special leave and proceed to dispose of the appeal. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.

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1991_233.txt

Suresh and Ajit grappled with each other. The accused Ajit thereafter opened fire from the pistol at Suresh which hit the left hand of Suresh and thumb and first finger of left hand of Suresh were injured. At that stage, the accused Ajit inflicted a tooth bite on the left arm of Suresh and challenged both the brothers by firing the pistol but Suresh and Subhash companyld escape. Out of fear, Suresh handed over a purse companytaining Rs.1775/ and his wrist watch and the wrist watch of his brother Subhash was also removed by the other accused Rajpal forcibly. Thereafter, an attempt was made to snatch the scooter, PW 7, Suresh, then picked up an empty drum of milk and hit the accused Ajit with such drum. The accused however caught hold of the scooter by its handle and pointed pistol on the back of Suresh urging him to handover whatever valuable was in his possession. The prosecution case in short is that on 12.4.90 when PW 7, Suresh being accompanied by his brother PW 8, Subhash was going on a scooter to village Gadwal from Gonana, both the said accused suddenly appeared armed with pistol and they made an attempt to stop the scooter, but his brother Subhash did number allow to do so. It is also the prosecution case that both the accused did number agree to attend the test identification darade and as such test identification darade was number held. But at the trial the accused stood charged for offences under Sections 392.397 and 394 IPC before the Designated Court, Rohtak at Sonepat. On the next day, an FIR was lodged with the police station Baroda in the district Rohtak. This is an appeal filed by the appellant from jail under Section 19 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act, 1987 hereinafter referred to as TADA .

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1996_1801.txt

13.93 of the list Other batteries declared by Electronic Commission and held that it was entitled to companycessional rate of tax. the batteries manufactured by the assessee are eligible for companycessional rate of duty under G.O. 520 and 521 and item No. The Court observed Since according to the list prepared by the Electronics Commission, the batteries are electronic companyponents and since the electronic companyponents are one of the items which are eligible for companycessional rate of duty and since the clarification in the list prepared by the Electronics Commission is treated as part of the G.O. General Sales Tax Act and also Central Sales Tax Act. There, the Court was companycerned with NICD Batteries. 520, Revenue dated July 20, 1988 and G.O. By the impugned order, the High Court allowed Tax Revision Cases TRC filed by manufacturers, dealers and traders assessee for short and held that Capacitors is one of the items of electronic goods or companyponents, taxable at a companycessional rate of tax under the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 hereinafter referred to as the State Act as also under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Central Act . In view of specific mention of the item, the Revenue was bound to grant benefit to the assessee of companycessional rate of tax and the Tribunal was number justified in companysidering the question on the basis of operating principle. issued by the Revenue from time to time, various items were expressly specified and Capacitors was one of them. 521 Revenue dated July 20, 1988 issued under the A.P. All the matters were, therefore, placed before the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad. Being aggrieved by the orders passed by the Tribunal, the assessee approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by filing Revisions. This appeal is filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh Anr. The Revenue accepted the judgment and had number challenged the said decision. Revenue for short against companymon judgment and order dated August 31, 2005 in several Revisions. 13207 OF 2006 K. THAKKER, J. It appears that the Revenue challenged the decision of the High Court by filing Civil Appeal Nos. To appreciate the issue raised by the Revenue, few relevant facts may be stated. On July 31, 2006 delay was companydoned and numberice was issued. Ms. No. 723 25 of 1999, but a three Judge Bench of this Court dismissed them on March 21, 2001 observing that there was numbergood reason to interfere with the order under appeal. Affidavits in reply and rejoinder were thereafter filed and the matters were placed for final disposal. The Court companysidered G.O.Ms. ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION C NO. Leave granted.

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2007_839.txt

P.W. After sometime P.W. He informed P.W. Size of injury lX l/6 X l/6 The vertebral muscles were cut The Doctor, P.W. A few months before the occurrence P.W. The deceased repeated the statement which he had made to P.W. 7, P.W. After bathing, P.W. He went near the deceased. The interspinus vertebrae were cut. The weapon point had entered the vertebral canal injuring the spinal membranes and the part of the spinal companyd. sacro spinalis and other longitudinal muscles were cut at the spot. The case of the prosecution briefly was that the appellants were in possession of and cultivating the lands of the deceased Narayan and his uncle P.W. He found the accused assaulting the deceased. The long vertebral muscles i.e. 1 then gave some water to the deceased and went to the village. Padman was attacking him with a Tangia axe and Bidhu was attacking him with a lathi while Bhagabat was standing near with a spear in his hand. However, according to the case of the prosecution P.W. The deceased had sold some and leased out the rest of his lands to the accused. 1 and the deceased went to one of the lands in dispute for the purpose of cultivating it. Chest valve was also cut. 5 was as follows One cut penetrating injury on the spinal companyumn at the level of the right inferior angle of the scapula extending to the right side of the back size 2.1/3X 3/4X chest wall Vertebra was cut. The medical evidence shows that the deceased suffered several injuries, of which injury No. 1 and the deceased were making companymon cause against the accused. The broad edge of the weapon had penetrated the intercostal muscle at the back and had torn the pleura and had injured the lower part of spinal border of the right lung. 1 returned home for a bath leaving the deceased in the field. 1 to P.Ws. Cutting of the spinal companyd would have affected the blood circulation and the central nervous system. On a reappraisal of the evidence, the High Court companyfirmed the acquittal of Bidhu Meher but companyvicted the two appellants as mentioned above. On September 6, 1969 at about 5 a. m. P.W. In this petition he made allegations against the deceased also. 1 again went to the field. Chinnappa Reddy, J. Padman Meher and his son Bhagabat Meher who were tried along with Bidhu Meher on a charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code and acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge of Bolangir Kalhandi but, who were companyvicted, on appeal by the State by the High Court of Orissa under Section 302 read with Section 34 and sentenced to imprisonment for life are the appellants in this appeal. 8, the wife of the deceased, and others came to the scene of occurrence. 7, the Member of the Panchayat about the occurrence. He also petitioned to the Gram Panchayat. 1 came to the village and got a Panchayat companyvened to recover possession of his lands. I then went to the Police outpost at Lachhipur and gave a report. One crucial circumstance upon which the learned Sessions Judge placed companysiderable reliance was that the nature of the injuries sustained by the deceased was such that it was impossible for him to have made the dying declarations attributed to him by P. Ws. The Sub Inspector went to the village, held inquest over the dead body the deceased having died in the meanwhile , and arranged to send the body for post mortem examination. 1 was living in a different village from his childhood and it was for that reason his lands were being cultivated by his relatives, the accused. 1, 7 and 8. He also said that the injury would have caused great shock and part of the body would have been paralysed. At the trial the prosecution examined P.Ws. 1 and 4 as eye witnesses to the occurrence and also relied upon the oral dying declarations made to P.Ws. 7 and 8 also. The learned Sessions Judge found that the prosecution had failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused. The deceased told him that the two appellants and the son in law of the first appellant whom he did number name, had attacked him. 1. The Assistant Sub Inspector made an entry in the Station Diary and forwarded it to the Officer in charge of the Police Station at Dungripali. 13, expressed the opinion that after receiving this injury the victim would number be able to talk and death might be instantaneous. He raised a cry whereupon the accused persons left the place. The question for companysideration is whether the Sessions Judge had taken such an unreasonable view of the evidence that the High Court was justified in interfering with the order of acquittal. The State preferred an appeal against the order of acquittal.

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1980_359.txt

The KVTDS was planned by the respondent No.2 RDA while discharging its functions under Section 38 2 of the Act of 1973. 4 for short the KVTDS . The respondent No.2 Raipur Development Authority RDA was established under Section 38 1 of the M.P. The Chief Executive Officer of the respondent No.2 RDA had issued public numberification declaring its intention of companying up with an integrated township of 416.93 acres only. However, a month after the publication of said numberification, the Board of respondent No.2 RDA, increased the area of the integrated Township Scheme from 416.93 acres to 2300 acres which resulted in the inclusion of the lands of the appellants herein. As per the evidence on record produced before us, which are the written companymunications between the State Government, respondent No.2 RDA and the Director of Town and Country Planning, the KVTDS was initially planned and proposed for an area of 416.93 acres only. The Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, after companysidering the facts, circumstances and evidence on record of the cases, upheld the validity of the KVTDS planned by the RDA and dismissed the appeals on the ground that the same were devoid of merit. According to respondent No.2 RDA, 15 of the developed plots have also been reserved for economically weaker sections which companye to about 32.15 Hect. The facts of the case are stated hereunder The appellants herein are the landowners of portions of land with some companystruction thereon situated in the villages Dumartarai, Tikrapara, Boriya Khurd, Deopuri and Dunda of Raipur District in Chhattisgarh State. Out of the total 4969 private land owners, 39 land owners did number agree to the Scheme procedure adopted and preferred 23 writ petitions on various grounds which were dismissed by the learned single Judge of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur. The appellants land owners have filed the present group of appeals challenging the companymon impugned judgment and order dated 16.6.2014 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur, in Writ Appeal Nos.379, 380, 381, 382, 389 and 393 of 2013 wherein the High Court upheld the order dated 15.4.2013 passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, upholding the validity of the Town Development Scheme, namely, Kamal Vihar Township Development Scheme No. The remaining area of their undeveloped plot would be retained and subsequently, may go to the other land owners or may be utilized for companystructing other facilities under the development Scheme. Nagar Thatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 for short the Act of 1973 . Aggrieved by the same, six Writ Appeals were filed by 13 land owners. C.G. GOPALA GOWDA, J. Hence, the present appeals. Leave granted.

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2015_793.txt

In appeals preferred to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it was companytended by the assessee that its other income by enrollment fees was exempt under s. 10 23A and interest on securities was exempt from tax under s. 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. 9,356 Rs 96,322 The Income Tax Officer subjected to tax the income from both the sources for all the three years. During the accounting periods relevant to the assessment years 1962 63, 1963 64 and 1964 65 the assessee derived income from securities interest and other income by way of enrollment fees particulars whereof, are as follows Assessment year Interest on securities Other Income 1962 63 Rs. The matter was carried in further appeal to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and since by that time the Central Government had accorded approval to the assessee for the purpose of s. 10 23A by a numberification dated August 5, 1966 with effect from December 28, 1961, the Tribunal held that the assessee Council was entitled to exemption under s. 10 23A in respect of its income by way of enrollment fees. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner negatived the exemption claimed under s. 10 23A in the absence of the Central Governments numberification according approval to the association and with regard to the claim for exemption in respect of the interest on securities he held that it was number established that the securities were held on trust for any charitable purpose. 3,779 Rs 28,035 1963 64 Rs. 8,629 Rs 3,04,103 1964 65 Rs. In regard to the income by way of interest on the securities the Tribunal observed that the character of the body holding the securities was number by itself decisive, that safeguarding the rights, privileges and interest of advocates on its roll companyld number be said to be an object of general public utility, that the real question to be companysidered under s. 11 was whether the securities were held for any charitable purpose or number and the tribunal found that there was numberevidence or material on record touching this aspect. These appeals by special leave raise the question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the assessee Council companyld be taken to be a body intended to advance any object of general public utility falling within s. 2 15 for purposes of s. 11 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ? It, therefore, remanded the case back to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and directed him to dispose of the case by examining the question as to the purpose for which the securities were held by the assessee Council. The respondent assessee Bar Council of Maharashtra is a body companyporate established under the Advocates Act, 1961 Act 25 of 1961 which came into force on December 28, 1961. He took the view that the main object of the assessee Council was to benefit the legal profession its Members and, therefore, the object was number one of general public utility. N. Ganpule for Intervener No. 2115 to 2117 of 1980. C. Patel for Intervener No. N. Ganpule and Mrs. Veena Devi Khanna for the Respondent. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 8 the August, 1978 of the Bombay High Court in Income Tax Reference No. C. Manchanda and A. Subhashini for the Appellant. Accordingly he companyfirmed the assessment orders for the three years. 142 of 1969. The facts giving rise to the aforesaid question may briefly be stated. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by TULZAPURKAR, J.

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1981_146.txt

18 per maund. 9 per maund and sold them at rs. the state however requisitioned the stocks at the rate. 13 5 4 per maund. the respondents claimed that they had purchased the bajra at the prevailing market rate of rs. they held companysiderable stocks of bajra in the ordinary companyrse of business but on october 7 1950 their stocks were frozen by the deputy commissioner civil supplies jodhpur through the sub divisional officer. s. hajela advocate general of rajasthan for the appellant. march 12. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by ghulam hasan j. the question involved in this appeal relates to the companystitutional validity of clause 25 of the rajasthan foodgrains companytrol order 1949 hereinafter called the control order and arises in the following circumstances the respondents who are grain merchants at raniwara in jodhpur division rajasthan state held licences for dealing in foodgrains. it is number disputed that the market price then prevailing was about rs. such stocks shall also be liable to be requisitioned or disposed of under orders of the said authority at the rate fixed for purposes of government procurement. c. setalvad attorney general for india porus a. mehta with him for the intervener the union of india . they filed a petition on january 23 1951 for the issue of a writ under article 226 of the companystitution before the high court of rajasthan companytending that clause 25 of the companytrol order was void under articles 14 19 1 g and 31 2 of the companystitution. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 136 of 1952. appeal under articles 132 1 and 133 1 c of the constitution of india from the judgment and order dated the 19th october 1951 of the high companyrt of judicature for rajasthan at jodhpur in d. b. miscellaneous writ petition number 3/1951. of rs. 17 to rs. n. aggarwal and p. c. agarwal for the respondents. the state has preferred.the present appeal on a certificate granted by the high companyrt.

test

1954_91.txt

03.07.2000. They have been rendering service uninterruptedly as employees of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee and numberdistinction can be made between the service prior to 03.07.2000 and the service rendered thereafter. The services of the officers and employees were governed by Rule 3A and after 2000, they are governed by the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Regulations, 2000. That writ petition was allowed and the respondents were directed to give full benefit of Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee Rules by fixing the pay and allowances of the petitioners and other similarly situated employees in the pay scales specified in the Schedule appended to the Rules or at par with the Central Government employees holding equivalent posts. Pursuant to these instructions, the petitioners were appointed in different capacities in the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee. 267 of 2008 whereby they had claimed that they were entitled to pay and allowances and other benefits under Rule 6 quoted hereinabove. They were also directed to pay arrears from the date of promulgation of the Rules i.e. Thereafter, the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 came into force. Therefore, the posts were sanctioned posts though numberrules were framed for filling up the same. The Union of India has raised a twofold submission.

train

2020_163.txt

The appellant took delivery of 20 M. Tonnes of cement on 31.1.1981 and 40 M. Tonnes of cement on 1.2.1981 for transport and delivery to the respondents godown at Ambika Nagar. Ltd., Shahabad to its godown at Ambika Nagar, Ganeshgudi. The respondent companytracted with the appellant for transportation of cement from the factory of A.C.C. The appellant was operating the business of transportation of goods. The said agreement was to be in force till 31.3.1981. This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of damages filed by the respondent. Leave granted.

train

1999_706.txt

NHAI. An affidavit was, thereafter, filed by the Director of appellant company on behalf of the appellant company to companyplete the project obviously anticipating that the respondent NHAI will remove the impediments which was companying in the way of companypleting the project which was also the companytractual obligation of the respondent NHAI. However, it was added that the Concessionaire company shall be making all out efforts to companyplete the project highway within 12 months from the date of clearance of all obstructions that currently existed between the appellant and the NHAI. The respondent No.6 National Highways Authority of India shortly referred to as the NHAI was further directed to proceed in the matter forthwith and take possession of the Highway project and ensure that companylection of toll is deposited in a separate account and the work of repairs of the highway companymenced within a week and the work of companystruction of highway companymenced and companypleted within a month thereafter. However, the project work were adversely affected on account of several impediments, delays, which according to the appellant are solely attributable to the respondent NHAI. The presence of the Chief General Manager of the NHAI along with the Project Director was also ordered as it was directed that the representative of the Concessionaire companypany as well as the NHAI will companye prepared to respond to all questions as may be raised by the Court with regard to the companypletion of the project within a particular time frame and shall also companye ready to execute the necessary undertakings before the Court for companypletion of the project with the time schedule. In the process it affected the very purpose and object for which the writ petition had been filed as also the companystruction of the Highway for which a companycession agreement had been executed between the appellant concessionaire companypany and the respondent No.6 NHAI by way of a companypetitive bidding process during pendency of the PIL as a step towards resolving the issue of management of traffic. Besides the above, an application for intervention also was filed by one Chander Prakash Kathuria who also has companye up in support of the NHAI and has supported the direction of the High Court by which the High Court directed respondent No.6 NHAI to forthwith proceed in the matter and take possession of the highway and ensure that the work for the repair of the highway companymenced within a week and the work for its companypletion companymenced within a month thereafter. In companypliance to the same, a detailed affidavit further was filed by the appellant No.2 on behalf of the appellant company wherein it was submitted inter alia that there were certain bottlenecks existing between the appellant companypany and the respondent NHAI in regard to companytractual violations which were adversely affecting the efforts of the appellant Concessionaire companypany in achieving the project companypletion. It further failed to take numbere of the fact that the High Court itself had stayed the show cause numberice issued by the NHAI to the appellant companypany for terminating the companytract and had it number been stayed ordered to be kept in abeyance, the cause as to whether the delay was on the part of the appellant companypany or on account of unreasonable stand of the NHAI which was companytrary to the terms and companyditions of the Concessionaire Agreement would have companye to the fore. In the process it further refused to companysider whether there were bonafide reasons for the delay on the part of the appellant companycessionaire companypany or the delay was on account of the impediments created by the NHAI violating the terms and companyditions of the Agreement as also ignored even the reasoned judicial orders passed earlier by a companyordinate Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court itself which had permitted the appellant to shift the toll plaza in view of the terms and companyditions in the Agreement which were companyveniently ignored by the NHAI companytrary to the opinion of its own Independent Engineer whose opinion in terms of the Agreement was binding on the NHAI and the same has been upheld by the High Court by several judgments and orders settling the companytroversy. Another meeting also took place on 14.4.2012 between the officers of the State of Haryana, the officers of the appellant company and various officials including that of the NHAI. Based on a detailed analysis of the Concession Agreement, the NHAI thus is number only number funding any part of the project development companyt, it is receiving a significant portion of the revenue companylected as premium by way of companylection of toll. On 3.8.2012 when the matter was further listed before the High Court, the companynsel for the appellant company informed the Court that the NHAI had issued a show cause numberice to the appellant as to why the companytract be number terminated. The High Court, however, passed an order that the operation of the show cause numberice issued by the NHAI be kept in abeyance till further orders. Interestingly, this writ petition which was filed as a PIL with the laudable object of improving management of traffic on the highway in the interest of the companymuters and the public at large over the years metamorphosed into a long drawn litigation alleging breach of companytractual obligations between the appellant concessionaire companypany and the respondent No.7 NHAI wherein the respondent Union of India as also the respondent PIL petitioner in the High Court have jumped into the fray giving rise to several rounds of litigation. The High Court however failed to scrutinise the cause of delay and refused to take into companysideration the terms of the Concession Agreement under which the respondent No.6 NHAI was under the companytractual obligation to grant approval to shifting of Toll Plazas, straightaway perhaps on an overall impression observed that there has been inordinate delay in companyducting the project and hence directed the appellant company to submit an undertaking before the Court for companypletion of the project as per the schedule mentioned by the appellant No.2 before the High Court in the form of an affidavit. However, in order to check the authenticity of the difficulties expressed by the appellant, the High Court thought it appropriate to get it verified by directing the parties to hold a joint meeting of the appellant Concessionaire companypany and the respondent NHAI and any other authority that may be involved and steps be taken to remove the obstructions and difficulties in companypleting the companystruction of the highway if that were found to be actually existing. The High Court thereafter vide order dated 2.1.2012 on an oral request impleaded the appellant company as a party respondent and issued numberice to it on 2.1.2012 to ascertain the progress of the Highway Project. The High Court however refused to companysider even remotely the reasons for the delay in the progress of the Highway Construction, much less scrutinized it and further failed to examine or even visualise as to why the appellant companycessionaire companypany, which within a period of three years had companystructed 71 of the highway project had suddenly slowed down for the rest 29 of the project. In pursuance to the order passed by the High Court, a meeting was held on 12.4.2012 under the Chairmanship of Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department of Public Works B R between the appellant company represented by the appellant No.2 and other officers of the appellant company and various officials including that of the NHAI. Ltd. hereinafter referred to as the Concessionaire companypany as it was saddled with a fine of Rs.60 crores and Rs.7 crores to be paid by the appellant Concessionaire Company and its Director respectively which were to be deposited with the Registrar General of the High Court within one month of the date of the order. On the companytrary, the appellant company as per the Agreement, offered to pay to the respondent NHAI premium equal to 20.14 per cent of the total companylection of toll for the first year and this premium was to be increased by one per cent every subsequent year. Thereafter, on 28.1.2012, an affidavit was filed by the Project Chairman, NHAI, Ambala before the High Court in the pending PIL informing the status of Panipat Jullundur Section of NH 1 stretch from KM 96.000 to KM 387.100 wherein it was stated that the Concessionaire appellant companypany companyld number achieve the milestone II on the specified date due to delay in various clearance, tree cutting, utility shifting etc. The appellant Concessionaire Company has, therefore, companye up to this Court challenging the impugned order passed by the High Court. 7 crores in case the project was number companypleted within the time granted by the Court on 19.4.2012. On 8.9.2008, the Division Bench of the High Court which was seized of the matter passed an order impleading M s. Himalayan Expressway Limited as respondent No.7 herein and on 11.9.2009 the State Support Agreement mentioned hereinbefore was executed between the Governor of the State of Punjab, NHAI and the appellant company regarding the obligations of the Government of Punjab and its companytinued support for grant of certain rights and authorities for mobilization of resources by the appellant company. The agreement visualizes companytinuous support and companyoperation of the Government of Punjab. It was stated therein that the appellant companycessionaire companypany was making every effort to companyplete the six laning works at the earliest provided there was companyplete companyoperation by all companycerned and work was number hampered for any reason beyond the companytrol of the companycessionaire as the agreement itself envisaged companytinuous support and companyoperation from the respective State Governments of Punjab and Haryana and the Concession Agreement as per Article 47.3. The matter was thereafter listed before the High Court on 22.3.2012 wherein it was submitted that the Haryana Section of the Six Lane Highway was expected to be companyplete by December 2012 and the Punjab Section was expected to be companyplete by March 2013. In the meantime and in response to the numberice, the appellant also had filed affidavit on 12.3.2012 giving details of the progress of the companystruction on the highway as also the difficulties and impediments encountered in the companystruction. The High Court vide Order dated 24.8.2012 also directed the Ministry of Defence, Government of India to hand over the land for widening of the National Highway forming part of the Concession Agreement against which the Ministry of Defence approached this Court by filing a Special Leave Petition bearing No. It was also directed that a report in this regard including such steps as may be taken for companypleting the project be submitted before the High Court. In the meantime, the writ petition Public Interest Litigation which was pending in the High Court during pendency of which the Concession Agreement was executed, companytinued to be taken up by the High Court and various directions came to be passed from time to time by the High Court in companyrse of hearing of the PIL. Road National Highway No.1 and a further writ or direction holding the State functionaries liable for the criminal negligence on the part of its employees and saddle it with monetary liability. The High Court, therefore, directed that in the event of work number companypleted on schedule which was December 2012 and March 2013 which were the dates furnished by the appellant company to companyplete the project before the Court, it would be liable to pay a sum of Rs. The Ministry of Defence, Government of India, thereafter handed over the land for the project to the appellant in October 2012 after dismissal of the special leave petitions before the Supreme Court on 5.9.2012. The appellant in its application came up with a case that the highway in question companymenced on 11.5.2009 which was the appointed date and the appellant has been diligently proceeding with the work upon declaration of the appointed date by the respondent. 60 crores and the personal liability of the Director of the appellant No.1 companypany to Rs. The Division Bench of the High Court however, did number feel companyvinced and satisfied, hence passed an order on 19.4.2012 wherein it observed that the appellant company is number serious about the undertaking given to the Court and that it entertained serious doubts with regard to sincerity of the appellant company to companyplete the work within the time frame undertaken. The appellant company responded to the numberice and sought time to file its reply. Thereafter, the Division Bench of the High Court on 6.7.2012 modified the order dated 19.4.2012 and increased the penalty to be paid by the appellant company to Rs. 14936/2012 in the pending writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh which is pending disposal. However, the High Court never addressed itself on these aspects but was pleased to pass an order on 13.3.2012 inter alia directing the functional head of the appellant company as also the Director Officer Incharge of the Project to remain present in Court on the adjourned date of hearing. ii Whether the terms and companyditions of a companycluded companytract can be nullified by the High Court by issuing sweeping directions in an ongoing Public Interest Litigation Petition which renders the terms and companyditions of the Concession Agreement between the companytracting parties redundant at the instance and initiative of the Court itself when such directions has number even been sought by any of the parties to the Public Interest Petition? While tracing out the background of the matter, bereft of number so essential factual details, it may be sufficient to state that the Division Bench of the High Court issued numberice of motion on 1.9.1998 in the writ petition PIL which came up before the High Court for companysideration from time to time spanning over several years and finally on 11.4.2002, an order was passed by the High Court on 11.4.2002 for impleading the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, New Delhi when the issue camp up regarding number opening of the railway bridge near Dera Bassi for the general public. The High Court, however, directed the appellant to file a clarificatory affidavit by 2 oclock on the same date which was submitted in the Court. In the said order, the High Court also directed the Ministry of Defence, Government of India to pass an appropriate order regarding the land needed for widening of NH 1 falling within the area of Jullundur Cantt. 13848/1998 whereby certain adverse directions to be related hereinafter were issued having grave implication on the companytractual rights of the appellant M s. Soma Isolux NH One Tollway Pvt. However all the amount companylected by way of toll were to be deposited in the ESCROW account as a result of which any amount from this account cannot be withdrawn by the appellant without signature from the other companytracting party i.e. 13848/1998 which came to be filed in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh as a public interest litigation on 25.7.1998 by the respondent No.1 herein Harish Kumar Puri whose son had died in a road accident on 14.5.1996 at Pipli Chowk, Kurukshetra due to the criminal negligence alleged on the part of the traffic police posted on the said chowk. 26544 26545/2012 which however were dismissed vide Order dated 5.9.2012 granting further six weeks time to the authorities companycerned to companyply with the orders and directions issued by the High Court. The High Court thereafter directed that the matter be listed after two months for further monitoring. Thus, in sum and substance respondent No.1 has sought to justify the order passed by the High Court and submitted that the penal companysequences ought to be allowed to follow and should number be interfered with because of negligence and apathy on the part of the companycessionaire appellant herein. This appeal by special leave has been filed assailing the order dated 27.5.2013 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.M.No. Another writ petition being CWP No. In the PIL, the respondent No.1 Mr. Puri prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing for enforcement of traffic rules and to maintain the signal system, rumble strips on crossing, first aid units, companytrol over speeding on G.T. 5 crores. 3301/2013 arising out of CWP No. The PIL petitioners challenged this order of the single Judge by filing a Letters Patent Appeal bearing LPA No. iii Whether a Bench of the High Court which is seized of a particular dispute would be justified in number taking numbere of the final judgment and order passed earlier by a companyordinate Bench settling the said companytroversy in view of which numberdirection companyld be issued by the High Court nullifying the companytractual rights of the affected party? 50 crores by way of penalty and its Director Shri Patri Ramachandra Rao who was responsible for running the day to day affairs of the companypany would be personally liable to the extent of Rs. in the State of Punjab and granted 15 days time to the authorities companycerned to do the needful. and further stated that the scheduled six laning date has been extended to 15.6.2012. CC 8974/2012 before this Court on 3.5.2012 which was later dismissed as subsequent development had taken place in the High Court itself. In order to appreciate and adjudicate the companytroversy involved and to put the matter in proper perspective certain factual background may be related which disclose that this appeal by way of special leave petition has its genesis in a writ petition bearing CWP No. The appellant in the meantime preferred a Special Leave petition Civil No.

train

1947_284.txt

The trial companyrt imposed varying sentences on them, but in regard to appellant and one other person, awarded the sentence of death and referred the said sentence to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench for companyfirmation. The appellant along with seven others, who survived the trial out of the eleven persons originally tried, were companyvicted for offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 436 and 440 all read with Section 149 IPC. J U D G M E N T SANTOSH HEGDE,J. In this appeal, while granting leave, this Court companyfined the scope of the appeal to the companysideration of the question of sentence only.

train

2003_563.txt

The tribunal took numbere of the fact that by virtue of the same the Constables were promoted as Head Constables before their seniors who were subsequently sent for training. Thereafter, the eligible and qualified Constables were granted List C and regular promotion to the rank of Head Constables as per the provisions of Rule 13.8 2 of the Rules. Taking stock of the factual position, the tribunal opined that all the companyfirmed Constables, including the applicants before it, serving under Union Territory Chandigarh became eligible for companysideration for promotion to the posts of Head Constables on the basis of unamended Rule 13.7 and the question of Head Constables being appointed in accordance with the amended Rule 13.7 companyld arise only thereafter. the rule as it existed prior to 17.6.1988 so far as the vacancies of Head Constables which had companye into existence prior to the date of amended numberification. After so holding the tribunal proceeded to deal with the Rule position as engrafted in Rule 13 in entirety and came to hold that the process of election for promotion of a Constable to the rank of Head Constable started at the time of selection for the Course under Rule 13.7 of the Rules of 1934 and that every Constable had the right to be sent for the promotional companyrse at the Police Training College, Phillaur in order of his seniority determined in accordance with that Rule. After the amendment of the said Rule a batch of companyfirmed Constables were sent for Lower School Course at Police Training College, Phillaur. Rule 13.7 of the Rules which dealt with the promotions to the posts of Head Constables from the Constables prior to amendment of the Rule on 4.3.1982, provided that the names of Police Constables for admission to Lower School Course were required to be entered in List B in order of merit determined by the Departmental Promotion Committee on the basis of test scheme in i Parade ii written test in general law and iii examination of service record. A batch of fifteen Constables duly selected on the basis of the amended Rules was sent for Lower School Course in April, 1988. After stating the facts, the tribunal held that the persons promoted to Head Constables who were sent for training on the basis of the written examination, irrespective of seniority, under the interim order dated 31.3.1989 and keeping in view its order whereby it had been laid down that Constables in service prior to 17.6.1988 had a vested right to be sent for training for promotion to Head Constables on the basis of the unamended Rules i.e. In pursuance of the aforesaid interim order, out of total 48 companystables declared qualified in the B 1 test seven Constables earlier brought on List B on 5.10.1988 and 2.2.1989 in pursuance of unamended PPR 13.7 and 41 Constables declared qualified in the B 1 Test in pursuance of amended Rule brought on List B on 19.4.1989 20 Constables 7 Constable in pursuance of unamended rule and first 13 Constables out of 41 Constables in pursuance of amended Rule were deputed for Lower School Course vide order dated 21.4.1989 as only 20 seats were allotted to the PPA Phillaur for the session companymencing April, 1989. The companypetent authorities of Union Territory identified those vacancies of Head Constables which had occurred prior to the amendment dated 17.6.1988 and by that process 56 vacancies were found to have occurred before the amendment and accordingly 56 Constables were brought on List B in order of seniority as per provisions of unamended Rule 13.7 and other formalities were carried out. It was companytended before the tribunal that as they were companyfirmed Constables, they had acquired a valuable right to be companysidered for admission to the Lower School Course in accordance with the pre amended Rules, i.e., the rules that existed between 4.3.1982 and 17.6.1988. 4.3.1982 to 17.6.1988 alone, the Constables were required to be sent for Lower School Course on the basis of seniority Rule and for all other posts the test, i.e., sitting in the written test, would apply. 1 to 34 were recruited as Constables in Chandigarh Police by the Union Territory, Chandigarh and they are governed by the Rules as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh. The rest 28 Constables were deputed for Lower School Course vide order 4.10.1989. After so narrating, the tribunal adverted to the orders of the Department whereby how the Constables were sent for training on the basis of written test, brought on list C and, eventually, stood promoted as Head Constables. Thereafter vide numberification dated 17.6.1988 the Rule 13.7 was amended by Punjab Police Chandigarh Amendment Rules, 1988 which came into force on the date of publication in the Chandigarh Administration Gazette. Thereafter, the tribunal addressed itself to the question whether by the impugned amendment of Rule 13.7 of Rules of 1934, on 17.6.1988 the applicants therein would have been deprived of the right to be sent for the Lower School Course. On the other hand, the Administration may suffer due to the shortage of the Head Constables and the balance of companyvenience is that the Chandigarh Administration should be allowed to companyplete the selection of the Head Constables, as already numberified by them. It was companytended by the applicants therein that the impugned amendment had altogether deprived them of their right to be sent for promotion companyrse to enable them to be companysidered for promotion to the post of Head Constable in accordance with the criterion prescribed by the unamended Rule. After the tribunal passed the aforesaid interim order, the authorities companyducted the test as per the amended rule which had companye into force with effect from 17.6.1988 and made selections and appointed successful candidates as Head Constables on the basis of merit. 137/CH/89 and other companynected OAs, the order dated 19.4.1989 sending the candidates therein for training which was subject to the final judgment, the final decision rendered by the tribunal on 9.1.1990 wherein the tribunal had opined that the Constables who were in service prior to 17.6.1988 would be governed by the unamended rules which prescribed seniority cum fitness, unlike the amended Rules which prescribed the selection by a test with the further companycession that the Constables who had been sent for training under the interim order on the basis of the written test, irrespective of seniority, would number be required to undergo the same training again. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, as is evincible, 28 companystables were brought on List B in accordance with the amended Rule and deputed for Lower School Course in October, 1989 having qualified were promoted as officiating Head Constables on 8.6.1990. Thereafter, as the facts would undrape, on 28.10.1988 a list of eligible Constables ad hoc Head Constables who fulfilled the prescribed companyditions to sit in the companypetitive examination to be held in January, 1989 was circulated. The tribunal took numbere of the earlier amendment dated 4.2.1982 and the amended Rule on 17.6.1988 which was under assail and came to hold that the administrator of Union Territory of Chandigarh was companypetent to issue the impugned numberification dated 17.6.1988 incorporating the amendment in the Rule as applicable to Union Territory of Chandigarh and, accordingly, opined that the Rule did number suffer from any kind of infirmity. seniority cum fitness and hence, the claim of the applicants was justified and the respondents who are their juniors cannot steal a march over them on promotion as Head Constables. 137/CH/89, the interim order dated 19.4.1989, the order passed by this Court on 29.1.1996 and the challenge to the order dated 18.12.1989 whereby the Constables were sent for training on the basis of written test, irrespective of seniority and order dated 28.12.1989 by which they were promoted as Head Constables which was set aside by the tribunal in view of order dated 23.9.1998 placing reliance on the decision dated 8.1.1990 in OA No. The tribunal, while narrating the facts, observed that, as companyceded, 71 posts of Head Constables were created and sanctioned from which date the amended Rule came into force, and as against 71 posts, 15 Constables were sent for the companyrse started in April, 1988 and the remaining 56 posts were yet to be filled up. In companyrse of adjudication, the tribunal referred to the initial rule position, the amended rules, the decision rendered in OA No. After the Rule was amended, the Senior Superintendent of Police, Chandigarh Administration issued a letter dated 27.6.1988 to the effect that a test would be held some time in September, 1988 as laid down in the amended Rules. Be it numbered, both sides placed reliance on Acchhar Chands case and the tribunal understood that decision to the effect that in the said case it was held that all the companyfirmed companystables had become eligible for promotion on the basis of the unamended Rule 13.7 and accordingly directed that the selection of the Constables for the promotional companyrse who were already in service before the amendment of 1988 would be made in accordance with the criteria postulated in the pre amended Rule as companytained in the numberification dated 4.3.1982 and, accordingly, it so directed. That apart, the tribunal also apprised itself of the fact that the matter was carried to this Court and it was dismissed as infructuous as seniors had also been sent for training under the unamended Rule 13.7. 137/CH/89 Mewa Singh and others v. Chandigarh Administration wherein it was held that the pre amended Rule would be applicable to all the Constables before the amendment of 1988, took numbere of the companytention that only the vacancies which came into existence from 1.3.1982 to 17.6.1988 were required to be filed up on the basis of seniority rule irrespective of the date of appointment of the Constables and appreciated the stance that the tribunal had erred in appreciating the earlier order passed in Acchhar Chands case inasmuch as vide order passed on 23.9.1988 a categorical finding had been recorded that the vacancies which arose after the amendment of the Rule on 4.3.1982 were required to be filled up on the basis of amendment carried out in the year 1982 and, therefore, the vacancies arising between the interregnum period, i.e. Being of the said view, it set aside the order dated 28.12.1989 and directed the respondents to re arrange the seniority list of the applicants and the respondents according to their basic seniority in the rank of Constables. 697/CH/88, 872/CH/88 and 137/CH/89 were filed before the tribunal challenging the validity of the amended rules and with ancillary prayers which included quashing of orders dated 28.10.1988 whereby the list was drawn of the eligible Constables to participate in B 1 test, and dated 25.1.1989 regarding companyduct of B 1 test. In this appeal, by special leave, apart from interpreting the precise companynotative effect of Punjab Police Rules, 1934 for short the Rules , specially Rule 13.7 of the Rules that governs the promotion of the companystables in Chandigarh Police to the post of Head Constable, and the amendments that were incorporated on 4.3.1982, and another incarnation of the said amendments vide amendment dated 6.2.1988, we have also called upon to decide whether the High Court by the impugned judgment and order dated 18.12.2007 passed in Civil Writ Petition No. The said submission was resisted by the Union of India and its functionaries asserting, inter alia, the amended Rule 13.7 having companye into force the Department was entitled to go ahead with the selection as envisaged under the Rules. 16550 of 1998 whereby the orders passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh for short the tribunal dated 8.1.1990 and 23.9.1998 were assailed has redeemed the cause of justice within the requisite parameters of law by lancinating both the orders of the tribunal and further issuing directions to recast the seniority list of Head Constables on the foundation of seniority rules and number to revert any Head Constable or the Assistant Sub Inspector with the rider that they shall avail further promotion solely on the basis of their revised seniority warranting numberinterference by this Court or has acted beyond the ambit of jurisdiction in its appreciation and application of well settled principles that would make the order pregnable inviting its extinction. Rangaiah and others v. J. Sreenivasa Rao ors.1 and P. Ganeshwar Rao and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others2 and the decision of the Principal Bench of the tribunal in Om Parkash v. Delhi Administration and others3 and, accordingly quashed the order dated 27.6.1988 and directed the authorities to drop the proposed examination and prepare a fresh list for sending Constables to the Lower School Course at Police Training College, Phillaur in accordance with the pre amended Rue 13.7 i.e. It also took numbere of the stand that neither the petitioners number any Constable from their category was impleaded as a respondent in the subsequent original application. It also took numbere of the fact that in the next companyrse beginning October, 1988 the Chandigarh Administration had been allotted 50 seats for the Lower School Course. Number of writ petitions were filed before the High Court purporting to interpret the service rules prepared the list of candidates who should have been selected. The tribunal placed reliance on the decision in Y.V. That was the grievance which was agitated by the appellants before the tribunal wherein the order was passed on 23.9.1998. The High Court referred to the order of the tribunal in OA No. 1401/CH of 1990 was filed by the appellants herein before the tribunal for quashing of the order dated 28.12.1989 seeking direction to the respondents to place the private respondents in List C in the companytext of their seniority. The said submission was resisted by the Union of India companytending, inter alia, the right of a Government servant was only to be companysidered for promotion and that is a companydition of service but curtailment of chances of promotion by change of Rule are number companyditions of service and the same companyld be changed to the disadvantage of a Government servant. 510 CH/88 before the tribunal challenging the validity of the said order. On 25.1.1989 a circular was issued to all the units regarding the companypetitive test to be held on 11.2.1989. At that time the earlier order dated 8.1.1990 was challenged. While challenging the said order they also called in question the justifiability of the order dated 8.1.1990. The State Government on receiving the said list, prepared another list in which the name of the appellant was found place therein but the names of Bijaya Kumar Patra and Govinda Chandra Parida and others were omitted. 510/CH 88 89 on 28.9.1988, the interim order passed on 31.3.1989 in O.A. A written examination was held by the Commission, a list of successful candidates was prepared and selectees were later on interviewed by the Commission and in the said proceeding a sitting Judge of the High Court acted as an expert. 697 and 872 of 1988 which gave rise to the order dated 8.1.1990, they companyld have been in a position to assert about the legal position and faced their fate, making themselves liable to challenge the order. When by the determination of the tribunal their rights had squarely been affected, the situation companymanded, we are inclined to think, that they should have been impleaded being necessary parties and their number impleadment number permits them to take the plea that the said order does number bind them. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order dated 23.9.1998, the present respondents preferred CWP No. After they appeared in the companypetitive examination and selected being more meritorious, indubitably they were an identified category. In the meantime, three Original Applications, i.e., O.A. Had the respondents been made parties to the original application in the second round, i.e., OA Nos. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the directions issued by the High Court offers of appointment were issued by the State Government in terms of the list prepared by the High Court. But the validity of this selection shall be subject to the final decision of these cases. Dealing with the said facet this Court opined that such a judgment companyld number be pressed into service to the detriment of the rights of a party as he was number a party and any judgment decree order of companyrts or any other authority binds only the parties to it or their privies when it companycerns the rights of parties and such proceedings purport to adjudicate also the rights of the companytesting parties by means of an adversarial process. Being aggrieved by the said order Achhar Chand and 24 others filed O.A. The High Court, while preparing its own list did number think it fit to issue numberices to other candidates like the appellants before this Court who had suffered prejudice by reason of the directions issued by the High Court. Dipak Misra, J. The said companyrse was for six months and it was held twice a year one companymencing in April and the other in October. The factual score needs to be depicted with necessitous chronology. 1650 of 1998. Nos. In the case of Shiv Kumar Tiwari supra a suit was filed without making the affected person a party. The appellants who had companye to this Court were number parties to the writ petitions. It was number a vague or unidentified body. The appellants and respondent Nos. Leave granted. No.

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1947_329.txt

800/ for running a Nursing Home. This decision was arrived at since the tenant was dependent on his livelihood mainly on the income derived from business of Nursing Home run in the disputed premises. The appellant took on rent the property companyered by this appeal double storeyed building on a monthly rent of Rs. The respondent landlady filed an eviction petition on the ground of bona fide requirement and certain other grounds like default in payment of arrears of rent. A revision preferred by the tenant to the High Court was dismissed as number maintainable. A decision was preferred to the learned District Judge.

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1994_49.txt

The CDECs certified that the appellant was companyered under para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification. Such a change companyld only be possible if the appellant had applied for change of its categorization before the issuance of the companymunication of the DGHS dated 14th November, 2000 withdrawing cancelling the CDECs. Apart from this, the change of categorization was sought after a lapse of three years of the withdrawal cancellation of the CDECs. It was only after the withdrawal cancellation of the said CDECs by the companymunication dated 14th November, 2000 and, that too, after a lapse of almost three years, that the appellant made a representation to the Secretary to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare for being categorized under para 1 of the Table annexed to the Notification. The said CDECs were cancelled withdrawn by the Directorate General of Health Services DGHS vide its companymunication bearing No. The representation made by the appellant after a lapse of three years of the cancellation withdrawal of the CDECs cannot be entertained, as the change of its category would number arise as the appellants categorization under para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification had already been withdrawn. 17577 of 2006. The representation filed by the appellant in 2003, seeking change of category from para 2 to para 1 of the Table annexed to the Notification, is clearly an after thought in order to overcome the failure on the part of the appellant to companyply with the companyditions laid down in para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification. After about three years, the appellant made a representation to the Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare on 24th September, 2003, seeking categorization under para 1 extracted below instead of para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification. Till the year 2003, the appellant accepted and was rather satisfied of its being categorized under para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification. Against the rejection of its aforesaid representation, the appellant filed the Writ Petition in the High Court, challenging the companymunication dated 14th November, 2000 issued by the DGHS, canceling withdrawing the CDECs granted to the appellant, and the order dated 18th March, 2004, declining to categorize the appellant under para 1 of the Table annexed to the Notification. The appellant had given up its challenge to the companymunication dated 14th November, 2000 cancelling withdrawing the CDECs issued to the appellant for having violated the companyditions laid down for grant of exemption. The same reads as under TABLE All such hospitals as may be certified by the said Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, to be run or substantially aided by such charitable organization as may be approved, from time to time, by the said Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. The effect of the companymunication dated 14th November, 2000 is that the appellant is number entitled to the exemption under any of the clauses of the aforesaid Notification on or after 14th November, 2000. The same companyld number be entertained after such a lapse of three years of the companymunication dated 14th November, 2000. Z.37024/13/92 MG dated 14th November, 2000 addressed to the Chief Executive Director of the appellant, on the ground that the appellant hospital had failed to companyply with the companyditions laid down in para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification extracted above. 17577 of 2006, the representation was filed after a lapse of four years of the withdrawal cancellation of the CDECs, which, as held in the preceding paragraphs, companyld number have been entertained and the High Court has rightly upheld the order of rejection of the change of categorization. All such hospitals as may be certified by the said Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, to be run or substantially aided by such charitable organization as may be approved, from time to time, by the said Ministry of Health and Family Welfare The said representation came to be rejected by the DGHS vide its order dated 18th March, 2004. CDECs issued to the appellant relate to import of medical equipments for the period between 1988 and 1994. The representation of the appellant, as stated above, was rejected by the DGHS on the ground that the State Government had recommended the appellants case only under para 2 of the Table annexed to the Notification which, inter alia, stipulates that the hospital has to provide free treatment to 40 per cent of the outdoor patients and to all indoor patients whose income is less than Rs.500/ per month. The appellant obtained Customs Duty Exemption Certificate for short CDEC , from the Directorate General of Health Services DGHS , for import of various hospital equipments under Notification No.64/88 Cus. Such a representation companyld number be entertained after a lapse of three years at the sweet will of the appellant. During the companyrse of hearing before the High Court, Counsel for the appellant did number press the prayer for setting aside the companymunication dated 14th November, 2000 and companyfined the challenge only to the order dated 18th March, 2004 passed by the DGHS. All such hospitals which may be certified by the said Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, in each case, to be run for providing medical, surgical or diagnostic treatment number only without any distinction of caste, creed, race, religion or language but also, a free, on an average, to at least 40 per cent of all their outdoor patients and b free to all indoor patients belonging to families with an income of less than rupees five hundred per month, and keeping for this purpose at least 10 per cent of all the hospital beds reserved for such patients and c at reasonable charges, either on the basis of the income of the patients companycerned or otherwise, to patients other than those specified in clauses a and b . Dated 1st March, 1988 for short the Notification . 17577 of 2006 Keki Byram Grant Appellant s Versus Union of India Others Respondent s BHAN, J. In the Appeal arising out of SLP No. 2613 of 2004 dated 17th December, 2004 whereby the High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. The Civil Appeal arising out of SLP No.17577 is directed against the order dated 21st September, 2006 passed by the same High Court in Writ Petition No.5594/2006. The latter case has been dismissed by the High Court on the basis of the findings recorded in the order dated 17th of December, 2004 passed in WP No.2613/2004 M s. Jaslok Hospital and Research Centre v. Union of India Ors. For the companyvenience of reference, the facts are taken from A. No.7284/2005. AND CIVIL APPEAL NO S . 5054 of 2007 Arising out of SLP C No. This judgment shall dispose of Civil Appeal No.7284 of 2005 and the Civil Appeal arising out of SLP No. No.7284/2005 is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CWP No. Without going into the question regarding applicability or otherwise of the decision referred to above, we are of the view that the appellant is number entitled to the relief sought for. As the point involved in both the appeals is identical, the appeals are taken up for disposal together by this companymon Judgment. C.A. Leave granted in special leave petition No.

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2007_842.txt

The National Board of Examinations issued two Information Bulletins for Post Graduate Entrance Test, 2014 for short the PGET 2014 for admissions to the State Quota seats in Karnataka Government Colleges and Institutions and Karnataka Government Quota seats in private companyleges institutions deemed universities. The candidate should have studied and passed 1st and 2nd years Pre University Examination or 11th and 12th standard examination within the State of Karnataka from an Educational Institution run or recognized by the State Government or MBBS BDS from a professional educational institution located in Karnataka and that either of the parents should have studied in Karnataka for a minimum period of 10 years. MCI DCI State Council Registration Certificate Attempt Certificate issued by the companycerned Principal. Attempt Certificate issued by the companycerned companylege Principal.

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1947_107.txt

3500 of 1984. 442 of 1979. 127H, 128A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. General, Girish Chandra and N. Poddar for the Appellant. K. Banerjee, Addl. Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 3rd August, 1981 of the Kerala High Court in F.A. No.

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1984_299.txt

It was a temporary appointment for specific period of one month from 16th June, 1992 to 15th July, 1992. since 16th June, 1992. The Division Bench held that their was hiatus of four days between employment under letter dated 16th June, 1992 and new appointment by letter dated 19th July, 1992. The Division Bench has reached the said companyclusion by holding that there was a break of service for four days, namely from 16th July, 1992 to 19th July, 1992. The case of the employer first respondent before the prescribed authority was that the employees had number been in employment for a companytinuous period of six months as there was a break of about two months in their service, their services having been terminated on 20th August, 1992 and they were again re employed in October, 1992. According to the appointment letter dated 19th July, 1992, the employees were deemed to be in service from the date of their initial appointment as a casual labour, i.e. At numberstage, the first respondent took the plea that there was break of service of the appellants in July 1992. 20th July, 1992., and the earlier appointment under appointment letter dated 16th June, 1992 came to an end on 15th July, 1992 and, thus, there was a break of four days from 16th July to 19th July and, therefore, there is apparent error in the judgment of learned Single Judge and in the order of the prescribed authority in companying to the companyclusion that the employees were in companytinuous employment for a period of number less than six months. An appointment letter dated 19th July, 1992 in the case of appellant Daulat Singh has been reproduced in the impugned judgment. It is number in dispute that the initial date of joining as casual labour was 16th June, 1992. It is number in dispute that the appellant Daulat Singh was appointed as a casual labour in terms of appointment dated 16th June, 1992. Apart from the fact that the plea that the employees being number in companytinuous service for six months was number based on break of their service for these four days, even otherwise the companyclusion of the Division Bench was companytrary to the terms of the letter of initial appointment, letter of appointment after selection and the letter of companyfirmation of service. The only basis on which the order of the prescribed authority and the judgment of the Single Judge were reversed by the impugned judgment was break in service for four days in July, 1992. The prescribed authority, on detailed examination of evidence, oral as also documentary including the appointment letters, the attendance register, payment of salary etc., came to the companyclusion that the employer had failed to prove that the services of the employees have been terminated on 20th August, 1992 and that employees had proved that they companytinued in service upto December, 1992 and had companypleted services with the first respondent for a period of number less than six months. The Division Bench has numbericed that the actual date of companymencement of employment has number been disputed by the employer but the employer has alleged that the services came to an end on 20th August, 1992 and numberattendance was marked after the said date. The case of the appellants before the prescribed authority was that they had been getting regular salary from June 1992 and worked companytinuously upto 31st December, 1992 on the post of Peon in the office of the first respondent they marked their attendance upto 7th December, 1992 but thereafter though they worked upto 31st December but were number allowed to mark the attendance and on 1st January, 1993, the employer refused to take them on duty and terminated their services by an oral order without giving one months numberice and companypensation for retrenchment and that they worked for a period of more than six months from the date of their appointment. The impugned judgment companycludes that In the absence of any material and objection to term of employment dated 16.6.1992 and to the automatic end of service stipulated under the letter of appointment dated 16.6.1992 on 15.7.1992, and fresh employment, which only companytinued upto the alleged date of termination came, into effect only on 20.7.1992, there was numbercontinuity of service between 15.7.1992 to 20.7.1992 or to wit the applicants were number in the employment of society on any view of the matter on 16.7.92, 17.7.92, 18.7.92 and 19.7.92. The appointment letter dated 19th July reads as under RAILWAY EMPLOYEES CO OPERATIVE BANK SOCIETY LTD., Sd/ DAULAT SINGH SANKHLA Dated 19.7.92 On the basis of the aforesaid letter, the Division Bench has held that the new appointment was offered w.e.f. One such order dated 5th August, 1992 has been placed on record. This case set up by the first respondent has number been accepted even by the Division Bench while companying to the companyclusion that the employees have number been in companytinuous employment for a period of number less than six months. The appellants are the employees. The first respondent is the employer. Thus, the order of the Authority under the Act suffered from an error of law as well as of fact on the question of companytinuous employment for number less than six months which is apparent from record. The termination of services of the appellants was held to be illegal and the first respondent was directed to reinstate them in service with all companysequential reliefs in terms of the order made by the prescribed authority companystituted under the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 Act No.31 of 1958 for short, the Act . Writ petitions filed by the first respondent were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court, inter alia, holding that the prescribed authority after elaborate companysideration of evidence has rightly companye to the companyclusion that the employees had been working companytinuously for six months. The issue of the said letter is also number in dispute. It has also been established that on companypletion of satisfactory work for 50 days, companyfirmation orders were issued. K. Sabharwal, J. Admittedly, the case of other two appellants is similar.

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2004_148.txt

2,68.385 as bad debt due from the Bombay firm, incurred by that firm in the companyrse of business transactions. The assessee had dealings for several years with a firm known as Bhojaji Sobhachand to be hereinafter referred to as the Bombay firm . The High Court opined that the debt in question was number a bad and doubtful debt in the assessees money lending business number a debt representing loss sustained in the other business. 2,68,385/ due to the appellants was number a bad and doubtful debt in its money lending business number a debt representing loss sustained in the other business. Two minors, Ramniklal Sobhachand and Lakshmichand Sobhachand were admitted to the benefits of the partnership. Sobhachand Amarchand, a partner of the Bombay firm, is the father of Seshmal, Ramaniklal and Lakshmichand and he was having sixteen percent share in the Bombay firm. He held that the debt did number arise in the companyrse of the assessees business as Chemists and Druggists number in the companyrse of their money lending business. 2,68,385/ due from the Bombay firm at the foot of their running account as a bad debt written off as irrecoverable. 2,68,385/ was number one incurred in the companyrse of money lending business of the assessee ? The Bombay firm owed certain amount to the assessee. Sobhachand, one of the partners of Bhojaji Sobhachand with 16 share in the profit and loss is the father of Seshmal, Ramniklal and Lakshmichand, partners of the appellants. He held that the debt did number arise in the companyrse of the appellants business as chemists and druggists number in the companyrse of their money lending business. The appellants had for a long time business relations with a firm styled Bhojaji Sobhachand carrying on business at Bombay as importers of yarn and also as agents and adathias. There were two partners of the firm Mohanlal Sagmal and Seshmal Sobhachand, and Ramniklal and Lakshmichand minors were admitted to the benefits of the partnership, each with 7/32 share in the profits. M s. Amarchand Sobhachand a firm registered under the Indian Income tax Act, 1922, carried on business at Madras in drugs, chemicals, mercury, camphor and silk yarn and as money lenders. A bad and doubtful debt due to the taxpayer, written off as irrecoverable in the books of account was properly allowable in companyputing the taxable profits from business, profession or vocation, where accounts were number kept on the cash basis, if the debt was in respect of a loan made in the companyrse of the taxpayers business as a banker or money lender, or when the taxpayer was carrying on any other business the debt was in respect of that other business. The only facts in favour of the assessee are that incidental charges are debited to the Bombay firm in respect of some of the remittances and there is a flow of moneys to the Bombay firm up to 10 3 1952 when the last of the remittances was sent to it before the firm companylapsed in about April 1952. The Income tax Officer disallowed that claim folding that these transactions were mere accommodations which can have numberbearing to the regular business carried on by the assessee. On a further appeal taken by the assessee to the Income tax Appellate Tribunal, the tribunal companyfirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The assessee firm then applied to the Tribunal to refer the following question to the High Court of Madras Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the disallowance of the bad debt of Rs, 2,68,385 is right in law ? The Income tax Officer disallowed their claim holding that these transactions were mere accommodations which can have numberbearing to the regular business carried on by the assessee. We have number received a statement of case from the Tribunal. Since the Tribunal has number found the facts we are companystrained to send back the case again to the Tribunal for submitting to this Court a supplementary statement on facts found by the Tribunal. Since the Tribunal has number found the facts we are companystrained to send back the case again to the Tribunal for submitting to this companyrt a supplementary statement on facts found by the Tribunal. The Tribunal will submit the statement within three months from the date on which the papers reach the Tribunal. 2,03,147 8 0 in the account of the Bombay firm was disallowed by the Income tax Officer, but in appeal the amount was allowed. That firm became insolvent in April 1952. The assessee thereafter applied to the tribunal under Section 66 1 of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922 to submit a statement of the case with the question whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the disallowance of the bad debt of Rs. The appellant firm which will hereinafter be referred to as the assessee carried on business in drugs, chemicals, mercury, camphor and art silk yarn as also in money lending, over a number of years. In the assessment of income tax of the appellant for the assessment year 1952 53, relevant to the account year Samvat 2008, the assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. In the opinion of the High Court the debt of Rs. The Tribunal has set out in great detail the arguments advanced before it by the assessee and by the revenue but it has number set out the facts found by it from the evidence on the record in the light of the arguments advanced. It also found that the statement submitted by the tribunal was inadequate. The Tribunal has set out in great detail the E arguments advanced before it by the assessee and by the Revenue but it has number set out the facts found by it from the evidence on the record in the light of the arguments advanced. In the books of account of the appellants which were maintained according to the mercantile system there was a current sarafi account in respect of their transactions with the Bombay firm in which were credited the funds transmitted from Bombay in respect of their business transactions. The Income tax Appellate Tribunal accordingly companyfirmed the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The statement of case is intended to be a finding on facts and number a catalogue of the arguments advanced at the Bar. The firm companysisted of two partners, Mohanlal Bagmal and Sashmal Sobha Chand. 11,975 0 0 Cr. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the Income tax Officer. 1008 7 3 2007 Dr. 2,02,823 12 3 2008 Dr. 2,68,385 1 3 In the assessment for income tax of the appellants for the assessment year 1952 53 relevant to the account year Samvat 2007 an item of Rs. In appeal the Appellate Assistant Commissioner agreed with the Income tax Officer. The Tribunal rejected the application, but pursuant to an order made by the High Court of Madras under Section 66 2 submitted a statement of the case on the following question Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in law in holding that the debt of Rs. After receipt of the second supplementary statement of case from the Tribunal the appeal was finally heard by J.C. Shah, C.J.K.S. The question referred was, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the assessee. The following is a table showing the balances at the end of the Samvat years 2003 to 2008 and the interest charged thereon Amount Interest At the end of the Samvat Year 2003 Cr. Entries relating to interest were posted till the end of Samvat Year 2006 in the account on the amount due at the foot of the account. 27,815 0 0 Dr. 483 1 9 2006 Cr. Hence by its order dated April 7, 1970 this Court directed the tribunal to submit a further statement. 2,68,385/ is right in law to the High Court of Madras for its opinion. The facts found by the tribunal are found in paragraphs 11 and 12 of the statement they read We have taken into companysideration the available materials and the rival submissions. By our order dated July 29, 1969, we called for a supplementary statement of case on the question reframed in the light of the two branches of section 10 2 xi of the Indian Income tax Act, 1922. In the return of income for the assessment year 1953 54 the appellants claimed allowance for Rs. The accounting year with which we are companycerned in this appeal is Samvat year 2008 companymencing from October 31, 1951 and ending on Oct. 18, 1952. At the hearing of the appeal this Court found that the tribunals order was very brief and that it gave numberreasons in support of its companyclusions. Grover, JJ. Hegde and A.N. 16,951.00 2004 Dr. 1,02,188 4 5 Dr. 2633 9 3 2005 Cr. Shah, J. JUDGMENT C. Shah, Ag. The question referred was, therefore, answered in the affirmative and against the appellants. January 21, 1971 The matter came for final hearing before J. C. SHAH C.J., K. S. HEGDE and A. N. GROVER JJ. T. Desai, Senior Advocate R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, Advocates, with him , for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S. Hegde, J. with him , for the appellant. C.J. Clause xi was in two parts. Thereafter the present appeal was brought after obtaining special leave from this Court.

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1971_77.txt

The award came to be made by the Land Acquisition Officer on 15.1.1986.

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1995_536.txt

Conviction of the appellants is based upon the evidence of Roop Lal W.1 and Satrohan P.W.2 , who claimed to be eye witnesses. Six appellants, along with accused Dularey, were companyvicted by the Trial Court under Section 304 Part II/149 of the Indian Penal Code hereinafter referred to as I.P.C. They were further companyvicted under Sections 147 and 148 I.P.C. So far as accused Dularey is companycerned, it appears that he did number move this Court whereas this appeal by special leave has been filed by the remaining six accused persons. but numberseparate sentence was awarded on any of these companynts. Convictions have been companyfirmed by the High Court on appeal being preferred by the accused persons. These two witnesses have companysistently supported the prosecution case and numberinfirmity companyld be pointed out therein. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years. Heard learned companynsel for the parties.

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2008_2135.txt

the companypany asserted that the distribution of dividend was out of the current years profit which amounted to rs. 3337813. out of this amount the income tax officer deducted rs. for the assessment year 1953 54 the net profits of the companypany in the calendar year 1952 were determined at rs. the income tax officer was of the view that this amount represents the profits of the previous year which must be deducted out of the book profits returned by the companypany to show the true companymercial profits. 1168000 as dividend had utilised the undistributed profits of the previous year held admissible to rebate. for the assessment year 1952 53 income tax officer companypanies circle i 2 bombay estimated the undistributed profits at rs. the income tax officer therefore informed the companypany that in his opinion the dividends had companye out of the profits of the earlier year represented by undervaluation of the opening stock which was the income of the previous year. 3103760 out of which rs. there is numberdispute that in the assessment year 1952 53 the companypany obtained rebate on the amount of undistributed profits under clause i of the proviso to paragraph b of part i of the first schedule to the finance act 1951. the income tax officer decided that the net available profits for distribution by the companypany in the account year 1952 were only rs. 3103760 and the taxable income was assessed at rs. the companypany had in the calendar year 1951 appropriated rs. that there was undervaluation of the opening stock in the year of account 1952 was accepted by the companypany. 1237533 were liable to be deducted as undervaluation of opening stock being profit for the last year leaving a balance of rs. 1294872. in that year also the companypany declared rs. the companypany companytended inter alia that it was number true that the dividend or any part thereof came out of the undistributed profits of the assessment year 1952 53. by his letter dated february 21 1958 the income tax officer informed the companypany that on a study of the figures of the assessment year 1953 54 it was disclosed that the net book profits amounted to rs. adjusting certain items which in the view of the income tax officer were number allowable the gross profit was rs. 316227 only remained as profit available for distribution. 1866227. out of that amount rs. as this amount exceeded the total income as reduced by seven annas in the rupee and a donation of rs. 1168000 as dividend payable to the shareholders. 53235.13 np. 800000 were deducted as depreciation and special depreciation reserve leaving net balance of rs. 7500 additional income tax was charged under clause ii of the proviso to paragraph b part i of the first schedule of the finance act 1953. this additional charge was set aside by the appellate tribunal by order dated august 18 1956. the income tax officer then addressed a letter dated numberember 12 1956 to the companypany intimating that he proposed to rectify the assessment of the year 1952 53 in exercise of the powers under section 35 10 of the income tax act and to withdraw the rebate because in his view the companypany distributing rs. 1066227 and deducting therefrom rs. the companypany also prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus ordering the income tax officer to withdraw and cancel the order dated march 19 1958 and the numberice of demand companysequent thereon. 750000 as provision for taxation rs. he therefore ordered on march 19 1958 that the rebate allowed at the rate of one anna in the rupee on rs. 53235.13 np and the numberice of demand companysequent thereon. the companypany then presented a petition under article 226 of the companystitution before the high companyrt of judicature at bombay praying for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari or other against the income tax officer calling for the record of the case and for a direction quashing the order dated march 19 1958 holding the companypany liable in the sum of rs. 851773 be withdrawn and issued a demand numberice for rs. 1824525 and allowed a rebate thereon under part i of the first schedule paragraph b proviso 1 finance act 1951 at the rate of one anna per rupee. shah j. the appellant is a public limited companypany incorporated under the indian companypanies act 1913 and has its registered office at bombay. the petition was rejected by the high companyrt.

test

1964_272.txt

This was achieved by the creation of Revenue Mandals in place of taluks and firkas. The change in the Revenue Administration was so achieved by the creation of Revenue Mandals in place of taluks and firkas. In the preliminary as well as final numberification, for formation of Kalher Revenue Mandal, Kalher was declared to the Mandal Headquarters. Each such district companysisted of Revenue Divisions and each Revenue Division companysisted of Revenue Mandals. In the present cases we are companycerned with the location of 12 Revenue Mandal Headquarters. The 23 districts number companyprise of 1104 Revenue Mandals. Incidentally, there is numberstatutory provision relating to location of Mandal Headquarters and the matter is governed by GOMs dated 25th July, 1985 issued by the State Government laying down the broad guidelines for the formation of Mandals and also for location of Mandal Headquarters. It was of the opinion that the only method to be adopted by the Government for a better Revenue Administration and to serve the interests of the people in a more effective and suitable manner was by formation of the Mandals in place of taluks and firkas. 226 of the Constitution were filed in the High Court by individuals and gram panchayat questioning the legality and propriety of the formation of certain Revenue Mandals, and particularly location of Mandal Headquarters, abolition of certain Mandals or shifting of Mandal Headquarters, as numberified in the preliminary numberification issued under sub s. 5 of s. 3, deletion and addition of villages to certain mandals. The change in administration was brought about by amending s. 3 of the Act by introducing the word mandals in place of taluks and firkas. The learned Judges upheld the validity of formation of Mandals as also the aforesaid GOMs and in some cases they declined to interfere with the location of Mandal Headquarters holding that the Government was the best judge of the situation or on the ground that there was a breach of the guidelines, and directed the Government to reconsider the question of location of Mandal Headquarters. The avowed object and purpose of the Andhra Pradesh District Formation Act, 1974, as amended by the Andhra Pradesh District Formation Amendment Act, 1985 as reflected in the long title, was to bring about a change in the Revenue Administration with a view to bring the administration nearer to the people and to make all public services easily available to them. However, in other cases the learned Judges have gone a step further and quashed the final numberification for location of Mandal Headquarters at a particular place holding that there was a breach of the guidelines based on the system of marking and also on the ground that there were numberreasons disclosed for deviating from the preliminary numberification, and instead directed the Government to issue a fresh numberification for location of Mandal Headquarters at another place. These appeals by special leave and the companynected special leave petitions directed against the various judgments and orders of the Andhra Pradesh High Court involve a question of principle, and relate to location of Mandal Headquarters in the State of Andhra Pradesh under s. 3 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Districts Formation Act, 1974. The avowed object was therefore to bring the administration nearer to the people and to make all public services easily available to them. Nos.6063, 5379, 9908, 7836 and 5379 of 1985. Kalher secured 14 marks as against Sirgapur which secured 22 marks. Pursuant to their powers under sub s. 1 of s. 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Districts Formation Act, as amended by Act 14 of 1985, the State Government, by numberification published in the official gazette, after following the procedure laid down in sub s. 5 thereof divided the State for the purpose of revenue administration into 23 Revenue District with such limits as specified therein. It also felt that there was urgent necessity to review its activities and services and welfare programmes and that they should be extended to the interior regions and that the creation of Mandals with a population ranging from 35,000 to 55,000 based upon density of population would be an effective method for providing better facilities to the people at lesser companyt and greater companyvenience. It was of the view that a decentralisation of administration and reduction in its levels would be companyducive to a more efficient implementation of administration which brings the involvement of the people, particularly in the implementation of several welfare measures of the Government, and especially to uplift the companyditions of the weaker sections of the society. To implement the decision of the Government, on 11th January, 1984 the Governor of Andhra Pradesh accordingly promulgated Ordinance No. The purpose of the legislation is brought out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, a relevant portion whereof is as under On a careful review of the socio economic development of the State for the last 20 years the State Government felt it necessary to take the administration nearer to the people. Vaidanathan, R. Sethia, Vimal Dave, B. Rajeshwara Rao, Jitendra Sharma, G.N. 14 of 1985. Rao, T.C. From the Judgment and Order dated 12.2.1986/28.2.1986/49.1.1986 and 5.2.1986 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. Chari, Ms. Vrinda Grover, S. Mudigonda, C.S. Seetaramaiah, A.S. Nambyar, R.N. Sarathi, A. Subba Rao and B. Kanta Rao for the appearing parties. Keshwani, T.V.S.N. The Ordinance was later replaced by Act No. Gupta, B.P. Some of the writ petitions were heard by one Division Bench and the others by another, both the Benches being presided over by Reghuvir, J. who has delivered all the judgments. Other facilities of the two villages were discussed at length in the record. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SEN, J. As many as 124 petitions under Art. 1979 85 of 1986 etc. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.

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1988_207.txt

They jointly owned suit property with Chhabili Kuer widow of Lalita Prasad. After the death of Chhabili Kuer on February 8, 1971, Ganga Devi the defendant in the suit came forward as the legal representative of Chhabili Kuer and got the mutation effected in her name in the place of the deceased Chhabili Kuer. They also found that Ganga Devi was number the heir of Chhabili but on the other hand the plaintiffs were her heirs. Ram Saran and Raghubir Saran, the plaintiffs are brothers. In 1958, the plaintiffs brought this suit for a declaration that they are the sole owners of the suit properties. The Courts below have companye to the companyclusion that the present suit falls within the scope of Section 209 of the U.P. They did number claim possession either of the entire or even any portion of the suit properties. Act 1 of 1951, and the suit number having been brought within the period of three years as provided in that Act, the suit is barred by limitation. This is a plaintiffs appeal by special leave. S. Hegde, J.

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1972_183.txt

Accused Daya Nand was armed with a gun. Accused Daya Nand produced a double barrel gun, Ex. PO/1 and Ex. Ruqa Ex. That statement Ex. Vide report, Ex. Accused Amar Singh exhorted his son accused Daya Nand to fire a shot. The gun was placed in a sealed parcel. Accused Daya Nand then fired a shot from his gun towards Chhajju Ram who took a turn but was hit on the right side of the waist and fell down. PO, the double barrel gun, Ex. A wireless message Ex. At 8.00 A.M. deceased Chhajju Ram diverted the irrigation water to his field. As per reports, Ex. P 2 and underwear Ex. On 9.9.1993 the said Shankar and his brother Nain Sukh and deceased Chhajju Ram went to their fields known as Theriwala for irrigating the land. Accused Daya Nand objected that his turn of water had number yet started. Chhajju Ram retorted that their turn started from 8.00 A.M. onwards. Sketch map, Ex. He moved an application Ex. The licence and the two live cartridges were also sealed in parcel and taken into possession vide memo Ex. Chhajju Ram was admitted to Civil Hospital, Fatehabad by his brother Shanker and Nain Sukh, where he was declared dead by the doctor. The pellets were sealed in a vial. P 1, Banian, Ex. P 8, licence, Ex. Shankar and others were to take turn of irrigation at 8.00 A.M. from the accused. Blood stained earth was lifted, made into a sealed parcel and taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex. Inquest proceedings were companyducted and report Ex. Rough site plan, Ex. Chhajju Ram hereinafter referred to as the Deceased was younger to PW 5 Shankar and they had a joint khewat in the revenue estate of village Sirdhan. PF and post mortem examination was companyducted vide report Ex. The pellets recovered from the dead body were opined to be pellets as are usually loaded in shot gun cartridges, including 12 bore cartridge. PP of the gun was prepared. One empty cartridge of 12 bore was found lying which was also lifted, made into a sealed parcel and taken into possession vide memo Ex. P0/2, human blood was found in blood stained earth and on shirt, Ex. Ram Kumar, Assistant Sub Inspector along with Ram Kumar Constable then went to village Sirdhan. The clothes of the deceased were removed and sealed into a parcel. In the meantime, both the accused came from the side of village Sirdhan. P8, was found in working order, the empty cartridge hereinafter referred to as the crime cartridge, which was lifted from the spot, Ex. Charge was framed against accused Daya Nand under Section 302 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. P 3 of the accused. Amar Singh who faced trial and was acquitted and Daya Nand appellant herein were already irrigating their fields. Thereafter, accused fled away towards the village along with the gun. Nain Sukh PW 6 also reached there at the Naka and witnessed the occurrence apart from Shankar. He inspected the spot in the presence of Nain Sukh, Ram Sarup, Sarpanch and Brij Lal, Chowkidar. An altercation took place between Shankar and the deceased on one side and the accused on the other. Ram Kumar, Assistant Sub inspector along with some companystables reached Civil Hospital Fatehabad and recorded the statement of Shanker in Civil Hospital, Fatehabad. P6, was opined to have been fired from the said gun. Shankar and others also went to supervise the flow of irrigation water through the water companyrses. PG/1 was sent to the Police Station and on its basis, FIR was recorded by Satbir Singh MHC, companyy of which is Ex. P 9, and two live cartridges. PF/1 was prepared by Ram Kumar Assistant Sub Inspector in the presence of Devi Lal and Shanker Lal PWs. Blood started oozing out from the fire shot injury. Accused threatened that they will see them and both of them left towards the village. PG was sent by Dr. Jagdish Chaudhry to the Station House Officer, Police Station Fatehabad. After companypletion of investigation, accused was sent up for trial. The cause of death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of fire arm injuries which were ante mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in the ordinary companyrse of nature vide post mortem report Ex. Charge was framed against accused Amar Singh under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. PK was sent by the said Police Station to Police Station Bhattu. The case property was sent for Chemical Examination and for report of the Ballistic expert of Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana, Madhuban. Multiple wounds of small sizes were found and eleven pellets were recovered from the abdomen of the deceased. In order to establish the accusations the prosecution examined 10 witnesses and the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Haryana, Madhuban was exhibited. A synoptical resume of the prosecution case is as under The prosecution machinery was set into motion at the instance of Shankar PW 5 who had four brothers. Accused persons during their examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short Cr. Mimani. PF/2 by Dr. S.P. PL, was prepared and statements of other witnesses were recorded. No.4325 of 2007 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the companyviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short IPC in terms of the judgment dated 9/10.10.1997 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Hissar. 595 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP Crl. pleaded innocence and false implication. REPORTABLE CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. P.C. Leave granted.

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2008_629.txt

in pursuance of rule 41 a the appellants were directed to exhibit cinematograph films for four shows only in a day. the appellants petitioners hold licences for exhibiting cinematograph films in their cinema theatres under the act and the rules in form prescribed by the rules. rule 4 1 a is as under 41 a. number of shows permissible in a day no licensee shall exhibit more than four cinematograph shows in a day. the appellants challenged validity of the aforesaid rule placing restriction on their right to exhibit cinematograph films before the high companyrt of karnataka by means of writ petitions under article 226 of the companystitution. the rules and conditions companytained in the licence form f do number prescribe any restriction on the number of shows of films which a licensee can exhibit in his theatre. the state government in exercise of its power under section 19 of the act framed rule 41 a directing that numberlicensee shall exhibit more than four cinematograph shows in a day. 16170 16171 16172 16173 13198 15052 16283 16285 86 16331 16334 16335 16597 16598 17116 17612 of 1981 39414 of 1982 17183 of 1981 42082 of 1982 3833 of 1983 and 15053 of 1981 k. sen. padmanabha mahle miss c.k. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by singh j. these appeals and writ petitions involve two questions of law i whether rule 41 a of the karnataka cinemas regulations rules hereinafter referred to as the rules framed by the state government under section 19 of the karnataka cinemas regulations act of 1964 karnataka act 23 of 1964 hereinafter referred to as the act has been made for purposes of the act and ii whether rule 41 a places unreasonable restrictions on the appellants right to carry on their business of exhibiting cinematograph films in violation of article 19 1 g of the companystitution. companydition number 11 of the licence however provides that numbercinematograph exhibition shall companytinue after such time number later than 1.00 a.m. numbermally the cinema owners were holding four shows but later on they increased it to five shows in a day starting from 10 a.m. to 12 numbern 12 numbern to 3 p.m. 3 p.m. to 6 p.m. 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. 9 p.m. to 12 a.m. thus the cinematograph films were being exhibited companytinuously from 10 a.m. to mid night which caused a number of problems. some of the aggrieved cinema owners have also filed writ petitions before this companyrt under article 32 of the constitution challenging validity of rule 41 a. the appeals and writ petitions raise companymon questions of law and they are being disposed of by a companymon order. from the judgment and order dated 9.10.1984 of the karnataka high companyrt in w.p. sucharita n.d.b. nagaraja b. krishna prasad miss malini poduval and r.b. raju m. rangaswamy k.r. iyenger m. veerappa and navin singh for the respondents. aggrieved by the decision of the high companyrt the appellants have challenged the correctness of the high companyrt judgment in these appeals. 54 to 73a of 1985 etc. a division bench of the high companyrt heard the parties at length but there was difference of opinion between the two learned judges companystituting the bench of the high companyrt. a division bench of the andhra pradesh high companyrt rejected both the companytentions. datar for the appellants. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number. number.

test

1988_11.txt

Whenever the Gram Panchayat demanded possession, the appellant challenged the ownership of Gram Panchayat. The second respondent Gram Panchayat Chhaleri filed an application under Section 11 of the Punjab Village Common Lands Regulation Act, 1961 hereinafter referred to as the Act that the Gram Panchayat is the owner of an area of 146 kanals 5 marlas spread over in several Khasra numbers. The original authority, namely, the Collector Divisional Deputy Director Rural Development, Patiala, accepting the companytention of the appellants that the dismissal of earlier application under Section 7 would companystitute res judicata dismissed the application of Panchayat under Section 11. The appellate authority under Section 11 2 held that the dismissal of the earlier applications would number companystitute res judicata and thereafter proceeded to hold that having regard to the entry in Jamabandhi 1976 77 and Khasra Girdwari Year 1959 83, the ownership of second respondent Panchayat had companye to be established, more so in the absence of any evidence to the companytrary. Aggrieved by the same, an appeal was preferred before the Joint Director, Punjab, exercising the powers of the Commissioner. The stand was opposed by the appellants. When a writ petition was filed by the appellants that was dismissed in limine. Thus, the appeal.

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1993_638.txt

Who set on fire you? Whether they set on fire you after pouring Kerosene? In which place and how you put on fire? Whether you can identify the person who set on fire you? Yes, with signs. With signs these two persons forcibly set me on the fire in their cattle shed. The questions put to her and answers given thereto with sign are as under Whether you set on fire before rising the sun? Yes, with sign of head. And then she identify Daljit Singh and Balwinder Singh sons of Faqir Singh resident of Dholran with sign of head. Two persons set on fire me one of them was open beard and one was with cutting beard. On 6.4.2001 early in the morning when she went to the land of the respondents, she was caught and set on fire after pouring kerosene on her. On the same day i.e.6.4.2001 itself, her dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Chamkaur Sahib. Appellant before us was attracted by fire and brought her to the hospital. Inter alia, on the aforementioned premise and furthermore upon companysidering the acceptability of one or the other dying declaration, it was held as the deceased has identified only Kashmir Singh and Satwinder Singh, there is numberreason for the learned Sessions Judge to frame charges against the respondents the dying declaration recorded by the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate should be preferred to that of the dying declaration recorded by the learned Executive Magistrate. It is, furthermore, number in dispute that the deceased was a dumb lady. Respondents themselves in their Memo of Revision filed before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana companytended that the deceased Darshan Kaur was deaf lady, who was paralytic also. Husband of the deceased Darshan Kaur is before us questioning the legality or validity of the said order. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court while allowing the said revision application, inter alia, opined that the deceased was both deaf and dumb and she was paralytic also. It was number necessary for the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate, Ropar to take the left thumb impression of the deceased on all pages. Both were sikhs and were wearing turban tied and both were 6 Ft. An application for discharge was filed before the learned Sessions Judge which, as numbericed hereinbefore, has been dismissed. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 14.12.2005 passed in Criminal Revision No.2250 of 2003 by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh whereby and whereunder the revision application filed by respondents accused herein questioning the companyrectness of the order dated 30.10.2003 passed by the learned Sessions Judge refusing to discharge them in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was allowed. She identified respondents herein. Indisputably, the parties are neighbourers. 1 First Information Report proceeded on the basis that as they have numberother place in their house for easing themselves, the deceased used to use the land of the respondents for that purpose. Leave granted.

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2008_1514.txt

While working with the IMD he was selected for appointment as Senior Engineer in the NTPC. He was relieved on 30 101986 by the IMD and he joined the NTPC on 31 10 1986. He joined the NTPC on 31 10 1986. The appellant delayed his joining the NTPC because his case for companyfirmation as Assistant Meteorologist was under companysideration of the Central Government. On 13 10 1977 he joined the Indian Meteorological Department IMD as Assistant Meteorologist after being selected through the Union Public Service Commission. Despite repeated representations the IMD did number companyfirm the appellant and, as such, he submitted his resignation on 21 10 1986 to the IMD. He was required to resign from the Central Government service for the purpose of joining the NTPC. In the meantime, the appellant was promoted as Meteorologist Grade I in the IMD with effect from 22 9 1986 and posted at Pune. The NTPC finally directed the appellant to join on or before 31 10 1986. He was selected for appointment as Senior Engineer in the National Thermal Power Corporation NTPC , a Central Government Undertaking. The appellant joined Central Government service on 2 3 1974. The question before the Central Administrative Tribunal the Tribunal , New Delhi was whether the appellant was entitled to pro rata pension for the period of his service under the Central Government. The appellant was, therefore, appointed as Assistant Meteorologist against a permanent vacancy. The Director General, IMD by his letter dated 11 11 1987 informed the appellant that since the seniority list of the cadre of Assistant Meteorologist has been quashed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Madras Bench, his case for companyfirmation will be companysidered according to rules on the basis of revised seniority list when finalised. Since numberdecision was taken by the IMD for companysiderable time, the appellant approached the Tribunal seeking direction that he should be deemed to be a substantive employee of the Central Government within the meaning of Rule 13 of the CCS Pension Rules 1972 the Rules and, as such, entitled to pension and other retrial benefits under the rules. On 11 2 1987 the appellant again represented to the Central Government requesting for the grant of pro rata pension as he had served the Government for twelve years and eight months. No specific order companyfirming the appellant in the service of the Central Government was issued. The appellant joined the Central Government service on 2 3 1974 as Technical Assistant in the office of the Director General of Supplies Disposals and worked there till 12 10 1977. The Tribunal answered the question in the negative and rejected the claim of the appellant on the short ground that the appellant was number a substantive employee of the Central Government. As mentioned above, the Tribunal rejected the prayer. He was permitted to cross the first efficiency bar on 1 10 1983. However, in order to pursue his case for companyfirmation, he decided to forego the promotion. This appeal by way of special leave is against the judgment of the Tribunal dated 24 10 1991. The memorandum dated 28 3 1988 came into force with effect from 1 4 1988. It is number the case of the respondents that the appellant was appointed against a temporary post. He was placed on probation for a period of two years. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KULDIP SINGH, J. Special leave granted.

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1994_402.txt

MACT awarded total companypensation of Rs.7,92,000/ . MACT companycluded that these sums companyld number be taken into account in the total salary of Sunita. The High Court applied the multiplier of 14, instead of 11 applied by MACT. Hence, companypensation was calculated at Rs.7,92,000/ along with interest at the rate of 6 p.a. It calculated the same by arriving at gross salary of Rs.14,541/ based on salary certificate provided by Haryana Women Development Corporation Ltd. , the employer of Mrs. Sunita Sharma. Aggrieved by the award of MACT, the claimants filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for enhancement of companypensation. Thus, dependency was calculated at Rs.72,000/ , to which a multiplier of 11 was applied. Legal heirs of the deceased, her husband and two children, filed a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal MACT claiming Rs.40,00,000/ as companypensation, along with interest 24 p.a. Thus, her total carry home salary was taken to be Rs.10,000/ annual equivalent being Rs.1,20,000/ . A deduction of 40 was made for personal expenses, as she was a working woman and was also maintaining a scooter. On 2.08.2006, around 4.40 PM, one Mrs. Sunita Sharma aged 41 years was returning to Panchkula from Chandigarh on her scooter, when the offending vehicle a Tata 407 bearing registration number HR 58 5649 driven by the second respondent hit her and ran over her. From the same, Rs.1310/ was deducted on various accounts she was an income tax assessee, was paid HRA amounting to Rs.885/ , CCA Rs.200/ and medical allowance Rs.250/ . MACT and the High Court did number take into companysideration the revision in pay scale of the deceased that came into force from January 2006 before her death while calculating her income. Deduction of 40 for personal expenses, which was upheld by the High Court, was number companyrect. GANGULY, J. Still aggrieved, the claimants filed the present appeal before this Court. She was declared dead when taken to hospital. Leave granted.

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2011_912.txt

This award of Mr. Justice Sharpe will be hereinafter referred to as the Mcsharpe award. It pleaded that the Mcsharpe Award was deed and gone and the claim for bonus should be adjudicated on the basis of the principles laid down by this Court. The Mcsharpe award ceased to be in force after the expiry of the Defence of India Rules. Bonus at this rate had to be paid to both the labour and uncovenanted staff. Its companytentions appear to have been that the workmen have repudiated the agreement under the Mcsharpe award and that they have also declared that they are number claiming under the Full Bench Formula. The Tribunal passed an interim award based upon the original principle laid down by the agreement in the Mcsharpe award without any modification. The Union made a request to the Tribunal to pass an interim award regarding bonus for the years 1959 60 and 1960 61. The dispute between the parties relates to a claim for additional bonus for the years 1957 58 and 1958 59 and for payment of bonus for the year 1959 60 and 1960 1961. The union in its written statement claimed that it is entitled to claim six months wages as bonus for each of these years on a proper working out of the percentage at the rate given in the Mcsharpe award or by applying the Full Bench Formula of that Labour Appellate Tribunal. Therefore, the Union was number entitled to any bonus at all for these years. This Tribunal rejected the claim of the workmen for an annual profit bonus equal to three months basic wages. The appellant companytested the claim of the union on the ground that according to the Mcsharpe award, the claim was totally unjustified. The Union filed a statement on September 6, 1961, that to enable the Tribunal to pass an interim award, it does number press its case on full Bench Formula and that it will companyfine its case to Mcsharpe award subject to certain modifications because of the issue of bonus shares by the appellant. In particular, the appellant requested the Tribunal to call upon the union to State categorically whether it is agreeable to be governed by the Mcsharpe award or it required on adjudication of the bonus claimed according to the law applicable to the same. The High Court declined to interfere with the interim award but gave a direction that the amounts paid under the interim award will have to be adjusted towards any bonus that may be declared by the companypany in future. The workmen in companysequence demanded bonus equivalent to eight days wages for each 1 dividend declared by the companypany on its ordinary shares. 24 of 1964, holding that the Industrial Tribunal has to Calcutta the claim for bonus made by the workmen according to the full Bench Formula, as explained by this Court. It claimed the years 1959 60 and 1960 61 six months or 180 days pay as bonus. The appellant opposed the request of the workmen for passing an interim award. But an industrial Tribunal, companysisting of three Adjudicators, to whom the question of annual bonus along with other matters was referred by the order dated October 31, 1947 of the State Government, gave an award on April 1, 1948, to the effect that the Mcsharpe award on the basis of the agreement between the parties will companytinue to govern question of bonus. When the matter was taken up by the Tribunal, after the order of stay was cancelled by the High Court, it framed an issue on the question whether the workmen have repudiated the Mcsharpe award and whether they have also given up their claim under the Full Bench Formula. By the judgment under attack, the Division Bench also held that the calculation of bonus will have to be made according to the Full Bench Formula, as explained by this Court. As the appellant was number agreeable to this demand, the State Government by its order dated July 6, referred to the First Industrial Tribunal for adjudication the issue relating to additional bonus for 1957 58 and 1958 59 and bonus for 1969 60 and 1960 61. Later on, the appellant issued bonus shares and this resulted in an increase the ordinary share capital from Rs. As per the agreement, the workmen were declared entitled to a profit sharing bonus at the rate of two days basic wages for every 1 dividend declared after February 1, 1947 and paid to the ordinary shareholders of the companypany. Even applying the Full Bench Formula, it was the companytention of the appellant that numberbonus was payable to its workmen. Accordingly it claimed 118 days pay as additional bonus for the years 1957 58 and 1958 59, after giving credit to the 65 days wages already paid by the appellant. In the certified Standing Orders of the companypany, it was provided in Clause 17 that the profit sharing bonus is based on dividends paid to ordinary shareholders of the companypany and payments are made in accordance with the rules which have been separately published. 1/2 days pay for 1959 60 and 64 days pay for 1960 61, as originally offered by the appellant, should be directed to be paid under the interim award. One of the questions that was referred and which has relevance to the present proceedings, was whether a profit sharing bonus scheme should be introduced in all or any of the factories mentioned in the order of reference and, if so, on what basis such a scheme be framed. 38,98,500/ in 1958 59. The parties were able to reach an agreement during the proceedings before the Adjudicator and accordingly the same was incorporated in the award dated March 3, 1947. In its final order on the writ petition, the High Court held that the workmen have made an unwise choice by giving up their legal rights under the full Bench formula and that they have to face the situation before the Tribunal. By order dated December 7, 1946, the Government of West Bengal referred a dispute between the appellant and its workmen for between the appellant and its workmen for adjudication under Rule 81A of the defence of India Rules to the Honble Mr. Justice William Mecormick sharps. The High Court by its order dated September 27, 1961, ordered stay of proceedings and gave certain directions as to how the payments made under the interim award are to be finally adjusted. The Government of Bengal by its order dated March 4, 1947, directed that the said award should remain in force and bind the parties for a period of four months and should also companytinue to be in force thereafter as long as Rule 81A of the Defence of India Rules companytinued to be in force. 9,74,625/ in 1947 48 and to Rs. The appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court and prayed for stay of further proceedings before the industrial Tribunal. The proceedings between the parties had a very chequered career, as will be numbered from the facts mentioned later. The appellant again carried the matter in appeal before the Division Bench. Vaidialingam, J. This appeal, by certificate, is against the judgment and order dated March 7, 1968, of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. Against this order the Co. again filed a writ petition before the High Court. They required that 67. The appellant challenges this decision of the High Court.

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1973_398.txt

On hearing the cry of PW 5, Saroj woke up. While PW 5 yelled out, PW 6 ran after the appellants up to the companypound shouting that the appellants had fired a gun shot at Saroj. The members of the family of PW 6 included PW 5, the Deceased Saroj aged about 16 years, who are PW 6s wife and eldest daughter respectively. PW 6 told them that the first appellant had fired a shot at his daughter Saroj and thereafter both the appellants had fled away from the scene. PW 6 had settled the marriage of his daughter Saroj at Dahiyapur, Etawah District U.P. On 25.5.1970 at about 11.00 A.M. PW 6 had gone to the market leaving Saroj alone in the house. On companying out of the companypound, PW 6 fell down. As instructed by the second appellant, Saroj lodged a companyplaint Ex. PW 1 has testified to the fact that he arrived at the scene on hearing the shouting of PW 6 killed, killed and found PW 6 lying down outside the main gate of his companypound, that PW 1 and others lifted PW 6 and brought him inside the house, that on being asked PW 6 informed PW 1 and others that Sengar and Tiwari referring to both appellants had shot at his daughter and that PW 6 requested him to lay a companyplaint at Budhni Police Station. The victim Saroj by that time was struggling for breathing and gasping. Suddenly the first appellants fired a shot which hit Saroj. He is married and distantly related to PW 6. On 24.5.1970 he along with his deceased daughter, Saroj, left Budhni for Bhopal enroute to Dahiyapur. On receipt of the injury Saroj fell down on her company. According to the prosecution, the second Appellant came to the house of PW 6 and told Saroj that her father wanted her presence for selection of clothes. PW 5 sighting the two appellants yelled out. The victim Saroj, when examined before the Magistrate on 12.7.1971 stated in her statement Ex. PW 6 who had earlier been awakened by his wife PW 5 saw both the appellants entering into his house with their respective weapons. PWs 1, 2 and others asked PW 6 as to what had happened. PW 6 narrated the incident to PWs 1 and 2 by mentioning the name of the appellants as the assailants and requested PW 1 to lodge a report at the police station. The deceased Saroj on seeing the two appellants hardly uttered Babaji. Even then numberprogress was made in the investigation on the report of PW 6 at Mangalwara. During this period both the appellants are stated to have forcibly companymitted sexual intercourse with Saroj. The case was fixed for recording evidence from 21.8.1972 on which date the victim Saroj was to be examined as a prosecution witness. Both PWs 5 and 6 identified the appellants as the assailants. PWs 1, 2 and others who rushed to the scene on hearing the shrieks and shouts of PWs 5 and 6 lifted PW 6 and brought him inside the house. While the matter stood thus, according to the prosecution, on 20.6.72 Saroj lodged a report Ex. P/10 on 3.8.1970 at the Police Station of Mangalwara, alleging that he had reason to believe that Saroj might have been kidnapped by both the appellants. P. 25 supporting the case of the prosecution registered on the companyplaint given by PW 1 at the instance of PW 6, the lodging of the companyplaint under Ex. The prosecution case is that on that fateful night the first appellant armed with a pistol and the second appellant with a farsa entered into the house of PW 6 through the main door which was kept ajar by PW 5 who went out of the house of answer call of nature inside the companypound and that the first appellant fired a shot which hit on the chest of the victim Saroj, who was then in her bed and caused her instantaneous death. Accordingly, PW 1 lodged the First Information Report Ex. The distress cries of PWs 5 and 6 attracted the neighbours to the scene. P 7 by Saroj on 20.6.72 against the second appellant and lastly the posting of the case for recording the evidence of Saroj on 21.8.72 when taken in companyjuction with the evidence of PWs 5 and 6, unevasively and unerringly show that these two appellants had strong motive to snap the life thread of the victim so that she companyld number give evidence on the next day in the case of kidnapping and rape. The learned companynsel for the appellants has submitted that PWs 5 and 6 had sufficient motive to implicate both the appellants in this heinous crime of murder as these two appellants according to both PWs had spoiled the future career of their daughter, deceased Saroj by kidnaping and companymitting rape on her even if the identity of the real assailant assailants was or were number known and further there was every possibility of PW 6 falsely implicating these two appellants on strong suspicion. The second appellant took Saroj in a taxi to Hoshangabad and left her near the police station with an instruction to lodge a false companyplaint at the police station that she was kidnapped from Bhopal on 25.5.1970 by one Ramnath and Indrasen and was wrongfully companyfined by them. PW 6 tried to chase the appellants, but he stumbled near the gate of the companypound and companyld number apprehend them. In addition to the ocular testimony of PWs 5 and 6 the prosecution also relies upon the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, who came to the scene spot immediately after the occurrence and learnt from PWs 5 and 6 that the appellants were the perpetrators of the crime. However, when she was taken to the Police Station, Mangalwara in companynection with the report, lodged by her father PW 6 she told the entire truth to the police and her parents. Saroj believing the words of second appellant and without entertaining any doubt on the representation of the second appellant accompanied him in a jeep which was driven by the first appellant. The several impelling circumstances attending the case namely, the prior incident of kidnaping and rape, the companyduct of the deceased Saroj in giving her statement under Ex. P 4 as spoken by PWs 1 and 18 amply companyroborate the evidence of PW 6 and support the prosecution case that the girl was shot dead in close range while she was on her bed. PW 5 witnessed both the appellants entering into the room and heard the sound of a gun shot and the appellants thereafter running out of the house. The first appellant Chandra Mohan Tiwari was wielding high influence in that locality and was well known to the members of the family of PW 6. No doubt, it is true that the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 is that of the interested party in that both of them are the parents of the victim and that they had animus towards the appellants. Ocular Testimony As per the prosecution, due to the above motive the appellants have resorted in perpetrating this dastardly and heinous crime, PWs 5 and 6 though the parents of the victim, are the natural and probable eye witnesses as the incident had occurred in the odd hours inside their house wherein these two witnesses and their 4 daughters including the deceased Saroj were the inmates. Then he lodged a report Ex. The matrix of the case which has led to the filing of this appeal briefly stated is as follow PW 6 Ahiwaransingh was at the material time, a companypounder in the Veterinary Hospital, Budhni. So PW 6 made a fervent plea to the then Chief Minister of the State and requested him to take action in the matter. D/15 on 9.8.1970 at Hoshangabad Police Station. The Trial Court for the reasons given in its judgment observed that the evidence of PW 5 as regards to the identity of the appellants is totally unreliable and that of PW 6 appears to be absurd and fantastic and finally companycluded thus I find the two accused persons had numbermotive to perpetrate the crime in question, that one Gungasingh and possibly the father of the girl Ahivaransingh might have had stronger motive for perpetrating the murder, that it was impossible for the accused persons to have been present at Budhni at 12.30 that night and that it is most likely that they have been falsely implicated in the murder by the political rivals of the accused Chandra Mohan Tiwari and with the motive of preventing the accused Ram Pal Singh over getting married to Saroj. According to these two witnesses by about 12 or 12.30 mid night PW 5 went out of the house by opening the main door to answer call of nature within the companypound. P/7 at Budhni Police Station companyplaining that the second appellant had forcibly entered into the backyard of her house, but took to his heels when she raised a hue and cry. This is number a case solely based on circumstantial evidence, but on the other hand there are two eye witnesses to the occurrence, namely, PWs 5 and 6. P 7 on 20.6.1972 at Budhni police station companyplaining that the second appellant had forcibly entered into the backyard of her house and on her raising a cry he took to his heels. The entire prosecution as indicated ibid mainly rests on the evidence of PWs 5 and 6 who are the unfortunate parents of the victim and who speak about the motive of the occurrence and give a full detailed account of the entire incident. D/15 at the Hoshangabad police station under duress and as instructed by the second appellant herein. Further the High Court was companyrectly rejected the finding of the Trial Court as an unreasonable one holding it is most likely that they have been falsely implicated in this murder by the political rivals of the accused Chandramohan Tiwari and with the motive of preventing the accused Rampalsingh ever getting married to Saroj. P/25 that she was kidnapped by both the appellants, wrongfully companyfined and subjected to sexual intercourse, though she initially lodged a report under Ex. P/25 that she was kidnapped by both the appellants and wrongfully companyfined and also subjected to sexual inter companyrse and that she lodged the false report Ex. Based on the evidence of DW 1, an advocate at Bhopal, who defended the appellants herein in the kidnaping case and who had deposed that on the night of 20.8.72 the first appellant was with him from 9/9.30 P.M. to 12 mid night and who had filed Ex. Both the appellants were on bail in the case of kidnaping and rape during the period of the occurrence in question which occurred on the intervening night of 20/21st August 1972. She found the appellant Chandra Mohan Tiwari having a small gun and the second appellant Rampal Singh being armed with a farsa. D 15 on 9.8.70 at the Hoshangabad police station against some other persons exculpating these two appellants. on 21.8.72 both the appellants were arrested when they had companye to attend the hearing of the case of kidnaping and rape. Earlier to her examination before the Magistrate the deceased lodged a report Ex. On internal examination PW 17 he found companyminuted fracture of sternum and second, third ribs of left side chest. PW 6 lost his nerve on the sudden disappearance of his daughter, but he instead of lodging a report with the police, which evidently he thought would adversely affect the future life of his daughter and her impending marriage and also bring the family in disrepute, unsuccessfully made a frantic and intensive search for his daughter. The companytents of Ex. P30, and application before the companyrt stating that the first appellant was with him, an argument was advanced that the appellants companyld number have gone to the scene village Budhni from Bhopal, when the distance between the two places is about 40 miles and companymitted the offence of murder. The trial of the case against both the appellants before the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal in Sessions Case Nos. 66 and 95 of 1972 under Sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC was fixed for recording the evidence of the victim in that case, namely, the deceased herein from 21.8.1972. It appears that he companytested the election to the Legislative Assembly from Budhni companystituency. P/1 at 1.30 A.M. PW 18, the investigating officer took up the investigation during the companyrse of which he inspected the scene of the occurrence, held in quest and then sent dead body to the hospital for necropsy. Added to that there was also electric light burning in the residential quarter of Doctor Sahib shedding light inside the companypound of the scene house. The Magistrate discharged the first appellant, and companymitted the second appellant alone to take his trial. D 15 cannot be said to have whittled down the veracity of the prosecution case as regards the motive for the occurrence. It is surprising that the learned trial Judge should have placed reliance on the testimony of DW 2 Ramakant and D.W.7 Durgaprasad and companye to the companyclusion that accused Rampalsingh companyld number have been at the scene of occurrence as he was at Bhopal, forty miles away from the scene of occurrence, at the relevant time. P/25 explaining under what circumstances she was forced to give Ex. Besides moon light, there was electric light within the companypound. Mehta for the Appellants. The police after companypleting the investigation filed the charge sheet before the Additional District Magistrate Judicial Bhopal against both these two appellants for offences punishable under Section 363, 366 and 376 IPC. In the above background, the present occurrence had occurred on the intervening night of 20/21st August 1972. On the opposite side of companypound there are Government quarters. On the other hand, the subsequent statement made by the deceased under, the Ex. D 15 would also serve as a companyroborating piece of evidence in establishing the motive for the occurrence. He was residing in one of the quarters situated in the companypound of the Veterinary Hospital. On a revision preferred against the order of discharge of the first appellant both the appellants were put up for trial before the third Additional Sessions Judge, Bhopal in Sessions Case Nos. One of which was occupied by appellant Ram Pal Singh Appellant No. At Bhopal he stayed with his relative by name Arjun Singh. A similar companytention of alibi was also raised before the High Court on the basis of the evidence of the defence witnesses and the High Court after discussing and deeply examining the testimony of the defence witnesses made the following observations It is with regret that we have to say that the testimony of this witness PW 1 does number inspire any companyfidence. Being the parents of the victim, they would be the least disposed to falsely implicate the appellants or substitute them in place of the real culprits. In support of the evidence of DW 1 reliance has been placed on the testimony of DWs 2 to 4 of whom DW 3 was the Proprietor of Chetna Lodge, who had testified to the effect that the first appellant was in his lodge from 18th to 21st August as borne out from the entry in Ex. After companypleting the investigation both the appellants were put up for trial. Then she was taken to a house where she was wrongfully companyfined for about two and a half months. The police did number take any prompt action on the report. During the said trial both appellants were on bail. 66 and 95 of 1972 for offences punishable under sections 363, 366 and 376 IPC. P1 and P 2 and W1 and W2 respectively gave his opinion that the holes, found on the saree, chader bed sheet and the blouse were gun shot holes and there was presence of blackening surrounding the holes on the chader and that the distance of firing should have been within one yard. By that time, the appellants, on companying to know of the lodging of the report, devised a plan fore stall any action being taken against them. The recovery of the pellets below the dead body and the companyk, usually fixed on cartridges from the chest of the girl under the Memo Ex. Thereafter both the appellants fled away. The surrounding skin was ecchymost, but numbertattooing of gun powder was numbericed. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, the State preferred the appeal before the High Court, which for the detailed discussion made in its judgment held that the prosecution has satisfactorily established the guilt of both appellants beyond all reasonable doubts, allowed the appeal by setting aside the judgment of the Trial Court acquitting the appellants and companyvicted the first appellant under section 302 and the second appellant under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each of them to undergo imprisonment for life. Further, on our independent analysis of the evidence we see absolutely numbersubstantial and companypelling reasons to brush aside the testimony of these two eye witnesses and to take a companytrary finding to that of the High Court. 477 of 1973, whereby the High Court has allowed the appeal preferred by the State by setting aside the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court and companyvicted the first appellant under Section 302 IPC and the second appellant under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and sentenced each of them to imprisonment for life. The Trial Court appears to have gone wrong in jettisoning the entire evidence in a very scanty and unsatisfactory manner with unsound reasoning. The Sessions Judge of Indore found both appellants number guilty of the offence of murder and companysequently acquitted them. The two appellants, namely, Chandra Mohan Tiwari and Ram Pal Singh Sengar have filed this criminal appeal challenging the companyrectness and legality of the judgment and order dated 17th of November 1978 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur rendered in Criminal Appeal No. She was also threatened that the appellants would be keeping a watch over her and that in case she divulged the truth, serious companysequences would follow. N. Mulla, Dhruv Mehta, Aman Vachher and S.K. The number recovery of lota a small vessel for taking water and the number marking of the place where the said vessel was kept in the site plan are too tenuous and they do number in any way belittle the veracity of the prosecution case. The wound was slightly oval shaped measuring 1 1/2 x 2 deep and opening into thoraic cavity. The wound as described by the Doctor is a slit like small lacerated wound on the medial end of clavicle. 477 of 1973. 2 , who was serving as Gram Sevak in the Block Development office. It was only thereafter, on the instructions of the higher authorities wheels of investigation started moving on. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by RATANAVEL PANDIAN, J. Hence the present appeal is preferred by the appellants on being aggrieved by the impugned judgment of the High Court. From, the judgement and Order dated 17.11.1978 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. Y. Kulkarni and Uma Nath Singh for Respondents. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal No. On the next day i.e. 36 of 1979.

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1992_12.txt

thus the effect of this relaxation was that only two candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes were enabled to pass the examination. as the aggregate number of marks was 500 and eight grace marks were given to the candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes the percentage of relaxation companyes to about 1.3/5 per cent. if the minimum qualifying standard for general candidates is reviewed at a later date the lower minimum qualifying standard applicable to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes should be reviewed. as seen earlier out of these additional five candidates who passed three had passed by reason of the grace marks allotted generally to all candidates and only two by reason of the additional grace marks given to the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes candidates. the members of the scheduled castes were the children of the endless night. only 72 candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes appeared for part 11 sas examination held in december 1980. twenty four of them had passed without any relaxation and after such relaxation was made altogether 29 passed. in such cases therefore a lower minimum qualifying standard should be fixed for candidates belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes taking into account the minimum standard necessary for maintenance of efficiency of administration. the number of vacancies reserved for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes was 445 in the year 1980 out of which 55 reserved vacancies were for the state of tamil nadu. the total aggregate of all the papers in part ii sas examination is 500 marks. in the part ii sas examination held in december 1977 3 per cent relaxation was given in december 1978 examination a relaxation up to ten marks in the aggregate was given and in december 1979 examination also a relaxation of ten marks was given. suitable relaxation for the respondents in the qualifying standard of marks for part ii of the sas examination held in december 1980 and to declare them as having passed the said examination. the effect of this proposal will be the percentage of pass of 44.6 will go upto 48.33. in the same branch out of 72 sc st candidates who appeared for the examination 24 have passed recording 33.3. this resulted in five candidates belonging to the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes passing out of which three had already passed by reason of the grace marks allotted to all the candidates. the first respondent had obtained 213 marks in the aggregate while the second respondent had obtained 204 marks in the aggregate. therefore the minimum aggregate of 45 per cent would be 225 marks. the respondents belong to the scheduled castes and are working as selection grade auditors in the department of indian audit and accounts at madras. the policy in regard to reservations for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes officers in posts filled by promotion on the basis of seniority subject to fitness has number been reviewed and it has been decided in supersession of the orders companytained in the aforesaid para 2 c of the m. dated 11th july 1968 that there will be reservation at 15 for scheduled castes and 7 1/2 for scheduled tribes in promotions made on the basis of seniority subject to fitness in appointments to all class i class ii class iii and class iv posts in grades or services in which the element of direct recruitment if any does number exceed 50 per cent. both the respondents have passed the part i examination held in december 1979. they appeared for the part ii examination in december 1980. both of them secured the minimum number of marks in each individual subject which was 40 per cent and in some papers more than the minimum number of marks but failed to secure the aggregate minimum which was 45 percent. the sas examination companysists of two parts namely part i and part ii. if one were to give eight grace marks which were allowed the first respondent would have got 220 marks and the second respondent would have got 212 marks. they are also number represented at the hearing of this appeal but with a view to ensure that no injustice may result to the respondents by reason of their number having legal assistance we requested mr. c dated the 11th july 1968 according to which there is numberreservation for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in appointments made by promotion on the basis of seniority subject to fitness although cases involving supersession of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes officers in class i and class ii appointments are required to be submitted for prior approval to the minister or deputy minister companycerned and cases of supersession in class iii and class iv appointments have to be reported within a month to the minister or deputy minister companycerned for information. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by madon j. this appeal filed by special leave granted by this companyrt under article 136 of the companystitution is directed against the judgment of a division bench of the madras high companyrt in writ appeal number 409 of 1982 and raises a question of importance to the members of the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes working in the department of indian audit and accounts who seek promotion to the subordinate accounts service. at the hearing of the writ appeal before the division bench the appellants before us produced the file companytaining the proposals for moderation of results and award of grace marks for the sas examination and revenue audit examination for section officers held in december 1980 made by the joint director exam. the relevant paragraph of the said office memorandum is as follows in the case of direct recruitment through a qualifying examination a minimum standard is generally fixed and candidates attaining that standard are placed on the select list for appointment against vacancies occurring from time to time. the first respondent secured 42.4 per cent and the second respondent 40.8 per cent. they were denied companytact with persons number belonging to their castes for their touch polluted and even their shadow defiled though the touch and the shadow of the animals did number for men rode on horses and elephants and on mules and camels and milked companys goats and buffaloes. the respondents thereupon filed the aforesaid writ appeal number 409 of 1982 which was allowed by a division bench of the high companyrt directing the appellants to give suitable relaxation to the respondents within two months from the date of its judgment and to companysider whether the respondents had qualified themselves in part ii of the sas examination held in december 1980 and further directing the appellants while granting such relaxation to bear in mind the observations made by it in its judgment as also the criteria envisaged in the said office memorandum dated january 21 1977. the division bench made numberorder with respect to the costs of the appeal. so far as the state of tamil nadu was concerned number a single candidate passed. a writ of mandamus. the respondents were represented by advocates at the hearing of the writ petition but they appeared before the division bench in person. the respondents thereupon filed a petition under article 226 of the companystitution being writ petition number 10706 of 1981 in the madras high companyrt praying for a writ of mandamus directing the companyptroller and auditor general of india and the accountant general i madras the appellants before us to make in accordance with the instructions contained in the office memorandum number 36021/10/76 estt. their birth right was the badge of shame their inheritance the overflowing cup of humiliation their constant and closest companypanion degradation the bride of their marriage lifelong poverty and their only fault to be born to their parents. the high companyrt had number issued a writ of mandamus. number 409 of 1982. s. gujral r.n. they were denied jobs except the lowest menial tasks. they were denied worship and the doors of the temples were shut in their faces for their very presence was supposed to offend the gods. bobde amicus curiae for the respondents. was the relief prayed for by the respondents in their writ petition. respondent in person v.a. it is against this judgment and order of the division bench that the appellants have approached this companyrt in appeal. they were denied education. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 2952 of 1984. from the judgment and order dated 12.1.1984 of the madras high companyrt in w.a. all these wrongs were done to them by those who fancied themselves their superiors. what the division bench did was to issue directions to the appellants in the exercise of its jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution. sct dated january 21 1977 issued by the department of personnel administrative reforms to all ministries etc. poddar dalveer bhandari and p.p singh for the appellants. the said writ petition was dismissed with no order as to companyts by a learned single judge of the high court.

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1986_72.txt

In order to establish its case prosecution examined five eye witnesses, namely, PW 1 Ganesh Singh, PW 3 Mohan Yadav, PW 4 Ramji Singh, PW 5 Nand Kishore and PW 6 Ram Pyari. When PW 1 Ganesh Singh tried to save him, A 2 and A 3 assaulted him with lathis. The first informant PW 1 Ganesh Singh was residing in the village while his elder brother Hira Singh deceased was carrying on business in Calcutta. PW 1 Ganesh Singh was a witness of the said incident and his statement had been recorded under Section 161 Cr. On 14.3.1979, which was the Holi day, the first informant PW 1 Ganesh Singh and his brother deceased Hira Singh went to the houses of some people in the village for the purpose of Holi Milan, as was customary. PW 5 Nand Kishore and PW 6 Ram Pyari did number support the case of the prosecution and they were declared hostile. Hira Singh was carried on a company to the bandh, which was at the outskirts of the village and from there he was taken to the district hospital in a tempo where he was medically examined at 9.00 P.M. PW 1 Ganesh Singh was medically examined at 9.50 P.M. and the remaining two injured PW 6 Ram Pyari and PW 3 Mohan Yadav were examined at 11.30 A.M. on the next day. PW 1 Ganesh Singh, who is the first informant and had received injuries in the incident, gave companyplete version of the incident in his deposition in Court. By evening time they were going on the pathway in front of the house of Nand Kishore, when Radha Mohan Singh A 1 armed with spear, Tej Bahadur Singh A 2 and Kapil Dev Singh A 3 armed with lathis, Devender Singh Mutuk Singh A 4 armed with farsa and Kaushal Kishore Singh A 5 armed with knife suddenly appeared there. A 1 assaulted Hira Singh with the spear and A 4 assaulted him with farsa and after receiving the injuries he fell down. The deceased Hira Singh had companye to his village home two days before the Holi festival which fell on 14.3.1979. Five days before the present incident, which took place on 14.3.1979, accused Radha Mohan Singh A 1 , Kaushal Kishore Singh A 5 and some others had assaulted Udai Narain. Ganesh Singh lodged a written report of the incident at 10.30 P.M. on the same night at P.S. Two other persons who were also present there, namely, PW 3 Mohan Yadav and PW 6 Ram Pyari tried to intervene and save them but they were also assaulted by A 5 by knife and A 3 by lathi. His testimony was fully companyroborated by PW 4 Ramji Singh, who was also named as an eye witness of the incident in the FIR. A 1 and A 5 met the deceased and asked him to forbid his younger brother PW 1 Ganesh Singh from giving evidence against them in the criminal case relating to the assault made upon Udai Narain. PW 3 Mohan Yadav, an injured witness, supported the prosecution case in his examination in chief and in cross examination. Kotwali giving a companyplete version of the incident. According to the case of the prosecution the incident giving rise to the present appeals took place in Village Sivpur Deeyar Nai Basti in the district of Ballia. The deceased, however, told them that as his brother had seen the incident, he would appear as a witness and would depose against them. The learned Sessions Judge framed charges under Sections 147, 148 and 323, 324 and 302 all read with Section 149 IPC against the accused persons. The accused felt annoyed and threatened that they would teach him a lesson. Agarwal and Honble K.K. The accused thereafter ran away from the seen of Page 595 occurrence. The appellants were awarded various terms of imprisonment on different companynts including sentence of imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Page 594 These appeals by special leave have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 9.7.2004 of Allahabad High Court by which the appeal preferred by the appellants was dismissed and their companyviction under Sections 147, 148 and 323, 324 302 all read with Section 149 IPC as recorded by the learned Sessions Judge and the sentences awarded thereunder were affirmed. On the request of the learned State companynsel, he was permitted to be cross examined. Misra, JJ. As his cross examination companyld number be companypleted it was companytinued on the next day when he stated that on account of darkness he companyld number identify anyone. After companypletion of investigation charge sheet was submitted against all the five accused and the case was companymitted to the companyrt of sessions. The appeal preferred by the appellants was heard by a Division Bench companysisting of Honble S.K. There was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges. P. Mathur, J. P.C.

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2006_11.txt

However, numberparticulars as to challans by which the rent was deposited with the Controller were furnished. The challan accompanying the deposit of the rent shall be in the Andhra Pradesh Treasury Code in Form No.10 in triplicate and shall specify a the name and address of tenant by whom or on whose behalf the rent is deposited b the name and address of the landlord entitled to receive the rent deposited c the rent at which and the period for which the rent is deposited d the description of the building in respect of which the rent is deposited e the provision of the Act including the circumstances under which the rent is deposited and f the head of account to which the rent is credited, namely II. The tenant through his advocate gave a reply that all the arrears of rent were cleared. Deposits and Advances Deposits and bearing interest C. Other Deposit Accounts Civil Deposits Personal Deposits Personal Ledger Account of the Controller or appellate authority, as the case may be. A tenant against whom an application for eviction has been made before the Controller shall deposit all the arrears of rent due by him, if any, in respect of the building within such reasonable time, number exceeding 15 days, as may be specified by the Controller. Complaining of the default once again having been companymitted by the tenant, the landlords in the first instance served through their companynsel a numberice dated 28.10.81 on the tenant, calling upon him to furnish details of the rent deposited by him with the Controller. 1 A tenant desirous of depositing the rent under sub section 5 of Section 8 or Section 9 or Section 11 shall deposit the same, if the building companycerned is in the City of Hyderabad, in the State Bank of Hyderabad and if the building is elsewhere, in the Controllers office or in the nearest treasury, whichever is companyvenient, after obtaining permission for the deposit of the rent from the companytroller. One companyy of the challan for the deposit of rent returned by the State Bank of Hyderabad Controllers Officer or treasury, as the case may be, after endorsing thereon the receipt of the amount deposited, shall be delivered in the office of the Controller or the appellate authority as the case may be. In an earlier round of litigation the tenant had companye up to this Court and this Court had, vide its order dated 12.1.1980, directed him to deposit the then arrears within a period of two months and companytinuously deposit the rent falling due thereafter, month by month, by the 10th day of every month, with the Rent Controller. Every Controller and every appellate authority shall cause proper accounts to be maintained in their offices for the rents deposited under sub section 5 of Section 8 or Section 9 or Section 11. The said provision entitles a landlord to evict the tenant on the latters failure to pay or tender the rent within the specified number of days on its becoming due. Buildings Lease, Rent Eviction Control Act, 1960 hereinafter the Act, for short . On delivering one companyy of the challan the Controller or the appellate authority, as the case may be, shall acknowledge its receipt on the back of the challan retained by the tenant and take necessary action for the service of the numberice of deposit on the person or persons companycerned within seven days of the delivery thereof. This litigation has a history of around thirty years broken into three rounds of litigation, each time the landlord having sought for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of wilful default and twice the tenant having successfully escaped the threat of eviction. The numberice of deposit shall be served on the person or persons companycerned in one or other of the modes specified in Rule 16. On a prayer made by the landlord, 4 years after the date of the said statement, the tenant was recalled for further cross examination and on 13.7.1993 he made available the challan showing deposit of Rs.6,300/ and other challans also which he had kept with himself until then. In exercise of the power companyferred by Section 30 of the Act, the Governor of Andhra Pradesh has framed the Rules called The Andhra Pradesh Buildings Lease, Rent and Eviction Control Rules, 1961 hereinafter the Rules, for short . Even these challans, when scrutinized, did number support the plea of the tenant that the entire amount in arrears up to date had been cleared. In the third round he is struck by the findings arrived at and recorded in very many details by the learned Rent Controller in his Order dated August 25, 1993, which has been upheld by the High Court in revision. The tenant is in appeal, by special leave, feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court holding the tenant liable to be evicted from the suit premises on the ground available to the landlord respondents under Section 10 2 i of A.P. Rule 5 of the Rules is relevant which reads as under 5. C. LAHOTI, J.

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2003_804.txt

The appellant, the Bihar State Text Book Workers Union seeks promotion of Helpers serving in the Bihar State Text Book Publishing Corporation for over 20 years, to the post of Operatives. The appellant Union approached the High Court of Patna with a prayer that the Divisional Commissioner, Patna be directed to numberinate a Member of the Departmental Promotion Committee which should in turn, companysider the case of the members of the appellant Union for promotion to the post of Operatives. A Single Judge of the Patna High Court granted the prayer and directed the Departmental Promotion Committee to companysider the case of the members of the appellant Union for promotion to the post of Operatives and if they are found qualified to hold the post, pass appropriate order in accordance with law. In an intra companyrt appeal carried by the respondent No.2 Corporation, on the ground that though the Helpers were appointed 20 years ago and were all number matriculates, a Division Bench declined to uphold the relief granted by the Single Judge and allowed the appeal and dismissed the writ petition. Leave granted. Heard learned companynsel for the parties.

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2013_426.txt

Shri Parekh was informed by Shri Bharatinder Singh that be had made the application for certified companyies in April 1976 and that he would hand over the certified companyies as soon as these were received. 386 of 1976. The said companyies were ready on September 17, 1976 and were received by Shri Parekh on that day. Since, however, for a long time the said certified companyies were number received by him from Shri Bharatinder Singh, Shri Parekh filed another application for certified companyies of the judgment and decree on July 14, 1976, after signing of the decree. It is stated that Shri Parekh was all along of the opinion that since the first companyy had been applied for in April 1976 and since that was number ready, the appeal would be well within time and since the said certified companyies would be obtained from Shri Bharatinder Singh Shri Parekh would file the said certified companyies to show that the appeal was within the period of limitation. On April 14, 1976, the appellant, who stays in Ahmedabad, requested Shri Bharatinder Singh, his Advocate in Delhi, in the trial companyrt, to take necessary steps to file an appeal in the High Court and the said Advocate made an application for certified companyies of the judgment and the decree on April 17, 1976. It is further stated that Shri Parekh was also of the opinion that the time for limitation would start running from May 6, 1976, since that was the date when the respondent paid the deficient companyrt fees and the final decree was drawn up and signed. Shri Parekh prepared the Memo of appeal, got it approved from his client in Ahmedabad, purchased the companyrt fees payable on the Memorandum of appeal on September 25, 1976, and filed the appeal in the High Court on September 29, 1976. The plaintiff after obtaining, from the companyrt, an extension of time supplied the deficient companyrt fees on May 6, 1976, on which date the decree was prepared and signed. Later on the appellant requested Shri P. H. Parekh, Advocate, to file the appeal in the High Court. M. Tarkunde, P. H. Parekh, Kailash Vasdev and Miss Manju Jetley for the Appellant. It appears that the suit was filed with a companyrt fee of Rs. 1187 of 1977. The plaintiff respondent filed a suit for rendition of accounts in the companyrt of the Commercial Sub Judge, Delhi and he decreed the suit by his judgment dated March 27, 1976, in the following words I grant the plaintiff a final decree in the sum of Rs. The plaintiff is directed to make up deficiency in companyrt fee within one month. It was under these circumstances, it was claimed before the High Court, that the appeal filed was within the period of limitation as prescribed by article 116 a of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The Registry of the High Court pointed out that the appeal was time barred and the appellant, therefore, filed an application explaining all the aforesaid facts and circumstances with regard to the delay in presentation of the appeal and also companytended that in fact there was numberdelay if the time ran from May 6, 1976. B. N. Sinha, K. K. Sinha and S. K. Sinha for the Respondent. 42,259.75 against the defendants with companyts. The High Court dismissed the appeal as time barred and also refused to companydone the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 28th March, 1977 of the Delhi High Court in Regular First Appeal No. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated March 28, 1977, in a regular first appeal. 20/ only. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J. The defendant is the appellant before us. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.

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1 whether the change effected by the appellant employer was in companytravention of Section 9 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the Act and 2 whether the employer was entitled to withdraw the medical benefits which were already given by it to the employees prior to the companying into force of the Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 the ESI Act . To withdraw the said benefits, the employer served as many as four numberices dated 30 3 1964, 19 6 1968, 13 11 1975 and 10 8 1976. On both questions, the Tribunal held against the appellant employer and hence the present appeals. These are appeals against the award dated 5 2 1993 made by the Third Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta, West Bengal.

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1993_451.txt

The Awas Evam Vikas Parishad in short the Parishad was companystituted under the Adhiniyam. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad hereinafter referred to as the Parishad and the other set of appeal is at the instance of the Parishad. The Uttar Pradesh Legislature has enacted Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam . One of the duties assigned to the Parishad under the Adhiniyam is to frame and carry out housing schemes by acquiring land. On 22nd September, 1986 the Special Land Acquisition Officer gave an award in respect of the Land acquired by the Parishad. The Land Acquisition Officer granted different rates of companypensation in respect of the lands so acquired. The High Court granted solatium at the rate of 30 per cent instead of 15 per cent as awarded by the Reference Court and also interest at rate of 15 per cent for one year and 9 per cent for subsequent years. In that view of the matter, the Parishad issued a numberification dated 2nd October, 1982 under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam proposing to acquire 136.12 acres of land in Villages Majhola and Majholi, both adjacent to town of Moradabad. metre and also granted solatium at the rate of 15 per cent, interest at the rate of 8 per cent and additional amount under Section 23 1 A of the Land Acquisition Act. 5522 to 5524 , 5526 to 5549 of 1999 and 7224, 7225, 7263 to 7277 of 2001. The Parishad aggrieved against the aforesaid order and judgment and preferred appeals before the High Court. Simultaneously the Reference Court deducted 25 per cent of the companypensation towards the development deductions. 180 per sq. 6093 of 1999 and 6096, 6097, 6775, 6776, 6091 of 2001. The said numberification under Section 29 was followed by a numberification dated 5th May, 1984 issued under Section 92 of the Adhiniyam which companyresponds to numberification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 56 per sq. 4866 of 1999. The High Court divided the entire acquired Land into three categories by applying belting system. metre to Rs. The claimants were number satisfied with the companypensation offered to them by the Collector and, therefore, they sought reference before the Reference Court. 2003 3 SCR 1081 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KHARE, CJ. Before us, there are two sets of civil appeals one set of appeals is at the instance of the claimants whose land has been acquired and the same is directed against the order and judgment passed by the Allahabad High Court partly allowing the first appeals of U.P. The Reference Court, by an order and judgment dated 18th April, 1990 enhanced the companypensation from Rs. On 5th March, 2003 when these appeals came up for hearing before a Bench of this Court, the Bench was of the view that these matters, require to be heard and decided by a Bench of three Judges. Consequently appeals were partly allowed. WITH Civil Appeal Nos. With Civil Appeal Nos. And Civil Appeal No. It is in this way these appeals have companye up for hearing before us.

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It further stated that to test the ability of the employees, a written test will be held and those employees who are successful in the test will be required to appear before the Selection Board for a viva voce. The appellants qualified in the written test and were also selected in the viva voce. Respondents 6 to 8 failed in the written test and were number called for interview. Respondent 5 passed in the written examination but g he failed in the viva voce. It further gave a direction that Respondents 5 to 8 as well as the appellants who were working on the posts of Ticket Collectors on an ad hoc basis at the time of the Tribunals order shall number be reverted until they are given three opportunities to appear in the written test excluding the impugned test which was being quashed. Accordingly, the appellants and Respondents 5 to 8 applied for the post of Ticket Collector. Respondents 5 to 8, however, filed a writ petition before the High Court which was subsequently transferred to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench, challenging the selection test so held. The Tribunal by its order dated 4 8 1992 set aside the selection and directed that fresh selection be made within a period of six months as set out therein. The circular which was issued by Northern Railways, Bikaner Division, set out that all regular number technical Class IV employees of Transportation and Commercial Departments, inter alia, who have companypleted three years companytinuous service on 11 8 1982 and who can write and read English can apply for the said posts. They were, therefore, selected for regular appointment. Hence, the appellants have filed the present appeal.

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1997_1219.txt

PW13 and PW16 are sons of Satwa, PW14 is widow of deceased Mohan, PW15 is wife of Damu and PW17 is widow of Satwa. 36, Madan Jagtap and accused No. They are accused No.20 Ramchandra Krishna Kamble, accused No.21 Bhawan Dharmaji Krishna Kamble, accused No.22 Narhari Krishna Kamble, accused No.23 Pandurang Krishna Kamble, accused No.25 Babu Sopan Mandade, accused No.27 Namdev Pandurang Kamble, accused No.28 Venkati Govind Yenjane, accused No.36 Madan Kerba Jagtap, accused No.44 Rukhmaji Babarao Jagtap, accused No.49 Shivaji Kerba Jagtap, accused No.50 Ashok Dattarao Jagtap, accused No.52 Uttam Chandrabhan Jagtap and accused No.53 Shesherao Tukaram Kodale. It was he and others who challenged Satwa and his sons to companye out of the house. Satwa, Mohan and Raosaheb died whereas Damu received serious injuries. They attacked the house of Mohan where they assaulted Satwa and his sons Mohan, Damu and Raosaheb and also caused injuries to the other persons of the family as earlier numbericed. 14, Chandrashen, accused No.26, Shesherao Ramchandra Kamble, accused No.31, Laxman and accused No.43, Devidas Tukaram Kodale. The case of the prosecution as culled out from the evidence in brief is that the three members from the same family, namely, Satwa and his two sons, Mohan and Raosaheb were murdered there was an attempt to murder the third son and injuries were caused on the lady members of the family Hirkani PW17 , widow of Satwa, Radhika PW14 widow of one of the deceased son Vatschala PW15 wife of Damu PW16 son of Satwa on whom attempt to murder was made and also causing injury to another son of Satwa, namely, Nagnath PW13 . Thereafter at about 7 a.m. on the same day, all the accused persons formed unlawful assembly with a motive to companymit murder of Satwa and his sons. As regards accused No.37, Bhanudas Chandrabhan Jagtap, it was numbericed that he died during the trial. The High Court has companyfirmed the companyviction and sentence of 11 accused persons acquitted two accused persons, namely, accused No. The trial companyrt companyvicted 13 out of 60 accused. The judgment and order of the High Court has been challenged by the companyvicted accused except accused Nos. 50 Ashok Dattarao Jagtap and one State appeal has been partly allowed by setting aside the judgment and order of the trial companyrt acquitting accused No.24 Ganesh K. Gulve. The companymon object of the unlawful assembly was to companymit aforesaid murders and other offences In furtherance of the companymon object, the members of the unlawful assembly killed father and two sons, made attempt on the life of another son and caused injuries to family members of Satwa. He was rescued by his son and brought to the house of Mohan, one of his sons. 20, 21, 22 and 23 assaulted deceased Satwa near his house by means of sticks and stones at a place called Khari. The High Court companyfirmed companyviction of 11 and acquitted accused Nos.36 and 50. The State of Maharashtra also preferred two appeals before the High Court one challenging the orders of acquittal passed in favour of 47 accused by the trial companyrt and the other for enhancement of sentence against 13 accused who had been companyvicted by the trial companyrt. The first part took place early in the morning when accused Nos. On appreciation of evidence, the High Court found that there was positive evidence against 17 accused out of which 11 had been companyvicted and sentenced by the trial companyrt. The companyviction and sentence of the said 11 accused persons has been companyfirmed in the impugned judgment and order. Regarding accused No.24, Ganesh K. Gulve, it has been held by the High Court that all the witnesses have number only stated his presence in the mob but have also stated the overt acts done by him at the time of the incident. The judgment and order of the trial companyrt was challenged by 12 out of 13 companyvicted accused by preferring criminal appeals before the High Court. He took part in assault on Damu and also threw an axe which struck on his head. He was seen prominently in the mob that marched to the house of Mohan. From the evidence duly appreciated by the trial companyrt and the High Court, it stands proved that Three persons numbericed above were murdered in the incident that took place in two parts on 7th September, 1991 and others as numbericed hereinbefore received injuries and there was attempt to murder Damu There was formation of unlawful assembly. Criminal Appeal Nos.324 of 2000, 156, 158 and 159 161 of 2002 have been filed by accused challenging the judgment and order of the High Court companyfirming their companyviction and sentence imposed by the trial companyrt. Counsel further companytended that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against accused No.24 there were material companytradictions in the testimony of the eye witnesses as also the version as deposed by the eye witnesses is number companyroborated by the medical evidence and the trial companyrt was, thus, justified in passing order of acquittal. It has been filed by Ganesh K. Gulve challenging the judgment and order of the High Court dated 25.2.1999 setting aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial companyrt in his favour. Regarding remaining 6, the High Court found that there is numberevidence to show actual sharing of companymon intention by accused Nos. Out of them 8 were eye witnesses including 5 injured witnesses, namely, PW13 to PW17. For companymission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 324, 326, 452 and 34 IPC and certain other offences, 60 accused persons were tried in the Sessions Court. One of the companytentions of the learned companynsel was that the companyclusion drawn and view taken by the trial companyrt acquitting Ganesh K. Gulve was a reasonable and possible view which did number call for reversal by the High Court. Therefore, the order of acquittal passed by the trial companyrt in their favour was number disturbed for lack of evidence. Lalit in Criminal Appeal No.501 of 1999. They were armed with deadly weapons such as axe, swords, knife, sticks and stones. The report was lodged with the Police by Gangubai PW12 wife of Nagnath. Besides this, there is medical evidence in the shape of three post mortem reports and testimony of PW11, Dr. Ugile. The incident took place on 7th September, 1991 in two parts. Criminal Appeal No.501 of 1999 is a statutory appeal. K. Sabharwal, J. Exhibits 84, 85 and 86 are three inquest panchanamas. The prosecution examined 39 witnesses. Imprisonment for life was imposed on them for offence under Section 149 read with Section 302 IPC besides payment of fine and imprisonment in case of default in payment of fine as also varied punishments in respect of other offences. The other State appeal seeking enhancement of sentence has been dismissed. All the appeals have been disposed of by the High Court by a companymon judgment and order. The main arguments have been addressed by Shri U.R. These two have number preferred any appeal. 27 and 28.

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2002_536.txt

He sowed the entire seeds purchased by him. He purchased tomato seeds from the appellant in the name of the landowners. The appellant denied that the seeds were defective and pleaded that respondent No. At the time of sowing, he might number have known that he had to keep back some seeds out of the seeds purchased by him as sample in the event of his approaching Forum if the seed crop was ultimately rejected by NSC. He has shown empty tomato seeds packet, which is available with him. of bitter gourd foundation seeds to the respondent by charging Rs.1,852.50 towards companyt of the seeds, inspection fee etc. The petitioner companyplainant told that he was purchasing the tomato seeds from National Seeds Corporation Ltd., Vijayawada since more than 5 years and he sustained heavy loss this year due to number production of the tomato yield since he supply of with inferior quality of tomato seeds. As all the seeds were sowed, he companyld number have taken out any seeds from the soil and produce them before the District Forum for following the procedure companytemplated under Section 13 1 of C.P. A 1 and sowed the seeds in an extent of 3 acres in his land. of KBSH 1 Sunflower seeds from Area Manager of the appellant at Kurnool. It was also claimed that there was numbercomplaint from any other farmer, who had purchased the same variety of seeds. The State Commission and the National Commission approved the companyclusion recorded by the District Forum that the respondent had suffered loss because the seeds sold by the appellant were defective. The District Forum finally companycluded that the foundation seeds supplied to the respondent were faulty and the appellant was liable to companypensate him. The appellant has questioned the orders of the National Commission, which also implies its challenge to the orders of the State Commission and the District Forums mainly on the following grounds a the District Forums did number have the jurisdiction to entertain companyplaints filed by the respondents because the issues relating to the quality of seeds are governed by the provisions companytained in the Seeds Act, 1966 for short, the Seeds Act and any companyplaint about the sale or supply of defective seeds can be filed only under the Seeds Act and number under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for short, the Consumer Act . c the growers of seeds, who had entered into agreements with it, are number companyered by the definition of companysumer under Section 2 d of the Consumer Act because they had purchased the seeds for companymercial purpose. Act by the District Forum. The respondents own lands in different districts of Andhra Pradesh and are engaged in agriculture seed production. The District Forum allowed the companyplaint and declared that the respondent was entitled to companypensation Rs.2,000/ per acre in addition to the companyt of the seeds. It was also pleaded that the crop had failed because while sowing the seeds the respondent did number take necessary precaution. He opined that the seed Pusa Early Dwarf supplied by, NSC, Vijayawada to the farmers of Yerrupalem and Pedergopalem villages may number be true type and crop failure to yield true type may be due to defective seed. The State Commission rejected the objection of the appellant that the District Forum had number companylected the sample of the seeds and sent them for analysis or test for determining the quality. Appellant M s. National Seeds Corporation Ltd. NSCL is a Government of India companypany. They filed companyplaints with the allegation that they had suffered loss due to failure of the crops less yield because the seeds sold supplied by the appellant were defective. The District Forum also referred to the appellants plea that issue relating to quality of the seeds can be determined only by getting the samples tested in a laboratory and rejected the same by making the following observations The companyplainant purchased 5 kgs of bitter gourd seeds under Ex. He was one of the persons selected by the appellant in March 2000 for growing bitter gourd seeds. 5.7 The District Forum rejected the appellants objection to the Commissioners report and held that the companyplainants the respondents herein have succeeded in proving that the seeds sold to them were defective resulting in loss of crop. The report of the Horticulture Officer was companytested on the premise that the respondent did number get the seeds tested in any government laboratory. The appellants plea that the District Forum companyld number have awarded companypensation to the respondents without companyplying with Section 13 1 c of the Consumer Act was negatived by the National Commission by observing that after having used all the seeds for sowing the respondent was number in a position to provide sample for testing and the report of the Horticulture Officer was sufficient for proving that the foundation seeds supplied by the appellant were defective. 7.2 The appellant companytroverted the claim of the respondent and pleaded that the companyplaint was liable to be dismissed because the District Forum was number companypetent to decide the issue relating to the quality of seeds. Its main functions are to arrange for production of quality seeds of different varieties in the farms of registered growers and supply the same to the farmers. He then filed a companyplaint for award of companypensation of Rs.60,000/ with interest at the rate of 12 per annum by alleging that he had suffered loss because the seeds sold by the appellant were defective. 5.9 The National Commission rejected the appellants plea that the only remedy available to the respondents was to file a companyplaint under the Seeds Act, which is a special legislation vis vis the Consumer Act, by observing that there is numberprovision in that Act for companypensating a farmer whose crop may be adversely affected due to use of defective seeds sold by the appellant. The onus passes on to the Petitioner to prove that the crop which grew in the field of the companyplainant was of Arkajyothi of which the seed was sold and number of Sugar Baby, as alleged. 1 did number get the expected yield because sufficient quantity of seeds had number been used for cultivation and there were numberrain during the relevant period. that the respondent had entered into an agreement for companymercial production of the seeds and, as such, he cannot be treated as a companysumer within the meaning of Section 2 d of the Consumer Act. 5.2 Dissatisfied with the response of the Area Manager, the respondents filed a companyplaint under Section 12 of the Consumer Act and prayed for award of companypensation of Rs.1,79,505/ towards the companyt of seeds, fertilizer and pesticides and value of the lost crop with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum by alleging that they did number get the expected yield because the seeds sold by the appellant were defective. In those circumstances, the sample of seeds companyld number be sent to the appropriate Laboratory for analysis as companytemplated under Section 13 of C.P. The argument that the District Forum companyld number have decided the companyplaint without companyplying with the mandate of Section 13 1 c of the Consumer Act was negatived by the National Commission and it was held that the report of the Commissioner, who was an expert in agriculture, was rightly relied upon by the District Forum for companying to the companyclusion that the crop had failed due to the use of defective seeds. The District Forum also opined that the appellant had failed to substantiate its assertion that the respondent had number removed off types and diseased plants despite the advice given by the Seed Officer by observing that numberevidence had been produced in that regard. The appellant also appointed a supervisor and the respondent sowed seeds under his supervision by spending a sum of Rs.22,470/ towards labour charges, fertilizers and pesticides. They undertook cultivation by adopting the recognized modes of preparing the field and irrigation and also used the prescribed fertilizer but there was germination only in 60 seeds and the height of the plants was uneven. 6.2 On receipt of the inspection report prepared by the officials of the appellant, the respondent companytacted the Horticulture Officer, who also inspected the field and submitted a report with the companyclusion that the crop had failed because the seeds were defective. 5.3 In the reply filed on behalf of the appellant, it was pleaded that the seeds were purchased by respondent number 1 alone and there was numberevidence of joint cultivation by the respondents. The respondent then filed a companyplaint under the Consumer Act and prayed for issue of a direction to the appellant to pay companypensation of Rs.1,38,322/ with interest at the rate of 18 per annum and companypensation of Rs.1,00,000/ by alleging that he had suffered loss because the foundation seeds supplied by the appellant were defective. The petitioner was also present, who told that he purchased the tomato seeds from the opposite party respondent as usual and transplanted the same in the month of Sep. 1995 and also manured and applied pesticides as previous. 6.4 District Forum, Mahabubnagar overruled the objections of the appellant by observing that the respondent had purchased the seeds for earning livelihood by self employment and number for any companymercial purpose and that availability of remedy by way of arbitration does number operate as a bar to the entertaining of a companyplaint filed under the Consumer Act. On merits, it was pleaded that Shri M. V. Narsimha Rao, Seed Officer of NSC Kurnool had advised the respondent and other growers to remove off types and diseased plants, which were liable to be rejected but the growers ignored his advice. 5.8 The State Commission dismissed the appeal and held that Commissioners report was rightly accepted by the District Forum because the appellant had number produced any evidence to companytrovert the findings companytained therein that the respondent had taken proper steps for cultivation but did number get the expected yield due to faulty seeds. The tomato trees were grown upto 3 to 5 feets height, but numberprogress in the tomato fruits. The appellant entered into an agreement with the respondent and assured him that by producing seeds on its behalf he will get minimum net profit of Rs.38,000/ per acre within a span of three months. In September, 2000, officials of the appellant visited the field of the respondent and others, who had entered into similar agreements, and rejected the seeds grown by them on the pretext that the same were number fit for certification. The tomato fruits are small just like small bolls. It was then averred that during their visit on 8.9.2000, Shri M. V. Narsimha Rao, Shri M. V. Sudhakar and Area Manager, NSCL, Kurnool found 7 off types seeds which were more than the prescribed standards and, therefore, their crops were rejected. There is numbersaleable value in the market for the said tomato fruits. 6.6 The State Commission dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant and companyfirmed the order passed by the District Forum. emphasis supplied 7.4 The District Forum companysidered the material produced before it including the Commissioners report, allowed the companyplaint of the respondent and directed the appellant to pay him Rs.36,200/ . The appeals and the revisions filed by the appellant were dismissed by the Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for short, the State Commission and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission respectively. b the District Forums companyld number have adjudicated upon the companyplaints filed by the respondents and awarded companypensation to them without following the procedure prescribed under Section 13 1 c of the Consumer Act. 7.3 By an order dated 27.12.1995, District Forum, Khammam appointed Shri A. Jeevan Babu, Advocate as Commissioner to inspect the field of the respondent and estimate the loss, if any, sustained by him. Associate Professor Sri P . Seshi Reddy has companylected the earth in the field and also trees along with the tomato fruits for testing purpose. In paragraph 4 of the judgment, this Court extracted the finding recorded by the State Commission for upholding the order of the District Forum and declined to interfere with the award of companypensation to the respondent. After companyducting inspection with the assistance of Shri P. Sesha Reddy and other officers, the Advocate Commissioner submitted report dated 31.1.1996, the relevant portions of which are extracted below The field and the tomato fruits were examined by me and the Agriculture Officer and all the persons. 6.3 In the reply filed on behalf of the appellant, the following objections were taken to the maintainability of the companyplaint that in view of the arbitration clause companytained in the agreement, the only remedy available to the respondent was to apply for arbitration and the District Forum did number have the jurisdiction to entertain the companyplaint. Accordingly, the companyplaint of the respondents was allowed and the appellant was directed to pay Rs.1,00,000/ towards loss of crop and Rs.10,000/ towards the companyt of fertilizer, pesticides, labour etc. The National Commission summarily dismissed the revision filed by the appellant. Sri P. Sesha Reddy, Associate Professor, Agrl. 5.4 By an order dated 1.12.1999 passed in IA No.141 of 1999, District Forum, Kurnool appointed Shri D. C. Rama Rao, retired Assistant Director of Agriculture as Commissioner and directed him to submit a report after inspecting the field of the respondents. For the sake of companyvenience, we may advert to the facts leading to the passing of orders by three Consumer Forums, which have been impugned in Civil Appeal Nos. The Advocate Commissioner requested the Principal, Agriculture College, Aswaraopet and Mandal Revenue Officer, Yerrupalem to depute an expert and an Administrative Officer of Peddagopavaram and Yerrupalem to assist him. The Principal deputed Shri P. Sesha Reddy, Associate Professor and the R.O. At the request of the respondents, Area Manager of the appellant inspected their field on 19.11.1999. The plants were sown at a distance of 3 feets from each plant. Civil Appeal No.3499 of 2000 6.1 Respondent P. V. Krishna Reddy is a grower having land in Khanpur village of Manopad Mandal of Mahabubnagar District of Andhra Pradesh. When the respondent numbericed that there was numberyield from the plants, he approached the appellants Manager at Vijayawada and requested him to inspect the field and assess the damages, but the latter did number respond. The germination in the remaining 40 plants was slow. The National Commission companysidered the objections raised by the appellant to the maintainability of the companyplaint, referred to the judgments of this Court in Fair Air Engineers Ltd. v. N.K. On enquiry the petitioner told regarding the mode of cultivation that he adopted in sowing Naru applying manure and pesticides. The Respondent Complainant led evidence of States agricultural authorities in support who made their statements after seeing the crop in the field. The Agrl. College, Aswaraopet has sent a report which is being submitted herewith. Civil Appeal No.7543 of 2004 5.1 Respondents M. Madhusudan Reddy and K. Rambhupal Reddy claim to have purchased 46 kg. emphasis supplied 6.5. 7543 of 2004, 3499 of 2009 and 4519 of 2009. The companyplaint was companytested by the appellant on several grounds. In furtherance of the terms of agreement, the appellant supplied 5 kgs. I companyducted Panchanama at the field to that effect on 4.1.1996. He is said to have agreed that there was less germination and the growth of the plants was uneven, but declined to give any assurance for payment of companypensation. Number of villagers gathered and they also opined that the petitioner companyplainant has sustained heavy loss this year. deputed two executive officers to assist the Advocate Commissioner. Leave granted in SLP C Nos.32750 of 2009 and 35350 of 2009. He used to take the lands of other farmers on lease and cultivate the same for his livelihood. Civil Appeal No.4519 of 2009 7.1 The respondent is an agricultural labourer. We may also mention that in their companyplaints the respondents had impleaded the officers of the appellant as parties but for the purpose of this judgment we shall only refer to them as the appellant. Modi 1996 6 SCC 385, State of Karnataka v. Vishwabharathi House Building Coop. with a stipulation that if the amount is number paid within one month, the appellant shall be liable to pay interest 9 per annum. Not only this, flowering did number take place simultaneously. Notice of the date of inspection was given to the appellant but numberone appeared on its behalf on the appointed day. Act. I returned back to Khammam on 4 1 1996 at 9 30 p.m. by passengers train. S. Singhvi, J. Any person aggrieved by an order made under Sections 9 or 10 can file an appeal under Section 11.

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According to the prosecution case, the deceased along with PW 2 Purshottam and PW 6 Badda, were working as agricultural labourers on the field of Purshottam Sharma, PW 1. Khan, PW 10. As the cattle entered the field of Purshottam Sharma, PW 1, where the crop of Soyabean was standing, the deceased and PW 2 told him to take his cattle away and number let his cattle damage the crop. PW 2 and PW 6 rushed to inform Shri Sharma, PW 1, who arrived at the spot. The trial companyrt on appreciation of the evidence found that the appellant had caused the injury with the pharsa on the head of the deceased when he prevented the appellant from grazing his cattle in the field of Purshottam, PW 1. On 24.7.1983 at about 1.00 p.m. while the deceased and other labourers were ploughing the field belonging to PW 1, the appellant came there for grazing his cattle. Thereafter, the appellant dealt a pharsa blow on the head of Krishna Kumar. The First Information Report was lodged by PW 1 Purshottam Sharma at police station Narsinghpur at about 3.00 p.m. on the same day. The evidence of these eye witnesses companypled with the recovery of pharsa and the medical evidence given by Dr. Khan, PW 10, un mistakably companynects the appellant with the companynects the appellant with the crime, i.e., the assault on the deceased which resulted in his death. P.C., the trial companyrt vide judgment dated 3.8.1984 came to the companyclusion that the evidence given by PW 2 Purshottam Mehra and PW 6 Badda, the two eye witnesses of the occurrence, was companyent, trustworthy and reliable. The trial companyrt also found that the medical evidence provided by Dr. Khan, PW 10 lent companyroboration to their occular testimony. The pharsa was found to be blood stained and according to the chemical examiner and the serologist, the blood found thereon was of human origin. The appellant, however, did number pay any heed to their request and insisted that he would graze the cattle in that field only. On receipt of the blow, Krishna Kumar fell down on the ground and died instantaneously. The Investigating Officer, Shri Prakash Chand Sonkar, PW 9, after registration of the FIR, came to the place of occurrence and after preparing the inquest report, sent the dead body of Krishna Kumar for post mortem examination to the District Hospital, Narsinghpur, where the autopsy was performed by Dr. M.R. In the opinion of the Doctor, the death of Krishna Kumar was caused as a result of that injury and the injury was found to be sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death. with him for the appellant N.Bachawat, Sr. Prashant Kumar and Uma Nath Singh, Advs. and Ashok Kumar Gupta, Adv. The appellant was arrested on 26.7.1983 and while in custody, he made a disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, leading to the recovery of a pharsa from the roof of the upper story of his house. An altercation ensued between the deceased and the accused. with him for the Respondents O R D E R The following Order of the Court was delivered Mahesh V. State of Madhya Pradesh O R D E R The appellants was tried for an offence under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Krishna Kumar on 24.7.1983. The Doctor found an incised wound on the right parietal region with fracture of the same and damage to the brain. After recording the evidence on behalf of the prosecution and examining the appellant under Section 313 Cr. The appellant was sent up for trial. On special leave being granted, the appellant is before us.

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1996_935.txt

6, Rupesh Yogeshwar Dhepe was an elected Councillor of Ward No. 6, set aside the order of Collector, whereby his resignation from the post of Councillor of Municipal Council, Achalpur, was accepted, thereby restoring the status of Municipal Councillor to Respondent No. In the fresh elections, the present Appellant Laxmi Verma was elected as Councillor and subsequently she was also elected as President of Municipal Council and is companytinuing as such. 6 was earlier elected and election programme companymenced. 8 of Municipal Council, Achalpur, District Amravati. 6 by order dated 25.02.2009 holding that the Collector had rightly accepted the resignation of Respondent No. On his resignation and acceptance thereof, since the seat fell vacant, Collector proceeded to arrange for elections of Ward No. Since the demands were number fulfilled, on 29.12.2008, he, keeping the promise, tendered his resignation. The Additional Commissioner decided the Revision Application of Respondent No. 6 by filing W.P. On 18.12.2008, Respondent No. Thereafter, the Additional Commissioner allowed the Revision Application filed by Respondent No. 6 wrote a letter to the Collector, threatening to resign, if certain demands made by him were number fulfilled, within a period of ten days. 1550 of 2009, which was partly allowed and the Additional Commissioner was directed to decide the Revision Application afresh after hearing both parties. Election was held sometime in the year 2008. On being asked by him to put initials at the places scored out by him, which he did, would be deemed to have been signed by him in presence of Collector. Deepak Verma, J. 6 filed a Revision Application before Additional Commissioner stating therein that he had in fact number resigned in accordance with law 3/ 3 and there has been companyplete violation of Sub section 2 of Section 41 of the Act. 4/ 4 This order was challenged by the Appellant in W.P. Facts of the case lie in a narrow companypass, which are as under Respondent No. 8, from which Respondent No. In the meantime, Respondent No. This order was challenged by Respondent No. Not being satisfied with the said order of dismissal, Appellant carried P.A No. On the same analogy the orders passed by learned Single Judge passed in Appellants Writ Petition and companyfirmed by Division Bench in appeal have been attacked. Leave granted. No.

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2010_276.txt

Leave granted.

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1994_722.txt

Indrajit Kaur who, in 1982, started the litigation for eviction of the petitioner from the building. Ownership of the building had passed from the then landlord to Smt. After he got himself impleaded as a plaintiff he Jettisoned most of the grounds put forth in the suit far eviction and companyfined to the surviving ground that, the period of tenancy has expired. Petitioner companytended that there was numbervalid lease by which any specified period of tenancy has been fixed. It was rented to the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs.90/ . During pendency of the suit for eviction, ownership of the building has again been transferred and the present respondent has companye into the field. The trial Court before which the aforesaid companytention was raised during the time of argument spurned it down on the premise that the tenant defendant had admitted in the written statement that the tenancy was admittedly for a fixed period of 5 years and hence he cannot be heard to argue differently. D E R Subject matter of this litigation is a shop room. From the trial companyrt up to the High Court the landlord succeeded on the said ground. This Special Leave Petition has been filed in challenge of the aforesaid decree of eviction as companyfirmed by the High Court.

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1998_820.txt

Appellant Pashupati Singh stood near Mohan Lal and Sutali Rai near Rukmini Devi. The learned Judges thought that Pashupati Singh who was mounting guard on Mohan Lal would number have gone away from him and assaulted Ram Prasad Mandal and Rukmini Devi. They have also stated that in the test identification chart there is numbermention about specific assault by Sutali Rai on Rukmini Devi. When the train stopped, Fireman Abdul Aziz P.W.8 came to the companypartment and found Pushpa crying and Ram Prasad Mandal and Rukmini Devi lying injured. All of them were sent to the hospital where Rukmini Devi died at 6 A.M. Ram Prasad Mandal offered whatever he had but tried to catch the hand of the absconding accused. At Pirpainty railway station appellant Pashupati Singh entered their companypartment and when the train reached Ghogha railway station appellant Sutali Rai and another accused, number absconding, got into that companypartment. Rukmini Devi asked them number to assault and took out her churies from one hand and handed over to one of the accused. After some time the absconding accused took out a Chura and asked Ram Prasad Mandal to give him whatever he had. Thereupon all the three accused attacked Ram Prasad Mandal who fell down. He also informed Bhagalpur railway station. The appellant Sutali Rai surrendered on the 10th of May, 1965 while Pashupati Singh was arrested on the, 11th of May. The train reached Bhagalpur at about 1.15 A.M. on 7 4 1965. Mohan Lal who tried to intervene was assaulted with a Gupti by Pashupati Singh and relieved of his wrist watch and rupees fifty or sixty, which he had. In the test indentification parade held on the 24th of May, 1965 Mohan Lal and Pushpa Devi identified both of them. P.W.10 handed over a written memo, Ext.2, to the Officer in charge Railway Police, on the basis of which the first information report was drawn up by P.W.12 at about 1.45 A.M. By this time Ram Prasad Mandal was dead and Rukmini Devi was in a serious companydition. and their daughter Pushpa Devi were returning from Vellore, where the daughter under went treatment. At the next railway station Sabour the Assistant Station Master P.W.5 advised them to go to Bhagalpur as there would be delay in getting medical aid at Sabour. They were accompanied by their servant Mohan Lal. Calcutta to Bhagalpur by the Howrah Danapur Fast Passenger oil 6 4 1965. The miscreants thereafter pulled the chain and got out of the train. They companysidered that when the weapons were number produced and there was numberdescription of the weapons given it was difficult to hold that a particular injury was caused by the absconding accused while the other injuries were caused by the two appellants. Her necklace was snatched by one of the three accused and when she tried to pull the alarm chain all the three assaulted her with the weapons in their hands and she also fell down. P. Singh, for the respondent in appeal 53/70 and appellants, in appeal 54/70 . According to the prosecution evidence, the dagger injuries were given by the absconding accused while the two other injuries were given by the two appellants. A. N. 54 of 1970, were tried before the Additional Sessions Judge of Bhagalpur for offences under ss. S. Prasad, S.K. B. Sinha and D. P. Mukerjea, for the appellant in appeal 53/70 and respondent in appeal 54/70 . The Guard P.W.10 also came, there. The accused as well as the State of Bihar have appealed to this. 53 and 54 of 1970. 150, 152 and 167 of 1969. Sinha, B. 302 and 394 of the Indian Penal Code and companyvicted by him for both the offences. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Criminal Appeal Nos. The two appellants in Crl. P.W.1 . They were travelling from. In due companyrse a charge sheet was laid against both of them with the result already mentioned. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated the 15th October, 1969 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Appeals Nos.

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1973_242.txt

the Maharashtra State Cooperative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd., the appellant in all these appeals. The Government of Maharashtra appointed the Maharashtra State Cooperative Marketing Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Marketing Federation, the Chief Agent in the Cotton Monopoly Scheme under the provision of section 42 of tile Maharashtra Raw Cotton Procurement Process of Marketing Act, 1971. The activities of the Marketing Federation extended to various agricultural produce including foodgrains. It has been already numbericed that under the Award of the Industrial Tribunal, the respondents were declared the permanent employees of the Marketing Federation. The appellant has prepared a seniority list for the year 1985 86 which shows that most of the respondents have been in the employment of the Marketing Federation since 1972. In February, 1984 the Government carved out the operation of the levy of companyton from the other activities of the Marketing Federation and assigned them to another society, namely. In a subsequent letter dated September 8, 1984 the Marketing Federation was directed to effect the transfer of the chief agency from the Marketing Federation to the appellant, inter alia by transferring all the assets and liabilities under the scheme account and the cash and Bank balance at Bombay and Mofussil under the scheme account as well as under the number scheme account to the appellant etc. These appeals preferred by the appellant, the Maharashtra State Cooperative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd., are directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court whereby the High Court allowed the writ petitions of the respondents and quashed the order of the Industrial Court Maharashtra Kolhapur Bench , Kolhapur, dismissing the companyplaints filed by the respondents. Further, it was held by the Industrial Court that there was numberunfair PG NO 476 labour practice on the part of the Marketing Fedration or the appellant and that, in any event, the companyplaints were barred by limitation as the same were filed beyond 90 days from the date of the knowledge of the respondents that they were appointed by the appellant as seasonal employees. Upon the said findings, the Industrial Court dismissed the companyplaints of the respondents. Kulkarni, Jitender Sharma, D.M. 620, 622 and 621 of 1986. The annual increment list, also D prepared by the appellant, shows that the respondents have been in the service of the appellant on monthly salaries and they were given annual increments on November 1, 1985. Nargolkar and S. Bhasme for the Respondents. PG NO 474 From the Judgment and Order dated 9/10.3.1987 of the Bombay High Court in W.P. Being aggrieved by the order of the Industrial Court, the respondents filed writ petitions before the High Court and, as stated already, the High Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the order of the Industrial Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No 3719 3721 of l988. The said seniority list is Annexure D to the writ petitions filed by the respondents in the High Court. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General and A.M. Khanwilkar for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DUTT, J. Dr. R.S. Heard learned Counsel for the parties. Nos. Hence these appeals. Special is granted.

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1988_364.txt

This appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in I.A.No.7088 of 2012 in Criminal Appeal No.876 of 2011, dated 27.09.2012. Aggrieved by the order so passed by the High Court the Complainant is before us in this criminal appeal. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has granted bail to the respondent No.1 herein, during the pendency of the appeal before it. Leave granted.

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2013_872.txt

during her minumberity kandayya sold the property on 29.10.1959 to jainulavudeen. subsequently kandayya married a second time when his daughter kaliammal was a minumber. the plaintiff respondent purchased the suit property from an ex minumber within three years after the minumber attained majority. veerammal died shortly after she purchased the property in 1948. she left behind her husband kandayya and their duaghter kaliammal. she had a daughter by name kaliammal. subsequently on 26.5.1966 the plaintiff obtained a deed of sale of the suit property in his favour from kaliammal who had by then attained majority. on 25.4.1966 jainulavudeen in turn sold the property to the defendant appellant. dismissing the second appeal the high companyrt held that the suit was rightly instituted by the respondent as a transferee from the ex minumber within three years after the minumber attained majority and that the companytention of the defendant that the suit by a transferee from the ex minumber was hit by section 6 e of the transfer of property act 1882 was unsustainable. during his minumberity the property was sold by his father as his natural guardian to a person from whom the present appellant purchased the property. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by thommen j. the appellant is the defendant in a suit insti tuted by the respondent to set aside a transfer of property made by the guardian of a minumber and for recovery of possession of the property. the relevant facts are that the suit property belonged to one veerammal. number 491 of 1968 against the appellant to set aside the transfer of property made by kandayya and for recovery of its possession. the plaintiff thereafter instituted the present suit o.s. she thereupon left her fathers house and resided with her maternal grand father who protected and maintained her. balakrishnan and s.prasad for the respondent. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number951 of 1977. from the judgment and order dated 29.7.1976 of the madras high companyrt in s.a. number89 of 1972. sampath and p.n.ramalingam for the appellant. the suit was decreed and the decree was companyfirmed by the first appellate companyrt as well as by the high companyrt.

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1991_146.txt

13876/1999 J U D G M E N T RAJENDRA BABU, J. Thereafter, several inspections took place but there was numberfulfilment of the requirements at all. NO 1992 OF 2002 arising out of Special Leave Petition C No. WITH C.A. Leave granted in SLP C No.

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2002_971.txt

P.C. Superintendent of Police, Bhind, M.P. 293/2010 by acquitting all the accused i.e. at Gwalior whereby the High Court has upheld the decision of the Sessions Court, Bhind, M.P. It was further urged by him that the High Court ought to have granted the leave to the appellant to file an appeal by the appellant as required under sub Section 3 of Section 378 of Cr. The trial companyrt after the examination of evidence on record passed the judgment and order dated 13.06.2013 acquitting all the accused of the charges levelled against them for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304B of Indian Penal Code, 1860 for short IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and alternatively for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. This criminal appeal by special leave is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 04.03.2014 passed in Criminal Appeal No.547 of 2013 by the High Court of M.P. The FIR was registered on 27.07.2010. The High Court, however, has mechanically disposed of the appeal by passing a cryptic order without examining as to whether the leave to file an appeal filed by the appellant as provided under sub Section 3 to Section 378 of Cr. Being aggrieved of the impugned judgment and order the appellant being the legal heir of the deceased filed an appeal before the High Court under proviso to Section 372 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for short the Cr. and thereafter it ought to have examined and disposed of the appeal on merits. the trial companyrt in Sessions Case No. The appellant herein made a written companyplaint dated 19.07.2010 regarding the death of his daughter, Ranjana hereinafter referred to as the deceased to the Addl. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is challenged in this appeal before this Court questioning its companyrectness. The companyrectness of the same is questioned by the appellant in this appeal inter alia urging various grounds. GOPALA GOWDA, J. He further requested this Court to remand the matter to the High Court for re appreciation of the evidence on record and pass appropriate order on merits of the case after hearing both the parties. Being aggrieved of the decision of the trial companyrt, the appellant approached the High Court against the order of acquittal of respondent number. Leave granted. 2 to 6 herein. can be granted or number. respondent number.

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2015_681.txt

FTC/10 of 2003/2006. It was held that, i the agreement in question is real and genuine ii it bears the signature of appellant iii the appellant did number execute the sale deed in terms of agreement iv the respondent was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement v he also performed his part and vi the appellant breached the agreement and did number execute the sale deed in terms of agreement. Since the appellant did number execute the sale deed in favour of the respondent in terms of the agreement, the respondent filed a civil suit against the appellant seeking specific performance of the agreement dated 02.07.1995 in relation to the suit land. The appellant entered into an agreement on 02.07.1995 with the respondent plaintiff whereby he agreed to sell his share of 55/118 of the entire land to the respondent for a total sale companysideration of Rs.5 lakhs. 5 lakhs, the respondent has paid Rs.4 lakhs in cash at the time of execution of agreement 02.07.1995 to the respondent and has agreed to pay the balanced amount to the appellant at the time of registration of the sale deed. The agreement, inter alia, recited that out of Rs. The appellant defendant is the companysharer of the land to the extent of 55/118, which companyes to 84 Kanals, in the joint Khata of total land measuring 177 kanals 10 Marlas situated in Village Vachhoa, Tehsil Ajnala, District Amritsar. The appellant while denying the averments mainly averred that, i the agreement in question is a forged document ii he had only signed on blank paper on request from the respondent iii he never intended to sell the land to the respondent iv his signature was taken by the respondent on blank paper for being used in one pending litigation in which both were parties and v since the appellant at that time was staying away from the respondent for pursuing his studies, he sent the blank paper, which was companyverted by the respondent in the form of an agreement in question without his knowledge. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ANITA MALHOTRA Date 2017.07.29 135403 IST Reason FTC/10 of 2003/2006 by which the appeal filed by the appellant herein was dismissed with companyts affirming the judgment and decree dated 12.08.2003 passed by the Additional Civil Judge Senior Division , Ajnala in Civil Suit No. It was agreed that the sale deed would be executed on or before 13.12.1995. In substance, this was the defense taken by the appellant while opposing the suit. The Trial Court, vide judgment decree dated 12.08.2003 decreed the respondents suit. The appellant defendant filed first appeal before the Additional District Judge, Amritsar being C.A. Jhanji, learned senior companynsel for the appellant and Mr. Sudeep Mahajan, learned companynsel for the respondent. The appellant is the defendant and the respondent is the plaintiff in the civil suit out of which this appeal arises. 2039 of 2007 whereby the High Court dismissed the second appeal filed by the appellant against the judgment and decree dated 21.03.2007 passed by the Additional District Judge Fast Track Court , Amritsar in C.A. The plaint, inter alia, companytained necessary averments as required under Section 16 c of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for claiming specific performance of the agreement in question. The appellant and the respondent are real brothers. The respondent is elder to the appellant. The first appellate Judge, vide his judgment dated 21.03.2007, affirmed all the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appellants appeal. The High Court, by impugned judgment dated 30.07.2007, dismissed the second appeal and affirmed the judgment decree of the first Appellate Court. In other words, all the three Courts, on appreciating the evidence in their respective jurisdiction and discretion, held that the defense taken by the appellant defendant was number proved. This appeal is filed against the judgment and final order dated 30.07.2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. Heard Mr. V.K. Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. The appellant pursued the matter to the High Court in Second Appeal. Having heard the learned companynsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case, we find numbermerit in the appeal. We herein set out the facts, in brief, to appreciate the issues involved in this appeal. The appellant, felt aggrieved of the judgment of the High Court, preferred this appeal by way of special leave to this Court. Parties adduced evidence. 95 of 2006. No.

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2017_623.txt

On 5.7.1995 the respondent No.1 submitted a second letter of voluntary retirement to the appellant. 1s letter dated 5.7.1995 was in fact a fresh application for voluntary retirement. 1 sent the letter dated 19.7.95 requesting that the numberice of voluntary retirement dated 5.7.95 be kept in abeyance. He sent a letter on 19.7.1995 by facsimile to the Board of Management of the appellant requesting that his letter dated 5.7.1995 be kept in abeyance. On 20.7.1995 the Chairman, Board of Management issued a memorandum to the respondent No.1 with reference to his letters dated 2.12.1994 and 5.7.1995, stating that both the Board of Life Members and the Board of Management had resolved to accept the respondent No.1s resignation voluntary retirement and to relieve the respondent No.1 from his services forthwith. On 19.7.1995 the respondent No.1 resumed his duties as Principal. No period of numberice was mentioned by the respondent No.1 in this letter. Besides there companyld number have been two applications for voluntary retirement. For these reasons the respondent number1 stated that he wished to resign from various posts held by him in the appellant society and to take voluntary retirement as Principal of the appellants companylege at Bangalore and that he may kindly be permitted to take voluntary retirement at the earliest. When the respondent No.1 submitted the second numberice on 5.7.1995 numberreference was made to the earlier numberice dated 2.12.84. He only requested that he may be permitted to take retirement at the earliest. A few days later, on 14.7.1995 the Board of Life Members of the appellant with reference to the letters dated 2.12.1984 and 5.7.1995 sent by the respondent No.1, unanimously resolved to recommend the acceptance of the resignation of the respondent No.1 from the various posts and also to permit the respondent No.1 to take voluntary retirement on medical grounds from the post of Principal of the College. He therefore requested the appellant to accord necessary permission to take voluntary retirement at the earliest and oblige. But it was number companysidered when the Board of Management met on the same day to companysider the recommendation of the Board of Life Members relating to the respondent No.1s letter dated 2.12.1994 and 5.7.1995. The respondent No.1 appealed against the resolution of the Board of Management before the Education Appellate Tribunal. While the appeal was pending, the Director, Collegiate Education issued an order according approval to the voluntary retirement of the respondent No.1 as requested by the appellants society. RUMA PAL, J The respondent No.1 was the Principal of the appellant societys companylege at Bangalore. 1 did number specify the intended date of retirement. This was number a letter for withdrawing the numberice. The memorandum went on to state In view of the resolutions passed by the Board of Life Members and Board of Management, your further request dated 19th July, 1995 for keeping the voluntary retirement in abeyance has number been companysidered. That the letter was received by the Board of Management is number in dispute. The respondent No.1 did number refuse number did he protest this. The number specification of a date companypled with the fact that numberrequest was made for curtailment of the numberice period, meant that the date of his voluntary retirement companyld only be on or after 5.10.95. The appellant purported to treat the numberice dated 5.7.95 as a companytinuation of the first numberice dated 2.12.94 for the purpose of calculating the numberice period. Had the appellant treated the first numberice of retirement as the operative one, when the impugned order of acceptance was issued, the respondent No.1 would have been treated as retired with effect from the expiry of the first numberice period. It was a request that the numberice may be kept in abeyance in the sense number companysidered immediately thus postponing the intended date of retirement. The lecturer from Belgaon assumed charge as Principal in Bangalore on 22.7. The appeal preferred by the respondent No.1 was allowed on 19.2.1999 by the Education Appellate Tribunal and the resolution dated 19.7.1995 was quashed and the appellant was directed to companytinue the service of the respondent No.1 and to release to him all the benefits as if he were companytinuing in service. Assuming that the letter dated 19.7.95 was a numberice of withdrawal and that the appellant was right in discarding it, nevertheless the appellant was bound to allow the numberice period of three months calculated from 5.7.95 to expire before issuing an order accepting the numberice. He sent a letter on 2.12.1994 to the appellant stating that he was unable to companytinue as Principal of the College due to his ill health. It was resolved to accept the recommendations of the Board of Life Members in toto. By another order passed on the same day the Chairman transferred a senior grade lecturer from the appellants companylege at Belgaon to take over immediately the post of Principal of the Bangalore College in place of the respondent No.1. The appellant number having waited for three months from 5.7.95, the order accepting the respondent No. By accepting the second application on 5.7.95 the first application must in any event be treated as having been superseded. The appellant did number reply number did it take any action on the letter. He companytinued in service well after the expiry of the first numberice period. The reason given for number companysidering the respondent No.1s request dated 19.7.1995 was that it did number establish that there has been a material change in circumstances. It was said in the letter I am severely hit by ill health and misfortune. 1 by their companyduct clearly treated the first numberice as infructuous and inoperative. Both the appellant and the respondent No. On the other hand on 1.7.1995 the respondent No.1 was requested by the appellant to visit six institutions of the appellant at least once in three months and to submit reports regarding ways and means to improve the academic standard of the institutions. During this period, the respondent No. According to the respondent No.1, in order to take the situation under companytrol and also to respect the appeals from students, their parents, companyleagues, and public at large, he had resumed his duties. The respondent No. Here too the respondent No. I do number wish to cause any problem to the Society or any individual. The order of acceptance companyld have been issued by the appellant on 20.7.95 only after obtaining the specific prior approval of the State Government under clause m and after verification of the respondent No. He says that he found that there was a law and order problem in the companylege campus with outsiders seeking to interfere with the Admissions Committee. The verification with the Accountant General has number been done at all. Admittedly the appellant did number do that. 1 was number only companytinued in service but vested with additional obligations. They companyld number have done that for the reasons stated earlier. 1 was companycerned, the appointing authority was the appellant and the approving authority was the State Government. By its judgment dated 26.5.2000, the High Court rejected the revision application of the appellant and companyfirmed the finding of the Tribunal. Aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, the appellant has number approached this Court. As a result, I have been undergoing both physical and mental agony, since long time. They issued the impugned order within 15 days. The appellant challenged the decision of the Tribunal before the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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2002_322.txt

Delhi on 21.8.95 which was marked as Exhibit PW 4/A. An enquiry was companyducted by PW 4 and its report was submitted to DCP North West Distt. Bhairo Singh, ACP Kamla Market, Delhi. Admittedly, the charge was framed after a preliminary enquiry was companyducted by PW 4 Sh. Many grounds have been urged before us.

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2007_1085.txt

663, 9433 of 1981 etc. Sanghi, Bishamber Lal, Mehta Dave Co., Uma Dutta, S.N. 3376 80 and 3382 of 1982 etc. Vaidyanathan, B.P. 363, 339, 546, 301, 362 and 544 of 1981 respectively. L. Sanghi, S.N. Mohanty, Mrs. Rani Chabbra, Miss A. Subhashini, B.P. Singh, Ganga Dev, L.P. Aggarwala Co., B. Mehrotra, E.C. Aggarwala, S.K. Mehta, Ashok Grover, Rishi Kesh, R.P. Sinha, Gopal Subramanium, Mrs. Shoba Dixit, C.V. Subba Rao, Madan Lokur, Sushil Kumar, N.S. 960 C 959 C,D,F 960 A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. Kacker, Harbans Lal, C.S. Sharma, G.L. Maheswari, Badridas Sharma and R.A. Gupta for the appearing parties. Das Behl, P.H. XV of 1948 hereinafter referred to as the Act and rule 87 of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Rules, 1948 hereinafter referred to as the Rules framed by the Government of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of its powers companyferred under the Act, as companystitutionally valid and dismissing the Writ Petitions with companyts. Singh, M. Singh, D.P. Parekh, S.C. Jain, O.P. These appeals by special leave are filed against the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.339 of 1981 and companynected cases delivered on May 25, 1982 holding inter alia that section 28 B of the Uttar Pradesh Sales Tax Act, 1948 P. Act No. Writ Petition Nos. From the Judgment and Order dated 25th May, 1982 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATARAMIAH, J. Some writ petitions have also been filed in this Court. and W.P. All these were heard together by us. Hence these appeals by special leave have been filed.

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1986_41.txt

the workmen on the other hand companytended that babulal parekh was first appointed as a mere clerk under ramkrishna prasad to begin with and it was only on numberember 28 1952 that he was promoted over the head of ramkrishna prasad as a store in charge thus superseding ramkrishna prasad. thereafter ramkrishna prasad made a representation against his being made subordinate to the stores in charge. this stand of the workmen was controverted by the mill and its case was that babulal parekh was from the very beginning appointed as store in charge. on december 2 1952 anumberher order was passed by which ramkrishna prasad was ordered to hand over the keys of the stores to babulal parekh. 140 per month in october 1952. the mill created a new post of store in charge about that time as the work in the stores department of the mill had increased. the tribunal came to the companyclusion after a companysideration of the evidence produced that babulal was first appointed as an ordinary clerk in the stores department and was subsequently made a store incharge. one ramkrishna prasad was appointed as clerk in this mill in 1933. gradually he worked his way up and was drawing rs. a dispute was then raised by the union and a reference was made by the government of bihar on may 9 1956 in which the following three matters were referred to the tribunal whether the status of workman sri ramkrishna prasad store keeper and the nature of the job performed by him has been changed to his prejudice with the appointment of a separate store in charge whether in view of the satisfactory performance of duties of store keeper for the last 20 years by the above named workman it was at all necessary to appoint a separate store in charge over him with higher emoluments and whether shri ramkrishna prasad is entitled to be appointed to the post of store in charge and whether the claim of the above named workman for promotion to higher grades has been overlooked by the management and if so what relief the workman is entitled to. he took charge on october 7 1952. on numberember 28 1952 an order was passed by the mill distributing the duties between the various clerks employed in the stores department and it was stated therein that all the staff of the stores department would work as subordinate to babulal parekh. when the matter came up before the tribunal the main contention on behalf of the mill was that it was exclusively the management function to decide its labour strength both qualitatively and quantitatively and that so far as ramkrishna prasad was companycerned his position had number been prejudicially affected by the creation of the new post of a store in charge. on october 4 1952 babulal parekh was appointed to this new post on a consolidated salary of rs. the appellant is a sugar mill in district saran in the state of bihar. p. varma for the intervener state of bihar . he was also asked by anumberher letter to take charge immediately. 180 per menses. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 402 of 1958. appeal by special leave from the award dated january 29 1957 of the industrial tribunal bihar at patna in reference number 7 of 1956. sukumar ghose for the appellant. k. ramamurthi r. k. garg a. n. nag and suresh aggarwal for the respondents. march 9. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by wanchoo j. this is an appeal by special leave against the award of the industrial tribunal patna. a letter of appointment was issued to him on that date and he was told that he would be on probation for one year. this representation was rejected.

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1960_87.txt

The learned Single Judge interfered with the punishment on the ground that other employees against whom disciplinary proceedings had been initiated on similar charges had been subjected to a companyparatively a lenient punishment of stoppage of increments. 1.22 crores by the staff in the District Treasury Office, Salem came to light involving the presentation of 257 bogus bills in the Treasury. 45.28 lakhs and 51.98 lakhs respectively. The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the writ petitions filed by two employees of the State, interfered with the punishment of removal from service on the ground that it was shockingly disproportionate. The orders of removal were challenged before the learned Single Judge. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA Date 2018.12.01 140735 IST Reason The two employees, M. Mangayarkarasi and M. Jayalakshmi, were working as Superintendent and Accountant respectively in the District Treasury at Salem. The Single Judge substituted it by directing the stoppage of increments for a period of two years without cumulative effect. Following the submission of a Special Audit Report, a charge memo was issued against eleven members of the Treasury staff. The State Government, however, sought to justify the punishment on the ground that the quantum of loss caused due to the production of bogus bills in the case of the two employees was substantially higher. The learned Single Judge rejected this submission on the ground that the companyrt would have to companysider only the nature of the charge and number the quantum involved. The Division Bench affirmed the judgment of the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ appeals filed by the State of Tamil Nadu. Charges were framed in the companyrse of the disciplinary proceedings. On the charges having been found to be established, the State Government issued an order of removal from service. The charges against them were of having admitted and sanctioned bills of the office of the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes without proper verification, in accordance with the departmental procedures. These appeals arise from a judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras dated 6.2.2015 by which writ appeals filed by the State of Tamil Nadu against the judgment of a learned Single Judge were dismissed. The case of the State is that during the period 1997 2000, a fraud involving misappropriation of a sum of Rs. Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J. Leave granted.

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2018_612.txt

It was found that the default had been companymitted by the tenant in respect of tax and the same amounts to wilful default in payment of rent which would entitle the landladies to evict the tenants. 2658, 2941, 3122 and 3129 of 1990 Godavari Bai Rathi are the owners of mulgies bearing Municipal Nos. 3.2.840/7. 2658, 2941, 3122 and 3129 of 1990 to the High Court. P 2 is in respect of mulgi bearing No. P 1 is in respect of mulgi bearing No. Alleging that the tenants had companymitted wilful default in payment of rent as well as the taxes due to the Municipal Corporation in respect of the demised premises, the landladies filed four eviction petitions bearing R.C. The tenants companytended that they did number companymit wilful default either with regard to payment of rent or municipal taxes. 3.2.840/6 and 3.2.840/7 situated at Veer Sawarkar Road, Kacheguda, Hyderabad. The appellate companyrt held that there was numberbasis for the trial companyrt to companyclude that the tenants had companymitted wilful default. 3.2.840/6 and Ex. The tenants were directed to vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession of the same to the landladies within three months from the date of the order. The tenants were directed to vacate the premises within a period of two months. Nos. These two mulgies were let out to appellants tenants under separate lease deeds marked as P 1 and P 2 respectively in the trial companyrt executed on September 23, 1978. 291 of 1984, 292 of 1984, 1972 of 1986 and 1973 of 1986 on the file of the First Additional Rent Controller at Hyderabad. Common evidence was adduced in R.C. Thereupon, revisions were preferred in Civil Revision Petition Nos. The first respondent landlady, Smt Kanta Bai Asawa, and her mother Smt From the Judgment and Order dated June 29, 1993 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in C.R.P. Accordingly all the four eviction petitions were allowed. Aggrieved by the order of eviction, appeals were preferred in R.A. Nos. The revision petitions were allowed. 387 390 of 1989 to the learned Chief Judge, City Small Cause Court, Hyderabad. All the petitions were clubbed together. All these appeals can be dealt with under a companymon judgment since they arise out of one and the same order in all the companyrts. For these reasons the appeals were allowed. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MOHAN, J. Thus, the present civil appeals. No.

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1994_78.txt

It was number disputed that the respondent had sold paddy seeds 135/ per bag to the appellant. The appellant approached the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum for short the District Forum by companyplaining that he purchased 10 bags of paddy seeds from the respondent 135 per bag for the purpose of sowing and transplanting the seedlings to raise paddy in 7 acres of his land. When he sowed the seeds in the nursery, they did number germinate properly. 17.500/ to the appellant by way of refunding of the price of the paddy seeds and damages caused to him as a result of the transaction. The only defence of the respondent was that the National Seed Corporation, which supplied the paddy seeds, was directly responsible for making good the loss and it should have been made party to the proceedings and that the respondent was number responsible to make good the loss. He made companyplaint to the respondent the respondent deputed the Agricultural Extension Officer to inspect the land and to submit his report about the quality of the seeds supplied to the appellant the said Officer having inspected the spot, reported that the germination was hardly upto 10 to 25 having received the report, the respondent addressed a letter to the Marketing Officer, National Seed Corporation, Mysore, stating that on account of sub standard paddy seeds sold to the appellant, the appellant had to leave 7 acres of his land hollow and uncultivated and that the National Seed Corporation was liable to make good the loss. The District Forum numbericed that the statement made in the affidavit of the appellant, that he companyld number raise and harvest paddy in 7 acres of his land due to number germination of the seeds purchased by him, was number denied by the respondent the respondent had only pleaded his ignorance as to whether the appellant had to leave 7 acres of his land uncultivated. The reason for modifying the amount of companypensation to be paid to the appellant is to be seen in paragraph 7 of the order of the State Commission which reads The germination of the paddy seeds in the nursery takes place within a period of 3 10 days after its sowing. The National Seed Corporation, in spite of the request of the, respondent, did number depute any technical expert to inspect the spot for assessment. The State Commission companycurred with the findings recorded by the District Forum but modified the order of the District Forum directing the respondent to pay and refund a sum of Rs. 1, 350/ , the price of the seeds, to the appellant with interest thereon at 18 per annum from the date of its purchase. According to the appellant, in the numbermal companyrse, he would have received 50 quintals of paddy from 7 acres of his land, the value of the same would have been Rs. The District Forum on admitted facts held that the respondent was a trader in relation to the appellant. Having companysidered the companytentions of the parties and the material placed before it, the District Forum directed the respondent to pay a sum ofRs. Both the parties filed respective affidavits before the District forum and the appellant, in addition produced two documents in support of his claim. Commission also awarded a sum of Rs. Therefore, the companyplainant would be able to know whether it was a proper germination or number within a period of 10 12 days. 100/ as companyt to the appellant. 2004 Supp 2 SCR 406 The Judgment was delivered by SHIVARAJ V. PATIL, J Shivaraj V. Patil, J. The respondent took up the matter in appeal before the Karnataka State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for short the State companymission . 17, 100/ with companysequential reliefs from the respondent. He, therefore, claimed a sum of Rs. 1, 000/ as companypensation to the appellant. 15, 750/ calculated at the lowest rate prevailing at the relevant time. A further direction was given to pay Rs. The State. Hence, this appeal.

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2004_401.txt

the companymissioner of income tax bombay city i is the appellate and the jubilee mills limited bombay the respondent. the companymissioner of income tax obtained a certificate of fitness and filed the present appeal. hidayatullah j. this is an appeal on a certificate of fitness granted by the high companyrt of bombay against the judgment of the high companyrt dated march 13 1958 on a reference made by the income tax appellate tribunal. the assessee companypany then applied for a reference and the tribunal referred the following questions for decision by the high companyrt whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the income tax officer was companypetent to pass an order under section 23a 1 of the act after having allowed a rebate of one anna per rupee in the assessment under proviso a to paragraph b of part i of the second schedule of the finance act 1948 ?

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1962_67.txt

Gugnani, advocate. Gugnani, advocate ventured to companyduct the chief examination of that witness. Gugnani, advocate of the companyplainant to companyduct under the supervision, guidance and companytrol of the public prosecutor, while companyducting the same case and the public prosecutor shall retain with himself the companytrol over the proceedings. Gugnani, advocate, to appear for him in the sessions companyrt during trial of the case. On 1.7.1996 when appellant was to be examined as a witness for prosecution, Shri R.C. It was objected to by the companynsel for the accused on the premise that a private companynsel cannot companyduct prosecution in a sessions trial. Appellant, on his part, engaged Shri R.C. Fairness to the accused who faces prosecution is the raison detre of the legislative insistence on that score. Appellant then moved an application on the same day, the relevant portion of which reads thus That the Public Prosecutor has numberobjection if the case is companyducted by Shri R.C. In this case, appellant is aggrieved because a companynsel engaged by him was number allowed by the High Court to companyduct prosecution in spite of obtaining a companysent from the Public Prosecutor companycerned. THOMAS,J It is as well for the protection of accused persons in sessions trials in India that provision is made to have the case against him prosecuted only by a Public Prosecutor and number by any companynsel engaged by the aggrieved private party. Appellant and respondent are advocates practicing at the same station. The trial companyrt passed an order thereon, the material portion of which reads thus I accept the application and allow Shri R.C. First respondent was the accused in the sessions trial wherein appellant wanted his companynsels active role to be played. The grievance of the appellant developed in the following fact situation Appellant is the brother of five sisters, and the youngest among them, Suman, had secured creditable academic laurels. She was given in marriage to Dr.Dinesh Kumar Gupta the son of the respondent . But about 4 months after her marriage she met with a tragic death by burns. But after companypletion of the investigation a charge sheet was laid against him for the offence under Section 304 B of the Indian Penal Code. On a companyplaint lodged by the appellant, FIR under Section 302 and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code IPC was registered by the local police against the respondent.

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1999_502.txt

xx xx xx xx. This said rule reads Termination of temporary service, 1 a The services of a temporary Government servantwho is number in quasi permanent service shall be liable to termination at any time by a numberice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant b the period of such numberice shall be one month Provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the numberice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the case may be, for the period by which such numberice falls short of one month. The question is, whether the order of termination of service can be sustained because of absence of payment on the 25th September. To put the matter in a nutshell, to be effective the termination of service has to be simultaneous with the payment to the employee of whatever is due to him. The proviso to sub r. b however gives the Government an additional right in that it gives an option to the Government number to retain the services of the employee till the expiry of the period of the numberice if it so chooses to terminate the service at any time it can do so forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the numberice at the same rate at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or, as the case may be, for the period by which such numberice falls short of one month. Rule, 5 1 a gives the Government as well as the employee a right to put an end to the service by a numberice in writing. The only question involved in this appeal is, whether the order dated September 25, 1968 terminating the services of the respondent, a temporary Government servant, was in accordance with the provisions of Rule 5 of the Central Service Temporary Service Rules 1965, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. Under rule 1 b the period prescribed for such numberice is one month. The services of the respondent appear to have been terminated on the basis of the directive companytained in a circular dated 12th September 1968 that action should be taken against every employee who absented himself from duty on 19th September, 1968. It is admitted that payment of the salary and allowances was number made to the respondent on 25th September, 1968. Apart from the authorities which were cited at the Bar, it appears to us that the rule is capable of the only interpretation that the order of termination can be upheld if the requisite amount in terms of the rule was paid into the hands of the employee of made available to him at the same time as he was served with the order. According to, the respondent the disbursing officer was intimated about the order of termination only on the 28th September when he was supplied with the, necessary funds. 1706 of 1971. No companytention was raised at any stage that numberaction companyld be taken under Rule, 5. As against this it was alleged in the companynter affidavit to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court that one months pay and allowances had been sent by money order to the respondent. 534 of 1969. S. R. Chart, A. K. Gupta, S. C. Agarwal and V. J. Francis, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Mtter, J. H. Dhebar, for the appellants. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated January 5, 1971 of the Kerala High Court in Civil Writ Appeal No. The order was quashed by a learned single Judge of the High Court and this was upheld by a Division Bench in appeal. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.

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1972_525.txt

Leave granted.

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2010_512.txt

Guravareddy were working as Health Inspector, Lower Division Clerk and Health Worker, respectively, attached to the Primary Health center, Ipur. In the same office, appellants 1 and 2 and the accused.

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1978_395.txt

Respondent No.1, who was an employee of the University, made applications both for the posts of Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar. 4 and 5 were appointed as Assistant Registrars. The minimum qualification prescribed for appointment as Assistant Registrar was as under Assistant Registrar A post graduate Degree with at least 55 marks or its equivalent grade. The appellant University on March 1, 1996 issued an advertisement for filling up the posts of Deputy Registrar and Assistant Registrar by direct recruitment. It was, accordingly, submitted that respondent No.1 was ineligible for appointment to the post of Assistant Registrar. Note In service employees of the University holding Bachelors Degree in any discipline and fulfilling other prescribed companyditions shall be eligible to companypete for appointment to the post of Assistant Deputy Registrar. the appellant was entitled, in terms of the numberice, to be companysidered for appointment as Assistant Registrar since he was holder of Bachelors Degree and an in service employee of the University, the appellant was entitled to companypete for the post of Assistant Registrar. The University took the stand that under the University statute the eligibility for appointment as Assistant Registrar for an in service employee was that he should either be a Section Officer or P.A. The recruitment to the post of Deputy Registrar is to be made in the ratio of 75 by direct recruitment and 25 by promotion and for the post of Assistant Registrar in the ratio of 50 by direct recruitment and 50 by promotion on the basis of merit cum seniority from amongst eligible Section Officers and P.A.1 cum Stenographers in the ratio of 21 respectively. He was working only as Head Assistant which post was one step lower to the post of Section Officer in the University. In the first place the Division Bench overlooked that according to the statutory eligibility criterion only a Section Officer or a A. cum Stenographer was eligible to be companysidered for appointment as Assistant Registrar and respondent No.1 was a Head Assistant. cum Stenographer and hold a Bachelors degree in any discipline. It was further pointed out that respondent No.1 had only 54.03 marks in the post graduation degree and for that reason too he was number eligible. The Division Bench found and held that respondent No.1 was number eligible to be companysidered for the post of Deputy Registrar and, hence, rejected his case in so far that post is companycerned. 4 and 5 above respondent No.1 in the select list. Coming, however, to the post of Assistant Registrar, the Division Bench took the view that Selection Committee had number assigned any reason for putting respondent number. This appeal is directed against the judgment passed by a Division Bench of the Jammu Kashmir High Court by which it has allowed the intra court appeal filed by respondent No.1, set aside the judgment and order passed by a single Judge of the High Court dismissing his Writ Petition and directed the appellant University to give seniority to respondent No.1 on the post of Assistant Registrar and to pay him the salary for that post from the date respondents 4 and 5 were appointed to the post of Assistant Registrar. The Writ Petition was opposed by the University. cum Steno. On the basis of the select list, prepared by the Selection Committee, respondent Nos. It was pointed out that respondent No.1 was neither a Section Officer number a P.A. Respondents 4 and 5 were placed in the select list at ranks IV and V respectively. The Selection Committee, companystituted for the purpose, on a companysideration of the merit, suitability, academic qualification, experience and performance of the candidates in the interview prepared a select list on May 26, 1996 in which respondent No.1 was placed at rank XIII. About two years later, respondent No.1 filed a Writ Petition Writ Petition No.1094 of 1998 seeking to challenge the appointments made in pursuance of the advertisement and claiming that persons inferior to him in qualification and merit were appointed on the two posts. 4 and 5. The only thing that was required to be seen was whether the selection companymittee assessed the merit of the appellant higher than respondent Nos.4 and 5. 4 and 5, found appellant was less meritorious than the respondent Nos. Against the judgment passed by the single Judge, respondent number1 filed an intra court appeal LPASW No.202/2001 which was allowed by the judgment and order dated April 24, 2009 by the Division Bench. In this regard, the Division Bench stated as follows In the background of what we have stated, i.e. Aftab Alam,J. It seems to have called for the documents relating to the selection process and, making its own assessment on going through the records, made the impugned direction. On a companysideration of all the material facts and circumstances, a single Judge of the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition by judgment and order dated May 31, 2001. Leave granted.

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2011_352.txt

Bijendra Narain claimed that all properties standing in the name of Bidya Narain and his sons and also of Hashistha Narain dependent No. Sons of Bidya Narain and Bashishta Narain were the principal companytesting defendants. In 1923 Udit Narain and the sons of Shyam Narain instituted suit No. It was urged that this recital also evidenced severance between Bijendra Narain and Bidya Narain of the joint family status by the preliminary decree. One Mankishun had four sons Talebar, Indra Narain, Chandra Narain and Shyam Narain. But the suit filed by Bijendra Narain is number of that nature. Bijendra Narain, son of Ishwari Narain who was at the date of the suit a minor was impleaded as the 8th defendant, by his guardian ad litem Bidya Narain his uncle, who was impleaded as the 4th defendant, Mode Narain, Hari Narain and Rajballav Narain, sons of Bidya Narain, were impleaded as defendants 5, 6 7. It was number alleged by Bijendra Narain that any property was purchased by the 24th defendant on his behalf or on behalf of another person through whom he, Bijendra Narain claimed. 27 of 1923 there was numberseverance of status between the plaintiff Bijendra Narain on the one hand and Bidya Narain and his sons on the other and that the properties in suit had at all material times remained joint and Bijendra Narain was on that account entitled to a decree for partition and separate possession of a half share in the immovable properties in Sch. 17 of 1942 of the file of Subordinate Judge, Purnea, filed by Bijendra Narain son of Ishwari Narain against Mode Narain, Hari Narain and Rajballav Narain, sons of Bidya Narain, and others for a decree for partition and separate possession of a half share in the properties described in schedules A, B C to the plaint. In support of this plea he relied upon specification in the decree of the share of Bijendra Narain. By the institution of the suit there was undoubtedly severance of status between the plaintiffs of that suit on the one hand and the defendants on the other, but companynsel for the appellants companytended that by the specification of shares in the preliminary decree, there was severance of status number only between the descendants of Indra Narain and the descendants of Chandra Narain but also between Bijendra Narain plaintiff in this suit and Bidya Narain. 24 were joint family properties, and that properties were acquired in the name of the 24th defendant by Bidya Narain and his sons with a view to defeat his claim. 27 of 1923 the joint family status between the plaintiff Bijendra Narain and Bidya Narain had companye to an end, that since the decree passed in the earlier suit the parties had been holding the properties as tenants in common and number as joint tenants, that the members of the branch of Bidhya Narain were living and carrying on their business separately, and the share of the plaintiff Bijendra Narain was looked after and managed by his mother and his maternal uncle Rudra Narain, that the private properties, of the plaintiff Bijendra Narain and the defendants had also been ascertained by the companypromise petition in suit No. His claim was that the properties belonged to the joint family, because they were purchased by Bidya Narain and his sons with the aid of joint family funds in the name of the 24th defendant. By paragraph a of the decree the adoption of Udit Narain as a son by Raghu Nandan was admitted and it was agreed that Udit Narain was entitled in the property in suit to a fourth share as adopted son of Raghu Nandan, and a twelfth share as heir of his natural father Shyam Narain. Bijendra Narain attained the age of majority in 1934, and on July 10, 1942 companymenced the present action for partition of a half share in the properties which were in the possession of Bidya Narain, his sons and grandsons alleging that he, Bijendra Narain came to learn in 1938 that taking advantage of his minority and inexperience his uncle Bidya Narain and the sons of Bidya Narain had purchased in their own names many properties with the aid of joint family funds and had acquired certain other properties in the name of Bashisht Narain twentyfourth defendant in the suit , who was daughters son of Bidya Narain that in September, 1941 certain respectable residents of the village companysented to lend their good offices to settle the dispute and to act as panchas, that at the meeting before the panchas, Bidya Narain and his sons admitted that the properties held by them including the properties acquired in their names and of Bashisht Narain were joint family estates, but they later demurred to give to the plaintiff a separate share, and hence the suit. A decree final was made on February 15, 1937 and the properties of the family were divided in three lots the first lot representing an eight anna share of Udit Narain and the sons of Shyam Narain, the second representing a four anna share of the branch of Indra Narain, and the third a four anna share of defendants 4 to 8 of the branch of Chandra Narain. Hanuman died leaving him surviving numberlineal descendant and Raghu Nandan adopted Udit Narain grandson of his uncle Shyam Narain. Bashisht Narain the 24th defendant submitted that the properties purchased in his name were obtained with the aid of his own funds and that he had numberconcern with the other defendants. 27 of 1923, that the defendants had been in exclusive possession of the properties purchased in their names since the date of acquisition, and that the plaintiff Bijendra Narain was never in possession of those properties. 27 of 1923 in the companyrt of the Subordinate Judge, Purnea, impleading as defendants the descendants of Indra Narain and Chandra Narain as parties thereto for partition and separate possession of a half share in the properties of the joint family. I and his brothers and their father admitted before the panchas that all the properties held by the parties the group of the plaintiff and the defendants 1st party including those acquired in the names of the defendants 1,3,6 and Bidya Narain Choudhary as also those acquired in the name of the defendant 24, who is the son of the sister of the defendants 1,2 and 6, were the joint properties of the plaintiff and themselves, and they also admitted that the plaintiffs share in all the properties was half and it was suggested that a fist of all the joint properties should be drawn up for the purpose of partition and accounts and it should be looked, and by paragraph 19 the plaintiff Bijendra Narain claimed a share in the properties including the properties standing in the name of the 24th defendant. He directed that an account be taken of the assets and liabilities of the family since the date of demand for partition by the plaintiff Bijendra Narain in 1941. 3 Two annas share Defendants Nos. B to the plaint, the learned Judge directed that the Commissioner appointed by the Court do ascertain the properties and divide the same in equal shares and do award one half to the plaintiff Bijendra Narain and the other half to the defendants. 6, 7 8 One anna four piece share Defendants I 2 Two annas share Defendant No. 1 Four annas share Plaintiffs Nos. The rest of properties are held by each of the defendants 4 to 8 in equal shares. 1 to 3s four annas share, and one allotment should be made for defendants 4 to 8s four annas share, i.e. 4, 5, 6 8 Two annas share Defendant No. 4 5 One anna four piece share Plaintiffs Nos. The defendants in the suit have appealed to this Court. 1 3 One anna four piece share Plaintiffs Nos. 27 of 1923 joint family estate. The learned Judge negatived the companytention of the 24th defendant that the properties in his possession did number belong to the joint family. 8 Two annas share That the parties agree that at the time of partition by the arbitrators one allotment should be made for defendants Nos. He did number set up the case that the 24th defendant acquired the properties for him, number did he plead that the properties were acquired for some person through whom he was claiming. The Trial Court had to try the issue of severance of the joint family status by the decree in suit No. Talebar had two sons Hanuman and Raghu Nandan. They submitted that by the decree in suit No. In regard to the movable properties described in Sch. By paragraph 13 of the plaint it was averred that the defendant No. 29 obtained by Narendra Narayan Chaoudhary defendant No. That the parties agree that the family estate is still joint and that the entire family estate except those that have already been partitioned as detailed below in schedule D will be partitioned by metes and bounds according to the shares as defined above That the parties agree that a preliminary decree be passed declaring the shares of the parties as follows Plaint No. The trial Judge held that by the decree in suit No. in the suit Ext. The decree further provided. Then followed schedules setting out detailed descriptions of the properties. A preliminary decree was passed in the suit on July, 1924 by companysent of parties. 29 29 b the certified companyies of the same decree Ext. In appeal, the High Court agreed with the view of the Trial Court on all the questions in dispute, and companyfirmed the decree, subject to a modification about the direction for determination of movable properties described in Sch. The suit was decreed by the Trial Court and in appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna the decree was companyfirmed with a slight modification. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated November 19, 1957 of the Patna High Court in Appeal from Original Decree No. 133 1 a of the Constitution arises out of suit No. 29 b obtained by the Darbhanga Raj on September 19, 1934 and May 24, 1940 respectively, were produced, and they did number companytain the recital. Goburdhun, for the respondent. The judg ment of this companyrt Addanki Venkatasubbaiah v. Chilakamarthi Kotaiah 1 does number assist the case of the appellants. Sarjoo Prasad, D. P. Singh, R. K. Garg, S. C. Agarwal and K Ramamurthi, for the appellants. Such a claim does number fall within the terms of s. 66 1 . 258 of 1848. three allotments will be made as aforesaid. The case fell squarely within the terms of sub s. 2 of s. 66. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah J. 756 of 1964. This appeal with certificate under Art. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. A.

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1966_255.txt

The State of Haryana has preferred this appeal against six accused persons who stood tried for having companymitted offence under Sections 306 and 498A I.P.C. The two companyvicted persons, namely, Jai Parkash and Shanti Devi preferred criminal appeal in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana against their companyviction and sentence. The State did number carry any appeal to the High Court against the acquittal of those four persons. The learned trial Judge, on appreciation of evidence, acquitted four of them. The State though has preferred this appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the High Court, has number even produced a companyy of the evidence of the two relevant witnesses, namely, the father and the brother of the deceased for appreciation of this Court.

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2000_296.txt

3 Jagdei but as pointed out by the High Court both the witnesses were companytradicted on these points. The High Court on reappreciation of their evidence found that the witnesses had made an improvement in their evidence over their initial version before the police as regards the manner in which P.W.3 Jagdei received the injury which was alleged to have been caused by Chandrawati. Nanavati Honble Mr. Justice B.N. The trial companyrt had companyvicted her on the basis of evidence of two eye witnesses P.W.2, Ram Lalit, aged about 11 years and P.W.3, Jagdei, aged about 7 years. She was companyvicted under Section 307 for causing injury to P.W. Singh and A.S. Pundit, Advs. Kirpal Arvind Kumar, I.P. for the appellant Dharam Bir Vohra, Adv. In these two appeals the State is challenging the acquittal of Chandrawati who was companyvicted by the trial companyrt for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 307 IPC but acquitted by the High Court. THE 25TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1997 Present Honble Mr.Justice G.T. for the Respondent J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered NANAVATI, J.

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1997_1523.txt

One Sadachiammal was the wife of Armugham Pillai. B 11 Will by Armugham Pillai dated 29.8.1932 were the joint family properties and so Armugham Pillai was incompetent to execute the Will. Armugham Pillai died in 1946. B 11 were the joint family properties or self acquired properties of Armugham Pillai. The plaintiff, Vijyammal, is the wife of Manickam Pillai Armugham Pillai executed Ext. Since it was held that Armugham Pillai was incompetent to execute Ext. Defendant pleaded that there is dedication of A B schedule properties to the Temple in Ext. Armugham Pillai, being a companyarcener in the family, was incompetent to execute Ext. B 10 maintenance decree passed against Armugham Pillai, charged on the properties. On the above premises, and holding that at the time when Armugham Pillai wrote Ext. 191 of 1937 whereby the plaintiff obtained a decree for maintenance against Armugham Pillai charged on the properties. It was further companytended that the life estate granted to Sadachiammal A schedule properties and the life estate granted to the plaintiff B schedule properties were so given, in lieu of their right to maintenance. B 11 were the self acquired properties of Armugham Pillai, in which case he was fully companypetent to execute the document, Ext. B 11 are admittedly joint family properties that the Will Ext. B 11 was executed on 29.8.1932 when Armugham was number the sole surviving companyarcener that the life estates given to Sadachiammal and the plaintiff over A and B schedule properties were in lieu of their antecedent right of maintenance that since Sadachiammal died on 13.6.1957 after the Hindu Succession Act, the life estate obtained by her over A schedule properties, enlarged into an absolute estate. Arumugham Pillai. Plaintiff claimed that she is absolutely entitled to A and B Schedule properties. Under the Will, his wife Sadachiammal was given a life estate over A schedule properties and the reminder was bequeathed to first defendant temple. B 11 were joint family properties or separate properties of the testator and whether Armugham Pillai was companypetent to deal with the properties by a testamentary instrument was also a moot question. Since Sadachiammal was given only a life interest in A schedule properties, on her death on 13.6.1957, the properties vested in the Temple and plaintiff is incompetent to lay claim to A schedule properties. The first defendant, Temple Mahaliamman Temple and Vigneswara Temple represented by its Trustees claimed that the properties have been dedicated to the Temple and the plaintiff has only a life estate in B Schedule properties. He had a son Manickam Pillai. The first defendant in the suit pleaded that Armugham Pillai was the sole surviving companyarcener when he died in 1946. B 11, Will, dated 29.8.1932 regarding plaint A B schedule properties. There are seven items in A Schedule and two items in B Schedule properties. So the properties, A B schedule, bequeathed to Sadachiammal and plaintiff, under the Will, enlarged into an absolute estate, and the first defendant cannot lay claim over the said properties. According to her, the properties dealt with in Ext. According to the first defendant the properties mentioned in Ext. Defendent further companytended that even with regard to B schedule properties, plaintiff was given only a life estate under Ext. The suit was laid for a declaration of plaintiffs title to plaint A and B Schedule properties. It was held that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration of her title over A and B schedule properties. B 11 and after her life, properties will vest in the first defendant Temple, for the charities mentioned in Ext. The further question whether the properties dealt with in Ext. Plaint A and B schedule properties belonged to one C.S. B 11 as he did. The Will, Ext. Armugham Pillais daughter in law Vijayammal, the plaintiff, filed the suit for a declaration of her title to plaint A B, schedule properties. B 11 dated 29.8.1932, he was number the sole surviving companyarcener, the trial companyrt found that Armugham Pillai was number companypetent to bequeath the suit properties by Will. Since Sadachiammal died after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, her life estate enlarged into an absolute estate and on death of Sadachiammal on 13.6.1957, the plaintiff became absolutely entitled to plaint A and B schedule properties. B 11, and dedicate the properties to the temple by Will dated 29.8.1932, when Manickam Pillai, his son, was alive. B 10, maintenance decree, obtained by the plaintiff in OS 191 of 1937 against Armugham Pillai, charged on the plaint properties is proof positive to show that she was given a life estate in lieu of her antecedent right of maintenance and the life estate so given to the plaintiff regarding B schedule properties also got enlarged into an absolute estate. B 11 the suit properties have been dedicated to the first defendant Temple and it was number a mere charge created over the suit properties for the purpose of the charities mentioned in Ext. Similarly, it was held that the B schedule properties were bequeathed to the plaintiff for life, in view of her pre existing right of maintenance as evidenced by Ext. Plaint A schedule companytains seven items of properties. The trial companyrt found that Armugham Pillai and his son Manickam Pillai were living as members of joint family they were jointly doing business that the suit properties belonged to the said joint family and are number the self acquired properties of Armugham Pillai, In companying to the aforesaid companyclusion, the trial companyrt relied on voluminous oral and documentary evidence and, in particular, Ext. According to the High Court the life estate given to Sadachiammal wife of Armugham Pillai enlarged into an absolute estate in view of Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, as she had a pre existing right to maintenance. The finding of the trial companyrt that the plaint properties were dedicated to the first defendant Temple as per Ext. Ext, B 11 became operative only then and as sole surviving companyarcener he was entitled to execute the Will, even if the properties dealt with, were joint family properties. The direction in Ext. His wife Sadachiammal died on 13.6.1957 after Hindu Succession Act. Similarly B schedule properties were bequeathed to plaintiff daughter in law for her life and in the absence of any child to her the said properties shall vest in the first defendant Temple for the various offerings charities mentioned hereinabove in the Will. Similarly, Ext. B 11, it was also held that the first defendant obtained numberright in the suit properties. On the other hand, companynsel for the respondent companytended that the properties dealt with in Ext. Nor are we companycerned with the claims put forward by certain other persons on the basis of alleged Wills of Armugham Pillai dated 20.5.1946 and 29.8.1932 which were found to be fabricated. The scope and effect of Ext. B 11 and number a mere charge as pleaded by the plaintiff. B 11 was that Sadachiammal was to companylect the entire income of A schedule properties and enjoy the same for her life time and after her life the entire income shall be spent for various vazhipadus offerings like Annadanam, Vilakku, Naivethyam and other charitable purposes of the first defendant Temple. Manickam Pillai, son of the testator, pre deceased him. So the bequests made regarding A B schedule properties in favour of the first defendant companyld number and did number take place at all. It was on the ground that plaintiff has also bequeathed her properties by Will and so her legal representatives aforesaid were brought on record. The nature and validity of the Wills, if any, executed by Sadachiammal and the plaintiff, will take effect on their own terms and according to law. Some of them are very valuable prime properties in Coimbatore fetching substantial income. B 11 and it was number a case of creation of mere charge over the suit properties, was number adjudicated but was left open by the High Court. The plaintiff in the said suit is the respondent. The trial companyrt, however, opined that in Ext. This suit OS No. B 10, decree, dated 26.10.1938 OS No. B 11 document called for discussion of alternate views. In this appeal, we are number called upon to decide the validity or nature of the bequests in the Wills executed by Sadachiammal dated 8.6.1957 or of the plaintiff said to have been executed during the pendency of this appeal. The first defendant in O.S. In the appeal filed by the first defendant before the High Court of Madras, AS 12 of 1977, the High Court made a slightly different approach and did number adjudicate the question as to whether the properties dealt with in Ext. The suit filed by the plaintiff was rightly decreed by both the companyrts below. B 11, is available at pages 140 147 of the printed paper book. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court an order was passed on 6.4.1987 requiring the plaintiff to deposit Rs 2,500/ as companytribution for the maintenance of the Temple. 537 of 1967 and OS 538 of 1968 which were tried along with the present suit OS No. 344 of 1967. 344 of 1967, Subordinate Judges companyrt, Coimbatore, is the appellant herein. 344/67 was tried along with two other suits O.S. Aggrieved by the said judgment, in AS 12 of 1977 dated 17.1.1983 the first defendant has filed the above civil appeal. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court the plaintiff died and her legal representatives were impleaded as respondents 1 to 16 as per order of this Court dated 12.3.1991. 537 of 1967 and 538 of 1968, which are number relevant at this stage. He died in 1934. The short facts to understand the scope of companytroversy in the suit are as follows. PARIPOORNAN,J. The litigation had a chequered career. No.

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45 which is in Gujarati and is described as Rojkam on the subject of the alignment of Vartu Canal. The Rojkam is signed by the Executive Engineer as also by the occupants. This suit of the plaintiffs appellants was companytested and the following issues were framed Whether the suit agreement dated 7.11.1966 is number binding to the defendant ? If it is binding whether the plaintiff prove that they have companyplied with the terms and companyditions of this agreement? Whether the suit is number maintainable as the agreement dated 7.11.1966 has number been registered of because numbercompromise decree had been passed in terms of this agreement? Somewhere in 1972, the plaintiffs appellants discovered that the State Government was going back from the agreement and alignment of the canal was being undertaken companytrary to the alignment reflected in the map appended to the agreement Ex.45. Under the Vartu Dam Irrigation Scheme, the defendant State proposed to companystruct a Dam on river Vartu and prepared a sketch, indicating the passage of the canal from Vartu Dam and for that purpose, it proceeded to acquire land through which the canal was proposed to run. Whether the suit is number in time? Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration sought? What order? As a result of the said agreement the suit was unconditionally withdrawn by the plaintiffs on 24.11.1966. Whether the suit as framed is number maintainable? During the pendency of the suit, it appears that an agreement was arrived at between the parties and it was agreed that the canal from Vartu Dam would be run as per the line demarcated in red in the map appended to the deed of agreement Ex.45. Whether the suit is bad for the mis joinder of the plaintiffs and the cause of action? The Rojkam further records that both the sides have agreed to the alignment shown in rose companyour in the map. The Trial Court decreed the suit and declared that the suit agreement dated 7.11.1966 entered between the plaintiffs and the defendants through its executive engineer, was binding on the parties and that the parties were bound to act in accordance with the terms of the said companypromise the defendant state was permanently restrained from going back from the agreement and act otherwise than as per the terms of the same. The High Court examined the agreement dated 7.11.1966, Ex. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get the permanent injunction as prayed for by them? The High Court numbericed that the Rojkam refers to the filing of the suit in the Civil Court and the meeting between the Executive Engineer and the occupants of land and proceeded to recite that on the aforesaid subject there was discussion of the Executive Engineer with the occupants and thereafter both the sides have amicably settled companypromised the dispute with regard to the alignment of the canal. They, therefore, filed a fresh suit for declaration to the effect that the agreement, dated 7.11.1966, entered into between them and the respondents through its Executive Engineer, Irrigation Department Jamnagar, was binding on the parties and that the parties were bound to act according to the terms of the said agreement and for an injunction, restraining the defendant State from going back on the agreement. During the hearing, the parties companyfined their arguments to the following two points Whether the agreement dated 7.11.66 is binding to the State of Gujarat? It was stated that the State does number admit any agreement made by the Executive Engineer either on behalf of the State or as a representative of the State and, therefore, the so called agreement did number bind the State Government. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs, granted to them by the trial companyrt? Suit was registered and defendants were summoned. It was asserted by the State that the Executive Engineer had numberauthority to agree on behalf of the State Government as he was number the representative of the Government. The Rojkam then records The Executive Engineer Mr. B.V. Nanavati having assured of getting necessary alterations as aforesaid made, they i.e., the plaintiffs or the occupants have shown willingness to withdraw unconditionally the suit filed in Civil Court. Before the High Court, the main plea raised by the State was that the alleged companypromise agreement was number binding upon the State. The plaintiffs appellants apprehended serious damage to their lands by the passing of the canal through their lands and they filed a Regular Civil Suit in 1966 against the defendant State, seeking to restrain it from implementing the Irrigation Scheme, as proposed. The plaintiffs appellants are the farmers of the Village Morzar under Bhanwad Taluka of Jamnagar District. Issues 1 to 8 were decided in favour of the plaintiffs appellants and against the defendant State. The appeal of the State of Gujarat was dismissed. The State of Gujarat preferred an appeal in the Court of District Judge Jamnagar against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 90 of 1976. The State filed a Second Appeal in the High Court. From the Judgment Order dated 20.1.77 of the Gujarat High Court in Second Appeal No. Their lands are situated on the outskirts of the village. Ms. Meenaksh Arora for Anip Sachthey for the Respondent. Similar plea had been raised before the trial companyrt and the lower appellate companyrt but was rejected. 45, was a null and void document. The appellate companyrt answered both the questions in the affirmative and by its order dated October 20, 1975 companyfirmed the judgment and decree of the trial companyrt. Krishan Kumar for Vimal Chandra S. Dave for the Appellants. This appeal by special leave, is directed against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court dated 20th of January, 1977 in Second Appeal No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ANAND, J. 47 of 1979.

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