Datasets:

L-NLProc

/

PredEx_Instruction-Tuning_Prediction

like 0

Follow

L-NLProc: Legal Natural Language Processing 3

Avtar Singh and Others Vs. Jagjit Singh and Another

UNTWALIA J.1. This appeal arises out of an unfortunate litiga tion where the plaintiff appellant in this appeal has got to fail in this Court too on some technical grounds.2. One Sardar Balwant Singh died on 10th March, 1955 leaving only three sons according to the case of appellants, namely, the two appellants and respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 1 claimed to be a fourth son of Balwant Singh entitled to 1/4th share in the property left by him. The appellants filed Suit No. 41 of 1958, in the Court of Sub Judge, Bassi. The Civil Court on the objection of Respondent No. 1 framed a preliminary issue whether the said Court was competent to try the suit or was it a matter which could be decided only by the Settlement Commissioner. By Order dated 7.7.1958 the learned Subordinate Judge decided that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try this suit and directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Revenue Court. When the appellants filed their claim in the Revenue Court their petition was returned holding that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to try it. Thereupon the appellants instituted suit No. 13 of 1960 in the Court of Sub Judge, First Class, Bassi on 2-4-1960. This suit has failed throughout on the ground of res judicata. The High Court has affirmed the dismissal on the view that the decision dated 7-7-1958 given by the Civil Court in Suit No. 41 of 1958 on the point of Civil Courts jurisdiction to try the suit will operate as res judicata. In our opinion the High Court is right.3. The learn ed counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants were driven from pillar to post for the redress of their grievances. When they instituted the suit in Civil Court, that Court held that it had no jurisdiction to try it. When the suit w as filed in the Revenue Court, the said Court took a contrary view. Where could the appellants then go? We do sympathise with the appellants dilemma but they were wrongly advised to do as they did. Either they ought to have followed the matter i n the First Civil Suit and insisted up to the end that the suit was triable by a Civil Court, or, they would have taken the matter further before the higher authorities and Court from the order of the Revenue Court and persisted that the matter w hether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the parties or not was res judicata; the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to go behind the decision of the Civil Court. The appellants did neither. It is unfortunate that due to the wrong paths which they followed under wrong advice they have ultimately to fail on the technical ground of res judicata but there is no way out.It was pointed out by Lord Russell of Killowen, Upendra Nath Bose v. Lall and Others, (1) that there could be res judicata in regard to the question of lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try a matter but-"A Court which declines jurisdiction cannot bind the parties by its reasons for declining jurisdiction: such reasons are not decisions, and are certainly not decisions by a Court of competent jurisdiction." (vide page 225).4. The above passage does not help the appellants, rather, goes against them. Mr. Garg had also placed reliance upon a Single Judge decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jwala Debi v. Amir Singh, (2) wherein the Learned Judge observed at page 132:-"Looked at closely, a question of jurisdiction, alongwith it may be raised by the defendant, is a question that virtually arises between the plaintiff and the Court itself. The plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. The defendant may or may not appear. If the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaint, it will order the return of it for presentation to the proper Court. The defendant, if he appears, and if he so chooses, may point out to the Court that it has no jurisdiction. A decision on the question of jurisdiction does not affect in any way the status of the parties or the right of one party to obtain redress against the other. The fact that a decision as to jurisdiction is not binding on the parties in a subsequent litigation will be apparent from this."5. We do not approve at all the views as expressed by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. If defendant does not appear and the Court on its own returns the plaint on the ground of la ck of jurisdiction the order in a subsequent suit may not operate as res judicata but if the defendant appears and an issue is raised and decided then the decision on the question of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit although the reasons for its decisions may not be so.

0[ds]We do sympathise with the appellants dilemma but they were wrongly advised to do as they did. Either they ought to have followed the matter i n the First Civil Suit and insisted up to the end that the suit was triable by a Civil Court, or, they would have taken the matter further before the higher authorities and Court from the order of the Revenue Court and persisted that the matter w hether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the parties or not was res judicata; the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to go behind the decision of the Civil Court. The appellants did neither. It is unfortunate that due to the wrong paths which they followed under wrong advice they have ultimately to fail on the technical ground of res judicata but there is no waydo not approve at all the views as expressed by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. If defendant does not appear and the Court on its own returns the plaint on the ground of la ck of jurisdiction the order in a subsequent suit may not operate as res judicata but if the defendant appears and an issue is raised and decided then the decision on the question of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit although the reasons for its decisions may not be so.

### Instruction: Assess the case proceedings and provide a prediction: is the court likely to rule in favor of (1) or against (0) the appellant/petitioner? ### Input: UNTWALIA J.1. This appeal arises out of an unfortunate litiga tion where the plaintiff appellant in this appeal has got to fail in this Court too on some technical grounds.2. One Sardar Balwant Singh died on 10th March, 1955 leaving only three sons according to the case of appellants, namely, the two appellants and respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 1 claimed to be a fourth son of Balwant Singh entitled to 1/4th share in the property left by him. The appellants filed Suit No. 41 of 1958, in the Court of Sub Judge, Bassi. The Civil Court on the objection of Respondent No. 1 framed a preliminary issue whether the said Court was competent to try the suit or was it a matter which could be decided only by the Settlement Commissioner. By Order dated 7.7.1958 the learned Subordinate Judge decided that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try this suit and directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the proper Revenue Court. When the appellants filed their claim in the Revenue Court their petition was returned holding that the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to try it. Thereupon the appellants instituted suit No. 13 of 1960 in the Court of Sub Judge, First Class, Bassi on 2-4-1960. This suit has failed throughout on the ground of res judicata. The High Court has affirmed the dismissal on the view that the decision dated 7-7-1958 given by the Civil Court in Suit No. 41 of 1958 on the point of Civil Courts jurisdiction to try the suit will operate as res judicata. In our opinion the High Court is right.3. The learn ed counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants were driven from pillar to post for the redress of their grievances. When they instituted the suit in Civil Court, that Court held that it had no jurisdiction to try it. When the suit w as filed in the Revenue Court, the said Court took a contrary view. Where could the appellants then go? We do sympathise with the appellants dilemma but they were wrongly advised to do as they did. Either they ought to have followed the matter i n the First Civil Suit and insisted up to the end that the suit was triable by a Civil Court, or, they would have taken the matter further before the higher authorities and Court from the order of the Revenue Court and persisted that the matter w hether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute between the parties or not was res judicata; the Revenue Court had no jurisdiction to go behind the decision of the Civil Court. The appellants did neither. It is unfortunate that due to the wrong paths which they followed under wrong advice they have ultimately to fail on the technical ground of res judicata but there is no way out.It was pointed out by Lord Russell of Killowen, Upendra Nath Bose v. Lall and Others, (1) that there could be res judicata in regard to the question of lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try a matter but-"A Court which declines jurisdiction cannot bind the parties by its reasons for declining jurisdiction: such reasons are not decisions, and are certainly not decisions by a Court of competent jurisdiction." (vide page 225).4. The above passage does not help the appellants, rather, goes against them. Mr. Garg had also placed reliance upon a Single Judge decision of the Allahabad High Court in Jwala Debi v. Amir Singh, (2) wherein the Learned Judge observed at page 132:-"Looked at closely, a question of jurisdiction, alongwith it may be raised by the defendant, is a question that virtually arises between the plaintiff and the Court itself. The plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. The defendant may or may not appear. If the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the plaint, it will order the return of it for presentation to the proper Court. The defendant, if he appears, and if he so chooses, may point out to the Court that it has no jurisdiction. A decision on the question of jurisdiction does not affect in any way the status of the parties or the right of one party to obtain redress against the other. The fact that a decision as to jurisdiction is not binding on the parties in a subsequent litigation will be apparent from this."5. We do not approve at all the views as expressed by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. If defendant does not appear and the Court on its own returns the plaint on the ground of la ck of jurisdiction the order in a subsequent suit may not operate as res judicata but if the defendant appears and an issue is raised and decided then the decision on the question of jurisdiction will operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit although the reasons for its decisions may not be so. ### Response: 0

Commissioner of Income Tax-3 Vs. Lokmat Newspapers Private Limited

and its interpretation, therefore, does not call for consideration here. What is material for the purposes of this case is, that the explanation postulates a situation where any part of the business of a Company consists of the purchase and sale of shares of other Companies. Therefore, the explanation is attracted in a situation where something more than an isolated transaction involving sale and purchase of shares is involved. A business postulates a systematic course of activity or dealing. Unless the business of a Company consists of the sale and purchase of shares, the deeming fiction would not apply. However, once the requirements of the explanation are satisfied, namely, in a situation where: (i) The assessee is a Company; (ii) Any part of the business of the Company consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other Companies, the consequence which is envisaged in the explanation, as a fiction of law, is brought into existence. The legal fiction is that the assessee is deemed to be carrying on a speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of the purchase and sale of such shares.8. Section 28 of the Act deals with the profits and gains of a business or profession. Explanation (2) to Section 28 provides that where speculative transactions carried on by an assessee are of such a nature as to constitute a business, the business (which is to be referred to as a "speculation business") shall be deemed to be distinct and separate from any other business. Section 43 provides definitions of certain terms relevant to the head of income from profits and gains of business or profession. Sub-section (5) of Section 43 defines the expression "speculative transaction" to mean a transaction in which a contract for the purchase or sale of any commodity, including stocks and shares, is periodically or ultimately settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or transfer of the commodity or scrips. The proviso to sub-section (5) then describes certain categories of transactions which shall not be deemed to be speculative transactions. The proviso will not have a bearing on these proceedings.9. The contention of the Revenue in the present case, in essence is that the definition of the expression "speculative transaction" in Section 43(5) must be read into the provisions of Section 73, because a business cannot be a speculation business unless there is a speculative transaction and a speculative transaction is defined by the former as one, not involving an actual delivery of shares. Hence, it was submitted that a transaction which involves an actual delivery of shares would not constitute a speculative transaction and the assessee who is engaged in a business involving the actual delivery of shares, cannot be regarded as being engaged in speculation business.10. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the Revenue, cannot be accepted, having regard to the plain meaning of the explanation to Section 73. The submission of the Revenue is that a loss which arises on account of a transaction of the sale and purchase of shares would constitute a loss from a speculation business for the purposes of the explanation. But, that the profit which arises from a transaction involving the actual delivery of shares would not constitute a profit for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) of Section 73 in respect of which a set off can be granted. To accept the submission of the Revenue would be to introduce a restriction into the scope and ambit of the deeming fiction which is created by the explanation to Section 73, which is not contemplated by Parliament.Once a deeming fiction is created by law, it must be given full and free effect, of course, in relation to the ambit within which it is intended to operate. The deeming fiction created by the explanation to Section 73 defines when an assessee is to be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purposes of the Section. The deeming fiction is, therefore, one which arises specifically in the context of the provisions of Section 73 and is confined to that purpose alone. The explanation stipulates that where an assessee is a company whose business consists in any part of the purchase and sale of shares of other Companies, it shall be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of purchase and sale of such shares. Whether or not it is a profit or loss that has resulted from carrying on such business, is a consideration which is alien to the meaning of what constitutes a speculation business by the explanation to Section 73. Once an assessee is deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purpose of Section 73, any loss computed in respect of that speculation business, can be set off only against the profits and gains of an other speculation business.Similarly, for the purposes of sub-section (2), the loss in respect of a speculation business which has not been set off either in whole or in part, can be carried forward and can be set off against profits and gains "of any speculation business". The expression "any speculation business" means a speculation business of the assessee in respect of which profits and gains for the Assessment Year in question have arisen and there is no justification to restrict the content of that speculation business where profits have arisen by excluding a business involving actual delivery of shares. No such restriction is found in the explanation. To impose one is a legislative function. In other words, once the assessee is carrying on a speculation business and the profits and gains have arisen from that business during the course of the Assessment Year, the assessee is entitled to set off the losses carried forward from a speculation business arising out of a previous Assessment Year.11. In these circumstances, the view which has been formed by the Tribunal is consistent with the provisions of Section 73.

0[ds]10. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the Revenue, cannot be accepted, having regard to the plain meaning of the explanation to Section 73. The submission of the Revenue is that a loss which arises on account of a transaction of the sale and purchase of shares would constitute a loss from a speculation business for the purposes of the explanation. But, that the profit which arises from a transaction involving the actual delivery of shares would not constitute a profit for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) of Section 73 in respect of which a set off can be granted. To accept the submission of the Revenue would be to introduce a restriction into the scope and ambit of the deeming fiction which is created by the explanation to Section 73, which is not contemplated by Parliament.Once a deeming fiction is created by law, it must be given full and free effect, of course, in relation to the ambit within which it is intended to operate. The deeming fiction created by the explanation to Section 73 defines when an assessee is to be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purposes of the Section. The deeming fiction is, therefore, one which arises specifically in the context of the provisions of Section 73 and is confined to that purpose alone. The explanation stipulates that where an assessee is a company whose business consists in any part of the purchase and sale of shares of other Companies, it shall be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of purchase and sale of such shares. Whether or not it is a profit or loss that has resulted from carrying on such business, is a consideration which is alien to the meaning of what constitutes a speculation business by the explanation to Section 73. Once an assessee is deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purpose of Section 73, any loss computed in respect of that speculation business, can be set off only against the profits and gains of an other speculation business.Similarly, for the purposes of(2), the loss in respect of a speculation business which has not been set off either in whole or in part, can be carried forward and can be set off against profits and gains "of any speculation business". The expression "any speculation business" means a speculation business of the assessee in respect of which profits and gains for the Assessment Year in question have arisen and there is no justification to restrict the content of that speculation business where profits have arisen by excluding a business involving actual delivery of shares. No such restriction is found in the explanation. To impose one is a legislative function. In other words, once the assessee is carrying on a speculation business and the profits and gains have arisen from that business during the course of the Assessment Year, the assessee is entitled to set off the losses carried forward from a speculation business arising out of a previous Assessment Year.11. In these circumstances, the view which has been formed by the Tribunal is consistent with the provisions of Section 73.

### Instruction: Evaluate the arguments and evidence in the case and predict the verdict: is an acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of the appeal more probable? ### Input: and its interpretation, therefore, does not call for consideration here. What is material for the purposes of this case is, that the explanation postulates a situation where any part of the business of a Company consists of the purchase and sale of shares of other Companies. Therefore, the explanation is attracted in a situation where something more than an isolated transaction involving sale and purchase of shares is involved. A business postulates a systematic course of activity or dealing. Unless the business of a Company consists of the sale and purchase of shares, the deeming fiction would not apply. However, once the requirements of the explanation are satisfied, namely, in a situation where: (i) The assessee is a Company; (ii) Any part of the business of the Company consists in the purchase and sale of shares of other Companies, the consequence which is envisaged in the explanation, as a fiction of law, is brought into existence. The legal fiction is that the assessee is deemed to be carrying on a speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of the purchase and sale of such shares.8. Section 28 of the Act deals with the profits and gains of a business or profession. Explanation (2) to Section 28 provides that where speculative transactions carried on by an assessee are of such a nature as to constitute a business, the business (which is to be referred to as a "speculation business") shall be deemed to be distinct and separate from any other business. Section 43 provides definitions of certain terms relevant to the head of income from profits and gains of business or profession. Sub-section (5) of Section 43 defines the expression "speculative transaction" to mean a transaction in which a contract for the purchase or sale of any commodity, including stocks and shares, is periodically or ultimately settled otherwise than by the actual delivery or transfer of the commodity or scrips. The proviso to sub-section (5) then describes certain categories of transactions which shall not be deemed to be speculative transactions. The proviso will not have a bearing on these proceedings.9. The contention of the Revenue in the present case, in essence is that the definition of the expression "speculative transaction" in Section 43(5) must be read into the provisions of Section 73, because a business cannot be a speculation business unless there is a speculative transaction and a speculative transaction is defined by the former as one, not involving an actual delivery of shares. Hence, it was submitted that a transaction which involves an actual delivery of shares would not constitute a speculative transaction and the assessee who is engaged in a business involving the actual delivery of shares, cannot be regarded as being engaged in speculation business.10. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the Revenue, cannot be accepted, having regard to the plain meaning of the explanation to Section 73. The submission of the Revenue is that a loss which arises on account of a transaction of the sale and purchase of shares would constitute a loss from a speculation business for the purposes of the explanation. But, that the profit which arises from a transaction involving the actual delivery of shares would not constitute a profit for the purposes of subsections (1) and (2) of Section 73 in respect of which a set off can be granted. To accept the submission of the Revenue would be to introduce a restriction into the scope and ambit of the deeming fiction which is created by the explanation to Section 73, which is not contemplated by Parliament.Once a deeming fiction is created by law, it must be given full and free effect, of course, in relation to the ambit within which it is intended to operate. The deeming fiction created by the explanation to Section 73 defines when an assessee is to be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purposes of the Section. The deeming fiction is, therefore, one which arises specifically in the context of the provisions of Section 73 and is confined to that purpose alone. The explanation stipulates that where an assessee is a company whose business consists in any part of the purchase and sale of shares of other Companies, it shall be deemed to be carrying on a speculation business to the extent to which the business consists of purchase and sale of such shares. Whether or not it is a profit or loss that has resulted from carrying on such business, is a consideration which is alien to the meaning of what constitutes a speculation business by the explanation to Section 73. Once an assessee is deemed to be carrying on a speculation business for the purpose of Section 73, any loss computed in respect of that speculation business, can be set off only against the profits and gains of an other speculation business.Similarly, for the purposes of sub-section (2), the loss in respect of a speculation business which has not been set off either in whole or in part, can be carried forward and can be set off against profits and gains "of any speculation business". The expression "any speculation business" means a speculation business of the assessee in respect of which profits and gains for the Assessment Year in question have arisen and there is no justification to restrict the content of that speculation business where profits have arisen by excluding a business involving actual delivery of shares. No such restriction is found in the explanation. To impose one is a legislative function. In other words, once the assessee is carrying on a speculation business and the profits and gains have arisen from that business during the course of the Assessment Year, the assessee is entitled to set off the losses carried forward from a speculation business arising out of a previous Assessment Year.11. In these circumstances, the view which has been formed by the Tribunal is consistent with the provisions of Section 73. ### Response: 0

Prabhakaran Nair, Etc Vs. State Of Tamil Nadu And Ors

who have no accommodation to reside or to carry on business. It does not create a class of landlords who will forever be kept outside the scope of the Act as the provision balances the interests of the landlords on the one hand and the tenants on the other in a reasonable way. This Court in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana ((1986) 2 SCC 249 ) also judged the rules of classification in dealing with the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. 32. This Court emphasized in Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v. Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy ((1970) 3 SCR 734 : (1970) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1971 SC 942 ) that in considering the reasonable and bona fide requirements of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It was also emphasised that it was not necessary that the landlord. should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. 33. Our attention was drawn to certain observations of Chatterjee, J. of the Calcutta High Court in Jiwanlal & Co. v. Manot and Co. Ltd. (64 Cal WN 932 0at 937) that where the landlord had established a case of building and rebuilding the tenants undoubtedly would suffer on ejectment. The learned Judge was of the view that though the landlords required the premises for the purpose of building and rebuilding, it was not desirable that the tenants should be ejected. The learned Judge emphasised that the purpose of the Act was to protect the tenants as long as possible and to eject them only when it was not otherwise possible. The landlords did not require it for their own use and occupation. They wanted it for the advantage of increased accommodation. The learned Judge was of the view that if the tenants were ejected, then for the time being, far from the problem being solved, it would create difficulties for the public as well as for themselves. We are, however, unable to accept this principle. It is true that the Act must be so constructed that it harmonises the rights of the landlords and at the same time protects the tenants and also serves best the purpose of the Act and one of the purposes of the Act is to solve the acute shortage of accommodation by making a rational basis for eviction and to encourage building and rebuilding which is at the root of all causes of shortage of accommodation. 34. It was held by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court (one of us - Natarajan, J.) in M/s. Patel Roadways Pvt Ltd., Madras v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1985 Mad 119 ) that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act were not violative of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) of the Act. But that was in a slightly different context. 35. Post-war migration of human beings enable place to place, the partition of the country and uprooting of the people from their hearth and home, explosion of population, are the various vital factors leading to the present acute shortage of housing. It has to be borne in mind that the urge for land and yearning for hearth and home are as perennial emotions as hunger and sex are, as Poet Rabindranath would say meaning thereby, it is not wealth I seek, it is not fame that I want, I crave for a home expressing the eternal yearning of all living beings for habitat. 36. It is common knowledge that there is acute shortage of housing, various factors have led to this problem. The laws relating to letting and of landlord and tenant in different States have from different States angles tried to grapple the problem. Yet in view of the magnitude of the problem, the problem has become insoluble and the litigations abound and the people suffer. More houses must, therefore, be built, more accommodation and more spaces made available for the people to live in. The laws of landlord and tenant must be made rational, humane, certain and capable of being quickly implemented. Those landlord who are having premises in their control should be induced and encouraged to part with available accommodation for limited periods on certain safeguards which will strictly ensure their recovery when wanted. Men with money should be given proper and meaningful incentives as in some European countries to build houses, tax holidays for new houses can be encouraged. The tenants should also be given protection and security and certain amount of reasonableness in the rent. Escalation of prices in the urban properties, land, material and houses must be rationally checked. This country very vitally and very urgently requires a National Housing Policy if we want to prevent a major breakdown of law and order and gradual disillusionment of people. After all shelter is is one of our fundamental rights. New national housing policy must attract new buildings, encourage new buildings, make available new spaces, rationalise the new structure and rationalise the rent provision and bring certain amount of uniformity though leaving scope for sufficient flexibility among the States to adjust such legislation according to its needs. This Court and the High Court should also be relieved of the heavy burdens of this rent litigations. Tier of appeals should be curtailed. Laws must be simple, rational and clear. Tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords as well as the tenants. Litigations must come to end quickly. Such new Housing Policy must comprehend the present and anticipate the future. The idea of a National Rent Tribunal on an All India basis with quicker procedure should be examined. This has become an urgent imperative of todays revolution. A fast changing society cannot operate with unchanging law and preconceived judicial attitude.

0[ds]13. It has to be borne in mind that it is not practicable and would be anomalous to expect a landlord to take back a tenant after a long lapse of time during which time the tenant must necessarily have found some suitable accommodation elsewhere. This is the true purpose behind Section 14(1)(b) read with Section 14(2)(b). In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are unable to accept the submission that in providing for re-induction of the tenant in case of repairs and not providing for such re-induction in case of reconstruction, there is any unreasonable and irrational classification without any basisState of Madhya Pradesh V. G. C. Mandawar ((1955) 1 SCR v. 599 : AIR 1954 Sc 493 )27. It has been borne in mind that the provisions of the Act imposed restrictions on the landlords right under the common law or the Transfer of Property Act to evict the tenant after termination of his tenancy. The rationale of these restrictions on the landlords rights is the acute shortage of accommodation and the consequent need to give protection to the tenants against unrestricted eviction. The nature, the form and the consequent extents of protection to be given to the tenants is a matter of legislative policy and judgment. It is inevitably bound to vary from one State to another depending on local and peculiar conditions prevailing in the State and the individual States appreciation of the needs and problems of its people. When we are confronted with the problem of a legislation being violative of Article 14, we are not concerned with the wisdom or lack of legislative enactment but we are concerned with the illegality of the legislation. There may be more than one view about the appropriateness or effectiveness or extent of the restrictions. There may be also more than one view about the relaxation of the restrictions on the landlords right of eviction. This fact is reflected in the different provisions made in different Acts about the grounds of eviction. For example, in case of Assam, Meghalaya, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Harayana, Orissa, Tripura, East Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Mysore, Himachal Pradesh and Pondicherry, no particular duration for arrears of rent is prescribed, which would entitle a landlord to maintain an action for ejectment of his tenant. However, in other cases a certain period is prescribed. For instance, two months in Bihar, West Bengal and Jammu and Kashmir, three months in Goa and Tripura, four months in Uttar Pradesh, six months in Bombay and Rajasthan. Again some Rent Acts require that before an action for ejectment on the ground of arrears is instituted, a notice demanding rent should be served on the tenant - for example - Bombay, Delhi, Kerala, Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh and U. P. Rent Acts. In such cases the tenant is given one chance to pay up the arrears. Again different Rent Acts provide different facts and circumstances on the basis of which premises could be recovered on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. Generally the bona fide requirement extends both to residential as well as commercial premises. However, the Delhi Rent Control Act restricts the right on account of the bona fide need of the landlords right to premises let for residential use only. Further, Bihar, Bombay, Goa, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, U. P. and West Bengal Rent Acts provide for partial eviction. But there is no such provision in the other Acts. It is obvious from the above that there can be no fixed and inflexible criteria or grounds governing imposition of restrictions on the landlords right or for relaxation of those restrictions in certain cases. Ultimately it is a matter of legislative policy and judgmentWe are, however, unable to accept this submission15. It is necessary now to deal with the submission that the section is unreasonable. For this, one has to bear in mind the public purpose behind the legislation. The Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 was passed in 1960. A similar enactment which was in operation from 1949 to 1960 did not contain any provision like Sections 14 to 16 providing for eviction of the tenant on the ground of demolition and reconstruction16. In 1949, however, the enactment contained a provision empowering the government to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act. When the landlords desired to evict tenants on the ground of demolition and reconstruction, they resorted to the remedy of moving the government by an application for exemption under Section 13 of the 1949 Act. The government by notification used to exempt any building or class of buildings from all or any of the provisions of the Act. In this connection reference may be made to the decision in S. Kannappa Pillai V. B. Venkatarathnam (79 Law Weekly 363). The government in that case when passing the order of exemption used to impose condition that the landlord should complete the reconstruction within four months from the date on which the premises were vacated by the tenants and that he should take back the old tenants into the reconstructed building at the rate demanded by the landlord subject to the fixation of fair rent. However, in view of the tenants conduct in resorting to writ proceedings challenging the order of exemption and in filing suits and having delayed the process of demolition and reconstruction, the court in the exercise of discretion refused to extend the benefit of the condition as ton in favour of the tenants. The further remedy was by writ proceedings before the High Court by the landlord or the tenant who felt aggrieved as the case may beIt is clear, therefore that the Madras legislature deliberately proceeded on the basis that fair rent was to be fixed which was to be fair both to the landlords as well as to the tenants and that only the poorer classes of tenants needed protection. The facile assumption on the basis of which an argument was advanced before this Court that all Rent Acts are intended for the protection of tenants and, therefore, this Act also should be held to be intended only for the protection of tenants breaks down when the provisions of the Act are examined in detail. The provision that both the tenant as well as the landlord can apply for fixation of fair rent would become meaningless if the fixation of fair rent cancan only be downwards from the contract rent and the contract rent was not to be increased. Of course, it has happened over the last few years that rents have increased enormously and that is why it is argued on behalf of the tenants that the contract rents should not be changed. If we could contemplate a situation where rents and prices are coming down this argument will break down. It is a realisation of the fact that prices and rents have enormously increased and therefore if the rents are pegged at 1940 rates there would be no new construction and the community as a whole would suffer that led the Madras legislature to exempt new buildings from the scope of the Act. It realised apparently how dangerous was the feeling that only "fools build houses for wise men to live in". At the time the 1960 Act was passed the Madras legislature had before it the precedent of the Madras Cultivating Tenants (Payments of Fair Rent) Act,. That Act provides for fixation of fair rent. It also provide that the contract rent, if lower, will be payable during the contract period. Even if the contract rent is higher only the fair rent will be payable. After the contract period is over only the fair rent is payable. The Madras legislature having this Act in mind still made only the fair rent payable and not the contract rent if it happens to be lower. It is clear, therefore, that the fair rent under the present Act is payable during the contract period as well as after the expiry of the contract period22. The Act sought to restore the balance in the scale which is otherwise weighted in favour of the stronger party which had larger bargaining power. The Act balances the scales and regulates the rights of the parties fairly and cannot be constructed only in favour of the tenantWhat the section really required is that the landlord must satisfy the court that the building was bona fide required by him, for the immediate purpose of demolition. I am totally unable to see how the present state of the building, and the extent to which it could stand without immediate demolition and reconstruction, in the future, are not relevant considerations in assessing the bona fides of the landlord. On the one hand, landlords may bona fide require such buildings, particularly old buildings, in their own interest, for demolition and reconstruction. On the other hand, it is equally possible that the mere fact that the building is old, is taken advantage of by the landlord to put forward such pretext his real object being ulterior, and not bona fide for the purpose of reconstruction. The courts have to apply several criteria, and to judge upon the totality of the facts. But the courts cannot exclude the possibility that the ancient or relatively old character of the building which may nevertheless be in quite a good and sound condition, is being taken advantage of by a landlord in order to make such an application with an ulterior purpose, which purpose might be, for instance, to obtain far more advantageous terms of rent in the future. What the section really contemplates is a bona fide requirement; that necessarily implied that it is in the interests of the landlord to demolish and reconstruct the building, and that the fact that the building is old is not merely a pretext for advancing the application, with the object of evicting the tenant, and of obtaining higher rentals31. We are therefore unable to accept the submission that absence of the right ofn of tenants in reconstructed premises is either arbitrary or unreasonable. The submission that Section 16(2) which provides that when a building is totally demolished and on which a new building is rejected shall be exempt from all the provisions of the Act for a period of five years is bad is also unsustainable.

### Instruction: Analyze the case proceeding and predict whether the appeal/petition will be accepted (1) or rejected (0). ### Input: who have no accommodation to reside or to carry on business. It does not create a class of landlords who will forever be kept outside the scope of the Act as the provision balances the interests of the landlords on the one hand and the tenants on the other in a reasonable way. This Court in Atam Prakash v. State of Haryana ((1986) 2 SCC 249 ) also judged the rules of classification in dealing with the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. 32. This Court emphasized in Panchamal Narayan Shenoy v. Basthi Venkatesha Shenoy ((1970) 3 SCR 734 : (1970) 1 SCC 499 : AIR 1971 SC 942 ) that in considering the reasonable and bona fide requirements of the landlord under this clause, the desire of the landlord to put the property to a more profitable use after demolition and reconstruction is also a factor that may be taken into account in favour of the landlord. It was also emphasised that it was not necessary that the landlord. should go further and establish under this clause that the condition of the building is such that it requires immediate demolition. 33. Our attention was drawn to certain observations of Chatterjee, J. of the Calcutta High Court in Jiwanlal & Co. v. Manot and Co. Ltd. (64 Cal WN 932 0at 937) that where the landlord had established a case of building and rebuilding the tenants undoubtedly would suffer on ejectment. The learned Judge was of the view that though the landlords required the premises for the purpose of building and rebuilding, it was not desirable that the tenants should be ejected. The learned Judge emphasised that the purpose of the Act was to protect the tenants as long as possible and to eject them only when it was not otherwise possible. The landlords did not require it for their own use and occupation. They wanted it for the advantage of increased accommodation. The learned Judge was of the view that if the tenants were ejected, then for the time being, far from the problem being solved, it would create difficulties for the public as well as for themselves. We are, however, unable to accept this principle. It is true that the Act must be so constructed that it harmonises the rights of the landlords and at the same time protects the tenants and also serves best the purpose of the Act and one of the purposes of the Act is to solve the acute shortage of accommodation by making a rational basis for eviction and to encourage building and rebuilding which is at the root of all causes of shortage of accommodation. 34. It was held by a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court (one of us - Natarajan, J.) in M/s. Patel Roadways Pvt Ltd., Madras v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1985 Mad 119 ) that the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act were not violative of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) of the Act. But that was in a slightly different context. 35. Post-war migration of human beings enable place to place, the partition of the country and uprooting of the people from their hearth and home, explosion of population, are the various vital factors leading to the present acute shortage of housing. It has to be borne in mind that the urge for land and yearning for hearth and home are as perennial emotions as hunger and sex are, as Poet Rabindranath would say meaning thereby, it is not wealth I seek, it is not fame that I want, I crave for a home expressing the eternal yearning of all living beings for habitat. 36. It is common knowledge that there is acute shortage of housing, various factors have led to this problem. The laws relating to letting and of landlord and tenant in different States have from different States angles tried to grapple the problem. Yet in view of the magnitude of the problem, the problem has become insoluble and the litigations abound and the people suffer. More houses must, therefore, be built, more accommodation and more spaces made available for the people to live in. The laws of landlord and tenant must be made rational, humane, certain and capable of being quickly implemented. Those landlord who are having premises in their control should be induced and encouraged to part with available accommodation for limited periods on certain safeguards which will strictly ensure their recovery when wanted. Men with money should be given proper and meaningful incentives as in some European countries to build houses, tax holidays for new houses can be encouraged. The tenants should also be given protection and security and certain amount of reasonableness in the rent. Escalation of prices in the urban properties, land, material and houses must be rationally checked. This country very vitally and very urgently requires a National Housing Policy if we want to prevent a major breakdown of law and order and gradual disillusionment of people. After all shelter is is one of our fundamental rights. New national housing policy must attract new buildings, encourage new buildings, make available new spaces, rationalise the new structure and rationalise the rent provision and bring certain amount of uniformity though leaving scope for sufficient flexibility among the States to adjust such legislation according to its needs. This Court and the High Court should also be relieved of the heavy burdens of this rent litigations. Tier of appeals should be curtailed. Laws must be simple, rational and clear. Tenants are in all cases not the weaker sections. There are those who are weak both among the landlords as well as the tenants. Litigations must come to end quickly. Such new Housing Policy must comprehend the present and anticipate the future. The idea of a National Rent Tribunal on an All India basis with quicker procedure should be examined. This has become an urgent imperative of todays revolution. A fast changing society cannot operate with unchanging law and preconceived judicial attitude. ### Response: 0

Dhara Singh Vs. District Judge, Meerut & Anr

preference cannot be taken into consideration. This contention to my mind has no force. Under the scheme of the counting as provided in the instructions a voter could have given his preference in the present case upto six preferences as there were six candidates who were seeking election. To my mind as long as there is any preference in a ballot paper which has not been exhausted according to the rules that preference has to be taken into consideration and to be credited to the continuing candidate in whose favour the preference is. Consequently, to my mind the Presiding Officer was in error when he did not count the preference in favour of Pitam Singh recorded in the ballot paper No. 0045. Crediting this preference of Pitam Singh, we find that the total number of votes which he obtained comes to 20 as against the total number of 19 in favour of Dhara Singh on the third counting. Thus, in this case to my mind there was no necessity for drawing the lots and Pitam Singh should have been declared as elected as a result of counting itself as there were only two continuing candidates and out of these continuing candidates Pitam Singh had secured the larger number of votes."It is not necessary to set out the findings on other points which are no longer in issue before us.6. Dhara Singh then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the declaration given by the Returning Officer and the order of the District Judge, referred to above. The High Court held that the District Judge was correct in allotting ballot paper No. 0045 to Pitam Singh. The High Court also repelled the contention that the District Judge was not entitled to take into account ballot paper No. 0045, and to award it to Pitam Singh, because Pitam Singh had not filed any recrimination in the case in order to claim the benefit of the ballot paper. The High Court was of the view that this was a case of rebuttal and not recrimination, as held in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nathu Ram v. R. P. Dikshit, AIR 1965 All 454 (FB). According to it the decision of this Court in Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, 1964-6 SCR 54 = (AIR 1964 SC 1200 ) was not applicable to the facts of the case.7. It has been strongly contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that the decision of this Court in 1964-6 SCR 54 = (AIR 1964 SC 1200 ) governs the interpretation of the Rules. In that case, this Court was concerned with the interpretation of Sections 97, 100 (1) (d) and 101 (a) of the Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) and Rule 57 (1) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. We find that the terms of those Sections are different and, in particular, S. 100 (1) (d) is materially different because it uses the words "that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected" which do not occur in Rr. 37 and 38. It was these words which were in part relied on to limit the scope of the enquiry in cases arising under the Representation of the People Act. But the language of the rules here is simple and quite different.It would be noticed that Rule 37(a) is wide and no rule prescribes the grounds on which the election of the returned candidate is to be declared void. In this, case we are not concerned with Rule 37 (b) or Rule 39.But the learned counsel for the appellant contends that reading Rules 37 and 39 together it is clear that the trial of the election petition takes place in two compartments, first to judge whether the returned candidates election is void, and, then to decide whether any other candidate should be declared to be duly elected. He says that it is only in the latter case that any recrimination can be made under R. 39. We are unable to agree with this contention.It seems to us that according to Rule 37 (a), read with Rule 40, which except for certain Sections applies the procedure in the Civil Procedure Code, the returned candidate can take any defence to show that he has been validly elected. If the petitioner in the election petition can allege and prove that some votes cast in favour of the returned candidate should be rejected, there is no reason why the returned candidate should not be able to allege and prove that certain votes should have been counted in his favour. Rule 43 which deals with the findings of the Judge also shows that the suggested limitation on his jurisdiction does not exist.8. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether AIR 1965 All 454 (FB) was correctly decided or not. Accordingly, we hold that the District Judge was entitled to go into the question whether ballot paper No. 0045 should have been counted in favour of Pitam Singh or not.9. Coming to the second point, the learned counsel contended that ballot paper No. 0045 was an "exhausted paper" within the definition quoted above. The contention seems to be contrary to the definition because the definition expressly says that a ballot paper on which no further preference is recorded for a continuing candidate shall be an exhausted paper. On the facts of this case, Pitam Singh was a continuing candidate and there was a preference recorded for him on ballot paper No. 0045. But the learned counsel says that this was a third preference and the second preference on this paper was for Mahabir Singh who was eliminated at one stage.Now, the fact that Mahabir Singh was eliminated does not make the ballot paper an exhausted paper within the definition given in the Rules. We agree with the conclusion of that District Judge on this point.

0[ds]It is not necessary to set out the findings on other points which are no longer in issue beforeto it the decision of this Court in Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, 1964-6 SCR 54 = (AIR 1964 SC 1200 ) was not applicable to the facts of thefind that the terms of those Sections are different and, in particular, S. 100 (1) (d) is materially different because it uses the words "that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected" which do not occur in Rr. 37 and 38. It was these words which were in part relied on to limit the scope of the enquiry in cases arising under the Representation of the People Act. But the language of the rules here is simple and quite different.It would be noticed that Rule 37(a) is wide and no rule prescribes the grounds on which the election of the returned candidate is to be declared void. In this, case we are not concerned with Rule 37 (b) or Rule 39.But the learned counsel for the appellant contends that reading Rules 37 and 39 together it is clear that the trial of the election petition takes place in two compartments, first to judge whether the returned candidates election is void, and, then to decide whether any other candidate should be declared to be duly elected. He says that it is only in the latter case that any recrimination can be made under R. 39. We are unable to agree with this contention.It seems to us that according to Rule 37 (a), read with Rule 40, which except for certain Sections applies the procedure in the Civil Procedure Code, the returned candidate can take any defence to show that he has been validly elected. If the petitioner in the election petition can allege and prove that some votes cast in favour of the returned candidate should be rejected, there is no reason why the returned candidate should not be able to allege and prove that certain votes should have been counted in his favour. Rule 43 which deals with the findings of the Judge also shows that the suggested limitation on his jurisdiction does not exist.8. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether AIR 1965 All 454 (FB) was correctly decided or not. Accordingly, we hold that the District Judge was entitled to go into the question whether ballot paper No. 0045 should have been counted in favour of Pitam Singh orcontention seems to be contrary to the definition because the definition expressly says that a ballot paper on which no further preference is recorded for a continuing candidate shall be an exhausted paper. On the facts of this case, Pitam Singh was a continuing candidate and there was a preference recorded for him on ballot paper No.the fact that Mahabir Singh was eliminated does not make the ballot paper an exhausted paper within the definition given in the Rules. We agree with the conclusion of that District Judge on this point.

### Instruction: Considering the arguments and evidence in case proceeding, predict the verdict: is it more likely to be in favor (1) or against (0) the appellant? ### Input: preference cannot be taken into consideration. This contention to my mind has no force. Under the scheme of the counting as provided in the instructions a voter could have given his preference in the present case upto six preferences as there were six candidates who were seeking election. To my mind as long as there is any preference in a ballot paper which has not been exhausted according to the rules that preference has to be taken into consideration and to be credited to the continuing candidate in whose favour the preference is. Consequently, to my mind the Presiding Officer was in error when he did not count the preference in favour of Pitam Singh recorded in the ballot paper No. 0045. Crediting this preference of Pitam Singh, we find that the total number of votes which he obtained comes to 20 as against the total number of 19 in favour of Dhara Singh on the third counting. Thus, in this case to my mind there was no necessity for drawing the lots and Pitam Singh should have been declared as elected as a result of counting itself as there were only two continuing candidates and out of these continuing candidates Pitam Singh had secured the larger number of votes."It is not necessary to set out the findings on other points which are no longer in issue before us.6. Dhara Singh then filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the declaration given by the Returning Officer and the order of the District Judge, referred to above. The High Court held that the District Judge was correct in allotting ballot paper No. 0045 to Pitam Singh. The High Court also repelled the contention that the District Judge was not entitled to take into account ballot paper No. 0045, and to award it to Pitam Singh, because Pitam Singh had not filed any recrimination in the case in order to claim the benefit of the ballot paper. The High Court was of the view that this was a case of rebuttal and not recrimination, as held in the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Nathu Ram v. R. P. Dikshit, AIR 1965 All 454 (FB). According to it the decision of this Court in Jabar Singh v. Genda Lal, 1964-6 SCR 54 = (AIR 1964 SC 1200 ) was not applicable to the facts of the case.7. It has been strongly contended before us by the learned counsel for the appellant that the decision of this Court in 1964-6 SCR 54 = (AIR 1964 SC 1200 ) governs the interpretation of the Rules. In that case, this Court was concerned with the interpretation of Sections 97, 100 (1) (d) and 101 (a) of the Representation of the People Act (43 of 1951) and Rule 57 (1) of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961. We find that the terms of those Sections are different and, in particular, S. 100 (1) (d) is materially different because it uses the words "that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected" which do not occur in Rr. 37 and 38. It was these words which were in part relied on to limit the scope of the enquiry in cases arising under the Representation of the People Act. But the language of the rules here is simple and quite different.It would be noticed that Rule 37(a) is wide and no rule prescribes the grounds on which the election of the returned candidate is to be declared void. In this, case we are not concerned with Rule 37 (b) or Rule 39.But the learned counsel for the appellant contends that reading Rules 37 and 39 together it is clear that the trial of the election petition takes place in two compartments, first to judge whether the returned candidates election is void, and, then to decide whether any other candidate should be declared to be duly elected. He says that it is only in the latter case that any recrimination can be made under R. 39. We are unable to agree with this contention.It seems to us that according to Rule 37 (a), read with Rule 40, which except for certain Sections applies the procedure in the Civil Procedure Code, the returned candidate can take any defence to show that he has been validly elected. If the petitioner in the election petition can allege and prove that some votes cast in favour of the returned candidate should be rejected, there is no reason why the returned candidate should not be able to allege and prove that certain votes should have been counted in his favour. Rule 43 which deals with the findings of the Judge also shows that the suggested limitation on his jurisdiction does not exist.8. It is not necessary to decide in this case whether AIR 1965 All 454 (FB) was correctly decided or not. Accordingly, we hold that the District Judge was entitled to go into the question whether ballot paper No. 0045 should have been counted in favour of Pitam Singh or not.9. Coming to the second point, the learned counsel contended that ballot paper No. 0045 was an "exhausted paper" within the definition quoted above. The contention seems to be contrary to the definition because the definition expressly says that a ballot paper on which no further preference is recorded for a continuing candidate shall be an exhausted paper. On the facts of this case, Pitam Singh was a continuing candidate and there was a preference recorded for him on ballot paper No. 0045. But the learned counsel says that this was a third preference and the second preference on this paper was for Mahabir Singh who was eliminated at one stage.Now, the fact that Mahabir Singh was eliminated does not make the ballot paper an exhausted paper within the definition given in the Rules. We agree with the conclusion of that District Judge on this point. ### Response: 0

Maya Devi Vs. Lalta Prasad

(i) the actual owner of the suit property having purchased it for valuable consideration, and (ii) being a third party not connected in any mala fide manner with the Judgment Debtor, and (iii) not having received prior notice of any action of late Shri Prem Chand Verma, was imperious to Execution proceedings. A miscarriage of justice, of monumental proportions, has taken place on an un-substantiated presumption that one of the assets of the Judgment Debtor had been illegally transferred to defeat the decree. The Appellant before us had no other recourse than to file Objections under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC.18. Finally another aspect which has come to the fore, is the approach of the Trial Court in the adjudication of the suit. The plaint contains an averment that the suit property had already been sold. The Defendant Shri Prem Chand Verma, (his wife Smt. Nirmal Verma was not impleaded) had appeared in the Trial Court and filed his Written Statement in which, whilst admitting the documentation executed between the parties, he had denied that he had been served with any legal notice and set up the defence that he was entitled to forfeit the amount received by him because the Plaintiff/Decree Holder had failed to pay the balance sale consideration as envisaged in the Deed of Agreement for Earnest Money. After filing his Written Statement he stopped appearing, and the suit proceeded ex-parte. Significantly, the Deed of Agreement for Earnest Money as well as the Written Statement predicate Defendant’s title on a Will, and in this context there is no evidence on record that it had taken effect because of the death of the Testator. In the event, as is to be expected, no appeal against the judgment and decree came to be filed, and, therefore, the decision was not tested before or scrutinized by the Appellate Court. The absence of the Defendant does not absolve the Trial Court from fully satisfying itself of the factual and legal veracity of the Plaintiff’s claim; nay, this feature of the litigation casts a greater responsibility and onerous obligation on the Trial Court as well as the Executing Court to be fully satisfied that the claim has been proved and substantiated to the hilt by the Plaintiff. Reference to Shantilal Gulabchand Mutha vs Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited, (2013) 4 SCC 396 , will be sufficient. The failure to file a Written Statement, thereby bringing Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC into operation, or the factum of Defendant having been set ex parte, does not invite a punishment in the form of an automatic decree. Both under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC and on the invocation of Order IX of the CPC, the Court is nevertheless duty-bound to diligently ensure that the plaint stands proved and the prayers therein are worthy of being granted. .19. I am fully mindful of the fact that the Appellant has not taken any steps for setting aside the ex parte decree against late Shri Prem Chand Verma. This is only to be expected since the Appellant/Objector has no reason to evince or harbour any interest in the inter se dispute between the Decree Holder and the Judgment Debtor. Indeed, if the Appellant had made any endeavour to assail or nullify the decree, it would be fair to conclude that she had been put up by the Judgment Debtor in an endeavour to defeat the decree. In these circumstances, my in-depth analysis of the law pertaining to decreeing what is essentially a penalty clause may, on a perfunctory or superficial reading, be viewed as non essential to the context. This, however, is not so. On a conjoint reading of Order XXI Rule 58 CPC and the fasciculus of Order XXI comprising Rules 97 to 104, it becomes clear that all questions raised by the Objector have to be comprehensively considered on their merits. In the case in hand, the decree from which the Execution proceedings emanate is not one for delivery of possession, but is a simple money decree. Order XXI proscribes the filing of a separate suit and prescribes that all relevant questions shall be determined by the Court. Objection under Order XXI should be meaningfully heard so as to avoid the possibility of any miscarriage of justice. It is significant in this regard that Rule 103 ordains that where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise, as if it were a decree. I shall only advert to the decisions of this Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694 , Shreenath vs Rajesh, (1998) 4 SCC 543 , and Tanzeem-e-sufia vs Bibi Haliman, (2002) 7 SCC 50 , where proceedings were under the aforesaid fasciculus of Order XXI comprising Rules 97 to 104, in which the Objectors had set up a title distinct or different from that of the Judgment Debtor and the Court had protected their interest. The Appellant before us is a third party and has been brought into the lis by a side wind in that her property is sought to be attached with the intention of satisfying a decree in which she was not directly or intrinsically concerned. 20. The Appellant/Objector who has approached the Court under Order XXI Rule 58 is more advantageously or favourably placed inasmuch as she is a third party so far as the decree is concerned, and her property is not the subject-matter of the decree. It is thus clear to me that the Courts below have in a hurried, if not prejudiced manner, rejected the Objections merely because of some sympathy towards the Decree Holder. The Objections deserved to be allowed without disturbing the decree, leaving all other remedies open to the Decree Holder/Respondent, including proceedings against the Estate of the Judgment Debtor.21. I respectfully agree with my learned Brother that the

1[ds]A perusal of the above will show that the Executing Court ignored and overlooked the important submission of the Appellant stating that she was the absolute owner of the suit property and that she had no truck whatsoever either with the Judgment Debtor Shri Prem Chand Verma or his wife Smt. Nirmal Verma beyond purchasing the subject property from the latter. What has also escaped the attention of the Court is that Suraj Lamp has prospective operation, thereby rendering it inapplicable to the subject 2006 transaction. Secondly, if the General Power of Attorney in favour of the Appellant Smt. Maya Devi was bereft of legal efficacy, the ownership of Smt. Nirmal Verma would also be invalid, and sequentially the property would have no connection whatsoever with the Judgment Debtor since he had purportedly derived title only through a Will. Unfortunately, this is also the approach which has been preferred by the High Court in terms of the impugned order. The High Court has also wrongly applied Suraj Lamp and has also neglected to reflect upon theplea that she is (i) the actual owner of the suit property having purchased it for valuable consideration, and (ii) being a third party not connected in any mala fide manner with the Judgment Debtor, and (iii) not having received prior notice of any action of late Shri Prem Chand Verma, was imperious to Execution proceedings. A miscarriage of justice, of monumental proportions, has taken place on an un-substantiated presumption that one of the assets of the Judgment Debtor had been illegally transferred to defeat the decree. The Appellant before us had no other recourse than to file Objections under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC.18. Finally another aspect which has come to the fore, is the approach of the Trial Court in the adjudication of the suit. The plaint contains an averment that the suit property had already been sold. The Defendant Shri Prem Chand Verma, (his wife Smt. Nirmal Verma was not impleaded) had appeared in the Trial Court and filed his Written Statement in which, whilst admitting the documentation executed between the parties, he had denied that he had been served with any legal notice and set up the defence that he was entitled to forfeit the amount received by him because the Plaintiff/Decree Holder had failed to pay the balance sale consideration as envisaged in the Deed of Agreement for Earnest Money. After filing his Written Statement he stopped appearing, and the suit proceeded ex-parte. Significantly, the Deed of Agreement for Earnest Money as well as the Written Statement predicatetitle on a Will, and in this context there is no evidence on record that it had taken effect because of the death of the Testator. In the event, as is to be expected, no appeal against the judgment and decree came to be filed, and, therefore, the decision was not tested before or scrutinized by the Appellate Court. The absence of the Defendant does not absolve the Trial Court from fully satisfying itself of the factual and legal veracity of theclaim; nay, this feature of the litigation casts a greater responsibility and onerous obligation on the Trial Court as well as the Executing Court to be fully satisfied that the claim has been proved and substantiated to the hilt by the Plaintiff. Reference to Shantilal Gulabchand Mutha vs Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited, (2013) 4 SCC 396 , will be sufficient. The failure to file a Written Statement, thereby bringing Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC into operation, or the factum of Defendant having been set ex parte, does not invite a punishment in the form of an automatic decree. Both under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC and on the invocation of Order IX of the CPC, the Court is nevertheless duty-bound to diligently ensure that the plaint stands proved and the prayers therein are worthy of being granted. .19. I am fully mindful of the fact that the Appellant has not taken any steps for setting aside the ex parte decree against late Shri Prem Chand Verma. This is only to be expected since the Appellant/Objector has no reason to evince or harbour any interest in the inter se dispute between the Decree Holder and the Judgment Debtor. Indeed, if the Appellant had made any endeavour to assail or nullify the decree, it would be fair to conclude that she had been put up by the Judgment Debtor in an endeavour to defeat the decree. In these circumstances, my in-depth analysis of the law pertaining to decreeing what is essentially a penalty clause may, on a perfunctory or superficial reading, be viewed as non essential to the context. This, however, is not so. On a conjoint reading of Order XXI Rule 58 CPC and the fasciculus of Order XXI comprising Rules 97 to 104, it becomes clear that all questions raised by the Objector have to be comprehensively considered on their merits. In the case in hand, the decree from which the Execution proceedings emanate is not one for delivery of possession, but is a simple money decree. Order XXI proscribes the filing of a separate suit and prescribes that all relevant questions shall be determined by the Court. Objection under Order XXI should be meaningfully heard so as to avoid the possibility of any miscarriage of justice. It is significant in this regard that Rule 103 ordains that where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise, as if it were a decree. I shall only advert to the decisions of this Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694 , Shreenath vs Rajesh, (1998) 4 SCC 543 , and Tanzeem-e-sufia vs Bibi Haliman, (2002) 7 SCC 50 , where proceedings were under the aforesaid fasciculus of Order XXI comprising Rules 97 to 104, in which the Objectors had set up a title distinct or different from that of the Judgment Debtor and the Court had protected their interest. The Appellant before us is a third party and has been brought into the lis by a side wind in that her property is sought to be attached with the intention of satisfying a decree in which she was not directly or intrinsicallyAppellant/Objector who has approached the Court under Order XXI Rule 58 is more advantageously or favourably placed inasmuch as she is a third party so far as the decree is concerned, and her property is not the subject-matter of the decree. It is thus clear to me that the Courts below have in a hurried, if not prejudiced manner, rejected the Objections merely because of some sympathy towards the Decree Holder. The Objections deserved to be allowed without disturbing the decree, leaving all other remedies open to the Decree Holder/Respondent, including proceedings against the Estate of the Judgment Debtor.

### Instruction: Given the specifics of the case proceeding, anticipate the court's ruling: will it favor (1) or oppose (0) the appellant’s request? ### Input: (i) the actual owner of the suit property having purchased it for valuable consideration, and (ii) being a third party not connected in any mala fide manner with the Judgment Debtor, and (iii) not having received prior notice of any action of late Shri Prem Chand Verma, was imperious to Execution proceedings. A miscarriage of justice, of monumental proportions, has taken place on an un-substantiated presumption that one of the assets of the Judgment Debtor had been illegally transferred to defeat the decree. The Appellant before us had no other recourse than to file Objections under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC.18. Finally another aspect which has come to the fore, is the approach of the Trial Court in the adjudication of the suit. The plaint contains an averment that the suit property had already been sold. The Defendant Shri Prem Chand Verma, (his wife Smt. Nirmal Verma was not impleaded) had appeared in the Trial Court and filed his Written Statement in which, whilst admitting the documentation executed between the parties, he had denied that he had been served with any legal notice and set up the defence that he was entitled to forfeit the amount received by him because the Plaintiff/Decree Holder had failed to pay the balance sale consideration as envisaged in the Deed of Agreement for Earnest Money. After filing his Written Statement he stopped appearing, and the suit proceeded ex-parte. Significantly, the Deed of Agreement for Earnest Money as well as the Written Statement predicate Defendant’s title on a Will, and in this context there is no evidence on record that it had taken effect because of the death of the Testator. In the event, as is to be expected, no appeal against the judgment and decree came to be filed, and, therefore, the decision was not tested before or scrutinized by the Appellate Court. The absence of the Defendant does not absolve the Trial Court from fully satisfying itself of the factual and legal veracity of the Plaintiff’s claim; nay, this feature of the litigation casts a greater responsibility and onerous obligation on the Trial Court as well as the Executing Court to be fully satisfied that the claim has been proved and substantiated to the hilt by the Plaintiff. Reference to Shantilal Gulabchand Mutha vs Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Limited, (2013) 4 SCC 396 , will be sufficient. The failure to file a Written Statement, thereby bringing Order VIII Rule 10 of the CPC into operation, or the factum of Defendant having been set ex parte, does not invite a punishment in the form of an automatic decree. Both under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC and on the invocation of Order IX of the CPC, the Court is nevertheless duty-bound to diligently ensure that the plaint stands proved and the prayers therein are worthy of being granted. .19. I am fully mindful of the fact that the Appellant has not taken any steps for setting aside the ex parte decree against late Shri Prem Chand Verma. This is only to be expected since the Appellant/Objector has no reason to evince or harbour any interest in the inter se dispute between the Decree Holder and the Judgment Debtor. Indeed, if the Appellant had made any endeavour to assail or nullify the decree, it would be fair to conclude that she had been put up by the Judgment Debtor in an endeavour to defeat the decree. In these circumstances, my in-depth analysis of the law pertaining to decreeing what is essentially a penalty clause may, on a perfunctory or superficial reading, be viewed as non essential to the context. This, however, is not so. On a conjoint reading of Order XXI Rule 58 CPC and the fasciculus of Order XXI comprising Rules 97 to 104, it becomes clear that all questions raised by the Objector have to be comprehensively considered on their merits. In the case in hand, the decree from which the Execution proceedings emanate is not one for delivery of possession, but is a simple money decree. Order XXI proscribes the filing of a separate suit and prescribes that all relevant questions shall be determined by the Court. Objection under Order XXI should be meaningfully heard so as to avoid the possibility of any miscarriage of justice. It is significant in this regard that Rule 103 ordains that where any application has been adjudicated upon under rule 98 or rule 100, the order made thereon shall have the same force and be subject to the same conditions as to an appeal or otherwise, as if it were a decree. I shall only advert to the decisions of this Court in Brahmdeo Chaudhary vs Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 694 , Shreenath vs Rajesh, (1998) 4 SCC 543 , and Tanzeem-e-sufia vs Bibi Haliman, (2002) 7 SCC 50 , where proceedings were under the aforesaid fasciculus of Order XXI comprising Rules 97 to 104, in which the Objectors had set up a title distinct or different from that of the Judgment Debtor and the Court had protected their interest. The Appellant before us is a third party and has been brought into the lis by a side wind in that her property is sought to be attached with the intention of satisfying a decree in which she was not directly or intrinsically concerned. 20. The Appellant/Objector who has approached the Court under Order XXI Rule 58 is more advantageously or favourably placed inasmuch as she is a third party so far as the decree is concerned, and her property is not the subject-matter of the decree. It is thus clear to me that the Courts below have in a hurried, if not prejudiced manner, rejected the Objections merely because of some sympathy towards the Decree Holder. The Objections deserved to be allowed without disturbing the decree, leaving all other remedies open to the Decree Holder/Respondent, including proceedings against the Estate of the Judgment Debtor.21. I respectfully agree with my learned Brother that the ### Response: 1

Marine Times Publications Pvt. Ltd Vs. Shiriram Transport And Finance Co. Ltd. And Anr

the premises but he refused to do so. Thereupon, the bank applied to the District Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bombay, praying that the dispute between the bank and the first respondent should be referred to arbitration under the provisions of Section 91 of the said Act. The Assistant Registrar passed an order to the effect that he was satisfied that there was dispute within the meaning of Section 91(1) of the said Act and he referred it for the decision of his nominee. The first respondent successfully challenged the order by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court. On appeal this Court held the when the original owner executed the lease he was not acting as a member but as a mortgagor in possession and, therefore, the claim of the bank did not fall within the provisions of Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act. This Court further took the view that the word "business" in the expression "touching the business of a society" in Section 91 does not mean "affairs of the society". It has been used in a narrower sense and means the actual trading of commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the said Act and the rules and its bye-laws. 10. It appears to us that the submissions of learned counsel for appellant deserves acceptance. 11. Before a dispute can be referred to a Cooperative Court under the provision of Section 91(1) of the said Act it is not only essential that the dispute should be of a kind described in sub-section (1) of Section 91 but it is also essential that the parties to the said dispute must belong to any of the categories specified in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of the said section. It is common ground that the parties to the dispute before us do not belong to any of the categories described in clauses (a) or (c) to (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the said Act and the only question is whether they can be held to be of any of the categories set out in clause (b) of the said sub-section. 12. We find that the appellant before us is a member of respondent 2, a cooperative society. Respondent 1 is not a member. The main question before us is whether the claim of respondent 1 in the dispute can be said to be one made against the cooperative society, being respondent 2, through the appellant, a member. On analysing the plaint it appears clear to us that the main claim of respondent 1 is for a decree or order for specifies performance of the agreement, whereby the appellant agreed to sell the said premises to respondent 1. The prayer for an order that respondent 2 Society should be directed to give their approval to the said transaction was merely a ancillary prayer made with a view to complete the relief of specific performance. As far as the claim to have the agreement specifically performed is concerned, we fail to see how it can be said to be a claim made by a person (non-member) against the society. The claim of respondent 1 against the society, as made in the plaint, cannot be said to be made through a member, the appellant herein, because it is only when a decree for performance of the said agreement is passed against the appellant, that it could be contended that the other relief, namely, for an order directing respondent 2 to approve the said transaction is claimed against the society through a member. Moreover, as we have pointed out that relief is only in the nature of ancillary relief, subsidiary to the main relief to specific performance. In our opinion, the dispute set out in the plaint cannot be said to fall within the scope of Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act and, in view of this, the learned Judge of the High Court was, with respect, in error in coming to the conclusion that both the parties to the dispute belonged to the categories covered under Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act. In our opinion, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the dispute in question was one "touching the business of the society" because even if that were so, it could not be referred to the Cooperative Court in the view which we have taken as set out earlier. 13. Learned counsel for respondent 1 drew our attention to the decision of this Court in O.N. Bhatnagar v. Rukibai Narsindas ( 1982 (2) SCC 244 : 1982 (3) SCR 681 ) and submitted that in that judgment the scope of the expression "touching the business" was given a larger connotation than that given to it in the case of Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain ( 1969 (1) SCR 887 : 1969 AIR(SC) 1320 : 1970 (40) CC 187) discussed earlier. In our opinion, it is not necessary to consider the interpretation of the said expression here because, even assuming that the expression "touching the business of the society" has been given a wider connotation in O.N. Bhatnagar case ( 1982 (2) SCC 244 : 1982 (3) SCR 681 ), as contended by learned counsel, it would make no difference to the result of the appeal in the view we have taken as we have based our conclusion on the construction of the provisions of Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act. The other decisions cited, namely, the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Leong v. Jinabai G. Gulrajami 1981 AIR(Bom) 244 : 83 Bom LR 299) and the decision of this Court in Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. ( 1990 (2) SCC 288 ) are of no direct relevance to the question before us and hence, we do not fell called upon to discuss the same.

1[ds]12. We find that the appellant before us is a member of respondent 2, a cooperative society. Respondent 1 is not a member. The main question before us is whether the claim of respondent 1 in the dispute can be said to be one made against the cooperative society, being respondent 2, through the appellant, a member. On analysing the plaint it appears clear to us that the main claim of respondent 1 is for a decree or order for specifies performance of the agreement, whereby the appellant agreed to sell the said premises to respondent 1. The prayer for an order that respondent 2 Society should be directed to give their approval to the said transaction was merely a ancillary prayer made with a view to complete the relief of specific performance. As far as the claim to have the agreement specifically performed is concerned, we fail to see how it can be said to be a claim made by a person (non-member) against the society. The claim of respondent 1 against the society, as made in the plaint, cannot be said to be made through a member, the appellant herein, because it is only when a decree for performance of the said agreement is passed against the appellant, that it could be contended that the other relief, namely, for an order directing respondent 2 to approve the said transaction is claimed against the society through a member. Moreover, as we have pointed out that relief is only in the nature of ancillary relief, subsidiary to the main relief to specific performance. In our opinion, the dispute set out in the plaint cannot be said to fall within the scope of Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act and, in view of this, the learned Judge of the High Court was, with respect, in error in coming to the conclusion that both the parties to the dispute belonged to the categories covered under Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act. In our opinion, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the dispute in question was one "touching the business of the society" because even if that were so, it could not be referred to the Cooperative Court in the view which we have taken as set outour opinion, it is not necessary to consider the interpretation of the said expression here because, even assuming that the expression "touching the business of the society" has been given a wider connotation in O.N. Bhatnagar case ( 1982 (2) SCC 244 : 1982 (3) SCR 681 ), as contended by learned counsel, it would make no difference to the result of the appeal in the view we have taken as we have based our conclusion on the construction of the provisions of Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act. The other decisions cited, namely, the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Leong v. Jinabai G. Gulrajami 1981 AIR(Bom) 244 : 83 Bom LR 299) and the decision of this Court in Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. ( 1990 (2) SCC 288 ) are of no direct relevance to the question before us and hence, we do not fell called upon to discuss the same

### Instruction: Analyze the legal arguments presented and estimate the likelihood of the court accepting (1) or rejecting (0) the petition. ### Input: the premises but he refused to do so. Thereupon, the bank applied to the District Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Bombay, praying that the dispute between the bank and the first respondent should be referred to arbitration under the provisions of Section 91 of the said Act. The Assistant Registrar passed an order to the effect that he was satisfied that there was dispute within the meaning of Section 91(1) of the said Act and he referred it for the decision of his nominee. The first respondent successfully challenged the order by a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court. On appeal this Court held the when the original owner executed the lease he was not acting as a member but as a mortgagor in possession and, therefore, the claim of the bank did not fall within the provisions of Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act. This Court further took the view that the word "business" in the expression "touching the business of a society" in Section 91 does not mean "affairs of the society". It has been used in a narrower sense and means the actual trading of commercial or other similar business activity of the society which the society is authorised to enter into under the said Act and the rules and its bye-laws. 10. It appears to us that the submissions of learned counsel for appellant deserves acceptance. 11. Before a dispute can be referred to a Cooperative Court under the provision of Section 91(1) of the said Act it is not only essential that the dispute should be of a kind described in sub-section (1) of Section 91 but it is also essential that the parties to the said dispute must belong to any of the categories specified in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1) of the said section. It is common ground that the parties to the dispute before us do not belong to any of the categories described in clauses (a) or (c) to (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 91 of the said Act and the only question is whether they can be held to be of any of the categories set out in clause (b) of the said sub-section. 12. We find that the appellant before us is a member of respondent 2, a cooperative society. Respondent 1 is not a member. The main question before us is whether the claim of respondent 1 in the dispute can be said to be one made against the cooperative society, being respondent 2, through the appellant, a member. On analysing the plaint it appears clear to us that the main claim of respondent 1 is for a decree or order for specifies performance of the agreement, whereby the appellant agreed to sell the said premises to respondent 1. The prayer for an order that respondent 2 Society should be directed to give their approval to the said transaction was merely a ancillary prayer made with a view to complete the relief of specific performance. As far as the claim to have the agreement specifically performed is concerned, we fail to see how it can be said to be a claim made by a person (non-member) against the society. The claim of respondent 1 against the society, as made in the plaint, cannot be said to be made through a member, the appellant herein, because it is only when a decree for performance of the said agreement is passed against the appellant, that it could be contended that the other relief, namely, for an order directing respondent 2 to approve the said transaction is claimed against the society through a member. Moreover, as we have pointed out that relief is only in the nature of ancillary relief, subsidiary to the main relief to specific performance. In our opinion, the dispute set out in the plaint cannot be said to fall within the scope of Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act and, in view of this, the learned Judge of the High Court was, with respect, in error in coming to the conclusion that both the parties to the dispute belonged to the categories covered under Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act. In our opinion, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the dispute in question was one "touching the business of the society" because even if that were so, it could not be referred to the Cooperative Court in the view which we have taken as set out earlier. 13. Learned counsel for respondent 1 drew our attention to the decision of this Court in O.N. Bhatnagar v. Rukibai Narsindas ( 1982 (2) SCC 244 : 1982 (3) SCR 681 ) and submitted that in that judgment the scope of the expression "touching the business" was given a larger connotation than that given to it in the case of Deccan Merchants Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain ( 1969 (1) SCR 887 : 1969 AIR(SC) 1320 : 1970 (40) CC 187) discussed earlier. In our opinion, it is not necessary to consider the interpretation of the said expression here because, even assuming that the expression "touching the business of the society" has been given a wider connotation in O.N. Bhatnagar case ( 1982 (2) SCC 244 : 1982 (3) SCR 681 ), as contended by learned counsel, it would make no difference to the result of the appeal in the view we have taken as we have based our conclusion on the construction of the provisions of Section 91(1)(b) of the said Act. The other decisions cited, namely, the decision of a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Leong v. Jinabai G. Gulrajami 1981 AIR(Bom) 244 : 83 Bom LR 299) and the decision of this Court in Sanwarmal Kejriwal v. Vishwa Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. ( 1990 (2) SCC 288 ) are of no direct relevance to the question before us and hence, we do not fell called upon to discuss the same. ### Response: 1

G. Ekambarappa & Ors Vs. Excess Profits Tax Officer, Bellary

charging section alone, and it arises not later than the close of the previous year, though quantification of the amount payable is postponed."The same view has been expressed by this Court in Chatturam Horilram Ltd .v. Commissioner of Income-tax, B. and O. 1955-27 ITR 709 (AIR1955 SC 619), in which the legal position was reviewed with regard to the question of charge to income-tax. In that case, the assessee-company carrying on business in Chota Nagpur was assessed to tax for the year 1939-40,but the assessment was set aside by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on March 28, 1942, on the ground that the Indian Finance Act, 1939,was not in force during the assessment year 1939-40, in Chota Nagpur which was a partially excluded area. On June 30, 1942, a Regulation was promulgated by which the Indian Finance Act of 1939.was brought into force in Chota Nagpur retrospectively as from March 30, 1939. Thereupon the Income-tax Officer made an order holding that the income of the assessee for the year 1939-40 had escaped assessment and issued to the assessee a notice under S. 34 of the Income-tax Act. The validity of the notice was questioned. It was held by this Court that though the Finance Act was not in force in that area in 1939-40, the income of the assessee was liable to tax in that year and, therefore, it had escaped assessment within the meaning of S. 34 of the Income-tax Act. It was pointed out that the income was chargeable to tax independently of the passing of the Finance Act but until the Finance Act was passed no tax could be actually levied. The same principle was reiterated by this Court in Kalwa Devadattam v. Union of India, 1963-49 ITR (SC) 165: (AIR 1964 SC 880 ). The question in that case was whether the liability of a Hindu undivided family arose before or after partition of the family. In that case, this Court speaking through Shah, J. stated in clear terms thus:"Under the Indian Income-tax Act liability to pay income -tax arises on the accrual of the income, and not from the computation made by the taxing authorities in the course of assessment proceedings: it arises at a point of time not later than the close of the year of account."The same view has been taken in a recent case by this Court in State of Kerala v. N. Sami Iyer, AIR 1966 SC 1415 . In view of the principle expressed in these authoritieswe are of the opinion that the liability to pay excess profits tax accrued immediately at the end of the chargeable accounting period and that liability was preserved under Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act even though the Act stood repealed so far as Bellary district was concerned with effect from November 1, 1956.6. Mr. Narsaraju contended in the alternative that on the combined operation of S. 53 of the Andhra Pradesh Act (Act 30 of 1953) and S. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act (Act 37 of 1956) all the provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 remained in operation in Bellary district in spite of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956. Section 53 of the Andhra Pradesh Act states as follows:"The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to the State of Madras or of Mysore shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, continue to have the same meaning."Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act reads as follow:"The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day".Section 120 of this Act states:"For the purpose of facilitating the application of any law in relation to any of the States formed or territorially altered by the provisions of Part II, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of one year from the appointed day, by order make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.Explanation.-In this section the expression "appropriate Government" means-(a) as respects any law relating to a matter enumerated in the Union List, the Central Government; and(b) as respects any other law,-(i) in its application to a Part A State, the State Government, and(ii) in its application to a Part C State, the Central Government."It was pointed out that the Act was in force in Bellary district when the Constitution came into force and the effect of S. 53 of the Andhra Pradesh Act was to continue the operation of that Act so far as Bellary district was concerned. The effect of S. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act was to preserve the territorial operation of the law which was immediately in force before the date of the promulgation of that Act until such law was repealed by the competent legislature or a competent legislative authority. There is great force in the argument advanced by Mr. Narasaraju on this point.But it is not necessary for us to express any concluded opinion on this aspect of the case because we have already given reasons for holding that the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that the Act stood repealed by reason of the adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 and the liability to pay tax on escaped profits continued under S. 6 of the General Clauses Act.

0[ds]In our opinion there is no justification for the argument put forward on behalf of the appellants. The result of the adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 so far as the Act was concerned, was that the provisions of that Act were no longer applicable or in force in Bellary diistrict. To put it differently, the Act was repealed so far as the area of Bellary district was concerned. Repeal of an Act means revocation or abrogation of the Act and, in our opinion, S. 6 of the General Clauses Act applies even in the case of a partial repeal or repeal of part of ando not think there is any substance in this argument. The liability of the appellants to tax arose immediately at the end of the chargeable accounting period and not merely at the time when it is quantified by assessment proceedings. It follows, therefore, that the notice issued under S. 15 of the Act was legally valid and the appellants representing the original partners of the firm continued to be liable to be proceeded against under that section for the profits which had escapedview of the principle expressed in these authoritieswe are of the opinion that the liability to pay excess profits tax accrued immediately at the end of the chargeable accounting period and that liability was preserved under Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act even though the Act stood repealed so far as Bellary district was concerned with effect from November 1,is great force in the argument advanced by Mr. Narasaraju on this point.But it is not necessary for us to express any concluded opinion on this aspect of the case because we have already given reasons for holding that the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that the Act stood repealed by reason of the adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 and the liability to pay tax on escaped profits continued under S. 6 of the General Clauses Act.

### Instruction: Analyze the legal arguments presented and estimate the likelihood of the court accepting (1) or rejecting (0) the petition. ### Input: charging section alone, and it arises not later than the close of the previous year, though quantification of the amount payable is postponed."The same view has been expressed by this Court in Chatturam Horilram Ltd .v. Commissioner of Income-tax, B. and O. 1955-27 ITR 709 (AIR1955 SC 619), in which the legal position was reviewed with regard to the question of charge to income-tax. In that case, the assessee-company carrying on business in Chota Nagpur was assessed to tax for the year 1939-40,but the assessment was set aside by the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal on March 28, 1942, on the ground that the Indian Finance Act, 1939,was not in force during the assessment year 1939-40, in Chota Nagpur which was a partially excluded area. On June 30, 1942, a Regulation was promulgated by which the Indian Finance Act of 1939.was brought into force in Chota Nagpur retrospectively as from March 30, 1939. Thereupon the Income-tax Officer made an order holding that the income of the assessee for the year 1939-40 had escaped assessment and issued to the assessee a notice under S. 34 of the Income-tax Act. The validity of the notice was questioned. It was held by this Court that though the Finance Act was not in force in that area in 1939-40, the income of the assessee was liable to tax in that year and, therefore, it had escaped assessment within the meaning of S. 34 of the Income-tax Act. It was pointed out that the income was chargeable to tax independently of the passing of the Finance Act but until the Finance Act was passed no tax could be actually levied. The same principle was reiterated by this Court in Kalwa Devadattam v. Union of India, 1963-49 ITR (SC) 165: (AIR 1964 SC 880 ). The question in that case was whether the liability of a Hindu undivided family arose before or after partition of the family. In that case, this Court speaking through Shah, J. stated in clear terms thus:"Under the Indian Income-tax Act liability to pay income -tax arises on the accrual of the income, and not from the computation made by the taxing authorities in the course of assessment proceedings: it arises at a point of time not later than the close of the year of account."The same view has been taken in a recent case by this Court in State of Kerala v. N. Sami Iyer, AIR 1966 SC 1415 . In view of the principle expressed in these authoritieswe are of the opinion that the liability to pay excess profits tax accrued immediately at the end of the chargeable accounting period and that liability was preserved under Section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act even though the Act stood repealed so far as Bellary district was concerned with effect from November 1, 1956.6. Mr. Narsaraju contended in the alternative that on the combined operation of S. 53 of the Andhra Pradesh Act (Act 30 of 1953) and S. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act (Act 37 of 1956) all the provisions of the Excess Profits Tax Act, 1940 remained in operation in Bellary district in spite of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956. Section 53 of the Andhra Pradesh Act states as follows:"The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to the State of Madras or of Mysore shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, continue to have the same meaning."Section 119 of the States Reorganisation Act reads as follow:"The provisions of Part II shall not be deemed to have effected any change in the territories to which any law in force immediately before the appointed day extends or applies, and territorial references in any such law to an existing State shall, until otherwise provided by a competent Legislature or other competent authority, be construed as meaning the territories within that State immediately before the appointed day".Section 120 of this Act states:"For the purpose of facilitating the application of any law in relation to any of the States formed or territorially altered by the provisions of Part II, the appropriate Government may, before the expiration of one year from the appointed day, by order make such adaptations and modifications of the law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and thereupon every such law shall have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.Explanation.-In this section the expression "appropriate Government" means-(a) as respects any law relating to a matter enumerated in the Union List, the Central Government; and(b) as respects any other law,-(i) in its application to a Part A State, the State Government, and(ii) in its application to a Part C State, the Central Government."It was pointed out that the Act was in force in Bellary district when the Constitution came into force and the effect of S. 53 of the Andhra Pradesh Act was to continue the operation of that Act so far as Bellary district was concerned. The effect of S. 119 of the States Reorganisation Act was to preserve the territorial operation of the law which was immediately in force before the date of the promulgation of that Act until such law was repealed by the competent legislature or a competent legislative authority. There is great force in the argument advanced by Mr. Narasaraju on this point.But it is not necessary for us to express any concluded opinion on this aspect of the case because we have already given reasons for holding that the appeal must be dismissed on the ground that the Act stood repealed by reason of the adaptation of Laws Order, 1956 and the liability to pay tax on escaped profits continued under S. 6 of the General Clauses Act. ### Response: 0

M/s. Banaras Electric Light & Power Company Limited Vs. Labour Court II, Lucknow & Others

is, however, stated that the resident engineer enquired from Srivastava why the cooly was allowed to work on live lines while he was standing there in contravention of his office orders stating that no unauthorised person should be allowed to work on the live lines and also as to why a ladder which was short for work and which did not belong to the company was being used. Srivastavas reply was that the company ladder was not long enough to reach the pole fuse to be replaced and it was necessary to secure another ladder. He also said that he was going to park his jeep and did not ask the cooly to work but his explanation was not accepted by the resident engineer who chastised Srivastava that he was standing and watching the replacement of the fuse by the cooly. The resident engineer also told srivastava that similar unauthorised work resulted in a fatal accident in Mangari village and wanted to know why his orders were being disobeyed. The witness was cross-examine and he reiterated what he had said earlier that he saw Shanker Das and Jagadhari, the former on the ladder working on the live lines and the latter standing on the ground holding the ladder and Srivastava standing near the jeep at a distance of 10 to 12 yards from where the ladder was fixed. It is further elucidated from the witness that the wooden stick which Shanker Das was using for replacing the fuse was something about 4 1/2 ft. and Shanker Das was trying to repair the fuse. On seeking this both the witnesses and the resident engineer asked Srivastava as to why he has allowed Shanker Das to climb on the ladder to work on the live lines to which Srivastava replied that he was going to park the jeep. This evidence directly contradicts the statement of Srivastava that he did not know that Shankar Das had climbed up the pole and was attending to the fuse with the stick because at that time he was parking the jeep. The statement that he was going to park the jeep is different from his statement that he was parking the jeep. Srivastavas evidence was that he did not know when the car of Bare Saheb came as he was completely engrossed in turning the jeep, that before parking the jeep he ordered the coolies to get down the ladder from the jeep and set it upon the pole, and that the cooly took the ladder from the jeep while he was parking the jeep. He further says that by the time he managed to stop the jeep, he found Bare Saheb and Chhote Saheb near the pole talking to the coolies, and when questioned by the Bare Saheb, he replied that he did not allow any cooly to go up nor did he know that Shanker Das had climbed the ladder. The evidence of Jagdhari was that Shanker Das had gone up the ladder and was measuring the height of the live line with the stick when the resident engineer and the assistant resident engineer arrived. In cross-examination he denies that Shankar Das was replacing the fuse. As to the use of the stick his explanation was that they used it for the purpose because the general order of the immediate officers is to somehow restore the supply and thereafter report it and they took the stick to use it for repairing. He admits that Srivastava did not say anything when the stick was taken. The inquiry officer asked Srivastava as to whether the cooly collected a wooden stick for the purpose or he had the same with him which he was using, but Srivastava replied that he cannot say anything about it. His evidence clearly shows that the stick which was in the jeep was taken by Shanker Das to the knowledge of Srivastava and he was using it on the live wire. Srivastava in his written explanation of November 5, had earlier stated in reply to the letter of the November 2, calling upon him to explain that he had seen the assistant resident engineer near the pole and that on the very day he had met the resident engineer twice and explained to him that neither he ordered Shanker Das nor did he know whether he had climbed on the ladder. In that explanation he, however, admitted that Shankar Das "did so as per usual practice prevailing in mains department". This explanation and admission was also considered by the inquiry officer in arriving at his finding. The evidence to which we have referred clearly justifies the inquiry officer in arriving at the finding that Srivastava had not only permitted Shankar Das to climb the pole and repair the fuse but was present at the time when Shankar Das was trying to repair it and did not prevent him from doing so. In this view the resident engineer was perfectly justified in finding the second respondent guilty of disobedience of the standing orders which were issued for protection of the life of the workers who were not authorised to deal with live wires. The live electric wires contain invisible death and those who come into contact with them suffer dangerous consequences if not fatality. The transgression of the office order, therefore, was a serious breach which justified the termination of the services of the second respondent.6. It was lastly contended that, because the second respondent was a protected workman and was carrying on the union activities, which were disliked by the resident engineer, he was victimised. We may point out that no complaint was made on this account to the resident engineer in his explanation nor was any ground taken before the labour Officer nor was any evidence led before the Labour Court. The Labour Court as well as the High Court went into this question and found that there was victimisation. These findings are based on no evidence and are wholly unwarranted.

0[ds]Though the learned Chief Justice while delivering the judgment of the Bench correctly set out the grounds upon which the findings of the domestic inquiry will be interfered with, he seems to have lost sight of those principles when he went into the evidence and came to his own conclusions thereon. This Court in several cases while dealing with industrial disputes of this kind, had occasion to point out that an Industrial Tribunal would not be justified in characterising the finding recorded in the domestic inquiry as perverse unless it can be shown that such a finding is not supported by any evidence, or is entirely opposed to the whole body of the evidence adduced before it. In a domestic inquiry once a conclusion is deduced from the evidence, it is not permissible is possible for some other authority to arrive at a different conclusion on the same evidence. In this case as we have pointed out earlier, the evidence of Chakraborty, assistant resident engineer, is clear and categorical and the Labour Officer as a domestic Tribunal came to the conclusion that on that evidence Srivastava filed on his duty to see that the office order Ext.7 was strictly complied with; as such the charge levelled against him under cl. 18(1) of the companys standing orders is proved. The Labour Court thought that the Labour Officer did not consider the defence evidence. We have, however, found from a perusal of the order that he evidence of defence witness Jagdhari as well as that of Srivastava was taken into consideration. There is also no rule of evidence which lays down that the evidence of a solitary witness cannot be relied upon or merely because there is only a solitary witness in support of the charge, no conclusion can be based upon it even though the evidence of that witness is acceptable as true5. The approach of the High Court was equally defective in that it mostly addressed its mind to the question whether there was direct evidence that Srivastava had asked Shankar Das to climb the ladder. It was never the case of the appellant that there was any direct evidence in that regard of Srivastava asking Shankar Das to repair the fuse. The inquiry officer, however, deduced from certain indisputable facts the conclusion that Shankar Das could not have gone up the ladder to replace the pole fuse without Srivastavas instructions and in any case it was Srivastavas duty to have exercised proper vigilance on his coolies so that the office order in question was strictly observed. The defence of Srivastava that Shanker Das, cooly, had gone up the ladder on his own account to work on the live lines and that he did not allow any cooly to go up, was considered both on the evidence of the employers as well as on the admission of Srivastava and Jagdhari. Chakraborty had spoken to the facts as they were witnessed by him when he and the resident engineer came on the scene at the time when Shanker Das was on the ladder and was working on a live line with a stick. This fact was not denied. What was in controversy is that while Chakraborty says that Srivastava was standing near a jeep at 10 or 12 yards from the ladder Srivastava says at the time when resident engineer and assistant resident engineer came, he was turning the jeep and did not know that shanker Das had climbed the pole. It is, however, stated that the resident engineer enquired from Srivastava why the cooly was allowed to work on live lines while he was standing there in contravention of his office orders stating that no unauthorised person should be allowed to work on the live lines and also as to why a ladder which was short for work and which did not belong to the company was being used. Srivastavas reply was that the company ladder was not long enough to reach the pole fuse to be replaced and it was necessary to secure another ladder. He also said that he was going to park his jeep and did not ask the cooly to work but his explanation was not accepted by the resident engineer who chastised Srivastava that he was standing and watching the replacement of the fuse by the cooly. The resident engineer also told srivastava that similar unauthorised work resulted in a fatal accident in Mangari village and wanted to know why his orders were being disobeyed. The witness wase and he reiterated what he had said earlier that he saw Shanker Das and Jagadhari, the former on the ladder working on the live lines and the latter standing on the ground holding the ladder and Srivastava standing near the jeep at a distance of 10 to 12 yards from where the ladder was fixed. It is further elucidated from the witness that the wooden stick which Shanker Das was using for replacing the fuse was something about 4 1/2 ft. and Shanker Das was trying to repair the fuse. On seeking this both the witnesses and the resident engineer asked Srivastava as to why he has allowed Shanker Das to climb on the ladder to work on the live lines to which Srivastava replied that he was going to park the jeep. This evidence directly contradicts the statement of Srivastava that he did not know that Shankar Das had climbed up the pole and was attending to the fuse with the stick because at that time he was parking the jeep. The statement that he was going to park the jeep is different from his statement that he was parking the jeep. Srivastavas evidence was that he did not know when the car of Bare Saheb came as he was completely engrossed in turning the jeep, that before parking the jeep he ordered the coolies to get down the ladder from the jeep and set it upon the pole, and that the cooly took the ladder from the jeep while he was parking the jeep. He further says that by the time he managed to stop the jeep, he found Bare Saheb and Chhote Saheb near the pole talking to the coolies, and when questioned by the Bare Saheb, he replied that he did not allow any cooly to go up nor did he know that Shanker Das had climbed the ladder. The evidence of Jagdhari was that Shanker Das had gone up the ladder and was measuring the height of the live line with the stick when the resident engineer and the assistant resident engineer arrived. Inn he denies that Shankar Das was replacing the fuse. As to the use of the stick his explanation was that they used it for the purpose because the general order of the immediate officers is to somehow restore the supply and thereafter report it and they took the stick to use it for repairing. He admits that Srivastava did not say anything when the stick was taken. The inquiry officer asked Srivastava as to whether the cooly collected a wooden stick for the purpose or he had the same with him which he was using, but Srivastava replied that he cannot say anything about it. His evidence clearly shows that the stick which was in the jeep was taken by Shanker Das to the knowledge of Srivastava and he was using it on the live wire. Srivastava in his written explanation of November 5, had earlier stated in reply to the letter of the November 2, calling upon him to explain that he had seen the assistant resident engineer near the pole and that on the very day he had met the resident engineer twice and explained to him that neither he ordered Shanker Das nor did he know whether he had climbed on the ladder. In that explanation he, however, admitted that Shankar Das "did so as per usual practice prevailing in mains department". This explanation and admission was also considered by the inquiry officer in arriving at his finding. The evidence to which we have referred clearly justifies the inquiry officer in arriving at the finding that Srivastava had not only permitted Shankar Das to climb the pole and repair the fuse but was present at the time when Shankar Das was trying to repair it and did not prevent him from doing so. In this view the resident engineer was perfectly justified in finding the second respondent guilty of disobedience of the standing orders which were issued for protection of the life of the workers who were not authorised to deal with live wires. The live electric wires contain invisible death and those who come into contact with them suffer dangerous consequences if not fatality. The transgression of the office order, therefore, was a serious breach which justified the termination of the services of the second respondent.6. It was lastly contended that, because the second respondent was a protected workman and was carrying on the union activities, which were disliked by the resident engineer, he was victimised.We may point out that no complaint was made on this account to the resident engineer in his explanation nor was any ground taken before the labour Officer nor was any evidence led before the Labour Court. The Labour Court as well as the High Court went into this question and found that there was victimisation. These findings are based on no evidence and are wholly unwarranted.

### Instruction: Based on the legal narrative and evidentiary details in the case proceeding, predict the court's stance: favorable (1) or unfavorable (0) to the appellant. ### Input: is, however, stated that the resident engineer enquired from Srivastava why the cooly was allowed to work on live lines while he was standing there in contravention of his office orders stating that no unauthorised person should be allowed to work on the live lines and also as to why a ladder which was short for work and which did not belong to the company was being used. Srivastavas reply was that the company ladder was not long enough to reach the pole fuse to be replaced and it was necessary to secure another ladder. He also said that he was going to park his jeep and did not ask the cooly to work but his explanation was not accepted by the resident engineer who chastised Srivastava that he was standing and watching the replacement of the fuse by the cooly. The resident engineer also told srivastava that similar unauthorised work resulted in a fatal accident in Mangari village and wanted to know why his orders were being disobeyed. The witness was cross-examine and he reiterated what he had said earlier that he saw Shanker Das and Jagadhari, the former on the ladder working on the live lines and the latter standing on the ground holding the ladder and Srivastava standing near the jeep at a distance of 10 to 12 yards from where the ladder was fixed. It is further elucidated from the witness that the wooden stick which Shanker Das was using for replacing the fuse was something about 4 1/2 ft. and Shanker Das was trying to repair the fuse. On seeking this both the witnesses and the resident engineer asked Srivastava as to why he has allowed Shanker Das to climb on the ladder to work on the live lines to which Srivastava replied that he was going to park the jeep. This evidence directly contradicts the statement of Srivastava that he did not know that Shankar Das had climbed up the pole and was attending to the fuse with the stick because at that time he was parking the jeep. The statement that he was going to park the jeep is different from his statement that he was parking the jeep. Srivastavas evidence was that he did not know when the car of Bare Saheb came as he was completely engrossed in turning the jeep, that before parking the jeep he ordered the coolies to get down the ladder from the jeep and set it upon the pole, and that the cooly took the ladder from the jeep while he was parking the jeep. He further says that by the time he managed to stop the jeep, he found Bare Saheb and Chhote Saheb near the pole talking to the coolies, and when questioned by the Bare Saheb, he replied that he did not allow any cooly to go up nor did he know that Shanker Das had climbed the ladder. The evidence of Jagdhari was that Shanker Das had gone up the ladder and was measuring the height of the live line with the stick when the resident engineer and the assistant resident engineer arrived. In cross-examination he denies that Shankar Das was replacing the fuse. As to the use of the stick his explanation was that they used it for the purpose because the general order of the immediate officers is to somehow restore the supply and thereafter report it and they took the stick to use it for repairing. He admits that Srivastava did not say anything when the stick was taken. The inquiry officer asked Srivastava as to whether the cooly collected a wooden stick for the purpose or he had the same with him which he was using, but Srivastava replied that he cannot say anything about it. His evidence clearly shows that the stick which was in the jeep was taken by Shanker Das to the knowledge of Srivastava and he was using it on the live wire. Srivastava in his written explanation of November 5, had earlier stated in reply to the letter of the November 2, calling upon him to explain that he had seen the assistant resident engineer near the pole and that on the very day he had met the resident engineer twice and explained to him that neither he ordered Shanker Das nor did he know whether he had climbed on the ladder. In that explanation he, however, admitted that Shankar Das "did so as per usual practice prevailing in mains department". This explanation and admission was also considered by the inquiry officer in arriving at his finding. The evidence to which we have referred clearly justifies the inquiry officer in arriving at the finding that Srivastava had not only permitted Shankar Das to climb the pole and repair the fuse but was present at the time when Shankar Das was trying to repair it and did not prevent him from doing so. In this view the resident engineer was perfectly justified in finding the second respondent guilty of disobedience of the standing orders which were issued for protection of the life of the workers who were not authorised to deal with live wires. The live electric wires contain invisible death and those who come into contact with them suffer dangerous consequences if not fatality. The transgression of the office order, therefore, was a serious breach which justified the termination of the services of the second respondent.6. It was lastly contended that, because the second respondent was a protected workman and was carrying on the union activities, which were disliked by the resident engineer, he was victimised. We may point out that no complaint was made on this account to the resident engineer in his explanation nor was any ground taken before the labour Officer nor was any evidence led before the Labour Court. The Labour Court as well as the High Court went into this question and found that there was victimisation. These findings are based on no evidence and are wholly unwarranted. ### Response: 0

Chintaman Rao & Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

S. 62. Section 92 constitutes the contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine or with both. The scheme of the aforesaid provisions indicates that the workmen in the factory are under the direct supervision and control of the management. The conditions of service are statutorily regulated and the management is to conform to the rules laid down at the risk of being penalised for dereliction of any of the statutory duties. The management obviously cannot fix the working hours, weekly holidays, arrange for night shifts and comply with other statutory requirements, if the persons like the Sattedars, working in their factories and getting their work done by others or through coolies, are workers within the meaning of the Act. It is well nigh impossible for the management of the factory to regulate their work or to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act.The said provisions, therefore, give a clear indication that a worker under the definition of the Act is a person who enters into a contract of service under the management and does not include an independent contractor or his coolies or servants who are not under the control and supervision of the employer.16. There is a conflict of decisions between the Allahabad and the Nagpur High Courts on the construction of S. 2 (1) of the Act. A Divisional Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar v. Robinson, ILR (1947) Nag 43: (AIR 1947 Nag 83) (C), considered the scope of the definition of the word "worker" in the Factories Act. There the facts were : On November 10, 1943, a new battery of boilers was being erected on the premises of the Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co. in order to supply energy to the New Ordnance Factory at Khamaria. The work of erection was entrusted to Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox of Calcutta. The persons who were employed by Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox were found working in the premises of the Electric Supply Co. in contravention of the provisions of the Factories Act. The question was whether the employees of an independent contractor were workers as defined under S. 2 (1) of the Act. Pollock, J. who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench stated at p. 44 (of ILR Nag): (at p. 84 of AIR), thus :"The definition of "worker" is a very wide one, and it is wide enough, in our opinion, to include persons employed in repairing machinery or putting up new machinery, even if such a machinery is not in actual use at the time."It may be noticed that no contention was raised in that case that the persons found in the factory were not the employees of Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co. The only question raised and decided was whether the persons employed in repairing the machinery or putting up new machinery were persons engaged in any manufacturing process or any work incidental to or connected with it. The question now raised was not before the learned Judge and therefore there was no occasion for them to express any opinion thereon. The fact that if this question was raised and decided in the way we did, the conclusion of the learned Judges would have been different cannot make the said decision an authority on a point not raised or decided upon by the learned Judges.17. Another Bench of the Nagpur High Court in The State v. Jiwabhai, ILR (1953) Nag 67: (AIR 1953 Nag 172) (D), gave a wide connotation to the word "employed" under S. 66 (1) (b) of the Factories Act. The learned Judges observed that the word "employed", in their opinion, did not only connote employed on wages but also being occupied or engaged in some form of activity. If the learned Judges meant by that observation, that if a person is found engaged in some form of activity in a factory, irrespective of whether there was any contract of employment or not between him and the employer, he is a worker, we should express our respectful dissent from the said observation. But, on the other hand, if they had only emphasized on the fact, which is obvious from the provisions of S. 2 (1), that the employment need not be for wages, the statement is unobjectionable.18. The decision in State v. Shri Krishna Prasad, AIR 1954 All 44 (E), need not be considered in detail as the learned Judges therein accepted the same interpretation that we have placed on the provisions of S. 2 (1) of the Act and came to the conclusion, on the facts of that case, that the persons therein were workers of the factory.19. We, therefore, hold that neither the Sattedars nor the coolies found by the Inspector to be working in the factory were workers, as they were not employed by the factory.20. As they were not workers, the non-inclusion of their names in the register of adult workers or the absence of any entries in regard to them in the said register would not constitute an offence under S. 92 of the Act.21. Before leaving this case we would like to make one observation.Our decision is not intended to lay down a general proposition that under no circumstances a Sattedar can be considered to be a worker within the meaning of its definition in the Act. Whether a particular person, under whatever designation he may be known, is a worker or not under the Act depends upon the terms of the contract entered into between him and the employer.In the case before us no attempt has been made by the prosecution to establish that the Sattedars were employed by the management for doing work in the factory. The uncontradicted evidence is that they were independent contractors who came to the factory to deliver the bidis or sent their coolies to do the same. Our decision is, therefore, confined to the facts of this case.

1[ds]12. There is no reason why the test laid down by this Court in the context of the definition of workman under the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947, cannot be invoked or applied for ascertaining whether a person is a worker under the Act. If the test be applied, it is not possible to hold that Sattedars in the present case, having regard to the nature of the work undertaken by them and the terms whereunder their services were engaged, are "workers" within the meaning of the definition under the Act.It has been established in the present case that the Sattedar is only an independent contractor and the agreement between the management and the Sattedar is only that the Sattedar should receive tobacco from the management and supply them rolled in bidis for consideration. He is not under the control of the factory management and he can manufacture bidis wherever he pleases.It is immaterial to the management whether he makes the bidis in his own factory or distributes tobacco to different individuals for making bidis under a separate agreement entered into by him with them.The management cannot regulate the manner of discharge of his work. His liability is discharged by his supplying bidis and delivering them in the factory. The terms of the contract between the management and the Sattedar, as disclosed in the evidence, do not enjoin on the latter to work in the factory.His only obligation is to deliver bidis at the factory. That would be an obligation imposed on any contractor who undertakes to supply and deliver the goods to the other party.We, therefore, hold that the Sattedars in this case were not employed by the management as workers but were only independent contractors who performed their part of the contract by making bidis and delivering them at the factory.13.If the Sattedars, i.e., three out of the nine persons found at the factory, were not workers within the meaning of the Act, can it be said that the other persons, who were coolies employed by the Sattedars to enable them to keep up their contract with the management of the factory, were workers as defined under the Act?A "worker" under the definition means a person employed, directly or through any agency.The words directly or through any agency indicate that the employment is by the management directly or through some kind of employment agency and in either case there is a contract of employment between the management and the persons employed. Admittedly the coolies were not employed by the management; there was no privity of contract between them and the management.It is not disputed that the coolies were not employed by the Sattedars for or on behalf of the management of the factory. They were employed by the Sattedars on their own account and they paid them for the work extracted from them.On the aforesaid facts it is obvious that the coolies were not employed by the management directly nor were they employed by the management through the agency of Sattedars. If so, it follows that coolies employed by the Sattedars are not workers within the meaning of the definition in the Act.14. The evidence discloses a third category of persons who took some part in the manufacturing process of bidis. They were the persons to whom the Sattedars distributed tobacco for making bidis in their respective homes. It does not appear from the evidence that any one of the nine persons found in the factory belongs to that category. That apart those persons cannot, in any sense of the term, be called the persons employed by the management directly or through anyscheme of the aforesaid provisions indicates that the workmen in the factory are under the direct supervision and control of the management. The conditions of service are statutorily regulated and the management is to conform to the rules laid down at the risk of being penalised for dereliction of any of the statutory duties. The management obviously cannot fix the working hours, weekly holidays, arrange for night shifts and comply with other statutory requirements, if the persons like the Sattedars, working in their factories and getting their work done by others or through coolies, are workers within the meaning of the Act. It is well nigh impossible for the management of the factory to regulate their work or to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act.The said provisions, therefore, give a clear indication that a worker under the definition of the Act is a person who enters into a contract of service under the management and does not include an independent contractor or his coolies or servants who are not under the control and supervision of the employer.The decision in State v. Shri Krishna Prasad, AIR 1954 All 44 (E), need not be considered in detail as the learned Judges therein accepted the same interpretation that we have placed on the provisions of S. 2 (1) of the Act and came to the conclusion, on the facts of that case, that the persons therein were workers of the factory.19. We, therefore, hold that neither the Sattedars nor the coolies found by the Inspector to be working in the factory were workers, as they were not employed by the factory.20. As they were not workers, theof their names in the register of adult workers or the absence of any entries in regard to them in the said register would not constitute an offence under S. 92 of the Act.

### Instruction: Based on the information in the case proceeding, determine the likely outcome: acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of the appellant/petitioner's case. ### Input: S. 62. Section 92 constitutes the contravention of any of the provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine or with both. The scheme of the aforesaid provisions indicates that the workmen in the factory are under the direct supervision and control of the management. The conditions of service are statutorily regulated and the management is to conform to the rules laid down at the risk of being penalised for dereliction of any of the statutory duties. The management obviously cannot fix the working hours, weekly holidays, arrange for night shifts and comply with other statutory requirements, if the persons like the Sattedars, working in their factories and getting their work done by others or through coolies, are workers within the meaning of the Act. It is well nigh impossible for the management of the factory to regulate their work or to comply with the mandatory provisions of the Act.The said provisions, therefore, give a clear indication that a worker under the definition of the Act is a person who enters into a contract of service under the management and does not include an independent contractor or his coolies or servants who are not under the control and supervision of the employer.16. There is a conflict of decisions between the Allahabad and the Nagpur High Courts on the construction of S. 2 (1) of the Act. A Divisional Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar v. Robinson, ILR (1947) Nag 43: (AIR 1947 Nag 83) (C), considered the scope of the definition of the word "worker" in the Factories Act. There the facts were : On November 10, 1943, a new battery of boilers was being erected on the premises of the Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co. in order to supply energy to the New Ordnance Factory at Khamaria. The work of erection was entrusted to Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox of Calcutta. The persons who were employed by Messrs. Babcock and Wilcox were found working in the premises of the Electric Supply Co. in contravention of the provisions of the Factories Act. The question was whether the employees of an independent contractor were workers as defined under S. 2 (1) of the Act. Pollock, J. who delivered the judgment of the Division Bench stated at p. 44 (of ILR Nag): (at p. 84 of AIR), thus :"The definition of "worker" is a very wide one, and it is wide enough, in our opinion, to include persons employed in repairing machinery or putting up new machinery, even if such a machinery is not in actual use at the time."It may be noticed that no contention was raised in that case that the persons found in the factory were not the employees of Jubbulpore Electric Supply Co. The only question raised and decided was whether the persons employed in repairing the machinery or putting up new machinery were persons engaged in any manufacturing process or any work incidental to or connected with it. The question now raised was not before the learned Judge and therefore there was no occasion for them to express any opinion thereon. The fact that if this question was raised and decided in the way we did, the conclusion of the learned Judges would have been different cannot make the said decision an authority on a point not raised or decided upon by the learned Judges.17. Another Bench of the Nagpur High Court in The State v. Jiwabhai, ILR (1953) Nag 67: (AIR 1953 Nag 172) (D), gave a wide connotation to the word "employed" under S. 66 (1) (b) of the Factories Act. The learned Judges observed that the word "employed", in their opinion, did not only connote employed on wages but also being occupied or engaged in some form of activity. If the learned Judges meant by that observation, that if a person is found engaged in some form of activity in a factory, irrespective of whether there was any contract of employment or not between him and the employer, he is a worker, we should express our respectful dissent from the said observation. But, on the other hand, if they had only emphasized on the fact, which is obvious from the provisions of S. 2 (1), that the employment need not be for wages, the statement is unobjectionable.18. The decision in State v. Shri Krishna Prasad, AIR 1954 All 44 (E), need not be considered in detail as the learned Judges therein accepted the same interpretation that we have placed on the provisions of S. 2 (1) of the Act and came to the conclusion, on the facts of that case, that the persons therein were workers of the factory.19. We, therefore, hold that neither the Sattedars nor the coolies found by the Inspector to be working in the factory were workers, as they were not employed by the factory.20. As they were not workers, the non-inclusion of their names in the register of adult workers or the absence of any entries in regard to them in the said register would not constitute an offence under S. 92 of the Act.21. Before leaving this case we would like to make one observation.Our decision is not intended to lay down a general proposition that under no circumstances a Sattedar can be considered to be a worker within the meaning of its definition in the Act. Whether a particular person, under whatever designation he may be known, is a worker or not under the Act depends upon the terms of the contract entered into between him and the employer.In the case before us no attempt has been made by the prosecution to establish that the Sattedars were employed by the management for doing work in the factory. The uncontradicted evidence is that they were independent contractors who came to the factory to deliver the bidis or sent their coolies to do the same. Our decision is, therefore, confined to the facts of this case. ### Response: 1

The Member, Board Of Revenue Vs. Arthur Paul Benthall

the authority conferred thereby.11. It may be mentioned that questions of this character cannot now arise in England in view of the special provision contained in the Finance Act, 1927 (17 and and 18, Geo.5.Ch.10), S. 56 which runs as follows:"No instrument chargeable with stamp duty under the heading Letter or power of Attorney and Commission, Factory, Mandate, or other instrument in the nature thereof in First Schedule to the stamp Act, 1891, shall be charged with duty more than once by reason only that more persons then one are named in the instrument as donors or donees (whether jointly or severally or otherwise), of the powers thereby conferred or that those powers relate to more than one matter",There is no provision in the statute law of this country similar to the above, and it is significant that it assumes that a power of attorney might consist of distinct matters by reason of fact that there are several donors or donees mentioned in it, or that it relates to more than one matter.12. Now, considering Ex. A in the light of the above discussion, the point for determination is whether it can be said to comprise distinct matters by reason of the fact that the respondent has executed it in different capacities. In this form, the question is bereft of authority, and falls to be decided on well- recognised principles applicable to the matter.13. It is, as has been stated above, settled law that when two persons join in executing a power-of attorney, whether it comprises distinct matters or not will depend on whether the interests of the executants in the subject-matter of the power are separae or joint. Conversely, if one person holding properties in two different capacities, each unconnected with the other, executes a power in respect of both of them, the instrument should logically be held to comprise distinct matters.14. That will be in consonance with the generally accepted notion of what are distinct matters. And that certainly was the view which the respondent himself took of the matter when he expressly recited in the power that he executed it both in his individual capacity and in his other capacities.15. But it is contended by Mr. Chaudhury that the fact that the respondent filled several capacities would not affect the character of the instrument as relating to a single matter, as the delegation thereunder extended to whatever the respondent could do, and that it would be immaterial that he held some properties in his individual capacity and some others as trustee or executor, as the legal title to all of them would vest in him equally in the latter as well as in the former capacity. We are concerned, he argued, not with the source from which the title flowed but with the reservoir in which it is now contained .16. This is to attach more importance to the form of the matter than to its substance. When a person is appointed trustee, the legal title to the estate does, under the English law undoubtedly vest in him; but then he holds it for the benefit of the cestuique trust in whom the equitable estate vests. Under the Indian law, it is well established that there can be trusts and fiduciary relations in the nature of trust even without there being a vesting of the legal estate in the trustee as in the case of mutts and temples.17. VideVidya Varuthi v. Balusami", AIR 1922 PC 123 (L). In such cases, the legal title is vested in the institution, the Mahant orshebaitbeing the manager thereof, and any delegation of authority by him can only be on behalf of the institution which here presents.When a person possesses both a personal capacity and a representative capacity, such as trustee, and there is a delegation of power by him in both those capacities, the position in law is exactly the same as if different persons join in executing a power in respect of matters which are unrelated.18. There being no community of interest between the personal estate belonging to the executant and the trust estate vested in him, they must be held to be distinct matters for purposes of S. 5 . The position is the same when a person is executor or administrator, because in that capacity he represents the estate of the deceased, whose persona is deemed to continue in him for purposes of administration.19. It was finally contended by Mr. Chaudhury that if every capacity of the donor is to be considered as a distinct matter, we should have to hold that there are distinct matters not only with reference to the capacity of the executant as trustee, executor and so forth, but in respect of every transaction entered into by him in his personal capacity.20. Thus, it is argued, if he confers on his attorney authority to sell one property, to mortgage another and to lease a third, he would have acted in three different capacities as vendor, mortgagor and lessor, and the instrument will have to be stamped as relating to three distinct matters. This, he contended would destroy the very basis of a general power-of attorney. The fallacy in this argument is in mixing up the capacity which a person possesses with acts exercisable by virtue of that capacity.21. When an executor, for example, sells one property for discharging the debts of the testator and mortgages another for raising funds for carrying on his business, he no doubt acts in two different transactions; but in respect of both of them, he functions only in his capacity as executor. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention.22.In the result, we are of the opinion, differing from the majority of the learned Judges of the court below, that the instrument, Ex. A, comprises distinct matters in respect of the several capacities of the respondent mentioned therein, and that the view taken by the revenue authorities and supported by S. R. Das Gupta J., is correct.

1[ds]4. We are unable to accept the contention that the word "matter in S. 5 was in tended to convey the same meaning as the word" description " in S. 6. In its popular sense, the expression" distinct matters" would connote something different from distinct "categories". Two transactions might be of the same description, but all the same, they might be distinct.Ifthe intention of the legislature was that the expression " distinct matters in S. 5 should be understood not in its popular sense but narrowly as meaning different categories in the Schedule, nothing would have been easier than to say so.When two words of different import are used in a statute in two consecutive provisions, it would be difficult to maintain that they are used in the same sense, and the conclusion must follow that the expression "distinct matters" in S. 5 and "descriptions" in Section 6 have differentthe topics covered by Ss. 5 and 6 are different, it is not difficult to conceive of instruments which might raise questions falling to be determined under both the Sections. Thus, if a partnership carried on by members of a family is would up and the deep of dissolution effects also a partition of the family properties as in - Board of Revenue, Madras v. Alagappa Chettiar, AIR 1937 Mad 308 (SB) (A),the instrument can be viewed both as a deed of dissolution and a deed of partition, and under S. 6, the duty payable will be the higher duty as on a instrument ofbut for the saving clause, a contention might be advanced that Section 5 and 6 are mutually exclusive, and as the instrument falls within S. 6, the only duty payable thereon is as on an instrument of partition and no more. The purpose of the case in S. 6 is to repeal any sucherror in this argument lies in thinking that the object and scope of Ss. 4 to 6 are the same, which in fact they arehowever, does not follow. The case before the court was one in which the instrument dealt with properties which fell under two categories, and the decision was that they were distinctthe view, then, that S. 5 would apply even when the instrument comprises matters of the same description, the point for decision is whether the instrument proposed to the executed by the respondent is a single power-of attorney or a combination of several ofare unable to agree with the respondent that when a person executes a power - of attorney in respect of all the matters in which he could act it should be held, as a matter of law and without regard to the contents of the instrument, to comprise a single matter. Whether it relates to a single matter or to distinct matters will in our opinion, depend on a number of factors such as who are parties thereto, which is the subject matter on which it operates and sois no provision in the statute law of this country similar to the above, and it is significant that it assumes that a power of attorney might consist of distinct matters by reason of fact that there are several donors or donees mentioned in it, or that it relates to more than oneis, as has been stated above, settled law that when two persons join in executing a power-of attorney, whether it comprises distinct matters or not will depend on whether the interests of the executants in the subject-matter of the power are separae or joint. Conversely, if one person holding properties in two different capacities, each unconnected with the other, executes a power in respect of both of them, the instrument should logically be held to comprise distinctwill be in consonance with the generally accepted notion of what are distinct matters. And that certainly was the view which the respondent himself took of the matter when he expressly recited in the power that he executed it both in his individual capacity and in his othera person is appointed trustee, the legal title to the estate does, under the English law undoubtedly vest in him; but then he holds it for the benefit of the cestuique trust in whom the equitable estate vests. Under the Indian law, it is well established that there can be trusts and fiduciary relations in the nature of trust even without there being a vesting of the legal estate in the trustee as in the case of mutts andbeing no community of interest between the personal estate belonging to the executant and the trust estate vested in him, they must be held to be distinct matters for purposes of S. 5 . The position is the same when a person is executor or administrator, because in that capacity he represents the estate of the deceased, whose persona is deemed to continue in him for purposes offallacy in this argument is in mixing up the capacity which a person possesses with acts exercisable by virtue of thatthe result, we are of the opinion, differing from the majority of the learned Judges of the court below, that the instrument, Ex. A, comprises distinct matters in respect of the several capacities of the respondent mentioned therein, and that the view taken by the revenue authorities and supported by S. R. Das Gupta J., is correct.

### Instruction: Based on the information in the case proceeding, determine the likely outcome: acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of the appellant/petitioner's case. ### Input: the authority conferred thereby.11. It may be mentioned that questions of this character cannot now arise in England in view of the special provision contained in the Finance Act, 1927 (17 and and 18, Geo.5.Ch.10), S. 56 which runs as follows:"No instrument chargeable with stamp duty under the heading Letter or power of Attorney and Commission, Factory, Mandate, or other instrument in the nature thereof in First Schedule to the stamp Act, 1891, shall be charged with duty more than once by reason only that more persons then one are named in the instrument as donors or donees (whether jointly or severally or otherwise), of the powers thereby conferred or that those powers relate to more than one matter",There is no provision in the statute law of this country similar to the above, and it is significant that it assumes that a power of attorney might consist of distinct matters by reason of fact that there are several donors or donees mentioned in it, or that it relates to more than one matter.12. Now, considering Ex. A in the light of the above discussion, the point for determination is whether it can be said to comprise distinct matters by reason of the fact that the respondent has executed it in different capacities. In this form, the question is bereft of authority, and falls to be decided on well- recognised principles applicable to the matter.13. It is, as has been stated above, settled law that when two persons join in executing a power-of attorney, whether it comprises distinct matters or not will depend on whether the interests of the executants in the subject-matter of the power are separae or joint. Conversely, if one person holding properties in two different capacities, each unconnected with the other, executes a power in respect of both of them, the instrument should logically be held to comprise distinct matters.14. That will be in consonance with the generally accepted notion of what are distinct matters. And that certainly was the view which the respondent himself took of the matter when he expressly recited in the power that he executed it both in his individual capacity and in his other capacities.15. But it is contended by Mr. Chaudhury that the fact that the respondent filled several capacities would not affect the character of the instrument as relating to a single matter, as the delegation thereunder extended to whatever the respondent could do, and that it would be immaterial that he held some properties in his individual capacity and some others as trustee or executor, as the legal title to all of them would vest in him equally in the latter as well as in the former capacity. We are concerned, he argued, not with the source from which the title flowed but with the reservoir in which it is now contained .16. This is to attach more importance to the form of the matter than to its substance. When a person is appointed trustee, the legal title to the estate does, under the English law undoubtedly vest in him; but then he holds it for the benefit of the cestuique trust in whom the equitable estate vests. Under the Indian law, it is well established that there can be trusts and fiduciary relations in the nature of trust even without there being a vesting of the legal estate in the trustee as in the case of mutts and temples.17. VideVidya Varuthi v. Balusami", AIR 1922 PC 123 (L). In such cases, the legal title is vested in the institution, the Mahant orshebaitbeing the manager thereof, and any delegation of authority by him can only be on behalf of the institution which here presents.When a person possesses both a personal capacity and a representative capacity, such as trustee, and there is a delegation of power by him in both those capacities, the position in law is exactly the same as if different persons join in executing a power in respect of matters which are unrelated.18. There being no community of interest between the personal estate belonging to the executant and the trust estate vested in him, they must be held to be distinct matters for purposes of S. 5 . The position is the same when a person is executor or administrator, because in that capacity he represents the estate of the deceased, whose persona is deemed to continue in him for purposes of administration.19. It was finally contended by Mr. Chaudhury that if every capacity of the donor is to be considered as a distinct matter, we should have to hold that there are distinct matters not only with reference to the capacity of the executant as trustee, executor and so forth, but in respect of every transaction entered into by him in his personal capacity.20. Thus, it is argued, if he confers on his attorney authority to sell one property, to mortgage another and to lease a third, he would have acted in three different capacities as vendor, mortgagor and lessor, and the instrument will have to be stamped as relating to three distinct matters. This, he contended would destroy the very basis of a general power-of attorney. The fallacy in this argument is in mixing up the capacity which a person possesses with acts exercisable by virtue of that capacity.21. When an executor, for example, sells one property for discharging the debts of the testator and mortgages another for raising funds for carrying on his business, he no doubt acts in two different transactions; but in respect of both of them, he functions only in his capacity as executor. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention.22.In the result, we are of the opinion, differing from the majority of the learned Judges of the court below, that the instrument, Ex. A, comprises distinct matters in respect of the several capacities of the respondent mentioned therein, and that the view taken by the revenue authorities and supported by S. R. Das Gupta J., is correct. ### Response: 1

Mafatlal Industries Limited & Another Vs. State of Maharashtra Through Its Ministries Revenue & Forest & Urban Development & Others

of their rights, that this principle would come into play. This is enshrined in Article 300A of the Constitution of India. In that event, even the guarantee of equality flowing from Article 14 of the Constitution of India is breached and violated. This is not a case of that nature. This is a case where the requirement of the land for a predesignated public purpose is fulfilled by balancing the rights and equities of the petitioners as lessees of Government land or public properties. Pertinently, the petitioners are not challenging the power of the State Government to make a conditional modification in the Development Plan or proposal. The power flowing from the substantive provisions of the MRTP Act can be exercised unconditionally or by imposing terms and conditions consistent with the object and purpose of the MRTP Act. Even the conditions of the Notifications are not challenged. It is but a reading and construction thereof to their advantage which is attempted by the petitioners in this petition. Once we find that such an attempt cannot succeed, then, no relief can be granted to the petitioners, particularly in terms of the prayers set out hereinabove.77. None of the decisions cited by Mr. Khambata would assist the petitioners.78. In those decisions, the controversy was entirely different. The ambit and scope of powers conferred by Section 37 of the MRTP Act was in issue in Pune Municipal Corporation V/s. Promoters and Builders Association (supra). The principle of estoppel and particularly promissory estoppel was pressed into service but even that attempt was not successful because the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against statutes. The backdrop in which all these issues arose for determination and consideration are totally different and distinct. The question was whether the State Government can make any changes on its own in the modifications submitted by the Planning Authority or not. It is answering that issue in favour of the Pune Municipal Corporation and rejecting all the arguments to the contrary that this Judgment was rendered. Far from assisting the petitioners before us, some of the observations in this Judgment would militate against the contentions of Mr. Khambata.79. In the case of Godrej And Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited (supra), the facts were peculiar. The plots of the appellants and the petitioners therein were shown in the Development Plan as reserved for roads. They voluntarily surrendered their lands. They constructed on their respective pieces of land the development plan roads at their own cost and as per the specifications stipulated in the relevant rules. This was in addition to the voluntary surrender. The dispute between the parties was limited to the question of extent of floor space index (FSI) or transferable development rights (TDR) for the roads constructed on the surrendered lands at the owners cost. The land owners claimed a certain FSI or TDR and relied upon para 6 of Appendix VII to the Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991. The Municipal Corporation, however, relied on a circular issued on 9-4-1996 and restricted the additional TDR only to the extent of 15% of the road area. The argument of the petitioners was that the contents of this circular were merely in the nature of executive instructions and could not supersede or override the provisions of the DC Regulations which were legislative in nature.80. It is in such a controversy that the issue arose as to whether this was a correct understanding of the State and the Municipal Corporation, or whether the petitioners were right. Holding that the contentions of the petitioners are of substance, their case came to be accepted. The observations relied upon by Mr. Khambata cannot be read in isolation but must be read in the backdrop of this essential question or controversy. We do not see how then can the petitioners claim any relief based on this Judgment. This Judgment is, therefore, entirely distinguishable.81. We do not see how the other Judgments, and particularly that rendered in the case of Pepsico India Holdings Private Limited (supra), would assist the petitioners. The Pepsicos was a case where the doctrine of promissory estoppel was invoked so as to rely upon a concession/exemption/incentive/rebate in sales tax. The argument was that Pepsico has taken effective steps for acquiring or placing firm orders for the purchase of the necessary plant and machinery under the Notification dated 3-11-1993, issued under the industrial policy of the State of Kerala. Therefore, it was entitled to the relief in terms of the Notification, namely, exemption from sales tax for a certain period. Its entitlement was thus upheld and the State was prevented from denying the benefit of this exemption Notification to it. We have no such case before us.82. Equally, the other Judgment in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation V/s. Kausarbag Cooperative Housing Society Limited (supra) is distinguishable. It may be discussing the concept of TDR and that can be offered in lieu of cash compensation and the issue was whether the land in question was shown as reserved for garden in the layout plan. The acquisition of the land was initiated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and was completed in the year 1987 whereafter possession of the land was taken over on 19-2-1987. Thereafter, the Development Plan was sought to be prepared and published and in the draft of which the land was shown as an existing garden. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners claimed that their entitlement to TDR cannot be defeated by such an attempt and urged that the land was acquired under a non-developmental proposal and the same would not attract the provisions of the MRTP Act. It is in these circumstances that the writ petition by Kausarbag Cooperative Housing Society Limited was allowed by the High Court and the appeal preferred from the Judgment of this Court was dismissed. This case is also distinguishable.83. We do not think that the other Judgments in the compilation are of any assistance to the petitioners.

1[ds]A perusal of this Notification leaves us in no manner of doubt that land admeasuring 58,197.97 square metres out of City Survey No.593 of Mazgaon Division, styled as the said land, may have been termed in this Notification to be owned by M/s. Mafatlal Industriesland is reserved for extension of VJB Udyan as per the proposals of the Development Plan of E Ward sanctioned by the Government onOn that land is located a cotton textile mill unit. This reservation continued after the term of the Development Plan of 1967 was over. In the earlier plan also, the land was reserved for extension to VJB Udyan, and in the revised Development Plan published under Section 26 of the MRTP Act and submitted to Government under Section 30 of the MRTP Act by the MCGM, the reservation was deleted from that land and it was placed in retention activity. However, while according sanction by the State Government to the revised Development Plan ofthe said land was kept reserved for the said purpose. The cotton textile mill was a running industry upto June, 2000, after which, taking into consideration the financial constraints faced by the company and the complete erosion of itsleading to closure of its activities, the unit of the said company was declared sick by the Board of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR for short) under the provisions of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.70. What is relevant and material for our purpose is that it is this textile unit/company which approached the Government with a proposal to commercially exploit its lands at Lower Parel and Mazgaon so as to generate funds and from these funds generated pursuant to the development of these lands, to partially revive the said mill and to pay its various dues. The company, therefore, requested that the reservation be deleted. It said that it intends to carry out development in accordance with Regulation 58 of the DCR, 1991, as modified in the year 2001.71. The entire issue was examined with reference to the possible development of the said land as per the proposals of the Development Plan visavis the revival scheme of the said mill as envisaged by the said company. The Government was of the view that after the revival scheme is approved by the BIFR, that will restore the viability of the said mill and also enable it to pay various dues, including labour dues. That would also help to some extent to protect the job of workers of the said mill. However, for this purpose it is necessary that the said land is released from the reservation and placed in retention activity.72. In these circumstances, after considering all the facts and related issues, the Government, in larger public interest, found it expedient to take necessary steps to promote the implementation of the revival package of the said company and for that purpose the Government found it expedient to delete the said reservation conditionally and placed the deleted land as retention activity after following the procedure laid down under Section 37 of the MRTP Act. In the Notification itself it is clarified that the deletion of the reservation would be conditional. It is necessary that a condition be imposed on the petitioners that after deletion, the land shall be developed scrupulously in accordance with the provisions contained in the modified Regulation 58 of the DCR, 1991, as also as per the package of measures, as may be approved by the BIFR in accordance with law. That is why the Government in exercise of the powers vested under Section 37(1) of the MRTP Act, vide order of even number datedhad directed the MCGM to delete the said reservation from the said land and designated the said land so deleted as retention activity. The MCGM was therefore directed to comply with the requirements of Section 37 of the MRTP Act but it failed to publish the requisite notice within the stipulated period of 60 days. That is how the Government of Maharashtra relied upon its powers under Section 37(1A) of the MRTP Act and issued the notice datedregarding proposed modification, and thereby invited suggestions/objections from the general public within a period of one month from the date of publication of the notice in the Official Gazette and it appointed the Deputy Director of Town Planning, Greater Mumbai, as officer, to submit his report to the Government. That would be regarding the suggestions/objections that may be received after the expiry of the period stipulated in its notice. Thus, this notice was published in the Government Gazette onand prior thereto in two newspapers.A careful perusal of this Notification leaves us in no manner of doubt that total deletion of the reservation was not accepted. There was already a Zoo in existence and its extension was required in public interest. That was also necessary for carrying forward the purpose of the Development Plan. It is in these circumstances that the Government of Maharashtra decided to retain the reservation by extension to VJB Udyan but restricted it to the extent of 50% of the land. It decided to release the remaining land from this reservation so as to enable the company to develop the property in order to satisfy the dues of the workers and other dues. This Notification itself records the fact that the company has agreed to handover the reserved land on noncash compensation basis.75. The Government, therefore, exercised its powers under Section 37(2) of the MRTP Act and sanctioned the modification, subject to conditions. If one reads the operative part of this Notification and under the heading/title MODIFICATION, it is evident that the conditional modification cannot be read in the manner suggested by Mr. Khambata. If the conditions are perused in totality or read together and harmoniously, it is evident that had it not been for this partial deletion by the Government, the reservation on the said land would have continued. Thus, the entire land would then have continued under reservation for the public purpose of extension of VJB Udyan. It was then not possible to use the land or develop it for any other purpose, save and except the notified one. If the total deletion of the reservation was sought by the petitioners, but that was not agreed upon and even the partial deletion is conditional, then, the petitioners cannot pick one of the terms and conditions and read it in isolation or to their benefit. If this modification to the Development Plan had not been granted and in the form issued by the State Government, then, it was not possible for the petitioners to develop the land under Regulation 58 of the DCR, 1991 and to the extent of 50% as per this Notification. That it can be developed under this Regulation by styling the petitioners as owners is only to enable them to get the benefit or advantage of the DC Regulation 58. That is specifically inserted in the DC Regulations to enable obtaining of FSI which is attached to the lands in use and possession of textile units/mills in Greater Mumbai. It is only after partial release from the reservation in terms of the Development Plan, that the petitioners could have developed the land to the extent of 50% and as permitted above, and utilised the funds generated from the development of land so released from reservation primarily for adjustment of dues of workers and also for payment of its outstanding dues of financial institutions, as stipulated by the BIFR. Thus, to implement and execute so also enforce the BIFR revival scheme, that this modification in the Development Plan has been made. The condition is to recommence the spinning activity of 10,000 spindles, as stipulated in the BIFR scheme.76. The basic premise on which Mr. Khambatas arguments are canvassed is fallacious and incorrect. The subject Notification is not the one acquiring the private property for public purpose under the sovereign power founded on the right of eminent domain vesting in the State. The subject Notification, as held above, is for effecting a major modification in the sanctioned Development Plan by exercising a statutory power conferred vide Section 37 of the MRTP Act, 1966. That modification is sanctioned conditionally. This is not to be confused with a power to acquire some interest in the land. The land to the extent released is the consideration based on which the rest of the land already under lease with the petitioners can be developed or redeveloped to the fullest by reaping the fruits of D.C. Regulation 58. That allows a land leased for industrial purpose to a textile mill to be redeveloped in terms thereof so that its potential in the market can be exploited to the maximum. It was not possible unless the reservation for public purpose is deleted. For deletion of that alone, partially, the subject Notification is issued. The ownership of the land admittedly vests in the State. The State is not required to acquire its own land. It cannot take recourse to the power of acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or the law now prevailing enabling acquisition of a private land or any interestis not the situation before us at all. The condition based on which the balance of 50% of the land released from reservation could have been developed in terms of the BIFR scheme is that the rest of it continues under reservation for extension of VJB Udyan and to that extent the land, as demarcated, would have to be handed over free of encumbrances on noncash compensation terms to the MCGM, then, it is evident that there is no question of any compensation to be awarded either way. Meaning thereby, either in cash or noncash basis. There is nothing emerging from this Notification which the petitioners can seek, much less as of right from the MCGM. The whole petition to this extent is misconceived. It is as if the petitioners claim to be absolute owners of the land and that they are being deprived of its use, enjoyment and benefits because of the surrender thereof in part for use by the MCGM that they should be compensated, is the foundation of the petitioners case. That foundation itself has no legal support. The petitioners are neither absolute owners nor they have such right as they can seek to enforce against the MCGM. They are not deprived of their property or kept out of its enjoyment by a procedure unknown to law. This is, therefore, not a case where a person is being deprived of his property, save by authority of law. All those cases in which a person is deprived of his property, save by authority of law, are clear. In those cases, the State Government or the Planning Authority by a mere designation or reservation of lands for a public purpose, but without acquiring them in accordance with law, deprive the owners thereof of their rights, that this principle would come into play. This is enshrined in Article 300A of the Constitution of India. In that event, even the guarantee of equality flowing from Article 14 of the Constitution of India is breached and violated. This is not a case of that nature. This is a case where the requirement of the land for a predesignated public purpose is fulfilled by balancing the rights and equities of the petitioners as lessees of Government land or public properties. Pertinently, the petitioners are not challenging the power of the State Government to make a conditional modification in the Development Plan or proposal. The power flowing from the substantive provisions of the MRTP Act can be exercised unconditionally or by imposing terms and conditions consistent with the object and purpose of the MRTP Act. Even the conditions of the Notifications are not challenged. It is but a reading and construction thereof to their advantage which is attempted by the petitioners in this petition. Once we find that such an attempt cannot succeed, then, no relief can be granted to the petitioners, particularly in terms of the prayers set out hereinabove.77. None of the decisions cited by Mr. Khambata would assist the petitioners.78. In those decisions, the controversy was entirely different. The ambit and scope of powers conferred by Section 37 of the MRTP Act was in issue in Pune Municipal Corporation V/s. Promoters and Builders Association (supra). The principle of estoppel and particularly promissory estoppel was pressed into service but even that attempt was not successful because the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against statutes. The backdrop in which all these issues arose for determination and consideration are totally different and distinct. The question was whether the State Government can make any changes on its own in the modifications submitted by the Planning Authority or not. It is answering that issue in favour of the Pune Municipal Corporation and rejecting all the arguments to the contrary that this Judgment was rendered. Far from assisting the petitioners before us, some of the observations in this Judgment would militate against the contentions of Mr.observations relied upon by Mr. Khambata cannot be read in isolation but must be read in the backdrop of this essential question or controversy. We do not see how then can the petitioners claim any relief based on this Judgment. This Judgment is, therefore, entirely distinguishable.81. We do not see how the other Judgments, and particularly that rendered in the case of Pepsico India Holdings Private Limited (supra), would assist the petitioners. The Pepsicos was a case where the doctrine of promissory estoppel was invoked so as to rely upon a concession/exemption/incentive/rebate in sales tax. The argument was that Pepsico has taken effective steps for acquiring or placing firm orders for the purchase of the necessary plant and machinery under the Notification datedissued under the industrial policy of the State of Kerala. Therefore, it was entitled to the relief in terms of the Notification, namely, exemption from sales tax for a certain period. Its entitlement was thus upheld and the State was prevented from denying the benefit of this exemption Notification to it. We have no such case before us.82. Equally, the other Judgment in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation V/s. Kausarbag Cooperative Housing Society Limited (supra) iscase is also distinguishable.83. We do not think that the other Judgments in the compilation are of any assistance to the petitioners.

### Instruction: Based on the information in the case proceeding, determine the likely outcome: acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of the appellant/petitioner's case. ### Input: of their rights, that this principle would come into play. This is enshrined in Article 300A of the Constitution of India. In that event, even the guarantee of equality flowing from Article 14 of the Constitution of India is breached and violated. This is not a case of that nature. This is a case where the requirement of the land for a predesignated public purpose is fulfilled by balancing the rights and equities of the petitioners as lessees of Government land or public properties. Pertinently, the petitioners are not challenging the power of the State Government to make a conditional modification in the Development Plan or proposal. The power flowing from the substantive provisions of the MRTP Act can be exercised unconditionally or by imposing terms and conditions consistent with the object and purpose of the MRTP Act. Even the conditions of the Notifications are not challenged. It is but a reading and construction thereof to their advantage which is attempted by the petitioners in this petition. Once we find that such an attempt cannot succeed, then, no relief can be granted to the petitioners, particularly in terms of the prayers set out hereinabove.77. None of the decisions cited by Mr. Khambata would assist the petitioners.78. In those decisions, the controversy was entirely different. The ambit and scope of powers conferred by Section 37 of the MRTP Act was in issue in Pune Municipal Corporation V/s. Promoters and Builders Association (supra). The principle of estoppel and particularly promissory estoppel was pressed into service but even that attempt was not successful because the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked against statutes. The backdrop in which all these issues arose for determination and consideration are totally different and distinct. The question was whether the State Government can make any changes on its own in the modifications submitted by the Planning Authority or not. It is answering that issue in favour of the Pune Municipal Corporation and rejecting all the arguments to the contrary that this Judgment was rendered. Far from assisting the petitioners before us, some of the observations in this Judgment would militate against the contentions of Mr. Khambata.79. In the case of Godrej And Boyce Manufacturing Company Limited (supra), the facts were peculiar. The plots of the appellants and the petitioners therein were shown in the Development Plan as reserved for roads. They voluntarily surrendered their lands. They constructed on their respective pieces of land the development plan roads at their own cost and as per the specifications stipulated in the relevant rules. This was in addition to the voluntary surrender. The dispute between the parties was limited to the question of extent of floor space index (FSI) or transferable development rights (TDR) for the roads constructed on the surrendered lands at the owners cost. The land owners claimed a certain FSI or TDR and relied upon para 6 of Appendix VII to the Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991. The Municipal Corporation, however, relied on a circular issued on 9-4-1996 and restricted the additional TDR only to the extent of 15% of the road area. The argument of the petitioners was that the contents of this circular were merely in the nature of executive instructions and could not supersede or override the provisions of the DC Regulations which were legislative in nature.80. It is in such a controversy that the issue arose as to whether this was a correct understanding of the State and the Municipal Corporation, or whether the petitioners were right. Holding that the contentions of the petitioners are of substance, their case came to be accepted. The observations relied upon by Mr. Khambata cannot be read in isolation but must be read in the backdrop of this essential question or controversy. We do not see how then can the petitioners claim any relief based on this Judgment. This Judgment is, therefore, entirely distinguishable.81. We do not see how the other Judgments, and particularly that rendered in the case of Pepsico India Holdings Private Limited (supra), would assist the petitioners. The Pepsicos was a case where the doctrine of promissory estoppel was invoked so as to rely upon a concession/exemption/incentive/rebate in sales tax. The argument was that Pepsico has taken effective steps for acquiring or placing firm orders for the purchase of the necessary plant and machinery under the Notification dated 3-11-1993, issued under the industrial policy of the State of Kerala. Therefore, it was entitled to the relief in terms of the Notification, namely, exemption from sales tax for a certain period. Its entitlement was thus upheld and the State was prevented from denying the benefit of this exemption Notification to it. We have no such case before us.82. Equally, the other Judgment in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation V/s. Kausarbag Cooperative Housing Society Limited (supra) is distinguishable. It may be discussing the concept of TDR and that can be offered in lieu of cash compensation and the issue was whether the land in question was shown as reserved for garden in the layout plan. The acquisition of the land was initiated under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and was completed in the year 1987 whereafter possession of the land was taken over on 19-2-1987. Thereafter, the Development Plan was sought to be prepared and published and in the draft of which the land was shown as an existing garden. It is in these circumstances that the petitioners claimed that their entitlement to TDR cannot be defeated by such an attempt and urged that the land was acquired under a non-developmental proposal and the same would not attract the provisions of the MRTP Act. It is in these circumstances that the writ petition by Kausarbag Cooperative Housing Society Limited was allowed by the High Court and the appeal preferred from the Judgment of this Court was dismissed. This case is also distinguishable.83. We do not think that the other Judgments in the compilation are of any assistance to the petitioners. ### Response: 1

State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Babu Lal and Others

RAY, C.J.1. This appeals is by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 12, 1974 of the High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Misc. Petition 132 of 1974.2. The State filed an application under Article 226 and 227 for a declaration that the suit filed by the respondent Babu Lal was not warranted in Law and in violation of the statutory provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Respondent 2, Baddiya is Bheel by caste. This is a Scheduled Tribe as declared by the State vide Notification No. 8000-1905-VII-N-I dated November 25, 1960. Respondent 1 Babulal does not belongs to Scheduled Tribe.3. Respondent Babulal field a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Class II, Jhabua, Tehsil Jhabua, District Jhabua, for a declaration that his name be recorded in the revenue record as a Bhumiswami for the lands bearing Khata No. 4, Survey Nos. 12, 224 and 354 in village Amli Parha, Tehsil Jhbua. Respondent 2, Baiddiya did not contest the suit. They filed a deed of compromise before the Court of Civil Judge, Jhabua. By the said Compromise Deed respondent 2, Baddiya transferred his Bhumiswami rights in favour of respondent 1, Babulal. The State contended that the entire proceeding were in contravention of sub-section 6 of Section 165 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The provision of that section are as follows :165. Rights of Transfer. -(6) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), the right of a Bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe by the State Government by notification in that behalf for the whole or a part of the area to which this Code applied shall not be transferred to a person not belonging to such tribe without the permission of a Revenue Officer not below the rank of a Collector, given for reason to be recorded in writing.4. The State contended before the High Court that a writ of certiorari should be issued to quash the judgment which was illegal and in clear violation of law. The High Court said that the State could file a suit for declaration that the decree is null and void.5. One of the principles on which certiorari is issued is where the Court acts illegality and there is error on the face of record. If the Court usurps the jurisdiction, the record is corrected by certiorari. This case is a glaring instance of such violation of law. The High Court was in error in not issuing writ of certiorari.

1[ds]5. One of the principles on which certiorari is issued is where the Court acts illegality and there is error on the face of record. If the Court usurps the jurisdiction, the record is corrected by certiorari. This case is a glaring instance of such violation of law. The High Court was in error in not issuing writ of certiorari.

### Instruction: Given the specifics of the case proceeding, anticipate the court's ruling: will it favor (1) or oppose (0) the appellant’s request? ### Input: RAY, C.J.1. This appeals is by special leave from the judgment and order dated July 12, 1974 of the High Court of Judicature of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Misc. Petition 132 of 1974.2. The State filed an application under Article 226 and 227 for a declaration that the suit filed by the respondent Babu Lal was not warranted in Law and in violation of the statutory provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. Respondent 2, Baddiya is Bheel by caste. This is a Scheduled Tribe as declared by the State vide Notification No. 8000-1905-VII-N-I dated November 25, 1960. Respondent 1 Babulal does not belongs to Scheduled Tribe.3. Respondent Babulal field a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Class II, Jhabua, Tehsil Jhabua, District Jhabua, for a declaration that his name be recorded in the revenue record as a Bhumiswami for the lands bearing Khata No. 4, Survey Nos. 12, 224 and 354 in village Amli Parha, Tehsil Jhbua. Respondent 2, Baiddiya did not contest the suit. They filed a deed of compromise before the Court of Civil Judge, Jhabua. By the said Compromise Deed respondent 2, Baddiya transferred his Bhumiswami rights in favour of respondent 1, Babulal. The State contended that the entire proceeding were in contravention of sub-section 6 of Section 165 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959. The provision of that section are as follows :165. Rights of Transfer. -(6) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), the right of a Bhumiswami belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe by the State Government by notification in that behalf for the whole or a part of the area to which this Code applied shall not be transferred to a person not belonging to such tribe without the permission of a Revenue Officer not below the rank of a Collector, given for reason to be recorded in writing.4. The State contended before the High Court that a writ of certiorari should be issued to quash the judgment which was illegal and in clear violation of law. The High Court said that the State could file a suit for declaration that the decree is null and void.5. One of the principles on which certiorari is issued is where the Court acts illegality and there is error on the face of record. If the Court usurps the jurisdiction, the record is corrected by certiorari. This case is a glaring instance of such violation of law. The High Court was in error in not issuing writ of certiorari. ### Response: 1

Competition Commission Of India Vs. Steel Authority Of India

the Commission under Sections 27(d) and 31(3) are of wide magnitude and of serious ramifications. The Commission has the jurisdiction even to direct that an agreement entered into between the parties shall stand modified to the extent and in the manner, as may be specified. Similarly, where it is of the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition but such adverse effect can be eliminated by suitable modification to such combination, the Commission is empowered to direct such modification. These powers of the Commission, read with provisions mentioned earlier, certainly require issuance of certain directions in order to achieve the object of the Act and to ensure its proper implementation. The power to restructure the agreement can be brought into service and matters dealt with expeditiously, rather than passing of ad interim orders in relation to such agreements, which may continue for indefinite periods. To avoid this mischief, it is necessary that wherever the Commission exercises its jurisdiction to pass ad interim restraint orders, it must do so by issuing notices for a short date and deal with such applications expeditiously. Order 39 Rules 3 and 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure also have similar provisions. Certain procedural directions will help in avoiding prejudicial consequences, against any of the parties to the proceedings and the possibility of abuse of jurisdiction by the parties can be eliminated by proper exercise of discretion and for valid reasons. Courts have been issuing directions in appropriate cases and wherever the situation has demanded so. Administration of justice does not depend on individuals, but it has to be a collective effort at all levels of the judicial hierarchy, i.e. the hierarchy of the Courts or the fora before whom the matters are sub judice, so that the persons awaiting justice can receive the same in a most expeditious and effective manner. The approach of the Commission even in its procedural matters, therefore, should be macro level rather than micro level. It must deal with all such references or applications expeditiously in accordance with law and by giving appropriate reasons. Thus, we find it necessary to issue some directions which shall remain in force till appropriate regulations in that regard are framed by the competent authority.Findings on Merits:69. Having examined various legal issues arising in the present case, we will now revert back to the facts of the case in hand. It is clear that Jindal Steel, the informant, had made a reference to the Commission. The Commission had initiated proceedings and asked for further information from the informant and thereafter, had even issued notice calling upon SAIL to submit its views and comments. From the record it is clear that parties had appeared before the Commission. The SAIL had failed to file the reply and prayed for extension of time, which was declined by the Commission in its order dated 8th December, 2009. The Director General was asked to conduct the investigation, but liberty was granted to SAIL to file its views and comments during the pendency of the investigation. Since further time was declined, SAIL preferred an appeal before the Tribunal, which resulted in passing of the order impugned in the present appeal. We are unable to accede to the submission that the Commission is not a necessary or proper party before the Tribunal. On the contrary, the Regulations and even the interest of justice demands that for complete and effective adjudication the Commission be added as a necessary and proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The direction issued by the Commission was set aside by the Tribunal and further time was granted to SAIL to file its further reply in addition to what has been filed on 15th December, 2009 and the Tribunal then directed the Commission to consider all such material and record a fresh decision. We have held that there is no statutory obligation on the Commission to issue notice for grant of hearing to the parties at the stage of forming an opinion under Section 26(1) of the Act unless, upon due application of mind, it finds it necessary to invite parties or experts to render assistance to and produce documents before the Commission at that stage. We are also unable to agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal that the inquiry commences as soon as the aspects highlighted in Sub-section (1) to Section 19 are fulfilled and brought to the notice of the Commission. It is obvious that Regulation 18(2) was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal which resulted in error of law, particularly, when examined in the light of other provisions and scheme of the Act as well. The Commission, vide its order dated 8th December, 2009, had, for reasons stated therein, declined the extension of time to SAIL. This order of the Commission cannot be stated to be without jurisdiction or suffering from any apparent error of law. However, the Tribunal, in exercise of its judicial discretion, had interfered with the said order and granted further time to SAIL unconditionally. We do not propose to interfere in the exercise of the discretion by the Tribunal except to the extent of imposition of cost. We, therefore direct that SAIL should pay cost of Rs. 25,000/- to the informant for seeking extension of time. The cost shall be conditional, whereafter, the additional reply filed by SAIL would be taken on record and the Commission shall apply its mind to form a prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, if the report of the Director General has not been received as yet. In the event the report prepared by the Director General during the period 8th December, 2009 to 11th January, 2010 has been received, the Commission shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the principles of law enunciated in this judgment giving proper notice to the informant as well as to SAIL and pass appropriate orders.

1[ds]Applying these principles to the provisions of Section 53A(1)(a), we are of the considered view that the appropriate interpretation of this provision would be that no other direction, decision or order of the Commission is appealable except those expressly stated in Section 53A(1)(a). The maxim est boni judicis ampliare justiciam, nonjurisdictionem finds application here. Right to appeal, being a statutory right, is controlled strictly by the provision and the procedure prescribing such a right. To read into the language of Section 53A that every direction, order or decision of the Commission would be appealable will amount to unreasonable expansion of the provision, when the language of Section 53A is clear and unambiguous. Section 53B(1) itself is an indicator of the restricted scope of appeals that shall be maintainable before the Tribunal; it provides that the aggrieved party has a right of appeal against ‘any direction, decision or order referred to in SectionIf the Legislature intended to enlarge the scope and make orders, other than those, specified in Section 53A(1)(a), then the language of Section 53B(1) ought to have been quite distinct from the one used by the Legislature.33. One of the parties before the Commission would, in any case, be aggrieved by an order where the Commission grants or declines to grant extension of time. Thus, every such order passed by the Commission would have to be treated as appealable as per the contention raised by the respondent before us as well as the view taken by the Tribunal. In our view, such orders cannot be held to be appealable within the meaning and language of Section 53A of the Act and also on the principle that they are not orders which determine the rights of the parties. No appeal can lie against such an order. Still the parties are not remediless as, when they prefer an appeal against the final order, they can always take up grounds to challenge the interim orders/directions passed by the Commission in the memorandum of appeal. Such an approach would be in consonance with the procedural law prescribed in Order 43 Rule 1A and even other provisions of Code of Civil Procedure.34. The above approach will subserve the purpose of the Act in the following manner:First, expeditious disposal of matters before the Commission and the Tribunal is an apparent legislative intent from the bare reading of the provisions of the Act and more particularly the Regulations framed thereunder. Second, if every direction or recording of an opinion are made appealable then certainly it would amount to abuse of the process of appeal. Besides this, burdening the Tribunal with appeals againstorders would defeat the object of the Act, as a prolonged litigation may harm the interest of free and fair market and economy. Finally, we see no ambiguity in the language of the provision, but even if, for the sake of argument, we assume that the provision is capable of two interpretations then we must accept the one which will fall in line with the legislative intent rather than the one which defeat the object of the Act.For these reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that no appeal will lie from any decision, order or direction of the Commission which is not made specifically appealable under Section 53A(1)(a) of the Act. Thus, the appeal preferred by SAIL ought to have been dismissed by the Tribunal as not maintainable.Submissions made and findings in relation to Point Nos. 2 & 535. The issue of notice and hearing are squarely covered under the ambit of the principles of natural justice. Thus, it will not be inappropriate to discuss these issues commonly under the same head. The principle of audi alteram partem, as commonly understood, means ‘hear the other side or hear both sides before a decision is arrivedIt is founded on the rule that no one should be condemned or deprived of his right even in quasi judicial proceedings unless he has been granted liberty of beingwe can classify compliance or otherwise, of these principles mainly under three categories. First, where application of principles of natural justice is excluded by specific legislation; second, where the law contemplates strict compliance to the provisions of principles of natural justice and default in compliance thereto can result in vitiating not only the orders but even the proceedings taken against the delinquent; and third, where the law requires compliance to these principles of natural justice, but an irresistible conclusion is drawn by the competent Court or forum that no prejudice has been caused to the delinquent and theis with regard to an action of directory nature. The cases may fall in any of these categories and therefore, the Court has to examine the facts of each case in light of the Act or the Rules and Regulations in force in relation to such a case. It is not only difficult but also not advisable to spell out any straight jacket formula which can be applied universally to all cases without variation.37. In light of the above principles, let us examine whether in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act read with Regulations in force, it is obligatory upon the Commission to issue notice to the parties concerned (more particularly the affected parties) and then form an opinion as to the existence of a prima facie case, or otherwise, and to issue direction to the Director General to conduct investigation in the matter.38. At the very outset, we must make it clear that we are considering the application of these principles only in light of the provisions of Section 26(1) and the finding recorded by the Tribunal in this regard. The intimation received by the Commission from any specific person complaining of violation of Section 3(4) read with Section 19 of the Act, sets into the motion, the mechanism stated under Section 26 of the Act. Section 26(1), as already noticed, requires the Commission to form an opinion whether or not there exists a prima facie case for issuance of direction to the Director General to conduct an investigation. This section does not mention about issuance of any notice to any party before or at the time of formation of an opinion by the Commission on the basis of a reference or information received by it. Language of Sections 3(4) and 19 and for that matter, any other provision of the Act does not suggest that notice to the informant or any other person is required to be issued at this stage. Into this, when the Commission receives the report from the Director General and if it has not already taken a decision to close the case under Section 26(2), the Commission is not only expected to forward the copy of the report, issue notice, invite objections or suggestions from the informant, Central Government, State Government, Statutory Authorities or the parties concerned, but also to provide an opportunity of hearing to the parties before arriving at any final conclusion under Sections 26(7) or 26(8) of the Act, as the case may be. This obviously means that wherever the Legislature has intended that notice is to be served upon the other party, it has specifically so stated and we see no compelling reason to read into the provisions of Section 26(1) the requirement of notice, when it is conspicuous by its very absence. Once the proceedings before the Commission are completed, the parties have a right to appeal under Section 53A(1)(a) in regard to the orders termed as appealable under that provision. Section 53B requires that the Tribunal should give, parties to the appeal, notice and an opportunity of being heard before passing orders, as it may deem fit and proper, confirming, modifying or setting aside the direction, decision or order appealed against.With some significance, we may also notice the provision of Regulation 33(4) of the Regulations, which requires that on being satisfied that the reference is complete, the Secretary shall place it during an ordinary meeting of the Commission and seek necessary instructions regarding the parties to whom the notice of the meeting has to be issued. This provision read with Sections 26(1) and 26(5) shows that the Commission is expected to apply its mind as to whom the notice should be sent before the Secretary of the Commission can send notice to the parties concerned. In other words, issuance of notice is not an automatic or obvious consequence, but it is only upon application of mind by the authorities concerned that notice is expected to bejurisdiction of the Commission, to act under this provision, does not contemplate any adjudicatory function. The Commission is not expected to give notice to the parties, i.e. the informant or the affected parties and hear them at length, before forming its opinion. The function is of a very preliminary nature and in fact, in common parlance, it is a departmental function. At that stage, it does not condemn any person and therefore, application of audi alteram partem is not called for. Formation of a prima facie opinion departmentally (Director General, being appointed by the Central Government to assist the Commission, is one of the wings of the Commission itself) does not amount to an adjudicatory function but is merely of administrative nature. At best, it can direct the investigation to be conducted and report to be submitted to the Commission itself or close the case in terms of Section 26(2) of the Act, which order itself is appealable before the Tribunal and only after this stage, there is a specific right of notice and hearing available to the aggrieved/affected party. Thus, keeping in mind the nature of the functions required to be performed by the Commission in terms of Section 26(1), we are of the considered view that the right of notice of hearing is not contemplated under the provisions of Section 26(1) of the Act. However, Regulation 17(2) gives right to Commission for seeking information, or in other words, the Commission is vested with the power of inviting such persons, as it may deem necessary, to render required assistance or produce requisite information or documents as per the direction of the Commission. This discretion is exclusively vested in the Commission by the Legislature. The investigation is directed with dual purpose; (a) to collect material and verify the information, as may be, directed by the Commission, (b) to enable the Commission to examine the report upon its submission by the Director General and to pass appropriate orders after hearing the parties concerned. No inquiry commences prior to the direction issued to the Director General for conducting the investigation. Therefore, even from the practical point of view, it will be required that undue time is not spent at the preliminary stage of formation of prima facie opinion and the matters are dealt with effectively and expeditiously. We may also usefully note that the functions performed by the Commission under Section 26(1) of the Act are in the nature of preparatory measures in contrast to the decision making process. That is the precise reason that the Legislature has used the wordto be issued to the Director General for investigation in that provision and not that the Commission shall take a decision or pass an order directing inquiry into the allegations made in the reference to the Commission.50. The Tribunal, in the impugned judgment, has taken the view that there is a requirement to record reasons which can be express, or, in any case, followed by necessary implication and therefore, the authority is required to record reasons for coming to the conclusion. The proposition of law whether an administrative or quasi judicial body, particularly judicial Courts, should record reasons in support of their decisions or orders is no more res integra and has been settled by a recent judgment of this Court in the case of Assistant Commissioner, C.T.D.W.C. v. M/s. Shukla & Brothers, III (2010) SLT 565=II (2010) CLT 204 (SC)=JT 2010 (4) SC 35, wherein this Court was primarily concerned with the High Court dismissing the appeals without recording any reasons. The Court also examined the practice and requirement of providing reasons for conclusions, orders and directions given by the51. In this very judgment, the Court while referring to other decisions of the Court held that it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the affected persons and record explicit reasons in support of the order made by them. Even in cases of supersession, it was held in Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab, (1979) 2 SCC 368 that reasons for supersession should be essentially provided in the order of the authority. Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. By practice adopted in all Courts and by virtue oflaw, the concept of reasoned judgment has become an indispensable part of basic rule of law and in fact, is a mandatory requirement of the procedural law. Clarity of thoughts leads to clarity of vision and, therefore, proper reasoning is foundation of a just and fair decision. Reference can be made to Alexander Machinery (Dudley) Ltd. v. Crabtree, 1974 ICR 120 in this regard.52. The above reasoning and the principles enunciated, which are consistent with the settled canons of law, we would adopt even in this case. In the backdrop of these determinants, we may refer to the provisions of the Act. Section 26, under its differentrequires the Commission to issue various directions, take decisions and pass orders, some of which are even appealable before the Tribunal. Even if it is a direction under any of the provisions and not a decision, conclusion or order passed on merits by the Commission, it is expected that the same would be supported by some reasoning. At the stage of forming a prima facie view, as required under Section 26(1) of the Act, the Commission may not really record detailed reasons, but must express its mind in no uncertain terms that it is of the view that prima facie case exists, requiring issuance of direction for investigation to the Director General. Such view should be recorded with reference to the information furnished to the Commission. Such opinion should be formed on the basis of the records, including the information furnished and reference made to the Commission under the various provisions of the Act, asHowever, other decisions and orders, which are not directions simpliciter and determining the rights of the parties, should be well reasoned analyzing and deciding the rival contentions raised before the Commission by the parties. In other words, the Commission is expected to express prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, without entering into any adjudicatory or determinative process and by recording minimum reasons substantiating the formation of such opinion, while all its other orders and decisions should be well reasoned.53. Such an approach can also be justified with reference to Regulation 20(4), which requires the Director General to record, in his report, findings on each of the allegations made by a party in the intimation or reference submitted to the Commission and sent for investigation to the Director General, as the case may be, together with all evidence and documents collected during investigation. The inevitable consequence is that the Commission is similarly expected to write appropriate reasons on every issue while passing an order under Sections 26 to 28 of the Act.Submissions made and findings in relation to Point No. 354. The concept of necessary and proper parties is an accepted norm of civil law and its principles can safely be applied to the proceedings before the Tribunal to a limited extent. Even some provisions of the Act and the Regulations would guide the discussion in this behalf. In terms of Section 7(2) of the Act the Commission is a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to sue and be sued in its name. In terms of Section 53A, the Tribunal is constituted to hear and dispose of appeals against any direction issued, decision made or order passed under the provisions stated therein. The Tribunal is also vested with the power of determining the claim of compensation that may arise from the findings recorded by the Commission. As already noticed, the procedure for entertaining the appeals is specified under Section 53B of the Act.55. The right to prefer an appeal is available to the Central Government, State Government or a local authority or enterprise or any person aggrieved by any direction, decision or order referred to in Clause (a) of Section 53A (ought to be printed as 53A(1)(a)). The appeal is to be filed within the period specified and Section 53B(3) further requires that the Tribunal, after giving the parties to appeal an opportunity of being heard, to pass such orders, as it thinks fit, and send a copy of such order to the Commission and the parties to the appeal. Section 53S contemplates that before the Tribunal a person may either appear ‘inor authorize one or more chartered accountants or company secretaries, cost accountants or legal practitioners or any of its officers to present its case before the Tribunal. However, theright to legal representation in any appeal before the Tribunal has been specifically mentioned under Section 53S(3). It provides that the Commission may authorize one or more of chartered accountants or company secretaries or cost accountants or legal practitioners or any of its officers to act as presenting officers before the Tribunal.56. Section 53T grants a right in specific terms to the Commission to prefer an appeal before the Supreme Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal to them. The expression ‘anyappearing in Section 53B has to be construed liberally as the provision first mentions specific Government bodies then local authorities and enterprises, which term, in any case, is of generic nature and then lastly mentions ‘anyObviously, it is intended that expanded meaning be given to the termi.e., persons or bodies who are entitled to appeal. The right of hearing is also available to the parties to appeal. The above stated provisions clearly indicate that the Commission a body corporate, is expected to be party in the proceedings before the Tribunal as it has a legal right of representation. Absence of the Commission before the Tribunal will deprive it of presenting its views in the proceedings. Thus, it may not be able to effectively exercise its right to appeal in terms of Section 53 of the Act. Furthermore, Regulations 14(4) and 51 support the view that the Commission can be a necessary or a proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The Commission, in terms of Section 19 read with Section 26 of the Act, is entitled to commence proceedings suo moto and adopt its own procedure for completion of such proceedings. Thus, the principle of fairness would demand that such party should be heard by the Tribunal before any orders adverse to it are passed in such cases. The Tribunal has taken this view and we have no hesitation in accepting that in cases where proceedings initiated suo motu by the Commission, the Commission is a necessary party. However, we are also of the view that in other cases the Commission would be a proper party. It would not only help in expeditious disposal, but the Commission, as an expert body, in any case, is entitled to participate in its proceedings in terms of Regulation 51. Thus, the assistance rendered by the Commission to the Tribunal could be useful in complete and effective adjudication of the issue before it. Regulations 24 to 26 define powers of the Commission to join or substitute parties in proceedings, permit person or enterprises to take part in proceedings and strike out unnecessary parties. Out of these provisions regulation 25(1) has a distinct feature as it lays down the criteria which should be considered by the Commission while applying its mind in regard to application of a party for impleadment. The person or enterprise sought to be impleaded should have substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings and/or that it is necessary in the public interest to allow such an application. In other words, substantial interest in proceedings and serving of larger public interest, amongst others, are the criteria which could be considered by the Commission. This principle would obviously stand extended for exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal. In our view, the Commission would have substantial interest in the outcome of the proceedings in most of the cases as not only would the judgments of the Tribunal be binding on it, but they would also provide guidelines for determining various matters of larger public interest and affect the economic policy of the country.57. In light of the above statutory provisions, let us examine the scheme under the general principles as well. The provisions of Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure control the parties to the proceedings and their addition or deletion thereof. Wide discretion is vested in the Court/appropriate forum in regard to impleadment of necessary and proper parties to the proceedings. Of course, such discretion has to be exercised in accordance with provisions of law and the principles enunciated by various judicial pronouncements. The consideration before the Court, while determining such a question, is whether the said party is a necessary or a proper party and its presence before the Court is essential for complete and effective adjudication of the subject matter, inter alia, it should also be kept in mind that multiplicity of litigation is to be avoided and that the necessary or proper party should not be left out from the proceedings, particularly, before the tribunal or theway to examine the matter is that if the proceedings cannot be concluded completely and effectively in absence of a party, that party should be normally impleaded as a party before the Court, of course, subject to other restrictions in law. Whileof necessary parties may prove fatal, theof proper parties may not be fatal to the proceedings, but would certainly adversely affect interest of justice and complete adjudication of the proceedings before the appropriate forum.58. As a normal rule, the applicant/informant is dominus litis and has the right to control the proceedings, but at the same time, such applicant is required to notify all other parties against whom the applicant wishes to proceed. Even if an applicant fails to join a party the Court has the discretion to direct joining of such party as the question of impleadment has to be decided on the touchstone of Order 1 Rule 10 which provides that a necessary or proper party may be added [Ramesh Hirachand Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay, (1992) 2 SCC 524 ].59. In the proceedings, which are initiated by the Commission suo motu, it shall be dominus litis of such proceedings while in other cases, the Commission being a regulatory body would be a proper party discharging inquisitorial, regulatory as well as adjudicatory functions and its presence before the Tribunal, particularly, in light of the above stated provisions, would be proper. The purpose is always to achieve complete, expeditious and effective adjudication. This Court in the case of Brahm Dutt v. Union of India, I (2005) SLT 633=117 (2005) DLT 1 (SC)=(2005) 2 SCC 431 , while considering the constitutional validity of Section 8 of the Act observed that the Commission is an expert body which had been created in consonance with international practice. The Court observed that it might be appropriate if two bodies are created for performing two kinds of functions, one, advisory and regulatory and other adjudicatory. Though the Tribunal has been constituted by the Competition (Amendment) Act, 2007, the Commission continues to perform both the functions stated by this Court in that case. Cumulative effect of the above reasoning is that the Commission would be a necessary and/or a proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal.Submissions made and findings in relation to Point No.In the case in hand, the provisions of Section 33 are specific and certain criteria have been specified therein, which need to be satisfied by the Commission, before it passes an ex parte ad interim order. These three ingredients we have already spelt out above and at the cost of repetition we may notice that there has to be application of mind of higher degree and definite reasons having nexus to the necessity for passing such an order need be stated. Further, it is required that the case of theshould also be stronger than a mere prima facie case. Once these ingredients are satisfied and where the Commission deems it necessary, it can pass such an order without giving notice to the other party. The scope of this power is limited and is expected to be exercised in appropriate circumstances. These provisions can hardly be invoked in each and every case except in a reasoned manner. Wherever, the applicant is able to satisfy the Commission that from the information received and the documents in support thereof, or even from the report submitted by the Director General, a strong case is made out of contravention of the specified provisions relating toagreement or an abuse of dominant position and it is in the interest of free market and trade that injunctive orders are called for, the Commission, in its discretion, may pass such order ex parte or even after issuing notice to the other side.66. For these reasons, we may conclude that the Commission can pass ex parte ad interim restraint orders in terms of Section 33, only after having applied its mind as to the existence of a prima facie case and issue direction to the Director General for conducting an investigation in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act. It has the power to pass ad interim ex parte injunction orders, but only upon recording its due satisfaction as well as its view that the Commission deemed it necessary not to give a notice to the other side. In all cases where ad interim ex parte injunction is issued, the Commission must ensure that it makes the notice returnable within a very short duration so that there is no abuse of the process of law and the very purpose of the Act is not defeated.Submissions made and findings in relation to Point No. 667. In light of the above discussion, the next question that we are required to consider is, whether the Court should issue certain directions while keeping in mind the scheme of the Act, legislative intent and the object sought to be achieved by enforcement of these provisions. We have already noticed that the principal objects of the Act, in terms of its Preamble and Statement of Objects and Reasons, are to eliminate practices having adverse effect on the competition, to promote and sustain competition in the market, to protect the interest of the consumers and ensure freedom of trade carried on by the participants in the market, in view of the economic developments in the country. In other words, the Act requires not only protection of free trade but also protection of consumer interest. The delay in disposal of cases, as well as undue continuation of interim restraint orders, can adversely and prejudicially affect the free economy of the country. Efforts to liberalize the Indian Economy to bring it at par with the best of the economies in this era of globalization would be jeopardised ifschedule and, in any case, expeditious disposal by the Commission is not adhered to. The scheme of various provisions of the Act which we have already referred to including Sections 26, 29, 30, 31, 53B(5) and 53T and Regulations 12, 15, 16, 22, 32, 48 and 31 clearly show the legislative intent to ensure time bound disposal of such matters.68. The Commission performs various functions including regulatory, inquisitorial and adjudicatory. The powers conferred by the Legislature upon the Commission under Sections 27(d) and 31(3) are of wide magnitude and of serious ramifications. The Commission has the jurisdiction even to direct that an agreement entered into between the parties shall stand modified to the extent and in the manner, as may be specified. Similarly, where it is of the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition but such adverse effect can be eliminated by suitable modification to such combination, the Commission is empowered to direct such modification. These powers of the Commission, read with provisions mentioned earlier, certainly require issuance of certain directions in order to achieve the object of the Act and to ensure its proper implementation. The power to restructure the agreement can be brought into service and matters dealt with expeditiously, rather than passing of ad interim orders in relation to such agreements, which may continue for indefinite periods. To avoid this mischief, it is necessary that wherever the Commission exercises its jurisdiction to pass ad interim restraint orders, it must do so by issuing notices for a short date and deal with such applications expeditiously. Order 39 Rules 3 and 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure also have similar provisions. Certain procedural directions will help in avoiding prejudicial consequences, against any of the parties to the proceedings and the possibility of abuse of jurisdiction by the parties can be eliminated by proper exercise of discretion and for valid reasons. Courts have been issuing directions in appropriate cases and wherever the situation has demanded so. Administration of justice does not depend on individuals, but it has to be a collective effort at all levels of the judicial hierarchy, i.e. the hierarchy of the Courts or the fora before whom the matters are sub judice, so that the persons awaiting justice can receive the same in a most expeditious and effective manner. The approach of the Commission even in its procedural matters, therefore, should be macro level rather than micro level. It must deal with all such references or applications expeditiously in accordance with law and by giving appropriate reasons. Thus, we find it necessary to issue some directions which shall remain in force till appropriate regulations in that regard are framed by the competent authority.Findings on Merits:69. Having examined various legal issues arising in the present case, we will now revert back to the facts of the case in hand. It is clear that Jindal Steel, the informant, had made a reference to the Commission. The Commission had initiated proceedings and asked for further information from the informant and thereafter, had even issued notice calling upon SAIL to submit its views and comments. From the record it is clear that parties had appeared before the Commission. The SAIL had failed to file the reply and prayed for extension of time, which was declined by the Commission in its order dated 8th December, 2009. The Director General was asked to conduct the investigation, but liberty was granted to SAIL to file its views and comments during the pendency of the investigation. Since further time was declined, SAIL preferred an appeal before the Tribunal, which resulted in passing of the order impugned in the present appeal. We are unable to accede to the submission that the Commission is not a necessary or proper party before the Tribunal. On the contrary, the Regulations and even the interest of justice demands that for complete and effective adjudication the Commission be added as a necessary and proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The direction issued by the Commission was set aside by the Tribunal and further time was granted to SAIL to file its further reply in addition to what has been filed on 15th December, 2009 and the Tribunal then directed the Commission to consider all such material and record a fresh decision. We have held that there is no statutory obligation on the Commission to issue notice for grant of hearing to the parties at the stage of forming an opinion under Section 26(1) of the Act unless, upon due application of mind, it finds it necessary to invite parties or experts to render assistance to and produce documents before the Commission at that stage. We are also unable to agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal that the inquiry commences as soon as the aspects highlighted in(1) to Section 19 are fulfilled and brought to the notice of the Commission. It is obvious that Regulation 18(2) was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal which resulted in error of law, particularly, when examined in the light of other provisions and scheme of the Act as well. The Commission, vide its order dated 8th December, 2009, had, for reasons stated therein, declined the extension of time to SAIL. This order of the Commission cannot be stated to be without jurisdiction or suffering from any apparent error of law. However, the Tribunal, in exercise of its judicial discretion, had interfered with the said order and granted further time to SAIL unconditionally. We do not propose to interfere in the exercise of the discretion by the Tribunal except to the extent of imposition of cost. We, therefore direct that SAIL should pay cost of Rs. 25,000/to the informant for seeking extension of time. The cost shall be conditional, whereafter, the additional reply filed by SAIL would be taken on record and the Commission shall apply its mind to form a prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, if the report of the Director General has not been received as yet. In the event the report prepared by the Director General during the period 8th December, 2009 to 11th January, 2010 has been received, the Commission shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the principles of law enunciated in this judgment giving proper notice to the informant as well as to SAIL and pass appropriate orders.

### Instruction: Interpret the case information and speculate on the court's decision: acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of the presented appeal. ### Input: the Commission under Sections 27(d) and 31(3) are of wide magnitude and of serious ramifications. The Commission has the jurisdiction even to direct that an agreement entered into between the parties shall stand modified to the extent and in the manner, as may be specified. Similarly, where it is of the opinion that the combination has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition but such adverse effect can be eliminated by suitable modification to such combination, the Commission is empowered to direct such modification. These powers of the Commission, read with provisions mentioned earlier, certainly require issuance of certain directions in order to achieve the object of the Act and to ensure its proper implementation. The power to restructure the agreement can be brought into service and matters dealt with expeditiously, rather than passing of ad interim orders in relation to such agreements, which may continue for indefinite periods. To avoid this mischief, it is necessary that wherever the Commission exercises its jurisdiction to pass ad interim restraint orders, it must do so by issuing notices for a short date and deal with such applications expeditiously. Order 39 Rules 3 and 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure also have similar provisions. Certain procedural directions will help in avoiding prejudicial consequences, against any of the parties to the proceedings and the possibility of abuse of jurisdiction by the parties can be eliminated by proper exercise of discretion and for valid reasons. Courts have been issuing directions in appropriate cases and wherever the situation has demanded so. Administration of justice does not depend on individuals, but it has to be a collective effort at all levels of the judicial hierarchy, i.e. the hierarchy of the Courts or the fora before whom the matters are sub judice, so that the persons awaiting justice can receive the same in a most expeditious and effective manner. The approach of the Commission even in its procedural matters, therefore, should be macro level rather than micro level. It must deal with all such references or applications expeditiously in accordance with law and by giving appropriate reasons. Thus, we find it necessary to issue some directions which shall remain in force till appropriate regulations in that regard are framed by the competent authority.Findings on Merits:69. Having examined various legal issues arising in the present case, we will now revert back to the facts of the case in hand. It is clear that Jindal Steel, the informant, had made a reference to the Commission. The Commission had initiated proceedings and asked for further information from the informant and thereafter, had even issued notice calling upon SAIL to submit its views and comments. From the record it is clear that parties had appeared before the Commission. The SAIL had failed to file the reply and prayed for extension of time, which was declined by the Commission in its order dated 8th December, 2009. The Director General was asked to conduct the investigation, but liberty was granted to SAIL to file its views and comments during the pendency of the investigation. Since further time was declined, SAIL preferred an appeal before the Tribunal, which resulted in passing of the order impugned in the present appeal. We are unable to accede to the submission that the Commission is not a necessary or proper party before the Tribunal. On the contrary, the Regulations and even the interest of justice demands that for complete and effective adjudication the Commission be added as a necessary and proper party in the proceedings before the Tribunal. The direction issued by the Commission was set aside by the Tribunal and further time was granted to SAIL to file its further reply in addition to what has been filed on 15th December, 2009 and the Tribunal then directed the Commission to consider all such material and record a fresh decision. We have held that there is no statutory obligation on the Commission to issue notice for grant of hearing to the parties at the stage of forming an opinion under Section 26(1) of the Act unless, upon due application of mind, it finds it necessary to invite parties or experts to render assistance to and produce documents before the Commission at that stage. We are also unable to agree with the view expressed by the Tribunal that the inquiry commences as soon as the aspects highlighted in Sub-section (1) to Section 19 are fulfilled and brought to the notice of the Commission. It is obvious that Regulation 18(2) was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal which resulted in error of law, particularly, when examined in the light of other provisions and scheme of the Act as well. The Commission, vide its order dated 8th December, 2009, had, for reasons stated therein, declined the extension of time to SAIL. This order of the Commission cannot be stated to be without jurisdiction or suffering from any apparent error of law. However, the Tribunal, in exercise of its judicial discretion, had interfered with the said order and granted further time to SAIL unconditionally. We do not propose to interfere in the exercise of the discretion by the Tribunal except to the extent of imposition of cost. We, therefore direct that SAIL should pay cost of Rs. 25,000/- to the informant for seeking extension of time. The cost shall be conditional, whereafter, the additional reply filed by SAIL would be taken on record and the Commission shall apply its mind to form a prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of the Act, if the report of the Director General has not been received as yet. In the event the report prepared by the Director General during the period 8th December, 2009 to 11th January, 2010 has been received, the Commission shall proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the principles of law enunciated in this judgment giving proper notice to the informant as well as to SAIL and pass appropriate orders. ### Response: 1

State Of Mysore Vs. Allum Karibasappa & Ors

recited that the State had given Rs.23.8 lakhs to the Bank and it was necessary in public interest to take powers to exercise control over the conduct of the business of the Bank to safeguard the public funds. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 54 of the Act should have the right to nominate as its representatives fifteen persons on the Board of Management and to appoint one among them as the President, one as the Vice-President under the notification should exercise powers and discharge their functions subject to the supervision direction and control of the State Government. The notification further stated that Section 29 which conferred power on the State Government subject to any notification under Section 54 or Section 121 to have "the right to nominate as its representatives not more than three persons or one-third of the total number of members of the Committee of the Co-operative Society, whichever is less" would be modified by substituting the words "have the right to nominate as its representatives 15 persons of the Committee of the Co-operative Society of whom one shall be appointed as Managing Director". The notification conferred power on the Managing Director subject to the policy decision of the Board, the right to conduct the business of the Bank and to sanction expenditure on establishment and certain other powers.8. The second notification nominated fifteen persons to form the Board of Directors of the Bank. The Deputy Commissioner Bellary was appointed the President of the Bank.9. The Bank challenged the notification on three grounds. First the action of the Government was ultra vires the Act; second, the action was bad in violation of principles of natural justice; third the action was taken because of political rivalry with an evil eye to remove the President from the office.10. The High Court upheld the first two contentions and set aside the order.11. Section 54 of the Act provides that where State aid amounting to not less than two lakhs of rupees is given to any co-operative society the State Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary in public interest so to do, may by notification in the official gazette take power to exercise such control over the conduct of business of such society as shall suffice in the opinion of the State Government to safeguard the interest of the State.12. Section 121 enacts that the State Government may, by general or special order published in the official gazette, exempt any co-operative society or any class of societies from any of the provisions of this Act or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such notifications as may be specified in the order.13. At this stage reference may be made to Section 30 of the Act which provides for supersession of Committee. If, in the opinion of the Registrar, the Committee of any Co-operative Society persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by the Act or the Rule or the bye-laws, or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interest of the society or its members, or is otherwise not functioning property, the Registrar may after giving the committee an opportunity to state its objections, if any, by order in writing, remove the committee and appoint a new committee consisting of one or more members of the society in its place or appoint one or more Administrators who need not be members of the society. Section 30 further provides that the Registrar can manage the affairs of the society for such period or periods not exceeding two years. There is also a provisions for extension of the period so that the aggregate period does not exceed four years.14. Section 29 to which reference has already been made provides for the nomination by the Government of persons on the committee of the Society where the State Government has subscribed to the share capital of a co-operative society or guaranteed the repayment of loans. The members nominated by the Government under Section 29 of the Act does not exceed three or one third of the total number of members of the Committee, whichever is less.15. Section 54 of the Act indicates that the power thereunder is to be exercised in public interest. The control over the business of the Society contemplated under Section 54 should be such as is sufficient in the opinion of the State Government to safeguard the interests of the State.16. In the present case, the impeached orders suffer from two in surmountable infirmities. One is that the entire committee of Management has been superseded. There is a provision under Section 30 of the Act to supersede the management. The State Government does not take recourse to the section. Indirectly the State Government has overthrown the Committee of Management including the President and the Vice-President. The President and the Vice-President are officers within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Act. Section 54 does not confer any power to remove the President and the Vice-President of the Society Section 54 contemplates exercise of control over the conduct of the business. The word "control" suggests check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to regulate and hold in check a restrain from action. In the guise of exercising control the State has displaced the committee of Management and substituted its own Committee. The State has indirectly intended to achieve what it is directly prohibited from doing under Section 54 of the Act.17. The second vice of the notification is that it is in violation of principles of natural justice. Section 30 of the Act contemplates a notice where the State intends to supersede the Management. The Committee has been deprived of their right to manage the affairs of the Society. They have been deprived of the right arbitrarily and in utter defiance of the powers under the statute.18. The High Court rightly set aside the impeached notifications.

0[ds]13. At this stage reference may be made to Section 30 of the Act which provides for supersession of Committee. If, in the opinion of the Registrar, the Committee of any Co-operative Society persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by the Act or the Rule or the bye-laws, or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interest of the society or its members, or is otherwise not functioning property, the Registrar may after giving the committee an opportunity to state its objections, if any, by order in writing, remove the committee and appoint a new committee consisting of one or more members of the society in its place or appoint one or more Administrators who need not be members of the society. Section 30 further provides that the Registrar can manage the affairs of the society for such period or periods not exceeding two years. There is also a provisions for extension of the period so that the aggregate period does not exceed four years.In the present case, the impeached orders suffer from two in surmountable infirmities. One is that the entire committee of Management has been superseded. There is a provision under Section 30 of the Act to supersede the management. The State Government does not take recourse to the section. Indirectly the State Government has overthrown the Committee of Management including the President and the Vice-President. The President and the Vice-President are officers within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Act. Section 54 does not confer any power to remove the President and the Vice-President of the Society Section 54 contemplates exercise of control over the conduct of the business. The word "control" suggests check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to regulate and hold in check a restrain from action. In the guise of exercising control the State has displaced the committee of Management and substituted its own Committee. The State has indirectly intended to achieve what it is directly prohibited from doing under Section 54 of the Act.17. The second vice of the notification is that it is in violation of principles of natural justice. Section 30 of the Act contemplates a notice where the State intends to supersede the Management. The Committee has been deprived of their right to manage the affairs of the Society. They have been deprived of the right arbitrarily and in utter defiance of the powers under the statute.18. The High Court rightly set aside the impeached notifications.

### Instruction: Delve into the case proceeding and predict the outcome: is the judgment expected to be in support (1) or in denial (0) of the appeal? ### Input: recited that the State had given Rs.23.8 lakhs to the Bank and it was necessary in public interest to take powers to exercise control over the conduct of the business of the Bank to safeguard the public funds. The State Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 54 of the Act should have the right to nominate as its representatives fifteen persons on the Board of Management and to appoint one among them as the President, one as the Vice-President under the notification should exercise powers and discharge their functions subject to the supervision direction and control of the State Government. The notification further stated that Section 29 which conferred power on the State Government subject to any notification under Section 54 or Section 121 to have "the right to nominate as its representatives not more than three persons or one-third of the total number of members of the Committee of the Co-operative Society, whichever is less" would be modified by substituting the words "have the right to nominate as its representatives 15 persons of the Committee of the Co-operative Society of whom one shall be appointed as Managing Director". The notification conferred power on the Managing Director subject to the policy decision of the Board, the right to conduct the business of the Bank and to sanction expenditure on establishment and certain other powers.8. The second notification nominated fifteen persons to form the Board of Directors of the Bank. The Deputy Commissioner Bellary was appointed the President of the Bank.9. The Bank challenged the notification on three grounds. First the action of the Government was ultra vires the Act; second, the action was bad in violation of principles of natural justice; third the action was taken because of political rivalry with an evil eye to remove the President from the office.10. The High Court upheld the first two contentions and set aside the order.11. Section 54 of the Act provides that where State aid amounting to not less than two lakhs of rupees is given to any co-operative society the State Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary in public interest so to do, may by notification in the official gazette take power to exercise such control over the conduct of business of such society as shall suffice in the opinion of the State Government to safeguard the interest of the State.12. Section 121 enacts that the State Government may, by general or special order published in the official gazette, exempt any co-operative society or any class of societies from any of the provisions of this Act or may direct that such provisions shall apply to such society or class of societies with such notifications as may be specified in the order.13. At this stage reference may be made to Section 30 of the Act which provides for supersession of Committee. If, in the opinion of the Registrar, the Committee of any Co-operative Society persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by the Act or the Rule or the bye-laws, or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interest of the society or its members, or is otherwise not functioning property, the Registrar may after giving the committee an opportunity to state its objections, if any, by order in writing, remove the committee and appoint a new committee consisting of one or more members of the society in its place or appoint one or more Administrators who need not be members of the society. Section 30 further provides that the Registrar can manage the affairs of the society for such period or periods not exceeding two years. There is also a provisions for extension of the period so that the aggregate period does not exceed four years.14. Section 29 to which reference has already been made provides for the nomination by the Government of persons on the committee of the Society where the State Government has subscribed to the share capital of a co-operative society or guaranteed the repayment of loans. The members nominated by the Government under Section 29 of the Act does not exceed three or one third of the total number of members of the Committee, whichever is less.15. Section 54 of the Act indicates that the power thereunder is to be exercised in public interest. The control over the business of the Society contemplated under Section 54 should be such as is sufficient in the opinion of the State Government to safeguard the interests of the State.16. In the present case, the impeached orders suffer from two in surmountable infirmities. One is that the entire committee of Management has been superseded. There is a provision under Section 30 of the Act to supersede the management. The State Government does not take recourse to the section. Indirectly the State Government has overthrown the Committee of Management including the President and the Vice-President. The President and the Vice-President are officers within the meaning of Section 2 (g) of the Act. Section 54 does not confer any power to remove the President and the Vice-President of the Society Section 54 contemplates exercise of control over the conduct of the business. The word "control" suggests check, restraint or influence. Control is intended to regulate and hold in check a restrain from action. In the guise of exercising control the State has displaced the committee of Management and substituted its own Committee. The State has indirectly intended to achieve what it is directly prohibited from doing under Section 54 of the Act.17. The second vice of the notification is that it is in violation of principles of natural justice. Section 30 of the Act contemplates a notice where the State intends to supersede the Management. The Committee has been deprived of their right to manage the affairs of the Society. They have been deprived of the right arbitrarily and in utter defiance of the powers under the statute.18. The High Court rightly set aside the impeached notifications. ### Response: 0

A. Hajee Abdul Shakoor And Company Vs. State Of Madras

If the statute treats both these kinds of hides and skins as different commodities the provision of sub-rule (1) of R. 16 providing for the levy of tax on raw hides and skins at a certain point even in the absence of any provision for the taxation of dressed hides and skins cannot be said to be discriminatory and invalid. The articles to be taxed were not the same and the legislature could provide differently about their taxation.32. We, therefore, hold that sub-rule (1) of R. 16 did not become invalid on this Courts declaring sub-rule (2) of that rule invalid in Mehtabs case, AIR 1963 SC 928.33. The only question that now remains for consideration is whether the State legislature was competent to enact the provision of sub-s. (1) of S. 2 of the Act. Hides and Skins had been declared under Act LII of 1952 to be essential for the life of the community. Article 286(3) of the Constitution as it stood before its amendment by the Constitution VIth Amendment Act of 1956, on September 11, 1956, read :"No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent."This provision, however, did not apply to the 1939 Act which had been enacted much earlier than the commencement of the Constitution. By August 28, 1963, when the Act was enacted by the Madras Legislature, Art. 286(3) had been amended and Act LII of 1952 had also been repealed. Consequently there was no Constitutional requirement for the Act being reserved for the assent of the President before it could be enforced. It is contended for the petitioner that the Act really enacted for a period, when if passed, it had to receive the Presidents assent for its enforcement and that therefore the State Legislature could not even in 1963 enact this provision affecting the taxation law in respect of the sale or purchase of goods which were goods declared essential for the life of the community. We do not see why such a fetter be placed on the legislative power of the State legislature. The State legislature is free to enact laws which would have retrospective operation. Its competence to make a law for a certain past period, depends on its present legislative power and not on what it possessed at the period of time when its enactment is to have operation. We therefore do not agree with this contention.34. The matter can be looked at in a different way. The 1939 Act required no assent of the President. The State Legislature was doing in 1963 what the legislature enacting the 1939 Act was supposed to have enacted and therefore its enactment was not governed by the Constitutional requirement for an Act to be enacted during the period Act LII of 1952 was in force.35. Lastly, it has been urged for the petitioner that hides and skins have been declared to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce by S. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act of 1956. The tax imposed by sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act is a tax on the sale of hides and skins in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and therefore fell within entry No. 92A of List I of Seventh Schedule and that therefore the State legislature was not competent to impose it. It could impose by virtue of entry No. 54 in List II of Seventh Schedule tax on the sale or purchase of goods subject to the provisions of entry No. 92A of List 1. There is no force in this contention. The tax is imposed on the sale which took place within the State. The State legislature is competent to impose such a tax. The mere fact that the article sold in the State had been brought from outside the state does not make the sale of that article a sale in the Course of inter-State trade or commerce. It is only when A, in State X, purchased through a commission agent in a State Y and receives the articles purchased through the Commercial agency that the sale comes within the expression in the course of inter-State trade : See 1954 SCR 53 at p 70 : (AIR 1953 SC 333 at p. 339).36. It has been argued for the State that the Act is not affected by the provisions of Art. 301 to 304 of the Constitution as they affect the legislative power with respect to Acts to operate in the future and not the power to enact Acts which would operate in the past. We do not consider the contention sound. The Act makes provision for a period subsequent to the commencement of the Constitution and therefore is to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution.37. We therefore hold that sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act discriminates against imported hides and skins which were sold up to the 1st of August 1957 upto which date the tax on sale of raw hides and skins was at the rate of 3 pies per rupee or 19/16th per cent. This however does not mean that the sub-section is valid with respect to the sales which took place subsequent to August 1, 1957. The sub-section being void in its provisions with respect to a certain initial period, we cannot change the provision with respect to the period as enacted to the period for which it could be valid as that would be re-writing the enactment. We have therefore to hold sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 void, and accordingly hold so.38. In view of the provisions of sub-section (1) of S. 2 being invalid the other provisions of that section become unenforceable.

1[ds]10. The effect of sub-s. (1) of S. 2 of the Act is the same as was the effect of sub-rule(2) of R. 16 of the Turnover and Assessment Rules 1939, and which was held to be invalid by this Court in Mehtabs case, AIR 1963 SC 928 . The impugned sub-section provides for the assessment of tax on the sale of dressed hides and skins which were not subject to tax under the 1939 Act as raw hides and skins and thus exempts from taxation, in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 2 of the Act the sale of tanned hides and skins with respect to which tax had been paid on their sale in the raw condition. Such tanned hides and skins had been exempted from taxation under sub-cl. (ii) of R. 2 of the Turnover and Assessment Rules. The same is the position in the present case. The present rule therefore is discriminatory and invalid for the same reasons which led this Court to hold sub-rule(2) of R. 16 invalid in Mehtabs case, AIR SC 928. There is no escape from this conclusion.11. In the earlier case, discrimination was brought about on account of sale price of tanned hides and skins to be higher than the sale price of untanned hides and skins, though the rate of tax was the same, while in the present case, the discrimination does not arise on account of difference of the price on which the tax is levied as the tax on the tanned hides and skins is levied on the amount for which those hides and skins were last purchased in the untanned condition, but on account of the fact that the rate of tax on the sale of tanned hides and skins is higher than that on the sale of untanned hides and skins. The rate of tax on the sale of tanned hides and skins is 2% on the purchase price of those hides and skins in the untanned condition while the rate of tax on the sale of raw hides and skins in the State during 1955 to 1957 is 3 pies per rupee. The difference in tax works out to 7/1600th of a rupee, i.e., a little less than 1/2 naya paise per rupee. Such a discrimination would affect the taxation upto the 1st of August 1957 when the rate of tax on the sale of raw hides and skins was raised to 2% of the sale price.12. The second contention has no force. There is nothing in sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act to suggest that the seller of the tanned hides and skins in the State, should himself be the purchaser of those hides and skins in the raw condition from outside the State. An importer can import tanned hides and skins as well as untanned hides and skins from outside the State. If he imports tanned hides and skins, he need not necessarily be the last purchaser of this hides and skins in the untanned condition. In that case, it may be difficult to assess the tax on the basis laid down in sub-sec. (1) of S. 2, as the importer may not be able to inform about the price at which those hides and skins were last purchased. Such a price may then have to be determined by estimate. In case the importer himself purchases the untanned hides and skins and then imports them either in the same condition or in the tanned condition, there would be no such difficulty. The difficulty existing in the former case does not necessarily mean that the importer of tanned hides and skins when he himself is not the last purchaser, cannot be taxed under sub-s. (1) of S. 2 of the Act.It is therefore not correct to say that the process of tanning brings about no change in the raw hides and skins and that therefore both types of hides and skins form one commodity.The Second Schedule refers to raw hides and skins separately from dressed hides and skins against serial No. 7. The rate of tax is different and so is the point at which the tax is to be levied. This will indicate that in 1959 the legislature in Madras considered raw hides and skins a different commodity from dressed hides and skins. There is no good reason why the legislature be not attributed the same intention when it enacted the 1939 Act especially when there are other reasons also to point to the same conclusion.28. We therefore hold that raw hides and skins and dressed hides and skins constitute different commodities of merchandise and they could therefore be treated as different goods for the purposes of thethey treat them as one class of goods, the contention for the petitioner loses force as taxing of hides and skins at the time of their sale on a raw condition meets the requirements of law as hides and skins could be taxed only at a single point. If the dressed or tanned hides and skins are not taxed at the time of their sale that does not offend against the statutory provisions. No question of discrimination arises as a sale of raw hides and skins of whatever origin, i. e., whether produced in the State or imported into the State would be equally liable to the levy of tax.31. If the statute treats both these kinds of hides and skins as different commodities the provision of sub-rule (1) of R. 16 providing for the levy of tax on raw hides and skins at a certain point even in the absence of any provision for the taxation of dressed hides and skins cannot be said to be discriminatory and invalid. The articles to be taxed were not the same and the legislature could provide differently about their taxation.32. We, therefore, hold that sub-rule (1) of R. 16 did not become invalid on this Courts declaring sub-rule (2) of that rule invalid in Mehtabs case, AIR 1963 SCprovision, however, did not apply to the 1939 Act which had been enacted much earlier than the commencement of the Constitution. By August 28, 1963, when the Act was enacted by the Madras Legislature, Art. 286(3) had been amended and Act LII of 1952 had also been repealed. Consequently there was no Constitutional requirement for the Act being reserved for the assent of the President before it could be enforced. It is contended for the petitioner that the Act really enacted for a period, when if passed, it had to receive the Presidents assent for its enforcement and that therefore the State Legislature could not even in 1963 enact this provision affecting the taxation law in respect of the sale or purchase of goods which were goods declared essential for the life of the community. We do not see why such a fetter be placed on the legislative power of the State legislature. The State legislature is free to enact laws which would have retrospective operation. Its competence to make a law for a certain past period, depends on its present legislative power and not on what it possessed at the period of time when its enactment is to have operation. We therefore do not agree with thisis no force in this contention. The tax is imposed on the sale which took place within the State. The State legislature is competent to impose such a tax. The mere fact that the article sold in the State had been brought from outside the state does not make the sale of that article a sale in the Course of inter-State trade or commerce. It is only when A, in State X, purchased through a commission agent in a State Y and receives the articles purchased through the Commercial agency that the sale comes within the expression in the course of inter-State trade : See 1954 SCR 53 at p 70 : (AIR 1953 SC 333 at p.do not consider the contention sound. The Act makes provision for a period subsequent to the commencement of the Constitution and therefore is to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution.We therefore hold that sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act discriminates against imported hides and skins which were sold up to the 1st of August 1957 upto which date the tax on sale of raw hides and skins was at the rate of 3 pies per rupee or 19/16th per cent. This however does not mean that the sub-section is valid with respect to the sales which took place subsequent to August 1, 1957. The sub-section being void in its provisions with respect to a certain initial period, we cannot change the provision with respect to the period as enacted to the period for which it could be valid as that would be re-writing the enactment. We have therefore to hold sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 void, and accordingly hold so.In view of the provisions of sub-section (1) of S. 2 being invalid the other provisions of that section become unenforceable.

### Instruction: Evaluate the arguments and evidence in the case and predict the verdict: is an acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of the appeal more probable? ### Input: If the statute treats both these kinds of hides and skins as different commodities the provision of sub-rule (1) of R. 16 providing for the levy of tax on raw hides and skins at a certain point even in the absence of any provision for the taxation of dressed hides and skins cannot be said to be discriminatory and invalid. The articles to be taxed were not the same and the legislature could provide differently about their taxation.32. We, therefore, hold that sub-rule (1) of R. 16 did not become invalid on this Courts declaring sub-rule (2) of that rule invalid in Mehtabs case, AIR 1963 SC 928.33. The only question that now remains for consideration is whether the State legislature was competent to enact the provision of sub-s. (1) of S. 2 of the Act. Hides and Skins had been declared under Act LII of 1952 to be essential for the life of the community. Article 286(3) of the Constitution as it stood before its amendment by the Constitution VIth Amendment Act of 1956, on September 11, 1956, read :"No law made by the Legislature of a State imposing or authorising the imposition of, a tax on the sale or purchase of any such goods as have been declared by Parliament by law to be essential for the life of the community shall have effect unless it has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent."This provision, however, did not apply to the 1939 Act which had been enacted much earlier than the commencement of the Constitution. By August 28, 1963, when the Act was enacted by the Madras Legislature, Art. 286(3) had been amended and Act LII of 1952 had also been repealed. Consequently there was no Constitutional requirement for the Act being reserved for the assent of the President before it could be enforced. It is contended for the petitioner that the Act really enacted for a period, when if passed, it had to receive the Presidents assent for its enforcement and that therefore the State Legislature could not even in 1963 enact this provision affecting the taxation law in respect of the sale or purchase of goods which were goods declared essential for the life of the community. We do not see why such a fetter be placed on the legislative power of the State legislature. The State legislature is free to enact laws which would have retrospective operation. Its competence to make a law for a certain past period, depends on its present legislative power and not on what it possessed at the period of time when its enactment is to have operation. We therefore do not agree with this contention.34. The matter can be looked at in a different way. The 1939 Act required no assent of the President. The State Legislature was doing in 1963 what the legislature enacting the 1939 Act was supposed to have enacted and therefore its enactment was not governed by the Constitutional requirement for an Act to be enacted during the period Act LII of 1952 was in force.35. Lastly, it has been urged for the petitioner that hides and skins have been declared to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce by S. 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act of 1956. The tax imposed by sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act is a tax on the sale of hides and skins in the course of inter-State trade or commerce and therefore fell within entry No. 92A of List I of Seventh Schedule and that therefore the State legislature was not competent to impose it. It could impose by virtue of entry No. 54 in List II of Seventh Schedule tax on the sale or purchase of goods subject to the provisions of entry No. 92A of List 1. There is no force in this contention. The tax is imposed on the sale which took place within the State. The State legislature is competent to impose such a tax. The mere fact that the article sold in the State had been brought from outside the state does not make the sale of that article a sale in the Course of inter-State trade or commerce. It is only when A, in State X, purchased through a commission agent in a State Y and receives the articles purchased through the Commercial agency that the sale comes within the expression in the course of inter-State trade : See 1954 SCR 53 at p 70 : (AIR 1953 SC 333 at p. 339).36. It has been argued for the State that the Act is not affected by the provisions of Art. 301 to 304 of the Constitution as they affect the legislative power with respect to Acts to operate in the future and not the power to enact Acts which would operate in the past. We do not consider the contention sound. The Act makes provision for a period subsequent to the commencement of the Constitution and therefore is to be subject to the provisions of the Constitution.37. We therefore hold that sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 of the Act discriminates against imported hides and skins which were sold up to the 1st of August 1957 upto which date the tax on sale of raw hides and skins was at the rate of 3 pies per rupee or 19/16th per cent. This however does not mean that the sub-section is valid with respect to the sales which took place subsequent to August 1, 1957. The sub-section being void in its provisions with respect to a certain initial period, we cannot change the provision with respect to the period as enacted to the period for which it could be valid as that would be re-writing the enactment. We have therefore to hold sub-sec. (1) of S. 2 void, and accordingly hold so.38. In view of the provisions of sub-section (1) of S. 2 being invalid the other provisions of that section become unenforceable. ### Response: 1

Durgadas Shirali Vs. Union Of India And Others

because as soon as a Proclamation of Emergency is issued by the President under Art. 358 the provisions of Art. 19 are automatically suspended. But a petitioner can challenge the validity of the Ordinance, rule or order made thereunder on a ground other than those covered by Art. 358, or the Presidential Order issued under Art. 359(1). Such a challenge is outside the purview of the Presidential Order. For instance, a citizen will not be deprived of his right to move an appropriate Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered mala fide. Similarly, it will be open to the citizen to challenge the order of detention of the ground that any of the grounds given in the order of detention is irrelevant and there is no real and proximate connection between the ground given and the object which the legislature has n view.7. It is contended, in the first place, on behalf of the petitioner, that the order of detention is bad because the District Magistrate had not applied his mind to the specific activities of the petitioner. It was pointed out that in the order of detention the District Magistrate has mainly dealt with the activities of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India which was carrying on anti-national and pro-Chinese propaganda. The District Magistrate proceeds to say that the party was formed at Pekings behest and was preparing for widespread agitation with the object of establishing communist regime by subversion and violence. The District Magistrate, therefore, reached the conclusion that the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party constituted a real danger to external and internal security of the country. So far as the petitioner is concerned, the District Magistrate has described him as Secretary of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party and has proceeded to state that he was satisfied that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner which was prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil Defence, Indias relations with foreign powers, public safety and the maintenance of the public order. In reply to the petition of the detenu the District Magistrate, Bhilwara has filed an affidavit in this Court. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit the District Magistrate has stated that he was satisfied from the reports that the petitioner was carrying on anti-national and pro-Chinese propaganda as a member of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party. In paragraph 5 the District Magistrate has stated that he passed the order of detention after satisfying himself on the reports that the petitioner was the Secretary of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India, Bhilwara branch and that he was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to Defence of India and Civil Defence, Indias relations with foreign powers, public safety and the maintenance of public order. In view of the affidavit of the District Magistrate it is not possible for us to accept the argument of Mr. Garg that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the specific activities of the petitioner and that he made the order of detention solely on the ground that the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India was carrying on anti-national and pro-Chinese propaganda.8. It was next argued on behalf of the petitioner that the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India has not been declared illegal by the Government of India and the party has not been banned. It was submitted, therefore, that membership of that party was not per se illegal and the order of detention of the petitioner cannot be legally based upon this ground. In other words, it was submitted by Mr. Garg that the ground that the petitioner was the Secretary of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India was irrelevant for the purpose of R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules. The argument was put forward that if this ground was irrelevant for the purpose of the Rule or was wholly illusory, the order of detention as a whole was vitiated and must be quashed by grant of a writ of habeas corpus.9. In support of his argument Mr. Garg referred to the decision of this Court in Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 SCR 418: (AIR 1954 SC 179 ). We are unable to accept the argument of Mr. Garg as correct. It is not correct to state that the activities of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party cannot in any circumstances be illegal and would necessarily be irrelevant merely because the Government of India has not declared the party illegal or imposed a ban. In considering the question whether the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the Defence of India within the meaning of R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules it is open to the District Magistrate to take into account the reports which he had received as to the political association of the petitioner, his political friends and his political loyalties. In considering the circumstance that the petitioner was a member of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India which, according to the said reports, was preparing for a widespread agitation with the object of establishing communist regime by subversion and violence the District Magistrate was not applying his mind to any irrelevant circumstance with regard to the need for detention of the petitioner under the Defence of India Rules. In our opinion, in the light of the reports received by the District Magistrate the political association of the petitioner and his membership of a particular political group is a relevant consideration in the matter of detention of the petitioner. This ground has close and proximate connection with the security of State and maintenance of public order as contemplated by R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules. In our opinion, Mr. Garg is unable to make goods his submission on this aspect of the case.10.

1[ds]It was held by this Court that the sweep of Art. 359(1) and the Presidential Order issued under it is wide enough to include all claims made by citizens in any Court of competent jurisdiction when it is shown that the said claims cannot be effectively adjudicated upon without examining the question as to whether the citizen is, in substance, seeking to enforce fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19, 21 and 22.It was pointed out that during the pendency of the Presidential Order the validity of the Ordinance or any rule or order made thereunder cannot be questioned on the ground that it contravenes Arts. 14, 21 and 22. But this limitation cannot preclude a citizen from challenging the validity of the Ordinance or any rule or order made thereunder on any other ground.If the petitioner seeks to challenge the validity of the Ordinance, rule or order made thereunder on any ground other than the contravention of Arts. 14, 21 and 22, the Presidential Order cannot come into operation. It is not also open to challenge the Ordinance, rule a order made thereunder on the ground of contravention of Art. 19 because as soon as a Proclamation of Emergency is issued by the President under Art. 358 the provisions of Art. 19 are automatically suspended. But a petitioner can challenge the validity of the Ordinance, rule or order made thereunder on a ground other than those covered by Art. 358, or the Presidential Order issued under Art. 359(1). Such a challenge is outside the purview of the Presidential Order.In view of the affidavit of the District Magistrate it is not possible for us to accept the argument of Mr. Garg that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the specific activities of the petitioner and that he made the order of detention solely on the ground that the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India was carrying on anti-national and pro-Chineseare unable to accept the argument of Mr. Garg as correct. It is not correct to state that the activities of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party cannot in any circumstances be illegal and would necessarily be irrelevant merely because the Government of India has not declared the party illegal or imposed a ban. In considering the question whether the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the Defence of India within the meaning of R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules it is open to the District Magistrate to take into account the reports which he had received as to the political association of the petitioner, his political friends and his political loyalties. In considering the circumstance that the petitioner was a member of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India which, according to the said reports, was preparing for a widespread agitation with the object of establishing communist regime by subversion and violence the District Magistrate was not applying his mind to any irrelevant circumstance with regard to the need for detention of the petitioner under the Defence of India Rules. In our opinion, in the light of the reports received by the District Magistrate the political association of the petitioner and his membership of a particular political group is a relevant consideration in the matter of detention of the petitioner. This ground has close and proximate connection with the security of State and maintenance of public order as contemplated by R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules. In our opinion, Mr. Garg is unable to make goods his submission on this aspect of the case.

### Instruction: Delve into the case proceeding and predict the outcome: is the judgment expected to be in support (1) or in denial (0) of the appeal? ### Input: because as soon as a Proclamation of Emergency is issued by the President under Art. 358 the provisions of Art. 19 are automatically suspended. But a petitioner can challenge the validity of the Ordinance, rule or order made thereunder on a ground other than those covered by Art. 358, or the Presidential Order issued under Art. 359(1). Such a challenge is outside the purview of the Presidential Order. For instance, a citizen will not be deprived of his right to move an appropriate Court for a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his detention has been ordered mala fide. Similarly, it will be open to the citizen to challenge the order of detention of the ground that any of the grounds given in the order of detention is irrelevant and there is no real and proximate connection between the ground given and the object which the legislature has n view.7. It is contended, in the first place, on behalf of the petitioner, that the order of detention is bad because the District Magistrate had not applied his mind to the specific activities of the petitioner. It was pointed out that in the order of detention the District Magistrate has mainly dealt with the activities of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India which was carrying on anti-national and pro-Chinese propaganda. The District Magistrate proceeds to say that the party was formed at Pekings behest and was preparing for widespread agitation with the object of establishing communist regime by subversion and violence. The District Magistrate, therefore, reached the conclusion that the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party constituted a real danger to external and internal security of the country. So far as the petitioner is concerned, the District Magistrate has described him as Secretary of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party and has proceeded to state that he was satisfied that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner which was prejudicial to the Defence of India and Civil Defence, Indias relations with foreign powers, public safety and the maintenance of the public order. In reply to the petition of the detenu the District Magistrate, Bhilwara has filed an affidavit in this Court. In paragraph 3 of the affidavit the District Magistrate has stated that he was satisfied from the reports that the petitioner was carrying on anti-national and pro-Chinese propaganda as a member of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party. In paragraph 5 the District Magistrate has stated that he passed the order of detention after satisfying himself on the reports that the petitioner was the Secretary of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India, Bhilwara branch and that he was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to Defence of India and Civil Defence, Indias relations with foreign powers, public safety and the maintenance of public order. In view of the affidavit of the District Magistrate it is not possible for us to accept the argument of Mr. Garg that the District Magistrate did not apply his mind to the specific activities of the petitioner and that he made the order of detention solely on the ground that the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India was carrying on anti-national and pro-Chinese propaganda.8. It was next argued on behalf of the petitioner that the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India has not been declared illegal by the Government of India and the party has not been banned. It was submitted, therefore, that membership of that party was not per se illegal and the order of detention of the petitioner cannot be legally based upon this ground. In other words, it was submitted by Mr. Garg that the ground that the petitioner was the Secretary of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India was irrelevant for the purpose of R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules. The argument was put forward that if this ground was irrelevant for the purpose of the Rule or was wholly illusory, the order of detention as a whole was vitiated and must be quashed by grant of a writ of habeas corpus.9. In support of his argument Mr. Garg referred to the decision of this Court in Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 SCR 418: (AIR 1954 SC 179 ). We are unable to accept the argument of Mr. Garg as correct. It is not correct to state that the activities of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party cannot in any circumstances be illegal and would necessarily be irrelevant merely because the Government of India has not declared the party illegal or imposed a ban. In considering the question whether the petitioner was acting in a manner prejudicial to the Defence of India within the meaning of R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules it is open to the District Magistrate to take into account the reports which he had received as to the political association of the petitioner, his political friends and his political loyalties. In considering the circumstance that the petitioner was a member of the Leftist Wing of the Communist Party of India which, according to the said reports, was preparing for a widespread agitation with the object of establishing communist regime by subversion and violence the District Magistrate was not applying his mind to any irrelevant circumstance with regard to the need for detention of the petitioner under the Defence of India Rules. In our opinion, in the light of the reports received by the District Magistrate the political association of the petitioner and his membership of a particular political group is a relevant consideration in the matter of detention of the petitioner. This ground has close and proximate connection with the security of State and maintenance of public order as contemplated by R. 30 of the Defence of India Rules. In our opinion, Mr. Garg is unable to make goods his submission on this aspect of the case.10. ### Response: 1

M/S AVINASH HITECH CITY 2 SOCIETY Vs. BODDU MANIKYA MALINI

the owners, pro-rata to their respective shares in the build-up space in the project after addressing the liabilities towards loans. Therefore, the dispute between the respondents and the appellants with respect to the sharing of the rent with respect to the leased space can be said to be related to the Addendum and/or in connection with or relating to the Addendum.7. Clause 19 of the Addendum, which is the arbitration clause and provides how to settle the dispute between the parties, reads as under:?The owners agree that any dispute between the Owners, including the dispute relating to this Addendum and all questions relating to its interpretation shall be construed in accordance with the laws of India, without reference to its principles of conflicts of law. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, the following provisions apply in the event of any dispute or difference arising among the Parties out of, in connection with or relating to the Agreement (The ‘Dispute?).(a) The Dispute shall be deemed to have occurred, when one Party serves on the other Party/ies a notice stating the nature of the Dispute (‘Notice of Dispute?).(b) The Parties hereto agree that they will use all reasonable efforts to resolve among themselves, any Dispute between them through negotiations.(c) Any Dispute and differences whatsoever arising between the Owners which could not be resolved by Parties through negotiations, within a period of thirty (30) days from the service of the Notice of Dispute, the same shall be referred to and shall finally be settled by arbitration in accordance with the (Indian) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and all the proceedings shall be conducted in English and a daily transcript in English shall be prepared.(d) In the event of any dispute which involves two or more Societies or Owners who are the members of two different Societies, the arbitral tribunal shall comprise of three or more arbitrators. In such a situation, each party to the dispute shall appoint one arbitrator, who shall be from the office bearers of their respective Societies and the two or more arbitrators so appointed shall appoint a presiding arbitrator, who shall be one of the office bearers of the Hitech City¬2 Owners Welfare Association (HOWA) and the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal; and the venue of arbitration shall be in Hyderabad, India.(e) In the event of any dispute which involves two or more Owners of the space in the same building, the arbitral tribunal shall comprise of the sold arbitrator. In such a situation, each party to the dispute shall refer the matter to the office bearers of their respective Society which shall be the arbitral tribunal; and the venue of arbitration shall be in Hyderabad, India.(f) The Parties are debarred from exercising any right or filing any application to any court or tribunal having jurisdiction in connection with matters involving substantial questions of law arising during any arbitration.(g) The Parties here by submit to the Arbitrator?s award and the award shall be enforceable in any competent court of law.? 7.1 On reading Clause 19 of the Addendum as a whole, it appears that in the event of dispute or difference among the parties out of, in connection with or relating to the agreement, the same shall be referred to arbitration. However, sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) provide for different procedure in the event of any disputes and differences between the owners; between two or more societies or owners who are the members of two different societies and between two or more owners of the space in the same building. Sub-clause (c) of Clause 19 provides that any disputes or differences whatsoever arising between owners, which could not be resolved by the parties through negotiations, within a period of 30 days from the service of the notice of dispute, the same shall be referred to and shall finally be settled by the arbitration in accordance with the (Indian) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Sub-clause (d) of Clause 19 provides that in the event of any dispute which involves two or more societies or owners who are the members of two different societies, the arbitral tribunal shall comprise of three or more arbitrators. It further provides, ?who shall be appointed as a presiding arbitrator; who shall be the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal and the venue of the arbitration? . Sub-clause (e) of Clause 19 provides that in the event of any dispute which involves two or more owners of the space in the same building, the arbitral tribunal shall comprise of the sole arbitrator and, in such a situation, each party to the dispute shall refer the matter to the office bearers of their respective Society which shall be the arbitral tribunal and the venue of arbitration shall be in Hyderabad.7.2 As observed hereinabove, Clause 19 shall be applicable in the event of any dispute and difference arising among the parties out of, in connection with or relating to the agreement. As observed hereinabove, the developers, owners, societies and the original owners and even subsequent societies formed are parties to the agreement and the Addendum. It is also required to be noted and, as observed hereinabove, the dispute is with respect to sharing of the rent of the leased space and it can be said that the respondents are also claiming the share relying upon the Development Agreements; Supplementary Development Agreements and the Addendum. Therefore, the dispute can be said to in connection with or relating to the Agreements also.7.3 Considering the above facts and circumstances, both the High Court and the learned District Judge have committed grave error in not referring the dispute between the appellants and the respondents to the arbitration. We are of the opinion that Clause 19 of the Addendum to the Supplementary Development Agreement shall be squarely applicable and therefore the disputes between the respondents and the appellants for which the respondents initiated proceedings under the Societies Registration Act, are required to be referred to the Arbitration and/or to the Arbitral Tribunal.

1[ds]At the outset, it is required to be noted that the dispute between the parties for which the respondents have initiated proceedings under Section 23 of the Societies Registration Act is with respect to sharing of the rent of the leased space. It is required to be noted that appellant no. 1 Society claims to be the co-developer. It cannot be disputed and it is not in dispute that owners, societies and developers are the parties to the Development Agreements, Supplementary Development Agreements and the Addendum. According to appellant no. 1-co-developer, after execution of the Development Agreements, Supplementary Development Agreements and the Addendum, a cold shell in building H1B was completed by the developer and appellant no. 1 Society (as co-developer), converted the same to warm shall by setting up the air conditioning facilities, back-up generators and back-up power implementation, building management system implementation, electrical works and civil works and the funds for the same were raised by appellant no. 1 Society by way of bank loans. That, thereafter, various spaces in building H1B were leased out to HCL Technologies Limited and one other and they recovered the rent from the lessee. As per Clause 13 of the Addendum/Agreement which sets out that the societies would be the ?sole authorities? to collect/receive the lease rents in respect of the extends leased out in a given building earmarked as the share of the owners in the completion and pool the entire revenue generated from each of the buildings by way of lease rents and distribute the same to the owners, pro-rata to their respective shares in the build-up space in the project after addressing the liabilities towards loans. Therefore, the dispute between the respondents and the appellants with respect to the sharing of the rent with respect to the leased space can be said to be related to the Addendum and/or in connection with or relating to theAs observed hereinabove, Clause 19 shall be applicable in the event of any dispute and difference arising among the parties out of, in connection with or relating to the agreement. As observed hereinabove, the developers, owners, societies and the original owners and even subsequent societies formed are parties to the agreement and the Addendum. It is also required to be noted and, as observed hereinabove, the dispute is with respect to sharing of the rent of the leased space and it can be said that the respondents are also claiming the share relying upon the Development Agreements; Supplementary Development Agreements and the Addendum. Therefore, the dispute can be said to in connection with or relating to the Agreements also.7.3 Considering the above facts and circumstances, both the High Court and the learned District Judge have committed grave error in not referring the dispute between the appellants and the respondents to the arbitration. We are of the opinion that Clause 19 of the Addendum to the Supplementary Development Agreement shall be squarely applicable and therefore the disputes between the respondents and the appellants for which the respondents initiated proceedings under the Societies Registration Act, are required to be referred to the Arbitration and/or to the Arbitral Tribunal.

### Instruction: Based on the information in the case proceeding, determine the likely outcome: acceptance (1) or rejection (0) of the appellant/petitioner's case. ### Input: the owners, pro-rata to their respective shares in the build-up space in the project after addressing the liabilities towards loans. Therefore, the dispute between the respondents and the appellants with respect to the sharing of the rent with respect to the leased space can be said to be related to the Addendum and/or in connection with or relating to the Addendum.7. Clause 19 of the Addendum, which is the arbitration clause and provides how to settle the dispute between the parties, reads as under:?The owners agree that any dispute between the Owners, including the dispute relating to this Addendum and all questions relating to its interpretation shall be construed in accordance with the laws of India, without reference to its principles of conflicts of law. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Agreement, the following provisions apply in the event of any dispute or difference arising among the Parties out of, in connection with or relating to the Agreement (The ‘Dispute?).(a) The Dispute shall be deemed to have occurred, when one Party serves on the other Party/ies a notice stating the nature of the Dispute (‘Notice of Dispute?).(b) The Parties hereto agree that they will use all reasonable efforts to resolve among themselves, any Dispute between them through negotiations.(c) Any Dispute and differences whatsoever arising between the Owners which could not be resolved by Parties through negotiations, within a period of thirty (30) days from the service of the Notice of Dispute, the same shall be referred to and shall finally be settled by arbitration in accordance with the (Indian) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and all the proceedings shall be conducted in English and a daily transcript in English shall be prepared.(d) In the event of any dispute which involves two or more Societies or Owners who are the members of two different Societies, the arbitral tribunal shall comprise of three or more arbitrators. In such a situation, each party to the dispute shall appoint one arbitrator, who shall be from the office bearers of their respective Societies and the two or more arbitrators so appointed shall appoint a presiding arbitrator, who shall be one of the office bearers of the Hitech City¬2 Owners Welfare Association (HOWA) and the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal; and the venue of arbitration shall be in Hyderabad, India.(e) In the event of any dispute which involves two or more Owners of the space in the same building, the arbitral tribunal shall comprise of the sold arbitrator. In such a situation, each party to the dispute shall refer the matter to the office bearers of their respective Society which shall be the arbitral tribunal; and the venue of arbitration shall be in Hyderabad, India.(f) The Parties are debarred from exercising any right or filing any application to any court or tribunal having jurisdiction in connection with matters involving substantial questions of law arising during any arbitration.(g) The Parties here by submit to the Arbitrator?s award and the award shall be enforceable in any competent court of law.? 7.1 On reading Clause 19 of the Addendum as a whole, it appears that in the event of dispute or difference among the parties out of, in connection with or relating to the agreement, the same shall be referred to arbitration. However, sub-clauses (c), (d) and (e) provide for different procedure in the event of any disputes and differences between the owners; between two or more societies or owners who are the members of two different societies and between two or more owners of the space in the same building. Sub-clause (c) of Clause 19 provides that any disputes or differences whatsoever arising between owners, which could not be resolved by the parties through negotiations, within a period of 30 days from the service of the notice of dispute, the same shall be referred to and shall finally be settled by the arbitration in accordance with the (Indian) Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Sub-clause (d) of Clause 19 provides that in the event of any dispute which involves two or more societies or owners who are the members of two different societies, the arbitral tribunal shall comprise of three or more arbitrators. It further provides, ?who shall be appointed as a presiding arbitrator; who shall be the Chairman of the arbitral tribunal and the venue of the arbitration? . Sub-clause (e) of Clause 19 provides that in the event of any dispute which involves two or more owners of the space in the same building, the arbitral tribunal shall comprise of the sole arbitrator and, in such a situation, each party to the dispute shall refer the matter to the office bearers of their respective Society which shall be the arbitral tribunal and the venue of arbitration shall be in Hyderabad.7.2 As observed hereinabove, Clause 19 shall be applicable in the event of any dispute and difference arising among the parties out of, in connection with or relating to the agreement. As observed hereinabove, the developers, owners, societies and the original owners and even subsequent societies formed are parties to the agreement and the Addendum. It is also required to be noted and, as observed hereinabove, the dispute is with respect to sharing of the rent of the leased space and it can be said that the respondents are also claiming the share relying upon the Development Agreements; Supplementary Development Agreements and the Addendum. Therefore, the dispute can be said to in connection with or relating to the Agreements also.7.3 Considering the above facts and circumstances, both the High Court and the learned District Judge have committed grave error in not referring the dispute between the appellants and the respondents to the arbitration. We are of the opinion that Clause 19 of the Addendum to the Supplementary Development Agreement shall be squarely applicable and therefore the disputes between the respondents and the appellants for which the respondents initiated proceedings under the Societies Registration Act, are required to be referred to the Arbitration and/or to the Arbitral Tribunal. ### Response: 1