value
stringlengths 25
18k
⌀ | subtecnique
int64 0
1
| answer
stringclasses 2
values | id
stringlengths 5
9
| name
stringlengths 3
102
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
Install persistence through rc.d services: rc.d (/etc/rc.d/init.d/linux_kill).
| 1 | accept | T1037.004 | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Rc Scripts |
Backwards compatibility on Ubuntu allowed attackers to achieve persistence via RC scripts.
| 1 | accept | T1037.004 | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Rc Scripts |
As the malware tries to achieve persistence, Hatching Triage analysis reports suspicious behavior: “Modifies rc script.” | 1 | accept | T1037.004 | Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts: Rc Scripts |
APT41 has configured payloads to load via LD_PRELOAD. | 1 | accept | T1574.006 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
Ebury has injected its dynamic library into descendent processes of sshd via LD_PRELOAD. | 1 | accept | T1574.006 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
HiddenWasp adds itself as a shared object to the LD_PRELOAD environment variable. | 1 | accept | T1574.006 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
Hildegard has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to intercept shared library import functions. | 1 | accept | T1574.006 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
Rocke has modified /etc/ld.so.preload to hook libc functions in order to hide the installed dropper and mining software in process lists. | 1 | accept | T1574.006 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking |
APT32 has used JavaScript for drive-by downloads and C2 communications. | 1 | accept | T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Javascript |
Astaroth uses JavaScript to perform its core functionalities. | 1 | accept | T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Javascript |
Bundlore can execute JavaScript by injecting it into the victim's browser. | 1 | accept | T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Javascript |
Cobalt Group has executed JavaScript scriptlets on the victim's machine. | 1 | accept | T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Javascript |
The Cobalt Strike System Profiler can use JavaScript to perform reconnaissance actions. | 1 | accept | T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Javascript |
Evilnum has used malicious JavaScript files on the victim's machine. | 1 | accept | T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Javascript |
FIN6 has used malicious JavaScript to steal payment card data from e-commerce sites. | 1 | accept | T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Javascript |
FIN7 used JavaScript scripts to help perform tasks on the victim's machine. ;; GRIFFON is written in and executed as JavaScript. ;; Higaisa used JavaScript to execute additional files. ;; InvisiMole can use a JavaScript file as part of its execution chain. ;; jRAT has been distributed as HTA files with JScript. ;; Kimsuky has used JScript for logging and downloading additional tools. ;; Leafminer infected victims using JavaScript code. ;; Metamorfo includes payloads written in JavaScript. ;; ;;Molerats used various implants including those built with JS on target machines. ;; MuddyWater has used JavaScript files to execute its POWERSTATS payload. ;; NanHaiShu executes additional Jscript code on the victim's machine. ;; POWERSTATS can use JavaScript code for execution. ;; Sidewinder has used JavaScript to drop and execute malware loaders. ;; Silence has used JS scripts. ;; TA505 has used JavaScript for code execution. ;; Turla has used various JavaScript-based backdoors. ;; Valak can execute JavaScript containing configuration data for establishing persistence. | 1 | accept | T1059.007 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Javascript |
Silent Librarian has cloned victim organization login pages and staged them for later use in credential harvesting campaigns. Silent Librarian has also made use of a variety of URL shorteners for these staged websites. | 1 | accept | T1608.005 | Stage Capabilities: Link Target |
The attackers prepared over 39,000 phishing pages mimicking the four platforms' login pages.
| 1 | accept | T1608.005 | Stage Capabilities: Link Target |
They used Ngrok’s paid option to acquire customized phishing URLs displaying Meta’s trademarks (such as hxxp://facebook[.]in[.]ngrok[.]io/).
| 1 | accept | T1608.005 | Stage Capabilities: Link Target |
Prior to the attack, they registered typosquatted domains, set up phishing pages and employed URL shortener service.
| 1 | accept | T1608.005 | Stage Capabilities: Link Target |
The attacker placed archived malicious Office Documents at the link target. | 1 | accept | T1608.005 | Stage Capabilities: Link Target |
APT32 has stood up websites containing numerous articles and content scraped from the Internet to make them appear legitimate but some of these pages include malicious JavaScript to profile the potential victim or infect them via a fake software update. | 1 | accept | T1608.004 | Stage Capabilities: Drive |
Threat Group-3390 has embedded malicious code into websites to screen a potential victim's IP address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest. | 1 | accept | T1608.004 | Stage Capabilities: Drive |
The attackers prepared an malvertizing: an ad combined of image and a JavaScript, which contained malicious code, and pushed it to legitimate websites via ad networks.
| 1 | accept | T1608.004 | Stage Capabilities: Drive |
Second stage of the Magecart attack included injecting malicious Javascript on the vulnerable checkout pages.
| 1 | accept | T1608.004 | Stage Capabilities: Drive |
This APT group was looking to compromise industry’s online publications to prepare for watering whole attacks. | 1 | accept | T1608.004 | Stage Capabilities: Drive |
Adversaries created self-signed certificates and installed them on their web servers.
| 1 | accept | T1608.003 | Stage Capabilities: Install Digital Certificate |
Attackers installed Let’s Encrypt certificates on their phishing servers to gain additional trust from the visitors.
| 1 | accept | T1608.003 | Stage Capabilities: Install Digital Certificate |
They prepare phishing pages with valid SSL/TLS certificates installed.
| 1 | accept | T1608.003 | Stage Capabilities: Install Digital Certificate |
According to PhishLabs, in the last quarter of 2019, 74% of reported phishing websites were 'secure,' being both HTTPS and with the lock symbol, meaning cybercriminals installed SSL certificates and circumvented so-called verification processes.
| 1 | accept | T1608.003 | Stage Capabilities: Install Digital Certificate |
Actors installed SSL certificates they made using OpenSSL (where you can even be your own Certificate Authority). | 1 | accept | T1608.003 | Stage Capabilities: Install Digital Certificate |
Threat Group-3390 has staged tools including gsecdump and WCE on previously compromised websites. | 1 | accept | T1608.002 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool |
Prior to the attack, the adversaries uploaded remote administration tools to compromised websites they controlled.
| 1 | accept | T1608.002 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool |
Threat actor placed several double-purpose tools on his GitHub repository.
| 1 | accept | T1608.002 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool |
The attackers uploaded Remote Utilities RAT tool to a third-party compromised website to be used if the victim environment won’t have a remote administration tool installed.
| 1 | accept | T1608.002 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool |
FIN5 staged a customized version of PsExec. | 1 | accept | T1608.002 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool |
APT32 has hosted malicious payloads in Dropbox Amazon S3 and Google Drive for use during targeting. | 1 | accept | T1608.001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
They were posting obfuscated malicious payloads on Pastebin to be used later during the attack.
| 1 | accept | T1608.001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
Some of the compromised websites were used to stage post-compromise malware such as keyloggers.
| 1 | accept | T1608.001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
These government hackers staged malicious Java scripts on the Microsoft typosquatted domains they registered earlier.
| 1 | accept | T1608.001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
Gamaredon stage malicious VBA scripts on various compromised websites. | 1 | accept | T1608.001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware |
APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads such as Winnti RAT. | 1 | accept | T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Search Order Hijacking |
Astaroth can launch itself via DLL Search Order Hijacking. | 1 | accept | T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Search Order Hijacking |
BOOSTWRITE has exploited the loading of the legitimate Dwrite.dll file by actually loading the gdi library which then loads the gdiplus library and ultimately loads the local Dwrite dll. | 1 | accept | T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Search Order Hijacking |
Crutch can persist via DLL search order hijacking on Google Chrome Mozilla Firefox or Microsoft OneDrive. | 1 | accept | T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Search Order Hijacking |
Downdelph uses search order hijacking of the Windows executable sysprep.exe to escalate privileges. | 1 | accept | T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Search Order Hijacking |
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit various DLL hijacking opportunities. | 1 | accept | T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Search Order Hijacking |
Evilnum has used the malware variant TerraTV to load a malicious DLL placed in the TeamViewer directory instead of the original Windows DLL located in a system folder. | 1 | accept | T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Search Order Hijacking |
A FinFisher variant uses DLL search order hijacking. ;; Hikit has used DLL Search Order Hijacking to load oci.dll as a persistence mechanism. ;; HTTPBrowser abuses the Windows DLL load order by using a legitimate Symantec anti-virus binary VPDN_LU.exe to load a malicious DLL that mimics a legitimate Symantec DLL navlu.dll. ;; InvisiMole can be launched by using DLL search order hijacking in which the wrapper DLL is placed in the same folder as explorer.exe and loaded during startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library. ;; Melcoz can use DLL hijacking to bypass security controls. ;; menuPass has used DLL search order hijacking. ;; MirageFox is likely loaded via DLL hijacking into a legitimate McAfee binary. ;; PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit DLL hijacking opportunities in services and processes. ;; Prikormka uses DLL search order hijacking for persistence by saving itself as ntshrui.dll to the Windows directory so it will load before the legitimate ntshrui.dll saved in the System32 subdirectory. ;; Ramsay can hijack outdated Windows application dependencies with malicious versions of its own DLL payload. ;; RedLeaves is launched through use of DLL search order hijacking to load a malicious dll. ;; RTM has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL. ;; Threat Group-3390 has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload. ;; Variants of WEBC2 achieve persistence by using DLL search order hijacking usually by copying the DLL file to %SYSTEMROOT% (C:\WINDOWS\ntshrui.dll). ;; Whitefly has used search order hijacking to run the loader Vcrodat. | 1 | accept | T1574.001 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Search Order Hijacking |
APT19 launched an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant using a legitimate executable that loaded the malicious DLL. | 1 | accept | T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Side |
APT3 has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools. | 1 | accept | T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Side |
APT32 ran legitimately-signed executables from Symantec and McAfee which load a malicious DLL. The group also side-loads its backdoor by dropping a library and a legitimate signed executable (AcroTranscoder). | 1 | accept | T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Side |
APT41 used legitimate executables to perform DLL side-loading of their malware. | 1 | accept | T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Side |
BADNEWS typically loads its DLL file into a legitimate signed Java or VMware executable. | 1 | accept | T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Side |
DLL side-loading has been used to execute BBSRAT through a legitimate Citrix executable ssonsvr.exe. The Citrix executable was dropped along with BBSRAT by the dropper. | 1 | accept | T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Side |
BlackTech has used DLL side loading by giving DLLs hardcoded names and placing them in searched directories. | 1 | accept | T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Side |
BRONZE BUTLER has used legitimate applications to side-load malicious DLLs. ;; Chimera has used side loading to place malicious DLLs in memory. ;; Denis exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code. ;; Egregor has used DLL side-loading to execute its payload. ;; FinFisher uses DLL side-loading to load malicious programs. ;; GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine. ;; A gh0st RAT variant has used DLL side-loading. ;; Goopy has the ability to side-load malicious DLLs with legitimate applications from Kaspersky Microsoft and Google. ;; Higaisa’s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the OINFO12.OCX dynamic link library. ;; HTTPBrowser has used DLL side-loading. ;; HyperBro has used a legitimate application to sideload a DLL to decrypt decompress and run a payload. ;; Javali can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs into legitimate executables. ;; LookBack side loads its communications module as a DLL into the libcurl.dll loader. ;; menuPass has used DLL side-loading to launch versions of Mimikatz and PwDump6 as well as UPPERCUT. ;; Metamorfo has side-loaded its malicious DLL file. ;; Mustang Panda has used a legitimately signed executable to execute a malicious payload within a DLL file. ;; Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables. ;; OwaAuth has been loaded onto Exchange servers and disguised as an ISAPI filter (DLL file). The IIS w3wp.exe process then loads the malicious DLL. ;; A Patchwork .dll that contains BADNEWS is loaded and executed using DLL side-loading. ;; PlugX has used DLL side-loading to evade anti-virus. ;; Sakula uses DLL side-loading typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files. ;; Sidewinder has used DLL side-loading to drop and execute malicious payloads including the hijacking of the legitimate Windows application file rekeywiz.exe. ;; During the T9000 installation process it drops a copy of the legitimate Microsoft binary igfxtray.exe. The executable contains a side-loading weakness which is used to load a portion of the malware. ;; Threat Group-3390 has used DLL side-loading including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants in which the DLL acts as a stub loader that loads and executes the shell code. ;; Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools. ;; Waterbear has used DLL side loading to import and load a malicious DLL loader. ;; Wingbird side loads a malicious file sspisrv.dll in part of a spoofed lssas.exe service. ;; ZeroT has used DLL side-loading to load malicious payloads. | 1 | accept | T1574.002 | Hijack Execution Flow: Dll Side |
APT39 has used malware to turn off the RequireSigned feature which ensures only signed DLLs can be run on Windows. | 1 | accept | T1553.006 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification |
BlackEnergy has enabled the TESTSIGNING boot configuration option to facilitate loading of a driver component. | 1 | accept | T1553.006 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification |
Hikit has attempted to disable driver signing verification by tampering with several Registry keys prior to the loading of a rootkit driver component. | 1 | accept | T1553.006 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification |
Turla has modified variables in kernel memory to turn off Driver Signature Enforcement after exploiting vulnerabilities that obtained kernel mode privileges. | 1 | accept | T1553.006 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification |
ESPecter patches Windows kernel function SepInitializeCodeIntegrity directly in memory to disable Driver Signature Enforcement (DSE). | 1 | accept | T1553.006 | Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing Policy Modification |
APT38 has prepended a space to all of their terminal commands to operate without leaving traces in the HISTCONTROL environment.
| 1 | accept | T1562.003 | Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging |
Attackers set SaveNothing option for PSReadLine to turn off logging PowerShell command history.
| 1 | accept | T1562.003 | Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging |
Threat actors set the command history size to zero (export HISTFILESIZE=0) to prevent logging of commands.
| 1 | accept | T1562.003 | Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging |
Prior to executing PowerShell commands, attackers meddled with PSReadLine module to disable logging.
| 1 | accept | T1562.003 | Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging |
After getting the initial access to the Windows Server, hackers changed PSReadLine logging destination to confuse incident responders. | 1 | accept | T1562.003 | Impair Defenses: Impair Command History Logging |
APT-C-36 has disguised its scheduled tasks as those used by Google. | 1 | accept | T1036.004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task Or Service |
APT29 named tasks \Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCacheManager in order to appear legitimate. | 1 | accept | T1036.004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task Or Service |
APT32 has used hidden or non-printing characters to help masquerade service names such as appending a Unicode no-break space character to a legitimate service name. APT32 has also impersonated the legitimate Flash installer file name install_flashplayer.exe". | 1 | accept | T1036.004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task Or Service |
Attor's dispatcher disguises itself as a legitimate task (i.e. the task name and description appear legitimate). | 1 | accept | T1036.004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task Or Service |
Bazar can create a task named to appear benign. | 1 | accept | T1036.004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task Or Service |
build_downer has added itself to the Registry Run key as "NVIDIA" to appear legitimate. | 1 | accept | T1036.004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task Or Service |
Carbanak has copied legitimate service names to use for malicious services. | 1 | accept | T1036.004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task Or Service |
Catchamas adds a new service named NetAdapter in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service. ;; ComRAT has used a task name associated with Windows SQM Consolidator. ;; Crutch has established persistence with a scheduled task impersonating the Outlook item finder. ;; CSPY Downloader has attempted to appear as a legitimate Windows service with a fake description claiming it is used to support packed applications. ;; Egregor has masqueraded the svchost.exe process to exfiltrate data. ;; The Exaramel for Windows dropper creates and starts a Windows service named wsmprovav with the description “Windows Check AV” in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service. ;; FIN6 has renamed the "psexec" service name to "mstdc" to masquerade as a legitimate Windows service. ;; FIN7 has created a scheduled task named “AdobeFlashSync” to establish persistence. ;; Fox Kitten has named the task for a reverse proxy lpupdate to appear legitimate. ;; Fysbis has masqueraded as the rsyncd and dbus-inotifier services. ;; GoldMax has impersonated systems management software to avoid detection. ;; Higaisa named a shellcode loader binary svchast.exe to spoof the legitimate svchost.exe. ;; InnaputRAT variants have attempted to appear legitimate by adding a new service named OfficeUpdateService. ;; InvisiMole has attempted to disguise itself by registering under a seemingly legitimate service name. ;; IronNetInjector has been disguised as a legitimate service using the name PythonUpdateSrvc. ;; Kimsuky has disguised services to appear as benign software or related to operating system functions. ;; Kwampirs establishes persistence by adding a new service with the display name "WMI Performance Adapter Extension" in an attempt to masquerade as a legitimate WMI service. ;; A Lazarus Group custom backdoor implant included a custom PE loader named "Security Package" that was added into the lsass.exe process via registry key. ;; Machete renamed task names to masquerade as legitimate Google Chrome Java Dropbox Adobe Reader and Python tasks. ;; Maze operators have created scheduled tasks masquerading as "Windows Update Security" "Windows Update Security Patches" and "Google Chrome Security Update" designed to launch the ransomware. ;; Nidiran can create a new service named msamger (Microsoft Security Accounts Manager) which mimics the legitimate Microsoft database by the same name. ;; Okrum can establish persistence by adding a new service NtmsSvc with the display name Removable Storage to masquerade as a legitimate Removable Storage Manager. ;; OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D has disguised its app bundle by adding special characters to the filename and using the icon for legitimate Word documents. ;; In one instance menuPass added PlugX as a service with a display name of "Corel Writing Tools Utility." ;; POWERSTATS has created a scheduled task named "MicrosoftEdge" to establish persistence. ;; PROMETHIUM has named services to appear legitimate. ;; New services created by RawPOS are made to appear like legitimate Windows services with names such as "Windows Management Help Service" "Microsoft Support" and "Windows Advanced Task Manager". ;; RDAT has used Windows Video Service as a name for malicious services. ;; RTM has named the scheduled task it creates "Windows Update". ;; Seasalt has masqueraded as a service called "SaSaut" with a display name of "System Authorization Service" in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate service. ;; Shamoon creates a new service named “ntssrv” that attempts to appear legitimate; the service's display name is “Microsoft Network Realtime Inspection Service” and its description is “Helps guard against time change attempts targeting known and newly discovered vulnerabilities in network time protocols.” Newer versions create the "MaintenaceSrv" service which misspells the word "maintenance." ;; ShimRat can impersonate Windows services and antivirus products to avoid detection on compromised systems. ;; SLOTHFULMEDIA has named a service it establishes on victim machines as "TaskFrame" to hide its malicious purpose. ;; StrongPity has named services to appear legitimate. ;; To establish persistence Truvasys adds a Registry Run key with a value "TaskMgr" in an attempt to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Task Manager. ;; UNC2452 named tasks \Microsoft\Windows\SoftwareProtectionPlatform\EventCacheManager in order to appear legitimate. ;; Some Volgmer variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application Background Security and Windows presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service. ;; Wizard Spider has used scheduled tasks to install TrickBot using task names to appear legitimate such as WinDotNet GoogleTask or Sysnetsf. It has also used common document file names for other malware binaries. ;; ZIRCONIUM has created a run key named Dropbox Update Setup to mask a persistence mechanism for a malicious binary." | 1 | accept | T1036.004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task Or Service |
APT29 leveraged privileged accounts to replicate directory service data with domain controllers. | 1 | accept | T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: Dcsync |
Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways including from DCSync/NetSync. | 1 | accept | T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: Dcsync |
Operation Wocao has used Mimikatz's DCSync to dump credentials from the memory of the targeted system. | 1 | accept | T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: Dcsync |
UNC2452 leveraged privileged accounts to replicate directory service data with domain controllers. | 1 | accept | T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: Dcsync |
The attacker discovered domain controllers (DCs) and submitted a replication request. This prompted the primary DC to replicate the credentials of other DCs back to the compromised domain administrator, using the Directory Replication Service (DRS) remote protocol. | 1 | accept | T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: Dcsync |
APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials. | 1 | accept | T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: Lsa Secrets |
CosmicDuke collects LSA secrets. | 1 | accept | T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: Lsa Secrets |
CrackMapExec can dump hashed passwords from LSA secrets for the targeted system. | 1 | accept | T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: Lsa Secrets |
Dragonfly 2.0 dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes. | 1 | accept | T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: Lsa Secrets |
gsecdump can dump LSA secrets. | 1 | accept | T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: Lsa Secrets |
SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information. | 1 | accept | T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: Lsa Secrets |
Ke3chang has dumped credentials including by using gsecdump. | 1 | accept | T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: Lsa Secrets |
LaZagne can perform credential dumping from LSA secrets to obtain account and password information. ;; Leafminer used several tools for retrieving login and password information including LaZagne. ;; menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials. ;; Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways including from the LSA. ;; MuddyWater has performed credential dumping with LaZagne. ;; OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access. ;; Pupy can use Lazagne for harvesting credentials. ;; Threat Group-3390 actors have used gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers. | 1 | accept | T1003.004 | OS Credential Dumping: Lsa Secrets |
APT28 has used a brute-force/password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in brute-force mode it typically sent over 300 authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several hours or days. | 1 | accept | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
China Chopper's server component can perform brute force password guessing against authentication portals. | 1 | accept | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
CrackMapExec can brute force passwords for a specified user on a single target system or across an entire network. | 1 | accept | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
Emotet has been observed using a hard coded list of passwords to brute force user accounts. | 1 | accept | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
Lucifer has attempted to brute force TCP ports 135 (RPC) and 1433 (MSSQL) with the default username or list of usernames and passwords. | 1 | accept | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
P.A.S. Webshell can use predefined users and passwords to execute brute force attacks against SSH FTP POP3 MySQL MSSQL and PostgreSQL services. | 1 | accept | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
Pony has used a small dictionary of common passwords against a collected list of local accounts. | 1 | accept | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
SpeakUp can perform brute forcing using a pre-defined list of usernames and passwords in an attempt to log in to administrative panels. ;; Xbash can obtain a list of weak passwords from the C2 server to use for brute forcing as well as attempt to brute force services with open ports. | 1 | accept | T1110.001 | Brute Force: Password Guessing |
Cleaver has used custom tools to facilitate ARP cache poisoning. | 1 | accept | T1557.002 | Man |
Iran’s cyber hacking skills have evolved to include customized private tools with ARP poisoning function.
| 1 | accept | T1557.002 | Man |
Alireza’s C++ tools include the following techniques:
• ARP poisoning
| 1 | accept | T1557.002 | Man |
Jasus is an ARP cache poisoner developed by the Operation Cleaver team.
| 1 | accept | T1557.002 | Man |