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t1071 | application layer protocol | null | analyze network data for uncommon data flows e |
t1071 | application layer protocol | null | analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol standards regarding syntax structure or any other variable adversaries could leverage to conceal data |
t1071 | application layer protocol | null | citation university of birmingham c2 |
t1071 | application layer protocol | null | commands to the remote system and often the results of those commands will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server |
t1071 | application layer protocol | null | network traffic network traffic flow network traffic network traffic content |
t1071 | application layer protocol | null | processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | a system not typically used to push software to clients that suddenly is used for such a task outside of a known admin function may be suspicious |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | adversaries may gain access to and use third party software suites installed within an enterprise network such as administration monitoring and deployment systems to move laterally through the network |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | analyze the process execution trees historical activities from the third party application such as what types of files are usually pushed and the resulting activities or events from the filebinaryscript pushed to systems |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | application log application log content process process creation |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | audit software deployment logs and look for suspicious or unauthorized activity |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | detection methods will vary depending on the type of third party software or system and how it is typically used |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | ensure that third party application logs are on boarded to the enterprise logging system and the logs are regularly reviewed |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | monitor account login activity on the deployment system |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | monitor account login activity on these applications to detect suspiciousabnormal usage |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | often these third party applications will have logs of their own that can be collected and correlated with other data from the environment |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | the same investigation process can be applied here as with other potentially malicious activities where the distribution vector is initially unknown but the resulting activity follows a discernible pattern |
t1072 | software deployment tools | null | third party applications and software deployment systems may be in use in the network environment for administration purposes e |
t1074 | data staged | null | to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging |
t1074 | data staged | null | adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to exfiltration |
t1074 | data staged | null | data may also be acquired and staged through windows system management tools such as windows management instrumentationt1047 and powershellt1059 |
t1074 | data staged | null | data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as archive collected datat1560 |
t1074 | data staged | null | file file access file file creation command command execution |
t1074 | data staged | null | monitor processes and command line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files |
t1074 | data staged | null | monitor publicly writable directories central locations and commonly used staging directories recycle bin temp folders etc |
t1074 | data staged | null | processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files such as 7zip rar zip or zlib |
t1074 | data staged | null | remote access tools with built in features may interact directly with the windows api to gather and copy to a location |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have vpn access |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining initial access persistence privilege escalation or defense evasion |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as guest have been activated |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | citation technet audit policy look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts either user admin or service accounts |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services such as vpns outlook web access and remote desktop |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | configure robust consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | correlate other security systems with login information e |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | examples one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | logon session logon session metadata user account user account authentication logon session logon session creation |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence |
t1078 | valid accounts | null | these audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or ssh keys and if any are discovered they should be updated immediately |
t1080 | taint shared content | null | adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations such as network drives or internal code repositories |
t1080 | taint shared content | null | content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs scripts or exploit code to otherwise valid files |
t1080 | taint shared content | null | frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files hidden files |
t1080 | taint shared content | null | lnk files and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content |
t1080 | taint shared content | null | monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to command and control and possible network discovery techniques |
t1080 | taint shared content | null | process process creation file file creation file file modification network share network share access |
t1080 | taint shared content | null | processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | adversaries may use the information from system information discoveryt1082 during automated discovery to shape follow on behaviors including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target andor attempts specific actions |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | an adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware including version patches hotfixes service packs and architecture |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | depending on how the environment is used that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | in cloud based systems native logging can be used to identify access to certain apis and dashboards that may contain system information |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | information may also be acquired through windows system management tools such as windows management instrumentationt1047 and powershellt1059 |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | instance instance metadata process process creation command command execution process os api execution |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | monitor processes and command line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | remote access tools with built in features may interact directly with the windows api to gather information |
t1082 | system information discovery | null | system and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment |
t1083 | file and directory discovery | null | adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system |
t1083 | file and directory discovery | null | adversaries may use the information from file and directory discoveryt1083 during automated discovery to shape follow on behaviors including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target andor attempts specific actions |
t1083 | file and directory discovery | null | data and events should not be viewed in isolation but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as collection and exfiltration based on the information obtained |
t1083 | file and directory discovery | null | information may also be acquired through windows system management tools such as windows management instrumentationt1047 and powershellt1059 |
t1083 | file and directory discovery | null | monitor processes and command line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information |
t1083 | file and directory discovery | null | process process creation command command execution process os api execution |
t1083 | file and directory discovery | null | remote access tools with built in features may interact directly with the windows api to gather information |
t1083 | file and directory discovery | null | system and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment |
t1104 | multi stage channels | null | adversaries may create multiple stages for command and control that are employed under different conditions or for certain functions |
t1104 | multi stage channels | null | host data that can relate unknown or suspicious process activity using a network connection is important to supplement any existing indicators of compromise based on malware command and control signatures and infrastructure |
t1104 | multi stage channels | null | network traffic network traffic flow network traffic network connection creation |
t1104 | multi stage channels | null | relating subsequent actions that may result from discovery of the system and network information or lateral movement to the originating process may also yield useful data |
t1104 | multi stage channels | null | use of multiple stages may obfuscate the command and control channel to make detection more difficult |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | adversaries may transfer tools or other files from an external system into a compromised environment |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | analyze network data for uncommon data flows e |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | citation university of birmingham c2 |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | files may be copied from an external adversary controlled system through the command and control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as ftp |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | monitor for file creation and files transferred into the network |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | network traffic network traffic flow network traffic network connection creation network traffic network traffic content file file creation |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | unusual processes with external network connections creating files on system may be suspicious |
t1105 | ingress tool transfer | null | use of utilities such as ftp that does not normally occur may also be suspicious |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | apt28 has used a brute-force password-spray tooling that operated in two modes: in brute-force mode it typically sent over 300 authentication attempts per hour per targeted account over the course of several hours or days. |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | china chopper's server component can perform brute force password guessing against authentication portals. |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | crackmapexec can brute force passwords for a specified user on a single target system or across an entire network. |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | emotet has been observed using a hard coded list of passwords to brute force user accounts. |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | lucifer has attempted to brute force tcp ports 135 rpc and 1433 mssql with the default username or list of usernames and passwords. |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | p.a.s. webshell can use predefined users and passwords to execute brute force attacks against ssh ftp pop3 mysql mssql and postgresql services. |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | pony has used a small dictionary of common passwords against a collected list of local accounts. |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | speakup can perform brute forcing using a predefined list of usernames and passwords in an attempt to log in to administrative panels. |
t1110.001 | brute force | password Technique guessing | xbash can obtain a list of weak passwords from the c2 server to use for brute forcing as well as attempt to brute force services with open ports. |
t1125 | video capture | null | an adversary can leverage a computers peripheral devices e |
t1125 | video capture | null | behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing apis associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera recording devices or recording software and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data |
t1125 | video capture | null | detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various apis that may be used |
t1125 | video capture | null | process os api execution command command execution |
t1125 | video capture | null | telemetry data regarding api use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system |
t1127 | trusted developer utilities proxy execution | null | adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads |
t1127 | trusted developer utilities proxy execution | null | command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed |
t1127 | trusted developer utilities proxy execution | null | compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity |
t1127 | trusted developer utilities proxy execution | null | it is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks so if it exists and is used outside of that context then the event may be suspicious |
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