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Respondents ignore that Oncor asserts the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (“UDJA”) as an alternate theory of jurisdiction not to correct the Wilbarger County appraisal roll, but only to determine the validity and scope of the 2019 settlement agreement under Tax Code section 1.111(e). Oncor made this clear in its initial brief. See Oncor’s Brief at 42-44. | Party Submissions | 9.363519 | 11.534264 | 10.795527 |
Dr. Castillo has never criticized Dr. Tappan’s expertise as an obstetrician-gynecologist or his qualifications to offer opinions about obstetrical standards of care. The Walkers are right in urging Dr. Tappan has significant experience managing labor and delivery, treatment of pregnant women, and treatment necessary for non-reassuring fetal heart rate patterns, among other things. (Pet. Br. at 41). | Party Submissions | 10.982663 | 11.101009 | 12.473818 |
Galovelho pled two types of regulatory takings claims against the appellees: a categorical taking pursuant to Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 and a traditional taking pursuant to Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. | Party Submissions | 6.449396 | 7.81089 | 7.253499 |
To direct the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to conduct a review of the criteria for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of certain mitigation projects, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.785509 | 4.173949 | 5.125155 |
The Walkers also overstate the Amarillo Court’s reliance on this Court’s decision in Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson, 649 S.W.3d 152 (Tex. 2022). The Court of Appeals cited Thompson twice, once for the same proposition found in Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. 2010)—that expert reports must explain how and why claimed departures from the standard of care caused an injury—and once for the elements of proximate cause. See Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *3, *5. That is not novel or inappropriate or divergent. | Party Submissions | 8.044337 | 8.041902 | 8.637555 |
Texas Bar No. 01323555 [email protected] 218 Beimer St. Taos, New Mexico 87571 575-751-4818 Voice Attorneys for Mills County ARB This computer-generated document complies with the word-count limitations set forth in TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i) because it contains 4244 words, excluding the parts of this document exempted by TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1). In making this certification, I have relied on the word-count program contained within Microsoft Word. | Party Submissions | 6.57608 | 7.493423 | 9.61794 |
And as this diagram illustrates, those two spheres of authority do not overlap. Indeed, to reinforce the boundary between those two spheres, Section 31.004(a) and Section 24.008 prohibit the issues related to the award of immediate possession adjudicated in the inferior justice of the peace court from having any effect whatsoever on the different issues reserved to the district court. | Party Submissions | 14.214408 | 12.980834 | 17.499 |
Nor is the Tribunal persuaded that the conduct of the Claimant or its counsel in the present arbitration constitutes an exceptional circumstance justifying an order for security for costs. | Legal Decisions | 8.523356 | 9.261231 | 11.559511 |
HN12 [ ] A writ of mandamus will issue when a trial court does not abate [*22] a tort suit while a suit for judicial review of a DWC decision is pending. See Louisiana-Pac., 112 S.W.3d at 189-90 (affording mandamus relief where trial court failed to abate tort litigation while suit for judicial review of Workers' Compensation Commission decision remained pending). As already explained, the suit for judicial review is still pending before a Travis County district court. There has been no final resolution of the issues presented in that suit. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by lifting the stay on litigation of the tort suit while the suit for judicial review was still pending. And Texas Mutual and Hellas have no adequate remedy by appeal. See id. at 190. Thus, Hellas has shown its entitlement to the writ of mandamus. | Party Submissions | 5.979556 | 6.665634 | 6.867562 |
To enhance the Federal Government’s planning and preparation for extreme weather and the Federal Government’s dissemination of best practices to respond to extreme weather, thereby increasing resilience, improving regional coordination, and mitigating the financial risk to the Federal Government from such extreme weather, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 8.732777 | 8.195639 | 10.245343 |
In Del Lago, this Court also rejected the argument that an owner has no duty to warn or protect the patrons where a danger is “known or obvious.” Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 774. As this Court explained, this theory has an exception where “the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A (1965)). Del Lago’s duty arose because it “had reason to expect harm notwithstanding Smith’s awareness of the risk.” Id. | Party Submissions | 6.059744 | 6.356296 | 6.966735 |
BSA disagrees with the Walkers’ statement of jurisdiction. There is no reason for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over the petition. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.001(a). The court of appeals used the basic causation principles applicable to Chapter 74 preliminary expert report cases in determining that the expert reports had multiple fatal flaws. This case is no different from a plethora of other expert report cases. The Walkers merely advocate for a more favorable view of their expert reports, but the court of appeals correctly applied the law to the facts of this case. The petition presents no error of law important to this state’s jurisprudence. | Party Submissions | 9.100117 | 9.552572 | 9.614403 |
To amend title 18, United States Code, to revise recidivist penalty provisions for child sexual exploitation offenses to uniformly account for prior military convictions, thereby ensuring parity among Federal, State, and military convictions, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 6.203044 | 6.18573 | 6.300197 |
Order No. 1 that the Tribunal had requested they give further consideration. 31. On February 13, 2020, the Parties submitted further comments on the procedural calendar. | Legal Decisions | 14.393435 | 15.514285 | 19.438068 |
Kemp ’s true holding is far narrower and has nothing to do with any categorical rule that a tenant’s compliance with the result in a forcible entry and detainer proceeding categorically bars the tenant from pursuing a claim for damages in district court. As Respondents eventually admit (Resp. 34), Kemp turned on whether a particular tenant had offered sufficient evidence to satisfy the elements of a constructive-eviction claim that simply happened to arise after the tenant dismissed an appeal of a forcible entry and detainer order and left the premises, 2020 WL 205313, at *1. And while some of the facts in Kemp therefore bear some superficial resemblance to the facts of this case, the dispositive facts are nonetheless very different. | Party Submissions | 9.370942 | 10.48947 | 11.252418 |
In sum, the paraphrased instruction on which the court of appeals reversed amounted to harmful error. The court of appeals properly reversed on this basis. | Party Submissions | 12.27583 | 15.258191 | 15.759268 |
The majority's rule also prevents courts from crafting case-specific solutions to balance all the interests at stake. Under the traditional discretionary-stay rule, for instance, a judge could allow the parties to conduct only the forms of discovery that would also be permitted in arbitration. That would save time and leave nobody worse off even if, as the majority fears, the dispute ultimately heads to arbitration. But this kind of equitable resolution, which the court and the parties might consider “sensible,” ante, at 1921, is forbidden under **1930 the majority's mandatory-general-stay rule. | Party Submissions | 13.178602 | 14.842544 | 15.547099 |
And in another case the Court considered whether a longstanding legal concept — the unlawful acts doctrine — was a proper affirmative defense that would bar the deceased plaintiff’s recovery because he ingested illegal drugs partly causing his death. See Dugger v. Arredondo, 408 S.w.3d 825, 829-36 (Tex. 2013). The doctrine “barr[ed] a plaintiff from recovering damages if it could be shown that, at the time of the injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act that contributed to the injury” and was “based on public 27 policy that wrongdoers should not be compensated for their immoral acts.” Id. at 829. In deciding the issue, the Court considered Chapter 33 and several other relevant statutes. Id. at 829-36. Chapter 33, it concluded, controlled over the wrongful acts doctrine. | Party Submissions | 7.028657 | 7.203207 | 7.29791 |
Policy Considerations Favor Collateral Estoppel/Issue Preclusion in this Case Relying on Restatement Section 29(7) in this case would extend it beyond its purpose, i.e., so that collateral estoppel not “inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration of the legal rule” upon which an issue of law was previously decided. The only Texas case we have found that applied Section 29(7) did so to avoid the federal Eighth Circuit’s decision from preventing a Texas court deciding the validity of certain workers’ compensation policies. See Tankersley v. Durish, 855 S.W.2d 241, 245–46 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ denied). That policy goal is not at issue here. In Hooks, Samson had every opportunity to litigate the same question and did raise it to this Court, but its petition was denied. | Party Submissions | 9.429806 | 9.674687 | 10.422195 |
Respondents fare even worse in trying to distinguish Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. 2013). Respondents’ focus on statements from Coinmach that have no bearing on this case—such as that a tenant who “defeats an eviction suit can still be liable for trespass” (Resp. 40)—cannot change Coinmach ’s holding that a tenant who loses a forcible entry and detainer action and gets evicted can still seek damages for wrongful eviction in district court. Respondents are forced to admit, (id.), that Coinmach properly drew support for that holding from Johnson v. Highland Hills Drive Apartments, 552 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.), which had previously adopted the same rule. See Coinmach, 417 S.W.3d at 919. Respondents are also forced to admit that this rule has been followed in numerous other cases. (Resp. 41) And because that is the rule, Respondents cannot explain how the court of appeals’ decision can survive. | Party Submissions | 5.089778 | 5.712814 | 5.5452 |
Historically, it has not been entirely obvious that the crab, including the snow crab, is considered a sedentary species according to the Convention on the Law of the Sea Article 77 (4). The content of the provision was little discussed during the Conference on the Law of the Sea, other than that a proposal from several states (including Norway) during the 1958 conference that crustaceans and swimming species should not be included was the subject of discussion and was finally voted down in plenum. There have been several conflicts related to the interpretation of the provision (mainly in the 60s), i.a. related to the king crab between resp. Japan and the United States and the Soviet Union and the United States. The United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement in 1964 which meant that the king crab was considered a “ natural resource of the continental shelf”, but the Soviet Union was allowed to fish for king crab on more specific terms. Although it seems relatively open for a period whether the crab is to be regarded as a sedentary species, recent literature seems quite unambiguous by assuming that the crab is to be regarded as a sedentary species that follows shelf jurisdiction. | Legal Decisions | 10.696179 | 10.671546 | 10.421636 |
Oncor cites to Matagorda Cty. Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, 165 S.W.3d 29 (Tex. 2005) for the proposition that this Court has held that settlement agreements are merits defenses and not jurisdictional. The proposition is undiscernible from the words of the case. | Party Submissions | 8.169733 | 10.109459 | 9.403601 |
The court of appeals’ decision exceeds the origin and intended purpose of the judicial-proceeding privilege and is contrary to this Court’s recent explanation and application of the privilege. The privilege began with the holding that “[c]ommunications in the due course of a judicial proceeding will not serve as the basis of a civil action for libel or slander, regardless of the negligence or malice with which they are made.” James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam); see also Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex. 1994). This Court explained that “[t]he rule is one of public policy ... founded on the theory that the good it accomplishes in protecting the rights of the general public outweighs any wrong or injury which may result to a particular individual.” Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co ., 166 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Tex. 1942). Because the “proper administration of justice” requires “full and free disclosure of information by participants in judicial proceedings,” the judicial proceedings privilege covers “any statement made by the judge, jurors, counsel, parties or witnesses, and attaches to all aspects of the proceedings, including statements made in open court, pre-trial hearings, depositions, affidavits and any of the pleadings or other papers in the case.” Landry’s, Inc. v. Animal Legal Def. Fund, 631 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tex. 2021) (citations omitted). | Party Submissions | 4.770014 | 5.050509 | 4.835289 |
MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant, Patricia A. Grant, acting pro se, appeals from a final judgment partitioning real property in Fayette County and from an order requiring payment of court costs. 1 We affirm both decisions. | Party Submissions | 7.343418 | 8.217943 | 9.555355 |
The most current abatement of Sonic's contract claims began approximately twenty-nine months ago, on October 23, 2003, based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. And, should [**34] Sonic pursue an appeal of our ruling in the judicial review case, its ability to pursue the contract [*482] claims will be further delayed, rendering it impossible to determine when abatement will end. Sonic is faced with a difficult choice. However, at this point in the proceedings, the issues to be finally determined in the judicial review case are not determinative of Sonic's contract claims, and continued abatement of the contract claims does not serve concerns raised in Fodge or Tyler. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's October 23, 2003 orders of abatement are an abuse of discretion. See Gebhardt, 891 S.W.2d at 329-30. It remains whether Sonic has shown that it lacks an adequate remedy by appeal should the contract claims remain abated. terms of the insurance policy indicated TMI was required to reimburse Sonic under the circumstances, but stated "[i]n any case, the hearings system of the Commission is not a general court of law with the jurisdiction to adjudicate contract liability." 20 Should Sonic choose to pursue reimbursement of the voluntary payments through its contract claims, because discovery has been conducted on the reimbursement issue, continued abatement does not serve the interests of judicial economy. Sonic argues it has no adequate remedy by appeal because the Alabama judgment has adverse consequences on its ability to operate. Sonic provided an affidavit stating it has lost three prospective buyers due to the adverse judgment, and it is losing profits because it cannot purchase needed equipment and training. Sonic contends that these losses will be increased because a final [**35] resolution of the judicial review case can take several more years. TMI argues that lost profits do not equate to an inadequate appellate remedy. | Party Submissions | 9.161236 | 8.687315 | 9.843505 |
The initial demarcation of the infested zone shall be immediately followed by a delimiting survey, with a design and sampling scheme allowing to detect, with a 95 % level of confidence, a 1 % presence of infested plants. | Legislation | 14.707122 | 18.252853 | 16.913912 |
Both principal and interest are payable in the same currency in which the Loan was made to the order of the Borrower at such place as the Borrower shall direct in writing. | Contract | 6.391427 | 9.415932 | 10.421874 |
The Walkers provide an example they believe shows the Court of Appeals’ error: its conclusion that neither expert linked H.W.’s asphyxia event to his stroke. (Pet. Br. at 30-31). They argue that Dr. Tappan set the stage by relating facts that put H.W. at risk for hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy, and stating how H.W.’s condition at birth suggested “suggested the possibility that he in fact suffered such an injury.” (Pet. Br. at 31-32).5 The Walkers further cite to Dr. Tappan’s statement that, if Dr. Castillo had performed an earlier caesarean section, “H.W. would have been born without neurological injury.” (Pet. Br. at 32). Pointing then to Dr. Null’s report, the Walkers say he deductively concluded there could not have been another cause of H.W.’s brain injury and “had [H.W.] been delivered...sooner he would not have suffered the degree of brain injury that he has.” (Pet. Br. at 33). But this discussion still does not address the critical deficiencies identified by the Court of Appeals: neither expert addressed how and why, within reasonable medical probability, Dr. Castillo’s conduct caused the baby’s subacute infarction before birth (or explained how the “asphyxia event” was tied to the subacute infarction), and neither expert addressed foreseeability as to the subacute infarction (except with respect to pushing on the baby’s head, and that explanation also was conclusory). Walker, 2022 WL 17324338 at *5. | Party Submissions | 7.496892 | 7.828312 | 7.756695 |
This case involves questions of law that are important to the jurisprudence of the state of Texas. First, the abuse of discretion standard of review, applicable to family law cases generally, lacks clear definition considering this Court’s recent recitation of the standard in the Bradshaw case. Bradshaw v. Bradshaw, 555 S.W.3d 539, 543 (Tex. 2018). Further, the consideration of circumstantial evidence on a question in the absence of direct evidence when conducting a sufficiency review under the abuse of discretion standard deserves clarification. Lastly, appellate remedies are unclear in the family law context when conducting a sufficiency review under the abuse of discretion standard. | Party Submissions | 6.065184 | 5.675393 | 6.392372 |
I certify that the foregoing Reply Brief on the Merits complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 because it contains 7,414 words and has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, using Microsoft Word via Microsoft Office 365 ProPlus, in 14-point Bookman Old Style font for text and 12-point Bookman Old Style font for footnotes that meets the typeface requirements. | Party Submissions | 4.978227 | 5.897135 | 6.50817 |
Alonzo v. Lampkin involved a malpractice claim against a gynecologic surgeon who purportedly nicked plaintiff’s bowel during a hysterectomy, resulting in myriad alleged cognitive problems and infections. Alonzo v. Lampkin, No. 07-12-00030-CV, 2013 WL 6073431 at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). When the patient sued Dr. Lampkin, she served an expert report from a board-certified obstetrician, who offered his opinions about the cause of plaintiff’s neurological injuries. Id. at *4. | Party Submissions | 4.331919 | 4.437234 | 4.485808 |
The Lawyers objected to the two paragraphs because they were “a redundancy and to the extent they don’t repeat what’s in the statute, then it would be an error of statement of law.” (11RR213) The Lawyers then objected that the language in the paragraphs came from an earlier trial in the case and from the court of appeals opinion that were not applicable. (Id.) Finally they objected that the two paraphrased instructions confused the issues, misled the jury, improperly commented on the weight of the evidence and were unduly prejudicial to Terry. ( Id .) The court of appeals decision. A majority of the panel below concluded that the second non-statutory instruction was improper because it made HSMiller’s “theory of negligence the law of the case,” and it “suggested, if not overtly instructed the jury, that Terry’s reasoning for not designating Flaven earlier in the case was flawed.” Newsom, Terry & Newsom, LLP v. Henry S. Miller Commercial Co., No. 05-20-00379-CV, 2022 WL 3908542, at *8 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 31, 2022, pet. filed). | Party Submissions | 8.981998 | 9.184968 | 9.39156 |
Merely satisfying the procedural steps to secure a lien does not ensure that the secured lien is not fraudulent. If it did, then no person could challenge a “secured” lien created and used in bad faith or a lien filed with the intent to cause financial injury. The two statutes at issue serve vastly different purposes. Section 55.005, titled “Securing Lien,” lists how to procedurally secure a lien. Chapter 12, titled “Liability Related to a Fraudulent Court Record or a Fraudulent Lien or Claim,” explains the liability resulting from the “use” of a lien to cause financial injury. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 12.002(a)(1) (“A person may not make, present, or use ...a fraudulent lien or claim. . .”) (emphasis added). Petitioners maintain that a lien is fraudulent under Chapter 12 when it has been created in bad faith or with dishonesty, a lack of integrity, or moral turpitude. See Nationstar Mortgage, LLC v. Barefoot, 654 S.W.3d 440, 446-47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, pet. denied). | Party Submissions | 5.746656 | 5.593835 | 6.216811 |
The Austin court held that because the guarantor breached the guaranty contract before the termination, the termination did not release the landlord’s claim against it. Id. at *3. “Under settled Texas law, ‘a claim for breach of contract accrues when the contract is breached.’” Id. (quoting Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32, 39 (Tex. 2015)). “And the termination of a contractual obligation does not release the obligor from a prior breach.” Id. (citing cases). Thus, the guarantor was not released from liability under the guaranty agreement. Id. at *4. | Party Submissions | 4.569521 | 4.607903 | 4.739416 |
If the bonus is retrospective, and not guaranteed, a clause apportioning it to the spouses if, when, and as received would cause both spouses to share the risk that no bonus will be received. Where the employee spouse controls the amount of the bonus, the issue of dividing a possible future bonus is more complex. Because a possible future bonus is not possessed by a spouse during marriage, the presumption that property possessed by either spouse upon dissolution of the marriage is community property does not apply. An attorney representing the nonemployee spouse who suspects that the employee spouse may receive a bonus after the divorce should try to have the possible bonus divided in kind in the divorce, or at least avoids the assignment of such an interest to the employee-spouse, leaving open the possibility of a postdivorce partition. | Party Submissions | 10.05643 | 10.924377 | 10.390539 |
In April of 2000, Real Parties in Interest, Maria and Donacino Gaona, Individually and as Representatives of the Estate of Reynaldo Gaona, filed the underlying suit in Harris County against Tyler and the manufacturer and owner of the power sprayer. The Gaonas allege Reynaldo's death was caused by Tyler's negligence. Tyler asserts that the negligence claims are barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act 1 because Reynaldo's death occurred in the course and scope of his employment. 2 See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 408.001 (Vernon 1996). | Party Submissions | 4.604124 | 4.942891 | 5.228197 |
To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to modify provisions relating to assistance by States, and political subdivisions of States, in the enforcement of Federal immigration laws, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 4.607777 | 3.166733 | 4.707557 |
To require the Secretary of Agriculture to convey certain National Forest System land in the Chequamegon-Nicolet National Forest to Tony’s Wabeno Redi-Mix, LLC, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 7.685943 | 7.189338 | 6.88092 |
The Claimant has not established that the requested documents are likely to exist or are otherwise in the Respondent’s posession, custory or control. | Legal Decisions | 13.990562 | 11.401905 | 17.221548 |
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be duly executed on its behalf by an officer thereunto duly authorized and Executive has duly executed this Amendment, effective as of the date and year first written above. | Contract | 2.743127 | 3.395637 | 3.561834 |
Mann timely objected to the affidavit of Pamela McShann 43 for two reasons: 1) Mr. Mann was obviously represented by counsel at the time that Pamela McShann allegedly records a statement to be used against Mann later. Pamela McShann represented Bay' workers' compensation carrier who had already denied coverage for Mann. Thus, Pamela McShann had no legitimate reason to call Mann *29 whatsoever. Pamela McShann served as an agent of Bay, who was already represented by counsel, Mr. Charles Vannaman; and 2) In response to Mann's request for disclosure, Bay tendered McShann's worker's compensation claim file history without Mann's consent and redacted portions of the notes without claiming a privilege or producing a privilege log. | Party Submissions | 13.645294 | 14.327816 | 16.204748 |
Thus, vast numbers of individualized issues are raised by the myriad contractual provisions that bear on the substance of, and the forum for 4 litigating, the breach of fiduciary duty claims in this case. ...Accordingly, this action is inappropriate for certification as a Rule 23(b)(3) class. (VII CR 4139). | Party Submissions | 13.607978 | 12.969824 | 15.935058 |
Indemnification. The Participating Employers shall indemnify and hold harmless each employee, officer, director, agent or organization, to whom or to which are delegated duties, responsibilities, and authority under the Plan or otherwise with respect to administration of the Plan, including, without limitation, the Committee and its agents, against all claims, liabilities, fines and penalties, and all expenses reasonably incurred by or imposed upon him or it (including but not limited to reasonable attorney fees) which arise as a result of his or its actions or failure to act in connection with the operation and administration of the Plan to the extent lawfully allowable and to the extent that such claim, liability, fine, penalty, or expense is not paid for by liability insurance purchased or paid for by the Participating Employer. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Participating Employer shall not indemnify any person or organization if his or its actions or failure to act are due to gross negligence or willful misconduct or for any such amount incurred through any settlement or compromise of any action unless the Participating Employer consents in writing to such settlement or compromise. | Contract | 4.129731 | 3.851762 | 4.264598 |
To apply user fees with respect to tobacco products deemed subject to the requirements of chapter IX of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. | Legislation | 11.470015 | 10.992765 | 13.184391 |
As in Tatum, Hall, and Huckabee, the Program speaks to a broad social controversy—the exploitative nature of this country’s guardianship systems—and 6 The article did not include Rosenthal’s explanation, or meaningfully attempt to obtain her comment. Id. at 432. | Party Submissions | 36.17466 | 38.20859 | 45.595413 |
Heath represented that there was no right to a jury trial because he was no asserting a separate property claim, and on this basis alone the trial court denied a jury trial. Permitting this error in the deprivation of a constitutional right to escape scrutiny due to some claim of after-the-fact waiver is wrong and offensive to the Texas Constitution. | Party Submissions | 15.290529 | 15.286546 | 18.627256 |
The Clerk’s Record is cited “CR[Page#].” Specific page references when referring to items in the Clerk’s Record are to the CR page numbers, and not to the internal pagination of a particular document. | Party Submissions | 13.584973 | 13.697375 | 20.459848 |
The amended assignment ’s indemnity clause provides: [TX 1111] will indemnify [First NBC] against and hold [First NBC] free and harmless from any and all claims, demands, lawsuits, judgments, awards, costs and expenses, including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney fees, arising by reason of any loss or impairment of the availability of the Contributions pursuant to the Borrower Operating Agreement, except to the extent such claims, demands, 21 Neither Osprin nor Backes challenge the applicability of the UDJA in this case. | Party Submissions | 10.419144 | 9.247082 | 12.361982 |
Fleming Defendants could have had this litigation concluded many years ago if they had not successfully defeated class certification. The trial court summarized their argument against class certification and the court’s agreement therewith at the time as follows: [Fleming] Defendants argue in response that common questions would not predominate, given the substantial choice of law questions that need to be resolved, as well as the individualized contractual provisions for arbitration and the treatment of expenses. (VII CR 4123). | Party Submissions | 14.957176 | 13.146358 | 15.71387 |
McCarthy Subcontract -9-01-12-2017 Rev. waive all rights of subrogation against McCarthy, Owner and others as required by the Contract Documents; (c) The Commercial General Liability Policy of the PEO, leasing company, temporary employment or casual labor agency shall name McCarthy, Owner and others as required by the Contract Documents as additional insureds on a primary and non-contributory basis and such policy will contain waivers of subrogation in favor of such additional insureds; (d) Coverage will not be cancelled or non-renewed until 30 days prior written notice has been provided to McCarthy. If such cancellation is the result of non-payment of premium, at least 10 days prior written notice must be provided to McCarthy before such cancellation is effected. Copies of applicable Additional Insured and Waiver of Subrogation Endorsements must be attached to Certificates of Insurance. | Party Submissions | 5.946021 | 5.074079 | 6.291085 |
Those assertions, although not fulsome, were sufficient to allege that 14 In any event, there was evidence that the trial judge would have had no legal basis to deny the motion. 6 RR 123, 222-23, 249; 8 RR 190. | Party Submissions | 13.179899 | 14.748482 | 17.910398 |
By its fourth issue, Bay argues that Mann was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his injury. | Party Submissions | 17.783445 | 31.402235 | 43.12233 |
THE SHARES ISSUABLE UPON VESTING OF THIS AWARD WILL NOT BE RELEASED TO YOU UNTIL ALL APPLICABLE TAX-RELATED ITEMS HAVE BEEN COLLECTED FROM YOU OR HAVE OTHERWISE BEEN PROVIDED FOR. | Contract | 4.18027 | 4.272798 | 6.039178 |
Respondent has conducted a reasonable search for the category of documents requested, and provides Claimant with the documents identified in the request that are in its possession, custody or control, as resulting from that search. | Legal Decisions | 12.293462 | 19.341578 | 15.236405 |
Petitioners demonstrated in their opening Brief that this Court could reverse the appellate court’s decision for the alternate reason that the court failed even to address Petitioners’ arguments that statements about which Barina complains most vociferously—the allegations of “exploitation” or describing guardianship proceedings as the “crime of the century”, for example—are constitutionally-protected expressions of rhetorical hyperbole or opinion based on disclosed facts. Pet. Br. at 29-38. | Party Submissions | 14.351824 | 16.083597 | 15.895693 |
See Respondent’s Memorial at para. 59. Claimants have shown that this assertion misconstrues the meaning of, and draws incorrect inferences from, Article 34.1. | Legal Decisions | 15.724683 | 16.459814 | 15.321329 |
The court of appeals never directly addressed this issue. The court suggested that the City had negated evidence of gross negligence by taking some steps to protect its patrons, including developing its “safety rules and policies.” Delapena, 2022 WL 16993493, at *8. But this cannot be reconciled with the City’s conscious decision not to enforce those policies. CR139-40. At best, this would create a fact issue. See Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227-28 (court must deny the plea when there is a fact issue). More likely, the existence of the policy and the City’s conscious disregard is itself evidence of the City’s gross negligence. | Party Submissions | 8.603251 | 9.184742 | 9.314894 |
The Energy Secretariat shall issue a resolution with the economic dispatch rules to be applied by the DNDC to the energy and capacity transactions provided in Article 35(b) above. This rule shall provide that all generation companies shall receive a uniform price for the electricity they sell at each point of delivery to be defined by the DNDC, based on the economic cost of the system. In calculating such price, the cost that unsupplied electricity represents for the community shall be taken into account. Likewise, offtakers (distributors) pay a uniform rate, stabilized every ninety (90) days, measured at the reception points, which will include what the generators receive for the concepts indicated in the preceding paragraph, and transportation costs between the supply and reception points. 779 676. The Tribunal finds that the language of Articles 35 and 36 of the Electricity Law leaves considerable discretion to the Energy Secretariat in the setting of capacity payments. It does not prescribe any specific currency, method of calculation or price that the Energy Secretariat should reflect in its resolutions. | Legal Decisions | 13.162817 | 14.022708 | 12.81013 |
null | Party Submissions | null | null | null |
However, to avoid any confusion, the measures that are claimed in both arbitrations are: (i) the freezing or blocking of accounts, and (ii) the deposit of VAT refunds on one of the blocked accounts, in particular those deposited between April 2020 and January 4, 2023.64 82. At the outset, the Claimant wishes to point out that the Request for Arbitration filed on June 29, 2023, does not seek to challenge the measures summarized above that are the subject of this ongoing arbitration.65 The Request for Arbitration seeks remedies concerning PEM’s entitlement. | Party Submissions | 10.587843 | 10.451016 | 11.610748 |
Vested Right “1. A right that so completely and definitely belongs to a person that it cannot be impaired or taken away without the person's consent. 2. A right that the holder can transmit by deed to others, and has transmitted to his or her heirs, in the event of the holder's dying intestate.” Right, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). | Party Submissions | 8.120138 | 7.838683 | 7.557927 |
Because of his extended labor and traumatic delivery, H.W. had to be resuscitated and intubated in the operating room at only 3 minutes old. App. 7, 666. H.W. also had significant swelling and bruising in the left parietal/occipital region, which the medical records ascribed to “ birth trauma. ” App. 7, CR 667. | Party Submissions | 10.272708 | 10.534082 | 11.30159 |
The same is true of the Walkers’ reliance on Miller v. JSC Lake Highlands Operations, LP, 536 S.W.3d 510 (Tex. 2017). There, this Court reversed the Dallas Court of Appeals because it failed to consider the various experts’ reports together. Id. at 513-14. Again, that is not what happened here. | Party Submissions | 7.393222 | 7.875191 | 8.280994 |
Action from which Relator seeks relief: Justice Devine filed his ballot application on November 14, 2023. Respondent accepted Justice Devine’s application on December 1, 2023. Relator did nothing for several weeks, but then challenged Justice Devine’s application on December 27, 2023, asking Respondent to reject the application and to remove Justice Devine from the list of certified candidates. Relator waited an additional full week before filing this emergency proceeding, in which Relator states that the Court must act within three business days. Trial Court : Relator did not seek an injunction in any trial court, and there are no related proceedings in any trial court. Court of Appeals: Relator did not petition for mandamus relief in the Third Court of Appeals, and there are no related proceedings in any court of appeals. | Party Submissions | 5.91416 | 6.591313 | 6.646187 |
In this Court, Rafiei does not address any of these concerns; neither did the majority in the court of appeals’ opinion. Justice Jewell’s observation that “Rafiei’s evidence fails to address why any of these options for a reduced or deferred filing fee are unavailable to him[,]” id., remains true. II. Rafiei has not shown that an arbitration on the merits would Throughout the argument in the Amended Brief, Rafiei relies more on rhetoric than any detailed defense of the court of appeals’ opinion or analysis of the evidence before the trial court. | Party Submissions | 16.433952 | 17.995787 | 17.27299 |
And yet, seeking to rewrite the statute for the sake of public policy is precisely what Petitioner requests. Petitioner tries to transmute a statute of limitations into a statute of acceleration and accrual. Doing so would ignore the fact that Section 51.003 does not create any new rights, but merely regulates a right that arises from a different source. Trunkhill Capital, Inc. v. Jansma, 905 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Tex.App.-Waco 1995, writ denied). The purpose of the statute was not to transform the optional acceleration doctrine or impose an increased requirement on all lienholders to watch for the actions of any others with security interests in collateral. Instead, the statute was enacted to ensure that borrowers receive proper credit when their foreclosed property is sold and protect them against large deficiency judgments resulting from unreasonably low prices paid at foreclosure sales. House Research Organization, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 169 72nd Leg., R.S. (1991). Nowhere in the Legislative history is there a shred of evidence that Section 51.003 was intended to apply to lenders uninvolved in the foreclosure, to create a new limitations accrual date, or to overturn long-standing precedent. In fact, the Legislature later amended Section 16.035 to specifically delete the concept of “ lien debt ” and, by doing so, avoid a conflict between the limitations governing foreclosure and Texas Business & Commerce Code § 3.118 – the applicable provision for the recovery of money due under real estate notes that qualify as negotiable instruments. Tex. S.B. 754, 75th R.S. (1997); Senate Comm. on Business & Industry, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 754, 75th Leg., R.S. (1997). The implication is clear – the Legislature understood that its laws governing foreclosures should not affect the law governing the enforcement of concurrent monetary obligations. | Party Submissions | 7.239252 | 7.340603 | 7.541424 |
Petitioners cite several cases following Casteel and argue that this Court did not focus enough on the "specific errors" in those holdings and that, if it had, the Court would have seen that none of the cited cases are controlling here. 17 With a bullet-point listing of case holdings, Petitioners suggested that the facts of this case are somehow different and should not be controlled by Casteel and the cited progeny.18 However, the actual holdings of each case support the Court's Opinion here that harmful error exists due the combined negligence question including the legally insufficient yield sign claim. | Party Submissions | 18.207535 | 17.648193 | 20.067 |
Texas district courts have exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases in which jurisdiction is conferred on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body. Tex. Const. art. V, § 8. An administrative agency has exclusive jurisdiction when the Texas Legislature grants it the sole authority to make an initial determination in a dispute; in such matters, a complaining party must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking review in district court. Until the party has satisfied the exhaustion requirement, the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction and must dismiss without prejudice those claims within the agency's exclusive jurisdiction. | Party Submissions | 4.797829 | 5.320859 | 5.213996 |
I certify that the foregoing Response Brief on the Merits complies with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4 because it contains 9,357 words and has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface, using Microsoft Word via Microsoft Office 365 ProPlus, in 14-point Bookman Old Style font for text and 12-point Bookman Old Style font for footnotes that meets the typeface requirements. | Party Submissions | 5.485632 | 6.890769 | 7.433003 |
In the event of corporate transactions described in Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-1(i)6), the identification of Specified Employees shall be determined in accordance with the default rules described therein, unless the Employer elects to utilize the available alternative methodology through designations made within the timeframes specified therein. | Contract | 8.324183 | 9.664096 | 10.373116 |
HSMiller’s objection to the third document, the bankruptcy court’s order on fees, likewise is groundless, in part because of HSMiller’s own arguments. HSMiller has relied on the bankruptcy plan to argue preemption and to inaccurately suggest that the bankruptcy proceedings were the normal fare. See Resp’s’s Br. at 28-35. The order on fees the Lawyers attached to their Petitioners’ Brief is a public order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, available through commercial databases like Westlaw. See In re Henry S. Miller Comm., LLC, No. 09-34422-SGJ-11, 2010 WL 4638882 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2010). | Party Submissions | 8.52118 | 8.319491 | 9.164993 |
Walker’s petition must also be rejected on the merits. First, mandamus relief would “transgress[] this Court’s settled limits on judicial interference with elec-tions,” In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 767, as the primary election process is already well underway—indeed, further along than in Khanoyan itself. Second, while the State’s interests in ensuring broad, statewide support for candidates for statewide office often justify the burden that the Election Code imposes on the Republican Party of Texas’s First Amendment associational rights, those interests fail here. Jus-tice Devine’s track record of statewide support diminishes any such interest the State might have in regulating how the Republican Party of Texas accepts candidates to compete for its endorsement via primary election, and no other plausible interest would be advanced by granting Walker mandamus relief. | Party Submissions | 10.971601 | 11.107327 | 11.656308 |
Instead of creating a new basis for liability, Section 51.003(a) set the statute of limitations for an action arising from a person ’s liability emanating from another source, such as a promissory note or a guaranty agreement. Sowell v. Int ’ l Interests, L.P., 416 S.W.3d 593, 597 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied). Section 51.003(a) thus “ operate[s] as a statute of limitations ,” which is “intended to compel a party who possesses a right of action to exercise that right within a reasonable time after it accrues. ” Trunkhill Cap., Inc. v. Jansma, 905 S.W.3d 464, 467-68 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, writ denied). Section 51.003 is clear that the cause of action accrues at the time of the foreclosure sale. See Tex. Prop. Code § 51.003(a); Sowell, 416 S.W.3d at 597 (“If the price at which real property is sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale under section 51.002 is less than the unpaid balance of the indebtedness secured by the real property, resulting in a deficiency, any action to recover this deficiency must be brought within two years of the foreclosure sale and is governe d by section 51.003.”). | Party Submissions | 4.215426 | 4.164866 | 4.26073 |
Notwithstanding anything in this paragraph to the contrary: (i) if a different definition of compensation has been designated by the Company with respect to another nonqualified deferred compensation plan in which a key employee participates, the definition of compensation shall be the definition provided in Treas. Reg. Section 1.409A-1(i)(2); and (ii) the Company may through action that is legally binding with respect to all nonqualified deferred compensation plans maintained by the Company, elect to use a different definition of compensation. | Contract | 5.484667 | 5.546671 | 6.754756 |
The trial court was within its discretionary authority to find Dr. Null qualified to opine as to causation. See Roberts, 111 S.W.3d 113. V. The Court should grant review to ensure Chapter 74’s Nearly three years ago, the Abshire opinion confirmed that lower courts should not prematurely weigh a preliminary expert report’s ultimate evidentiary value, which “is a matter to be determined at summary judgment and beyond.” 563 S.W.3d at 22 6. The Court reaffirmed that holding just last term. E.D., 644 S.W.3d at 664. | Party Submissions | 13.058919 | 12.066908 | 13.265463 |
The evidence shows Terry was acutely aware that Flaven was a problem and knew there was a risk. The evidence also shows that regardless of what Flaven did, HSMiller and its agent Defterios were going to have credibility problems before the jury. To a great extent the evidence supports a conclusion that this was a “damned if you do, damned if you don’t” situation: HSMiller and Defterios were not going to look good in the jury’s eyes either way. | Party Submissions | 12.848153 | 12.604978 | 13.373847 |
The decision below transgresses the boundary between those separate spheres. And Respondents barely attempt to argue otherwise. They simply try to make the decision mean something other than what it actually says. | Party Submissions | 20.476015 | 24.643051 | 29.213772 |
HN1 [ ] Administrative Proceedings, Costs & Attorney Fees Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 408.221(c) provides for a carrier's liability for a claimant's attorney's fees if the claimant prevails in the carrier's action for judicial review. | Party Submissions | 7.975694 | 8.729137 | 8.950486 |
Bay also alleges that it has standing to initiate a proceeding at the Division as a subclaimant. However, even if Bay could prove that it properly preserved a claim as a subclaimant, that tactic will not accomplish what it desires. Citing the Texas Supreme Court in Franks v. Sematech, Inc. 936 S.W.2d 959, 960 (Tex. 1997) the 14th Circuit held “...a derivative claim under the TWCA [Texas Workers' Compensation Act] is not independent of the employee's claim... There is but one cause of action for an employee's injuries, and it belongs to the employee.” It follows that as a subclaimant, [an employer's] ability to recover reimbursement under the TWCA should be coextensive with [the injured's] ability to recover benefits. Texas Mut. Ins. V. Sonic Systems Intern., 214 S.W.3d 469 (Tex.App. -Houston [14th], 2006, writ denied). | Party Submissions | 7.356001 | 7.561099 | 7.527899 |
This document is current through the 2023 Regular Session, the 1st C.S. and the 2nd C.S. of the 88th Legislature; and the 2023 ballot proposition contingencies to date. | Party Submissions | 8.685042 | 7.921706 | 8.740299 |
Being part of the management team of a Texas Corporation is an obvious availment of the Respondent’s right to do business in Texas, and clearly embraces the possibility that he may be haled into Texas Courts. | Party Submissions | 17.88425 | 18.220797 | 19.169212 |
Mr Broshko alleges that he decided to invest in Obnova's shares independently from Mr Rand (in November 2017, indirectly through MLI) because he believed that Obnova would either be able to resolve the issue with the 2013 DRP or be awarded compensation due under Serbian law. Mr Broshko argues that the lack of compensation breached the Canada-Serbia BIT. | Legal Decisions | 21.548363 | 20.946932 | 21.997364 |
We believe the reasoning in Mantas is equally applicable here. Claiming that Gaetjen has sustained a compensable injury, Luby's has asserted the exclusive remedy defense to Gaetjen's negligence claim. See TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. § 408.001(a) (Vernon 1996) (“recovery of workers compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers' compensation coverage”). Hence, a jury would have to first decide the compensability issue before it could consider the negligence issue. Whether Gaetjen's injury is compensable, however, is a matter within the primary jurisdiction of the Commission. | Party Submissions | 5.736797 | 6.515294 | 6.634683 |
This mandamus proceeding arises out of a negligence suit filed by Elizabeth Gaetjen (“Gaetjen”) against her employer, Luby's Cafeterias, Inc. (“Luby's”), after Gaetjen was sexually assaulted in the workplace by a fellow employee. The relator, Luby's, contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to abate the negligence trial until the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission decides whether Gaetjen, the real party in interest, sustained a compensable injury. See generally TEX. LAB.CODE ANN. Ch.402 (Vernon 1996). | Party Submissions | 4.338175 | 4.57636 | 4.606329 |
This was and remains a garden-variety immunity case. It presents no novel questions of law, but rather is simply another case in which a plaintiff failed to satisfy the simple evidentiary burden imposed on it when presented with a Miranda Plea to the Jurisdiction. For the foregoing reasons, Midland respectfully requests that Weatherford’s Petition for Review be DENIED. | Party Submissions | 11.129755 | 12.840274 | 13.486074 |
To amend the Harmful Algal Blooms and Hypoxia Research and Control Act of 1998 to address harmful algal blooms, and for other purposes. | Legislation | 2.684027 | 2.319892 | 2.567469 |
The record in this case reflects that, prior to Catiana’s death, the City hired a risk management consultant to evaluate the City’s operation of Buttercup Pool. The consultant’s report, written approximately six weeks before the incident, specifically found that Buttercup Pool’s use of two lifeguard stands, one covering the deep end of the pool and the other covering the shallow end, was adequate to safely monitor all swimmers in the pool. The Delapenas have not suggested there were any prior incidents at Buttercup Pool that would undermine the City’s reliance on the consultant’s report. See Shumake, 199 S.W.3d at 281, 288 (concluding that plaintiffs stated a claim for gross negligence, in part, because the Parks Department received several recent reports of near drownings but failed to act). | Party Submissions | 7.107194 | 7.322409 | 7.495629 |
R, M : Claimants failed to demonstrate how requested documents are relevant to its case and material for the outcome of the proceedings. This is a classic "fishing expedition". Claimants are seeking any underlying documentation which might not support the decision to place the bus loop on the Dunavska Plots, but they have no reasonable basis for assuming that the work plan will contain anything relevant or material to the outcome of the dispute. PCC : The requested document is accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade in accordance with the applicable regulations.246 In other words, the requested document is "in the public domain and equally and effectively available to both parties".247 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Institute in order to obtain documents in question.248 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents and it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants obviously already obtained certain documentation from the Urban Planning Institute of Belgrade (exhibit C-025), so they can also request document whose production they now seek. | Legal Decisions | 13.957286 | 13.532806 | 14.161278 |
If a sales standard is set at 100 widgets but only 50 widgets are available for resale purchase, that 100 widget sales standard cannot be satisfied and is plainly not reasonable without knowing if there are supportable intervening circumstances and facts. | Party Submissions | 20.814264 | 26.233774 | 22.050467 |
Walker has neither complied with this Court’s rules in seeking mandamus relief nor is he entitled to it on the merits. This Court should summarily deny the petition for at least three independent reasons. | Party Submissions | 11.200684 | 10.842335 | 12.953764 |
Respondent’s interpretation of controlling precedent misses the mark while seeking to obscure the elephant in the room to their benefit. | Party Submissions | 24.555464 | 21.410147 | 24.39159 |
The opinion below not only undermines these authorities, but also directly contradicts decisions reached by other intermediate appellate courts on almost identical facts. See Cornejo, 446 S.W.3d at 125; McKellar, 367 S.W.3d at 486. | Party Submissions | 7.370842 | 7.832931 | 8.099974 |
PCC : The requested documents are accessible to Obnova/Claimants who can obtain the documents from the Cadastre, in accordance with the applicable regulations.287 In other words, the requested documents are "in public domain, and are equally and effectively available to both parties".288 Respondent, just like Claimants, must address the Cadastre in order to obtain documents in question.289 Therefore, it is equally burdensome for Respondent as it is for Claimants to obtain these documents, so it is not justified encumbering Respondent with the task that can be performed by Claimants themselves. In fact, Claimants already obtained decisions based on which the City of Belgrade was inscribed in the Cadastre as the user/owner of certain Objects on Dunavska Plots (exhibits C-165 and C-166), so they can also request the documents whose production they now seek. B, U : The request is overly broad and unduly burdensome as Claimants failed to specify a narrow and specific category of requested documents. Respondent cannot reasonably be requested to identify and locate “any and all documents referred to on page 14 (pdf) of exhibit R -052”, instead of Claimants. | Legal Decisions | 13.297866 | 13.088206 | 13.830322 |
In July of 2019, twenty-year-old Bruno succumbed to injuries caused by heat stroke sustained while working on a construction site overseen by subcontractor Hellas Construction, Inc. Whether Bruno was a Hellas employee at the time of injury is the crux of the litigation in the two courts below. Whether DWC had jurisdiction to decide that issue is the [*3] question before this Court. | Party Submissions | 11.282394 | 10.611547 | 12.521841 |
In addition, Morris v. Kohls-York, 164 SW3d 686 (Tex. App. -Austin, 2005, rev. dism’d) notes that “Corporate agents are individually liable for fraudulent or tortious acts committed while in the service of their corporation.” At 695. | Party Submissions | 9.692028 | 9.425374 | 10.354529 |
Justice John Devine, the Real Party in Interest, filed an application for a place on the 2024 Republican General Primary Ballot, seeking the office of Justice, Texas Supreme Court, Place 4. Ex.C.1 Justice Devine filed his application on November 14, 2023. Ex.C. Pursuant to Tex. Elec. Code §141.035, the application was immediately available to the public. Respondent Matt Rinaldi, the Chairman of the Republican Party of Texas, accepted Justice Devine’s application on December 1, 2023. Ex C. Accordingly, Chairman Rinaldi also certified to the Texas Secretary of State that Justice Devine should appear on the ballot for the election. Ex.C. Relator filed an application for the same office on December 4, 2023. Ex.B. | Party Submissions | 4.681016 | 5.329191 | 5.216874 |
The Tribunal considers however that a provisional measure of the type requested by the Claimant, concerning the VAT refunds to which PEM is entitled, in order not to aggravate the dispute and to maintain the status quo, cannot cover actions by the Respondent that predate the relevant request (4 January 2023).53 63. As a result, the Tribunal only granted the Claimant access to future VAT refunds not because prior VAT refunds were measures already contested in the First Arbitration but because the type of provisional measure requested cannot cover actions by the Respondent that predate the relevant request . | Party Submissions | 11.230093 | 11.052884 | 11.597925 |
Second, this Court has never held that a breach of a contractual duty alone qualifies a person as an RTP in a tort case. Conceptually, logically, and legally a breach of contract by itself does not support a tort claim and does not cause damages in tort. As discussed below, for a breach of contract to be actionable in tort, a tort must accompany the breach. | Party Submissions | 8.288793 | 8.737355 | 10.199122 |
To ensure that women seeking an abortion are informed of the medical risks associated with the abortion procedure and the major developmental characteristics of the unborn child, before giving their informed consent to receive an abortion. | Legislation | 6.928382 | 7.701566 | 7.414135 |
Lease J thus ended up in both cases: in the Hooks case for the Hooks’ royalty interest, and in this Bordages case for the J.J. Johns Trust’s non-participating royalty interest. Also, the executive rights holder for the a portion of the J.J. Johns Trust’s NPRI was in the Hooks case. But the same Lease J has been in both cases. | Party Submissions | 18.270313 | 22.806654 | 19.848448 |