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Jul 3

Code Security Vulnerability Repair Using Reinforcement Learning with Large Language Models

With the recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs), generating functionally correct code has become less complicated for a wide array of developers. While using LLMs has sped up the functional development process, it poses a heavy risk to code security. Code generation with proper security measures using LLM is a significantly more challenging task than functional code generation. Security measures may include adding a pair of lines of code with the original code, consisting of null pointer checking or prepared statements for SQL injection prevention. Currently, available code repair LLMs generate code repair by supervised fine-tuning, where the model looks at cross-entropy loss. However, the original and repaired codes are mostly similar in functionality and syntactically, except for a few (1-2) lines, which act as security measures. This imbalance between the lines needed for security measures and the functional code enforces the supervised fine-tuned model to prioritize generating functional code without adding proper security measures, which also benefits the model by resulting in minimal loss. Therefore, in this work, for security hardening and strengthening of generated code from LLMs, we propose a reinforcement learning-based method for program-specific repair with the combination of semantic and syntactic reward mechanisms that focus heavily on adding security and functional measures in the code, respectively.

TrustSQL: Benchmarking Text-to-SQL Reliability with Penalty-Based Scoring

Text-to-SQL enables users to interact with databases using natural language, simplifying the retrieval and synthesis of information. Despite the remarkable success of large language models (LLMs) in translating natural language questions into SQL queries, widespread deployment remains limited due to two primary challenges. First, the effective use of text-to-SQL models depends on users' understanding of the model's capabilities-the scope of questions the model can correctly answer. Second, the absence of abstention mechanisms can lead to incorrect SQL generation going unnoticed, thereby undermining trust in the model's output. To enable wider deployment, it is crucial to address these challenges in model design and enhance model evaluation to build trust in the model's output. To this end, we introduce TrustSQL, a novel comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate text-to-SQL reliability-defined as a model's ability to correctly handle any type of input question by generating correct SQL queries for feasible questions and abstaining from generating infeasible ones (e.g., due to schema incompatibility or functionalities beyond SQL). We evaluate existing methods using a novel penalty-based scoring metric with two modeling approaches: (1) pipeline-based methods combining SQL generators with infeasible question detectors and SQL error detectors for abstention; and (2) unified methods using a single model for the entire task. Our experimental results reveal that achieving high scores under severe penalties requires significant effort and provide a new perspective on developing text-to-SQL models for safer deployment. TrustSQL is available at https://github.com/glee4810/TrustSQL.

StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

SQL Injection Jailbreak: a structural disaster of large language models

In recent years, the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has brought new vitality to the various domains and generated substantial social and economic benefits. However, the swift advancement of LLMs has introduced new security vulnerabilities. Jailbreak, a form of attack that induces LLMs to output harmful content through carefully crafted prompts, poses a challenge to the safe and trustworthy development of LLMs. Previous jailbreak attack methods primarily exploited the internal capabilities of the model. Among them, one category leverages the model's implicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker is unaware of the exact reasons for the attack's success. The other category utilizes the model's explicit capabilities for jailbreak attacks, where the attacker understands the reasons for the attack's success. For example, these attacks exploit the model's abilities in coding, contextual learning, or understanding ASCII characters. However, these earlier jailbreak attacks have certain limitations, as they only exploit the inherent capabilities of the model. In this paper, we propose a novel jailbreak method, SQL Injection Jailbreak (SIJ), which utilizes the construction of input prompts by LLMs to inject jailbreak information into user prompts, enabling successful jailbreak of the LLMs. Our SIJ method achieves nearly 100\% attack success rates on five well-known open-source LLMs in the context of AdvBench, while incurring lower time costs compared to previous methods. More importantly, SIJ reveals a new vulnerability in LLMs that urgently needs to be addressed. To this end, we propose a defense method called Self-Reminder-Key and demonstrate its effectiveness through experiments. Our code is available at https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak{https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/SQL-Injection-Jailbreak}.

Virtual Prompt Injection for Instruction-Tuned Large Language Models

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

ControlNET: A Firewall for RAG-based LLM System

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has significantly enhanced the factual accuracy and domain adaptability of Large Language Models (LLMs). This advancement has enabled their widespread deployment across sensitive domains such as healthcare, finance, and enterprise applications. RAG mitigates hallucinations by integrating external knowledge, yet introduces privacy risk and security risk, notably data breaching risk and data poisoning risk. While recent studies have explored prompt injection and poisoning attacks, there remains a significant gap in comprehensive research on controlling inbound and outbound query flows to mitigate these threats. In this paper, we propose an AI firewall, ControlNET, designed to safeguard RAG-based LLM systems from these vulnerabilities. ControlNET controls query flows by leveraging activation shift phenomena to detect adversarial queries and mitigate their impact through semantic divergence. We conduct comprehensive experiments on four different benchmark datasets including Msmarco, HotpotQA, FinQA, and MedicalSys using state-of-the-art open source LLMs (Llama3, Vicuna, and Mistral). Our results demonstrate that ControlNET achieves over 0.909 AUROC in detecting and mitigating security threats while preserving system harmlessness. Overall, ControlNET offers an effective, robust, harmless defense mechanism, marking a significant advancement toward the secure deployment of RAG-based LLM systems.

CodeS: Towards Building Open-source Language Models for Text-to-SQL

Language models have shown promising performance on the task of translating natural language questions into SQL queries (Text-to-SQL). However, most of the state-of-the-art (SOTA) approaches rely on powerful yet closed-source large language models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and GPT-4, which may have the limitations of unclear model architectures, data privacy risks, and expensive inference overheads. To address the limitations, we introduce CodeS, a series of pre-trained language models with parameters ranging from 1B to 15B, specifically designed for the text-to-SQL task. CodeS is a fully open-source language model, which achieves superior accuracy with much smaller parameter sizes. This paper studies the research challenges in building CodeS. To enhance the SQL generation abilities of CodeS, we adopt an incremental pre-training approach using a specifically curated SQL-centric corpus. Based on this, we address the challenges of schema linking and rapid domain adaptation through strategic prompt construction and a bi-directional data augmentation technique. We conduct comprehensive evaluations on multiple datasets, including the widely used Spider benchmark, the newly released BIRD benchmark, robustness-diagnostic benchmarks such as Spider-DK, Spider-Syn, Spider-Realistic, and Dr.Spider, as well as two real-world datasets created for financial and academic applications. The experimental results show that our CodeS achieves new SOTA accuracy and robustness on nearly all challenging text-to-SQL benchmarks.

OmniSQL: Synthesizing High-quality Text-to-SQL Data at Scale

Text-to-SQL, the task of translating natural language questions into SQL queries, plays a crucial role in enabling non-experts to interact with databases. While recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced text-to-SQL performance, existing approaches face notable limitations in real-world text-to-SQL applications. Prompting-based methods often depend on closed-source LLMs, which are expensive, raise privacy concerns, and lack customization. Fine-tuning-based methods, on the other hand, suffer from poor generalizability due to the limited coverage of publicly available training data. To overcome these challenges, we propose a novel and scalable text-to-SQL data synthesis framework for automatically synthesizing large-scale, high-quality, and diverse datasets without extensive human intervention. Using this framework, we introduce SynSQL-2.5M, the first million-scale text-to-SQL dataset, containing 2.5 million samples spanning over 16,000 synthetic databases. Each sample includes a database, SQL query, natural language question, and chain-of-thought (CoT) solution. Leveraging SynSQL-2.5M, we develop OmniSQL, a powerful open-source text-to-SQL model available in three sizes: 7B, 14B, and 32B. Extensive evaluations across nine datasets demonstrate that OmniSQL achieves state-of-the-art performance, matching or surpassing leading closed-source and open-source LLMs, including GPT-4o and DeepSeek-V3, despite its smaller size. We release all code, datasets, and models to support further research.

Demystifying RCE Vulnerabilities in LLM-Integrated Apps

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

EllieSQL: Cost-Efficient Text-to-SQL with Complexity-Aware Routing

Text-to-SQL automatically translates natural language queries to SQL, allowing non-technical users to retrieve data from databases without specialized SQL knowledge. Despite the success of advanced LLM-based Text-to-SQL approaches on leaderboards, their unsustainable computational costs--often overlooked--stand as the "elephant in the room" in current leaderboard-driven research, limiting their economic practicability for real-world deployment and widespread adoption. To tackle this, we exploratively propose EllieSQL, a complexity-aware routing framework that assigns queries to suitable SQL generation pipelines based on estimated complexity. We investigate multiple routers to direct simple queries to efficient approaches while reserving computationally intensive methods for complex cases. Drawing from economics, we introduce the Token Elasticity of Performance (TEP) metric, capturing cost-efficiency by quantifying the responsiveness of performance gains relative to token investment in SQL generation. Experiments show that compared to always using the most advanced methods in our study, EllieSQL with the Qwen2.5-0.5B-DPO router reduces token use by over 40% without compromising performance on Bird development set, achieving more than a 2x boost in TEP over non-routing approaches. This not only advances the pursuit of cost-efficient Text-to-SQL but also invites the community to weigh resource efficiency alongside performance, contributing to progress in sustainable Text-to-SQL.

Towards Robustness of Text-to-SQL Models against Synonym Substitution

Recently, there has been significant progress in studying neural networks to translate text descriptions into SQL queries. Despite achieving good performance on some public benchmarks, existing text-to-SQL models typically rely on the lexical matching between words in natural language (NL) questions and tokens in table schemas, which may render the models vulnerable to attacks that break the schema linking mechanism. In this work, we investigate the robustness of text-to-SQL models to synonym substitution. In particular, we introduce Spider-Syn, a human-curated dataset based on the Spider benchmark for text-to-SQL translation. NL questions in Spider-Syn are modified from Spider, by replacing their schema-related words with manually selected synonyms that reflect real-world question paraphrases. We observe that the accuracy dramatically drops by eliminating such explicit correspondence between NL questions and table schemas, even if the synonyms are not adversarially selected to conduct worst-case adversarial attacks. Finally, we present two categories of approaches to improve the model robustness. The first category of approaches utilizes additional synonym annotations for table schemas by modifying the model input, while the second category is based on adversarial training. We demonstrate that both categories of approaches significantly outperform their counterparts without the defense, and the first category of approaches are more effective.

DB-Explore: Automated Database Exploration and Instruction Synthesis for Text-to-SQL

Recent text-to-SQL systems powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in translating natural language queries into SQL. However, these systems often struggle with complex database structures and domain-specific queries, as they primarily focus on enhancing logical reasoning and SQL syntax while overlooking the critical need for comprehensive database understanding. To address this limitation, we propose DB-Explore, a novel framework that systematically aligns LLMs with database knowledge through automated exploration and instruction synthesis. DB-Explore constructs database graphs to capture complex relational schemas, leverages GPT-4 to systematically mine structural patterns and semantic knowledge, and synthesizes instructions to distill this knowledge for efficient fine-tuning of LLMs. Our framework enables comprehensive database understanding through diverse sampling strategies and automated instruction generation, bridging the gap between database structures and language models. Experiments conducted on the SPIDER and BIRD benchmarks validate the effectiveness of DB-Explore, achieving an execution accuracy of 52.1% on BIRD and 84.0% on SPIDER. Notably, our open-source implementation, based on the Qwen2.5-coder-7B model, outperforms multiple GPT-4-driven text-to-SQL systems in comparative evaluations, and achieves near state-of-the-art performance with minimal computational cost.

LLM-R2: A Large Language Model Enhanced Rule-based Rewrite System for Boosting Query Efficiency

Query rewrite, which aims to generate more efficient queries by altering a SQL query's structure without changing the query result, has been an important research problem. In order to maintain equivalence between the rewritten query and the original one during rewriting, traditional query rewrite methods always rewrite the queries following certain rewrite rules. However, some problems still remain. Firstly, existing methods of finding the optimal choice or sequence of rewrite rules are still limited and the process always costs a lot of resources. Methods involving discovering new rewrite rules typically require complicated proofs of structural logic or extensive user interactions. Secondly, current query rewrite methods usually rely highly on DBMS cost estimators which are often not accurate. In this paper, we address these problems by proposing a novel method of query rewrite named LLM-R2, adopting a large language model (LLM) to propose possible rewrite rules for a database rewrite system. To further improve the inference ability of LLM in recommending rewrite rules, we train a contrastive model by curriculum to learn query representations and select effective query demonstrations for the LLM. Experimental results have shown that our method can significantly improve the query execution efficiency and outperform the baseline methods. In addition, our method enjoys high robustness across different datasets.

Understanding the Effects of Noise in Text-to-SQL: An Examination of the BIRD-Bench Benchmark

Text-to-SQL, which involves translating natural language into Structured Query Language (SQL), is crucial for enabling broad access to structured databases without expert knowledge. However, designing models for such tasks is challenging due to numerous factors, including the presence of 'noise,' such as ambiguous questions and syntactical errors. This study provides an in-depth analysis of the distribution and types of noise in the widely used BIRD-Bench benchmark and the impact of noise on models. While BIRD-Bench was created to model dirty and noisy database values, it was not created to contain noise and errors in the questions and gold queries. We found that noise in questions and gold queries are prevalent in the dataset, with varying amounts across domains, and with an uneven distribution between noise types. The presence of incorrect gold SQL queries, which then generate incorrect gold answers, has a significant impact on the benchmark's reliability. Surprisingly, when evaluating models on corrected SQL queries, zero-shot baselines surpassed the performance of state-of-the-art prompting methods. We conclude that informative noise labels and reliable benchmarks are crucial to developing new Text-to-SQL methods that can handle varying types of noise. All datasets, annotations, and code are available at https://github.com/niklaswretblad/the-effects-of-noise-in-text-to-SQL.

Can LLM Already Serve as A Database Interface? A BIg Bench for Large-Scale Database Grounded Text-to-SQLs

Text-to-SQL parsing, which aims at converting natural language instructions into executable SQLs, has gained increasing attention in recent years. In particular, Codex and ChatGPT have shown impressive results in this task. However, most of the prevalent benchmarks, i.e., Spider, and WikiSQL, focus on database schema with few rows of database contents leaving the gap between academic study and real-world applications. To mitigate this gap, we present Bird, a big benchmark for large-scale database grounded in text-to-SQL tasks, containing 12,751 pairs of text-to-SQL data and 95 databases with a total size of 33.4 GB, spanning 37 professional domains. Our emphasis on database values highlights the new challenges of dirty database contents, external knowledge between NL questions and database contents, and SQL efficiency, particularly in the context of massive databases. To solve these problems, text-to-SQL models must feature database value comprehension in addition to semantic parsing. The experimental results demonstrate the significance of database values in generating accurate text-to-SQLs for big databases. Furthermore, even the most effective text-to-SQL models, i.e. ChatGPT, only achieves 40.08% in execution accuracy, which is still far from the human result of 92.96%, proving that challenges still stand. Besides, we also provide an efficiency analysis to offer insights into generating text-to-efficient-SQLs that are beneficial to industries. We believe that BIRD will contribute to advancing real-world applications of text-to-SQL research. The leaderboard and source code are available: https://bird-bench.github.io/.

No, of course I can! Refusal Mechanisms Can Be Exploited Using Harmless Fine-Tuning Data

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Black-Box Adversarial Attacks on LLM-Based Code Completion

Modern code completion engines, powered by large language models (LLMs), assist millions of developers with their strong capabilities to generate functionally correct code. Due to this popularity, it is crucial to investigate the security implications of relying on LLM-based code completion. In this work, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art black-box LLM-based code completion engines can be stealthily biased by adversaries to significantly increase their rate of insecure code generation. We present the first attack, named INSEC, that achieves this goal. INSEC works by injecting an attack string as a short comment in the completion input. The attack string is crafted through a query-based optimization procedure starting from a set of carefully designed initialization schemes. We demonstrate INSEC's broad applicability and effectiveness by evaluating it on various state-of-the-art open-source models and black-box commercial services (e.g., OpenAI API and GitHub Copilot). On a diverse set of security-critical test cases, covering 16 CWEs across 5 programming languages, INSEC increases the rate of generated insecure code by more than 50%, while maintaining the functional correctness of generated code. We consider INSEC practical -- it requires low resources and costs less than 10 US dollars to develop on commodity hardware. Moreover, we showcase the attack's real-world deployability, by developing an IDE plug-in that stealthily injects INSEC into the GitHub Copilot extension.

PLeak: Prompt Leaking Attacks against Large Language Model Applications

Large Language Models (LLMs) enable a new ecosystem with many downstream applications, called LLM applications, with different natural language processing tasks. The functionality and performance of an LLM application highly depend on its system prompt, which instructs the backend LLM on what task to perform. Therefore, an LLM application developer often keeps a system prompt confidential to protect its intellectual property. As a result, a natural attack, called prompt leaking, is to steal the system prompt from an LLM application, which compromises the developer's intellectual property. Existing prompt leaking attacks primarily rely on manually crafted queries, and thus achieve limited effectiveness. In this paper, we design a novel, closed-box prompt leaking attack framework, called PLeak, to optimize an adversarial query such that when the attacker sends it to a target LLM application, its response reveals its own system prompt. We formulate finding such an adversarial query as an optimization problem and solve it with a gradient-based method approximately. Our key idea is to break down the optimization goal by optimizing adversary queries for system prompts incrementally, i.e., starting from the first few tokens of each system prompt step by step until the entire length of the system prompt. We evaluate PLeak in both offline settings and for real-world LLM applications, e.g., those on Poe, a popular platform hosting such applications. Our results show that PLeak can effectively leak system prompts and significantly outperforms not only baselines that manually curate queries but also baselines with optimized queries that are modified and adapted from existing jailbreaking attacks. We responsibly reported the issues to Poe and are still waiting for their response. Our implementation is available at this repository: https://github.com/BHui97/PLeak.

Can Editing LLMs Inject Harm?

Knowledge editing techniques have been increasingly adopted to efficiently correct the false or outdated knowledge in Large Language Models (LLMs), due to the high cost of retraining from scratch. Meanwhile, one critical but under-explored question is: can knowledge editing be used to inject harm into LLMs? In this paper, we propose to reformulate knowledge editing as a new type of safety threat for LLMs, namely Editing Attack, and conduct a systematic investigation with a newly constructed dataset EditAttack. Specifically, we focus on two typical safety risks of Editing Attack including Misinformation Injection and Bias Injection. For the risk of misinformation injection, we first categorize it into commonsense misinformation injection and long-tail misinformation injection. Then, we find that editing attacks can inject both types of misinformation into LLMs, and the effectiveness is particularly high for commonsense misinformation injection. For the risk of bias injection, we discover that not only can biased sentences be injected into LLMs with high effectiveness, but also one single biased sentence injection can cause a high bias increase in general outputs of LLMs, which are even highly irrelevant to the injected sentence, indicating a catastrophic impact on the overall fairness of LLMs. Then, we further illustrate the high stealthiness of editing attacks, measured by their impact on the general knowledge and reasoning capacities of LLMs, and show the hardness of defending editing attacks with empirical evidence. Our discoveries demonstrate the emerging misuse risks of knowledge editing techniques on compromising the safety alignment of LLMs.

CyberSecEval 2: A Wide-Ranging Cybersecurity Evaluation Suite for Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

XiYan-SQL: A Multi-Generator Ensemble Framework for Text-to-SQL

To tackle the challenges of large language model performance in natural language to SQL tasks, we introduce XiYan-SQL, an innovative framework that employs a multi-generator ensemble strategy to improve candidate generation. We introduce M-Schema, a semi-structured schema representation method designed to enhance the understanding of database structures. To enhance the quality and diversity of generated candidate SQL queries, XiYan-SQL integrates the significant potential of in-context learning (ICL) with the precise control of supervised fine-tuning. On one hand, we propose a series of training strategies to fine-tune models to generate high-quality candidates with diverse preferences. On the other hand, we implement the ICL approach with an example selection method based on named entity recognition to prevent overemphasis on entities. The refiner optimizes each candidate by correcting logical or syntactical errors. To address the challenge of identifying the best candidate, we fine-tune a selection model to distinguish nuances of candidate SQL queries. The experimental results on multiple dialect datasets demonstrate the robustness of XiYan-SQL in addressing challenges across different scenarios. Overall, our proposed XiYan-SQL achieves the state-of-the-art execution accuracy of 89.65% on the Spider test set, 69.86% on SQL-Eval, 41.20% on NL2GQL, and a competitive score of 72.23% on the Bird development benchmark. The proposed framework not only enhances the quality and diversity of SQL queries but also outperforms previous methods.

Metasql: A Generate-then-Rank Framework for Natural Language to SQL Translation

The Natural Language Interface to Databases (NLIDB) empowers non-technical users with database access through intuitive natural language (NL) interactions. Advanced approaches, utilizing neural sequence-to-sequence models or large-scale language models, typically employ auto-regressive decoding to generate unique SQL queries sequentially. While these translation models have greatly improved the overall translation accuracy, surpassing 70% on NLIDB benchmarks, the use of auto-regressive decoding to generate single SQL queries may result in sub-optimal outputs, potentially leading to erroneous translations. In this paper, we propose Metasql, a unified generate-then-rank framework that can be flexibly incorporated with existing NLIDBs to consistently improve their translation accuracy. Metasql introduces query metadata to control the generation of better SQL query candidates and uses learning-to-rank algorithms to retrieve globally optimized queries. Specifically, Metasql first breaks down the meaning of the given NL query into a set of possible query metadata, representing the basic concepts of the semantics. These metadata are then used as language constraints to steer the underlying translation model toward generating a set of candidate SQL queries. Finally, Metasql ranks the candidates to identify the best matching one for the given NL query. Extensive experiments are performed to study Metasql on two public NLIDB benchmarks. The results show that the performance of the translation models can be effectively improved using Metasql.

SWE-SQL: Illuminating LLM Pathways to Solve User SQL Issues in Real-World Applications

Resolution of complex SQL issues persists as a significant bottleneck in real-world database applications. Current Large Language Models (LLMs), while adept at text-to-SQL translation, have not been rigorously evaluated on the more challenging task of debugging SQL issues. To address this gap, we introduce BIRD-CRITIC, a new SQL issue debugging benchmark comprising 530 PostgreSQL tasks (BIRD-CRITIC-PG) and 570 multi-dialect tasks (BIRD-CRITIC-Multi), distilled from authentic user issues and replayed within new environments to facilitate rigorous evaluation. Baseline evaluations underscore the task's complexity, with the leading reasoning model O3-Mini achieving only 38.87% success rate on BIRD-CRITIC-PG and 33.33% on BIRD-CRITIC-Multi. Meanwhile, advancing open-source models for database tasks is crucial for empowering local development while safeguarding data privacy. Therefore, we present Six-Gym (Sql-fIX-Gym), a training environment for elevating open-source model capabilities for SQL issue debugging. This environment leverages SQL-Rewind strategy, which automatically generates executable issue-solution datasets by reverse-engineering issues from verified SQLs. However, popular trajectory-based fine-tuning methods do not explore substantial supervisory signals. We further propose f-Plan Boosting, which extracts high-level debugging plans from SQL solutions, enabling teacher LLMs to produce 73.7% more successful trajectories for training. We integrate these components into an open-source agent, Bird-Fixer. Based on Qwen-2.5-Coder-14B, Bird-Fixer achieves 38.11% success rate on BIRD-CRITIC-PG and 29.65% on BIRD-CRITIC-Multi, surpassing leading proprietary models such as Claude-3.7-Sonnet and GPT-4.1, marking a significant step toward democratizing sophisticated SQL-debugging capabilities. The leaderboard and source code are available: https://bird-critic.github.io/

Next-Generation Database Interfaces: A Survey of LLM-based Text-to-SQL

Generating accurate SQL from natural language questions (text-to-SQL) is a long-standing challenge due to the complexities in user question understanding, database schema comprehension, and SQL generation. Conventional text-to-SQL systems, comprising human engineering and deep neural networks, have made substantial progress. Subsequently, pre-trained language models (PLMs) have been developed and utilized for text-to-SQL tasks, achieving promising performance. As modern databases become more complex, the corresponding user questions also grow more challenging, causing PLMs with parameter constraints to produce incorrect SQL. This necessitates more sophisticated and tailored optimization methods, which, in turn, restricts the applications of PLM-based systems. Recently, large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated significant capabilities in natural language understanding as the model scale increases. Therefore, integrating LLM-based implementation can bring unique opportunities, improvements, and solutions to text-to-SQL research. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of LLM-based text-to-SQL. Specifically, we propose a brief overview of the technical challenges and the evolutionary process of text-to-SQL. Then, we provide a detailed introduction to the datasets and metrics designed to evaluate text-to-SQL systems. After that, we present a systematic analysis of recent advances in LLM-based text-to-SQL. Finally, we discuss the remaining challenges in this field and propose expectations for future research directions.

BEAVER: An Enterprise Benchmark for Text-to-SQL

Existing text-to-SQL benchmarks have largely been constructed from web tables with human-generated question-SQL pairs. LLMs typically show strong results on these benchmarks, leading to a belief that LLMs are effective at text-to-SQL tasks. However, how these results transfer to enterprise settings is unclear because tables in enterprise databases might differ substantially from web tables in structure and content. To contend with this problem, we introduce a new dataset BEAVER, the first enterprise text-to-SQL benchmark sourced from real private enterprise data warehouses. This dataset includes natural language queries and their correct SQL statements, which we collected from actual query logs. We then benchmark off-the-shelf LLMs on this dataset. LLMs perform poorly, even when augmented with standard prompt engineering and RAG techniques. We identify three main reasons for the poor performance: (1) schemas of enterprise tables are more complex than the schemas in public data, resulting in SQL-generation tasks intrinsically harder; (2) business-oriented questions are often more complex, requiring joins over multiple tables, aggregations, and nested queries; (3) public LLMs cannot train on private enterprise data warehouses that are not publicly accessible, and therefore it is difficult for the model to learn to solve (1) and (2). We believe BEAVER will facilitate future research in building text-to-SQL systems that perform better in enterprise settings.

Spider 2.0: Evaluating Language Models on Real-World Enterprise Text-to-SQL Workflows

Real-world enterprise text-to-SQL workflows often involve complex cloud or local data across various database systems, multiple SQL queries in various dialects, and diverse operations from data transformation to analytics. We introduce Spider 2.0, an evaluation framework comprising 632 real-world text-to-SQL workflow problems derived from enterprise-level database use cases. The databases in Spider 2.0 are sourced from real data applications, often containing over 1,000 columns and stored in local or cloud database systems such as BigQuery and Snowflake. We show that solving problems in Spider 2.0 frequently requires understanding and searching through database metadata, dialect documentation, and even project-level codebases. This challenge calls for models to interact with complex SQL workflow environments, process extremely long contexts, perform intricate reasoning, and generate multiple SQL queries with diverse operations, often exceeding 100 lines, which goes far beyond traditional text-to-SQL challenges. Our evaluations indicate that based on o1-preview, our code agent framework successfully solves only 17.0% of the tasks, compared with 91.2% on Spider 1.0 and 73.0% on BIRD. Our results on Spider 2.0 show that while language models have demonstrated remarkable performance in code generation -- especially in prior text-to-SQL benchmarks -- they require significant improvement in order to achieve adequate performance for real-world enterprise usage. Progress on Spider 2.0 represents crucial steps towards developing intelligent, autonomous, code agents for real-world enterprise settings. Our code, baseline models, and data are available at https://spider2-sql.github.io.

Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applications

Large Language Models (LLMs), renowned for their superior proficiency in language comprehension and generation, stimulate a vibrant ecosystem of applications around them. However, their extensive assimilation into various services introduces significant security risks. This study deconstructs the complexities and implications of prompt injection attacks on actual LLM-integrated applications. Initially, we conduct an exploratory analysis on ten commercial applications, highlighting the constraints of current attack strategies in practice. Prompted by these limitations, we subsequently formulate HouYi, a novel black-box prompt injection attack technique, which draws inspiration from traditional web injection attacks. HouYi is compartmentalized into three crucial elements: a seamlessly-incorporated pre-constructed prompt, an injection prompt inducing context partition, and a malicious payload designed to fulfill the attack objectives. Leveraging HouYi, we unveil previously unknown and severe attack outcomes, such as unrestricted arbitrary LLM usage and uncomplicated application prompt theft. We deploy HouYi on 36 actual LLM-integrated applications and discern 31 applications susceptible to prompt injection. 10 vendors have validated our discoveries, including Notion, which has the potential to impact millions of users. Our investigation illuminates both the possible risks of prompt injection attacks and the possible tactics for mitigation.

Nightshade: Prompt-Specific Poisoning Attacks on Text-to-Image Generative Models

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

When the signal is in the noise: Exploiting Diffix's Sticky Noise

Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...]

Keep Security! Benchmarking Security Policy Preservation in Large Language Model Contexts Against Indirect Attacks in Question Answering

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as enterprise and government, ensuring that they adhere to user-defined security policies within context is critical-especially with respect to information non-disclosure. While prior LLM studies have focused on general safety and socially sensitive data, large-scale benchmarks for contextual security preservation against attacks remain lacking. To address this, we introduce a novel large-scale benchmark dataset, CoPriva, evaluating LLM adherence to contextual non-disclosure policies in question answering. Derived from realistic contexts, our dataset includes explicit policies and queries designed as direct and challenging indirect attacks seeking prohibited information. We evaluate 10 LLMs on our benchmark and reveal a significant vulnerability: many models violate user-defined policies and leak sensitive information. This failure is particularly severe against indirect attacks, highlighting a critical gap in current LLM safety alignment for sensitive applications. Our analysis reveals that while models can often identify the correct answer to a query, they struggle to incorporate policy constraints during generation. In contrast, they exhibit a partial ability to revise outputs when explicitly prompted. Our findings underscore the urgent need for more robust methods to guarantee contextual security.

Prompt-Driven LLM Safeguarding via Directed Representation Optimization

Prepending model inputs with safety prompts is a common practice of safeguarding large language models (LLMs) from complying with queries that contain harmful intents. However, the working mechanisms of safety prompts have not yet been fully understood, which hinders the potential for automatically optimizing them for improved LLM safety. Motivated by this problem, we investigate the impact of safety prompts from the perspective of model representations. We find that in models' representation space, harmful and harmless queries can be largely distinguished, but this is not noticeably enhanced by safety prompts. Instead, the queries' representations are moved by different safety prompts in similar directions, where models become more prone to refusal (i.e., refusing to provide assistance) even when the queries are harmless. Inspired by these findings, we propose a method called DRO (Directed Representation Optimization) for automatic safety prompt optimization. DRO treats safety prompts as continuous, trainable embeddings and learns to move the representations of harmful/harmless queries along/opposite the direction in which the model's refusal probability increases. We demonstrate that DRO remarkably improves the safeguarding performance of human-crafted safety prompts and outperforms strong baselines, as evaluated on out-of-domain benchmarks, without compromising the general model capability.

Alignment faking in large language models

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversion

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

On the Proactive Generation of Unsafe Images From Text-To-Image Models Using Benign Prompts

Text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion have had a profound impact on daily life by enabling the generation of photorealistic images from textual prompts, fostering creativity, and enhancing visual experiences across various applications. However, these models also pose risks. Previous studies have successfully demonstrated that manipulated prompts can elicit text-to-image models to generate unsafe images, e.g., hateful meme variants. Yet, these studies only unleash the harmful power of text-to-image models in a passive manner. In this work, we focus on the proactive generation of unsafe images using targeted benign prompts via poisoning attacks. We propose two poisoning attacks: a basic attack and a utility-preserving attack. We qualitatively and quantitatively evaluate the proposed attacks using four representative hateful memes and multiple query prompts. Experimental results indicate that text-to-image models are vulnerable to the basic attack even with five poisoning samples. However, the poisoning effect can inadvertently spread to non-targeted prompts, leading to undesirable side effects. Root cause analysis identifies conceptual similarity as an important contributing factor to the side effects. To address this, we introduce the utility-preserving attack as a viable mitigation strategy to maintain the attack stealthiness, while ensuring decent attack performance. Our findings underscore the potential risks of adopting text-to-image models in real-world scenarios, calling for future research and safety measures in this space.

Semantic Decomposition of Question and SQL for Text-to-SQL Parsing

Text-to-SQL semantic parsing faces challenges in generalizing to cross-domain and complex queries. Recent research has employed a question decomposition strategy to enhance the parsing of complex SQL queries. However, this strategy encounters two major obstacles: (1) existing datasets lack question decomposition; (2) due to the syntactic complexity of SQL, most complex queries cannot be disentangled into sub-queries that can be readily recomposed. To address these challenges, we propose a new modular Query Plan Language (QPL) that systematically decomposes SQL queries into simple and regular sub-queries. We develop a translator from SQL to QPL by leveraging analysis of SQL server query optimization plans, and we augment the Spider dataset with QPL programs. Experimental results demonstrate that the modular nature of QPL benefits existing semantic-parsing architectures, and training text-to-QPL parsers is more effective than text-to-SQL parsing for semantically equivalent queries. The QPL approach offers two additional advantages: (1) QPL programs can be paraphrased as simple questions, which allows us to create a dataset of (complex question, decomposed questions). Training on this dataset, we obtain a Question Decomposer for data retrieval that is sensitive to database schemas. (2) QPL is more accessible to non-experts for complex queries, leading to more interpretable output from the semantic parser.

PURPLE: Making a Large Language Model a Better SQL Writer

Large Language Model (LLM) techniques play an increasingly important role in Natural Language to SQL (NL2SQL) translation. LLMs trained by extensive corpora have strong natural language understanding and basic SQL generation abilities without additional tuning specific to NL2SQL tasks. Existing LLMs-based NL2SQL approaches try to improve the translation by enhancing the LLMs with an emphasis on user intention understanding. However, LLMs sometimes fail to generate appropriate SQL due to their lack of knowledge in organizing complex logical operator composition. A promising method is to input the LLMs with demonstrations, which include known NL2SQL translations from various databases. LLMs can learn to organize operator compositions from the input demonstrations for the given task. In this paper, we propose PURPLE (Pre-trained models Utilized to Retrieve Prompts for Logical Enhancement), which improves accuracy by retrieving demonstrations containing the requisite logical operator composition for the NL2SQL task on hand, thereby guiding LLMs to produce better SQL translation. PURPLE achieves a new state-of-the-art performance of 80.5% exact-set match accuracy and 87.8% execution match accuracy on the validation set of the popular NL2SQL benchmark Spider. PURPLE maintains high accuracy across diverse benchmarks, budgetary constraints, and various LLMs, showing robustness and cost-effectiveness.

DB-GPT: Empowering Database Interactions with Private Large Language Models

The recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) are positioned to transition many areas of software. Database technologies particularly have an important entanglement with LLMs as efficient and intuitive database interactions are paramount. In this paper, we present DB-GPT, a revolutionary and production-ready project that integrates LLMs with traditional database systems to enhance user experience and accessibility. DB-GPT is designed to understand natural language queries, provide context-aware responses, and generate complex SQL queries with high accuracy, making it an indispensable tool for users ranging from novice to expert. The core innovation in DB-GPT lies in its private LLM technology, which is fine-tuned on domain-specific corpora to maintain user privacy and ensure data security while offering the benefits of state-of-the-art LLMs. We detail the architecture of DB-GPT, which includes a novel retrieval augmented generation (RAG) knowledge system, an adaptive learning mechanism to continuously improve performance based on user feedback and a service-oriented multi-model framework (SMMF) with powerful data-driven agents. Our extensive experiments and user studies confirm that DB-GPT represents a paradigm shift in database interactions, offering a more natural, efficient, and secure way to engage with data repositories. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of DB-GPT framework on the future of human-database interaction and outlines potential avenues for further enhancements and applications in the field. The project code is available at https://github.com/eosphoros-ai/DB-GPT. Experience DB-GPT for yourself by installing it with the instructions https://github.com/eosphoros-ai/DB-GPT#install and view a concise 10-minute video at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYs4nTDzEhk.

MAG-SQL: Multi-Agent Generative Approach with Soft Schema Linking and Iterative Sub-SQL Refinement for Text-to-SQL

Recent In-Context Learning based methods have achieved remarkable success in Text-to-SQL task. However, there is still a large gap between the performance of these models and human performance on datasets with complex database schema and difficult questions, such as BIRD. Besides, existing work has neglected to supervise intermediate steps when solving questions iteratively with question decomposition methods, and the schema linking methods used in these works are very rudimentary. To address these issues, we propose MAG-SQL, a multi-agent generative approach with soft schema linking and iterative Sub-SQL refinement. In our framework, an entity-based method with tables' summary is used to select the columns in database, and a novel targets-conditions decomposition method is introduced to decompose those complex questions. Additionally, we build a iterative generating module which includes a Sub-SQL Generator and Sub-SQL Refiner, introducing external oversight for each step of generation. Through a series of ablation studies, the effectiveness of each agent in our framework has been demonstrated. When evaluated on the BIRD benchmark with GPT-4, MAG-SQL achieves an execution accuracy of 61.08\%, compared to the baseline accuracy of 46.35\% for vanilla GPT-4 and the baseline accuracy of 57.56\% for MAC-SQL. Besides, our approach makes similar progress on Spider.

Backdoor Activation Attack: Attack Large Language Models using Activation Steering for Safety-Alignment

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

RMCBench: Benchmarking Large Language Models' Resistance to Malicious Code

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly influenced various aspects of software development activities. Despite their benefits, LLMs also pose notable risks, including the potential to generate harmful content and being abused by malicious developers to create malicious code. Several previous studies have focused on the ability of LLMs to resist the generation of harmful content that violates human ethical standards, such as biased or offensive content. However, there is no research evaluating the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. To fill this gap, we propose RMCBench, the first benchmark comprising 473 prompts designed to assess the ability of LLMs to resist malicious code generation. This benchmark employs two scenarios: a text-to-code scenario, where LLMs are prompted with descriptions to generate code, and a code-to-code scenario, where LLMs translate or complete existing malicious code. Based on RMCBench, we conduct an empirical study on 11 representative LLMs to assess their ability to resist malicious code generation. Our findings indicate that current LLMs have a limited ability to resist malicious code generation with an average refusal rate of 40.36% in text-to-code scenario and 11.52% in code-to-code scenario. The average refusal rate of all LLMs in RMCBench is only 28.71%; ChatGPT-4 has a refusal rate of only 35.73%. We also analyze the factors that affect LLMs' ability to resist malicious code generation and provide implications for developers to enhance model robustness.

AdvWeb: Controllable Black-box Attacks on VLM-powered Web Agents

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have revolutionized the creation of generalist web agents, empowering them to autonomously complete diverse tasks on real-world websites, thereby boosting human efficiency and productivity. However, despite their remarkable capabilities, the safety and security of these agents against malicious attacks remain critically underexplored, raising significant concerns about their safe deployment. To uncover and exploit such vulnerabilities in web agents, we provide AdvWeb, a novel black-box attack framework designed against web agents. AdvWeb trains an adversarial prompter model that generates and injects adversarial prompts into web pages, misleading web agents into executing targeted adversarial actions such as inappropriate stock purchases or incorrect bank transactions, actions that could lead to severe real-world consequences. With only black-box access to the web agent, we train and optimize the adversarial prompter model using DPO, leveraging both successful and failed attack strings against the target agent. Unlike prior approaches, our adversarial string injection maintains stealth and control: (1) the appearance of the website remains unchanged before and after the attack, making it nearly impossible for users to detect tampering, and (2) attackers can modify specific substrings within the generated adversarial string to seamlessly change the attack objective (e.g., purchasing stocks from a different company), enhancing attack flexibility and efficiency. We conduct extensive evaluations, demonstrating that AdvWeb achieves high success rates in attacking SOTA GPT-4V-based VLM agent across various web tasks. Our findings expose critical vulnerabilities in current LLM/VLM-based agents, emphasizing the urgent need for developing more reliable web agents and effective defenses. Our code and data are available at https://ai-secure.github.io/AdvWeb/ .