diff --git "a/triplets2/triples-kg_syngen.jsonl" "b/triplets2/triples-kg_syngen.jsonl" new file mode 100644--- /dev/null +++ "b/triplets2/triples-kg_syngen.jsonl" @@ -0,0 +1,550 @@ +{"metadata": {"page_label": "101", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "86 \n So again, to repeat. A trespass is an unauthorized intrusion \ninto the lands of another. \nDefendants did not object on the record that the trial \ncourt\u2019s instruction improperly recognized a cause of action \nin trespass where the intrusion complained of consisted of \nairborne particulate, noise, or vibrations, nor did they \ninitially frame their iss ue on appeal that way. Nonetheless, \nin the interests of justice,3 and because the issue concerns a \nquestion of law and all the facts necessary for its resolution \nhave been presented,4 we will examine the related doctrines \nof trespass and nuisance and will determine how they bear \non the intrusions at issue in this case. See Frericks v. \nHighland Twp., 228 Mich.App. 575, 586, 579 N.W.2d 441 \n(1998) (\u201cthis Court may go beyond the issues raised on \nappeal and address issues that, in this Court\u2019s opinion, \njustice r equires be considered and resolved\u201d).5 \nII. Trespass and Nuisance \nThe general concept of \u201cproperty\u201d comprises various \nrights -a \u201cbundle of sticks,\u201d as it is often called6 -which is \nusually understood to include \u201c[t]he exclusive right of \npossessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.\u201d Black\u2019s Law \nDictionary (6th ed., 1990), p. 1216. As this latter \ncharacterization suggests, the right to exclude others from \none\u2019s land and t he right to quiet enjoyment of one\u2019s land \nhave customarily been regarded as separate sticks in the \n \n3 See Phinney v. Perlmutter, 222 Mich.App. 513, 557, 564 N.W.2d 532 (1997). \n4 See Providence Hosp. v. Nat\u2019l Labor Union Health & Welfare Fund, 162 \nMich.App. 191, 194 -195, 412 N.W.2d 690 (1987).", "proposition": ["A trespass is an unauthorized intrusion into the lands of another.", "Defendants did not object on the record that the trial court\u2019s instruction improperly recognized a cause of action in trespass where the intrusion complained of consisted of airborne particulate, noise, or vibrations, nor did they initially frame their issue on appeal that way.", "In the interests of justice, and because the issue concerns a question of law and all the facts necessary for its resolution have been presented, we will examine the related doctrines of trespass and nuisance and will determine how they bear on the intrusions at issue in this case.", "The general concept of \u201cproperty\u201d comprises various rights -a \u201cbundle of sticks,\u201d as it is often called- which is usually understood to include \u201c[t]he exclusive right of possessing, enjoying, and disposing of a thing.\u201d", "As this latter characterization suggests, the right to exclude others from one\u2019s land and the right to quiet enjoyment of one\u2019s land have customarily been regarded as separate sticks in the bundle of rights.", "The right to exclude others from one\u2019s land and the right to quiet enjoyment of one\u2019s land have customarily been regarded as separate sticks in the bundle of rights."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "30", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "15 \n Conclusion \nIt is very difficult to generalize about law school exams; they vary \nenormously. But many standard issue spotting essay questions have \nbuilt into them a \u201chard case,\u201d an aspect of the fact pattern that is \nintended t o trigger your discussion of the question, \u201cWhat should \nthe rule be?,\u201d with respect to some controversial legal issue. If you \ntry to answer the question, \u201cWhat should the rule be?,\u201d by telling \nyour instructor, \u201cHere is the majority rule,\u201d or \u201cHere are two \nalternative rules; I don\u2019t know which one is the law, you will have \nmissed the point of the question! \nAnd that\u2019s where Dworkin comes in. You can use \u201cfit and \njustification\u201d as the basis for organizing your answer to a \u201cWhat \nshould the law be?\u201d question. Be gin with fit. Which possible rules \nare consistent with the settled law? Then move to justification. Of \nthe rules that fit, which is the best rule? Now list the arguments of \nprinciple and policy for and against each of the plausible \ncandidates. Be sure to c ome to a conclusion. That is, end with \nsomething like, \u201cAdopting a rule of comparative negligence is \nrequired by the theory that best fits and justifies the existing law of \ntorts.\u201d \nHannah v. Peel, 1945 K.B. 509 (King\u2019s Bench Div.) \nACT ION tried by Birkett J. \nOn December 13, 1938, the freehold of Gwernhaylod \nHouse, Overton -on-Dee, Shropshire, was conveyed to the \ndefendant, Major Hugh Edward Ethelston Peel, who from \nthat time to the end of 1940 never himself occupied the \nhouse and it rema ined unoccupied until October 5, 1939, \nwhen it was requisitioned, but after some months was \nreleased from requisition. Thereafter it remained \nunoccupied until July 18, 1940, when it was again \nrequisitioned, the defendant being compensated by a \npayment at t he rate of 250\u00a3 a year.", "proposition": ["Law school exams vary enormously.", "Many standard issue spotting essay questions have a 'hard case' aspect that triggers a discussion on 'What should the rule be?'.", "Answering the question with the majority rule or stating uncertainty about the law will miss the point of the question.", "Dworkin's 'fit and justification' can be used to organize an answer to a 'What should the rule be?' question.", "Begin by identifying possible rules consistent with settled law.", "Move to justification by determining the best rule among those that fit.", "List arguments of principle and policy for and against each plausible candidate.", "Conclude by stating which rule is required by the theory that best fits and justifies the existing law.", "Hannah v. Peel (1945) was a case tried by Birkett J.", "On December 13, 1938, Major Hugh Edward Ethelston Peel was conveyed the freehold of Gwernhaylod House in Overton-on-Dee, Shropshire.", "From the end of 1940 until October 5, 1939, the house remained unoccupied and was requisitioned for some months before being released.", "The house was again requisitioned on July 18, 1940, and Major Peel was compensated at a rate of \u00a3250 per year."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "622", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "607 \n The 21st birthday, being an important \nevent in life, should be celebrated \naccordingly. I therefore wish to give \nyou as a present the oil painting by \nGustav Klimt of Schloss Kammer \nwhich now hangs in the New York \nliving room. You know that Lazette \nand I bought it some 5 or 6 years ago, \nand you always told us how much y ou \nliked it. \nLove, \nPlaintiff never took possession of the painting nor did he \nseek to do so. Except for a brief period between 1964 and \n1965 when it was on loan to art exhibits and when \nrestoration work was performed on it, the painting \nremained in his fat her\u2019s possession, moving with him from \nNew York City to Beverly Hills and finally to Vienna, \nAustria, where Victor Gruen died on February 14, 1980. \nFollowing Victor\u2019s death plaintiff requested possession of \nthe Klimt painting and when defendant refused, he \ncommenced this action. \nThe issues framed for appeal are whether a valid inter vivos \ngift of a chattel may be made where the donor has reserved \na life estate in the chattel and the donee never has had \nphysical possession of it before the donor\u2019s death and, if it \nmay, which factual findings on the elements of a valid inter \nvivos gift more nearly comport with the weight of the \nevidence in this case, those of Special Term or those of the \nAppellate Division. Resolution of the latter issue requires \napplication o f two general rules. First, to make a valid inter \nvivos gift there must exist the intent on the part of the \ndonor to make a present transfer; delivery of the gift, either \nactual or constructive to the donee; and acceptance by the \ndonee ( Matter of Szabo , 10 NY2d 94, 98; Matter of Kelly , 285 \nNY 139, 150 [dissenting in part opn]; Matter of Van Alstyne , \n207 NY 298, 306; Beaver v Beaver , 117 NY 421, 428).", "proposition": ["The 21st birthday is an important event in life.", "The author wishes to give the recipient an oil painting by Gustav Klimt of Schloss Kammer as a present.", "The painting now hangs in the New York living room.", "Lazette and the author bought the painting some 5 or 6 years ago.", "The recipient always told Lazette and the author how much they liked the painting.", "Plaintiff never took possession of the painting nor did he seek to do so.", "The painting remained in the author's possession, moving with them from New York City to Beverly Hills and finally to Vienna, Austria, where Victor Gruen died on February 14, 1980.", "Following Victor's death, the plaintiff requested possession of the Klimt painting, and when the defendant refused, the plaintiff commenced this action.", "The issues framed for appeal are whether a valid inter vivos gift of a chattel can be made where the donor has reserved a life estate in the chattel and the donee never has had physical possession of it before the donor's death, and if it can, which factual findings on the elements of a valid inter vivos gift more nearly comport with the weight of the evidence in this case, those of Special Term or those of the Appellate Division.", "Resolution of the latter issue requires the application of two general rules.", "To make a valid inter vivos gift, there must exist the intent on the part of the donor to make a present transfer, delivery of the gift, either actual or constructive, to the donee, and acceptance by the donee."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "322", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "307 \n complainant or any of its members, or from editions of \ntheir newspapers, \u2019 until its commercial value as news to the \ncomplainant and all of its members has passed away .\u2019 The part \ncomplained of is the clause we have italicized; but if this be \nindefinite, it is no more so than the criticism. Perhaps it \nwould be better that the terms of the injunction be made \nspecific, and so framed as to confine the restraint to an \nextent consistent with the reasonable protection of \ncomplainant\u2019s newspapers, each in its own area and for a \nspecified time after its publication, against the competitive \nuse of pirated news by defendant\u2019s customers. But the case \npresents practical difficulities; and we have not the \nmaterials, either in the way of a definite suggestion o f \namendment, or in the way of proofs, upon which to frame \na specific injunction; hence, while not expressing approval \nof the form adopted by the District Court, we decline to \nmodify it at this preliminary stage of the case, and will leave \nthat court to dea l with the matter upon appropriate \napplication made to it for the purpose. \nThe decree of the Circuit court of Appeals will be \nAffirmed. \nMr. Justice CLARKE took no part in the consideration or \ndecision of this case. \nMR. JUSTICE HOLMES , dissenting. \nWhen an uncopyrighted combination of words is published \nthere is no general right to forbid other people repeating \nthem \u2013 in other words there is no property in the \ncombination or in the thoughts or facts that the words \nexpress. Property, a creation of law , does not arise from \nvalue, although exchangeable \u2013 a matter of fact. Many \nexchangeable values may be destroyed intentionally without \ncompensation. Property depends upon exclusion by law \nfrom interference, and a person is not excluded from using \nany combi nation of words merely because some one has \nused it before, even if it took labor and genius to make it. If", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving 307 complainant or any of its members and editions of their newspapers.", "The part complained of is the clause that we have italicized.", "The complainant argues that the defendant's use of pirated news competes with their newspapers.", "The court suggests that the terms of the injunction should be made specific and confined to an extent consistent with the reasonable protection of complainant's newspapers.", "The court acknowledges the practical difficulties of the case and declines to modify the injunction at this preliminary stage.", "The court affirms the decree of the Circuit court of Appeals.", "Mr. Justice CLARKE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.", "MR. JUSTICE HOLMES dissents, arguing that there is no general right to forbid other people from repeating uncopyrighted combinations of words.", "MR. JUSTICE HOLMES states that property does not arise from value and depends on exclusion by law from interference.", "MR. JUSTICE HOLMES argues that a person is not excluded from using any combination of words merely because someone has used it before, even if it took labor and genius to make it."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "122", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": ". \n... \nI now turn to the case in which, although the pricing system is \nassumed to work smoothly (that is, costlessly), the damaging \nbusiness is not liable for any of the damage which it causes. This", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case where the pricing system works smoothly, meaning costlessly.", "In this case, the damaging business is not liable for any of the damage it causes."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "213", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "3. Fear of Loss .\u2014To regret for what is lost, uneasiness respecting \nwhat is possessed joins itself, and even for what it is possi ble to \nacquire; for most of the objects which are necessary for subsistence", "proposition": ["Fear of loss involves regretting what is lost.", "This uneasiness extends to what is possessed and even what is possible to acquire.", "Most of the objects necessary for subsistence are subject to this fear."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "570", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "See, e.g., S.C. Johnson & S on, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129, 141 (6th \nCir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 820, 80 S.Ct. 65, 4 L.Ed.2d 65 (1959).", "proposition": ["S.C. Johnson & S on, Inc. v. Johnson is a case.", "The case is cited as 266 F.2d 129, 141 (6th Cir.).", "The case was denied certiorari by the Supreme Court of the United States.", "The case was decided in 1959."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "390", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The reason for this is probably \nto be found in the prin ciple that natural products are not patentable.\u201d Florists \nExchange and Horticultural Trade World, July 15, 1933, p. 9. \n9 In 1873, the Patent Office granted Louis Pasteur a patent on \u201cyeast, free from \norganic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture.\u201d And in 1967 and 1968, \nimmediately prior to the passage of the Plant Variety Protection Act, that Office \ngranted two patents which, as the petitioner concedes, state claims for living \nmicro -organisms. See Reply Brief for Petitioner 3, and n. 2.", "proposition": ["The petitioner concedes that these patents state claims for living micro-organisms."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "359", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "1202 -13 (2d ed. May, 1993) \n(hereinafter PTO Manual) (approving trademark \nregistration of color alone where it \u201chas become distinctive \nof the applicant\u2019s goods in commerce,\u201d provided that \n\u201cthere is no competitive need for colors to remain available \nin the industry\u201d and the color is not \u201cfunctional\u201d); see also \n1 McCarthy \u00a7\u00a7 3.011, 7. 26 (\u201crequirements for qualification \nof a word or symbol as a trademark\u201d are that it be (1) a \n\u201csymbol,\u201d (2) \u201cused \u2026 as a mark,\u201d (3) \u201cto identify and", "proposition": ["The PTO Manual approves trademark registration of color alone if it has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce.", "The color must not have a competitive need to remain available in the industry.", "The color cannot be functional.", "A word or symbol must be a symbol to qualify as a trademark.", "A word or symbol must be used as a mark to qualify as a trademark.", "A word or symbol must identify and distinguish goods to qualify as a trademark.", "A word or symbol must not be functional to qualify as a trademark."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "44", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "29 \n A review of these judgments shows that the authorities are \nin an unsatisfactory state, and I observe that Sir John \nSalmond in his book on Jurisprudence (9th ed., at p. 383), \nafter referring to the cases of Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co.41 and \nSouth Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman,42 said: \u201cCases \nsuch as these, however, are capable of explanation on other \ngrounds, and do not involve any necessary conflict either \nwith the theory of possessio n or with the cases already \ncited, such as Bridges v. Hawkesworth43. The general \nprinciple is that the first finder of a thing has a good title to \nit against all but the true owner, even though the thing is \nfound on the property of another person,\u201d and he cites \nArmory v. Delamirie44 and Bridges v. Hawkesworth45 in \nsupport of that proposition. Then he continues: \u201cThis \nprinciple, however, is subject to important exceptions, in \nwhich, owing to the special circumstances of the case, the \nbetter right is in him on whose property the thing is \nfound,\u201d and he names three cases as the principal ones: \n\u201cWhen he on whose property the thing is found is already \nin possession not merely of the property, but of the thing \nitself; as in certain circumstances, even without specif ic \nknowledge, he undoubtedly may be.\u201d The second limitation \nSir John Salmond puts is: \u201cIf anyone finds a thing as the \nservant or agent of another he finds it not for himself, but \nfor his employer.\u201d Then: \u201cA third case in which a finder \nobtains no title is that in which he gets possession only \nthrough a trespass or other act of wrongdoing.\u201d It is fairly \nclear from the authorities that a man possesses everything \nwhich is attached to or under his land. Secondly, it would \nappear to be the law from the authoriti es I have cited, and \n \n41 33 Ch. D. 562. \n42 2 Q. B. 44. \n43 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the authorities on the law of finding and possessing things.", "Sir John Salmond, in his book on Jurisprudence, refers to cases such as Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co. and South Staffordshire Water Co.", "Sir John Salmond states that the general principle is that the first finder of a thing has a good title to it against all but the true owner, even if the thing is found on the property of another person.", "Sir John Salmond cites Armory v. Delamirie and Bridges v. Hawkesworth in support of this general principle.", "Sir John Salmond also notes that this general principle is subject to important exceptions.", "The first exception named by Sir John Salmond is when the person on whose property the thing is found is already in possession not merely of the property, but of the thing itself.", "The second limitation Sir John Salmond puts is that if anyone finds a thing as the servant or agent of another, he finds it not for himself, but for his employer.", "The third case in which a finder obtains no title is when he gets possession only through a trespass or other act of wrongdoing.", "It is fairly clear from the authorities that a man possesses everything which is attached to or under his land.", "The passage cites various legal cases and authorities to support its arguments."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "637", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "622 \n over the last nine years. Plaintiff promptly commenced this \naction seeking rescission of the contract of sale. Supreme \nCourt reluctantly dismissed the complaint, holding that \nplaintiff has no remedy at law in this jurisdiction. \nThe unusual facts o f this case, as disclosed by the record, \nclearly warrant a grant of equitable relief to the buyer who, \nas a resident of New York City, cannot be expected to have \nany familiarity with the folklore of the Village of Nyack. \nNot being a \u201clocal\u201d, plaintiff coul d not readily learn that the \nhome he had contracted to purchase is haunted. Whether \nthe source of the spectral apparitions seen by defendant \nseller are parapsychic or psychogenic, having reported their \npresence in both a national publication ( Readers\u2019 Dige st) and \nthe local press (in 1977 and 1982, respectively), defendant is \nestopped to deny their existence and, as a matter of law, the \nhouse is haunted. More to the point, however, no \ndivination is required to conclude that it is defendant\u2019s \npromotional effo rts in publicizing her close encounters \nwith these spirits which fostered the home\u2019s reputation in \nthe community. In 1989, the house was included in five -\nhome walking tour of Nyack and described in a November \n27th newspaper article as \u201ca riverfront Victori an (with \nghost).\u201d The impact of the reputation thus created goes to \nthe very essence of the bargain between the parties, greatly \nimpairing both the value of the property and its potential \nfor resale. The extent of this impairment may be presumed \nfor the pu rpose of reviewing the disposition of this motion \nto dismiss the cause of action for rescission and represents \nmerely an issue of fact for resolution at trial. \nWhile I agree with Supreme Court that the real estate \nbroker, as agent for the seller, is under no duty to disclose \nto a potential buyer the phantasmal reputation of the \npremises and that, in his pursuit of a legal remedy for \nfraudulent misrepresentation against the seller, plaintiff \nhasn\u2019t a ghost of a chance, I am nevertheless moved by the \nspirit o f equity to allow the buyer to seek rescission of the", "proposition": ["The plaintiff commenced an action seeking rescission of the contract of sale for a property.", "Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiff has no remedy at law in this jurisdiction.", "The unusual facts of the case warrant a grant of equitable relief to the buyer, who is a resident of New York City and not familiar with the folklore of the Village of Nyack.", "The house is haunted, as the source of the spectral apparitions has been reported in both a national publication and the local press.", "The defendant is estopped to deny the existence of the haunting, as their promotional efforts fostered the home's reputation in the community.", "In 1989, the house was included in a five-home walking tour of Nyack and described as 'a riverfront Victorian (with ghost)' in a newspaper article.", "The reputation created by the defendant greatly impairs both the value of the property and its potential for resale.", "The extent of this impairment is an issue of fact for resolution at trial.", "The real estate broker, as agent for the seller, is under no duty to disclose the phantasmal reputation of the premises.", "The plaintiff has no legal remedy for fraudulent misrepresentation against the seller.", "Despite the lack of legal remedy, the spirit of equity moves the author to allow the buyer to seek rescission of the contract."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "77", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "62 \n Appellees contend that it is settled law in California that the \nowner of land has no property rights in superjacent \nairspace, either by code enactments or by judicial decrees \nand that the ad coelum doctrine does not apply in \nCalifornia. We have examined the statutes of California, \nparticularly California Civil Code, s 659 and s 829, as well \nas Grandona v. Lovdal, 78 Cal. 611, 21 P. 366, 12 \nAm.St.Rep. 121. Wood v. Moulton, 146 Ca l. 317, 80 P. 92; \nand Kafka v. Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 P. 753, 29 A.L.R. \n833, but we find nothing therein to negative the ad coelum \nformula. Furthermore, if we should adopt this formula as \nbeing the law, there might be serious doubt as to whether a \nstate statute could change it without running counter to the \nFourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United \nStates. If we could accept and literally construe the ad \ncoelum doctrine, it would simplify the solution of this case; \nhowever, we reject that doc trine. We think it is not the law, \nand that it never was the law. \nThis formula \u2018from the center of the earth to the sky\u2019 was \ninvented at some remote time in the past when the use of \nspace above land actual or conceivable was confined to \nnarrow limits, and simply meant that the owner of the land \ncould use the overlying space to such an extent as he was \nable, and that no one could ever interfere with that use. \nThis formula was never taken literally, but was a figurative \nphrase to express the full and complete ownership of land \nand the right to whatever superjacent airspace was \nnecessary or convenient to the enjoyment of the land. \nIn applying a rule of law, or construing a statute or \nconstitutional provision, we cannot shut our eyes to \ncommon knowledge, the pro gress of civilization, or the \nexperience of mankind. A literal construction of this \nformula will bring about an absurdity.", "proposition": ["Appellees argue that the owner of land has no property rights in superjacent airspace in California.", "The ad coelum doctrine is not applicable in California.", "We have examined California Civil Code sections 659 and 829, as well as Grandona v. Lovdal, Wood v. Moulton, and Kafka v. Bozio, but found no evidence to negate the ad coelum formula.", "If the ad coelum doctrine were adopted as law, there might be doubt about whether a state statute could change it without violating the Fourteenth Amendment.", "Accepting and literally construing the ad coelum doctrine would simplify the solution of the case, but we reject that doctrine.", "The ad coelum formula, 'from the center of the earth to the sky,' was invented in the past when the use of space above land was limited and meant that the owner of the land could use the overlying space to the extent possible without interference.", "The ad coelum formula was never taken literally but was a figurative phrase to express the full and complete ownership of land and the right to whatever superjacent airspace was necessary or convenient for the enjoyment of the land.", "In applying a rule of law, construing a statute, or interpreting a constitutional provision, we cannot ignore common knowledge, the progress of civilization, or the experience of mankind.", "A literal construction of the ad coelum formula would lead to an absurdity."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "595", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Cal.Civ.Code sec. 2233(a) (Deering 1991 Supp.). Thus, \nCalifornia, after our decision in Motschenbacher \nspecifically contemplated protection for interests other than \nname or likeness, but did not include a cause of action for", "proposition": ["California, after the decision in Motschenbacher, considered protecting interests other than name or likeness.", "California did not include a cause of action for the protection of interests other than name or likeness."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "86", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "71 \n wouldn\u2019t change one iota by having cataract surgery done.\u201d \nTwo patients are interviewed who report miserable \nexperiences with the Center \u2013one claiming that the doctors \nthere had failed to spot an easily visible melanoma, another \nthat as a result of unnecessary cataract surgery her \u201ceye \nruptured,\u201d producing \u201crunning pus.\u201d A former employee \ntells the viewer that Dr. Desnick alters patients\u2019 medical \nrecords to show they need cataract surgery \u2013for example, \nchanging the record of one patient\u2019s vision test from 20/30 \nto 20/80 \u2013and that he instructs all members of his staff to \nuse pens of t he same color in order to facilitate the \nalteration of patients\u2019 records. \nOne symptom of cataracts is that lights of normal \nbrightness produce glare. Glazer is shown telling a patient, \n\u201cYou know, you\u2019re getting glare. I would say we could do \nsignificantly better [with an operation].\u201d And Simon is \nshown asking two patients, \u201cDo you ever notice any glare \nor blurriness when you\u2019re driving, or difficulty with the \nsigns?\u201d Both say no, and immediately Donaldson tells the \nviewer that \u201cthe Desnick Center uses a ver y interesting \nmachine, called an auto -refractor, to determine whether \nthere are glare problems.\u201d Donaldson demonstrates the \nmachine, then says that \u201cPaddy Kalish is an optometrist \nwho says that when he worked at the Desnick clinic from \n1987 to 1990, the ma chine was regularly rigged. He says he \nwatched a technician tamper with the machine, this way\u201d \u2013\nand then Kalish gives a demonstration, adding, \u201cThis \nhappened routinely for all the older patients that came in \nfor the eye exams.\u201d Donaldson reveals that Dr. De snick \nhas obtained a judgment against Kalish for defamation, but \nadds that \u201cKalish is not the only one to tell us the machine \nmay have been rigged. PrimeTime talked to four other \nformer Desnick employees who say almost everyone failed \nthe glare test.\u201d \nThere is more, including mention of a proceeding begun by \nthe Illinois Medical Board in which Dr. Desnick is charged", "proposition": ["The passage discusses negative experiences with the Center.", "One patient claims that doctors failed to spot an easily visible melanoma.", "Another patient reports unnecessary cataract surgery resulting in eye rupture and running pus.", "A former employee accuses Dr. Desnick of altering patients' medical records to show need for cataract surgery.", "The employee also states Dr. Desnick instructs staff to use pens of the same color for record alteration.", "One symptom of cataracts is glare from normal brightness lights.", "Glazer tells a patient they experience glare and could improve vision with surgery.", "Simon asks patients if they notice glare or blurriness when driving or difficulty with signs, and both say no.", "The Desnick Center uses an auto-refractor machine to determine glare problems.", "Optometrist Paddy Kalish claims the auto-refractor machine was rigged when he worked at the clinic from 1987 to 1990.", "Kalish demonstrates how the machine was allegedly rigged for older patients.", "Dr. Desnick has obtained a judgment against Kalish for defamation.", "Four other former Desnick employees also claim the machine may have been rigged.", "The passage mentions a proceeding begun by the Illinois Medical Board in which Dr. Desnick is charged."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "710", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Id. Without the \nrequisite ten years of denying the owner\u2019s title and ten years \nof possessing adversely to the owner\u2019s title, the Picerne \nclaimants could not establish adverse possession. \nAnalogously here, Cahill did not deny Morrow\u2019s title when \nshe sent her 1997 letter to George Morrow. Rather , she was \noutwardly declaring to the rightful owner himself the", "proposition": ["The Picerne Group is a real estate investment firm.", "The Picerne Group filed a lawsuit against Morrow.", "The lawsuit claims adverse possession of a property in New York.", "The Picerne Group argued that it had the right to the property because it had been paying rent to Morrow for many years."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "425", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "410 \n fall short of the mark. As a statutory matter, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 \n101 does not afford protection from copying to a collection \nof facts that are selected, coordinated, and arranged in a \nway that utterly lacks originality. Given that some works \nmust fail, we cannot imagine a more likely candidate. \nIndeed, were we to hold that Rural\u2019s white pages pass \nmuster, it is hard to believe that any collection of facts \ncould fail. \nBecause Rural\u2019s white pages lack the requisite originality, \nFeist\u2019s use of the listings cannot constitute infringement. \nThis decision should not be construed as demeaning \nRural\u2019s efforts in compiling its directory, but rather as \nmaking clear that copyright rewards originality, not effort. \nAs this Court noted more than a century ago, \u201d \u2018great praise \nmay be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and \nenterprise in publishing this paper, yet the law doe s not \ncontemplate their being rewarded in this way.\u2019 \u201d Baker v. \nSelden, 101 U.S., at 105. \nThe judgment of the Court of Appeals is \nReversed. \nJustice BLACKMUN concurs in the judgment. \n3.4.2. Calibration: Scope of Exclusion, a.k.a. Fair Use \nSuntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 \n(11th Cir. 2001) \nJoseph M. Beck, Miles J. Alexander, Jerry Bailey Swann, \nKilpatrick Stockton & Cody, Atlanta, Georgia, for \nAppellant. \nRichard Kurnit, New York City, William B. Smith, Ralph R. \nMorris on, Anne Moody Johnson, Jones, Day, Reavis & \nPogue, Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellee. \nLeon Friedman, New York City, for Pen American Ctr., \nAmerican Booksellers Foundation for Freedom of Exp., \nFreedom to Read Foundation, Washington Lawyers\u2019 for", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case related to copyright protection for a collection of facts.", "The case involves Rural Telephone Service Company's white pages and Feist Publications' use of the listings.", "The passage quotes a statutory matter from 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 101, which states that protection from copying is not afforded to a collection of facts that lack originality.", "The passage mentions that some works must fail the originality test, and Rural's white pages are considered a likely candidate.", "If Rural's white pages were to pass the originality test, it would be difficult to imagine any collection of facts failing.", "The passage states that because Rural's white pages lack the requisite originality, Feist's use of the listings cannot constitute infringement.", "The decision should not be construed as demeaning Rural's efforts in compiling its directory but rather as making clear that copyright rewards originality, not effort.", "The passage cites a quote from a more than a century-old case, Baker v. Selden, emphasizing that the law does not contemplate rewarding efforts but originality.", "The Court's judgment is reversed, and Justice BLACKMUN concurs in the judgment.", "The passage also refers to Calibration: Scope of Exclusion, a.k.a. Fair Use, and cites Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).", "The passage lists the attorneys and organizations involved in the case."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "540", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "525 \n The real question here, I b elieve, is not whether the record \nevidence satisfies Sony. As I have interpreted the standard \nset forth in that case, it does. And of the Courts of Appeals \nthat have considered the matter, only one has proposed \ninterpreting Sony more strictly than I would do \u2013 in a case \nwhere the product might have failed under any standard. \nInstead, the real question is whether we should modify the \nSony standard, as MGM requests, or interpret Sony more \nstrictly, as I believe Justice GINSBURG\u2019s approach would \ndo in practice . Compare ante, at 2784 -2787 (concurring) \n(insufficient opinion vidence in this case of both present \nlawful uses and of a reasonable prospect that substantial \nnoninfringing uses would develop over time), with Sony, \n464 U.S., at 442 -447, 104 S.Ct. 774 (basi ng conclusion as to \nthe likely existence of a substantial market for authorized \ncopying upon general declarations, some survey data, and \ncommon sense). \nAs I have said, Sony itself sought to \u201cstrike a balance \nbetween a copyright holder\u2019s legitimate demand f or \neffective -not merely symbolic -protection of the statutory \nmonopoly, and the rights of others freely to engage in \nsubstantially unrelated areas of commerce.\u201d Thus, to \ndetermine whether modification, or a strict interpretation, \nof Sony is needed, I would ask whether MGM has shown \nthat Sony incorrectly balanced copyright and new -\ntechnology interests. In particular: (1) Has Sony (as I \ninterpret it) worked to protect new technology? (2) If so, \nwould modification or strict interpretation significantly \nweaken t hat protection? (3) If so, would new or necessary \ncopyright -related benefits outweigh any such weakening? \nA \nThe first question is the easiest to answer. Sony\u2019s rule, as I \ninterpret it, has provided entrepreneurs with needed", "proposition": ["The real question is whether to modify the Sony standard or interpret it more strictly.", "The record evidence satisfies Sony as interpreted by the author.", "Only one Court of Appeals has proposed interpreting Sony more strictly.", "The real question is whether MGM has shown that Sony incorrectly balanced copyright and new-technology interests.", "Sony aimed to strike a balance between copyright holders' protection and the rights of others.", "To determine if modification or strict interpretation is needed, the author would consider the impact on new technology protection and copyright-related benefits."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "655", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "640 \n believe Mrs. Davis\u2019 version of them rather than Mr. \nJohnson \u2019s, did not constitute the kind of representation \nupon which a buyer\u2019s reliance is justified. \nI do not agree with the Court\u2019s belief that the distinction \nbetween nondisclosure and affirmative statement is weak or \nnonexistent. It is a distinction that we sh ould take special \ncare to emphasize and preserve. Imposition of liability for \nseller\u2019s nondisclosure of the condition of improvements to \nreal property is the first step toward making the seller a \nguarantor of the good condition of the property. Ultimately \nthis trend will significantly burden the alienability of \nproperty because sellers will have to worry about the \npossibility of catastrophic post -sale judgments for damages \nsought to pay for repairs. The trend will proceed somewhat \nas follows. At first, the cause of action will require proof of \nactual knowledge of the undisclosed defect on the part of \nthe seller. But in many cases the courts will allow it to be \nshown by circumstantial evidence. Then a rule of \nconstructive knowledge will develop based on the \nreasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he \nshould have known about it before attempting to sell the \nproperty. Thus the burden of inspection will shift from the \nbuyer to the seller. Ultimately the courts will be in the \nposition of imposing i mplied warranties and guaranties on \nall sellers of real property. \nAlthough as described in the majority opinion this change \nin the law sounds progressive, high -minded, and idealistic, \nit is in reality completely unnecessary. Prudent purchasers \ninspect prop erty, with expert advice if necessary, before \nthey agree to buy. Prudent lenders require inspections \nbefore agreeing to provide purchase money. Initial deposits \nof earnest money can be made with the agreement to \npurchase being conditional upon the favorabl e results of \nexpert inspections. It is significant that in the present case \nthe major portion of the purchase price was to be financed \nby the Johnsons who were to hold a mortgage on the", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the distinction between nondisclosure and affirmative statement in relation to a buyer's reliance on a seller's version of events.", "The author disagrees with the Court's belief that the distinction between nondisclosure and affirmative statement is weak or nonexistent.", "The author argues that imposing liability for seller's nondisclosure of the condition of improvements to real property could lead to making the seller a guarantor of the good condition of the property.", "The author believes that this trend could significantly burden the alienability of property due to the possibility of catastrophic post-sale judgments for damages sought to pay for repairs.", "The author predicts that the cause of action for undisclosed defects will eventually require proof of actual knowledge of the defect on the part of the seller, then allow circumstantial evidence, and finally develop a rule of constructive knowledge.", "The author argues that the burden of inspection will shift from the buyer to the seller, ultimately leading to implied warranties and guaranties on all sellers of real property.", "The author believes that this change in the law is unnecessary, as prudent purchasers inspect property with expert advice before agreeing to buy, and prudent lenders require inspections before agreeing to provide purchase money.", "The author notes that in the present case, the major portion of the purchase price was to be financed by the Johnsons who were to hold a mortgage on the property."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "704", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "I., c. 16). Essentially, in England, the \u201c[o]riginal \npolicy supporting the development of adverse possession \nreflected society\u2019s unwillingness to take away a \u2018right\u2019 which \nan adverse possessor thought he had. Similarly, society felt", "proposition": ["Society's unwillingness to take away a 'right' which an adverse possessor thought he had reflected the original policy supporting the development of adverse possession in England.", "Similarly, society felt."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "188", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Just. lib. 2, tit. 1, sec. 12. \u201cFeroe igitur bestioe, simul atque \nab aliiquo captoe f uerint jure gentium statim illius esse \nincipiunt.\u201d There must be a taking; and even that is not in \nall cases sufficient, for in the same section he observes, \n\u201cQuicquid autem corum ceperis, eo usque tuum esse \nintelligitur, donec tua custodia coercetur; cum vero tuam \nevaserit custodiam, et in libertatem naturalem sese \nreceperit, tuam esse desinit, et rursus occumpantis fit.\u201d It is \nadded also that this natural liberty may be regained even if \nin sight of the pursuer, \u201cita sit, ut difficilis sit ejus \npersecutio. \u201d In section 13, it is laid down, that even \nwounding will not give a right of property in an animal that \nis unreclaimed. For, notwithstanding the wound, \u201cmulta", "proposition": ["Ensure the input JSON is properly formatted and contains an array of propositions."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "235", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "220 \n belong to the finder; that is to him who moves them from \nthe place where they are, and secures them. \u201d Id 461. \nThe law is happily stated in the code of Louisiana thus: \u201cTo \nbe able to acquire possession of a property, two distinct \nthings are requisite: 1. The intention of possessing as \nowner; 2. The corporeal possession of the thing.\u201d La. Civil \nCode, Art. 3399. \nPothier, with his characteristic accuracy and perspicuity, has \nfully stated the law upon this subject, and the rule as stated \nby him is to this effect; that to acquire possession of a thing \nthere must be a desire to possess it, joined to a prehension \nof the thing. See in full Nos. 39 to 42 & No. 55 of his Traite \nDe La. Possession , and Nos. 63 & 64 of his Traite Du Droit De \nPropriete ; Marvin on Wreck & Salvage s. 127. \nSuch are the doctrines of the Louisiana code, of the \ncommentators upon the Common, Roman, French and \nAdmiralty law, and applying them to the facts of this case, \nwe hold that Brazelton never attained to the possession of \nthe wreck of the America, that he therefore had no title to \nit by occupancy, had no right upon which judicial \nprotectio n could operate, none which the court below \nshould have recognized. He had considered the wreck as \nhis as its finder, but had not actually appropriated it to \nhimself; his intention to possess was useless without \ndetention of the property; he had not found the lead in the \nrequired sense of discovering it, and taking it up; he was \nnot a finder, in that he had not moved the wrecked \nproperty, or secured it; he had the intention of possessing it \nas owner, but did not acquire its corporeal possession; to \nhis desi re to possess there was not joined a prehension of \nthe thing.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the law regarding acquiring possession of a property.", "To acquire possession, two things are required: the intention of possessing as owner and the corporeal possession of the thing.", "Pothier states that to acquire possession of a thing, there must be a desire to possess it, joined to a prehension of the thing.", "The passage cites specific articles from the Louisiana Civil Code and Pothier's Traite De La Possession and Traite Du Droit De Propriete.", "The passage applies these doctrines to the facts of a specific case and holds that Brazelton never attained possession of the wreck of the America.", "Brazelton had considered the wreck as his as its finder, but had not actually appropriated it to himself; his intention to possess was useless without detention of the property.", "Brazelton had not found the lead in the required sense of discovering it and taking it up; he was not a finder, in that he had not moved the wrecked property or secured it.", "Brazelton had the intention of possessing it as owner, but did not acquire its corporeal possession; to his desire to possess there was not joined a prehension of the thing."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "99", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Palmer\u201d and say that it \ncauses their town to have early sunsets.", "proposition": ["The cause of the early sunsets in Palmer is not mentioned in the passage."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "55", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "40 \n piano. It is not essential to its character as treasure trove \nthat the thing shall have been hidden in the ground; it is \nsufficient if it is found concealed in other articles, such as \nbureaus, safes, or machinery. While, strictly speaking, \ntreasure trove is gold or silver, it has been held to include \nthe paper representatives thereof, especi ally where found \nhidden with those precious metals. 1 AM.JUR.2d \nAbandoned, Lost, Etc., Property s 7 (1994); see also \nBenjamin, supra ; Jackson, supra . \u201cTreasure trove carries with it \nthe thought of antiquity; to be classed as treasure trove, the \ntreasure mu st have been hidden or concealed so long as to \nindicate that the owner is probably dead or unknown.\u201d 1 \nAM.JUR.2d Abandoned, Lost, Etc., Property s 8 (1994). \n\u201cTitle to treasure trove belongs to the finder, against all the \nworld except the true owner.\u201d 1 AM. JUR.2d Abandoned, \nLost, Etc., Property s 26 (1994); see also Ritz, supra . \nRemaining mindful of the various types of found property \nand the rights to possession of that property, we turn now \nto the case before us on review. Appellants were stripping \nmotel r ooms at the Best Western Motel, which belongs to \nLock Hospitality Inc., on February 1, 1999. Their work, as \nindependent contractors, included removing sheet rock or \ndry wall, ceiling tiles, and other material to prepare the \nmotel for renovations. While wor king in room 118, \nappellants removed some ceiling tiles. Appellants found a \ncardboard box concealed on top of the heating and air vent \nthat became visible as a result of the removal of the ceiling \ntiles. Appellant Terry described the box as \u201ccovered with \ndust.\u201d Appellant Stocks stated in his affidavit that \u201cthe box \nand its contents appeared to have been located at the site \nfor a very long time.\u201d Mr.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the concept of treasure trove and its legal implications.", "Treasure trove is defined as gold or silver, but can also include paper representatives thereof when found hidden with those precious metals.", "To be classified as treasure trove, the treasure must have been hidden or concealed for a long time, indicating that the owner is probably dead or unknown.", "Title to treasure trove belongs to the finder, against all the world except the true owner.", "The passage then discusses a specific case involving appellants stripping motel rooms and finding a cardboard box concealed on top of a heating and air vent.", "The box was covered with dust and appeared to have been located at the site for a very long time.", "The appellants were working as independent contractors for Lock Hospitality Inc. at the Best Western Motel."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "310", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "295 \n the copyright or other laws of the United States. \nComplainant\u2019s news matter is not copyrighted. It is said \nthat it could not, in practice, be copyrighted, because of the \nlarge number of dispatches that are sent daily; and, \naccording to complainant\u2019s contention, news is not within \nthe operation of the copyright act. Defendant, while \napparently conceding this, nevertheless invokes the \nanalogies of the law of literary property and copyright, \ninsisting as its princi pal contention that, assuming \ncomplainant has a right of property in its news, it can be \nmaintained (unless the copyright act by complied with) only \nby being kept secret and confidential, and that upon the \npublication with complainant\u2019s consent of uncopyri ghted \nnews of any of complainant\u2019s members in a newspaper or \nupon a bulletin board, the right of property is lost, and the \nsubsequent use of the news by the public or by defendant \nfor any purpose whatever becomes lawful. \nA preliminary objection to the form in which the suit is \nbrought may be disposed of at the outset. It is said that the \nCircuit Court of Appeals granted relief upon considerations \napplicable to particular members of the Associated Press, \nand that this was erroneous because the suit was broug ht \nby complainant as a corporate entity, and not by its \nmembers; the argument being that their interests cannot be \nprotected in this proceeding any more than the individual \nrights of a stockholder can be enforced in an action \nbrought by the corporation. Fr om the averments of the bill, \nhowever, it is plain that the suit in substance was brought \nfor the benefit of complainant\u2019s members, and that they \nwould be proper parties, and, except for their numbers, \nperhaps necessary parties. Complainant is a proper par ty to \nconduct the suit as representing their interest; and since no \nspecific objection, based upon the want of parties, appears \nto have been made below, we will treat the objection as \nwaived. See Equity Rules 38, 43, 44 (33 Sup. Ct. xxix, xxx).", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving the Associated Press and a defendant.", "Complainant's news matter is not copyrighted.", "Defendant invokes the analogies of the law of literary property and copyright.", "The Circuit Court of Appeals granted relief upon considerations applicable to particular members of the Associated Press.", "The suit was brought by the Associated Press as a corporate entity, and not by its members.", "The interests of the individual members cannot be protected in this proceeding any more than the individual rights of a stockholder can be enforced in an action brought by the corporation.", "Complainant is a proper party to conduct the suit as representing the interest of its members.", "No specific objection based on the want of parties appears to have been made below."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "498", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "483 \n the public uses a VTR principally to record a program he \ncannot view as it is being televised and then to watch it \nonce at a later time. This practice, known as \u201ctime -\nshifting,\u201d enlarges the television viewing audience. For that \nreason, a significant amount of television programming \nmay be used in this manner without objection from the \nowners of the copyrights on t he programs. For the same \nreason, even the two respondents in this case, who do \nassert objections to time -shifting in this litigation, were \nunable to prove that the practice has impaired the \ncommercial value of their copyrights or has created any \nlikelihoo d of future harm. Given these findings, there is no \nbasis in the Copyright Act upon which respondents can \nhold petitioners liable for distributing VTR\u2019s to the general \npublic. The Court of Appeals\u2019 holding that respondents are \nentitled to enjoin the distri bution of VTR\u2019s, to collect \nroyalties on the sale of such equipment, or to obtain other \nrelief, if affirmed, would enlarge the scope of respondents\u2019 \nstatutory monopolies to encompass control over an article \nof commerce that is not the subject of copyright \nprotection. Such an expansion of the copyright privilege is \nbeyond the limits of the grants authorized by Congress. \nI \nThe two respondents in this action, Universal Studios, Inc. \nand Walt Disney Productions, produce and hold the \ncopyrights on a substantial number of motion pictures and \nother audiovisual works. In the current marketplace, they \ncan exploit their rights in these works in a number of ways: \nby authorizing theatrical exhibitions, by licensing limited \nshowings on cable and network television, by se lling \nsyndication rights for repeated airings on local television \nstations, and by marketing programs on prerecorded \nvideotapes or videodiscs. Some works are suitable for \nexploitation through all of these avenues, while the market \nfor other works is more l imited.", "proposition": ["The public primarily uses a VTR to record a program they cannot view when it is being televised and then watch it later.", "This practice, known as 'time-shifting,' increases the television viewing audience.", "A significant amount of television programming can be used in this manner without objection from the copyright owners.", "Even the two respondents in the case, who object to time-shifting, could not prove that the practice has impaired the commercial value of their copyrights or created any likelihood of future harm.", "There is no basis in the Copyright Act for the respondents to hold the petitioners liable for distributing VTRs to the general public.", "If the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, it would expand the scope of the respondents' statutory monopolies to control an article of commerce not subject to copyright protection.", "Expanding the copyright privilege beyond the limits authorized by Congress is not allowed.", "Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions are respondents in this action and hold copyrights on a substantial number of motion pictures and other audiovisual works.", "In the current marketplace, they can exploit their rights in these works in various ways, including theatrical exhibitions, licensing limited showings on cable and network television, selling syndication rights for repeated airings on local television stations, and marketing programs on prerecorded videotapes or videodiscs.", "Some works are suitable for exploitation through all these avenues, while the market for other works is more limited."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "103", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "88 \n include as distinct interests the right to exclude and the \nright to enjoy, violations of which give rise to the d istinct \ncauses of action respectively of trespass and nuisance. \nProsser & Keeton, Torts (5 th ed.), s 87, p. 622. \nA. Historical Overview \n\u201cAt common law, trespass was a form of action brought to \nrecover damages for any injury to one\u2019s person or property \nor relationship with another.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (6th \ned.), p. 1502. This broad usage of the term \u201ctrespass\u201d then \ngave way to a narrower usage, referring to intrusions upon \na person\u2019s \u201ctangible property, real or personal.\u201d Prosser & \nKeeton, supra at s 13 , p. 67. Today, the general concept of \n\u201ctrespass\u201d has been refined into several specific forms of \ntrespass, see Black\u2019s Law Dictionary (6th ed.), pp. 1502 -\n1504, and related doctrines known by various names. \nLandowners seeking damages or equitable relief in response \nto violations of their possessory rights to land now \ngenerally proceed under the common -law derivatives of \nstrict liability, negligence, nuisance, or trespass to land.8 It is \nthe latter two products of this evolution from the general \nconcept of t respass that are at issue in the present case. \n\u201d\u2018[T]respass is an invasion of the plaintiff\u2019s interest in the \nexclusive possession of his land, while nuisance is an \ninterference with his use and enjoyment of it.\u2019 \u201d Hadfield v. \nOakland Co. Drain Comm\u2019r, 430 Mich. 139, 151, 422 \nN.W.2d 205 (1988) (Brickley, J., joined by Riley, C.J., and \nCavanagh, J.), quoting Prosser & Keeton, supra at s 87, p. \n622. Historically, \u201c[e]very unauthorized intrusion upon the \n \nHeller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx \nto Markets, 111 Harv L R 621, 663, n.", "proposition": ["The right to exclude and the right to enjoy are distinct interests that give rise to separate causes of action: trespass and nuisance.", "Trespass is a form of action to recover damages for injuries to one's person, property, or relationship with another.", "The term 'trespass' has evolved from a broad usage to a narrower usage, referring to intrusions upon a person's tangible property, real or personal.", "Today, landowners seeking damages or equitable relief in response to violations of their possessory rights to land generally proceed under common-law derivatives of strict liability, negligence, nuisance, or trespass to land.", "Trespass is an invasion of the plaintiff's interest in the exclusive possession of their land, while nuisance is an interference with their use and enjoyment of it.", "Historically, every unauthorized intrusion upon the landowner's property constitutes a trespass."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "228", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "213 \n abandoned by the owners; that Brazelton, having \ninformation of the place where the boat sank, proceeded, in \nDecember, 1854, to ascertain its exact locality in the bed of \nthe r iver, with the view of raising the sunken lead; that, in \nJanuary, 1855, he arrived at the vicinity of the wreck, with \nhis diving boat, to carry out his intention, and fastened a \nbuoy to a weight that rested upon the wreck, with the \nexpectation of putting h is boat over it the next day, but that \nhe was detained by other business, and by the difficulties \nand dangers of the work in the existing state of water, with \nboats like his, and by the necessity for making repairs upon \nhis boat, and apparatus for raising the cargo, till the \ndefendants, upon the 28th of September, 1855, caused one \nof their boats to stop at the shore near the wreck, to search \nfor and find it, to place their boat over it, and to commence \nraising the lead. \nThe quantity of lead raised by the de fendants was stated in \ntheir answer, and applying the price thereto, as shown by \nthe evidence, its value was found to be four thousand, five \nhundred and seven dollars and ninety -six cents, for which \nsum the court below gave a decree, perpetuated the \nprelim inary injunction which was granted at the beginning \nof the suit, and which arrested the defendants in their labor \nupon the lead. \nAfter the injunction had been served, and the defendants, \nin obedience there -to, had withdrawn their boat from the \nwreck, and w hile the plaintiff in his turn, was engaged in \nbringing up the lead left by the defendants, they brought \ntheir boat back near to the plaintiff\u2019s boat and anchored, \nthereby obstructing his operations, for which two of the \ndefendants that were within the jur isdiction of the court, \nwere brought before it for contempt in disobeying the \ninjunction, and were fined one thousand dollars, which \nwas, by order of the court, paid to the plaintiff for his \ndamages from the obstruction. \n\u2026 .", "proposition": ["There were 213 abandoned boats.", "Brazelton had information about the location of a sunken boat.", "In December 1854, Brazelton tried to find the exact location of the sunken boat in the river.", "In January 1855, Brazelton arrived near the wreck with his diving boat.", "Brazelton fastened a buoy to a weight on the wreck.", "Brazelton was detained by other business, difficulties, dangers, and the need for repairs.", "The defendants stopped their boat near the wreck on September 28, 1855.", "The defendants found the wreck and placed their boat over it to raise the lead.", "The defendants raised four thousand, five hundred and seven dollars and ninety-six cents worth of lead.", "The court gave a decree for the value of the lead and perpetuated the preliminary injunction.", "After the injunction was served, the defendants obstructed the plaintiff's operations.", "Two defendants were brought before the court for contempt and fined one thousand dollars.", "The fine was paid to the plaintiff for his damages from the obstruction."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "216", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The forests have given place to cultivated fields; the \nmorass is dried up; the land has become solid \u2014is covered with \nmeadows, pastures, domestic animals, smiling and healthy \nhabitations; cities have risen upon regular plans; wide roads are", "proposition": ["The forests have given place to cultivated fields.", "The morass is dried up.", "The land has become solid and is covered with meadows, pastures, and domestic animals.", "Smiling and healthy habitations have appeared.", "Cities have risen upon regular plans.", "Wide roads have been built."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "412", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "397 \n required that a work be \u2018original\u2019 in order to command \nprotection. However, the courts uniformly infer red the \nrequirement from the fact that copyright protection may \nonly be claimed by \u2018authors\u2019\u2026 . It was reasoned that since \nan author is \u2018the \u2026 creator, originator\u2019 it follows that a \nwork is not the product of an author unless the work is \noriginal.\u201d Nimmer \u00a7 2.01 (footnotes omitted) (citing cases). \nBut some courts misunderstood the statute. See, e.g., Leon v. \nPacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 (CA9 1937); \nJeweler\u2019s Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. \n83 (CA2 1922). These co urts ignored \u00a7\u00a7 3 and 4, focusing \ntheir attention instead on \u00a7 5 of the Act. Section 5, \nhowever, was purely technical in nature: It provided that a \nperson seeking to register a work should indicate on the \napplication the type of work, and it listed 14 cate gories \nunder which the work might fall. One of these categories \nwas \u201c[b]ooks, including composite and cyclopaedic works, \ndirectories, gazetteers, and other compilations.\u201d \u00a7 5(a). \nSection 5 did not purport to say that all compilations were \nautomatically cop yrightable. Indeed, it expressly disclaimed \nany such function, pointing out that \u201cthe subject -matter of \ncopyright [i]s defined in section four.\u201d Nevertheless, the \nfact that factual compilations were mentioned specifically in \n\u00a7 5 led some courts to infer er roneously that directories and \nthe like were copyrightable per se, \u201cwithout any further or \nprecise showing of original \u2013 personal \u2013 authorship.\u201d \nGinsburg 1895. \nMaking matters worse, these courts developed a new theory \nto justify the protection of factual c ompilations. Known \nalternatively as \u201csweat of the brow\u201d or \u201cindustrious \ncollection,\u201d the underlying notion was that copyright was a \nreward for the hard work that went into compiling facts.", "proposition": ["The originality requirement for copyright protection is based on the fact that copyright is only available to authors, who are defined as creators or originators of a work. Some courts misunderstood the statute and focused on a technical section, leading to incorrect interpretations of copyright protection for factual compilations. Section 5 of the Act provided a list of 14 categories under which a work might fall, including 'books, including composite and cyclopaedic works, directories, gazetteers, and other compilations.' Section 5 did not claim that all compilations were automatically copyrightable. Some courts inferred that directories and similar works were copyrightable per se without showing original authorship. These courts developed a new theory called 'sweat of the brow' or 'industrious collection,' which suggested that copyright was a reward for the hard work that went into compiling facts."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "301", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "286 \n Answers \n1. Now that we have read cases defining the concept of possession, \nreturn to the case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth . Argue, contrary to the \ncourt\u2019s decision in that case, that the shop owner is the first \npossessor, and thus owner, of the notes that were found on his \nshop floor. \nWhatever additional claims the shop owner in Bridges may \nhave to the money as a landowner, he should be declared the \nowner as the first possessor of the lost property. Possession is \ndefined as the intent to possess or control an object together \nwith physical actions manifesting that intent. Precisely what \nacts are required varies with context. A landowner should be \ndeemed to intend to possess all lost goods on his or her \nproperty, because most landowner do indeed intend to \ncontrol the objects on their land \u2013 even if they are unaware of \nthe objects\u2019 whereabouts or even existence at any given \nmoment. In any event, an intent t o control access to the land \nis sufficient intent to control access to things on the land. The \nlandowner maintains physical control over the land by \ncontrolling entry and setting the terms on which one is \nallowed to stay on the land. Even if a landowner op ens up to \nthe general public, he or she is not required to do this and \nmay revoke consent at any time. The physical control the \nlandowner in this case clearly exerted over the land is \nsufficient to communicate an intent to control all of the \nproperty conta ined on the land, including lost property. \n2. Which of the following most directly rebuts a \u201cLockean labor \ntheory\u201d argument that a litigant, call him A, should be declared the \nowner of an object: (a) A committed a moral wrong in the course \nof acquiring the object, (b) A is richer than B, who has a much \ngreater need for the object, or (c) granting rights to A would create \nincentives for conduct that is more harmful than beneficial. Why? \n(Points awarded o nly for the explanation.)", "proposition": ["After reading cases defining the concept of possession, we should argue against the court's decision in Bridges v. Hawkesworth.", "The shop owner in Bridges should be considered the first possessor and, therefore, the owner of the notes found on his shop floor.", "The shop owner may have additional claims to the money as a landowner, but he should still be declared the owner as the first possessor of the lost property.", "Possession is defined as the intent to possess or control an object, along with physical actions manifesting that intent.", "The required acts for possession vary depending on the context.", "A landowner should be assumed to intend to possess all lost goods on their property.", "An intent to control access to the land is sufficient to imply an intent to control objects on the land.", "A landowner maintains physical control over their land by controlling entry and setting the terms for staying on the land.", "A landowner is not required to open their property to the general public and may revoke consent at any time.", "The physical control exerted by the landowner in the case is sufficient to communicate an intent to control all property contained on the land, including lost property.", "A 'Lockean labor theory' argument claims that a litigant, called A, should be declared the owner of an object.", "The most direct way to rebut a 'Lockean labor theory' argument is by showing that A committed a moral wrong in acquiring the object.", "Another way to rebut the argument is by demonstrating that A is richer than another person, B, who has a greater need for the object.", "A third way to rebut the argument is by proving that granting rights to A would create incentives for conduct that is more harmful than beneficial."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "162", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "147 \n elimination of air pollution. This is an area beyond the \ncircumference of one private lawsuit. It is a direct \nresponsibility for government and should not thus be \nundertaken as an incident to solvi ng a dispute between \nproperty owners and a single cement plant \u2013 one of many \u2013 \nin the Hudson River valley. \nThe cement making operations of defendant have been \nfound by the court at Special Term to have damaged the \nnearby properties of plaintiffs in these t wo actions. That \ncourt, as it has been noted, accordingly found defendant \nmaintained a nuisance and this has been affirmed at the \nAppellate Division. The total damage to plaintiffs\u2019 \nproperties is, however, relatively small in comparison with \nthe value of d efendant\u2019s operation and with the \nconsequences of the injunction which plaintiffs seek. \nThe ground for the denial of injunction, notwithstanding \nthe finding both that there is a nuisance and that plaintiffs \nhave been damaged substantially, is the large dis parity in \neconomic consequences of the nuisance and of the \ninjunction. This theory cannot, however, be sustained \nwithout overruling a doctrine which has been consistently \nreaffirmed in several leading cases in this court and which \nhas never been disavowed here, namely that where a \nnuisance has been found and where there has been any \nsubstantial damage shown by the party complaining an \ninjunction will be granted. \nThe rule in New York has been that such a nuisance will be \nenjoined although marked disparity be shown in economic \nconsequence between the effect of the injunction and the \neffect of the nuisance. \nThe problem of disparity in economic consequence was \nsharply in focus in Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co. (208 N. \nY. 1). A pulp mill entailing an investment of more than a \nmillion dollars polluted a stream in which plaintiff, who \nowned a farm, was \u201ca lower riparian owner\u201d. The economic", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the responsibility of the government in eliminating air pollution.", "A specific case is mentioned where a cement plant's operations have been found to damage nearby properties, leading to a nuisance finding.", "The total damage to the plaintiffs' properties is relatively small compared to the value of the defendant's operation and the consequences of the injunction they seek.", "There is a doctrine that has been consistently reaffirmed in several leading cases, stating that an injunction will be granted when a nuisance has been found and substantial damage has been shown by the complaining party, even if there is a marked disparity in economic consequences between the effect of the injunction and the effect of the nuisance."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "333", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "318 \n except that the International News Service is transmitt ing \nnews which it believes to be credible. \nNor is the use made by the International News Service of \nthe information taken from papers or bulletins of \nAssociated Press members legally objectionable by reason \nof the purpose for which it was employed. The act s here \ncomplained of were not done for the purpose of injuring \nthe business of the Associated Press. Their purpose was \nnot even to divert its trade, or to put it at a disadvantage by \nlessening defendant\u2019s necessary expenses. The purpose was \nmerely to suppl y subscribers of the International News \nService promptly with all available news. The suit is, as this \ncourt declares, in substance one brought for the benefit of \nthe members of the Associated Press, who would be \nproper, and except for their number perhaps necessary, \nparties; and the plaintiff conducts the suit as representing \ntheir interests. It thus appears that the protection given by \nthe injunction is not actually to the business of the \ncomplainant news agency; for this agency does not sell \nnews nor see k to earn profits, but is a mere instrumentality \nby which 800 or more newspapers collect and distribute \nnews. It is these papers severally which are protected; and \nthe protection afforded is not from competition of the \ndefendant, but from possible competit ion of one or more \nof the 400 other papers which receive the defendant\u2019s \nservice. Furthermore, the protection to these Associated \nPress members consists merely in denying to other papers \nthe right to use as news, information which by authority of \nall conce rned, had theretofore been given to the public by \nsome of those who joined in gathering it; and to which the \nlaw denies the attributes of property. There is in \ndefendant\u2019s purpose nothing on which to base a claim for \nrelief. \nIt is further said that, while that for which the Associated \nPress spends its money is too fugitive to be recognized as \nproperty in the common -law courts, the defendant cannot", "proposition": ["The error was caused by not properly formatting the JSON output."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "495", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "480 \n and Alexander\u2019s Ragtime Band), the same assumptions \nyield a figure of 99.996%. \nThe most unrealistically conservative aspect of these \nassumptions, i. e., the aspect most unrealistically favorable \nto the majority, is the assumption of a constant future \nincome stream. In fact, as noted in the text, uncontested \ndata indicate that no author could rationally expect that a \nstream of copyright royalties will be constant forever. \nIndeed, only ab out 2% of copyrights can be expected to \nretain commercial value at the end of 55 to 75 years. Thus, \nin the overwhelming majority of cases, the ultimate value of \nthe extension to copyright holders will be zero, and the \neconomic difference between the extend ed copyright and a \nperpetual copyright will be zero. \nNonetheless, there remains a small 2% or so chance that a \ngiven work will remain profitable. The CRS Report \nsuggests a way to take account of both that likelihood and \nthe related \u201cdecay\u201d in a work\u2019s comm ercial viability: Find \nthe annual decay rate that corresponds to the percentage of \nworks that become commercially unavailable in any given \nyear, and then discount the revenue for each successive \nyear accordingly. See CRS Report 7. Following this \napproach, if one estimates, conservatively, that a full 2% of \nall works survives at the end of 75 years, the corresponding \nannual decay rate is about 5%. I instead (and again \nconservatively) use the 3.8% decay rate the CRS has applied \nin the case of books whose copy rights were renewed \nbetween 1950 and 1970. Using this 3.8% decay rate and the \neconomist amici\u2019s proposed 7% discount rate, the value of a \n95-year copyright is more realistically estimated not as \n99.8%, but as 99.996% of the value of a perpetual \ncopyright. The comparable \u201cIrving Berlin\u201d figure is \n99.99999%. (With a 5% decay rate, the figures are 99.999% \nand 99.999998%, respectively.) Even these figures seem \nlikely to be underestimates in the sense that they assume", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the assumptions made in estimating the value of extended copyrights.", "The passage states that the most unrealistic assumption is the assumption of a constant future income stream.", "Uncontested data indicate that only about 2% of copyrights can be expected to retain commercial value at the end of 55 to 75 years.", "In the overwhelming majority of cases, the ultimate value of the extension to copyright holders will be zero.", "There remains a small chance that a given work will remain profitable.", "The CRS Report suggests a way to take account of both the likelihood and the related 'decay' in a work's commercial viability.", "The passage provides an example of estimating the value of a 95-year copyright using a 3.8% decay rate and a 7% discount rate.", "The passage acknowledges that these figures may be underestimates as they assume a constant future income stream."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "468", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "453 \n exchange for the copyright. Indeed, since the 1976 Act, \ncopyright has run from creation, not publication. \nFurther distinguishing the two kinds of intellectual \nproperty, copyright gives the holder no monopoly on any \nknowledge. A reader of an author\u2019s writing may make full \nuse of any fact or idea she acquires fr om her reading. The \ngrant of a patent, on the other hand, does prevent full use \nby others of the inventor\u2019s knowledge. In light of these \ndistinctions, one cannot extract from language in our patent \ndecisions \u2013 language not trained on a grant\u2019s duration \u2013 \ngenuine support for petitioners\u2019 bold view. Accordingly, we \nreject the proposition that a quid pro quo requirement stops \nCongress from expanding copyright\u2019s term in a manner that \nputs existing and future copyrights in parity.15 \n\u2026 . \nIII \nPetitioners separately argue that the CTEA is a content -\nneutral regulation of speech that fails heightened judicial \nreview under the First Amendment. We reject petitioners\u2019 \nplea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a \ncopyright scheme that incorporates its own speech -\nprotective purposes and safeguards. \u2026 . \nIV \nIf petitioners\u2019 vision of the Copyright Clause held sway, it \nwould do more than render the CTEA\u2019s duration \nextensions unconstitutional as to existing works. Indeed, \npetitioners\u2019 assertion that the provisions of th e CTEA are \n \n15 The fact that patent and copyright involve different exchanges does not, of \ncourse, mean that we may not be guided in our \u201climited Times\u201d analysis by \nCongress\u2019 repeated extensions of existing patents. If patent\u2019s quid pro quo is more \nexacting than copyright\u2019s, then Congress\u2019 repeated extension of existing patents \nwithout constitutional objection suggests even more strongly that similar \nlegislation with respect to copyrights is constitutionally permissible.", "proposition": ["Copyright has run from creation since the 1976 Act, not publication.", "Copyright does not give the holder a monopoly on any knowledge.", "A reader of an author\u2019s writing may make full use of any fact or idea she acquires from her reading.", "The grant of a patent prevents full use by others of the inventor\u2019s knowledge.", "One cannot extract genuine support for petitioners\u2019 bold view from language in our patent decisions.", "We reject the proposition that a quid pro quo requirement stops Congress from expanding copyright\u2019s term in a manner that puts existing and future copyrights in parity.", "Petitioners argue that the CTEA is a content-neutral regulation of speech that fails heightened judicial review under the First Amendment.", "We reject petitioners\u2019 plea for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.", "If petitioners\u2019 vision of the Copyright Clause held sway, it would do more than render the CTEA\u2019s duration extensions unconstitutional as to existing works.", "Petitioners\u2019 assertion that the provisions of the CTEA are unconstitutional as to existing works would suggest that similar legislation with respect to copyrights is constitutionally permissible."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "712", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "697 \n than on the claimants\u2019 knowledge that they lacked colorable \nlegal title.\u201d (Emphases added.) Essentially, Tavares turned \non the difference between the adverse possession \nclaimant\u2019s \u201cknowledge\u201d regarding the owner\u2019s title and his \n\u201cobjective manifestations\u201d thereof. In that case, the \nadverse -possession claimant surveyed his land and \ndiscovered \u201cthat he did not hold tit le to the parcels in \nquestion.\u201d Id. at 350. After such enlightenment, however, \nthe claimant objectively manifested his claim of ownership \nto the parcels by \u201cposting no -trespass signs, constructing \nstone walls, improving drainage, and wood cutting.\u201d Id. at \n352. This Court explained that simply having knowledge \nthat he was not the title owner of the parcels was not \nenough to destroy his claim of right given his objective, \nadverse manifestations otherwise. Id. at 351 -52. In fact, we \nwent so far as to state tha t \u201ceven when claimants know that \nthey are nothing more than black -hearted trespassers, they \ncan still adversely possess the property in question under a \nclaim of right to do so if they use it openly, notoriously, \nand in a manner that is adverse to the true owner\u2019s rights \nfor the requisite ten -year period.\u201d Tavares , 814 A.2d at 351. \nThis statement is legally correct considering that adverse \npossession does not require the claimant to make \u201ca good \nfaith mistake that he or she had legal title to the land.\u201d 16 \nPowell on Real Property \u00a7 91.05[2] at 91 -23; see 5 Restatement \nof the Law Property: Servitudes \u00a7 458, cmt. d at 2927 (1944) \n(\u201c[I]t is not necessary in order that a use be adverse that it \nbe made either in the belief or under a claim that it is legally \njustified.\u201d).", "proposition": ["Tavares established a distinction between the adverse possession claimant's 'knowledge' and 'objective manifestations' of the owner's title.", "In Tavares, the adverse possession claimant discovered he did not hold title to the parcels in question.", "After discovering this, the claimant objectively manifested his claim of ownership by posting no trespass signs, constructing stone walls, improving drainage, and wood cutting.", "The court explained that mere knowledge of not holding title is not enough to destroy the claim of right when there are objective, adverse manifestations.", "Adverse possession can still be established even if the claimant knows they are a trespasser, as long as they use the property openly, notoriously, and adversely to the true owner's rights for the required ten-year period.", "Adverse possession does not require a good faith mistake about legal title.", "Objective manifestations, not belief or claim of legal justification, are necessary for adverse possession."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "299", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Among the many documents and \nartifacts in the museum\u2019s store rooms was a book that had caught \nAlfonso\u2019s eye and had occup ied all of his spare time since. Through", "proposition": ["The museum's store rooms contained many documents and artifacts.", "A book caught Alfonso's eye.", "Alfonso has been occupied with the book since he found it."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "259", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "244 \n to understand in each case what the court has done. They \u2019re \nwriting to explain why they\u2019ve decided as they have. Our job is to \nunderstand the language in which they\u2019re writing and to \u201cdecode\u201d \nthe cases. Knowing the court\u2019s reasons will allow us to use the case \nto make arguments in a future case. \nSecond, we\u2019re g radually becoming familiar with a number of \nconcepts that are used repeatedly in many substantive areas of the \nlaw. Knowing these concepts (most of which we\u2019re pulling out and \ndescribing as Big Ideas) will help us read the language of cases and \nto use and to criticize cases. \nThird, we\u2019re assembling a sketch of several areas of the law that are \ncommonly lumped together and called \u201cproperty law.\u201d The goal \nhere is to know enough about these areas so that if confronted in \npractice with a real case, we\u2019d have an appreciation for the doctrine \nas a whole and therefore some immediate understanding when we \nstarted to dig into the cases in our jurisdiction covering the specific \nissue of interest. So far, we\u2019ve covered Finders vs. Landowners, \nTrespass to Land, Nuisance , and a bit of the doctrine of acquisition \nby first possession. \nPursuant to our first goal \u2013 simply to understand what the courts \nhave done in a case \u2013 here\u2019s my outline of the decision in Popov . I \ngive the first few words of the sentence where the new hea ding \nwould begin, so scan through the case as you follow along. \nThe first, roughly, three pages summarize the Facts. \n\u201cPlaintiff has pled causes of \u2026\u201d This \nparagraph lists the claims. Here\u2019s what the \nfight is about. \n\u201cConversion is the \u2026\u201d up through fn. 13: \nThe court defines two of the claims, stating \nmore particularly what must be shown in \norder to prove them. \n\u201cIn the case at bar,\u201d: A HERE section. The \napplication of the law to the facts disposes \nof one claim right away.", "proposition": ["The goal is to understand the language in which the court writes and decode the cases.", "Knowing the court's reasons will allow us to use the case to make arguments in a future case.", "We are gradually becoming familiar with a number of concepts that are used repeatedly in many substantive areas of the law.", "Knowing these concepts (most of which we're pulling out and describing as Big Ideas) will help us read the language of cases and to use and to criticize cases.", "The goal is to know enough about these areas so that if confronted in practice with a real case, we'd have an appreciation for the doctrine as a whole and therefore some immediate understanding when we started to dig into the cases in our jurisdiction covering the specific issue of interest.", "So far, we've covered Finders vs. Landowners, Trespass to Land, Nuisance, and a bit of the doctrine of acquisition by first possession.", "The first, roughly, three pages summarize the Facts.", "The paragraph lists the claims.", "Here's what the fight is about.", "Conversion is the ..."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "276", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "It appears to me also, that there is no \nrule of the English common law, at variance with this \nprinciple; but, it is said, that every entry on the lands of", "proposition": ["There is no rule of the English common law that is at variance with this principle.", "It is said that every entry on the lands of..."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "202", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "187 \n Perhaps the only fo rmal whaling code authorized by legislative \nenactment, was that of Holland. It was decreed by the States -\nGeneral in A.D. 1695. But though no other nation has ever had any \nwritten whaling law, yet the American fishermen have been their \nown legislators and l awyers in this matter. They have provided a \nsystem which for terse comprehensiveness surpasses Justinian\u2019s \nPandects and the By -laws of the Chinese Society for the \nSuppression of Meddling with other People\u2019s Business. Yes; these \nlaws might be engraven on a Queen Anne\u2019s farthing, or the barb of \na harpoon, and worn round the neck, so small are they. \nI. A Fast -Fish belongs to the party fast to it. \nII. A Loose -Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it. \nBut what plays the mischief with this masterly code is the \nadmirable brevity of it, which necessitates a vast volume of \ncommentaries to expound it. \nFirst: What is a Fast -Fish? Alive or dead a fish is technically fast, \nwhen it is connected with an occupied ship or boat, by any medium \nat all controllable by the occupant or occupants, \u2013a mast, an oar, a \nnine-inch cable, a telegraph wire, or a strand of cobweb, it is all the \nsame. Likewise a fish is technically fast when it bears a waif, or any \nother recognized symbol of possession; so long as the party wail ing \nit plainly evince their ability at any time to take it alongside, as well \nas their intention so to do. \nThese are scientific commentaries; but the commentaries of the \nwhalemen themselves sometimes consist in hard words and harder \nknocks \u2013 the Coke -upon -Littleton of the fist. True, among the \nmore upright and honorable whalemen allowances are always made \nfor peculiar cases, where it would be an outrageous moral injustice \nfor one party to claim possession of a whale previously chased or \nkilled by another par ty. But others are by no means so scrupulous.", "proposition": ["The only formal whaling code authorized by legislative enactment was that of Holland.", "It was decreed by the States-General in A.D. 1695.", "American fishermen have been their own legislators and lawyers in whaling.", "They have provided a system that surpasses Justinian's Pandects and the By-laws of the Chinese Society for the Suppression of Meddling with other People's Business in terms of terse comprehensiveness.", "The laws might be engraved on a Queen Anne's farthing or the barb of a harpoon and worn round the neck, as they are so small.", "A Fast-Fish belongs to the party fast to it.", "A Loose-Fish is fair game for anybody who can soonest catch it.", "The brevity of the whaling code necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it.", "What plays the mischief with this masterly code is its admirable brevity.", "The scientific commentaries sometimes consist in hard words and harder knocks \u2013 the Coke-upon-Littleton of the fist.", "Among the more upright and honorable whalemen, allowances are always made for peculiar cases where it would be an outrageous moral injustice for one party to claim possession of a whale previously chased or killed by another party."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "444", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "429 \n of transformation is a double -edged sword in this case. On \nthe one hand, the story of Cynara and her perception of the \nevents in TWDG certainly adds new \u201cexpression, meaning, \n[and] message\u201d to GWTW. From another perspective, \nhowever, TWDG\u2019 s success as a pure work of fiction \ndepends heavily on copyrighted elements appropriated \nfrom GWTW to carry its own plot forward. \nHowever, as noted above, TWDG is more than an abstract, \npure fictional work. It is principally and purposefully a \ncritical sta tement that seeks to rebut and destroy the \nperspective, judgments, and mythology of GWTW. \nRandall\u2019s literary goal is to explode the romantic, idealized \nportrait of the antebellum South during and after the Civil \nWar. In the world of GWTW, the white charact ers \ncomprise a noble aristocracy whose idyllic existence is upset \nonly by the intrusion of Yankee soldiers, and, eventually, by \nthe liberation of the black slaves. Through her characters as \nwell as through direct narration, Mitchell describes how \nboth blac ks and whites were purportedly better off in the \ndays of slavery: \u201cThe more I see of emancipation the more \ncriminal I think it is. It\u2019s just ruined the darkies,\u201d says \nScarlett O\u2019Hara. GWTW at 639. Free blacks are described \nas \u201ccreatures of small intelligen ce \u2026 [l]ike monkeys or \nsmall children turned loose among treasured objects whose \nvalue is beyond their comprehension, they ran wild - either \nfrom perverse pleasure in destruction or simply because of \ntheir ignorance.\u201d Id. at 654. Blacks elected to the legi slature \nare described as spending \u201cmost of their time eating \ngoobers and easing their unaccustomed feet into and out of \nnew shoes.\u201d Id. at 904. \nAs the district court noted: \u201cThe earlier work is a third -\nperson epic, whereas the new work is told in the first -\nperson as an intimate diary of the life of Cynara.", "proposition": ["The story of Cynara in TWDG adds new expression, meaning, and message to GWTW.", "TWDG's success as a pure work of fiction depends on copyrighted elements appropriated from GWTW.", "TWDG is a critical statement that seeks to rebut and destroy the perspective, judgments, and mythology of GWTW.", "Randall's literary goal is to explode the romantic, idealized portrait of the antebellum South during and after the Civil War.", "In GWTW, white characters are portrayed as a noble aristocracy whose idyllic existence is upset only by the intrusion of Yankee soldiers and the liberation of black slaves.", "Mitchell describes how both blacks and whites were purportedly better off in the days of slavery.", "Free blacks in GWTW are described as creatures of small intelligence, running wild and destroying treasured objects.", "Blacks elected to the legislature in GWTW are described as spending most of their time eating goobers and easing their unaccustomed feet into new shoes.", "The earlier work (GWTW) is a third-person epic, while the new work (TWDG) is told in the first-person as an intimate diary of the life of Cynara."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "659", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "644 \n at all, only when someone actually disturbs the grantee\u2019s ownership. \n(This is the key to understanding the Brown v. Lober case.3) \nDeeds are important for an additional reason: they can pr ovide \nnotice to others as to the ownership status of real estate. You can\u2019t \ncarry land around with you, wear it, get your arms around it, or kill \nit (well, sadly, you kind of can). It\u2019s hard to signify to others that \nyou own land. Fencing and cultivation p rovide some notice. But \nthe ownership of land is necessarily abstract. How can I tell \nwhether I\u2019m being ripped off by a purported seller of land: how do \nI know that he or she owns that land and hasn\u2019t already granted the \nsame land to someone else. \nA system whereby the ownership of land can be determined by \nsearching records helps solve the problem of uncertainty in land \nownership. The idea is to place deeds, meeting the requirements \nabove, in a centralized, public location. Because each deed records \nthe gra ntor and grantee, you can, with an appropriate index, trace \ntitle down through preceding owners, presumably all the way to a \npatent from the sovereign.4 \nSuppose I want to know whether the seller has the power to \nconvey the land I wish to buy. I can go to t he land office, and look \nup my seller in a Grantee Index, finding the deed conveying the \nland to the seller. I would then look in the Grantor Index and look \nfor any conveyances from the seller after he or she received the \nland (to be sure I\u2019m not buying la nd that\u2019s already been conveyed). \nSatisfied with that, I then look up my seller\u2019s grantor in the Grantee \nIndex. Even though I now know that my seller acquired a deed and \ndidn\u2019t convey the land since, how do I know that the seller \nacquired good title from h is or her grantor?", "proposition": ["Deeds are important for determining the ownership status of real estate.", "Deeds can provide notice to others about the ownership status of real estate.", "It is difficult to signify to others that you own land.", "A system whereby the ownership of land can be determined by searching records helps solve the problem of uncertainty in land ownership.", "Deeds are recorded in a centralized, public location.", "Each deed records the grantor and grantee.", "By tracing title through preceding owners, you can find the patent from the sovereign.", "To know whether the seller has the power to convey the land, you can search the Grantee Index and Grantor Index.", "Satisfied with the search results, you may still wonder if the seller acquired good title from his or her grantor."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "267", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "252 \n the artifacts became res nullius until found and reduced to \npossession by plaintiff who then became the owner. \nPlaintiff contends that he has obtained ownership of the \nproperty through occupancy, which is a \u201cmode of acquiring \nproperty by which a thing which belongs to nobody, \nbecomes the property of the person who took possession \nof it, with the intention of acquiring a right of ownership \nupon it.\u201d La.C.C. art. 3412, prior to amendment by Act No. \n187 of 1982.4 \nOne of the five methods of acquiring property by \noccupancy is \u201cBy finding (that is, by discovering precious \nstones on the sea shore, or things abandoned, or a \ntreasure.)\u201d La.C.C. art. 3414, prior to amendment by Act \nNo. 187 of 1982. Plaintiff contends that the artifacts were \nabandoned by the Tunicas and that by finding them he \nbecame the owner. \n \n4 La.C.C. art. 3412, 3414 and 3421 cited herein were repealed by Acts 1982, No. \n187, \u00a7 1, effective January 1, 1984. The provisions replacing those artic les \nreproduce their substance. Although the language has changed, they do not \nchange the law. See specifically La.C.C. art. 3412 and 3418, as adopted by Acts \n1982, No. 187, \u00a7 1 and the comments. The articles previously read as follow: \nLa.C.C. art. 3412 \nOccupancy is a mode of acquiring property by which a \nthing which belongs to nobody, becomes the property \nof the person who took possession of it, with the \nintention of acquiring a right of ownership upon it. \nLa.C.C. art. 3414 \nThere are five ways of acquiring property by \noccupancy, to wit: By hunting. By fowling. By fishing. \nBy finding (that is, by discovering precious stones on \nthe sea shore, or things abandoned, or a treasure.) \nLa.C.C. 3421.", "proposition": ["The artifacts became res nullius until found and reduced to possession by plaintiff who then became the owner.", "Plaintiff contends that he has obtained ownership of the property through occupancy.", "Occupancy is a mode of acquiring property by which a thing which belongs to nobody, becomes the property of the person who took possession of it, with the intention of acquiring a right of ownership upon it.", "One of the five methods of acquiring property by occupancy is by finding (discovering precious stones on the sea shore, or things abandoned, or a treasure).", "Plaintiff contends that the artifacts were abandoned by the Tunicas and that by finding them he became the owner.", "La.C.C. art. 3412, 3414 and 3421 cited herein were repealed by Acts 1982, No. 187, \u00a7 1, effective January 1, 1984.", "The provisions replacing those articles reproduce their substance.", "Although the language has changed, they do not change the law.", "See specifically La.C.C. art. 3412 and 3418, as adopted by Acts 1982, No. 187, \u00a7 1 and the comments.", "The articles previously read as follow: Occupancy is a mode of acquiring property by which a thing which belongs to nobody, becomes the property of the person who took possession of it, with the intention of acquiring a right of ownership upon it. There are five ways of acquiring property by occupancy, to wit: By hunting. By fowling. By fishing. By finding (that is, by discovering precious stones on the sea shore, or things abandoned, or a treasure.)."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "410", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "395 \n a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original \nwritten expression, only the compiler\u2019s selection and \narrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied \nat wil l. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the \nmeans by which copyright advances the progress of science \nand art. \nThis Court has long recognized that the fact/expression \ndichotomy limits severely the scope of protection in fact -\nbased works. Mo re than a century ago, the Court observed: \n\u201cThe very object of publishing a book on science or the \nuseful arts is to communicate to the world the useful \nknowledge which it contains. But this object would be \nfrustrated if the knowledge could not be used wit hout \nincurring the guilt of piracy of the book.\u201d Baker v. Selden, \n101 U.S. 99, 103, 25 L.Ed. 841 (1880). We reiterated this \npoint in Harper & Row: \n[N]o author may copyright facts or \nideas. The copyright is limited to those \naspects of the work \u2013 termed \n\u2018expression\u2019 \u2013 that display the stamp of \nthe author\u2019s originality. [C]opyright \ndoes not prevent subsequent users \nfrom copying from a prior author\u2019s \nwork those constituent elements that \nare not original \u2013 for example \u2026 facts, \nor materials in the public domain \u2013 as \nlong as such use does not unfairly \nappropriate the author\u2019s original \ncontributions. \n471 U.S., at 547 -548, 105 S.Ct., at 2223 -2224 (citation \nomitted). \nThis, then, resolves the doctrinal tension: Copyright treats \nfacts and factual compilations in a wholl y consistent \nmanner. Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, \nare not original and therefore may not be copyrighted. A \nfactual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an", "proposition": ["A factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied at will.", "This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate.", "It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.", "The fact/expression dichotomy limits severely the scope of protection in fact-based works.", "More than a century ago, the Court observed that the object of publishing a book on science or the useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge it contains, and that this object would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the guilt of piracy of the book.", "We reiterated this point in Harper & Row, stating that no author may copyright facts or ideas, and that copyright is limited to those aspects of the work termed 'expression' that display the stamp of the author's originality.", "Copyright does not prevent subsequent users from copying from a prior author's work those constituent elements that are not original, such as facts or materials in the public domain, as long as such use does not unfairly appropriate the author's original contributions.", "This, then, resolves the doctrinal tension: Copyright treats facts and factual compilations in a whole consistent manner.", "Facts, whether alone or as part of a compilation, are not original and therefore may not be copyrighted.", "A factual compilation is eligible for copyright if it features an original selection or arrangement of facts."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "49", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "We have furt her noted that an error in bringing a suit in \nequity when there is an adequate remedy at law is waived by \nfailure to move to transfer the cause to the circuit court; \nwhere the adequacy of the remedy at law is the only basis \nfor questioning equity jurisdict ion the chancellor\u2019s decree is \nnot subject to reversal for failure to transfer the case, unless \nthe chancery court is wholly incompetent to grant the relief \nsought. Titan Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Shipley , 257 Ark. 278, 517 \nS.W.2d 210 (1974). Some examples of cou rts granting relief", "proposition": ["An error in bringing a suit in equity when there is an adequate remedy at law is waived by failure to move to transfer the cause to the circuit court.", "The adequacy of the remedy at law is the only basis for questioning equity jurisdiction in the chancellor's decree.", "The chancellor's decree is not subject to reversal for failure to transfer the case, unless the chancery court is wholly incompetent to grant the relief sought.", "Titan Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Shipley is a legal case that provides information on this topic.", "Some examples of courts granting relief are mentioned in the passage."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "630", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "615 \n a. By a down payment in cash on the signing of this \ncontract, receipt of which is by this instrument \nacknowledged by seller: $ . \nb. By assumption of an existing encumbrance on property \nin the form of a mortgage owned by , at [address], City of , \nCounty of , State of Georgia, which purchaser by this \ninstrument expressly assumes and agrees to pay. Present \nprincipal balance outstanding on the encumbrance: $ . \nc. By a purchase money mortgage to be executed by \npurchaser to seller, securing purchaser' s [noteor bond] \npayable in equal installments of $ , or more, including \ninterest, commencing on the day of the month following \nthe close of this transaction and continuing at monthly \nintervals thereafter on the same day of each successive \nmonth. Interest: percent per year. The [noteor bond and \nmortgage] shall be in a form substantially as set forth in \nattached Exhibits \" \" and \" .\" Principal amount: $ . \nd. Additional cash on settlement, in the exact balance of \npurchase price after crediting foregoing items, with \nprincipal balance on existing encumbrance to be computed \nexactly to close of transaction. Estimated amount: $ . \nTotal: $ \nSection \nII. Title \nTitle to property to be conveyed by seller shall be good and \nmarketable title, clear of all liens, encumbrances , defects, \nand burdens, except: [state exceptions, such as: utility \neasements, and agreements with utility companies of \nrecord; zoning ordinances; existing rights of way for streets \nand alleys bordering property; taxes and assessments not \ndelinquent]. \nTitle as required in this agreement shall be evidenced by: \n[specify, such as: a standard form policy of title insurance \nissued by a title company acceptable to purchaser, doing", "proposition": ["Check the format of your JSON object and ensure it follows the specified schema."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "326", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "311 \n gainful use o f it while it retains such value. An essential \nelement of individual property is the legal right to exclude \nothers from enjoying it. If the property is private, the right \nof exclusion may be absolute; if the property is affected \nwith a public interest, the right of exclusion is qualified. But \nthe fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer \nmoney and labor, and has a value for which others are \nwilling to pay, is not sufficient to ensure to it this legal \nattribute of property. The general rule of la w is, that the \nnoblest of human productions \u2013 knowledge, truths \nascertained, conceptions, and ideas \u2013 became, after \nvoluntary communication to others, free as the air to \ncommon use. Upon these incorporeal productions the \nattribute of property is continued after such \ncommunication only in certain classes of cases where public \npolicy has seemed to demand it. These exceptions are \nconfined to productions which, in some degree, involve \ncreation, invention, or discovery. But by no means all such \nare endowed with this attribute of property. The creations \nwhich are recognized as property by the common law are \nliterary, dramatic, musical, and other artistic creations; and \nthese have also protection under the copyright statutes. The \ninventions and discoveries upon whi ch this attribute of \nproperty is conferred only by statute, are the few comprised \nwithin the patent law. There are also many other cases in \nwhich courts interfere to prevent curtailment of plaintiff\u2019s \nenjoyment of incorporal productions; and in which the \nright to relief is often called a property right, but is such \nonly in a special sense. In those cases, the plaintiff has no \nabsolute right to the protection of his production; he has \nmerely the qualified right to be protected as against the \ndefendant\u2019s acts , because of the special relation in which \nthe latter stands or the wrongful method or means \nemployed in acquiring the knowledge or the manner in \nwhich it is used. Protection of this character is afforded \nwhere the suit is based upon breach of contract or of trust \nor upon unfair competition.", "proposition": ["The legal right to exclude others is an essential element of individual property.", "The right of exclusion may be absolute for private property and qualified for property affected with public interest.", "Knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas become free to common use after voluntary communication to others.", "Exceptions to this rule are confined to productions which involve creation, invention, or discovery.", "Literary, dramatic, musical, and other artistic creations are recognized as property by the common law and are protected under copyright statutes.", "Inventions and discoveries upon which the attribute of property is conferred only by statute are the few comprised within the patent law.", "Courts may interfere to prevent curtailment of plaintiff\u2019s enjoyment of incorporeal productions in certain cases.", "In these cases, the plaintiff has no absolute right to the protection of his production; he has merely the qualified right to be protected against the defendant\u2019s acts."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "455", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "440 \n With the Wind\u2019s reputation, or protect its story from \n\u201ctaint,\u201d however, it may not now invoke copyright to \nfurther that goal. Of course, SunTrust can choose to license \nits derivatives however it wishes a nd insist that those \nderivatives remain free of content it deems disreputable. \nSunTrust may be vigilant of Gone With the Wind\u2019s public \nimage \u2013 but it may not use copyright to shield Gone With \nthe Wind from unwelcome comment, a policy that would \nextend inte llectual property protection \u201cinto the precincts \nof censorship,\u201d in Pat Conroy\u2019s words. \u201cBecause the social \ngood is served by increasing the supply of criticism \u2013 and \nthus, potentially, of truth \u2013 creators of original works \ncannot be given the power to blo ck the dissemination of \ncritical derivative works.\u201d Leibovitz, 137 F.3d at 115 n.3. \n\u201cCopyright law is not designed to stifle critics. Destructive \nparodies play an important role in social and literary \ncriticism and thus merit protection even though they ma y \ndiscourage or discredit an original author.\u201d Fisher, 794 F.2d \nat 438 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). \nThe law grants copyright holders a powerful monopoly in \ntheir expressive works. It should not also afford them \nwindfall damages for the publication of the sorts of works \nthat they themselves would never publish, or worse, grant \nthem a power of indirect censorship. \nFinally, Appellee warns that our decision in this case will \nprompt an endless parade of litigants to test the boundaries \nof the rule we establish here. This is at least possible, but \nsuch a phenomenon is not exactly alien to our common law \ntradition. And to the extent authors and publishers will be \nencouraged to experiment with new and different forms of \nstorytelling, copyright\u2019s fundamental purpose, \u201c[t]o \npromote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,\u201d will have \nbeen served. U.S. Const. Art. 1, \u00a7 8, cl. 8.", "proposition": ["SunTrust may not use copyright to shield Gone With the Wind from unwelcome comment.", "Copyright law is not designed to stifle critics.", "Destructive parodies play an important role in social and literary criticism and thus merit protection.", "The law grants copyright holders a powerful monopoly in their expressive works.", "Copyright should not afford holders windfall damages for the publication of works they would never publish.", "Copyright holders should not be granted a power of indirect censorship.", "Appellee warns that our decision in this case may prompt an endless parade of litigants testing the boundaries of the rule we establish.", "Encouraging authors and publishers to experiment with new and different forms of storytelling serves copyright's fundamental purpose."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "488", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "473 \n that because uncorrected disuniformity would permit \nEurope, not the United States, to hold out the prospect of \nprotection lasting for \u201clife plus 70 years\u201d (instead of \u201clife \nplus 50 years\u201d), a potential author might decide to publish \ninitially in Europe, delayi ng American publication. And the \nstatute, by creating a uniformly longer term, corrects for the \ndisincentive that this disuniformity might otherwise \nproduce. \nThat disincentive, however, could not possibly bring about \nserious harm of the sort that the Court , the Solicitor \nGeneral, or the law review author fears. \u2026 . As we have \nseen, the present commercial value of any such difference \namounts at most to comparative pennies. And a \ncommercial decision that turned upon such a difference \nwould have had to have re sted previously upon a knife edge \nso fine as to be invisible. A rational legislature could not \ngive major weight to an invisible, likely nonexistent \nincentive -related effect. \nBut if there is no incentive -related benefit, what is the \nbenefit of the future u niformity that the statute only \npartially achieves? Unlike the Copyright Act of 1976, this \nstatute does not constitute part of an American effort to \nconform to an important international treaty like the Berne \nConvention. \u2026 . \nIn sum, the partial, future uni formity that the 1998 Act \npromises cannot reasonably be said to justify extension of \nthe copyright term for new works. And concerns with \nuniformity cannot possibly justify the extension of the new \nterm to older works, for the statute there creates no \nunifo rmity at all. \nThird, several publishers and filmmakers argue that the \nstatute provides incentives to those who act as publishers to \nrepublish and to redistribute older copyrighted works. This \nclaim cannot justify this statute, however, because the \nrational e is inconsistent with the basic purpose of the", "proposition": ["Uncorrected disuniformity would permit Europe to hold out the prospect of protection lasting for \u2018life plus 70 years\u2019 instead of \u2018life plus 50 years\u2019.", "A potential author might decide to publish initially in Europe, delaying American publication.", "The statute creates a uniformly longer term, correcting for the disincentive that disuniformity might otherwise produce.", "The disincentive created by disuniformity could not possibly bring about serious harm.", "The present commercial value of any difference in copyright term amounts to comparative pennies.", "A commercial decision that turned upon such a difference would have had to rest upon a knife edge so fine as to be invisible.", "A rational legislature could not give major weight to an invisible, likely nonexistent incentive-related effect.", "The partial, future uniformity that the 1998 Act promises cannot reasonably be said to justify extension of the copyright term for new works.", "Concerns with uniformity cannot justify the extension of the new term to older works, as the statute creates no uniformity at all.", "Several publishers and filmmakers argue that the statute provides incentives to republish and redistribute older copyrighted works.", "This claim cannot justify the statute, as it is inconsistent with the basic purpose of the statute."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "634", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "619 \n Time is expr essly declared to be of the essence of this \ncontract. The contract shall be executed and completed, \nand sale closed, on or before , or any other date as the \nparties may in writing agree to. Each party shall fully \nperform all obligations under this agreemen t at such times \nas to insure closing within the period specified in this \nagreement, or any extension of the period specified. \nAnything to the contrary in this agreement \nnotwithstanding, the obligation of purchaser to \nconsummate the closing of this transact ion is subject to and \nconditioned on the satisfaction at or prior to closing of the \nfollowing conditions precedent: \na. The full and complete performance by seller of each and \nevery agreement and covenant contained in this agreement \nto be performed by selle r. \nb. Purchaser shall receive evidence satisfactory to purchaser \nthat the property has not been used for the handling, \ntreatment, storage or disposal of any hazardous or toxic \nsubstance as defined under any applicable state or federal \nlaws or regulation in cluding, but not limited to, CERCLA \nand the Georgia Hazardous Waste Management Act. \nIn the event that the conditions stated above have not been \nsatisfied by the closing date, purchaser shall be entitled to, \nat purchaser's option, terminate this agreement b y written \nnotice to seller. In the event that purchaser elects to \nterminate this agreement, then neither party shall have any \nfurther rights, obligations or liabilities under this agreement \nexcept to the extent that any right, obligation or liability \nexpre ssly survives termination of the agreement. \nSection \nVIII. Remedies of Parties \n(1) If purchaser fails or refuses to comply with the \nconditions assumed, or to perform all obligations under \nthis agreement, seller has the option to:", "proposition": ["Time is expressly declared to be of the essence of this contract.", "The contract shall be executed and completed, and sale closed, on or before [date], or any other date as the parties may in writing agree to.", "Each party shall fully perform all obligations under this agreement at such times as to insure closing within the period specified in this agreement, or any extension of the period specified.", "Anything to the contrary in this agreement notwithstanding, the obligation of purchaser to consummate the closing of this transaction is subject to and conditioned on the satisfaction at or prior to closing of the following conditions precedent: a. The full and complete performance by seller of each and every agreement and covenant contained in this agreement to be performed by seller. b. Purchaser shall receive evidence satisfactory to purchaser that the property has not been used for the handling, treatment, storage or disposal of any hazardous or toxic substance as defined under any applicable state or federal laws or regulation including, but not limited to, CERCLA and the Georgia Hazardous Waste Management Act.", "In the event that the conditions stated above have not been satisfied by the closing date, purchaser shall be entitled to, at purchaser's option, terminate this agreement by written notice to seller.", "In the event that purchaser elects to terminate this agreement, then neither party shall have any further rights, obligations or liabilities under this agreement except to the extent that any right, obligation or liability expressly survives termination of the agreement.", "Section VIII. Remedies of Parties (1) If purchaser fails or refuses to comply with the conditions assumed, or to perform all obligations under this agreement, seller has the option to:", "If purchaser fails or refuses to comply with the conditions assumed, or to perform all obligations under this agreement, seller has the option to terminate this agreement and seek damages from purchaser."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "452", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "437 \n [A] lack of irreparable injury to SunTrust, together with the \nFirst Amendme nt concerns regarding comment and \ncriticism and the likelihood that a fair use defense will \nprevail, make injunctive relief improper and we need not \naddress the remaining factors, except to stress that the \npublic interest is always served in promoting Firs t \nAmendment values and in preserving the public domain \nfrom encroachment. Accordingly, we vacate the district \ncourt\u2019s injunction. \nIII. CONCLUSION \nIn this case, we have found that to the extent SunTrust \nsuffers injury from TWDG\u2019s putative infringement of its \ncopyright in GWTW, such harm can adequately be \nremedied through an award of monetary damages. \nMoreover, under the present state of the record, it appears \nthat a viable fair use defense is available. Thus, the issuance \nof the injunction was at odds with the shared principles of \nthe First Amendment and the copyright law, acting as a \nprior restraint on speech because the public had not had \naccess to Randall\u2019s ideas or viewpoint in the form of \nexpression that she chose. \nWe REVERSE the judgment of the distri ct court and \nREMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with \nthis opinion. \nMARCUS , Circuit Judge, specially concurring: \nI concur in Judge Birch\u2019s thoughtful and thorough opinion \nbut write separately to emphasize that, on this limited \nrecord, SunTru st has fallen well short of establishing a \nlikelihood of success on its copyright infringement claim. I \nstress three points. First, the district court erred by finding \nthat the critical or parodic element of The Wind Done \nGone is anything but clear -cut. Fa r from amounting to \n\u201cunabated piracy,\u201d 136 F.Supp.2d 1357, 1369 (N.D. Ga. \n2001), The Wind Done Gone is unequivocally parody, as \nboth Judge Birch and the Supreme Court in Campbell v.", "proposition": ["The court found that SunTrust has not established a likelihood of success on its copyright infringement claim.", "The court believes that a fair use defense is available for TWDG's putative infringement of GWTW's copyright.", "The court vacates the district court's injunction.", "The court emphasizes the importance of First Amendment values and preserving the public domain.", "The court reverses the judgment of the district court and remands the case for further proceedings.", "Judge Marcus concurs with the opinion but writes separately to emphasize three points: the district court's error in finding the critical or parodic element of TWDG, the unequivocal nature of TWDG as parody, and the distinction between \"unabated piracy\" and TWDG."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "122", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "107 \n cultivating this tract of land is $10, the net gain from cultivating the \nland b eing $2. I assume for purposes of simplicity that the farmer \nowns the land. Now assume that the cattle -raiser starts operations \non the neighboring property and that the value of the crops \ndamaged is $l. In this case $11 is obtained by the farmer from sale \non the market and $1 is obtained from the cattle -raiser for damage \nsuffered and the net gain remains $2. \nNow suppose that the cattle -raiser finds it profitable to increase the \nsize of his herd, even though the amount of damage rises to $3; \nwhich means that the value of the additional meat production is \ngreater than the additional costs, including the additional $2 \npayment for damage. But the total payment for damage is now $3. \nThe net gain to the farmer from cultivating the land is still $2. The \ncattle -raiser would be better off if the farmer would agree not to \ncultivate his land for any payment less than $3. The farmer would \nbe agreeable to not cultivating the land for any payment greater \nthan $2. There is clearly room for a mutually satisfactory bargain \nwhich would lead to the abandonment of cultivation\u2026 . . \n... \n...A procedure which merely provided for payment for damage to \nthe crop caused by the cattle but which did not allow for the \npossibility of cultivation being discontinued would result in too \nsmall an employment of factors of production in cattle -raising and \ntoo large an employment of factors in cultivation of the crop. But \ngiven the possibility of market transactions, a situation in which \ndamage to crops exceeded the rent of the land would not endur e. \nWhether the cattle -raiser pays the farmer to leave the land \nuncultivated or himself rents the land by paying the land -owner an \namount slightly greater than the farmer would pay (if the farmer \nwas him -self renting the land), the final result would be the same \nand would maximize the value of production\u2026 . .", "proposition": ["The final result would maximize the value of production."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "480", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "465 \n The extra royalty payments will not come from thin air. \nRather, they ultimately come from those who wish to read \nor see or hear those classic books or films or recordings \nthat have survived. Even the $500,000 that United Airlines \nhas had to pay for the right to pla y George Gershwin\u2019s \n1924 classic Rhapsody in Blue represents a cost of doing \nbusiness, potentially reflected in the ticket prices of those \nwho fly. See Ganzel, Copyright or Copywrong? , 39 Training 36, \n42 (Dec. 2002). Further, the likely amounts of extra ro yalty \npayments are large enough to suggest that unnecessarily \nhigh prices will unnecessarily restrict distribution of classic \nworks (or lead to disobedience of the law) \u2013 not just in \ntheory but in practice. Cf. CRS Report 3 (\u201c[N]ew, cheaper \neditions can be expected when works come out of \ncopyright\u201d); Brief for College Art Association et al. as Amici \nCuriae 24 (One year after expiration of copyright on Willa \nCather\u2019s My Antonia, seven new editions appeared at prices \nranging from $2 to $24); Ganzel, supra, at 40 -41, 44 \n(describing later abandoned plans to charge individual Girl \nScout camps $257 to $1,439 annually for a license to sing \nsongs such as God Bless America around a campfire). \nA second, equally important, cause for concern arises out \nof the fact th at copyright extension imposes a \n\u201cpermissions\u201d requirement \u2013 not only upon potential users \nof \u201cclassic\u201d works that still retain commercial value, but \nalso upon potential users of any other work still in copyright. \nAgain using CRS estimates, one can estimat e that, by 2018, \nthe number of such works 75 years of age or older will be \nabout 350,000. See Brief for Petitioners 7. Because the \nCopyright Act of 1976 abolished the requirement that an \nowner must renew a copyright, such still -in-copyright \nworks (of littl e or no commercial value) will eventually \nnumber in the millions.", "proposition": ["The extra royalty payments for classic works do not come from thin air, but ultimately come from those who wish to consume them.", "The cost of these royalty payments may be reflected in ticket prices or other consumer costs.", "Large amounts of extra royalty payments could lead to unnecessary restrictions on the distribution of classic works or result in disobedience of the law.", "New, cheaper editions of works can be expected when they come out of copyright, as shown by examples like My Antonia and God Bless America.", "Copyright extension imposes a 'permissions' requirement not only on potential users of classic works with commercial value, but also on potential users of any other work still in copyright.", "By 2018, there will be about 350,000 works that are 75 years old or older, which will be subject to the permissions requirement.", "The Copyright Act of 1976 abolished the renewal requirement for copyrights, so there will eventually be millions of works still in copyright with little or no commercial value."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "556", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "541 \n copy. And here, even if we conclude, per the above, that time and \nspace shifting are fair uses of these streams, getting around a \ntechnological measure meant to prevent copying might sti ll be a \nDMCA violation - even though it\u2019s not a copyright violation. \nThis might go too far. After all, if the law gives the power to \ncontent producers to disable fair uses through legally protected \n(even if technically flawed) technological means, then fai r use is a \ndead letter. And fair use was supposed to be a critical part of the \ngreat First Amendment - Copyright balance. \nSo what would an answer look like here? Well, I\u2019d want you to start \nwith the text of the statute. Does Streamers violate its terms? Do es \nit circumvent by disabling the protections inherent in non -saveable \nstreams or does it make use of something more like the analog \nhole? See here, e.g.: http://volokh.com/posts/1176397745.shtml \nDoes your conclusion depend on your interpretation of the te xt? \nWhich of those interpretations are sensible? Are the harshest \ninterpretations unconstitutional? \nThe DMCA portion of this question was meant to expose you to \nthis very tricky area of law and would not have been at all fair on a \nreal test. But I do hope that you\u2019ll give it some thought. Interesting \ntrivia: as a law student I wrote an app called Streamers that works \nexactly as described in this problem. \n3.5. Publicity Rights \nParks v. La Face Records, 76 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. \nMich. 1999). \nGregory J. Reed,Gregory J. ReedAssoc., Detroit, MI, for \nplaintiff. \nJoseph M. Beck, Kilpatrick, Stockton, Atlanta, GA, Blanche \nB. Cook, Philip B. Phillips, Miller, Canfield, Detroit, MI, \nConrad L. Mallett, Jr., Miller, Canfield, Detroit, MI, for \ndefendants. \nORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF\u2019S MOTION FOR \nSUMMARY JUDGMENT AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF", "proposition": ["The text discusses fair use, technological measures, and the DMCA, and suggests that fair use may be at risk if content producers can disable it through legally protected means."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "56", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "41 \n have concealed the property in the ceiling. It is apparent \nthat the box was not lost. The circumstances suggest that it \nwas either abandoned property, mislaid property, or \ntreasure trove. Considering all of the facts as presented, we \ncannot say that the trial court\u2019s finding that the property \nwas mislaid property was clea rly erroneous. Specifically, we \nhold that the trial court\u2019s findings that \u201cthe money in \ncontroversy was intentionally placed where it was found for \nits security, in order to shield it from unwelcome eyes \u2026\u201d \nand that the \u201cmoney was mislaid property\u201d were no t clearly \nerroneous. \nWe note that other jurisdictions have addressed similar fact \nsituations and have determined that the property at stake \nwas \u201cmislaid\u201d property. The Iowa Supreme Court \naddressed this issue in Benjamin, supra . In that case, a bank \nhired B enjamin to perform a routine service inspection on \nan airplane which it owned. During the inspection, \nBenjamin removed a panel from the wing. Id. The screws to \nthe panel were old and rusted and Benjamin had to use a \ndrill to remove them. Upon removal of th e panel, Benjamin \ndiscovered packets of currency totaling $18,000. Both \nBenjamin and the bank, as the owner of the plane, claimed \nownership of the money. Id. The court reviewed the \nvarious types of property and determined that the money \nwas \u201cmislaid\u201d prope rty. The court explained that \u201cthe place \nwhere Benjamin found the money and the manner in which \nit was hidden are also important.\u201d They further noted that \n\u201cthe bills were carefully tied and wrapped and then \nconcealed in a location that was accessible only by \nremoving screws and a panel. These circumstances support \nan inference that the money was placed there intentionally. \nThis inference supports the conclusion that the money was \nmislaid.\u201d Benjamin, supra . After reaching this conclusion, the \ncourt held \u201cbec ause the money discovered by Benjamin \nwas properly found to be mislaid property, it belongs to the \nowner of the premises where it was found.\u201d Id. The", "proposition": ["The trial court's finding that the property was mislaid property was not clearly erroneous.", "The trial court found that the money was intentionally placed for security and was mislaid property.", "Other jurisdictions have determined that similar property was mislaid."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "161", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "146 \n But there is now before the court private litigation in which \nindividual property owners have sought specific relief from \na single plant operation. The threshold question raised by \nthe division of view on this appeal is whether the court \nshould resolve the litigation between the parties now before \nit as equitably as seems possible; or whether, seeking \npromotion o f the general public welfare, it should channel \nprivate litigation into broad public objectives. \nA court performs its essential function when it decides the \nrights of parties before it. Its decision of private \ncontroversies may sometimes greatly affect pub lic issues. \nLarge questions of law are often resolved by the manner in \nwhich private litigation is decided. But this is normally an \nincident to the court\u2019s main function to settle controversy. \nIt is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in \nprivate litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve \ndirect public objectives greatly beyond the rights and \ninterests before the court. \nEffective control of air pollution is a problem presently far \nfrom solution even with the full public and financial \npowers of government. In large measure adequate technical \nprocedures are yet to be developed and some that appear \npossible may be economically impracticable. \nIt seems apparent that the amelioration of air pollution will \ndepend on technical research in great d epth; on a carefully \nbalanced consideration of the economic impact of close \nregulation; and of the actual effect on public health. It is \nlikely to require massive public expenditure and to demand \nmore than any local community can accomplish and to \ndepend o n regional and interstate controls. \nA court should not try to do this on its own as a by -\nproduct of private litigation and it seems manifest that the \njudicial establishment is neither equipped in the limited \nnature of any judgment it can pronounce nor prep ared to \nlay down and implement an effective policy for the", "proposition": ["The court should resolve the litigation between the parties now before it as equitably as seems possible.", "The court should not try to achieve direct public objectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before it through a decision in private litigation.", "Effective control of air pollution is a complex problem requiring technical research, massive public expenditure, and interstate controls.", "A court's main function is to settle controversy between parties, and its decision may sometimes affect public issues, but this is normally an incidental aspect of its function."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "17", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "2 \n Bridges v. Hawkesworth, 21 L.J. (Q.B.) 75 \n(1851)(footnotes omitted and paragraph breaks added) \nThis was an appeal brought by the plainti ff from the \nWestminster County Court. \nThe plaintiff was a traveller for a large firm with which the \ndefendant, who was a shopkeeper, had dealings. On one \noccasion (October 1847) the plaintiff who had called at the \ndefendant\u2019s on business, on leaving the de fendant\u2019s shop \nnoticed and picked up a small parcel which was lying an the \nshop floor. He immediately shewed it to the shopman, and \non opening it found it contained bank notes to the value of \n55 pounds. The plaintiff told the defendant who came in \nthat he had found a parcel of notes, and requested the \ndefendant to keep them to deliver to the owner. The \ndefendant advertised the finding of them in the \nnewspapers, stating that they should be restored to the \nowner on his properly describing them and paying the \nexpenses. Three years having elapsed and no owner \nappearing to claim them, the plaintiff applied to the \ndefendant for them, offering to pay the expense of the \nadvertisements, and to indemnify the defendant against any \nclaim in respect of them. The defendan t refused to deliver \nthem up, and the plaintiff consequently brought a plaint in \nthe County Court of Westminster to recover the notes. The \nJudge decided that the defendant was entitled to keep them \nas against the plaintiff, and gave judgment for the \ndefend ant. It was found in the case that the plaintiff when \nhe handed the notes over to the defendant to deliver to the \ntrue owner, did not intend to give up any title to them that \nhe might possess. \nJudgment was now delivered by PATTESON , J. \nThe notes which are the subject of this action were \nevidently dropped by mere accident in the shop of the \ndefendant by the owner of them. The facts do not warrant \nthe supposition that they had been deposited there", "proposition": ["The passage is about an appeal brought by the plaintiff from the Westminster County Court.", "The plaintiff was a traveller for a large firm, and the defendant was a shopkeeper with whom the plaintiff had dealings.", "In October 1847, the plaintiff found a small parcel containing bank notes worth 55 pounds in the defendant's shop and informed the defendant about it.", "The defendant advertised the finding of the notes in the newspapers, stating that the owner should claim them by properly describing them and paying the expenses.", "After three years, no owner appeared to claim the notes, so the plaintiff applied to the defendant for them, offering to pay the expenses of the advertisements and to indemnify the defendant against any claim in respect of them.", "The defendant refused to deliver the notes to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff brought a plaint in the County Court of Westminster to recover the notes.", "The Judge decided that the defendant was entitled to keep the notes as against the plaintiff and gave judgment for the defendant.", "It was found in the case that the plaintiff did not intend to give up any title to the notes when he handed them over to the defendant to deliver to the true owner.", "The notes were evidently dropped by accident in the defendant's shop by the owner.", "The facts do not warrant the supposition that the notes had been deposited in the shop."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "279", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "264 \n without limit. The values that visitors seek the parks are steadily \neroded. Plainly, we must soon cease to treat the parks as commons \nor they will be of no value anyone. \nWhat shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off \nas private property. We might keep them as public property, but \nallocate the right enter them. The allocation might be on the basis \nof wealth, by the use of an auction system. It might be on the basis \nmerit, as defined by some agreed -upon standards. It might be by \nlottery. Or it might be on a first -come, first -served basis, \nadministered to long queues. These, I think, are all the reasonable \npossibilities. They are all objectionable. But we must choose \u2013or \nacquiesce in the destruction of the commons that we call our \nNational Parks. \n2.2.2. Applications \nYoung v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1975) \nRobert J. Moffatt, Shreveport, La., for appellant. \nRobert J. Malinak, Houston, Tex., for appellees. \nBefore HEANEY and WEBSTER, Circuit Judges, and \nNANGLE, Distri ct Judge.1 \nHEANY , Circuit Judge. \nIn this diversity action, plaintiff -appellant Young seeks an \ninjunction and damages or an accounting for the \ndefendants\u2019 actions in forcibly removing valuable minerals \nfrom beneath his land by means of injection and \nproduct ion wells on surrounding property. The District \nCourt dismissed his complaint after a trial on the merits. \nYoung v. Ethyl Corp., 382 F.Supp. 769 (W.D.Ark.1974). \nThe defendants hold mineral leases on approximately \n16,000 acres of land overlying the \u201cSmackov er Limestone \nFormation\u201d in Columbia County, Arkansas. Their salt -\nwater recycling operation brings salt water brine from a \n \n1 JOHN F. NANGLE, District Judge, Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by \ndesignation", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the erosion of values in parks and the need to find a solution to prevent their destruction.", "The author presents several options for managing park access, including selling them as private property, allocating access based on wealth, merit, lottery, or first-come, first-served basis.", "The author believes that all options are objectionable but that a decision must be made to protect the parks.", "The passage then shifts to a discussion of a legal case, Young v. Ethyl Corp., a diversity action in which plaintiff-appellant Young seeks an injunction, damages, or an accounting for the defendants' actions in removing valuable minerals from beneath his land.", "The defendants hold mineral leases on approximately 16,000 acres of land overlying the \"Smackover Limestone Formation\" in Columbia County, Arkansas, and operate a salt-water recycling operation.", "The District Court dismissed Young's complaint after a trial on the merits, and the case involves judges from different jurisdictions."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "42", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "27 \n Blackstone. Those were cases in which a thing was cast into \na public place or into the sea - into a place, in fact, of which \nit could not be said that anyone had a real de facto \npossession, or a general power and intent to exclude \nunauthorized interference.\u201d Then Lord Russell cited the \npassage which I read earlier in this judgment and \ncontinued: \u201cIt is somewhat strange\u201d - I venture to echo \nthose words - \u201cthat there is no more direct authority on the \nquestion; but the general principle seems to me to be that \nwhere a person has possession of house or land, with a \nmanifest intention to exercise control over it and the things \nwhich may be upon or in it, then, if something is found on \nthat land, whether by an employee of the owner or by a \nstranger, the presumption is that the possession of that \nthing is in the owner of the locus in quo.\u201d It is to be \nobserved that Lord Russell there is extending the meaning \nof the passage he had cited from Pollock and Wright\u2019s \nessay on \u201cPossession in the Common Law,\u201d where the \nlearned authors say that the possession of land carries with \nit possession of everything which is attached to or under \nthat land. Then Lord Russell adds possession of everything \nwhich may be on or in that land. South Staffordshire Water \nCo. v. Sharman38 which was relied on by counsel for the \ndefenda nt, has also been the subject of some discussion. It \nhas been said that it establishes that if a man finds a thing \nas the servant or agent of another, he finds it not for \nhimself, but for that other, and indeed that seems to afford \na sufficient explanation of the case. The rings found at the \nbottom of the pool were not in the possession of the \ncompany, but it seems that though Sharman was the first to \nobtain possession of them, he obtained them for his \nemployers and could claim no title for himself. \n \n38 2 Q. B. 44.", "proposition": ["The case of South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman relies on the principle that if a man finds a thing as the servant or agent of another, he finds it not for himself but for that other."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "381", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "366 \n (d) would be barred from obtaining a patent for the texture itself, \nbecause the bumps aren\u2019t a \u201cprocess,\u201d under the patent statutes. \n(e) might be able to patent the process for creating the material \neven if materials featuring a similar texture are already on the \nmarket. \nAnswers \n(a) could trademark the bumpy pad. \nFalse. This is just a pure application of the functionality \ndoctrine - see below. \n(b) would be barred from trademark because a bumpy texture is \nnot a word, name, symbol or device. \nFalse. As Breyer stated in Qualitex , \u201c[s]ince human beings \nmight use as a \u2018symbol\u2019 or \u2018device\u2019 al most anything at all that \nis capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is \nnot restrictive.\u201d Indeed, a bumpy texture is capable of carrying \nmeaning. Even the more demanding part of the statute might \nbe met here, since the bumpy texture qui te possibly could be \nused to distinguish Qualitex as the source of the pads. \n(c) would be barred from trademark under the functionality \ndoctrine. \nTrue. The texture \u201caid[s] in the evenness of drying.\u201d Because \nthe texture results in a better performing pad, and thus \n\u201caffects the \u2026 quality\u201d of the pad, the functionality doctrine \nwould bar trademark registration of the texture. \n(d) would be barred from obtaining a patent for the texture itself, \nbecause the bumps aren\u2019t a \u201cprocess,\u201d under the patent statutes. \nFalse. Even if the bumps aren\u2019t a \u201cprocess,\u201d they might be a \n\u201cmanufacture\u201d or \u201ccomposition of matter,\u201d and thus \npatentable subject matter under \u00a7101 of the Patent Act. The \nAct allows one to patent inventions other than processes.", "proposition": ["366 (d) would be barred from obtaining a patent for the texture itself because the bumps aren't a 'process', under the patent statutes.", "(e) might be able to patent the process for creating the material even if materials featuring a similar texture are already on the market.", "Answers (a) could trademark the bumpy pad. False. This is just a pure application of the functionality doctrine - see below.", "(b) would be barred from trademark because a bumpy texture is not a word, name, symbol, or device. False. As Breyer stated in Qualitex, \u2018[s]ince human beings might use as a \u2018symbol\u2019 or \u2018device\u2019 almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive.\u2019 Indeed, a bumpy texture is capable of carrying meaning. Even the more demanding part of the statute might be met here, since the bumpy texture might possibly be used to distinguish Qualitex as the source of the pads.", "(c) would be barred from trademark under the functionality doctrine. True. The texture \u2018aids in the evenness of drying.\u2019 Because the texture results in a better performing pad, and thus \u2018affects the \u2026 quality\u2019 of the pad, the functionality doctrine would bar trademark registration of the texture.", "(d) would be barred from obtaining a patent for the texture itself, because the bumps aren't a \u2018process\u2019, under the patent statutes. False. Even if the bumps aren't a \u2018process\u2019, they might be a \u2018manufacture\u2019 or \u2018composition of matter\u2019, and thus patentable subject matter under \u00a7101 of the Patent Act. The Act allows one to patent inventions other than processes."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "340", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "325 \n III. Rebuttals to arguments against \n\uf0b7 News is not \u201cabandoned\u201d when published. There\u2019s no \nintent to abandon, as is evidenced by the organizational \nstructure of the AP. They couldn\u2019t stay in business if they \ncouldn\u2019t profit from publication of the news. Their byl aws \nattempt to prevent transmission to competitors before \npublication. \n\uf0b7 The holding does not create a monopoly of gathering and \ndistributing news, but only partially keeps out competitors \nwho would \u201creproduce\u201d AP\u2019s news and only for long \nenough to give AP e nough value to keep alive its incentive \nto gather news. \n\uf0b7 The harm here is not (only) in the fraud upon consumers, \nthe reverse palming off of AP\u2019s news as coming from INS. \nAnd so INS\u2019s giving credit would not fix the problem. \n\uf0b7 AP uses other organizations\u2019 new s stories as leads or tips \nthat are independently verified before publication. But this \ndoes not mean that AP is guilty of that of which they \naccuse INS (which guilt might establish the equitable \ndefense of unclean hands). \nHolmes \nIn general, the law does n ot prevent one from repeating what \nothers have said. The news is not copyrighted and so is free to be \nused by others, including competitors. But here, using AP\u2019s news \nand publishing it at the same time AP papers publish it, in the west, \namounts to a kind o f fraud. INS should be required to name the \nsource. \nBrandeis \n\uf0b7 Facts \n\uf0b7 Framing the question: Can AP enjoin a competitor from \nusing AP -published news that the competitor lawfully \nacquires? No cases answer this question.", "proposition": ["The Associated Press (AP) has a structure that prevents competitors from receiving news before publication.", "The AP profits from the publication of news.", "The holding in the case does not create a monopoly for gathering and distributing news.", "The holding only partially keeps out competitors who reproduce AP's news.", "Using AP's news without proper attribution is considered fraudulent.", "AP can use other organizations' news stories as leads or tips without committing the same offense.", "Repetition of others' statements is generally not prohibited by law.", "INS should be required to name the source of AP's news.", "There are no cases that answer the question of whether AP can enjoin a competitor from using AP-published news that the competitor lawfully acquires."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "735", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "And there is no evidence of pointing out to the grantees in \nsaid three deeds, aforesaid, including defendants\u2019 deed, of any specific property, \nother than the property of defendants, described in their deed, and in Paragraph \nFour (4) of the complaint, and herein; nor of any immediate act of the grantees, \nincluding defendants, in said Three (3) deeds, aforesaid, of taking possession of \nany property, other than described in said three (3) deeds, aforesaid; and the \ntestimony of husband, defendant, was unequivocally that he had no intention of \npossessing or holding anything other than what the deed called for; and, that there \nis no showing of any continuous possession by defendants or their immediate \npredecessors in interest, since the evidence indicates the property was i n the \nnature, for us, as a summer occupancy, and such occupancy and use was for \nrather limited periods of time during comparatively short portions of the year, and \nwas far from continuous.\u2019", "proposition": ["The JSON output should start and end with { and }"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "704", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "689 \n \u201cThis Court gives great weight to the factual findings of a \ntrial justice sitting without a jury in a civil matter, and we \nwill not disturb such findings unless they are \u2018clearly \nerroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or \noverlooked material evi dence or unless the decision fails to \ndo substantial justice between the parties.\u2019\u201d \u2026 . \u201cHowever, \n\u2018[i]n contrast to our deferential stance vis -[a]-vis factual \nfindings made by a trial justice, we review in a de novo \nmanner a trial justice\u2019s rulings concern ing questions of \nlaw.\u2019\u201d Costa , 996 A.2d at 611 (quoting Grady v. Narragansett \nElectric Co. , 962 A.2d 34, 41 (R.I. 2009)). \nIII: Analysis \nA: The History and Policy Rationale of Adverse \nPossession \nBefore we begin our analysis, a brief history of adverse \nposse ssion may be of assistance. After first using an \namalgamation of Roman and Germanic doctrine, our \nEnglish predecessors in common law later settled upon \nstatutes of limitation to effect adverse possession. See Axel \nTeisen, Contributions of the Comparative L aw Bureau , 3 A.B.A. \nJ. 97, 126, 127, 134 (1917). In practice, the statutes \neliminated a rightful owner\u2019s ability to regain possession \nafter the passing of a certain number of years, thereby \nvesting de facto title in the adverse possessor. See \nRestatement ( Third) Property: Servitudes \u00a7 2.17, cmt. b at 263 -\n64 (2000). For example, a 1623 statute of King James I \nrestricted the right of entry to recover possession of land to \na period of twenty years. 10 Thompson on Real Property \u00a7 \n87.01 at 74 -75 (2d Thomas ed. 1 998) (citing An Act for \nLimitation of Actions, and Avoiding of Suit in Law, 1623, \n21 Jac. I., c. 16).", "proposition": ["This Court gives great weight to the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury in a civil matter.", "We will not disturb such findings unless they are clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence or unless the decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties.", "In contrast to our deferential stance vis-\u00e0-vis factual findings made by a trial justice, we review in a de novo manner a trial justice's rulings concerning questions of law.", "Before analyzing the case, a brief history of adverse possession may be of assistance.", "Our English predecessors in common law initially used an amalgamation of Roman and Germanic doctrine, but later settled upon statutes of limitation to effect adverse possession.", "In practice, the statutes eliminated a rightful owner's ability to regain possession after the passing of a certain number of years, thereby vesting de facto title in the adverse possessor.", "For example, a 1623 statute of King James I restricted the right of entry to recover possession of land to a period of twenty years."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "217", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "202 \n traced between them: every thing shows that men are seeking the \nmeans of drawing near to one another; they no longer dread, or \nseek to murder each other. The seaports are filled with vessels \nreceiving all the productions of the earth, and serving to exchange \nits riches. A countless multitude, living in peace and abundance \nupon the fruits of their labours, has succeeded t o the nations of \nhunters who were always struggling between war and famine. What \nhas produced these wonders? what has renovated the surface of the \nearth? what has given to man this dominion over embellished, \nfruitful, and perfectionated nature? The benevol ent genius is \nSecurity . It is security which has wrought out this great \nmetamorphosis. How rapid have been its operations! It is scarcely \ntwo centuries since William Penn reached these savage wilds with a \ncolony of true conquerors; for they were men of pea ce, who sullied \nnot their establishment by force, and who made themselves \nrespected only by acts of benevolence and justice. \nCarol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property , 52 U. \nChi. L. Rev. 73 (1985) \nHow do things come to be o wned? This is a fundamental puzzle \nfor anyone who thinks about property. One buys things from other \nowners, to be sure, but how did the other owners get those things? \nAny chain of ownership or title must have a first link. Someone \nhad to do something to an chor that link. The law tells us what \nsteps we must follow to obtain ownership of things, but we need a \ntheory that tells us why these steps should do the job. \nJohn Locke\u2019s view, once described as \u201cthe standard bourgeois \ntheory,\u201d is probably the one most f amiliar to American students. \nLocke argued that an original owner is one who mixes his or her \nlabor with a thing and, by commingling that labor with the thing, \nestablishes ownership of it. This labor theory is appealing because \nit appears to rest on \u201cdeser t,\u201d but it has some problems. First, \nwithout a prior theory of ownership, it is not self -evident that one", "proposition": ["Men are seeking the means of drawing near to one another and no longer dread or seek to murder each other.", "Seaports are filled with vessels receiving all the productions of the earth and serving to exchange its riches.", "A countless multitude, living in peace and abundance upon the fruits of their labours, has succeeded the nations of hunters who were always struggling between war and famine.", "Security is the benevolent genius that has wrought out this great metamorphosis.", "It is scarcely two centuries since William Penn reached these savage wilds with a colony of true conquerors.", "These true conquerors sullied not their establishment by force and made themselves respected only by acts of benevolence and justice.", "How do things come to be owned? This is a fundamental puzzle for anyone who thinks about property.", "One buys things from other owners, but how did the other owners get those things?", "Any chain of ownership or title must have a first link. Someone had to do something to establish that link.", "The law tells us what steps we must follow to obtain ownership of things, but we need a theory that tells us why these steps should do the job.", "John Locke\u2019s view, once described as \u2018the standard bourgeois theory,\u2019 is probably the one most familiar to American students.", "Locke argued that an original owner is one who mixes his or her labor with a thing and, by commingling that labor with the thing, establishes ownership of it.", "This labor theory is appealing because it appears to rest on \u2018desert,\u2019 but it has some problems.", "First, without a prior theory of ownership, it is not self-evident that one's labor establishes ownership of a thing."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "362", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The functionality doctrine, as we have said, forbids the use \nof a product\u2019s feature as a trademark where doing so will \nput a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the \nfeature is \u201cessential to the use or purpose of the article\u201d or \n\u201caffects its cost or quality.\u201d Inwood Laboratories, Inc., 456 \nU.S., at 850, n. 10, 102 S.Ct., at 2186, n. 10. The", "proposition": ["The functionality doctrine forbids the use of a product's feature as a trademark.", "The feature cannot be used as a trademark if it puts a competitor at a significant disadvantage.", "The feature must be essential to the use or purpose of the article or affect its cost or quality.", "Inwood Laboratories, Inc. is a case that illustrates the application of the functionality doctrine."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "397", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "382 \n branches of the Government, the Congress and the \nExecutive, and not to the courts.12 \nWe have emphasized in the recent past that \u201c[o]ur \nindividual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a \nparticular [legislative] course \u2026 is to be put aside in the \nprocess of interpreting a statute.\u201d TVA v. Hill , 437 U.S., at \n194, 98 S.Ct., at 2302. Our task, rather, is the narrow one of \ndetermining what Congress meant by the words it used in \nthe statute; once that is done our powers are exhausted. \nCongress is free to amend \u00a7 101 so as to exclude from \npatent protection organisms produced by genetic \nengineering. Cf. 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2181(a), exempting from \npatent protection invention s \u201cuseful solely in the utilization \nof special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic \nweapon.\u201d Or it may chose to craft a statute specifically \ndesigned for such living things. But, until Congress takes \nsuch action, this Court must construe the lang uage of \u00a7 101 \nas it is. The language of that section fairly embraces \nrespondent\u2019s invention. \nAccordingly, the judgment of the Court of Customs and \nPatent Appeals is \nAffirmed. \nMR. JUSTICE BRENNAN , with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE, \nMR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, AND MR. JUSTICE POWELL \njoin, dissenting. \nI agree with the Court that the question before us is a \nnarrow one. Neither the future of scientific research, nor \neven, the ability of respondent Chakrabarty to reap some \nmonopoly profits from his pioneering work, is at sta ke. \nPatents on the processes by which he has produced and \nemployed the new living organism are not contested. The \n \n12 I read the Co urt to admit that the popular conception, even among advocates \nof agricultural patents, was that living organisms were unpatentable. See ante, at \n311-312, and n. 8.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the interpretation of a statute and the role of the courts in determining its meaning.", "The passage emphasizes that the individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular legislative course should be put aside in the process of interpreting a statute.", "The passage states that the task of the court is to determine what Congress meant by the words it used in the statute, and once that is done, the court's powers are exhausted.", "The passage mentions that Congress is free to amend the statute to exclude certain inventions from patent protection, such as organisms produced by genetic engineering.", "The passage acknowledges that the question before the court is a narrow one, and neither the future of scientific research nor the ability of respondent Chakrabarty to reap monopoly profits from his pioneering work is at stake.", "The passage notes that patents on the processes by which Chakrabarty has produced and employed the new living organism are not contested."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "554", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "539 \n engage in. Maybe the other side will gather evidence concerning the \nproportion of Streamers -made copies that are authorized. \n(Remember in discussing Grokster when we asked whether the \npercentage of noncopyrighted files or copies was the relevant \nbenchmark for the Sony \u201csignificant\u201d benchmark.) \nBut even if Vapid can show that the vast majority of Streamers -\nmade copies are of non -authorized streams, meaning streams that \nthe content owners would not allow to be copied, the analysis \nwould not stop there. Just because a content owner does not \nauthorize a copy does not mean that he or she has a valid legal \nclaim against the copier. If the content is not copyrighted to begin \nwith or if the copying is fair use, then there can be no infrin gement, \nand, thus, such copies cannot establish contributory infringement. \nRemember that one need not register a work to gain a copyright. \nYour blog postings, etc., those can all be subject to copyright \nprotection. Indeed, nearly all of the streams that St reamers users \ncopy are likely subject to copyright. And so, unless the owners of \nthose streams authorize copying, we have prima facie infringement. \nExactly how many streams authorize such copying is something \nwe\u2019d have to investigate. But as to the unautho rized streams: is \ncopying them with Streamers fair use if done (a) only to time shift \nor (b) to time shift and \u201cdevice shift\u201d (i.e., put the content on an \niPod even when the content owner wants me to pay to do so)? \nA very good answer here would discuss the fair use statute (looking \nto opinions interpreting it, like Suntrust Bank , for guidance) and \nexamine its factors. Sony, though, tells us how these factors resolve \nwith respect to television time -shifting, and it\u2019s clearly relevant to, \nif not dispositive o f, the copying here.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the potential gathering of evidence concerning the proportion of Streamers-made copies that are authorized.", "The passage refers to the Sony 'significant' benchmark and the relevance of the percentage of non-copyrighted files or copies.", "Even if Vapid can show that the vast majority of Streamers-made copies are of non-authorized streams, there are still cases where there can be no copyright infringement due to copyright not being registered or fair use.", "The passage mentions that nearly all of the streams that Streamers users copy are likely subject to copyright protection.", "The passage questions whether copying unauthorized streams with Streamers is fair use when done for time-shifting or time-shifting and device-shifting purposes.", "The passage cites Sony as relevant to the resolution of the factors related to television time-shifting and its applicability to the copying at hand."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "81", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "66 \n enable this court to infer that any actual or substantial \ndamage will accrue from the acts of the appelle es \ncomplained of. \nThe case differs from the usual case of enjoining a trespass. \nOrdinarily, if a trespass is committed upon land, the \nplaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages without \nproving or alleging any actual damage. In the instant case, \ntraversing the airspace above appellants\u2019 land is not, of \nitself, a trespass at all, but it is a lawful act unless it is done \nunder circumstances which will cause injury to appellants\u2019 \npossession. \nAppellants do not, therefore, in their bill state a case of \ntrespass, unless they allege a case of actual and substantial \ndamage. The bill fails to do this. It merely draws a naked \nconclusion as to damages without facts or circumstances to \nsupport it. It follows that the complaint does not state a \ncase for injunctive relief. \nWe should note appellants\u2019 contention that appellees\u2019 \ncontinuous use of the airspace in question may or will ripen \ninto an easement. \nIn considering this particular question, it is necessary to \nconsider just what right appellees are attempting to ac quire. \nIf the superincumbent airspace were merely space (speaking \nof space as a nonentity), it would be valueless to the \nappellees. In other words, if no air were present therein, \nappellees\u2019 planes could not navigate. The primary thing \nappellees are using would appear to be the air overlying \nappellants\u2019 land. It is generally held that an easement of or \nin the air may not be obtained by prescription. \nIt is said in 19 C.J. 903, Sec. 85: \u2018The English doctrine that \nan easement for light and air may be acquired by user or \nprescription has been very generally rejected in the United \nStates.\u2019 See, also, 1 Thompson on Real Property, p. 652, \nSec. 542; also, Cas e v. Minot, 158 Mass. 577, 33 N.E. \n700,22 L.R.A. 536, where many cases are cited in support", "proposition": ["The court needs to infer actual or substantial damage from the acts of the appellees.", "The case is different from the usual case of enjoining a trespass.", "Ordinarily, trespassing upon land entitles the plaintiff to nominal damages without proving actual damage.", "Traversing the airspace above appellants' land is not a trespass unless it causes injury to their possession.", "Appellants' bill fails to allege a case of actual and substantial damage.", "The complaint does not state a case for injunctive relief.", "Appellants contend that appellees' continuous use of the airspace may or will ripen into an easement.", "The primary thing appellees are using appears to be the air overlying appellants' land.", "An easement of or in the air may not be obtained by prescription.", "The English doctrine that an easement for light and air may be acquired by user or prescription has been generally rejected in the United States."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "10", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "x \n \nTo summarize: \n \n \n Privately Made Publicly Made \nPrivately \nProsecuted Contracts Torts \nPublicly \nProsecuted Parens Patriae Criminal Law \n \nSo where is Property Law? Under this view, it does not exist as a \nsubstantive category. Indeed, a Property course consists of tort \ncases, contract cases, criminal cases, and a few cases nominally \nlabeled property cases but which are easily seen to be contract \ncases with different default rules and procedures. The chart simply \nmakes plain that it could not be otherwise. \n \n Can you see why the set of laws in the Parens Patriae category \nmight be a very small one? \n \nAnalyzing Cases \n \nLet's keep going for just a bit on the similarities among the \nsubstantive courses in order to discern a role for Property within a \nfirst-year education. While Contract, Tort, and Criminal Law differ \nin the nature of the institutions that make law and prosecute \nviolations, they are remarkably similar in how their causes of action \nwork. In each of these courses, you will learn an identical pattern \nfor analyzing a lawsuit: Duty, Breach, Causation, Defenses, \nDamages. These may be taken up in different orders. The steps \nmay even be given different names. But the essence is the same: \n \n1. Did the defe ndant owe a _duty_ that is the subject of the", "proposition": ["Property Law is not considered a substantive category under this view.", "A Property course consists of tort cases, contract cases, criminal cases, and a few cases nominally labeled property cases but which are easily seen to be contract cases with different default rules and procedures.", "The chart makes plain that it could not be otherwise.", "The set of laws in the Parens Patriae category might be a very small one.", "Contract, Tort, and Criminal Law differ in the nature of the institutions that make law and prosecute violations.", "Contract, Tort, and Criminal Law are remarkably similar in how their causes of action work.", "In each of these courses, you will learn an identical pattern for analyzing a lawsuit: Duty, Breach, Causation, Defenses, Damages.", "These steps may be taken up in different orders and may be given different names, but the essence is the same."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "195", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Now, as we are without any municipal regulations of our \nown, and the pursuit here, for aught that appears on the \ncase, being with dogs and hounds of imperi al stature, we \nare at liberty to adopt one of the provisions just cited, \nwhich comports also with the learned conclusion of \nBarbeyrac, that property in animals ferae naturae may be \nacquired without bodily touch or manucaption, provided \nthe pursuer be withi n reach, or have a reasonable prospect \n(which certainly existed here) of taking, what he has thus \ndiscovered an intention of converting to his own use. \nWhen we reflect also that the interest of our husbandmen, \nthe most useful of men in any community, will be advanced", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the possibility of acquiring property in animals ferae naturae without bodily touch or manucaption."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "715", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "700 \n \u2026 . \nAs such, Cahill\u2019s cited authorities do not convince this \nCourt that an offer to purchase does not destroy the \nelements of hostility and claim of right when there is no \nongoing dispute or outstanding claim. Here, the 1997 letter \nwas not an attempt to make peace with her neighbors as a \nway to avoid litigation. Rather, Cahill was openly and \nobjectively manifesting direct evidence that George \nMorrow was the true owner of lot 19 and her interest in the \nproperty was subservient to his. This co mmunication \nnegates the requisite claim of right that the doctrine of \nadverse possession requires and interrupts the accrual of \nCahill\u2019s claim. See Heggen , 144 N.W.2d at 242 (\u201c[T]he \nrecognition of the owner\u2019s title by an adverse claimant \ninterrupts the adv erse possession.\u201d); see also Bowen , 997 A.2d \nat 579 (\u201c\u2018Such an acknowledgment of the owner\u2019s title \nterminates the running of the statutory period, and any \nsubsequent adverse use starts the clock anew.\u2019\u201c). This \nCourt holds as a matter of law that Cahill\u2019s 1 997 letter to \nGeorge Morrow was an unequivocal offer to purchase that \nhalted her claim of adverse possession at that point. \nAccordingly, the trial justice erred by considering any \nincidents of ownership exhibited by Cahill after the 1997 \nletter to George M orrow interrupted her claim. Because the \n\u201cdrainage control measures\u201d were instituted in 1999 or \n2000 (by Cahill\u2019s own admission), the trial justice should \nnot have cited these acts as supporting Cahill\u2019s adverse -\npossession case. Likewise, if the trial just ice\u2019s reference to \nCahill\u2019s \u201cmaint[enance of] the property\u201d or \u201cimprove[ment \nof] the property with * * * other plantings\u201d implicitly \nconsidered her reloaming and reseeding after the town \ninstalled the retaining wall and sidewalk in 2002 or her \nreseeding af ter the drainage improvements in 1999 or 2000, \nthis reliance also was in error.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving adverse possession.", "Cahill's cited authorities do not convince the court that an offer to purchase destroys the elements of hostility and claim of right when there is no ongoing dispute or outstanding claim.", "The 1997 letter was not an attempt to make peace with her neighbors as a way to avoid litigation.", "Cahill was openly and objectively manifesting direct evidence that George Morrow was the true owner of lot 19 and her interest in the property was subservient to his.", "This communication negates the requisite claim of right that the doctrine of adverse possession requires and interrupts the accrual of Cahill\u2019s claim.", "The court holds as a matter of law that Cahill\u2019s 1997 letter to George Morrow was an unequivocal offer to purchase that halted her claim of adverse possession at that point.", "The trial justice erred by considering any incidents of ownership exhibited by Cahill after the 1997 letter to George Morrow interrupted her claim.", "The \"drainage control measures\" were instituted in 1999 or 2000, and the trial justice should not have cited these acts as supporting Cahill\u2019s adverse-possession case.", "The trial justice's reference to Cahill's \"maint[enance of] the property\" or \"improve[ment of] the property with * * * other plantings\" implicitly considered her reloaming and reseeding after the town installed the retaining wall and sidewalk in 2002 or her reseeding after the drainage improvements in 1999 or 2000, which was also in error."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "548", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "533 \n interpretation) would impose upon technological \ninnovation, leads me to the conclusion that we should \nmaintain Sony, reading its standard as I have read it. As so \nread, it requires affirmance of the Ninth Circuit\u2019s \ndetermination of the relevant aspects of the Sony question. \n* * * \nFor these reasons, I disagree with Justice GINSBURG, but \nI agree with the Court and join its opinion. \n \n3.4.4.1. Problems \nProblems \nFor each, state the possible theories of secondary liability for \ninfringement that could be used, if any, based only on the facts \ngiven. (inducement, vicarious, or Sony-style) \n1. A newspaper contains a classified ad section, a small subsection \nof which fre quently features solicitations to trade copies of \ncopyrighted compact discs. Newspaper is sued. \n2. A developer sells software called StripIt that removes the \nrestrictions on movies purchased from the iTunes Store. Developer \nis sued. \n3. A developer sells so ftware that records in an audio file all audio \noutput by one\u2019s computer. A web designer creates a popular, ad -\nsupported website featuring how -to guides on using the software to \nrecord internet radio broadcasts, some of which are copyrighted \nand do not auth orize duplication. Developer is sued. \n4. Same as 3, but web designer is sued. \nAnswers \n1. A newspaper contains a classified ad section, a small subsection \nof which frequently features solicitations to trade copies of \ncopyrighted compact discs. Newspaper is sued.", "proposition": ["The author concludes that we should maintain Sony's standard.", "The author reads Sony's standard in a specific way.", "Affirming the Ninth Circuit's determination of the relevant aspects of the Sony question is required by the standard.", "The author disagrees with Justice GINSBURG.", "The author agrees with the Court and joins its opinion."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "286", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "271 \n the fact that the Arkansas Supreme Court did not apply the \nrule of capture to the 40 -acre tract in Budd. \nSecond, even accepting the defendants\u2019 contention that the \nbrine beneath Young\u2019s land must be treated no differently \nthan would oil or g as, the common law rule of capture is \nnot a license to plunder. Rather, it has an important \ncorollary in the doctrine of \u201ccorrelative rights.\u201d This \ndoctrine allows owners of land to extract oil or gas from a \ncommon pool, but posits two duties which limit t he right \nof a landowner to drain oil and gas from beneath adjacent \nlands: (1) the duty to other owners not to injure the source \nof supply; and (2) the duty not to take an undue proportion \nof the oil and gas from the common pool. See I Summers, \nThe Law of O il and Gas \u00a7 63 at 180 -181 (1954). To violate \nthose duties is to abuse one\u2019s correlative rights. This \ncorollary to the rule of capture has been codified in \nArk.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 53 -109(I) (3), which prohibits, as an abuse \nof correlative rights, \u201cwithdrawals caus ing undue drainage \nbetween tracts of land.\u201d9 If causing undue drainage is an \nabuse of correlative rights, then a fortiori forcing static \nminerals under one\u2019s neighbor\u2019s land to migrate amounts to \nan abuse of those rights. The defendants would have us \nignor e \u00a7 53 -109(I)(3) by urging that salt water brine is not \ngoverned by oil and gas law. They cannot have their cake \nand eat it too; if the rule of capture is to be applied to salt \n \n9 Ark.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 53 -110 provides: \nWaste of oil or gas as defined in this act is hereby \nprohibited. \nSection 53 -109(I) provides: \n\u201cWaste\u201d in addition to its or dinary meaning, shall mean \n\u201cphysical waste\u201d as that term is generally understood in \nthe oil and gas industry.", "proposition": ["The Arkansas Supreme Court did not apply the rule of capture to the 40-acre tract in Budd.", "The defendants argue that the brine beneath Young's land must be treated no differently than oil or gas.", "The common law rule of capture is not a license to plunder.", "The rule of capture has an important corollary in the doctrine of 'correlative rights.'", "The doctrine of correlative rights allows owners of land to extract oil or gas from a common pool.", "The doctrine posits two duties that limit the right of a landowner to drain oil and gas from beneath adjacent lands.", "Violating those duties is considered an abuse of correlative rights.", "The corollary to the rule of capture has been codified in Ark.Stat.Ann. \u00a7 53-109(I)(3).", "Causing undue drainage between tracts of land is prohibited as an abuse of correlative rights.", "Forcing static minerals under one's neighbor's land to migrate amounts to an abuse of correlative rights.", "The defendants argue that saltwater brine is not governed by oil and gas law.", "The rule of capture is to be applied to saltwater brine, according to the defendants."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "686", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "671 \n It is appropriate, in our opinion, that adverse possession be \nproved by a more stringent standard than a mere \npreponderance of the evidence. First, West Virginia appears \nto have been leaning toward the majority rule. Even before \nthe turn of the century, this Court had indicated that \n\u201cclear\u201d evidence was needed to establish adverse \npossession. In Syllabus Poi nt 2 of Boggs v. Bodkin , 32 W.Va. \n566 (1889), this Court explicitly stated: \u201cwhether he has had \nten years\u2019 adversary possession of the land, he must, \u2026 \nspecifically establish by clear evidence, that he has had such \nadversary possession for ten years \u2026 .\u201d ( emphasis added). \nMoreover, we agree with the plaintiffs that it would be \ninconsistent for this Court to adopt a preponderance of the \nevidence standard for adverse possession, in light of the \nfact that we have adopted a clear and convincing standard \nfor pro ving an easement. See Syl. pt. 3, Norman v. Belcher , \n180 W.Va. 581 (1989). \nSecond, on policy grounds there is sound and reasonable \njustification for the majority view. The function of a \nstandard of proof is to \u201cinstruct the factfinder concerning \nthe degree of confidence our society thinks he [or she] \nshould have in the correctness of a factual conclusion for a \nparticular kind of adjudication.\u201d In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358, \n370 (1970) (Harlan, J. Concurring). \u201cThe standard [of \nproof] serves to allocate the ri sk of error between the \nlitigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to \nthe ultimate decision.\u201d Addington v. Texas , 441 U.S. 418, 423 \n(1979). \nWhile the preponderance standard applies across the board \nin civil cases, a higher standard is neede d where fairness \nand equity require more persuasive proof. Although the \nstandard clear and convincing is less commonly used, it \nnonetheless is no stranger to West Virginia civil cases. In \nWheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co.", "proposition": ["The author believes that a more stringent standard than a mere preponderance of the evidence should be used to prove adverse possession.", "West Virginia appears to have been leaning toward the majority rule for adverse possession.", "This Court had indicated that \"clear\" evidence was needed to establish adverse possession before the turn of the century.", "In Syllabus Point 2 of Boggs v. Bodkin, this Court explicitly stated that clear evidence is required to establish adverse possession for ten years.", "The author agrees with the plaintiffs that it would be inconsistent for this Court to adopt a preponderance of the evidence standard for adverse possession, given that a clear and convincing standard has been adopted for proving an easement.", "The function of a standard of proof is to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence society thinks they should have in the correctness of a factual conclusion for a particular kind of adjudication.", "The standard of proof serves to allocate the risk of error between litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.", "A higher standard is needed where fairness and equity require more persuasive proof.", "The clear and convincing standard is less commonly used but is not a stranger to West Virginia civil cases.", "The author acknowledges that the clear and convincing standard may be more difficult to meet than the preponderance of the evidence standard, but believes that it is necessary to protect the interests of both parties involved in adverse possession cases."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "529", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "514 \n The classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose \noccurs when one induces commission of infringement by \nanother, or \u201centic[es] or persuad[es] another\u201d to infringe, \nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary 790 (8th ed.2004), as by advertising. \nThus at common law a copyright or patent defendant who \n\u201cnot only expected but invoked [infringing use] by \nadvertisemen t\u201d was liable for infringement \u201con principles \nrecognized in every part of the law.\u201d Kalem Co. v. Harper \nBrothers, 222 U.S., at 62 -63 (copyright infringement). \nThe rule on inducement of infringement as developed in \nthe early cases is no different today. Evi dence of \u201cactive \nsteps \u2026 taken to encourage direct infringement,\u201d Oak \nIndustries, Inc. v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 697 F.Supp. \n988, 992 (N.D.Ill.1988), such as advertising an infringing \nuse or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show \nan affirm ative intent that the product be used to infringe, \nand a showing that infringement was encouraged \novercomes the law\u2019s reluctance to find liability when a \ndefendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for \nsome lawful use. \nFor the same reasons that So ny took the staple -article \ndoctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe -\nharbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for \ncopyright. We adopt it here, holding that one who \ndistributes a device with the object of promoting its use to \ninfringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other \naffirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for \nthe resulting acts of infringement by third parties. We are, \nof course, mindful of the need to keep from trenching on \nregular commerce o r discouraging the development of \ntechnologies with lawful and unlawful potential. \nAccordingly, just as Sony did not find intentional \ninducement despite the knowledge of the VCR \nmanufacturer that its device could be used to infringe, mere \nknowledge of infr inging potential or of actual infringing \nuses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to", "proposition": ["The classic case of direct evidence of unlawful purpose occurs when one induces commission of infringement by another or entices or persuades another to infringe.", "At common law, a copyright or patent defendant who expected and invited infringing use by advertisement was liable for infringement.", "The rule on inducement of infringement as developed in the early cases is no different today.", "Evidence of active steps taken to encourage direct infringement, such as advertising an infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, shows an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe, and a showing that infringement was encouraged overcomes the law's reluctance to find liability when a defendant merely sells a commercial product suitable for some lawful use.", "For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule is a sensible one for copyright.", "The Court adopts the inducement rule, holding that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.", "The Court is mindful of the need to avoid trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development of technologies with lawful and unlawful potential.", "Just as Sony did not find intentional inducement despite the knowledge of the VCR manufacturer that its device could be used to infringe, mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "534", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "519 \n purpose to cause and profit from third -party acts of \ncopyright infringement. If liability for inducing \ninfringement is ultimately found, it will not be on the basis \nof presuming or imputing fault, but from inferring a \npatently illegal objective from statements and actions \nshowing what that objective was. \nThere is substantial evidence in MGM\u2019s favor on all \nelements of inducement, and summary judgment in favor \nof Grokster and StreamCast was er ror. On remand, \nreconsideration of MGM\u2019s motion for summary judgment \nwill be in order. \nThe judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the \ncase is remanded for further proceedings consistent with \nthis opinion. \nIt is so ordered. \nJUSTICE GINSBURG , with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND \nJUSTICE KENNEDY join, concurring \nI concur in the Court\u2019s decision, which vacates in full the \njudgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, \nand write separately to clarify why I conclude that the \nCourt of Appeals misperc eived, and hence misapplied, our \nholding in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, \nInc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). \n\u2026 . \nThis case differs markedly from Sony. Here, there has been \nno finding of any fair use and little beyond anecdotal \nevidence of noninf ringing uses. In finding the Grokster and \nStreamCast software products capable of substantial \nnoninfringing uses, the District Court and the Court of \nAppeals appear to have relied largely on declarations \nsubmitted by the defendants. These declarations incl ude \nassertions (some of them hearsay) that a number of \ncopyright owners authorize distribution of their works on \nthe Internet and that some public domain material is", "proposition": ["Grokster and StreamCast are accused of causing and profiting from third-party acts of copyright infringement.", "If liability for inducing infringement is ultimately found, it will not be based on presuming or imputing fault.", "There is substantial evidence in MGM's favor on all elements of inducement.", "Summary judgment in favor of Grokster and StreamCast was erroneous.", "The Court of Appeals misperceived and misapplied the holding in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.", "This case differs markedly from Sony, as there has been no finding of any fair use and little beyond anecdotal evidence of noninfringing uses.", "The District Court and the Court of Appeals relied largely on declarations submitted by the defendants in finding the Grokster and StreamCast software products capable of substantial noninfringing uses.", "JUSTICE GINSBURG concurs in the Court's decision and writes separately to clarify her reasoning."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "342", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "327 \n would affect the public at large, perhaps adversely. \nCourts won\u2019t do a good job, and so should leave \nthis for the legislature (which can take broader \nevidence about the problem and produce more \nfinely tuned ru les enforceable by administrative \nmachinery). \nCheney Bros. V. Doris Silk Corporation, 35 F.2d 279 \n(SDNY, 1929) \nHarry D. Nims, of New York City (Minturn DeS. Verdi \nand Wallace H. Martin, both of New York City, on the \nbrief), for appellant. \nEpstein & Bros., of New York City (Arthur J. Brothers, of \nNew York City, of counsel), for appellee. \nBefore MANTON, L. HAND, and SWAN, Circuit Judges. \nL. HAND, CIRCUIT JUDGE \nThe plaintiff, a corporation, is a manufacturer of silks, \nwhich puts out each season many new patterns, designed to \nattract purchasers by their novelty and beauty. Most of \nthese fail in that purpose, so that no much more than a \nfifth catch the public fancy. Moreover, they have only a \nshort life, for the most part no more than a single season of \neight or nine months. It is in practice impossible, and it \nwould be very onerous if it were not, to secure design \npatents upon all of these; it would also be impossible to \nknow in advance which would sell well, and patent only \nthose. Bes ides, it is probable that for the most part they \nhave no such originality as would support a design patent. \nAgain, it is impossible to copyright them under the \nCopyright Act (17 USCA s 1 et seq.), or at least so the \nauthorities of the Copyright Office hold . So it is easy for \nany one to copy such as prove successful, and the plaintiff, \nwhich is put to much ingenuity and expense in fabricating \nthem, finds itself without protection of any sort for its \npains.", "proposition": ["Decision 327 may have negative consequences for the general public.", "Courts are not capable of handling this issue effectively, so it should be left to the legislature.", "The case Cheney Bros. V. Doris Silk Corporation (35 F.2d 279, SDNY, 1929) is mentioned.", "The plaintiff is a silk manufacturer that produces numerous patterns each season.", "Most of these patterns do not attract the public's attention.", "Silk patterns have a short lifespan, usually lasting only one season.", "It is impractical to secure design patents for all patterns, and it is difficult to predict which patterns will be successful.", "It is unlikely that most patterns possess the originality required for a design patent.", "Silk patterns cannot be copyrighted under the Copyright Act (17 USCA s 1 et seq.).", "As a result, it is easy for others to copy successful patterns, leaving the plaintiff without protection for their efforts."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "499", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "484 \n Petitioner Sony manufactures millions of Betamax video \ntape recorders and markets these devices through \nnumerous retail establishments, some of which are also \npetitioners in this action. Sony\u2019s Betamax VTR is a \nmechanism consisting of three basic c omponents: (1) a \ntuner, which receives electromagnetic signals transmitted \nover the television band of the public airwaves and \nseparates them into audio and visual signals; (2) a recorder, \nwhich records such signals on a magnetic tape; and (3) an \nadapter, which converts the audio and visual signals on the \ntape into a composite signal that can be received by a \ntelevision set. \nSeveral capabilities of the machine are noteworthy. The \nseparate tuner in the Betamax enables it to record a \nbroadcast off one station while the television set is tuned to \nanother channel, permitting the viewer, for example, to \nwatch two simultaneous news broadcasts by watching one \n\u201clive\u201d and recording the other for later viewing. Tapes may \nbe reused, and programs that have been recorded may be \nerased either before or after viewing. A timer in the \nBetamax can be used to activate and deactivate the \nequipment at predetermined times, enabling an intended \nviewer to record programs that are transmitted when he or \nshe is not at home. Thus a per son may watch a program at \nhome in the evening even though it was broadcast while \nthe viewer was at work during the afternoon. The Betamax \nis also equipped with a pause button and a fast -forward \ncontrol. The pause button, when depressed, deactivates the \nrecorder until it is released, thus enabling a viewer to omit a \ncommercial advertisement from the recording, provided, of \ncourse, that the viewer is present when the program is \nrecorded. The fast forward control enables the viewer of a \npreviously recorded pr ogram to run the tape rapidly when a \nsegment he or she does not desire to see is being played \nback on the television screen.", "proposition": ["The Betamax is a video tape recorder manufactured and marketed by Sony.", "It consists of a tuner, recorder, and adapter components.", "Tapes used in the Betamax can be reused and programs can be erased before or after viewing.", "A timer can be used to activate and deactivate the equipment at predetermined times.", "The Betamax enables a person to watch a program at home even if it was broadcast while they were at work.", "The Betamax has a pause button and a fast-forward control.", "The pause button allows a viewer to omit a commercial advertisement from the recording.", "The fast-forward control enables the viewer to run the tape rapidly during unwanted segments."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "636", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "621 \n conditions, statements, or representations, oral or written, \nnot contained in this agreement. Each party acknowledges \nthat in executing this contract he or she has not been \ninduced, persuaded, or motivated by any promise or \nrepresentation made by the other party, unless expressly set \nforth in this agreement. All previous negotiations, \nstatements, and preliminary instruments by the parties or \ntheir representatives are merged in this instrument. \nSection \nX. Signature and Effective Date \nThis instrument shall not be effective as a contract until \nduly signed by both parties. The date of execution and \neffective date of the contract is the date first above set \nforth. The date of signature by each party is the date set \nforth unless otherwise indicated after the signature. \nIn witness, the parties have executed this instrument on the \nday and year first above written. \n[Signatures] \n[Attestation] \nStambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. \n1991) \nWilliam M. Stein of counsel (Hood & Stein, attorneys), for \nappellant. \nAndrew C. Bisulca of counsel (Mann, Mann & Lewis, P. C., \nattorneys), for Helen V. Ackley, respondent. \nJeffrey J. Ellis of counsel (Quirk & Bakalor, P. C., \nattorneys), fo r Ellis Realty, respondent. \nRUBIN , J. \nPlaintiff, to his horror, discovered that the house he had \nrecently contracted to purchase was widely reputed to be \npossessed by poltergeists, reportedly seen by defendant \nseller and members of her family on numerous o ccasions", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a contract between two parties.", "The contract contains 621 conditions, statements, or representations.", "Both parties acknowledge that they were not induced by any promises or representations not included in the contract.", "Previous negotiations, statements, and preliminary instruments are merged into the contract.", "The contract is not effective until both parties sign it.", "The date of execution and effective date of the contract is mentioned in the passage.", "The date of signature by each party is also mentioned.", "The passage is from Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).", "William M. Stein is counsel for the appellant.", "Andrew C. Bisulca is counsel for Helen V. Ackley, the respondent.", "Jeffrey J. Ellis is counsel for Ellis Realty, another respondent.", "The plaintiff discovered that the house he purchased was widely reputed to be possessed by poltergeists.", "The seller and members of her family reportedly saw the poltergeists on numerous occasions."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "712", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "However, to the extent that Tavares\u2019s reference \nto \u201cblack -hearted trespassers\u201d suggests that this Court \nendorses an invade -and-conquer mentality in modern \nproperty law, we dutifully excise that sentiment from our \njurisprudence. \nIn the case before this Court, Cahill went beyond mere \nknowledge that she was not the record owner by sending \nthe offer -to-purchase letter. As distinguished from the", "proposition": ["Tavares's reference to 'black-hearted trespassers' suggests that this Court endorses an invade-and-conquer mentality in modern property law.", "This Court dutifully excises that sentiment from its jurisprudence.", "In the case before this Court, Cahill went beyond mere knowledge that she was not the record owner by sending the offer-to-purchase letter.", "Cahill's actions distinguish her case from others where mere knowledge of not being the record owner is sufficient."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "362", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "347 \n Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795, 798 (CA3 \n1949). Jacobson claims that, if one of many competitors \ncan appropriate a particular color for use as a trademark, \nand each competitor then tries to do the same, the supply \nof colors will soon be depleted. Put in its strongest form, \nthis argument would concede that \u201dhundr eds of color \npigments are manufactured and thousands of colors can be \nobtained by mixing.\u201d L. Cheskin, Colors: What They Can \nDo For You 47 (1947). But, it would add that, in the \ncontext of a particular product, only some colors are \nusable. By the time one discards colors that, say, for \nreasons of customer appeal, are not usable, and adds the \nshades that competitors cannot use lest they risk infringing \na similar, registered shade, then one is left with only a \nhandful of possible colors. And, under these circ umstances, \nto permit one, or a few, producers to use colors as \ntrademarks will \u201cdeplete\u201d the supply of usable colors to the \npoint where a competitor\u2019s inability to find a suitable color \nwill put that competitor at a significant disadvantage. \nThis argument is unpersuasive, however, largely because it \nrelies on an occasional problem to justify a blanket \nprohibition. When a color serves as a mark, normally \nalternative colors will likely be available for similar use by \nothers. See, e.g., Owens -Corning, 774 F.2d , at 1121 (pink \ninsulation). Moreover, if that is not so \u2013 if a \u201ccolor \ndepletion\u201d or \u201ccolor scarcity\u201d problem does arise \u2013 the \ntrademark doctrine of \u201cfunctionality\u201d normally would seem \navailable to prevent the anticompetitive consequences that \nJacobson\u2019s a rgument posits, thereby minimizing that \nargument\u2019s practical force.", "proposition": ["Jacobson claims that if one of many competitors can appropriate a particular color for use as a trademark, and each competitor then tries to do the same, the supply of colors will soon be depleted.", "In its strongest form, Jacobson's argument would concede that hundreds of color pigments are manufactured and thousands of colors can be obtained by mixing.", "However, Jacobson argues that in the context of a particular product, only some colors are usable.", "After discarding colors that are not usable for reasons of customer appeal and adding the shades that competitors cannot use without risking infringement, there would be only a handful of possible colors left.", "Permitting one or a few producers to use colors as trademarks would 'deplete' the supply of usable colors to the point where a competitor's inability to find a suitable color would put that competitor at a significant disadvantage.", "The passage argues that Jacobson's argument is unpersuasive because it relies on an occasional problem to justify a blanket prohibition.", "When a color serves as a mark, normally alternative colors will likely be available for similar use by others.", "If a 'color depletion' or 'color scarcity' problem does arise, the trademark doctrine of 'functionality' would seem available to prevent the anticompetitive consequences that Jacobson's argument posits, thereby minimizing that argument's practical force."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "50", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "35 \n which they were \u201cwholly without jurisdiction\u201d to grant \nwould be a chancery court trying a criminal case or a \nchancery court hearing a probate matter. See Dugal Logging, \nInc. v. Arkansas Pulpwood Co. , 66 Ark.App. 22, 988 S.W.2d \n25 (1999) . \nWe have also noted that when the issue is whether the \nchancery court has jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks \nan adequate remedy at law, we will not allow it to be raised \nfor the first time on appeal. Liles, supra . It is only when the \ncourt of equity is wholly incompetent to consider the \nmatter before it that we will permit the issue of competency \nto be raised for the first time on appeal. Finally, we have \nheld that it is a well -settled rule that one who has invoked \nthe assistance of equity cannot lat er object to equity\u2019s \njurisdiction unless the subject matter of the suit is wholly \nbeyond equitable cognizance. Leonards v. E.A. Martin \nMachinery Co ., 321 Ark. 239, 900 S.W.2d 546 (1995). \nKeeping in mind the foregoing applicable principles of law, \nwe turn to the case now on review. In this case, appellants \nfiled their complaint in Faulkner County Chancery Court. \nLooking at the pleadings filed in this case, we conclude that \nthe chancery court properly had subject -matter jurisdiction \nto address the matter. Th e appellants\u2019 complaint sought the \nfollowing equitable remedies: (1) an injunction; (2) specific \nperformance; and (3) the imposition of a constructive trust. \nAdditionally, appellants asserted in their complaint that \nthey were seeking equitable relief.", "proposition": ["A chancery court has no jurisdiction to grant trying a criminal case or hearing a probate matter.", "In Dugal Logging, Inc. v. Arkansas Pulpwood Co., a chancery court was found to have jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacked an adequate remedy at law.", "The issue of competency of a chancery court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal unless the subject matter is wholly beyond equitable cognizance.", "In Leonards v. E.A. Martin Machinery Co., it was held that one who invokes the assistance of equity cannot object to equity's jurisdiction unless the subject matter is wholly beyond equitable cognizance.", "The case now on review involves appellants filing a complaint in Faulkner County Chancery Court.", "The pleadings filed in the case show that the chancery court properly had subject-matter jurisdiction to address the matter.", "Appellants' complaint sought equitable remedies, including an injunction, specific performance, and the imposition of a constructive trust.", "Appellants asserted in their complaint that they were seeking equitable relief."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "68", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "53 \n Steenberg Homes plowed a path across the Jacques\u2019 land \nand dragged the mobile home across that path, in th e face \nof the Jacques\u2019 adamant refusal. A $30 forfeiture and a $1 \nnominal damage award are unlikely to restrain Steenberg \nHomes from similar conduct in the future. An appropriate \npunitive damage award probably will. \nIn sum, as the court of appeals noted, t he Barnard rule \nsends the wrong message to Steenberg Homes and any \nothers who contemplate trespassing on the land of another. \nIt implicitly tells them that they are free to go where they \nplease, regardless of the landowner\u2019s wishes. As long as \nthey cause n o compensable harm, the only deterrent \nintentional trespassers face is the nominal damage award of \n$1, the modern equivalent of Merest\u2019s halfpenny, and the \npossibility of a Class B forfeiture under Wis. Stat. \u00a7 943.13. \nWe conclude that both the private lan downer and society \nhave much more than a nominal interest in excluding \nothers from private land. Intentional trespass to land causes \nactual harm to the individual, regardless of whether that \nharm can be measured in mere dollars. Consequently, the \nBarnard rationale will not support a refusal to allow punitive \ndamages when the tort involved is an intentional trespass to \nland. Accordingly, assuming that the other requirements for \npunitive damages have been met, we hold that nominal \ndamages may support a puniti ve damage award in an action \nfor intentional trespass to land. \nOur holding is supported by respected legal commentary. \nThe Restatement (Second) of Torts supports the \nproposition that an award of nominal damages will support \nan award of punitive damages in a trespass to land action: \nThe fact that the actor knows that his \nentry is without the consent of the \npossessor and without any other \nprivilege to do so, while not necessary \nto make him liable, may affect the \namount of damages recoverable", "proposition": ["The Barnard rule implicitly tells them that they are free to go where they please, regardless of the landowner\u2019s wishes.", "As long as they cause no compensable harm, the only deterrent intentional trespassers face is the nominal damage award of $1, and the possibility of a Class B forfeiture under Wis. Stat. \u00a7 943.13."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "518", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Metro -Goldwyn -Mayer Studios I nc. v. Grokster, Ltd., \n545 U.S. 913 (2005) \nJUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court. \nThe question is under what circumstances the distributor of \na product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable \nfor acts of copyright infringement by thir d parties using the \nproduct. We hold that one who distributes a device with \nthe object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as \nshown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken \nto foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of \ninfringement by third parties. \nI \nA \nRespondents, Grokster, Ltd., and StreamCast Networks, \nInc., defendants in the trial court, distribute free software \nproducts that allow computer users to share electronic files \nthrough peer -to-peer networks, so called becaus e users\u2019 \ncomputers communicate directly with each other, not \nthrough central servers. The advantage of peer -to-peer \nnetworks over information networks of other types shows \nup in their substantial and growing popularity. Because they \nneed no central compute r server to mediate the exchange \nof information or files among users, the high -bandwidth \ncommunications capacity for a server may be dispensed \nwith, and the need for costly server storage space is \neliminated. Since copies of a file (particularly a popular one) \nare available on many users\u2019 computers, file requests and \nretrievals may be faster than on other types of networks, \nand since file exchanges do not travel through a server, \ncommunications can take place between any computers \nthat remain connected to t he network without risk that a \nglitch in the server will disable the network in its entirety. \nGiven these benefits in security, cost, and efficiency, peer -\nto-peer networks are employed to store and distribute", "proposition": ["The question is about the circumstances under which a distributor of a product capable of both lawful and unlawful use is liable for acts of copyright infringement by third parties using the product.", "The Court holds that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.", "Grokster, Ltd., and StreamCast Networks, Inc. are defendants in the trial court.", "They distribute free software products that allow computer users to share electronic files through peer-to-peer networks.", "Peer-to-peer networks are so-called because users' computers communicate directly with each other, not through central servers.", "The advantage of peer-to-peer networks over other types of information networks is their substantial and growing popularity.", "Peer-to-peer networks do not require a central computer server to mediate the exchange of information or files among users.", "This eliminates the need for high-bandwidth communications capacity for a server and the costly server storage space.", "Copies of a file (particularly a popular one) are available on many users' computers in peer-to-peer networks, making file requests and retrievals faster than other types of networks.", "File exchanges in peer-to-peer networks do not travel through a server, allowing communications to take place between any connected computers without the risk of a server glitch disabling the network.", "Peer-to-peer networks offer benefits in security, cost, and efficiency, making them suitable for storing and distributing content."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "553", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "538 \n using his program, Streamers. Called \u201ccontributory infringement,\u201d \nthis basis for liability is not found in the Copyright Act itself but is \na judicial doctrine meant to effectuate the Act\u2019s purposes. \nWe have identified three possible circumstances unde r which one \nmay be liable for the infringing acts of another. First, vicarious \nliability (think Napster ) may be found where one has the ability and \nright to control the infringing acts of third parties but does not do \nso. Second, liability for inducement ( think Grokster ) attaches when \none \u201cdistributes a device with the object of promoting its use to \ninfringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other \naffirmative steps taken to foster infringement.\u201d Third, mere \ndistribution, with no such expression or affirmative steps, may \nconstitute contributory infringement if the device is not capable of \nsignificant noninfringing use. \nA good answer here would run through these three possibilities. \nThere\u2019s clearly no control as there was in Napster , and so vicarious \nliability seems exceedingly unlikely. Inducement? Well, the facts did \nstate that L provided some assistance to users seeking to record \nshows. It is not clear whether and to what extent L helped in the \ncopying of copyrighted material. The problem asked what evidence \nmight be relevant to the case, and the content of L\u2019s customer \nsupport is likely important. If it can be shown that L provided no \nhelp toward what he knew to be infringing uses, then L can likely \navoid an inducement claim, and he won\u2019t have to de fend the \nlegality of the acts of any particular users he helped. \nWhat about the third possibility ( Sony)? Regardless of the support \nhe provided or steps he took, could L be liable simply because of \nthe infringement that Streamers makes possible? The questi on here \nwould center on how much non -infringing use Streamers either \npermits or, if Ginsburg\u2019s analysis rules the day, is likely actually to \noccur. L\u2019s lawyer would clearly want to establish the large number \nof potential noninfringing uses that could be ma de of Streamers.", "proposition": ["1. 538 uses a program called Streamers to analyze copyright infringement cases.", "2. Contribatory infringement is a judicial doctrine that can lead to liability for copyright infringement.", "3. There are three possible circumstances under which one may be liable for the infringing acts of another: vicarious liability, liability for inducement, and contributory infringement through mere distribution.", "4. Vicarious liability may be found when one has the ability and right to control the infringing acts of third parties but does not do so.", "5. Liability for inducement attaches when one distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright.", "6. Mere distribution may constitute contributory infringement if the device is not capable of significant noninfringing use.", "7. In the case of L, there is no clear control as in the Napster case, making vicarious liability unlikely.", "8. The facts state that L provided some assistance to users seeking to record shows, but it is unclear whether and to what extent L helped in the copying of copyrighted material.", "9. The problem asks what evidence might be relevant to the case, and the content of L's customer support is likely important.", "10. If L can show that he provided no help toward what he knew to be infringing uses, then L can avoid an inducement claim and not have to defend the legality of the acts of any particular users he helped.", "11. The question centers on how much non-infringing use Streamers either permits or, if Ginsburg's analysis rules the day, is likely actually to occur.", "12. L's lawyer would want to establish the large number of potential noninfringing uses that could be made of Streamers."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "102", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "87 \n bundle. E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 \nU.S. 1003, 1044, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) \n(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (addressing as separate \n\u201cattributes of ownership\u201d the rights of exclusion, \nalienation, and enjoyment); Biggs v. Comm\u2019r of Internal \nRevenue, 632 F.2d 1171, 1177 (C.A.5, 1980) (\u201d \u2018title to real \nproperty \u2026 is nothing more than a bundle of potential \ncauses of action: for tre spass, to quiet title, for interference \nwith quiet enjoyment, and so on,\u2019 \u201d quoting Starker v. \nUnited States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1355 [C.A.9, 1979] ); \nLivingston, Public Access to Virginia\u2019s Tidelands: A \nFramework for Analysis of Implied Dedications and Public \nPrescriptive Rights, 24 Wm & Mary L R 669, 698 (1983) \n(\u201cThe notion of fee simple ownership carries with it the \nidea that the owner may exclude all others from his \nproperty, shall have the quiet enjoyment of it, and shall be \nfree from unrecorded conflictin g interests in it.\u201d), citing \nCribbet, Principles of the Law of Property (2d ed., 1975), \npp. 263 -332.7 Thus, possessory rights to real property \n \n7 A.M.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the concept of possessory rights to real property.", "Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) is a case that addresses the bundle of rights associated with ownership of real property.", "In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, Blackmun, J., dissenting, identified the rights of exclusion, alienation, and enjoyment as separate attributes of ownership.", "Biggs v. Comm\u2019r of Internal Revenue, 632 F.2d 1171, 1177 (C.A.5, 1980) quotes Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1355 [C.A.9, 1979] in stating that title to real property is a bundle of potential causes of action.", "Livingston, Public Access to Virginia\u2019s Tidelands: A Framework for Analysis of Implied Dedications and Public Prescriptive Rights, 24 Wm & Mary L R 669, 698 (1983) discusses the idea that fee simple ownership includes the right to exclude others, quiet enjoyment, and freedom from unrecorded conflicting interests.", "Cribbet, Principles of the Law of Property (2d ed., 1975), pp. 263 -332.7 is cited as a source in Livingston's article."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "287", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "272 \n water brine, the doctrine of correlative rights must likewise \nbe applied. \nWe co nclude that the Supreme Court of Arkansas would \nnot apply the rule of capture to this situation and, hence, \nwould not need to proceed to the alternative question of \ncorrelative rights. Accordingly, the appellant has a vested \nexisting property right in the brominated salt water \nunderlying his land, and the action of the defendants in \nforcibly removing that solution by means of injection and \nproduction wells on surrounding property constitutes an \nactionable trespass. It was improper for the District Court \nto dismiss the action. The order of dismissal is reversed, \nand the cause remanded for further proceedings as to the \nrelief to be granted. \n \nElliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948) \nBoone, Boone & Davis, Kemp, Lewright, Dy er, Wilson & \nSorrell, and J. M. Wilson, all of Corpus Christi, for \npetitioners. \nTarlton, Koch & Hale and McCampbell, Wood & \nKirkham, all of Corpus Christi, for respondents. \nFOLLEY , Justice. \nThis is a suit by the petitioners, Mrs. Mabel Elliff, Frank \nElliff , and Charles C. Elliff, against the respondents, Texon \nDrilling Company, a Texas corporation, Texon Royalty \nCompany, a Texas corporation, Texon Royalty Company, a \nDelaware corporation, and John L. Sullivan, for damages \nresulting from a \u201cblowout\u201d gas well drilled by respondents \nin the Agua Dulce Field in Nueces County. \nThe petitioners owned the surface and certain royalty \ninterests in 3054.9 acres of land in Nueces County, upon \nwhich there was a producing well known as Elliff No. 1. \nThey owned all the miner al estate underlying the west 1500 \nacres of the tract, and an undivided one -half interest in the", "proposition": ["The case is about a suit filed by the petitioners against the respondents for damages resulting from a gas well blowout in the Agua Dulce Field in Nueces County.", "The petitioners owned surface and royalty interests in the land where the well was drilled.", "The Supreme Court of Arkansas would not apply the rule of capture in this situation.", "The appellant has a vested existing property right in the brominated salt water underlying his land.", "The action of the defendants in forcibly removing the solution by means of injection and production wells on surrounding property constitutes an actionable trespass.", "The District Court's dismissal of the action was improper.", "Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948)", "Boone, Boone & Davis, Kemp, Lewright, Dy er, Wilson & Sorrell, and J. M. Wilson represented the petitioners.", "Tarlton, Koch & Hale and McCampbell, Wood & Kirkham represented the respondents.", "Justice FOLLEY wrote the opinion."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "63", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "48 \n The general rule was stated in Barnard v. Cohen , 165 Wis. \n417 (1917), where the question presented was: \u201cIn an \naction for libel, can there be a recovery of punitory \ndamages if only nominal compensatory damages are \nfound?\u201d With the bare assertion that authority and better \nreason supported its conclusion, the Barnard court said no. \nId. at. 418. Barnard continues to state the general rule of \npunitive damages in Wisconsin. The rationale for the \ncompensatory damage requirement is that if the individua l \ncannot show actual harm, he or she has but a nominal \ninterest, hence, society has little interest in having the \nunlawful, but otherwise harmless, conduct deterred, \ntherefore, punitive damages are inappropriate. \nHowever, whether nominal damages can suppor t a punitive \ndamage award in the case of an intentional trespass to land \nhas never been squarely addressed by this court. \nNonetheless, Wisconsin law is not without reference to this \nsituation. In 1854 the court established punitive damages, \nallowing the as sessment of \u201cdamages as a punishment to \nthe defendant for the purpose of making an example.\u201d \nMcWilliams v. Bragg , 3 Wis. 424, 425 (1854).1 The McWilliams \ncourt related the facts and an illustrative tale from the \nEnglish case of Merest v. Harvey , 128 Eng. R ep. 761 (C.P. \n1814), to explain the rationale underlying punitive damages. \nIn Merest , a landowner was shooting birds in his field when \nhe was approached by the local magistrate who wanted to \nhunt with him. Although the landowner refused, the \nmagistrate pro ceeded to hunt. When the landowner \ncontinued to object, the magistrate threatened to have him \njailed and dared him to file suit.", "proposition": ["In an action for libel, can there be a recovery of punitory damages if only nominal compensatory damages are found?", "The Barnard court said no.", "Barnard continues to state the general rule of punitive damages in Wisconsin.", "The rationale for the compensatory damage requirement is that if the individual cannot show actual harm, he or she has but a nominal interest.", "Society has little interest in having the unlawful, but otherwise harmless, conduct deterred, therefore, punitive damages are inappropriate.", "Whether nominal damages can support a punitive damage award in the case of an intentional trespass to land has never been squarely addressed by this court.", "Wisconsin law is not without reference to this situation.", "In 1854 the court established punitive damages, allowing the assessment of \u2018damages as a punishment to the defendant for the purpose of making an example.\u2019", "The McWilliams court related the facts and an illustrative tale from the English case of Merest v. Harvey to explain the rationale underlying punitive damages.", "In Merest, a landowner was shooting birds in his field when he was approached by the local magistrate who wanted to hunt with him.", "Although the landowner refused, the magistrate proceeded to hunt.", "When the landowner continued to object, the magistrate threatened to have him jailed and dared him to file suit."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "463", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "According to the \nRegister, extending the copyright for existing works \u201ccould \u2026 provide additional \nincome that would finance the production and publication of new works.\u201d House \nHearings 158. \u201cAuthors would not be able to continue to create,\u201d the Register \nexplained, \u201cun less they earned income on their finished works. The public \nbenefits not only from an author\u2019s original work but also from his or her further \ncreations. Although this truism may be illustrated in many ways, one of the best \nexamples is Noah Webster[,] who s upported his entire family from the earnings \non his speller and grammar during the twenty years he took to complete his \ndictionary.\u201d Id., at 165.", "proposition": ["Extending the copyright for existing works could provide additional income to finance the production and publication of new works.", "Authors need to earn income on their finished works to continue creating.", "The public benefits from an author's original work and their further creations.", "Noah Webster is an example of an author who supported his family from the earnings on his speller and grammar while working on his dictionary."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "497", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "482 \n tape recorders sold by petitioners to reco rd some of these \nbroadcasts, as well as a large number of other broadcasts. \nThe question presented is whether the sale of petitioners\u2019 \ncopying equipment to the general public violates any of the \nrights conferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act. \nRespo ndents commenced this copyright infringement \naction against petitioners in the United States District \nCourt for the Central District of California in 1976. \nRespondents alleged that some individuals had used \nBetamax video tape recorders (VTR\u2019s) to record so me of \nrespondents\u2019 copyrighted works which had been exhibited \non commercially sponsored television and contended that \nthese individuals had thereby infringed respondents\u2019 \ncopyrights. Respondents further maintained that petitioners \nwere liable for the copyr ight infringement allegedly \ncommitted by Betamax consumers because of petitioners\u2019 \nmarketing of the Betamax VTR\u2019s. Respondents sought no \nrelief against any Betamax consumer. Instead, they sought \nmoney damages and an equitable accounting of profits \nfrom pet itioners, as well as an injunction against the \nmanufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR\u2019s. \nAfter a lengthy trial, the District Court denied respondents \nall the relief they sought and entered judgment for \npetitioners. 480 F.Supp. 429 (1979). The United Stat es \nCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the \nDistrict Court\u2019s judgment on respondent\u2019s copyright claim, \nholding petitioners liable for contributory infringement and \nordering the District Court to fashion appropriate relief. \n659 F.2d 963 (1981). W e granted certiorari; since we had \nnot completed our study of the case last Term, we ordered \nreargument. We now reverse. \nAn explanation of our rejection of respondents\u2019 \nunprecedented attempt to impose copyright liability upon \nthe distributors of copying eq uipment requires a quite \ndetailed recitation of the findings of the District Court. In \nsummary, those findings reveal that the average member of", "proposition": ["The decomposed propositions", "1. The passage discusses the sale of copying equipment by petitioners to the general public.", "2. The question presented is whether this sale violates any rights conferred upon respondents by the Copyright Act.", "3. Respondents commenced a copyright infringement action against petitioners in the United States District Court for the Central District of California in 1976.", "4. Respondents alleged that some individuals used Betamax video tape recorders (VTR's) to record some of their copyrighted works exhibited on commercially sponsored television, thereby infringing their copyrights.", "5. Respondents maintained that petitioners were liable for the copyright infringement allegedly committed by Betamax consumers due to petitioners' marketing of the Betamax VTR's.", "6. Respondents sought money damages, an equitable accounting of profits from petitioners, and an injunction against the manufacture and marketing of Betamax VTR's, but not against any Betamax consumer.", "7. The District Court denied respondents all the relief they sought and entered judgment for petitioners.", "8. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment on respondent's copyright claim, holding petitioners liable for contributory infringement and ordering the District Court to fashion appropriate relief.", "9. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered reargument, ultimately reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision.", "10. The passage explains that the District Court's findings reveal that the average member of the public uses copying equipment for legitimate purposes and not for copyright infringement."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "664", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "529; Jones v. Warner (1876), 81 Ill. 343. \nSince the deed was delivered to the plaintiffs on December \n21, 1957, any cause of action fo r breach of the covenant of", "proposition": ["The deed was delivered to the plaintiffs on December 21, 1957.", "The cause of action for breach of the covenant arose after the deed was delivered.", "The case being referred to is Jones v. Warner (1876), 81 Ill. 343."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "78", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "63 \n can be no ownership of infinity, nor can equity prevent a \nsupposed violation of an abstract conception. \nThe appellants\u2019 case, then, rests upon the assumption that \nas owners of the soil they have an absolute and present title \nto all the space above the e arth\u2019s surface, owned by them, \nto such a height as is, or may become, useful to the \nenjoyment of their land. This height, the appellants assert in \nthe bill, is of indefinite distance, but not less than 150 feet. \nIf the appellants are correct in this premis e, it would seem \nthat they would have such a title to the airspace claimed, as \nan incident to their ownership of the land, that they could \nprotect such a title as if it were an ordinary interest in real \nproperty. Let us then examine the appellants\u2019 premise . They \ndo not seek to maintain that the ownership of the land \nactually extends by absolute and exclusive title upward to \nthe sky and downward to the center of the earth. They \nrecognize that the space claimed must have some use, \neither present or contemplat ed, and connected with the \nenjoyment of the land itself. \nTitle to the airspace unconnected with the use of land is \ninconceivable. Such a right has never been asserted. It is a \nthing not known to the law. \nSince, therefore, appellants must confine their clai m to 150 \nfeet of the airspace above the land, to the use of the space \nas related to the enjoyment of their land, to what extent, \nthen, is this use necessary to perfect their title to the \nairspace? Must the use be actual, as when the owner claims \nthe space above the earth occupied by a building \nconstructed thereon; or does it suffice if appellants \nestablish merely that they may reasonably expect to use the \nairspace now or at some indefinite future time? \nThis, then, is appellants\u2019 premise, and upon this \npropo sition they rest their case. Such an inquiry was never \npursued in the history of jurisprudence until the occasion is \nfurnished by the common use of vehicles of the air.", "proposition": ["The appellants' case is based on the assumption that as owners of the soil, they have an absolute and present title to all the space above the earth's surface, owned by them, to such a height as is, or may become, useful to the enjoyment of their land.", "The appellants assert that the height they claim is of indefinite distance, but not less than 150 feet.", "If the appellants are correct in their premise, they would have such a title to the airspace claimed, as an incident to their ownership of the land, that they could protect such a title as if it were an ordinary interest in real property.", "The appellants do not seek to maintain that the ownership of the land actually extends by absolute and exclusive title upward to the sky and downward to the center of the earth.", "The space claimed must have some use, either present or contemplated, and connected with the enjoyment of the land itself.", "Title to the airspace unconnected with the use of land is inconceivable.", "Such a right has never been asserted. It is a thing not known to the law.", "Since the appellants must confine their claim to 150 feet of the airspace above the land, to the use of the space as related to the enjoyment of their land, the question is, to what extent is this use necessary to perfect their title to the airspace?", "Must the use be actual, as when the owner claims the space above the earth occupied by a building constructed thereon; or does it suffice if the appellants establish merely that they may reasonably expect to use the airspace now or at some indefinite future time?"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "554", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Though the fair use factors \nappear both here and in Sony, on their surface, pretty heavily to \nfavor the broadcasters, the fact in Sony that a user of a VCR is only \nshifting to a more convenient time the viewing of a program he or \nshe w as invited to view free of charge pretty much overwhelmed \nthe analysis. The Court just didn\u2019t see anything wrong with that \nkind of copying in light of the purposes of copyright, and the \nstatutory factors that pointed the other way were deemed less \nimportan t in this context.", "proposition": ["The fair use factors in this case seem to heavily favor the broadcasters. In Sony, the Court found that copying a program for more convenient viewing was not wrong in light of the purposes of copyright. The statutory factors that pointed in the opposite direction were deemed less important in the context of Sony."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "683", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "668 \n part of the conveyance.1 The defendants believed the two -\nfeet-wide tract of land was part of their property, and \nutilized it consistent with ownership rights up until the \nfiling of this law suit. \nThe plaintiffs purchased their property by deed dated April \n28, 1989. Shortly before making this purchase, the plaintiffs \nhad a survey of the property done. The survey revealed that \nthe fenced -in two -feet-wide tract of land was part of \nplaintiffs\u2019 property.2 Although the plaintiffs were aware at \nthe time of the purchas e of their property that the two -feet-\nwide tract of land was, in fact, theirs, they did nothing to \nshow ownership to the tract until around August, 1994. It \nwas in August of 1994, that the plaintiffs decided to build a \nroad along the two -feet-wide tract of land. To do this \nmeant cutting down several trees that were along the tract.3 \nThe defendants apparently attempted to prevent the \nplaintiffs from building the road by asserting that they \nowned the tract of land. The plaintiffs thereafter instituted \nthe pre sent suit. The trial of this matter was held by the \ncircuit court, sitting as factfinder, on December 13, 1994. \nThe trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of \nlaw, wherein it held that \u201cthe defendants have failed to \n \n1 The pertinent call references of defendants\u2019 deed provide: \nthence leaving the said Willowbrook Road N 71\u00b0 28\u2019 E \n184.80 feet to a fence post in the line of said private \ndriveway, thence S 32\u00b0 33\u2019 E 133.80 feet to a fence p ost in \nthe line of said driveway, thence S 17\u00b0 04\u2019 W 13 feet to a \nfence post in the line of said private driveway[.] \n(Emphasis added.) \n2 The pertinent call references of plaintiffs\u2019 deed provide: \nthence S. 62\u00b0 00\u2019 W.", "proposition": ["The defendants believed that a two-feet-wide tract of land was part of their property.", "They utilized the land as if it was theirs until the filing of the lawsuit.", "The plaintiffs purchased their property by deed dated April 28, 1989.", "Shortly before the purchase, the plaintiffs had a survey done, which revealed that the fenced-in two-feet-wide tract of land was part of their property.", "The plaintiffs were aware of the tract's ownership at the time of purchase but did not show ownership until August 1994.", "In August 1994, the plaintiffs decided to build a road along the two-feet-wide tract of land, which required cutting down trees.", "The defendants attempted to prevent the plaintiffs from building the road by asserting ownership of the tract.", "The plaintiffs instituted the present suit after the defendants' assertion.", "The trial was held on December 13, 1994, by the circuit court sitting as a factfinder.", "The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, holding that the defendants failed to prove their ownership of the tract of land."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "354", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "But, the \nCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the \njudgment in Qualitex\u2019s favor on the trademark \ninfringement claim because, in that Circuit\u2019s view, the \nLanham Act does not permit Qualitex, or anyone else, to \nregister \u201ccolor alone\u201d as a trademark. 13 F.3d 1297, 1300, \n1302 (1994). \nThe courts of appeals have differed as to whether or not \nthe law recognizes the use of color alone as a trademark.", "proposition": ["The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set aside the judgment in Qualitex\u2019s favor on the trademark infringement claim.", "The Ninth Circuit's view is that the Lanham Act does not permit Qualitex, or anyone else, to register \u2018color alone\u2019 as a trademark.", "The courts of appeals have differing opinions regarding the use of color alone as a trademark."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "476", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "461 \n and Amendment at cross -purposes, thereby depriving the \npublic of the speech -related benefits that the Founders, \nthrough both, have promised. \nConsequently, I would review plausible claims that a \ncopyright statute seriously, and unjustifiably, restricts the \ndissemination of speech somewhat more carefully than \nreference to this Court\u2019s traditional Copyright Clause \njurisprudence might suggest. There is no need in this case \nto characterize that rev iew as a search for \u201c\u2018congruence and \nproportionality,\u2019\u201d or as some other variation of what this \nCourt has called \u201cintermediate scrutiny.\u201d Rather, it is \nnecessary only to recognize that this statute involves not \npure economic regulation, but regulation of e xpression, and \nwhat may count as rational where economic regulation is at \nissue is not necessarily rational where we focus on \nexpression \u2013 in a Nation constitutionally dedicated to the \nfree dissemination of speech, information, learning, and \nculture. In th is sense only, and where line -drawing among \nconstitutional interests is at issue, I would look harder than \ndoes the majority at the statute\u2019s rationality \u2013 though less \nhard than precedent might justify. \nThus, I would find that the statute lacks the constit utionally \nnecessary rational support (1) if the significant benefits that \nit bestows are private, not public; (2) if it threatens seriously \nto undermine the expressive values that the Copyright \nClause embodies; and (3) if it cannot find justification in \nany significant Clause -related objective. Where, after \nexamination of the statute, it becomes difficult, if not \nimpossible, even to dispute these characterizations, \nCongress\u2019 \u201cchoice is clearly wrong.\u201d \nII \nA. \nBecause we must examine the relevant statutory eff ects in \nlight of the Copyright Clause\u2019s own purposes, we should", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a conflict between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.", "The author suggests that the conflict deprives the public of speech-related benefits promised by the Founders.", "The author proposes a more careful review of claims that a copyright statute restricts the dissemination of speech.", "The author argues that the statute involves regulation of expression, not pure economic regulation.", "The author suggests that the majority's approach to line-drawing among constitutional interests should be reconsidered.", "The author proposes a three-part test for determining the constitutionality of a statute: (1) significant benefits are public, not private; (2) the statute does not undermine expressive values; and (3) the statute has a significant Clause-related objective.", "The author states that if these characterizations cannot be disputed, Congress' choice is clearly wrong.", "The passage argues that we should examine statutory effects in light of the Copyright Clause's own purposes."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "711", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "696 \n viability of his title and fully acknowledging her subservient \ninterest to that owner\u2019s title. This manifestation from Cahill \ninterrupted the accrual of her claim. See Heggen v. Marentette , \n144 N.W.2d 218, 242 (N.D.1966) (\u201c[T]he recognition of \nthe owner\u2019s title by an adverse claimant interrupts the \nadverse possession.\u201d); Smith v. Vermont Marble Co. , 99 Vt. \n384, 133 A. 355, 358 (1926) (\u201cNothing can more effectively \ninterrupt the running of the [ adverse possession] statute \nthan an express acknowledgment of the true owner\u2019s title. * \n* * This recognition of another\u2019s title may be by acts, as \nwell as words. So when one who was wrongfully [using \nanother\u2019s land] * * * yields to the latter\u2019s demands * * * and \noffer[s] to buy the right, his adverse use is interrupted, and \nhis claim of prescriptive right fails.\u201d); see also Bowen v. \nSerksnas , 121 Conn.App. 503, 997 A.2d 573, 579 (2010) \n(\u201c[T]he possession of one who recognizes or admits title in \nanother, eit her by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to \nthe title of such other. * * * Such an acknowledgment of \nthe owner\u2019s title terminates the running of the statutory \nperiod, and any subsequent adverse use starts the clock \nanew.\u201d) (quoting Allen v. Johnson , 79 Conn.App. 740, 831 \nA.2d 282, 286 (2003)); 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession \u00a7 104 \nat 171 -72 (2002) (\u201cAlthough efforts to obtain deeds from \nother claimants to the property do not disprove the hostile \ncharacter of a possession, efforts to buy the property fro m \nthe record owner constitute an acknowledgment of the \nrecord owner\u2019s superior title, and thus disprove the adverse \nholding, because there has been no claim of right.\u201d).", "proposition": ["An acknowledgment of the owner's title can interrupt the running of the adverse possession statute.", "Acknowledgment of the owner's title can be by acts, as well as words."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "132", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "117 \n Restatement (Second) of Torts, Sec. 821D, Comment b, p. \n101 (1977) \nAlthough the defendant\u2019s obstruction of the plaintiff\u2019s \naccess to sunlight ap pears to fall within the Restatement\u2019s \nbroad concept of a private nuisance as a nontrespassory \ninvasion of another\u2019s interest in the private use and \nenjoyment of land, the defendant asserts that he has a right \nto develop his property in compliance with sta tutes, \nordinances and private covenants without regard to the \neffect of such development upon the plaintiff\u2019s access to \nsunlight. In essence, the defendant is asking this court to \nhold that the private nuisance doctrine is not applicable in \nthe instant cas e and that his right to develop his land is a \nright which is per se superior to his neighbor\u2019s interest in \naccess to sunlight. This position is expressed in the maxim \n\u201ccujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos,\u201d \nthat is, the owner of land ow ns up to the sky and down to \nthe center of the earth. The rights of the surface owner are, \nhowever, not unlimited. U. S. v. Causby , 328 U.S. 256, 260 -1 \n(1946). \nThe defendant is not completely correct in asserting that \nthe common law did not protect a lando wner\u2019s access to \nsunlight across adjoining property. At English common law \na landowner could acquire a right to receive sunlight across \nadjoining land by both express agreement and under the \njudge -made doctrine of \u201cancient lights.\u201d Under the doctrine \nof an cient lights if the landowner had received sunlight \nacross adjoining property for a specified period of time, the \nlandowner was entitled to continue to receive unobstructed \naccess to sunlight across the adjoining property. Under the \ndoctrine the landowner acquired a negative prescriptive", "proposition": ["The defendant obstructs the plaintiff's access to sunlight.", "The defendant argues that their development of their property should not be subject to the private nuisance doctrine.", "The defendant claims that their right to develop their land is superior to the plaintiff's interest in access to sunlight.", "The maxim 'cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos' suggests that the owner of land owns up to the sky and down to the center of the earth.", "The rights of the surface owner are not unlimited.", "The defendant is not completely correct in asserting that the common law did not protect a landowner's access to sunlight across adjoining property.", "At English common law, a landowner could acquire a right to receive sunlight across adjoining land by both express agreement and under the judge-made doctrine of 'ancient lights.'", "Under the doctrine of ancient lights, if the landowner had received sunlight across adjoining property for a specified period of time, the landowner was entitled to continue to receive unobstructed access to sunlight across the adjoining property.", "Under the doctrine, the landowner acquired a negative prescriptive right to sunlight across adjoining property."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "422", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "407 \n There is no doubt that Feist took from th e white pages of \nRural\u2019s directory a substantial amount of factual \ninformation. At a minimum, Feist copied the names, towns, \nand telephone numbers of 1,309 of Rural\u2019s subscribers. \nNot all copying, however, is copyright infringement. To \nestablish infringeme nt, two elements must be proven: (1) \nownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of \nconstituent elements of the work that are original. See \nHarper & Row, 471 U.S., at 548, 105 S.Ct., at 2224. The first \nelement is not at issue here; Feist appears to con cede that \nRural\u2019s directory, considered as a whole, is subject to a valid \ncopyright because it contains some foreword text, as well as \noriginal material in its yellow pages advertisements. See \nBrief for Petitioner 18; Pet. for Cert. 9. \nThe question is whether Rural has proved the second \nelement. In other words, did Feist, by taking 1,309 names, \ntowns, and telephone numbers from Rural\u2019s white pages, \ncopy anything that was \u201coriginal\u201d to Rural? Certainly, the \nraw data does not satisfy the o riginality requirement. Rural \nmay have been the first to discover and report the names, \ntowns, and telephone numbers of its subscribers, but this \ndata does not \u201d \u2018ow[e] its origin\u2019 \u201d to Rural. Burrow -Giles, \n111 U.S., at 58, 4 S.Ct., at 281. Rather, these b its of \ninformation are uncopyrightable facts; they existed before \nRural reported them and would have continued to exist if \nRural had never published a telephone directory. The \noriginality requirement \u201crule[s] out protecting \u2026 names, \naddresses, and telephon e numbers of which the plaintiff by \nno stretch of the imagination could be called the author.\u201d \nPatterson & Joyce 776. \nRural essentially concedes the point by referring to the \nnames, towns, and telephone numbers as \u201cpreexisting \nmaterial.\u201d Brief for Responde nt 17.", "proposition": ["Feist took a substantial amount of factual information from the white pages of Rural's directory.", "At a minimum, Feist copied the names, towns, and telephone numbers of 1,309 of Rural's subscribers.", "To establish copyright infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.", "Feist appears to concede that Rural's directory, considered as a whole, is subject to a valid copyright because it contains some foreword text and original material in its yellow pages advertisements.", "The question is whether Rural has proved the second element of copyright infringement: did Feist, by taking 1,309 names, towns, and telephone numbers from Rural's white pages, copy anything that was 'original' to Rural?", "The raw data (names, towns, and telephone numbers) does not satisfy the originality requirement.", "Rural may have been the first to discover and report the names, towns, and telephone numbers of its subscribers, but this data does not 'owe its origin' to Rural.", "These bits of information are uncopyrightable facts; they existed before Rural reported them and would have continued to exist if Rural had never published a telephone directory.", "The originality requirement rules out protecting names, addresses, and telephone numbers of which the plaintiff by no stretch of the imagination could be called the author."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "550", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "535 \n infringement, you can be liable for the illegal copying of those \nwho use it. \nHere, StripIt appears to be useful only to remove the \nprotections that prevent unauthorized copying of digital \nmovies purchased from iTunes. We\u2019d want to know, though, \nwhether it\u2019s capable of other uses. Further, we\u2019d want to \nknow how often the product is used to enable users to make \nfair use copies of movies they have bought. (There is another \nstatute, the controversial DMCA, that governs the intentional \ncircumvention of anti -copying measures.) \n3. A developer sells software that records in an audio file all audio \noutput by one\u2019s computer. A web designer creat es a popular, ad -\nsupported website featuring how -to guides on using the software to \nrecord internet radio broadcasts, some of which are copyrighted \nand do not authorize duplication. Developer is sued. \nNo liability. There is no evidence here that the develo per has \ndone anything to encourage anyone to use the product to \nmake illegal copies. It\u2019s doubtful therefore that there could be \nliability under an inducement theory. Nor is vicarious liability \na realistic possibility. The courts aren\u2019t going to require th e \ndeveloper to change the program to monitor people\u2019s usage \nand route that information back to the developer. The \ndeveloper simply doesn\u2019t have the practical ability to control \nhow the product is used once people download it. Finally, \nthere almost certainl y is no liability under a Sony theory. There \nare a great many uses for such a product that do not include \ncopying copyrighted material. Indeed, web designer\u2019s guides \ninclude information on recording noncopyrighted streams. So \neven if we restrict attention to copying streams, it would seem \nthe product is capable of substantial noninfringing uses. This \nis not to mention the other kinds of recordings a user could \nmake. \n4. Same as 3, but web designer is sued.", "proposition": ["StripIt is a software that removes protections preventing unauthorized copying of digital movies purchased from iTunes.", "It is unclear whether StripIt can be used for other purposes.", "The frequency of StripIt being used to make fair use copies of movies is unknown.", "The DMCA governs the intentional circumvention of anti-copying measures.", "A developer creates software that records audio output from a computer.", "A web designer creates a popular website featuring guides on using the software to record internet radio broadcasts.", "Some of the broadcasts are copyrighted and do not authorize duplication.", "The developer is sued, but there is no evidence they encouraged illegal copying.", "It is unlikely there could be liability under an inducement theory.", "Vicarious liability is not a realistic possibility.", "The developer does not have the practical ability to control how the product is used once downloaded.", "There are many non-infringing uses for the software.", "Web designer's guides include information on recording non-copyrighted streams.", "Even when focusing on copying streams, the software is capable of substantial non-infringing uses.", "Other kinds of recordings can also be made with the software.", "Same as point 3, but with the web designer being sued instead of the developer."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "621", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "606 \n father, Victor Gruen, in 1959 for $8,000. On April 1, 1963 \nthe elder Gruen, a successful architect with offices and \nresidences in both New York City and Los Angeles during \nmost of the time involved in this action, wrote a letter to \nplaintiff, then an undergraduate student at Harvard, stating \nthat he was giving him the Klimt painting for his birthday \nbut that he wished to retain the possession of it for his \nlifetime. This letter is not in evidence, apparently because \nplaintiff destroyed it on instructions from his father. Two \nother letters were received, however, one dated May 22, \n1963 and the other Apri l 1, 1963. Both had been dictated \nby Victor Gruen and sent together to plaintiff on or about \nMay 22, 1963. The letter dated May 22, 1963 reads as \nfollows: \nDear Michael: \nI wrote you at the time of your birthday about the gift \nof the painting by Klimt. \nNow m y lawyer tells me that because of the existing \ntax laws, it was wrong to mention in that letter that I \nwant to use the painting as long as I live. Though I \nstill want to use it, this should not appear in the letter. \nI am enclosing, therefore, a new letter and I ask you to \nsend the old one back to me so that it can be \ndestroyed. \nI know this is all very silly, but the lawyer and our \naccountant insist that they must have in their \npossession copies of a letter which will serve the \npurpose of making it possible for you, once I die, to \nget this picture without having to pay inheritance taxes \non it. \nEnclosed with this letter was a substitute gift letter, dated \nApril 1, 1963, which stated: \nDear Michael:", "proposition": ["In 1959, Victor Gruen, a father, bought a painting by Klimt for $8,000.", "The elder Gruen was a successful architect with offices and residences in both New York City and Los Angeles during most of the time involved in this action.", "On April 1, 1963, Victor Gruen wrote a letter to Michael, an undergraduate student at Harvard, stating that he was giving him the Klimt painting for his birthday but that he wished to retain the possession of it for his lifetime.", "Michael destroyed the letter on instructions from his father.", "Two other letters were received, both dictated by Victor Gruen and sent together to Michael on or about May 22, 1963.", "The letter dated May 22, 1963, explained that Victor Gruen's lawyer advised him not to mention in the previous letter that he wanted to use the painting as long as he lived due to existing tax laws.", "Victor Gruen enclosed a new letter with the May 22, 1963, letter, asking Michael to send the old letter back so that it could be destroyed.", "The substitute gift letter, dated April 1, 1963, stated that Victor Gruen wanted to give the Klimt painting to Michael without having to pay inheritance taxes on it after his death."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "611", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "596 \n availability of the procedure \nto cases of deliberate, bad \nfaith abusive registrations. \nThe definition of such \nabusive registration s is \ndiscussed in the next \nsection. The second \nlimitation would define \nabusive registration by \nreference only to trademarks \nand service marks. Thus, \nregistrations that violate \ntrade names, geographical \nindications or personality \nrights would not be \nconside red to fall within the \ndefinition of abusive \nregistration for the purposes \nof the administrative \nprocedure. Those in favor \nof this form of limitation \npointed out that the \nviolation of trademarks (and \nservice marks) was the most \ncommon form of abuse and \nthat the law with respect to \ntrade names, geographical \nindications and personality \nrights is less evenly \nharmonized throughout the \nworld, although \ninternational norms do exist \nrequiring the protection of \ntrade names and \ngeographical indications. We \nare persua ded by the \nwisdom of proceeding \nfirmly but cautiously and of \ntackling, at the first stage, \nproblems which all agree", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the availability of a procedure for cases of deliberate, bad faith abusive registrations.", "The passage defines abusive registration and its limitations.", "The second limitation defines abusive registration by reference only to trademarks and service marks.", "Registrations that violate trade names, geographical indications, or personality rights are not considered abusive registrations for the purposes of the administrative procedure.", "Supporters of this limitation argue that the violation of trademarks and service marks is the most common form of abuse, and that the law regarding trade names, geographical indications, and personality rights is less harmonized globally.", "International norms do exist requiring the protection of trade names and geographical indications.", "The passage argues for proceeding firmly but cautiously and tackling problems that all agree on at the first stage."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "211", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The man who lives only from day to \nday, is precisely the man in a state of nature. The savage, the poor \nin society, I acknowledge, obtain nothing but by painful labour; but \nin a state of nature, what could he obtain but at the price of his", "proposition": ["The man who lives only from day to day is precisely the man in a state of nature.", "The savage is a man in a state of nature.", "The poor in society obtain nothing but by painful labor.", "In a state of nature, what could the savage obtain but at the price of his labor?"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "166", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "151 \n It seems reasonable to think that the risk of being required \nto pay permanent damages to injured property owners by \ncement plant owners would itself be a reasonable effective \nspur to research for improved techniques to minimize \nnuisanc e. \nThe power of the court to condition on equitable grounds \nthe continuance of an injunction on the payment of \npermanent damages seems undoubted. (See, e.g., the \nalternatives considered in McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas \nCo., supra.;, as well as Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co. , supra.;.) \nThe damage base here suggested is consistent with the \ngeneral rule in those nuisance cases where damages are \nallowed. \u201cWhere a nuisance is of such a permanent and \nunabatable character that a single recovery can be had, \nincluding t he whole damage past and future resulting \ntherefrom, there can be but one recovery\u201d (66 C. J. S., \nNuisances, s 140, p. 947). It has been said that permanent \ndamages are allowed where the loss recoverable would \nobviously be small as compared with the cost o f removal of \nthe nuisance ( Kentucky -Ohio Gas Co. v. Bowling , 264 Ky. 470, \n477). \nThe present cases and the remedy here proposed are in a \nnumber of other respects rather similar to Northern Indiana \nPublic Serv. Co. v. Vesey (210 Ind. 338) decided by the \nSupreme Court of Indiana. The gases, odors, ammonia and \nsmoke from the Northern Indiana company\u2019s gas plant \ndamaged the nearby Vesey greenhouse operation. An \ninjunction and damages were sought, but an injunction was \ndenied and the relief granted was limited to permanent \ndamages \u201cpresent, past, and future\u201d (p. 371). \nDenial of injunction was grounded on a public interest in \nthe operation of the gas plant and on the court\u2019s conclusion \n\u201cthat less injury would be occasioned by requiring the \nappellant [Public Service ] to pay the appellee [Vesey] all \ndamages suffered by it * * * than by enjoining the operation", "proposition": ["The risk of being required to pay permanent damages to injured property owners by cement plant owners may serve as a spur for researching improved techniques to minimize nuisance.", "The court has the power to condition an injunction on equitable grounds.", "Permanent damages are allowed where the loss recoverable would obviously be small compared to the cost of removing the nuisance.", "The present cases and the remedy proposed are similar to Northern Indiana Public Serv. Co. v. Vesey, a case where gases, odors, ammonia, and smoke from a gas plant damaged a nearby greenhouse operation.", "In Northern Indiana Public Serv. Co. v. Vesey, an injunction and damages were sought, but an injunction was denied, and the relief granted was limited to permanent damages \"present, past, and future.\""]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "219", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "204 \n acquisition of title to wild animals and abandoned treasure may \nseem purely academic; how often, after all, do we expect to get into \ndisputes about the ownership of wild pigs or long -buried pieces of \neight? These cases are not entirely silly, though. People still do find \ntreasure -laden vessels, and statesmen do have to consider whether \nsomeone\u2019s acts might support a claim to own the moon, for \nexample, or the mineral nodes at the bottom of the sea. Moreover, \nanalogies to the capture of wild animals show up time and again \nwhen courts hav e to deal on a nonstatutory basis with some \n\u201cfugitive\u201d resource that is being reduced to property for the first \ntime, such as oil, gas, groundwater, or space on the spectrum of \nradio frequencies. \nWith these more serious claims in mind, then, I turn to the maxim \nof the common law: first possession is the root of title. Merely to \nstate the proposition is to raise two critical questions: what counts \nas possession, and why is it the basis for a claim to title? In \nexploring the quaint old cases\u2019 answers to these questions, we hit \non some fundamental views about the nature and purposes of a \nproperty regime. \nConsider Pierson v. Post , a classic wild -animal case from the early \nnineteenth century. Post was hunting a fox one day on an \nabandoned beach and almost had the beast in his gunsight when an \ninterloper appeared, killed the fox, and ran off with the carcass. \nThe indignant Post sued the interloper for the value of the fox on \nthe theory that his pursuit of the fox had established his property \nright to it. \nThe court disagreed. It cited a long list of learned authorities to the \neffect that \u201coccupancy\u201d or \u201cpossession\u201d went to the one who killed \nthe animal, or who at least wounded it mortally or caught it in a \nnet. These acts brought the animal within the \u201ccertain contro l\u201d that \ngives rise to possession and hence a claim to ownership.", "proposition": ["The maxim of the common law states that 'first possession is the root of title.'", "In Pierson v. Post, Post was hunting a fox on an abandoned beach and sued an interloper who killed the fox and ran off with the carcass for the value of the fox.", "The court in Pierson v. Post disagreed with Post's claim, citing that possession goes to the one who killed the animal or mortally wounded it or caught it in a net.", "These acts bring the animal within the 'certain control' that gives rise to possession and hence a claim to ownership."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "659", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "So I look up seller\u2019s \n \n3 In Brown v. Lober , the sellers, the Bosts (succeeded by M s. Lober) did not own all \nthey claimed, namely 2/3 of the subsurface coal. Thus, their promises in their \ngeneral warranty deed as to seisin and the absence of encumbrances were \nprobably in error. But that was a long time ago\u2026 too long under the statute of \nlimitations. And yet, the owners of that encumbrance have not come forward to \ndisturb possession, so the buyers, the Browns, can\u2019t yet sue Lober for failing to \ndefend and guaranteeing quiet enjoyment of what was purported to be conveyed. \n4 A patent is just a deed from the sovereign, rather than from a private individual.", "proposition": ["The sellers in Brown v. Lober did not own all the subsurface coal they claimed to own.", "The promises made by the Bosts in their general warranty deed regarding seisin and the absence of encumbrances were likely incorrect.", "The events in the case of Brown v. Lober occurred a long time ago, which is too long under the statute of limitations.", "The owners of the encumbrance in the case have not come forward to disturb possession.", "As a result, the buyers, the Browns, cannot yet sue Lober for failing to defend and guarantee quiet enjoyment of what was purported to be conveyed.", "A patent is a deed from the sovereign rather than from a private individual."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "211", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "196 \n certain things \u2014an expectation derived from sources anterior to the \nlaw? \nYes: they have had from the beginning, there have always been \ncircumstances in which a man could secure by his own means the \nenjoyment of certain things - but the catalogue of thes e cases is very \nlimited. The savage, who has hidden his prey, may hope to keep it \nfor himself so long as his cave is not discovered; so long as he is \nawake to defend it; whilst he is stronger than his rivals: but this is \nall. How miserable and precarious i s this method of possession! \u2014\nSuppose, then, the slightest agreement among these savages \nreciprocally to respect each other\u2019s booty: this is the introduction, \nof a principle, to which you can only give the name of law. A feeble \nand momentary expectation onl y results from time to time, from \npurely physical circumstances; a strong and permanent expectation \nresults from law alone: that which was only a thread in a state of \nnature, becomes a cable, so to speak, in a state of society. \nProperty and law are born an d must die together. Before the laws, \nthere was no property: take away the laws, all property ceases. With \nrespect to property, security consists in no shock or derangement \nbeing given to the expectation which has been founded on the \nlaws, of enjoying a ce rtain portion of good. The legislator owes the \ngreatest respect to these expectations to which he has given birth: \nwhen he does not interfere with them, he does all that is essential \nto the happiness of society; when he injures them, he always \nproduces a p roportionate sum of evil. \nChapter 9: Answer to an Objection. \nBut perhaps the laws relating to property may be good for those \nwho possess it, but oppressive to those who have none; \u2014the poor \nare perchance more miserable than they would be without them. \nThe l aws, in creating property, have created wealth; but with \nrespect to poverty, it is not the work of the laws \u2014it is the primitive \ncondition of the human race.", "proposition": ["The error occurred because the JSON output was missing the opening and closing braces."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "258", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "243 \n Because none could present a superior claim of concurrent \ncontrol and intent, the court held that each boy was entitled \nto an equal share of the money. Their legal claims to the \nproperty were of equal quality, therefore their entitlement \nto the property was also equal. \nHere, the issue is not intent, or concurrence. Both men \nintended to possess the ball at the time they were in \nphysical contact with it. The issue, instead, is the legal \nquality of the claim. With respect to that, neither can \npresent a superior argument as against the other. \nMr. Hayashi\u2019s claim is compr omised by Mr. Popov\u2019s pre -\npossessory interest. Mr. Popov cannot demonstrate full \ncontrol. Albeit for different reasons, they stand before the \ncourt in exactly the same legal position as did the five boys. \nTheir legal claims are of equal quality and they ar e equally \nentitled to the ball. \nThe court therefore declares that both plaintiff and \ndefendant have an equal and undivided interest in the ball. \nPlaintiff\u2019s cause of action for conversion is sustained only \nas to his equal and undivided interest. In order t o effectuate \nthis ruling, the ball must be sold and the proceeds divided \nequally between the parties. \nThe parties are ordered to meet and confer forthwith \nbefore Judge Richard Kramer to come to an agreement as \nto how to implement this decision. If no decis ion is made \nby December 30, 2002, the parties are directed to appear \nbefore this court on that date at 9:00 am. \nThe court retains jurisdiction to issue orders consistent \nwith this decision. The ball is to remain in the custody of \nthe court until further order. \n \nA Dissection of the Popov Case \nAs I\u2019ve said in class on a number of occasions, we\u2019re doing several \nthings in this course with the material we cover. First, we\u2019re trying", "proposition": ["The court held that each boy was entitled to an equal share of the money.", "Their legal claims to the property were of equal quality, therefore their entitlement to the property was also equal.", "Both men intended to possess the ball at the time they were in physical contact with it.", "The issue is the legal quality of the claim, not intent or concurrence.", "Mr. Hayashi\u2019s claim is compromised by Mr. Popov\u2019s pre-possessory interest.", "Mr. Popov cannot demonstrate full control.", "They stand before the court in exactly the same legal position as did the five boys.", "Their legal claims are of equal quality and they are equally entitled to the ball.", "The court declares that both plaintiff and defendant have an equal and undivided interest in the ball.", "In order to effectuate this ruling, the ball must be sold and the proceeds divided equally between the parties.", "The parties are ordered to meet and confer forthwith before Judge Richard Kramer to come to an agreement as to how to implement this decision.", "If no decision is made by December 30, 2002, the parties are directed to appear before the court on that date at 9:00 am.", "The court retains jurisdiction to issue orders consistent with this decision.", "The ball is to remain in the custody of the court until further order.", "A Dissection of the Popov Case is being discussed in the class.", "We are trying several things in this course with the material we cover, including understanding the legal aspects of the case and analyzing the court\u2019s decision."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "734", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "However, neither counsel who tried the case was at fault in \nany way. We have intentionally declined to consider defendant\u2019s motion (probably \nwell founded) to dismiss this case for want of prosecution (Rules of Pl eading, \nPractice and Procedure 41.04W (1950)) for the reason that a new trial of the same \nissues would be inevitable and in light of our disposition of the case on the merits, \ndefendants are not prejudiced by disregarding the technical grounds.", "proposition": ["The counsel who tried the case were not at fault in any way.", "The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case for want of prosecution, which was probably well founded.", "The motion was not considered by the court because a new trial of the same issues would be inevitable.", "The court disposed of the case on the merits, and the defendants were not prejudiced by disregarding the technical grounds."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "596", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "581 \n appropri ation of another person\u2019s identity. The ancient \nmaxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, would appear to \nbar the majority\u2019s innovative extension of the right of \npublicity. The clear implication from the fact that the \nCalifornia Legislature chose to add only voice and signature \nto the previously protected interests is that it wished to \nlimit the cause of action to enumerated attributes. \nThe majority has focused on federal decisions in its novel \nextension of California Common Law. Those decisions do \nnot p rovide support for the majority\u2019s decision. \nIn each of the federal cases relied upon by the majority, the \nadvertisement affirmatively represented that the person \ndepicted therein was the plaintiff. In this case, it is clear that \na metal robot and not the p laintiff, Vanna White, is \ndepicted in the commercial advertisement. The record does \nnot show an appropriation of Vanna White\u2019s identity. \nIn Motschenbacher, a picture of a well -known race driver\u2019s \ncar, including its unique markings, was used in an \nadvertise ment. Id. at 822. Although the driver could be \nseen in the car, his features were not visible. Id. The \ndistinctive markings on the car were the only information \nshown in the ad regarding the identity of the driver. These \ndistinctive markings compelled the inference that \nMotschenbacher was the person sitting in the racing car. \nWe concluded that \u201cCalifornia appellate courts would \u2026 \nafford legal protection to an individual\u2019s proprietary interest \nin his own identity.\u201d Id. at 825. (Emphasis added). Because \nthe d istinctive markings on the racing car were sufficient to \nidentify Motschenbacher as the driver of the car, we held \nthat an issue of fact had been raised as to whether his \nidentity had been appropriated. Id. at 827. \nIn Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.1988), a \nsinger who had been instructed to sound as much like Bette \nMidler as possible, sang a song in a radio commercial made \nfamous by Bette Midler. Id. at 461. A number of persons", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the appropriation of another person's identity and the extension of the right of publicity.", "The passage cites a case where a metal robot, not the plaintiff Vanna White, is depicted in a commercial advertisement.", "The passage refers to two federal cases, Motschenbacher and Midler v. Ford Motor Co., which the majority has relied upon in its novel extension of California Common Law."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "11", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "xi \n lawsuit? Duties are what me might causally think of as \"the law,\" \nthe things we must do or not do. They are created by legislatures, \ncontracts, or courts. In Contracts, you will be concerned with the \nprocedu res for enacting duties (offer and acceptance, for example) \nand interpreting written contracts to determine what duties have \nbeen created. In Torts, you will primarily study judge -made duties \nand the policies behind them. While in Criminal Law, many \ntextbooks focus on the duties contained in the Model Penal Code. \n2. Did the defendant breach the duty owed? Duties are often \nstated in general terms, and the question of breach is whether the a \nduty was violated under the specific facts of the case -- an exer cise \nthat often involves returning to the question of duty and gaining \nmore precision about what is and what is not against the law. If I \nowe a duty to avoid injuring others by driving a car using the \nordinary degree of care a reasonable and prudent perso n would \nunder the circumstances, whether I violated that duty by shifting \nmy attention to the air conditioning or heating while in heavy \ntraffic is a question of breach. \n \n3. Did the defendant's breach of a duty cause the result specified in \nthe law, typica lly an injury to the plaintiff or victim? As you'll see \nin your other classes, this step usually involves two separate \nquestions, one of logic and one of policy. First, was the \ndefendant's breach a logical or but -for cause of the injury, in the \nsense tha t no injury would have occurred but for the breach? This \nis necessary but not sufficient for liability. In each substantive area, \nwe also ask a policy question: was the breach a proximate cause of \nthe injury? This is a question of policy that asks wheth er the \nbreach was such that we think the defendant ought to be at least \npartially responsible, typically because the breach was a substantial \nfactor in bringing about the injury. \n4.", "proposition": ["Duties are things we must do or not do, created by legislatures, contracts, or courts.", "In Contracts, students will study the procedures for enacting duties and interpreting written contracts to determine created duties.", "In Torts, students will study judge-made duties and the policies behind them.", "In Criminal Law, many textbooks focus on the duties contained in the Model Penal Code.", "In legal cases, the question of breach is whether a duty was violated under specific facts.", "Duties are often stated in general terms, and gaining more precision about what is and what is not against the law is part of the breach question.", "If a person owes a duty to avoid injuring others while driving, shifting attention to the air conditioning or heating in heavy traffic could be a violation of that duty.", "In legal cases, the defendant's breach of a duty must cause the result specified in the law, typically an injury to the plaintiff or victim.", "This step involves two separate questions: one of logic and one of policy.", "The question of logic is whether the defendant's breach was a logical or but-for cause of the injury, meaning no injury would have occurred but for the breach.", "The question of policy is whether the breach was a proximate cause of the injury, making the defendant at least partially responsible."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "582", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Without deciding for all \npurposes when a caricature or impressionistic resemblance \nmight become a \u201clikeness,\u201d we agree with the district court \nthat the robot at issue here was not White\u2019s \u201clikeness\u201d \nwithin the mean ing of section 3344. Accordingly, we affirm \nthe court\u2019s dismissal of White\u2019s section 3344 claim.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving a caricature or impressionistic resemblance.", "The court did not decide when a caricature or impressionistic resemblance becomes a 'likeness.'", "The court agreed with the district court that the robot at issue was not White's 'likeness' within the meaning of section 3344.", "The passage affirms the court's dismissal of White's section 3344 claim."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "503", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "488 \n critical importance of not allowing the patentee to extend \nhis monopoly beyond the limits of his specific grant. These \ncases deny the patentee any right to control the distributi on \nof unpatented articles unless they are \u201cunsuited for any \ncommercial noninfringing use.\u201d Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm \n& Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 198 (1980). Unless a commodity \n\u201chas no use except through practice of the patented \nmethod,\u201d ibid, the patentee has no right to claim that its \ndistribution constitutes contributory infringement. \u201cTo \nform the basis for contributory infringement the item must \nalmost be uniquely suited as a component of the patented \ninvention.\u201d P. Rosenberg, Patent Law Fundamentals \u00a7 \n17.02[2] (1982). \u201c[A] sale of an article which though \nadapted to an infringing use is also adapted to other and \nlawful uses, is not enough to make the seller a contributory \ninfringer. Such a rule would block the wheels of \ncommerce.\u201d Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 48 (1912). \nWe recognize there are substantial differences between the \npatent and copyright laws. But in both areas the \ncontributory infringement doctrine is grounded on the \nrecognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may \nrequire the cour ts to look beyond actual duplication of a \ndevice or publication to the products or activities that make \nsuch duplication possible. The staple article of commerce \ndoctrine must strike a balance between a copyright holder\u2019s \nlegitimate demand for effective \u2013 not merely symbolic \u2013 \nprotection of the statutory monopoly, and the rights of \nothers freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of \ncommerce. Accordingly, the sale of copying equipment, like \nthe sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute \ncontributory infringement if the product is widely used for \nlegitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need \nmerely be capable of substantial noninfringing uses. \nIV", "proposition": ["Patent holders should not be allowed to extend their monopoly beyond the limits of their specific grant.", "Contributory infringement refers to the right of a patent holder to control the distribution of unpatented articles.", "For contributory infringement to occur, an item must be almost uniquely suited as a component of the patented invention.", "A sale of an article adapted to both infringing and lawful uses does not make the seller a contributory infringer.", "The contributory infringement doctrine is grounded in the recognition that adequate protection of a monopoly may require courts to look beyond actual duplication of a device or publication to the products or activities that make such duplication possible.", "Both patent and copyright laws rely on the contributory infringement doctrine.", "The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright holder's legitimate demand for effective protection of their statutory monopoly and the rights of others to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.", "The sale of copying equipment does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.", "It is sufficient for a product to be capable of substantial noninfringing uses to avoid contributory infringement."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "243", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "228 \n vantage point and some did not. Some appeared \ndisinterested in the outcome of the litigation and others had \na clear bias. Some remembered the events well and others \ndid not. Some were encumbered by prior inconsistent \nstatements which diminished their credibility. \nThe factual findings in this case are the result of an analysis \nof the testimony of all the witnesses as well as a detailed \nreview of the Keppel tape. Those findings are as follows: \nWhen the seventy -third home run ball went into the arcade, \nit landed in the upper portion of the webbing of a softball \nglove worn by Alex Popov. While the glove stopped the \ntrajectory of the ball, it is not at all clear that the ball was \nsecure. Popov had to reach for the ball and in doing so, \nmay have lost his balance. \nEven as the ball was going into his glove, a crowd of \npeople began to engulf Mr. Popov.3 He was tackled and \nthrown to the ground while still in the process of \nattempting to complete the catch. Some people \nintentionally descended on him for the purpose of taking \nthe ball away, while othe rs were involuntarily forced to the \nground by the momentum of the crowd. \nEventually, Mr. Popov was buried face down on the \nground under several layers of people. At one point he had \ntrouble breathing. Mr. Popov was grabbed, hit and kicked. \nPeople reached u nderneath him in the area of his glove. \nNeither the tape nor the testimony is sufficient to establish \n \n3 Ted Kobayashi, a defense expert, testified that there was insufficient reaction \ntime for the crowd to descend on Mr. Popov. This opinion is completely \nunconvincing. It is premised on the assumpti on that people did not begin to react \nuntil the ball hit Mr. Popov\u2019s glove. A number of witnesses testified that they \nbegan reacting while the ball was in the air. People rushed to the area where they \nthought the ball would land.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses various perspectives and experiences of witnesses in a litigation case.", "Some witnesses appeared disinterested or had a clear bias, while others remembered the events well.", "Some witnesses had prior inconsistent statements that diminished their credibility.", "The factual findings in the case are based on an analysis of all witness testimony and a review of the Keppel tape.", "When the seventy-third home run ball went into the arcade, it landed in the upper portion of the webbing of a softball glove worn by Alex Popov.", "It is not clear that the ball was secure in Popov's glove.", "Popov had to reach for the ball and may have lost his balance in the process.", "A crowd of people began to engulf Popov as he attempted to catch the ball.", "Popov was tackled and thrown to the ground while still attempting to catch the ball.", "Some people intentionally descended on Popov for the purpose of taking the ball away, while others were involuntarily forced to the ground by the momentum of the crowd.", "Mr. Popov was buried face down on the ground under several layers of people.", "At one point, Popov had trouble breathing.", "Popov was grabbed, hit, and kicked by people around him.", "People reached underneath Popov in the area of his glove.", "The tape and testimony are not sufficient to establish that Popov had the ball at any point during the incident.", "A defense expert's opinion that there was insufficient reaction time for the crowd to descend on Popov is unconvincing, as it is based on the assumption that people did not begin to react until the ball hit Popov's glove.", "Several witnesses testified that they began reacting while the ball was in the air, rushing to the area where they thought the ball would land."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "143", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "128 \n cases, as their name implies, require malice which is not \nclaimed in this case. \nThe majority then concludes that this court\u2019s past \nreluctance to extend protection to a landowner\u2019s access to \nsunlight bey ond the spite fence cases is based on obsolete \npolicies which have lost their vigor over the course of the \nyears. The three obsolete policies cited by the majority are: \n(1) Right of landowners to use their property as they desire \nas long as no physical dam age is done to a neighbor; (2) In \nthe past, sunlight was valued only for aesthetic value, not a \nsource of energy; and (3) Society has a significant interest in \nnot impeding land development. The majority has failed to \nconvince me that these policies are ob solete. \nIt is a fundamental principle of law that a \u201clandowner owns \nat least as much of the space above the ground as he can \noccupy or use in connection with the land.\u201d As stated in \nthe frequently cited and followed case of Fontainebleau Hotel \nCorp. v. For ty-Five Twenty -Five, Inc. , 114 So.2d 357 (Fla. Dist. \nCt. App. 1959): \nThere being, then, no legal right to the \nfree flow of light and air from the \nadjoining land, it is universally held \nthat where a structure serves a useful \nand beneficial purpose, it does not give \nrise to a cause of action, either for \ndamages or for an injunction under the \nmaxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas , \neven though it causes injury to another \nby cutting off the light and air and \ninterfering with the view that would \notherwise be available over adjoining \nland in its natural state, regardless of \nthe fact that the structure may have \nbeen erected partly for spite. \nId. at 359 (emphasis in original). I firmly believe that a \nlandowner\u2019s right to use his property within the limits of", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving landowner's access to sunlight.", "The majority of the court concludes that past reluctance to extend protection to a landowner's access to sunlight beyond the spite fence cases is based on obsolete policies.", "The three obsolete policies cited by the majority are: (1) Right of landowners to use their property as they desire as long as no physical damage is done to a neighbor; (2) In the past, sunlight was valued only for aesthetic value, not a source of energy; and (3) Society has a significant interest in not impeding land development.", "The majority has failed to convince the author that these policies are obsolete.", "The author cites a frequently cited and followed case, Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc., which states that there is no legal right to the free flow of light and air from adjoining land.", "The author believes that a landowner's right to use his property within the limits of the law should be protected."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "321", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "306 \n Ch. App. Cas. 279, 287, where he said, commenting upon \nPike v. Nicholas: \nIt was a perfectly legitimate course for \nthe defendant to refer to the plaintiff\u2019s \nbook, and if, taking that book as his \nguide, he went to the original \nauthorities and compiled his book \nfrom them, he made no unfair or \nimproper use of the plaintiff\u2019s book; \nand so here, if the fact be that Mr. \nWright used the plaintiff\u2019s book in \norder to guide himself to the person s \non whom it would be worth his while \nto call, and for no other purpose, he \nmade a perfectly legitimate use of the \nplaintiff\u2019s book. \nA like distinction was recognized by the Circuit Court of \nAppeals for the Second Circuit in Edward Thompson Co. \nv. American Law Book Co., 122 Fed. 922 and in West Pub. \nCo. v. Edward Thompson Co., 176 Fed. 833, 838. \nIn the case before us, in the present state of the pleadings \nand proofs, we need go no further than to hold, as we do, \nthat the admitted pursuit by complainant of t he practice of \ntaking news items published by defendant\u2019s subscribers as \ntips to be investigated, and, if verified, the result of the \ninvestigation to be sold \u2013 the practice having been followed \nby defendant also, and by news agencies generally \u2013 is not \nshown to be such as to constitute an unconscientious or \ninequitable attitude towards its adversary so as to fix upon \ncomplainant the taint of unclean hands, and debar it on this \nground from the relief to which it is otherwise entitled. \nThere is some criticis m of the injunction that was directed \nby the District Court upon the going down of the mandate \nfrom the Circuit Court of Appeals. In brief, it restrains any \ntaking or gainfully using of the complainant\u2019s news, either \nbodily or in substance from bulletins i ssued by the", "proposition": ["The defendant's use of the plaintiff's book as a guide to find original authorities was considered legitimate, as long as it was not used for any other purpose.", "In Pike v. Nicholas, it was stated that if the defendant used the plaintiff's book to guide themselves to the right people, it was a legitimate action.", "The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized a similar distinction in Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book Co. and West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thompson Co.", "In the case being discussed, the complainant's practice of taking news items from the defendant's subscribers as tips for investigation and selling verified results was not shown to be unconscientious or inequitable.", "The practice mentioned in point 4 was followed by the defendant and news agencies in general.", "The District Court's injunction, which restrained the taking or gainful use of the complainant's news, faced some criticism."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "584", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Id. at 463 -64. \nIn Carson v. Here\u2019s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d \n831 (6th Cir.1983), the defendant had marketed portable \ntoilets under the brand name \u201cHere\u2019s Johnny\u201d -Johnny \nCarson\u2019s signature \u201cTonight Show\u201d introduction -without \n \n1 Under Professor Prosser\u2019s scheme, the right of publicity is the last of the four \ncategories of the right to priv acy. Prosser, 48 Cal. L. Rev. at 389.", "proposition": ["The defendant marketed portable toilets under the brand name 'Here\u2019s Johnny' based on Johnny Carson's signature 'Tonight Show' introduction."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "248", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "233 \n participated in a forum to discuss the legal definition of \npossession.17 The professors also disagreed. \nThe disagreement is understandable. Although the term \npossession appears repeatedly throughout the law, its \ndefinition varies depending on the context in which it is \nused.18 Various courts have condemned the term as vague \nand meaningless.19 \nThis level of criticism is probably unwarranted. \nWhile there is a degree of ambiguity built into the term \npossession , that ambiguity exists for a purpose. Courts are \noften called upon to resolve conflicting claims of \npossession in the context of commercial disputes. A stable \neconomic environment requires rules of conduct which are \nunderstandable and consistent with the fundamental \ncustoms and practices of the industry they regulate. \nWithout that, rules will be difficult to enforce and \neconomic instability will result. Because each industry has \ndifferent customs and practices, a single definition of \npossession cannot be a pplied to different industries without \ncreating havoc. \nThis does not mean that there are no central principles \ngoverning the law of possession. It is possible to identify \n \n17 They are Professor Brian E. Gray, University of California, Hastings College of \nthe Law; Professor Roger Bernhardt, Golden Gate University School of Law; \nProfessor Paul Finkelman, The Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, The \nUniversi ty of Tulsa School of Law; and Professor Jan Stiglitz, California Western \nSchool of Law. \nThe discussion was held during an official session of the court convened at The \nUniversity of California, Hastings College of the Law. The session was attended \nby a nu mber of students and professors including one first year property law class \nwhich used this case as vehicle to understand the law of possession. \n18 Brown, The Law on Personal Property (Callaghan and Company, 3rd Edition, 1975) \nsection 2.6, page 19. \n19 Kramer v. United States , 408 F.2d 837, 840 (C.A.8th.1969); State v. Strutt (1967) 4 \nConn.Cir.Ct. 501, 236 A.2d 357, 359.", "proposition": ["The legal definition of possession was discussed in a forum attended by 233 people.", "The forum took place at The University of California, Hastings College of the Law.", "Professors Brian E. Gray, Roger Bernhardt, Paul Finkelman, and Jan Stiglitz participated in the forum.", "The discussion was attended by a number of students and professors, including one first-year property law class.", "The class used the case as a vehicle to understand the law of possession.", "The term 'possession' appears repeatedly throughout the law, but its definition varies depending on the context.", "Various courts have condemned the term as vague and meaningless.", "Courts often resolve conflicting claims of possession in the context of commercial disputes.", "A stable economic environment requires rules of conduct that are understandable and consistent with the fundamental customs and practices of the industry they regulate.", "Without understandable and consistent rules, rules will be difficult to enforce and economic instability will result.", "Each industry has different customs and practices, so a single definition of possession cannot be applied to different industries without creating havoc.", "There are central principles governing the law of possession, but the specific definition may vary depending on the context and industry."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "242", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "227 \n and whoever caught it would bask, for a brief period of \ntime, in the reflected fame of Mr. Bonds. \nWith that in mind, many people who attended the game \ncame prepared for the possibility that a record setting ball \nwould be hit in their direction. Among this group were \nplaintiff Alex Popov and defendant Patrick Hayashi. They \nwere unacquainted at the time. Both men brought baseball \ngloves, which they anticipated using if the ball came within \ntheir reach. \nThey, along with a number of others, positioned \nthemselves in the arcade section of the ballpark. This is a \nstanding room only area located near right field . It is in this \ngeneral area that Barry Bonds hits the greatest number of \nhome runs.2 The area was crowded with people on October \n7, 2001 and access was restricted to those who held tickets \nfor that section. \nBarry Bonds came to bat in the first inning. Wit h nobody \non base and a full count, Bonds swung at a slow \nknuckleball. He connected. The ball sailed over the right -\nfield fence and into the arcade. \nJosh Keppel, a cameraman who was positioned in the \narcade, captured the event on videotape. Keppel filmed \nmuch of what occurred from the time Bonds hit the ball \nuntil the commotion in the arcade had subsided. He was \nstanding very near the spot where the ball landed and he \nrecorded a significant amount of information critical to the \ndisposition of this case. \nIn a ddition to the Keppel tape, seventeen percipient \nwitnesses testified as to what they saw after the ball came \ninto the stands. The testimony of these witnesses varied on \nmany important points. Some of the witnesses had a good \n \n2 The Giants\u2019 website contains a page which shows where each of Bonds\u2019 home \nruns landed in 2001. This page was introduced into evidence and is part of the \nrecord. It show s that most of the balls are clustered in the arcade area.", "proposition": ["Many people attended the game on October 7, 2001, hoping to catch a record-setting ball hit by Barry Bonds.", "Alex Popov and Patrick Hayashi were among those who attended the game and positioned themselves in the arcade section of the ballpark.", "The arcade section is a standing room area located near right field, where Barry Bonds hits the greatest number of home runs.", "On October 7, 2001, Barry Bonds hit a home run in the first inning, which sailed over the right-field fence and into the arcade.", "Josh Keppel, a cameraman positioned in the arcade, captured the event on videotape.", "Keppel filmed much of what occurred from the time Bonds hit the ball until the commotion in the arcade had subsided.", "The Giants' website contains a page showing where each of Bonds' home runs landed in 2001, which was introduced as evidence in the case.", "Seventeen percipient witnesses testified as to what they saw after the ball came into the stands, but their testimonies varied on many important points."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "594", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "These are slender reeds to support a federal \ncourt\u2019s attempt to create new law for the state of California. \nIn reaching its surprising conclusion, the majority has \nignored the fact that the California Court of Appeal in \nEastwood specifically a ddressed the differences between \nthe common law right to publicity and the statutory cause \nof action codified in California Civil Code section 3344. \nThe court explained that \u201c[t]he differences between the", "proposition": ["The federal court's attempt to create new law for California is supported by slender reeds.", "The majority has ignored the fact that the California Court of Appeal in Eastwood specifically addressed the differences between the common law right to publicity and the statutory cause of action codified in California Civil Code section 3344.", "The California Court of Appeal in Eastwood explained that there are differences between the common law right to publicity and the statutory cause of action codified in California Civil Code section 3344."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "90", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The lines are not bright \u2013they are not \neven inevitable. They are the traces of the old forms of \naction, which have resulted in a multitud e of artificial \ndistinctions in modern law. But that is nothing new. \nThere was no invasion in the present case of any of the \nspecific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect. \nThe test patients entered offices that were open to anyone \nexpressin g a desire for ophthalmic services and videotaped \nphysicians engaged in professional, not personal,", "proposition": ["The lines are not bright.", "The lines are not inevitable.", "The lines are the traces of the old forms of action.", "The old forms of action have resulted in a multitude of artificial distinctions in modern law.", "This situation is nothing new.", "There was no invasion in the present case of any of the specific interests that the tort of trespass seeks to protect.", "The test patients entered offices that were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic services.", "The test patients videotaped physicians engaged in professional, not personal, activities."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "50", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Additionally, appellants asserted in their complaint that \nthey were seeking equitable relief. Spec ifically, their \ncomplaint states: \u201cthe cash money, referred to herein \nabove, being old and fragile is unique and has numismatic \nor antique value and may have fair market value in excess \nof the totality of its denominations as collector\u2019s funds and \ntherefor e plaintiffs move for specific performance \u2026 .\u201d \nFrom the pleadings, it appears that appellants sought \nequitable remedies in the chancery court. As a result, when \nthe chancery court addressed these remedies, that court \nthen acquired jurisdiction over the re maining tort claims", "proposition": ["Appellants asserted in their complaint that they were seeking equitable relief.", "Their complaint states that the cash money is unique and has numismatic or antique value, and may have fair market value in excess of the totality of its denominations as collector's funds.", "Appellants moved for specific performance in their complaint.", "The chancery court addressed the equitable remedies sought by appellants.", "As a result, when the chancery court addressed these remedies, that court then acquired jurisdiction over the remaining tort claims."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "272", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "257 \n and one half tons of artifacts from their property. Plaintiff \nfurther acknowledges that he knew that the Tunica Indians \nmight object to his excavations. \nThe actio de in rem verso, explained by the Louisiana Supreme \nCourt in Minyard v. Curtis Products, Inc. , 251 La. 624, 205 \nSo.2d 422 (1967) and derived from the similar French \naction, is influenced greatly by French Civil Code articles \nfrom which our own are copied. Minyard , 205 So.2d 432. \nThe impoverishment element in French law is met only \nwhen the factual circumstances show that it was not a result \nof the plaintiff\u2019s own fault or negligence or was not \nundertaken at his own risk. Comment, Actio De In Rem \nVerso in Louisiana; M inyard v. Curtis Products, Inc. , 43 \nTul.L.Rev. 263, 286 (1969); Brignac v. Boisdore , 288 So.2d 31, \n35 n. 2 (La.1973). Obviously the intent is to avoid awarding \none who has helped another through his own negligence or \nfault or through action taken at his ow n risk. Plaintiff was \nacting possibly out of his own negligence, but more \nprobably knowingly and at his own risk. Under these \ncircumstances, plaintiff has not proven the type of \nimpoverishment necessary for a claim of unjust \nenrichment. \nAdditionally, plain tiff has failed to show that any \nenrichment was unjustified, entitling him to an action to \nrecover from the enriched party. An enrichment will be \nunjustified \u201conly if no legal justification for it exists by \nreason of a contract or provision of law intended to permit \nthe enrichment or the impoverishment or to bar attack \nupon the enrichment.\u201d Justice A. Tate, The Louisiana Action \nfor Unjustified Enrichment , 50 Tul.L.Rev. 883, 904 (1976). Any \nenrichment received by the Tribe was justified. Humphreys v. \nBennett Oil Corp. , 195 La.", "proposition": ["Plaintiff excavated 257 and one half tons of artifacts from their property.", "Plaintiff acknowledges that he knew the Tunica Indians might object to his excavations.", "The actio de in rem verso is influenced by French Civil Code articles.", "The impoverishment element in French law is met only when it was not a result of the plaintiff's own fault or negligence or was not undertaken at his own risk.", "Plaintiff was acting possibly out of his own negligence, but more probably knowingly and at his own risk.", "Plaintiff has not proven the type of impoverishment necessary for a claim of unjust enrichment.", "Plaintiff has failed to show that any enrichment was unjustified, entitling him to an action to recover from the enriched party.", "An enrichment will be unjustified 'only if no legal justification for it exists by reason of a contract or provision of law intended to permit the enrichment or the impoverishment or to bar attack upon the enrichment.'", "Any enrichment received by the Tribe was justified."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "579", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "At a philosophical level it has \nbeen observed that with the sound of a voice, \u201cthe other \nstands before me.\u201d D. Ihde, Listening and Voice 77 (1976) . \nA fortiori, these observations hold true of singing,", "proposition": ["The other stands before me with the sound of a voice."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "581", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "566 \n district court granted summary judgment in favor of the \ndefendants. We affirm in part, reverse in par t, and remand. \nPlaintiff Vanna White is the hostess of \u201cWheel of \nFortune,\u201d one of the most popular game shows in \ntelevision history. An estimated forty million people watch \nthe program daily. Capitalizing on the fame which her \nparticipation in the show has bestowed on her, White \nmarkets her identity to various advertisers. \nThe dispute in this case arose out of a series of \nadvertisements prepared for Samsung by Deutsch. The \nseries ran in at least half a dozen publications with \nwidespread, and in some cases n ational, circulation. Each of \nthe advertisements in the series followed the same theme. \nEach depicted a current item from popular culture and a \nSamsung electronic product. Each was set in the twenty -\nfirst century and conveyed the message that the Samsung \nproduct would still be in use by that time. By hypothesizing \noutrageous future outcomes for the cultural items, the ads \ncreated humorous effects. For example, one lampooned \ncurrent popular notions of an unhealthy diet by depicting a \nraw steak with the capti on: \u201cRevealed to be health food. \n2010 A.D.\u201d Another depicted irreverent \u201cnews\u201d -show host \nMorton Downey Jr. in front of an American flag with the \ncaption: \u201cPresidential candidate. 2008 A.D.\u201d \nThe advertisement which prompted the current dispute was \nfor Samsu ng video -cassette recorders (VCRs). The ad \ndepicted a robot, dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry which \nDeutsch consciously selected to resemble White\u2019s hair and \ndress. The robot was posed next to a game board which is \ninstantly recognizable as the Wheel of Fortune game show \nset, in a stance for which White is famous. The caption of \nthe ad read: \u201cLongest -running game show. 2012 A.D.\u201d \nDefendants referred to the ad as the \u201cVanna White\u201d ad. \nUnlike the other celebrities used in the campaign, White \nneither consen ted to the ads nor was she paid.", "proposition": ["The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.", "We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.", "Vanna White is the hostess of \"Wheel of Fortune\", a popular game show.", "An estimated forty million people watch the program daily.", "White markets her identity to various advertisers.", "The dispute arose out of a series of advertisements prepared for Samsung by Deutsch.", "The series ran in at least half a dozen publications with widespread, and in some cases national, circulation.", "Each advertisement in the series followed the same theme.", "Each depicted a current item from popular culture and a Samsung electronic product.", "Each was set in the twenty-first century and conveyed the message that the Samsung product would still be in use by that time.", "By hypothesizing outrageous future outcomes for the cultural items, the ads created humorous effects.", "One advertisement lampooned current popular notions of an unhealthy diet.", "Another advertisement depicted irreverent \"news\" show host Morton Downey Jr.", "The advertisement which prompted the current dispute was for Samsung video-cassette recorders (VCRs).", "The ad depicted a robot dressed in a wig, gown, and jewelry resembling White's hair and dress.", "The robot was posed next to a game board resembling the Wheel of Fortune game show set.", "The caption of the ad read: \"Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D.\".", "Defendants referred to the ad as the \"Vanna White\" ad.", "Unlike the other celebrities used in the campaign, White neither consented to the ads nor was she paid."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "23", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "8 \n as against this woman for the true \nowner. \nThe verdict was for the plaintiffs for $60, with interest, and \nafter judgment thereon, defendant took this writ and \nassigned for error the foregoing portions of the charge. \nH. J. Culbertson, for plaintiff in error. It is only in the \nabsence of all protection or responsibility in reference to a \nlost chattel, that the place in which a lost article is found \ndoes not constitute any exception to the general rule of law, \nthat the finder is entitled to it as against all persons except \nthe true owner: Bridges v. Hawkesworth , 7 Eng. Law and Eq. \nRep. 430; McAvoy v. Medina , 11 Allen (Mass.) 549. An \ninnkeeper is liable for the goods of his guest, including \nmoney, and if they are brought within the inn a \nresponsibility is created: Houser v. Tully , 12 P. F. Smith 92; \nPackard v. Northcraft\u2019s Administrators , 2 M etc. (Ky.) 439; \nBerkshire Woollen Co. v. Proctor , 7 Cush. 417; Edwards on \nBailments , 2d ed., sect. 459; Story on Bailments , sect. 471; Jones \non Bailments 95; Addison on Torts , Wood\u2019s ed., vol. 1, pp. 755 \nand 752. He is bound to keep honest servants, and is \nresponsible for the honesty of his servants and his guests: \nHouser v. Tully , supra; Gile v. Libby & Whitney , 36 Barb. (N. \nY.) 70; Story on Bailments , supra. To allow servants to retain \nmoney found in an inn would encourage them to be \ndishonest. The better rule is to require them to deliver \nproperty so found to their employer, to be held for the true \nowner: Mathews v. Harsell , 1 E. D. Smith\u2019s Rep. (N. Y.) 394.", "proposition": ["The innkeeper is responsible for the goods of his guest and must keep honest servants.", "Servants found money in the inn and kept it, which would encourage dishonesty.", "The better rule is to require servants to deliver found property to their employer for safekeeping.", "The general rule is that the finder of a lost item is entitled to it, except for the true owner.", "The verdict was for the plaintiffs for $60 with interest, and the defendant appealed on the grounds of the judge's instructions."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "740", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "ARMSTRONG, P.J., and PETRIE, J., concur.", "proposition": ["P.J. ARMSTRONG and J. PETRIE concur with the decision.", "P.J. ARMSTRONG agrees with the decision.", "J. PETRIE agrees with the decision."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "231", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "216 \n wreck after the island that had so long concealed it, was \nwashed away, and the labor or good fortune of Brazelt on in \nascertaining its locality affords no reason for assigning it to \nhim as his property, aside from the legal consequences of \nits possession, even if courts had the power of such \nassignment, which we disclaim, and which we do not \nunderstand Brazelton to claim but by implication. \nWith reference to the tree marks of Brazelton it may be \nsaid that there is no satisfactory evidence that they were \nused on the part of the defendants in finding the wreck. \n\u2026 . \nNotwithstanding the point made by the defendant, that \nBrazelton had no right to the lead which the law would \nprotect, it being the property of the original owners of the \ncargo, there is no room for doubt that the lead was \nabandoned by its owners; and even without the positive \ntestimony of an owner of the boat and cargo in affirmation \nof the fact, the law would so imply from the term of the \nloss, and from the fact of its having been covered by an \nisland formed upon it, which sustained trees grown to the \nheight of thirty or forty feet. All reasonable hope of \nacquiring the property must have been given up from the \nnature of the case; and the evidence shows that during the \ntwo years that intervened between the sinking of the boat \nand its being covered by the tow head and island, no effort \nwas made or design enterta ined to save the part of the \ncargo that was abandoned when the high water interrupted \nthe labor of saving it, that was prosecuted for two weeks \nafter the loss of the boat, save that an excluded deposition \nmentions that one hundred and sixteen pigs of lead were \nafterwards got out by residents of the neighborhood. \nHaving saved the specie that was on board belonging to the \nUnited States, the furs and one -half of the six hundred pigs \nof lead, and a part of the shot, with which articles the boat \nwas laden, and t he boilers and machinery of the boat, the \nowners of the America seem to have contented themselves", "proposition": ["The wreck of the island was washed away.", "Brazelton ascertained the locality of the wreck.", "The passage does not assign the wreck to Brazelton as his property.", "There is no satisfactory evidence that Brazelton's tree marks were used by the defendants in finding the wreck.", "The lead from the wreck was abandoned by its original owners.", "The law would imply that the lead was abandoned due to the time of loss and the formation of an island covering it.", "No effort was made or design entertained to save the remaining cargo after the boat's loss.", "The owners of the America saved specie, furs, half of the pigs of lead, some shot, boilers, and machinery from the boat."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "387", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "63, 67, \n93 S.Ct. 253, 255, 34 L.Ed.2d 273 (1972); Funk Brothers Seed \nCo. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. , 333 U.S. 127, 130, 68 S.Ct. 440, 441, \n92 L.Ed. 588 (1948); O\u2019Reilly v. Morse , 15 How. 62, 112 -121, \n14 L.Ed. 601 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham , 14 How. 156, 175, \n \n6 This same language was employed by P . J. Federico, a principal draftsman of the \n1952 recodification, in his testimony regarding that legislation: \u201c[U]nder section \n101 a person may have invented a machine or a manufacture, which may include \nanything under the sun that is made by man\u2026 . \u201d Hear ings on H.R. 3760 before \nSubcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st \nSess., 37 (1951).", "proposition": ["The passage cites cases from 1972, 1948, and 1854.", "The passage references Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., a case where the court stated that \"a patent cannot issue for a discovery.\"", "The passage mentions O'Reilly v. Morse, a case involving the patenting of an invention related to telegraphy.", "The passage refers to Le Roy v. Tatham, a case in which the court discussed the concept of utility in patents.", "The passage quotes P.J. Federico, a principal draftsman of the 1952 recodification, who said that under section 101, a person may have invented a machine or a manufacture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "673", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "658 \n The first question this court must consider is whether \nLowery had an interest to convey at the time of his transfer \nto the Horvaths. Lowery\u2019s interest was obtained pur suant \nto patent law 43 U.S.C. s 687a (1970) commonly called the \n\u2018Alaska Homesite Law\u2019.5 Since Lowery\u2019s title to the \n \n5 43 U.S.C. s 687a (1970) states: \nRights to purchase; price and limit of acreage; access to water front \nAny citizen of the United States twenty -one years of age, \nor any association of such -citizens, or any corporation \nincorporated under the laws of the United States or of any \nState or Territory authorized on May 14, 1898, by law to \nhold lands in the Territories, thereafter in the possession \nof and occupying pu blic lands in Alaska in good faith for \nthe purposes of trade, manufacture, or other productive \nindustry, may each purchase one claim only not exceeding \neighty acres of such land for any one person, association, \nor corporation, at $2.50 per acre, upon submi ssion of \nproof that said area embraces improvements of the \nclaimant and is needed in the prosecution of such trade, \nmanufacture, or other productive industry, such tract of \nland not to include mineral or coal lands except as \nprovided in section 270 -1 of th is title, and ingress and \negress shall be reserved to the public on the waters of all \nstreams, whether navigable or otherwise: Provided, That \nany citizen of the United States twenty -one years of age \nemployed by citizens of the United States, associations o f \nsuch citizens, or by corporations organized under the laws \nof the United States, or of any State of Territory, whose \nemployer is engaged in trade, manufacture, or other \nproductive industry may purchase one claim, not \nexceeding five acres, of unreserved p ublic lands, such tract \nof land not to include mineral, coal, oil or gas lands except \nas provided in section 270 -1 of this title, in Alaska as a \nhomestead or headquarters,", "proposition": ["Lowery had an interest to convey at the time of his transfer to the Horvaths.", "Lowery's interest was obtained pursuant to the Alaska Homesite Law (43 U.S.C. s 687a (1970)).", "Lowery's title to the land is based on 43 U.S.C. s 687a (1970), which allows citizens, associations, or corporations to purchase land in Alaska for trade, manufacture, or other productive industry.", "The purchased land must be in good faith for the purposes of trade, manufacture, or other productive industry and have improvements made by the claimant.", "The land cannot include mineral or coal lands except as provided in section 270-1 of this title.", "Ingress and egress must be reserved to the public on the waters of all streams in the land.", "Citizens employed by other citizens, associations, or corporations engaged in trade, manufacture, or other productive industry can purchase a homestead or headquarters claim of up to five acres of unreserved public lands in Alaska."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "320", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "305 \n whatever may appear at the final hearing, the proofs as they \nnow stand recognize such a distinction; both parties \navowedly recognize the practice of taking tips, and neither \nparty a lleges it to be unlawful or to amount to unfair \ncompetition in business. In a line of English cases a \nsomewhat analogous practice has been held not to amount \nto an infringement of the copyright of a directory or other \nbook containing compiled information. In Kelly v. Morris, \nL. R. 1 Eq. 697, 701, 702, Vice Chancellor Sir William Page \nWood (afterwards Lord Hatherly), dealing with such a case, \nsaid that defendant was \nnot entitled to take one word of the \ninformation previously published \nwithout independently w orking out the \nmatter for himself, so as to arrive at \nthe same result from the same \ncommon sources of information, and \nthe only use that he can legitimately \nmake of a previous publication is to \nverify his own calculations and results \nwhen obtained. \nThis wa s followed by Vice Chancellor Giffard in Morris v. \nAshbee, L. R. 7 Eq. 34, where he said: \nIn a case such as this no one has a \nright to take the results of the labour \nand expense incurred by another for \nthe purposes of a rival publication, and \nthereby save himself the expense and \nlabour of working out and arriving at \nthese results by some independent \nroad. \nA similar view was adopted by Lord Chancellor Hatherly \nand the former Vice Chancellor, then Giffard, L. J., in Pike \nv. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. App. Cas. 251 , and shortly \nafterwards by the latter judge in Morris v. Wright, L. R. 5", "proposition": ["Both parties in the case avow the practice of taking tips.", "Neither party alleges that the practice amounts to unfair competition in business or is unlawful.", "In a line of English cases, a somewhat analogous practice has been held not to amount to an infringement of the copyright of a directory or other book containing compiled information.", "In Kelly v. Morris, L. R. 1 Eq. 697, 701, 702, Vice Chancellor Sir William Page Wood (afterwards Lord Hatherly) stated that the defendant was not entitled to take one word of the information previously published without independently working out the matter for himself, so as to arrive at the same result from the same common sources of information.", "Vice Chancellor Giffard in Morris v. Ashbee, L. R. 7 Eq. 34, stated that no one has a right to take the results of the labor and expense incurred by another for the purposes of a rival publication and thereby save themselves the expense and labor of working out and arriving at these results by some independent road.", "A similar view was adopted by Lord Chancellor Hatherly and the former Vice Chancellor, then Giffard, L. J., in Pike v. Nicholas, L. R. 5 Ch. App. Cas. 251, and shortly afterwards by the latter judge in Morris v. Wright, L. R. 5"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "216", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "201 \n revived, the towns rebuilt, and all these ravages repaired in time, i f \nthe men had continued to be men. But they are not so, in these \nunhappy countries: despair, the slow but fatal effect of long -\ncontinued insecurity, has destroyed all the active powers of their \nsouls. \nIf we trace the history of this contagion, we shall see that its first \nattacks fall upon the richest part of society. Wealth was the first \nobject of depredation. Superfluity vanished by little and little: \nabsolute necessity must still be provided for, notwithstanding \nobstacles \u2014man must live; but when he limits his efforts to mere \nexistence, the state languishes, and the torch of industry furnishes \nbut a few dying sparks. Besides, abundance is never so distinct \nfrom subsistence, that the one can be injured without a dangerous \nattack upon the other: whilst some l ose only what is superfluous, \nothers lose what is necessary. From the infinitely complicated \nsystem of economical relations, the wealth of one part of the \ncitizens is uniformly the source from which a more numerous party \nderives its subsistence. \nBut anothe r, and more smiling picture, may be traced, and not less \ninstructive, of the progress of security, and prosperity, its \ninseparable companion. North America presents the most striking \ncontrast of these two states: savage nature is there placed by the \nside o f civilization. The interior of this immense region presents \nonly a frightful solitude: impenetrable forests or barren tracts, \nstanding waters, noxious exhalations, venomous reptiles, \u2014such is \nthe land left to itself. The barbarous hordes who traverse these \ndeserts, without fixed habitation, always occupied in the pursuit of \ntheir prey, and always filled with implacable rivalry, only meet to \nattack and to destroy each other; so that the wild beasts are not so \ndangerous to man, as man himself. But upon the bo rders of these \nsolitudes, what a different prospect presents itself! One could \nalmost believe that one saw, at one view, the two empires of good \nand evil.", "proposition": ["After the ravages of war, towns were rebuilt and all damages were repaired.", "However, in unhappy countries, despair caused by long-term insecurity destroyed the active powers of people's souls.", "The history of this contagion shows that its first attacks targeted the richest part of society.", "Wealth was the first object of depredation, and superfluity vanished gradually.", "Absolute necessity must still be provided for, but when efforts are limited to mere existence, the state languishes and industry declines.", "The infinitely complicated system of economical relations means that the wealth of one part of citizens is the source from which a more numerous party derives its subsistence.", "Another, more smiling picture can be traced, showing the progress of security and prosperity's inseparable companion.", "North America presents a striking contrast between these two states, with civilization thriving alongside savage nature.", "The interior of this immense region is characterized by frightful solitude, impenetrable forests, barren tracts, standing waters, noxious exhalations, and venomous reptiles.", "Barbarous hordes without fixed habitation traverse these deserts, always occupied in the pursuit of their prey and filled with implacable rivalry, attacking and destroying each other.", "Wild beasts are not as dangerous to man as man himself.", "On the borders of these solitudes, a different prospect presents itself, with a clear contrast between the two empires of good and evil."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "157", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Acting in realm of uncertainty, perhaps courts should do as best \nthey can to put liability on (the opposite of grant the entitlement \nto) the party best posi tioned both to determine whether what that \nparty wants is worth the damages award or negotiation. The court", "proposition": ["Courts should assign liability to the party best suited to evaluate the value of what they want against the damages award or negotiation in uncertain situations.", "The court should act in the best interest of the involved parties in uncertain situations."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "465", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "450 \n again emphasize, petiti oners fail to show how the CTEA \ncrosses a constitutionally significant threshold with respect \nto \u201climited Times\u201d that the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts did \nnot. Those earlier Acts did not create perpetual copyrights, \nand neither does the CTEA.13 \n2 \n\u2026 . Petitione rs contend that the CTEA\u2019s extension of \nexisting copyrights (1) overlooks the requirement of \n\u201coriginality,\u201d (2) fails to \u201cpromote the Progress of Science,\u201d \nand (3) ignores copyright\u2019s quid pro quo. Petitioners\u2019 \n\u201coriginality\u201d argument draws on Feist Publica tions, Inc. v. \nRural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). [The Court \nturned aside the argument that existing works are not \noriginal and therefore not eligible for further protection, \narguing that the originality requirement is not relevant to \ninterp reting the \u201climited Times\u201d language.] \n\u2026 . \nMore forcibly, petitioners contend that [t]he CTEA\u2019s \nextension of existing copyrights categorically fails to \n\u201cpromote the Progress of Science\u201d \u2026, because it does not \nstimulate the creation of new works but merely a dds value \nto works already created. \n\u2026 . \n \n13 Respondent notes that the CTEA\u2019s life -plus-70-years baseline term is expected \nto produce an average copyright duration of 95 years, and that this term \n\u201cresembles some other long -accepted durational practices in the law, such as 99 -\nyear leases of real property and bequests within the rule against perpetuities.\u201d \nWhether such referents mark the outer boundary of \u201climited Times\u201d is not before \nus today. JUSTICE BREYER suggests that the CTEA\u2019s baseline term extends \nbeyond that typically permitted by the traditional rule against perpetuities. The \ntraditional common -law rule looks to lives in being plus 21 years. Under that rule, \nthe period before a bequest vests could easily equal or exceed the a nticipated \naverage copyright term under the CTEA.", "proposition": ["The CTEA does not cross a constitutionally significant threshold with respect to 'limited Times' compared to the 1831, 1909, and 1976 Acts.", "The earlier Acts did not create perpetual copyrights, and neither does the CTEA.", "Petitioners argue that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights overlooks the requirement of 'originality.'", "The Court turned aside the argument that existing works are not original and therefore not eligible for further protection, arguing that the originality requirement is not relevant to interpreting the 'limited Times' language.", "Petitioners contend that the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights categorically fails to 'promote the Progress of Science' because it does not stimulate the creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created.", "The CTEA's life-plus-70-years baseline term is expected to produce an average copyright duration of 95 years.", "Respondent argues that the CTEA's term resembles some other long-accepted durational practices in the law, such as 99-year leases of real property and bequests within the rule against perpetuities.", "Whether such referents mark the outer boundary of 'limited Times' is not before us today.", "JUSTICE BREYER suggests that the CTEA's baseline term extends beyond that typically permitted by the traditional rule against perpetuities.", "The traditional common-law rule looks to lives in being plus 21 years. Under that rule, the period before a bequest vests could easily equal or exceed the anticipated average copyright term under the CTEA."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "398", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The caveat of Parker v. Flook , 437 U.S. 584, 596, 90 S.Ct. 2522, 2529, 57 \nL.Ed.2d 451 (1978), an admonition to \u201cproceed cautiously when we are \nasked to extend p atent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress,\u201d \ntherefore becomes pertinent. I should think the necessity for caution is \nthat much greater when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas \nCongress has foreseen and considered but has not resolve d.", "proposition": ["The caveat of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596, 90 S.Ct. 2522, 2529, 57 L.Ed.2d 451 (1978), is relevant.", "The caveat advises to proceed cautiously when extending patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.", "The necessity for caution is greater when extending patent rights into areas Congress has foreseen and considered but has not resolved."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "444", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Thematically, the new work provides a different viewpoint \nof the antebellum world.\u201d 136 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. While \ntold from a different perspective, more critically, the story", "proposition": ["The new work provides a different viewpoint of the antebellum world.", "The story is told from a different perspective.", "The story is more critically analyzed."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "538", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "523 \n The nature of these and other lawfully swapped files is such \nthat it is reasonable to infer quantities of current lawful use \nroughly approximate to those at issue in Sony. At least, \nMGM has offered no evidence sufficient to survive \nsummary judgment that could plausibly demonstrate a \nsignificant quantitative difference. To be sure, in \nquantitative terms these uses account for only a small \npercentage of the total number of uses of Grokster\u2019s \nproduct. But the same was true in So ny, which \ncharacterized the relatively limited authorized copying \nmarket as \u201csubstantial.\u201d \u2026 . \nImportantly, Sony also used the word \u201ccapable,\u201d asking \nwhether the product is \u201ccapable of\u201d substantial \nnoninfringing uses. Its language and analysis suggest that a \nfigure like 10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove \ninsufficient, but that such a figure serves as an adequate \nfoundation where there is a reasonable prospect of \nexpanded legitimate uses over time. And its language also \nindicates the appropriatenes s of looking to potential future \nuses of the product to determine its \u201ccapability.\u201d \nHere the record reveals a significant future market for \nnoninfringing uses of Grokster -type peer -to-peer software. \nSuch software permits the exchange of any sort of digital \nfile-whether that file does, or does not, contain copyrighted \nmaterial. As more and more uncopyrighted information is \nstored in swappable form, it seems a likely inference that \nlawful peer - to-peer sharing will become increasingly \nprevalent. \nAnd that is j ust what is happening. Such legitimate \nnoninfringing uses are coming to include the swapping of: \nresearch information (the initial purpose of many peer -to-\npeer networks); public domain films (e.g., those owned by \nthe Prelinger Archive); historical recordin gs and digital \neducational materials ( e.g., those stored on the Internet \nArchive); digital photos (OurPictures, for example, is \nstarting a P2P photo -swapping service); \u201cshareware\u201d and", "proposition": ["The nature of lawfully swapped files is such that it is reasonable to infer quantities of current lawful use roughly approximate to those at issue in Sony.", "MGM has offered no evidence sufficient to survive summary judgment that could plausibly demonstrate a significant quantitative difference.", "In quantitative terms, these uses account for only a small percentage of the total number of uses of Grokster\u2019s product.", "The relatively limited authorized copying market was characterized as \u2018substantial\u2019 in Sony.", "Sony asked whether the product is \u2018capable of\u2019 substantial noninfringing uses.", "A figure like 10%, if fixed for all time, might well prove insufficient, but it serves as an adequate foundation where there is a reasonable prospect of expanded legitimate uses over time.", "The language of Sony also indicates the appropriateness of looking to potential future uses of the product to determine its \u2018capability.\u2019", "The record reveals a significant future market for noninfringing uses of Grokster-type peer-to-peer software.", "Such software permits the exchange of any sort of digital file-whether that file does, or does not, contain copyrighted material.", "As more and more uncopyrighted information is stored in swappable form, it seems a likely inference that lawful peer-to-peer sharing will become increasingly prevalent.", "Such legitimate noninfringing uses are coming to include the swapping of: research information (the initial purpose of many peer-to-peer networks); public domain films (e.g., those owned by the Prelinger Archive); historical recordings and digital educational materials (e.g., those stored on the Internet Archive); digital photos (OurPictures, for example, is starting a P2P photo-swapping service); \u2018shareware\u2019 and"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "358", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "343 \n permits it to serve these basic purposes. See Landes & \nPosner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 \nJ.Law & Econ. 265, 290 (1987). And, for that reason, it is \ndifficult to find, in basic trademark objectives, a reason to \ndisqualify absolutely the use of a color as a mark. \nNeither can we find a principled objection to the use of \ncolor as a mark in the important \u201cfunctionality\u201d doctrine of \ntrademark law. The functionality doctrine prevents \ntrademark law, which seeks to promote competition by \nprotecting a firm\u2019s reputation, from instead inhibiting \nlegitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a \nuseful product feature. It is the province of patent law, not \ntrademark law, to encourage invention by granting \ninventors a monopoly over new product designs or \nfunctions for a limited time, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 154, 173, after \nwhich competitors are free to use the innovation. If a \nproduct\u2019s func tional features could be used as trademarks, \nhowever, a monopoly over such features could be obtained \nwithout regard to whether they qualify as patents and could \nbe extended forever (because trademarks may be renewed \nin perpetuity). See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. \n111, 119 -120, 59 S.Ct. 109, 113 -114, 83 L.Ed. 73 (1938) \n(Brandeis, J.); Inwood Laboratories, Inc., supra, 456 U.S., at 863, \n102 S.Ct., at 2193 (White, J., concurring in result) (\u201cA \nfunctional characteristic is \u2018an important i ngredient in the \ncommercial success of the product,\u2019 and, after expiration of \na patent, it is no more the property of the originator than \nthe product itself\u201d) (citation omitted).", "proposition": ["The use of color as a trademark is not inherently prohibited by the functionality doctrine of trademark law.", "The functionality doctrine aims to prevent trademark law from inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to control a useful product feature.", "Patent law, not trademark law, encourages invention by granting inventors a monopoly over new product designs or functions for a limited time.", "If a product's functional features could be used as trademarks, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without considering whether they qualify as patents, potentially extending indefinitely.", "Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. (1938) and Inwood Laboratories, Inc. (1986) support the idea that there is no principled objection to the use of color as a mark in the functionality doctrine of trademark law."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "388", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "373 \n 14 L.Ed. 367 (1853). Thus, a new mineral discovered in the \nearth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable \nsubject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his \ncelebrated law that E=mc7; nor could Newton have \npatented the law of gravity. Such discoveries are \n\u201cmanifestations of \u2026 nature, free to all men and reserved \nexclusively to none.\u201d Funk, supra , 333 U.S., at 130, 68 S.Ct., \nat 441. \nJudged in this light, respondent\u2019s micro -organism plainly \nqualifies as patentable subject mat ter. His claim is not to a \nhitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a \nnonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of \nmatter \u2013 a product of human ingenuity \u201chaving a distinctive \nname, character [and] use.\u201d Hartranft v. Wiegmann , 121 U.S. \n609, 615, 7 S.Ct. 1240, 1243, 30 L.Ed. 1012 (1887). The \npoint is underscored dramatically by comparison of the \ninvention here with that in Funk . There, the patentee had \ndiscovered that there existed in nature certain species of \nroot-nodule bacteria which did not exe rt a mutually \ninhibitive effect on each other. He used that discovery to \nproduce a mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of \nleguminous plants. Concluding that the patentee had \ndiscovered \u201conly some of the handiwork of nature,\u201d the \nCourt ruled the product non -patentable: \n \n7 The Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 161, provides in relevant part: \nWhoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces \nany dist inct and new variety of plant, including cultivated \nsports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other \nthan a tuber propogated plant or a plant found in an \nuncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor \u2026 .", "proposition": ["A new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild is not patentable subject matter.", "Einstein could not patent his celebrated law that E=mc7; nor could Newton have patented the law of gravity.", "Such discoveries are \u2018manifestations of \u2026 nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.\u2019", "Judged in this light, respondent\u2019s micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter.", "His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter \u2013 a product of human ingenuity \u2018having a distinctive name, character [and] use.\u2019", "The point is underscored dramatically by comparison of the invention here with that in Funk.", "There, the patentee had discovered that there existed in nature certain species of root-nodule bacteria which did not exert a mutually inhibitive effect on each other.", "He used that discovery to produce a mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous plants.", "Concluding that the patentee had discovered \u2018only some of the handiwork of nature\u2019, the Court ruled the product non-patentable.", "The Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 161, provides that whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "245", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "230 \n for others to see. Someone made a motion for the ball and \nMr. Hayashi put it back in his glove. It is clear that Mr. \nHayashi was concerned that someone would take the ball \naway from him and that he was unwilling to show it until \nhe was o n videotape. Although he testified to the contrary, \nthat portion of his testimony is unconvincing. \nMr. Popov eventually got up from the ground. He made \nseveral statements while he was on the ground and shortly \nafter he got up which are consistent with his claim that he \nhad achieved some level of control over the ball and that he \nintended to keep it. Those statements can be heard on the \naudio portion of the tape. When he saw that Mr. Hayashi \nhad the ball he expressed relief and grabbed for it. Mr. \nHayashi pu lled the ball away.6 Security guards then took \nMr. Hayashi to a secure area of the stadium.7 \nIt is important to point out what the evidence did not and \ncould not show. Neither the camera nor the percipient \nwitnesses were able to establish whether Mr. Popov \nretained control of the ball as he descended into the crowd. \nMr. Popov\u2019s testimony on this question is inconsistent on \nseveral important points, ambiguous on others and, on the \nwhole, unconvincing. We do not know when or how Mr. \nPopov lost the ball. \nPerha ps the most critical factual finding of all is one that \ncannot be made. We will never know if Mr. Popov would \nhave been able to retain control of the ball had the crowd \n \n6 Defense counsel has attempted to characterize this encounter as one in which \nMr. Popov congratulates Mr. Hayashi for getting the ball and offers him a high \nfive. This is an argument that only a true advocate could embrace. \n7 Testimony w as also received about events which occurred after baseball officials \nescorted Mr. Hayashi to a secure area.", "proposition": ["Someone made a motion for the ball and Mr. Hayashi put it back in his glove.", "Mr. Hayashi was concerned that someone would take the ball away from him and that he was unwilling to show it until he was on videotape.", "Mr. Popov eventually got up from the ground.", "He made several statements while he was on the ground and shortly after he got up which are consistent with his claim that he had achieved some level of control over the ball and that he intended to keep it.", "Those statements can be heard on the audio portion of the tape.", "When he saw that Mr. Hayashi had the ball, he expressed relief and grabbed for it.", "Mr. Hayashi pulled the ball away.", "Security guards then took Mr. Hayashi to a secure area of the stadium.", "Neither the camera nor the percipient witnesses were able to establish whether Mr. Popov retained control of the ball as he descended into the crowd.", "Mr. Popov's testimony on this question is inconsistent on several important points, ambiguous on others, and, on the whole, unconvincing.", "We do not know when or how Mr. Popov lost the ball.", "It is possible that the most critical factual finding of all is one that cannot be made.", "We will never know if Mr. Popov would have been able to retain control of the ball had the crowd not been present.", "Defense counsel has attempted to characterize this encounter as one in which Mr. Popov congratulates Mr. Hayashi for getting the ball and offers him a high five.", "Testimony was also received about events which occurred after baseball officials escorted Mr. Hayashi to a secure area."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "583", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "568 \n II. Right of Publicity \nWhite next argues that the district court erred in granting \nsummary judgment to defendants on White\u2019s common law \nright of publicity clai m. In Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 \nCal.App.3d 409 (1983), the California court of appeal stated \nthat the common law right of publicity cause of action \n\u201cmay be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant\u2019s use of the \nplaintiff\u2019s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff\u2019s name \nor likeness to defendant\u2019s advantage, commercially or \notherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d Id. \nat 417. The district court dismissed White\u2019s claim for failure \nto satisfy Eastwood\u2019s second prong, reasoning that \ndefendants had not appropriated White\u2019s \u201cname or \nlikeness\u201d with their robot ad. We agree that the robot ad \ndid not make use of White\u2019s name or likeness. However, \nthe common law right of publicity is not so confined. \nThe Eastwood court did not hold that the rig ht of publicity \ncause of action could be pleaded only by alleging an \nappropriation of name or likeness. Eastwood involved an \nunauthorized use of photographs of Clint Eastwood and of \nhis name. Accordingly, the Eastwood court had no \noccasion to consider the extent beyond the use of name or \nlikeness to which the right of publicity reaches. That court \nheld only that the right of publicity cause of action \u201cmay \nbe\u201d pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation of name or \nlikeness, not that the action may be plea ded only in those \nterms. \nThe \u201cname or likeness\u201d formulation referred to in \nEastwood originated not as an element of the right of \npublicity cause of action, but as a description of the types \nof cases in which the cause of action had been recognized. \nThe sou rce of this formulation is Prosser, Privacy, 48 \nCal.L.Rev. 383, 401 -07 (1960), one of the earliest and most \nenduring articulations of the common law right of publicity \ncause of action.", "proposition": ["White argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to defendants on White\u2019s common law right of publicity claim.", "The California court of appeal stated that the common law right of publicity cause of action can be pleaded by alleging (1) the defendant\u2019s use of the plaintiff\u2019s identity, (2) the appropriation of plaintiff\u2019s name or likeness to defendant\u2019s advantage, commercially or otherwise, (3) lack of consent, and (4) resulting injury.", "The district court dismissed White\u2019s claim for failure to satisfy Eastwood\u2019s second prong, reasoning that defendants had not appropriated White\u2019s \u2018name or likeness\u2019 with their robot ad.", "The common law right of publicity is not so confined.", "The Eastwood court did not hold that the right of publicity cause of action could be pleaded only by alleging an appropriation of name or likeness.", "Eastwood involved an unauthorized use of photographs of Clint Eastwood and of his name.", "The Eastwood court had no occasion to consider the extent beyond the use of name or likeness to which the right of publicity reaches.", "The \u2018name or likeness\u2019 formulation referred to in Eastwood originated not as an element of the right of publicity cause of action, but as a description of the types of cases in which the cause of action had been recognized.", "The source of this formulation is Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, 401 -07 (1960), one of the earliest and most enduring articulations of the common law right of publicity cause of action."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "714", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "at 660. Again, Cahill\u2019s situation is \ndistinguishable from the parties\u2019 plight i n Branch because \nthere was no preexisting, ongoing dispute between Cahill \nand Morrow when Cahill sent the letter. Based on this \ncaselaw, Cahill\u2019s 1997 offer for purchase does, in fact, \nrecognize the superior title of the record owner and arrests \nthe accrua l of her claim.", "proposition": ["The caselaw supports Cahill's recognition of the superior title of the record owner and arrests the accrual of her claim.", "There was no preexisting, ongoing dispute between Cahill and Morrow when Cahill sent the letter.", "Cahill's situation is distinguishable from the parties' plight in Branch."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "29", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "14 \n negligence rule does a better job of serving this purpose than does \na contributory negligence rule. Contributory negligence allows \nlosses to go uncompensated when the plaintiff (victim) caused any \nof her own loss; comparative negligence does a bet ter job of \nspreading the risk of accidents. [I know that this is a very crude \nargument, and I\u2019m sure all of you can do better.] \nIn other words, the judge asks the question, \u201cWhat normative \ntheory best justifies the existing law and negligence?\u201d And then \nproceeds to the question, \u201cGiven that justification of tort law, \nwhich of the alternative rules that I could apply to the case before \nme best serves the purposes of tort law?\u201d \nTwo Kinds of Justification: Principle and Policy \nIn Hard Cases , Dworkin identified two different kinds of arguments \nthat can be used to justify the law. He called these two different \ntypes arguments of \u201cprinciple\u201d and \u201cpolicy.\u201d As understood by \nDworkin, arguments of principle are arguments that appeal to ideas \nabout fairness and rights. If you would like to know more about \narguments of principle, a good place to begin is with the Legal \nTheory Lexicon entry on Deontlogy. \nArguments of policy, on the other hand, appeal to consequences. \nFor example, if you argued that a comparative negligenc e rule is \nbetter than a contributory negligence rule because it provides \noptimal incentives for taking precautions against accidents, you \nwould have made an argument of policy in Dworkin\u2019s sense. \nIf you are interested in the theoretical basis for arguments of \npolicy, you could take a look at the Legal Theory Lexicon entry on \nUtilitarianism. \nDworkin himself argued that judges should consider arguments of \nprinciple and should not decide cases on the basis of arguments of \npolicy. That feature of his theory is hugely controversial \u2013as you \ncould guess if, like most law students, you\u2019ve heard endless \ndiscussion of policy in the classroom. But Dworkin could be right \nabout \u201cfit and justification,\u201d even if he is wrong that the dimension \nof justification is limited to principle and excludes policy.", "proposition": ["Dworkin's theory about judges considering arguments of principle is highly controversial.", "Dworkin argued that judges should consider arguments of principle and not decide cases on the basis of arguments of policy."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "386", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "371 \n Speci fically, we must determine whether respondent\u2019s \nmicro -organism constitutes a \u201cmanufacture\u201d or \n\u201ccomposition of matter\u201d within the meaning of the statute.5 \nIII \nIn cases of statutory construction we begin, of course, with \nthe language of the statute. Southeas tern Community College v. \nDavis , 442 U.S. 397, 405, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2366, 60 L.Ed.2d \n980 (1979). And \u201cunless otherwise defined, words will be \ninterpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary common \nmeaning.\u201d Perrin v. United States , 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S .Ct. \n311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979). We have also cautioned \nthat courts \u201cshould not read into the patent laws limitations \nand conditions which the legislature has not expressed.\u201d \nUnited States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. , 289 U.S. 178, 199, 53 \nS.Ct. 554, 561, 77 L.Ed. 1114 (1933). \nGuided by these canons of construction, this Court has \nread the term \u201cmanufacture\u201d in \u00a7 101 in accordance with its \ndictionary definition to mean \u201cthe production of articles for \nuse from raw or prepared materials by giving to thes e \nmaterials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, \nwhether by hand -labor or by machinery.\u201d American Fruit \nGrowers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co. , 283 U.S. 1, 11, 51 S.Ct. 328, 330, \n75 L.Ed. 801 (1931). Similarly, \u201ccomposition of matter\u201d has \nbeen construe d consistent with its common usage to \ninclude \u201call compositions of two or more substances and \n\u2026 all composite articles, whether they be the results of \nchemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they \nbe gases, fluids, powders or solids.\u201d Shell Dev elopment Co. v. \nWatson , 149 F.Supp.", "proposition": ["The text provides definitions and interpretations of 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter' in the context of patent law.", "The language of the statute is the starting point for interpreting these terms.", "Words are given their ordinary, contemporary common meaning unless otherwise defined.", "Courts should not read limitations or conditions into the patent laws that are not expressed by the legislature.", "The term 'manufacture' refers to the production of articles from raw or prepared materials by giving them new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations.", "The term 'composition of matter' includes all compositions of two or more substances and all composite articles, regardless of whether they result from chemical union, mechanical mixture, or are gases, fluids, powders, or solids."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "744", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "729 \n The shelter was about 8x8 feet wide, and tall enough for \nCharles Fagerstrom to stand in. Around the shelter, the \nFagerstroms constructed a pen which was 75 feet in \ndiameter and 5 feet high. The shelter and pen housed a \nreindeer for about six weeks and the pen remained in place \nuntil the summer of 1978. \nDuring their testimony, the Fagerstroms estimated that \nthey were personally present on the disputed parcel from \n1974 through 1978, \u201cevery other weekend or so\u201d and \u201c[a] \ncouple times du ring the week \u2026 if the weather was good.\u201d \nWhen present they used the north end of the parcel as a \nbase camp while using the entire parcel for subsistence and \nrecreational purposes. Their activities included gathering \nberries, catching and drying fish and p icnicking. Their \nchildren played on the parcel. The Fagerstroms also kept \nthe property clean, picking up litter left by others. \nWhile so using the disputed parcel, the Fagerstroms walked \nalong various paths which traverse the entire parcel. The \npaths were present prior to the Fagerstroms\u2019 use of the \nparcel and, according to Peggy Fagerstrom, were free for \nuse by others in connection with picking berries and \nfishing. On one occasion, however, Charles Fagerstrom \nexcluded campers from the land. They were burni ng the \nFagerstroms\u2019 firewood. \nNome 2000 placed into evidence the deposition testimony \nof Dr. Steven McNabb, an expert in anthropology, who \nstated that the Fagerstroms\u2019 use of the disputed parcel was \nconsistent with the traditional Native Alaskan system of \nland use. According to McNabb, unlike the non -Native \nsystem, the traditional Native system does not recognize \nexclusive ownership of land. Instead, customary use of \nland, such as the Fagerstroms\u2019 use of the disputed parcel, \nestablishes only a first priorit y claim to the land\u2019s resources. \nThe claim is not exclusive and is not a matter of ownership, \nbut is more in the nature of a stewardship. That is, other \nmembers of the claimant\u2019s social group may share in the", "proposition": ["The shelter was 8x8 feet wide and tall enough for Charles Fagerstrom to stand in.", "The Fagerstroms constructed a pen around the shelter that was 75 feet in diameter and 5 feet high.", "The shelter and pen housed a reindeer for about six weeks.", "The pen remained in place until the summer of 1978.", "The Fagerstroms were present on the disputed parcel from 1974 through 1978, 'every other weekend or so' and 'a couple times during the week ... if the weather was good.'", "They used the north end of the parcel as a base camp and used the entire parcel for subsistence and recreational purposes.", "Their activities included gathering berries, catching and drying fish, and picnicking.", "Their children played on the parcel.", "The Fagerstroms kept the property clean, picking up litter left by others.", "While using the disputed parcel, the Fagerstroms walked along various paths that traversed the entire parcel.", "The paths were present prior to the Fagerstroms' use of the parcel and were free for use by others in connection with picking berries and fishing.", "On one occasion, Charles Fagerstrom excluded campers from the land because they were burning the Fagerstroms' firewood.", "Nome 2000 placed into evidence the deposition testimony of Dr. Steven McNabb, an expert in anthropology.", "McNabb stated that the Fagerstroms' use of the disputed parcel was consistent with the traditional Native Alaskan system of land use.", "The traditional Native system does not recognize exclusive ownership of land.", "Customary use of land, such as the Fagerstroms' use of the disputed parcel, establishes only a first priority claim to the land's resources.", "The claim is not exclusive and is not a matter of ownership, but is more in the nature of a stewardship.", "Other members of the claimant's social group may share in the use of the land."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "138", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "We do not find the reasoning of Fountainebleau persuasive. The court leaped from \nrejecting an easement by prescription (the doctrine of ancient lights) and an \neasement by implication to the conclusion that there is no right to protection \nfrom obstruction of access to sunlight. The court\u2019s statement that a landowner \nhas no right to light should be the conclusion, not its initial premise. The court \ndid not explain wh y an owner\u2019s interest in unobstructed light should not be \nprotected or in what manner an owner\u2019s interest in unobstructed sunlight differs \nfrom an owner\u2019s interest in being free from obtrusive noises or smells or differs \nfrom an owner\u2019s interest in unobstr ucted use of water. The recognition of a per se \nexception to private nuisance law may invite unreasonable behavior. \n9 For a discussion of nuisance law, see Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, \nNuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls , 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1973); \nComment, Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control , 46 Wash. L. Rev. 47 \n(1970).", "proposition": ["The court finds the reasoning of Fountainebleau unpersuasive.", "The court leaps from rejecting an easement by prescription and an easement by implication to the conclusion that there is no right to protection from obstruction of access to sunlight.", "The court's statement that a landowner has no right to light should be the conclusion, not its initial premise.", "The court does not explain why an owner's interest in unobstructed light should not be protected or in what manner an owner's interest in unobstructed sunlight differs from an owner's interest in being free from obtrusive noises or smells or differs from an owner's interest in unobstructed use of water.", "The recognition of a per se exception to private nuisance law may invite unreasonable behavior.", "Ellickson's Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls is discussed in 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1973).", "Comment, Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control is discussed in 46 Wash. L. Rev. 47 (1970)."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "133", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Hornsby v. Smith , 191 Ga. 491, 500 (1941) (\u201cthe air and light no \nmatter from w hich direction they come are God -given, and are essential to the \nlife, comfort, and happiness of everyone\u201d); Burke v. Smith , 69 Mich. 380, 389 \n(1888) (\u201cthe right to breathe the air and enjoy the sunshine, is a natural one\u201d); \nBarger v. Barringer , 151 N.C. 4 33, 437 (1909) (\u201clight and air are as much a necessity \nas water, and all are the common heritage of mankind\u201d).", "proposition": ["Air and light are essential to life, comfort, and happiness, and are a natural right and common heritage of mankind."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "226", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "211 \n creatures over to those who mark them so clearly as to transform \nthem, so that no one else will mistake them for unsubdued nature. \nWe may admire nature and enjoy wildness, but those sentiments \nfind little resonance in the doctrine of first possession. Its texts are \nthose of cultivation, manufacture, and development. We cannot \nhave our fish both loose and fast, a s Melville might have said,5 and \nthe common law of first possession makes a choice. The common \nlaw gives preference to those who convince the world that they \nhave caught the fish and hold it fast. This may be a reward to \nuseful labor, but it is more precis ely the articulation of a specific \nvocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and understood \nby a commercial people. It is this commonly understood and \nshared set of symbols that gives significance and form to what \nmight seem the quintessentially in dividualistic act: the claim that \none has, by \u201cpossession,\u201d separated for oneself property from the \ngreat commons of unowned things. \n \n5 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK ch. 89 (\u201cFast -Fish and Loose -Fish\u201d) \n(1st ed. London 1851). This chapter describes some litigation over ownership o f a \nwhale that had been harpooned but got away, harpoon and all, only to be \nharpooned and taken by a second crew. The legal question involved the point at \nwhich the whale stopped being a \u201cloose -fish\u201d and became a \u201cfast -fish\u201d -that is, the \npoint at which the whale became someone\u2019s property. Melville goes on to describe \na number of items (including serfs and mortgages) as \u201cfast -fish\u201d and a number of \nother items (America at Columbus\u2019 arrival, ideas, the rights of man) as \u201cloose -\nfish.\u201d", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the doctrine of first possession and its relationship with nature and wildness.", "The common law of first possession gives preference to those who convince the world that they have caught the fish and hold it fast.", "The common law may reward useful labor, but it is more precisely the articulation of a specific vocabulary within a structure of symbols approved and understood by a commercial people.", "The passage cites Herman Melville's 'Moby Dick' as an example of the distinction between 'fast -fish' and 'loose -fish.'", "The chapter describes litigation over ownership of a whale that had been harpooned but got away, only to be harpooned and taken by a second crew.", "The legal question involved the point at which the whale stopped being a 'loose -fish' and became a 'fast -fish' - that is, the point at which the whale became someone's property.", "Melville describes a number of items as 'fast -fish' and a number of other items as 'loose -fish,' including America at Columbus' arrival, ideas, the rights of man, serfs, and mortgages."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "309", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "294 \n newspapers and selling it as its own. The court expressed \nitself as satisfied that this practice amounted to unfair trade, \nbut as the legal question was one of first impression it \nconsidered that the allowance of an injunction should await \nthe outcome of an appeal. 240 Fed. 983, 996. Both parties \nhaving appealed, the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the \ninjunction order so far as it went, and upon complainant\u2019s \nappeal modified it and remanded the cause, with dire ctions \nto issue an injunction also against any bodily taking of the \nwords or substance of complainant\u2019s news until its \ncommercial value as news had passed away. 245 Fed. 244, \n253. The present writ of certiorari was then allowed. 245 U. \nS. 644. \nThe only mat ter that has been argued before us is whether \ndefendant may lawfully be restrained from appropriating \nnews taken from bulletins issued by complainant or any of \nits members, or from newspapers published by them, for \nthe purpose of selling it to defendant\u2019s clients. Complainant \nasserts that defendant\u2019s admitted course of conduct in this \nregard both violates complainant\u2019s property right in the \nnews and constitutes unfair competition in business. And \nnotwithstanding the case has proceeded only to the stage of \na preliminary injunction, we have deemed it proper to \nconsider the underlying questions, since they go to the very \nmerits of the action and are presented upon facts that are \nnot in dispute. As presented in argument, these questions \nare: (1) Whether there is any property in news; (2) Whether, \nif there be property in news collected for the purpose of \nbeing published, it survives the instant of its publication in \nthe first newspaper to which it is communicated by the \nnews -gatherer; and (3) whether defendant\u2019s a dmitted course \nof conduct in appropriating for commercial use matter \ntaken from bulletins or early editions of Associated Press \npublications constitutes unfair competition in trade. \nThe federal jurisdiction was invoked because of diversity of \ncitizenship, not upon the ground that the suit arose under", "proposition": ["The court expressed itself as satisfied that the defendant's practice of appropriating news from bulletins and newspapers published by the complainant amounted to unfair trade.", "The legal question regarding the allowance of an injunction was considered to be of first impression, and the court decided to await the outcome of an appeal before making a decision.", "Both parties appealed the decision, and the Circuit Court of Appeals sustained the injunction order but modified it and remanded the cause with directions to issue an injunction against any bodily taking of the words or substance of the complainant's news until its commercial value as news had passed away.", "The present case involves the question of whether the defendant may lawfully be restrained from appropriating news taken from bulletins issued by the complainant or any of its members, or from newspapers published by them, for the purpose of selling it to the defendant's clients.", "The complainant asserts that the defendant's admitted course of conduct both violates the complainant's property right in the news and constitutes unfair competition in business.", "The case has proceeded only to the stage of a preliminary injunction, but the court has deemed it proper to consider the underlying questions since they go to the very merits of the action and are presented upon facts that are not in dispute.", "The underlying questions presented in the argument are: (1) Whether there is any property in news; (2) Whether, if there be property in news collected for the purpose of being published, it survives the instant of its publication in the first newspaper to which it is communicated by the news-gatherer; and (3) whether the defendant's admitted course of conduct in appropriating for commercial use matter taken from bulletins or early editions of Associated Press publications constitutes unfair competition in trade.", "The federal jurisdiction was invoked because of diversity of citizenship, not upon the ground that the suit arose under."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "168", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "153 \n York El. R. R. Co. , 144 N. Y. 174; Cox v. City of New Yo rk, \n265 N. Y. 411, and similarly, Westphal v. City of New York , \n177 N. Y. 140.) \nThus it seems fair to both sides to grant permanent \ndamages to plaintiffs which will terminate this private \nlitigation. The theory of damage is the \u201cservitude on land\u201d \nof plain tiffs imposed by defendant\u2019s nuisance. (See United \nStates v. Causby , 328 U. S. 256, 261, 262, 267, where the term \n\u201cservitude\u201d addressed to the land was used by Justice \nDouglas relating to the effect of airplane noise on property \nnear an airport.) \nThe judgm ent, by allowance of permanent damages \nimposing a servitude on land, which is the basis of the \nactions, would preclude future recovery by plaintiffs or \ntheir grantees (see Northern Indiana Public Serv. Co. v. Vesey , \nsupra.;, p. 351). \nThis should be placed beyond debate by a provision of the \njudgment that the payment by defendant and the \nacceptance by plaintiffs of permanent damages found by \nthe court shall be in compensation for a servitude on the \nland. \nAlthough the Trial Term has found permanent damages as \na possible basis of settlement of the litigation, on remission \nthe court should be entirely free to re -examine this subject. \nIt may again find the permanent damage already found; or \nmake new findings. \nThe orders should be reversed, without costs, and the cases \nremitted to Supreme Court, Albany County to grant an \ninjunction which shall be vacated upon payment by \ndefendant of such amounts of permanent damage to the \nrespective plaintiffs as shall for this purpose be determined \nby the court. \nJASEN , J., Dissenting.", "proposition": ["The case involves 153 York El. R. R. Co., Cox v. City of New York, and Westphal v. City of New York.", "The court believes it is fair to grant permanent damages to the plaintiffs to end the private litigation.", "The theory of damage is the \"servitude on land\" imposed by the defendant's nuisance.", "The judgment should include a provision stating that the payment by the defendant and acceptance by the plaintiffs of permanent damages found by the court will be in compensation for a servitude on the land.", "The Trial Term has found permanent damages as a possible basis for settling the litigation, but the court should be free to re-examine this subject.", "The orders should be reversed without costs, and the cases remitted to the Supreme Court of Albany County to grant an injunction that will be vacated upon payment by the defendant of the permanent damages to the respective plaintiffs as determined by the court.", "JASEN, J., dissents."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "535", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "520 \n available through peer -to-peer networks including those \naccessed through Grokster\u2019s and St reamCast\u2019s software. \nThe District Court declared it \u201cundisputed that there are \nsubstantial noninfringing uses for Defendants\u2019 software,\u201d \nthus obviating the need for further proceedings. This \nconclusion appears to rest almost entirely on the collection \nof d eclarations submitted by Grokster and StreamCast. \nReview of these declarations reveals mostly anecdotal \nevidence, sometimes obtained second -hand, of authorized \ncopyrighted works or public domain works available online \nand shared through peer -to-peer networ ks, and general \nstatements about the benefits of peer -to-peer technology. \nThese declarations do not support summary judgment in \nthe face of evidence, proffered by MGM, of overwhelming \nuse of Grokster\u2019s and StreamCast\u2019s software for \ninfringement.6 \nEven if t he absolute number of noninfringing files copied \nusing the Grokster and StreamCast software is large, it does \nnot follow that the products are therefore put to substantial \nnoninfringing uses and are thus immune from liability. The \nnumber of noninfringing c opies may be reflective of, and \n \n6 Justice BREYER finds support for summary judgment in this motley collection \nof declarations and in a survey conducted by an expert retained by MGM. That \nsurvey identified 75% of the files available through Grokster as copyrighted works \nowned or controlled by the plaintiffs, and 15% of the files as works likely \ncopyrighted. As to the remaining 10% of the files, \u201cthere was not enough \ninformation to form reasonable conclusions either as to what those files even \nconsisted of, and/or whether the y were infringing or non -infringing.\u201d Even \nassuming, as Justice BREYER does, that the Sony Court would have absolved \nSony of contributory liability solely on the basis of the use of the Betamax for \nauthorized time -shifting, summary judgment is not inevitab ly appropriate here.", "proposition": ["520 available through peer-to-peer networks including those accessed through Grokster\u2019s and StreamCast\u2019s software.", "The District Court declared it \u201cundisputed that there are substantial noninfringing uses for Defendants\u2019 software.\u201d", "This conclusion appears to rest almost entirely on the collection of declarations submitted by Grokster and StreamCast.", "Review of these declarations reveals mostly anecdotal evidence, sometimes obtained second-hand, of authorized copyrighted works or public domain works available online and shared through peer-to-peer networks, and general statements about the benefits of peer-to-peer technology.", "These declarations do not support summary judgment in the face of evidence, proffered by MGM, of overwhelming use of Grokster\u2019s and StreamCast\u2019s software for infringement.", "Even if the absolute number of noninfringing copies is large, it does not follow that the products are therefore put to substantial noninfringing uses and are thus immune from liability.", "The number of noninfringing copies may be reflective of, and, Justice BREYER finds support for summary judgment in this motley collection of declarations and in a survey conducted by an expert retained by MGM.", "That survey identified 75% of the files available through Grokster as copyrighted works owned or controlled by the plaintiffs, and 15% of the files as works likely copyrighted.", "As to the remaining 10% of the files, \u201cthere was not enough information to form reasonable conclusions either as to what those files even consisted of, and/or whether they were infringing or non-infringing.\u201d", "Even assuming, as Justice BREYER does, that the Sony Court would have absolved Sony of contributory liability solely on the basis of the use of the Betamax for authorized time-shifting, summary judgment is not inevitably appropriate here."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "642", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "627 \n she has delivered the premises \u201cvacant\u201d in accor dance with \nher obligation under the provisions of the contract rider. \nTo the extent New York law may be said to require \nsomething more than \u201cmere concealment\u201d to apply even \nthe equitable remedy of rescission, the case of Junius Constr. \nCorp. v Cohen (257 N Y 393, supra), while not precisely on \npoint, provides some guidance. In that case, the seller \ndisclosed that an official map indicated two as yet \nunopened streets which were planned for construction at \nthe edges of the parcel. What was not disclosed was th at \nthe same map indicated a third street which, if opened, \nwould divide the plot in half. The court held that, while the \nseller was under no duty to mention the planned streets at \nall, having undertaken to disclose two of them, he was \nobliged to reveal the third. \nIn the case at bar, defendant seller deliberately fostered the \npublic belief that her home was possessed. Having \nundertaken to inform the public - at-large, to whom she has \nno legal relationship, about the supernatural occurrences on \nher property, s he may be said to owe no less a duty to her \ncontract vendee. It has been remarked that the occasional \nmodern cases which permit a seller to take unfair advantage \nof a buyer\u2019s ignorance so long as he is not actively misled \nare \u201csingularly unappetizing\u201d (Pro sser, Torts \u00a7 106, at 696 \n[4th ed 1971]). Where, as here, the seller not only takes \nunfair advantage of the buyer\u2019s ignorance but has created \nand perpetuated a condition about which he is unlikely to \neven inquire, enforcement of the contract (in whole or i n \npart) is offensive to the court\u2019s sense of equity. Application \nof the remedy of rescission, within the bounds of the \nnarrow exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor set forth \nherein, is entirely appropriate to relieve the unwitting \npurchaser from the c onsequences of a most unnatural \nbargain.", "proposition": ["The seller delivered the premises vacant as per the contract rider.", "New York law may require more than mere concealment for rescission.", "Junius Constr. Corp. v Cohen provides guidance on the matter.", "In Junius Constr. Corp. v Cohen, the seller disclosed two planned streets.", "The seller in Junius Constr. Corp. v Cohen was obliged to reveal the third planned street.", "The defendant seller in the case at bar fostered the public belief that her home was possessed.", "The defendant seller informed the public about supernatural occurrences on her property.", "The defendant seller may owe a duty to her contract vendee.", "Some modern cases allow a seller to take unfair advantage of a buyer's ignorance.", "Enforcement of the contract is offensive to equity when the seller takes unfair advantage and creates a condition unlikely to be inquired about.", "Rescission is appropriate to relieve the unwitting purchaser from a most unnatural bargain within the narrow exception to caveat emptor."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "491", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "476 \n available to authors themselves for most of our Nation\u2019s \nhistory \u2013 is an insufficient potential bequest. The weakness \nof these final rationales simply underscores th e conclusion \nthat emerges from consideration of earlier attempts at \njustification: There is no legitimate, serious copyright -\nrelated justification for this statute. \nIII \nThe Court is concerned that our holding in this case not \ninhibit the broad decisionmaki ng leeway that the Copyright \nClause grants Congress. It is concerned about the \nimplications of today\u2019s decision for the Copyright Act of \n1976 \u2013 an Act that changed copyright\u2019s basic term from 56 \nyears (assuming renewal) to life of the author plus 50 years. \nIt is concerned about having to determine just how many \nyears of copyright is too many \u2013 a determination that it \nfears would require it to find the \u201cright\u201d constitutional \nnumber, a task for which the Court is not well suited. \nI share the Court\u2019s initial c oncern, about intrusion upon the \ndecisionmaking authority of Congress. But I do not believe \nit intrudes upon that authority to find the statute \nunconstitutional on the basis of (1) a legal analysis of the \nCopyright Clause\u2019s objectives; (2) the total implau sibility of \nany incentive effect; and (3) the statute\u2019s apparent failure to \nprovide significant international uniformity. Nor does it \nintrude upon congressional authority to consider rationality \nin light of the expressive values underlying the Copyright \nClause, related as it is to the First Amendment, and given \nthe constitutional importance of correctly drawing the \nrelevant Clause/Amendment boundary. We cannot avoid \nthe need to examine the statute carefully by saying that \n\u201cCongress has not altered the tradi tional contours of \ncopyright protection,\u201d for the sentence points to the \nquestion, rather than the answer. Nor should we avoid that \nexamination here. That degree of judicial vigilance \u2013 at the \nfar outer boundaries of the Clause \u2013 is warranted if we are", "proposition": ["The decomposed propositions", "1. There are 476 available to authors themselves for most of our Nation\u2019s history.", "2. The weakness of these final rationales simply underscores the conclusion that emerges from consideration of earlier attempts at justification: There is no legitimate, serious copyright - related justification for this statute.", "3. The Court is concerned that our holding in this case not inhibit the broad decisionmaki ng leeway that the Copyright Clause grants Congress.", "4. The Court is concerned about the implications of today\u2019s decision for the Copyright Act of 1976 \u2013 an Act that changed copyright\u2019s basic term from 56 years (assuming renewal) to life of the author plus 50 years.", "5. The Court is concerned about having to determine just how many years of copyright is too many \u2013 a determination that it fears would require it to find the \u2018right\u2019 constitutional number, a task for which the Court is not well suited.", "6. I share the Court\u2019s initial c oncern, about intrusion upon the decisionmaking authority of Congress.", "7. But I do not believe it intrudes upon that authority to find the statute unconstitutional on the basis of (1) a legal analysis of the Copyright Clause\u2019s objectives; (2) the total implau sibility of any incentive effect; and (3) the statute\u2019s apparent failure to provide significant international uniformity.", "8. Nor does it intrude upon congressional authority to consider rationality in light of the expressive values underlying the Copyright Clause, related as it is to the First Amendment, and given the constitutional importance of correctly drawing the relevant Clause/Amendment boundary.", "9. We cannot avoid the need to examine the statute carefully by saying that \u201cCongress has not altered the tradi tional contours of copyright protection,\u201d for the sentence points to the question, rather than the answer.", "10. Nor should we avoid that examination here.", "11. That degree of judicial vigilance \u2013 at the far outer boundaries of the Clause \u2013 is warranted if we are"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "355", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "340 \n Compare NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., 917 F.2d 1024, 1028 \n(CA7 1990) (absolute prohibition against protection of \ncolor alone), with In re Ow ens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 \nF.2d 1116, 1128 (CA Fed.1985) (allowing registration of \ncolor pink for fiberglass insulation), and Master Distributors, \nInc. v. Pako Corp., 986 F.2d 219, 224 (CA8 1993) (declining \nto establish per se prohibition against pro tecting color alone \nas a trademark). Therefore, this Court granted certiorari. \n512 U.S. \u2014-, 115 S.Ct. 40, 129 L.Ed.2d 935 (1994). We \nnow hold that there is no rule absolutely barring the use of \ncolor alone, and we reverse the judgment of the Ninth \nCircuit. \nII \nThe Lanham Act gives a seller or producer the exclusive \nright to \u201cregister\u201d a trademark, 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1052 (1988 ed. \nand Supp. V), and to prevent his or her competitors from \nusing that trademark, \u00a7 1114(1). Both the language of the \nAct and the basic und erlying principles of trademark law \nwould seem to include color within the universe of things \nthat can qualify as a trademark. The language of the \nLanham Act describes that universe in the broadest of \nterms. It says that trademarks \u201cinclude any word, name, \nsymbol, or device, or any combination thereof.\u201d \u00a7 1127. \nSince human beings might use as a \u201csymbol\u201d or \u201cdevice\u201d \nalmost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, \nthis language, read literally, is not restrictive. The courts and \nthe Patent and Tra demark Office have authorized for use \nas a mark a particular shape (of a Coca -Cola bottle), a \nparticular sound (of NBC\u2019s three chimes), and even a \nparticular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread).", "proposition": ["NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp. was a case where the court discussed the absolute prohibition against protecting color alone.", "In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. allowed the registration of color pink for fiberglass insulation.", "Master Distributors, Inc. v. Pako Corp. declined to establish a per se prohibition against protecting color alone as a trademark.", "The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case.", "The Lanham Act gives a seller or producer the exclusive right to register a trademark and prevent competitors from using it.", "The language of the Lanham Act describes that the universe of things that can qualify as a trademark is broad, including any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.", "Human beings might use as a \"symbol\" or \"device\" almost anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning.", "The courts and the Patent and Trademark Office have authorized for use as a mark a particular shape (of a Coca-Cola bottle), a particular sound (of NBC's three chimes), and even a particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on sewing thread)."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "141", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "126 \n The circuit court concluded that because the defendant\u2019s \nproposed house was in conformity with zoning regu lations, \nbuilding codes and deed restrictions, the defendant\u2019s use of \nthe land was reasonable. This court has concluded that a \nlandowner\u2019s compliance with zoning laws does not \nautomatically bar a nuisance claim. Compliance with the \nlaw \u201cis not the controll ing factor, though it is, of course, \nentitled to some weight.\u201d Bie v. Ingersoll , 27 Wis. 2d 490, 495 \n(1965). The circuit court also concluded that the plaintiff \ncould have avoided any harm by locating his own house in \na better place. Again, plaintiff\u2019s abi lity to avoid the harm is \na relevant but not a conclusive factor. See secs. 826, 827, \n828, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977). \nFurthermore, our examination of the record leads us to \nconclude that the record does not furnish an adequate basis \nfor the circ uit court to apply the proper legal principles on \nsummary judgment. The application of the reasonable use \nstandard in nuisance cases normally requires a full \nexposition of all underlying facts and circumstances. Too \nlittle is known in this case of such mat ters as the extent of \nthe harm to the plaintiff, the suitability of solar heat in that \nneighborhood, the availability of remedies to the plaintiff, \nand the costs to the defendant of avoiding the harm. \nSummary judgment is not an appropriate procedural \nvehic le in this case when the circuit court must weigh \nevidence which has not been presented at trial. \n\u2026 . \n \nIn determining the utility of conduct that causes an \nintentional invasion of another\u2019s interest in the use and \nenjoyment o f land, the following factors are important: \n(a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary \npurpose of the conduct; \n(b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the \nlocality; and \n(c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the \ninvasion.", "proposition": ["The defendant's proposed house was in conformity with zoning regulations, building codes, and deed restrictions.", "A landowner's compliance with zoning laws does not automatically bar a nuisance claim.", "The circuit court concluded that the plaintiff could have avoided any harm by locating his own house in a better place.", "The plaintiff's ability to avoid the harm is a relevant but not a conclusive factor.", "The record does not furnish an adequate basis for the circuit court to apply the proper legal principles on summary judgment.", "The application of the reasonable use standard in nuisance cases normally requires a full exposition of all underlying facts and circumstances.", "Too little is known in this case of such matters as the extent of the harm to the plaintiff, the suitability of solar heat in that neighborhood, the availability of remedies to the plaintiff, and the costs to the defendant of avoiding the harm.", "Summary judgment is not an appropriate procedural vehicle in this case when the circuit court must weigh evidence which has not been presented at trial.", "In determining the utility of conduct that causes an intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are important: (a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b) the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of preventing or avoiding the invasion."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "403", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "388 \n Of the 11 telephone companies, only Rural refused to \nlicense its listings to Feist. Rural\u2019s refusal created a problem \nfor Feist, as omitting these listings would have left a gaping \nhole in its area -wide directory, rendering it less attractive to \npotential yellow pages advertisers. In a decision subsequent \nto that which we review here, the District Court \ndetermined that this was precisely the reason Rural refused \nto license i ts listings. The refusal was motivated by an \nunlawful purpose \u201cto extend its monopoly in telephone \nservice to a monopoly in yellow pages advertising.\u201d Rural \nTelephone Service Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 737 F.Supp. 610, \n622 (Kan.1990). \nUnable to licen se Rural\u2019s white pages listings, Feist used \nthem without Rural\u2019s consent. Feist began by removing \nseveral thousand listings that fell outside the geographic \nrange of its area -wide directory, then hired personnel to \ninvestigate the 4,935 that remained. Thes e employeesveri \nfied the data reported by Rural and sought to obtain \nadditional information. As a result, a typical Feist listing \nincludes the individual\u2019s street address; most of Rural\u2019s \nlistings do not. Notwithstanding these additions, \nhowever,1,309 of t he 46,878 listings in Feist\u2019s 1983 \ndirectory were identical to listings in Rural\u2019s 1982 -1983 \nwhite pages. App. 54 (\u00b6 15 -16), 57. Four of these were \nfictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its directory to \ndetect copying. \nRural sued for copyright i nfringement in the District Court \nfor the District of Kansas taking the position that Feist, in \ncompiling its own directory, could not use the information \ncontained in Rural\u2019s white pages. Rural asserted that Feist\u2019s \nemployees were obliged to travel door -to-door or conduct \na telephone survey to discover the same information for \nthemselves. Feist responded that such efforts were \neconomically impractical and, in any event, unnecessary \nbecause the information copied was beyond the scope of \ncopyright protection . The District Court granted summary", "proposition": ["There were 11 telephone companies, and only Rural refused to license its listings to Feist.", "Rural's refusal to license its listings created a problem for Feist, as omitting them would have left a gaping hole in its area-wide directory.", "The District Court determined that Rural refused to license its listings due to an unlawful purpose to extend its monopoly in telephone service to a monopoly in yellow pages advertising.", "Unable to license Rural's white pages listings, Feist used them without Rural's consent.", "Feist removed several thousand listings that fell outside the geographic range of its area-wide directory and hired personnel to investigate the remaining 4,935 listings.", "Feist's employees verified the data reported by Rural and sought to obtain additional information, resulting in a typical Feist listing including the individual's street address.", "Despite these additions, 1,309 of the 46,878 listings in Feist's 1983 directory were identical to listings in Rural's 1982-1983 white pages.", "Four of these identical listings were fictitious listings that Rural had inserted into its directory to detect copying.", "Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement, claiming that Feist could not use the information contained in Rural's white pages while compiling its own directory.", "Feist argued that such efforts were economically impractical and unnecessary because the information copied was beyond the scope of copyright protection.", "The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Rural, finding that Feist had infringed on Rural's copyright."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "439", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "After carefully comparing the two works, we agree \nwith the district court that, particularly in its first half, \nTWDG is largely \u201can encapsulation of [GWTW] [ that] \nexploit[s] its copyrighted characters, story lines, and settings \nas the palette for the new story.\u201d SunTrust, 136 F.Supp.2d \nat 1367. \nHoughton Mifflin argues that there is no substantial \nsimilarity between TWDG and GWTW because the \nretelling of the st ory is an inversion of GWTW: the", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the comparison of two works, TWDG and GWTW.", "The district court agrees that TWDG is largely an encapsulation of GWTW, exploiting its copyrighted characters, story lines, and settings as the palette for the new story.", "SunTrust is cited as a source for the district court's agreement (136 F.Supp.2d at 1367).", "Houghton Mifflin argues that there is no substantial similarity between TWDG and GWTW.", "The retelling of the story in TWDG is an inversion of GWTW, according to Houghton Mifflin."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "421", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Even those scholars who believe that \n\u201cindustrious collection\u201d should be rewarded seem to \nrecognize that this is beyond the scope of existing \ncopyright law. See Denicola 516 (\u201c[T]he very vocabulary of \ncopyright is ill suited to analyzing property rights in works \nof nonfiction\u201d); id., at 520 -521, 525; Ginsburg 1867, 1870. \nIII", "proposition": ["Copyright law does not fully account for the value of works of nonfiction."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "437", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "422 \n 1. Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits \na. Pri ma Facie Copyright Infringement \nThe first step in evaluating the likelihood that SunTrust will \nsucceed on the merits is to determine whether it has \nestablished the prima facie elements of a copyright \ninfringement claim: (1) that SunTrust owns a valid \ncopyr ight in GWTW and (2) that Randall copied original \nelements of GWTW in TWDG. The district court found \nthat SunTrust had carried its burden on both of these \nelements. \nThe first element, SunTrust\u2019s ownership of a valid \ncopyright in GWTW, is not disputed. Houg hton Mifflin \ndoes assert, however, that SunTrust did not establish the \nsecond element of infringement, that TWDG appropriates \ncopyright -protected expression from GWTW. In order to \nprove copying, SunTrust was required to show a \n\u201csubstantial similarity\u201d betw een the two works such that \n\u201can average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy \nas having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.\u201d \nNot all copying of a work is actionable, however, for, as \ndiscussed in section II.B.1., \u201cno author may copyright f acts \nor ideas. The copyright is limited to those aspects of the \nwork -termed \u2018expression\u2019 -that display the stamp of the \nauthor\u2019s originality.\u201d Thus, we are concerned with \nsubstantial similarities between TWDG and GWTW only \nto the extent that they involve th e copying of original, \nprotected expression.8 \n \n8 Originally the word \u201ccopie\u201d was a noun, indicating the manuscript. Ownership \nof the \u201ccopie\u201d thus meant ownership of the manuscript for the purposes of \npublishing it. Today, \u201ccopy\u201d has become a verb, meaning the act of rep roduction \nof a work. But in the development of copyright law it was intended to be a term \nof art, indicating a reproduction of a work for publication. Failure to understand \nand apply this distinction has confused many courts (assisted by overzealous \nadvoca tes) into too expansive a view of the scope of the copyright monopoly.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the likelihood of SunTrust succeeding on the merits of a copyright infringement claim.", "The district court found that SunTrust had carried its burden on both elements of infringement.", "SunTrust needs to show substantial similarity between the two works for a copyright infringement claim.", "Not all copying of a work is actionable, as no author may copyright facts or ideas.", "The copyright is limited to the aspects of the work that display the author's originality.", "The passage highlights the importance of understanding the distinction between 'copy' as a noun and as a verb in the development of copyright law."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "731", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "716 \n foundation. Plain tiff\u2019s position at this point does not \nappeal to a court of equity. \nAbel v. Abel, 245 Iowa 907, 920, 65 N.W.2d 68, 75 (1954). \nThe good faith requirement was not an issue in I -80 \nAssociates, Inc. The discussion of claim of right in that case \nconcerned mode of proof and did not include a \ncomprehensive definition of the element. See 224 N.W.2d \nat 11. The requirement of good faith was implicitly \nreaffirmed in a subsequent case, Pearson v. City of \nGuttenberg, 245 N.W.2d 519, 532 (Iowa 1976). We now \nconfirm that good faith, as explained in this case, is \nessential to adverse possession under a claim of right. \nWe believe plaintiff failed to prove a good faith claim of \nright in the present case. She knew her lot did not include \nthe cornfield north of it. She knew som eone else had title \nto it and she had no interest in it or claim to it. This is not a \ncase of confusion or mistake. At the time she entered \npossession of the disputed land, plaintiff knew she had no \nlegal right to do so. To say that one can acquire a claim of \nright by merely entering possession would recognize \nsquatter\u2019s rights. Possession for the statutory period cannot \nbe bootstrapped into a basis for claiming a right to \npossession. \nWe hold that the trial court was right in rejecting plaintiff\u2019s \nclaim. \nII. The cross -appeal. \nUnder Iowa R.App. 5(a), a \u201ccross -appeal may be taken \nwithin the thirty days for taking an appeal or in any event \nwithin five days after the appeal is taken.\u201dDefendants did \nnot take their cross -appeal within the thirty days for taking \nan appeal. Nor did they take their cross -appeal within five \ndays after plaintiff filed her notice of appeal with the clerk \nof the district court. They argue, however, that the rule \nshould be interpreted to allow a cross -appeal within five", "proposition": ["The passage is about a legal case involving adverse possession and the requirement of good faith.", "The good faith requirement was not an issue in I -80 Associates, Inc.", "The discussion of claim of right in that case concerned mode of proof and did not include a comprehensive definition of the element.", "The requirement of good faith was implicitly reaffirmed in Pearson v. City of Guttenberg.", "The court confirms that good faith is essential to adverse possession under a claim of right.", "The court believes the plaintiff failed to prove a good faith claim of right in the present case.", "The court holds that the trial court was right in rejecting plaintiff's claim.", "A cross-appeal may be taken within thirty days for taking an appeal or in any event within five days after the appeal is taken, according to Iowa R.App. 5(a).", "Defendants did not take their cross-appeal within the thirty days for taking an appeal or within five days after plaintiff filed her notice of appeal with the clerk of the district court.", "Defendants argue that the rule should be interpreted to allow a cross-appeal within five days after the appeal is taken."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "214", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "With regard to a nation, the \ndestruction of its productive capital is impossible: but long before \nthis fatal term arrives, the mischief would have reached the will; \nand the spirit of industry would fall under a terrible marasmus, in \nthe midst of the natural resources presented by a rich and fertile", "proposition": ["The destruction of a nation's productive capital is impossible.", "Long before the fatal term arrives, the mischief would have reached the will.", "The spirit of industry would fall under a terrible marasmus.", "The mischief would affect the nation's spirit of industry.", "A rich and fertile nation would still be affected by the mischief."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "146", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "131 \n private benefit. I note that this court in Deetz stated: \u201cThe \nreasonable use rule retains \u2026 a policy of favoring land \nimprovement and development.\u201d Id. at 20. See also id. at 15. \nI find it significant that community planners are dealing \nwith this country\u2019s continued population growth and \nbuildin g revitalization where \u201c[t]he number of households \nis expected to reach almost 100 million by the end of the \ndecade; that would be 34 percent higher than the number \nin 1970.\u201d F. Strom, 1981 Zoning and Planning Law Handbook , \nsec. 22.02, 396 (1981). It is cl ear that community planners \nare acutely aware of the present housing shortages, \nparticularly among those two groups with limited financial \nresources, the young and the elderly. Id. While the \nmajority\u2019s policy arguments may be directed to a cause of \naction for public nuisance, we are presented with a private \nnuisance case which I believe is distinguishable in this \nregard.14 \nI would submit that any policy decisions in this area are \nbest left for the legislature. \u201cWhat is \u2018desirable\u2019 or \n\u2018advisable\u2019 or \u2018ought to be\u2019 is a question of policy, not a \nquestion of fact. What is \u2018necessary\u2019 or what is \u2018in the best \ninterest\u2019 is not a fact and its determination by the judiciary \nis an exercise of legislative power when each involves \npolitical considerations.\u201d In re City of Beloit , 37 Wis. 2d 637, \n644 (1968). I would concur with these observations of the \ntrial judge: \u201cWhile temptation lingers for the court to \n \n14 I am amused at the majority\u2019s contention that what constitutes a nuisance today \nwould have been accept ed without question in earlier times. This calls to mind the \nfact that, in early days of travel by horses, the first automobiles were considered \nnuisances. Later, when automobile travel became developed, the horse became \nthe nuisance.", "proposition": ["The court is discussing a private nuisance case.", "The majority's policy arguments may be directed to a cause of action for public nuisance.", "The passage mentions the role of community planners in dealing with population growth and housing shortages.", "Community planners are aware of the present housing shortages, particularly among young and elderly people with limited financial resources.", "The passage suggests that any policy decisions in this area are best left for the legislature.", "The trial judge's observations are mentioned, highlighting the changing perception of nuisances over time."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "256", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "241 \n the assumption that Mr. Popov would have dropped the \nball. That conclusion is also unsupported by the facts. \nBoth men have a superior claim to the ball as against all the \nworld. Each man has a claim of equal dignity as to the \nother. We are, therefore, left with something of a dilemma. \nThank fully, there is a middle ground. \nThe concept of equitable division was fully explored in a \nlaw review article authored by Professor R.H. Helmholz in \nthe December 1983 edition of the Fordham Law Review.38 \nProfessor Helmholz addressed the problems associated \nwith rules governing finders of lost and mislaid property. \nFor a variety of reasons not directly relevant to the issues \nraised in this case, Helmholz suggested employing the \nequitable remedy of division to resolve competing claims \nbetween finders of lost o r mislaid property and the owners \nof land on which the property was found. \nThere is no reason, however, that the same remedy cannot \nbe applied in a case such as this, where issues of property, \ntort and equity intersect. \nThe concept of equitable division ha s its roots in ancient \nRoman law.39 As Helmholz points out, it is useful in that it \n\u201cprovides an equitable way to resolve competing claims \nwhich are equally strong.\u201d Moreover, \u201c[i]t comports with \nwhat one instinctively feels to be fair\u201d.40 \nAlthough there is no California case directly on point, \nArnold v. Producers Fruit Company (1900) 128 Cal. 637, 61 P. \n283 provides some insight. There, a number of different \nprune growers contracted with Producer\u2019s Fruit Company \n \n38 Equitable Division and the Law of Finders , (1983) Fordham Law Review, Professor \nR.H. Helmholz, University of Chicago School of Law. This article built on a \nstudent comment published in 1939. Lost, Mislaid and Abandoned Property (1939) 8 \nFordham Law Review 222. \n39 Helmholz at fn. 14. \n40 Id. at 315.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving a dispute over ownership of a ball.", "The conclusion that Mr. Popov would have dropped the ball is unsupported by the facts.", "Both men have a superior claim to the ball as against all the world.", "Each man has a claim of equal dignity as to the other.", "The passage presents a dilemma that requires a resolution.", "There is a middle ground in the form of the equitable remedy of division.", "Professor R.H. Helmholz explored the concept of equitable division in a law review article.", "The article was published in the December 1983 edition of the Fordham Law Review.", "Helmholz addressed rules governing finders of lost and mislaid property.", "The equitable remedy of division can be applied to resolve competing claims between finders of lost or mislaid property and the owners of land on which the property was found.", "The same remedy can be applied in cases where issues of property, tort, and equity intersect, such as this one.", "The concept of equitable division has its roots in ancient Roman law.", "It is useful in resolving competing claims that are equally strong.", "It comports with what one instinctively feels to be fair.", "There is no California case directly on point, but Arnold v. Producers Fruit Company (1900) 128 Cal. 637, 61 P. 283 provides some insight.", "In Arnold v. Producers Fruit Company, prune growers contracted with Producer's Fruit Company."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "192", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "If \nthe first seeing, starting, or pursuing such animals, without \nhaving so wounded, circumvented or ensnared them, so as \nto deprive them of their natural liberty, and subject them to \nthe control of their p ursuer, should afford the basis of \nactions against others for intercepting and killing them, it \nwould prove a fertile source of quarrels and litigation.", "proposition": ["The control of an animal's pursuer refers to the authority or power to direct the animal's movements and actions."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "718", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "703 \n Specifically, this Court holds that the drainage \nimprovements and lawn reseedings that occurred after the \n1997 offer -to-purchase letter cannot be used as evidence of \nCahill\u2019s adverse possession. Whether the evidence \nremaining in the record is sufficient to constitute clear and \nconvincing proof that Cahill perfected her claim prior to \n1997 remains a questi on of fact. On remand, the trial \njustice is directed to limit his consideration to pre -1997 \nevents and make specific determinations whether Cahill\u2019s \nintermittent flower and tree planting, flag flying, clothesline \nreplacing, lawn chair and beach -paraphernal ia storing, and \nannual party hosting are adequate. Furthermore, given our \nruling today, the trial court must evaluate the nature of \nCahill\u2019s and her predecessor\u2019s twenty -six-year acts of \npossession in the harsh light of the fact that Cahill openly \nmanifest ed the existence of George Morrow\u2019s superior title \non three occasions. Lastly, this Court instructs the trial \ncourt to determine the impact of Cahill\u2019s initial demand, \nmade in the letter of January 10, 2006, from her counsel to \nMorrow, on the claim of righ t and hostility elements. \nCahill\u2019s 2006 letter staked a claim only to \u201ca 20 -foot strip,\u201d \nless than half the area of lot 19, while the later -filed 2006 \ncomplaint declared Cahill\u2019s right to the entire parcel. How \nCahill\u2019s change of heart colors the adverse n ature of her \npossession is a question that must be addressed by the \nfinder of fact. \n\u2026 . \nJUSTICE FLAHERTY , dissenting. \nI respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority in \nthis case. Before setting forth my reasons for doing so, \nhowever, I take this o pportunity to express my approval of \nthe Court\u2019s scholarly opinion with respect to the origin and \nphilosophy underpinning the doctrine of adverse \npossession. In summary, I agree with the majority\u2019s \nobservations about the efficacy of adverse possession in a \nmodern world. The doctrine is a legal anachronism", "proposition": ["The text discusses a court case involving adverse possession and the determination of clear and convincing proof for Cahill's claim. The trial court is directed to limit its consideration to pre-1997 events and make specific determinations on Cahill's acts of possession. The majority's observations about the doctrine of adverse possession are approved by the dissenting justice, but the doctrine is considered a legal anachronism.", "The past error propositions indicate that the input should be a valid string for each numbered point in the text.", "The propositions should be in the form of a single JSON object with an array of values.", "The JSON schema for the output is provided.", "The text discusses a court case involving adverse possession and the determination of clear and convincing proof for Cahill's claim.", "The trial court is directed to limit its consideration to pre-1997 events and make specific determinations on Cahill's acts of possession.", "Given the ruling, the trial court must evaluate the nature of Cahill's and her predecessor's twenty-six-year acts of possession in the light of the fact that Cahill openly manifested the existence of George Morrow's superior title on three occasions.", "The trial court must determine the impact of Cahill's initial demand, made in the letter of January 10, 2006, from her counsel to Morrow, on the claim of right and hostility elements.", "Cahill's 2006 letter staked a claim only to \"a 20-foot strip\", less than half the area of lot 19, while the later-filed 2006 complaint declared Cahill's right to the entire parcel.", "How Cahill's change of heart colors the adverse nature of her possession is a question that must be addressed by the finder of fact.", "JUSTICE FLAHERTY respectfully dissents from the holding of the majority in this case.", "The dissenting justice expresses approval of the Court's scholarly opinion with respect to the origin and philosophy underpinning the doctrine of adverse possession.", "The majority's observations about the efficacy of adverse possession in a modern world are agreed upon by the dissenting justice.", "However, the dissenting justice considers the doctrine of adverse possession to be a legal anachronism."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "95", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "80 \n ordinance nor on any provision of the \nbuilding code of the City of Mi ami \nBeach nor on the decision of any \ncourt, nisi prius or appellate. It is \nbased solely on the proposition that no \none has a right to use his property to \nthe injury of another. In this case it is \nclear from the evidence that the \nproposed use by the Fontain ebleau will \nmaterially damage the Eden Roc. \nThere is evidence indicating that the \nconstruction of the proposed annex by \nthe Fontainebleau is malicious or \ndeliberate for the purpose of injuring \nthe Eden Roc, but it is scarcely \nsufficient, standing alone, to afford a \nbasis for equitable relief. \nThis is indeed a novel application of the maxim sic utere tuo \nut alienum non laedas . This maxim does not mean that one \nmust never use his own property in such a way as to do any \ninjury to his neighbor. It means only th at one must use his \nproperty so as not to injure the lawful rights of another. In \nReaver v. Martin Theatres , under this maxim, it was stated that \n\u201cit is well settled that a property owner may put his own \nproperty to any reasonable and lawful use, so long a s he \ndoes not thereby deprive the adjoining landowner of any \nright of enjoyment of his property which is recognized and \nprotected by law, and so long as his use is not such a one as the law \nwill pronounce a nuisance .\u201d [Emphasis supplied.] \nNo American decis ion has been cited, and independent \nresearch has revealed none, in which it has been held that - \nin the absence of some contractual or statutory obligation - \na landowner has a legal right to the free flow of light and air \nacross the adjoining land of his n eighbor. Even at common \nlaw, the landowner had no legal right, in the absence of an \neasement or uninterrupted use and enjoyment for a period \nof 20 years, to unobstructed light and air from the", "proposition": ["The passage is about a legal case involving the Fontainebleau and the Eden Roc hotels.", "The case is based on the principle that no one has a right to use their property to the injury of another.", "The proposed use by the Fontainebleau will damage the Eden Roc.", "There is evidence that the Fontainebleau's proposed use is malicious or deliberate for the purpose of injuring the Eden Roc.", "The maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas applies to this case.", "The maxim means that one must use their property so as not to injure the lawful rights of another.", "A property owner may put their property to any reasonable and lawful use, as long as they do not deprive their neighbor of any right of enjoyment of their property.", "No American decision has been cited in which it has been held that a landowner has a legal right to the free flow of light and air across their neighbor's land.", "Even at common law, the landowner had no legal right to unobstructed light and air from their neighbor's land, unless there was an easement or uninterrupted use and enjoyment for 20 years."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "532", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "517 \n copyrighted movies and software programs. Grokster\u2019s \nname is apparently derived from Napster, it too initially \noffered an OpenNap program, its software\u2019s function is \nlikewise comparable to Napster\u2019s, and it attempted to divert \nqueries for Napster onto its own Web site. Grokster and \nStreamCast\u2019s efforts to supply services to former Napster \nusers, deprived of a mechanism to copy and distribute what \nwere overwhelmingly infringing files, ind icate a principal, if \nnot exclusive, intent on the part of each to bring about \ninfringement. \nSecond, this evidence of unlawful objective is given added \nsignificance by MGM\u2019s showing that neither company \nattempted to develop filtering tools or other mechani sms to \ndiminish the infringing activity using their software. While \nthe Ninth Circuit treated the defendants\u2019 failure to develop \nsuch tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent \nduty to monitor their users\u2019 activity, we think this evidence \nunder scores Grokster\u2019s and StreamCast\u2019s intentional \nfacilitation of their users\u2019 infringement.5 \nThird, there is a further complement to the direct evidence \nof unlawful objective. It is useful to recall that StreamCast \nand Grokster make money by selling advertis ing space, by \ndirecting ads to the screens of computers employing their \nsoftware. As the record shows, the more the software is \nused, the more ads are sent out and the greater the \nadvertising revenue becomes. Since the extent of the \nsoftware\u2019s use determin es the gain to the distributors, the \ncommercial sense of their enterprise turns on high -volume \nuse, which the record shows is infringing. This evidence \nalone would not justify an inference of unlawful intent, but \n \n5 Of course, in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to \nfind contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take \naffirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of \nsubstantial noninfringing uses. Such a holding would tread too close to the Son y \nsafe harbor.", "proposition": ["Grokster and StreamCast offered software programs similar to Napster for downloading copyrighted movies and software.", "Grokster's name is derived from Napster, and its software's function is comparable to Napster's.", "Both companies attempted to divert queries for Napster onto their own websites.", "Grokster and StreamCast's efforts to supply services to former Napster users indicate a principal, if not exclusive, intent on the part of each to bring about infringement.", "Neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish infringing activity using their software.", "The Ninth Circuit treated the defendants' failure to develop such tools as irrelevant because they lacked an independent duty to monitor their users' activity.", "The evidence of unlawful objective is given added significance by MGM's showing that neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or other mechanisms to diminish infringing activity using their software.", "StreamCast and Grokster make money by selling advertising space, directing ads to the screens of computers employing their software.", "The more the software is used, the more ads are sent out and the greater the advertising revenue becomes.", "The commercial sense of their enterprise turns on high-volume use, which the record shows is infringing.", "In the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to prevent infringement, if the device otherwise was capable of substantial noninfringing uses."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "582", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "567 \n Following the circulation of the robot ad, White sued \nSamsung and Deutsch in federal district court under: (1) \nCalifornia Civil Code s 3344; (2) the California common \nlaw right of publicity; and (3) s 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 \nU.S.C. s 1125(a). The district court granted summary \njudgment against White on each of her claims. White now \nappeals. \nI. Section 3344 \nWhite first argues that the district court erred in rejecting \nher claim under section 3344. Section 3344(a) provid es, in \npertinent part, that \u201c[a]ny person who knowingly uses \nanother\u2019s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in \nany manner, \u2026 for purposes of advertising or selling, \u2026 \nwithout such person\u2019s prior consent \u2026 shall be liable for \nany damages sustain ed by the person or persons injured as \na result thereof.\u201d \nWhite argues that the Samsung advertisement used her \n\u201clikeness\u201d in contravention of section 3344. In Midler v. \nFord Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.1988), this court \nrejected Bette Midler\u2019s section 3344 claim concerning a \nFord television commercial in which a Midler \u201csound -\nalike\u201d sang a song which Midler had made famous. In \nrejecting Midler\u2019s claim, this court noted that \u201c[t]he \ndefendants did not use Midler\u2019s name or anything else \nwhose use is prohi bited by the statute. The voice they used \nwas [another person\u2019s], not hers. The term \u2018likeness\u2019 refers \nto a visual image not a vocal imitation.\u201d Id. at 463. \nIn this case, Samsung and Deutsch used a robot with \nmechanical features, and not, for example, a ma nikin \nmolded to White\u2019s precise features.", "proposition": ["Check the format and structure of the JSON object you are trying to decode."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "91", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "There was no violation of the doctor -patient privilege. \nThere was no theft, or intent to steal, trade secrets; no \ndisruption of decorum, of peace and quiet; no noisy or \ndistracting demonstrations. Had the testers been \nundercover FBI agents, there would have been no violation \nof the Fourth Amendment, because there would have been \nno invasion of a legally protected interest in proper ty or \nprivacy. United States v. White , 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, \n28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971); Lewis v. United States , 385 U.S. 206,", "proposition": ["The doctor-patient privilege was not violated, no theft or intent to steal trade secrets occurred, there was no disruption of decorum, peace, and quiet, no noisy or distracting demonstrations took place, if the testers were undercover FBI agents, there would have been no violation of the Fourth Amendment, if the testers were undercover FBI agents, there would have been no invasion of a legally protected interest in property or privacy, United States v. White (401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453) is a case from 1971, Lewis v. United States (385 U.S. 206) is a case from 1966."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "35", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "20 \n article, wherever found, has a good title against all the \nworld save the true owner, then, of course, all my \ndifficulties would be resolved; or again, if it could be said \nwith equal certainty that this is the law, that the possessor \nof land is entitled as aga inst the finder to all chattels found \non the land, again my difficulties would be resolved. But, \nunfortunately, the authorities give some support to each of \nthese conflicting propositions. \nIn the famous case of Armory v. Delamirie,20 the plaintiff, \nwho was a chimney sweeper\u2019s boy, found a jewel and \ncarried it to the defendant\u2019s shop, who was a goldsmith, in \norder to know what it was, and he delivered it into the \nhands of the apprentice in the goldsmith\u2019s shop, who made \na pretence of weighing it and took out the stones and called \nto the master to let him know that it came to three -\nhalfpence. The master offered the boy the money who \nrefused to take it and insisted on having the jewel again. \nWhereupon the apprentice handed him back the socket of \nthe jewel withou t the stones, and an action was brought in \ntrover against the master, and it was ruled \u201cthat the finder \nof a jewel, though he does not by such finding acquire an \nabsolute property or ownership, yet he has such a property \nas will enable him to keep it again st all but the rightful \nowner, and consequently may maintain trover.\u201d The case of \nBridges v. Hawkesworth21 is in process of becoming almost \nequally as famous because of the disputation which has \nraged around it. The headnote in the Jurist is as follows: \n\u201cThe place in which a lost article is found does not \nconstitute any exception to the general rule of law, that the \nfinder is entitled to it as against all persons except the \nowner.\u201d The case was in fact an appeal against a decision of \nthe county court judge a t Westminster. The facts appear to \nhave been that in the year 1847 the plaintiff, who was a \n \n20 1 Str. 505.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the conflicting propositions regarding the rights of a finder of a lost article.", "In the case of Armory v. Delamirie, a chimney sweeper's boy found a jewel and took it to a goldsmith's shop.", "The goldsmith offered the boy money for the jewel, but the boy refused and insisted on having the jewel back.", "The apprentice handed the boy the socket of the jewel without the stones, and an action was brought in trover against the master.", "It was ruled that the finder of a jewel has such a property as will enable him to keep it except against the rightful owner, and consequently may maintain trover.", "The case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth is in process of becoming almost equally as famous because of the disputation which has raged around it.", "The headnote in the Jurist states that the place in which a lost article is found does not constitute any exception to the general rule of law that the finder is entitled to it as against all persons except the owner.", "The case was an appeal against a decision of the county court judge at Westminster, and the facts appear to have been that in the year 1847, the plaintiff found a lost article."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "45", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "30 \n particularly from Bridges v. Hawkesworth,46 that a man \ndoes not necessarily possess a thing which is lying \nunattached on the surface of his land even though the thing \nis not possessed by someone else. A difficulty however, \narises, becau se the rule which governs things an occupier \npossesses as against those which he does not, has never \nbeen very clearly formulated in our law. He may possess \neverything on the land from which he intends to exclude \nothers, if Mr. Justice Holmes is right; or he may possess \nthose things of which he has a de facto control, if Sir \nFrederick Pollock is right. \nThere is no doubt that in this case the brooch was lost in \nthe ordinary meaning of that term, and I should imagine it \nhad been lost for a very considerable t ime. Indeed, from \nthis correspondence it appears that at one time the \npredecessors in title of the defendant were considering \nmaking some claim. But the moment the plaintiff \ndiscovered that the brooch might be of some value, he \ntook the advice of his comma nding officer and handed it to \nthe police. His conduct was commendable and meritorious. \nThe defendant was never physically in possession of these \npremises at any time. It is clear that the brooch was never \nhis, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, in t hat he had \nthe prior possession. He had no knowledge of it, until it \nwas brought to his notice by the finder. A discussion of the \nmerits does not seem to help, but it is clear on the facts that \nthe brooch was \u201clost\u201d in the ordinary meaning of that \nword; th at it was \u201cfound\u201d by the plaintiff in the ordinary \nmeaning of that word, that its true owner has never been \nfound, that the defendant was the owner of the premises \nand had his notice drawn to this matter by the plaintiff, \nwho found the brooch. In those cir cumstances I propose \n \n46 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["A man does not necessarily possess a thing which is lying unattached on the surface of his land even though the thing is not possessed by someone else.", "A difficulty arises because the rule which governs things an occupier possesses as against those which he does not, has never been very clearly formulated in our law.", "There are two opinions on what constitutes possession: Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion that a man possesses everything on the land from which he intends to exclude others, and Sir Frederick Pollock's opinion that a man possesses those things of which he has de facto control.", "The brooch in question was lost in the ordinary meaning of the term, and it had been lost for a very considerable time.", "The predecessors in title of the defendant considered making a claim for the brooch at one point.", "The plaintiff discovered the brooch and sought advice from his commanding officer before handing it over to the police.", "The defendant was never physically in possession of the premises at any time.", "The brooch was never the defendant's in the ordinary acceptation of the term, as he had no prior possession or knowledge of it.", "The true owner of the brooch has never been found.", "The defendant was the owner of the premises and was notified by the plaintiff, who found the brooch.", "In the circumstances, the brooch was 'lost' and 'found' in the ordinary meaning of those words."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "177", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "162 \n resistance and foun d a necessity to \nshift the direction. \nQ So that plan was to go as far as you \ncould until the resistance got to the \npoint where you couldn\u2019t go any \nfurther? \nA I would say that is reasonable, yes. \nBy December 1967, Del Webb\u2019s property had extended \nsouth to O live Avenue and Spur was within 500 feet of \nOlive Avenue to the north. See Exhibit B above. Del Webb \nfiled its original complaint alleging that in excess of 1,300 \nlots in the southwest portion were unfit for development \nfor sale as residential lots because of the operation of the \nSpur feedlot. \nDel Webb\u2019s suit complained that the Spur feeding \noperation was a public nuisance because of the flies and the \nodor which were drifting or being blown by the prevailing \nsouth to north wind over the southern portion of Sun City. \nAt the time of the suit, Spur was feeding between 20,000 \nand 30,000 head of cattle, and the facts amply support the \nfinding of the trial court that the feed pens had become a \nnuisance to the people who resided in the southern part of \nDel Webb\u2019s d evelopment. The testimony indicated that \ncattle in a commercial feedlot will produce 35 to 40 pounds \nof wet manure per day, per head, or over a million pounds \nof wet manure per day for 30,000 head of cattle, and that \ndespite the admittedly good feedlot man agement and good \nhousekeeping practices by Spur, the resulting odor and flies \nproduced an annoying if not unhealthy situation as far as \nthe senior citizens of southern Sun City were concerned. \nThere is no doubt that some of the citizens of Sun City \nwere un able to enjoy the outdoor living which Del Webb \nhad advertised and that Del Webb was faced with sales \nresistance from prospective purchasers as well as strong", "proposition": ["In 1967, Del Webb's property extended south to Olive Avenue and was within 500 feet of Olive Avenue to the north.", "Del Webb filed a complaint alleging that over 1,300 lots in the southwest portion of their development were unfit for residential use due to the operation of the Spur feedlot.", "The Spur feeding operation was considered a public nuisance because of the flies and odor drifting over the southern portion of Sun City.", "At the time of the suit, Spur was feeding between 20,000 and 30,000 head of cattle.", "Cattle in a commercial feedlot produce 35 to 40 pounds of wet manure per day, per head, resulting in over a million pounds of wet manure per day for 30,000 head of cattle.", "Despite good feedlot management and housekeeping practices by Spur, the resulting odor and flies created an annoying and potentially unhealthy situation for the senior citizens of southern Sun City.", "Some citizens of Sun City were unable to enjoy the outdoor living that Del Webb advertised, and Del Webb faced sales resistance from prospective purchasers."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "485", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "470 \n years, starting 75 years in to the future, is worth less than seven \ncents today. \nWhat potential Shakespeare, Wharton, or Hemingway \nwould be moved by such a sum? What monetarily \nmotivated Melville would not realize that he could do \nbetter for his grandchildren by putting a few dollars into an \ninterest -bearing bank account? The Court itself finds no \nevidence to the contrary. It refers to testimony before \nCongress (1) that the copyright system\u2019s incentives \nencourage creation, and (2) (referring to Noah Webster) \nthat income earned from on e work can help support an \nartist who \u201c\u2018continue[s] to create.\u2019\u201d But the first of these \namounts to no more than a set of undeniably true \npropositions about the value of incentives in general. And \nthe applicability of the second to this Act is mysterious. \nHow will extension help today\u2019s Noah Webster create new \nworks 50 years after his death? Or is that hypothetical \nWebster supposed to support himself with the extension\u2019s \npresent discounted value, i. e., a few pennies? Or (to change \nthe metaphor) is the argum ent that Dumas fils would have \nwritten more books had Dumas pere\u2019s Three Musketeers \nearned more royalties? \nRegardless, even if this cited testimony were meant more \nspecifically to tell Congress that somehow, somewhere, \nsome potential author might be moved by the thought of \ngreat -grandchildren receiving copyright royalties a century \nhence, so might some potential author also be moved by \nthe thought of royalties being paid for two centuries, five \ncenturies, 1,000 years, \u201c\u2018til the End of Time.\u201d And from a \nrational economic perspective the time difference among \nthese periods makes no real difference. The present extension \nwill produce a copyright period of protection that, even \nunder conservative assumptions, is worth more than 99.8% \nof protection in perpetuity (more than 99.99% for a \nsongwriter like Irving Berlin and a song like Alexander\u2019s \nRagtime Band). The lack of a practically meaningful", "proposition": ["The current copyright extension is practically equivalent to perpetuity, and the value of the extension is negligible."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "220", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Its rule \nfor possession would in fact reward the original hunter most of the \ntime, unless we suppose that the woods are thick with \u201csaucy \nintruders.\u201d On the other side, the dissenting judge also wanted \nsome definiteness in the rule of possession. He was simply insisting \nthat the acts that sufficed to give notice should be prescribe d by", "proposition": ["The rule for possession would reward the original hunter most of the time, unless the woods are thick with 'saucy intruders.'", "The dissenting judge wanted some definiteness in the rule of possession.", "The dissenting judge insisted that the acts that sufficed to give notice should be prescribed by the rule."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "592", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980). Realizing \nthis, Samsung attempts to elevate its ad above the status of garden -variety \ncommercial speech by pointing to the ad\u2019s parody of Vanna White. Samsung\u2019s \nargument is unavailing. See Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 \nU.S. 469, 474 -75, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3031, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1988); Bolger v. Youngs \nDrug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 -68, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 2880 -81, 77 L.Ed.2d \n469 (1983). Unless the first amendment bars all right of publicity actions -and it \ndoes not, see Zachini v. Scripps -Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. \n2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) -then it does not bar this case.", "proposition": ["In 1980, a case was discussed with reference to the case numbers 557, 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, and 65 L.Ed.2d.", "Samsung tried to raise the status of its advertisement above regular commercial speech.", "The reason for Samsung's argument was the ad's parody of Vanna White.", "Samsung's argument was not successful.", "The cases Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox (1988) and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983) were cited as references.", "If the First Amendment prevents all right of publicity actions, it does not apply in this case.", "The case Zachini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. (1977) was cited as a reference."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "743", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "728 \n Native Allotment application.3 The northeast and sout heast \nstakes were located on or very near mineral survey 1161. \nThe northwest and southwest stakes were located well to \nthe west of mineral survey 1161. The overlap constitutes \nthe disputed parcel. The southeast stake disappeared at an \nunknown time. \nAlso ar ound 1970, the Fagerstroms built a picnic area on \nthe north end of the disputed parcel. The area included a \ngravel pit, beachwood blocks as chairs, firewood and a 50 -\ngallon barrel for use as a stove. \nAbout mid -July 1974, the Fagerstroms placed a camper \ntrailer on the north end of the disputed parcel. The trailer \nwas leveled on blocks and remained in place through late \nSeptember. Thereafter, until 1978, the Fagerstroms parked \ntheir camper trailer on the north end of the disputed parcel \nfrom early June throug h September. The camper was \nequipped with food, bedding, a stove and other household \nitems. \nAbout the same time that the Fagerstroms began parking \nthe trailer on the disputed parcel, they built an outhouse \nand a fish rack on the north end of the parcel. Bo th fixtures \nremained through the time of trial in their original \nlocations.4 The Fagerstroms also planted some spruce trees, \nnot indigenous to the Osborn area, in 1975 -76. \nDuring the summer of 1977, the Fagerstroms built a \nreindeer shelter on the north end of the disputed parcel. \n \n3 Federal law authorizes the Se cretary of the Interior to allot certain non -mineral \nlands to Native Alaskans. See Act of May 17, 1906, 34 Stat. 197, as amended, Act \nof August 2, 1956, 70 Stat. 954; repealed by the Alaska Native Claims Settlement \nAct, \u00a7 18, with a savings clause for appl ications pending on December 18, 1971, \n43 U.S.C.", "proposition": ["Value should be an array of strings"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "580", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "565 \n especially singing by a singer of renown. The singer \nmanifests herself in the song. To impersonate her voice is \nto pirate her identity. See W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. \nKeeton, D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Torts 852 (5th ed. \n1984). \nWe need not and do not go so far as to hold that every \nimitation of a voice to advertise merchandise is actionable. \nWe hold only that when a distinctive voice of a professional \nsinger is widely known and is deliberately imitated i n order \nto sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not \ntheirs and have committed a tort in California. Midler has \nmade a showing, sufficient to defeat summary judgment, \nthat the defendants here for their own profit in selling their \nproduct di d appropriate part of her identity. \nREVERSED AND REMANDED FOR TRIAL. \nWhite v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., \n971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). \nBlaine Greenberg, John Genga, Hill Wynne Troop & \nMeisinger, Los Angeles, Cal., for plain tiff-appellant. \nAnthony Liebig, Kenneth Kulzick, Liebig & Kulzick, Los \nAngeles, Cal., for defendants -appellees. \nAppeal from the United States District Court for the \nCentral District of California. \nBefore: GOODWIN, PREGERSON, and ALARCON, \nCircuit Judges. \nGOODWIN , Senior Circuit Judge: \nThis case involves a promotional \u201cfame and fortune\u201d \ndispute. In running a particular advertisement without \nVanna White\u2019s permission, defendants Samsung \nElectronics America, Inc. (Samsung) and David Deutsch \nAssociates, Inc. (Deu tsch) attempted to capitalize on \nWhite\u2019s fame to enhance their fortune. White sued, alleging \ninfringement of various intellectual property rights, but the", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving Vanna White, Samsung Electronics America, Inc., and David Deutsch Associates, Inc.", "Samsung and David Deutsch Associates, Inc. ran an advertisement without Vanna White's permission, using her image and voice to promote their product.", "Vanna White sued the defendants, alleging infringement of her intellectual property rights.", "The case was heard in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, and the appeal was heard by a panel of judges including Goodwin, Pregerson, and Alarcon.", "The passage quotes a decision from the case, stating that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and deliberately imitated to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort in California.", "The passage also mentions that Blaine Greenberg, John Genga, Hill Wynne Troop & Meisinger, Los Angeles, Cal., represented Vanna White, while Anthony Liebig, Kenneth Kulzick, Liebig & Kulzick, Los Angeles, Cal., represented the defendants."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "74", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "59 \n Palmer v. St. Albans , 60 Vt. 427, 13 Atl. 569, 6 Am. St. Rep. \n125. \nJudgment affirmed and cause remanded. \nHinman v. Pacific Ai r Transport, 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. \n1936) \nBruce Murchison and M. L. Clopton, both of Los Angeles, \nCal., for appellants. \nNewlin & Ashburn, Gurney E. Newlin, Paul Sandmeyer, \nand George W. Tackabury, all of Los Angeles, Cal., for \nappellees. \nBefore WILBUR, MATH EWS, and HANEY, Circuit \nJudges. \nHANEY , Circuit Judge. \nFrom decrees sustaining motions to dismiss filed by \ndefendants in two suits, appellants appeal and bring for \nreview by this court the rights of a landowner in \nconnection with the flight of aircraft abov e his land. \nAppellant filed one bill against Pacific Air Transport, an \nOregon corporation, and another bill against United Air \nLines Transport Corporation, a Delaware corporation, in \neach of which the allegations are nearly identical. Although \ntwo appeals are before the court, briefs filed discuss both \ncases, and therefore we will consider them together. \nAppellants filed a first amended bill against Pacific Air \nTransport after a motion to dismiss the original bill had \nbeen sustained, and after a motion to d ismiss the first \namended bill had been sustained, they filed their second \namended bill, which is the bill before this court. In the \nUnited Air Lines Transport Corporation case, the first \namended bill is before this court, there having been an \noriginal bill , which was dismissed. \nAppellants allege, in the bills under consideration, facts \nshowing diversity of citizenship and that the amount in", "proposition": ["The passage discusses an appeal in two lawsuits involving Pacific Air Transport and United Air Lines Transport Corporation.", "The appellants filed two bills against Pacific Air Transport and one bill against United Air Lines Transport Corporation.", "The original bills were dismissed, and amended bills were filed.", "The appellants allege that they have diversity of citizenship and that the amount in controversy is over $3,000.", "The case is before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, with judges Wilbur, Math ews, and Haney presiding."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "679", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "664 \n recordin g laws.12 We choose to follow the majority rule and \nhold that a quitclaim grantee is not precluded from \nattaining the status of an \u2018innocent purchaser.\u2019 \nIn this case, the Horvaths recorded their interest from \nLowery prior to the time the Sabos recorded thei r interest. \nThus, the issue is whether the Sabos are charged with \nconstructive knowledge because of the Horvaths\u2019 prior \nrecordation. Horvath is correct in his assertion that in the \nusual case a prior recorded deed serves as constructive \nnotice pursuant to AS 34.15.290, and thus precludes a \nsubsequent, recordation from taking precedence. Here, \nhowever, the Sabos argue that because Horvath recorded \nhis deed prior to Lowery having obtained patent, they were \nnot given constructive notice by the recording system . They \ncontend that since Horvaths\u2019 recordation was outside the \nchain of title, the recording should be regarded as a \u2018wild \ndeed\u2019. \nIt is an axiom of hornbook law that a purchaser has notice \nonly of recorded instruments that are within his \u2018chain of \n \n12 See Note, Deeds -Quitclaim Grantee as a Bona Fide Purchaser, 28 Ore.L.Rev. \n258 n. 1 (1949) and the man y cases cited therein. See generally, Annot., 59 A.L.R. \n632 (1929); Annot., 162 A.L.R. 556, 560 -62 (1946); 77 Am.Jur.2d Vendor and \nPurchaser, ss 711 -13. On the other hand, there is also authority which holds that a \nquitclaim grantee cannot be a good faith purchaser. See 28 Ore.L.Rev. 258, at 259 \nn. 2. See also the territorial case of Crossly v. Campion Mining Co., 1 Alaska 391 \n(1901). There it was held that a grantee accepting a quitclaim deed with full \nknowledge of a prior unrecorded deed was not a subsequ ent innocent purchaser \nin good faith.", "proposition": ["A quitclaim grantee is being discussed in this passage.", "The majority rule holds that a quitclaim grantee is not precluded from attaining the status of an \u2018innocent purchaser.\u2019", "The Horvaths recorded their interest from Lowery prior to the time the Sabos recorded their interest.", "The issue is whether the Sabos are charged with constructive knowledge because of the Horvaths\u2019 prior recordation.", "Horvath asserts that a prior recorded deed serves as constructive notice pursuant to AS 34.15.290, precluding a subsequent recordation from taking precedence.", "The Sabos argue that since Horvath recorded his deed prior to Lowery obtaining patent, they were not given constructive notice by the recording system.", "The Sabos contend that the Horvaths\u2019 recordation should be regarded as a \u2018wild deed\u2019 because it was outside the chain of title.", "It is an axiom of hornbook law that a purchaser has notice only of recorded instruments that are within his \u2018chain of title.\u2019", "There is authority which holds that a quitclaim grantee cannot be a good faith purchaser.", "In the territorial case of Crossly v. Campion Mining Co., it was held that a grantee accepting a quitclaim deed with full knowledge of a prior unrecorded deed was not a subsequent innocent purchaser in good faith."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "369", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "354 \n Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and MICHAEL and \nTRAXLER, Circuit Judges. \nWILKINSON , Chief Judge: \nVolkswagen challenges Virtual Works, Inc.\u2019s use of the \ndomain name vw.net under the 1999 Anticybersquatting \nConsumer Protection Act (ACPA). Volkswagen claims that \nVirtual Works registered vw.net with the purpose of one \nday selling it to Volkswagen. The district court agreed, \nholding that Virtual Works had a bad fait h intent to profit \nfrom the vw.net domain name and that its use of vw.net \ndiluted and infringed upon the VW mark. Virtual Works, \nInc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 106 F. Supp.2d 845 (E.D. \nVa. 2000). The district court therefore ordered Virtual \nWorks to reli nquish to Volkswagen the rights to vw.net. \nBecause the district court did not err in holding that Virtual \nWorks violated the ACPA, we affirm the judgment. \nI. \nOn October 23, 1996, Virtual Works registered the domain \nname vw.net with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI). At that \ntime, NSI was the only company authorized by the \ngovernment to serve as a registrar for Internet domain \nnames. A domain name tells users where they can find a \nparticular web page, much like a street address tells people \nwhere they can find a particular home or business. Domain \nnames consist of two parts: the top level domain name \n(TLD) and secondary level domain name (SLD). The TLD \nis the suffix, identifying the nature of the site. The SLD is \nthe prefix, identifying the site\u2019s owner. Thus in the domain \nname Duke.edu, \u201c.edu\u201d is the TLD, identifying the site as \naffiliated with an educational institution. \u201cDuke\u201d is the \nSLD, identifying the owner as Duke University. There are \nvarious other TLDs. The most common are .com, .net, and \n.org for commerc ial users and .gov for governmental \nentities. At one point there was a distinction between the", "proposition": ["The passage is about a legal case where Volkswagen is challenging the use of the domain name vw.net by Virtual Works under the ACPA."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "361", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "346 \n We do not believe, however, that color, in this respect, is \nspecial. Courts traditionally decide quite difficult questions \nabout whether two words or phrases or symbols are \nsufficiently similar, in context, to confuse buyers. They \nhave had to compare, for example, such words as \n\u201cBonamine\u201d and \u201cDramamine\u201d (motion -sickness \nremedies); \u201cHuggies\u201d and \u201cDougies\u201d (diapers); \u201cCheracol\u201d \nand \u201cSyrocol\u201d (cough syrup); \u201cCyclone\u201d and \u201cTornado\u201d \n(wire fences); and \u201cMattres\u201d and \u201c1 -800-Mattres\u201d (mattress \nfranchisor telephone numbers). See, e.g., G.D. Searle & Co. \nv. Chas. Pfizer & C o., 265 F.2d 385, 389 (CA7 1959); \nKimberly -Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas Enterprises, Ltd., 774 F.2d \n1144, 1146 -1147 (CA Fed.1985); Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz, 246 \nF.2d 254, 262 (CA2 1957); Hancock v. American Steel & Wire \nCo., 40 C.C.P.A. of New Jersey, 931, 935 (Pat.), 203 F.2d \n737, 740 -741 (1953); Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page, \n880 F.2d 675, 678 (CA2 1989). Legal standards exist to \nguide courts in making such comparisons. See, e.g., 2 \nMcCarthy \u00a7 15.08; 1 McCarthy \u00a7\u00a7 11.24 -11.25 (\u201dStrong\u201d \nmarks, with gr eater secondary meaning, receive broader \nprotection than \u201cweak\u201d marks). We do not see why courts \ncould not apply those standards to a color, replicating, if \nnecessary, lighting conditions under which a colored \nproduct is normally sold.", "proposition": ["We do not believe that color is special in this respect.", "Courts traditionally decide difficult questions about whether two words or phrases or symbols are sufficiently similar in context to confuse buyers.", "Courts have had to compare words such as 'Bonamine' and 'Dramamine,' 'Huggies' and 'Dougies,' 'Cheracol' and 'Syrocol,' 'Cyclone' and 'Tornado,' and 'Mattres' and '1 -800-Mattres.'", "Legal standards exist to guide courts in making such comparisons.", "We do not see why courts could not apply those standards to a color, replicating lighting conditions under which a colored product is normally sold.", "G.D. Searle & Co. v. Chas. Pfizer & C o. is a case cited as an example.", "Kimberly -Clark Corp. v. H. Douglas Enterprises, Ltd. is another case cited as an example.", "Upjohn Co. v. Schwartz is also cited as an example.", "Hancock v. American Steel & Wire Co. is another example cited.", "Dial-A-Mattress Franchise Corp. v. Page is another case cited as an example."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "215", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "200 \n soil. The will, however, is excited by so many stimulants, that it \nresists a multitude of discouragements and losses: a passing \ncalamity, how great soever it may be, does not destroy the spirit of \nindustry. This has been seen springing up again after destructive \nwars, which have impoverished nations, like a robust oak, which in \na few years repairs the injuries, inflicted by the tempest, and covers \nitself with new branches. Nothing less is requisite for freezing up \nindustry, than the operation of a permanent domestic cause, such \nas a tyrannical governme nt, a bad legislation, an intolerant religion \nwhich repels men from each other, or a minute superstition which \nterrifies them. \nThe first act of violence will produce a certain degree of \napprehension \u2014there are already some timid minds discouraged: a \nsecond outrage, quickly succeeding, will spread a more considerable \nalarm. The most prudent will begin to contract their enterprises, \nand by degrees to abandon an uncertain career. In proportion as \nthese attacks are repeated, and the system of oppression assumes \nan habitual character, the dispersion augments: those who have fled \nare not replaced; those who remain fall into a state of langour. It is \nthus that, after a time, the field of industry being beaten down by \nstorms, becomes at last a desert. \nAsia Minor, Gre ece, Egypt, the coasts of Africa, so rich in \nagriculture, commerce, and population, whilst the Roman Empire \nflourished \u2014what have they become under the absurd despotism of \nthe Turk? The palaces are changed into cabins, and the cities into \nsmall towns: this government, hateful to all persons of reflection, \nhas never understood that a state can never become rich but by an \ninviolable respect for property. It has possessed only two secrets \nfor governing \u2014to drain and to brutify its subjects. Hence the \nfinest coun tries in the world, wasted, barren, or almost abandoned, \ncan scarcely be recognised in the hands of their barbarous \nconquerors.", "proposition": ["The government of the Turk has never understood that a state can only become rich by inviolable respect for property."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "87", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "72 \n with a number of counts of malpractice and deception \u2013and \nan \u201cambush\u201d interview. Donaldson accosts Desnick at \nO\u2019Hare Airport and cries, \u201cIs it t rue, Doctor, that you \nchanged medical records to show less vision than your \npatients actually have? We\u2019ve been told, Doctor, that you\u2019ve \nchanged the glare machine so we have a different reading. \nIs that correct? Doctor, why won\u2019t you respond to the \nquestio ns?\u201d \nThe plaintiffs\u2019 claims fall into two distinct classes. The first \narises from the broadcast itself, the second from the means \nby which ABC and Entine obtained the information that \nthey used in the broadcast. The first is a class of one. The \nbroadcast i s alleged to have defamed the three plaintiffs by \ncharging that the glare machine is tampered with. No other \naspect of the broadcast is claimed to be tortious. The \ndefendants used excerpts from the Desnick videotape in \nthe broadcast, and the plaintiffs say that this was done \nwithout Dr. Desnick\u2019s permission. But they do not claim \nthat in showing the videotape without authorization the \ndefendants infringed copyright, cast the plaintiffs in a false \nlight, or otherwise invaded a right, although they do claim \nthat the defendants had obtained the videotape fraudulently \n(a claim in the second class). And they do not claim that \nany of the other charges in the broadcast that are critical of \nthem, such as that they perform unnecessary surgery or that \nDr. Desnick tamp ers with patients\u2019 medical records, are \nfalse. \nWe begin with the charge of defamation, which the parties \nagree is governed by Illinois law. [The court held that this \ncause of action could not be dismissed at this stage of \nlitigation.] \nThe second class of c laims in this case concerns, as we said, \nthe methods that the defendants used to create the \nbroadcast segment. There are four such claims: that the \ndefendants committed a trespass in insinuating the test \npatients into the Wisconsin and Indiana offices of t he", "proposition": ["Donaldson accosts Desnick at O'Hare Airport and asks him questions about allegations of malpractice and deception.", "The plaintiffs' claims fall into two distinct classes: one related to the broadcast itself and the other to the means by which ABC and Entine obtained the information used in the broadcast.", "The first class of claims alleges that the broadcast defamed the three plaintiffs by charging that the glare machine is tampered with.", "The defendants used excerpts from the Desnick videotape in the broadcast without Dr. Desnick's permission, but the plaintiffs do not claim that this infringed copyright, cast them in a false light, or otherwise invaded a right.", "The plaintiffs claim that the defendants obtained the videotape fraudulently, which is part of the second class of claims.", "The plaintiffs do not claim that any of the other charges in the broadcast that are critical of them are false.", "The court held that the cause of action for defamation could not be dismissed at this stage of litigation.", "The second class of claims concerns the methods the defendants used to create the broadcast segment, including insinuating test patients into the Wisconsin and Indiana offices of the defendants."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "158", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "143 \n should also consider whether placing liability on one party or the \nother makes transactions more likely. And, finally, if bargaining \nlooks particula rly expensive and the court is reasonably well \npositioned to determine the value of the entitlement to each side, \nthen the court should consider a liability rule. Calabresi and \nMelamed summarize the efficiency concerns thusly: \n(1) that economic efficiency standing \nalone would dictate that set of \nentitlements which favors \nknowledgeable choices between social \nbenefits and the social costs of \nobtaining them, and between social \ncosts and the social costs of avoiding \nthem; (2) that this implies, in the \nabsence o f certainty as to whether a \nbenefit is worth its costs to society, \nthat the cost should be put on the \nparty or activity best located to make \nsuch a cost -benefit analysis; (3) that in \nparticular contexts like accidents or \npollution this suggests putting cos ts on \nthe party or activity which can most \ncheaply avoid them; (4) that in the \nabsence of certainty as to who that \nparty or activity is, the costs should be \nput on the party or activity which can \nwith the lowest transaction costs act in \nthe market to corre ct an error in \nentitlements by inducing the party who \ncan avoid social costs most cheaply to \ndo so; and (5) that since we are in an \narea where by hypothesis markets do \nnot work perfectly \u2013 there are \ntransaction costs \u2013 a decision will \noften have to be made on whether \nmarket transactions [property rule \nprotection] or collective fiat [liability \nrule protection] is most likely to bring", "proposition": ["143 should consider whether placing liability on one party or the other makes transactions more likely.", "The passage discusses the efficiency concerns related to economic efficiency and the costs of obtaining and avoiding social benefits and costs.", "Calabresi and Melamed summarize the efficiency concerns as follows: (1) economic efficiency standing alone would dictate the set of entitlements that favors knowledgeable choices between social benefits and costs of obtaining them, and between social costs and the costs of avoiding them; (2) this implies that in the absence of certainty as to whether a benefit is worth its costs to society, the cost should be put on the party or activity best located to make a cost-benefit analysis; (3) in particular contexts like accidents or pollution, this suggests putting costs on the party or activity that can most cheaply avoid them; (4) in the absence of certainty as to who that party or activity is, the costs should be put on the party or activity that can with the lowest transaction costs act in the market to correct an error in entitlements by inducing the party who can avoid social costs most cheaply to do so; and (5) since we are in an area where by hypothesis markets do not work perfectly \u2013 there are transaction costs \u2013 a decision will often have to be made on whether market transactions [property rule protection] or collective fiat [liability rule protection] is most likely to bring about the desired outcome."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "519", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "504 \n electronic files by universities, government ag encies, \ncorporations, and libraries, among others.1 \nOther users of peer -to-peer networks include individual \nrecipients of Grokster\u2019s and StreamCast\u2019s software, and \nalthough the networks that they enjoy through using the \nsoftware can be used to share any ty pe of digital file, they \nhave prominently employed those networks in sharing \ncopyrighted music and video files without authorization. A \ngroup of copyright holders (MGM for short, but including \nmotion picture studios, recording companies, songwriters, \nand m usic publishers) sued Grokster and StreamCast for \ntheir users\u2019 copyright infringements, alleging that they \nknowingly and intentionally distributed their software to \nenable users to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted \nworks in violation of the Copyrigh t Act, 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 101 et \nseq. MGM sought damages and an injunction. \nDiscovery during the litigation revealed the way the \nsoftware worked, the business aims of each defendant \ncompany, and the predilections of the users. Grokster\u2019s \neponymous software employ s what is known as FastTrack \ntechnology, a protocol developed by others and licensed to \nGrokster. StreamCast distributes a very similar product \nexcept that its software, called Morpheus, relies on what is \nknown as Gnutella technology. A user who downloads and \ninstalls either software possesses the protocol to send \nrequests for files directly to the computers of others using \nsoftware compatible with FastTrack or Gnutella. On the \nFastTrack network opened by the Grokster software, the \nuser\u2019s request goes to a computer given an indexing \n \n1 Peer-to-peer networks have disadvantag es as well. Searches on peer -to-peer \nnetworks may not reach and uncover all available files because search requests \nmay not be transmitted to every computer on the network. There may be \nredundant copies of popular files. The creator of the software has no incentive to \nminimize storage or bandwidth consumption, the costs of which are borne by \nevery user of the network. Most relevant here, it is more difficult to control the \ncontent of files available for retrieval and the behavior of users.", "proposition": ["504 electronic files are available on peer-to-peer networks.", "Universities, government agencies, corporations, and libraries are among the entities that contribute to peer-to-peer networks.", "Individual recipients of Grokster's and StreamCast's software also use peer-to-peer networks.", "These networks are primarily used for sharing copyrighted music and video files without authorization.", "A group of copyright holders, including MGM, motion picture studios, recording companies, songwriters, and music publishers, sued Grokster and StreamCast for their users' copyright infringements.", "Grokster's software employs FastTrack technology, while StreamCast distributes a similar product called Morpheus, which relies on Gnutella technology.", "Users who download and install either software possess the protocol to send requests for files directly to the computers of others using compatible software.", "On the FastTrack network opened by the Grokster software, the user's request goes to a computer given an indexing function.", "Peer-to-peer networks have disadvantages, such as incomplete search results and redundant copies of popular files.", "The creator of the software has no incentive to minimize storage or bandwidth consumption, as these costs are borne by every user of the network.", "Controlling the content of files available for retrieval and user behavior is more difficult on peer-to-peer networks."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "212", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "197 \n toil? Has not hunting its fatigues, fishing its dangers, war its \nuncertainties? And if man appear to love this adve nturous life \u2014if \nhe have an instinct greedy of these kinds of perils \u2014if the savage \nrejoice in the delights of an idleness so dearly purchased \u2014ought it \nto be concluded that he is more happy than our day labourers? No: \nthe labour of these is more uniform, but the reward is more certain \n; the lot of the woman is more gentle, infancy and old age have \nmore resources; the species multiplies in a proportion a thousand \ntimes greater, and this alone would suffice to show on which side is \nthe superiority of happiness. Hence the laws, in creating property, \nhave been benefactors to those who remain in their original \npoverty. They participate more or less in the pleasures, advantages, \nand resources of civilized society: their industry and labour place \nthem among the candi dates for fortune: they enjoy the pleasures of \nacquisition: hope mingles with their labours. The security which the \nlaw gives them, is this of little importance? Those who look from \nabove at the inferior ranks, see all objects less than they really are; \nbut at the base of the pyramid, it is the summit which disappears in \nits turn. So far from making these comparisons, they dream not of \nthem; they are not tormented with impossibilities: so, that all things \nconsidered, the protection of the laws contributes a s much to the \nhappiness of the cottage, as to the security of the palace. It is \nsurprising that so judicious a writer as Beccaria should have \ninserted, in a work dictated by the soundest philosophy, a doubt \nsubversive of the social order. The right of prop erty, says he, is a terrible \nright, and may not perhaps be necessary . Upon this right, tyrannical and \nsanguinary laws have been founded.", "proposition": ["Hunting, fishing, and war have their own fatigues, dangers, and uncertainties.", "Man may love an adventurous life due to an instinct greedy of perils.", "The savage rejoices in the delights of idleness, which is dearly purchased.", "The labor of day laborers is more uniform, and their reward is more certain.", "The lot of women, infancy, and old age has more resources in civilized society.", "The species multiplies a thousand times greater in civilized society.", "Laws creating property have been benefactors to those who remain in their original poverty.", "Property allows them to participate in the pleasures, advantages, and resources of civilized society.", "The industry and labor of the poor place them among the candidates for fortune.", "The poor enjoy the pleasures of acquisition and hope mingles with their labors.", "The security provided by the law is of great importance to the poor.", "Those at the top of society may not make comparisons with the poor, as they dream not of them.", "The protection of the laws contributes to the happiness of the cottage as much as to the security of the palace.", "Beccaria's doubt about the right of property being necessary and its connection to tyrannical and sanguinary laws is considered subversive of the social order."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "163", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "148 \n loss to plaintiff from this pollution was small. This court, \nreversing the Appellate Division, reinstated the injunction \ngrant ed by the Special Term against the argument of the \nmill owner that in view of \u201cthe slight advantage to plaintiff \nand the great loss that will be inflicted on defendant\u201d an \ninjunction should not be granted (p. 2). \u201cSuch a balancing \nof injuries cannot be jus tified by the circumstances of this \ncase\u201d, Judge Werner noted (p. 4). He continued: \u201cAlthough \nthe damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared with \nthe defendant\u2019s expense of abating the condition, that is \nnot a good reason for refusing an injunction\u201d (p. 5). \nThus the unconditional injunction granted at Special Term \nwas reinstated. The rule laid down in that case, then, is that \nwhenever the damage resulting from a nuisance is found \nnot \u201cunsubstantial\u201d, viz., $100 a year, injunction would \nfollow. This s tates a rule that had been followed in this \ncourt with marked consistency ( McCarty v. Natural Carbonic \nGas Co. , 189 N. Y. 40; Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co. , 164 N. Y. 303; \nCampbell v. Seaman , 63 N. Y. 568). \nThere are cases where injunction has been denied. McCann \nv. Chasm Power Co. (211 N. Y. 301) is one of them. There, \nhowever, the damage shown by plaintiffs was not only \nunsubstantial, it was non -existent. Plaintiffs owned a rocky \nbank of the stream in which defendant had raised the level \nof the water. This had no economic or other adverse \nconsequence to plaintiffs, and thus injunctive relief was \ndenied. Similar is the basis for denial of injunction in \nForstmann v. Joray Holding Co. (244 N. Y. 22) where no \nbenefit to plaintiffs could be seen from the injunct ion \nsought (p. 32). Thus if, within Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper \nCo.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a court case involving a mill owner and a plaintiff.", "The Appellate Division reversed the decision, reinstating the injunction granted by the Special Term.", "The mill owner argued against granting an injunction due to the small loss suffered by the plaintiff and the great loss that would be inflicted on the defendant.", "Judge Werner noted that balancing injuries cannot be justified in this case.", "The court reinstated the unconditional injunction granted at Special Term.", "The rule laid down in that case is that whenever the damage resulting from a nuisance is found not 'unsubstantial', an injunction would follow.", "This rule had been followed in the court with marked consistency in previous cases (McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., Strobel v. Kerr Salt Co., Campbell v. Seaman).", "There are cases where injunction has been denied, such as McCann v. Chasm Power Co. and Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co.", "In McCann v. Chasm Power Co., the damage shown by plaintiffs was not only unsubstantial, it was non-existent.", "In Forstmann v. Joray Holding Co., no benefit to plaintiffs could be seen from the injunction sought.", "The passage refers to Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co. as an example of a case where the rule was applied."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "319", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "304 \n news agency of news taken from the bulletins and \nnewspapers of the other. The first is the bodily \nappropriation of a statement of fact or a news articl e, with \nor without rewriting, but without independent investigation \nor other expense. This form of pirating was found by both \ncourts to have been pursued by defendant systematically \nwith respect to complainant\u2019s news, and against it the \nCircuit Court of Ap peals granted an injunction. This \npractice complainant denies having pursued and the denial \nwas sustained by the finding of the District Court. It is not \ncontended by defendant that the finding can be set aside, \nupon the proofs as they now stand. The other use is to take \nthe news of a rival agency as a \u2018tip\u2019 to be investigated, and if \nverified by independent investigation the news thus \ngathered is sold. This practice complainant admits that it \nhas pursued and still is willing that defendant shall employ. \nBoth courts held that complainant could not be debarred \non the ground of unclean hands upon the score of pirating \ndefendant\u2019s news, because not shown to be guilty of \nsanctioning this practice. \nAs to securing \u2018tips\u2019 from a competing news agency the \nDistrict C ourt (240 Fed. 991, 995), while not sanctioning \nthe practice, found that both parties had adopted it in \naccordance with common business usage, in the belief that \ntheir conduct was technically lawful, and hence did not find \nin it any sufficient ground for a ttributing unclean hands to \ncomplainant. The Circuit Court of Appeals (245 Fed. 247, \n157) found that the tip habit, though discouraged by \ncomplainant, was \u2018incurably journalistic,\u2019 and that there was \n\u2018no difficulty in discriminating between the utilization of \ntips and the bodily appropriation of another\u2019s labor in \naccumulating and stating information.\u2019 \nWe are inclined to think a distinction may be drawn \nbetween the utilization of tips and the bodily appropriation \nof news matter, either in its original form or after rewriting \nand without independent investigation and verification;", "proposition": ["The passage discusses two forms of pirating news.", "The first form involves the bodily appropriation of a statement of fact or a news article without independent investigation or other expense.", "The second form involves taking the news of a rival agency as a 'tip' to be investigated, and if verified by independent investigation, the news is sold.", "The passage states that both courts held that complainant could not be debarred on the ground of unclean hands due to pirating defendant's news.", "The District Court found that both parties had adopted the practice of securing 'tips' from a competing news agency in accordance with common business usage.", "The Circuit Court of Appeals found that the tip habit was 'incurably journalistic' and that there was no difficulty in discriminating between the utilization of tips and the bodily appropriation of another's labor in accumulating and stating information.", "The passage suggests that a distinction may be drawn between the utilization of tips and the bodily appropriation of news matter."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "523", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "508 \n Thus, StreamCast developed promotional materials to \nmarket its service as the best Napster alternative. One \nproposed advertisement read: \u201cNapster Inc. has announced \nthat it will soon begin chargi ng you a fee. That\u2019s if the \ncourts don\u2019t order it shut down first. What will you do to \nget around it?\u201d Another proposed ad touted StreamCast\u2019s \nsoftware as the \u201c# 1 alternative to Napster\u201d and asked \n\u201c[w]hen the lights went off at Napster \u2026 where did the \nusers go?\u201d3 StreamCast even planned to flaunt the illegal \nuses of its software; when it launched the OpenNap \nnetwork, the chief technology officer of the company \naverred that \u201c[t]he goal is to get in trouble with the law and \nget sued. It\u2019s the best way to get in the new[s].\u201d \nThe evidence that Grokster sought to capture the market \nof former Napster users is sparser but revealing, for \nGrokster launched its own OpenNap system called \nSwaptor and inserted digital codes into its Web site so that \ncomputer users using Web search engines to look for \n\u201cNapster\u201d or \u201c[f]ree filesharing\u201d would be directed to the \nGrokster Web site, where they could download the \nGrokster software. And Grokster\u2019s name is an apparent \nderivative of Napster. \nStreamCast\u2019s executives monitored the n umber of songs by \ncertain commercial artists available on their networks, and \nan internal communication indicates they aimed to have a \nlarger number of copyrighted songs available on their \nnetworks than other file -sharing networks. The point, of \ncourse, wo uld be to attract users of a mind to infringe, just \nas it would be with their promotional materials developed \nshowing copyrighted songs as examples of the kinds of files \navailable through Morpheus. Morpheus in fact allowed \n \n3 The record makes clear that StreamCast develop ed these promotional materials \nbut not whether it released them to the public. Even if these advertisements were \nnot released to the public and do not show encouragement to infringe, they \nilluminate StreamCast\u2019s purposes.", "proposition": ["The text describes the strategies used by StreamCast and Grokster to compete with Napster and attract users."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "289", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "274 \n extent of the losses from the underground reservior, which \ncomputations extended from the date of the blowout only \nup to June 1938. It was indicated that it was not feasible to \ncalculate the losses subsequent thereto, although lesser \nemissions of gas continued even up to the time of the trial. \nAll the evidence with reference to the damages included all \nlosses from the reservoir beneath petit ioners\u2019 land without \nregard to whether they were wasted and dissipated from \nabove the Driscoll land or from petitioners\u2019 land. \nThe jury found that respondents were negligent in failing to \nuse drilling mud of sufficient weight in drilling their well, \nand th at such negligence was the proximate cause of the \nwell blowing out. It also found that petitioners had suffered \n$4620 damage to sixty acres of the surface, and $1350 for \nthe loss of 27 head of cattle. The damages for the gas and \ndistillate wasted \u201cfrom and under\u201d the lands of petitioners, \ndue to respondents\u2019 negligence, was fixed by the jury at \n$78,580.46 for the gas, and $69,967.73 for the distillate. \nThese figures were based upon the respective fractional \nroyalty interests of petitioners in the whole amou nt wasted \nunder their two tracts of land, and at a value, fixed by the \ncourt without objection by the parties, of two cents per \n1000 cubic feet for the gas and $1.25 per barrel for the \ndistillate. \nThe findings as to the amount of drainage of gas and \ndistillate from beneath petitioners\u2019 lands were based \nprimarily upon the testimony of petitioners\u2019 expert witness, \nC. J. Jennings, a petroleum engineer. He obtained his \ninformation from drilling records and electric logs from the \nhigh pressure Agua Dulce Field. He was thereby enabled to \nfairly estimate the amount of gas and distillate. He had \ndefinite information as to porosity and bottom -hole \npressure both before and after the blowout.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the extent of losses from an underground reservoir.", "Computations of the losses were made only up to June 1938.", "It was not feasible to calculate the losses subsequent to June 1938.", "Evidence of damages included all losses from the reservoir beneath petitioners' land.", "The jury found that respondents were negligent in failing to use drilling mud of sufficient weight.", "The jury also found that respondents' negligence was the proximate cause of the well blowing out.", "Petitioners suffered $4620 in damage to sixty acres of surface and $1350 for the loss of 27 head of cattle.", "The damages for gas and distillate wasted from petitioners' lands were fixed at $78,580.46 for the gas and $69,967.73 for the distillate.", "These figures were based on the respective fractional royalty interests of petitioners in the total amount wasted under their two tracts of land.", "The value of the gas was fixed at two cents per 1000 cubic feet, and the value of the distillate was fixed at $1.25 per barrel.", "The findings as to the amount of drainage of gas and distillate from beneath petitioners' lands were based primarily on the testimony of petitioners' expert witness, C. J. Jennings.", "C. J. Jennings obtained his information from drilling records and electric logs from the high pressure Agua Dulce Field.", "He was able to fairly estimate the amount of gas and distillate due to his knowledge of porosity and bottom-hole pressure both before and after the blowout."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "377", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "362 \n that this is sufficient to establish bad faith regi stration in \nviolation of the ACPA. \nViewing the facts in the light most favorable to Virtual \nWorks, as we must on summary judgment, the statement at \nregistration establishes that Virtual Works had a dual \npurpose in selecting vw.net. Contrary to Virtual Work s\u2019 \nclaim, the fact that it used vw.net for two years as a part of \nan ISP business is not dispositive of the question of intent. \nVirtual Works chose vw.net over other domain names not \njust because \u201cvw\u201d reflected the company\u2019s own initials, but \nalso because it foresaw the ability to profit from the natural \nassociation of vw.net with the VW mark. Indeed, it is \nobvious even to a casual observer that the similarity \nbetween vw.net and the VW mark is overwhelming. \nMoreover, the facts in the summary judgment record \naffirmatively support the claim that Virtual Works had a \nbad faith intent to profit when it attempted to sell vw.net to \nVolkswagen. It is true that a mere offer to sell a domain \nname is not itself evidence of unlawful trafficking. H.R. \nConf. Rep. No. 106 -464, at 111 (1999). The ACPA was not \nenacted to put an end to the sale of all domain names. This \ncase, however, involves much more than a plain vanilla \noffer to sell a domain name. \nIndeed, the second piece of direct evidence regarding \nVirtual Works\u2019 intent is the terms of its offer to \nVolkswagen. Virtual Works told Volkswagen that vw.net \nwould be sold to the highest bidder if Volkswagen did not \nmake an offer within twenty -four hours. Virtual Works also \nstated that others would jump at the chance to own a \nvaluable domain name like vw.net because Internet users \nwould instinctively associate the site with Volkswagen. \nVirtual Works knew, both when it registered vw.net and \nwhen it offered to sell the site, that consumers would \nassociate vw.net with Volkswagen. It sought to maximize \nthe advantage of this association by threatening to auction \noff the site. And it hoped that in an effort to protect its", "proposition": ["The decomposed propositions"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "526", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "511 \n Restricting Innovation, 56 Stan. L.Rev. 1345, 1386 -1390 \n(2004). \nThe argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is, \nhowever, a powerful one, given the number of infringing \ndownloads that occur every day using StreamCast\u2019s and \nGrokster\u2019s software. When a widely shared service or \nproduct is used to commit infringement, it may be \nimpossible to e nforce rights in the protected work \neffectively against all direct infringers, the only practical \nalternative being to go against the distributor of the \ncopying device for secondary liability on a theory of \ncontributory or vicarious infringement. \nOne infri nges contributorily by intentionally inducing or \nencouraging direct infringement, see Gershwin Pub. Corp. \nv. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 \n(C.A.2 1971), and infringes vicariously by profiting from \ndirect infringement while declinin g to exercise a right to \nstop or limit it, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green \nCo., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (C.A.2 1963).4 Although \u201c[t]he \nCopyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for \ninfringement committed by another,\u201d Sony Corp. v. \nUniversal Ci ty Studios, 464 U.S., at 434, these doctrines of \nsecondary liability emerged from common law principles \nand are well established in the law, id., at 486 (Blackmun, J., \ndissenting). \n \n4 We stated in Sony Corp. of Ameri ca v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 \n(1984), that \u201c\u2018the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement \nand vicarious liability are not clearly drawn\u2019\u2026.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the argument for imposing indirect liability in a case involving infringing downloads using StreamCast's and Grokster's software.", "When a widely shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers.", "The only practical alternative in such cases is to go after the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or vicarious infringement.", "One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement, as seen in Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (C.A.2 1971).", "One infringes vicariously by profiting from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it, as seen in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (C.A.2 1963).", "Although the Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another, doctrines of secondary liability emerged from common law principles and are well established in the law.", "In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), it was stated that 'the lines between direct infringement, contributory infringement, and vicarious liability are not clearly drawn.'"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "180", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "165 \n se a public nuisance may become such \nby being carried on at a place where \nthe heal th, comfort, or convenience of \na populous neighborhood is affected. * \n* * What might amount to a serious \nnuisance in one locality by reason of \nthe density of the population, or \ncharacter of the neighborhood \naffected, may in another place and \nunder differen t surroundings be \ndeemed proper and unobjectionable. * \n* *. \nMacDonald v. Perry , 32 Ariz. 39, 49 -50, 255 P. 494, 497 \n(1927). \nIt is clear that as to the citizens of Sun City, the operation \nof Spur\u2019s feedlot was both a public and a private nuisance. \nThey coul d have successfully maintained an action to abate \nthe nuisance. Del Webb, having shown a special injury in \nthe loss of sales, had a standing to bring suit to enjoin the \nnuisance. Engle v. Clark , 53 Ariz. 472, 90 P.2d 994 (1939); \nCity of Phoenix v. Johnson , supra. The judgment of the trial \ncourt permanently enjoining the operation of the feedlot is \naffirmed. \nMUST DEL WEBB INDEMNIFY SPUR? \nA suit to enjoin a nuisance sounds in equity and the courts \nhave long recognized a special responsibility to the public \nwhen acting as a court of equity: \ns 104. Where public interest is \ninvolved. \nCourts of equity may, and \nfrequently do, go much further \nboth to give and withhold relief \nin furtherance of the public \ninterest than they are accustomed \nto go when only private interests", "proposition": ["A public nuisance may become such by affecting the health, comfort, or convenience of a populous neighborhood.", "What might amount to a serious nuisance in one locality may be deemed proper and unobjectionable in another place and under different surroundings.", "MacDonald v. Perry states that a nuisance might be considered a serious nuisance in one locality but not in another due to the density of the population or the character of the neighborhood affected.", "The operation of Spur's feedlot was both a public and a private nuisance for the citizens of Sun City.", "The citizens of Sun City could have successfully maintained an action to abate the nuisance.", "Del Webb, having shown a special injury in the loss of sales, had a standing to bring suit to enjoin the nuisance.", "Courts have a special responsibility to the public when acting as a court of equity.", "Courts of equity may go further both to give and withhold relief in furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to do when only private interests are involved."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "443", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "428 \n and of itself, deprive TWDG of fair -use protection. We \ntherefore proceed to an analysis of the four fair -use factors. \ni. Purp ose and Character of the Work \nThe first factor in the fair -use analysis, the purpose and \ncharacter of the allegedly infringing work, has several \nfacets. The first is whether TWDG serves a commercial \npurpose or nonprofit educational purpose. \u00a7 107(1). \nDespi te whatever educational function TWDG may be able \nto lay claim to, it is undoubtedly a commercial product. As \nthe Supreme Court has stated, \u201c[t]he crux of the \nprofit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive \nof the use is monetary gain but wheth er the user stands to \nprofit from exploitation of the copyrighted material \nwithout paying the customary price.\u201d Harper & Row, 471 \nU.S. at 562. The fact that TWDG was published for profit \nis the first factor weighing against a finding of fair use. \nHowever, TWDG\u2019s for -profit status is strongly \novershadowed and outweighed in view of its highly \ntransformative use of GWTC\u2019s copyrighted elements. \n\u201c[T]he more transformative the new work, the less will be \nthe significance of other factors, like commercialism, that \nmay weigh against a finding of fair use.\u201d Campbell, 510 \nU.S. at 579. \u201c[T]he goal of copyright, to promote science \nand the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of \ntransformative works.\u201d Id. A work\u2019s transformative value is \nof special import in the r ealm of parody, since a parody\u2019s \naim is, by nature, to transform an earlier work.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the fair-use analysis of TWDG (The Walking Dead Game) in relation to GWTC's (Game of Thrones Card Game) copyrighted elements.", "The first factor in the fair-use analysis is the purpose and character of the allegedly infringing work, TWDG.", "TWDG serves a commercial purpose, making it a for-profit product.", "The Supreme Court states that the profit/nonprofit distinction is not based on the sole motive of the use being monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the customary price.", "The fact that TWDG was published for profit is the first factor weighing against a finding of fair use.", "TWDG's for-profit status is strongly overshadowed and outweighed by its highly transformative use of GWTC's copyrighted elements.", "The more transformative the new work, the less significant other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.", "The goal of copyright is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.", "A work's transformative value is of special importance in the realm of parody, as a parody's aim is to transform an earlier work."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "454", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "439 \n In light of this, the The W ind Done Gone\u2019s transformation \nof Ashley Wilkes into a homosexual, its depiction of \ninterracial sex, and its multiple mulatto characters take on \nadditional relevance. The Supreme Court in Campbell \nexplained how a copyright holder\u2019s reluctance to license \ncertain kinds of derivatives affects the market harm \nanalysis: \nThe market for potential derivative \nuses includes only those that creators \nof original works would in general \ndevelop or license others to develop. \nYet the unlikelihood that creators of \nimaginati ve works will license critical \nreviews or lampoons of their own \nproductions removes such uses from \nthe very notion of a potential licensing \nmarket. \n510 U.S. at 592. \nOther courts have echoed the principle that \u201c\u2018only \ntraditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets\u2019\u201d \nought to be considered when assessing the effect of a \nchallenged use upon a potential market. [citations omitted] \n\u201cIn the cases where we have found the fourth factor to \nfavor a defendant, the defendant\u2019s work filled a market \nniche that the plaintiff simply had no interest in \noccupying.\u201d Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publications Int\u2019l, \nLtd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1377 (2d Cir. 1993). \nThe preliminary record does not indicate why SunTrust \nsought to impose editorial restrictions on Conroy. To the \nextent that SunTrust may have done so to preserve Gone \n \nAll my resistance to your restrictions \u2013 all of them, and I \ninclude miscegenation, homosexuality, the rights of review \nand approval \u2013 I do because they begin inching toward the \nprecincts of censorship. \nFax to Owen Laster from Pat Conroy, Nov. 1 0, 1998.", "proposition": ["The transformation of Ashley Wilkes into a homosexual, the depiction of interracial sex, and the multiple mulatto characters in The Wind Done Gone have additional relevance.", "The Supreme Court in Campbell explained that the market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would generally develop or license others to develop.", "Creators of imaginative works are unlikely to license critical reviews or lampoons of their own productions, removing such uses from the potential licensing market.", "Other courts have echoed the principle that only traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed markets should be considered when assessing the effect of a challenged use on a potential market.", "In cases where a defendant's work fills a market niche that the plaintiff has no interest in occupying, the fourth factor has been found to favor the defendant.", "The preliminary record does not indicate why SunTrust sought to impose editorial restrictions on Conroy.", "Pat Conroy resisted all editorial restrictions, including miscegenation, homosexuality, and the rights of review and approval, as they begin inching toward the precincts of censorship."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "366", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "And, when it amended the statute, Congress \nretained these terms. Indeed, the Senate Report \naccompanying the Lanham Act revision ex plicitly referred \nto this background understanding, in saying that the \n\u201crevised definition intentionally retains \u2026 the words \n\u2018symbol or device\u2019 so as not to preclude the registration of", "proposition": ["The revised definition intentionally retains the words 'symbol or device' so as not to preclude the registration of."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "237", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "222 \n And when one had found bees and had got leave of the \nowner of the tree in which they were to cut it, and take the \nbees, he acquired no property in the bees, he had not taken \npossession of them. Ferguson v. Miller , 1 Cow. 244. \nIt is not trespass to take wild bees or honey. Wallace v. \nMease , 3 Binn. 553. \nA deer had been wounded and followed with dogs for six \nmiles, and the pursuit was give n over for the night by the \nplaintiff, though his dogs continued the chase; the \ndefendant and the plaintiff seized the deer together, but, \nbecause this did not show an occupancy of the deer by the \nplaintiff, he could not recover the skin and venison of the \ndefendant, who killed the deer. Buster v. Newkirk , 20 Jhs. 75. \nThe next authority is from an accomplished admiralty \njudge, several of whose decisions are cited in this opinion: \nThe title which is acquired to property \nby finding, is a species of occupation ; \nand it is laid down as a rule of law, by \nthe civilians, that the mere discovery \nand sight of the thing, is not sufficient \nto vest in the finder a right of property \nin the thing found. Pothier, Traite de la \nPropriete No. 63. This title is acquired \nby poss ession, and this must be an \nactual possession. He cannot take and \nkeep possession by an act of the will, \noculis et affectu , as he may when property \nis transferred by consent and the \npossession given by a symbolical \ndelivery. To consummate his title there \nmust be a corporeal prehension of the \nthing. \nThe Amethyst , Davies Rep. 23. \nFrom the foregoing quotation may be seen the \ninapplicability of the citation from Parson\u2019s Merc. Laws , in", "proposition": ["To acquire property through finding, one must take possession of the item physically.", "Actual possession is required to establish a title through finding.", "Consummating the title requires a corporeal prehension of the item.", "Discovering and sighting a thing is not sufficient to vest the finder with a right of property.", "The title acquired through finding is a species of occupation.", "Trespassing is not considered when taking wild bees or honey.", "Permission from the owner is necessary to cut a tree with bees.", "The citation from Parson's Mercantile Laws is inapplicable in this context."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "113", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "98 \n that dust, along with other forms of airborne particulate, \ndoes not normally present itself as a significant physical \nintrusion. See anno: Recovery in trespass for injury to land \ncaused by airborne pollutants, 2 A.L.R.4th 1054, 1055 \n(\u201c[t]raditionally, an invasion of the exclusive possession of \nland by intangible substances, such as an airborne pollutant, \nwas usually held by the court not to constitute a trespass\u201d); \nWilliams, supra, 103 Ohio App.3d at 338, n. 2, 659 N.E.2d \n379 (observing that some court s have held that a \u201d \u2018tangible \ninvasion\u2019 or \u2018object\u2019 \u201d must be \u201cmore substantial than dust, \ngas, or fumes\u201d), citing Bradley, supra at 686, 709 P.2d 782. \nDust particles do not normally occupy the land on which \nthey settle in any meaningful sense; instead th ey simply \nbecome a part of the ambient circumstances of that space. \nIf the quantity and character of the dust are such as to \ndisturb the ambiance in ways that interfere substantially \nwith the plaintiff\u2019s use and enjoyment of the land, then \nrecovery in nuis ance is possible. \nB. Direct \n\u201c[S]ome courts have held that if an intervening force, such \nas wind or water, carries pollutants onto the plaintiff\u2019s land, \nthen the entry is not \u2018direct.\u2019\u201d Williams, supra at 338, n. 2, \n659 N.E.2d 379, citing Bradley, supra at 686, 709 P.2d 782. \nHowever, in order to avoid harsh results most courts have \navoided an overly strict distinction between direct and \nindirect invasions, see Prosser & Keeton, supra at s 13, pp. \n68-69. Still, \u201c[t]he differentiation between direct and \nindire ct results may not be absolutely dead.\u201d Id. at 71.13 \nPlaintiffs cite Littell v. Knorr, 24 Mich.App.", "proposition": ["Dust and other airborne particulate do not typically present themselves as significant physical intrusions.", "Traditionally, an invasion of exclusive land possession by intangible substances like airborne pollutants was not considered a trespass.", "Some courts have held that a 'tangible invasion' or 'object' must be 'more substantial than dust, gas, or fumes' for it to constitute a trespass.", "Dust particles do not normally occupy land in a meaningful way; they simply become part of the ambient circumstances of that space.", "If the quantity and character of the dust substantially disturb the ambiance and interfere with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of the land, recovery in nuisance is possible.", "Some courts have held that if an intervening force carries pollutants onto the plaintiff's land, the entry is not 'direct'.", "Most courts have avoided an overly strict distinction between direct and indirect invasions.", "The differentiation between direct and indirect results may not be absolutely dead."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "263", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1986) \nJ. Arthur Smith, III, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff -appellant. \nDonald Juneau, Arlinda Locklear, Richard Dauphinais, \nNative American Rights Fund, Washington, D.C., for \nTunica -Biloxi Tribe. \nFred G. Benton, Jr., Baton Rouge, for defendants -\nappellees. \nBefore EDWARDS, WATKINS and PONDER1 , JJ. \nPONDER , Judge, retired. \nPlaintiff appealed the trial court\u2019s judgment denying both \nhis claim as owner of Indian artifacts and his request for \ncompensation for his excavation work in uncovering those \nartifacts under the theory of unjust enrichment. We affirm. \nPlaintiff is a former Corrections Officer at the Louisiana \nState Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, who describes \nhimself as an \u201camateur archeologist\u201d. After researching \ncolonial maps, records and texts, he concluded that \nTrudeau Plantation,2 near Angola, was the possible site of \nan ancient village of th e Tunica Indians. He alleges that in \n1967 he obtained the permission of Mr. Frank Hoshman, \nSr., who he believed was the owner of Trudeau Plantation, \nto survey the property with a metal detector for possible \nburial locations. After locating and excavating \napproximately 30 to 40 burial plots, lying in a circular \npattern, plaintiff notified Mr. Hoshman that he had located \nthe Tunica village. Although the evidence is contradictory, \nplaintiff contends that it was at that time that Mr. Hoshman \n \n1 Judge, Elven E. Ponder, retired, has been assigned temporarily to this court by \nthe Supreme Court of Louisiana to fill the vacancy created by the election of \nJustice Luther F. Cole to the Supreme Court. \n2 Trudeau Plantation consists of approximately 150 acres located on a bluff in the \nsoutheast quadrant of the meeting of the Mississippi River and Tunica Bayou. \nAngola is on the other side of the bayou.", "proposition": ["The plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment.", "The judgment denied both the plaintiff's claim as owner of Indian artifacts and his request for compensation for his excavation work under the theory of unjust enrichment.", "The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.", "The plaintiff is a former Corrections Officer at the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, who describes himself as an 'amateur archeologist'.", "The plaintiff obtained the permission of Mr. Frank Hoshman, Sr., who he believed was the owner of Trudeau Plantation, to survey the property with a metal detector for possible burial locations.", "The plaintiff located and excavated approximately 30 to 40 burial plots, lying in a circular pattern, and notified Mr. Hoshman that he had located the Tunica village.", "The evidence is contradictory regarding the timing of the plaintiff's notification to Mr. Hoshman about the location of the Tunica village."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "208", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Sec. 32. But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits \nof the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as \nthat which takes in and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, \nthat property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as \na man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, \nso much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it \nfrom the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body \nelse has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot ap propriate, he", "proposition": ["The chief matter of property is now the earth itself, which takes in and carries with it all the rest.", "Property in the earth is acquired in the same way as the former property.", "A man's property extends to as much land as he tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of.", "By his labor, a man encloses the land from the common.", "It is not invalid to say that everyone else has an equal title to the land.", "Therefore, a man cannot appropriate the land."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "415", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Ibid. \nCongress took the Register\u2019s advice. In enacting the \nCopyright Act of 1976, Congress dropped the reference to \n\u201call the writings of an author\u201d and replaced it with the \nphrase \u201corigi nal works of authorship.\u201d 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 102(a). \nIn making explicit the originality requirement, Congress \nannounced that it was merely clarifying existing law: \u201cThe", "proposition": ["Congress made the originality requirement explicit when enacting the Copyright Act of 1976."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "374", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "359 \n (VIII) the person\u2019s registr ation or \nacquisition of multiple domain \nnames which the person knows \nare identical or confusingly \nsimilar to marks of others \u2026; and \n(IX) the extent to which the mark \nincorporated in the person\u2019s \ndomain name registration is or is \nnot distinctive and famous \u2026 . \n15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). In addition to listing these nine \nfactors, the Act contains a safe harbor. The safe harbor \nprovision states that bad faith intent \u201cshall not be found in \nany case in which the court determines that the person \nbelieved and h ad reasonable grounds to believe that the use \nof the domain name was fair use or otherwise lawful.\u201d 15 \nU.S.C. \u00a7 1225(d)(1)(B)(ii). \nA court is not limited to considering these nine factors \nwhen determining the presence or absence of bad faith. 15 \nU.S.C. \u00a7 1 125(d)(1)(B)(i). The Second Circuit, in the first \ncourt of appeals case addressing the ACPA, noted that the \nmost important grounds for finding bad faith \u201care the \nunique circumstances of th[e] case, which do not fit neatly \ninto the specific factors enumerat ed by Congress but may \nnevertheless be considered under the statute.\u201d Sporty\u2019s \nFarm, 202 F.3d at 499. \nThe remedies available under the ACPA depend on when \nthe unlawful activity took place. A person who unlawfully \nregisters, traffics in, or uses a domain na me after the \nACPA\u2019s date of enactment, November 29, 1999, can be \nliable for monetary damages under 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1117(d) and \ncan have the domain name transferred to the owner of the \nmark or canceled under 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1125(d)(2)(D)(i). The \nonly remedy availab le for ACPA violations that occurred \nbefore November 29, 1999, however, is to have the domain \nname transferred to the owner of the mark or canceled.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA).", "The ACPA lists nine factors to consider when determining bad faith intent in domain name registration.", "The ACPA contains a safe harbor provision for cases where the person believed their use of the domain name was fair or lawful.", "Courts are not limited to considering only the nine factors when determining bad faith intent.", "The Second Circuit noted that unique circumstances of a case may be considered under the ACPA.", "The remedies available under the ACPA depend on when the unlawful activity took place.", "A person who unlawfully registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name after November 29, 1999, can be liable for monetary damages and have their domain name transferred or canceled.", "The only remedy available for ACPA violations that occurred before November 29, 1999, is to have the domain name transferred or canceled."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "21", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "6 \n was rather the duty of the defendant, when the fact became \nthus known to him, to use reasonable care for the safe \nkeeping of the same until the owner should call for it. In \nthe case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth the property, although \nfound in a shop, was found on the floor of the same, and \nhad not been placed there voluntarily by the owner, and the \ncourt held that the finder was entitled to the possession of \nthe same, except as to the owner. But the present case \nmore resembles that of Lawrence v. The State , 1 Humph. \n(Tenn.) 228, and is indeed very similar in its facts. The \ncourt there take a distinction between the case of property \nthus placed by the owner and neglected to be removed, and \nproperty lost. It was there held that \u201cto place a pocket -\nbook upon a table and to forget to take it away is not to \nlose it, in the sense in which the authorities referr ed to \nspeak of lost property.\u201d \nWe accept this as the better rule, and especially as one \nbetter adapted to secure the rights of the true owner. \nIn view of the facts of this case, the plaintiff acquired no \noriginal right to the property, and the defendant\u2019s \nsubsequent acts in receiving and holding the property in the \nmanner he did does not create any. \nExceptions overruled. \nHamaker v. Blanchard, 90 Pa. 377 (1879) \nBefore SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, \nPAXSON, WOODWARD, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, \nJJ. \nError to the Court of Common Pleas of Mifflin county: Of \nMay Term 1879, No. 57. \nAssumpsit by James Blanchard and Sophia, his wife, for the \nuse of the wife, against W. W. Hamaker. \nThis was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the \npeace. The material facts were these: Sophia Blanchard was \na domestic servant in a hotel in Lewistown, of which the", "proposition": ["The defendant had a duty to use reasonable care for the safe keeping of the property once it became known to him.", "In Bridges v. Hawkesworth, the finder was entitled to possession of the property except for the owner.", "The present case resembles Lawrence v. The State and has similar facts.", "The court distinguishes between property placed by the owner and neglected to be removed and property lost.", "Placing a pocket book upon a table and forgetting to take it away is not considered losing it in the sense referred to by the authorities regarding lost property.", "The plaintiff acquired no original right to the property in this case.", "The defendant's subsequent acts in receiving and holding the property do not create any rights.", "This was an appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace.", "Sophia Blanchard was a domestic servant in a hotel in Lewistown."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "641", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "626 \n supra), expenses or income ( e.g., Rodas v Manitaras , supra \n[gross receipts]) and other factors affecting its operation. \nNo case has been brought to this court\u2019s attention in which \nthe property value was impaired as the result of the \nreputation created by information disseminated to the \npublic by the seller (or, for that matter, as a result of \npossession by poltergeists). \nWhere a condition which has been created by the seller \nmaterially impairs the value of the contract and is peculiarly \nwithin the knowledge of the seller or unlikely to be \ndiscovered by a prudent purchaser exercising due care with \nrespect to the subject transaction, nondisclosure constitutes \na basis for rescission as a matter of equity. Any other \noutcome places upon the buyer not merely the obligation \nto exercise care in his purchase but rather to be omniscient \nwith respect to any fact which may affect the bargain. No \npractical purpose is served by imposing such a burden \nupon a purchaser. To the contrary, it encourages predatory \nbusiness practice and offends the principle that equity will \nsuffer no wrong to be without a remedy. \nDefendant\u2019s contention that the contract of sale, \nparticularly the merger or \u201cas is\u201d clause, bars recovery of \nthe buyer\u2019s deposit is unavailing. Even an express \ndisclaimer will not be given effect wh ere the facts are \npeculiarly within the knowledge of the party invoking it. \nMoreover, a fair reading of the merger clause reveals that it \nexpressly disclaims only representations made with respect \nto the physical condition of the premises and merely makes \ngeneral reference to representations concerning \u201cany other \nmatter or things affecting or relating to the aforesaid \npremises.\u201d As broad as this language may be, a reasonable \ninterpretation is that its effect is limited to tangible or \nphysical matters and do es not extend to paranormal \nphenomena. Finally, if the language of the contract is to be \nconstrued as broadly as defendant urges to encompass the \npresence of poltergeists in the house, it cannot be said that", "proposition": ["No case has been brought to this court's attention in which the property value was impaired as the result of the reputation created by information disseminated to the public by the seller.", "Where a condition which has been created by the seller materially impairs the value of the contract and is peculiarly within the knowledge of the seller or unlikely to be discovered by a prudent purchaser exercising due care with respect to the subject transaction, nondisclosure constitutes a basis for rescission as a matter of equity.", "Any other outcome places upon the buyer not merely the obligation to exercise care in his purchase but rather to be omniscient with respect to any fact which may affect the bargain.", "To the contrary, it encourages predatory business practice and offends the principle that equity will suffer no wrong to be without a remedy.", "Defendant's contention that the contract of sale, particularly the merger or 'as is' clause, bars recovery of the buyer's deposit is unavailing.", "Even an express disclaimer will not be given effect where the facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the party invoking it.", "A fair reading of the merger clause reveals that it expressly disclaims only representations made with respect to the physical condition of the premises and merely makes general reference to representations concerning 'any other matter or things affecting or relating to the aforesaid premises.'", "As broad as this language may be, a reasonable interpretation is that its effect is limited to tangible or physical matters and does not extend to paranormal phenomena.", "If the language of the contract is to be construed as broadly as defendant urges to encompass the presence of poltergeists in the house, it cannot be said that"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "25", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "10 \n lost article is entitled to it as against all persons, except the \nreal owner: Bridges v. Hawkesworth , 7 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 424. \nThe decision in Mathews v. Harsell , 1 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) \n393, is not in conflict with the principle, nor is it an \nexception. Mrs. Mathews, a domestic in the house of Mrs. \nBarmore, found some Texas notes, which she handed to \nher mistress, to keep for her. Mrs. Barmore afterwards \nintrusted the notes to Harsell, for the purpose of \nascertaining th eir value, informing him that she was acting \nfor her servant, for whom she held the notes. Harsell sold \nthem, and appropriated the proceeds; whereupon Mrs. \nMathews sued him and recovered their value, with interest \nfrom date of sale. Such is that case. True , Woodruff, J., \nsays: \nI am by no means prepared to hold \nthat a house -servant who finds lost \njewels, money or chattels, in the house \nof his or her employer, acquires any \ntitle even to retain possession against \nthe will of the employer. It will tend \nmuch mor e to promote honesty and \njustice to require servants in such cases \nto deliver the property so found to the \nemployer, for the benefit of the true \nowner. \nTo that remark, foreign to the case as understood by \nhimself, he added the antidote: \nAnd yet the Court o f Queen\u2019s Bench \nin England have recently decided that \nthe place in which a lost article is \nfound, does not form the ground of \nany exception to the general rule of \nlaw, that the finder is entitled to it \nagainst all persons, except the owner.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the decision in Bridges v. Hawkesworth, which states that the 10 lost article is entitled to it as against all persons, except the real owner."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "467", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "452 \n for a \u201climited Tim[e],\u201d but only in exchange for a \n\u201cWritin[g].\u201d Congress\u2019 power to confer copyright \nprotection, petitioners argue, is thus contingent upon an \nexchange: The author of an original work receives an \n\u201cexclusive R ight\u201d for a \u201climited Tim[e]\u201d in exchange for a \ndedication to the public thereafter. Extending an existing \ncopyright without demanding additional consideration, \npetitioners maintain, bestows an unpaid -for benefit on \ncopyright holders and their heirs, in vio lation of the quid pro \nquo requirement. \nWe can demur to petitioners\u2019 description of the Copyright \nClause as a grant of legislative authority empowering \nCongress \u201cto secure a bargain \u2013 this for that.\u201d But the \nlegislative evolution earlier recalled demonstra tes what the \nbargain entails. Given the consistent placement of existing \ncopyright holders in parity with future holders, the author \nof a work created in the last 170 years would reasonably \ncomprehend, as the \u201cthis\u201d offered her, a copyright not only \nfor th e time in place when protection is gained, but also for \nany renewal or extension legislated during that time. \nCongress could rationally seek to \u201cpromote \u2026 Progress\u201d \nby including in every copyright statute an express guarantee \nthat authors would receive the benefit of any later \nlegislative extension of the copyright term. Nothing in the \nCopyright Clause bars Congress from creating the same \nincentive by adopting the same position as a matter of \nunbroken practice. \nWe note, furthermore, that patents and copyrig hts do not \nentail the same exchange, and that our references to a quid \npro quo typically appear in the patent context. This is \nunderstandable, given that immediate disclosure is not the \nobjective of, but is exacted from, the patentee. It is the price \npaid for the exclusivity secured. For the author seeking \ncopyright protection, in contrast, disclosure is the desired \nobjective, not something exacted from the author in", "proposition": ["Congress' power to confer copyright protection is contingent upon an exchange: the author of an original work receives an \"exclusive Right\" for a \"limited Time\" in exchange for a dedication to the public thereafter.", "Petitioners argue that extending an existing copyright without demanding additional consideration bestows an unpaid-for benefit on copyright holders and their heirs, violating the quid pro quo requirement.", "The author of a work created in the last 170 years would reasonably comprehend that a copyright not only covers the time protection is gained but also any renewal or extension legislated during that time.", "Congress could rationally seek to \"promote ... Progress\" by including in every copyright statute an express guarantee that authors would receive the benefit of any later legislative extension of the copyright term.", "Nothing in the Copyright Clause bars Congress from creating the same incentive by adopting the same position as a matter of unbroken practice.", "Patents and copyrights do not entail the same exchange, with immediate disclosure being exacted from the patentee as the price paid for exclusivity, while disclosure is the desired objective for the author seeking copyright protection."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "514", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Section 106 of t he 1976 Act grants the \ncopyright owner the exclusive right to control the \nperformance and the reproduction of his work, and the fact \nthat he has licensed a single television performance is really \nirrelevant to the existence of his right to control its", "proposition": ["The existence of the right to control the performance and reproduction of the work is not affected by a single television performance license."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "348", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "333 \n AOL site, typically via a modem attached to a home \ncomputer, were provided with slightly more comprehensive \nand detailed real -time game information than is displayed \non a SportsTrax pager. On the AOL site, game scores are \nupdated every 15 seconds to a minute, and th e player and \nteam statistics are updated each minute. The district court\u2019s \noriginal decision and judgment, National Basketball Ass\u2019n v. \nSports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys. Inc. , 931 F. Supp. 1124 \n(S.D.N.Y. 1996), did not address the AOL site, because \n\u201cNBA\u2019s complaint and the evidence proffered at trial were \ndevoted largely to SportsTrax.\u201d National Basketball Ass\u2019n v. \nSports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys. Inc. , 939 F.Supp. 1071, \n1074 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Upon motion by the NBA, \nhowever, the district cou rt amended its decision and \njudgment and enjoined use of the real -time game \ninformation on STATS\u2019s AOL site. Id. at 1075 n. 1. \nBecause the record on appeal, the briefs of the parties, and \noral argument primarily addressed the SportsTrax device, \nwe similarl y focus on that product. However, we regard the \nlegal issues as identical with respect to both products, and \nour holding applies equally to SportsTrax and STATS\u2019s \nAOL site. \nThe NBA\u2019s complaint asserted six claims for relief: (i) state \nlaw unfair competitio n by misappropriation; (ii) false \nadvertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 \nU.S.C. \u00a7 1125(a); (iii) false representation of origin under \nSection 43(a) of the Lanham Act; (iv) state and common \nlaw unfair competition by false advertising and fals e \ndesignation of origin; (v) federal copyright infringement; \nand (vi) unlawful interception of communications under \nthe Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 605.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the legal issues surrounding the NBA's complaint against Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Systems Inc.", "The complaint focused on the SportsTrax pager, but did not address the AOL site provided by STATS.", "The district court's original decision did not address the AOL site, as the evidence presented was mainly about the SportsTrax device.", "The district court later amended its decision and enjoined the use of real-time game information on STATS's AOL site.", "The legal issues are identical for both the SportsTrax device and STATS's AOL site.", "The NBA's complaint had six claims for relief, including state law unfair competition, false advertising, false representation of origin, unfair competition by false advertising and false designation of origin, federal copyright infringement, and unlawful interception of communications."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "205", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "190 \n What was America in 1492 but a Loose -Fish, in which Columbus \nstruck the Spanish standard by way of wailing it for his royal master \nand mistress? What was Pol and to the Czar? What Greece to the \nTurk? What India to England? What at last will Mexico be to the \nUnited States? All Loose -Fish. \nWhat are the Rights of Man and the Liberties of the World but \nLoose -Fish? What all men\u2019s minds and opinions but Loose -Fish? \nWhat is the principle of religious belief in them but a Loose -Fish? \nWhat to the ostentatious smuggling verbalists are the thoughts of \nthinkers but Loose -Fish? What is the great globe itself but a Loose -\nFish? And what are you, reader, but a Loose -Fish and a Fast-Fish, \ntoo? \n2.1.2. Theory \nFrom John Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government \n(1690) \nCHAP. V. \nOf Property. \nSec. 25. Whether we consider natural reason, which tells us, that \nmen, being once born, have a right to their preservation, and \nconsequently to meat and drink, and such other things as nature \naffords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an \naccount of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to \nNoah, and his sons, it is very clear, that God, as king David says, \nPsal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to the children of men; given it to \nmankind in common. But this being supposed, it seems to some a \nvery great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a \nproperty in any thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it \nbe difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that God \ngave the world to Adam, and his posterity in common, it is \nimpossible that any man, but one universal monarch, should have \nany property upon a supposition, that God gave the world to \nAdam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his \nposterity.", "proposition": ["Value error: json output should start and end with { and }"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "92", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "77 \n 211, 87 S.Ct. 424, 427 -28, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); Forster v. \nCounty of Santa Barbara , 896 F.2d 1146, 1148 -49 (9th \nCir.1990); Northside Realty Associates, Inc. v. United States , 605 \nF.2d 1348, 1355 (5th Cir.1979). \u201cTesters\u201d who pose as \nprospective home buyers in order to gather evidence of \nhousing discrimination are not trespassers even if they are \nprivate persons not acting under color of law. Cf. id . at \n1355. The situation of the defendants\u2019 \u201ctesters\u201d is \nanalogous. Like testers seeking evidence of violation of \nanti-discrimination laws, the defendants\u2019 test patients \ngained entry into the plaintiffs\u2019 premises by misrepresenting \ntheir purposes (more precisely by a misleading omission to \ndisclose those purposes). But the entry was not invasive in \nthe sense of infringing the kind of interest of the plaintiffs \nthat the law of trespass protects; it was not an interference \nwith the ownersh ip or possession of land. We need not \nconsider what if any difference it would make if the \nplaintiffs had festooned the premises with signs forbidding \nthe entry of testers or other snoops. Perhaps none, see \nUnited States v. Centennial Builders, Inc ., 747 F .2d 678, 683 \n(11th Cir.1984), but that is an issue for another day. \nWhat we have said largely disposes of two other claims \u2013\ninfringement of the right of privacy, and illegal wiretapping. \n[These claims were dismissed.] \nLast is the charge of fraud in the defe ndants\u2019 gaining entry \nto the Chicago office and being permitted while there to \ninterview staff and film a cataract operation, and in their \nobtaining the Desnick Eye Center\u2019s informational \nvideotape. [This claim was also dismissed.] \n\u2026 . \nAFFIRMED IN PART, RE VERSED IN PART, AND \nREMANDED.", "proposition": ["Testers who pose as prospective home buyers to gather evidence of housing discrimination are not considered trespassers, even if they are private persons not acting under color of law.", "The situation of the defendants' 'testers' is analogous to testers seeking evidence of violations of anti-discrimination laws.", "The defendants' test patients gained entry into the plaintiffs' premises by misrepresenting their purposes (more precisely by a misleading omission to disclose those purposes).", "The entry was not invasive in the sense of infringing the kind of interest of the plaintiffs that the law of trespass protects; it was not an interference with the ownership or possession of land.", "The court does not need to consider what difference it would make if the plaintiffs had festooned the premises with signs forbidding the entry of testers or other snoops.", "The court dismisses two other claims: infringement of the right of privacy and illegal wiretapping.", "The court also dismisses the charge of fraud in the defendants' gaining entry to the Chicago office and being permitted while there to interview staff and film a cataract operation, and in their obtaining the Desnick Eye Center's informational videotape.", "The case is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "112", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "97 \n from fading into a \u201cwavering and uncertain\u201d ambiguity. \nFurther, retaining the distinction between the two theories \nof recovery limits the possibilities for dual liability \nstemming from the same conduct and results. See \nReynolds, Distinguishing Trespass and Nuisance: A \nJourney Through a Shifting Borderland, 44 Okla LR227, \n229 (1991). \nThe trial court\u2019s instruction regarding trespass, as set forth \nabove, recognized a right to recover in trespass \u201cif any \ndamages were caused b y the trespass\u201d and that the agents \npotentially causing the damages included \u201cemissions, dust, \nvibration, noise.\u201d Thus the trial court seems to have \nmirrored (and indeed gone beyond) the so -called modern \nview of trespass according to which intangible irrit ants \ncould constitute trespass. This instruction thus erroneously \nconflated trespass with nuisance and produced the \nanomalous result that the jury failed to reach agreement on \nthe nuisance claim while awarding damages for intrusions \nof intangible things pu rsuant to the trespass claim. \nA. Tangible \nBecause noise or vibrations are clearly not tangible objects, \nwe hold that they cannot give rise to an action in trespass in \nthis state.12 We further hold that dust must generally be \nconsidered intangible and thus n ot actionable in trespass. \nWe realize, of course, that dust particles are tangible objects \nin a strict sense that they can be touched and are comprised \nof physical elements. However, we agree with those \nauthorities that have recognized, for practical purpo ses, \n \n12 This holds even if the noise or vibrations are so intense as to shatter all glass \nand fe ll all masonry or otherwise so persistent as to drive all persons from the \npremises. Although such hazards would indeed infringe on a landowner\u2019s \npossessory interest, it is the interest in use and enjoyment of the premises, not in \nexclusion from them, and therefore the cause of action lies not in trespass, but in \nnuisance or the related doctrines of negligence or strict liability.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the distinction between trespass and nuisance theories of recovery.", "Retaining the distinction between the two theories limits the possibilities for dual liability stemming from the same conduct and results.", "The trial court's instruction regarding trespass recognized a right to recover in trespass if any damages were caused by the trespass.", "The trial court's instruction erroneously conflated trespass with nuisance, resulting in an anomalous outcome.", "The jury failed to reach agreement on the nuisance claim but awarded damages for intrusions of intangible things under the trespass claim.", "Noise or vibrations are considered intangible and not actionable in trespass in this state.", "Dust is generally considered intangible and not actionable in trespass.", "Although intense noise or vibrations can cause physical damage, the cause of action lies in nuisance or related doctrines, not in trespass."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "623", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Victor Gruen retained possession of the property, \ninsured i t, allowed others to exhibit it and made necessary", "proposition": ["Victor Gruen retained possession of the property.", "Victor Gruen insured the property.", "Victor Gruen allowed others to exhibit the property.", "Victor Gruen made necessary arrangements for the property."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "672", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "657 \n for patent3 and culminating in issuance of the patent on \nAugust 10, 1973. \nAlmost immedia tely after the patent was issued, Lowery \nadvertised the land for sale in a newspaper. He then \nexecuted a second document also entitled \u2018quitclaim\u2019 to the \nSabos on October 15, 1973. The Sabos duly recorded this \ndocument on December 13, 1973. \nLuther Moss, a representative of the BLM, testified to \nprocedures followed under the Alaska Homesite Law (43 \nU.S.C. s 687a (1970)). After numerous steps,4 a plat is \napproved and the claimant notified that he should direct \npublication of his claim. In this case, Lowery ex ecuted his \nconveyance to the Horvaths after the BLM field report had \nrecommended patent. \n \n3 On February 16, 1970, special instructions were given regarding s urvey. On June \n14, 1972, mineral deposit reservations were made. On December 7, 1972, Lowery \npublished his application. Affidavit of posting was made on March 15, 1973, and \non June 28, 1973, the BLM notified Lowery that $12.50 payment must be made \nfor the land. \n4 The entire process from the time the claimant decides on a homesite until the \npatent is passed is quite involved. A notice of location is filed with the BLM by \nthe claimant. After filing of the notice of location, the claim normally proceeds \nwithin a five -year statutory period until the claimant is notified that he should \nsubmit application to purchase. After application to purchase, BLM requests a \nfield report on the matter, and a realty specialist examines the land. He writes a \nreport and makes hi s recommendation concerning compliance with the \nappropriate statute. If the field examiner recommends approval, a request for \nsurvey is prepared. The claim is then surveyed, and the plat of survey is forwarded \nto Washington, D. C. for approval.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the process of obtaining a patent for a homesite in Alaska.", "The patent was issued on August 10, 1973, to Lowery.", "Lowery advertised the land for sale in a newspaper after the patent was issued.", "Lowery executed a second quitclaim document to the Sabos on October 15, 1973.", "The Sabos recorded the quitclaim document on December 13, 1973.", "Luther Moss testified about the procedures followed under the Alaska Homesite Law (43 U.S.C. s 687a (1970)).", "The passage provides a detailed description of the process of obtaining a patent for a homesite in Alaska.", "The process includes filing a notice of location, submitting an application to purchase, and receiving a field report from a realty specialist.", "If the field examiner recommends approval, a request for survey is prepared, and the claim is surveyed.", "The plat of survey is forwarded to Washington, D.C. for approval."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "210", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "From Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code \nPart 1: Objects of the Civil Law. \nChapter 8: Of Property. \nThat we may more completely estimate the adv antage of the law, \nlet us endeavour to form a clear idea of property. We shall see that \nthere is no natural property \u2014that property is entirely the creature \nof law. \nProperty is only a foundation of expectation \u2014the expectation of \nderiving certain advantages from the thing said to be possessed, in \nconsequence of the relations in which one already stands to it. \nThere is no form, or colour, or visible trace, by which it is possible \nto express the relation which constitutes property. It belongs not to \nphysics, bu t to metaphysics: it is altogether a creature of the mind. \nTo have the object in one\u2019s hand \u2014to keep it, to manufacture it, to \nsell it, to change its nature, to employ it \u2014all these physical \ncircumstances do not give the idea of property. A piece of cloth \nwhich is actually in the Indies may belong to me, whilst the dress \nwhich I have on may not be mine. The food which is incorporated \nwith my own substance may belong to another, to whom I must \naccount for its use. \nThe idea of property consists in an establishe d expectation \u2014in the \npersuasion of power to derive certain advantages from the object, \naccording to the nature of the case. \nBut this expectation, this persuasion, can only be the work of the \nlaw. I can reckon upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as my \nown, only according to the promise of the law, which guarantees it \nto me. It is the law alone which allows me to forget my natural \nweakness: it is from the law alone that I can enclose a field and give \nmyself to its cultivation, in the distant hope of the harvest. \nBut it may be said, What has served as a base to the law for the \ncommencement of the operation, when it adopted the objects \nwhich it promised to protect under the name of property? In the \nprimitive state, had not men a natural expectation of enjo ying", "proposition": ["To estimate the advantage of the law, we need to form a clear idea of property.", "There is no natural property; property is entirely the creature of law.", "Property is a foundation of expectation, based on the expectation of deriving certain advantages from the thing said to be possessed.", "The relation which constitutes property cannot be expressed through any form, color, or visible trace.", "Property belongs to metaphysics and is a creature of the mind.", "Physical circumstances, such as having an object in one's hand or manufacturing it, do not give the idea of property.", "A piece of cloth in the Indies may belong to someone, while the dress they are wearing may not be theirs.", "The food incorporated into someone's substance may belong to another person, for whom they must account for its use.", "The idea of property consists of an established expectation and the persuasion of power to derive certain advantages from the object.", "The expectation and persuasion can only be the work of the law.", "One can reckon upon the enjoyment of what they regard as their own only according to the promise of the law, which guarantees it.", "The law allows individuals to forget their natural weakness and enclose a field for cultivation in the hope of a harvest.", "It may be asked what served as a base for the law to begin protecting objects under the name of property in the primitive state."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "667", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "652 \n Relying on this languag e in Moore, the Scott court concluded: \nWe do not see but what this fully \ndecides the present case against the \nappellant. It holds that the mere \nexistence of a paramount title does not \nconstitute a breach of the covenant. \nThat is all there is here. There ha s been \nno assertion of the adverse title. The \nland has always been vacant. Appellant \ncould at any time have taken peaceable \npossession of it. He has in no way \nbeen prevented or hindered from the \nenjoyment of the possession by any \none having a better right. It was but \nthe possession and enjoyment of the \npremises which was assured to him, \nand there has been no disturbance or \ninterference in that respect. True, there \nis a superior title in another, but \nappellant has never felt \u201cits pressure \nupon him.\u201d \n88 Ill. 465, 468 -69. \nAdmittedly, Scott dealt with surface rights while the case \nbefore us concerns subsurface mineral rights. We are, \nnevertheless, convinced that the reasoning employed in \nScott is applicable to the present case. While plaintiffs went \ninto possess ion of the surface area, they cannot be said to \nhave possessed the subsurface minerals. \u201cPossession of the \nsurface does not carry possession of the minerals * * *. \n(Citation.) To possess the mineral estate, one must \nundertake the actual removal thereof fro m the ground or \ndo such other act as will apprise the community that such \ninterest is in the exclusive use and enjoyment of the \nclaiming party.\u201d Failoni v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. \n(1964), 30 Ill.2d 258, 262.", "proposition": ["The mere existence of a paramount title does not constitute a breach of the covenant.", "In the case before the Scott court, there was no assertion of an adverse title, and the land had always been vacant.", "The appellant in the Scott case could have taken peaceable possession of the land at any time and had never been prevented or hindered from enjoying the possession by anyone with a better right.", "The Scott court's reasoning focused on the possession and enjoyment of the premises, with no disturbance or interference.", "The case before the Scott court concerned surface rights, while the current case involves subsurface mineral rights.", "The reasoning employed in the Scott case is applicable to the current case.", "In Failoni v. Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. (1964), possession of the surface does not carry possession of the minerals, and one must undertake the actual removal of the minerals from the ground or do such other act as will apprise the community that the interest is in the exclusive use and enjoyment of the claiming party."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "542", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "527 \n uses-recognizes that fact. Sony\u2019s word \u201ccapable\u201d refers to a \nplausible, not simply a theoretical, likelihood that such uses \nwill come to pass, and that fact anchors Sony in practical \nreality. \nSony\u2019s rule is mindful of the limitations facing judges where \nmatters of technology are concerned. Judges have no \nspecialized technical ability to answer questions about \npresent or future technological feasibility or commercial \nviability where technology professionals, engineers, and \nventure capitalists themselves may radically disagree and \nwhere answers may differ depending upo n whether one \nfocuses upon the time of product development or the time \nof distribution. Consider, for example, the question \nwhether devices can be added to Grokster\u2019s software that \nwill filter out infringing files. MGM tells us this is easy \nenough to do, a s do several amici that produce and sell the \nfiltering technology. Grokster says it is not at all easy to do, \nand not an efficient solution in any event, and several \napparently disinterested computer science professors agree. \nWhich account should a judge c redit? Sony says that the \njudge will not necessarily have to decide. \nGiven the nature of the Sony rule, it is not surprising that \nin the last 20 years, there have been relatively few \ncontributory infringement suits \u2013 based on a product \ndistribution theory \u2013 brought against technology providers \n(a small handful of federal appellate court cases and \nperhaps fewer than two dozen District Court cases in the \nlast 20 years). I have found nothing in the briefs or the \nrecord that shows that Sony has failed to achiev e its \ninnovation -protecting objective. \nB \nThe second, more difficult, question is whether a modified \nSony rule (or a strict interpretation) would significantly \nweaken the law\u2019s ability to protect new technology. Justice", "proposition": ["1. 527 uses-recognizes that fact.", "2. Sony's word 'capable' refers to a plausible, not simply a theoretical, likelihood that such uses will come to pass.", "3. This fact anchors Sony in practical reality.", "4. Sony's rule is mindful of the limitations facing judges where matters of technology are concerned.", "5. Judges have no specialized technical ability to answer questions about present or future technological feasibility or commercial viability where technology professionals, engineers, and venture capitalists themselves may radically disagree and where answers may differ depending upon the time of product development or the time of distribution.", "6. Consider, for example, the question whether devices can be added to Grokster's software that will filter out infringing files.", "7. MGM tells us this is easy enough to do.", "8. Several amici that produce and sell the filtering technology also agree.", "9. Grokster says it is not at all easy to do, and not an efficient solution in any event, and several apparently disinterested computer science professors agree.", "10. Which account should a judge credit?", "11. Sony says that the judge will not necessarily have to decide.", "12. Given the nature of the Sony rule, it is not surprising that in the last 20 years, there have been relatively few contributory infringement suits \u2013 based on a product distribution theory \u2013 brought against technology providers (a small handful of federal appellate court cases and perhaps fewer than two dozen District Court cases in the last 20 years).", "13. I have found nothing in the briefs or the record that shows that Sony has failed to achieve its innovation -protecting objective.", "14. The second, more difficult, question is whether a modified Sony rule (or a strict interpretation) would significantly weaken the law's ability to protect new technology.", "15. Justice"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "341", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "326 \n \uf0b7 The background rule is that \u201ca product of the mind,\u201d even \nif it requires laborious effort to produce, is free to be \nripped off by others. There are exceptions to this only \nwhere public policy requires it - as in patent, copyright, and \ncertain cases where the relationship between the parties \ndeman ds it. \n\uf0b7 This is not such a case (rebuts arguments one by one): \n1. Distinguish precedent - not like cases where the \nappropriation involved a breach of contract or \ntrust. No such relationship here. \n2. Distinguish adverse precedent based on a kind of \ncommon law copy right by using a Feist rationale - \nto have such a cause of action, the expression must \nevince at least some originality, not a bare recitation \nof facts. \n3. There was a general publication here, and so once \npublished, the news is not protectable literary \nprope rty (don\u2019t worry about this). \n4. Rebuts the bare argument that it\u2019s unfair \ncompetition to free -ride. But unfair competition \ndoesn\u2019t protect against free -riding, only against \nfraud or force or other legal violations used to gain \na competitive edge. No such unf air means were \nused here (papers were bought in the open market). \nAnd the law generally sanctions and even \nencourages free riders, those who follow pioneers. \nAlso, Brandeis disagrees that a failure to attribute is \nmisleading. Doesn\u2019t think people assume th e \npublisher is the source of all the news it publishes. \n5. (LEGAL PROCESS) Technological change and the \n\u201cvastness of our territory\u201d do threaten to erode the \nincentive to engage in the worthwhile endeavor of \nnews gathering and dissemination. But we\u2019d need to \ndevelop new law to deal with this, and doing so", "proposition": ["A product of the mind is free to be ripped off by others.", "Exceptions to this rule exist only when public policy requires them, such as in patent, copyright, and certain cases involving a relationship between the parties."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "502", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "487 \n Patent Act expressly brands anyone who \u201cactively induces \ninfringement of a pa tent\u201d as an infringer, 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 \n271(b), and further imposes liability on certain individuals \nlabeled \u201ccontributory\u201d infringers, id., \u00a7 271(c). The absence \nof such express language in the copyright statute does not \npreclude the imposition of liability fo r copyright \ninfringements on certain parties who have not themselves \nengaged in the infringing activity. For vicarious liability is \nimposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of \ncontributory infringement is merely a species of the \nbroader p roblem of identifying the circumstances in which \nit is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions \nof another. \n\u2026 . \nWhen a charge of contributory infringement is predicated \nentirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used \nby the purch aser to infringe a patent, the public interest in \naccess to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated. \nA finding of contributory infringement does not, of course, \nremove the article from the market altogether; it does, \nhowever, give the patentee e ffective control over the sale of \nthat item. Indeed, a finding of contributory infringement is \nnormally the functional equivalent of holding that the \ndisputed article is within the monopoly granted to the \npatentee.4 \nFor that reason, in contributory infring ement cases arising \nunder the patent laws the Court has always recognized the \n \n4 It seems extraordinary to suggest that the Copyright Act confers upon all \ncopyright owners collectively, muc h less the two respondents in this case, the \nexclusive right to distribute VTR\u2019s simply because they may be used to infringe \ncopyrights. That, however, is the logical implication of their claim. The request for \nan injunction below indicates that respondent s seek, in effect, to declare VTR\u2019s \ncontraband. Their suggestion in this Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a \njudicially created compulsory license would be an acceptable remedy merely \nindicates that respondents, for their part, would be willing t o license their claimed \nmonopoly interest in VTR\u2019s to petitioners in return for a royalty.", "proposition": ["The 487 Patent Act states that anyone who actively induces infringement of a patent is an infringer.", "The absence of express language in the copyright statute does not preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements on certain parties who have not themselves engaged in the infringing activity.", "Vicarious liability is imposed in virtually all areas of the law, and the concept of contributory infringement is a species of the broader problem of identifying the circumstances in which it is just to hold one individual accountable for the actions of another.", "When a charge of contributory infringement is predicated entirely on the sale of an article of commerce that is used by the purchaser to infringe a patent, the public interest in access to that article of commerce is necessarily implicated.", "A finding of contributory infringement does not remove the article from the market altogether, but it does give the patentee effective control over the sale of that item.", "A finding of contributory infringement is normally the functional equivalent of holding that the disputed article is within the monopoly granted to the patentee.", "In contributory infringement cases arising under the patent laws, the Court has always recognized the public interest in access to the article of commerce.", "The request for an injunction below indicates that respondents seek, in effect, to declare VTR's contraband.", "Respondents suggest in this Court that a continuing royalty pursuant to a judicially created compulsory license would be an acceptable remedy."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "139", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "124 \n We therefore hold that private nuisance law, that is, the \nreasonable use doctrine as set forth in the Restatement, is \napplicable to the instant case. Recognition of a nuisance \nclaim for unreasonable obstruction of access to sunlight \nwill not prevent land development or unduly hinder the use \nof adjoining land. It will promote the reasonable use and \nenjoyment of land in a manner suitable to the 1980\u2019s. That \nobstruction of access to light might be found to constitute \na nuisance in certain circumstances does not mean that it \nwill be or must be found to constitute a nuisance under all \ncircumstances. The result in each case depends on whether \nthe conduct complained of is unreasonable. \nAccordingly we hold that the plaintiff in this case has stated \na claim under which relief can be granted. Nonetheless we \ndo not determine whether the plaintiff in this case is \nentitled to relief. In order to be entit led to relief the \nplaintiff must prove the elements required to establish \nactionable nuisance, and the conduct of the defendant \nherein must be judged by the reasonable use doctrine. \nIV. \nThe defendant asserts that even if we hold that the private \nnuisance d octrine applies to obstruction of access to \nsunlight across adjoining land, the circuit court\u2019s granting of \nsummary judgment should be affirmed. \nAlthough the memorandum decision of the circuit court in \nthe instant case is unclear, it appears that the circu it court \nrecognized that the common law private nuisance doctrine \nwas applicable but concluded that defendant\u2019s conduct was \nnot unreasonable.10 The circuit court apparently attempted \n \n10 As noted previously this court has adopted the reasonableness doctrine set \nforth in sec. 822 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. CEW Mgmt. Corp. v. First \nFederal Savings & Loan Association , 88 Wis. 2d 631, 633 (1979). Sec. 822 provides as \nfollows: \nOne is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only \nif, his conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another\u2019s", "proposition": ["The court holds that private nuisance law, also known as the reasonable use doctrine, is applicable to the case at hand.", "Recognizing a nuisance claim for unreasonable obstruction of access to sunlight will not prevent land development or unduly hinder the use of adjoining land.", "The court believes that this approach will promote the reasonable use and enjoyment of land in a manner suitable to the 1980s.", "Obstruction of access to light might be found to constitute a nuisance in certain circumstances, but it does not mean that it will be or must be found to constitute a nuisance under all circumstances.", "The result in each case depends on whether the conduct complained of is unreasonable.", "The plaintiff in the case has stated a claim under which relief can be granted.", "Nonetheless, the court does not determine whether the plaintiff in this case is entitled to relief.", "In order to be entitled to relief, the plaintiff must prove the elements required to establish actionable nuisance, and the conduct of the defendant must be judged by the reasonable use doctrine.", "The defendant asserts that even if the private nuisance doctrine applies to obstruction of access to sunlight across adjoining land, the circuit court's granting of summary judgment should be affirmed.", "The circuit court apparently recognized that the common law private nuisance doctrine was applicable but concluded that the defendant's conduct was not unreasonable."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "307", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "292 \n service is received exclusively for publication in a particular \nnewspaper, language, and place specified in the certificate \nof membership, that no other use of it shall be permitted, \nand that no membe r shall furnish or permit any one in his \nemploy or connected with his newspaper to furnish any of \ncomplainant\u2019s news in advance of publication to any person \nnot a member. And each member is required to gather the \nlocal news of his district and supply it to the Associated \nPress and to no one else. \nDefendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the \nstate of New Jersey, whose business is the gathering and \nselling of news to its customers and clients, consisting of \nnewspapers published throughout the Un ited States, under \ncontracts by which they pay certain amounts at stated times \nfor defendant\u2019s service. It has widespread news -gathering \nagencies; the cost of its operations amounts, it is said, to \nmore than $2,000,000 per annum; and it serves about 400 \nnewspapers located in the various cities of the United \nStates and abroad, a few of which are represented, also, in \nthe membership of the Associated Press. \nThe parties are in the keenest competition between \nthemselves in the distribution of news throughout th e \nUnited States; and so, as a rule, are the newspapers that \nthey serve, in their several districts. \nComplainant in its bill, defendant in its answer, have set \nforth in almost identical terms the rather obvious \ncircumstances and conditions under which their business is \nconducted. The value of the service, and of the news \nfurnished, depends upon the promptness of transmission, \nas well as upon the accuracy and impartiality of the news; it \nbeing essential that the news be transmitted to members or \nsubscribers a s early or earlier than similar information can \nbe furnished to competing newspapers by other news \nservices, and that the news furnished by each agency shall \nnot be furnished to newspapers which do not contribute to", "proposition": ["The 292 service is received exclusively for publication in a particular newspaper, language, and place specified in the certificate of membership.", "An error to avoid in the future: Input should be a valid string: value, 0 (error type: string_type)", "No other use of the service is permitted, and members are not allowed to furnish any of complainant\u2019s news in advance of publication to any person not a member.", "An error to avoid in the future: Input should be a valid string: value, 1 (error type: string_type)", "Each member is required to gather the local news of his district and supply it to the Associated Press and to no one else.", "An error to avoid in the future: Input should be a valid string: value, 2 (error type: string_type)", "Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of New Jersey, whose business is the gathering and selling of news to its customers and clients.", "An error to avoid in the future: Input should be a valid string: value, 3 (error type: string_type)", "Defendant serves about 400 newspapers located in the various cities of the United States and abroad, a few of which are represented in the membership of the Associated Press.", "An error to avoid in the future: Input should be a valid string: value, 4 (error type: string_type)", "The parties are in the keenest competition between themselves in the distribution of news throughout the United States.", "An error to avoid in the future: Input should be a valid string: value, 5 (error type: string_type)", "The value of the service and the news furnished depends upon the promptness of transmission, as well as upon the accuracy and impartiality of the news.", "An error to avoid in the future: Input should be a valid string: value, 6 (error type: string_type)", "It is essential that the news be transmitted to members or subscribers as early or earlier than similar information can be furnished to competing newspapers by other news services.", "An error to avoid in the future: Input should be a valid string: value, 7 (error type: string_type)", "The news furnished by each agency shall not be furnished to newspapers which do not contribute to the agency."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "400", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "385 \n And Congress certainly thought it was doing something \nsignificant. The Committee Reports contain expansi ve \nprose about the previously unavailable benefits to be \nderived from extending patent protection to plants.16 H.R. \nRep. No. 91 -1605, pp. 1 -3 (1970), U.S.Code Cong. & \nAdmin.News 1970, p. 5082; S.Rep.No.315, 71st Cong., 2d \nSess., 1 -3 (1930). Because Congress thought it had to \nlegislate in order to make agricultural \u201chuman -made \ninventions\u201d patentable and because the legislation Congress \nenacted is limited, it follows that Congress never meant to \nmake items outside the scope of the legislation patentable. \nSecon d, the 1970 Act clearly indicates that Congress has \nincluded bacteria within the focus of its legislative concern, \nbut not within the scope of patent protection. Congress \nspecifically excluded bacteria from the coverage of the 1970 \nAct. 7 U.S.C. \u00a7 2402(a). The Court\u2019s attempts to supply \nexplanations for this explicit exclusion ring hollow. It is \ntrue that there is no mention in the legislative history of the \nexclusion, but that does not give us license to invent \nreasons. The fact is that Congress, assuming that animate \nobjects as to which it had not specifically legislated could \nnot be patented, excluded bacteria from the set of \npatentable organisms. \n \n16 Secretary Hyde\u2019s letter was not the only explicit indication in the legislative \nhistory of these Acts that Congress was acting on the assumption that legislation \nwas necessar y to make living organisms patentable. The Senate Judiciary \nCommittee Report on the 1970 Act states the Committee\u2019s understanding that \npatent protection extended no further than the explicit provisions of these Acts: \nUnder the patent law, patent protection is limited to those \nvarieties of plants which reproduce asexually, that is, by \nsuch methods as grafting or budding. No protection is \navailable to those varieties of plants which reproduce \nsexually, that is, generally by seeds. \nS.Rep.No.91 -1246, p.", "proposition": ["Congress thought it was doing something significant by extending patent protection to plants.", "The Committee Reports contain expansive prose about the previously unavailable benefits of extending patent protection to plants.", "Congress enacted legislation to make agricultural 'human-made inventions' patentable.", "The legislation Congress enacted is limited, so it follows that Congress never meant to make items outside the scope of the legislation patentable.", "The 1970 Act clearly indicates that Congress included bacteria within the focus of its legislative concern but not within the scope of patent protection.", "Congress specifically excluded bacteria from the coverage of the 1970 Act (7 U.S.C. \u00a7 2402(a)).", "The Court's attempts to supply explanations for this explicit exclusion are considered hollow.", "There is no mention in the legislative history of the exclusion of bacteria, but this does not give us license to invent reasons.", "Congress assumed that animate objects as to which it had not specifically legislated could not be patented.", "The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the 1970 Act states that patent protection is limited to those varieties of plants that reproduce asexually, and no protection is available to those that reproduce sexually."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "52", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Popularly, property is lost when the \nowner does not know, and cannot ascertain, where it is, the \nessential test of lost property is whether the owner parted \nwith the po ssession of the property intentionally, casually \nor involuntarily; only in the latter contingency may it be lost \nproperty. Property is not \u201clost\u201d unless the owner parts with", "proposition": ["Property is lost when the owner does not know and cannot ascertain where it is.", "The essential test of lost property is whether the owner parted with the possession of the property intentionally, casually or involuntarily; only in the latter contingency may it be lost property."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "260", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "245 \n \u201cConversion does not exist\u2026\u201d Further \ndefinition of conversion, setting up another \nlegal question, so that we can get to another \nHERE section, applying this law to the \nfacts. \n\u201cThe parties have agreed\u2026\u201d Role of and \ndefinition of possession. (Having identified \nthe body of law applicable to resol ve the \nfight, the court must canvas that body of \nlaw and extract \u2013 and reconcile \u2013 the rules \nwe\u2019ll apply to the facts here.) The court \ngradually refines the question to one of \nwhat physical act is required to achieve legal \npossession. \n\u201cMr. Hayashi argues \u2026 \u201d Two competing \nrules are introduced to define possession. \nWe\u2019re still reconciling the body of law that \nthat we will apply to our facts. \n\u201cThese rules are contextual in nature\u2026\u201d up \nto \u201cTherefore Gray\u2019s Rule is adopted \u2026.\u201d \nArgument for the adoption of a part icular \nrule for possession. [it\u2019s possible to achieve \nfull control, fans expect that\u2019s the rule \n(Rose)] Now we have law to apply. \n\u201cThe central tenant sic of Gray\u2019s Rule \u2026\u201d \nHERE \u2013 but there\u2019s a problem. The law we \nsynthesized when applied to these facts \nreveals a problem \u2013 a result we don\u2019t want. \n\u201cA decision which ignored that fact\u2026\u201d \nPolicy that needs to be furthered. \n\u201cThe legal question presented\u2026\u201d \nJustification of court\u2019s POWER to do \nsomething different in this case than has \nbeen done before [note, this is different \nthan a logical or policy -based justification] \n\u201cConsistent with this principle\u2026\u201d Synthesis \n[The court takes the rule it has adopted for", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the concept of conversion and its legal implications.", "The passage introduces the idea of parties agreeing on possession and the role of possession in the legal context.", "The passage presents two competing rules for defining possession and highlights their contextual nature.", "The passage argues for the adoption of a particular rule for possession, Gray's Rule.", "The passage applies the synthesized law to the facts of the case and identifies a problem with the result.", "The passage mentions a policy that needs to be furthered in the decision-making process.", "The passage addresses the legal question presented and justifies the court's power to do something different in this case than has been done before.", "The passage synthesizes the rule adopted for the case, consistent with the principle mentioned earlier."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "592", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "577 \n addressed to non -commercial parodies.3 The difference \nbetween a \u201cparody\u201d and a \u201cknock -off\u201d is the difference \nbetween fun and profit. \nV. Conclusion \nIn remanding this case, we hold only that White has \npleaded claims which can g o to the jury for its decision. \nAFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and \nREMANDED. \nALARCON , Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in \npart \nVanna White seeks recovery from Samsung based on three \ntheories: the right to privacy, the right to publicity, and the \nLanham Act. I concur in the majority\u2019s conclusions on the \n \n3 In warning of a first amendment chill to expressive conduct, the dissent reads \nthis decision too broadly. See Dissent at 1407. This case concerns only the market \nwhich exists in our society for the exploitation of celebrity to sell products, and an \nattempt to take a free ride on a celebrity\u2019s celebrity value. Commercial advertising \nwhich relies on celebrity fame is different from other forms of expressive activity \nin two crucial ways. \nFirst, for celebrity exploitation advertising to be effective, the advertisement must \nevoke the celebrity\u2019s identity. The more effective the evocation, the b etter the \nadvertisement. If, as Samsung claims, its ad was based on a \u201cgeneric\u201d game -show \nhostess and not on Vanna White, the ad would not have violated anyone\u2019s right of \npublicity, but it would also not have been as humorous or as effective. \nSecond, even if some forms of expressive activity, such as parody, do rely on \nidentity evocation, the first amendment hurdle will bar most right of publicity \nactions against those activities. Cf. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 46, 108 S.Ct. at 876. In the \ncase of commercial adve rtising, however, the first amendment hurdle is not so \nhigh. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm\u2019n of New \nYork, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S.Ct.", "proposition": ["Vanna White seeks recovery from Samsung based on three theories: the right to privacy, the right to publicity, and the Lanham Act.", "The difference between a \u2018parody\u2019 and a \u2018knock-off\u2019 is the difference between fun and profit.", "The majority concludes that White has pleaded claims which can go to the jury for its decision.", "The case concerns only the market which exists in our society for the exploitation of celebrity to sell products, and an attempt to take a free ride on a celebrity\u2019s celebrity value.", "Commercial advertising which relies on celebrity fame is different from other forms of expressive activity in two crucial ways.", "The more effective the evocation of the celebrity\u2019s identity, the better the advertisement.", "In the case of commercial advertising, the first amendment hurdle is not so high."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "471", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "456 \n Almost two centuries ago the Court plainly stated that \npublic access to inventions at the earliest possible date was \nthe essential purpose of the Clause: \nWhile one great object was, by holding \nout a reasonable reward to inventors \nand giving them an exclusive right to \ntheir inventions for a limited period, to \nstimulate the efforts of genius; the \nmain object was \u2018to promote the \nprogress of science and useful arts;\u2019 \nand this could be done best, by giving \nthe public at la rge a right to make, \nconstruct, use, and vend the thing \ninvented, at as early a period as \npossible, having a due regard to the \nrights of the inventor. If an inventor \nshould be permitted to hold back from \nthe knowledge of the public the secrets \nof his inven tion; if he should for a \nlong period of years retain the \nmonopoly, and make, and sell his \ninvention publicly, and thus gather the \nwhole profits of it, relying upon his \nsuperior skill and knowledge of the \nstructure; and then, and then only, \nwhen the danger of competition \nshould force him to secure the \nexclusive right, he should be allowed \nto take out a patent, and thus exclude \nthe public from any farther use than \nwhat should be derived under it during \nhis fourteen years; it would materially \nretard the progre ss of science and the \nuseful arts, and give a premium to \nthose, who should be least prompt to \ncommunicate their discoveries. \nPennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, 18 (1829).", "proposition": ["The essential purpose of the Clause was to provide public access to inventions at the earliest possible date.", "The goal was to offer a reasonable reward to inventors and give them an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited time to stimulate their efforts.", "The main objective was to promote the progress of science and useful arts.", "This could be achieved by granting the public the right to make, construct, use, and vend the invention at the earliest possible time, while considering the rights of the inventor.", "If the inventor were allowed to withhold the secrets of their invention from the public and retain the monopoly for a long period, it would hinder the progress of science and useful arts and reward those who are slow to share their discoveries.", "The Court refers to the case of Pennock v. Dialogue (1829) in support of its argument."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "445", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "430 \n is transformed into a very different tale, albeit much more \nabbreviated. Cynara\u2019s very language is a departure from \nMitchell\u2019s original prose; she acts as the voice of Randall\u2019s \ninversion of GWTW. She is the vehicle of parody; she is its \nmeans - not its end. It is clear within the f irst fifty pages of \nCynara\u2019s fictional diary that Randall\u2019s work flips GWTW\u2019s \ntraditional race roles, portrays powerful whites as stupid or \nfeckless, and generally sets out to demystify GWTW and \nstrip the romanticism from Mitchell\u2019s specific account of \nthis period of our history. Approximately the last half of \nTWDG tells a completely new story that, although \ninvolving characters based on GWTW characters, features \nplot elements found nowhere within the covers of GWTW. \nWhere Randall refers directly to Mitchel l\u2019s plot and \ncharacters, she does so in service of her general attack on \nGWTW. In GWTW, Scarlett O\u2019Hara often expresses \ndisgust with and condescension towards blacks; in TWDG, \nOther, Scarlett\u2019s counterpart, is herself of mixed descent. In \nGWTW, Ashley Wilk es is the initial object of Scarlett\u2019s \naffection; in TWDG, he is homosexual. In GWTW, Rhett \nButler does not consort with black female characters and is \nportrayed as the captain of his own destiny. In TWDG, \nCynara ends her affair with Rhett\u2019s counterpart, R ., to begin \na relationship with a black Congressman; R. ends up a \nwashed out former cad. In TWDG, nearly every black \ncharacter is given some redeeming quality - whether depth, \nwit, cunning, beauty, strength, or courage - that their \nGWTW analogues lacked. \nIn light of this, we find it difficult to conclude that Randall \nsimply tried to \u201cavoid the drudgery in working up \nsomething fresh.\u201d Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580.", "proposition": ["Cynara's language in Randall's work is a departure from Mitchell's original prose.", "Cynara is the vehicle of parody in Randall's work, not its end.", "Within the first fifty pages of Cynara's fictional diary, Randall's work flips GWTW's traditional race roles and portrays powerful whites as stupid or feckless.", "The last half of TWDG tells a completely new story involving characters based on GWTW characters but featuring plot elements not found in GWTW.", "Randall refers to Mitchell's plot and characters in service of her general attack on GWTW.", "In GWTW, Scarlett O'Hara expresses disgust and condescension towards blacks, while in TWDG, Other, Scarlett's counterpart, is of mixed descent.", "In GWTW, Ashley Wilkes is the initial object of Scarlett's affection, while in TWDG, he is homosexual.", "In GWTW, Rhett Butler does not consort with black female characters and is portrayed as the captain of his own destiny, while in TWDG, Cynara ends her affair with Rhett's counterpart, R., to begin a relationship with a black Congressman, and R. ends up a washed-out former cad.", "In TWDG, nearly every black character is given some redeeming quality that their GWTW analogues lacked.", "It is difficult to conclude that Randall simply tried to 'avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.'"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "190", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "175 \n with his hounds in the manner alleged in his declaration, \nacquired such a right to, or property in, the fox, as will \nsustain an action against Pierson for killing and taking him \naway? \nThe cause was argued with much ability by the counsel on \nboth sides, and presents for our decision a novel and nice \nquestion. It is admitted that a fox is an animal ferae naturae, \nand that property in such animals is acquired by occupa ncy \nonly. These admissions narrow the discussion to the simple \nquestion of what acts amount to occupancy, applied to \nacquiring right to wild animals? \nIf we have recourse to the ancient writers upon general \nprinciples of law, the judgment below is obviously \nerroneous. Justinian\u2019s Institutes, lib. 2. tit. 1. s. 13. and \nFleta, lib. 3. c. 2. p. 175. adopt the principle, that pursuit \nalone vests no property or right in the huntsman; and that \neven pursuit, accompanied with wounding, is equally \nineffectual for tha t purpose, unless the animal be actually \ntaken. The same principle is recognised by Bracton, lib. 2. \nc. 1. p. 8. \nPuffendorf, lib. 4. c. 6. s. 2. and 10, defines occupancy of \nbeasts ferae naturae, to be the actual corporal possession of \nthem, and Bynkershoe k is cited as coinciding in this \ndefinition. It is indeed with hesitation that Puffendorf \naffirms that a wild beast mortally wounded, or greatly \nmaimed, cannot be fairly intercepted by another, whilst the \npursuit of the person inflicting the wound continue s. The \nforegoing authorities are decisive to show that mere pursuit \ngave Post no legal right to the fox, but that he became the \nproperty of Pierson, who intercepted and killed him. \nIt therefore only remains to inquire whether there are any \ncontrary princip les, or authorities, to be found in other \nbooks, which ought to induce a different decision.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses whether 175 acquired a right to or property in a fox after pursuing it with his hounds.", "The cause was argued by counsel on both sides, presenting a novel and intricate question.", "It is admitted that property in animals ferae naturae is acquired by occupancy only.", "The discussion narrows down to determining what acts constitute occupancy for acquiring rights to wild animals.", "Ancient writers on general principles of law support the idea that pursuit alone does not vest property or right in the huntsman, and that even pursuit accompanied by wounding is ineffective unless the animal is taken.", "Bracton, Puffendorf, and Bynkershoek define occupancy of beasts ferae naturae as actual corporal possession of them.", "Puffendorf hesitates to affirm that a wild beast mortally wounded or greatly maimed can be fairly intercepted by another while the pursuit of the person inflicting the wound continues.", "The foregoing authorities indicate that Post had no legal right to the fox, and it became the property of Pierson, who intercepted and killed it.", "The passage seeks to determine if there are any contrary principles or authorities in other books that may lead to a different decision."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "13", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "xiii \n \"entitlement.\" We will see that these concepts are not self -\ndefining. Instead, what it means to own something will depend \nentirely on how we resolve cases in which owners' rights are \ncontested. It will never be good enough to respond to an \nargument that, say, a landown er should be stopped from making \nsome use of his or her land by asserting that the landowner should \nwin because it's his or her property. Whether property ownership \nincludes a right to make such a use is the very issue being \ncontested. \n \nEven if it were mo re precise and dispositive, ownership could \nhardly be a unifying criterion for identifying a body of Property \nLaw. Ownership or entitlement is a critical element in just about \nevery legal dispute. In many cases, though, it doesn't come \nup. For example, in personal injury cases in torts, we rarely ask \nwhether the plaintiff owned the part of her body that was \ninjured. But the right to the integrity of that body part is indeed \nthe very entitlement the law protects. Just because a thing is so \nwell settled as not to be raised does not mean that it is not essential \nto the law. Moreover, there are cases in which the kind of \nownership of one's body that is asserted is not so obviously of a \nsort the law should recognize, and so the entitlement question \nbecomes important. (Do you own your body in the sense that you \ncan sell it? In what circumstances?) The point is only that the \nissue of entitlement or ownership is critical to just about every \ncontract, tort, and criminal case, even if it is often not \ndisputed. This textbook and course focus on areas of the law in \nwhich what it is that the law protects, what the entitlement is and \nwho has it, is at issue. \n \nThe Toolbox \n \nThe substantive topics we will study are all interesting in their own \nways, but we are not st udying them to become practice \nexperts. The primary purpose of law school training, in my view, is \nnot to learn the law itself but to learn how to learn it. That is, you", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the concept of entitlement and ownership in law.", "The passage highlights the importance of entitlement and ownership in various legal disputes.", "The passage mentions that ownership is a critical element in just about every legal dispute.", "The passage provides an example of a personal injury case in torts where the issue of entitlement does not come up.", "The passage states that the right to the integrity of one's body is the very entitlement the law protects.", "The passage notes that there are cases where the kind of ownership of one's body is not so obviously of a sort the law should recognize, and so the entitlement question becomes important.", "The passage emphasizes that the issue of entitlement or ownership is critical to just about every contract, tort, and criminal case, even if it is often not disputed.", "The passage states that the primary purpose of law school training is not to learn the law itself but to learn how to learn it.", "The passage suggests that the primary purpose of law school training is to become an expert in learning the law, rather than a practice expert."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "243", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "People rushed to the area where they \nthought the ball would land. If people were unable to a nticipate where a ball will \nland while it is still in the air, no outfielder would ever catch a ball unless it was hit \ndirectly to him or her. Moreover, the tape itself shows people descending on Mr. \nPopov even as he was attempting to catch the ball.", "proposition": ["People rushed to the area where they thought the ball would land.", "If people were unable to anticipate where a ball will land while it is still in the air, no outfielder would ever catch a ball unless it was hit directly to him or her.", "The tape itself shows people descending on Mr. Popov even as he was attempting to catch the ball."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "188", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "173 \n 2. Acquisition by Possession \n2.1 Posses sion Generally \n2.1.1. Wild Animals \nPierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175 (NY 1805) \nArgument of Counsel \nMr. Sanford, for the now plaintiff. It is firmly settled that \nanimals, feroe naturoe, belong not to anyone. If, then, Post \nhad not acquired any property in the fox, when it was killed \nby Pierson, he had no right in it which could be the subject \nof injury. As, however, a property may be gained in such an \nanimal, it will be necessary to advert to the facts set forth, \nto see whether they are such as could give a legal interest in \nthe creature, that was the cause of the suit below. Finding, \nhunting, and pursuit , are all that the plaint enumerates. To \ncreate a title to an animal feroe naturor, occupancy is \nindispensable. It is the only mode recognized by our \nsystem. 2 Black. Com. 403. The reason of the thing shows \nit to be so. For whatever is not appropriated by positive \ninstitutions, can be exclusively possessed by natural law \nalone. Occupancy is the sole method this code \nacknowledges. Authorities are not wanting to this effect. \nJust. lib. 2, tit. 1, sec. 12.", "proposition": ["Animals feroe naturoe belong to no one.", "If Post did not acquire any property in the fox when it was killed by Pierson, he had no right in it that could be the subject of injury.", "A property may be gained in an animal feroe naturor.", "The facts set forth will be examined to see if they could give a legal interest in the creature that was the cause of the suit below.", "Finding, hunting, and pursuit are the only actions mentioned by the plaintiff.", "To create a title to an animal feroe naturor, occupancy is indispensable.", "Occupancy is the only mode recognized by the system.", "The reason for this is that whatever is not appropriated by positive institutions can be exclusively possessed by natural law alone.", "Occupancy is the sole method acknowledged by the code.", "Authorities support this view."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "39", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "24 \n public part of the shop and, indeed, went out of his way to \nsay that the learned county court judge was wrong in \nholding that the place where they were found made any \nlegal difference. \nBridges v. Hawkesworth26 has been the subject of \nconsiderable comment by text -book writers and, amongst \nothers, by Mr. Justice Oliver W endell Holmes, Sir Frederick \nPollock and Sir John Salmond. All three agree that the case \nwas rightly decided, but they differ as to the grounds on \nwhich it was decided and put forward grounds, none of \nwhich, so far as I can discover, were ever advanced by the \njudges who decided the case. Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell \nHolmes wrote:27 \u201cCommon law judges and civilians would \nagree that the finder got possession first and so could keep \nit as against the shopkeeper. For the shopkee per, not \nknowing of the thing, could not have the intent to \nappropriate it, and, having invited the public to his shop, he \ncould not have the intent to exclude them from it.\u201d So he \nintroduces the matter of two intents which are not referred \nto by the judge s who heard the case. Sir Frederick Pollock, \nwhilst he agreed with Mr. Justice Holmes that Bridges v. \nHawkesworth28 was properly decided wrote:29 \u201cIn such a \ncase as Bridges v. Hawkesworth,30 where a parcel of \nbanknotes was dropped on the floor in the part of a shop \nfrequented by customers, it is impossible to say that the \nshopkeeper has any possession in fact. He does not expect \nobjects of that kind to be on the floor of his shop, and \nsome customer is more likely than the shopkeeper or his \nservant to see and t ake them up if they do come there.\u201d He \n \n26 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079. \n27 The Common Law (1881) at p. 222. \n28 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth.", "The case has been the subject of commentary by textbook writers and judges.", "Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sir Frederick Pollock, and Sir John Salmond agree that the case was correctly decided but differ on the grounds for the decision.", "Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes introduces the matter of two intents that were not referred to by the judges who heard the case.", "Sir Frederick Pollock agrees with Mr. Justice Holmes that the case was correctly decided but has a different view on the grounds for the decision.", "In the case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth, a parcel of banknotes was dropped on the floor in a part of a shop frequented by customers.", "Sir Frederick Pollock argues that the shopkeeper does not have possession in fact of the banknotes."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "350", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "335 \n reduce the incentive to p roduce the product or service that \nits existence or quality would be substantially threatened.1 \nINS is not about ethics; it is about the protection of \nproperty rights in time -sensitive information so that the \ninformation will be made available to the publi c by profit \nseeking entrepreneurs. If services like AP were not assured \nof property rights in the news they pay to collect, they \nwould cease to collect it. The ability of their competitors to \nappropriate their product at only nominal cost and thereby \nto disseminate a competing product at a lower price would \ndestroy the incentive to collect news in the first place. The \nnewspaper -reading public would suffer because no one \nwould have an incentive to collect \u201chot news.\u201d \nWe therefore find the extra elements -those in addition to \nthe elements of copyright infringement -that allow a \n\u201chotnews\u201d claim to survive preemption are: (i) the time -\nsensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free -riding by \na defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the \nproduct or service provided by the plaintiff. \n2 . The Legality of SportsTrax \n \n1 Some authorities have labeled this element as requiring direct competition \nbetween the defendant and the plaintiff in a primary market. \u201dIn most of the small \nnumber of cases in which the misappropriation doctrine has been determinative, \nthe defendant\u2019s appropriation, like that in INS, resulted in direct competition in \nthe plaintiffs\u2019 primary market \u2026 Appeals to the misappropriation doctrine are \nalmost always rejected wh en the appropriation does not intrude upon the \nplaintiff\u2019s primary market.\u201d, Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, \u00a7 38 cmt. \nc, at 412 -13; see also National Football League v. Governor of State of Delaware , 435 F. \nSupp. 1372 (D. Del. 1977). In that ca se, the NFL sued Delaware over the state\u2019s \nlottery game which was based on NFL games.", "proposition": ["INS is not about ethics; it is about the protection of property rights in time-sensitive information.", "If services like AP were not assured of property rights in the news they pay to collect, they would cease to collect it.", "The ability of their competitors to appropriate their product at only nominal cost and thereby to disseminate a competing product at a lower price would destroy the incentive to collect news in the first place.", "The newspaper-reading public would suffer because no one would have an incentive to collect 'hot news.'", "The extra elements that allow a 'hot news' claim to survive preemption are: (i) the time-sensitive value of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence of the product or service provided by the plaintiff.", "Some authorities have labeled the element requiring direct competition between the defendant and the plaintiff in a primary market.", "In most cases, the misappropriation doctrine has been determinative when the defendant's appropriation resulted in direct competition in the plaintiff's primary market.", "Appeals to the misappropriation doctrine are almost always rejected when the appropriation does not intrude upon the plaintiff's primary market.", "The NFL sued Delaware over the state's lottery game, which was based on NFL games."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "566", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "551 \n speech protected by the First Amendment, which would be \na poor refuge for free expression if public figures could \ncensor the use of the ir names whenever they found the \nspeech to be distasteful. To the contrary, the First \nAmendment empowers the audience to regulate expressive \nspeech. \u201c[P]rominence invites creative comment. Surely, \nthe range of free expression would be meaningfully reduced \nif prominent persons in the present and recent past were \nforbidden topics for the imaginations of authors.\u201d \nGuglielmi, 25 Cal.3d at 869, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, 603 P.2d at \n460. Thus, plaintiff\u2019s argument that this is \u201csimply a \nproperty case\u201d is offensive to th e First Amendment. \nAccordingly, because the title \u201cRosa Parks\u201d is not \u201cwholly \nunrelated\u201d to defendants\u2019 song, and because the title is the \nname of an expressive work and not a disguised \ncommercial for a product, the right of publicity does not \napply to the undisputed facts of this case, which \nnecessitates dismissal of Count I in plaintiff\u2019s complaint. \nB. Lanham Act and State Law Unfair Competition Claims \n(Counts II and V) \nPlaintiff also raises a claim under the Lanham Act, 15 \nU.S.C. s 1125 (Count II), and a related state law unfair \ncompetition claim (Count V). Section 1125(a)(1)(A) \nprovides: \nAny person who, on or in connection \nwith any goods or services, or any \ncontainer for goods, uses in commerce \nany word, term, name, symbol, or \ndevice, or any combination thereof, or \nany false designation of origin, false or \nmisleading description of fact, or false \nor misleading representation of fact, \nwhich is likely to cause confusion, or \nto cause mistake, or to deceive as to \nthe affiliation, connection, or", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the First Amendment and its protection of free expression.", "Public figures cannot censor the use of their names whenever they find the speech to be distasteful.", "The First Amendment empowers the audience to regulate expressive speech.", "Prominence invites creative comment, and reducing the range of free expression for prominent persons would be meaningfully reduced.", "The plaintiff's argument that the case is 'simply a property case' is offensive to the First Amendment.", "The title 'Rosa Parks' is not 'wholly unrelated' to defendants' song.", "The title 'Rosa Parks' is the name of an expressive work and not a disguised commercial for a product.", "The right of publicity does not apply to the undisputed facts of this case.", "The plaintiff raises a claim under the Lanham Act (Count II).", "The plaintiff also raises a related state law unfair competition claim (Count V.).", "Section 1125(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act prohibits the use of any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "262", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "247 \n lawyers do. That will help us write our own argumen ts and more \nquickly read and extract information from the writings of others. \nMy substantive notes on Popov, if I were making an outline, might \nbe something more like: Popov (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002) - Bonds \nhomerun ball case. Popov \u201ccatches,\u201d but Hayashi win ds up with it, \nafter \u201cillegal\u201d violence to Popov but not perpetrated by Hayashi. \nConversion - so issue is whether Popov possessed. Intent+phys \nposs. Physical possession unclear. Ct. considers Finkelman\u2019s rule \n(stopping momentum) and Gray\u2019s (complete contro l after stop, \nincidental contact dislodging vitiates possession), decides on \nGray\u2019s. But Popov deprived of chance to possess because of illegal \ncontact - so \u201cqualified right to possession,\u201d right to try to achieve \npossession unimpeded. But unfair to Hayash i - so split. \nIt would probably be a bit shorter than that when all was said and \ndone. But others will want a much longer description of the facts \nand law in the case than appears in my capsule here. What kind of \nnotes you want depends on how much and what kind of \ndescription you need to enable you to use Popov to make an \nargument in another case.", "proposition": ["247 lawyers use Popov to write their own arguments and quickly read and extract information from the writings of others.", "The author's notes on Popov, if made into an outline, would be something like this: Popov (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002) - Bonds homerun ball case. Popov \"catches,\" but Hayashi wins up with it, after \"illegal\" violence to Popov but not perpetrated by Hayashi. Conversion - so issue is whether Popov possessed. Intent+phys poss. Physical possession unclear. Ct. considers Finkelman\u2019s rule (stopping momentum) and Gray\u2019s (complete control after stop, incidental contact dislodging vitiates possession), decides on Gray\u2019s. But Popov deprived of chance to possess because of illegal contact - so \"qualified right to possession,\" right to try to achieve possession unimpeded. But unfair to Hayashi - so split. It would probably be a bit shorter than that when all was said and done.", "Others may want a much longer description of the facts and law in the case than appears in the author's capsule.", "The kind of notes one wants depends on how much and what kind of description is needed to use Popov to make an argument in another case."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "434", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "419 \n The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, while \nintuitively in conflict,7 were drafted to work together to \nprevent censorship; cop yright laws were enacted in part to \nprevent private censorship and the First Amendment was \nenacted to prevent public censorship. There are \n\u201c[c]onflicting interests that must be accommodated in \ndrawing a definitional balance\u201d between the Copyright \nClause an d the First Amendment. 1 Nimmer \u00a7 1.10[B][1]. \nIn establishing this balance \u201c[o]n the copyright side, \neconomic encouragement for creators must be preserved \nand the privacy of unpublished works recognized. Freedom \nof speech[, on the other hand,] requires the preservation of \na meaningful public or democratic dialogue, as well as the \nuses of speech as a safety valve against violent acts, and as \nan end in itself.\u201d Id. \nIn copyright law, the balance between the First \nAmendment and copyright is preserved, in part, by the \nidea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use. \n1. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy \nCopyright cannot protect an idea, only the expression of \nthat idea. The result is that \u201ccopyright assures authors the \nright to their original expression, but en courages others to \nbuild freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by \nthe work.\u201d Feist, 499 U.S. at 349 -50. It is partly through \nthis idea/expression dichotomy that copyright law \nembodies the First Amendment\u2019s underlying goal of \nencouraging open debat e and the free exchange of ideas. \nHolding an infringer liable in copyright for copying the \nexpression of another author\u2019s ideas does not impede First \nAmendment goals because the public purpose has been \nserved - the public already has access to the idea or the \n \n7 While the First Amendment disallows laws that abridge the freedom of speech, \nthe Copyright Clause ca lls specifically for such a law.", "proposition": ["The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment were drafted to work together to prevent censorship.", "Copyright laws were enacted in part to prevent private censorship, while the First Amendment was enacted to prevent public censorship.", "Conflicting interests must be accommodated in drawing a definitional balance between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.", "The balance between the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment is preserved, in part, by the idea/expression dichotomy and the doctrine of fair use.", "Copyright cannot protect an idea; it can only protect the expression of that idea.", "Copyright law embodies the First Amendment's underlying goal of encouraging open debate and the free exchange of ideas.", "Holding an infringer liable in copyright for copying the expression of another author's ideas does not impede First Amendment goals because the public purpose has been served - the public already has access to the idea or the information conveyed by the work.", "While the First Amendment disallows laws that abridge the freedom of speech, the Copyright Clause calls specifically for such a law."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "524", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "509 \n users to search specifically for \u201cTop 40\u201d songs, which were \ninevitably copyrighted. Similarly, Grokster sent users a \nnewsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, \npopular copyrighted materials. \nIn addition to this evidence of express promotion, \nmarketing, and intent to promote f urther, the business \nmodels employed by Grokster and StreamCast confirm that \ntheir principal object was use of their software to download \ncopyrighted works. Grokster and StreamCast receive no \nrevenue from users, who obtain the software itself for \nnothing. Instead, both companies generate income by \nselling advertising space, and they stream the advertising to \nGrokster and Morpheus users while they are employing the \nprograms. As the number of users of each program \nincreases, advertising opportunities become w orth more. \nWhile there is doubtless some demand for free \nShakespeare, the evidence shows that substantive volume is \na function of free access to copyrighted work. Users \nseeking Top 40 songs, for example, or the latest release by \nModest Mouse, are certain t o be far more numerous than \nthose seeking a free Decameron, and Grokster and \nStreamCast translated that demand into dollars. \nFinally, there is no evidence that either company made an \neffort to filter copyrighted material from users\u2019 downloads \nor otherwise impede the sharing of copyrighted files. \nAlthough Grokster appears to have sent e -mails warning \nusers about infringing content when it received threatening \nnotice from the copyright holders, it never blocked anyone \nfrom continuing to use its software to sh are copyrighted \nfiles. StreamCast not only rejected another company\u2019s offer \nof help to monitor infringement, but blocked the Internet \nProtocol addresses of entities it believed were trying to \nengage in such monitoring on its networks. \n\u2026 . \nII", "proposition": ["509 users searched specifically for \"Top 40\" songs, which were inevitably copyrighted.", "Grokster sent users a newsletter promoting its ability to provide particular, popular copyrighted materials.", "There is evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote further by Grokster and StreamCast.", "The business models of Grokster and StreamCast confirm that their principal object was using their software to download copyrighted works.", "Grokster and StreamCast receive no revenue from users and generate income by selling advertising space.", "The number of users of each program increases, leading to more advertising opportunities.", "Users seeking Top 40 songs or the latest release by Modest Mouse are more numerous than those seeking free Shakespeare.", "Grokster never blocked anyone from using its software to share copyrighted files, even after receiving threatening notice from copyright holders.", "StreamCast rejected another company's offer of help to monitor infringement and blocked entities trying to engage in monitoring on its networks."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "522", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "507 \n After the notorious file -sharing service, Napster, was sued \nby copyright holders for facilitation of copyright \ninfringement, A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 \nF.Supp.2d 896 (N.D.Cal.2000), aff\u2019d in part, rev\u2019d in part, \n239 F.3d 1004 (C.A.9 2001), StreamCast gave away a \nsoftware program of a kind known as OpenNap, designed \nas compatible with the Napster program and open to \nNapster users for downloading files from other Napster \nand OpenNap users\u2019 computers. Evidence indicates that \n\u201c[i]t was always [StreamCast\u2019s] intent to use [its OpenNap \nnetwork] to be able to capture email addresses of [its] initial \ntarget market so that [it ] could promote [its] StreamCast \nMorpheus interface to them,\u201d App. 861; indeed, the \nOpenNap program was engineered \u201c\u2018to leverage Napster\u2019s \n50 million user base.\u2019\u201d \nStreamCast monitored both the number of users down -\nloading its OpenNap program and the number of music \nfiles they downloaded. It also used the resulting OpenNap \nnetwork to distribute copies of the Morpheus software and \nto encourage users to adopt it. Internal company \ndocuments indicate that StreamCast hoped to attract large \nnumbers of former Napst er users if that company was shut \ndown by court order or otherwise, and that StreamCast \nplanned to be the next Napster. A kit developed by \nStreamCast to be delivered to advertisers, for example, \ncontained press articles about StreamCast\u2019s potential to \ncapture former Napster users, and it introduced itself to \nsome potential advertisers as a company \u201cwhich is similar \nto what Napster was.\u201d It broadcast banner advertisements \nto users of other Napster -compatible software, urging them \nto adopt its OpenNap.", "proposition": ["StreamCast used the OpenNap network to distribute copies of the Morpheus software and encourage users to adopt it."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "501", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "486 \n evidence of decreased television viewing by Betamax \nowners.3 \nSony introduced considerable evidence describing \ntelevision programs that could be copied without objection \nfrom any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, \nreligious, and educational prog ramming. For example, their \nsurvey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record \nsports events, and representatives of professional baseball, \nfootball, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no \nobjection to the recording of their televised ev ents for \nhome use. \nRespondents offered opinion evidence concerning the \nfuture impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR\u2019s on the \ncommercial value of their copyrights. The District Court \nfound, however, that they had failed to prove any \nlikelihood of future ha rm from the use of VTR\u2019s for time -\nshifting. Id., at 469. \n\u2026 . \nIII \nThe Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable \nfor infringement committed by another. In contrast, the \n \nAccording to plaintiffs\u2019 survey, 75.4% of the VTR owners \nuse their machines to record for time -shifting purposes \nhalf or most of the time. Defendants\u2019 surve y showed that \n96% of the Betamax owners had used the machine to \nrecord programs they otherwise would have missed. When \nplaintiffs asked interviewees how many cassettes were in \ntheir library, 55.8% said there were 10 or fewer. In \ndefendants\u2019 survey, of the total programs viewed by \ninterviewees in the past month, 70.4% had been viewed \nonly that one time and for 57.9%, there were no plans for \nfurther viewing. \n480 F.Supp., at 438. \n3 \u201c81.9% of the defendants\u2019 interviewees watched the same amount or more of \nregul ar television as they did before owning a Betamax. 83.2% reported their \nfrequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax.\u201d 480 F.Supp., at 439.", "proposition": ["There are 486 pieces of evidence of decreased television viewing by Betamax owners.", "Sony introduced evidence describing television programs that could be copied without objection from any copyright holder, with special emphasis on sports, religious, and educational programming.", "Sony's survey indicated that 7.3% of all Betamax use is to record sports events.", "Representatives of professional baseball, football, basketball, and hockey testified that they had no objection to the recording of their televised events for home use.", "Respondents offered opinion evidence concerning the future impact of the unrestricted sale of VTR's on the commercial value of their copyrights.", "The District Court found that respondents failed to prove any likelihood of future harm from the use of VTR's for time-shifting.", "The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another.", "Plaintiffs' survey showed that 75.4% of VTR owners use their machines to record for time-shifting purposes half or most of the time.", "Defendants' survey showed that 96% of Betamax owners had used the machine to record programs they otherwise would have missed.", "In plaintiffs' survey, 55.8% of interviewees said there were 10 or fewer cassettes in their library.", "In defendants' survey, 70.4% of the total programs viewed by interviewees in the past month had been viewed only once, and for 57.9%, there were no plans for further viewing.", "81.9% of defendants' interviewees watched the same amount or more of regular television as they did before owning a Betamax.", "83.2% of defendants' interviewees reported that their frequency of movie going was unaffected by Betamax."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "214", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "199 \n and abundance, being perishable matters, future acquisitions form a \nnecessary supplement to present possessions. \nWhen insecurity reaches a certain point, the fear of loss hinders t he \nenjoyment of what is possessed. The care of preserving condemns \nus to a thousand sad and painful precautions, always liable to fail. \nTreasures fly away, or are buried: enjoyment becomes sombre, \nstealthy, and solitary: it fears, by the exhibition of itse lf, to direct \ncupidity to its prey. \n4. Destruction of Industry .\u2014If I despair of enjoying the fruits of my \nlabour, I shall only think of living from day to day: I shall not \nundertake labours which will only benefit my enemies. But besides \nthis, in order to the existence of labour, the will alone is not \nsufficient: instruments are wanting: whilst these are being provided, \nsubsistence is necessary. A single loss may render me unable to act, \nwithout depriving me of the disposition to labour \u2014without having \nparal yzed my will. Hence the three first of these evils affect the \npassive faculties of the individual, whilst the fourth extends to his \nactive faculties, and strikes them with numbness. \nIt is perceived in this analysis, that the two first of these evils do \nnot extend beyond the individual injured; but the two latter expand \nthemselves, and occupy an indefinite space in society. An attack \nmade upon the property of one individual spreads alarm among the \nother proprietors: this feeling is communicated from one to \nanother, and the contagion may at last spread over the whole body \nof the state. \nFor the development of industry, the union of power and will is \nrequired. Will depends upon encouragement \u2014power upon \nmeans. \u2014These means are called, in the language of political \neconomy, productive capital. \u2014With regard to a single individual, \nhis capital may be destroyed, without his industrious disposition \nbeing destroyed, or even weakened.", "proposition": ["Future acquisitions form a necessary supplement to present possessions because perishable matters.", "When insecurity reaches a certain point, the fear of loss hinders the enjoyment of what is possessed.", "The care of preserving condemns us to a thousand sad and painful precautions, always liable to fail.", "Treasures fly away, or are buried, causing enjoyment to become sombre, stealthy, and solitary.", "If an individual despairs of enjoying the fruits of their labour, they will only think of living from day to day and not undertake labours that will only benefit their enemies.", "In order for the existence of labour, the will alone is not sufficient; instruments are needed, and subsistence is necessary while these are being provided.", "A single loss may render an individual unable to act without depriving them of the disposition to labour or paralyzing their will.", "The first three evils affect the passive faculties of an individual, while the fourth extends to their active faculties and strikes them with numbness.", "The first two evils do not extend beyond the individual injured, but the last two expand themselves and occupy an indefinite space in society.", "An attack made upon the property of one individual spreads alarm among other proprietors, and the feeling is communicated from one to another, potentially spreading over the whole body of the state.", "For the development of industry, the union of power and will is required.", "Will depends upon encouragement, and power depends upon means.", "These means are called productive capital in the language of political economy.", "A single individual's capital may be destroyed without their industrious disposition being destroyed or even weakened."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "571", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "556 \n Act between plaintiff\u2019s and defendants\u2019 albums as a matter \nof law.6 \nLikewise, plaintiff\u2019s state law unfair competition claim also \nfails.7 As a threshold matter, plaintiff cannot proceed under \nM.C.L. s 429.428 because application of that statute \nconte mplates a state registered trademark, which plaintiff \ndoes not have. Furthermore, plaintiff has not established \nthat she has any common law trademark rights in her name, \n \n6 Compare the Lanham Act cases cited by plaintiff all of which involved the use \nof famous persons\u2019 names in connection with recordings by them, thereby directly \nand intentionally misrepresenting that the plaintiffs had approved the \nunauthorized distributions of their work. See PPX Enter., Inc. v. Audiofidelity \nEnter., Inc., 818 F.2d 266, 268 (2d Cir.1987) (defendants marketed eight albums \nalleged ly containing feature performances by the electric guitarist Jimi Hendrix, \nwhen in fact the albums \u201ceither did not contain Hendrix performances at all or \ncontained performances in which Hendrix was merely a background performer or \nundifferentiated session player\u201d); Apple Corps Ltd. v. Adirondack Group, 124 \nMisc.2d 351, 355, 476 N.Y.S.2d 716, 719 (1983) (defendants distributed \n\u201crecordings of inferior quality which were made as a lark\u201d); Benson v. Paul Winley \nRecord Sales Corp., 452 F.Supp. 516, 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendants \u201cmade [the \nplaintiff] to appear as the central and controlling artist when in fact he was not,\u201d \nand also misrepresented to the public that the songs on the album were recent \nreleases by the plaintiff). On the other hand, defendants here h ave not used \nplaintiff\u2019s name on a work by plaintiff, nor have defendants misappropriated any \nwritten or recorded material of plaintiff\u2019s. \n7 The Sixth Circuit noted in Carson v. Here\u2019s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., that \nLanham Act and Michigan state law u nfair competition claims were both \ngoverned by the same standards.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving plaintiff\u2019s and defendants\u2019 albums.", "As a matter of law, the act between plaintiff\u2019s and defendants\u2019 albums is being considered.", "Plaintiff\u2019s state law unfair competition claim fails.", "Plaintiff cannot proceed under M.C.L. s 429.428 because application of that statute requires a state registered trademark, which plaintiff does not have.", "Furthermore, plaintiff has not established that she has any common law trademark rights in her name.", "The Lanham Act cases cited by plaintiff all involved the use of famous persons\u2019 names in connection with recordings by them, thereby directly and intentionally misrepresenting that the plaintiffs had approved the unauthorized distributions of their work.", "Defendants in the case have not used plaintiff\u2019s name on a work by plaintiff, nor have defendants misappropriated any written or recorded material of plaintiff\u2019s.", "The Sixth Circuit noted in Carson v. Here\u2019s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., that Lanham Act and Michigan state law unfair competition claims were both governed by the same standards."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "591", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "576 \n Finally, the eighth factor, \u201clikelihood of expansion of the \nproduct lines,\u201d does not appear apposite to a celebrity \nendorsement case such as this. \nApplication of the Sleekcraft f actors to this case indicates \nthat the district court erred in rejecting White\u2019s Lanham \nAct claim at the summary judgment stage. In so \nconcluding, we emphasize two facts, however. First, \nconstruing the motion papers in White\u2019s favor, as we must, \nwe hold on ly that White has raised a genuine issue of \nmaterial fact concerning a likelihood of confusion as to her \nendorsement. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 \nF.2d 851, 852 -53 (9th Cir.1988). Whether White\u2019s Lanham \nAct claim should succeed is a matter for th e jury. Second, \nwe stress that we reach this conclusion in light of the \npeculiar facts of this case. In particular, we note that the \nrobot ad identifies White and was part of a series of ads in \nwhich other celebrities participated and were paid for their \nendorsement of Samsung\u2019s products. \nIV. The Parody Defense \nIn defense, defendants cite a number of cases for the \nproposition that their robot ad constituted protected \nspeech. The only cases they cite which are even remotely \nrelevant to this case are Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 \nU.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) and L.L. Bean, \nInc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.1987). \nThose cases involved parodies of advertisements run for \nthe purpose of poking fun at Jerry Falwell and L.L. Bea n, \nrespectively. This case involves a true advertisement run for \nthe purpose of selling Samsung VCRs. The ad\u2019s spoof of \nVanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient and only \ntangentially related to the ad\u2019s primary message: \u201cbuy \nSamsung VCRs.\u201d Defendant s\u2019 parody arguments are better", "proposition": ["The eighth factor, 'likelihood of expansion of the product lines,' does not seem relevant to a celebrity endorsement case like this one.", "Applying the Sleekcraft factors to this case indicates that the district court erred in rejecting White's Lanham Act claim at the summary judgment stage.", "In concluding this, we emphasize two facts: first, White has raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning a likelihood of confusion as to her endorsement; and second, whether White's Lanham Act claim should succeed is a matter for the jury.", "We reach this conclusion in light of the peculiar facts of this case, particularly the fact that the robot ad identifies White and was part of a series of ads in which other celebrities participated and were paid for their endorsement of Samsung's products.", "Defendants cite a number of cases for the proposition that their robot ad constituted protected speech.", "The only cases they cite that are even remotely relevant to this case are Hustler Magazine v. Falwell and L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc.", "Those cases involved parodies of advertisements run for the purpose of poking fun at Jerry Falwell and L.L. Bean, respectively.", "This case involves a true advertisement run for the purpose of selling Samsung VCRs.", "The ad's spoof of Vanna White and Wheel of Fortune is subservient and only tangentially related to the ad's primary message: 'buy Samsung VCRs.'", "Defendants' parody arguments are better"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "748", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "See Kavorkian , 694 P.2d at \n163; Municipality of Anchorage v. Baugh Construction & Engineering Co. , 722 P.2d 919, \n927 (Alaska 1986).", "proposition": ["1. Kavorkian is a case with the citation 694 P.2d at 163.", "2. Municipality of Anchorage v. Baugh Construction & Engineering Co. is a case with the citation 722 P.2d 919, 927 (Alaska 1986)."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "445", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "at 580. It is hard to \nimagine how Randall could have specifically criticized \nGWTW without depending heavil y upon copyrighted \nelements of that book. A parody is a work that seeks to \ncomment upon or criticize another work by appropriating \nelements of the original. \u201cParody needs to mimic an", "proposition": ["Parody needs to mimic an original work.", "A parody is a work that seeks to comment upon or criticize another work by appropriating elements of the original.", "It is hard to imagine how Randall could have specifically criticized Gone with the Wind (GWTG) without depending heavily upon copyrighted elements of that book."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "278", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "263 \n because tribal wars, poaching, and disease keep the numbers of \nboth man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. \nFinally, however, comes the day of reckoning, that is, the day when \nthe long -desired goal of s ocial stability becomes a reality. At this \npoint, the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates \ntragedy. \nAs a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. \nExplicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, \u201cWhat is \nthe ut ility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?\u201d This \nutility has one negative and one positive component. \n1. The positive component is a function of the increment of \none animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds \nfrom the sale of the additional a nimal, the positive utility is \nnearly +1. \n2. The negative component is a function of the additional \novergrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, \nthe effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, \nthe negative utility for any particular deci sion-making \nherdsman is only a fraction of -1. \nAdding together the component partial utilities, the rational \nherdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to \npursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and \nanother\u2026. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every \nrational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each \nman is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd \nwithout limit \u2013in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination \ntoward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a \nsociety that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a \ncommons brings ruin to all. \n\u2026 . \nThe National Parks present another instance of the working out of \nthe tragedy of the commons. At present, they are open to all, \nwithout limit. The parks themselves are limited in extent \u2013there is \nonly one Yosemite Valley \u2013whereas population seems to grow", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the tragedy of the commons, which occurs when individuals acting in their own self-interest deplete a shared resource.", "The passage explains that the carrying capacity of the land is well below the number of people and animals that can be supported by it due to factors such as tribal wars, poaching, and disease.", "The passage states that social stability becomes a reality when the long-desired goal is achieved.", "Each herdsman seeks to maximize their gain by asking, \"What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?\"", "The positive component of the utility is nearly +1, as the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal.", "The negative component of the utility is a fraction of -1, as the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen.", "The rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course is to add another animal to their herd, and this conclusion is reached by each herdsman.", "This leads to a tragedy, as each person is locked into a system that compels them to increase their herd without limit in a world that is limited.", "The passage mentions that freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.", "The National Parks are presented as another instance of the working out of the tragedy of the commons, with parks being open to all without limit while population seems to grow."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "328", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "313 \n there is a dedication to the public under the copyright \nstatutes or otherwise. But they are inapplic able for two \nreasons: (1) At common law, as under the copyright acts, \nintellectual productions are entitled to such protection only \nif there is underneath something evincing the mind of a \ncreator or originator, however modest the requirement. \nThe mere reco rd of isolated happenings, whether in words \nor by photographs not involving artistic skill, are denied \nsuch protection. (2) At common law, as under the \ncopyright acts, the element in intellectual productions \nwhich secures such protection, is not the knowle dge, truths, \nideas, or emotions which the composition expresses, but \nthe form or sequence in which they are expressed; that is, \n\u2018some new collocation of visible or audible points \u2013 of \nlines, colors, sounds, or words.\u2019 See White -Smith Music Co. \nv. Apollo Co ., 209 U. S. 1, 19; Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., \n222 U. S. 55, 63. An author\u2019s theories, suggestions, and \nspeculations, or the systems, plans, methods, and \narrangements of an originator, derive no such protection \nfrom the statutory copyright of the book in w hich they are \nset forth; and they are likewise denied such protection at \ncommon law. \nThat news is not property in the strict sense is illustrated by \nthe case of Sports and General Press Agency, Ltd., v. \u2018Our \nDogs\u2019 Publishing Co., Ltd., [1916] 2 K. B. 880, where the \nplaintiff, the assignee of the right to photograph the \nexhibits at a dog show, was refused an injunction against \ndefendant who had also taken pictures of the show and was \npublishing them.", "proposition": ["The text contains an unexpected character when decoding array value (2).", "Ensure the JSON format is correct and all values are in the correct format."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "632", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "617 \n casualty prior to closing, the contract shall continue in full \nforce and effect, and purchaser shall be subrogated to \nseller's right of coverage with respect to any insurance \ncarried by seller. \nAll existing property insurance now in effect shall be \ncontinued by seller, and shall be transferred to purchaser at \nclosing. Premiums on such insurance shall be prorated to \ntime of closing. All such policies shall be exhibited \nimmediately to purchaser, who may secure additional \ninsurance on property, or any portion of it, if so desired. \nAny such additional insurance shall name seller and \npurchaser as coinsureds as their interests appear. \nSection \nV. Transfer of Property \nSeller shall maintain property, including improvements, the \npersonal property described in this agreement, and lawns, \nshrubs, and trees, in its present condi tion pending the \nclosing of this transaction, normal and reasonable wear \nexcepted. \nPrior to transfer of possession, purchaser shall cause \nproperty to be cleaned and placed in a neat, sanitary, and \nhabitable condition. Property shall be transferred to \npurch aser, as provided in this agreement, in such condition, \nand clear of all trash, debris, and the personal effects, \nfurnishings, and belongings of seller. \nPossession of property shall be transferred to purchaser \nwithin days after closing of sale. All keys sh all be delivered \nto purchaser at the time of transfer of possession. If \ntransfer is delayed for any cause beyond the period \nspecified in this agreement, seller shall pay to purchaser $ \nfor each day of such delay, as agreed rental, but this \nprovision shall not be construed as barring or limiting any \nremedy available to purchaser, in law or equity, for the \nrecovery of possession.", "proposition": ["Ensure that the JSON output is enclosed in curly braces {}"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "232", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "2 Blk. Com. 9; 1 Bouv. Am. L. 195, No. 494; \nCoop. Just. Lib. 11, Tit. I. S. 46; Abbott on Shipping 555, Am.", "proposition": ["The passage refers to 2 Blk. Com. 9.", "The passage also refers to 1 Bouv. Am. L. 195, No. 494.", "The passage mentions Coop. Just. Lib. 11, Tit. I. S. 46.", "The passage cites Abbott on Shipping 555, Am."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "675", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The regulations promulgated pursuant to Alaska Homestead Act, 43 C.F.R. s \n2567.7(c) (1975) state: \nIn Alaska as elsewhere in the United States, a forf eiture of \nthe claim results from a transfer of any part of the land or \nof any interest therein before the submission of the proof, \nwith certain exceptions specified by law.", "proposition": ["The Alaska Homestead Act, 43 C.F.R. s 2567.7(c) (1975), states that a forfeiture of the claim occurs if any part of the land or interest therein is transferred before the submission of the proof."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "36", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "21 \n commercial traveller, called on a firm named Byfield & \nHawkesworth on business, as he was in the habit of doing, \nand as he was leaving the shop he picked up a small parcel \nwhich was lying on the floor. He immediately showed it to \nthe shopman, and opened it in his presence, when it was \nfound to consist of a quantity of Bank of England notes, to \nthe amount of 65\u00a3. The defendant, who was a partner in \nthe firm of Byfield & Hawkesworth, was then called, and \nthe plaintiff told him he had found the notes, and asked the \ndefendant to keep them until the owner appeared to claim \nthem. Then various advertisements were put in the papers \nasking for the owner, but the true owner was never found. \nNo person having appeared to claim them, and three years \nhaving elapsed since they were found, the plaintiff applied \nto the defendant to have the notes returned to him, and \noffered to pay the expenses of the advertisements, and to \ngive an ind emnity. The defendant refused to deliver them \nup to the plaintiff, and an action was brought in the county \ncourt of Westminster in consequence of that refusal. The \ncounty court judge decided that the defendant, the \nshopkeeper, was entitled to the custody o f the notes as \nagainst the plaintiff, and gave judgment for the defendant. \nThereupon the appeal was brought which came before the \ncourt composed of Patteson J. and Wightman J. Patteson J. \nsaid: \u201cThe notes which are the subject of this action were \nincidenta lly dropped, by mere accident, in the shop of the \ndefendant, by the owner of them. The facts do not warrant \nthe supposition that they had been deposited there \nintentionally, nor has the case been put at all upon that \nground. The plaintiff found them on the floor, they being \nmanifestly lost by someone. The general right of the finder \nto any article which has been lost, as against all the world, \nexcept the true owner, was established in the case of \nArmory v. Delamirie22 which has never been disputed. This \n \n22 1 Str. 505.", "proposition": ["A commercial traveller found a small parcel containing Bank of England notes on the floor of a shop named Byfield & Hawkesworth.", "The defendant, a partner in the firm of Byfield & Hawkesworth, was informed about the found notes.", "Various advertisements were placed in the papers asking for the owner of the notes, but the true owner was never found.", "The plaintiff applied to the defendant to have the notes returned, but the defendant refused.", "An action was brought in the county court of Westminster.", "The county court judge decided that the defendant was entitled to the custody of the notes as against the plaintiff.", "An appeal was brought, and the case came before the court composed of Patteson J. and Wightman J."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "692", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Whereas, \u201ccolor of title\u201d \nimports there is an instrument giving the appearance of \ntitle, bu t which instrument in point of law does not. \n(Citations omitted.)", "proposition": ["The concept of 'color of title' implies that there is an instrument that gives the appearance of title.", "However, in point of law, this instrument does not actually confer title."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "750", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "735 \n \u201cacted toward the land as if he owned it,\u201d without the \npermission of one with legal authority to give possession. \nHubbard , 684 P.2d at 848 (citing Peters , 519 P.2d at 832). As \nindicated, the Fagerstroms\u2019 actions toward the property \nwere consistent with ownership of it, and Nome 2000 \noffers no proof that the Fagerstroms so acted with \nanyone\u2019s permission. That the Fagerstroms\u2019 objective \nmanifestations of ownership may have been acc ompanied \nby what was described as a traditional Native Alaskan \nmind -set is irrelevant. To hold otherwise would be \ninconsistent with precedent and patently unfair. \nHaving concluded that the Fagerstroms established the \nelements of adverse possession, we turn to the question \nwhether they were entitled to the entire disputed parcel. \nSpecifically, the question presented is whether the jury \ncould reasonably conclude that the Fagerstroms adversely \npossessed the southerly portion of the disputed parcel.9 \nAbsent color of title,10 only property actually possessed may \nbe acquired by adverse possession. Bentley Family Trust v. \nLynx Enterprises , Inc., 658 P.2d 761, 768 (Alaska 1983) and \nLinck , 559 P.2d at 1052 -53 n. 8. See also Krebs , 768 P.2d at \n126 and n. 7 (recognizing the possibility that the \nrequirements of adverse possession may be met only as to a \nportion of a disputed parcel). Here, from the summer of \n1977 through the summer of 1978, the Fagerstroms\u2019 only \nactivity on the south erly portion of the land included use of \nthe pre -existing trails in connection with subsistence and \nrecreational activities, and picking up litter. They claim that \nthese activities, together with their placement of the \ncornerposts, constituted actual posse ssion of the southerly \n \n9 See supra n. 8.", "proposition": ["The Fagerstroms acted toward the land as if they owned it without the permission of one with legal authority to give possession.", "Hubbard states that the Fagerstroms' actions toward the property were consistent with ownership of it, and Nome 2000 offers no proof that the Fagerstroms so acted with anyone's permission.", "The traditional Native Alaskan mindset of the Fagerstroms is irrelevant to their claim of adverse possession.", "To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with precedent and patently unfair.", "The Fagerstroms have established the elements of adverse possession.", "The question presented is whether the Fagerstroms adversely possessed the southerly portion of the disputed parcel.", "Absent color of title, only property actually possessed may be acquired by adverse possession.", "From the summer of 1977 through the summer of 1978, the Fagerstroms' only activity on the southerly portion of the land included use of the pre-existing trails in connection with subsistence and recreational activities, and picking up litter.", "The Fagerstroms claim that these activities, together with their placement of the cornerposts, constituted actual possession of the southerly portion of the land."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "240", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "225 \n exertions for its preservation and \nrescue. There is no foundation for \nsuch notion. The right of a salvor \nresults from the fact that he has held \nin actual possession, or has kept near \nwhat was lost or abandoned by the \nowner, or placed in a dangerous \nexposure to destruction, with the \nmeans at command to preserve and \nsave it, and that he is actually \nemploying those means to that end. \nThe finder thus becomes the legal \npossessor, and acquires a privilege \nagainst the property for his salvage \nservices which takes precedence of all \nother title. \nLewis v. The Elizabeth & Jane , Ware, 41; The Bee , Ware, 332; \nThe St. Peter , Bee, 82. \n* * * The fact that property is found at \nsea or on the coast in peril, without the \npresence of anyone to protect it, gives \nthe finder a right to take it in his \npossession; and the law connects with \nsuch right the obligation to use the \nmeans he has at control, and with al l \nreasonable promptitude, to save it for \nthe owner. He can therefore be no \notherwise clothed with the character of \nsalvor than whilst he is in the \noccupancy of the property, and \nemploying the necessary means for \nsaving it. \nNotorious possession, with the av owal \nof the object of such possession, are \ncardinal requisites to the creation or \nmaintenance of the privileges of a \nsalvor; where they do not exist, any", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the right of a salvor.", "The right of a salvor results from actual possession or keeping near what was lost or abandoned by the owner.", "The finder becomes the legal possessor and acquires a privilege against the property for salvage services.", "The passage cites examples from legal cases.", "The fact that property is found at sea or on the coast in peril gives the finder a right to take it into possession.", "The law connects the right to take possession with the obligation to use means to save the property for the owner.", "A salvor can only be clothed with the character of salvor while in occupancy of the property and employing necessary means for saving it.", "Notorious possession and the avowal of the object of possession are cardinal requisites for the creation or maintenance of the privileges of a salvor.", "Without notorious possession and avowal, any claim to salvage privileges is invalid."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "721", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "289, 149 A.2d 17, 21 -22 \n(1959)). There was uncontradicted testimony that the \nplaintiff cut the grass, planted flowers, improved the flower \nbeds, and entertained on the property. This is entirely \ncompatible with the type of use that would be expected of \nthe owner of unimproved land. Moreover, this Court \nrepeatedly has made the statement that \u201c[c]ultivating land, \nplanting trees, and making other improvements in such a \nmanner as is usual for comparable land have been \nsuccessfully relied on as proof of the required possession.\u201d", "proposition": ["The plaintiff cut the grass, planted flowers, improved the flower beds, and entertained on the property, which is compatible with the type of use expected of the owner of unimproved land."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "595", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "580 \n common law and the statutory actions are: (1) Secti on \n3344, subdivision (a) requires knowing use whereas under \ncase law, mistake and inadvertence are not a defense against \ncommercial appropriation and (2) section 3344, subdivision \n(g) expressly provides that its remedies are cumulative and \nin addition to a ny provided by law.\u201d Eastwood, 149 \nCal.App.3d at n. 6, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342 (emphasis in original). \nThe court did not include appropriations of identity by \nmeans other than name or likeness among its list of \ndifferences between the statute and the common law. \nThe majority also relies on Dean Prosser\u2019s statement that \n\u201c[i]t is not impossible that there might be an appropriation \nof the plaintiff\u2019s identity, as by impersonation, without the \nuse of either his name or his likeness, and that this would \nbe an invasion of his right of privacy.\u201d Prosser, Privacy,48 \nCal.L.Rev. 383, 401 n. 155 (1960). As Dean Prosser noted, \nhowever, \u201c[n]o such case appears to have arisen.\u201d Id. \nThe majority states that the case law has borne out Dean \nProsser\u2019s insight that the right to publ icity is not limited to \nname or likeness. As noted above, however, the courts of \nCalifornia have never found an infringement on the right to \npublicity without the use of the plaintiff\u2019s name or likeness. \nThe interest of the California Legislature as expres sed in \nCalifornia Civil Code section 3344 appears to preclude the \nresult reached by the majority. The original section 3344 \nprotected only name or likeness. In 1984, ten years after \nour decision in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco \nCompany, 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1974) and 24 years after \nProsser speculated about the future development of the law \nof the right of publicity, the California legislature amended \nthe statute. California law now makes the use of someone\u2019s \nvoice or signature, as well as name or likeness, actionable.", "proposition": ["Section 3344 of the California Civil Code requires knowing use of a person's name or likeness for commercial appropriation.", "Under common law, mistake and inadvertence are not a defense against commercial appropriation.", "Section 3344 of the California Civil Code provides that its remedies are cumulative and in addition to any provided by law.", "The court did not include appropriations of identity by means other than name or likeness among its list of differences between the statute and the common law.", "Dean Prosser speculated that there might be an appropriation of a person's identity without the use of their name or likeness, but no such case appears to have arisen.", "The majority relies on Dean Prosser's insight that the right to publicity is not limited to name or likeness.", "The courts of California have never found an infringement on the right to publicity without the use of the plaintiff's name or likeness.", "The interest of the California Legislature as expressed in California Civil Code section 3344 appears to preclude the result reached by the majority.", "The original section 3344 protected only name or likeness.", "In 1984, ten years after Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and 24 years after Prosser's speculation, the California legislature amended the statute to include the use of someone's voice or signature, as well as name or likeness, as actionable."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "638", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "623 \n contract of sale and recovery of his down payment. New \nYork law fails to recognize any remedy for damages \nincurred as a result of the seller\u2019s mere silence, applying \ninstead the strict rule of caveat em ptor. Therefore, the \ntheoretical basis for granting relief, even under the \nextraordinary facts of this case, is elusive if not ephemeral. \n\u201cPity me not but lend thy serious hearing to what I shall \nunfold\u201d (William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I, Scene V \n[Ghost] ). \nFrom the perspective of a person in the position of plaintiff \nherein, a very practical problem arises with respect to the \ndiscovery of a paranormal phenomenon: \u201cWho you gonna\u2019 \ncall?\u201d as a title song to the movie \u201cGhostbusters\u201d asks. \nApplying the strict rule of caveat emptor to a contract \ninvolving a house possessed by poltergeists conjures up \nvisions of a psychic or medium routinely accompanying the \nstructural engineer and Terminix man on an inspection of \nevery home subject to a contract of sale. It port ends that \nthe prudent attorney will establish an escrow account lest \nthe subject of the transaction come back to haunt him and \nhis client \u2013or pray that his malpractice insurance coverage \nextends to supernatural disasters. In the interest of avoiding \nsuch un tenable consequences, the notion that a haunting is \na condition which can and should be ascertained upon \nreasonable inspection of the premises is a hobgoblin which \nshould be exorcised from the body of legal precedent and \nlaid quietly to rest. \nIt has been s uggested by a leading authority that the ancient \nrule which holds that mere nondisclosure does not \nconstitute actionable misrepresentation \u201cfinds proper \napplication in cases where the fact undisclosed is patent, or \nthe plaintiff has equal opportunities for obtaining \ninformation which he may be expected to utilize, or the \ndefendant has no reason to think that he is acting under \nany misapprehension\u201d (Prosser, Torts \u00a7 106, at 696 [4th ed \n1971]). However, with respect to transactions in real estate,", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a contract of sale and recovery of a down payment.", "New York law applies the strict rule of caveat emptor, which does not recognize any remedy for damages incurred as a result of the seller's mere silence.", "The theoretical basis for granting relief under the extraordinary facts of the case is elusive or ephemeral.", "A practical problem arises with respect to the discovery of a paranormal phenomenon in a contract involving a house possessed by poltergeists.", "The passage suggests that the prudent attorney will establish an escrow account to avoid un tenable consequences.", "The notion that a haunting is a condition which can and should be ascertained upon reasonable inspection of the premises should be exorcised from the body of legal precedent.", "A leading authority suggests that the ancient rule which holds that mere nondisclosure does not constitute actionable misrepresentation finds proper application in cases where the fact undisclosed is patent, the plaintiff has equal opportunities for obtaining information which he may be expected to utilize, or the defendant has no reason to think that he is acting under any misapprehension.", "With respect to transactions in real estate, the passage discusses the application of this ancient rule."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "31", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Scott Cairns for plaintiff. The plaintiff, as the finder of this \nbrooch, is entitled to its possession as against all persons \nother than the owner, who is unknown: Armory v. \nDelamirie.1 The case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth2 is \n \n1 (1722) 1 Str. 505. \n2 (1851) 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["The case Armory v. Delamirie can be found in 2 (1851) 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "The case Bridges v. Hawkesworth can be found in 1 (1722) 1 Str. 505."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "746", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Nome 2000 also argues that the \nFagerstroms\u2019 use of the disputed p arcel was not exclusive \nbecause \u201c[o]thers were free to pick the berries, use the \npaths and fish in the area.\u201d We reject these arguments. \nWhether a claimant\u2019s physical acts upon the land are \nsufficiently continuous, notorious and exclusive does not \nnecessar ily depend on the existence of significant \nimprovements, substantial activity or absolute exclusivity.", "proposition": ["Nome 2000 argues that the Fagerstroms' use of the disputed parcel was not exclusive.", "Nome 2000 claims that others were free to pick berries, use paths, and fish in the area.", "The author rejects these arguments made by Nome 2000.", "The author states that a claimant's physical acts upon the land do not necessarily depend on significant improvements, substantial activity, or absolute exclusivity."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "264", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "249 \n first advised that he was the caretaker, not the owner, of \nthe property. \nPlaintiff continued to excavate the area for the next three \nyears until he had located and excavated approximately 150 \nburial sites, containing beads, European ceramics, \nstoneware, glass bottles; iron k ettles, vessels and skillets; \nknives, muskets, gunflints, balls and shots; crucifixes, rings \nand bracelets; and native pottery. The excavated artifacts \nare estimated to weigh two to two and one -half tons. \nIn search of a buyer for the collection, plaintiff talked to \nDr. Robert S. Neitzel of Louisiana State University, who, in \nturn, informed Dr. Jeffrey D. Brain of Harvard University. \nDr. Brain, who was involved in a survey of archeology \nalong the lower Mississippi River, viewed the artifacts and \nbegan discus sions of their sale to the Peabody Museum of \nHarvard University. The discussions resulted in the lease of \nthe artifacts to the Museum, where they were inventoried, \ncatalogued and displayed. \nPlaintiff initially informed Dr. Neitzel and Dr. Brain that he \nhad found the artifacts in a cave in Mississippi, so as to \nconceal their source; later he did disclose the actual site of \nthe find to Dr. Brain, who had expressed his concern over \nthe title of the artifacts. Dr. Brain then obtained permission \nfrom the landown ers to do further site testing and \nconfirmed that it was the true source of the artifacts. \nConfronted with the inability to sell the collection because \nhe could not prove ownership, plaintiff filed suit against the \nsix nonresident landowners of Trudeau Pla ntation, \nrequesting declaratory relief confirming that he was the \nowner of the artifacts. Alternatively, plaintiff requested that \nhe be awarded compensation under the theory of unjust \nenrichment for his time and expenses. \nThe State of Louisiana intervened in the proceeding on \nnumerous grounds, including its duty to protect its citizens \nin the absence of the lawful heirs of the artifacts. In 1978,", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving the ownership of a collection of artifacts.", "The plaintiff, who discovered the artifacts, is not the owner of the property where they were found.", "The plaintiff excavated the area for three years and found approximately 150 burial sites containing various artifacts.", "The excavated artifacts are estimated to weigh two to two and a half tons.", "The plaintiff tried to sell the collection to the Peabody Museum of Harvard University.", "The plaintiff initially lied about the source of the artifacts to conceal their true origin.", "Dr. Brain, from Harvard University, confirmed the true source of the artifacts after being informed of the plaintiff's lie.", "The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the six nonresident landowners of Trudeau Plantation, requesting declaratory relief or compensation under the theory of unjust enrichment.", "The State of Louisiana intervened in the proceeding, claiming its duty to protect its citizens in the absence of the lawful heirs of the artifacts.", "The passage was written in 1978."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "227", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "2.1.3. Sunken Ships, Baseballs, and Artifacts \nEads v. Brazelton, 22 Ark. 499 (1861) \nAppeal from Miss issippi Circuit Court in Chancery. Hon. \nGeorge W. Beazley, Circuit Judge. \nFowler & Stillwell, for the appellant. \nWatkins & Gallagher, for appellee. \nFAIRCHILD , J. \nWhen things that become property from being \nappropriated are the property of nobody, are in a state of \nnegative community, the first finder may reduce them to \npossession, which is a good claim, and under the name of \ntitle by occupancy is regarded as the foundation of all \nproperty. 2 Blk\u2019s Com. 3, 258; 1 Bouv. Am. L. 194, No. 491; \nPothier Droit De P ropriete , Nos. 20, 21; La. Civil Code , Art\u2019s \n3375, 3376. \nHence, wild animals, that are not property in their natural \ncondition, may be captured, will belong to the first taker by \noccupancy, and will so belong while in the keeping of the \ntaker, or person cl aiming under him, or while in \ndomestication. 2 Kent. 348; Coop. Just. Lib. II, Tit. I. sec. 12; \n1 Bouv. Am. L. 194, No. 492; La. Civil Code , Art. 3379. \nSo, the finder of things that have never been appropriated, \nor that have been abandoned by a former occu pant, may \ntake them into his possession as his own property; and the \nfinder of anything casually lost is its rightful occupant \nagainst all but the real owner. \n\u2026 .", "proposition": ["The first taker of wild animals by occupancy will own them."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "151", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "136 \n discover that a legiti mate action exists which would require \nhim to defend the design and location of his home against a \nnuisance suit, notwithstanding the fact that he located and \nbegan to build his house within the applicable building, \nmunicipal, and deed restrictions. \nObviou sly, the legislature was cognizant of the importance \nof notice. In Chapter 354, Laws of 1981, secs. 66.032(5) \nand (6) deal with notice to an adjoining landowner. \n[statutory excerpt omitted] \nIn recognizing this common law cause of action, this \ncourt\u2019s decis ion is in direct conflict with the 1981 legislative \nprovisions for the granting of solar access permits. In a \nmunicipality which enacts the ordinance in conformity with \nthe statute, neighbors know their respective rights. Under \nthe majority decision, in a municipality which does not \nenact the ordinance, a common law cause of action for \nnuisance exists without any defined rights. \nI believe the facts of the instant controversy present the \nclassic case of the owner of a solar collector who fails to \ntake any ac tion to protect his investment. There is nothing \nin the record to indicate that Mr. Prah disclosed his \nsituation to Mr. Maretti prior to Maretti\u2019s purchase of the \nlot or attempted to secure protection for his solar collector \nprior to Maretti\u2019s submission o f his building plans to the \narchitectural committee. Such inaction should be \nconsidered a significant factor in determining whether a \ncause of action exists. \nThe majority\u2019s failure to recognize the need for notice may \nperpetuate a vicious cycle. Maretti ma y feel compelled to \nsell his lot because of Prah\u2019s solar collector\u2019s interference \nwith his plans to build his family home. If so, Maretti will \nnot be obliged to inform prospective purchasers of the \nproblem. Certainly, such information will reduce the value \nof his land. If the presence of collectors is sufficient notice, \nit cannot be said that the seller of the lot has a duty to", "proposition": ["The majority's failure to recognize the need for notice may perpetuate a vicious cycle."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "640", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "625 \n principle of law, long before exceptions were embodied in \nstatute law, the doctrine was held inapplicable to contagion \namong animals, adulteration of food, and insolvency of a \nmaker of a promissory note and of a tenant substituted for \nanother under a lease. Common law is not moribund. Ex \nfacto jus oritur (law arises o ut of facts). Where fairness and \ncommon sense dictate that an exception should be created, \nthe evolution of the law should not be stifled by rigid \napplication of a legal maxim. \nThe doctrine of caveat emptor requires that a buyer act \nprudently to assess the fitness and value of his purchase \nand operates to bar the purchaser who fails to exercise due \ncare from seeking the equitable remedy of rescission. For \nthe purposes of the instant motion to dismiss the action \npursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), plaintiff is en titled to every \nfavorable inference which may reasonably be drawn from \nthe pleadings, specifically, in this instance, that he met his \nobligation to conduct an inspection of the premises and a \nsearch of available public records with respect to title. It \nshould be apparent, however, that the most meticulous \ninspection and the search would not reveal the presence of \npoltergeists at the premises or unearth the property\u2019s \nghoulish reputation in the community. Therefore, there is \nno sound policy reason to deny pl aintiff relief for failing to \ndiscover a state of affairs which the most prudent \npurchaser would not be expected to even contemplate. \nThe case law in this jurisdiction dealing with the duty of a \nvendor of real property to disclose information to the \nbuyer is distinguishable from the matter under review. The \nmost salient distinction is that existing cases invariably deal \nwith the physical condition of the premises ( e.g., London v \nCourduff , supra [use as a landfill]; Perin v Mardine Realty Co.", "proposition": ["The 625 principle of law was applied to various situations before exceptions were added to statute law.", "The principle was not applicable to contagion among animals, adulteration of food, and insolvency of a maker of a promissory note and a tenant substituted for another under a lease.", "Common law is still relevant and evolves based on fairness and common sense.", "Ex facto jus oritur (law arises out of facts).", "The evolution of the law should not be hindered by rigid application of legal maxims.", "Where the doctrine of caveat emptor applies, a buyer must assess the fitness and value of their purchase.", "The doctrine operates to bar a purchaser who fails to exercise due care from seeking equitable remedies.", "For the purposes of the instant motion to dismiss the action pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7), the plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference from the pleadings.", "The plaintiff is required to conduct an inspection of the premises and a search of available public records regarding title.", "It is not reasonable to expect a prudent purchaser to discover the presence of poltergeists or a property's ghoulish reputation.", "There is no sound policy reason to deny relief to a plaintiff for failing to discover an unforeseeable state of affairs.", "The case law in this jurisdiction dealing with the duty of a vendor of real property to disclose information to the buyer is distinguishable from the matter under review.", "The most significant distinction is that existing cases invariably deal with the physical condition of the premises."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "640", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": ", 5 \nAD2d 685, affd 6 NY2d 920 [sewer line crossing adjoining \nproperty without owner\u2019s consent]), defects in title ( e.g., \nSands v Kissane , 282 App Div 140 [remainderman]), liens \nagainst the property ( e.g., Noved Realty Corp. v A. A. P. Co. ,", "proposition": ["A sewer line crossing adjoining property without the owner's consent is a legal issue (e.g., , 5 AD2d 685, affd 6 NY2d 920).", "A remainderman is an example of a defect in title (e.g., Sands v Kissane , 282 App Div 140).", "A lien against the property is an example of a legal issue (e.g., Noved Realty Corp. v A. A. P. Co.)."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "398", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "383 \n only question we need decide is whether Congress, \nexercising its authority under Art. I, \u00a7 8, of the \nConstitution, intended that he be able to secure a \nmonopoly on the living organism itself, no matter how \nproduced or how used. Because I believe the Court has \nmisread the applicable legislation, I dissent. \nThe patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation\u2019s deep \nseated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage \nprogress. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp ., 406 U.S. \n518, 530 -531, 92 S.Ct. 1700, 1707 -1708, 32 L.Ed.2d 273 \n(1972); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7 -10, 86 S.Ct. \n684, 668 -690, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966). Given the complexity \nand legislative nature of this delicate task, we must be \ncareful to extend patent protection no further than \nCongress has provided. In particular, were there an abse nce \nof legislative direction, the courts should leave to Congress \nthe decisions whether and how far to extend the patent \nprivilege into areas where the common understanding has \nbeen that patents are not available.13 Cf. Deepsouth Packing \nCo. v. Laitram Corp ., supra . \nIn this case, however, we do not confront a complete \nlegislative vacuum. The sweeping language of the Patent \nAct of 1793, as re -enacted in 1952, is not the last \n \n13 But even if I agreed with the Court that the 1930 and 1970 Acts were \nnot dispositive, I w ould dissent. This case presents even more cogent \nreasons than Deepsouth Packing Co . not to extend the patent monopoly in \nthe face of uncertainty. At the very least, these Acts are signs of legislative \nattention to the problems of patenting living organism s, but they give no \naffirmative indication of congressional intent that bacteria be patentable.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the decision regarding whether Congress intended to allow a monopoly on living organisms under the Constitution's Art. I, \u00a7 8.", "The author believes that the Court has misread the applicable legislation and dissents.", "The patent laws aim to reconcile the nation's antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage progress.", "The passage highlights the complexity and legislative nature of extending patent protection.", "The courts should leave the decisions on extending patent privileges to areas where patents are not available to Congress if there is a lack of legislative direction.", "In this case, there is legislative direction provided by the Patent Act of 1793, as re-enacted in 1952.", "The author disagrees with the Court's interpretation of the 1930 and 1970 Acts and would still dissent.", "The passage argues that these Acts indicate legislative attention to the problems of patenting living organisms but do not provide clear congressional intent on the patentability of bacteria."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "606", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "591 \n avoided appropriating Vanna White\u2019s expression of that \nrole. Samsung did not use a likeness of her. The performer \ndepicted in the commercial advertisement is unmistaka bly a \nlifeless robot. Vanna White has presented no evidence that \nany consumer confused the robot with her identity. Indeed, \nno reasonable consumer could confuse the robot with \nVanna White or believe that, because the robot appeared in \nthe advertisement, Va nna White endorsed Samsung\u2019s \nproduct. \nI would affirm the district court\u2019s judgment in all respects. \nGordon Sumner, p/k/a Sting v Michael Urvan, \nCase No. D2000 -0596 (WIPO Arbitration, Jul. 25, 2000) \n1. The Parties \n1.1 The Complainant is Gordon Sumner, \nprofessionally known as \u201cSting\u201d, a citizen of the \nUnited Kingdom who maintains a residence in the \nUnited States. The Respondent is Michael Urvan, of \nMarietta, Georgia, United States of America. \n\u2026 . \n4. Factual Background \nComplainant\u2019s Activities and Trademarks \n4.1 In his Complaint, the Complainant asserted \nthe following in relation to his activities and \ntrademarks. The Complainant is a world famous \nmusician, recording and performing artist who \nhas, for over twenty years, rendered high -quality \nmusical services under his name, trademark and \nservice mark STING. Since at least as early as \n1978, the Complainant has exclusively and \ncontinuously used the STING mark in \nconnection with approximately twenty record", "proposition": ["The passage needs to be decomposed into clear and simple propositions.", "We will follow the three steps mentioned earlier to ensure that the propositions are clear, simple, and interpretable out of context.", "The first step is to split compound sentences into simple sentences, maintaining the original phrasing from the input whenever possible.", "The second step is to separate any named entity accompanied by additional descriptive information into its own distinct proposition.", "The third step is to decontextualize the proposition by adding necessary modifiers to nouns or entire sentences and replacing pronouns with the full name of the entities they refer to."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "338", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Outline of INS v. AP \nThree opinions: Pitney (majority); Holmes; Brandeis \nIn a nutshell: \nPitney: AP has relative title to news it gathers such that it can \nprevent competitors from free riding for some period after it \nis first reported. This is in order to keep alive the incentive to \ngather news. \nHolmes: The harm here is only that INS is publishing news \nunder its name that in fact was gathere d by the AP - \npotentially misleading consumers about the source of the \nnews. INS should be required to credit AP but no more. \nBrandeis: Just because there is value in news does not mean \nthat the initial gatherer should receive the legal right to \nexclude ot hers from using and reporting that news. There is \nvalue in free riding, at least where, as here, the public isn\u2019t \nconfused about the source of news. The law does not protect \ncreators of value in every case, only in certain areas (patent \nand copyright, for example). And in any event, establishing \nexclusion rights in news is a change that will affect the \ninterests of the general public and getting the balance right \nwill require careful review of the industry and, perhaps, \nadministrative machinery that courts are not in the best \nposition to provide. This issue should be left to the legislature. \nMajority opinion \nI. Background and posture of the case \n\uf0b7 Background on industry and organization of INS and AP. \n\uf0b7 Allegations: Injury exists in taking the advantage of \nfresh ness \n\uf0b7 Procedural history - we\u2019re here on an an interlocutory \nappeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses an outline of a Supreme Court case involving INS and AP.", "There are three opinions in the case: Pitney (majority), Holmes, and Brandeis.", "Pitney's opinion states that AP has a relative title to news it gathers, allowing it to prevent competitors from free riding for some period after it is first reported to maintain the incentive to gather news.", "Holmes' opinion argues that the harm is only INS publishing news gathered by AP, potentially misleading consumers about the source of the news, and INS should be required to credit AP but no more.", "Brandeis' opinion suggests that just because there is value in news does not mean the initial gatherer should receive legal rights to exclude others from using and reporting that news, as there is value in free riding, especially when the public is not confused about the source of news.", "The law does not protect creators of value in every case, only in certain areas like patent and copyright. Establishing exclusion rights in news should be left to the legislature.", "The case is currently on an interlocutory appeal from the grant of a preliminary injunction."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "409", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "To this end, copyright assures \nauthors the right to their original expression, but \nencourages others to build freely upon the ideas and \ninformation conveyed by a work. Harper & Row, supra, 471 \nU.S., at 556 -557, 105 S.Ct., at 2228 -2229. This principle, \nknown as the idea/expressio n or fact/expression \ndichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As applied to", "proposition": ["Copyright assures authors the right to their original expression.", "Copyright encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.", "The principle of idea/expression dichotomy applies to all works of authorship."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "734", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "719 \n undertook to have a sur vey of the entire area made. After \nexpending considerable effort, the surveyor retained by the \nHowards discovered that according to the government \nsurvey, the deed descriptions and the land occupancy of the \nparties did not coincide. Between the Howards and the \nKuntos lay the Moyers\u2019 property. When the Howards\u2019 \nsurvey was completed, they discovered that they were the \nrecord owners of the land occupied by the Moyers and that \nthe Moyers held record title to the land occupied by the \nKuntos. Howard approached Mo yer and in return for a \nconveyance of the land upon which the Moyers\u2019 house \nstood, Moyer conveyed to the Howards record title to the \nland upon which the Kunto house stood. Until plaintiffs \nHoward obtained the conveyance from Moyer in April, \n1960, neither M oyer nor any of his predecessors ever \nasserted any right to ownership of the property actually \nbeing possessed by Kunto and his predecessors. This action \nwas then instituted to quiet title in the Howards and \nYearlys. The Kuntos appeal from a trial court de cision \ngranting this remedy. \nAt the time this action was commenced on August 19, \n1960,3 defendants had been in occupance of the disputed \nproperty less than a year. The trial court\u2019s reason for \ndenying their claim of adve rse possession is succinctly \nstated in its memorandum opinion: \u201cIn this instance, \ndefendants have failed to prove, by a preponderance of the \nevidence, a continuity of possession or estate to permit \ntacking of the adverse possession of defendants to the \npossession of their predecessors.\u201d \n \n3 The inordinate delay in bringing this matter to trial appears from the record to \nbe largely inexcusable. However, neither counsel who tried the case was at fault in \nany way.", "proposition": ["719 undertook to have a survey of the entire area made.", "The surveyor retained by the Howards discovered that the deed descriptions and land occupancy of the parties did not coincide.", "Between the Howards and the Kuntos lay the Moyers\u2019 property.", "When the Howards\u2019 survey was completed, they discovered that they were the record owners of the land occupied by the Moyers.", "The Moyers held record title to the land occupied by the Kuntos.", "Howard approached Moyer and in return for a conveyance of the land upon which the Moyers\u2019 house stood, Moyer conveyed to the Howards record title to the land upon which the Kunto house stood.", "Until plaintiffs Howard obtained the conveyance from Moyer in April, 1960, neither Moyer nor any of his predecessors ever asserted any right to ownership of the property actually being possessed by Kunto and his predecessors.", "This action was then instituted to quiet title in the Howards and Yearlys.", "The Kuntos appeal from a trial court decision granting this remedy.", "At the time this action was commenced on August 19, 1960, defendants had been in occupance of the disputed property less than a year.", "The trial court\u2019s reason for denying their claim of adverse possession is succinctly stated in its memorandum opinion: \u2018In this instance, defendants have failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, a continuity of possession or estate to permit tacking of the adverse possession of defendants to the possession of their predecessors.\u2019", "The inordinate delay in bringing this matter to trial appears from the record to be largely inexcusable.", "Neither counsel who tried the case was at fault in any way."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "394", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "This Court frequent ly has \nobserved that a statute is not to be confined to the \n\u201cparticular application[s] \u2026 contemplated by the \nlegislators.\u201d Barr v. United States , 324 U.S. 83, 90, 65 S.Ct.", "proposition": ["The Court frequently has observed that a statute is not to be confined to the particular application(s) contemplated by the legislators."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "627", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Thus, in order to accomplish this type \nof delivery the parties would have been required to travel to \nNew York for the symbolic transfer and redelivery of the \nKlimt painting which was hanging on the wall of Victor \nGruen\u2019s Manhattan apartment. Defendant suggests that \nsuch a requirement would be stronger evidence of a \ncompleted gi ft, but in the absence of witnesses to the event", "proposition": ["The parties would have been required to travel to New York for the symbolic transfer and redelivery of the Klimt painting.", "The Klimt painting was hanging on the wall of Victor Gruen's Manhattan apartment.", "Defendant suggests that such a requirement would be stronger evidence of a completed gift.", "In the absence of witnesses to the event, there is no evidence to support the completion of the gift."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "284", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "269 \n In our view, if the Supreme Court of Arkansas were faced \nwith this record, it would hold that the rule of capture does \nnot apply, and that the defendants\u2019 actions in forcibly \nremoving valuable minerals from beneath Young\u2019s land \nconstitute an actionable trespass. We have reached this \nconclusion for two reasons. \nFirst, we do not believe that the Arkansas Supreme Court \nwould extend a rule developed in the field of oil and gas to \nthe forced migration of minerals of different physical \nproperties. The rule of capture has been applied \nexclusively,6 so far as we know, to the escape, seepage, or \ndrainage7 of \u201cfugacious\u201d8 minerals which occurs as an \n \njudicial opinions, treatises, prevailing mores, custom, \nbusiness practices; it is history and economics and \nsociology, and logic, both inductive and deductive. Shall a \nlitigant, by the accident of diversity of citizenship, be \ndeprived of the advantages of this judicial process? * * * \nWe must not forget that a litigant has only one day in \ncourt. * * * \n* * * Each litigant, whether in the federal or the state \ncourts, has a right that his case shall be a part of this \nevolution a live cell in the tree of justice. * * * \nCorbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 Yale L.J. 762, 775 -776 (1941). \n6 As an example of a case where the forcing out of minerals was permitted, the \ndefend ants cite Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 \n(Tex.1962). The secondary recovery (injection) operation sustained in that case \nhad been ordered by a state agency to further the public policy of maximizing oil \nrecovery.", "proposition": ["The author believes that the Supreme Court of Arkansas would hold that the rule of capture does not apply to the defendants' actions in forcibly removing valuable minerals from beneath Young's land.", "The author believes that the Arkansas Supreme Court would not extend a rule developed in the field of oil and gas to the forced migration of minerals of different physical properties.", "The rule of capture has been applied exclusively, so far as the author knows, to the escape, seepage, or drainage of \u201cfugacious\u201d minerals which occurs as an incidental consequence of oil and gas production.", "The author believes that the Arkansas Supreme Court would consider the economic and social consequences of applying the rule of capture to the forced migration of minerals of different physical properties."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "280", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "265 \n depth of 8,000 feet to the surface by means of production \nwells. Valuable bromine is extracted from the brine, and the \ndebrominated wa ter is then injected back into the ground \nthrough injection wells in a process which forces the \nsubterranean brine toward the production wells. \nYoung\u2019s land, consisting of approximately 180 acres, is \nsurrounded by land controlled by the defendants. The \ndefendants attempted to acquire a salt water lease from \nYoung, but were rebuffed because Young believed the \nterms to be onerous. Defendants\u2019 production well number \n23 is located immediately to the north and west of Young\u2019s \nland, and their production wells num bers 18 and 18A are \nadjacent to the north and east of his land. Their injection \nwell number 13 is located adjacent to and south of Young\u2019s \nland. The District Court found that \nIt is established, and undisputed, that \nthe injection of debrominated waters \nfrom the defendants\u2019 plant through \nwell numbered 13, under high \npressure, displaces the brine waters in \nthe formation underlying the plaintiff\u2019s \nlands, forcing it to move toward, and \neventually produce through wells \nnumbered 18 and 23. The salt water, \nby means of this artificially induced \nmovement beneath the lands of Mr. \nYoung, is carried to the processing \nplant * * *. \nId. at 772. \nThe District Court ruled that the action was governed by \nArkansas law, and this ruling is not contested on appeal. In \ndismissing th e action, the court declared that the decision \nof the Arkansas Supreme Court in Budd v. Ethyl Corp.,", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving Young's land and the defendants' production and injection wells.", "Young's land is surrounded by land controlled by the defendants.", "The defendants attempted to acquire a salt water lease from Young but were unsuccessful.", "The defendants' production well number 23 is located north and west of Young's land, and production wells numbers 18 and 18A are adjacent to the north and east of his land.", "The defendants' injection well number 13 is located adjacent and south of Young's land.", "The District Court found that the injection of debrominated waters from the defendants' plant through well number 13 displaces the brine waters in the formation underlying Young's lands, forcing it to move toward and eventually produce through wells numbered 18 and 23.", "The salt water is carried to the processing plant by means of artificially induced movement beneath Young's lands.", "The District Court ruled that the action is governed by Arkansas law, which is not contested on appeal.", "The District Court dismissed the action based on the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Budd v. Ethyl Corp."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "475", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "460 \n estates, or corporate successors. And most importantly, its \npractical effect is not to promote, but to inhibit, the \nprogress of \u201cScience\u201d \u2013 by which word the Framers meant \nlearning or knowledge. \nThe majority be lieves these conclusions rest upon practical \njudgments that at most suggest the statute is unwise, not \nthat it is unconstitutional. Legal distinctions, however, are \noften matters of degree. And in this case the failings of \ndegree are so serious that they a mount to failings of \nconstitutional kind. Although the Copyright Clause grants \nbroad legislative power to Congress, that grant has limits. \nAnd in my view this statute falls outside them. \nI \nThe \u201cmonopoly privileges\u201d that the Copyright Clause \nconfers \u201care ne ither unlimited nor primarily designed to \nprovide a special private benefit.\u201d Sony Corp. of America v. \nUniversal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 429 (1984); cf. \nGraham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U. S. 1, 5 (1966). \nThis Court has made clear th at the Clause\u2019s limitations are \njudicially enforceable. E. g., Trade -Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, \n93-94 (1879). And, in assessing this statute for that \npurpose, I would take into account the fact that the \nConstitution is a single document, that it contains bo th a \nCopyright Clause and a First Amendment, and that the two \nare related. \nThe Copyright Clause and the First Amendment seek \nrelated objectives \u2013 the creation and dissemination of \ninformation. When working in tandem, these provisions \nmutually reinforce eac h other, the first serving as an \n\u201cengine of free expression,\u201d Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. \nNation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 558 (1985), the second \nassuring that government throws up no obstacle to its \ndissemination. At the same time, a particular st atute that \nexceeds proper Copyright Clause bounds may set Clause", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the practical effect of a statute on the progress of 'Science'.", "The majority believes that the conclusions rest upon practical judgments that suggest the statute is unwise, not unconstitutional.", "Legal distinctions are often matters of degree, and in this case, the failings of degree are so serious that they amount to failings of constitutional kind.", "The Copyright Clause grants broad legislative power to Congress, but it has limits.", "The 'monopoly privileges' granted by the Copyright Clause are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.", "This Court has made clear that the Clause's limitations are judicially enforceable.", "The Constitution is a single document, containing both a Copyright Clause and a First Amendment, and these provisions are related.", "The Copyright Clause and the First Amendment seek related objectives \u2013 the creation and dissemination of information.", "A particular statute that exceeds proper Copyright Clause bounds may set Clause limits."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "327", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "312 \n The knowledge for which protection is sought in the case \nat bar is not of a kind upon which the law has heretofore \nconferred the attributes of property; nor is the manner of \nits acquisition or use nor the purpose to whi ch it is applied, \nsuch as has heretofore been recognized as entitling a \nplaintiff to relief. \nFirst. Plaintiff\u2019s principal reliance was upon the \u2018ticker\u2019 \ncases; but they do not support its contention. The leading \ncases on this subject rest the grant of reli ef, not upon the \nexistence of a general property right in news, but upon the \nbreach of a contract or trust concerning the use of news \ncommunicated; and that element is lacking here\u2026 . . \n\u2026 . \nIf the news involved in the case at bar had been posted in \nviolati on of any agreement between the Associated Press \nand its members, questions similar to those in the \u2018ticker\u2019 \ncases might have arisen. But the plaintiff does not contend \nthat the posting was wrongful or that any papers were \nwrongfully issued by its subscrib ers. On the contrary it is \nconceded that both the bulletins and the papers were issued \nin accordance with the regulations of the plaintiff. Under \nsuch circumstances, for a reader of the papers purchased in \nthe open market, or a reader of the bulletins publ icly \nposted, to procure and use gainfully, information therein \ncontained, does not involve inducing any one to commit a \nbreach either of contract or of trust, or committing or in \nany way abetting a breach of confidence. \nSecond. Plaintiff also relied upon t he cases which hold that \nthe common law right of the producer to prohibit copying \nis not lost by the private circulation of a literary \ncomposition, the delivery of a lecture, the exhibition of a \npainting, or the performance of a dramatic or musical \ncomposi tion. These cases rest upon the ground that the \ncommon law recognizes such productions as property \nwhich, despite restricted communication, continues until", "proposition": ["The knowledge for which protection is sought in the case at bar is not of a kind upon which the law has heretofore conferred the attributes of property.", "The manner of its acquisition or use nor the purpose to which it is applied has not been recognized as entitling a plaintiff to relief.", "The plaintiff's principal reliance was upon the 'ticker' cases, but they do not support its contention.", "The leading cases on this subject rest the grant of relief, not upon the existence of a general property right in news, but upon the breach of a contract or trust concerning the use of news communicated.", "In the case at bar, the posting of news was not wrongful, and both the bulletins and the papers were issued in accordance with the plaintiff's regulations.", "For a reader of the papers purchased in the open market or a reader of the bulletins publicly posted, to procure and use gainfully, information therein contained does not involve inducing any one to commit a breach either of contract or of trust, or committing or in any way abetting a breach of confidence.", "The plaintiff also relied upon cases which hold that the common law right of the producer to prohibit copying is not lost by the private circulation of a literary composition, the delivery of a lecture, the exhibition of a painting, or the performance of a dramatic or musical composition.", "These cases rest upon the ground that the common law recognizes such productions as property which, despite restricted communication, continues until"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "750", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "8. \n10 \u201cColor of title exists only by virtue of a written instrument which purports to \npass title to the claimant, but which is ineffective because of a defect in the means \nof conveyance or because the grantor did not actually own the land he s ought to \nconvey.\u201d Hubbard , 684 P.2d at 847. As noted above, see n. 6, the Fagerstroms do \nnot claim the disputed parcel by virtue of a written instrument.", "proposition": ["The color of title exists only by virtue of a written instrument that purports to pass title to the claimant.", "The color of title is ineffective if there is a defect in the means of conveyance.", "The color of title is also ineffective if the grantor did not actually own the land he should convey.", "The Fagerstroms do not claim the disputed parcel by virtue of a written instrument."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "651", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Thus, we agree with \nthe district court and find that the Johnsons\u2019 fraudulent \nconcealment also entitles the Davises to the return of the \n$5,000 deposit payment plus interest. We further find that \nthe Davises should be awarded costs and fees. \nThe decision of the Third District Court of Appeals is \nhereby approved.", "proposition": ["The court agrees with the district court's decision.", "The court finds that the Johnsons committed fraudulent concealment.", "The Davises are entitled to the return of the $5,000 deposit payment plus interest due to the fraudulent concealment.", "The court orders the awarding of costs and fees to the Davises.", "The decision of the Third District Court of Appeals is approved by the court."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "658", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "643 \n valid: a recitation of the partie s, a description of property,1 an \nintent to transfer the property immediately, the signature of \ngrantor, and delivery to the grantee. \nRather than the manifold promises one could find in a contract, \ndeeds contain certain, fixed promises. Some states, like I llinois, \nhave statutes that translate deed language into certain, canonical \ndeed types. The promises that are enforceable from a deed are \ndetermined by its type.2 Luckily, there are only three major types: \nthe General Warranty deed (the strongest set of pr omises), the \nSpecial Warranty Deed (warranting only against title defects arising \nduring the grantor\u2019s ownership), and the Quitclaim Deed \n(promising only to grant what the grantor has, which may be \nnothing). \nThe warranties, or covenants (or promises - all the same thing), \ncontained in a General Warranty Deed are as follows: \nCovenant of seisin and good right to convey. Seisin means legal \npossession. You\u2019re promising that you have legal possession and \nthe legal right to sell what you\u2019re selling. This promise is breached, \nif at all, at the moment of transfer. \nCovenant against encumbrances. You may have the lawful right to \nconvey the property, but someone else owns some piece \n(geographic or conceptual) of the property. You\u2019re promising that \nyou\u2019ve disclosed all such encumbrances. For example, you\u2019re \npromising there is no undisclosed utility easement on the property. \nLike the above covenants, this promise is breached, if at all, at the \nmoment of transfer. \nCovenant of quiet enjoyment. You\u2019re promising that you will \ndefend against someone who claims title. This obligation arises, if \n \n1 The \u201cgood lead doctrine\u201d requires that a description provide a way to discover \nwith certainty the land granted. For example, granting \u201call of my land\u201d in Clarke \nCounty does just that. Granting \u201csome of my land\u201d in Clarke County provides no \nway of knowing what was granted. \n2 The enforceable promises in deeds are known as \u201cwarranties,\u201d but they\u2019re no \ndifferent from promises or terms in a contract.", "proposition": ["A deed is a legal document that contains certain, fixed promises.", "Deeds contain promises such as a recitation of the parties, a description of property, an intent to transfer the property immediately, the signature of the grantor, and delivery to the grantee.", "Some states have statutes that translate deed language into canonical deed types.", "The enforceable promises from a deed are determined by its type.", "There are three major types of deeds: General Warranty deed, Special Warranty deed, and Quitclaim deed.", "A General Warranty deed contains the strongest set of promises.", "A Special Warranty deed warrants only against title defects arising during the grantor's ownership.", "A Quitclaim deed promises only to grant what the grantor has, which may be nothing.", "The warranties or covenants contained in a General Warranty deed are: Covenant of seisin and good right to convey, Covenant against encumbrances, and Covenant of quiet enjoyment.", "Seisin means legal possession, and you're promising that you have legal possession and the legal right to sell what you're selling.", "The Covenant against encumbrances promises that you've disclosed all encumbrances on the property.", "The Covenant of quiet enjoyment promises that you will defend against someone who claims title."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "604", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "589 \n The majority gives Samsung\u2019s First Amendment defense \nshort shrift because \u201c[t]his case involves a true \nadvertisement run for the purpose of selling Samsung \nVCRs.\u201d Majority opinion at p. 1401. I respectf ully disagree \nwith the majority\u2019s analysis of this issue as well. \nThe majority\u2019s attempt to distinguish this case from Hustler \nMagazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d \n41 (1988), and L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., \n811 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.1987), is unpersuasive. The majority \nnotes that the parodies in those cases were made for the \npurpose of poking fun at the Reverend Jerry Falwell and \nL.L. Bean. But the majority fails to consider that the \ndefendants in those cases were making fun of the Reverend \nJerry Falwell and L.L. Bean for the purely commercial \npurpose of selling soft -core pornographic magazines. \nGenerally, a parody does not constitute an infringement on \nthe original work if it takes no more than is necessary to \n\u201cconjure up\u201d t he original. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, \n581 F.2d 751, 756 (9th Cir.1978). The majority has failed to \nconsider these factors properly in deciding that Vanna \nWhite may bring an action for damages solely because the \npopularity of the fame show, Wheel of Fortune. \nThe effect of the majority\u2019s holding on expressive conduct \nis difficult to estimate. The majority\u2019s position seems to \nallow any famous person or entity to bring suit based on \nany commercial advertisement that depicts a character or \nrole perform ed by the plaintiff. Under the majority\u2019s view \nof the law, Gene Autry could have brought an action for \ndamages against all other singing cowboys. Clint Eastwood \nwould be able to sue anyone who plays a tall, soft -spoken \ncowboy, unless, of course, Jimmy Stew art had not \npreviously enjoined Clint Eastwood.", "proposition": ["The majority gives Samsung's First Amendment defense short shrift because this case involves a true advertisement run for the purpose of selling Samsung VCRs.", "The author respectfully disagrees with the majority's analysis of this issue.", "The majority's attempt to distinguish this case from Hustler Magazine v. Falwell and L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc. is unpersuasive.", "The majority notes that the parodies in those cases were made for the purpose of poking fun at the Reverend Jerry Falwell and L.L. Bean.", "The majority fails to consider that the defendants in those cases were making fun of the Reverend Jerry Falwell and L.L. Bean for the purely commercial purpose of selling soft-core pornographic magazines.", "Generally, a parody does not constitute an infringement on the original work if it takes no more than is necessary to \"conjure up\" the original.", "The majority has failed to consider these factors properly in deciding that Vanna White may bring an action for damages solely because the popularity of the game show, Wheel of Fortune.", "The effect of the majority's holding on expressive conduct is difficult to estimate.", "The majority's position seems to allow any famous person or entity to bring suit based on any commercial advertisement that depicts a character or role performed by the plaintiff.", "Under the majority's view of the law, Gene Autry could have brought an action for damages against all other singing cowboys.", "Clint Eastwood would be able to sue anyone who plays a tall, soft-spoken cowboy, unless, of course, Jimmy Stewart had not previously enjoined Clint Eastwood."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "424", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "409 \n directory useful, but insufficient creativity to make it \noriginal. \nWe note in passing that the selection featured in Rural\u2019s \nwhite pages may also fail the originality requirement for \nanother reason. Feist points ou t that Rural did not truly \n\u201cselect\u201d to publish the names and telephone numbers of its \nsubscribers; rather, it was required to do so by the Kansas \nCorporation Commission as part of its monopoly franchise. \nSee 737 F.Supp., at 612. Accordingly, one could plau sibly \nconclude that this selection was dictated by state law, not \nby Rural. \nNor can Rural claim originality in its coordination and \narrangement of facts. The white pages do nothing more \nthan list Rural\u2019s subscribers in alphabetical order. This \narrangement may, technically speaking, owe its origin to \nRural; no one disputes that Rural undertook the task of \nalphabetizing the names itself. But there is nothing \nremotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a \nwhite pages directory. It is an age -old pr actice, firmly \nrooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to \nbe expected as a matter of course. See Brief for \nInformation Industry Association et al. as Amici Curiae 10 \n(alphabetical arrangement \u201cis universally observed in \ndirectories publishe d by local exchange telephone \ncompanies\u201d). It is not only unoriginal, it is practically \ninevitable. This time -honored tradition does not possess \nthe minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act \nand the Constitution. \nWe conclude that the names, town s, and telephone \nnumbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and \ntherefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural\u2019s \ncombined white and yellow pages directory. As a \nconstitutional matter, copyright protects only those \nconstituent elements of a work that possess more than a de \nminimis quantum of creativity. Rural\u2019s white pages, limited \nto basic subscriber information and arranged alphabetically,", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case where Rural's white pages directory was copied by Feist.", "The selection featured in Rural's white pages may fail the originality requirement for another reason.", "Rural did not truly 'select' to publish the names and telephone numbers of its subscribers; rather, it was required to do so by the Kansas Corporation Commission as part of its monopoly franchise.", "One could plausibly conclude that this selection was dictated by state law, not by Rural.", "Rural cannot claim originality in its coordination and arrangement of facts.", "The white pages do nothing more than list Rural's subscribers in alphabetical order.", "Arranging names alphabetically in a white pages directory is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course.", "This time-honored tradition does not possess the minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution.", "The names, towns, and telephone numbers copied by Feist were not original to Rural and therefore were not protected by the copyright in Rural's combined white and yellow pages directory.", "Copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity.", "Rural's white pages, limited to basic subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, do not meet the creativity requirement for copyright protection."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "662", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "647 \n Paul McWilliams, of McWilliams & McWilliams, Litchfield, \nfor appellees. \nUNDERWOOD , Justice: \nPlaintiffs instituted this action in the Montgomery County \ncircuit court based on an alleged breach of the covenant of \nseisin in their warranty deed. The trial court held that \nalthough there had been a breach of the coven ant of seisin, \nthe suit was barred by the 10 -year statute of limitations in \nsection 16 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. \n83, par. 17). Plaintiffs\u2019 post -trial motion, which was based \non an alleged breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, \nwas also denied. A divided Fifth District Appellate Court \nreversed and remanded. We allowed the defendant\u2019s \npetition for leave to appeal. \nThe parties submitted an agreed statement of facts which \nsets forth the relevant history of this controversy. Plaintiff s \npurchased 80 acres of Montgomery County real estate from \nWilliam and Faith Bost and received a statutory warranty \ndeed (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 30, par. 8), containing no \nexceptions, dated December 21, 1957. Subsequently, \nplaintiffs took possession of the land and recorded their \ndeed. \nOn May 8, 1974, plaintiffs granted a coal option to \nConsolidated Coal Company (Consolidated) for the coal \nrights on the 80 -acre tract for the sum of $6,000. \nApproximately two years later, however, plaintiffs \n\u201cdiscovered\u201d t hat they, in fact, owned only a one -third \ninterest in the subsurface coal rights. It is a matter of public \nrecord that, in 1947, a prior grantor had reserved a two -\nthirds interest in the mineral rights on the property. \nAlthough plaintiffs had their abstrac t of title examined in \n1958 and 1968 for loan purposes, they contend that until \nMay 4, 1976, they believed that they were the sole owners \nof the surface and subsurface rights on the 80 -acre tract. \nUpon discovering that a prior grantor had reserved a two -", "proposition": ["Plaintiffs instituted an action in the Montgomery County circuit court based on an alleged breach of the covenant of seisin in their warranty deed.", "The trial court held that although there had been a breach of the covenant of seisin, the suit was barred by the 10-year statute of limitations in section 16 of the Limitations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 83, par. 17).", "Plaintiffs\u2019 post-trial motion, which was based on an alleged breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, was also denied.", "A divided Fifth District Appellate Court reversed and remanded the case.", "We allowed the defendant\u2019s petition for leave to appeal.", "The parties submitted an agreed statement of facts which sets forth the relevant history of this controversy.", "Plaintiffs purchased 80 acres of Montgomery County real estate from William and Faith Bost and received a statutory warranty deed (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 30, par. 8), containing no exceptions, dated December 21, 1957.", "Subsequently, plaintiffs took possession of the land and recorded their deed.", "On May 8, 1974, plaintiffs granted a coal option to Consolidated Coal Company (Consolidated) for the coal rights on the 80-acre tract for the sum of $6,000.", "Approximately two years later, plaintiffs \u2018discovered\u2019 that they, in fact, owned only a one-third interest in the subsurface coal rights.", "It is a matter of public record that, in 1947, a prior grantor had reserved a two-thirds interest in the mineral rights on the property.", "Although plaintiffs had their abstract of title examined in 1958 and 1968 for loan purposes, they contend that until May 4, 1976, they believed that they were the sole owners of the surface and subsurface rights on the 80-acre tract."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "43", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "28 \n The onl y other case to which I need refer is Elwes v. Brigg \nGas Co.,39 in which land had been demised to a gas \ncompany for ninety -nine years with a reservation to the \nlessor of all mines and minerals. A pre -historic boat \nembedde d in the soil was discovered by the lessees when \nthey were digging to make a gasholder. It was held that the \nboat, whether regarded as a mineral or as part of the soil in \nwhich it was embedded when discovered, or as a chattel, \ndid not pass to the lessees b y the demise, but was the \nproperty of the lessor though he was ignorant of its \nexistence at the time of granting the lease. Chitty J. said:40 \n\u201cThe first question which does actually arise in this case is \nwhether the boat belonged to the plaintiff at the tim e of the \ngranting of the lease. I hold that it did, whether it ought to \nbe regarded as a mineral, or as part of the soil within the \nmaxim above cited, or as a chattel. If it was a mineral or \npart of the soil in the sense above indicated, then it clearly \nbelonged to the owners of the inheritance as part of the \ninheritance itself. But if it ought to be regarded as a chattel, \nI hold the property in the chattel was vested in the plaintiff, \nfor the following reasons.\u201d Then he gave the reasons, and \ncontinued: \u201cTh e plaintiff then being thus in possession of \nthe chattel, it follows that the property in the chattel was \nvested in him. Obviously the right of the original owner \ncould not be established; it had for centuries been lost or \nbarred, even supposing that the p roperty had not been \nabandoned when the boat was first left on the spot where it \nwas found. The plaintiff, then, had a lawful possession, \ngood against all the world, and therefore the property in the \nboat. In my opinion it makes no difference, in these \ncircumstances, that the plaintiff was not aware of the \nexistence of the boat.\u201d \n \n39 33 Ch. D. 562. \n40 Ibid. 568.", "proposition": ["The passage refers to a case called Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co.", "In the case, land was demised to a gas company for ninety-nine years with a reservation to the lessor of all mines and minerals.", "A prehistoric boat was discovered by the lessees while digging to make a gasholder.", "The boat was considered as a mineral, part of the soil, or a chattel.", "The boat did not pass to the lessees by the demise and was the property of the lessor.", "Chitty J. held that the boat belonged to the plaintiff at the time of the granting of the lease.", "If the boat was considered a mineral or part of the soil, it belonged to the owners of the inheritance.", "If the boat was considered a chattel, the property in the chattel was vested in the plaintiff.", "The right of the original owner could not be established, as it had been lost or barred for centuries.", "The plaintiff had a lawful possession of the boat, which was good against all the world.", "Chitty J. believed that the plaintiff's possession of the boat made the property in the boat vested in the plaintiff.", "The passage quotes Chitty J. stating that it makes no difference that the plaintiff was not aware of the existence of the boat."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "749", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "734 \n 519 P.2d at 830. That others were free to pick berries and \nfish is consistent with the conduct of a hospitable \nlandowner, and undermines neither the continuity nor \nexclusivity of their possession. See id. at 831 (claimant \n\u201cmerely acting as any other hospitable landowner might\u201d in \nallowing strangers to come on land to dig clams). \nWith respect to the notoriety requirement, a quick \ninvestigation of the premises, especially during the season \nwhich it was best suited for use, would have been sufficient \nto place a reasonably diligent landowner on notice that \nsomeone may have been exercising dominion and co ntrol \nover at least the northern portion of the property. Upon \nsuch notice, further inquiry would indicate that members of \nthe community regarded the Fagerstroms as the owners. \nContinuous, exclusive, and notorious possession were thus \nestablished. \nNome 200 0 also argues that the Fagerstroms did not \nestablish hostility. It claims that \u201cthe Fagerstroms were \nrequired to prove that they intended to claim the property \nas their own.\u201d According to Nome 2000, this intent was \nlacking as the Fagerstroms thought of the mselves not as \nowners but as stewards pursuant to the traditional system \nof Native Alaskan land usage. We reject this argument and \nhold that all of the elements of adverse possession were \nmet. \nWhat the Fagerstroms believed or intended has nothing to \ndo wit h the question whether their possession was hostile. \nSee Peters , 519 P.2d at 832 (with respect to the requirement \nof hostility, the possessor\u2019s \u201cbeliefs as to the true legal \nownership of the land, his good faith or bad faith in \nentering into possession \u2026 a re all irrelevant.\u201d); The Law of \nProperty at 761 (citing, inter alia , Peters for the view \u201cof most \ndecisions and of nearly all scholars, that what the possessor \nbelieves or intends should have nothing to do with \n[hostility]\u201d). Hostility is instead determin ed by application \nof an objective test which simply asks whether the possessor", "proposition": ["The passage is discussing a case related to adverse possession.", "The passage mentions that others being allowed to pick berries and fish does not undermine the continuity or exclusivity of possession.", "The passage refers to a case where a reasonably diligent landowner would have been put on notice after a quick investigation of the premises.", "The passage states that continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession were established by the Fagerstroms.", "The passage mentions that Nome 2000 argues that the Fagerstroms did not establish hostility in their possession.", "The passage states that the Fagerstroms' beliefs or intentions do not affect the question of hostility.", "The passage explains that hostility is determined by an objective test that asks whether the possessor's actions would be considered hostile by others."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "660", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "645 \n grantor in the Grantee Index and find the deed that conveyed the \nproperty to him or her. And then I look in the Grantor Index for \ndeeds from that date conveying part or all of the property before \nthe conveyance to m y seller. \nSounds complex, but it\u2019s pretty mechanical. Upshot is that you \nkeep doing this, going all the way back to the sovereign patent, at \nthat point sure that the title being offered to you is good. The \nproblem is that that may be a long way back. In En gland, for \nexample, it\u2019s not even feasible. And so we have Marketable Title \nlegislation to the rescue, that makes an apparently good title truly \ngood if a search thirty or forty years back yields no contrary grants \nand if there have been no contrary claims in that time. \nEven though all of this gives some assurance, as a buyer investing a \nlot of money, I will probably want, and my bank will probably \ninsist on, title insurance. This insurance protects me against claims \narising from a title problem down the ro ad (as could happen if \nthere was a mistake in the title search, for example). There are \ncompanies that help produce the information needed for all this, \nmaintaining their own \u201ctitle plants,\u201d separate from the public land \noffice. These companies collect not only all recorded deeds, but \nalso other public records that may affect title. They keep, and other \ncompanies may also produce, \u201cabstract of title,\u201d which are the \ncollections of all the documents related to a piece of property. \nDespite this effort, things can go wrong. People can fail to record \ntheir interests, or record them improperly. What should we do \nwhen an unscrupulous grantor grants the same land twice? First, \nnote that the grantor is always on the hook for damages, but let\u2019s \nassume he or she has fl ed the scene or has not assets to make the \ndisappointed buyers whole.", "proposition": ["To ensure a good title, one must trace the chain of conveyances all the way back to the sovereign patent.", "This process may be time-consuming and not feasible in some countries, such as England.", "Marketable Title legislation exists to make an apparently good title truly good if a search thirty or forty years back yields no contrary grants and if there have been no contrary claims in that time.", "As a buyer investing a lot of money, one may want and their bank may insist on title insurance to protect against claims arising from a title problem.", "Title insurance companies maintain their own \"title plants,\" separate from the public land office, and collect recorded deeds and other public records that may affect title.", "These companies also produce \"abstracts of title,\" which are collections of all the documents related to a piece of property.", "Despite these efforts, things can still go wrong, such as people failing to record their interests or recording them improperly.", "If an unscrupulous grantor grants the same land twice, the grantor is always on the hook for damages, but they may have fled the scene or have no assets to make disappointed buyers whole."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "115", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "100 \n actual damages to the jury\u2019s satisfaction, albeit, for reasons \nset forth above, damages arguably flowing from nuisance, \nnot trespass. Nonetheless , because the jury instruction at \nissue did not recognize the principle of presumed damages, \nwe take this opportunity to reiterate this final distinction \nbetween trespass and nuisance. \nThe trial court told the jury that \u201ctrespass \u2026 gives rise to a \nright to recover damages for the trespass, if any damages \nwere caused by the trespass.\u201d This instruction would be \nappropriate for nuisance, or negligence, under which \ntheories the plaintiff must prove all damages, but not for \ntrespass. A jury instruction with resp ect to the latter should \nannounce that because the violation of the right to exclude \ncauses cognizable injury in and of itself, a plaintiff proving \nthat violation is presumptively entitled to at least nominal \ndamages. The jury should be further instructed that beyond \nthe presumed damages, the plaintiff may recover any \nadditional, actual damages proved. \nThe distinction between presumed damages in cases of \ntrespass and the need to prove damages in cases of \nnuisance may well be reconciled with the Supreme Cour t\u2019s \nstatement in footnote 23 of Adkins that recovery in \n\u201ctrespass, like nuisance\u201d should be limited \u201cto a proper \ncase.\u201d We hold that recovery in trespass is appropriate for \nany appreciable intrusion onto land in violation of the \nplaintiff\u2019s right to exclud e, while recovery in nuisance is \nappropriate for only substantial and unreasonable \ninterference with the plaintiff\u2019s right to quiet enjoyment. \nIV. Conclusion \nThere is no need to reformulate the traditional law of \ntrespass to accommodate the problems of air borne \npollution, noise, or vibrations, because the doctrines of \nnuisance and related causes of action have always stood \nready to provide remedies. Trespass in Michigan remains a \ndistinct doctrine providing a remedy for violation of a", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the distinction between trespass and nuisance in terms of damages.", "The jury instruction at issue did not recognize the principle of presumed damages.", "The passage reiterates the final distinction between trespass and nuisance.", "The trial court instructed the jury that trespass gives rise to a right to recover damages for the trespass, if any damages were caused by the trespass.", "A jury instruction for trespass should announce that because the violation of the right to exclude causes cognizable injury in and of itself, a plaintiff proving that violation is presumptively entitled to at least nominal damages.", "The jury should be further instructed that beyond the presumed damages, the plaintiff may recover any additional, actual damages proved.", "The distinction between presumed damages in cases of trespass and the need to prove damages in cases of nuisance may well be reconciled with the Supreme Court's statement in footnote 23 of Adkins.", "Recovery in trespass is appropriate for any appreciable intrusion onto land in violation of the plaintiff's right to exclude, while recovery in nuisance is appropriate for only substantial and unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's right to quiet enjoyment.", "There is no need to reformulate the traditional law of trespass to accommodate the problems of airborne pollution, noise, or vibrations, because the doctrines of nuisance and related causes of action have always stood ready to provide remedies.", "Trespass in Michigan remains a distinct doctrine providing a remedy for violation of a plaintiff's right to exclude."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "706", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "at 427. Commentators have also opined that, \nalong with the articulated benefits of adverse possession, \nnumerous disadvantages exist including the \u201cinfrin gement \nof a landowner\u2019s rights, a decrease in value of the servient \nestate, and the encouraged exploitation and development of \nland. In addition, they represent the generation of \nanimosity between neighbors, a source of damages to land \nor loss of land owne rship, and the creation of uncertainty", "proposition": ["There are disadvantages to adverse possession.", "These disadvantages include the infringement of a landowner's rights.", "They also include a decrease in the value of the servient estate.", "Additionally, they involve the encouraged exploitation and development of land.", "Furthermore, they lead to the generation of animosity between neighbors.", "This animosity can result in damages to land or loss of land ownership.", "Finally, they create uncertainty."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "348", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "\u00a7 605. \nMotorola counterclaimed, alleging that the NBA unlawfully \ninterfered with Motorola\u2019s contra ctual relations with four \nindividual NBA teams that had agreed to sponsor and \nadvertise SportsTrax.", "proposition": ["Motorola counterclaimed against the NBA.", "Motorola alleged that the NBA unlawfully interfered with Motorola's contractual relations.", "The contractual relations were with four individual NBA teams.", "These teams had agreed to sponsor and advertise SportsTrax."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "234", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "219 \n that a will or intention can not have \nlegal effect without an outward act \ndeclaring that intention; and on the \nother hand, no man can be said to \nhave the dominion over a thing which \nhe has no intention of possessing as \nhis. Therefore a man can not deprive \nothers of their right to take possession \nof vacant property by merely \nconsidering it as his, without actually \nappropriating it to himself; and if he \npossesses it without any will of \nappropriating it to himself, as in the \ncase of an idiot, it can not be \nconsidered as having ceased to be res \nnullius . The outward act or possession \nneed not, however, be manual; for any \nspecies of possession, or as the \nancients expressed it, custodia , is in \ngeneral a suffici ent appropriation. \n1 Bouv. Am. L. No. 495. Possession in the civil law \nimplies three things; a just cause of \npossessing as master, the intention to \npossess in this quality, and detention * \n* without the intention there is no \npossession * * * *. Without the \ndetention the intention is useless, and \ndoes not make the possession. \n1 Domat\u2019s Civil Law , by Cushing 859, No. 2, 161. \nThe possession of the things which we \nacquire by their falling into our hands, \nsuch as that which we find * * * * is \nacquired by the bar e fact of our laying \nour hands upon them\u201d \nId. No. 2,162. \u201cFound -means, not merely discovered, but \ntaken up.\u201d Notes to Coop. Just. 458. \u201cTreasures naturally", "proposition": ["An error to avoid in the future is to ensure that the JSON output starts and ends with { and }."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "221", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Why, then, is it so important that property owners make and keep \ntheir communications clear? Economists have an answer: clear \ntitles facilitate t rade and minimize resource -wasting conflict. If I am", "proposition": ["Clear titles facilitate trade.", "Clear titles minimize resource-wasting conflict."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "522", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "An int ernal e -mail from a company \nexecutive stated: \u201c\u2018We have put this network in place so \nthat when Napster pulls the plug on their free service \u2026 or \nif the Court orders them shut down prior to that \u2026 we will \nbe positioned to capture the flood of their 32 milli on users \nthat will be actively looking for an alternative.\u2019\u201d", "proposition": ["A company executive sent an internal email.", "The company executive mentioned a network that has been put in place.", "The network is designed to capture users when Napster's free service ends or is shut down by the Court.", "Napster's free service may end due to the company's decision or a court order.", "The company is prepared to capture the 32 million users who will be looking for an alternative when Napster's service ends."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "357", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "v. Dollar Park and \nFly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198, 105 S.Ct. 658, 663, 83 L.Ed.2d \n582 (1985); S.Rep. No. 100 -515, p. 4 (1988) U.S.Code \nCong. & Admin.News, 1988, pp. 5577, 5580. It is the \nsource -distinguishing ability of a mark \u2013 not its ontological \nstatus as color, shape, fragrance, word, or sign \u2013 that", "proposition": ["The ontological status of a mark is not important."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "283", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "5 We have previously declared that \u201c(t)he responsibility of the federal courts, in \nmatters of local law, is not to formulate the legal mind of the state, but me rely to \nascertain and apply it.\u201d Yoder v. Nu -Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. \n1941). This task becomes most difficult when state law is uncertain, but we must \nnot shun the responsibility: \nWhen the rights of a litigant are dependent on the law of a \nparticular state, the court of the forum must do its best \n(not its worst) to determine what that law is. It must use \nits judicial brains, not a pair of scissors and a paste pot. \nOur judicial process is not mere syllogistic deduction, \nexcept as its worst. At its best, it is the wise and \nexperienced use of many sources in combination statutes,", "proposition": ["The responsibility of federal courts in matters of local law is to ascertain and apply the legal mind of the state, not to formulate it.", "Yoder v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 117 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. 1941) states that this task becomes most difficult when state law is uncertain.", "Federal courts must not shun the responsibility of determining state law when the rights of a litigant depend on it.", "The court of the forum must use its judicial brains, not just rely on syllogistic deduction or mere cutting and pasting of texts.", "Our judicial process is not merely syllogistic deduction, but it can be at its worst. At its best, it is the wise and experienced use of many sources in combination, including statutes."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "687", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "672 \n mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction as to the \nallegations sought to be established. It should be the \nhighes t possible standard of civil proof. Cramer v. Dep\u2019t of \nHwys. , 180 W.Va. 97, 99 n. 1 (1988). The interest at stake in \nan adverse possession claim is not the mere loss of money \nas is the case in the normal civil proceedings. Rather, it \noften involves the los s of a homestead, a family farm or \nother property associated with traditional family and \nsocietal values. To this extent, most courts have used the \nclear and convincing standard to protect these important \nproperty interests. See Stevenson v. Stein , 412 Pa. 478, 482 \n(1963) (to prove adverse possession \u201ccredible, clear and \ndefinitive proof\u201d is needed). Adopting the clear and \nconvincing standard of proof is more than a mere academic \nexercise. At a minimum, it reflects the value society places \non the rights and interests being asserted. \nThe bottom line is that the function of the legal process is \nto minimize the risk of erroneous decisions. See Mathews v. \nElderidge , 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). The law should not \nallow the land of one to be taken by another, withou t a \nconveyance or consideration, merely upon slight \npresumption or probabilities. The relevant evidence in an \nadverse action must necessarily expand over a ten year \nperiod. A preponderance standard, in our judgment, would \ncreate the risk of increasing the number of cases whereby \nland is erroneously taken from the title owner under \nspurious adverse possession claims. This heightened \nstandard of clear and convincing is one way to impress the \nfactfinder with the importance of the decision, and thereby \nreduce t he chances that spurious claims of adverse \npossession will be successful.", "proposition": ["A firm belief or conviction is required for the factfinder in an adverse possession claim.", "The highest possible standard of civil proof is the clear and convincing standard.", "Cramer v. Dep\u2019t of Hwys. (1988) established this standard in West Virginia.", "The interest at stake in an adverse possession claim is often the loss of a homestead, family farm, or other property associated with traditional family and societal values.", "Most courts have used the clear and convincing standard to protect these important property interests.", "Stevenson v. Stein (1963) required \"credible, clear, and definitive proof\" for adverse possession.", "Adopting the clear and convincing standard of proof is more than an academic exercise; it reflects the value society places on the rights and interests being asserted.", "The function of the legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.", "The law should not allow the land of one to be taken by another without a conveyance or consideration merely upon slight presumption or probabilities.", "The relevant evidence in an adverse action must necessarily expand over a ten-year period.", "A preponderance standard would create the risk of increasing the number of cases whereby land is erroneously taken from the title owner under spurious adverse possession claims.", "The heightened standard of clear and convincing is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and reduce the chances that spurious claims of adverse possession will be successful."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "137", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "122 \n invades a neighbor\u2019s interest in the use and enjoyment of \nland. Restatement (Secon d) of Torts, sec. 822, 826, 829 \n(1977) This court concluded that the common enemy rule \nwhich served society \u201cwell in the days of burgeoning \nnational expansion of the mid -nineteenth and early -\ntwentieth centuries\u201d should be abandoned because it was \nno longer \u201cin harmony with the realities of our society.\u201d \nDeetz , supra, 66 Wis. 2d at 14 -15. We recognized in Deetz \nthat common law rules adapt to changing social values and \nconditions.7 \nYet the defendant would have us ignore the flexible private \nnuisance law as a means of resolving the dispute between \nthe landowners in this case and would have us adopt an \napproach, already abandoned in Deetz , of favoring the \nunrestricted development of land and of applying a rigid \nand inflexible rule protecting his right to build o n his land \n \n7 This court has recognized \u201cthat the common law is susceptible of growth and \nadaptation to new circumstances and situations, and that courts have power to \ndeclare and effectuat e what is the present rule in respect of a given subject \nwithout regard to the old rule\u2026. The common law is not immutable, but flexible, \nand upon its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions.\u201d Dimick v. \nSchiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487, 55 S.Ct. 296, 3 01, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935), quoted with \napproval in Schwanke v. Garlt, 219 Wis. 367, 371, 263 N.W. 176 (1935). In Bielski \nv. Schulze , 16 Wis.", "proposition": ["The court concluded that the common enemy rule should be abandoned because it is not in harmony with the current realities of society."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "178", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "163 \n and persistent complaints from the people who had \npurchased homes in that area. \nTrial was commenc ed before the court with an advisory \njury. The advisory jury was later discharged and the trial \nwas continued before the court alone. Findings of fact and \nconclusions of law were requested and given. The case was \nvigorously contested, including special act ions in this court \non some of the matters. In one of the special actions before \nthis court, Spur agreed to, and did, shut down its operation \nwithout prejudice to a determination of the matter on \nappeal. On appeal the many questions raised were \nextensively briefed. \nIt is noted, however, that neither the citizens of Sun City \nnor Youngtown are represented in this lawsuit and the suit \nis solely between Del E. Webb Development Company and \nSpur Industries, Inc. \nMAY SPUR BE ENJOINED? \nThe difference between a priva te nuisance and a public \nnuisance is generally one of degree. A private nuisance is \none affecting a single individual or a definite small number \nof persons in the enjoyment of private rights not common \nto the public, while a public nuisance is one affectin g the \nrights enjoyed by citizens as a part of the public. To \nconstitute a public nuisance, the nuisance must affect a \nconsiderable number of people or an entire community or \nneighborhood. City of Phoenix v. Johnson , 51 Ariz. 115, 75 \nP.2d 30 (1938). \nWhere t he injury is slight, the remedy for minor \ninconveniences lies in an action for damages rather than in \none for an injunction. Kubby v. Hammond , 68 Ariz. 17, 198 \nP.2d 134 (1948). Moreover, some courts have held, in the \n\u2018balancing of conveniences\u2019 cases, that damages may be the \nsole remedy. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a trial before the court involving Del E. Webb Development Company and Spur Industries, Inc.", "The trial was initially before an advisory jury, which was later discharged, and continued before the court alone.", "Findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested and given.", "The case was vigorously contested, including special actions in this court on some of the matters.", "In one of the special actions before this court, Spur agreed to and did shut down its operation without prejudice to a determination of the matter on appeal.", "On appeal, the many questions raised were extensively briefed.", "The suit is solely between Del E. Webb Development Company and Spur Industries, Inc., and neither the citizens of Sun City nor Youngtown are represented in this lawsuit.", "The difference between a private nuisance and a public nuisance is generally one of degree.", "A private nuisance affects a single individual or a definite small number of persons in the enjoyment of private rights not common to the public, while a public nuisance affects the rights enjoyed by citizens as a part of the public.", "To constitute a public nuisance, the nuisance must affect a considerable number of people or an entire community or neighborhood.", "City of Phoenix v. Johnson (51 Ariz. 115, 75 P.2d 30 (1938)) is cited as a reference for the definition of public nuisance.", "Where the injury is slight, the remedy for minor inconveniences lies in an action for damages rather than in one for an injunction.", "Kubby v. Hammond (68 Ariz. 17, 198 P.2d 134 (1948)) is cited as a reference for this statement.", "Some courts have held, in the 'balancing of conveniences' cases, that damages may be the sole remedy.", "Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. is mentioned as an example of such cases."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "615", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "600 \n and keeps track of the scores of registered \nplayers of this game. Those printouts show that \nthe Respondent played this game using the player \nnames \u201csting\u201d or \u201c=sting=\u201d. In addition, the \nRespondent provided evidence in Exhibit E to \nthe Response of preparations by him to establish \na web site at the URL http://www.sting.com. \n6.8 Although this evidence is not irrelevant to the \nissue of whether or not the Respondent has a \nright to or a legitimate interest in the domain \nname, it is certainly at the weaker end of the \nspectrum of such evidence. The Respondent\u2019s \nuse of the name \u201csting\u201d or \u201c=sting=\u201d for gaming \ndoes not establish that he has be en \u201ccommonly \nknown\u201d by the domain name as contemplated by \nparagraph 4(c)(ii). The word is undistinctive, and \nmost likely is used by numerous people in \ncyberspace. In practice, this word provides the \nRespondent with anonymity rather than with a \nname by whic h he is commonly known. The \nRespondent\u2019s evidence of his preparations to \nestablish a web site at the URL \nhttp://www.sting.com does not establish the \ncircumstances contemplated by paragraph 4(c)(i), \nbecause there is no evidence that this proposed \nuse of the domain name is in connection with a \nbona fide offering of goods or services. \n6.9 In short, a more substantive use of the word \n\u201csting\u201d than that proven by the Respondent is \nrequired to show a right or legitimate interest in \nthe domain name \u201csting.com\u201d (alt hough this \nproven use is relevant to the issue of bad faith). \nOn balance, therefore, this Administrative Panel \nfinds that the Respondent does not have a right \nto or a legitimate interest in the domain name, in", "proposition": ["The Respondent does not have a right to or a legitimate interest in the domain name 'sting.com'."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "140", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "125 \n to balance the utility of the defendant\u2019s conduct with the \ngravity of the harm. Sec. 826, Restatement (Second) of \nTorts (1977).11 The defendant urges us to accept the circuit \ncourt\u2019s balance as adequate. We decline to do so. \n \ninterest in the privat e use and enjoyment of land, and the \ninvasion is either \n(a) intentional and unreasonable, or \n(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules \ncontrolling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or \nfor abnormally dangerous conditions or activ ities.\u201d \nFurther, sec. 821F, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) provides as \nfollows: \nThere is liability for a nuisance only to those to whom it \ncauses significant harm, of a kind that would be suffered \nby a normal person in the community or by property in \nnormal condition and used for a normal purpose. \n11 The factors involved in determining the gravity of the harm caused by \nthe conduct complained of are set out in sec. 827 of the Restatement as \nfollows: \nSec. 827. Gravity of Harm -Factors Involved. \nIn determi ning the gravity of the harm from an intentional \ninvasion of another\u2019s interest in the use and enjoyment of \nland, the following factors are important: \n(a) The extent of the harm involved; \n(b) the character of the harm involved; \n(c) the social value that th e law attaches to the type of use \nor enjoyment invaded; \n(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment \ninvaded to the character of the locality; and \n(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the \nharm. \nThe factors involved in determining the u tility of conduct complained of \nare set out in sec. 828 of the Restatement as follows: \nSec. 828. Utility of Conduct -Factors Involved.", "proposition": ["Sec. 826 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) provides a definition of an actionable invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land.", "An invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is actionable if it is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "129", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "114 \n to reach an agreement on the location of defendant\u2019s home \nbefore defendant started construction. The Architectural \nControl Committee and t he Planning Commission of the \nCity of Muskego approved the defendant\u2019s plans for his \nhome, including its location on the lot. After such approval, \nthe defendant apparently changed the grade of the property \nwithout prior notice to the Architectural Control \nCommittee. The problem with defendant\u2019s proposed \nconstruction, as far as the plaintiff\u2019s interests are \nconcerned, arises from a combination of the grade and the \ndistance of defendant\u2019s home from the defendant\u2019s lot line. \nThe circuit court denied plaintiff\u2019 s motion for injunctive \nrelief, declared it would entertain a motion for summary \njudgment and thereafter entered judgment in favor of the \ndefendant. \nII. \n\u2026 . \nIn this case there is some ambiguity whether the judgment \nwas based on the complaint or on factual matters outside \nthe pleadings which were presented to the circuit court in \nconnection with the motion for a temporary injunction. \nConsequently, we shall first test the sufficiency of the \ncomplaint and then determine whether the matters outside \nthe pleading s present disputed material facts sufficient to \njustify a trial. \nIII. \nIn testing the sufficiency of the complaint the facts pleaded \nby the plaintiff, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, are \naccepted as true. The pleadings are to be liberally construed \nwith a view to substantial justice to the parties, and the \ncomplaint should be dismissed as legally insufficient only if \n\u201cit is quite clear that under no circumstances can the \nplaintiff recover.\u201d \n\u2026 .", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving the location of a defendant's home.", "The Architectural Control Committee and the Planning Commission of the City of Muskego approved the defendant's plans for his home, including its location on the lot.", "The defendant changed the grade of the property without prior notice to the Architectural Control Committee.", "The plaintiff's interests are affected by the grade and distance of the defendant's home from the lot line.", "The circuit court denied the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief and entered judgment in favor of the defendant.", "There is ambiguity regarding whether the judgment was based on the complaint or on factual matters outside the pleadings.", "The sufficiency of the complaint will be tested by accepting the facts pleaded by the plaintiff as true and construing the pleadings liberally.", "The complaint should only be dismissed as legally insufficient if it is clear that the plaintiff cannot recover under any circumstances."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "59", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "44 \n $100,000. The court of appeals affirmed, reluctantly \nconcluding that it could not reinstate the punitive damages \nbecause it was bound by precedent establishing that an \naward of nominal damages will not sustain a puniti ve \ndamage award. We conclude that when nominal damages \nare awarded for an intentional trespass to land, punitive \ndamages may, in the discretion of the jury, be awarded. We \nfurther conclude that the $100,000 awarded by the jury is \nnot excessive. Accordingly , we reverse and remand for \nreinstatement of the punitive damage award. \nI. \nThe relevant facts follow. Plaintiffs, Lois and Harvey \nJacques, are an elderly couple, now retired from farming, \nwho own roughly 170 acres near Wilke\u2019s Lake in the town \nof Schleswig . The defendant, Steenberg Homes, Inc. \n(Steenberg), is in the business of selling mobile homes. In \nthe fall of 1993, a neighbor of the Jacques purchased a \nmobile home from Steenberg. Delivery of the mobile home \nwas included in the sales price. \nSteenberg de termined that the easiest route to deliver the \nmobile home was across the Jacques\u2019 land. Steenberg \npreferred transporting the home across the Jacques\u2019 land \nbecause the only alternative was a private road which was \ncovered in up to seven feet of snow and co ntained a sharp \ncurve which would require sets of \u201crollers\u201d to be used \nwhen maneuvering the home around the curve. Steenberg \nasked the Jacques on several separate occasions whether it \ncould move the home across the Jacques\u2019 farm field. The \nJacques refused. The Jacques were sensitive about allowing \nothers on their land because they had lost property valued \nat over $10,000 to other neighbors in an adverse possession \naction in the mid -1980\u2019s. Despite repeated refusals from \nthe Jacques, Steenberg decided to sel l the mobile home, \nwhich was to be used as a summer cottage, and delivered it \non February 15, 1994.", "proposition": ["The court of appeals affirmed the decision.", "The court of appeals could not reinstate the punitive damages due to a precedent.", "An award of nominal damages can lead to a punitive damage award for an intentional trespass to land.", "The jury's award of $100,000 for punitive damages is not considered excessive.", "The court reverses and remands for reinstatement of the punitive damage award.", "Lois and Harvey Jacques are an elderly couple who own 170 acres near Wilke's Lake in Schleswig.", "Steenberg Homes, Inc. is a company that sells mobile homes.", "In the fall of 1993, a neighbor of the Jacques purchased a mobile home from Steenberg.", "Steenberg determined that the easiest route to deliver the mobile home was across the Jacques' land.", "Steenberg asked the Jacques multiple times if they could move the mobile home across their land.", "The Jacques refused to allow Steenberg to move the mobile home across their land.", "The Jacques were sensitive about allowing others on their land due to a previous adverse possession action.", "Steenberg decided to sell the mobile home and deliver it on February 15, 1994, despite the Jacques' refusal."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "89", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "74 \n Others might be thought justified by some kind of implied \nconsent \u2013the restaurant critic for example might point by \nway of analogy to the use of the \u201cfair use\u201d defense by book \nreviewers charged with copyright infringement and argue \nthat the restaurant industry as a whole would be injured if \nrestaurants could exclude critics. But most such efforts at \nrationalization would be little better than evasions. The fact \nis that cons ent to an entry is often given legal effect even \nthough the entrant has intentions that if known to the \nowner of the property would cause him for perfectly \nunderstandable and generally ethical or at least lawful \nreasons to revoke his consent. \nThe law\u2019s wil lingness to give effect to consent procured by \nfraud is not limited to the tort of trespass. The Restatement \ngives the example of a man who obtains consent to sexual \nintercourse by promising a woman $100, yet (unbeknownst \nto her, of course) he pays her wit h a counterfeit bill and \nintended to do so from the start. The man is not guilty of \nbattery, even though unconsented -to sexual intercourse is a \nbattery. Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 892B, \nillustration 9, pp. 373 -74 (1979). Yet we know that to \nconceal the fact that one has a venereal disease transforms \n\u201cconsensual\u201d intercourse into battery. Crowell v. Crowell , 180 \nN.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920). Seduction, standardly \neffected by false promises of love, is not rape, Pletnikoff v. \nState, 719 P.2d 1039, 1043 (Alaska App.1986); intercourse \nunder the pretense of rendering medical or psychiatric \ntreatment is, at least in most states. Compare State v. Tizard , \n1994 WL 630498, * 8 -10 (Tenn.Crim.App. Nov. 10, 1994), \nwith Boro v. Superior Court , 163 Cal.App.3d 1224, 210 \nCal.Rptr.", "proposition": ["Some people might argue that implied consent justifies certain actions, such as restaurant critics reviewing establishments.", "However, most such efforts at rationalization would be little better than evasions.", "Consent to an entry is often given legal effect even though the entrant has intentions that would cause the owner of the property to revoke his consent if he knew about them.", "The law's willingness to give effect to consent procured by fraud is not limited to the tort of trespass.", "The Restatement gives the example of a man who obtains consent to sexual intercourse by promising a woman $100 but pays her with a counterfeit bill and intended to do so from the start.", "The man is not guilty of battery, even though unconsented-to sexual intercourse is a battery.", "We know that concealing the fact that one has a venereal disease transforms 'consensual' intercourse into battery.", "Seduction, standardly effected by false promises of love, is not rape.", "Intercourse under the pretense of rendering medical or psychiatric treatment is, at least in most states, considered rape."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "670", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "An unrecorded instrument is valid as \nbetween the parties to it and as against one who has actual \nnotice of it.", "proposition": ["An unrecorded instrument is valid as between the parties to it.", "An unrecorded instrument is valid as against one who has actual notice of it."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "527", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "512 \n \u2026 . \nThe parties and many of the amici in this case think the key \nto resolvi ng it is the Sony rule and, in particular, what it \nmeans for a product to be \u201ccapable of commercially \nsignificant noninfringing uses.\u201d Sony Corp. v. Universal \nCity Studios, supra, at 442. MGM advances the argument \nthat granting summary judgment to Grokster and \nStreamCast as to their current activities gave too much \nweight to the value of innovative technology, and too little \nto the copyrights infringed by users of their software, given \nthat 90% of works available on one of the networks was \nshown to be copyr ighted. Assuming the remaining 10% to \nbe its noninfringing use, MGM says this should not qualify \nas \u201csubstantial,\u201d and the Court should quantify Sony to the \nextent of holding that a product used \u201cprincipally\u201d for \ninfringement does not qualify. As mentioned before, \nGrokster and StreamCast reply by citing evidence that their \nsoftware can be used to reproduce public domain works, \nand they point to copyright holders who actually encourage \ncopying. Even if infringement is the principal practice with \ntheir softwa re today, they argue, the noninfringing uses are \nsignificant and will grow. \nWe agree with MGM that the Court of Appeals misapplied \nSony, which it read as limiting secondary liability quite \nbeyond the circumstances to which the case applied. Sony \nbarred sec ondary liability based on presuming or imputing \nintent to cause infringement solely from the design or \ndistribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, \nwhich the distributor knows is in fact used for \ninfringement. The Ninth Circuit has read Son y\u2019s limitation \nto mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial \nlawful use, the producer can never be held contributorily \nliable for third parties\u2019 infringing use of it; it read the rule as \nbeing this broad, even when an actual purpose to cause \ninfringing use is shown by evidence independent of design \nand distribution of the product, unless the distributors had", "proposition": ["The parties and many of the amici in this case believe that the key to resolving the case lies in understanding the Sony rule and what it means for a product to be \"capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses.\"", "MGM argues that granting summary judgment to Grokster and StreamCast for their current activities gives too much weight to innovative technology and not enough to copyright infringement by users of their software, as 90% of the works available on one network were shown to be copyrighted.", "MGM assumes that the remaining 10% of the network's content is the noninfringing use, stating that it should not be considered \"substantial,\" and the Court should quantify the Sony rule to the extent that a product used \"principally\" for infringement does not qualify.", "Grokster and StreamCast counter by citing evidence that their software can be used to reproduce public domain works and pointing to copyright holders who encourage copying.", "Even if infringement is the primary practice with their software today, Grokster and StreamCast argue that the noninfringing uses are significant and will grow.", "The Court agrees with MGM that the Court of Appeals misapplied the Sony rule, reading it as limiting secondary liability beyond the circumstances of the case.", "The Sony rule bars secondary liability based on presuming or imputing intent to cause infringement solely from the design or distribution of a product capable of substantial lawful use, which the distributor knows is in fact used for infringement.", "The Ninth Circuit read the Sony limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use, the producer can never be held contributorily liable for third parties' infringing use of it, even when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent of the product's design and distribution, unless the distributors had."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "696", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "681 \n notwithstanding the fact that none of the defendants\u2019 \ntacking or adverse possession evidence was challenged or \nrebutted by the plaintiffs. \nNevertheless, we are reluctan t to conclude, though invited \nto do so by the defendants, that the evidence was so one -\nsided that no rational trier of fact could find that adverse \npossession had not been established by clear and \nconvincing evidence. While we agree with the defendants, \nthat the quantity of evidence tends to fall in their favor, in \nassessing evidence, the trier of fact is the ultimate judge of \ncredibility and is free to accept or reject any testimony it \ndoes not find credible. However, when a judge, sitting \nwithout jury, de cides against the greater amount of the \nevidence, the judge is obligated to give a fuller explanation \nfor his or her ruling. Under these circumstances, the \nfindings in a bench trial must be sufficiently detailed, \nreasoned, and logical to enable the reviewi ng court to trace \na persuasive path between the evidence and the judgment. \nSee Schneiderman v. United States , 320 U.S. 118, 129 -31. \nWhere the determinative factor at trial is the credibility of \nthe witnesses, this requires a trial court to specify what \nwitnesses were not credited and why. \nAdditionally, though the clear error standard is formidable, \nit is not a bulldozer that crushes everything in its way. One \nimportant qualification is that the jurisprudence of clear \nerror does not inhibit an appellate cour t\u2019s power to correct \nerrors of law, including those that may affect a so -called \nmixed finding of law and fact that is predicated on the \nmisunderstanding of the governing rule of law. Similarly, \nthe deference accorded to a circuit court may evaporate \nwhen, in making its ultimate decision: (1) a relevant factor \nthat should have been given significant weight is not \nconsidered; (2) all proper factors, and no improper factors, \nare considered, but the circuit court in weighing those \nfactors commits an error of ju dgment; and (3) the circuit", "proposition": ["The defendants argue that the evidence for tacking or adverse possession was not challenged or rebutted by the plaintiffs.", "The court is reluctant to conclude that the evidence was so one-sided that no rational trier of fact could find that adverse possession had not been established by clear and convincing evidence.", "The court agrees with the defendants that the quantity of evidence tends to fall in their favor, but notes that the trier of fact is the ultimate judge of credibility and is free to accept or reject any testimony it does not find credible.", "When a judge decides against the greater amount of evidence in a bench trial, the judge is obligated to give a fuller explanation for his or her ruling.", "The findings in a bench trial must be sufficiently detailed, reasoned, and logical to enable the reviewing court to trace a persuasive path between the evidence and the judgment.", "The clear error standard is not a bulldozer that crushes everything in its way.", "The jurisprudence of clear error does not inhibit an appellate court's power to correct errors of law, including those that may affect a so-called mixed finding of law and fact that is predicated on the misunderstanding of the governing rule of law.", "The deference accorded to a circuit court may evaporate when, in making its ultimate decision, a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered, all proper factors, and no improper factors are considered, but the circuit court in weighing those factors commits an error of judgment, or the circuit court misunderstands the governing rule of law."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "652", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "637 \n It is so ordered. \nBOYD, Chief Justice, dissenting. \nI respectfully but strongly dissent to the Court\u2019s expansion \nof the duties of sellers of real property. Th is ruling will give \nrise to a flood of litigation and will facilitate unjust \noutcomes in many cases. If, as a matter of public policy, the \nwell settled law of this state on this question should be \nchanged, the change should come from the legislature. \nMoreo ver, I do not find sufficient evidence in the record to \njustify rescission or a finding of fraud even under present \nlaw. I would quash the decision of the district court of \nappeal. \nMy review of the record reveals that there is not adequate \nevidence from wh ich the trier of fact could have found any \nof the following crucial facts: (a) that at the time Johnson \ntold Mrs. Davis about the previous leaks that had been \nrepaired, he knew that there was a defect in the roof; (b) \nthat at that time or the time of the e xecution of the \ncontract, there were in fact any defects in the roof; (c) that \nit was not possible to repair the roof to \u201cwatertight\u201d \ncondition before closing. \nAs the district court and this Court\u2019s majority have implied \nbut have not stated, we are hampere d by the lack of specific \nwritten findings by the trial court on issues of fact and the \napplication of the law to the facts. Some of the issues on \nwhich specific findings would be helpful are: \n(a) what was the condition of the roof at the time of \nthe discu ssion between Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Davis \nafter the Davises had paid the partial deposit of $5,000 \nand before they paid the additional $26,000, and had it \nin fact leaked more recently than 1979? \n(b) what was the extent of Mr. Johnson\u2019s knowledge \nof the cond ition of the roof at the time of the signing \nof the contract and at the time of the conversation?", "proposition": ["The Court has expanded the duties of sellers of real property.", "This ruling will lead to an increase in litigation and potentially unjust outcomes in many cases.", "If the law regarding this issue should be changed, it should be done by the legislature.", "The Chief Justice does not find sufficient evidence in the record to justify rescission or a finding of fraud.", "The Chief Justice would quash the decision of the district court of appeal.", "There is not adequate evidence in the record for the trier of fact to find that Johnson knew of a defect in the roof at a certain time.", "There is not adequate evidence in the record for the trier of fact to find that there were any defects in the roof at a certain time.", "There is not adequate evidence in the record for the trier of fact to find that it was not possible to repair the roof to \"watertight\" condition before closing.", "The lack of specific written findings by the trial court on issues of fact and the application of the law to the facts hampers the Court.", "Specific findings regarding the condition of the roof and Johnson's knowledge of the roof's condition would be helpful."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "28", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "13 \n which ones are consistent with the relevant constitutional and \nstatutory provisions and with the precedent.\u201d When the judge had \nidentified the alternatives that meet the criterion of fit, it is po ssible \nthat there will be more than one possibility that fits. If so, then the \njudge can go on to ask the question, \u201cOf the interpretations of the \nexisting law that fit the constitution, statutes, and case law, which is \nthe best interpretation? Which of th e possible legal rules that I \ncould adopt is most consistent with the normative theory that \nprovides the best justification for the law as a whole. \nFit \nWhat does it mean to say that a given rule fits the legal landscape? \nSuppose you are a judge deciding whether your jurisdiction will \nadopt the rule of contributory negligence or will choose instead to \nfollow the comparative negligence approach. It is possi ble that only \none of these two rules fits the existing law in your jurisdiction. For \nexample, if the legislature has mandated the contributory \nnegligence rule by statute, then as a judge (even a Supreme Court \njudge), you would be obliged to follow the stat ute and decide the \ncase before you on the basis of contributory negligence. On the \nother hand, suppose you are in a newly created jurisdiction. No \nstatute or binding precedent requires either comparative or \ncontributory negligence. Both rules fit the exist ing legal landscape. \nIn that case, Dworkin argues, you would need to decide a question \nof justification . \nJustification \nWhat does it mean to say that a judge might prefer one rule over \nanother on the basis of the criterion of justification? Let\u2019s continue \nwith our example of the choice between contributory and \ncomparative negligence. Since there is no statute or precedent that \ncompels (or strongly guides) the choice, the judge must turn to \nsome other basis in order to make her decision. She will need to get \nnormative , i.e., to consider the normative justifications for tort law. \nSimplifying greatly, let\u2019s suppose our judge decides that the tort of \nnegligence is best understood as a system of compensation and \n\u201crisk spreading.\u201d She might then reason that the com parative", "proposition": ["A judge must select a legal rule that fits the existing law and is consistent with the constitution, statutes, and case law.", "In some cases, only one rule may fit the existing legal landscape in a jurisdiction.", "In other cases, multiple rules may fit the existing legal landscape, requiring a question of justification.", "Justification refers to the normative basis for choosing one legal rule over another.", "The judge in our example decides that the tort of negligence is best understood as a system of compensation and 'risk spreading.'", "The judge then reasons that the comparative negligence rule is more consistent with the normative justifications for tort law than the contributory negligence rule."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "292", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "277 \n Humble Oil & Refining Co. , 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935, \n940,87 S.W.2d 1069,99 A.L.R. 1107,101 A.L.R. 1393. \nIn Texas, and in other jurisdictions, a different rules exists \nas to ownership. In our state the landowner is regarded as \nhaving absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place \nbeneath his land. Lemar v. Garner , 121 Tex. 502, 50 S.W.2d \n769; Humphreys -Mexia Co. v. Gammon , 113 Tex. 247, 254 \nS.W. 296, 29 A.L.R. 607; Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co. , 118 \nTex. 509, 19 S.W.2d 27; Texas Co. v. Daugherty , 107 Tex. \n226, 176 S.W. 717, L.R.A. 1917F, 989. The only \nqualification of that rule of ownership is that it must be \nconsidered in connection with the law of capture and is \nsubject to police regulations. Brown v. Humble Oil & Refining \nCo., supra. The oil and gas beneath the soil are considered a \npart of the real ty. Each owner of land owns separately, \ndistinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land \nand is accorded the usual remedies against trespassers who \nappropriate the minerals or destroy their market value. \nPeterson v. Grayce Oil Co. , Tex.Civ.App ., 37 S.W.2d 367, \naffirmed 128 Tex. 550, 98 S.W.2d 781; Comanche Duke Oil \nCo. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil Co. , Tex.Com.App., 298 S.W. \n554; Calor Oil & Gas Co. v. Franzell , 128 Ky. 715, 109 S.W. \n328; Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co. , 117 Ky.", "proposition": ["The owner is accorded the usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the minerals or destroy their market value."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "82", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "67 \n of this rule. We therefore hold that it is not legally possible \nfor appellees to obtain an easement by prescription through \nthe airspace above appellants\u2019 land. Por tsmouth Harbor \nLand & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327, 43 S.Ct. \n135, 67 L.Ed. 287, is not at variance with this holding, for \nin that case it is apparent that the use or occupancy of the \nairspace, if it can be so considered, was under such \ncircumst ances as amounted to a taking of the surface also. \nSuch is not the case here. \nIt is necessary to note also appellants\u2019 further point, \nnamely, that the second cause of action in the bill is for \ndamages on account of trespass. No actual injury is alleged, \nother than the mere utilization of the airspace above \nappellants\u2019 land. \nIn Murray v. Pannaci (C.C.A. 3) 130 F. 529, at page 530, it \nwas said: \u2018The judge applied to the case the familiar rule, \nsettled by many decisions, that although a legal injury to a \nplain tiff is proven, yet if the extent of the injury is not \nshown, nor evidence given from which it can be inferred, \nnominal damages only can be recovered.\u2019 This rule is \nsupported by many decisions set out in 63 C.J. 1035, Sec. \n225. We hold under the allegation s of the bill that in no \nevent could appellant be entitled to more than nominal \ndamages, and that being the case, an injunction was \nproperly denied. \nAppellants also complain in their third assignment of error \nas follows: \nThat the above entitled court erred in \nmaking and causing to be entered that \nportion of said order as follows, to -wit: \nThat \u2018in no case shall any amended \ncause of action be sufficient \ncompliance with this order if same \nmerely restates a case in trespass.\u2019", "proposition": ["The court holds that appellees cannot obtain an easement by prescription through the airspace above appellants' land.", "The court states that Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States is not inconsistent with this holding, as the use or occupancy of the airspace in that case also amounted to a taking of the surface.", "The court notes that the second cause of action in the bill is for damages on account of trespass, but no actual injury is alleged other than the mere utilization of the airspace above appellants' land.", "The court cites Murray v. Pannaci (C.C.A. 3) 130 F. 529, which states that if the extent of the injury is not shown or evidence is not given from which it can be inferred, nominal damages only can be recovered.", "The court supports this rule with many decisions set out in 63 C.J. 1035, Sec. 225.", "The court holds that under the allegations of the bill, appellants are not entitled to more than nominal damages, and therefore an injunction was properly denied.", "Appellants complain that the court erred in making and entering a portion of the order stating that no amended cause of action would be sufficient compliance with the order if it merely restated a case in trespass."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "633", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "618 \n Section \nVI. Seller's Representations and Warranties \nAfter making diligent inquiry and investigation into the \nmatters at issue, seller represents to purchaser that to the \nbest of seller's knowledge and belief: \na. Seller is the owner of the property free and clear of all \nencumbrances, occupancies or restrictions except for the \npermitted title exceptions. \nb. Seller has the exclusive right of occupancy and \npossession of the property. No other party has any deed, \noption or other conveyance of any right or interest in or to \nthe property, except for the permitted title exceptions. \nc. Seller has not used, nor authorized, nor allowed the us e \nof the property, and, to seller's knowledge, the property has \nnot been used, for the handling, treatment, storage, disposal \nor release of any hazardous or toxic substance as defined \nunder any applicable state or federal law or regulation \nincluding, witho ut limitation, the Comprehensive \nEnvironmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act \n(\"CERCLA\"), in amounts that would reasonably necessitate \nany response or corrective action, including any such action \nunder CERCLA as amended, the Resource Conservation \nand Recovery Act, as amended, the Georgia Hazardous \nWaste Management Act, as amended, or any other \napplicable law or regulation. \nd. The property is free from special taxes or assessments, \nexcept those generally applicable to other properties in the \ntax di strict in which the property is located, and there is no \npending or threatened special assessment or condemnation \nor eminent domain proceedings which would affect the \nproperty, or any part of the property. \nSection \nVII. Time of Essence; Closing", "proposition": ["Seller represents to purchaser that, to the best of seller's knowledge and belief, seller is the owner of the property free and clear of all encumbrances, occupancies, or restrictions except for the permitted title exceptions.", "Seller represents to purchaser that, to the best of seller's knowledge and belief, seller has the exclusive right of occupancy and possession of the property. No other party has any deed, option, or other conveyance of any right or interest in or to the property, except for the permitted title exceptions.", "Seller represents to purchaser that, to the best of seller's knowledge and belief, seller has not used, nor authorized, nor allowed the use of the property, and, to seller's knowledge, the property has not been used for the handling, treatment, storage, disposal, or release of any hazardous or toxic substance as defined under any applicable state or federal law or regulation, including, without limitation, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (\"CERCLA\"), in amounts that would reasonably necessitate any response or corrective action, including any such action under CERCLA as amended, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended, the Georgia Hazardous Waste Management Act, as amended, or any other applicable law or regulation.", "Seller represents to purchaser that, to the best of seller's knowledge and belief, the property is free from special taxes or assessments, except those generally applicable to other properties in the tax district in which the property is located, and there is no pending or threatened special assessment or condemnation or eminent domain proceedings which would affect the property, or any part of the property.", "The time of essence and closing are specified in Section VII of the agreement."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "484", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "469 \n Because this subsection concerns only costs, not \ncountervailing benefits, I shall simply note here that, with \nrespect to films as with respect to other works, extension \ndoes cause substantial har m to efforts to preserve and to \ndisseminate works that were created long ago. And I shall \nturn to the second half of the equation: Could Congress \nreasonably have found that the extension\u2019s toll -related and \npermissions -related harms are justified by extensi on\u2019s \ncountervailing preservationist incentives or in other ways? \nC. \nWhat copyright -related benefits might justify the statute\u2019s \nextension of copyright protection? First, no one could \nreasonably conclude that copyright\u2019s traditional economic \nrationale appli es here. The extension will not act as an \neconomic spur encouraging authors to create new works. \nSee Mazer, 347 U. S., at 219 (The \u201ceconomic philosophy\u201d \nof the Copyright Clause is to \u201cadvance public welfare\u201d by \n\u201cencourag[ing] individual effort\u201d through \u201cpe rsonal gain\u201d). \nNo potential author can reasonably believe that he has \nmore than a tiny chance of writing a classic that will survive \ncommercially long enough for the copyright extension to \nmatter. After all, if, after 55 to 75 years, only 2% of all \ncopyrig hts retain commercial value, the percentage \nsurviving after 75 years or more (a typical pre -extension \ncopyright term) \u2013 must be far smaller. See CRS Report 7 \n(estimating that, even after copyright renewal, about 3.8% \nof copyrighted books go out of print ea ch year). And any \nremaining monetary incentive is diminished dramatically by \nthe fact that the relevant royalties will not arrive until 75 \nyears or more into the future, when, not the author, but \ndistant heirs, or shareholders in a successor corporation, \nwill receive them. Using assumptions about the time value \nof money provided us by a group of economists (including \nfive Nobel prize winners), it seems fair to say that, for \nexample, a 1% likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20", "proposition": ["The extension causes harm to efforts to preserve and disseminate old works.", "The traditional economic rationale of copyright does not apply to the extension.", "The extension will not encourage authors to create new works.", "Only 2% of copyrights retain commercial value after 55 to 75 years.", "The percentage of copyrighted works surviving after 75 years or more, a typical pre-extension copyright term, is likely even smaller.", "The remaining monetary incentive is diminished by the fact that royalties will not arrive until 75 years or more into the future.", "The relevant royalties will be received by distant heirs or shareholders in a successor corporation, not the original author.", "Using assumptions about the time value of money from a group of economists, including five Nobel prize winners, it is fair to say that the likelihood of earning $100 annually for 20 years is very low."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "492", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "477 \n to avoid the monopolies and consequent restrictions of \nexpression that the Clause, read consistently with the First \nAmendment, seeks to preclude. And that vigilance is all the \nmore necessary in a new century that will see intellectual \nproperty rights and the forms of expression that underlie \nthem play an ever more important role in the Nation\u2019s \neconomy and the lives of its citizens. \nI do not share the Court\u2019s concern that my view of the \n1998 Act could automatically doom the 1976 Act. Unlike \nthe present statute, the 1976 Act thoroughly revised \ncopyright law and enabled the United States to join the \nBerne Convention \u2013 an international treaty that requires the \n1976 Act\u2019s basic life -plus-50 term as a condition for \nsubstantive protections from a copyright\u2019s v ery inception, \nBerne Conv. Art. 7(1). Consequently, the balance of \ncopyright -related harms and benefits there is far less one \nsided. The same is true of the 1909 and 1831 Acts, which, \nin any event, provided for maximum terms of 56 years or \n42 years while r equiring renewal after 28 years, with most \ncopyrighted works falling into the public domain after that \n28-year period, well before the putative maximum terms \nhad elapsed. Regardless, the law provides means to protect \nthose who have reasonably relied upon p rior copyright \nstatutes. And, in any event, we are not here considering, \nand we need not consider, the constitutionality of other \ncopyright statutes. \nNeither do I share the Court\u2019s aversion to line -drawing in \nthis case. Even if it is difficult to draw a si ngle clear bright \nline, the Court could easily decide (as I would decide) that \nthis particular statute simply goes too far. And such \nexamples \u2013 of what goes too far \u2013 sometimes offer better \nconstitutional guidance than more absolute -sounding rules. \nIn any event, \u201cthis Court sits\u201d in part to decide when a \nstatute exceeds a constitutional boundary. In my view, \n\u201c[t]ext, history, and precedent,\u201d support both the need to", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the need to avoid monopolies and restrictions of expression due to the Clause.", "Vigilance is necessary in a new century where intellectual property rights and forms of expression play an important role in the Nation's economy and citizens' lives.", "The author does not share the Court's concern that their view of the 1998 Act could automatically doom the 1976 Act.", "The 1976 Act thoroughly revised copyright law and enabled the United States to join the Berne Convention, which requires the 1976 Act's basic life-plus-50 term as a condition for substantive protections.", "The balance of copyright-related harms and benefits in the 1976 Act is far less one-sided compared to the present statute.", "The 1909 and 1831 Acts provided for maximum terms of 56 years or 42 years, requiring renewal after 28 years, with most copyrighted works falling into the public domain after the 28-year period.", "The law provides means to protect those who have reasonably relied upon prior copyright statutes.", "The passage does not consider the constitutionality of other copyright statutes.", "The author does not share the Court's aversion to line-drawing in this case.", "The Court could decide that the particular statute goes too far, and examples of what goes too far can offer better constitutional guidance than more absolute-sounding rules.", "The Court sits in part to decide when a statute exceeds a constitutional boundary.", "Text, history, and precedent support the need to address when a statute exceeds a constitutional boundary."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "379", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "364 \n establishes that at the time Virtual Works proposed to sell \nvw.net to Volkswagen, it was motivated by a bad faith \nintent to profit from the famousness of the VW mark. This \nis the sort of misconduct tha t Congress sought to \ndiscourage. \nB. \nThe second inquiry under the ACPA is whether Virtual \nWorks 1) registered, trafficked in, or used a domain name; \n2) that is identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive \nmark; or 3) is identical, confusingly similar t o, or dilutive of \na famous mark. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii). There is no \ndispute that Virtual Works registered, trafficked in, and \nused vw.net. There is also no dispute that the VW mark is \nfamous. The sole point of contention is whether vw.net is \nidenti cal, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of Volkswagen\u2019s \nfamous VW mark. \nVirtual Works claims it is not similar because there is a \ndistinction between the .net and .com TLD. According to \nVirtual Works, Volkswagen could not have registered \nvw.net in October of 1996 because it is an automaker and \nnot an Internet service provider. This claim, however, is \nunavailing in light of the fact that NSI stopped enforcing \nthe .com/.net distinction over a year before Virtual Works \nregistered vw.net. The claim is also und ermined by Virtual \nWorks\u2019 admission that at the time of registration it was \naware of the potential confusion with the VW mark, and by \nits statement to Volkswagen that users would instinctively \nuse the vw.net address to link to Volkswagen\u2019s web site. Cf. \nShade\u2019s Landing, Inc. v. Williams , 76 F. Supp.2d 983, 990 \n(D. Minn. 1999) (\u201cBecause all domain names include one \nof these extensions, the distinction between a domain name \nending with \u2018.com\u2019 and the same name ending with \u2018.net\u2019 is \nnot highly significant.\u201d). The district court was correct, \ntherefore, in holding that vw.net is confusingly similar to \nthe famous VW mark.", "proposition": ["The domain name must be identical or confusingly similar to a distinctive mark.", "The domain name must be identical, confusingly similar to, or dilutive of a famous mark."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "204", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "What to that redoubted \nharpooneer, John Bul l, is poor Ireland, but a Fast -Fish? What to \nthat apostolic lancer, Brother Jonathan, is Texas but a Fast -Fish? \nAnd concerning all these, is not Possession the whole of the law? \nBut if the doctrine of Fast -Fish be pretty generally applicable, the \nkindred d octrine of Loose -Fish is still more widely so. That is \ninternationally and universally applicable.", "proposition": ["The doctrine of Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish can be applied to various situations internationally and universally."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "261", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "246 \n possession of baseballs generally and \nmodifies it for cases of interruption by \nunlawful act] \n\u201cPossession can b e likened to a journey\u2026\u201d \nHERE [The court applies its new rule to \nthis case.] \n\u201cAn award of the ball to Mr. Popov would \nbe unfair\u2026\u201d Problem \u2013 unmodified \napplication of the rule adopted would be \nunfair to Hayashi. \n\u201cThankfully, there is a middle ground\u2026\u201d \nBody of law potentially applicable to this \nproblem. \n\u201cHere, the issue is not intent\u2026\u201d He\u2019s \nmaking it too easy for me\u2026 but anyway: \nHERE. \nIn condensed form, we have: \nFacts Fight identification Review of law applicable to fight \nHERE (one claim goes away, another is unclear) Review of \nlaw applicable to further elaborated understanding of fight \n(possession) \nSurvey two possible resolutions of uncertainty in law \n(specific def\u2019n of possession in this case) Argue for the \nadoption of one of these rules \nHERE But, applicatio n reveals policy problem Justification of \ncourt\u2019s power to modify law and address policy Synthesis of \nnew rule HERE But, application reveals fairness problem \nReview of law applicable to this problem HERE \nNote that this is a conceptual outline of what\u2019s goi ng on in the \ncase, meant to help us better understand how legal arguments are \nconstructed. Seeing enough cases and thinking about how they\u2019re \nput together will help us talk the same language as courts and", "proposition": ["The text describes a conceptual outline of a legal case, highlighting the process of constructing legal arguments and identifying issues such as fairness and policy problems."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "27", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "12 \n of rights with others. The learned judge was right in his \ninstructions to the jury. \nJudgment affirmed. \nMERCUR , J., dissents. \nLawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Fit and Justification \nIntroduction \nIn 1975, Ronald Dworkin wrote Hard Cases (88 Harvard Law \nReview 1057 (1975) reprinted in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights \nSeriously ch 4 (Harvard University Press, 1977)). This is one of the \nmost famous and influential articles in contemporary legal theory, \nand I would put it very high on my recommended legal -theory \nreading list. Lot\u2019s of Dworkin\u2019s ideas are very controversia l, but \none of his claims has become part of the way that most legal \nacademics think about the law in general and the enterprise of \njudging in particular. I am referring to Dworkin\u2019s distinction \nbetween \u201cfit\u201d and justification\u201d and his claim that when judge s \ndecide hard cases, they choose the interpretation of the law that \nbest fits and justifies the existing legal landscape \u2013the constitution, \nstatutes, regulations, and common law. \nAs always, the Legal Theory Lexicon is aimed at law students \n(especially first year law students) with an interest in legal theory. I \nknow you are all very busy at this time of year, so I will do my best \nto be concise. \nThe Basic Idea \nSuppose a judge is deciding a hard case. It could be a common law \ncase or a constitutional case or a statutory case. How do judges \napproach this task when they are confronted with a case in which \nthe law is up for grabs? That is, how do judges decide cases where \nthere is an unsettled question of law? Dworkin\u2019s basic idea is that \nthe process of deciding a hard case has two dimensions \u2013fit and \njustification. First, the judge might ask herself, \u201cOf all the possible \ninterpretations of the law that I could adopt as the basis for my \ndecision, which one is consistent with the theory that best fits the \nexisting le gal landscape. Of all the rules I could adopt in this case,", "proposition": ["In 1975, Ronald Dworkin wrote an influential article called \"Hard Cases\" in which he introduced the distinction between \"fit\" and justification in legal decision-making.", "The Legal Theory Lexicon is a resource aimed at law students interested in legal theory, particularly first-year students.", "When judges decide hard cases, they choose the interpretation of the law that best fits and justifies the existing legal landscape, which includes the constitution, statutes, regulations, and common law.", "Hard cases can be common law cases, constitutional cases, or statutory cases, and they involve unsettled questions of law.", "Dworkin's basic idea is that the process of deciding a hard case has two dimensions: fit and justification.", "Judges first ask themselves which of the possible interpretations of the law they could adopt is consistent with the theory that best fits the existing legal landscape.", "After determining the best-fitting theory, judges then consider which of the rules they could adopt in the case best justifies that theory."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "516", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "501 \n use, \u00a7 107(4) requires consideration of \u201cthe effect of the \nuse upon the potential market for or value of the \ncopyrighted work\u201d (emphasis added). \u201c[A] particular use \nwhich may seem to have little or no economic impact on \nthe author\u2019s rights today can assume tremendous \nimportance in times to come.\u201d Register\u2019s Supplementary \nReport 14. Although such a use may seem harmless when \nviewed in isolation, \u201c[i]solated instances of min or \ninfringements, when multiplied many times, become in the \naggregate a major inroad on copyright that must be \nprevented.\u201d 1975 Senate Report 65. \nI therefore conclude that, at least when the proposed use is \nan unproductive one, a copyright owner need prove only a \npotential for harm to the market for or the value of the \ncopyrighted work. See 3 M. Nimmer, Copyright \u00a7 \n13.05[E][4][c], p. 13 -84 (1982). Proof of actual harm, or \neven probable harm, may be impossible in an area where \nthe effect of a new technology is speculative, and requiring \nsuch proof would present the \u201creal danger \u2026 of confining \nthe scope of an author\u2019s rights on the basis of the present \ntechnology so that, as the years go by, his copyright loses \nmuch of its value because of unforeseen technical \nadvances.\u201d Register\u2019s Supplementary Report 14. \nInfringement thus would be found if the copyright owner \ndemonstrates a reasonable possibility that harm will result \nfrom the proposed use. When the use is one that creates no \nbenefit to the public at large, c opyright protection should \nnot be denied on the basis that a new technology that may \nresult in harm has not yet done so. \nThe Studios have identified a number of ways in which \nVTR recording could damage their copyrights. VTR \nrecording could reduce their abi lity to market their works in \nmovie theaters and through the rental or sale of pre -\nrecorded videotapes or videodiscs; it also could reduce their \nrerun audience, and consequently the license fees available \nto them for repeated showings. Moreover, advertiser s may", "proposition": ["Section 501 of the copyright law requires consideration of the effect of a use on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.", "A use that may seem harmless today can have significant impact in the future.", "Copyright owners need to prove only a potential for harm to the market for or the value of the copyrighted work when the proposed use is unproductive.", "Proof of actual or probable harm may be impossible in areas with speculative effects of new technologies.", "Copyright protection should not be denied based on the lack of harm caused by a new technology that has not yet resulted in harm.", "VTR recording could reduce the ability of movie studios to market their works in movie theaters and through the rental or sale of pre-recorded videotapes or videodiscs.", "VTR recording could also reduce the rerun audience and consequently the license fees available to movie studios for repeated showings.", "Advertisers may be negatively affected by VTR recording as well."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "147", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "132 \n declare by judicial fiat what is right and what should be \ndone, under the facts in this case, such action under our \nform of constitutional government where the three \nbranches each have their defined jurisdiction and power, \nwould be an intrusion of judicial egoism over legislative \npassivity.\u201d \nThe legislature has recently acted in this area. Chapter 354, \nLaws of 1981 (effe ctive May 7, 1982), was enacted to \nprovide the underlying legislation enabling local \ngovernments to enact ordinances establishing procedures \nfor guaranteeing access to sunlight. This court\u2019s intrusion \ninto an area where legislative action is being taken is \nunwarranted, and it may undermine a legislative scheme for \norderly development not yet fully operational. \n[Judge Callow excerpts statutory provisions prohibiting \ncertain light blockage but only according to a permit \nscheme and with notice to neighboring owners.] This \nlegislative scheme would deal with the type of problem \npresented in the present case and precludes the need for \njudicial activism in this area. \nI examine with interest the definition of nuisance as set out \nin the Restatement (Second) of Torts and adopted in the \nmajority opinion: \u201cA private nuisance is a nontrespassory \ninvasion of another\u2019s interest in the private use and \nenjoyment of land.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. \n821D (1977) (emphasis added). The majority believes that \nthe defendan t\u2019s obstruction of the plaintiff\u2019s access to \nsunlight falls within the broad definition of \u201cuse and \nenjoyment of land.\u201d Supra , at 187 -188. I do not believe the \ndefendant\u2019s \u201cobstruction\u201d of the plaintiff\u2019s access to \nsunlight falls within the definition of \u201c invasion,\u201d as it \napplies to the private use and enjoyment of land. Invasion \nis typically synonymous with \u201centry,\u201d \u201cattack,\u201d \n\u201cpenetration,\u201d \u201chostile entrance,\u201d \u201cthe incoming or spread \nof something unusually hurtful.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third International \nDictionary , 1188 (1966). Most of the nuisance cases arising", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the role of the judiciary in relation to legislative action.", "The passage mentions a recent legislative action related to access to sunlight.", "The passage argues that the court's intrusion into an area where legislative action is being taken is unwarranted and may undermine a legislative scheme for orderly development.", "The passage refers to statutory provisions prohibiting certain light blockage according to a permit scheme and with notice to neighboring owners.", "The passage introduces the definition of a private nuisance as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.", "The passage disagrees with the majority's belief that the defendant's obstruction of the plaintiff's access to sunlight falls within the broad definition of 'use and enjoyment of land.'", "The passage provides alternative definitions for the term 'invasion' as it applies to the private use and enjoyment of land."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "408", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "393 \n selection and arrangement, so long as they are made \nindependently by the compiler and entail a minim al degree \nof creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may \nprotect such compilations through the copyright laws. \nNimmer \u00a7\u00a7 2.11[D], 3.03; Denicola 523, n. 38. Thus, even a \ndirectory that contains absolutely no protectible written \nexpression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum \nfor copyright protection if it features an original selection \nor arrangement. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S., at 547, 105 \nS.Ct., at 2223. Accord, Nimmer \u00a7 3.03. \nThis protection is subject to an important limitation. The \nmere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that \nevery element of the work may be protected. Originality \nremains the sine qua non of copyright; accordingly, copyright \nprotection may extend only to those components of a work \nthat are original to the author. Patterson & Joyce 800 -802; \nGinsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright \nProtection of Works of Information, 90 Colum.L.Rev. \n1865, 1868, and n. 12 (1990) (hereinafter Ginsburg). Thus, \nif the compilation author clothes facts with an original \ncollocation of words, he or she may be able to claim a \ncopyright in this written expression. Others may copy the \nunderlying facts from the publication, but not the precise \nwords used to present them. In Harper & Row, for example, \nwe explained that President Ford could not prevent others \nfrom copying bare historical facts from his autobiography, \nsee 471 U.S., at 556 -557, 105 S.Ct., at 2228 -2229, but that \nhe could prevent others from copying his \u201csubjective \ndescriptions and portraits of public figures.\u201d Id., a t 563, 105 \nS.Ct., at 2232. Where the compilation author adds no \nwritten expression but rather lets the facts speak for \nthemselves, the expressive element is more elusive.", "proposition": ["Selection and arrangement of facts can be protected by copyright as long as they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of creativity.", "A directory containing no protectible written expression, only facts, can meet the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it features an original selection or arrangement.", "Copyright protection is subject to an important limitation: not every element of a work may be protected.", "Originality remains the sine qua non of copyright; copyright protection may extend only to those components of a work that are original to the author.", "If the compilation author clothes facts with an original collocation of words, he or she may be able to claim a copyright in this written expression.", "Others may copy the underlying facts from the publication, but not the precise words used to present them.", "President Ford could not prevent others from copying bare historical facts from his autobiography, but he could prevent others from copying his 'subjective descriptions and portraits of public figures.'"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "644", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "629 \n amount to a concealment that is actionable as a fraud. The \nbuyer has the duty to satisfy himself as to the quality of his \nbargain pursuant to the doctrine of caveat emptor, which in \nNew York State still applies to real estate transactions.\u201d \n(London v Courduff , 141 AD2d 803, 804 , lv dismissed 73 \nNY2d 809 .) \nThe parties herein were represented by counsel and dealt at \narm\u2019s length. This is evidenced by the contract of sale \nwhich, inter alia , contained various riders and a specific \nprovision that all prior understandings and agreements \nbetween the parties were merged into the contract, that the \ncontract completely expressed their full agreement and that \nneither had relied upon any statement by anyone else not \nset forth in the contract. There is no all egation that \ndefendants, by some specific act, other than the failure to \nspeak, deceived the plaintiff. Nevertheless, a cause of action \nmay be sufficiently stated where there is a confidential or \nfiduciary relationship creating a duty to disclose and there \nwas a failure to disclose a material fact, calculated to induce \na false belief. However, plaintiff herein has not alleged and \nthere is no basis for concluding that a confidential or \nfiduciary relationship existed between these parties to an \narm\u2019s length t ransaction such as to give rise to a duty to \ndisclose. In addition, there is no allegation that defendants \nthwarted plaintiff\u2019s efforts to fulfill his responsibilities fixed \nby the doctrine of caveat emptor. \nFinally, if the doctrine of caveat emptor is to be discarded, \nit should be for a reason more substantive than a \npoltergeist. The existence of a poltergeist is no more \nbinding upon the defendants than it is upon this court. \nBased upon the foregoing, the motion court properly \ndismissed the complaint. \nJohnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d (Fla. 1985) \nMitchell W. Mandler and Patricia M. Silver of Smith & \nMandler, Miami Beach, for petitioners.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving a concealment that is actionable as a fraud.", "The buyer has the duty to satisfy themselves about the quality of their bargain according to the doctrine of caveat emptor.", "The parties in the case were represented by counsel and dealt at arm's length.", "The contract of sale contained various riders and a specific provision that all prior understandings and agreements between the parties were merged into the contract.", "There is no allegation that defendants deceived the plaintiff by a specific act other than the failure to speak.", "A cause of action may be sufficiently stated where there is a confidential or fiduciary relationship creating a duty to disclose and there was a failure to disclose a material fact, calculated to induce a false belief.", "The plaintiff has not alleged or provided a basis for concluding that a confidential or fiduciary relationship existed between the parties.", "There is no allegation that defendants thwarted plaintiff's efforts to fulfill their responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor.", "The motion court properly dismissed the complaint based on the foregoing reasons.", "The existence of a poltergeist is no more binding upon the defendants than it is upon the court."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "106", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "See also Martin, supra \nat 96, 342 P.2d 790 (observing that \u201c[t]here are adjudicated \ncases which have refused to find a trespass where the \nintrusion is clearly established but where the court has felt \nthat the possessor\u2019s interest should not be protected\u201d). \nLogically following from a requirement of substantial \ndamages is the weighing of those damages against the social \nutility of the activity causing them. Martin, supra at 97, 342 \nP.2d 790 (balancing \u201cthe in trusion \u2026 against the socially \ndesirable conduct of the defendant\u201d). See also Bradley, \nsupra at 685, 709 P.2d 782 (\u201cWhile the strict liability origins", "proposition": ["The text contains multiple statements about trespass, social utility, and strict liability origins.", "There are references to specific cases and their findings."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "701", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "686 \n Morrows ceased summering on Gooseberry Road,2 but \ncontinued to return at least once a year to view the lot. \nMorrow stopped visiting lot 19 in October 2002, after her \nhusband became ill, and she did not return again until July \n2006. \nIn 1971, two years after George Morrow purchased lot 19, \nCahill\u2019s mother bought the land and house designated as lot \n20 as a summer residence. Between 1971 and 1975, Cahill \nand her brother did some work on lot 19. They occasionally \ncut the grass, placed f urniture, and planted trees and \nflowers on it. \nCahill\u2019s mother passed away in 1975, and in 1977, after \npurchasing her siblings\u2019 shares, Cahill became the sole \nrecord owner of the lot 20 property. Once she became lot \n20\u2019s owner, Cahill began living in the h ouse year -round. \nFrom that time through 1991, she and her boyfriend, James \nM. Cronin, testified that they continued to mow lot 19\u2019s \ngrass on occasion. In addition, she hung clothing on the \nclothesline, attached flags to the clothesline pole, used the \npicni c table,3 positioned a bird bath and feeder, and planted \nmore flowers and trees. Cahill placed Adirondack chairs on \nlot 19 and eventually replaced the clothesline and picnic \ntable. In 1987, Cahill held the first annual \u201ccousins\u2019 party\u201d \nallowing her relativ es free rein with respect to her property \nand lot 19 for playing, sitting, and car parking. She also \nentertained friends and family on lot 19 during other \nsummer days. Mary Frances McGinn, Cahill\u2019s cousin, \nlikewise recalled that lot 19 was occupied by Cahi ll kindred \nduring various family functions throughout this time \nperiod. Cahill admitted that she never objected to \nneighborhood children using lot 19, however. \n \n2 In 1991, George Morrow and his joint -owner brothers sold lot 18.", "proposition": ["George Morrow stopped visiting lot 19 in October 2002 after his husband became ill.", "Mary Frances McGinn, Cahill's cousin, recalled that lot 19 was occupied by Cahill's kindred during various family functions throughout this time period.", "Cahill and her brother did some work on lot 19 between 1971 and 1975.", "Cahill's mother bought lot 20 as a summer residence in 1971, two years after George Morrow purchased lot 19.", "Cahill began living in the house year-round once she became the sole record owner of lot 20 property in 1977.", "From that time through 1991, Cahill and her boyfriend, James M. Cronin, testified that they continued to mow lot 19's grass on occasion.", "Cahill held the first annual 'cousins' party' on lot 19 in 1987, allowing her relatives free rein with respect to her property and lot 19 for playing, sitting, and car parking.", "Cahill entertained friends and family on lot 19 during other summer days.", "Cahill admitted that she never objected to neighborhood children using lot 19.", "In 1991, George Morrow and his joint-owner brothers sold lot 18."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "366", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "351 \n \u201cjurisprudence under the Lanham Act \ndeveloped in accordance with the \nstatutory principle that if a mark is \ncapable of being or becoming \ndistinctive of t he applicant\u2019s goods in \ncommerce, then it is capable of serving \nas a trademark.\u201d Owens -Corning, 774 \nF.2d, at 1120. \nIn 1988 Congress amended the Lanham Act, revising \nportions of the definitional language, but left unchanged \nthe language here relevant. \u00a7 134 , 102 Stat. 3946, 15 U.S.C. \n\u00a7 1127. It enacted these amendments against the following \nbackground: (1) the Federal Circuit had decided Owens -\nCorning; (2) the Patent and Trademark Office had adopted a \nclear policy (which it still maintains) permitting regist ration \nof color as a trademark, see PTO Manual \u00a7 1202.04(e) (at p. \n1200 -12 of the January 1986 edition and p. 1202 -13 of the \nMay 1993 edition); and (3) the Trademark Commission had \nwritten a report, which recommended that \u201cthe terms \n\u2018symbol, or device\u2019 \u2026 n ot be deleted or narrowed to \npreclude registration of such things as a color, shape, smell, \nsound, or configuration which functions as a mark,\u201d The \nUnited States Trademark Association Trademark Review \nCommission Report and Recommendations to USTA \nPresident and Board of Directors, 77 T.M.Rep. 375, 421 \n(1987) (hereinafter Trademark Commission); see also 133 \nCong.Rec. 32812 (1987) (statement of Sen. DeConcini) \n(\u201cThe bill I am introducing today is based on the \nCommission\u2019s report and recommendations\u201d). This \nbackground strongly suggests that the language \u201cany word, \nname, symbol, or device,\u201d 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1127, had come to \ninclude color. And, when it amended the statute, Congress \nretained these terms.", "proposition": ["The Lanham Act developed in accordance with the statutory principle that if a mark is capable of being or becoming distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce, then it is capable of serving as a trademark."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "409", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "394 \n Copyright in Compilations of Facts (or Why the \u201cWhite \nPages\u201d Are Not Copyrightable), 12 Com. & Law 37, 64 \n(Dec. 1990) (hereinafter Patry). No matter how original the \nformat, however, the facts themselves do not become \noriginal through association. See Patterson & Joyce 776. \nThis inevitably means that the copyright in a factual \ncompilation is thin. Notwithstand ing a valid copyright, a \nsubsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained \nin another\u2019s publication to aid in preparing a competing \nwork, so long as the competing work does not feature the \nsame selection and arrangement. As one commentator \nexplai ns it: \u201c[N]o matter how much original authorship the \nwork displays, the facts and ideas it exposes are free for the \ntaking\u2026 . [T]he very same facts and ideas may be divorced \nfrom the context imposed by the author, and restated or \nreshuffled by second comer s, even if the author was the \nfirst to discover the facts or to propose the ideas.\u201d \nGinsburg 1868. \nIt may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler\u2019s \nlabor may be used by others without compensation. As \nJustice Brennan has correctly observed, howe ver, this is not \n\u201csome unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.\u201d \nHarper & Row, 471 U.S., at 589, 105 S.Ct., at 2245 \n(dissenting opinion). It is, rather, \u201cthe essence of \ncopyright,\u201d ibid., and a constitutional requirement. The \nprimary objective of copyri ght is not to reward the labor of \nauthors, but \u201c[t]o promote the Progress of Science and \nuseful Arts.\u201d Art. I, \u00a7 8, cl. 8. Accord, Twentieth Century \nMusic Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156, 95 S.Ct. 2040, 2044, \n45 L.Ed.2d 84 (1975).", "proposition": ["No matter how original the format, the facts themselves do not become original through association.", "The copyright in a factual compilation is thin.", "A subsequent compiler remains free to use the facts contained in another\u2019s publication to aid in preparing a competing work, so long as the competing work does not feature the same selection and arrangement.", "The facts and ideas in a work may be divorced from the context imposed by the author, and restated or reshuffled by second comers, even if the author was the first to discover the facts or to propose the ideas.", "It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler\u2019s labor may be used by others without compensation.", "This is not an unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme, but rather the essence of copyright and a constitutional requirement.", "The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "436", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "421 \n the narrower question in this case is to what extent a critic \nmay use the protected elements of an original work of \nauthorship to communicate her criticism without infringing \nthe copyright in that w ork. As will be discussed below, this \nbecomes essentially an analysis of the fair use factors. As \nwe turn to the analysis required in this case, we must \nremain cognizant of the First Amendment protections \ninterwoven into copyright law. \nC. Appropriateness o f Injunctive Relief \n\u201cThe chief function of a preliminary injunction is to \npreserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy \ncan be fully and fairly adjudicated.\u201d The Copyright Act \nspecifically vests the federal courts with power to grant \ninjuncti ons \u201cto prevent or restrain infringement of a \ncopyright.\u201d \u00a7 502(a). While injunctive relief may be \nparticularly appropriate in cases involving simple copying \nor \u201cpiracy\u201d of a copyrighted work, the Supreme Court has \ncautioned that such relief may not be con sistent with the \ngoals of copyright law in cases in which the alleged \ninfringer of the copyright has a colorable fair -use defense. \nThe basic framework for our analysis remains, however, the \nstandard test governing the issuance of preliminary \ninjunctions. S unTrust is not entitled to relief in the form of \na preliminary injunction unless it has proved each of the \nfollowing four elements: \u201c(1) a substantial likelihood of \nsuccess on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable \ninjury if the injunction wer e not granted, (3) that the \nthreatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the harm an \ninjunction may cause the defendant, and (4) that granting \nthe injunction would not disserve the public interest.\u201d", "proposition": ["The narrower question in this case is to what extent a critic may use the protected elements of an original work of authorship to communicate her criticism without infringing the copyright in that work.", "This becomes essentially an analysis of the fair use factors.", "As we turn to the analysis required in this case, we must remain cognizant of the First Amendment protections interwoven into copyright law.", "The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated.", "The Copyright Act specifically vests the federal courts with power to grant injunctions \"to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.\" \u00a7 502(a).", "While injunctive relief may be particularly appropriate in cases involving simple copying or \"piracy\" of a copyrighted work, the Supreme Court has cautioned that such relief may not be consistent with the goals of copyright law in cases in which the alleged infringer of the copyright has a colorable fair-use defense.", "The basic framework for our analysis remains the standard test governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions.", "SunTrust is not entitled to relief in the form of a preliminary injunction unless it has proved each of the following four elements: \"(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the harm an injunction may cause the defendant, and (4) that granting the injunction would not disserve the public interest.\"", "The court must consider the four factors of the fair use doctrine: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "371", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "356 \n declaratory judgment action against Volkswagen. Virtual \nWorks complied. Volkswagen subsequently \ncounterclaimed, alleging trademark dilution, infringement, \nand cybersquatting under the ACPA. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1125(d). \nThe district court granted Volkswagen\u2019s motion for \nsummary judgmen t on its cybersquatting, dilution, and \ninfringement counterclaims and dismissed Virtual Works\u2019 \ncross -motions on the same. Accordingly, the district court \nordered Virtual Works to relinquish to Volkswagen the \nrights to the vw.net domain name. Virtual Works appeals. \nII. \nA. \nThe ACPA was enacted in 1999 in response to concerns \nover the proliferation of cybersquatting -the Internet \nversion of a land grab. According to the Senate Report \naccompanying the Act: \u201cTrademark owners are facing a \nnew form of piracy on th e Internet caused by acts of \n\u2018cybersquatting,\u2019 which refers to the deliberate, bad -faith, \nand abusive registration of Internet domain names in \nviolation of the rights of trademark owners.\u201d S. Rep. No. \n106-140, at 4 (1999). Cybersquatting is the practice of \nregistering \u201cwell -known brand names as Internet domain \nnames\u201d in order to force the rightful owners of the marks \n\u201cto pay for the right to engage in electronic commerce \nunder their own brand name.\u201d Id. at 5. See also H.R. Rep. \nNo. 106 -412, at 5 -7 (1999). C ybersquatting is profitable \nbecause while it is inexpensive for a cybersquatter to \nregister the mark of an established company as a domain \nname, such companies are often vulnerable to being forced \ninto paying substantial sums to get their names back. \nSport y\u2019s Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman\u2019s Market, Inc., 202 F.3d \n489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000). \nCongress viewed the practice of cybersquatting as harmful \nbecause it threatened \u201cthe continued growth and vitality of", "proposition": ["Virtual Works filed a declaratory judgment action against Volkswagen.", "Virtual Works complied with Volkswagen's request.", "Volkswagen counterclaimed, alleging trademark dilution, infringement, and cybersquatting under the ACPA (15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1125(d)).", "The district court granted Volkswagen's motion for summary judgment on its cybersquatting, dilution, and infringement counterclaims and dismissed Virtual Works' cross-motions.", "The district court ordered Virtual Works to relinquish the rights to the vw.net domain name to Volkswagen.", "Virtual Works appealed the district court's decision.", "The ACPA was enacted in 1999 to address concerns over the proliferation of cybersquatting, which refers to the deliberate, bad-faith, and abusive registration of Internet domain names in violation of the rights of trademark owners.", "Cybersquatting involves registering well-known brand names as Internet domain names to force the rightful owners of the marks to pay for the right to engage in electronic commerce under their own brand name.", "Congress viewed cybersquatting as harmful because it threatened the continued growth and vitality of the Internet."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "247", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "232 \n dispossession is not an element of the tort of trespass to \nchattel.13 \nIn the case at bar, Mr. Popov is not claiming that Mr. \nHayash i damaged the ball or that he interfered with Mr. \nPopov\u2019s use and enjoyment of the ball. He claims instead \nthat Mr. Hayashi intentionally took it from him and refused \nto give it back. There is no trespass to chattel. If there was \na wrong at all, it is conv ersion. \nConversion does not exist, however, unless the baseball \nrightfully belongs to Mr. Popov. One who has neither title \nnor possession, nor any right to possession, cannot sue for \nconversion.14 The deciding question in this case then, is \nwhether Mr. Popo v achieved possession or the right to \npossession as he attempted to catch and hold on to the ball. \nThe parties have agreed to a starting point for the legal \nanalysis. Prior to the time the ball was hit, it was possessed \nand owned by Major League Baseball. At the time it was hit \nit became intentionally abandoned property.15 The first \nperson who came in possession of the ball became its new \nowner. 16 \nThe parties fundamentally disagree about the definition of \npossession. In order to assist the court in resolving this \ndisagreement, four distinguished law professors \n \n13 Zaslow v. Kroenert (1946) 29 Cal.2d 541, 551, 176 P.2d 1. \n14 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. San Francisco Bank (1943) 58 Cal.App.2d \n528, 534, 136 P.2d 853; Witkin, supra, at section 617. \n15 See generally, Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned Property: Who Owns the Home Run \nBall?, Cardozo Law Review, May 2002, Paul Finkelman, (Chapman Distinguished \nProfessor of Law). \n16 See genera lly, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property , (1986) \n64:667;. Washington U.L.", "proposition": ["The court must determine whether Mr. Popov had possession of the baseball at the time it was hit, and if so, whether Mr. Hayashi's actions amounted to conversion."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "494", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "479 \n constitutionally legitimate, copyright -related way in which \nthe statute will benefit the public. Indeed, in respect to \nexisting works, the serious public harm and the virtually \nnonexistent public benefit coul d not be more clear. \nI have set forth the analysis upon which I rest these \njudgments. This analysis leads inexorably to the conclusion \nthat the statute cannot be understood rationally to advance \na constitutionally legitimate interest. The statute falls \noutside the scope of legislative power that the Copyright \nClause, read in light of the First Amendment, grants to \nCongress. I would hold the statute unconstitutional. \nI respectfully dissent. \nAPPENDIX TO OPINION OF BREYER, J. \nA \nThe text\u2019s estimates of the econ omic value of 1998 Act \ncopyrights relative to the economic value of a perpetual \ncopyright as well as the incremental value of a 20 -year \nextension of a 75 -year term rest upon the conservative \nfuture value and discount rate assumptions set forth in the \nbrief of economist amici. Brief for George A. Akerlof et al. \nas Amici Curiae 5-7. Under these assumptions, if an author \nexpects to live 30 years after writing a book, the copyright \nextension (by increasing the copyright term from \u201clife of \nthe author plus 50 yea rs\u201d to \u201clife of the author plus 70 \nyears\u201d) increases the author\u2019s expected income from that \nbook \u2013 i. e., the economic incentive to write \u2013 by no more \nthan about 0.33%. \nThe text assumes that the extension creates a term of 95 \nyears (the term corresponding to works made for hire and \nfor all existing pre -1978 copyrights). Under the economists\u2019 \nconservative assumptions, the value of a 95 -year copyright \nis slightly more than 99.8% of the value of a perpetual \ncopyright. If a \u201clife plus 70\u201d term applies, and if a n author \nlives 78 years after creation of a work (as with Irving Berlin", "proposition": ["The statute is being analyzed in a constitutionally legitimate, copyright-related way.", "The public harm and benefit of the statute are clear in relation to existing works.", "The analysis leads to the conclusion that the statute cannot be understood rationally to advance a constitutionally legitimate interest.", "The statute falls outside the scope of legislative power granted by the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment.", "The author suggests holding the statute unconstitutional and dissents from the majority opinion.", "The text's estimates of the economic value of the 1998 Act copyrights are based on conservative future value and discount rate assumptions.", "The extension of the copyright term increases the author's expected income by no more than about 0.33%.", "The value of a 95-year copyright is slightly more than 99.8% of the value of a perpetual copyright.", "The passage provides an example of an author who lived 78 years after creation of a work (as with Irving Berlin.)"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "300", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "285 \n exhaustive research, Alfonso was able to decipher the notations in \nthe book, finally concluding that it pinpointed the location of \nGorefiend\u2019s burial. Using software to model beach erosion and \ncoastline changes, Alf onso generated a map showing the current \nlocation of the site: a forested area of Beach Bum Billy\u2019s, a private \nbeach club not far away from the fort. \nThough Billy\u2019s was a private and invitation -only club, once each \nyear on March 17 the club invited the pub lic to join a beachside \nfundraiser for the local children\u2019s hospital. Seizing the chance, \nAlfonso showed up, paid the entrance fee, grabbed a drink at the \ncabana, and under cover of darkness headed toward the forested \nsouthern corner of the club. \nAmong the trees, Alfonso was shocked to find an exposed \nskeleton, apparently eroded out of the ground, with scraps of old \nleather clothing tying the corpse to Gorefiend\u2019s era. Alfonso spied \nseveral gold doubloons and silver jewelry, tarnished but visible \namongst th e bones. Unprepared to map the site and inventory the \nfind, Alfonso placed markers on nearby trees displaying his name \nand phone number, with a message that this historically significant \nfind should not be disturbed. With that, he headed home, and \nexcitedl y posted an article describing his find (but withholding the \nprecise location) on an internet site dedicated to amateur \narchaeology. \nUnbeknownst to Alfonso, he had been followed by another visitor \nto the club, Craig Crawford, who suspected from Alfonso\u2019s h aste \nthat something unusual was up. Craig hid in the bushes and later \nmade off with as much gold as he could carry without raising \nsuspicions. Everything unravelled, though, when a Billy\u2019s employee \nspotted Craig\u2019s overstuffed pockets. Upon being caught, he \nreluctantly handed over the gold and the location of the find.", "proposition": ["Alfonso used software to model beach erosion and coastline changes.", "Alfonso generated a map showing the current location of the site.", "The site was located at a forested area.", "The site was located at a forested area of Beach Bum Billy\u2019s.", "Beach Bum Billy\u2019s was a private beach club.", "Beach Bum Billy\u2019s was not far away from the fort.", "Once each year on March 17, Beach Bum Billy\u2019s invited the public.", "The invitation was for a beachside fundraiser.", "The fundraiser benefited the local children\u2019s hospital.", "Alfonso showed up at Beach Bum Billy\u2019s.", "Alfonso paid the entrance fee.", "Alfonso grabbed a drink at the cabana.", "Alfonso headed toward the forested southern corner of the club under cover of darkness.", "Among the trees, Alfonso was shocked to find an exposed skeleton, apparently eroded out of the ground, with scraps of old leather clothing tying the corpse to Gorefiend\u2019s era.", "Alfonso saw several gold doubloons.", "Alfonso saw silver jewelry.", "The gold doubloons and silver jewelry were tarnished but visible.", "The gold doubloons and silver jewelry were among the bones.", "Alfonso was unprepared to map the site and inventory the find.", "Alfonso placed markers on nearby trees.", "The markers displayed his name and phone number.", "The message on the markers requested that the historically significant find should not be disturbed.", "Alfonso headed home.", "Alfonso excitedly posted an article describing his find.", "The article withheld the precise location.", "The article was posted on an internet site dedicated to amateur archaeology.", "Unbeknownst to Alfonso, he had been followed by another visitor to the club, Craig Crawford, who suspected from Alfonso\u2019s haste that something unusual was up.", "Craig hid in the bushes.", "Craig made off with as much gold as he could carry without raising suspicions.", "Upon being caught, he reluctantly handed over the gold and the location of the find."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "506", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "491 \n 480 F.Supp., at 468. \nAlthough the District Court made these statements in the \ncontext of considering the propriety of injunctive relief, the \nstatements constitute a finding that the evidence \nconcerning \u201csports, religious, educational, and other \nprogramming\u201d was sufficient to establish a significant \nquantity of broadcasting whose copying is now authorized, \nand a significant potential for future authorized copying. \nThat finding is amply supported by the record. In addition \nto the religious and sports officials identified explicitly by \nthe District Court, two items in the record deserve specific \nmention. \nFirst is the testimony of John Kenaston, the station \nmanager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los \nAngeles affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service. He \nexplained and authenticated the station\u2019s published guide to \nits programs. For each program, the guide tells whether \nunlimited home ta ping is authorized, home taping is \nauthorized subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure \nwithin seven days), or home taping is not authorized at all. \nThe Spring 1978 edition of the guide described 107 \nprograms. Sixty -two of those programs or 58% auth orize \nsome home taping. Twenty -one of them or almost 20% \nauthorize unrestricted home taping. \nSecond is the testimony of Fred Rogers, president of the \ncorporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr. \nRogers\u2019 Neighborhood. The program is carried by mo re public \ntelevision stations than any other program. Its audience \nnumbers over 3,000,000 families a day. He testified that he \nhad absolutely no objection to home taping for \nnoncommercial use and expressed the opinion that it is a", "proposition": ["The District Court made statements about the propriety of injunctive relief in the context of considering evidence concerning \u2018sports, religious, educational, and other programming.\u2019", "The evidence concerning \u2018sports, religious, educational, and other programming\u2019 was sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broadcasting whose copying is now authorized, and a significant potential for future authorized copying.", "The District Court identified religious and sports officials explicitly.", "John Kenaston, the station manager of Channel 58, an educational station in Los Angeles affiliated with the Public Broadcasting Service, testified and authenticated the station\u2019s published guide to its programs.", "For each program, the guide tells whether unlimited home taping is authorized, home taping is authorized subject to certain restrictions (such as erasure within seven days), or home taping is not authorized at all.", "The Spring 1978 edition of the guide described 107 programs.", "Sixty-two of those programs, or 58%, authorize some home taping.", "Twenty-one of them, or almost 20%, authorize unrestricted home taping.", "Fred Rogers, president of the corporation that produces and owns the copyright on Mr. Rogers\u2019 Neighborhood, testified that he had absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use.", "Fred Rogers expressed the opinion that home taping is a valuable educational tool."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "575", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "560 \n memories of when they were in college. Different popular \nsongs of the seventies were sung on each co mmercial. The \nagency tried to get \u201cthe original people,\u201d that is, the singers \nwho had popularized the songs, to sing them. Failing in \nthat endeavor in ten cases the agency had the songs sung by \n\u201csound alikes.\u201d Bette Midler, the plaintiff and appellant \nhere, was done by a sound alike. \nMidler is a nationally known actress and singer. She won a \nGrammy as early as 1973 as the Best New Artist of that \nyear. Records made by her since then have gone Platinum \nand Gold. She was nominated in 1979 for an Academy \naward for Best Female Actress in The Rose, in which she \nportrayed a pop singer. Newsweek in its June 30, 1986 issue \ndescribed her as an \u201coutrageously original \nsinger/comedian.\u201d Time hailed her in its March 2, 1987 \nissue as \u201ca legend\u201d and \u201cthe most dynamic and po ignant \nsinger -actress of her time.\u201d \nWhen Young & Rubicam was preparing the Yuppie \nCampaign it presented the commercial to its client by \nplaying an edited version of Midler singing \u201cDo You Want \nTo Dance,\u201d taken from the 1973 Midler album, \u201cThe \nDivine Miss M .\u201d After the client accepted the idea and \nform of the commercial, the agency contacted Midler\u2019s \nmanager, Jerry Edelstein. The conversation went as follows: \n\u201cHello, I am Craig Hazen from Young and Rubicam. I am \ncalling you to find out if Bette Midler would be interested \nin doing \u2026? Edelstein: \u201cIs it a commercial?\u201d \u201cYes.\u201d \u201cWe \nare not interested.\u201d \nUndeterred, Young & Rubicam sought out Ula Hedwig \nwhom it knew to have been one of \u201cthe Harlettes\u201d a \nbackup singer for Midler for ten years.", "proposition": ["The agency tried to get the original singers, but in ten cases, they had the songs sung by sound-alikes when they failed to get the original singers."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "414", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "In truth, \u201c[i]t is just such wasted effort that \nthe proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts \u2026 \n \n1 The Court ultimate ly rendered judgment for Associated Press on noncopyright \ngrounds that are not relevant here. See 248 U.S., at 235, 241 -242, 39 S.Ct., at 71, \n73-74.", "proposition": ["The proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts leads to wasted effort.", "The Court ultimately rendered judgment for Associated Press on non-copyright grounds.", "The Court's judgment is not relevant to the current discussion.", "The Court's judgment can be found in 248 U.S., at 235, 241 -242, 39 S.Ct., at 71, 73-74."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "656", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "641 \n property. If they had been knowingly trying to get rid of \nwhat they kn ew to be a defectively constructed house, it is \nunlikely that they would have been willing to lend $200,000 \nwith the house in question as their only security. \nI would quash the decision of the district court of appeal. \nThis case should be remanded for findings by the trial court \nbased on the evidence already heard. The action for \nrescission based on fraud should be dismissed. The only \nissue is whether the Johnsons were in compliance with the \ncontract at the time of the breach by the Davises. Resolving \nthis issue requires a finding of whether the roof could have \nbeen put in watertight condition by spot repairs or by re -\nroofing and in either case whether the sellers were willing \nto fulfill their obligation by paying for the necessary work. \nIf so, the Johns ons should keep the entire $31,000 deposit. \n4.2.2. The Deed \nState of Georgia County of ss \nGeneral Warranty Deed \nThis indenture, made ____, between ____, of [mailing \naddress], grantor, and ____, of [mailing address], grantee. \n(The terms \u201cgrantor\u201d and \u201cgrant ee\u201d include the respective \nheirs, successors, successors -in-title, executors, legal \nrepresentatives and assigns of the parties where the context \nrequires or permits.) \nGrantor, for and in consideration of the sum of $10 paid at \nand before the sealing and de livery of this instrument, and \nfor other valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency \nof which is acknowledged, has granted, bargained, sold, \naliened, conveyed and confirmed, and by these presents \ndoes grant, bargain, sell, alien, convey and confirm to \ngrantee, all of that certain tract or parcel of land lying and \nbeing in Land Lot ____, ____ District, ____ County, \nGeorgia, as more particularly described as follows: [or in \nthe alternative: as more particularly described in Exhibit", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving a property.", "The property in question is a 641 property.", "The Johnsons are the owners of the property, and the Davises are the buyers.", "The Davises attempted to rescind the contract based on fraud.", "The issue at hand is whether the Johnsons were in compliance with the contract at the time of the breach by the Davises.", "Resolving this issue requires a finding of whether the roof could have been put in watertight condition by spot repairs or by re-roofing and in either case whether the sellers were willing to fulfill their obligation by paying for the necessary work.", "If the Johnsons were in compliance with the contract, they should keep the entire $31,000 deposit.", "The passage also includes a general warranty deed for the property."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "560", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The right of publicity protect s a celebrity\u2019s \ncommercial interest in her identity. \u201cThe theory of the right \nis that a celebrity\u2019s identity can be valuable in the \npromotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest \nthat may be protected from the unauthorized commercial \nexploitation of that identity.\u201d Carson v. Here\u2019s Johnny \nPortable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.1983) \n(emphasis added). The right of publicity, however, does not", "proposition": ["The right of publicity protects a celebrity's commercial interest in her identity.", "The theory of the right of publicity is that a celebrity's identity can be valuable in the promotion of products.", "The celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity.", "Carson v. Here\u2019s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. is a case that emphasizes the importance of the right of publicity."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "128", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "L. \nRev. 94 (1977); Note, The Allocation of Sunlight; Solar Rights and the Prior Appropriation \nDoctrine , 47 U. Colo. L. Rev. 421 (1976).", "proposition": ["The United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land.", "State laws that conflict with the Constitution are void."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "37", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "22 \n right would clearly have accrued to the plaintiff had the \nnotes been picked up by him outside the shop of the \ndefendant and if he once had the right, the case finds that \nhe did not intend, by delivering the notes to the defendant, \nto waive the title (if any) w hich he had to them, but they \nwere handed to the defendant merely for the purpose of \ndelivering them to the owner should he appear.\u201d Then a \nlittle later: \u201cThe case, therefore, resolves itself into the \nsingle point on which it appears that the learned judge \ndecided it, namely, whether the circumstance of the notes \nbeing found inside the defendant\u2019s shop gives him, the \ndefendant, the right to have them as against the plaintiff, \nwho found them.\u201d After discussing the cases, and the \nargument, the learned judge s aid: \u201cIf the discovery had \nnever been communicated to the defendant, could the real \nowner have had any cause of action against him because \nthey were found in his house? Certainly not. The notes \nnever were in the custody of the defendant, nor within the \nprotection of his house, before they were found, as they \nwould have been had they been intentionally deposited \nthere; and the defendant has come under no responsibility, \nexcept from the communication made to him by the \nplaintiff, the finder, and the steps tak en by way of \nadvertisement. \u2026 We find, therefore, no circumstances in \nthis case to take it out of the general rule of law, that the \nfinder of a lost article is entitled to it as against all persons \nexcept the real owner, and we think that that rule must \nprevail, and that the learned judge was mistaken in holding \nthat the place in which they were found makes any legal \ndifference. Our judgment, therefore, is that the plaintiff is \nentitled to these notes as against the defendant.\u201d \nIt is to be observed that in Bridges v. Hawkesworth23 which \nhas been the subject of immense disputation, neither \ncounsel put forward any argument on the fact that the \n \n23 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["The plaintiff found some notes and delivered them to the defendant, who was the owner of a shop.", "The case revolves around whether the defendant has the right to keep the notes as they were found inside his shop.", "The learned judge decided that the circumstance of the notes being found inside the defendant's shop gives him the right to have them as against the plaintiff.", "The judge's decision was based on the general rule of law that the finder of a lost article is entitled to it as against all persons except the real owner.", "The judge held that the place in which the notes were found makes a legal difference.", "The court found no circumstances to take the case out of the general rule of law.", "The court concluded that the plaintiff is entitled to the notes as against the defendant."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "375", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "360 \n Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. \n106-113, \u00a7 3010, 113 Stat. 1536. Since Virtual Work s\u2019 \nalleged cybersquatting occurred before the ACPA\u2019s date of \nenactment, Volkswagen sought only the right to use vw.net \nfor itself. \nIII. \nHaving discussed the statutory purpose and framework of \nthe ACPA, we must now determine whether Virtual Works \nviolated the Act. The district court found that a number of \nthe ACPA\u2019s nine bad faith factors supported Volkswagen\u2019s \nclaim that Virtual Works\u2019 registration of vw.net constituted \ncybersquatting under the Act. Virtual Works, 106 F. \nSupp.2d at 848. With respect to the first and second \nfactors, for example, the district court held that Virtual \nWorks had no right to or interest in the VW mark and that \nVirtual Works had never been referred to or done business \nunder the name VW. Id. at 847. With respect to the fifth \nfactor , the district court held that the disparaging \ncomments posted by Virtual Works harmed the goodwill of \nthe VW mark. Id. Finally, the district court found that, \nunder the ninth factor, the famousness of the VW mark \nalso favored Volkswagen. Id. The district court thus \ngranted summary judgment to Volkswagen, which we \nreview de novo. \nA. \nThe first inquiry under the ACPA is whether Virtual Works \nacted with a bad faith intent to profit from a protected \nmark. 15 U.S.C. \u00a7 1125(d)(1)(A)(i). Virtual Works claims \nthat the district court erred in holding that it did. We need \nnot, however, march through the nine factors seriatim \nbecause the ACPA itself notes that use of the listed criteria \nis permissive. As the Second Circuit noted in Sporty\u2019s \nFarms, the factors are \u201cexpr essly described as indicia that", "proposition": ["The 360 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) was enacted on a specific date.", "Virtual Work's alleged cybersquatting occurred before the ACPA's date of enactment.", "Volkswagen sought the right to use vw.net for itself.", "The passage discusses the statutory purpose and framework of the ACPA.", "The district court found that a number of the ACPA's nine bad faith factors supported Volkswagen's claim that Virtual Works' registration of vw.net constituted cybersquatting under the Act.", "The district court held that Virtual Works had no right to or interest in the VW mark and that Virtual Works had never been referred to or done business under the name VW.", "The district court held that the disparaging comments posted by Virtual Works harmed the goodwill of the VW mark.", "The district court found that, under the ninth factor, the famousness of the VW mark also favored Volkswagen.", "The district court granted summary judgment to Volkswagen.", "The appeals process involves reviewing the district court's decision de novo.", "The first inquiry under the ACPA is whether Virtual Works acted with a bad faith intent to profit from a protected mark.", "Virtual Works claims that the district court erred in holding that it did.", "The passage notes that the use of the listed criteria under the ACPA is permissive.", "The factors are 'expr ssly described as indicia that.'"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "14", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "xiv \n need to become familiar with the techniques of legal reasoning, the \nstructure of the legal system, and the major analytical tools of the \nlaw. With these in hand, it becomes possible to read judicial \nopinions and statutes quickly and to synthesize new arguments. In \npractice, you will work on cases raising issues you have not studied, \nand, even if have, you will do new research to understand the \nspecific state of the law as it applies to your case. Doing law is a \nprocess, not a recalling of memorized facts. \n \nWith this in mind, our second and most important purpose is to \nbuild a toolbox of big ideas that appear over and over again, across \nthe substantive categories. During this semester, we will focus on \nseveral, including: \n \n* Reasoning from bare precedent, using decided cases like puzzle \npieces that must be fit together; \n* Instrumentalism , the idea that legal rules should be crafted to \nattain some public purpose; \n \n* Law and economics, a huge and pervasive topic that we initially \nexplore using nuisance law; \n* The substantive and institutional differences between rules and \nstandards, which t he cases involving possession nicely raise; \n* The distinction between natural law and positivist approaches; \n* Labor, possession, and communication theories of ownership; \n* The use of exclusion (property rights) or governance regimes to \nsolve coordination problems of users of common resources, which \nwe explore in the traditional context of oil and other common pool \nresources but also in how to design a system of property rights in \nideas and expression -- so-called intellectual property; \n* The legal process school's understanding that which institution, \nsay courts or legislatures, decides a question can be more important \nthan any arguments concerning the right answer.", "proposition": ["Students need to become familiar with legal reasoning techniques, the structure of the legal system, and the major analytical tools of the law.", "With these skills, it becomes possible to read judicial opinions and statutes quickly and synthesize new arguments.", "In practice, students will work on cases raising issues they have not studied and may need to do new research to understand the specific state of the law.", "Doing law is a process, not a recalling of memorized facts.", "The second and most important purpose is to build a toolbox of big ideas that appear over and over again, across the substantive categories.", "During this semester, the focus will be on several big ideas, including reasoning from bare precedent, instrumentalism, law and economics, rules vs. standards, natural law vs. positivist approaches, labor, possession, and communication theories of ownership, exclusion or governance regimes to solve coordination problems, and the legal process school's understanding of institutional decision-making.", "The passage emphasizes the importance of understanding these big ideas and applying them to various legal issues and cases."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "296", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "281 \n of land therein to take oil or gas \ntherefrom by lawful operations \nconducted on his own land; that each \nsuch owner has duties to the other \nowner s not to exercise his privileges of \ntaking so as to injure the common \nsource of supply; and that each such \nowner has rights that other owners not \nexercise their privileges of taking so as \nto injure the common source of \nsupply. \nIn 85 A.L.R. 1156, in discuss ing the case of Hague v. \nWheeler , supra, the annotator states: \n* * * The fact that the owner of the \nland has a right to take and to use gas \nand oil, even to the diminution or \nexhaustion of the supply under his \nneighbor\u2019s land, does not give him the \nright t o waste the gas. His property in \nthe gas underlying his land consists of \nthe right to appropriate the same, and \npermitting the gas to escape into the \nair is not an appropriation thereof in \nthe proper sense of the term. \nIn like manner, the negligent waste a nd destruction of \npetitioners\u2019 gas and distillate was neither a legitimate \ndrainage of the minerals from beneath their lands nor a \nlawful or reasonable appropriation of them. Consequently, \nthe petitioners did not lose their right, title and interest in \nthem under the law of capture. At the time of their removal \nthey belonged to petitioners, and their wrongful dissipation \ndeprived these owners of the right and opportunity to \nproduce them. That right is forever lost, the same cannot \nbe restored, and petitione rs are without an adequate legal \nremedy unless we allow a recovery under the same \ncommon law which governs other actions for damages and", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the rights and duties of owners of land that contain oil or gas.", "Each owner has the right to take oil or gas from their own land using lawful operations.", "Each owner has the duty not to exercise their privileges of taking in a way that injures the common source of supply.", "Each owner has the right that other owners not exercise their privileges of taking in a way that injures the common source of supply.", "The annotator in 85 A.L.R. 1156 discusses the case of Hague v. Wheeler, where the owner's right to take and use gas and oil does not give them the right to waste the gas.", "Permitting the gas to escape into the air is not an appropriate way to take the gas, as it is not an appropriation in the proper sense of the term.", "The negligent waste and destruction of petitioners' gas and distillate were not legitimate drains of the minerals from beneath their lands nor lawful or reasonable appropriations of them.", "Petitioners did not lose their right, title, and interest in the gas and distillate under the law of capture.", "At the time of their removal, the gas and distillate belonged to the petitioners, and their wrongful dissipation deprived them of the right and opportunity to produce them.", "The wrongful dissipation of the gas and distillate cannot be restored, and petitioners are without an adequate legal remedy unless a recovery is allowed under the same common law that governs other actions for damages."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "46", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "31 \n to follow the decision in Bridges v. Hawkesworth,47 and to \ngive judgment in this case for the plaintiff for 66\u00a3. \n \n47 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["The passage is about a court case.", "The court followed the decision in Bridges v. Hawkesworth.", "The court gave judgment in this case for the plaintiff.", "The court awarded the plaintiff 66\u00a3.", "The case reference is 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "401", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "386 \n The Court protests that its holding today is dictated by the \nbroad language of \u00a7 101, which cannot \u201cbe confin ed to the \n\u2018particular application[s] \u2026 contemplated by the \nlegislators.\u2019 \u201d Ante, at 315, quoting Barr v. United States , 324 \nU.S. 83, 90, 65 S.Ct. 522, 525, 89 L.Ed. 765 (1945). But as I \nhave shown, the Court\u2019s decision does not follow the \nunavoidable impli cations of the statute. Rather, it extends \nthe patent system to cover living material even though \nCongress plainly has legislated in the belief that \u00a7 101 does \nnot encompass living organisms. It is the role of Congress, \nnot this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the \npatent laws. This is especially true where, as here, the \ncomposition sought to be patented uniquely implicates \nmatters of public concern. \n3.4 Copyright \n3.4.1. Eligibility \nFeist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service \nCo., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) \nO\u2019CONNOR J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in \nwhich REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, \nSTEVENS, SCALIA, KENNEDY, and SOUTER, JJ., \njoined. BLACKMUN, J., concurred in the judgment. \nKyler Knobbe, Cimarron, Kan., for p etitioner. \nJames M. Caplinger, Jr., Topeka, Kan., for respondent. \nJUSTICE O\u2019C ONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. \nThis case requires us to clarify the extent of copyright \nprotection available to telephone directory white pages. \nI \nRural Telephone Service Company, Inc., is a certified \npublic utility that provides telephone service to several \ncommunities in northwest Kansas. It is subject to a state \nregulation that requires all telephone companies operating", "proposition": ["The Court argues that its decision is based on the broad language of \u00a7 101, which cannot be limited to the particular applications considered by the legislators.", "The Court references Barr v. United States to support its position.", "The Court's decision does not follow the necessary implications of the statute.", "The Court expands the patent system to include living material, despite Congress's belief that \u00a7 101 does not cover living organisms.", "It is the responsibility of Congress, not the Court, to determine the scope of the patent laws.", "This is particularly relevant when the composition sought to be patented involves matters of public concern."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "646", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "631 \n kitchen of the home. Upon inquiring, Mrs. Davis was told \nby Mr. Johnson that the window had had a minor problem \nthat had long since been corrected and that the stains were \nwallpaper glue and the result of ceiling beams being moved. \nThere is disagreement among the parties as to whether Mr. \nJohnson also told Mrs. Davis at this time that there had \nnever been any problems with the roof or ceilings. The \nDavises thereafter paid the remainder of their deposit and \nthe Johnsons vacated the home. Several days later, \nfollowing a heavy rain, Mrs. Davis entered the home and \ndiscovered water \u201cgushing\u201d in from around the window \nframe, the ceiling of the family room, the light fixtures, the \nglass doors, and the stove in the kitchen. \nTwo roofers hired by the Johnsons\u2019 broker concluded that \nfor under $1,000 they could \u201cfix\u201d certain leaks in the roof \nand by doing so make the roof \u201cwatertight.\u201d Three roofers \nhired by the Davises found that the roof was inherently \ndefective, that any repairs would be temporary because the \nroof was \u201cslipping,\u201d and that only a new $15,000 roof \ncould be \u201cwatertight.\u201d \nThe Davises filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, \nfraud and misrepresentation, and sought recission of the \ncontract and return of their deposit. The Johnsons \ncounterclaimed seeking the deposit as liquidated damages. \nThe trial court entered its final judgment on May 27, 1983. \nThe court made no findings of fact, but awarded the \nDavises $26,000 plus interest and awarded the Johnsons \n$5,000 plus interest. Each par ty was to bear their own \nattorneys\u2019 fees. \nThe Johnsons appealed and the Davises cross -appealed \nfrom the final judgment. The Third District found for the \nDavises affirming the trial court\u2019s return of the majority of \nthe deposit to the Davises ($26,000), and reversing the \naward of $5,000 to the Johnsons as well as the court\u2019s \nfailure to award the Davises costs and fees. Accordingly,", "proposition": ["The dispute is about a home owned by the Johnsons.", "Mrs. Davis inquired about a window issue and was told by Mr. Johnson that the problem had been corrected.", "There is disagreement about whether Mr. Johnson also said there had never been any problems with the roof or ceilings.", "The Davises paid the remainder of their deposit and the Johnsons vacated the home.", "Mrs. Davis discovered water damage in the home after a heavy rain.", "Two roofers hired by the Johnsons' broker said they could fix certain leaks for under $1,000.", "Three roofers hired by the Davises found that the roof was inherently defective and needed a new $15,000 roof to be watertight.", "The Davises filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation, and sought recission of the contract and return of their deposit.", "The Johnsons counterclaimed seeking the deposit as liquidated damages.", "The trial court awarded the Davises $26,000 plus interest and the Johnsons $5,000 plus interest, with each party bearing their own attorneys' fees.", "The Third District found for the Davises, affirming the trial court's return of the majority of the deposit and reversing the award to the Johnsons and the failure to award costs and fees to the Davises."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "352", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "337 \n copyrighted broadcasts of those games -there is no evidence \nthat anyone regards SportsTrax or the AOL site as a \nsubstitute for attending NBA games or watching them on \ntelevision. In fact, Motorola markets SportsTrax as being \ndesigned \u201cfor those times when you cannot be at the arena, \nwatch the game on TV, or listen to the radio \u2026\u201d \nThe NBA argues that the pager market is also relevant to a \n\u201chot-news\u201d INS-type claim and that SportsTrax\u2019s future \ncompetition with Gamestats satisfies any missing element. \nWe agree that there is a separate market for the real -time \ntransmission of factual information to pagers or similar \ndevices, such as STATS\u2019s AOL site. However, we disagree \nthat SportsTrax is in any sense free -riding off Gamestats. \nAn indispensable element of an INS \u201chot-news\u201d claim is \nfree riding by a defendant on a plaintiff\u2019s product, enabling \nthe defendant to produce a directly competitive product for \nless money because it has lower costs. SportsTrax is not \nsuch a product. The use of pagers to transmit rea l-time \ninformation about NBA games requires: (i) the collecting of \nfacts about the games; (ii) the transmission of these facts on \na network; (iii) the assembling of them by the particular \nservice; and (iv) the transmission of them to pagers or an \non-line c omputer site. Appellants are in no way free -riding \non Gamestats. Motorola and STATS expend their own \nresources to collect purely factual information generated in \nNBA games to transmit to SportsTrax pagers. They have \ntheir own network and assemble and trans mit data \nthemselves. \nTo be sure, if appellants in the future were to collect facts \nfrom an enhanced Gamestats pager to retransmit them to \nSportsTrax pagers, that would constitute free -riding and \nmight well cause Gamestats to be unprofitable because it \nhad to bear costs to collect facts that SportsTrax did not. If \nthe appropriation of facts from one pager to another pager \nservice were allowed, transmission of current information \non NBA games to pagers or similar devices would be", "proposition": ["The court agrees that there is a separate market for the real-time transmission of factual information to pagers or similar devices, such as STATS's AOL site."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "416", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "401 \n two fundamental criteria of copyright protection [are] \noriginality and fixation in tangible fo rm\u2026 . The phrase \n\u2018original works of authorship,\u2019 which is purposely left \nundefined, is intended to incorporate without change the \nstandard of originality established by the courts under the present \n[1909] copyright statute. \u201d H.R.Rep. No. 94 -1476, p. 51 (19 76) \n(emphasis added) (hereinafter H.R.Rep.); S.Rep. No. 94 -\n473, p. 50 (1975), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1976, \npp. 5659, 5664 (emphasis added) (hereinafter S.Rep.). This \nsentiment was echoed by the Copyright Office: \u201cOur \nintention here is to maintain the established standards of \noriginality\u2026 .\u201d Supplementary Report of the Register of \nCopyrights on the General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law, \n89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 6, p. 3 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print \n1965) (emphasis added). \nTo ensure that the mistakes of t he \u201csweat of the brow\u201d \ncourts would not be repeated, Congress took additional \nmeasures. For example, \u00a7 3 of the 1909 Act had stated that \ncopyright protected only the \u201ccopyrightable component \nparts\u201d of a work, but had not identified originality as the \nbasis for distinguishing those component parts that were \ncopyrightable from those that were not. The 1976 Act \ndeleted this section and replaced it with \u00a7 102(b), which \nidentifies specifically those elements of a work for which \ncopyright is not available: \u201cIn no case does copyright \nprotection for an original work of authorship extend to any \nidea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, \nconcept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in \nwhich it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied i n \nsuch work.\u201d Section 102(b) is universally understood to \nprohibit any copyright in facts.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the two fundamental criteria of copyright protection: originality and fixation in tangible form.", "The phrase 'original works of authorship' is purposely left undefined in the passage, but is intended to incorporate the standard of originality established by the courts under the 1909 copyright statute.", "The passage cites H.R.Rep. No. 94 -1476 and S.Rep. No. 94 - 473 as sources for the intention to maintain the established standards of originality.", "The passage mentions that the Copyright Office stated its intention to maintain the established standards of originality in a Supplementary Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of U.S. Copyright Law.", "The passage notes that Congress took additional measures to ensure that the mistakes of the 'sweat of the brow' courts would not be repeated.", "The passage explains that \u00a7 3 of the 1909 Act stated that copyright protected only the 'copyrightable component parts' of a work, but did not identify originality as the basis for distinguishing those component parts that were copyrightable from those that were not.", "The passage states that the 1976 Act deleted this section and replaced it with \u00a7 102(b), which identifies specifically those elements of a work for which copyright is not available.", "The passage highlights that section 102(b) universally understood to prohibit any copyright in facts."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "450", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "435 \n iv. Effect on the Market Value of the \nOriginal \nThe final fair -use factor requires us to consider the effect \nthat the publication of TWDG will have on the market for \nor value of SunTrust\u2019s copyright in GWTW, incl uding the \npotential harm it may cause to the market for derivative \nworks based on GWTW. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590. In \naddressing this factor, we must \u201cconsider not only the \nextent of market harm caused by the particular actions of \nthe alleged infringer, bu t also whether unrestricted and \nwidespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the \ndefendant [] would result in a substantially adverse impact \non the potential market.\u201d Id., 114 S. Ct. at 1177 (quotations \nomitted). More specifically, the Campbell Court conti nued: \n\u201c[T]he only harm to derivatives that need concern us \u2026 is \nthe harm of market substitution. The fact that a parody \nmay impair the market for derivative uses by the very \neffectiveness of its critical commentary is no more relevant \nunder copyright that the like threat to the original market.\u201d \nId., 510 U.S. at 593. \nAs for the potential market, SunTrust proffered evidence in \nthe district court of the value of its copyright in GWTW. \nSeveral derivative works of GWTW have been authorized, \nincluding the famous movie of the same name and a book \ntitled Scarlett: The Sequel. GWTW and the derivative \nworks based upon it have generated millions of dollars for \nthe copyright holders. SunTrust has negotiated an \nagreement with St. Martin\u2019s Press permitting it to produce \nanother derivative work based on GWTW, a privilege for \nwhich St. Martin\u2019s paid \u201cwell into seven figures.\u201d Part of \nthis agreement was that SunTrust would not authorize any \nother derivative works prior to the publication of St. \nMartin\u2019s book. \nAn examination of the record, with its limited development \nas to relevant market harm due to the preliminary", "proposition": ["Check the format and structure of the JSON object you are trying to decode."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "357", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "342 \n \u201cin the minds of the public, the primary significance of a \nproduct feature \u2026 is to identify the source of the product \nrather than t he product itself\u201d). Again, one might ask, if \ntrademark law permits a descriptive word with secondary \nmeaning to act as a mark, why would it not permit a color, \nunder similar circumstances, to do the same? \nWe cannot find in the basic objectives of trademar k law any \nobvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a \ntrademark, where that color has attained \u201csecondary \nmeaning\u201d and therefore identifies and distinguishes a \nparticular brand (and thus indicates its \u201csource\u201d). In \nprinciple, trademark law , by preventing others from \ncopying a source -identifying mark, \u201creduces the customer\u2019s \ncosts of shopping and making purchasing decisions,\u201d 1 J. \nMcCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair \nCompetition \u00a7 2.012, p. 2 -3 (3d ed. 1994) (hereinafter \nMcCarthy), fo r it quickly and easily assures a potential \ncustomer that this item \u2013 the item with this mark \u2013 is made \nby the same producer as other similarly marked items that \nhe or she liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, \nthe law helps assure a producer t hat it (and not an imitating \ncompetitor) will reap the financial, reputation -related \nrewards associated with a desirable product. The law \nthereby \u201cencourages the production of quality products,\u201d \nibid., and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell \ninferior products by capitalizing on a consumer\u2019s inability \nquickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale. \nSee, e.g., 3 L. Altman, Callmann on Unfair Competition, \nTrademarks and Monopolies \u00a7 17.03 (4th ed. 1983); Landes \n& Posner, The Economic s of Trademark Law, 78 T.M. \nRep. 267, 271 -272 (1988); Park \u2018N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and \nFly, Inc., 469 U.S.", "proposition": ["Trademark law reduces the customer's costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions by quickly and easily assuring a potential customer that the item with the mark is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items.", "Trademark law helps assure a producer that it will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable product.", "The law encourages the production of quality products and discourages those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer's inability to quickly evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale.", "In the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself.", "One might ask why trademark law permits a descriptive word with secondary meaning to act as a mark, but not a color under similar circumstances.", "The basic objectives of trademark law do not have any obvious theoretical objection to the use of color alone as a trademark, where that color has attained 'secondary meaning' and therefore identifies and distinguishes a particular brand."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "717", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "702 \n possession prior to 1997 were made under a claim of right. \nHow the offer and inquiries affect the nature and character \nof Cahill\u2019s pre -1997 possession necessarily are questions for \nthe f act-finder to evaluate and are not resolvable by this \nCourt. See Lowe v. Cox , 210 Ark. 169, 194 S.W.2d 892, 896 \n(1946) (holding that \u201cthe weight to be given to such \nrecognition [in an offer to purchase] would be a question \nfor the jury, and the court could not declare as a matter of \nlaw that the mere fact that defendant had recognized the \ntitle of the [plaintiff] entitled plaintiff to a judgment for \npossession\u201d) (quoting Shirey v. Whitlow , 80 Ark. 444, 97 S.W. \n444, 445 (1906)); Gonthier v. Horne , 576 A.2d 7 45, 748 \n(Me.1990) (stating that deed requests made after the \nstatutory period \u201crationally could be considered indicative \nof the nature of [the claimant\u2019s] prior holding during the \n20-year [statutory] period [that] * * * [t]he Superior Court \nacting as the t rier of fact was free to determine, as clearly it \ndid, that this evidence indicated that [the claimant] did not \npossess the parcel under a claim of right during the crucial \n20-year period\u201d). \n3. Questions of Fact Remain \nDespite the significant deference aff orded to the trial \njustice\u2019s findings of fact, such findings are not unassailable.", "proposition": ["The nature and character of Cahill's pre-1997 possession are questions for the fact-finder to evaluate."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "412", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The classic formulation of the doctrine appeared in Jeweler\u2019s \nCircular Publishing Co., 281 F., at 88:", "proposition": ["The classic formulation of the doctrine appeared in Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "627", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "612 \n Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in \nActions Evidenced by Commercial Instruments , 21 Ill L Rev 341, \n348-349). Accordingly, what is sufficient to constitute \ndelivery \u201cmust be tailored to suit the circumstances of the \ncase\u201d ( Matter of Szabo , supra, at p. 98). The rule requires that \n\u201d\u2019[t]he delivery necessary to consummate a gift must be as \nperfect as the nature of the property and the circumstances \nand surroundings of the parties will reasonably permit\u2019\u201d ( id.; \nVincent v Rix , 248 NY 76, 83; Matter of Van Alstyne , supra, at \np. 309; see, Beaver v Beaver , supra, at p. 428). \nDefendant contends that when a tangible piece of personal \nproperty such as a painting is the subject of a gift, physical \ndeliver y of the painting itself is the best form of delivery \nand should be required. Here, of course, we have only \ndelivery of Victor Gruen\u2019s letters which serve as \ninstruments of gift. Defendant\u2019s statement of the rule as \napplied may be generally true, but it ig nores the fact that \nwhat Victor Gruen gave plaintiff was not all rights to the \nKlimt painting, but only title to it with no right of \npossession until his death. Under these circumstances, it \nwould be illogical for the law to require the donor to part \nwith possession of the painting when that is exactly what he \nintends to retain. \nNor is there any reason to require a donor making a gift of \na remainder interest in a chattel to physically deliver the \nchattel into the donee\u2019s hands only to have the donee \nredeliv er it to the donor. As the facts of this case \ndemonstrate, such a requirement could impose practical \nburdens on the parties to the gift while serving the delivery \nrequirement poorly.", "proposition": ["The rule for delivery in gifts of chattels should be tailored to suit the circumstances of the case.", "The delivery necessary to consummate a gift must be as perfect as the nature of the property and the circumstances and surroundings of the parties will reasonably permit.", "Defendant contends that physical delivery of a tangible piece of personal property is the best form of delivery and should be required.", "In this case, the donor gave the donee title to the Klimt painting with no right of possession until his death.", "It would be illogical for the law to require the donor to part with possession of the painting when that is exactly what he intends to retain.", "There is no reason to require a donor making a gift of a remainder interest in a chattel to physically deliver the chattel into the donee's hands only to have the donee redeliver it to the donor.", "The facts of this case demonstrate that such a requirement could impose practical burdens on the parties to the gift while serving the delivery requirement poorly."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "39", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "(Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079. \n29 Possession in the Common Law (P ollock and Wright) at p. 39. \n30 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["The passage is to be decomposed into propositions.", "We will split compound sentences into simple sentences.", "Any named entity accompanied by additional descriptive information will be separated into its own distinct proposition.", "The proposition will be decontextualized by adding necessary modifiers to nouns or entire sentences and replacing pronouns with the full name of the entities they refer to."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "438", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Mitchell used to describe them, as well as \ntheir complex relationships with each other. Moreover, the \nvarious [fictional] locales, \u2026 settings, characters, themes, \nand plot of [TWDG] closely mirror those contained in \n[GWTW].\u201d SunTrust, 136 F.Supp.2d at 1367.", "proposition": ["Mitchell used to describe the relationships between the characters in \"The Walking Dead\" and \"Gone with the Wind.\".", "The various fictional locales, settings, characters, themes, and plot of \"The Walking Dead\" closely mirror those contained in \"Gone with the Wind.\".", "SunTrust mentioned the similarities between the fictional elements of \"The Walking Dead\" and \"Gone with the Wind\" in their analysis."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "672", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "After it is approved and accepted by the Chief, \nDivision of Cadastral Survey, it is returned to the Alaska State Office for filing. \nThe claimant is then notified that he should direct publication of his claim in the \nnearest newspaper. In the case of a special survey, publication continues \nthroughout a nine -week period. The newspaper submits proof of publication to \nthe case file, and the claimant must submit an affidavit of posting to purchase the \nclaim along with the appropriate map and his application for purchase. A fter all \nthis is completed, the matter is finally reviewed. All reservations to the United \nStates Government are summarized, and a final certificate is prepared. Upon \nsigning of the final certificate, a patent is typed, reviewed several times, signed and \nsealed and the patent number is affixed. The patent is then mailed certified mail to \nthe claimant.", "proposition": ["The Chief, Division of Cadastral Survey approves and accepts the claim.", "The claim is returned to the Alaska State Office for filing.", "The claimant is notified to direct publication of the claim in the nearest newspaper.", "In the case of a special survey, publication continues for nine weeks.", "The newspaper submits proof of publication to the case file.", "The claimant submits an affidavit of posting to purchase the claim along with the appropriate map and his application for purchase.", "After all the requirements are completed, the matter is reviewed.", "All reservations to the United States Government are summarized.", "A final certificate is prepared.", "Upon signing the final certificate, a patent is typed, reviewed, signed, sealed, and the patent number is affixed.", "The patent is mailed certified mail to the claimant."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "414", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "399 \n Decisions of this Court applying the 1909 Act make clear \nthat the statute did not permit the \u201csweat of the brow\u201d \napproach. The best example is International News Service v. \nAssociated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 \n(1918). In that decision, the Court stated unambiguously \nthat the 1909 Act conferred copyright protection only on \nthose elements of a work that were original to the author. \nInternational News Service had conceded taking news \nreported by Associated Press and publishing it in its own \nnewspapers. Recognizing that \u00a7 5 of the Act specifically \nmentioned \u201d \u2018periodicals, including newspapers,\u2019 \u201d \u00a7 5(b), \nthe Court acknowledged that news articles were \ncopyrightable. Id., at 234, 39 S.Ct ., at 70. It flatly rejected, \nhowever, the notion that the copyright in an article \nextended to the factual information it contained: \u201c[T]he \nnews element \u2013 the information respecting current events \ncontained in the literary production \u2013 is not the creation of \nthe writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are \npublici juris; it is the history of the day.\u201d Ibid.1 \nWithout a doubt, the \u201csweat of the brow\u201d doctrine flouted \nbasic copyright principles. Throughout history, copyright \nlaw has \u201crecognize[d] a greater need to disseminate factual \nworks than works of fiction or fantasy.\u201d Harper & Row, 471 \nU.S., at 563, 105 S.Ct., at 2232. Accord, Gorman, Fact or \nFancy: The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. Copyright Soc. \n560, 563 (1982). But \u201csweat of the brow\u201d co urts took a \ncontrary view; they handed out proprietary interests in facts \nand declared that authors are absolutely precluded from \nsaving time and effort by relying upon the facts contained \nin prior works.", "proposition": ["The 1909 Act did not permit the 'sweat of the brow' approach.", "International News Service v. Associated Press is an example of a decision applying the 1909 Act.", "The Court stated that the 1909 Act conferred copyright protection only on original elements of a work.", "International News Service took news reported by Associated Press and published it in its own newspapers.", "The Court acknowledged that news articles were copyrightable under \u00a7 5 of the Act.", "The Court rejected the notion that the copyright in an article extended to the factual information it contained.", "Copyright law has recognized a greater need to disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy.", "Courts applying the 'sweat of the brow' doctrine handed out proprietary interests in facts and precluded authors from relying upon prior works."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "727", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "712 \n one time obtained the Rosenfelds\u2019 permission to keep a \nhorse on the lot. On one occasion in the 1960\u2019s plaintiff \nexamined the plat of defendants\u2019 lot in the courthouse to \nsee if it ran all the way to a street to the north. \nWhen defendant McCormick purchased his interest in the \nlot in 1978, he was aware of the possibility of a boundary \ndispute because of the location of plaintiff\u2019s propane tank \nand driveway. He and the other defendants were \nunsuccessful in their efforts to s ettle the dispute with \nplaintiff, who subsequently brought this action. \nIn seeking to establish her ownership of the disputed \nparcel, plaintiff alleged she had \u201cfor more than thirty (30) \nyears last past been in open, exclusive, hostile, adverse and \nactual possession under claim of right.\u201dThe trial court held \nin part that she did not establish her possession was under \na claim of right. The court reasoned that a claim of right \nmust be made in good faith and that plaintiff was not in \ngood faith because she kne w someone else had title to the \nland. Although the court found plaintiff had not proved her \nclaim of adverse possession, it ordered defendants to \u201cdo \nequity\u201d by deeding to her the strip of land her driveway was \non and to pay the costs of moving the propane tank to her \nlot. The appeal and cross -appeal followed. \nI. The appeal. \nThe doctrine of adverse possession is based on the ten -year \nstatute of limitations for recovery of real property in \nsection 614.1(5), The Code. One claiming title by adverse \npossession must establish hostile, actual, open, exclusive \nand continuous possession, under a claim of right or color \nof title, for at least ten years, by clear and positive proof. \nBecause the law presumes possession under regular title, \nthe doctrine is strictly cons trued. These and other \ngoverning principles are explained in I -80 Associates, Inc. \nv. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad, 224 N.W.2d \n8, 10 -11 (Iowa 1974).", "proposition": ["The plaintiff did not establish her possession was under a claim of right.", "The court reasoned that a claim of right must be made in good faith and that the plaintiff was not in good faith because she knew someone else had title to the land.", "The doctrine of adverse possession is based on the ten-year statute of limitations for recovery of real property in section 614.1(5), The Code.", "One claiming title by adverse possession must establish hostile, actual, open, exclusive, and continuous possession, under a claim of right or color of title, for at least ten years, by clear and positive proof.", "The law presumes possession under regular title, so the doctrine is strictly construed."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "250", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "235 \n intent to the world.23 The question is whether he did \nenough to reduce the reduce the ball to his exclusive \ndominion and control. Were his acts sufficient to create a \nlegally cognizable interest in the ball? \nMr. Hayashi argues that possession does not occur until the \nfan has complete control of the ball. Professor Brian Gray, \nsuggests the following definition \u201d A person who catches a \nbaseball that enters the stands is its owner. A ball is caught \nif the person has achieved complete control of the ball at \nthe point in time that the momentum of the ball and the \nmomentum of the fan while attempting to catch the ball \nceases. A baseball, which is dislodged by incidental contact \nwith an inanimate object or another person, before \nmomentum has ceased, is not possessed. Incidental contact \nwith another person is contact that is not intended by the \nother person. The first person to pick up a loose ball and \nsecure it becomes its possessor.\u201d24 \nMr. Popov argues th at this definition requires that a person \nseeking to establish possession must show unequivocal \ndominion and control, a standard rejected by several \nleading cases.25 Instead, he offers the perspectives of \nProfessor Bernhardt and Professor Paul Finkelman26 who \nsuggest that possession occurs when an individual intends \nto take control of a ball and manifests that intent by \nstopping the forward momentum of the ball whether or \nnot complete control is achieved. \n \n23 Litera lly. \n24 This definition is hereinafter referred to as Gray\u2019s Rule. \n25 Pierson v. Post , 3 Caines R. (N.Y.1805); Young v. Hitchens , 6 Q.B. 606 (1844); State \nv. Shaw , (1902) 67 Ohio St. 157, 65 N.E. 875. \n26 Professor Finkelman is the author of the definitive law review article on the \ncentral issue in this case, Fugitive Baseballs and Abandoned Property: Who Owns the \nHome Run Ball? , Cardozo Law Review, May 2002, Paul Finkelman, (Chapman \nDistinguished Professo r of Law).", "proposition": ["The question is whether a person who catches a baseball that enters the stands becomes its owner.", "Mr. Hayashi argues that possession does not occur until the fan has complete control of the ball.", "Professor Brian Gray suggests a definition of possession: 'A person who catches a baseball that enters the stands is its owner. A ball is caught if the person has achieved complete control of the ball at the point in time that the momentum of the ball and the momentum of the fan while attempting to catch the ball ceases. A baseball, which is dislodged by incidental contact with an inanimate object or another person, before momentum has ceased, is not possessed. Incidental contact with another person is contact that is not intended by the other person. The first person to pick up a loose ball and secure it becomes its possessor.'", "Mr. Popov argues that this definition requires unequivocal dominion and control, a standard rejected by several leading cases.", "Professors Bernhardt and Paul Finkelman suggest that possession occurs when an individual intends to take control of a ball and manifests that intent by stopping the forward momentum of the ball, whether or not complete control is achieved.", "Pierson v. Post, Young v. Hitchens, and State v. Shaw are cases that reject the standard of unequivocal dominion and control."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "194", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "It may be expec ted, however, by the learned counsel, that \nmore particular notice be taken of their authorities. I have \nexamined them all, and feel great difficulty in determining, \nwhether to acquire dominion over a thing, before in \ncommon, it be sufficient that we barely see it, or know", "proposition": ["The learned counsel expects more particular notice to be taken of their authorities. The speaker has examined all the authorities provided by the learned counsel. The speaker feels great difficulty in determining whether seeing a thing is enough to acquire dominion over it, or if knowing it is also required."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "569", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "533 (W.D.Tex.1980), the plaintiff\u2019s \nname was used without permission in an explicit \u201cendorsement\u201d of products, and \nin Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal.App.2d 82, 291 P.2d \n194 (1955), the defendant explicitly misrepresented that the pl aintiff was a \n\u201csatisfied user\u201d of defendant\u2019s products.", "proposition": ["The plaintiff's name was used without permission in court case 533 (W.D.Tex.1980).", "In court case Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal.App.2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955), the defendant explicitly misrepresented that the plaintiff was a 'satisfied user' of their products."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "396", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "381 \n of genetic diversity, and that its practice may tend to \ndepreciate the value of human life. These arguments are \nforcefully, even passionately , presented; they remind us \nthat, at times, human ingenuity seems unable to control \nfully the forces it creates \u2013 that with Hamlet, it is \nsometimes better \u201cto bear those ills we have than fly to \nothers that we know not of.\u201d \nIt is argued that this Court sho uld weigh these potential \nhazards in considering whether respondent\u2019s invention is \npatentable subject matter under \u00a7 101. We disagree. The \ngrant or denial of patents on micro -organisms is not likely \nto put an end to genetic research or to its attendant ris ks. \nThe large amount of research that has already occurred \nwhen no researcher had sure knowledge that patent \nprotection would be available suggests that legislative or \njudicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific \nmind from probing into t he unknown any more than \nCanute could command the tides. Whether respondent\u2019s \nclaims are patentable may determine whether research \nefforts are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by \nwant of incentives, but that is all. \nWhat is more important is tha t we are without competence \nto entertain these arguments \u2013 either to brush them aside as \nfantasies generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on \nthem. The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high \npolicy for resolution within the legislative process after the \nkind of investigation, examination, and study that legislative \nbodies can provide and courts cannot. That process \ninvolves the balancing of competing values and interests, \nwhich in our democratic system is the business of elected \nrepresentatives . Whatever their validity, the contentions \nnow pressed on us should be addressed to the political", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the potential hazards of human ingenuity and its inability to fully control the forces it creates.", "The passage argues that the Court should weigh these potential hazards in considering whether respondent's invention is patentable subject matter under \u00a7 101.", "The passage disagrees with the argument that the grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms will put an end to genetic research or its attendant risks.", "The passage suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to patentability will not deter the scientific mind from probing into the unknown.", "The passage states that the choice of whether to allow patents on micro-organisms is a matter of high policy for resolution within the legislative process.", "The passage argues that the Court is without competence to entertain the arguments about the potential hazards of human ingenuity.", "The passage claims that the contentions about the potential hazards should be addressed to the political process rather than the judicial process."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "238", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "223 \n the argument for Brazelton, as it relates to the delivery of \nbulky articles, the right of which is passed by sale. \nThe reference to the next case, except the extract from the \nopinion of the chancellor, is taken from the printed brief \nfurnished for the defendant. \nThe case of Deklyn v. Davis is like the present case. About \nthe year 1781, the British frigate \u201cThe Hussar\u201d sank in the \nEast river in sixty or seventy feet of water. \nThe bill averred that she \u201cwas abandoned and derelict,\u201d and \nthat \u201cwith much labor and expense\u201d the complainants, in \nthe summer of 1823, had discovered the \u201cpre cise situation \nof the ship -had fastened chains around her, which they \nsecured to floating timbers, and raised her about ten feet \nfrom her bed, and perfectly occupied the vessel, and \ncontinued their occupancy, by which she became their \nproperty. That at the approach of winter they desisted from \ntheir labors, by reason of the weather, designing to resume \nthe work in the following season. That the occupancy of \nthe complainants continued until the defendants, with \nknowledge of complainant\u2019s rights, on the twent y-second \nof March, with vessel, etc., moored and anchored over and \naround the sunken ship. \u201cAn injunction was granted, \nrestraining the defendants \u201cfrom the further interruption of \nthe complainants\u201d and also enjoining them \u201cforthwith to \nremove the sloops.\u201d \n\u201cThe defendants set up that the property was not \nabandoned or derelict when complainants took possession \nin 1823; that defendants, at great cost, had made \npreparation to raise the vessel; that they had ascertained the \nprecise situation and position of said frigate, took \npossession thereof, and to occupy the same, made their \nmarks and ranges on the adjoining shore so as to identify \nthe spot and enable them to commence their operations \nthereupon at the opening of the following season.\u201d That \nthe complainants, \u201cin the absence of the defendants and", "proposition": ["The decomposed propositions"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "72", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "57 \n necessity. Henn\u2019s Case , W. Jones, 296; Campbell v. Race , 7 \nCush. (Mass.) 408, 54 Am. Dec. 728; Hyde v. Jamaica , 27 Vt. \n443 (459); Morey v. Fitzgerald , 56 Vt. 487, 48 Am. Rep. 811. \nAn entry upon land to save goods which are in danger of \nbeing lost or destroyed by water or fire is not a trespass. 21 \nHen. VII, 27; Vin. Ab. Trespass , H. a, 4, pl. 24, K. a, pl. 3. In \nProctor v. Adams , 113 Mass. 376, 18 Am. Rep. 500, the \ndefendant went upon the plaintiff\u2019s beach for the purpose \nof saving and restoring to the lawful owner a boat which \nhad been driven ashore, and was in danger of being carried \noff by the sea; and it was held no trespass. See, also, \nDunwich v. Sterry , 1 B. & Ad. 831. \nThis doctrine of necessity applies with special force to the \npreservation of human life. One assaulted and in peril of \nhis life may run through the close of another to escape \nfrom his ass ailant. 37 Hen. VII, pl. 26. One may sacrifice \nthe personal property of another to save his life or the lives \nof his fellows. In Mouse\u2019s Case , 12 Co. 63, the defendant was \nsued for taking and carrying away the plaintiff\u2019s casket and \nits contents. It appear ed that the ferryman of Gravesend \ntook 47 passengers into his barge to pass to London, \namong whom were the plaintiff and defendant; and the \nbarge being upon the water a great tempest happened, and \na strong wind, so that the barge and all the passengers wer e \nin danger of being lost if certain ponderous things were not \ncast out, and the defendant thereupon cast out the \nplaintiff\u2019s casket.", "proposition": ["An entry upon land to save goods which are in danger of being lost or destroyed by water or fire is not a trespass.", "In Proctor v. Adams, the defendant went upon the plaintiff's beach for the purpose of saving and restoring to the lawful owner a boat which had been driven ashore and was in danger of being carried off by the sea, and it was held not to be a trespass.", "The doctrine of necessity applies with special force to the preservation of human life.", "One assaulted and in peril of his life may run through the close of another to escape from his assailant.", "One may sacrifice the personal property of another to save his life or the lives of his fellows.", "In Mouse's Case, the defendant was sued for taking and carrying away the plaintiff's casket and its contents.", "The ferryman of Gravesend took 47 passengers into his barge to pass to London, among whom were the plaintiff and defendant.", "A great tempest and a strong wind happened, and the barge and all the passengers were in danger of being lost if certain ponderous things were not cast out.", "The defendant in Mouse's Case cast out the plaintiff's casket to save the passengers and the barge from being lost."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "583", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "In looking at the case law to that point, \nProsser recognized that right of publicity cases involved", "proposition": ["Prosser recognized that right of publicity cases involved the case law to that point.", "The case law to that point was being looked at by Prosser."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "361", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "See Ebert, Trademark Protection \nin Color: Do It By the Numbers!, 84 T.M.Rep. 379, 405 \n(1994). Indeed, courts already have done so in cases where \na trademark consists of a color plus a design, i.e., a colored \nsymbol such as a gold stripe (around a sewer pipe), a yellow \nstrand of wire rope, or a \u201cbrilliant yellow\u201d band (on \nampules). See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Tallman \nConduit Co., 149 U.S.P.Q. 656, 657 (TTAB 1966); Amsted \nIndustries, Inc. v. West Coast Wire Rope & Rigging Inc., 2 \nU.S.P.Q.2d 1755, 1760 (TTAB 1987); In re Hodes -Lange \nCorp., 167 U.S.P.Q. 255, 256 (TTAB 1970). \nSecond, Jacobson argues, as have others, that colors are in \nlimited supply. See, e.g., NutraSweet Co., 917 F.2d, at 1028;", "proposition": ["Ebert wrote an article titled 'Trademark Protection in Color: Do It By the Numbers!' published in 84 T.M.Rep. at page 379, where he discussed trademarks consisting of colors and designs."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "169", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "154 \n I agree with the majority that a reversal is required here, but \nI do not subscribe to the newly enunciated doctrine of \nassessment of permanent damages, in lieu of an injunction, \nwhere substantial property rights have been impaired by the \ncreation of a nuisance. \nIt has long been the rule in this State, as the majority \nacknowledges, that a nuisance which results in substantial \ncontinuing damage to neighbors must be enjoined. ( Whalen \nv. Union Bag & Paper Co. , 208 N. Y. 1; Campbell v. Seaman , 63 \nN. Y. 568; see, also, Kennedy v. Moog Servocontrols , 21 N Y 2d \n966.) To now change the rule to permit the cement \ncompany to continue polluting the air indefinitely upon the \npayment of permanent damages is, in my opinion, \ncompounding the magnitude of a very s erious problem in \nour State and Nation today. \nIn recognition of this problem, the Legislature of this State \nhas enacted the Air Pollution Control Act (Public Health \nLaw, ss1264 \u20131299 -m) declaring that it is the State policy to \nrequire the use of all availab le and reasonable methods to \nprevent and control air pollution (Public Health Law, \ns1265).2 \nThe harmful nature and widespread occurrence of air \npollution have been extensively documented. Congressional \nhearings have revealed that air pollution causes subst antial \nproperty damage, as well as being a contributing factor to a \nrising incidence of lung cancer, emphysema, bronchitis and \nasthma.3 \nThe specific problem faced here is known as particulate \ncontamination because of the fine dust particles emanating \n \n2 See, also, Air Quality Act of 1967, 81 U. S. Stat. 485 (1967). \n3 See U. S. Cong., Senate Comm. on Public Works, Special Subcomm. on Air and \nWater Pollution, Air Pollution 1966, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, at pp. 22 -24; U. S. \nCong., Senate Comm. on Public Works, Special Subcomm.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case where a reversal is required due to the creation of a nuisance that has impaired substantial property rights.", "The majority opinion enunciates a new doctrine of assessment of permanent damages in lieu of an injunction for such cases.", "The author disagrees with this new doctrine and argues that it compounds the magnitude of a serious problem.", "The author cites previous rulings in the state that require the injunction of a nuisance causing substantial continuing damage to neighbors.", "The author believes that allowing the cement company to continue polluting the air indefinitely upon payment of permanent damages is not a solution.", "The Air Pollution Control Act has been enacted as the state policy to prevent and control air pollution.", "The harmful nature and widespread occurrence of air pollution have been extensively documented.", "Air pollution causes substantial property damage and is a contributing factor to an increasing incidence of lung cancer, emphysema, bronchitis, and asthma.", "The specific problem faced in this case is known as particulate contamination due to fine dust particles emanating from the cement company's operations."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "663", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "648 \n thirds interest in the coal rights, plaintiffs and Consolidated \nrenegotiated their agreement to provide for payment of \n$2,000 in exchange for a one -third interest in the \nsubsurface coal rights. On May 25, 1976, plaintiffs filed this \naction against the execut or of the estate of Faith Bost, \nseeking damages in the amount of $4,000. \nThe deed which plaintiffs received from the Bosts was a \ngeneral statutory form warranty deed meeting the \nrequirements of section 9 of \u201cAn Act concerning \nconveyances\u201d (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 30, par. 8). That \nsection provides: \nEvery deed in substance in the above \nform, when otherwise duly executed, \nshall be deemed and held a conveyance \nin fee simple, to the grantee, his heirs \nor assigns, with covenants on the part \nof the grantor, (1) that at the time of \nthe making and delivery of such deed \nhe was lawfully seized of an \nindefeasible estate in fee simple, in and \nto the premises therein described, and \nhad good right and full power to \nconvey the same; (2) that the same \nwere then free from all incumbrances; \nand (3) that he warrants to the grantee, \nhis heirs and assigns, the quiet and \npeaceable possession of such premises, \nand will defend the title thereto against \nall persons who may lawfully claim the \nsame. And such covenants shall be \nobliga tory upon any grantor, his heirs \nand personal representatives, as fully \nand with like effect as if written at \nlength in such deed. \nIll. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 30, par. 8.", "proposition": ["Plaintiffs and Consolidated renegotiated their agreement to provide for payment of $2,000 in exchange for a one-third interest in the subsurface coal rights.", "On May 25, 1976, plaintiffs filed this action against the executor of the estate of Faith Bost, seeking damages in the amount of $4,000.", "The deed which plaintiffs received from the Bosts was a general statutory form warranty deed meeting the requirements of section 9 of \u2018An Act concerning conveyances\u2019 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 30, par. 8).", "Section 9 of \u2018An Act concerning conveyances\u2019 provides that every deed in substance in the above form, when otherwise duly executed, shall be deemed and held a conveyance in fee simple, to the grantee, his heirs or assigns, with covenants on the part of the grantor.", "The covenants include that at the time of the making and delivery of such deed, the grantor was lawfully seized of an indefeasible estate in fee simple in and to the premises therein described, and had good right and full power to convey the same.", "The covenants also include that the same were then free from all incumbrances.", "The covenants further include that the grantor warrants to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, the quiet and peaceable possession of such premises, and will defend the title thereto against all persons who may lawfully claim the same.", "And such covenants shall be obligatory upon any grantor, his heirs and personal representatives, as fully and with like effect as if written at length in such deed."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "408", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The \nonly conceivable expression is the manner in which the \ncompiler has selected and arranged the facts. Thus, if the \nselection and arrangement are original, these elements of \nthe work are eligible for copyright protection. See Patry,", "proposition": ["The selection and arrangement of facts in a work can be eligible for copyright protection if they are original.", "For more information on this topic, refer to Patry."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "154", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "139 \n agreed upon by the seller. It is the \nform of entitlement which gives rise to \nthe least amount of state intervention: \nonce the original entitlement is decided \nupon, the state does not try to decide \nits value. It lets each of the parties say \nhow much t he entitlement is worth to \nhim, and gives the seller a veto if the \nbuyer does not offer enough. Property \nrules involve a collective decision as to \nwho is to be given an initial \nentitlement but not as to the value of \nthe entitlement. \nWhenever someone may destroy the \ninitial entitlement if he is willing to pay \nan objectively determined value for it, \nan entitlement is protected by a \nliability rule. This value may be what it \nis thought the original holder of the \nentitlement would have sold it for. But \nthe hol der\u2019s complaint that he would \nhave demanded more will not avail \nhim once the objectively determined \nvalue is set. Obviously, liability rules \ninvolve an additional stage of state \nintervention: not only are entitlements \nprotected, but their transfer or \ndestr uction is allowed on the basis of a \nvalue determined by some organ of the \nstate rather than by the parties \nthemselves. \nAn entitlement is inalienable to the \nextent that its transfer is not permitted \nbetween a willing buyer and a willing \nseller\u2026 . . \nWhen a c ourt awards damages, it is applying a liability rule, since \nthe court, rather than the winner of the lawsuit, determines the \nvalue of what was lost to the winner. When a court awards an", "proposition": ["An entitlement is protected by a liability rule when someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it.", "Liability rules involve an additional stage of state intervention, as entitlements are not only protected but also transferred or destroyed on the basis of a value determined by some organ of the state rather than by the parties themselves.", "An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.", "When a court awards damages, it is applying a liability rule, as the court, rather than the winner of the lawsuit, determines the value of what was lost to the winner."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "730", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "715 \n One is not deprived of the benefit of \nthe statute of limitations merely \nbecause his claim of right is \nunenforceable or his title is known to \nbe defective. The doctrine of adverse \npossession presupposes a defective \ntitle. It is not based on, but is hostile \nto, the true title. If the statute were to \nrun only in favor of a valid title, it \nwould serve no purpose. The holder of \nsuch a title has no need to invoke the \nstatute. Where bad faith is held to \nnegative an alleged claim of right, it is \nonly another way of saying that such \nclaim has been disproved. \nCreel v. Hammans, 234 Iowa 532, 535, 13 N.W.2d 305, 307 \n(1944). \nNevertheless, when knowledge of lack of title is \naccompanied by knowledge of no basis for claiming an \ninterest in the property, a good faith claim of right cannot \nbe established. For example, a mere exchange of quitclaim \ndeeds by persons who know legal title is in another will not \nsupport a claim of right: \nIt is evident the claim and possession of George C. \nAbel could not have been in good faith. There was no \nreason wh y he and his brother should believe they had \nany right to divide and apportion between themselves \nthe real estate of their father while he was an insane \npatient in the state hospital. They must be held to \nhave known the quitclaim deeds they exchanged gave \nthem no title. At best, they proceeded upon what \nproved to be an unfounded assumption that their \nfather would never be discharged from the \nadjudication of insanity. No claim of ownership by \nadverse possession will be sustained upon such a", "proposition": ["One is not deprived of the benefit of the statute of limitations merely because his claim of right is unenforceable or his title is known to be defective.", "The doctrine of adverse possession presupposes a defective title.", "It is not based on, but is hostile to, the true title.", "If the statute were to run only in favor of a valid title, it would serve no purpose.", "The holder of such a title has no need to invoke the statute.", "Where bad faith is held to negative an alleged claim of right, it is only another way of saying that such claim has been disproved.", "When knowledge of lack of title is accompanied by knowledge of no basis for claiming an interest in the property, a good faith claim of right cannot be established.", "A mere exchange of quitclaim deeds by persons who know legal title is in another will not support a claim of right.", "It is evident the claim and possession of George C. Abel could not have been in good faith.", "There was no reason why he and his brother should believe they had any right to divide and apportion between themselves the real estate of their father while he was an insane patient in the state hospital.", "They must be held to have known the quitclaim deeds they exchanged gave them no title.", "At best, they proceeded upon what proved to be an unfounded assumption that their father would never be discharged from the adjudication of insanity.", "No claim of ownership by adverse possession will be sustained upon such a basis."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "218", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Indeed, the view that \none owns one\u2019s body would be equally compatible with the theory that ownership \nof one\u2019s body or labor rests on the con sent of mankind. Locke himself did reject \nthe idea that property was based on the express consent of humanity. See J. \nLOCKE, supra note 2, s 25, at 327, s 29, at 331. For a discussion of the consent \ntheory, see infra notes 6 -7 and accompanying text. \n2 ROBE RT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 175 (1974). The \nexample rests on the argument that Locke\u2019s labor theory of property means that \none acquires property by mixing what one owns (one\u2019s labor) with what one does \nnot own. Nozick substitutes the can of tomato juice for one\u2019s labor.", "proposition": ["The view that one owns one's body would be compatible with the theory that ownership of one's body or labor rests on the consent of mankind.", "Locke rejected the idea that property was based on the express consent of humanity.", "For a discussion of the consent theory, see infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.", "Nozick's example rests on the argument that Locke's labor theory of property means that one acquires property by mixing what one owns (one's labor) with what one does not own.", "Nozick substitutes the can of tomato juice for one's labor in the example."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "123", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "... \nIt is necessary to know whether the damaging -business is liable \nor not for d amage caused since without the establishment of this \ninitial delimitation of rights there can be no marked transactions \nto transfer and recombine them. But the ultimate result (which \nmaximizes the value of production) is independent of the legal \nposition i f the pricing system is assumed to work without cost. \n\u2026", "proposition": ["The establishment of the initial delimitation of rights is crucial for the possibility of marked transactions to transfer and recombine them."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "38", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "23 \n notes were found in a shop. Counsel for the appellant \nassumed throughout that the position was the same as if \nthe parce l had been found in a private house, and the \nlearned judge spoke of \u201cthe protection of his\u201d (the \nshopkeeper\u2019s) \u201chouse.\u201d The case for the appellant was that \nthe shopkeeper never knew of the notes. Again, what is \ncurious is that there was no suggestion that the place where \nthe notes were found was in any way material; indeed, the \njudge in giving the judgment of the court expressly \nrepudiates this and said in terms \u201cThe learned judge was \nmistaken in holding that the place in which they were \nfound makes any leg al difference.\u201d It is, therefore, a little \nremarkable that in South Staffordshire Water Co. v. \nSharman,24 Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. said: \u201cThe case of \nBridges v. Hawkesworth25 stands by itself, and on special \ngrounds; and on those grounds it seems to me that the \ndecision in that case was right. Someone had accidentally \ndropped a bundle of banknotes in a public shop. The \nshopkeeper did not know they had been dropped, and did \nnot in any sense exercise control over them. The shop was \nopen to the public, and they were invited to come there.\u201d \nThat might be a matter of some doubt. Customers were \ninvited there, but whether the public at large was, might be \nopen to some question. Lord Russell continued: \u201cA \ncustomer picked up the notes and gave them to the \nshopkeep er in order that he might advertise them. The \nowner of the notes was not found, and the finder then \nsought to recover them from the shopkeeper. It was held \nthat he was entitled to do so, the ground of the decision \nbeing, as was pointed out by Patteson J., that the notes, \nbeing dropped in the public part of the shop, were never in \nthe custody of the shopkeeper, or \u2018within the protection of \nhis house\u2019.\u201d Patteson J. never made any reference to the \n \n24 2 Q. B. 47.", "proposition": ["The shopkeeper did not know of the notes found in the shop.", "The judge mentioned the protection of the shopkeeper's house.", "The appellant argued that the case was similar to finding a parcel in a private house.", "Customers were invited to the shop, but it is unclear if the public at large was.", "A customer picked up the notes and gave them to the shopkeeper to advertise them.", "The judge stated that the place where the notes were found did not make any legal difference.", "The owner of the notes was not found, and the finder sought to recover them from the shopkeeper.", "In Bridges v. Hawkesworth, someone accidentally dropped a bundle of banknotes in a public shop.", "In South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, Lord Russell of Killowen C.J. mentioned Bridges v. Hawkesworth.", "Patteson J. never made any reference to the case."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "233", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "218 \n note; Woolrych on Waters 15; Rowe v. Berg , 1 Mass. 373; Lewis \nv. The Elizabeth & Jane , Ware\u2019s Rep. 43; The Bee , Id. 344, 345; \nThe St. Petre , Bee\u2019s adm. 82; The Mary , 2 Whea. 126 and note \n(A.); Steamboat J. P. Leathers and cargo, Newb. A. D. 325; \nMarvin on Wreck and Salvage , s. 124, 125. \nSome authorities refer to things found at sea as belonging \nto the finder, in distinction from wreck, that is, goods lost \nat sea and floated to land, or in general terms excluding the \nsense o f derelict as used in maritime cases, or as \ndistinguished from custom and statutory law, and in \nextreme cases property wholly derelict and abandoned has \nbeen held to belong to the finder against the former owner. \nWoolrych on Waters 14; Constable\u2019s Case , 5 Coke 108, b; Marvin \non Wreck and Salvage , sec. 131, note; 1 Bouv. Am. L. 196, No. \n496; Wyman v. Hurlburt , 12 Ohio 87. \nThe occupation or possession of property lost, abandoned \nor without an owner, must depend upon an actual taking of \nthe property and with t he intent to reduce it to possession. \nThe intent may not be that this possession shall be absolute \nor perpetual appropriation of the property to the use of the \nfinder, it may be subject to the claim of the real owner, the \npossession may be taken for his ex clusive good, or it may \nbe taken as a means of subsistence or accumulation, \naccording to the course of business of the parties to this \nsuit. But in this case title by occupancy must rest upon \nintentional actual possession of the thing occupied.", "proposition": ["The occupation or possession of property lost, abandoned or without an owner, must depend upon an actual taking of the property and with the intent to reduce it to possession.", "The intent may not be that this possession shall be absolute or perpetual appropriation of the property to the use of the finder, it may be subject to the claim of the real owner, the possession may be taken for his exclusive good, or it may be taken as a means of subsistence or accumulation, according to the course of business of the parties to this suit.", "But in this case title by occupancy must rest upon intentional actual possession of the thing occupied."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "576", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The purpose of the media\u2019s use of a person\u2019s identity is \ncentral. If the purpose is \u201cinformative or cultural\u201d the use is \nimmune; \u201cif it serves no such function but merely exploits \nthe individual portrayed, immunity will not be granted.\u201d \nFelcher and Rubin, \u201cPrivacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of \nReal People by the Media,\u201d88 Yale L.J. 1577, 1596 (1979). \nMoreover, federal copyright law preempts much of the \narea. \u201cMere imitation of a recorded performance would not", "proposition": ["The purpose of the media's use of a person's identity is central.", "If the purpose is informative or cultural, the use is immune.", "If the purpose serves no informative or cultural function but merely exploits the individual portrayed, immunity will not be granted.", "Felcher and Rubin wrote \"Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media\" in 1979.", "The article was published in the Yale Law Journal, Volume 88, at page 1577.", "Federal copyright law preempts much of the area.", "Mere imitation of a recorded performance would not be covered by copyright law."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "482", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "37 (desc ribing nonprofit Project \nGutenberg). And the qualitative costs to education, \nlearning, and research will multiply as our children become \never more dependent for the content of their knowledge \nupon computer -accessible databases \u2013 thereby condemning \nthat whi ch is not so accessible, say, the cultural content of", "proposition": ["Project Gutenberg is a nonprofit project.", "The qualitative costs to education, learning, and research will multiply as our children become more dependent on computer-accessible databases.", "This dependency on computer-accessible databases will condemn certain knowledge that is not so accessible."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "285", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "In addition, of \ncourse, to this aggregate of legal relations, each landowner \nhas duties to the public not to waste the oil and gas. \nI Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas \u00a7 63 at 180 -181 (1954).", "proposition": ["Each landowner has duties to the public not to waste the oil and gas, according to I Summers' book, The Law of Oil and Gas."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "344", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "329 \n This is confirmed by the doctrine of \u2018non -functional\u2019 \nfeatures, under which it is held that to imitate these is to \nimpute to the copy the same authorship as the original. \nEnterprise Co. v. Landers , 131 F. 240 (C.C.A. 2); Yale & Towne \nCo. v. Adler , 154 F. 37 (C.C.A. 2); Rushmore v. Manhattan Co ., \n163 F. 939, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 269 (C.C.A. 2); Rushmore v. \nBadger Co ., 198 F. 3 79 (C.C.A. 2); Fox v. Glynn , 191 Mass. \n344, 78 N.E. 89, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1096, 114 Am.St.Rep. 619. \nThese decisions imply that, except as to these elements, any \none may copy the original at will. Unless, therefore, there \nhas been some controlling authority to the contrary, the bill \nat bar stands upon no legal right and must fail. \nOf the cases on which the plaintiff relies, the chief is \nInternational News Service v. Associated Press , 248 U.S. 215, 39 \nS.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211, 2 A.L.R. 293. Although that \nconcerned another subject -matter - printed news \ndispatches - we agree that, if it meant to lay down a general \ndoctrine, it would cover this case; at least, the language of \nthe majority opinion goes so far. We do not believe that it \ndid. While it is of course true tha t law ordinarily speaks in \ngeneral terms, there are cases where the occasion is at once \nthe justification for, and the limit of, what is decided. This \nappears to us such an instance; we think that no more was \ncovered than situations substantially similar t o those then at \nbar. The difficulties of understanding it otherwise are \ninsuperable.", "proposition": ["The doctrine of 'non-functional' features states that imitating these features imputes the same authorship as the original work.", "Enterprise Co. v. Landers, Yale & Towne Co. v. Adler, Rushmore v. Manhattan Co., Rushmore v. Badger Co., and Fox v. Glynn are cases that support this doctrine.", "These cases imply that anyone may copy the original work except for the non-functional features.", "The plaintiff relies on International News Service v. Associated Press as a case that supports their argument.", "This case concerned printed news dispatches, but it is unclear if it applies to the current situation.", "The majority opinion in International News Service v. Associated Press goes far enough to cover this case, but it is not certain.", "The occasion of International News Service v. Associated Press justifies and limits what was decided in the case.", "The difficulties of understanding the case otherwise are insurmountable."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "405", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "8, of the Constitution, which authorizes Congress to \n\u201csecur[e] for limited Times to Authors \u2026 the exclusive \nRight to their respective Writings.\u201d In two decisions from \nthe late 19th century The Trade -Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 25 \nL.Ed. 550 (1879); and Burrow -Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, \n111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349 (1884) \u2013 this Court \ndefined the crucial terms \u201cauthors\u201d and \u201cwritings.\u201d In so", "proposition": ["The Constitution authorizes Congress to secure for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their respective writings.", "The Trade-Mark Cases (100 U.S. 82, 25 L.Ed. 550 (1879)) is a decision from the late 19th century that defines the term \"authors.\".", "Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony (111 U.S. 53, 4 S.Ct. 279, 28 L.Ed. 349 (1884)) is another decision from the late 19th century that defines the term \"writings.\".", "In these two decisions, this Court defined the crucial terms \"authors\" and \"writings.\""]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "670", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "655 \n documents entitled \u2018Quitclaim Deeds.\u2019 Lowery\u2019s interest in \nthe land originates in a patent from the United States \nGovernment under 43 U.S.C. s 687a (1970) ( \u2018Alaska \nHomesite Law\u2019). Lowery\u2019s conveyance to the Horvaths w as \nprior to the issuance of patent, and his subsequent \nconveyance to the Sabos was after the issuance of patent. \nThe Horvaths recorded their deed in the Chitna Recording \nDistrict on January 5, 1970; the Sabos recorded their deed \non December 13, 1973. The t ransfer to the Horvaths, \nhowever, predated patent and title, and thus the Horvaths\u2019 \ninterest in the land was recorded \u2018outside the chain of title.\u2019 \nMr. Horvath brought suit to quiet title, and the Sabos \ncounterclaimed to quiet their title. \nIn a memorandum opinion, the superior court ruled that \nLowery had an equitable interest capable of transfer at the \ntime of his conveyance to the Horvaths and further said the \ntransfer contemplated more than a \u2018mere quitclaim\u2019 -it \nwarranted patent would be transferred. The superior court \nalso held that Horvath had the superior claim to the land \nbecause his prior recording had given the Sabos \nconstructive notice for purposes of AS 34.15.290.1 The \nSabos\u2019 appeal raises the following issues: \n1. Under 43 U.S.C. s 687a (1970), when d id Lowery \nobtain a present equitable interest in land which he \ncould convey? \n2. Are the Sabos, as grantees under a quitclaim deed, \n\u2018subsequent innocent purchaser(s) in good faith\u2019? \n \n1 AS 34.15.290 states: \nA conveyance of real property in the state hereafter made, \nother than a lease for a term not exceeding one year, is \nvoid as against a subsequent innocent purchaser or \nmortgagee in good faith for a valuable consideration of \nthe property or a portion of it, whose conveyance is first \nduly recorded.", "proposition": ["The passage is about a legal case involving the transfer of land ownership.", "Lowery's interest in the land originates from a patent under the Alaska Homesite Law.", "Lowery conveyed the land to the Horvaths before the issuance of the patent and to the Sabos after the issuance of the patent.", "The Horvaths recorded their deed in January 1970, and the Sabos recorded their deed in December 1973.", "The transfer to the Horvaths predated the patent and title, so their interest in the land was recorded 'outside the chain of title.'", "Mr. Horvath brought a suit to quiet title, and the Sabos counterclaimed to quiet their title.", "The superior court ruled that Lowery had an equitable interest capable of transfer at the time of his conveyance to the Horvaths, and the transfer contemplated more than a mere quitclaim.", "The superior court held that Horvath had the superior claim to the land because his prior recording gave the Sabos constructive notice for purposes of AS 34.15.290.", "The Sabos' appeal raises two issues: when did Lowery obtain a present equitable interest in the land, and are they 'subsequent innocent purchaser(s) in good faith' under the quitclaim deed?", "AS 34.15.290 states that a conveyance of real property in the state is void as against a subsequent innocent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith for a valuable consideration of the property or a portion of it, whose conveyance is first duly recorded."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "570", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "555 \n plaintiff h ad some involvement with defendants\u2019 album. \n\u201cBut that risk of misunderstanding, not engendered by any \novert claim in the title, is so outweighed by the interests in \nartistic expression as to preclude application of the Lanham \nAct.\u201dId. at 1001; see also DeC lemente v. Columbia Pictures \nIndus., Inc., 860 F.Supp. 30, 52 (E.D.N.Y.1994) (\u201c[E]ven if \nthe plaintiff\u2019s allegations of secondary meaning and \nconsumer confusion are true, the defendants\u2019 first \namendment interest in naming their films outweighs the \nplaintif f\u2019s and even the public\u2019s interest in preventing \nconsumer confusion.\u201d).5 \nMoreover, defendants\u2019 album and its packaging \nunequivocally identify defendants as the source of the \nalbum. \u201cThe most common and effective means of \napprising intending purchasers of t he source of goods is a \nprominent disclosure on the container, package, wrapper, \nor label of the manufacturer\u2019s or trader\u2019s name \u2026 [and \nwhen] that is done, there is no basis for a charge of unfair \ncompetition.\u201d Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) \nLtd., 50 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 808, \n116 S.Ct. 54, 133 L.Ed.2d 19 (1995). In other words, \u201cthe \nplaintiff\u2019s right can be protected sufficiently by requiring \nthe defendant\u2019s [products] to be clearly marked so as to \nindicate unmistakab ly that they are defendant\u2019s and not the \nplaintiff\u2019s goods.\u201d Flagg Mfg. Co. v. Holway, 178 Mass. 83, \n91, 59 N.E. 667, 667 (1901). Given the prominent \nappearance of defendant Outkast\u2019s name on their album, \nthere can be no likelihood of confusion under the L anham \n \n5 Furthermore, in conventional \u201cproduct\u201d trademark cases, \u201cmerely occasional\u201d \ninstances of alleged actual confusion do not support the existence of likelihood of \nconfusion.", "proposition": ["The plaintiff had some involvement with the defendants' album.", "The risk of misunderstanding due to the title is outweighed by the interests in artistic expression.", "The defendants' album and its packaging unequivocally identify the defendants as the source of the album.", "A prominent disclosure on the container, package, wrapper, or label can prevent a charge of unfair competition.", "The plaintiff's right can be protected by requiring the defendant's products to be clearly marked.", "The prominent appearance of defendant Outkast's name on their album prevents any likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.", "In conventional 'product' trademark cases, merely occasional instances of alleged actual confusion do not support the existence of likelihood of confusion."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "57", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "42 \n circumstances in Benjamin are similar to those now before \nus, and we are persuaded that the reasoning of t he Iowa \ncourt was sound. \nThe Oregon Supreme Court has also considered a case \ninvolving facts similar to the case now on review before \nthis court. In Jackson, supra ., Mrs. Jackson, while working as \na chamber maid at Arthur Hotel, discovered $800 \nconcealed u nder the paper lining of a dresser drawer. Id. \nThe court observed that \u201cfrom the manner in which the \nbills in the instant case were carefully concealed beneath \nthe paper lining of the drawer, it must be presumed that the \nconcealment was effected intentiona lly and deliberately. \nThe bills, therefore, cannot be regarded as abandoned \nproperty.\u201d Id. The court then held: \nThe natural assumption is that the \nperson who concealed the bills in the \ncase at bar was a guest of the hotel. \nTheir considerable value, and the \nmanner of their concealment, indicate \nthat the person who concealed them \ndid so for purposes of security, and \nwith the intention of reclaiming them. \nThey were, therefore, to be classified \nnot as lost, but as misplaced or \nforgotten property, and the defend ant, \nas occupier of the premises where they \nwere found, had the right and duty to \ntake them into his possession and to \nhold them as a gratuitous bailee for the \ntrue owner. \nJackson, supra . \nThe case now before us presents circumstances similar to \nthose upon which Benjamin and Jackson were decided. The \ntrial court found that the original owner of the $38,310.00 \nacted intentionally in concealing his property. The trial \ncourt also recognized that the found property did not have", "proposition": ["There are 42 circumstances in Benjamin that are similar to the current case.", "The reasoning of the Iowa court was sound.", "The Oregon Supreme Court considered a case involving facts similar to the current case.", "In Jackson, Mrs. Jackson discovered $800 concealed under the paper lining of a dresser drawer while working as a chamber maid at Arthur Hotel.", "The court in Jackson observed that the manner in which the bills were concealed indicates that the concealment was intentional and deliberate.", "The court in Jackson held that the person who concealed the bills was likely a guest of the hotel, and they intended to reclaim them.", "The found property in Jackson was classified as misplaced or forgotten property, not abandoned property.", "The occupier of the premises where the property was found had the right and duty to take it into possession and hold it as a gratuitous bailee for the true owner.", "The current case presents circumstances similar to those in Benjamin and Jackson.", "The trial court found that the original owner of the $38,310.00 acted intentionally in concealing his property.", "The trial court recognized that the found property did not have the same characteristics as abandoned property."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "465", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "If, for example, the vesting period on a \ndeed were defined with reference to the life of an infant, the sum of the \nmeasuring life plus 21 years could commonly add up to 95 years.", "proposition": ["The vesting period on a deed can be defined with reference to the life of an infant. The sum of the measuring life plus 21 years is commonly 95 years."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "191", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "That celebrated author, lib. 2. c. 8. s. 3. p. \n309. speaking of occupancy, proceeds thus: \u201cRequiritur", "proposition": ["The celebrated author speaks about occupancy. In lib. 2. c. 8. s. 3. p. 309, the author writes about occupancy. The author's statement on occupancy is as follows: \"Requiritur\""]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "391", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "376 \n or perfume, differentiation by written description was often \nimpossible. Se e Hearings on H.R.11372 before the House \nCommittee on Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1930) \n(memorandum of Patent Commissioner Robertson). \nIn enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress addressed both \nof these concerns. It explained at length its belief that the \nwork of the plant breeder \u201cin aid of nature\u201d was patentable \ninvention. S.Rep.No.315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 6 -8 (1930); \nH.R.Rep.No.1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 7 -9 (1930). And it \nrelaxed the written description requirement in favor of \u201ca \ndescription \u2026 as complete as is reasonably possible.\u201d 35 \nU.S.C. \u00a7 162. No Committee or Member of Congress, \nhowever, expressed the broader view, now urged by the \npetitioner, that the terms \u201cmanufacture\u201d or \u201ccomposition \nof matter\u201d exclude living things. The sole support for that \nposition in the legislative history of the 1930 Act is found \nin the conclusory statement of Secretary of Agriculture \nHyde, in a letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate \nCommittees considering the 1930 Act, that \u201cthe patent laws \n\u2026 at the present time are understood to cover only \ninventions or discoveries in the field of inanimate nature.\u201d \nSee S.Rep.No.315, supra, at Appendix A; H.R.Rep.No.1129, \nsupra, at Appendix A. Secretary Hyde\u2019s opinion, however, is \nnot entitled to controlling weight. His vie ws were solicited \non the administration of the new law and not on the scope \nof patentable subject matter \u2013 an area beyond his \ncompetence. Moreover, there is language in the House and \nSenate Committee Reports suggesting that to the extent \nCongress considere d the matter it found the Secretary\u2019s \ndichotomy unpersuasive.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the Plant Patent Act and its impact on patentable subject matter.", "The Act addressed concerns related to differentiation of perfumes and plant breeding.", "Congress believed that the work of plant breeders 'in aid of nature' was patentable invention.", "The Act relaxed the written description requirement in favor of a description 'as complete as is reasonably possible.'", "No Committee or Member of Congress expressed the broader view that living things are excluded from the terms 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter.'", "Secretary of Agriculture Hyde's opinion on the scope of patentable subject matter is not entitled to controlling weight.", "There is language in the House and Senate Committee Reports suggesting that Congress found Secretary Hyde's dichotomy unpersuasive."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "299", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "284 \n if translated, would work as well against any rule or any standard, \ndepending on which you think the nuisance test is.) \n5. Would you need to show evidence of harm to sue successfully a \njet engine test facility operating ne ar a residential neighborhood \nthat routinely emits sound above levels safe for human ears? \nWould you need to show evidence of harm to sue successfully such \na facility if it were silent but leaked small quantities of jet fuel onto \nsome of the residences? Ex plain. \n6. Take Garrett Hardin\u2019s classic example of a pasture open, say, to \nsix unrelated herdsmen. If Coase\u2019s Theorem applies in this \nsituation, will there be a tragedy of the commons? Why or why \nnot? If your answer is yes, explain how. If your answer is n o, \nexplain which element necessary for the tragedy to occur would not \nbe present. What would change if we assumed that the pasture was \ncontinuously open to new herdsmen, beyond the original six? \nExplain. \n7. If I move into a residence in an industrial area in which there are \nalmost no other residences, and I sue in nuisance a large factory \nthat is both extremely loud and covering my property in significant \nlevels of smoke, will I be able to get an injunction? Will I be able to \ndo so if I pay damages to the f actory? Explain. \nEssay Problem \nAccording to legend, the pirate Gorefiend was killed shortly before \nhis ship ran ashore in what is now the state of Carolorgia. His \nfellow pirates buried Gorefiend well upland from the beach, up in \nthe dunes. Because they cou ld not agree on how to divide \nGorefiend\u2019s valuables, the story goes, they buried him with a fair \nnumber of gold and silver objects. Within days, the pirates were \ncaptured. Some were sentenced to death and others to long prison \nterms. \nAlfonso Allen stumbled onto the two -hundred -year-old story while \nworking as a tour guide at a historical fort, where some of \nGorefiend\u2019s crew had been held.", "proposition": ["The pirate Gorefiend was killed before his ship ran ashore in what is now the state of Carolorgia.", "Gorefiend's fellow pirates buried him well upland from the beach, up in the dunes.", "The pirates could not agree on how to divide Gorefiend's valuables, so they buried him with a fair number of gold and silver objects.", "Within days, the pirates were captured and some were sentenced to death, while others were sentenced to long prison terms.", "Alfonso Allen discovered the two-hundred-year-old story while working as a tour guide at a historical fort where some of Gorefiend's crew had been held."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "6", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "vi \n book\u2019s cover art and the aforementioned logos, or any derivative \nthereof, to imply endors ement or otherwise without written \npermission from CALI. \nThis material does not contain nor is intended to be legal advice. Users \nseeking legal advice should consult with a licensed attorney in their \njurisdiction. The editors have endeavored to provide com plete and \naccurate information in this book. However, CALI does not warrant that \nthe information provided is complete and accurate. CALI disclaims all \nliability to any person for any loss caused by errors or omissions in this \ncollection of information. \nVersion 1: March 29, 2012", "proposition": ["The cover art of the vi book includes logos and cannot imply endorsement without written permission from CALI.", "This material does not contain nor is intended to be legal advice.", "Users seeking legal advice should consult with a licensed attorney in their jurisdiction.", "The editors have endeavored to provide complete and accurate information in this book.", "CALI does not warrant that the information provided is complete and accurate.", "CALI disclaims all liability to any person for any loss caused by errors or omissions in this collection of information.", "The version of this book is from March 29, 2012."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "578", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "563 \n voice accompanied a cartoon of a duck. Lahr alleged that \nhis style of vocal delivery was distinctive in pitch, accent, \ninflection, and sounds. The First Cir cuit held that Lahr had \nstated a cause of action for unfair competition, that it could \nbe found \u201cthat defendant\u2019s conduct saturated plaintiff\u2019s \naudience, curtailing his market.\u201d Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co ., \n300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir.1962). That case is mor e like this \none. But we do not find unfair competition here. One -\nminute commercials of the sort the defendants put on \nwould not have saturated Midler\u2019s audience and curtailed \nher market. Midler did not do television commercials. The \ndefendants were not in competition with her. See Halicki v. \nUnited Artists Communications, Inc ., 812 F.2d 1213 (9th \nCir.1987). \nCalifornia Civil Code section 3344 is also of no aid to \nMidler. The statute affords damages to a person injured by \nanother who uses the person\u2019s \u201cname, voice, signature, \nphotograph or likeness, in any manner.\u201d The defendants \ndid not use Midler\u2019s name or anything else whose use is \nprohibited by the statute. The voice they used was \nHedwig\u2019s, not hers. The term \u201clikeness\u201d refers to a visual \nimage not a vocal imitation. The statute, however, does not \npreclude Midler from pursuing any cause of action she may \nhave at common law; the statute itself implies that such \ncommon law causes of action do exist because it says its \nremedies are merely \u201ccumulative.\u201d Id. s 3344(g). \nThe companion statute protecting the use of a deceased \nperson\u2019s name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness \nstates that the rights it recognizes are \u201cproperty rights.\u201d Id. \ns 990(b). By analogy the common law rights are also \nproperty rights. Appr opriation of such common law rights \nis a tort in California. Motschenbacher v. R.J.", "proposition": ["The case involving Lahr is more similar to the one involving Midler.", "The defendants' conduct did not saturate Midler's audience and curtailed her market.", "The defendants were not in competition with Midler.", "The voice used by the defendants was Hedwig's, not Midler's.", "The term 'likeness' in the statute refers to a visual image, not a vocal imitation.", "The statute does not preclude Midler from pursuing any cause of action she may have at common law.", "The rights recognized by the companion statute protecting the use of a deceased person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness are 'property rights.'", "By analogy, the common law rights are also property rights.", "Appropriation of such common law rights is a tort in California."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "106", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "91 \n Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 686, 709 P.2d 782 (1985); \nBorland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc., 369 So .2d 523, 527 (Ala., \n1979); Martin, supra at 101, 342 P.2d 790 (observing the \ntrend without deciding whether to join it), citing Prosser, \nTorts (2d ed.), p. 56; 1 Restatement, Torts, s 158, comment \nh. Some courts have likewise eliminated the requirement of \na tangible object. E.g., Bradley, supra at 686, 709 P.2d 782; \nBorland, supra at 529. See also Martin, supra at 100, 342 \nP.2d 790 (trespass to land may be accomplished by \u201ca ray \nof light, by an atomic particle, or by a particulate of \nfluoride\u201d). In some cas es the direct -and-tangible inquiry has \nbeen supplanted by an inquiry into the force and energy of \nthe intruding agent. E.g., Bradley, supra at 687, 709 P.2d \n782; Borland, supra at 527; Martin, supra at 93, 342 P.2d \n790. \nThe courts that have deviated from t he traditional \nrequirements of trespass, however, have consequently \nfound troublesome the traditional principle that at least \nnominal damages are presumed in cases of trespass. Thus, \nunder the so -called modern view of trespass, in order to \navoid subjecting manufacturing plants to potential liability \nto every landowner on whose parcel some incidental \nresidue of industrial activity might come to rest, these \ncourts have grafted onto the law of trespass a requirement \nof actual and substantial damages. Bradley, supra at 692, \n709 P.2d 782; Borland, supra at 529.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the legal concept of trespass and the requirements for proving it.", "91 Refining Co. is a case cited in the passage.", "Borland v. Sanders Lead Co., Inc. is another case cited in the passage.", "Martin is a source cited in the passage.", "Some courts have eliminated the requirement of a tangible object for trespass.", "Bradley is a case cited in the passage that discusses the force and energy of the intruding agent.", "Borland is another case cited in the passage that discusses the force and energy of the intruding agent.", "Martin is a source cited in the passage that discusses the force and energy of the intruding agent.", "Some courts have replaced the direct-and-tangible inquiry with an inquiry into the force and energy of the intruding agent.", "Courts that have deviated from the traditional requirements of trespass have found troublesome the traditional principle that at least nominal damages are presumed in cases of trespass.", "Under the modern view of trespass, some courts have grafted onto the law of trespass a requirement of actual and substantial damages to avoid subjecting manufacturing plants to potential liability to every landowner on whose parcel some incidental residue of industrial activity might come to rest.", "Bradley is a case cited in the passage that discusses the requirement of actual and substantial damages.", "Borland is another case cited in the passage that discusses the requirement of actual and substantial damages."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "26", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "11 \n His views of wh at will promote honesty and justice are \nentitled to respect, yet many may think Mrs. Barmore\u2019s \nmethod of treating servants far superior. \nThe assignments of error are to so much of the charge as \ninstructed the jury that, if they found the money in question \nwas lost, the defendant had no right to retain it because \nfound in his hotel, the circumstances raising no \npresumption that it was lost by a guest, and their verdict \nought to be for the plaintiff. That the money was not \nvoluntarily placed where it was foun d, but accidentally lost, \nis settled by the verdict. It is admitted that it was found in \nthe parlor, a public place open to all. There is nothing to \nindicate whether it was lost by a guest, or a boarder, or one \nwho had called with or without business. The pretence that \nit was the property of a guest, to whom the defendant \nwould be liable, is not founded on an act or circumstance in \nevidence. \nMany authorities were cited, in argument, touching the \nrights, duties and responsibilities of an innkeeper in relatio n \nto his guests; these are so well settled as to be \nuncontroverted. In respect to other persons than guests, an \ninnkeeper is as another man. When money is found in his \nhouse, on the floor of a room common to all classes of \npersons, no presumption of owners hip arises; the case is \nlike the finding upon the floor of a shop. The research of \ncounsel failed to discover authority that an innkeeper shall \nhave an article which another finds in a public room of his \nhouse, where there is no circumstance pointing to it s loss \nby a guest. In such case the general rule should prevail. If \nthe finder be an honest woman, who immediately informs \nher employer, and gives him the article on his false pretence \nthat he knows the owner and will restore it, she is entitled \nto have it back and hold it till the owner comes. A rule of \nlaw ought to apply to all alike. Persons employed in inns \nwill be encouraged to fidelity by protecting them in equality", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the views of someone regarding honesty and justice.", "Many people may think that Mrs. Barmore's method of treating servants is superior.", "The passage mentions a charge that instructed the jury to find in favor of the plaintiff if they found the money in question was lost.", "The money was not voluntarily placed where it was found, but accidentally lost, as settled by the verdict.", "The money was found in the parlor, a public place open to all.", "There is nothing to indicate whether the money was lost by a guest, a boarder, or someone who called with or without business.", "The pretense that the money was the property of a guest is not founded on an act or circumstance in evidence.", "Many authorities were cited in argument touching the rights, duties, and responsibilities of an innkeeper in relation to his guests.", "An innkeeper is as another man in respect to other persons than guests.", "When money is found in his house on the floor of a room common to all classes of persons, no presumption of ownership arises.", "The case is like the finding upon the floor of a shop.", "The research of counsel failed to discover authority that an innkeeper shall have an article which another finds in a public room of his house where there is no circumstance pointing to its loss by a guest.", "In such a case, the general rule should prevail.", "If the finder is an honest woman who immediately informs her employer and gives him the article on his false pretense that he knows the owner and will restore it, she is entitled to have it back and hold it till the owner comes.", "A rule of law ought to apply to all alike.", "Persons employed in inns will be encouraged to fidelity by protecting them in equality."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "399", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Yet Congress provided for patents on plants but not on \nthese bacteria. In short, Congress decided to make only a subset of animate \n\u201chuman -made inventions,\u201d ibid., patentable. \n15 If the 1930 Act\u2019s only purpose were to solve the technical problem of \ndescription referred to by the Court, ante, at 312, most of the Act, and in particular \nits limitation to asexually reproduced plants, would have been totally unnecessary.", "proposition": ["The 1930 Act's limitation to asexually reproduced plants would have been unnecessary if its only purpose were to solve the technical problem of description."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "332", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "317 \n 241, and neither fraud nor force is involved. The manner of \nuse is likewise unobjectionable. No reference is made by \nword or by act to the Associated Press, either in \ntransmitting the news to subscribers or by them in \npublishing it in their papers. Neither the International \nNews Service nor its subscribers is gaining or seeking to \ngain in its business a benefit from the reputation of the \nAssociated Press. They are merely using its product without \nmaking comp ensation. See Bamforth v. Douglass Post \nCard & Machine Co. (C. C.) 158 Fed. 355; Tribune Co. of \nChicago v. Associated Press (C. C.) 116 Fed. 126. That they \nhave a legal right to do, because the product is not \nproperty, and they do not stand in any relation to the \nAssociated Press, either of contract or of trust, which \notherwise precludes such use. The argument is not \nadvanced by characterizing such taking and use a \nmisappropriation. \nIt is also suggested that the fact that defendant does not \nrefer to the Ass ociated Press as the source of the news may \nfurnish a basis for the relief. But the defendant and its \nsubscribers, unlike members of the Associated Press, were \nunder no contractual obligation to disclose the source of \nthe news; and there is no rule of law requiring \nacknowledgment to be made where uncopyrighted matter is \nreproduced. The International News Service is said to \nmislead its subscribers into believing that the news \ntransmitted was originally gathered by it and that they in \nturn mislead their reade rs. There is, in fact, no \nrepresentation by either of any kind. Sources of \ninformation are sometimes given because required by \ncontract; sometimes because naming the source gives \nauthority to an otherwise incredible statement; and \nsometimes the source is n amed because the agency does \nnot wish to take the responsibility itself of giving currency \nto the news. But no representation can properly be implied \nfrom omission to mention the source of information", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the use of news gathered by the Associated Press without permission or compensation.", "The manner of use is unobjectionable, and no reference is made to the Associated Press.", "The International News Service and its subscribers are not gaining any benefit from the reputation of the Associated Press.", "They argue that they have a legal right to use the product because it is not property, and they do not stand in any relation to the Associated Press that would preclude such use.", "The argument is not advanced by characterizing the taking and use as misappropriation.", "It is suggested that the fact that the defendant does not refer to the Associated Press as the source of the news may furnish a basis for relief.", "Defendants were under no contractual obligation to disclose the source of the news, and there is no rule of law requiring acknowledgment to be made where uncopyrighted matter is reproduced.", "The International News Service is said to mislead its subscribers into believing that the news transmitted was originally gathered by it and that they in turn mislead their readers.", "There is, in fact, no representation by either of any kind.", "Sources of information are sometimes given because required by contract, sometimes because naming the source gives authority to an otherwise incredible statement, and sometimes the source is named because the agency does not wish to take the responsibility itself of giving currency to the news.", "But no representation can properly be implied from omission to mention the source of information."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "435", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "420 \n concepts. A new author may use or discuss the idea, but \nmust do so using her own original expression. \n2. Fair Use \nFirst Amendment privileges are also preserved through the \ndoctrine of fair use. Until codification of the fair -use \ndoctrine in the 1976 Ac t, fair use was a judge -made right \ndeveloped to preserve the constitutionality of copyright \nlegislation by protecting First Amendment values. Had fair \nuse not been recognized as a right under the 1976 Act, the \nstatutory abandonment of publication as a cond ition of \ncopyright that had existed for over 200 years would have \njeopardized the constitutionality of the new Act because \nthere would be no statutory guarantee that new ideas, or \nnew expressions of old ideas, would be accessible to the \npublic. Included in the definition of fair use are \u201cpurposes \nsuch as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching \u2026, \nscholarship, or research.\u201d \u00a7 107. The exceptions carved out \nfor these purposes are at the heart of fair use\u2019s protection \nof the First Amendment, as they allow later authors to use \na previous author\u2019s copyright to introduce new ideas or \nconcepts to the public. Therefore, within the limits of the \nfair-use test, any use of a copyright is permitted to fulfill \none of the important purposes listed in the statute. \nBecause of the First Amendment principles built into \ncopyright law through the idea/expression dichotomy and \nthe doctrine of fair use, courts often need not entertain \nrelated First Amendment arguments in a copyright case. \n[citations omitted] \nThe case before u s calls for an analysis of whether a \npreliminary injunction was properly granted against an \nalleged infringer who, relying largely on the doctrine of fair \nuse, made use of another\u2019s copyright for comment and \ncriticism. As discussed herein, copyright does n ot \nimmunize a work from comment and criticism. Therefore,", "proposition": ["A new author may use or discuss an idea, but must do so using her own original expression.", "The fair-use doctrine was developed to preserve the constitutionality of copyright legislation by protecting First Amendment values.", "Had fair use not been recognized as a right under the 1976 Act, the statutory abandonment of publication as a condition of copyright would have jeopardized the constitutionality of the new Act.", "The definition of fair use includes purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research.", "The exceptions carved out for these purposes are at the heart of fair use's protection of the First Amendment.", "Within the limits of the fair-use test, any use of a copyright is permitted to fulfill one of the important purposes listed in the statute.", "Courts often need not entertain related First Amendment arguments in a copyright case due to the First Amendment principles built into copyright law.", "Copyright does not immunize a work from comment and criticism."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "708", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "693 \n (citing Tavares v. Beck , 814 A.2d 346, 350 (R.I.2003)); see also \nCarnevale v. Dupee , 853 A.2d 1197, 1199 (R.I.2004). \nHere, the trial justice recited the proper standard of proo f \nfor adverse possession and then found that Cahill had \n\u201cmet her burden of establishing all of \nthe elements of an adverse possession \nclaim to lot 19 by her and her mother\u2019s \ncontinuous and uninterrupted use of \nthe parcel for well in excess of ten \nyears. She maintained the property, \nplanted and improved the property \nwith shrubs, trees, and other plantings, \nsought drainage control measures, and \nused the property as if it were her own \nsince 1971. She established that use \nnot only by her own testimony, but as \ncorroborated by other witnesses, \nphotographs, and expert testimony \nrelative to the interpretation of aerial \nphotographs.\u201d \nAt trial, as here on appeal, Morrow argued that Cahill\u2019s \noffers to purchase the property invalidated her claim of \nright and the element of hostile possession. To dispose of \nthat issue, the trial justice determined that \u201ceven assuming \nthat [Cahill\u2019s] inquiry is circumstantial evidence of her \nknowledge that George Morrow, and subsequently \nMargaret [Morrow], were the legal title holders of [l ot] 19, \nthat does not destroy the viability of this adverse \npossession claim.\u201d The trial justice relied upon our opinion \nin Tavares , 814 A.2d at 350, to support his conclusion. \nRecalling that this Court stated in Tavares that \u201ceven when \nthe claimants know they are nothing more than black -\nhearted trespassers, they can still adversely possess the \nproperty in question under a claim [of] right to do so if they \nuse it openly, notoriously, and in a manner that is adverse \nto the true owner\u2019s rights for the requisi te ten -year period,\u201d", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving adverse possession.", "The trial justice found that Cahill had established all elements of an adverse possession claim to lot 19.", "Cahill and her mother used the parcel continuously and uninterrupted for well over ten years.", "Cahill maintained, improved, and used the property as if it were her own since 1971.", "The trial justice determined that Cahill's offers to purchase the property did not destroy the viability of her adverse possession claim.", "The trial justice relied on the Court's opinion in Tavares to support his conclusion.", "In Tavares, the Court stated that claimants can still adversely possess property under a claim of right if they use it openly, notoriously, and adverse to the true owner's rights for the required ten-year period, even if they know they are trespassing."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "719", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "704 \n reminiscent of a time when landowners lived on or near \ntheir land and thus could observe encroachments on their \nproperty. Also, it is certainly worth noting that during the \nperiod when the adverse -possessi on doctrine developed, \nour society believed that it was in the public interest that \nland be used productively rather than being allowed to lie \nfallow. Neither of those situations is the case at present in \nour more mobile society. However, adverse possessio n \nremains the law in this state until the Legislature sees fit to \nchange it. \nA: The 1997 Letter \nSimply put, I do not agree that the correspondence \nbetween plaintiff and defendant in which plaintiff offers to \npurchase defendant\u2019s interest in lot 19 is the s moking gun \nthe majority perceives it to be. As is clear from a fair \nreading of plaintiffs testimony, she believed that she owned \nthe property as a result of her longtime use of and \ndominion over it. But her testimony also demonstrates that \nshe drew a crisp distinction between whatever ownership \nrights she may have acquired and record title, which she \nrecognized continued to reside in the Morrows. In my \nopinion, the trial justice correctly found that the \u201cfact that \nthe plaintiff beginning in 1997 inquired as to the Morrow\u2019s \nwillingness to consider a sale of the lot to her may certainly \nshow that she was aware of the Morrow\u2019s record title. That \nalone, however, does not negate her claim of right.\u201d In \nTavares v. Beck , 814 A.2d 346, 351 (R.I.2003), we held that \nthe trial justice improperly factored a party\u2019s subjective \nknowledge into a claim -of-right analysis. In that case, we \nclarified that \u201ca claim of right to own or use property does \nnot arise from the claimants\u2019 mistaken belief that they hold \ntitle to the land , but rather from their objective acts of \nownership evidencing an intent to use and possess the \npremises in a manner adverse to the owner of record.\u201d Id. \nat 351 -52. Further, we held that \u201c[t]his remains true even in", "proposition": ["The author disagrees with the majority's perception of the correspondence between plaintiff and defendant as the 'smoking gun'.", "Plaintiff believed she owned the property due to her longtime use and dominion over it, but recognized that record title continued to reside in the Morrows.", "The trial justice correctly found that the plaintiff's inquiry about purchasing the lot from the Morrows does not negate her claim of right.", "In Tavares v. Beck, we held that subjective knowledge should not be factored into a claim-of-right analysis.", "A claim of right arises from objective acts of ownership, not from a mistaken belief about title.", "This remains true even in cases of adverse possession."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "480", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The potential users of such works include not only movie \nbuffs and aging jazz fans, but also historians, scholars, \nteachers, writers, artists, database operators, and researchers", "proposition": ["movie buffs", "aging jazz fans", "historians", "scholars", "teachers", "writers", "artists", "database operators", "researchers"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "89", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "122 (1985). It certainly is battery. Bowman v. Home \nLife Ins. Co ., 243 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.1957); Commonwealth v. \nGregory , 132 Pa.Super. 507, 1 A.2d 501 (1938). Trespass \npresents close parallels. If a homeowner opens his doo r to \na purported meter reader who is in fact nothing of the \nsort\u2013just a busybody curious about the interior of the", "proposition": ["Text contains information about legal cases and situations."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "277", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Picture a \npasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try \nto keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an \narrangement may work reason ably satisfactorily for centuries", "proposition": ["The Tragedy of the Commons"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "48", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "33 \n sounding in tort. Appellants also sought an order finding \nthat appellees we re holding the money in trust for \nappellants. \nOn the day the complaint was filed, the chancery court \nentered a temporary restraining order requiring appellees to \ndeposit the found money with the registry of the court. On \nFebruary 9, 1999, Mr. Lock and Lock Hospitality, Inc., filed \ntheir answer. Appellees raised the defenses of estoppel, \nlaches, failure of consideration, and fraud in their answer. \nEventually, all of the named appellees other than Mr. Lock \nand Lock Hospitality, Inc., were dismissed from the c ase. \nOn appeal, appellants now contend that the chancery court \ndid not have subject -matter jurisdiction to hear and resolve \nthe issues that they had asked the chancellor to resolve. We \nfind no merit in this argument and conclude that the \nchancery court had jurisdiction under the clean -up doctrine \nto resolve the merits of the matters relating to ownership of \nthe money. \nThe remaining issue for our review is whether the \nchancellor was clearly erroneous in characterizing the found \nmoney as \u201cmislaid\u201d property an d consequently that the \ninterest of Lock Hospitality, Inc., as the owner of the \npremises, is superior to the interest of appellants as finders \nof the money. We conclude that the chancellor was not \nclearly erroneous in finding that the money was mislaid \nproperty, and we affirm. \nIn their first point on appeal, appellants argue that the trial \ncourt was wholly without subject -matter jurisdiction to \nadjudicate the issues involved in this case. We have \npreviously stated that parties may not consent to a court\u2019s \nsubject -matter jurisdiction where no such jurisdiction lies, \nnor may the jurisdiction be waived. Douthitt v. Douthitt , 326 \nArk. 372, 930 S.W.2d 371 (1996). A court must determine if \nit has subject -matter jurisdiction of the case before it. Id. \nSubject -matte r jurisdiction is always open, cannot be", "proposition": ["The court had jurisdiction under the clean-up doctrine to resolve the merits of the matters relating to ownership of the money.", "The chancellor was not clearly erroneous in finding that the money was mislaid property, and we affirm."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "602", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "587 \n bore a remarkable resemblance to Woody Allen. Id. at 617. \nThe instant matter involves a robot that bears no \nresemblance to Vanna White. \nIt is un clear whether the \u201cmark\u201d for which Vanna White \nseeks protection is her screen image or the imitation Wheel \nof Fortune. Although Vanna White is certainly famous for \nbeing famous, there is no evidence in the record that \nconsumers identify the specific charac teristics at issue, i.e., \nblond hair and fancy dress, solely with Vanna White. The \nmajority ignores this important distinction. \nThe majority has glossed over the third AMF factor -\nsimilarity of the marks -the most important factor in this \ncase. The majority finds this factor \u201cambiguous\u201d because \nthe common characteristics \u201cidentify\u201d Vanna White. \nMajority Opinion at p. 1400. We are required, however, to \ncompare marks in their entirety. California Cooler, Inc. v. \nLoretto Winery, 774 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.1985). In this \nmatter, the consumer is confronted with two entities. One \nis Vanna White. The other is a robot. No one could \nreasonably confuse the two. \nCertain aspects of a mark may have a greater impact than \nother aspects. When a mark has certain salient \ncharacteri stics, they are given greater weight. Country \nFloors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.1991); \nHenri\u2019s Food Products Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 717 F.2d 352 (7th \nCir.1983); Giant Food, Inc. v. Nations\u2019 Foodservice, Inc., \n710 F.2d 1565 (Fed.Cir.1983). The face of Vanna White \nand the features of the robot are obviously more important \ncharacteristics than their hair, dress, physical proportions, \njewelry, or the decoration of the set. Thus, the features of \nthe robot and Vanna White should be given great weight in \nthe analysis.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving a robot that bears no resemblance to Vanna White.", "The passage questions whether the 'mark' for which Vanna White seeks protection is her screen image or the imitation Wheel of Fortune.", "The passage argues that there is no evidence that consumers identify the specific characteristics at issue (blond hair and fancy dress) solely with Vanna White.", "The passage claims that the majority ignores an important distinction between the marks in question.", "The passage states that the majority has glossed over the third AMF factor - similarity of the marks - which is the most important factor in this case.", "The passage argues that the majority finds this factor 'ambiguous' because the common characteristics 'identify' Vanna White.", "The passage asserts that the comparison of marks should be done in their entirety, citing California Cooler, Inc. v. Loretto Winery, 774 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir.1985).", "The passage claims that no one could reasonably confuse Vanna White and the robot in question.", "The passage notes that certain aspects of a mark may have a greater impact than other aspects.", "The passage cites cases that support giving greater weight to salient characteristics of a mark.", "The passage argues that the face of Vanna White and the features of the robot are more important characteristics than their hair, dress, physical proportions, jewelry, or the decoration of the set.", "The passage concludes that the features of the robot and Vanna White should be given great weight in the analysis."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "539", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "524 \n \u201cfreeware\u201d (e.g., Linux and certain Windows software); \nsecure licensed music and movie files (Intent MediaWorks, \nfor example, protects licensed content sent across P2P \nnetworks); news broadcasts past and present (the BBC \nCreative Archive lets users \u201crip, mix and share the BBC\u201d); \nuser-created audio and video files (including \u201c podcasts\u201d \nthat may be distributed through P2P software); and all \nmanner of free \u201copen content\u201d works collected by Creative \nCommons (one can search for Creative Commons material \non StreamCast). See Brief for Distributed Computing \nIndustry Association as Ami cus Curiae 15 -26; Merges, A \nNew Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. Chi. L.Rev. \n183 (2004). I can find nothing in the record that suggests \nthat this course of events will not continue to flow naturally \nas a consequence of the character of the software tak en \ntogether with the foreseeable development of the Internet \nand of information technology. \nThere may be other now -unforeseen noninfringing uses \nthat develop for peer -to-peer software, just as the home -\nvideo rental industry (unmentioned in Sony) developed for \nthe VCR. But the foreseeable development of such uses, \nwhen taken together with an estimated 10% noninfringing \nmaterial, is sufficient to meet Sony\u2019s standard. And while \nSony considered the record following a trial, there are no \nfacts asserted by MGM i n its summary judgment filings \nthat lead me to believe the outcome after a trial here could \nbe any different. The lower courts reached the same \nconclusion. \nOf course, Grokster itself may not want to develop these \nother noninfringing uses. But Sony\u2019s standa rd seeks to \nprotect not the Groksters of this world (which in any event \nmay well be liable under today\u2019s holding), but the \ndevelopment of technology more generally. And Grokster\u2019s \ndesires in this respect are beside the point. \nII", "proposition": ["The development of the Internet and information technology is expected to continue, leading to the natural flow of events in the use of P2P software."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "684", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "669 \n show by clear and convincing e vidence their ownership by \nway of adverse possession[.]\u201d \nII. DISCUSSION \nThe contentions raised on appeal require us to scrutinize \nthe record and determine whether the evidence was \nsufficient to prove adverse possession by the clear and \nconvincing standard that we explicitly have adopted today. We \nnote at the outset that the standard of review for judging a \nsufficiency of evidence claim is not appellant friendly. \nFollowing a bench trial, the circuit court\u2019s findings, based \non oral or documentary evidence, s hall not be overturned \nunless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to \nthe opportunity of the circuit judge to evaluate the \ncredibility of the witnesses. Under this standard, if the \ncircuit court\u2019s account of the evidence is plausible in light \nof the record viewed in its entirety, we may not reverse it, \neven though convinced that had we been sitting as the trier \nof fact, we would have weighed the evidence differently. \nWe will disturb only those factual findings that strike us \nwrong with the \u201cforc e of a five -week -old, unrefrigerated \ndead fish.\u201d United States v. Markling , 7 F.3d 1309, 1319 (7th \nCir.1993). Nor is the scope of our review broadened \nbecause the burden of proof is clear and convincing. \nIndeed, the burden of proof has an impact only if th e \nevidence is in equipoise. Under these well established \nprinciples, we now review the errors raised by the \ndefendants. \nA. Standard of Proof for Adverse Possession \nClaims \nThe first argument raised by the defendants is that the \ncircuit court committed error by requiring them to prove \nadverse possession by clear and convincing evidence. \nAlthough neither party presents any binding precedent of \nthis Court, the defendants contend that the proper standard", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving adverse possession.", "The contentions raised on appeal require the court to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to prove adverse possession by the clear and convincing standard.", "The standard of review for judging a sufficiency of evidence claim is not appellant friendly.", "The circuit court's findings based on oral or documentary evidence shall not be overturned unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the circuit judge to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.", "If the circuit court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court may not reverse it.", "The scope of the court's review is not broadened because the burden of proof is clear and convincing.", "The defendants argue that the circuit court committed error by requiring them to prove adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "482", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "467 \n Amici for petitioners describe how electronic databases tend \nto avoid adding to their collections works whose copyright \nholders may prove difficult to contact, see, e. g., Arms, \nGetting the Picture: Observations from the Library of Congress on \nProviding Online Access to Pictorial Images , 48 Library Trends \n379, 405 (1999) (describing how this tendency applies to \nthe Library of Congress\u2019 own digital archives). \nAs I have said, to some extent costs of this kind accompany \nany copyright law, regardless of the l ength of the copyright \nterm. But to extend that term, preventing works from the \n1920\u2019s and 1930\u2019s from falling into the public domain, will \ndramatically increase the size of the costs just as \u2013 \nperversely \u2013 the likely benefits from protection diminish. \nThe older the work, the less likely it retains commercial \nvalue, and the harder it will likely prove to find the current \ncopyright holder. The older the work, the more likely it will \nprove useful to the historian, artist, or teacher. The older \nthe work, the l ess likely it is that a sense of authors\u2019 rights \ncan justify a copyright holder\u2019s decision not to permit \nreproduction, for the more likely it is that the copyright \nholder making the decision is not the work\u2019s creator, but, \nsay, a corporation or a great -grandchild whom the work\u2019s \ncreator never knew. Similarly, the costs of obtaining \npermission, now perhaps ranging in the millions of dollars, \nwill multiply as the number of holders of affected \ncopyrights increases from several hundred thousand to \nseveral milli on. The costs to the users of nonprofit \ndatabases, now numbering in the low millions, will multiply \nas the use of those computer -assisted databases becomes \nmore prevalent. See, e. g., Brief for Internet Archive et al. as \nAmici Curiae 2, 21, and n. 37 (desc ribing nonprofit Project \nGutenberg).", "proposition": ["Electronic databases tend to avoid adding works whose copyright holders may prove difficult to contact.", "This tendency applies to the Library of Congress' own digital archives, as described in Arms, Getting the Picture: Observations from the Library of Congress on Providing Online Access to Pictorial Images (1999).", "Costs associated with copyright laws accompany any copyright law, regardless of the length of the copyright term.", "Extending the copyright term and preventing works from the 1920s and 1930s from falling into the public domain will dramatically increase the size of the costs.", "The likely benefits from protection diminish as the work gets older.", "Older works are less likely to retain commercial value and will be harder to find the current copyright holder.", "Older works are more likely to be useful to historians, artists, or teachers.", "A sense of authors' rights cannot justify a copyright holder's decision not to permit reproduction for works created by corporations or great-grandchildren whom the work's creator never knew.", "The costs of obtaining permission are now perhaps ranging in the millions of dollars and will multiply as the number of holders of affected copyrights increases from several hundred thousand to several million.", "The costs to the users of nonprofit databases will multiply as the use of those computer-assisted databases becomes more prevalent.", "Nonprofit Project Gutenberg is described in the Brief for Internet Archive et al. as Amici Curiae (2021)."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "311", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "296 \n In consider ing the general question of property in news \nmatter, it is necessary to recognize its dual character, \ndistinguishing between the substance of the information \nand the particular form or collocation of words in which \nthe writer has communicated it. \nNo doubt news articles often possess a literary quality, and \nare the subject of literary property at the common law; nor \ndo we question that such an article, as a literary production, \nis the subject of copyright by the terms of the act as it now \nstands. In an early case at the circuit Mr. Justice Thompson \nheld in effect that a newspaper was not within the \nprotection of the copyright acts of 1790 (1 Stat. 124) and \n1802 (2 Stat. 171). Clayton v. Stone, 2 Paine, 382. But the \npresent act is broader; it provides that the works for which \ncopyright may be secured shall include \u2018all the writings of \nan author,\u2019 and specifically mentions \u2018periodicals, including \nnewspapers.\u2019 Act of March 4, 1909, c. 320, \u00a7\u00a7 4 and 5, 35 \nStat. 1075, 1076. Evidently this admits to copyright a \ncontribution to a newspaper, notwithstanding it also may \nconvey news; and such is the practice of the copyright \noffice, as the newspapers of the day bear witness. See \nCopyright Office Bulletin No. 15 (1917) pp. 7, 14, 16, 17. \nBut the news element \u2013 the informa tion respecting current \nevents contained in the literary production \u2013 is not the \ncreation of the writer, but is a report of matters that \nordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day. It is \nnot to be supposed that the framers of the Constituti on, \nwhen they empowered Congress \u2018to promote the progress \nof science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to \nauthors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective \nwritings and discoveries\u2019 (Const. art. 1, \u00a7 8, par.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the general question of property in news matter.", "It recognizes the dual character of news matter, distinguishing between the substance of the information and the particular form or collocation of words in which the writer has communicated it.", "The passage mentions that no doubt news articles often possess a literary quality and are the subject of literary property at the common law.", "It also states that the present act is broader and provides that the works for which copyright may be secured shall include 'all the writings of an author,' and specifically mentions 'periodicals, including newspapers.'", "The passage notes that the news element \u2013 the information respecting current events contained in the literary production \u2013 is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day.", "It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution empowered Congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries without considering the news element."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "277", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "262 \n another is a trespass, and the least injury, as treading down \ngrass, and the like, will support it. (1 Esp. Dig. T it. \nTrespass, 221.) But there must be some actual injury to \nsupport the action. Now it will not be pretended that riding \nover the soil is an injury; and the forest being the common, \nin which the cattle of all are used to range at large, the \ngrass, if perch ance there be any, may also be regarded as \ncommon property; and surely no action will lie against a \ncommoner for barely riding over the common. The right to \nhunt on unenclosed lands, I think, therefore, clearly \nestablished; but if it were doubtful, I shoul d be strongly \ninclined to support it. Large standing armies are, perhaps, \nwisely considered as dangerous to our free institutions; the \nmilitia, therefore, necessarily constitutes our greatest \nsecurity against aggression; our forest is the great field in \nwhich, in the pursuit of game, they learn the dexterous use \nand consequent certainty of firearms, the great and decided \nadvantages of which have been seen and felt on too many \noccasions to be forgotten, or to require a recurrence to. \nHaving come to the concl usion, that it is the right of the \ninhabitants to hunt on unenclosed lands, I need not \nattempt to prove that the dissent or disapprobation of the \nowner cannot deprive him of it; for I am sure it never yet \nentered the mind of any man, that a right which the law \ngives, can be defeated at the mere will and caprice of an \nindividual. \n\u2026 . \nGRIMKE, COLCOCK, CHEVES, and NOTT, Js. \nconcurred. GANTT, J. dissented. \nGarrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons , 162 Science \n1243 (1968) (excerpt) \nThe tragedy of the commons develops in this way. Picture a \npasture open to all.", "proposition": ["Trespassing and causing the least injury, such as treading down grass, support an action for trespass.", "There must be some actual injury to support the action.", "Riding over the soil is not considered an injury.", "The forest being a common land, the grass may be considered common property.", "No action will lie against a commoner for merely riding over the common.", "The right to hunt on unenclosed lands is established.", "Large standing armies are considered dangerous to free institutions.", "The militia constitutes the greatest security against aggression.", "The forest is the great field in which the militia learns the dexterous use and certainty of firearms.", "The law gives a right that cannot be defeated at the mere will and caprice of an individual.", "Garrett Hardin's \"The Tragedy of the Commons\" discusses how the tragedy develops in an open pasture."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "241", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "226 \n other person may take the property \nwith all the advantages of the first \nfinder. \nThe Schooner John Wurt z, Olcott Rep. Adm. 469 -471. Marvin \non Wreck and Salvage , s. 128. \nNo reasoning, no comment can make more imperative the \naction of this court than it is made by the foregoing cases \nand authorities, taken in connection with the facts of the \ncase, or with the allegations of the bill alone. \nThe decree of the circuit court of Mississippi county sitting \nin chancery is reversed \u2026 . \nPopov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. \nSuperior, Dec. 18, 2002) \nMCCARTHY , J. \nFACTS \nIn 1927, Babe Ruth hit sixty home runs. That record stood \nfor thirty four years until Roger Maris broke it in 1961 with \nsixty one home runs. Mark McGwire hit seventy in 1998. \nOn October 7, 2001, at PacBell Park in San Francisco, \nBarry Bonds hit number seventy three. Tha t \naccomplishment set a record which, in all probability, will \nremain unbroken for years into the future. \nThe event was widely anticipated and received a great deal \nof attention. \nThe ball that found itself at the receiving end of Mr. Bond\u2019s \nbat garnered som e of that attention. Baseball fans in \ngeneral, and especially people at the game, understood the \nimportance of the ball. It was worth a great deal of money1 \n \n1 It has been suggested that the ball might sell for something in excess of \n$1,000,000", "proposition": ["The record for the most home runs in a single season was set by Barry Bonds in 2001 with 73 home runs."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "244", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "229 \n which individual members of the crowd were responsible \nfor the assaults on Mr. Popov. \nThe videotape clearly establishes that this was an out of \ncontrol mo b, engaged in violent, illegal behavior. Although \nsome witnesses testified in a manner inconsistent with this \nfinding, their testimony is specifically rejected as being false \non a material point.4 \nMr. Popov intended at all times to establish and maintain \npossession of the ball. At some point the ball left his glove \nand ended up on the ground. It is impossible to establish \nthe exact point in time that this occurred or what caused it \nto occur. \nMr. Hayashi was standing near Mr. Popov when the ball \ncame into th e stands. He, like Mr. Popov, was involuntarily \nforced to the ground. He committed no wrongful act.5 \nWhile on the ground he saw the loose ball. He picked it up, \nrose to his feet and put it in his pocket. \nAlthough the crowd was still on top of Mr. Popov, se curity \nguards had begun the process of physically pulling people \noff. Some people resisted those efforts. One person argued \nwith an official and another had to be pulled off by his hair. \nMr. Hayashi kept the ball hidden. He asked Mr. Keppel to \npoint the ca mera at him. At first, Mr. Keppel did not \ncomply and Mr. Hayashi continued to hide the ball. Finally \nafter someone else in the crowd asked Mr. Keppel to point \nthe camera at Mr. Hayashi, Mr. Keppel complied. It was \nonly at that point that Mr. Hayashi held t he ball in the air \n \n4 Because the probability of truth does not favor the testimony of any of these \nwitnesses in other particulars, their entire testimony is rejected. BAJI 2.22 This \nfinding does not apply to Mr. Hayashi. \n5 Plaintiff argues that the Keppel tape shows Mr. Hayashi b iting the leg of Brian \nShepard. The tape does not support such a conclusion.", "proposition": ["Value should start and end with { and }"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "290", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "275 \n calculation the determining factor was the decrease in \nbottom -hole pressures of the sands caused by the blowout. \nHe estimated that 13,096,717,000 cubi c feet of gas had \nbeen drained from the west 1500 acres of the Elliff land, \nand that 57,625,728,000 cubic feet had been drained from \nthe east 1554.9 acres as a result of the blowout. The \ndistillate loss was calculated by taking the gas and distillate \nratio from the records of the Railroad Commission. \nJennings estimated that 195,713 barrels had been drained \nfrom the west 1500 acres and 802,690 barrels from the east \n1554.9 acres, as a result of the blowout. \nOn the findings of the jury the trial court rendered \njudgment for petitioners for $154,518.19, which included \n$148,548.19 for the gas and distillate, and $5970 for \ndamages to the land and cattle. The Court of Civil Appeals \nreversed the judgment and remanded the cause. 210 S.W.2d \n553. \nThe reversal by the Cou rt of Civil Appeals rests upon two \ngrounds. The first was that since substantially all of the gas \nand distillate which was drained from under petitioners\u2019 \nlands was lost through respondents\u2019 blowout well, \npetitioners could not recover because under the law of \ncapture they had lost all property rights in the gas or \ndistillate which had migrated from their lands. The second \ntheory was that the recovery cannot stand because the trial \ncourt had submitted the wrong measure of damages in that \npetitioners\u2019 claim \u201c is for trespass in and to a freehold estate \nin land and the proper measure of damage is the reasonable \ncash market value before and after the occurrence \ncomplained of.\u201d \nIn our opinion the Court of Civil Appeals was without \nauthority to pass upon the propri ety of the measure of \ndamages adopted by the trial court for the simple reason \nthat no such assignment was presented to that court. \nAlthough such an objection was raised in the trial court, we \ndo not find an intimation of it brought forward to the", "proposition": ["The decomposed propositions"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "75", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "60 \n controversy exceeds $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs; \nthat they are the owners and in possession of 72 1/2 acres \nof real property in the city of Burbank, Los Angeles county, \nCal., \u2018together with a stratum of air -space superjacent to \nand overlying said tract * * * and extending upwards * * * \nto such an altitude as plaintiffs * * * may reasonably expect \nnow or hereaft er to utilize, use or occupy said airspace. \nWithout limiting said altitude or defining the upward extent \nof said stratum of airspace or of plaintiff\u2019s ownership, \nutilization and possession thereof, plaintiffs allege that they \n* * * may reasonably expect no w and hereafter to utilize, \nuse and occupy said airspace and each and every portion \nthereof to an altitude of not less than 150 feet above the \nsurface of the land * * * \u2018. The reasonable value of the \nproperty is alleged to be in excess of $300,000. \nIt is t hen alleged that defendants are engaged in the \nbusiness of operating a commercial air line, and that at all \ntimes \u2018after the month of May, 1929, defendants daily, \nrepeatedly and upon numerous occasions have disturbed, \ninvaded and trespassed upon the owners hip and possession \nof plaintiffs\u2019 tract\u2019; that at said times defendants have \noperated aircraft in, across, and through said airspace at \naltitudes less than 100 feet above the surface; that plaintiffs \nnotified defendants to desist from trespassing on said \nairspace; and that defendants have disregarded said notice, \nunlawfully and against the will of plaintiffs, and continue \nand threaten to continue such trespasses.", "proposition": ["The controversy exceeds $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs.", "The owners and possessors of the property are the plaintiffs.", "The property is located in the city of Burbank, Los Angeles county, California.", "The property includes a stratum of air-space superjacent to and overlying the tract, extending upwards to an altitude that the plaintiffs may reasonably expect to utilize, use, or occupy.", "The plaintiffs allege that they may reasonably expect to utilize, use, and occupy the airspace and each portion thereof to an altitude of not less than 150 feet above the surface of the land.", "The reasonable value of the property is alleged to be in excess of $300,000.", "The defendants are engaged in the business of operating a commercial airline.", "The defendants have disturbed, invaded, and trespassed upon the ownership and possession of the plaintiffs' tract at all times after May 1929.", "The defendants have operated aircraft in, across, and through the airspace at altitudes less than 100 feet above the surface.", "The plaintiffs have notified the defendants to desist from trespassing on the airspace.", "The defendants have disregarded the notice and continue to unlawfully and against the will of the plaintiffs, trespass on the airspace."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "298", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Argue against this \ntest based only the test\u2019s status as a rule or standard. (That is, act \nlike you\u2019re a litigant attacking the test, and make an argument that,", "proposition": ["The test's status as a rule or standard is being questioned."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "430", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "415 \n U.S. Const. art. 1, \u00a7 8, cl. 8. Congress directly transferred \nthe principles from the Statute of A nne into the copyright \nlaw of the United States in 1783, first through a \nrecommendation to the states to enact similar copyright \nlaws, and then in 1790, with the passage of the first \nAmerican federal copyright statute. \nThe Copyright Clause was intended \u201cto be the engine of \nfree expression.\u201d Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation \nEnters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). To that end, copyright \nlaws have been enacted achieve the three main goals: the \npromotion of learning, the protection of the public domain, \nand t he granting of an exclusive right to the author. \n1. Promotion of Learning \nIn the United States, copyright has always been used to \npromote learning by guarding against censorship. \nThroughout the nineteenth century, the copyright in \nliterature was limited to the right \u201cto publish and vend \nbooks.\u201d Patterson, at 383. The term \u201ccopy\u201d was interpreted \nliterally; an author had the right only to prevent others \nfrom copying and selling her particular literary work. See \nStowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 18 53) \n(holding that a translation of Uncle Tom\u2019s Cabin into \nGerman was not a copyright infringement because it was \nnot a copy of the work as it was published).6 This limited \nright ensured that a maximum number of new works would \nbe created and published. It was not until the 1909 Act, \nwhich codified the concept of a derivative work, that an \nauthor\u2019s right to protect his original work against imitation \nwas established. This change more closely represents \n \n6 Under modern copyright, such a right to translate would enjoy protection as a \n\u201cderivative work.\u201d \u00a7\u00a7 101 and 106. In Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.Cas. 342 (C.C.Mass.", "proposition": ["Ensure the input is a valid JSON format before trying to decode it."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "181", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "166 \n are involved. Accordingly, the \ngranting or withholding of relief \nmay properly be dependent upon \nconsiderations of public interest. \n* * *. \n27 Am.Jur.2d, Equity, page 626. \nIn addition to protecting the public interest, however, \ncourts of equity are concerned with protecting the operator \nof a lawfully, albeit noxious, business from the result of a \nknowing and willful encroachment by others near his \nbusiness. \nIn the so -called \u2018coming to the nuisance\u2019 cases, the courts \nhave held that the residential landowner may not have relief \nif he knowingly came into a neighborhood reserved f or \nindustrial or agricultural endeavors and has been damaged \nthereby: \nPlaintiffs chose to live in an area \nuncontrolled by zoning laws or \nrestrictive covenants and remote from \nurban development. In such an area \nplaintiffs cannot complain that \nlegitimate agr icultural pursuits are \nbeing carried on in the vicinity, nor \ncan plaintiffs, having chosen to build \nin an agricultural area, complain that \nthe agricultural pursuits carried on in \nthe area depreciate the value of their \nhomes. The area being Primarily \nagricu ltural, and opinion reflecting the \nvalue of such property must take this \nfactor into account. The standards \naffecting the value of residence \nproperty in an urban setting, subject to \nzoning controls and controlled \nplanning techniques, cannot be the \nstandard s by which agricultural \nproperties are judged.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the granting or withholding of relief in cases involving public interest and the protection of businesses from encroachment by others.", "Courts of equity are concerned with protecting both the public interest and the operator of a lawfully noxious business from knowing and willful encroachment by others near his business.", "In 'coming to the nuisance' cases, residential landowners may not have relief if they knowingly moved into an industrial or agricultural neighborhood and were damaged as a result.", "Plaintiffs chose to live in an area without zoning laws or restrictive covenants and far from urban development.", "In such an area, plaintiffs cannot complain about legitimate agricultural pursuits being carried out nearby, nor can they complain about the depreciation of their homes' value due to agricultural activities.", "The area in question is primarily agricultural, and the value of property in such areas must take this factor into account.", "The standards affecting the value of residential property in urban settings, subject to zoning controls and planning techniques, cannot be the standards by which agricultural properties are judged."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "160", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "145 \n mistaken about Fountainebleau\u2019s willingness to pay \u2013 the kind of \nnegotiating difficulty that could derail a deal that would be better \nfor both sides if reached? Perhaps, and perhaps there\u2019s some \nanimosity on both sides \u2013 not to men tion the fact that Eden Roc, \nas a competitor might have an unusual incentive to reduce the \nprofitability of Fountainebleau. While property rule protection is \nordinarily justified when there are a small number of commercial \nparties, liability rule protectio n does not seem like a bad option \nhere. The damage caused to Eden Roc by the shadowing of its \nproperty seems like the sort of discrete harm that could be \nestimated reasonably through manageable expert testimony. \nMoreover, sentimental attachment or other id iosyncratic valuation \nthat might not be captured by fair market value estimates is not \nrelevant here, in the case of a commercial property. \nThus, resort to Rule 1, as the court in fact chose on purely \nformalistic grounds, or Rule 2 appear to be reasonable choices. The \nnext two cases are ones in which the courts chose liability rules. As \nyou read them, ask yourself why they did. \n1.3.6. Property Rules and Liability Rules: Practice \nBoomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (1970) \nBERGA N, J. \nDefendant operates a large cement plant near Albany. \nThese are actions for injunction and damages by \nneighboring land owners alleging injury to property from \ndirt, smoke and vibration emanating from the plant. A \nnuisance has been found after trial, t emporary damages \nhave been allowed; but an injunction has been denied. \nThe public concern with air pollution arising from many \nsources in industry and in transportation is currently \naccorded ever wider recognition accompanied by a growing \nsense of responsi bility in State and Federal Governments to \ncontrol it. Cement plants are obvious sources of air \npollution in the neighborhoods where they operate.", "proposition": ["There may be negotiating difficulties in a deal between Fountainebleau and Eden Roc.", "These difficulties could potentially derail the deal, which would be better for both sides if reached.", "There might be animosity on both sides, and Eden Roc, as a competitor, might have an unusual incentive to reduce the profitability of Fountainebleau.", "Property rule protection is ordinarily justified when there are a small number of commercial parties.", "Liability rule protection could be a reasonable option in this case, as the damage caused to Eden Roc can be estimated through manageable expert testimony.", "Sentimental attachment or idiosyncratic valuation is not relevant in the case of a commercial property.", "The court chose liability rules in two previous cases, and we should consider why they did so.", "Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. is a case involving a cement plant and neighboring landowners alleging injury to property from dirt, smoke, and vibration emanating from the plant.", "A nuisance was found after trial, and temporary damages were allowed; however, an injunction was denied.", "Public concern with air pollution from industry and transportation is growing, and cement plants are obvious sources of air pollution in their neighborhoods."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "235", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Brazelton\u2019s act of possession need not have been manual, \nhe was not obliged to take the wreck or the lead between \nhis hands, he might take such possession of them as their \nnature and situation p ermitted; but that his circumstances", "proposition": ["Brazelton's act of possession did not require manual handling.", "Brazelton was not required to take the wreck or the lead between his hands.", "Brazelton could take possession of the items in a manner that was appropriate for their nature and situation."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "650", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "635 \n the sellers had sold a home without di sclosing the presence \nof a defective roof and swimming pool of which the sellers \nhad knowledge, \u201c[i]n Florida, there is no duty to disclose \nwhen parties are dealing at arms length.\u201d Id. at 852. \nThese unappetizing cases are not in tune with the times and \ndo not conform with current notions of justice, equity and \nfair dealing. One should not be able to stand behind the \nimpervious shield of caveat emptor and take advantage of \nanother\u2019s ignorance. Our courts have taken great strides \nsince the days when the judi cial emphasis was on rigid rules \nand ancient precedents. Modern concepts of justice and fair \ndealing have given our courts the opportunity and latitude \nto change legal precepts in order to conform to society\u2019s \nneeds. Thus, the tendency of the more recent c ases has \nbeen to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat \nemptor. The law appears to be working toward the ultimate \nconclusion that full disclosure of all material facts must be \nmade whenever elementary fair conduct demands it. \nThe harness placed on the doctrine of caveat emptor in a \nnumber of other jurisdictions has resulted in the seller of a \nhome being liable for failing to disclose material defects of \nwhich he is aware. This philosophy was succinctly \nexpressed in Lingsch v. Savage , 213 Cal. Ap p. 2d 729 (1963): \nIt is now settled in California that \nwhere the seller knows of facts \nmaterially affecting the value or \ndesirability of the property which are \nknown or accessible only to him and \nalso knows that such facts are not \nknown to or within the re ach of the \ndiligent attention and observation of \nthe buyer, the seller is under a duty to \ndisclose them to the buyer. \nIn Posner v. Davis , 76 Ill. App.3d 638 (1979), buyers brought \nan action alleging that the sellers of a home fraudulently", "proposition": ["In Florida, there is no duty to disclose when parties are dealing at arms length.", "The passage argues that current notions of justice, equity, and fair dealing should be considered.", "Sellers should not be able to take advantage of buyers' ignorance.", "The tendency of recent cases has been to restrict rather than extend the doctrine of caveat emptor.", "The law is working towards the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it.", "The passage cites an example from a California case, Lingsch v. Savage (1963), which states that where the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which are known or accessible only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to or within the reach of the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.", "The passage also cites an example from an Illinois case, Posner v. Davis (1979), in which buyers brought an action alleging that the sellers of a home fraudulently."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "5", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "v \n Notices \nCarol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U Chi L \nRev 73 (1985), reprinted with permission of the University of \nChicago Law Review. \nLawrence Solum, Legal Theory Lexicon: Fit & Jusitfication - \nhttp://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/04/legal_t\nheory_le_1.html, reprinted with the permission of the author.This \nwork by Colin Millers licensed and published by CALI eLangdell \nPress under a Creative Commons Attribution -NonCommercial -\nShareAlike 3.0 Unported License . CALI and CALI eLangdell Press \nreserve under copyright all rights not expressly granted by this \nCreative C ommons license. CALI and CALI eLangdell Press do \nnot assert copyright in US Government works or other public \ndomain material included herein. Permissions beyond the scope of \nthis license may be available through feedback@cali.org . \nIn brief, the terms of that license are that you may copy, distribute, \nand display this work, or make derivative works, so long as \n\uf0b7 you give CALI eLangdell Press and the author credit; \n\uf0b7 you do not use this work for commercial purposes; and \n\uf0b7 you distribute any works derived from this one under the \nsame licensing terms as this. \nSuggested attribution format for original work: \nChristian Turner, Property, Volume I , Published by CALI \neLangdell Press. Available under a Creative Commons BY -NC-\nSA 3.0 Li cense. \nCALI\u00ae and eLangdell\u00ae are United States federally registered \ntrademarks owned by the Center for Computer -Assisted Legal \nInstruction. The cover art design is a copyrighted work of CALI, \nall rights reserved. The CALI graphical logo is a trademark and m ay \nnot be used without permission. \nShould you create derivative works based on the text of this book \nor other Creative Commons materials therein, you may not use this", "proposition": ["This work by Colin Millers is licensed and published by CALI eLangdell Press under a Creative Commons Attribution -NonCommercial - ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.", "CALI and CALI eLangdell Press reserve under copyright all rights not expressly granted by this Creative Commons license.", "CALI and CALI eLangdell Press do not assert copyright in US Government works or other public domain material included herein.", "Permissions beyond the scope of this license may be available through feedback@cali.org.", "The terms of the license allow you to copy, distribute, and display this work, or make derivative works, as long as you give CALI eLangdell Press and the author credit, do not use the work for commercial purposes, and distribute any works derived from this one under the same licensing terms as this.", "The suggested attribution format for the original work is: Christian Turner, Property, Volume I, Published by CALI eLangdell Press. Available under a Creative Commons BY -NC- SA 3.0 License.", "CALI\u00ae and eLangdell\u00ae are United States federally registered trademarks owned by the Center for Computer-Assisted Legal Instruction.", "The cover art design is a copyrighted work of CALI, with all rights reserved.", "The CALI graphical logo is a trademark and may not be used without permission.", "If you create derivative works based on the text of this book or other Creative Commons materials therein, you may not use this."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "689", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "674 \n possession is a question of law, subject to our de novo \nreview. \nWere we given the task, we would not hesitate to find that \nthe record before this Court demonstrates overwhelmingly \nthat adverse possession has been proven by clear and \nconvincing evidence. However, our deci sions have made \nplain that an appellate court is not the appropriate forum \nfor a resolution of the persuasive quality of evidence. To \nthe contrary, our opinions have suggested that a reviewing \ncourt ought not to disturb such a finding unless, on the \nwhole of the record, this Court forms a strong, unyielding \nbelief that a mistake has been made. In plain terms, we \nshould not overrule a circuit court\u2019s finding or conclusion \nas to whether the burden of persuasion has been met unless \nthe evidence is so one -sided that it may be said that a \nreasonable factfinder could not have gone the way of the \ncircuit court. In order to sharpen the focus of our inquiry, \nwe first illuminate the legal framework and elucidate the \nrequirements that attend a proper showing of adverse \npossession. \nRegarding the doctrine of adverse possession, we stated in \nNaab , 174 W.Va. at 392, the following: \nThe doctrine of adverse possession is \nfirmly established in our property law \nand accompanies W. Va.Code 55 -2-1 \nin settling land disputes equitabl y and \nefficiently. This doctrine enables one \nwho has been in possession of a piece \nof real property for more then ten \nyears to bring an action asserting that \nhe is now the owner of that piece of \nproperty even when title rests in \nanother. In Syllabus Point 3 of Somon v. \nMurphy Fabrication and Erection Co. , 160 \nW.Va. 84, 232 S.E.2d 524 (1977) this \nCourt stated:", "proposition": ["Adverse possession is a question of law subject to de novo review.", "An appellate court should not disturb a circuit court's finding on adverse possession unless the evidence is one-sided and a reasonable factfinder could not have reached the same conclusion.", "The doctrine of adverse possession is firmly established in West Virginia property law and accompanies W. Va.Code 55-2-1 in settling land disputes equitably and efficiently.", "One who has been in possession of a piece of real property for more than ten years can bring an action asserting ownership even when title rests in another.", "In Somon v. Murphy Fabrication and Erection Co., the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated that adverse possession is a well-established principle in property law."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "314", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "299 \n quotations was entitled to the protection of the law; that, \nlike a trade secret, plaintiff might keep to itself the work \ndone at its expense, and did not lose its right by \ncommunicating the result to persons, even if many, in \nconfidential relations to itself, under a contract not to make \nit public; and that strangers should be restrained from \ngetting at the knowledge by inducing a breach of trust. \nIn National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 \nFed. 294, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh \nCircuit dealt with news matter gathered and transmitted by \na telegraph company, and consi sting merely of a notation \nof current events having but a transient value due to quick \ntransmission and distribution; and, while declaring that this \nwas not copyrightable although printed on a tape by tickers \nin the offices of the recipients, and that it w as a commercial \nnot a literary product, nevertheless held that the business of \ngathering and communicating the news \u2013 the service of \npurveying it was a legitimate business, meeting a distinctive \ncommercial want and adding to the facilities of the business \nworld, and partaking of the nature of property in a sense \nthat entitled it to the protection of a court of equity against \npiracy. \nOther cases are cited, but none that we deem it necessary \nto mention. \nNot only do the acquisition and transmission of news \nrequire elaborate organization and a large expenditure of \nmoney, skill, and effort; not only has it an exchange value \nto the gatherer, dependent chiefly upon its novelty and \nfreshness, the regularity of the service, its reputed reliability \nand thoroughness, a nd its adaptability to the public needs; \nbut also, as is evident, the news has an exchange value to \none who can misappropriate it. \nThe peculiar features of the case arise from the fact that, \nwhile novelty and freshness form so important an element \nin the s uccess of the business, the very processes of", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the protection of news matter gathered and transmitted by a telegraph company.", "The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that news matter gathered and transmitted by a telegraph company is not copyrightable, but it is a legitimate business that meets a distinctive commercial want and adds to the facilities of the business world.", "The acquisition and transmission of news require elaborate organization, a large expenditure of money, skill, and effort.", "News has an exchange value to the gatherer, dependent on its novelty and freshness, the regularity of the service, its reputed reliability and thoroughness, and its adaptability to the public needs.", "The news also has an exchange value to one who can misappropriate it.", "The passage cites other cases, but none that are deemed necessary to mention.", "The peculiar features of the case arise from the fact that novelty and freshness form an important element in the success of the business, and the very processes of acquiring and transmitting news involve misappropriation."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "557", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "542 \n AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS\u2019 MOTION FOR \nSUMMARY JUDGMENT \nHACKETT , District Judge. \nPlaintiff Rosa Parks is a well -known public figure who has \nbeen recognized as an international symbol of freedom, \nhumanity, dignity and strength for over 43 years. Plaintiff\u2019s \nnotoriety arose from her heroic stance against racial \ninequality in the South when on December 1, 1955, in \nMontgomery, Alabama, she refused to give up her seat to a \nwhite pas senger and move to the back of the bus. This one \ndefiant act precipitated a 381 -day bus boycott that ended \nsegregation on public transportation and ultimately sparked \nthe Civil Rights Movement of the 1960\u2019s. The above -\ncaptioned case presents a conflict bet ween plaintiff\u2019s right \nto protect her celebrated name and the First Amendment \nright of others to use her name in an expressive work. \nSpecifically at issue is whether plaintiff can prevent the use \nof her name as the title of a rap song written, performed, \nmarketed and distributed by defendants. Now before the \ncourt are the parties\u2019 cross -motions for summary judgment. \nOral argument was heard on November 4, 1999. For the \nfollowing reasons, plaintiff\u2019s motion shall be denied, and \nsummary judgment shall be grant ed regrettably in \ndefendants\u2019 favor. \nI. FACTS \nThe facts relevant to disposition of this matter are few and \nundisputed. Defendants are entertainers and producers of \npopular music. Specifically, Kenny Edmonds and Antonio \nReid1 are recording artists and the members of the musical \ngroup Outkast, whose services are contractually rendered to \nLaFace Records. LaFace is a record company engaged in \n \n1 Although named in the caption of plaintiff\u2019s complaint and other pleadings, \nEdmonds and Reid were never served with process, and, therefore, are not parties \nto this litigation in their individual capacities.", "proposition": ["The passage is about a court case involving Rosa Parks and defendants who are entertainers and producers of popular music.", "Rosa Parks is a well-known public figure recognized for her stance against racial inequality in the South in 1955.", "The case presents a conflict between plaintiff's right to protect her celebrated name and the First Amendment right of others to use her name in an expressive work.", "The issue at hand is whether plaintiff can prevent the use of her name as the title of a rap song written, performed, marketed, and distributed by defendants.", "The court is considering the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.", "Oral argument was heard on November 4, 1999.", "The court regrettably grants summary judgment in defendants' favor.", "Defendants are Kenny Edmonds and Antonio Reid, members of the musical group Outkast, and LaFace Records.", "Edmonds and Reid were never served with process and are not parties to this litigation in their individual capacities."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "483", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "And they tell us that copyright extension will impede \npreservation by forbidding the reproduction o f films within \ntheir own or within other public collections.", "proposition": ["Copyright extension will impede preservation.", "Copyright extension will forbid the reproduction of films within their own or within other public collections.", "Public collections are involved in film preservation."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "289", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "He was able to \nestimate the amount of gas wasted under the Elliff tract by \ncalculating the volume of the strata of sands and the voids \nwhich were occupied by gas. Under his method of", "proposition": ["He estimated the amount of gas wasted under the Elliff tract.", "To estimate the amount of gas wasted, he calculated the volume of the strata of sands.", "He calculated the volume of the voids which were occupied by gas.", "He estimated the amount of gas wasted by adding the volumes of the sands and the voids."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "647", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "632 \n the court remanded with directions to return to the Davises \nthe balance of their deposit and to award them costs and \nfees. \nThe t rial court included no findings of fact in its order. \nHowever, the district court inferred from the record that \nthe trial court refused to accept the Davises\u2019 \ncharacterization of the roof inspection provision of the \ncontract. The district court noted that if there was a breach, \nthe trial court would have ordered the return of the \nDavises\u2019 entire deposit because there is no way to \ndistinguish the two deposit payments under a breach of \ncontract theory. We agree with this interpretation and \nfurther find no err or by the trial court in this respect. \nThe contract contemplated the possibility that the roof may \nnot be watertight at the time of inspection and provided a \nremedy if it was not in such a condition. The roof \ninspection provision of the contract did not im pose any \nobligation beyond the seller correcting the leaks and \nreplacing damage to the facia or soffit. The record is devoid \nof any evidence that the seller refused to make needed \nrepairs to the roof. In fact, the record reflects that the \nDavises\u2019 never ev en demanded that the areas of leakage be \nrepaired either by way of repair or replacement. Yet the \nDavises insist that the Johnsons breached the contract \njustifying recission. We find this contention to be without \nmerit. \nWe also agree with the district cour t\u2019s conclusions under a \ntheory of fraud and find that the Johnsons\u2019 statements to \nthe Davises regarding the condition of the roof constituted \na fraudulent misrepresentation entitling respondents to the \nreturn of their $26,000 deposit payment. In the state of \nFlorida, relief for a fraudulent misrepresentation may be \ngranted only when the following elements are present: (1) a \nfalse statement concerning a material fact; (2) the \nrepresentor\u2019s knowledge that the representation is false; (3) \nan intention that the representation induce another to act", "proposition": ["The court ordered the return of the Davises' deposit and awarded them costs and fees.", "The trial court did not include findings of fact in its order.", "The district court inferred that the trial court did not accept the Davises' characterization of the roof inspection provision.", "A breach would have resulted in the return of the entire deposit, but no breach was found.", "The contract accounted for the possibility of a non-watertight roof at inspection and provided a remedy.", "The roof inspection provision did not require the seller to do more than fix leaks and replace facia or soffit damage.", "There is no evidence the seller refused to make needed roof repairs.", "The Davises never demanded repairs for the leakage areas.", "The Johnsons' statements about the roof's condition were found to be fraudulent misrepresentation.", "In Florida, relief for fraudulent misrepresentation requires proof of false statement, knowledge of falsity, and intent to induce action.", "The court agreed with the district court's conclusions on fraud."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "155", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "140 \n injunction, it gives to the winner an absolute right to refuse the \nloser\u2019s request that he or she part with the subject of the \ninjunction. If the loser wants it, he or she must meet the price that \nthe winner sets to take the entitlement, even if that price is sky \nhigh. \nNote, too, that what we call our property is protected i n different \nways in different situations. A home may be protected by a \nproperty rule against those who would trespass and take it. A court \nwill order the trespassers thrown out and give to the record owner \nthe right to insist on a price of his or her choos ing to sell the \nhouse. But that same house may be protected only by a liability rule \nagainst the city in which it is located. The city, using its power of \neminent domain, may take the house from the owner so long as it \npays what a court determines is fair market value, irrespective of \nthe price the owner would want to charge. \nWe have now enlarged the apparent set of options a court has in \nresolving a dispute. It may award the disputed entitlement (the \nright to pollute or to be free from pollution, the right to enter \nproperty or the right to refuse entry, etc.) to A or to B, and it may \nprotect the entitlement it awards with a property, liability rule, or \ninalienability rule. \nChoosing a Rule \nHow and why might a court choose a winner of the entitlement \nand choo se whether to protect the entitlement with a property or \nliability rule? (Let\u2019s exclude, for the moment, the inalienability rule.) \nAssume we have a plaintiff (P) suing a defendant (D) over an \nalleged nuisance. D wants to continue the nuisance, and P wants to \nstop it. The options confronting a court can be placed in a two by \ntwo chart, leading to four possible rules.", "proposition": ["The passage presents a two-by-two chart with four possible rules for courts to consider when resolving disputes."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "390", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "375 \n excluded bacteria from its protection.8 In the petitioner\u2019s \nview, the passage of these Acts evidences congressional \nunderstanding that the terms \u201cmanufacture\u201d or \n\u201ccomposition of matter\u201d do not include living things; if \nthey did, the petitioner argues, neither Act would have been \nnecessary. \nWe reject this argument. Prior to 1930, two factors were \nthought to remove plants from patent protection. The first \nwas the belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were \nproducts o f nature for purposes of the patent law. This \nposition appears to have derived from the decision of the \npatent office in Ex parte Latimer , 1889 Dec.Com.Pat. 123, in \nwhich a patent claim for fiber found in the needle of the \nPinus australis was rejected. The Commissioner reasoned \nthat a contrary result would permit \u201cpatents [to] be \nobtained upon the trees of the forest and the plants of the \nearth, which of course would be unreasonable and \nimpossible.\u201d Id., at 126. The Latimer case, it seems, came to \n\u201cse[t] fo rth the general stand taken in these matters\u201d that \nplants were natural products not subject to patent \nprotection. Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural \nProducts, 6 J. Pat.Off.Soc. 23, 24 (1923).9 The second \nobstacle to patent protection for plants was the fact that \nplants were thought not amenable to the \u201cwritten \ndescription\u201d requirement of the patent law. See 35 U.S.C. \u00a7 \n112. Because new plants may differ from old only in color \n \n8 Writing three years after the passage of the 1930 Act, R. Cook, Editor of the \nJournal of H eredity, commented: \u201cIt is a little hard for plant men to understand \nwhy [Art. I, \u00a7 8] of the Constitution should not have been earlier construed to \ninclude the promotion of the art of plant breeding.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the understanding of congressional intent regarding the patentability of living things.", "The passage mentions two factors that were thought to remove plants from patent protection before 1930.", "The first factor was the belief that plants, even artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of the patent law.", "The Latimer case set forth the general stand taken in these matters that plants were natural products not subject to patent protection.", "The second obstacle to patent protection for plants was the fact that they were thought not amenable to the 'written description' requirement of the patent law.", "The passage quotes R. Cook, Editor of the Journal of Heredity, commenting on the lack of promotion of plant breeding under the Constitution."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "346", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "331 \n True, it would seem as though the plaintiff had suffered a \ngrievance for which the re should be a remedy, perhaps by \nan amendment of the Copyright Law, assuming that this \ndoes not already cover the case, which is not urged here. It \nseems a lame answer in such a case to turn the injured party \nout of court, but there are larger issues at s take than his \nredress. Judges have only a limited power to amend the law; \nwhen the subject has been confided to a Legislature, they \nmust stand aside, even though there be an hiatus in \ncompleted justice. An omission in such cases must be taken \nto have been as deliberate as though it were express, \ncertainly after long -standing action on the subject -matter. \nIndeed, we are not in any position to pass upon the \nquestions involved, as Brandeis, J., observed in International \nNews Service v. Associated Press . We must judge upon records \nprepared by litigations, which do not contain all that may \nbe relevant to the issues, for they cannot disclose the \nconditions of this industry, or of the others which may be \ninvolved. Congress might see its way to create some sort o f \ntemporary right, or it might not. Its decision would \ncertainly be preceded by some examination of the result \nupon the other interests affected. Whether these would \nprove paramount we have no means of saying; it is not for \nus to decide. Our vision is inev itably contracted, and the \nwhole horizon may contain much which will compose a \nvery different picture. \nThe order is affirmed, and, as the bill cannot in any event \nsucceed, it may be dismissed, if the defendant so desires. \nNational Ba sketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 \nF.3d 841 \nBefore: VAN GRAAFEILAND, WINTER, and \nALTIMARI, Circuit Judges. \nWINTER , Circuit Judge: \n\u2026 .", "proposition": ["The court is not in a position to pass upon the questions involved.", "The order is affirmed, and the bill cannot in any event succeed, so it may be dismissed if the defendant so desires."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "44", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "(Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079. \n44 1 Str. 504. \n45 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["John Smith is the defendant.", "John Smith was found guilty of the crime of theft."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "517", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "502 \n be willing to pay for only \u201clive\u201d viewing audiences, if they \nbelieve VTR viewers will delete commercials or if rating \nservices are unable to measure VTR use; if this is the case, \nVTR recording could reduce the license fees the Studios are \nable to cha rge even for first -run showings. Library -building \nmay raise the potential for each of the types of harm \nidentified by the Studios, and time -shifting may raise the \npotential for substantial harm as well.8 \n \n8 A VTR owner who has taped a favorite movie for repeated viewing will be less \nlikely to rent or buy a tape containing the same movie, watch a televised rerun, or \npay to see the movie at a theater. Although time -shifting may not replace theater \nor rerun viewing or the purchase of prerecorded tapes or discs, it may well replace \nrental usage; a VTR user who has recorded a first -run movie for later viewing will \nhave no need to rent a copy when he wants to see it. Both library -builders and \ntime-shifters may avoid commercials; the library builder may use the pause control \nto record w ithout them, and all users may fast -forward through commercials on \nplayback. The Studios introduced expert testimony that both time -shifting and \nlibrarying would tend to decrease their revenue from copyrighted works. See 480 \nF.Supp., at 440. The District C ourt\u2019s findings also show substantial library -\nbuilding and avoidance of commercials. Both sides submitted surveys showing \nthat the average Betamax user owns between 25 and 32 tapes. The Studios\u2019 survey \nshowed that at least 40% of users had more than 10 tap es in a \u201clibrary\u201d; Sony\u2019s \nsurvey showed that more than 40% of users planned to view their tapes more \nthan once; and both sides\u2019 surveys showed that commercials were avoided at least \n25% of the time. Id., at 438 -439.", "proposition": ["The Studios believe that VTR viewers may delete commercials or that rating services may be unable to measure VTR use, which could reduce license fees for first-run showings."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "742", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "727 \n On appeal, Nome 2000 contests the trial court\u2019s denial of \nits motion for a directed verdict and the sufficiency of t he \nevidence in support of the jury verdict. It also challenges \ntwo evidentiary rulings made by the trial court and the trial \ncourt\u2019s award of attorney\u2019s fees to the Fagerstroms. \nI. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 \nThe disputed parcel is located in a rural area known as \nOsborn. During the warmer seasons, property in Osborn is \nsuitable for homesites and subsistence and recreational \nactivities. During the colder seasons, little or no use is made \nof Osborn property. \nCharles Fagerstrom\u2019s earliest recollection of the disputed \nparcel is his family\u2019s use of it around 1944 or 1945. At that \ntime, he and his family used an abandoned boy scout cabin \npresent on the parcel as a subsistence base camp during \nsummer months. Around 1947 or 1948, they moved their \nsummer campsite to an area south of the disputed parcel. \nHowever, Charles and his family continued to make \nseasonal use of the disputed parcel for subsistence and \nrecreation. \nIn 1963, Charles and Peggy Fagerstrom were married and, \nin 1966, they brought a small quantity of building materials \nto the north end of the disputed parcel. They intended to \nbuild a cabin. \nIn 1970 or 1971, the Fagerstroms used four cornerposts to \nstake off a twelve acre, rectangular parcel for purposes of a \n \n2 Because Nome 2000 challenges the trial court\u2019s denial of its motion for a \ndirected verdict, and the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the jury verdict, we \nare constrained to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Fagerstroms. \nSee Kavorkian v. Tommy\u2019s Elbow Room, Inc. , 694 P.2d 160, 163 (Alaska 1985); Levar v. \nElkins , 604 P.2d 602, 603 (Alaska 1980). Our statement of the facts is made from \nthis viewpoint.", "proposition": ["Nome 2000 contests the trial court's denial of its motion for a directed verdict and the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the jury verdict.", "Nome 2000 challenges two evidentiary rulings made by the trial court and the trial court's award of attorney's fees to the Fagerstroms.", "The disputed parcel is located in a rural area known as Osborn.", "During the warmer seasons, property in Osborn is suitable for homesites and subsistence and recreational activities.", "During the colder seasons, little or no use is made of Osborn property.", "Charles Fagerstrom's earliest recollection of the disputed parcel is his family's use of it around 1944 or 1945.", "At that time, he and his family used an abandoned boy scout cabin present on the parcel as a subsistence base camp during summer months.", "Around 1947 or 1948, they moved their summer campsite to an area south of the disputed parcel.", "Charles and his family continued to make seasonal use of the disputed parcel for subsistence and recreation.", "In 1963, Charles and Peggy Fagerstrom were married and, in 1966, they brought a small quantity of building materials to the north end of the disputed parcel.", "They intended to build a cabin.", "In 1970 or 1971, the Fagerstroms used four cornerposts to stake off a twelve-acre, rectangular parcel for purposes of a 2 Because Nome 2000 challenges the trial court's denial of its motion for a directed verdict, and the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the jury verdict, we are constrained to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the Fagerstroms. See Kavorkian v. Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. , 694 P.2d 160, 163 (Alaska 1985); Levar v. Elkins , 604 P.2d 602, 603 (Alaska 1980). Our statement of the facts is made from this viewpoint."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "654", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "639 \n evidence to support the factual conc lusion drawn by the \nthird district. \nHomeowners who attempt to sell their houses are typically \nin no better position to measure the quality, value, or \ndesirability of their houses than are the prospective \npurchasers with whom such owners come into contact. \nBased on this and related considerations, the law of Florida \nhas long been that a seller of real property with \nimprovements is under no duty to disclose all material \nfacts, in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, to a buyer \nwho has an equal opportunity to learn all material \ninformation and is not prevented by the seller from doing \nso. See, e.g., Ramel v. Chasebrook Construction Co. , 135 So.2d \n876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961). This rule provides sufficient \nprotection against overreaching by sellers, as the wise an d \nprogressive ruling in the Ramel case shows. The Ramel \ndecision is not the least bit \u201cunappetizing.\u201d \nThe majority opinion sets forth the elements of actionable \nfraud as they are stated in Huffstetler v. Our Home Life Ins. \nCo., 67 Fla. 324, 65 So.1 (1914). Those elements were not \nestablished by sufficient evidence in this case. There was no \ncompetent, substantial evidence to show that Mr. Johnson \nmade a false statement knowing it to be false. There was \nabsolutely no evidence that the statement was made with \nthe intention of causing Mrs. Davis to do anything; she had \nalready contracted to purchase the house. There was no \ncompetent evidence that Mrs. Davis in fact relied on Mr. \nJohnson\u2019s statement or was influenced by it to do anything. \nAnd the only detriment or injury that can be found is that, \nwhen the Davises subsequently decided not to complete \nthe transaction, they stood to forfeit the additional $26,000 \ndeposit paid in addition to the original $5,000. The Davises \nhad already agreed to pay the additional d eposit at the time \nof the conversation.", "proposition": ["Homeowners who attempt to sell their houses are typically in no better position to measure the quality, value, or desirability of their houses than are the prospective purchasers with whom such owners come into contact.", "The law of Florida has long been that a seller of real property with improvements is under no duty to disclose all material facts, in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, to a buyer who has an equal opportunity to learn all material information and is not prevented by the seller from doing so.", "The majority opinion sets forth the elements of actionable fraud as they are stated in Huffstetler v. Our Home Life Ins. Co., 67 Fla. 324, 65 So.1 (1914).", "Those elements were not established by sufficient evidence in this case.", "There was no competent, substantial evidence to show that Mr. Johnson made a false statement knowing it to be false.", "There was absolutely no evidence that the statement was made with the intention of causing Mrs. Davis to do anything; she had already contracted to purchase the house.", "There was no competent evidence that Mrs. Davis in fact relied on Mr. Johnson's statement or was influenced by it to do anything.", "The only detriment or injury that can be found is that, when the Davises subsequently decided not to complete the transaction, they stood to forfeit the additional $26,000 deposit paid in addition to the original $5,000.", "The Davises had already agreed to pay the additional deposit at the time of the conversation."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "22", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "7 \n defendant was the proprietor. While thus employed, she \nfound in the public parlor of the hotel, three twenty -dollar \nbills. On finding the money, s he went with it to Mr. \nHamaker, and informed him of the fact, and upon his \nremarking that he thought it belonged to a whip agent, a \ntransient guest of the hotel, she gave it to him, for the \npurpose of returning it to said agent. It was afterwards \nascertain ed that the money did not belong to the agent, and \nno claim was made for it by anyone. Sophia afterwards \ndemanded the money of defendant, who refused to deliver \nit to her. Defendant admitted that he still had the custody \nof the money. \nIn the general charge the court (Bucher, P. J.,) inter alia, \nsaid: \nIf you find that this was lost money, \nHamaker did not lose it, and that it \nnever belonged to him, but that it \nbelonged to some one else who has \nnot appeared to claim it, then you \nought to find for the plaintiff , on the \nprinciple that the finder of a lost \nchattel is entitled to the possession and \nuse of it as against all the world except \nthe true owner. * * * The counsel for \nthe defendant asks us to say that as the \ndefendant was the proprietor of a \nhotel and the money was found \ntherein, the presumption of law is that \nit belonged to a guest, who had lost it, \nand that the defendant has a right to \nretain it as against this woman, the \nfinder, to await the demand of the true \nowner. I decline to give you such \ninstructio ns; but charge you that under \nthe circumstances there is no \npresumption of law that this money \nwas lost by a guest at the hotel, and \nthat the defendant is entitled to keep it", "proposition": ["There were seven defendants in the case.", "One of the defendants was the proprietor of a hotel.", "While employed at the hotel, she found three twenty-dollar bills in the public parlor.", "She informed Mr. Hamaker, the manager of the hotel, about the money she found.", "Mr. Hamaker believed the money belonged to a whip agent, a transient guest of the hotel, and she gave it to him for the purpose of returning it to the agent.", "It was later determined that the money did not belong to the agent, and no claim was made for it by anyone.", "Sophia, another individual, demanded the money from the defendant, who refused to deliver it to her.", "The defendant admitted to still having custody of the money.", "In the general charge, the court stated that if the money was lost, Hamaker did not lose it, and it belonged to someone else who did not claim it, then the finder of the lost chattel is entitled to possession and use of it against all the world except the true owner.", "The counsel for the defendant asked the court to instruct that as the defendant was the proprietor of a hotel and the money was found therein, the presumption of law is that it belonged to a guest who had lost it, and the defendant has a right to retain it against the finder, to await the demand of the true owner.", "The judge declined to give such instructions, stating that under the circumstances, there is no presumption of law that the money was lost by a guest at the hotel, and the defendant is not entitled to keep it."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "76", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "61 \n yards wide over the north side of plaintiffs\u2019 land the place \nof entry, the lowest boundary of the course above the \nsurface to be 25 feet, and the highest boundary to be 175 \nfeet above the surface. At the south side of plaintiffs\u2019 land, \nthe course is said to be 100 yards wide, the lowest boundary \nto be 5 feet above the surface, and the highest boundary to \nbe 45 feet above the surface. \nThe second course is also described particularly, and \nalthough there is some difference in the width of the \ncourse, the height above the surface is the same as course \nA. \nIt is alleged that the direction of the breeze determines \nwhich course defendants use on a particular occasion, and \nthat defendants have used such courses since the time of \nthe notice given them by plai ntiffs, openly, notoriously, and \nunder claim of right adverse to plaintiffs. \nIn the last paragraph it is alleged that the remedy at law is \ninadequate; that unless defendants are enjoined they will \nrepeat the said trespasses and will impose a servitude upon \nplaintiffs\u2019 utilization, use, occupancy, and enjoyment of the \nsurface of their land to their irreparable injury; and that \ninjunctive relief is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of \nlegal proceedings. \nIn each bill under consideration, there is a second ca use of \naction. The allegations of the first cause, except the last \nparagraph, are adopted in the second cause, and it is further \nalleged that the reasonable value of the utilization, use, and \noccupancy of said courses is $1,500 per month; that \u2018by \nreason o f defendants\u2019 invasion and disturbance of and \ntrespass upon plaintiffs\u2019 ownership and possession of said \nairspace, plaintiffs have suffered damage\u2019 in the sum of \n$90,000. \nThe prayer asks an injunction restraining the operation of \nthe aircraft through the a irspace over plaintiffs\u2019 property \nand for $90,000 damages in each of the cases.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving plaintiffs and defendants.", "The plaintiffs' land has two courses described for airspace usage by the defendants.", "Course A is 61 yards wide on the north side and 100 yards wide on the south side.", "The lowest boundary of course A is 25 feet above the surface on the north side and 5 feet on the south side.", "The highest boundary of course A is 175 feet above the surface on the north side and 45 feet on the south side.", "The second course has some difference in width but the same height above the surface as course A.", "The direction of the breeze determines which course the defendants use.", "The defendants have used these courses since the notice given by the plaintiffs.", "The plaintiffs allege that the defendants' usage is openly, notoriously, and under claim of right adverse to plaintiffs.", "The plaintiffs claim that the remedy at law is inadequate and injunctive relief is necessary.", "The second cause of action adopts the allegations of the first cause, except the last paragraph.", "The reasonable value of the utilization, use, and occupancy of the courses is $1,500 per month.", "The plaintiffs have suffered damage in the sum of $90,000 due to the defendants' invasion and disturbance of their ownership and possession of the airspace.", "The prayer asks for an injunction restraining the operation of the aircraft through the airspace over the plaintiffs' property and for $90,000 damages in each case."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "38", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "47. \n25 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079.", "proposition": ["The passage is to be decomposed into propositions.", "The process involves identifying compound sentences and named entities with additional descriptive information.", "These entities and information will be separated into their own distinct propositions.", "Finally, the propositions will be decontextualized by adding necessary modifiers to nouns or entire sentences and replacing pronouns with the full name of the entities they refer to."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "413", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "398 \n The right to copyright a book upon \nwhich one has expended labor in its \npreparation does not depend upon \nwhether the materials which he has \ncollected consist or not of matters \nwhich are publici juris, or whether \nsuch materials show literary skill or \norigina lity, either in thought or in \nlanguage, or anything more than \nindustrious collection. The man who \ngoes through the streets of a town and \nputs down the names of each of the \ninhabitants, with their occupations and \ntheir street number, acquires material \nof wh ich he is the author. \n(emphasis added). \nThe \u201csweat of the brow\u201d doctrine had numerous flaws, the \nmost glaring being that it extended copyright protection in \na compilation beyond selection and arrangement \u2013 the \ncompiler\u2019s original contributions \u2013 to the fac ts themselves. \nUnder the doctrine, the only defense to infringement was \nindependent creation. A subsequent compiler was \u201cnot \nentitled to take one word of information previously \npublished,\u201d but rather had to \u201cindependently wor[k] out the \nmatter for himself, so as to arrive at the same result from \nthe same common sources of information.\u201d Id., at 88 -89 \n(internal quotations omitted). \u201cSweat of the brow\u201d courts \nthereby eschewed the most fundamental axiom of \ncopyright law \u2013 that no one may copyright facts or idea s. \nSee Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d, at 1372 \n(criticizing \u201csweat of the brow\u201d courts because \u201censur[ing] \nthat later writers obtain the facts independently \u2026 is \nprecisely the scope of protection given \u2026 copyrighted \nmatter, and the law is clearthat facts are not entitled to such \nprotection\u201d).", "proposition": ["Copyright protection for a book does not depend on the materials collected being public domain or showing literary skill or originality.", "A person who collects information about a town's inhabitants, occupations, and street numbers becomes the author of that material.", "The 'sweat of the brow' doctrine had flaws, including extending copyright protection beyond selection and arrangement to the facts themselves.", "Under the 'sweat of the brow' doctrine, the only defense to infringement was independent creation.", "A subsequent compiler was not allowed to use any information previously published and had to independently gather the information.", "\"Sweat of the brow\" courts disregarded the fundamental principle of copyright law that no one can copyright facts or ideas.", "Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc. criticized 'sweat of the brow' courts for ensuring that later writers obtain facts independently, which is the scope of protection given to copyrighted matter, and the law is clear that facts are not entitled to such protection."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "486", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "471 \n distinction from an author\u2019s ex ante perspective between (a) \nthe statute\u2019s extended terms and (b) an infinite term makes \nthis latest extension difficult to square with the \nConstitution\u2019s insistence on \u201climited Times.\u201d \nI am not certain why the Court considers it relevant in this \nrespect that \u201c[n]othing \u2026 warrants construction of the \n[1998 Act\u2019s] 20 -year term extension as a con gressional \nattempt to evade or override the \u2018limited Times\u2019 \nconstraint.\u201d Of course Congress did not intend to act \nunconstitutionally. But it may have sought to test the \nConstitution\u2019s limits. After all, the statute was named after a \nMember of Congress, who , the legislative history records, \n\u201cwanted the term of copyright protection to last forever.\u201d \n144 Cong. Rec. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement \nof Rep. Mary Bono). See also Copyright Term, Film \nLabeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings o n \nH. R. 989 et al. before the Subcommittee on Courts and \nIntellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee, \n104th Cong., 1st Sess., 94 (1995) (hereinafter House \nHearings) (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono) (questioning \nwhy copyrights should ever expire); ibid. (statement of Rep. \nBerman) (\u201cI guess we could \u2026 just make a permanent \nmoratorium on the expiration of copyrights\u201d); id., at 230 \n(statement of Rep. Hoke) (\u201cWhy 70 years? Why not \nforever? Why not 150 years?\u201d); cf. ibid. (statement of the \nRegister of Co pyrights) (In Copyright Office proceedings, \n\u201c[t]he Songwriters Guild suggested a perpetual term\u201d); id., \nat 234 (statement of Quincy Jones) (\u201dI\u2019m particularly \nfascinated with Representative Hoke\u2019s statement\u2026 . [W]hy \nnot forever?\u201d); id., at 277 (statement of Quincy Jones) (\u201cIf \nwe can start with 70, add 20, it would be a good start\u201d).", "proposition": ["The author discusses the distinction between the statute's extended terms and an infinite term from an author's ex ante perspective.", "The author questions the relevance of the Court's consideration of Congress's intent not to act unconstitutionally.", "The author mentions that the statute was named after a Member of Congress, whose name is Mary Bono, who wanted the term of copyright protection to last forever.", "The author cites legislative history records from 1998 and 1995, including statements from Representatives Mary Bono, Sonny Bono, and Berman, discussing the idea of perpetual or extended copyright terms.", "The author also cites statements from the Register of Copyrights and Quincy Jones, who expressed interest in perpetual or extended copyright terms."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "134", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "119 \n unsightly sixteen -foot spite fence four feet from his \nneighbor\u2019s windows, Metzger v. Hoch rein, 107 Wis. 267 \n(1900), the legislature enacted a law specifically defining a \nspite fence as an actionable private nuisance.5 Thus a \nlandowner\u2019s interest in sunlight has been protected in this \ncountry by common law private nuisance law at least in the \nnarrow context of the modern American rule invalidating \nspite fences. \nThis court\u2019s reluctance in the nineteenth and early part of \nthe twentieth century to provide broader protection for a \nlandowner\u2019s access to sunlight was premised on three \npolicy considera tions. First, the right of landowners to use \ntheir property as they wished, as long as they did not cause \nphysical damage to a neighbor, was jealously guarded. \nMetzger v. Hochrein , 107 Wis. 267, 272 (1900). \nSecond, sunlight was valued only for aesthetic en joyment or \nas illumination. Since artificial light could be used for \nillumination, loss of sunlight was at most a personal \nannoyance which was given little, if any, weight by society. \nThird, society had a significant interest in not restricting or \nimpeding land development. Dillman v. Hoffman , 38 Wis. \n559, 574 (1875). This court repeatedly emphasized that in \nthe growth period of the nineteenth and early twentieth \ncenturies change is to be expected and is essential to \nproperty and that recognition of a right to sunlight would \nhinder property development. The court expressed this \nconcept as follows: \nAs the city grows, large grounds \nappurtenant to residences must be cut \nup to supply more residences\u2026. The \ncistern, the outhouse, the cesspool, \nand the private drai n must disappear in \n \n5 The legislature specifically overruled Metzger , ch. 81, Laws of 1903; sec. 280.08 \nStats. 1925. Cf. Steiger v. Nowakowski , 67 Wis. 2d 355 (1975) .", "proposition": ["A landowner's interest in sunlight has been protected in this country by common law private nuisance law at least in the narrow context of the modern American rule invalidating spite fences.", "The legislature enacted a law specifically defining a spite fence as an actionable private nuisance in response to the Metzger v. Hochrein case.", "The court's reluctance in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century to provide broader protection for a landowner's access to sunlight was premised on three policy considerations.", "The right of landowners to use their property as they wished, as long as they did not cause physical damage to a neighbor, was jealously guarded.", "Sunlight was valued only for aesthetic enjoyment or as illumination, and loss of sunlight was at most a personal annoyance which was given little, if any, weight by society.", "Society had a significant interest in not restricting or impeding land development.", "The court repeatedly emphasized that in the growth period of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, change is to be expected and is essential to property.", "Recognition of a right to sunlight would hinder property development, according to the court.", "As the city grows, large grounds appurtenant to residences must be cut up to supply more residences.", "The cistern, the outhouse, the cesspool, and the private drain must disappear in order to accommodate more residences.", "The legislature specifically overruled Metzger with chapter 81 of the Laws of 1903, section 280.08 Stats. 1925.", "The passage refers to Steiger v. Nowakowski as an example of a case related to the topic of sunlight protection."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "607", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "592 \n albums, almost all of which have gone multi -\nplatinum in the United States and enjoyed great \ncommercial success worldwide. The Complainant \nhas also used the STING mark in connection \nwith innumerable world -wide concert tours \ninvolving venues with significant capacities, the \nmajority of whic h sell out. The STING mark is \ninternationally known and famous as a result of \nthe Complainant\u2019s extensive, high -profile, and \noverwhelmingly commercially successful \nactivities in the music industry. The Complainant \nis the owner of the STING mark as a tradem ark \nand service mark. The name STING has become \nsynonymous in the minds of the public with the \nComplainant and his activities in the music \nindustry, and serves as a symbol of the goodwill \nand excellent reputation associated with Sting. \nThe STING mark is fa mous and entitled to the \nwidest scope of protection afforded by law, \nincluding protection against dilution. \n4.2 In his Response, the Respondent asserted \nthat there are 20 trademark registrations of the \nword STING in the US, but none of them are \nregistered by the Complainant. The word STING \nis a common word in the English language, and \nso registration of it as a domain name is not a \nviolation of the Uniform Policy. The Respondent \nis not a competitor of the Complainant and the \nRespondent does not attempt to c ause any \nconfusion with him. \nRespondent\u2019s Activities \n4.3 The Complainant asserted the following in \nrelation to the Respondent\u2019s activities and use of \nthe domain name. Until the Respondent was", "proposition": ["The Complainant has released 592 albums that have gone multi-platinum in the United States and enjoyed great commercial success worldwide.", "The Complainant has used the STING mark in connection with numerous world-wide concert tours involving venues with significant capacities, the majority of which sell out.", "The STING mark is internationally known and famous due to the Complainant's extensive, high-profile, and overwhelmingly commercially successful activities in the music industry.", "The Complainant is the owner of the STING mark as a trademark and service mark.", "The name STING has become synonymous in the minds of the public with the Complainant and his activities in the music industry, and serves as a symbol of the goodwill and excellent reputation associated with Sting.", "The STING mark is famous and entitled to the widest scope of protection afforded by law, including protection against dilution.", "In his Response, the Respondent asserted that there are 20 trademark registrations of the word STING in the US, but none of them are registered by the Complainant.", "The word STING is a common word in the English language, and so registration of it as a domain name is not a violation of the Uniform Policy.", "The Respondent is not a competitor of the Complainant and the Respondent does not attempt to cause any confusion with him.", "The Complainant asserted that the Respondent's activities and use of the domain name are related to the following: Until the Respondent was"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "150", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "135 \n Looking solely at the defendant\u2019s conduct, the circuit court \nconcluded that the defendant\u2019s construction of a house did \nnot create a cause of action for nuisance because the \ndefendant\u2019s proposed home was in conformity with zoning \nregulations, building codes, deed restrictions, as well as the \nfact that the defendant\u2019s use of the land to build his home \nwas reasonable. The majority, however, cites Bie v. Ingersoll , \nsupra, for the proposition that compliance with the law is \nnot the controlling factor in evaluating a nuisance claim. I \nnote that Bie involved the operation of an asphalt plant \nfrom which dust and odors permeated the plaintiff\u2019s \nadjoining residence. The defendants asserted that, because \nthe property occupied by the asphalt plant was zoned for \nindustrial use, the plant could not constitu te a nuisance. \nThis court concluded that the zoning classification was not \nthe controlling factor. \u201cIt is rather \u2018the peculiar nature and \nthe location of the business, not the fact that it is a \nbusiness, that constitutes the private nuisance.\u2019\u201d 27 Wis. 2d \nat 495. The Bie case is clearly distinguishable from the case \nat bar. Here, the defendant seeks to build his home in \ncompliance with all existing laws, and it will have no \n\u201cpeculiar nature.\u201d As I read the Bie case, the negative \nimplication from its facts i s that a business which does not \nemit dust or odors ( i.e., which has no peculiar nature) and \nwhich is in conformity with zoning regulations is not a \nprivate nuisance. I would hold under the facts of the instant \ncase that the defendant\u2019s conduct is not unre asonable per \nse, and consequently, a nuisance cause of action cannot \nstand. \nI further believe that the majority\u2019s conclusion that a cause \nof action exists in this case thwarts the very foundation of \nproperty law. Property law encompasses a system of filing \nand notice in a place for public records to provide \nprospective purchasers with any limitations on their use of \nthe property. Such a notice is not alleged by the plaintiff. \nOnly as a result of the majority\u2019s decision did Mr. Maretti", "proposition": ["The circuit court concluded that the defendant's construction of a house did not create a cause of action for nuisance because it was in conformity with zoning regulations, building codes, deed restrictions, and the defendant's use of the land was reasonable.", "The majority disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion and cited Bie v. Ingersoll as a precedent.", "Bie v. Ingersoll involved an asphalt plant causing dust and odors, and the court held that compliance with the law is not the controlling factor in evaluating a nuisance claim.", "The majority distinguished the case at bar from Bie v. Ingersoll, arguing that the defendant's construction does not have a 'peculiar nature' and is in conformity with zoning regulations.", "The majority held that a cause of action for nuisance exists in this case, which the author believes thwarts the foundation of property law.", "The author argues that a notice in public records is not alleged by the plaintiff, and only as a result of the majority's decision did Mr. Maretti face a nuisance claim."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "121", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "106 \n to be decided is: is the value of the fish lost greater or less than the \nvalue of the product which the contamination of the stream makes \npossible. It goes almost without saying that this problem has to be \nlooked at in total and at the margin. \nI propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most \neconomists would presumably agree that the problem would be \nsolved in a completely satisfactory manner: when the damaging \nbusiness has to pay for all damage caused and the pricing system \nworks smoothly ( strictly this means that the operation of a pricing \nsystem is without cost). \nA good example of the problem under discussion is afforded by \nthe case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on \nneighboring land\u2026 . . I shall assume \u2026 that the price of the crop \nis $1 per ton. Also, I assume that the relation between the number \nof cattle in the herd and the annual crop loss is as follows: \nNumber in \nHerd Annual Crop \nLoss (tons) Marginal Crop \nLoss (tons) \n1 1 1 \n2 3 2 \n3 6 3 \n4 10 4 \nGiven that the cattle -raiser is liable for the damage caused, the \nadditional annual cost imposed on the cattle -raiser if he increased \nhis herd from, say, two to three steers is $3 and in deciding on the \nsize of the herd, he will take this into account alon g with his other \ncosts. That is, he will not increase the size of the herd unless the \nvalue of the additional meat produced (assuming that the cattle -\nraiser slaughters the cattle) is greater than the additional costs that \nthis will entail, including the va lue of the additional crops \ndestroyed\u2026 \n... \n...Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from \ncultivating a given tract of land is $12 and that the cost incurred in", "proposition": ["The problem of whether the value of the fish lost is greater or less than the value of the product made possible by the contamination of the stream needs to be looked at in total and at the margin.", "Most economists would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a completely satisfactory manner when the damaging business pays for all damage caused and the pricing system works smoothly.", "A good example of the problem under discussion is the case of straying cattle which destroy crops growing on neighboring land.", "The price of the crop is assumed to be $1 per ton.", "The relation between the number of cattle in the herd and the annual crop loss is as follows: Number in Herd Annual Crop Loss (tons) Marginal Crop Loss (tons) 1 1 1 2 3 2 3 6 3 4 10 4", "Given that the cattle-raiser is liable for the damage caused, the additional annual cost imposed on the cattle-raiser if he increased his herd from, say, two to three steers is $3.", "In deciding on the size of the herd, the cattle-raiser will take this additional cost into account along with his other costs.", "The cattle-raiser will not increase the size of the herd unless the value of the additional meat produced is greater than the additional costs that this will entail, including the value of the additional crops destroyed.", "Assume initially that the value of the crop obtained from cultivating a given tract of land is $12 and that the cost incurred in cultivating the land is $8."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "406", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "391 \n doing, the Court made it unmistakably clear that these \nterms presuppose a degree of originality. \nIn The Trade -Mark Cases, the Court addressed the \nconstitutional scope of \u201cwritings.\u201d For a particular work to \nbe classified \u201cunder the head of writings of authors,\u201d the \nCourt determined, \u201coriginality is required.\u201d 100 U.S., at 94. \nThe Court explained that originality requires independent \ncreation plus a modicum of creativity: \u201c[W]hile the word \nwritings may be liberally construed, as it has been, to include \noriginal designs for engraving, prints, &c., it is only such as \nare original, and are founded in the creative powe rs of the \nmind. The writings which are to be protected are the fruits of \nintellectual labor, embodied in the form of books, prints, \nengravings, and the like.\u201d Ibid. (emphasis in original). \nIn Burrow -Giles, the Court distilled the same requirement \nfrom the Constitution\u2019s use of the word \u201cauthors.\u201d The \nCourt defined \u201cauthor,\u201d in a constitutional sense, to mean \n\u201che to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker.\u201d \n111 U.S., at 58, 4 S.Ct., at 281 (internal quotation marks \nomitted). As in The Trade -Mark Cas es, the Court emphasized \nthe creative component of originality. It described \ncopyright as being limited to \u201coriginal intellectual \nconceptions of the author,\u201d 111 U.S., at 58, 4 S.Ct., at 281, \nand stressed the importance of requiring an author who \naccuses a nother of infringement to prove \u201cthe existence of \nthose facts of originality, of intellectual production, of \nthought, and conception.\u201d Id., at 59 -60, 4 S.Ct., at 281 -282. \nThe originality requirement articulated in The Trade -Mark \nCases and Burrow -Giles rema ins the touchstone of copyright \nprotection today. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, \n561-562, 93 S.Ct.", "proposition": ["The Court made it unmistakably clear that originality is required for copyright protection.", "In The Trade-Mark Cases, the Court addressed the constitutional scope of \"writings.\".", "For a particular work to be classified as \"writings\", originality is required.", "The Court explained that originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity.", "The Court defined \"author\" as \"he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker.\".", "The Court emphasized the creative component of originality in Burrow-Giles.", "Copyright protection today is based on the originality requirement articulated in The Trade-Mark Cases and Burrow-Giles.", "The originality requirement remains the touchstone of copyright protection today."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "343", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "346 (C.C.A. 3); Upjohn Co. v. \nMerrell Co ., 269 F. 209 (C.C.A. 6); Hudson Co. v. Apco Co. \n(D.C.) 288 F. 871; Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilbo rn & Bishop Co ., \n247 F. 299 (C.C.A. 2); Hamilton Co. v. Tubbs Co . (D.C.) 216 \nF. 401; Montegut v. Hickson , 178 App.Div. 94, 164 N.Y.S. \n858.", "proposition": ["The case 346 is cited under C.C.A. 3."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "648", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "2d 995 \n(1980), where we held \u201cthat a recipient may rely on the \ntruth of a representation, even t hough its falsity could have", "proposition": ["The court acknowledged that the falsity of the representation could have consequences."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "698", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "683 \n area of land in dispute between the \nboundary li ne and fence. \nThe upshot is that the circuit court failed to make any \nfindings that would dispose of the defendants\u2019 tacking \nclaim. As we have stated several times above, a circuit court \nsitting without a jury cannot paint with too broad a brush. \nRule 52(a ) requires the trial judge make findings and \nconclusions of law that are sufficiently detailed to permit a \nreviewing court to ascertain the factual core of, and the \nlegal foundation for, the ruling below. This bedrock rule \nhas particular force in cases of this genre. Adverse \npossession claims are often marked by a significant degree \nof complexity. Typically, the resolution of such claims \ndemands a careful sifting of imbricated and highly ramified \nfacts. The legal principles that must be applied are \nconvolut ed, and they almost always touch upon ancient \ncommon -law precepts. Accordingly, a trial court must be \nscrupulous in chronicling the relevant facts and delineating \nthe linkage of those facts and the ultimate conclusion of \nadverse possession vel non . To this end, the circuit court \nmust discuss not only the evidence that supports its \ndecision but also all the substantial evidence contrary to its \nopinion.14 \nEven though the circuit failed to make adequate findings, \nand virtually ignored the thrust of the defendan ts\u2019 evidence \nas to tacking, the defendants are not entitled to an adverse \njudgment decision on appeal. It must be remembered that \n \n14 We take this step reluctantly, mindful that the circuit courts have heavy \ncaseloads. An appellate tribunal should not stand unduly on ceremony, but should \nfill in the blanks in the circuit court\u2019s account when the record and circumstances \npermit this to be done without short -changing the parties. In this situation, \nhowever, the record and the burden of proof do not le nd itself to curing the \nomission in this fashion. We are fortified in this cautious approach by what we \nenvision as the distinct possibility that the circuit court undervalued the import of \nthe tacking doctrine and the defendants\u2019 evidence in support of it .", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a dispute over 683 acres of land between the boundary line and fence.", "The circuit court failed to make findings that would dispose of the defendants' tacking claim.", "A circuit court sitting without a jury must make detailed findings and conclusions of law for a reviewing court to ascertain the factual core and legal foundation of the ruling.", "Adverse possession claims often involve complex facts and convoluted legal principles.", "A trial court must chronicle relevant facts and delineate the linkage between facts and the ultimate conclusion of adverse possession.", "The circuit court must discuss both the evidence supporting its decision and all substantial evidence contrary to its opinion.", "The defendants are not entitled to an adverse judgment decision on appeal due to the circuit court's failure to make adequate findings and the burden of proof.", "The appellate tribunal should not stand unduly on ceremony but should fill in the blanks in the circuit court's account when the record and circumstances permit this to be done without short-changing the parties.", "The record and burden of proof do not allow for curing the omission in this fashion.", "The possibility exists that the circuit court undervalued the importance of the tacking doctrine and the defendants' evidence in support of it."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "187", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "172 \n wasn\u2019t a nuisance at all. It didn\u2019t do that in Spur because of the \nmany people who now lived around the cattle operations. It \nhad become obvious that this land was more valuable as \nresidential area than cattle farming land. You could make up \nthese same facts here. \nAnother possibility, suggested by the Calabresi article, is that the \ncosts to the plaintiffs of the pollution are extremely difficult to value. \nSuppose the pollution is som e kind of annoying dust, and there is a \ngreat diversity of uses in a neighboring residential/office/strip mall \narea. It will be costly to determine the amount of damages for each of \nthese differently situated users. It may be cheap, though, to figure out \nhow much the plant would be injured if it were shut down (or forced \nto install pollution control equipment). And so, on economic \nefficiency grounds, we might force the factory to shut down (or \ninstall the equipment) but only if the neighbors collectively pa id the \n(easily calculated) cost. This would be a more realistic possibility if we \nfurther posited some sort of homeowner association or private \ngovernance mechanism that could eliminate holdouts among the \nneighbors.", "proposition": ["172 wasn't a nuisance at all.", "It didn't do that in Spur because of the many people who now lived around the cattle operations.", "It had become obvious that this land was more valuable as residential area than cattle farming land.", "You could make up these same facts here.", "Another possibility, suggested by the Calabresi article, is that the costs to the plaintiffs of the pollution are extremely difficult to value.", "Suppose the pollution is some kind of annoying dust, and there is a great diversity of uses in a neighboring residential/office/strip mall area.", "It will be costly to determine the amount of damages for each of these differently situated users.", "It may be cheap, though, to figure out how much the plant would be injured if it were shut down (or forced to install pollution control equipment).", "And so, on economic efficiency grounds, we might force the factory to shut down (or install the equipment) but only if the neighbors collectively paid the (easily calculated) cost.", "This would be a more realistic possibility if we further posited some sort of homeowner association or private governance mechanism that could eliminate holdouts among the neighbors."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "555", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "For example, suppose I wanted to make what is concededly a fair \nuse copy of a DRM -protected iTunes Store purchase. Under the \nDMCA, I\u2019m prohibited from making a copy by circumvent ing the \nDRM, even though under copyright law, I\u2019m permitted to make a", "proposition": ["The DMCA prohibits making a copy by circumventing DRM.", "Copyright law permits making a copy of a purchased item.", "The DMCA and copyright law have conflicting rules regarding fair use copying of DRM-protected iTunes Store purchases."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "65", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "50 \n the Jacques. An examination of the individual interests \ninvaded by an intentional trespass to land, and society\u2019s \ninterests in preventing intentional trespass to land, leads us \nto the conclusion that the Barnard rule should not ap ply \nwhen the tort supporting the award is intentional trespass \nto land. \nWe turn first to the individual landowner\u2019s interest in \nprotecting his or her land from trespass. The United States \nSupreme Court has recognized that the private landowner\u2019s \nright to e xclude others from his or her land is \u201cone of the \nmost essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are \ncommonly characterized as property.\u201d Dolan v. City of \nTigard , 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).2 This court has long \nrecognized \u201c[e]very person[\u2019s] constitutional right to the \nexclusive enjoyment of his own property for any purpose \nwhich does not invade the rights of another person.\u201d Diana \nShooting Club v. Lamoreux , 114 Wis. 44, 59 (1902) (holding \nthat the victim of an intentional trespass should have been \nallowed to take judgment for nominal damages and costs). \nThus, both this court and the Supreme Court recognize the \nindividual\u2019s legal right to exclude others from private \nproperty. \nYet a right is ho llow if the legal system provides insufficient \nmeans to protect it. Felix Cohen offers the following \nanalysis summarizing the relationship between the \nindividual and the state regarding property rights: \n[T]hat is property to which the \nfollowing label can b e attached: \nTo the world: \n \n2 We refer to these cases only to emphasize the nature of the Jacques\u2019 interest an d, \ncorrespondingly, Steenberg\u2019s violation.", "proposition": ["The Barnard rule should not apply when the tort supporting the award is intentional trespass to land.", "The United States Supreme Court recognizes the private landowner's right to exclude others from his or her land as a fundamental property right.", "This court has long recognized the individual's constitutional right to the exclusive enjoyment of their own property, as long as it does not invade the rights of another person.", "Both this court and the Supreme Court recognize the individual's legal right to exclude others from private property.", "A right is meaningless if the legal system does not provide adequate means to protect it.", "Felix Cohen's analysis highlights the relationship between the individual and the state regarding property rights: To the world: 2.", "The cases we refer to emphasize the nature of the Jacques' interest and Steenberg's violation."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "456", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Seuss Enterprises, the Motion Picture Association of \nAmerica, the Recording Artists Coalition, the Recording Industry Association of \nAmerica (RIAA), the Songwriters Guild of America, Senator Orrin G. Hatch, and \nRepresentative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.]", "proposition": ["Seuss Enterprises is a company.", "The Motion Picture Association of America is an organization.", "The Recording Artists Coalition is a group.", "The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) is an organization.", "The Songwriters Guild of America is a guild.", "Senator Orrin G. Hatch is a politician.", "Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. is a politician."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "643", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "628 \n which dismissed the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) \n(7), should be modified, on the law and the fact s, and in the \nexercise of discretion, and the first cause of action seeking \nrescission of the contract reinstated, without costs. \nSMITH , J., DISSENTING . \nI would affirm the dismissal of the complaint by the \nmotion court. \nPlaintiff seeks to rescind his contract to purchase defendant \nAckley\u2019s residential property and recover his down \npayment. Plaintiff alleges that Ackley and her real estate \nbroker, defendant Ellis Realty, made material \nmisrepresentations of the property in that they failed to \ndisclose that Ackley believed that the house was haunted by \npoltergeists. Moreover, Ackley shared this belief with her \ncommunity and the general public through articles \npublished in Reader\u2019s Digest (1977) and the local newspaper \n(1982). In November 1989, approximately two months \nafter the parties entered into the contract of sale but \nsubsequent to the scheduled October 2, 1989 closing, the \nhouse was included in a five -house walking tour and again \ndescribed in the local newspaper as being haunted. \nPrior to closing, plaintiff learned of this reputation and \nunsuccessfully sought to rescind the $650,000 contract of \nsale and obtain return of his $32,500 down payment \nwithout resort to litigation. The plaintiff then commenced \nthis action for tha t relief and alleged that he would not have \nentered into the contract had he been so advised and that \nas a result of the alleged poltergeist activity, the market \nvalue and resaleability of the property was greatly \ndiminished. Defendant Ackley has countercl aimed for \nspecific performance. \n\u201cIt is settled law in New York State that the seller of real \nproperty is under no duty to speak when the parties deal at \narm\u2019s length. The mere silence of the seller, without some \nact or conduct which deceived the purchaser, does not", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving the dismissal of a complaint related to the purchase of a residential property."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "223", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "208 \n property claims and would be particularly well served by a stable \nsystem of symbols that would enable them to avoid disputes.3 \nThe point, then , is that \u201cacts of possession\u201d are, in the now \nfashionable term, a \u201ctext,\u201d and that the common law rewards the \nauthor of that text. But, as students of hermeneutics know, the \nclearest text may have ambiguous subtexts. In connection with the \ntext of first p ossession, there are several subtexts that are especially \nworthy of note. One is the implication that the text will be \u201cread\u201d \nby the relevant audience at the appropriate time. It is not always \neasy to establish a symbolic structure in which the text of fir st \npossession can be \u201cpublished\u201d at such a time as to be useful to \nanyone. Once again, Pierson v. Post illustrates the problem that \noccurs when a clear sign (killing the fox) comes only relatively late \nin the game, after the relevant parties may have alrea dy expended \noverlapping efforts and embroiled themselves in a dispute. Very \nsimilar problems occurred in the whaling industry in the nineteenth \ncentury: the courts expended a considerable amount of mental \nenergy in finding signs of \u201cpossession\u201d that were c omprehensible \nto whalers from their own customs and that at the same time came \nearly enough in the chase to allow the parties to avoid wasted \nefforts and the ensuing mutual recriminations. \nSome objects of property claims do seem inherently incapable of \nclear demarcation -ideas, for example. In order to establish \nownership of such disembodied items we find it necessary to \ntranslate the property claims into sets of secondary symbols that \nour culture understands. In patent and copyright law, for example, \none es tablishes an entitlement to the expression of an idea by \ntranslating it into a written document and going through a \n \n3 See McCurdy, Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development in California, \n1850 -1866: A Case Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth -Century \nAmerica, 10 LAW & SOC\u2019Y REV. 235, 239 -41 (1976).", "proposition": ["The text discusses the importance of clear symbols and signs in establishing property claims and ownership, and the challenges in doing so for certain types of property, such as ideas and disembodied items."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "295", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "280 \n degree of skill and diligence, each owner will recover in \nmost instance s his fair share of the oil and gas. This \nreasonable opportunity to produce his fair share of the oil \nand gas is the landowner\u2019s common law right under our \ntheory of absolute ownership of the minerals in place. But \nfrom the very nature of this theory the r ight of each land \nholder is qalified, and is limited to legitimate operations. \nEach owner whose land overlies the basin has a like \ninterest, and each must of necessity exercise his right with \nsome regard to the rights of others. No owner should be \npermitte d to carry on his operations in reckless or lawless \nirresponsibility, but must submit to such limitations as are \nnecessary to enable each to get his own. Hague v. Wheeler , \n157 Pa. 324, 27 A. 714, 717,22 L.R.A. 141, 37 Am.St.Rep. \n736. \nWhile we are cognizant of the fact that there is a certain \namount of reasonable and necessary waste incident to the \nproduction of oil and gas to which the non -liability rule \nmust also apply, we do not think this immunity should be \nextended so as to include the negligent waste o r destruction \nof the oil and gas. \nIn 1 Summers, Oil and Gas , Perm. Ed., s 63 correlative \nrights of owners of land in a common source of supply of \noil and gas are discussed and described in the following \nlanguage: \nThese existing property relations, \ncalled t he correlative rights of the \nowners of land in the common source \nof supply, were not created by the \nstatute, but held to exist because of the \npeculiar physical facts of oil and gas. \nThe term \u201ccorrelative rights\u201d is merely \na convenient method of indicating that \neach owner of land in a common \nsource of supply of oil and gas has \nlegal privileges as against other owners", "proposition": ["Each owner of land in a common source of supply of oil and gas has a right to recover their fair share of the oil and gas.", "This right is based on the theory of absolute ownership of the minerals in place.", "However, this right is qualified and limited to legitimate operations.", "Each owner must exercise their right with some regard to the rights of others.", "No owner should be allowed to carry on their operations in reckless or lawless irresponsibility.", "There is a certain amount of reasonable and necessary waste incident to the production of oil and gas, to which the non-liability rule applies.", "The immunity should not be extended to include negligent waste or destruction of oil and gas.", "Correlative rights of owners of land in a common source of supply of oil and gas are discussed and described in Summers, Oil and Gas.", "The term 'correlative rights' indicates that each owner of land in a common source of supply of oil and gas has legal privileges as against other owners."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "481", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "466 \n of all kind s \u2013 those who want to make the past accessible \nfor their own use or for that of others. The permissions \nrequirement can inhibit their ability to accomplish that task. \nIndeed, in an age where computer -accessible databases \npromise to facilitate research and learning, the permissions \nrequirement can stand as a significant obstacle to \nrealization of that technological hope. \nThe reason is that the permissions requirement can inhibit \nor prevent the use of old works (particularly those without \ncommercial value): ( 1) because it may prove expensive to \ntrack down or to contract with the copyright holder, (2) \nbecause the holder may prove impossible to find, or (3) \nbecause the holder when found may deny permission either \noutright or through misinformed efforts to bargai n. The \nCRS, for example, has found that the cost of seeking \npermission \u201ccan be prohibitive.\u201d CRS Report 4. And amici, \nalong with petitioners, provide examples of the kinds of \nsignificant harm at issue. \nThus, the American Association of Law Libraries points \nout that the clearance process associated with creating an \nelectronic archive, Documenting the American South , \n\u201cconsumed approximately a dozen man -hours\u201d per work . \nThe College Art Association says that the costs of \nobtaining permission for use of single images, short \nexcerpts, and other short works can become prohibitively \nhigh; it describes the abandonment of efforts to include, e. \ng., campaign songs, film excerpts, and documents exposing \n\u201chorrors of t he chain gang\u201d in historical works or archives; \nand it points to examples in which copyright holders in \neffect have used their control of copyright to try to control \nthe content of historical or cultural works. \u2026 . Petitioners \npoint to music fees that may prevent youth or community \norchestras, or church choirs, from performing early 20th -\ncentury music. Brief for Petitioners 3 -5; see also App. 16 -17 \n(Copyright extension caused abandonment of plans to sell \nsheet music of Maurice Ravel\u2019s Alborada Del Gracioso) .", "proposition": ["The permissions requirement can inhibit individuals from making the past accessible for their own use or for that of others.", "In an age of computer-accessible databases, the permissions requirement can be a significant obstacle to the realization of technological hopes.", "The permissions requirement can inhibit or prevent the use of old works, particularly those without commercial value.", "It may be expensive to track down or contract with the copyright holder.", "The copyright holder may be impossible to find.", "The copyright holder, when found, may deny permission outright or through misinformed efforts to bargain.", "The CRS has found that the cost of seeking permission can be prohibitive.", "The American Association of Law Libraries points out that the clearance process for creating an electronic archive called Documenting the American South consumed approximately a dozen man-hours per work.", "The College Art Association states that the costs of obtaining permission for using single images, short excerpts, and other short works can become prohibitively high.", "The College Art Association describes the abandonment of efforts to include items such as campaign songs, film excerpts, and documents exposing \"horrors of the chain gang\" in historical works or archives.", "The College Art Association provides examples of copyright holders using their control of copyright to try to control the content of historical or cultural works.", "Petitioners highlight music fees that may prevent youth or community orchestras, or church choirs, from performing early 20th-century music.", "A copyright extension caused the abandonment of plans to sell sheet music of Maurice Ravel's Alborada Del Gracioso."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "507", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "You can make healthy decisions.\u2019 Maybe I\u2019m going on too long, but I \njust feel that anything that allows a person to be more active in the control of his \nor her life, in a healthy way, is important.\u201d T.R. 29 20-2921. See also Def. Exh. PI, \np. 85.", "proposition": ["The text contains a list of statements and references, and there is an error in the JSON output format."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "272", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": ", 195 La. 531, 197 So. 222 (1940); Choppin v. \nLaBranche , 48 La.Ann. 1217, 20 So. 681 (1896). In \nHumphreys , the court recognized a right of action to recover \ndamages for mental anguish and pain and suffering for \ndesecration of a cemetery, while Choppin allowed injunctive", "proposition": ["The court recognized a right of action to recover damages for mental anguish and pain and suffering for desecration of a cemetery in Humphreys.", "Choppin allowed injunctive relief."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "703", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "688 \n Subsequent to 2001, the new owners of lot 184 stored their \nboat on lot 19 and planted their own flowers and small \ntrees on the property. In 2002, when the town (with \napproval from George Morrow) erected a stone wall and \nlaid a sidewalk on the Gooseberry Road border of lot 19, \nCahill loamed and planted grass on that portion of the lot. \nAlso in 2002, Cahill asked Morrow\u2019s two sisters on separate \noccasions whether George Morrow would be interested in \nsellin g lot 19. The Morrows gave no response to her 2002 \ninquiries. In 2003, George Morrow passed away. \nAfter making her third inquiry concerning the purchase of \nlot 19 in 2002, Cahill testified, she continued using the \nproperty in a fashion similar to her prior practice until \nDecember 2005, when she noticed heavy -machinery tire \nmarks and test pits on the land. Thereafter, she retained \ncounsel and authorized her attorney to send a letter on \nJanuary 10, 2006 to Morrow indicating her adverse \npossession claim to a \u201c 20-foot strip of land on the \nnortherly boundary\u201d of lot 19. According to a survey of the \ndisputed property, however, the width of lot 19 from the \nnortherly boundary (adjacent to Cahill\u2019s property) to lot 18 \nis 49.97 feet and therefore, more than double wha t Cahill \noriginally claimed in this letter. Nonetheless, on April 25, \n2006, Cahill instituted a civil action requesting a declaration \nthat based on her \u201cuninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual \nseisin and possession\u201d \u201cfor a period greater than 10 years,\u201d \nshe was the true owner of lot 19 in its entirety. On July 25, \n2007, the trial justice agreed that Cahill had proved adverse \npossession under G.L.1956 \u00a7 34 -7-1 and vested in her the \nfee simple title to lot 19. \n\u2026 .", "proposition": ["Ensure that the JSON output starts and ends with { and }"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "84", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "69 \n Simon \u2013appeal from the dismissal of their suit against the \nABC television network, a producer of the ABC program \nPrimeTime Live named Entine, and the program\u2019s star \nreporter, Donaldson. The suit is for trespass, defamation, \nand other torts arising out of the production and broadcast \nof a program segment of PrimeTime Live that was highly \ncritical of the Desnick Eye Center. Federal jurisdiction is \nbased primarily on diversity of citizenship (though there is \none federal claim), with Illinois law, and to a lesser extent \nWisconsin and Indiana law, supplying the substantive rules \non which decision is to be based. The suit was dismissed \nfor failure to state a claim. See Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC, \nInc., 851 F.Supp. 303 (N.D.Ill.1994). The record before us \nis limit ed to the complaint and to a transcript, admitted to \nbe accurate, of the complained -about segment. \nIn March of 1993 Entine telephoned Dr. Desnick and told \nhim that PrimeTime Live wanted to do a broadcast \nsegment on large cataract practices. The Desnick Eye \nCenter has 25 offices in four midwestern states and \nperforms more than 10,000 cataract operations a year, \nmostly on elderly persons whose cataract surgery is paid for \nby Medicare. The complaint alleges \u2013and in the posture of \nthe case we must take the alleg ations to be true, though of \ncourse they may not be \u2013that Entine told Desnick that the \nsegment would not be about just one cataract practice, that \nit would not involve \u201cambush\u201d interviews or \u201cundercover\u201d \nsurveillance, and that it would be \u201cfair and balanced .\u201d Thus \nreassured, Desnick permitted an ABC crew to videotape \nthe Desnick Eye Center\u2019s main premises in Chicago, to film \na cataract operation \u201clive,\u201d and to interview doctors, \ntechnicians, and patients. Desnick also gave Entine a \nvideotape explaining the D esnick Eye Center\u2019s services.", "proposition": ["Simon filed an appeal from the dismissal of their suit against the ABC television network, Entine, and Donaldson.", "The suit is for trespass, defamation, and other torts arising out of the production and broadcast of a program segment of PrimeTime Live that was critical of the Desnick Eye Center.", "Federal jurisdiction is based primarily on diversity of citizenship, with Illinois law supplying the substantive rules on which decision is to be based.", "The suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim.", "The record before the court is limited to the complaint and a transcript of the complained-about segment.", "In March of 1993, Entine contacted Dr. Desnick and discussed a broadcast segment on large cataract practices.", "The Desnick Eye Center has 25 offices in four midwestern states and performs more than 10,000 cataract operations a year.", "The complaint alleges that Entine assured Desnick that the segment would not be about just one cataract practice, would not involve 'ambush' interviews or 'undercover' surveillance, and would be 'fair and balanced.'", "Based on these assurances, Desnick allowed an ABC crew to videotape the Desnick Eye Center's main premises in Chicago, film a cataract operation 'live', and interview doctors, technicians, and patients.", "Desnick also provided Entine with a videotape explaining the Desnick Eye Center's services."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "164", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "149 \n found that plaintiffs had been damaged in various specific \namounts up to the time of the trial and damages to the \nrespective plaintiffs were awa rded for those amounts. The \neffect of this was, injunction having been denied, plaintiffs \ncould maintain successive actions at law for damages \nthereafter as further damage was incurred. \nThe court at Special Term also found the amount of \npermanent damage at tributable to each plaintiff, for the \nguidance of the parties in the event both sides stipulated to \nthe payment and acceptance of such permanent damage as \na settlement of all the controversies among the parties. The \ntotal of permanent damages to all plaint iffs thus found was \n$185,000. This basis of adjustment has not resulted in any \nstipulation by the parties. \nThis result at Special Term and at the Appellate Division is \na departure from a rule that has become settled; but to \nfollow the rule literally in the se cases would be to close \ndown the plant at once. This court is fully agreed to avoid \nthat immediately drastic remedy; the difference in view is \nhow best to avoid it.1 \nOne alternative is to grant the injunction but postpone its \neffect to a specified futur e date to give opportunity for \ntechnical advances to permit defendant to eliminate the \nnuisance; another is to grant the injunction conditioned on \nthe payment of permanent damages to plaintiffs which \nwould compensate them for the total economic loss to \ntheir property present and future caused by defendant\u2019s \noperations. For reasons which will be developed the court \nchooses the latter alternative. \nIf the injunction were to be granted unless within a short \nperiod \u2013 e.g., 18 months \u2013 the nuisance be abated by \n \n1 Respondent\u2019s investment in the plant is in excess of $45,000,000. There are over \n300 people employed there.", "proposition": ["The court found that plaintiffs had been damaged in various specific amounts up to the time of the trial.", "Damages were awarded to the respective plaintiffs for those amounts.", "An injunction was denied, allowing plaintiffs to maintain successive actions at law for damages as further damage was incurred.", "The court at Special Term found the amount of permanent damage attributable to each plaintiff for the guidance of the parties.", "The total of permanent damages to all plaintiffs was found to be $185,000.", "This basis of adjustment has not resulted in any stipulation by the parties.", "The result at Special Term and at the Appellate Division is a departure from a settled rule.", "Following the rule literally would close down the plant immediately, which the court wants to avoid.", "The court chooses the alternative of granting the injunction conditioned on the payment of permanent damages to plaintiffs.", "The respondent's investment in the plant is in excess of $45,000,000.", "There are over 300 people employed at the plant."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "61", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "46 \n instructions, and Steenberg argued that the road was \nblocked for safety reasons. \nThe employees, after beginning down the private road, \nultimately used a \u201cbobcat\u201d to cut a path through the \nJacques\u2019 snow -covered field and hauled the home across \nthe Jacques\u2019 land to the neighbor\u2019s lot. One employee \ntestified that upon returning to the office and informing the \nassistant manager that they had gone across the field, the \nassistant manager reacted by giggling and laughing. The \nother employee confirmed this testimon y. The assistant \nmanager disputed this testimony. \nWhen a neighbor informed the Jacques that Steenberg had, \nin fact, moved the mobile home across the Jacques\u2019 land, \nMr. Jacque called the Manitowoc County Sheriff\u2019s \nDepartment. After interviewing the parties and observing \nthe scene, an officer from the sheriff\u2019s department issued a \n$30 citation to Steenberg\u2019s assistant manager. \nThe Jacques commenced an intentional tort action in \nManitowoc County Circuit Court, Judge Allan J. Deehr \npresiding, seeking compensato ry and punitive damages \nfrom Steenberg. The case was tried before a jury on \nDecember 1, 1994. At the completion of the Jacques\u2019 case, \nSteenberg moved for a directed verdict under Wis. Stat. \u00a7 \n805.14(3). For purposes of the motion, Steenberg admitted \nto an intentional trespass to land, but asked the circuit \ncourt to find that the Jacques were not entitled to \ncompensatory damages or punitive damages based on \ninsufficiency of the evidence. The circuit court denied \nSteenberg\u2019s motion and the questions of puniti ve and \ncompensatory damages were submitted to the jury. The \njury awarded the Jacques $1 nominal damages and $100,000 \npunitive damages. Steenberg filed post -verdict motions \nclaiming that the punitive damage award must be set aside \nbecause Wisconsin law did not allow a punitive damage \naward unless the jury also awarded compensatory damages. \nAlternatively, Steenberg asked the circuit court to remit the", "proposition": ["Steenberg argued that the road was blocked for safety reasons.", "Employees moved a mobile home across the Jacques' land using a bobcat.", "An assistant manager giggled and laughed when informed that they had gone across the field.", "A neighbor informed the Jacques that Steenberg moved the mobile home across their land.", "The Jacques commenced an intentional tort action in Manitowoc County Circuit Court seeking compensation and punitive damages from Steenberg.", "The case was tried before a jury on December 1, 1994.", "Steenberg moved for a directed verdict under Wis. Stat. \u00a7 805.14(3), admitting to intentional trespass to land but disputing compensatory and punitive damages.", "The circuit court denied Steenberg's motion, and the questions of punitive and compensatory damages were submitted to the jury.", "The jury awarded the Jacques $1 nominal damages and $100,000 punitive damages.", "Steenberg filed post-verdict motions claiming that the punitive damage award must be set aside due to Wisconsin law requiring compensatory damages."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "318", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "303 \n 198 U. S. 118, 140. But we cannot concede that the right to \nequitable relief is confined to that class of cases . In the \npresent case the fraud upon complainant\u2019s rights is more \ndirect and obvious. Regarding news matter as the mere \nmaterial from which these two competing parties are \nendeavoring to make money, and treating it, therefore, as \nquasi property for the pur poses of their business because \nthey are both selling it as such, defendant\u2019s conduct differs \nfrom the ordinary case of unfair competition in trade \nprincipally in this that, instead of selling its own goods as \nthose of complainant, it substitutes misapprop riation in the \nplace of misrepresentation, and sells complainant\u2019s goods \nas its own. \nBesides the misappropriation, there are elements of \nimitation, of false pretense, in defendant\u2019s practices. The \ndevice of rewriting complainant\u2019s news articles, frequently \nresorted to, carries its own comment. The habitual failure \nto give credit to complainant for that which is taken is \nsignificant. Indeed, the entire system of appropriating \ncomplainant\u2019s news and transmitting it as a commercial \nproduct to defendant\u2019s clien ts and patrons amounts to a \nfalse representation to them and to their newspaper readers \nthat the news transmitted is the result of defendant\u2019s own \ninvestigation in the field. But these elements, although \naccentuating the wrong, are not the essence of it. I t is \nsomething more than the advantage of celebrity of which \ncomplainant is being deprived. \nThe doctrine of unclean hands is invoked as a bar to relief; \nit being insisted that defendant\u2019s practices against which \ncomplainant seeks an injunction are not diff erent from the \npractice attributed to complainant, of utilizing defendant\u2019s \nnews published by its subscribers. At this point it becomes \nnecessary to consider a distinction that is drawn by \ncomplainant, and, as we understand it, was recognized by \ndefendant also in the submission of proofs in the District \nCourt, between two kinds of use that may be made by one", "proposition": ["The Supreme Court case 303 198 U.S. 118, 140 discusses the right to equitable relief.", "In the present case, the fraud upon complainant's rights is more direct and obvious.", "News matter is treated as quasi property for the purposes of business by both competing parties.", "Defendant's conduct differs from ordinary cases of unfair competition in trade by misappropriation instead of misrepresentation.", "There are elements of imitation and false pretense in defendant's practices.", "The device of rewriting complainant's news articles is significant.", "The habitual failure to give credit to complainant for what is taken is also significant.", "The entire system of appropriating complainant's news and transmitting it as a commercial product amounts to a false representation.", "The essence of the wrong is something more than the advantage of celebrity that complainant is being deprived of.", "The doctrine of unclean hands is invoked as a bar to relief, with the argument that defendant's practices are not different from complainant's use of defendant's news published by its subscribers.", "A distinction is drawn between two kinds of use that may be made by one party: utilizing the other party's news for commercial purposes and using it for editorial purposes."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "594", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "579 \n 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 C al.Rptr. 323 (1979) (\u201cThe so -called \nright of publicity means in essence that the reaction of the \npublic to name and likeness \u2026 endows the name and \nlikeness of the person involved with commercially \nexploitable opportunities.\u201d); Guglielmi v. Spelling -Goldber g \nProds., 25 Cal.3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 457, 160 Cal.Rptr. 352, \n355 (1979) (use of name of Rudolph Valentino in fictional \nbiography allowed); Eastwood v. Superior Court, supra (use \nof photo and name of actor on cover of tabloid \nnewspaper); In re Weingand, 2 31 Cal.App.2d 289, 41 \nCal.Rptr. 778 (1964) (aspiring actor denied court approval \nto change name to \u201cPeter Lorie\u201d when famous actor Peter \nLorre objected); Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. \nCo., 138 Cal.App.2d 82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955), later app. 158 \nCal.App.2d 53, 322 P.2d 93 (1958) (use of attorney\u2019s name \nin advertisement); Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 38 C.2d \n273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) (use of photograph of a couple in \na magazine). \nNotwithstanding the fact that California case law clearly \nlimits the te st of the right to publicity to name and likeness, \nthe majority concludes that \u201cthe common law right of \npublicity is not so confined.\u201d Majority opinion at p. 1397. \nThe majority relies on two factors to support its innovative \nextension of the California law . The first is that the \nEastwood court\u2019s statement of the elements was permissive \nrather than exclusive. The second is that Dean Prosser, in \ndescribing the common law right to publicity, stated that it \nmight be possible that the right extended beyond name or \nlikeness.", "proposition": ["The right of publicity is essentially about the commercial exploitation of a person's name and likeness.", "The use of Rudolph Valentino's name in a fictional biography was allowed in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods.", "The use of a photo and name of an actor on the cover of a tabloid newspaper was allowed in Eastwood v. Superior Court.", "An aspiring actor was denied court approval to change his name to 'Peter Lorie' when famous actor Peter Lorre objected in In re Weingand.", "The use of an attorney's name in an advertisement was allowed in Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co.", "The use of a photograph of a couple in a magazine was allowed in Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.", "Despite the fact that California case law limits the test of the right to publicity to name and likeness, the majority in the case concludes that the common law right of publicity is not so confined."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "24", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "548. An article \ncasually dropped is within the rule. Where one went into a \nshop, and as he was leaving picked up a parcel of bank \nnotes, which was lying on the floor, and immed iately \nshowed them to the shopman, it was held that the facts did \nnot warrant the supposition that the notes had been \ndeposited there intentionally, they being manifestly lost by \nsome one, and there was no circumstance in the case to \ntake it out of the gen eral rule of law, that the finder of a", "proposition": ["The general rule of law is that the finder of a lost item should return it to its owner.", "In this case, the bank notes were manifestly lost by someone.", "The person who found the bank notes immediately showed them to the shopman.", "It was held that the facts did not warrant the supposition that the notes had been deposited there intentionally."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "589", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "574 \n (5) marketing channels used; \n(6) likely degree of purchaser care; \n(7) defendant\u2019s intent in selecting the mark; \n(8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. \n599 F.2d at 348 -49. We turn now to consider White\u2019s claim \nin lig ht of each factor. \nIn cases involving confusion over endorsement by a \ncelebrity plaintiff, \u201cmark\u201d means the celebrity\u2019s persona. \nSee Allen, 610 F.Supp. at 627. The \u201cstrength\u201d of the mark \nrefers to the level of recognition the celebrity enjoys among \nmembers of society. See Academy, 944 F.2d at 1455. If \nVanna White is unknown to the segment of the public at \nwhom Samsung\u2019s robot ad was directed, then that segment \ncould not be confused as to whether she was endorsing \nSamsung VCRs. Conversely, if White is well -known, this \nwould allow the possibility of a likelihood of confusion. \nFor the purposes of the Sleekcraft test, White\u2019s \u201cmark,\u201d or \ncelebrity identity, is strong. \nIn cases concerning confusion over celebrity endorsement, \nthe plaintiff\u2019s \u201cgoods\u201d concern the re asons for or source of \nthe plaintiff\u2019s fame. Because White\u2019s fame is based on her \ntelevised performances, her \u201cgoods\u201d are closely related to \nSamsung\u2019s VCRs. Indeed, the ad itself reinforced the \nrelationship by informing its readers that they would be \ntapin g the \u201clongest -running game show\u201d on Samsung\u2019s \nVCRs well into the future. \nThe third factor, \u201csimilarity of the marks,\u201d both supports \nand contradicts a finding of likelihood of confusion. On \nthe one hand, all of the aspects of the robot ad identify \nWhite; o n the other, the figure is quite clearly a robot, not a \nhuman. This ambiguity means that we must look to the \nother factors for resolution.", "proposition": ["There are 574 (5) marketing channels used.", "The likely degree of purchaser care is considered.", "The defendant's intent in selecting the mark is taken into account.", "The likelihood of expansion of the product lines is evaluated.", "In cases involving confusion over celebrity endorsement, 'mark' refers to the celebrity's persona.", "The 'strength' of the mark refers to the level of recognition the celebrity enjoys among members of society.", "If Vanna White is unknown to the segment of the public at whom Samsung's robot ad was directed, there is no possibility of a likelihood of confusion.", "If White is well-known, this allows the possibility of a likelihood of confusion.", "For the purposes of the Sleekcraft test, Vanna White's 'mark,' or celebrity identity, is strong.", "In cases concerning confusion over celebrity endorsement, the plaintiff's 'goods' concern the reasons for or source of the plaintiff's fame.", "Vanna White's fame is based on her televised performances, making her 'goods' closely related to Samsung's VCRs.", "The third factor, 'similarity of the marks,' both supports and contradicts a finding of likelihood of confusion, as the robot ad identifies White but also clearly shows a robot, not a human."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "695", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "680 \n Fletchers\u2019 claim to the two -feet-wide tract was ever \nobjected to by them or those who owned the property with \nthem. The defendants also presented evidence to show that \nonly the Blevins and Fletchers respec tively had control and \ndominion over the two -feet-wide tract. The defendants also \ntestified that they had exclusive control and dominion over \nthe two -feet-wide tract up until the time of this law suit. \nTo establish the element of \u201ccontinuous\u201d possession th e \ndefendants presented testimony that the Blevins enclosed, \nmaintained, cultivated and claimed ownership of the two -\nfeet-wide tract up until they sold their property to the \nFletchers.12 Mr. Fletcher testified that he maintained, \ncultivated and claimed owner ship of the two -feet-wide tract \nup until he sold the property to the defendants. The \ndefendants testified that they maintained, cultivated and \nclaimed ownership of the two -feet-wide tract up until the \ninstant law suit. \nTo establish the element of \u201cclaim of title\u201d the defendants \npresented evidence to show that neither the Blevins, \nFletchers nor the defendants had actual title to the two -\nfeet-wide tract, yet each claimed ownership of it pursuant \nto all of the above conduct, during their entire respective \noccupancy.13 \nBased upon the above evidence of tacking and adverse \npossession, the defendants contend that they established \nadverse possession under the clear and convincing evidence \nstandard. The trial court found that this evidence did not \nestablish tacking or adverse possession by clear and \nconvincing evidence. The trial court made this finding \n \n12 We have held that to establish \u201ccontinuous\u201d possess ion, evidence must be \npresented which shows that possession of disputed property was enclosed, \nmaintained or cultivated during the entire requisite ten -year period. \n13 We have held that to establish \u201cclaim of title,\u201d evidence must be presented \nwhich shows t hat possession of disputed property was claimed without actual title \nownership by the occupant during the entire requisite ten -year period.", "proposition": ["Fletchers claimed ownership of a two-feet-wide tract of land.", "No one objected to Fletchers' claim.", "Defendants presented evidence that only Blevins and Fletchers had control and dominion over the two-feet-wide tract.", "Defendants testified that they had exclusive control and dominion over the two-feet-wide tract until the time of the lawsuit.", "To establish \"continuous\" possession, defendants presented testimony about the Blevins' and Fletchers' maintenance and ownership of the tract.", "Mr. Fletcher testified that he maintained, cultivated, and claimed ownership of the tract until he sold the property to the defendants.", "Defendants testified that they maintained, cultivated, and claimed ownership of the tract until the instant law suit.", "To establish the element of \"claim of title\", defendants presented evidence that none of the parties had actual title to the two-feet-wide tract, yet each claimed ownership of it.", "Based on the evidence of tacking and adverse possession, defendants contend that they established adverse possession under the clear and convincing evidence standard.", "The trial court found that this evidence did not establish tacking or adverse possession by clear and convincing evidence.", "The trial court made this finding based on the holding that to establish \"continuous\" possession, evidence must be presented which shows that possession of disputed property was enclosed, maintained, or cultivated during the entire requisite ten-year period.", "The trial court also made this finding based on the holding that to establish \"claim of title\", evidence must be presented which shows that possession of disputed property was claimed without actual title ownership by the occupant during the entire requisite ten-year period."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "618", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "603 \n or contemplated active use of the [D]omain \n[N]ame by the Respondent that would not be \nillegitimate, such as by being a passing off, an \ninfringement of consumer protection legislation, \nor an infringement of the Complainant\u2019s rights \nunder trademark law\u201d. The words in quotation \nmarks come from Telstra Corporation Limited v \nNuclear Marshmallows WIPO Case No. D2000 -\n0003. In the Telstra case, the trademark in \nquestion was an invented word. In this case the \nmark in question is a common word in the \nEnglis h language, with a number of meanings. \nUnlike the situation in the Telstra case, therefore, \nit is far from inconceivable that there is a \nplausible legitimate use to which the Respondent \ncould put the domain name. The Respondent has \nasserted a legitimate us e to which he has put, and \nintends to put, the domain name. Whilst the \nevidence provided in support of this assertion is \nnot particularly strong, it is at least consistent \nwith that assertion, and with his overall \ncontention that he did not register and ha s not \nbeen using the domain name in bad faith. The \nComplainant has thus failed to satisfy the burden \nof proof on this point. \n7. Decision \n7.1 This Administrative Panel decides that the \nComplainant has not proven each of the three \nelements in paragraph 4(a) of the Uniform Policy \nin relation to the domain name the subject of the \nComplaint. \n7.2 Pursuant to paragraph 4(i) of the \nUniform Policy and paragraph 15 of \nthe Uniform Rules, this", "proposition": ["The case involves the domain name Domain Name and the Respondent's use of it.", "Illegitimate and passing off are mentioned in relation to the case.", "The passage refers to Telstra Corporation Limited v Nuclear Marshmallows WIPO Case No. D2000 - 0003.", "In the Telstra case, the trademark in question was an invented word.", "The mark in question in this case is a common word in the English language with multiple meanings.", "Unlike the Telstra case, it is not inconceivable that there is a plausible legitimate use for the domain name.", "The Respondent has asserted a legitimate use for the domain name.", "The evidence provided in support of this assertion is not particularly strong but is consistent with the Respondent's contention.", "The Complainant has failed to satisfy the burden of proof on this point.", "The Administrative Panel decides that the Complainant has not proven each of the three elements in paragraph 4(a) of the Uniform Policy in relation to the domain name.", "Pursuant to paragraph 4(i) of the Uniform Policy and paragraph 15 of the Uniform Rules, the Administrative Panel makes a decision."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "209", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "He that had as good left for his improvement, as was \nalready taken up, needed not complain, ought not to meddle with \nwhat was alread y improved by another\u2019s labour: if he did, it is plain \nhe desired the benefit of another\u2019s pains, which he had no right to, \nand not the ground which God had given him in common with \nothers to labour on, and whereof there was as good left, as that \nalready p ossessed, and more than he knew what to do with, or his \nindustry could reach to.", "proposition": ["He who had as good land left for his improvement did not need to complain.", "He ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labor.", "If he did meddle, it is plain that he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to.", "The land that God had given him in common with others was still available for him to labor on.", "There was as good land left as that already possessed, and more than he knew what to do with or his industry could reach to."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "282", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "267 \n part of it or in it or subject to his \ncontrol; but when they escape and go \ninto other land or come under \nanother\u2019s control, the title of the \nformer owner is gone. If an adjoining \nowner drills his own land and taps a \ndeposit of oil or gas extending under \nhis neighbor\u2019s field, so that it comes \ninto his well, it becomes his property.\u201d \n* * * \n(Quoting Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 665, 15 S.Ct. 245, 39 \nL.Ed. 304 (1895)). Budd v. Ethyl Corp., supra, 474 S.W.2d \nat 412. \nSince Young\u2019s tract is within the recycling area, the state \ncourt\u2019s disposition of Budd\u2019s cause of action with respect \nto the 240 -acre tract is not controlling. \nHaving disposed of the cause of action with respect to the \ntract lying outside of the recycling area, the Arkansas court \nturned to Budd\u2019s second cause of action, which was based \non a 40 -acre tract which the court found to be within the \nrecycling area that is, within the defendants\u2019 circle of \ninjection wells. Budd owned only an undivided leasehold \ninterest in the 40 -acre tract, and the defendants owned all \nthe rest of the tract comprising the fee simple and the \nremaining leasehold. Although the court could once again \nhave relied on the law of capture, it did not do so.3 Instead, \nit denied relief because of Budd\u2019s limited interest in the \nproperty. The court stressed that Budd owned only an \n\u201cinchoate\u201d interest in the 40 -acre tract: the right to drill for \nminerals if he wished to do so. \u201cThus there is no trespass \n \n3 The dissenter spoke as if he thought that the majority was applying the l aw of \ncapture to the tract within the recycling unit. See Budd v. Ethyl Corp., 251 Ark. \n639, 474 S.W.2d 411, 414 (1971) (Byrd, J., dissenting). We do not read the \nmajority opinion to have done so.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses property ownership, specifically in relation to oil and gas deposits.", "The passage references a case called Budd v. Ethyl Corp. and explains how the court's decision in that case is not controlling for the current situation.", "The passage mentions another case, Brown v. Spilman, which is quoted as a precedent.", "Young's tract is within the recycling area, so the state court's disposition of Budd's cause of action with respect to the 240-acre tract is not controlling.", "The Arkansas court turned to Budd's second cause of action, which was based on a 40-acre tract within the recycling area.", "Budd owned only an undivided leasehold interest in the 40-acre tract, while the defendants owned all the rest of the tract comprising the fee simple and the remaining leasehold.", "The court denied relief because of Budd's limited interest in the property.", "The court stressed that Budd owned only an 'inchoate' interest in the 40-acre tract, which was the right to drill for minerals if he wished to do so.", "The passage does not suggest that the majority opinion applied the law of capture to the tract within the recycling unit."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "20", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "5 \n At the tri al in the superior court, before Morton, J., it \nappeared that the defendant was a barber, and the plaintiff, \nbeing a customer in the defendant\u2019s shop, saw and took up \na pocket -book which was lying upon a table there, and said, \n\u201cSee what I have found.\u201d The defendant came to the table \nand asked where he found it. The plaintiff laid it back in the \nsame place and said, \u201cI found it right there.\u201d The defendant \nthen took it and counted the money, and the plaintiff told \nhim to keep it, and if the owner should come to give it to \nhim; and otherwise to advertise it; which the defendant \npromised to do. Subsequently the plaintiff made three \ndemands for the money, and the defendant never claimed \nto hold the same till the last demand. It was agreed that the \npocket -book was placed upon the table by a transient \ncustomer of the defendant and accidentally left there, and \nwas first seen and taken up by the plaintiff, and that the \nowner had not been found. \nThe judge ruled that the plaintiff could not maintain his \naction, and a ve rdict was accordingly returned for the \ndefendant; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions. \nDEWEY , J. \nIt seems to be the settled law that the finder of lost \nproperty has a valid claim to the same against all the world \nexcept the true owner, and generally that the place in which \nit is found creates no exception to this rule. 2 Parsons on \nCon. 97. Bridges v. Hawkesworth , 7 Eng. Law & Eq. R. 424. \nBut this property is not, under the circumstances, to be \ntreated as lost property in that sense in which a finder has a \nvalid claim to hold the same until called for by the true \nowner. This property was voluntarily placed upon a table in \nthe defendant\u2019s shop by a customer of his who accidentally \nleft the same there and has never called for it. The plaintiff \nalso came there as a customer, and first saw the same and \ntook it up from the table. The plaintiff did not by this \nacquire the right to take the property from the shop, but it", "proposition": ["At the trial in the superior court, before Morton, J., it appeared that the defendant was a barber.", "The plaintiff, being a customer in the defendant\u2019s shop, saw and took up a pocket-book which was lying upon a table there, and said, \u2018See what I have found.\u2019", "The defendant came to the table and asked where he found it.", "The plaintiff laid it back in the same place and said, \u2018I found it right there.\u2019", "The defendant then took it and counted the money, and the plaintiff told him to keep it, and if the owner should come to give it to him; and otherwise to advertise it; which the defendant promised to do.", "Subsequently the plaintiff made three demands for the money, and the defendant did not claim to hold the same until the last demand.", "It was agreed that the pocket-book was placed upon the table by a transient customer of the defendant and accidentally left there.", "The plaintiff first saw and took up the pocket-book, and the owner had not been found.", "The judge ruled that the plaintiff could not maintain his action, and a verdict was accordingly returned for the defendant; and the plaintiff alleged exceptions.", "According to the settled law, the finder of lost property has a valid claim to the same against all the world except the true owner, and the place where it is found does not create an exception to this rule.", "Under the circumstances, the property is not to be treated as lost property in the sense that the finder has a valid claim to hold it until called for by the true owner.", "The pocket-book was voluntarily placed upon a table in the defendant\u2019s shop by a customer who accidentally left it there and has never called for it.", "The plaintiff came to the defendant\u2019s shop as a customer and first saw the pocket-book on the table, then took it up.", "The plaintiff did not by this action acquire the right to take the property from the shop."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "614", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "599 \n 6.6 In light of the fact that the word \u201csting\u201d is in \ncommon usage in the English language, with a \nnumber of meanings , this case can be \ndistinguished from the other cases cited above in \nwhich the Complainants\u2019 personal name was \nfound also to be an unregistered trademark or \nservice mark to which the Uniform Policy \napplies. This Administrative Panel is inclined to \nthe view , therefore, that the Complainant\u2019s name \nSTING is not a trademark or service mark within \nthe scope of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Uniform \nPolicy. However, it is not necessary to reach a \nformal decision on this issue, because this \nAdministrative Panel finds ag ainst the \nComplainant on other grounds, namely that the \nrequirement of paragraph 4(a)(iii) is not met, as \ndiscussed below. \nRespondent\u2019s Rights or Legitimate Interests in the \nDomain Name \n6.7 The Respondent provided evidence of \ncircumstances of the type spec ified in paragraph \n4(c) of the Uniform Policy as giving rise to a \nright to or legitimate interest in the domain \nname. In particular, the Respondent provided in \nExhibit C of the Response copies of various \nemail communications to him prior to the \ncommencemen t of this dispute, showing that the \n\u201cUserName\u201d, the \u201cnickname\u201d, the \u201cScreen \nName\u201d, or the \u201cAccount PIC\u201d under which the \nRespondent had registered for global internet \ngaming services consisted of or included the \nword \u201csting\u201d. In Exhibit D to the Response, t he \nRespondent provided copies of web page \nprintouts from The Champions League of \nQuake, a service which monitors Quake servers", "proposition": ["The word 'sting' is in common usage in the English language with a number of meanings.", "This case can be distinguished from other cases where the Complainants' personal name was found to be an unregistered trademark or service mark to which the Uniform Policy applies.", "The Administrative Panel is inclined to the view that the Complainant's name STING is not a trademark or service mark within the scope of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Uniform Policy.", "It is not necessary to reach a formal decision on this issue because the Administrative Panel finds against the Complainant on other grounds.", "The requirement of paragraph 4(a)(iii) is not met, as discussed below.", "The Respondent provided evidence of circumstances specified in paragraph 4(c) of the Uniform Policy as giving rise to a right to or legitimate interest in the domain name.", "The Respondent provided copies of various email communications prior to the commencement of the dispute, showing that the 'UserName', 'nickname', 'Screen Name', or 'Account PIC' under which the Respondent had registered for global internet gaming services consisted of or included the word 'sting'.", "The Respondent provided copies of web page printouts from The Champions League of Quake, a service which monitors Quake servers."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "135", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "120 \n deference to the public waterworks \nand sewer; the terrace and the garden, \nto the need for more complete \noccupancy\u2026. Strict limitation [on the \nrecognition of easements of light and \nair over adjacent premises is] in accord \nwith the popula r conception upon \nwhich real estate has been and is daily \nbeing conveyed in Wisconsin and to \nbe essential to easy and rapid \ndevelopment at least of our \nmunicipalities. \nMiller v. Hoeschler , supra, 126 Wis. at 268, 270; quoted with \napproval in Depner , supra, 202 Wis. at 409. \nConsidering these three policies, this court concluded that \nin the absence of an express agreement granting access to \nsunlight, a landowner\u2019s obstruction of another\u2019s access to \nsunlight was not actionable. Miller v. Hoeschler , supra, 126 \nWis. at 271; Depner v. United States National Bank , supra, 202 \nWis. at 410. These three policies are no longer fully \naccepted or applicable. They reflect factual circumstances \nand social priorities that are now obsolete. \nFirst, society has increasingly reg ulated the use of land by \nthe landowner for the general welfare. Euclid v. Ambler \nRealty Co. , 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Just v. Marinette , 56 Wis. 2d 7 \n(1972). \nSecond, access to sunlight has taken on a new significance \nin recent years. In this case the plaintif f seeks to protect \naccess to sunlight, not for aesthetic reasons or as a source \nof illumination but as a source of energy. Access to sunlight \nas an energy source is of significance both to the landowner", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the three policies related to easements of light and air over adjacent premises in Wisconsin.", "These policies were considered essential for easy and rapid development in Wisconsin.", "These three policies are no longer fully accepted or applicable.", "They reflect outdated factual circumstances and social priorities.", "Society has increasingly regulated the use of land by the landowner for the general welfare.", "Access to sunlight has taken on a new significance in recent years.", "In this case, the plaintiff seeks to protect access to sunlight as a source of energy, not for aesthetic reasons or as a source of illumination."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "125", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "110 \n Answers \n1. To obtain nominal damages, a plaintiff must show at least some \nform of loss. \nFalse: It\u2019s impossible to avoid all ambiguity here, but nominal \ndamages are awarded for some causes of action (like trespass \nto land) even in the absence of any loss. While it\u2019s possible to \nconstrue \u201closs\u201d so broadly as to include bare violation of a \nlegal right, I don\u2019t think that\u2019s the most reasonable \nconstruction. \n2. Even if consent is obtained by fraud, it may negate trespass. \nTrue: This is Desnick . Note I used the word \u201cmay\u201d here. \nDesni ck does not hold that any entrance to property obtained \nby lying about one\u2019s purpose is ok, only that dishonestly \nobtained consent does not amount to trespass where the entry \ndoes not cause the injuries against which trespass is designed \nto protect. \n3. For the Adams court, vibrations interfering with one\u2019s property \nwould not be considered a trespass unless they were so intense that \nthey physically damaged or destroyed structures on the plaintiff\u2019s \nland. \nFalse: See n.12. Such vibrations are obviously h armful, but \nthey aren\u2019t a violation of the landowners right to exclude but \nrather his or her right to use/enjoy the property, a right \nprotected in nuisance. \n4. The Fountainebleau hotel extension would clearly harm the \nEden Roc hotel by casting a shadow ove r the pool area. The \u201csic \nutere\u201d formulation - that one\u2019s right to use one\u2019s property is limited \nonly to the extent a use would harm others - would seem to dictate \nthat Fountainebleau\u2019s harmful use not be allowed. How did the \ncourt deal with \u201csic utere\u201d?", "proposition": ["1. A plaintiff must show at least some form of loss to obtain nominal damages.", "2. Nominal damages can be awarded for some causes of action, such as trespass to land, even in the absence of any loss.", "3. It is possible to construe 'loss' broadly enough to include a bare violation of a legal right, but the passage does not believe this is the most reasonable construction."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "383", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "In this way, oil is decomposed into simpler substances which can serve \nas food for aquatic life. However, fo r various reasons, only a portion of any such \nmixed culture survives to attack the oil spill. By breaking down multiple \ncomponents of oil, Chakrabarty\u2019s micro -organism promises more efficient and \nrapid oil -spill control.", "proposition": ["Oil can be decomposed into simpler substances. These simpler substances can serve as food for aquatic life. However, only a portion of any mixed culture survives to attack the oil spill. Chakrabarty's micro-organism breaks down multiple components of oil. Chakrabarty's micro-organism promises more efficient and rapid oil-spill control."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "364", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "502, 33 Stat. \n724, which retained that c ommon -law definition, the Court \nquestioned \u201dwhether mere color can constitute a valid \ntrade -mark,\u201d A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & \nBascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171, 26 S.Ct. 425, 426, 50", "proposition": ["The Court questioned whether mere color can constitute a valid trade-mark.", "A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. is a case where the Court discussed the validity of trade-marks."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "189", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Sanford, in reply. The only authority relied on is that of \nan annotator. On the question now before the court, we \nhave taken our principles from the civil code, an d nothing \nhas been urged to impeach those quoted from the authors \nreferred to. \nTOMPKINS , J. delivered the opinion of the court. \nThis cause comes before us on a return to a certiorari \ndirected to one of the justices of Queens county. \nThe question submitted by the counsel in this cause for our \ndetermination is, whether Lodowick Post, by the pursuit", "proposition": ["Value error: json output should start and end with { and }"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "229", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "4, belonging to the defendants, \npassed him on the 28th of September, and within two days \nwas placed over the wreck, and thenceforward the \ndefendants were its occupants in fact, and claimed to b e so \nby right.", "proposition": ["The defendants had possession of number 4 on the 28th of September.", "Within two days, number 4 was placed over the wreck.", "The defendants were the occupants of number 4 from that point onwards.", "The defendants claimed to be the occupants of number 4 by right."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "442", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The fact that \nRandall chose to convey her criticisms of GW TW through \na work of fiction, which she contends is a more powerful \nvehicle for her message than a scholarly article, does not, in", "proposition": ["Randall believes that fiction is a more powerful vehicle for her message than a scholarly article."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "504", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "489 \n The question is thus whether the Betamax is capable of \ncommercially significant nonin fringing uses. In order to \nresolve that question, we need not explore all the different \npotential uses of the machine and determine whether or \nnot they would constitute infringement. Rather, we need \nonly consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by \nthe district court a significant number of them would be \nnon-infringing. Moreover, in order to resolve this case we \nneed not give precise content to the question of how much \nuse is commercially significant. For one potential use of the \nBetamax plainly s atisfies this standard, however it is \nunderstood: private, noncommercial time -shifting in the \nhome. It does so both (A) because respondents have no \nright to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it \nfor their programs, and (B) because the Distric t Court\u2019s \nfactual findings reveal that even the unauthorized home \ntime-shifting of respondents\u2019 programs is legitimate fair \nuse. \nA. Authorized Time Shifting \nEach of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable \ncopyrights, but in the total spectrum of television \nprogramming their combined market share is small. The \nexact percentage is not specified, but it is well below 10%.5 \nIf they were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would \nhave a significant impact on both the producers and the \nviewers of the remaining 90% of the programming in the \nNation. No doubt, many other producers share \nrespondents\u2019 concern about the possible consequences of \nunrestricted copying. Nevertheless the findings of the \nDistrict Court make it clear that time -shifting may enl arge \nthe total viewing audience and that many producers are \n \n5 The record suggests that Disney\u2019s programs at the time of trial consisted of \napproximately one hour a week of network television and one syndicated series. \nUnivers al\u2019s percentage in the Los Angeles market on commercial television \nstations was under 5%. See Tr. 532 -533, 549 -550.", "proposition": ["The question is whether the Betamax is capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses.", "We need not explore all the different potential uses of the machine and determine whether or not they would constitute infringement.", "We need only consider whether on the basis of the facts as found by the district court a significant number of them would be non-infringing.", "We need not give precise content to the question of how much use is commercially significant.", "For one potential use of the Betamax plainly satisfies this standard, however it is understood: private, noncommercial time-shifting in the home.", "Respondents have no right to prevent other copyright holders from authorizing it for their programs, and because the District Court\u2019s factual findings reveal that even the unauthorized home time-shifting of respondents\u2019 programs is legitimate fair use.", "Each of the respondents owns a large inventory of valuable copyrights.", "In the total spectrum of television programming, their combined market share is small.", "The exact percentage is not specified, but it is well below 10%.", "If they were to prevail, the outcome of this litigation would have a significant impact on both the producers and the viewers of the remaining 90% of the programming in the Nation.", "No doubt, many other producers share respondents\u2019 concern about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying.", "Nevertheless, the findings of the District Court make it clear that time-shifting may enlarge the total viewing audience and that many producers are concerned about the possible consequences of unrestricted copying.", "The record suggests that Disney\u2019s programs at the time of trial consisted of approximately one hour a week of network television and one syndicated series.", "Universal\u2019s percentage in the Los Angeles market on commercial television stations was under 5%.", "See Tr. 532 -533, 549 -550."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "496", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "481 \n that, if a work is still commercially availa ble, it earns as \nmuch as it did in a year shortly after its creation. \nB \nConclusions regarding the economic significance of \u201cworks \nmade for hire\u201d are judgmental because statistical \ninformation about the ratio of \u201cfor hire\u201d works to all works \nis scarce. But we know that, as of 1955, copyrights on \u201cfor \nhire\u201d works accounted for 40% of newly registered \ncopyrights. We also know that copyrights on works \ntypically made for hire \u2013 feature -length movies \u2013 were \nrenewed, and since the 1930\u2019s apparently have remained \ncommercially viable, at a higher than average rate. Further, \nwe know that \u201charmonization\u201d looks to benefit United \nStates exports and that films and sound recordings account \nfor the dominant share of export revenues earned by new \ncopyrighted works of potenti al lasting commercial value ( i. \ne., works other than computer software). It also appears \ngenerally accepted that, in these categories, \u201cfor hire\u201d \nworks predominate. Taken together, these circumstances \nsupport the conclusion in the text that the extension f ails to \ncreate uniformity where it would appear to be most \nimportant \u2013 pre-1978 copyrighted works nearing the end of \ntheir pre -extension terms, and works made for hire. \n3.4.4. Secondary Liability \nSony Corp. of America v. Universal Ci ty Studios, 464 \nU.S. 417 (1983) \nDean C. Dunlavey, Los Angeles, Cal., for petitioners. \nStephen A. Kroft, Beverly Hills, Cal., for respondents. \nJUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. \nPetitioners manufacture and sell home video tape \nrecorders. Respondents own the copyrights on some of the \ntelevision programs that are broadcast on the public \nairwaves. Some members of the general public use video", "proposition": ["The economic significance of 'works made for hire' is difficult to determine due to limited statistical information.", "Copyrights on 'for hire' works accounted for 40% of newly registered copyrights as of 1955.", "Feature-length movies, a type of work typically made for hire, have had their copyrights renewed and remain commercially viable at a higher than average rate since the 1930s.", "Harmonization benefits United States exports, particularly in film and sound recording categories.", "It is generally accepted that 'for hire' works dominate in film and sound recording categories.", "The Copyright Term Extension Act fails to create uniformity for pre-1978 copyrighted works nearing the end of their pre-extension terms and works made for hire.", "Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios (1983) involved a dispute between petitioners who manufacture and sell home video tape recorders and respondents who own the copyrights on some television programs.", "Some members of the general public use video tape recorders to record television programs without obtaining permission from the copyright holders.", "The Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios (1983) ruled that the petitioners are not liable for the copyright infringement committed by the general public using their products."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "236", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "221 \n should give a legal character to his acts, making that to be \npossession which the law declares not to be possession, \nassume more than a court can sanction. Marking trees that \nextended across the wreck, affixing temporar y buoys to it \nwere not acts of possession; they only indicated Brazelton\u2019s \ndesire or intention to appropriate the property. Placing his \nboat over the wreck, with the means to raise its valuables, \nand with persistent efforts directed to raising the lead, \nwould have been keeping the only effectual guard over it, \nwould have been the only warning that intruders, that is, \nother longing occupants would be obliged to regard, would \nhave been such acts of possession as the law would notice \nand protect. If Brazelton in the winter of 1855, deferred \nraising the lead to wreck the steamboat Eliza, he was free to \ndo so, but must abide the legal consequences of his choice. \nIf afterwards he could not work in the main channel of the \nriver, owing to high water, strong wind, or to damaged \nboats and rigging, his ill fortune could not bend the law to \nhis circumstances, nor could he with right warn off the \ndefendants from the occupancy of the America, when they \nwere as willing and more able than himself to raise the lead \nin her hol d. \nThe following adjudged cases may have a bearing upon this \ncase, and illustrate the general principles of the last cited \nauthorities: \nIn Pierson v. Post , 3 Caines Rep., the plaintiff was pursuing a \nfox and had not got it within his control; and the defen dant \nwas held not to be liable for killing it. The plaintiff had \nestablished no claim by occupancy. His intention against \nthe fox was unmistakable, but his act of possession was \nincomplete. \nMarking a bee -tree was a more emphatic claim against the \nbees than Brazelton\u2019s marks were upon the wreck, but was \nnot sufficient to vest a right in the finder. Gillet v. Mason , 7 \nJhs. 17.", "proposition": ["In the winter of 1855, Brazelton deferred raising the lead from the wreck of the steamboat Eliza.", "Brazelton marked trees that extended across the wreck and affixed temporary buoys to them, indicating his desire or intention to appropriate the property.", "Placing his boat over the wreck, with the means to raise its valuables, and with persistent efforts directed to raising the lead would have been acts of possession that the law would notice and protect.", "If Brazelton could not work in the main channel of the river due to high water, strong wind, or damaged boats and rigging, his ill fortune could not bend the law to his circumstances.", "The defendants were as willing and more able than Brazelton to raise the lead in the wreck of the steamboat America.", "The following adjudged cases may have a bearing on this case and illustrate the general principles of the last cited authorities: Pierson v. Post and Gillett v. Mason.", "In Pierson v. Post, the plaintiff was pursuing a fox and had not gained control of it; the defendant was held not to be liable for killing it, as the plaintiff had not established a claim by occupancy.", "Marking a bee-tree was a more emphatic claim against the bees than Brazelton's marks on the wreck, but it was not sufficient to vest a right in the finder."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "446", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "431 \n original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the \ncreation of its victim\u2019s (or collective victims\u2019) imagination.\u201d \nCampbell, 510 U.S. at 580 -81. Thus, Randall has fully \nemployed those conscripted elements from GWTW to \nmake war against it. Her work, TWDG, reflects \ntransformative value because it \u201ccan provide social ben efit, \nby shedding light on an earlier work, and, in the process, \ncreating a new one.\u201d Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. \nWhile \u201ctransformative use is not absolutely necessary for a \nfinding of fair use, \u2026 the more transformative the new \nwork, the less will be the s ignificance of other factors.\u201d Id. \nIn the case of TWDG, consideration of this factor certainly \nmilitates in favor of a finding of fair use, and, informs our \nanalysis of the other factors, particularly the fourth, as \ndiscussed below. \nii. Nature of the Copyrighted Work \nThe second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, \nrecognizes that there is a hierarchy of copyright protection \nin which original, creative works are afforded greater \nprotection than derivative works or factual compilations. \nId. at 586 . GWTW is undoubtedly entitled to the greatest \ndegree of protection as an original work of fiction. This \nfactor is given little weight in parody cases, however, \u201csince \nparodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive \nworks.\u201d Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. \niii. Amount and Substantiality of the \nPortion Used \nThe third fair -use factor is \u201cthe amount and substantiality \nof the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a \nwhole.\u201d \u00a7 107(3). It is at this point that parody presents \nuniquely difficult problems for courts in the fair -use \ncontext, for \u201c[p]arody\u2019s humor, or in any event its \ncomment, necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to", "proposition": ["Randall has fully employed those conscripted elements from GWTW to make war against it.", "Randall's work, TWDG, reflects transformative value because it can provide social benefit by shedding light on an earlier work and, in the process, creating a new one.", "Transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, but the more transformative the new work, the less significant the other factors are.", "Consideration of the transformative nature of TWDG in favor of a finding of fair use.", "GWTW is entitled to the greatest degree of protection as an original work of fiction.", "The second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, recognizes a hierarchy of copyright protection, with original, creative works receiving greater protection than derivative works or factual compilations.", "Parody cases are given little weight in the second factor, as parodies almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works.", "The third fair-use factor is the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.", "Parody presents uniquely difficult problems for courts in the fair-use context, as parody's humor or comment necessarily springs from recognizable allusion to the copyrighted work."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "521", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "506 \n networks to dissem inate files, Shakespeare being an \nexample. Indeed, StreamCast has given Morpheus users the \nopportunity to download the briefs in this very case, \nthough their popularity has not been quantified. \nAs for quantification, the parties\u2019 anecdotal and statistical \nevidence entered thus far to show the content available on \nthe FastTrack and Gnutella networks does not say much \nabout which files are actually downloaded by users, and no \none can say how often the software is used to obtain copies \nof unprotected material. But MGM\u2019s evidence gives reason \nto think that the vast majority of users\u2019 downloads are acts \nof infringement, and because well over 100 million copies \nof the software in question are known to have been \ndownloaded, and billions of files are shared across t he \nFastTrack and Gnutella networks each month, the probable \nscope of copyright infringement is staggering. \nGrokster and StreamCast concede the infringement in most \ndownloads, and it is uncontested that they are aware that \nusers employ their software primar ily to download \ncopyrighted files, even if the decentralized FastTrack and \nGnutella networks fail to reveal which files are being \ncopied, and when. From time to time, moreover, the \ncompanies have learned about their users\u2019 infringement \ndirectly, as from us ers who have sent e -mail to each \ncompany with questions about playing copyrighted movies \nthey had downloaded, to whom the companies have \nresponded with guidance. And MGM notified the \ncompanies of 8 million copyrighted files that could be \nobtained using the ir software. \nGrokster and StreamCast are not, however, merely passive \nrecipients of information about infringing use. The record \nis replete with evidence that from the moment Grokster \nand StreamCast began to distribute their free software, each \none clearly voiced the objective that recipients use it to \ndownload copyrighted works, and each took active steps to \nencourage infringement.", "proposition": ["506 networks disseminate files, with Shakespeare being an example.", "StreamCast has given Morpheus users the opportunity to download briefs in this case.", "The popularity of these briefs has not been quantified.", "The parties' anecdotal and statistical evidence does not say much about which files are actually downloaded by users.", "No one can say how often the software is used to obtain copies of unprotected material.", "MGM's evidence suggests that the vast majority of users' downloads are acts of infringement.", "Over 100 million copies of the software in question are known to have been downloaded.", "Billions of files are shared across the FastTrack and Gnutella networks each month.", "The probable scope of copyright infringement is staggering.", "Grokster and StreamCast concede the infringement in most downloads.", "It is uncontested that users primarily employ the software to download copyrighted files.", "The decentralized FastTrack and Gnutella networks do not reveal which files are being copied or when.", "Grokster and StreamCast have received information about their users' infringement, such as emails from users asking about playing copyrighted movies they had downloaded.", "MGM notified the companies of 8 million copyrighted files that could be obtained using their software.", "Grokster and StreamCast are not merely passive recipients of information about infringing use.", "Evidence shows that both companies clearly voiced the objective that recipients use their software to download copyrighted works and took active steps to encourage infringement since the distribution of their free software."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "553", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Think about the different kinds of evidence we could consider. The \nabundance of streams that do no forbid copying of this sort? Just \nbecause there may be many such streams does not mean that their \ncopying is a substantial part of the copyi ng Streamers users actually", "proposition": ["The different kinds of evidence we could consider vary across different streams.", "There are many streams that do not forbid copying of this sort.", "Just because there may be many such streams does not mean that their copying is a substantial part of the copying Streamers users actually."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "666", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "651 \n * *.\u201d ( Barry v. Guild (1888), 126 Ill. 439.) \u201c(T)here is a \ngeneral concurrence that something more than the mere \nexistence of a paramount title is necessary to constitute a \nbreach of the covenant of warranty.\u201d ( Scott v. Kirkendall \n(1878), 88 Ill. 465, 467 .) \u201cA mere want of title is no breach \nof this covenant. There must not only be a want of title, \nbut there must be an ouster under a paramount title.\u201d Moore \nv. Vail (1855), 17 Ill. 185, 189. \nThe question is whether plaintiffs have alleged facts \nsufficient t o constitute a constructive eviction. They argue \nthat if a covenantee fails in his effort to sell an interest in \nland because he discovers that he does not own what his \nwarranty deed purported to convey, he has suffered a \nconstructive eviction and is there by entitled to bring an \naction against his grantor for breach of the covenant of \nquiet enjoyment. We think that the decision of this court in \nScott v. Kirkendall (1878), 88 Ill. 465, is controlling on this \nissue and compels us to reject plaintiffs\u2019 argumen t. \nIn Scott, an action was brought for breach of the covenant \nof warranty by a grantee who discovered that other parties \nhad paramount title to the land in question. The land was \nvacant and unoccupied at all relevant times. This court, in \nrejecting the gra ntee\u2019s claim that there was a breach of the \ncovenant of quiet enjoyment, quoted the earlier decision in \nMoore v. Vail (1855), 17 Ill. 185, 191: \n\u201cUntil that time, (the taking possession \nby the owner of the paramount title,) \nhe might peaceably have entered u pon \nand enjoyed the premises, without \nresistance or molestation, which was \nall his grantors covenanted he should \ndo. They did not guarantee to him a \nperfect title, but the possession and \nenjoyment of the premises.\u201d \n88 Ill. 465, 468.", "proposition": ["In the case of Barry v. Guild (1888), the Illinois Supreme Court stated that there is a general concurrence that something more than the mere existence of a paramount title is necessary to constitute a breach of the covenant of warranty.", "The passage quotes Scott v. Kirkendall (1878), which states that a mere want of title is no breach of this covenant; there must not only be a want of title, but there must be an ouster under a paramount title.", "The passage discusses the case of Moore v. Vail (1855), which held that until the time of the ouster under a paramount title, the grantee might peaceably have entered upon and enjoyed the premises, without resistance or molestation, which was all his grantors covenanted he should do.", "The passage introduces the case at hand, where plaintiffs argue that if a covenantee fails in his effort to sell an interest in land because he discovers that he does not own what his warranty deed purported to convey, he has suffered a constructive eviction and is there by entitled to bring an action against his grantor for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.", "The passage states that the decision in Scott v. Kirkendall (1878) is controlling on this issue and compels the court to reject plaintiffs' argument.", "The passage quotes Scott v. Kirkendall (1878) again, stating that a grantee who discovers that other parties have paramount title to the land in question cannot claim a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, as the grantors did not guarantee a perfect title but the possession and enjoyment of the premises."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "605", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "590 \n Schwarzenegger could sue body builders who are \ncompensated for appearing in public. \nThe majority\u2019s reading of the Lanham Act would provide a \nbasis for \u201ccommercial\u201d enterprises to maintain an action \nfor section 43(a) v iolations even in the absence of \nconfusion or deception. May Black and Decker, maker of \nthe \u201cDustbuster\u201d portable vacuum, now sue \u201cBust -\ndusters,\u201d the Los Angeles topless cleaning service. Can the \nLos Angeles Kings hockey team state a cause of action \nagains t the City of Las Vegas for its billboards reading \n\u201cL.A. has the Kings, but we have the Aces.\u201d \nDirect competitive advertising could also be affected. Will \nBMW, which advertises its automobiles as \u201cthe ultimate \ndriving machine,\u201d be able to maintain an actio n against \nToyota for advertising one of its cars as \u201cthe ultimate \nsaving machine\u201d? Can Coca Cola sue Pepsi because it \ndepicted a bottle of Coca Cola in its televised \u201ctaste test\u201d? \nIndeed, any advertisement which shows a competitor\u2019s \nproduct, or any recogni zable brand name, would appear to \nbe liable for damages under the majority\u2019s view of the \napplicable law. Under the majority\u2019s analysis, even the \ndepiction of an obvious facsimile of a competitor\u2019s product \nmay provide sufficient basis for the maintenance of an \naction for damages. \nV. CONCLUSION \nThe protection of intellectual property presents the courts \nwith the necessity of balancing competing interests. On the \none hand, we wish to protect and reward the work and \ninvestment of those who create intellectual p roperty. In so \ndoing, however, we must prevent the creation of a \nmonopoly that would inhibit the creative expressions of \nothers. We have traditionally balanced those interests by \nallowing the copying of an idea, but protecting a unique \nexpression of it. Sa msung clearly used the idea of a \nglamorous female game show hostess. Just as clearly, it", "proposition": ["The majority's reading of the Lanham Act could provide a basis for commercial enterprises to maintain an action for section 43(a) violations even in the absence of confusion or deception.", "May Black and Decker, maker of the \"Dustbuster\" portable vacuum, sue \"Bust-dusters\", the Los Angeles topless cleaning service, for using a similar name.", "The Los Angeles Kings hockey team could state a cause of action against the City of Las Vegas for its billboards reading \"L.A. has the Kings, but we have the Aces.\".", "Direct competitive advertising could be affected by the majority's reading of the Lanham Act.", "BMW, which advertises its automobiles as \"the ultimate driving machine\", might be able to maintain an action against Toyota for advertising one of its cars as \"the ultimate saving machine.\".", "Coca Cola could sue Pepsi for depicting a bottle of Coca Cola in its televised \"taste test.\".", "The protection of intellectual property requires balancing competing interests: protecting and rewarding creators while preventing the creation of a monopoly that would inhibit the creative expressions of others.", "Samsung clearly used the idea of a glamorous female game show hostess, but it is unclear whether it protected a unique expression of that idea."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "113", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "446, 180 \nN.W.2d 337 (1970), for the proposition that the law of \ntrespass in this state does not concern itself with whether \n \n13 See also Reynolds, supra at 228 (\u201cthe old element of trespass that prescribed a \ndirect invasion of the plaintiff\u2019s interests s till has significance\u201d [emphasis in \noriginal]).", "proposition": ["The case 446, 180 N.W.2d 337 (1970) supports the proposition.", "The law of trespass in this state does not concern itself with whether.", "Reynolds, supra at 228, emphasizes the significance of the old element of trespass that prescribed a direct invasion of the plaintiff's interests."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "743", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "\u00a7 1617(a) (1982); modified by the Alaska National Interest Lands \nConservation Act, \u00a7 905, 43 U.S.C. \u00a7 1634 (1982). As a result of her application, \nPeggy was awarded two lots (lots 3 and 12) which border the disputed parcel \nalong its western boundary. (See Appendix.) \n4 The outhouse was blown over one winter by strong winds, but was re -erected \nthe following summer with additional supports.", "proposition": ["ValueError('json output should start and end with { and }')"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "576", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "561 \n At the direction of Young & Ru bicam, Hedwig then made \na record for the commercial. The Midler record of \u201cDo \nYou Want To Dance\u201d was first played to her. She was told \nto \u201csound as much as possible like the Bette Midler \nrecord,\u201d leaving out only a few \u201caahs\u201d unsuitable for the \ncommercial. Hedwig imitated Midler to the best of her \nability. \nAfter the commercial was aired Midler was told by \u201ca \nnumber of people\u201d that it \u201csounded exactly\u201d like her record \nof \u201cDo You Want To Dance.\u201d Hedwig was told by \u201cmany \npersonal friends\u201d that they thought it was Midler singing \nthe commercial. Ken Fritz, a personal manager in the \nentertainment business not associated with Midler, declares \nby affidavit that he heard the commercial on more than one \noccasion and thought Midler was doing the singing. \nNeither the na me nor the picture of Midler was used in the \ncommercial; Young & Rubicam had a license from the \ncopyright holder to use the song. At issue in this case is \nonly the protection of Midler\u2019s voice. The district court \ndescribed the defendants\u2019 conduct as that \u201c of the average \nthief.\u201d They decided, \u201cIf we can\u2019t buy it, we\u2019ll take it.\u201d The \ncourt nonetheless believed there was no legal principle \npreventing imitation of Midler\u2019s voice and so gave \nsummary judgment for the defendants. Midler appeals. \nThe First Amendmen t protects much of what the media do \nin the reproduction of likenesses or sounds. A primary \nvalue is freedom of speech and press. Time, Inc. v. Hill , 385 \nU.S. 374, 388, 87 S.Ct. 534, 542, 17 L.Ed.2d 456 (1967). \nThe purpose of the media\u2019s use of a person\u2019s identity is \ncentral.", "proposition": ["Hedwig made a record for a commercial at the direction of Young & Rubicam.", "The Midler record of \u2018Do You Want To Dance\u2019 was first played to Hedwig.", "Hedwig was told to sound as much like the Bette Midler record as possible, leaving out only a few 'aahs' unsuitable for the commercial.", "After the commercial was aired, Midler was told by 'a number of people' that it sounded exactly like her record of 'Do You Want To Dance.'", "Hedwig was told by 'many personal friends' that they thought it was Midler singing the commercial.", "Ken Fritz, a personal manager in the entertainment business not associated with Midler, declared by affidavit that he heard the commercial on more than one occasion and thought Midler was doing the singing.", "Neither the name nor the picture of Midler was used in the commercial; Young & Rubicam had a license from the copyright holder to use the song.", "The district court described the defendants' conduct as 'of the average thief.'", "The court believed there was no legal principle preventing imitation of Midler's voice and so gave summary judgment for the defendants.", "Midler appeals the decision.", "The First Amendment protects much of what the media do in the reproduction of likenesses or sounds.", "A primary value is freedom of speech and press.", "The purpose of the media's use of a person's identity is central."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "297", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "282 \n under which the property rights in oil and gas are vested. \nThis remedy should not be denied. \nIn common with others who are familiar with the nature of \noil and gas and the risks involved in their production, the \nrespondents had knowledge that a failure to use due care in \ndrilling their well might result in a blowout with the \nconsequent waste and dissipation of the oil, gas and \ndistillate from the common reservoir. In the conduct of \none\u2019s business or in the use and exploitation of one\u2019s \nproperty, the law imposes upon all persons the duty to \nexercise ordinary care to avoid injury or damage to the \nproperty of others. Thus under the common law, and \nindependent of the conservation statutes, the respondents \nwere legally bound to use due care to avoid the negligent \nwaste or destruction of the minerals imbedded in \npetitioners\u2019 oil and gas -bearing strata. This common -law \nduty the resp ondents failed to discharge. For that omission \nthey should be required to respond in such damages as will \nreasonably compensate the injured parties for the loss \nsustained as the proximate result of the negligent conduct. \nThe fact that the major portion of the gas and distillate \nescaped from the well on respondents\u2019 premises is \nimmaterial. Irrespective of the opening from which the \nminerals escaped, they belonged to the petitioners and the \nloss was the same. They would not have been dissipated at \nany opening except for the wrongful conduct of the \nrespondents. Being responsible for the loss they are in no \nposition to deny liability because the gas and distillate did \nnot escape through the surface of petitioners\u2019 lands. \nWe are therefore of the opinion the Court of Civil Appeals \nerred in holding that under the law of caputre the \npetitioners cannot recover for the damages resulting from \nthe wrongful drainage of the gas and distillate from beneath \ntheir lands. However, we cannot affirm the judgment of the \ntrial cou rt because there is an assignment of error in the \nCourt of Civil Appeals challenging the sufficiency of the", "proposition": ["The property rights in oil and gas are vested under Section 282.", "The remedy should not be denied.", "The respondents had knowledge that a failure to use due care in drilling their well might result in a blowout with the consequent waste and dissipation of the oil, gas, and distillate from the common reservoir.", "The law imposes upon all persons the duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injury or damage to the property of others.", "The respondents were legally bound to use due care to avoid the negligent waste or destruction of the minerals imbedded in petitioners\u2019 oil and gas-bearing strata.", "The respondents failed to discharge their common-law duty.", "The respondents should be required to respond in such damages as will reasonably compensate the injured parties for the loss sustained as the proximate result of the negligent conduct.", "The fact that the major portion of the gas and distillate escaped from the well on respondents\u2019 premises is immaterial.", "The loss would not have been dissipated at any opening except for the wrongful conduct of the respondents.", "The petitioners cannot recover for the damages resulting from the wrongful drainage of the gas and distillate from beneath their lands under the law of capture.", "There is an assignment of error in the Court of Civil Appeals challenging the sufficiency of the judgment of the trial court."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "105", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "90 \n Plaintiffs urge this Court to hold that they are entitled to \nrecover in trespass for invasions of their premises by \nintangi ble things without regard for how these annoyances \ncame to their land. Plaintiffs would have us follow the \nexample of certain courts from other jurisdictions, which \nhave eliminated the traditional requirements for trespass of \na direct intrusion by a tangib le object, directing the inquiry \ninstead toward the nature of the interest harmed. These \ncourts have permitted recovery in trespass for indirect, \nintangible invasions that nonetheless interfered with \nexclusive possessory interests in the land. See 75 Am Ju r \n2d, Trespass, s 33, p. 33 and cases cited. See also Mercer v. \nRockwell Int\u2019l Corp., 24 F.Supp.2d 735, 743 (W.D.Ky., \n1998) (allowing an action in \u201cnegligent trespass\u201d \nconcerning intrusions of invisible polychlorinated biphenyls \n[PCBs] that actually harm t he property); Williams, supra \n(airborne particulate matter from a sand and gravel \nprocessing facility, an asphalt plant, and a concrete plant \nconstituted trespass); Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 221 \nOr. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959) (trespass may stem from \nfluoride compounds in the form of gases and particles). We \nagree with the characterization of cases of this sort found \nin Prosser & Keeton as being \u201cin reality, examples of the \ntort of private nuisance or liability for harm resulting from \nnegligence,\u201d not prop er trespass cases. Prosser & Keeton, \nsupra at s 13, pp. 71 -72 (concerning \u201cdecisions finding a \ntrespass constituted by the entry of invisible gases and \nmicroscopic particles, but only if harm results\u201d). \nAccordingly, we decline plaintiffs\u2019 invitation to str ip the \ntort of trespass to land of its distinctive accouterments and \ncommingle its identity with other causes of action. \nAs stated above, the traditional view of trespass required a \ndirect entry onto the land by a tangible object.", "proposition": ["The plaintiffs argue that they should be able to recover in trespass for invasions of their premises by intangible things.", "Some courts have adapted the traditional requirements for trespass, allowing recovery for indirect, intangible invasions that interfere with exclusive possessory interests in the land.", "These courts have followed the example of certain courts from other jurisdictions that have redefined trespass to focus on the nature of the interest harmed.", "The passage cites specific cases where courts have allowed actions in negligent trespass or private nuisance for invasions of invisible substances like PCBs, airborne particulate matter, and fluoride compounds.", "The passage disagrees with the characterization of these cases as proper trespass cases, arguing that they are better classified as private nuisance or negligence cases.", "The passage declines the plaintiffs' invitation to strip the tort of trespass to land of its distinctive accouterments and commingle its identity with other causes of action."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "577", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "562 \n constitute a copyright infringement even where one \nperformer deliberately sets out to simul ate another\u2019s \nperformance as exactly as possible.\u201d Notes of Committee \non the Judiciary, 17 U.S.C.A. s 114(b). It is in the context of \nthese First Amendment and federal copyright distinctions \nthat we address the present appeal. \nNancy Sinatra once sued Goody ear Tire and Rubber \nCompany on the basis of an advertising campaign by \nYoung & Rubicam featuring \u201cThese Boots Are Made For \nWalkin\u2019,\u201d a song closely identified with her; the female \nsingers of the commercial were alleged to have imitated her \nvoice and style and to have dressed and looked like her. \nThe basis of Nancy Sinatra\u2019s complaint was unfair \ncompetition; she claimed that the song and the \narrangement had acquired \u201ca secondary meaning\u201d which, \nunder California law, was protectible. This court noted that \nthe defendants \u201chad paid a very substantial sum to the \ncopyright proprietor to obtain the license for the use of the \nsong and all of its arrangements.\u201d To give Sinatra damages \nfor their use of the song would clash with federal copyright \nlaw. Summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. \nSinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 717 -718 \n(9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906, 91 S.Ct. 1376, 28 \nL.Ed.2d 646 (1971). If Midler were claiming a secondary \nmeaning to \u201cDo You Want To Dance\u201d or seeking to \nprevent the defendants from using that song, she would fail \nlike Sinatra. But that is not this case. Midler does not seek \ndamages for Ford\u2019s use of \u201cDo You Want To Dance,\u201d and \nthus her claim is not preempted by federal copyright law. \nCopyright protects \u201coriginal works of authorship fixed in \nany tangible medium of expression.\u201d 17 U.S.C. s 102(a). A \nvoice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not \u201cfixed.\u201d \nWhat is put forward as protectible here is more personal \nthan any work of authorship.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a copyright infringement case involving a song.", "Nancy Sinatra once sued Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company over an advertising campaign featuring her song \"These Boots Are Made For Walkin'\".", "The basis of Nancy Sinatra's complaint was unfair competition, claiming that the song and arrangement had acquired a secondary meaning under California law.", "The defendants in the Sinatra case had paid a substantial sum to the copyright proprietor for the use of the song and its arrangements.", "The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in the Sinatra case.", "Midler does not seek damages for Ford's use of \"Do You Want To Dance\", so her claim is not preempted by federal copyright law.", "Copyright protects \"original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.\".", "A voice is not copyrightable, and the sounds are not \"fixed\".", "What is put forward as protectible in this case is more personal than any work of authorship."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "194", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "179 \n spared. His depredations on farmers and on barn yards, \nhave not been forgotten; and to put him to death wherever \nfound, is allowed to be meritorious, and of public benefit. \nHence it follows, that our decision should have in view the \ngreatest possible encourag ement to the destruction of an \nanimal, so cunning and ruthless in his career. But who \nwould keep a pack of hounds; or what gentleman, at the \nsound of the horn, and at peep of day, would mount his \nsteed, and for hours together, \u201csub jove frigido,\u201d or a \nvertical sun, pursue the windings of this wily quadruped, if, \njust as night came on, and his stratagems and strength were \nnearly exhausted, a saucy intruder, who had not shared in \nthe honours or labours of the chase, were permitted to \ncome in at the death, and bear away in triumph the object \nof pursuit? Whatever Justinian may have thought of the \nmatter, it must be recollected that his code was compiled \nmany hundred years ago, and it would be very hard indeed, \nat the distance of so many centuries, not to have a right to \nestablish a rule for ourselves. In his day, we read of no \norder of men who made it a business, in the language of the \ndeclaration in this cause, \u201cwith hounds and dogs to find, \nstart, pursue, hunt, and chase,\u201d these animals, and that, too, \nwithout any other motive than the preservation of Roman \npoultry; if this diversion had been then in fashion, the \nlawyers who composed his institutes, would have taken \ncare not to pass it by, without suitable encouragement. If \nany thing, therefore, in the digests o r pandects shall appear \nto militate against the defendant in error, who, on this \noccasion, was the foxhunter, we have only to say tempora \nmutantur; and if men themselves change with the times, \nwhy should not laws also undergo an alteration?", "proposition": ["The past error was caused by not properly formatting the JSON output."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "458", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "443 \n legislation, as in all previous copyright term extensions, \nCongress placed existing and future copyrights in parity. In \nprescribing that alignment, we hold, Co ngress acted within \nits authority and did not transgress constitutional \nlimitations. \nI \nA. \nWe evaluate petitioners\u2019 challenge to the constitutionality of \nthe CTEA against the backdrop of Congress\u2019 previous \nexercises of its authority under the Copyright Clau se. The \nNation\u2019s first copyright statute, enacted in 1790, provided a \nfederal copyright term of 14 years from the date of \npublication, renewable for an additional 14 years if the \nauthor survived the first term. The 1790 Act\u2019s renewable \n14-year term applied to existing works ( i. e., works already \npublished and works created but not yet published) and \nfuture works alike. Congress expanded the federal \ncopyright term to 42 years in 1831 (28 years from \npublication, renewable for an additional 14 years), and to 5 6 \nyears in 1909 (28 years from publication, renewable for an \nadditional 28 years). Both times, Congress applied the new \ncopyright term to existing and future works; to qualify for \nthe 1831 extension, an existing work had to be in its initial \ncopyright term at the time the Act became effective. \nIn 1976, Congress altered the method for computing \nfederal copyright terms. For works created by identified \nnatural persons, the 1976 Act provided that federal \ncopyright protection would run from the work\u2019s creation, \nnot \u2013 as in the 1790, 1831, and 1909 Acts \u2013 its publication; \nprotection would last until 50 years after the author\u2019s death. \nIn these respects, the 1976 Act aligned United States \ncopyright terms with the then -dominant international \nstandard adopted under th e Berne Convention for the \nProtection of Literary and Artistic Works. For anonymous", "proposition": ["The 1790 Act provided a federal copyright term of 14 years from the date of publication, renewable for an additional 14 years if the author survived the first term.", "The 1790 Act's renewable 14-year term applied to existing works and future works alike.", "Congress expanded the federal copyright term to 42 years in 1831 (28 years from publication, renewable for an additional 14 years) and to 56 years in 1909 (28 years from publication, renewable for an additional 28 years).", "Both times, Congress applied the new copyright term to existing and future works.", "In 1976, Congress altered the method for computing federal copyright terms.", "For works created by identified natural persons, the 1976 Act provided that federal copyright protection would run from the work's creation, not from its publication.", "Protection would last until 50 years after the author's death.", "In these respects, the 1976 Act aligned United States copyright terms with the then-dominant international standard adopted under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.", "For anonymous works, the 1976 Act provided a copyright term of 75 years after publication or 100 years after creation, whichever is shorter."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "623", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "608 \n Second, the proponent of a gift has the burden of proving \neach of these elements by clear and convincing evi dence \n(Matter of Kelley , supra, at p. 150; Matter of Abramowitz , 38 \nAD2d 387, 389 -390, affd on opn 32 NY2d 654). \nDonative Intent \nThere is an important distinction between the intent with \nwhich an inter vivos gift is made and the intent to make a \ngift by will. An inter vivos gift requires that the donor \nintend to make an irrevocable present transfer of \nownership; if the intention is to make a testamentary \ndisposition effective only after death, the gift is invalid \nunless made by will ( see, McCarthy v Piere t, 281 NY 407, 409; \nGannon v McGuire , 160 NY 476, 481; Martin v Funk, 75 NY \n134, 137 -138). \nDefendant contends that the trial court was correct in \nfinding that Victor did not intend to transfer any present \ninterest in the painting to plaintiff in 1963 but o nly \nexpressed an intention that plaintiff was to get the painting \nupon his death. The evidence is all but conclusive, \nhowever, that Victor intended to transfer ownership of the \npainting to plaintiff in 1963 but to retain a life estate in it \nand that he did , therefore, effectively transfer a remainder \ninterest in the painting to plaintiff at that time. Although \nthe original letter was not in evidence, testimony of its \ncontents was received along with the substitute gift letter \nand its covering letter dated M ay 22, 1963. The three letters \nshould be considered together as a single instrument ( see, \nMatter of Brandreth , 169 NY 437, 440) and when they are \nthey unambiguously establish that Victor Gruen intended \nto make a present gift of title to the painting at tha t time. \nBut there was other evidence for after 1963 Victor made \nseveral statements orally and in writing indicating that he \nhad previously given plaintiff the painting and that plaintiff \nowned it.", "proposition": ["In a gift dispute, the proponent has the burden of proving each element by clear and convincing evidence.", "There is a distinction between the intent with which an inter vivos gift is made and the intent to make a gift by will.", "An inter vivos gift requires that the donor intends to make an irrevocable present transfer of ownership.", "If the intention is to make a testamentary disposition effective only after death, the gift is invalid unless made by will.", "Defendant contends that the trial court was correct in finding that Victor did not intend to transfer any present interest in the painting to plaintiff in 1963 but only expressed an intention that plaintiff was to get the painting upon his death.", "The evidence is all but conclusive that Victor intended to transfer ownership of the painting to plaintiff in 1963 but to retain a life estate in it and that he did, therefore, effectively transfer a remainder interest in the painting to plaintiff at that time.", "Although the original letter was not in evidence, testimony of its contents was received along with the substitute gift letter and its covering letter dated May 22, 1963.", "The three letters should be considered together as a single instrument, and when they are, they unambiguously establish that Victor Gruen intended to make a present gift of title to the painting at that time.", "After 1963, Victor made several statements orally and in writing indicating that he had previously given plaintiff the painting and that plaintiff owned it."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "267", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "La.C.C. 3421. \nHe who finds a thing which is abandoned; that is, \nwhich its owner h as let [left] with the intention not to \nkeep it any longer, becomes master of it in the same \nmanner as if it had never belonged to any body.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the concept of finding an abandoned thing.", "An abandoned thing is defined as an object that its owner has left with the intention not to keep it any longer.", "The person who finds an abandoned thing becomes the master of it.", "This is equivalent to the object never having belonged to anyone else."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "18", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "If the notes had \nbeen accidentally kicked into the street, and then found by", "proposition": ["Ensure that the JSON output starts and ends with { and }"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "71", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Ab. \nTrespass , H. a, 4, pl. 19. If one have a way o ver the land of \nanother for his beasts to pass, and the beasts, being \nproperly driven, feed the grass by morsels in passing, or run \nout of the way and are promptly pursued and brought back, \ntrespass will not lie. See Vin. Ab. Trespass , K. a, pl. 1. A \ntrave ler on a highway who finds it obstructed from a \nsudden and temporary cause may pass upon the adjoining \nland without becoming a trespasser because of the", "proposition": ["The passage refers to the legal case Ab. Trespass, H. a, 4, pl. 19.", "The passage also refers to the legal case Vin. Ab. Trespass, K. a, pl. 1."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "285", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "270 \n inevitable result of the tapping of a common reservoir. The \nrule was ad opted near the turn of the century primarily as a \nrule of necessity when courts concluded that the amount of \noil and gas which drained toward a production well from \nneighboring tracts was incapable of measurement. See \ngenerally I Summers, The Law of Oil an d Gas \u00a7 63 & n. 37 \n(1954). With the development of more sophisticated \nknowledge of geology and a greater ability to measure the \namount of drainage, the absolutism with which some courts \ncontinue to apply the rule of capture to oil and gas has \nbeen criticiz ed. See, e. g., id. at \u00a7 63. We agree with the \ndefendants that the Arkansas Supreme Court foreclosed \nsuch arguments with respect to the drainage of minerals \nfrom adjacent lands. But Young does not claim that he is \nlosing minerals due to seepage or drainage toward the \ndefendants\u2019 production wells. Rather, he asserts, and has \nestablished to the satisfaction of the District Court, that the \nbrine solution under his land would not migrate to the \ndefendants\u2019 production wells but for the force exerted by \nthe injec tion wells; in other words, that the brine is \nprimarily \u201cnon -fugacious.\u201d We believe that it would be \nunwise to extend the rule to situations in which non -\nfugacious minerals are forced from beneath a landowner\u2019s \nproperty. Our conclusion in this respect is c onsistent with \n \nactually or theoretically causing some displacement of the \noil or gas under his neighbor\u2019s land. * * * \nI Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas \u00a7 62 at 157 (1954). \n9 * * * The term \u201ccorrelative rights\u201d is merely a \nconvenient metas legal privileges as against other owners \nof land therein to take oil and gas therefras legal privileges \nas against other owners of land therein to take oil and gas \ntherefrom by lawful operations conduc ted on his own \nland limited, however, by duties to other owners not to \ninjure the source of supply and by duties not to take an \nundue proportion of the oil and gas.", "proposition": ["The rule of capture was adopted near the turn of the century primarily as a rule of necessity when courts concluded that the amount of oil and gas which drained toward a production well from neighboring tracts was incapable of measurement.", "With the development of more sophisticated knowledge of geology and a greater ability to measure the amount of drainage, the absolutism with which some courts continue to apply the rule of capture to oil and gas has been criticized.", "The Arkansas Supreme Court foreclosed arguments regarding the drainage of minerals from adjacent lands.", "Young does not claim that he is losing minerals due to seepage or drainage toward the defendants\u2019 production wells.", "Young asserts that the brine solution under his land would not migrate to the defendants\u2019 production wells but for the force exerted by the injection wells; in other words, that the brine is primarily \u201cnon-fugacious.\u201d", "It would be unwise to extend the rule to situations in which non-fugacious minerals are forced from beneath a landowner\u2019s property.", "The term \u201ccorrelative rights\u201d refers to legal privileges as against other owners of land therein to take oil and gas therefrom by lawful operations conducted on his own land, limited, however, by duties to other owners not to injure the source of supply and by duties not to take an undue proportion of the oil and gas."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "146", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Later, when automobile travel became developed, the horse became \nthe nuisance. Ellickson, Alternativ es to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as \nLand Use Controls , 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 731 (1973). This makes me wonder if we \nare examining the proper nuisance in the case before us. In other words, could it \nbe said that the solar energy user is creating the nuisance when others must \nconform their homes to accommodate his use? I note that solar panel glare may \ntemporarily blind automobile drivers, reflect into adjacent buildings causing \nexcessive heat, and otherwise irritate neighbors. Certainly i n these instances the \nsolar heating system constitutes the nuisance.", "proposition": ["The text contains a discussion about the development of automobile travel and its impact on horses, as well as the potential nuisance caused by solar energy systems."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "136", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "121 \n who invests in solar collectors and to a society whic h has \nan interest in developing alternative sources of energy.6 \nThird, the policy of favoring unhindered private \ndevelopment in an expanding economy is no longer in \nharmony with the realities of our society. State v. Deetz , 66 \nWis. 2d 1 (1974). The need fo r easy and rapid development \nis not as great today as it once was, while our perception of \nthe value of sunlight as a source of energy has increased \nsignificantly. \nCourts should not implement obsolete policies that have \nlost their vigor over the course of the years. The law of \nprivate nuisance is better suited to resolve landowners\u2019 \ndisputes about property development in the 1980\u2019s than is a \nrigid rule which does not recognize a landowner\u2019s interest \nin access to sunlight. As we said in Ballstadt v. Pagel , 202 \nWis. 484, 489 (1930), \u201cWhat is regarded in law as \nconstituting a nuisance in modern times would no doubt \nhave been tolerated without question in former times.\u201d We \nread State v. Deetz , 66 Wis. 2d 1 (1974), as an endorsement \nof the application of common l aw nuisance to situations \ninvolving the conflicting interests of landowners and as \nrejecting per se exclusions to the nuisance law reasonable \nuse doctrine. \nIn Deetz the court abandoned the rigid common law \ncommon enemy rule with respect to surface water an d \nadopted the private nuisance reasonable use rule, namely \nthat the landowner is subject to liability if his or her \ninterference with the flow of surface waters unreasonably \n \n6 State and federal governments are encouraging the use of the sun as a significant \nsource of energy. In this state the legislature has granted tax benefits to encourage \nthe utilization of solar energy. See Ch. 349, 350, Laws of 1979. See also Ch. 354, \nLaws of 1981 (eff. May 7, 1982) enabling legislation providing for local ordinances \nguaranteeing access to sunlight.", "proposition": ["There are 121 people who invest in solar collectors.", "Society has an interest in developing alternative sources of energy, particularly solar energy.", "The policy of favoring unhindered private development in an expanding economy is no longer in harmony with the realities of our society.", "The need for easy and rapid development is not as great today as it once was.", "Our perception of the value of sunlight as a source of energy has increased significantly.", "Courts should not implement obsolete policies that have lost their vigor over the course of the years.", "The law of private nuisance is better suited to resolve landowners' disputes about property development in the 1980's than is a rigid rule which does not recognize a landowner's interest in access to sunlight.", "What is regarded in law as constituting a nuisance in modern times would have been tolerated without question in former times.", "State v. Deetz (66 Wis. 2d 1, 1974) endorses the application of common law nuisance to situations involving the conflicting interests of landowners and rejects per se exclusions to the nuisance law reasonable use doctrine.", "In Deetz, the court abandoned the rigid common law common enemy rule with respect to surface water and adopted the private nuisance reasonable use rule, namely that the landowner is subject to liability if his or her interference with the flow of surface waters unreasonably.", "State and federal governments are encouraging the use of the sun as a significant source of energy.", "In this state, the legislature has granted tax benefits to encourage the utilization of solar energy.", "Local ordinances guaranteeing access to sunlight have been enabled by legislation (Ch. 354, Laws of 1981, eff. May 7, 1982)."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "360", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "345 \n distinguish the seller\u2019s goods from goods made or sold by \nothers,\u201d but that it not be \u201cfunctional\u201d). Indeed, the \nDistrict Court, in this case, entered findings (accepted by \nthe Ninth Circuit) that show Qualitex\u2019s green -gold press \npad color has met these requirements. The green -gold color \nacts as a symbol. Having developed secondary meaning (for \ncustomers identif ied the green -gold color as Qualitex\u2019s), it \nidentifies the press pads\u2019 source. And, the green -gold color \nserves no other function. (Although it is important to use \nsome color on press pads to avoid noticeable stains, the \ncourt found \u201cno competitive need in the press pad industry \nfor the green -gold color, since other colors are equally \nusable.\u201d 21 U.S.P.Q.2d, at 1460, 1991 WL 318798.) \nAccordingly, unless there is some special reason that \nconvincingly militates against the use of color alone as a \ntrademark, t rademark law would protect Qualitex\u2019s use of \nthe green -gold color on its press pads. \nIII \nRespondent Jacobson Products says that there are four \nspecial reasons why the law should forbid the use of color \nalone as a trademark. We shall explain, in turn, why w e, \nultimately, find them unpersuasive. \nFirst, Jacobson says that, if the law permits the use of color \nas a trademark, it will produce uncertainty and unresolvable \ncourt disputes about what shades of a color a competitor \nmay lawfully use. Because lighting ( morning sun, twilight \nmist) will affect perceptions of protected color, competitors \nand courts will suffer from \u201cshade confusion\u201d as they try to \ndecide whether use of a similar color on a similar product \ndoes, or does not, confuse customers and thereby inf ringe a \ntrademark. Jacobson adds that the \u201cshade confusion\u201d \nproblem is \u201cmore difficult\u201d and \u201cfar different from\u201d the \n\u201cdetermination of the similarity of words or symbols.\u201d \nBrief for Respondent 22.", "proposition": ["The District Court found that Qualitex's green-gold press pad color has met the requirements to be considered a trademark.", "The green-gold color acts as a symbol, has developed secondary meaning, and serves no other function.", "The court found that there is no competitive need in the press pad industry for the green-gold color, as other colors are equally usable.", "The respondent, Jacobson Products, argues that there are four special reasons why the law should forbid the use of color alone as a trademark.", "Jacobson Products claims that allowing the use of color as a trademark will produce uncertainty and unresolvable court disputes about what shades of a color a competitor may lawfully use.", "Jacobson Products adds that the \"shade confusion\" problem is more difficult and far different from the determination of the similarity of words or symbols."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "144", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "129 \n ordinances, statutes, and restrictions of record where such \nuse is necessary to serve his legitimate needs is a \nfundamental precept of a free society which this court \nshould strive to uphold. \nAs one commentator has suggested: \nIt is fashionable to dismiss such values \nas deriving from a bygone era in which \npeople valued development as a \u2018goal \nin itself,\u2019 but current market prices for \nreal estate, and more particularly the \npremiums paid for land whose zoning \npermits intensive use, suggest that \npeople still place v ery high values on \nsuch rights. \nWilliams, Solar Access and Property Rights: A Maverick Analysis , \n11 Conn. L. Rev. 430, 443 (1979) (footnote omitted). Cf. \nGoble, Solar Access and Property Rights: Reply to a \u201cMaverick\u201d \nAnalysis , 12 Conn. L. Rev. 270 (1980). \nThe majority cites two zoning cases, Village of Euclid v. \nAmbler Realty Company , 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and Just v. \nMarinette County , 56 Wis. 2d 7 (1972), to support the \nconclusion that society has increasingly regulated private \nland use in the name of publi c welfare. The cases involving \nthe use of police power and eminent domain are clearly \ndistinguishable from the present situation as they relate to \ninterference with a private right solely for the public health, \nsafety, morals, or welfare. In the instant ca se, we are dealing \nwith an action which seeks to restrict the defendant\u2019s \nprivate right to use his property, notwithstanding a \ncomplete lack of notice of restriction to the defendant and \nthe defendant\u2019s compliance with applicable ordinances and \nstatutes. T he plaintiff who knew of the potential problem \nbefore the defendant acquired the land seeks to impose \nsuch use restriction to accommodate his personal, private \nbenefit -a benefit which could have been accommodated by", "proposition": ["Check the format and structure of your JSON object.", "Ensure that the JSON object is properly formatted and contains valid data types."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "30", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "In August, 1940, the \nplaintiff, Duncan Hannah, a lance -corporal, serving in a \nbattery of the Royal Artillery, was stationed at the house \nand on the 21st of that month, when in a bedroom, used as", "proposition": ["Duncan Hannah was a lance-corporal in August 1940.", "Duncan Hannah served in a battery of the Royal Artillery.", "Duncan Hannah was stationed at a house.", "On the 21st of August 1940, Duncan Hannah was in a bedroom.", "The bedroom was used as."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "586", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "571 \n commercial exploitation of that \nidentity\u2026. If the celebrity\u2019s identity is \ncommercially exploited, there has been \nan invasion of his right whether or not \nhis \u201cname or likeness\u201d is used. \nCarson, 698 F.2d at 835. It is not important how the \ndefendant has appropriated the plaintiff\u2019s identity, but \nwhether the defendant has done so. Motschenbacher, \nMidler, and Carson teach the impossibility of treating the \nright of publicity as guarding only aga inst a laundry list of \nspecific means of appropriating identity. A rule which says \nthat the right of publicity can be infringed only through the \nuse of nine different methods of appropriating identity \nmerely challenges the clever advertising strategist to come \nup with the tenth. \nIndeed, if we treated the means of appropriation as \ndispositive in our analysis of the right of publicity, we \nwould not only weaken the right but effectively eviscerate \nit. The right would fail to protect those plaintiffs most in \nneed of its protection. Advertisers use celebrities to \npromote their products. The more popular the celebrity, \nthe greater the number of people who recognize her, and \nthe greater the visibility for the product. The identities of \nthe most popular celebrities are not only the most attractive \nfor advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke without \nresorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or \nvoice. \nConsider a hypothetical advertisement which depicts a \nmechanical robot with male features, an African -Ameri can \ncomplexion, and a bald head. The robot is wearing black \nhightop Air Jordan basketball sneakers, and a red basketball \nuniform with black trim, baggy shorts, and the number 23 \n(though not revealing \u201cBulls\u201d or \u201cJordan\u201d lettering). The ad \ndepicts the robot dunking a basketball one -handed, stiff -\narmed, legs extended like open scissors, and tongue \nhanging out. Now envision that this ad is run on television", "proposition": ["The commercial exploitation of a celebrity's identity can lead to an invasion of their right to publicity.", "The right of publicity cannot be limited to guarding against a specific list of means of appropriating identity.", "Treating the means of appropriation as dispositive in the analysis of the right of publicity would weaken and eviscerate the right.", "The right of publicity is most essential for protecting those plaintiffs who are most vulnerable to exploitation.", "Advertisers often use popular celebrities to promote their products, as their identities are attractive and easy to evoke without using their name, likeness, or voice.", "A hypothetical advertisement featuring a robot with features resembling a popular celebrity can potentially infringe upon their right to publicity."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "114", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Accordingly, rather than reject this traditional requirement, we preserve \nthis requirement as something akin to proximate cause, meaning \u201cthat which, in a \nnatural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, \nproduces the injury and without which the accident could not have happened, if \nthe injury be one which might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen.\u201d Black\u2019s Law \nDictionary (6th ed.), p. 1225.", "proposition": ["We preserve the traditional requirement of proximate cause.", "Proximate cause means \"that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the accident could not have happened.\".", "Proximate cause is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.), p. 1225."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "286", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "It shall include: \n(3) Abuse of the correlative rights and opportunities of \neach owner of oil and gas in a common reservoir due to \nnonuniform, disp roportionate, and unratable withdrawals \ncausing undue drainage between tracts of land.", "proposition": ["Abuse of correlative rights and opportunities of each owner of oil and gas in a common reservoir is a problem.", "This abuse is caused by nonuniform, disproportionate, and unratable withdrawals.", "These withdrawals cause undue drainage between tracts of land."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "478", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "463 \n the \u201cauthor\u201d or \u201cany particular class of citizens, however \nworthy.\u201d Rather, under the Constitution, copyright was \ndesigned \u201cprimarily for the benefit of the public,\u201d for \u201cthe \nbenefit of the great body of people, in that it will stimulate \nwriting and invention.\u201d And were a copyright statute not \n\u201cbelieved, in fact, to accomplish\u201d the basic constitutional \nobjective of adva ncing learning, that statute \u201cwould be \nbeyond the power of Congress\u201d to enact. Similarly, those \nwho wrote the House Report on legislation that \nimplemented the Berne Convention for the Protection of \nLiterary and Artistic Works said that \u201c[t]he constitutiona l \npurpose of copyright is to facilitate the flow of ideas in the \ninterest of learning.\u201d H. R. Rep. No. 100 -609, p. 22 (1988) \n(internal quotation marks omitted). They added: \nUnder the U. S. Constitution, the \nprimary objective of copyright law is \nnot to rewa rd the author, but rather to \nsecure for the public the benefits \nderived from the authors\u2019 labors. By \ngiving authors an incentive to create, \nthe public benefits in two ways: when \nthe original expression is created and \n\u2026 when the limited term \u2026 expires \nand t he creation is added to the public \ndomain. \nId., at 17. \nFor present purposes, then, we should take the following as \nwell established: that copyright statutes must serve public, \nnot private, ends; that they must seek \u201cto promote the \nProgress\u201d of knowledge an d learning; and that they must \ndo so both by creating incentives for authors to produce \nand by removing the related restrictions on dissemination \nafter expiration of a copyright\u2019s \u201climited Tim[e]\u201d \u2013 a time \nthat (like \u201ca limited monarch\u201d) is \u201crestrain[ed]\u201d and \n\u201ccircumscribe[d],\u201d \u201cnot [left] at large,\u201d 2 S. Johnson, A \nDictionary of the English Language 1151 (4th rev. ed. 1773). I", "proposition": ["Copyright law is designed primarily for the benefit of the public.", "The primary objective of copyright law is to facilitate the flow of ideas in the interest of learning.", "The House Report on legislation that implemented the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works said that the constitutional purpose of copyright is to facilitate the flow of ideas in the interest of learning.", "Under the U.S. Constitution, the primary objective of copyright law is not to reward the author, but rather to secure for the public the benefits derived from the authors' labors.", "Copyright statutes must serve public, not private, ends.", "Copyright statutes must seek to promote the progress of knowledge and learning.", "Copyright statutes must create incentives for authors to produce and remove related restrictions on dissemination after the expiration of a copyright's limited time.", "A limited monarch is restrained and circumscribed, not left at large."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "564", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "352, 603 P.2d at 462 (\u201cIt would be illogical to \nallow respondents to exhibit the film but effectively \npreclude any advance discussion or promotion of their \nlawfu l enterprise.\u201d); Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 \nA.D.2d 487, 488, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1975), aff\u2019d, 39 \nN.Y.2d 897, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397, 352 N.E.2d 584 (1976) \n(\u201cThe use of plaintiff\u2019s photograph was merely incidental \nadvertising of defendants\u2019 magazine in wh ich plaintiff had \nearlier been properly and fairly depicted.\u201d). \nPlaintiff also contends that because her name was not used \nin the news, to educate, for scholarly purposes or as a \nparody, defendants\u2019 use is not protected by the First \nAmendment. However, the Supreme Court has expressly", "proposition": ["The passage discusses two cases: 352, 603 P.2d at 462 and Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1975), aff\u2019d, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 386 N.Y.S.2d 397, 352 N.E.2d 584 (1976).", "The passage quotes the 352, 603 P.2d at 462 case, which states that it would be illogical to allow respondents to exhibit the film but effectively preclude any advance discussion or promotion of their lawful enterprise.", "The passage quotes the Namath v. Sports Illustrated case, which states that the use of plaintiff\u2019s photograph was merely incidental advertising of defendants\u2019 magazine in which plaintiff had earlier been properly and fairly depicted.", "The plaintiff contends that because her name was not used in the news, to educate, for scholarly purposes or as a parody, defendants\u2019 use is not protected by the First Amendment.", "The Supreme Court has expressly stated that defendants\u2019 use is not protected by the First Amendment."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "251", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "499; Treasure Salvors Inc. , id. at 571. \n29 Liesner v. Wanie (1914) 156 Wis. 16, 145 N.W. 374; Ghen v. Rich , 8 F. 159 \n(D.Mass.1881); Pierson v. Post , 3 Caines R. (N.Y.1805); Young v. Hitchens , 6 Q.B. 606 \n(1844); State v. Shaw (1902) 67 Ohio St. 157, 65 N.E. 875. See also Herbert \nHovenkamp and Sheldon Kurtz, The Law of Property (5th ed. West Group 2001) at \npage 2. \n30 Indian River Recovery Company v. The China , 645 F.Supp. 141, 144 (D.Del.1986); \nTreasure Salvors Inc. v. The Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel , \n(1981)640 F.2d 560; Richard v. Pringle , 293 F.Supp. 981 (S.D.N.Y.1968). \n31 Swift v. Gifford , 23 F. Cas. 558 (D.Mass.1872)", "proposition": ["The text contains a list of cases and their details."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "337", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "322 \n and adequate, provide a fixed measure of damages, as in the \ncase of copyright infringement. \nOr again, a Legislature might conclude that it was unwise to \nrecognize even so limited a property right in published \nnews as that above indicated; but that a news agency \nshould, on some conditions, be given full protection of its \nbusiness; and to that end a remedy by injunction as well as \none for damages should be granted, where news collected \nby it is gainfully used without permission. If a Legislature \nconcluded (as at least one court has held, New York and \nChicago Grain and Stock E xchange v. Board of Trade, 127 \nIll. 153) that under certain circumstances news -gathering is \na business affected with a public interest; it might declare \nthat, in such cases, news should be protected against \nappropriation, only if the gatherer assumed the o bligation \nof supplying it at resonable rates and without \ndiscrimination, to all papers which applied therefor. If \nlegislators reached that conclusion, they would probably go \nfurther, and prescribe the conditions under which and the \nextent to which the prot ection should be afforded; and they \nmight also provide the administrative machinery necessary \nfor insuring to the public, the press, and the news agencies, \nfull enjoyment of the rights so conferred. \nCourts are ill -equipped to make the investigations which \nshould precede a determination of the limitations which \nshould be set upon any property right in news or of the \ncircumstances under which news gathered by a private \nagency should be deemed affected with a public interest. \nCourts would be powerless to presc ribe the detailed \nregulations essential to full enjoyment of the rights \nconferred or to introduce the machinery required for \nenforcement of such regulations. Considerations such as \nthese should lead us to decline to establish a new rule of \nlaw in the effor t to redress a newly disclosed wrong, \nalthough the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear.", "proposition": ["A legislature might conclude that it is unwise to recognize a limited property right in published news.", "A legislature might decide to grant a news agency full protection of its business and provide remedies for damages and injunctions.", "A court might hold that news-gathering is a business affected with a public interest.", "A legislature might declare that news should be protected against appropriation if the gatherer assumes the obligation to supply it at reasonable rates and without discrimination to all papers that apply therefor.", "Legislators might prescribe the conditions and extent to which protection should be afforded and provide the administrative machinery necessary for insuring the full enjoyment of the rights conferred.", "Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations necessary for determining the limitations of a property right in news or the circumstances under which news gathered by a private agency should be deemed affected with a public interest.", "Courts would be powerless to prescribe the detailed regulations essential to the full enjoyment of the rights conferred or to introduce the machinery required for enforcement of such regulations.", "Considerations such as these should lead us to decline to establish a new rule of law in the effort to redress a newly disclosed wrong, although the propriety of some remedy appears to be clear."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "9", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "ix \n Preface \nProperty is an odd subject. Typically a first -year, foundational \ncourse, it becomes apparent to beginning students rather quickly \nthat it differs greatly from Contracts, Torts, and Criminal \nLaw. Whereas those courses usually have a consistent rhythm, a \nmutually reinforcin g structure, Property seems to be a grab bag of \ntopics. Worse, the cases one studies are generally tort and contract \ncases. Are there property cases? What is distinctive about them? \n \nTo understand what we're about to embark on, you must first \nunderstand what is happening in your other courses. I will give a \nvery brief overview here of my conception of the structure of legal \nsystems. I find that thinking broadly at first helps to show how the \nstudy of Property Law is different and also to explain the st ructure \nof a typical first -year curriculum. A fuller explanation, intended for \nnon-experts, can be found in a short series of blog posts at \n[http://hydratext.com/blog/category/laws -not-that-\nhard](http://hydratext.com/blog/category/laws -not-that-hard) . \n \nAn Atlas of Legal Systems \n \nContracts, Torts, and Criminal Law are substantive fields of the \nlaw. By that, I mean that they are basic categories of causes of \naction. They differ in the identity of the institution that controls \nlawmaking and prosecution. \n \nContract Law is the set of laws that are created by private entities \n(often, but not always, through bilateral agreemen t) and enforced \nby private lawsuits. Tort Law is the set of laws that are created by \npublic entities (usually courts creating common law or legislatures) \nand enforced by private lawsuits. Criminal Law is the set of laws \nthat are created by public entitie s and enforced by public lawsuits \n(or prosecutions).", "proposition": ["Property is an odd subject and differs greatly from Contracts, Torts, and Criminal Law.", "Typically a first-year, foundational course, Property seems to be a grab bag of topics.", "Cases studied in Property Law are usually tort and contract cases; the distinctive aspects of property cases are unclear.", "Understanding the study of Property Law requires understanding the structure of other courses in the first-year curriculum.", "The author provides a brief overview of their conception of the structure of legal systems to help explain the differences between Property Law and other courses.", "Contracts, Torts, and Criminal Law are substantive fields of the law, representing basic categories of causes of action.", "Contract Law consists of laws created by private entities (often through bilateral agreements) and enforced by private lawsuits.", "Tort Law consists of laws created by public entities (usually courts creating common law or legislatures) and enforced by private lawsuits.", "Criminal Law consists of laws created by public entities and enforced by public lawsuits (or prosecutions).", "A fuller explanation of the author's conception of the structure of legal systems can be found in a series of blog posts at http://hydratext.com/blog/category/laws-not-that-hard."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "724", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "709 \n to the Blevins/Fletchers/Gobbles. How might this be done in \nCahill ? \n3. Explain, succinctly, the difference between the \u201cclear error\u201d \nstandard and the \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d standard. \nClear error is the standard of review that appellate cour ts \ntypically apply on reviewing individual findings of fact by a \ntrial court. Unless the appellate court, reviewing only the cold \nrecord, finds clear error, they will uphold a factual finding \neven if it seems like it\u2019s probably wrong. (Remember the dead \nfish standard from the Gobble case.) The clear and convincing \nevidence standard is a standard of proof that a litigant must \nmeet in order establish a fact in the trial court. As we saw, this \nstandard, rather than the usual \u201cpreponderance standard,\u201d \nwhich mea ns 50% plus a scintilla, must be met when proving \nadverse possession. \n4. If the Browns had granted the Gobbles permission to maintain \nthe strip as soon as they discovered the error, would the Gobbles \nstill have an AP claim? Why or why not? \nThough further f acts will be developed on remand, it\u2019s almost \ncertainly true that the Gobbles\u2019 AP claim doesn\u2019t depend on \ntheir having met the AP elements during their own period of \npossession. If there was AP, it very likely occurred back when \nthe Blevins owned the land. Since AP already occurred, \npermission from the Browns was irrelevant. Yes, normally \npermission defeats AP, but that\u2019s not true if AP has already \noccurred, meaning the statutory period has already passed, at \nthe time permission is granted. \nCarpenter v. Ruperto, 315 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1982). \nJames R. Bowers, Jr. and Keith E. Uhl of Scalise, Scism, \nGentry, Brick & Brick, Des Moines, for appellant. \nJohn D. Hudson and Timothy R. Williams of Carney, \nHudson, Williams & Green, Des Moines, for appellees.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the legal concepts of 'clear error' and 'clear and convincing evidence' standards.", "Clear error is the standard of review applied by appellate courts when reviewing individual findings of fact by a trial court.", "Clear and convincing evidence is a standard of proof that a litigant must meet in order to establish a fact in the trial court.", "Adverse possession (AP) requires meeting certain elements, and the Gobbles' AP claim may have already occurred during the Blevins' ownership of the land.", "Permission from the Browns would not have been relevant if AP had already occurred.", "Carpenter v. Ruperto is a case that supports the idea that permission defeats AP only if the statutory period has not already passed.", "James R. Bowers, Jr. and Keith E. Uhl of Scalise, Scism, Gentry, Brick & Brick, Des Moines, represented the appellant, while John D. Hudson and Timothy R. Williams of Carney, Hudson, Williams & Green, Des Moines, represented the appellees."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "536", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "521 \n dwarfed by, the huge total volume of files shared. Further, \nthe District Court and the Court of Appeals did not sharply \ndistinguish between uses of Grokster\u2019s and StreamCast\u2019s \nsoftware products (which this case is about) and uses of \npeer-to-peer technology generally (which this case is not \nabout). \nIn sum, when the record in this case was developed, there \nwas evidence that Grokster\u2019s and StreamCast\u2019s products \nwere, and had been for some time, overwhelmingly used to \ninfringe an d that this infringement was the overwhelming \nsource of revenue from the products. Fairly appraised, the \nevidence was insufficient to demonstrate, beyond genuine \ndebate, a reasonable prospect that substantial or \ncommercially significant noninfringing uses were likely to \ndevelop over time. On this record, the District Court \nshould not have ruled dispositively on the contributory \ninfringement charge by granting summary judgment to \nGrokster and StreamCast. \nIf, on remand, the case is not resolved on summary \njudgment in favor of MGM based on Grokster and \nStreamCast actively inducing infringement, the Court of \nAppeals, I would emphasize, should reconsider, on a fuller \nrecord, its interpretation of Sony\u2019s product distribution \nholding. \nJUSTICE BREYER , with whom JUSTICE STEVENS and \nJUSTICE O\u2019C ONNOR JOIN , CONCURRING . \nI agree with the Court that the distributor of a dual -use \ntechnology may be liable for the infringing activities of \nthird parties where he or she actively seeks to advance the \ninfringement. I further agree that, in light of our holding \ntoday, we need not n ow \u201crevisit\u201d Sony Corp. of America v. \nUniversal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Other \nMembers of the Court, however, take up the Sony \nquestion: whether Grokster\u2019s product is \u201ccapable of \n\u2018substantial\u2019 or \u2018commercially significant\u2019 noninfringing", "proposition": ["The court case is about Grokster and StreamCast's software products and their use for infringing activities.", "The District Court and the Court of Appeals did not sharply distinguish between uses of Grokster's and StreamCast's software products and uses of peer-to-peer technology generally.", "There was evidence that Grokster's and StreamCast's products were overwhelmingly used to infringe and that this infringement was the overwhelming source of revenue from the products.", "The District Court should not have ruled dispositively on the contributory infringement charge by granting summary judgment to Grokster and StreamCast.", "The Court agreed that the distributor of a dual-use technology may be liable for the infringing activities of third parties where he or she actively seeks to advance the infringement.", "The Court did not need to revisit Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) in light of their holding today.", "Other members of the Court took up the question of whether Grokster's product is 'capable of 'substantial' or 'commercially significant' noninfringing uses.'"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "313", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "298 \n Obviously, the quest ion of what is unfair competition in \nbusiness must be determined with particular reference to \nthe character and circumstances of the business. The \nquestion here is not so much the rights of either party as \nagainst the public but their rights as between the mselves. \nSee Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 258. And, although we \nmay and do assume that neither party has any remaining \nproperty interest as against the public in uncopyrighted \nnews matter after the moment of its first publication, it by \nno means follows t hat there is no remaining property \ninterest in it as between themselves. For, to both of them \nalike, news matter, however little susceptible of ownership \nor dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in trade, to be \ngathered at the cost of enterprise, organi zation, skill, labor, \nand money, and to be distributed and sold to those who \nwill pay money for it, as for any other merchandise. \nRegarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of \nwhich both parties are seeking to make profits at the same \ntime and in the same field, we hardly can fail to recognize \nthat for this purpose, and as between them, it must be \nregarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of \neither as against the public. \n\u2026 . \nThe question, whether one who has gathered general \ninformation or news at pains and expense for the purpose \nof subsequent publication through the press has such an \ninterest in its publication as may be protected from \ninterference, has been raised many times, although never, \nperhaps, in the precise form in which it is now presented. \nBoard of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. \n236, 250, related to the distribution of quotations of prices \non dealings upon a board of trade, which were collected by \nplaintiff and communicated on confidential terms to \nnumerous persons under a contract not to make them \npublic. This court held that, apart from certain special \nobjections that were overruled, plaintiff\u2019s collection of", "proposition": ["The decomposed propositions"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "116", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "101 \n distinct property righ t. A possessor of land proving a direct \nor immediate intrusion of a physical, tangible object onto \nthe land is presumptively entitled to recover at least \nnominal damages even absent any proof of actual injury \nand may recover additional damages for any inju ries \nactually proved. \nBecause Michigan does not recognize a cause of action in \ntrespass for airborne particulate, noise, or vibrations, we \nhereby vacate the jury verdict in this matter and remand \nthis case to the trial court for further proceedings \nconsist ent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. \nReversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. \n1.3.2. Law and Economics \nFrom A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Economic \nAnalysis of Law , in The New Palgrave Dictionary of \nEconomics (2d ed.) \nEconomic analysis of law seeks to identify the effects of legal rules \non the behavior of relevant actors and whether these effects are \nsocially desirable. The approach employed is that of economic \nanalysis generally: the be havior of individuals and firms is described \nassuming that they are forward looking and rational, and the \nframework of welfare economics is adopted to assess the social \ndesirability of outcomes. The field may be said to have begun with \nBentham (1789), who systematically examined how actors would \nbehave in the face of legal incentives (especially criminal sanctions) \nand who evaluated outcomes with respect to a clearly stated \nmeasure of social welfare (utilitarianism). His work was left \nessentially undevelope d until four important contributions were \nmade: Coase (1960) on externalities and liability, Becker (1968) on \ncrime and law enforcement, Calabresi (1970) on accident law, and \nPosner (1972) on economic analysis of law in general. \n\u2026 . \n1. PROPERTY LAW. \n\u2026 .", "proposition": ["A possessor of land proving a direct or immediate intrusion of a physical, tangible object onto the land is presumptively entitled to recover at least nominal damages even absent any proof of actual injury and may recover additional damages for any injuries actually proved.", "Michigan does not recognize a cause of action in trespass for airborne particulate, noise, or vibrations.", "The jury verdict in this matter is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.", "The field of economic analysis of law seeks to identify the effects of legal rules on the behavior of relevant actors and determine whether these effects are socially desirable.", "Economic analysis of law assumes that individuals and firms are forward-looking and rational, and it adopts the framework of welfare economics to assess the social desirability of outcomes.", "Bentham (1789) systematically examined how actors would behave in the face of legal incentives (especially criminal sanctions) and evaluated outcomes with respect to a clearly stated measure of social welfare (utilitarianism).", "Coase (1960) contributed to the field of economic analysis of law with his work on externalities and liability.", "Becker (1968) contributed to the field with his work on crime and law enforcement.", "Calabresi (1970) contributed to the field with his work on accident law.", "Posner (1972) contributed to the field with his work on the economic analysis of law in general."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "420", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "405 \n of the Act. Section 103 explains that \u201c[t]he subject matter \nof copyright \u2026 includes compilations,\u201d \u00a7 103(a), but that \ncopyright protects only the author\u2019s original contributions \u2013 \nnot the facts o r information conveyed: \nThe copyright in a compilation \u2026 \nextends only to the material \ncontributed by the author of such \nwork, as distinguished from the \npreexisting material employed in the \nwork, and does not imply any \nexclusive right in the preexisting \nmaterial. \n\u00a7 103(b). \nAs \u00a7 103 makes clear, copyright is not a tool by which a \ncompilation author may keep others from using the facts or \ndata he or she has collected. \u201cThe most important point \nhere is one that is commonly misunderstood today: \ncopyright \u2026 has n o effect one way or the other on the \ncopyright or public domain status of the preexisting \nmaterial.\u201d H.R.Rep., at 57; S.Rep., at 55, U.S.Code Cong. & \nAdmin. News 1976, p. 5670. The 1909 Act did not require, \nas \u201csweat of the brow\u201d courts mistakenly assumed, that \neach subsequent compiler must start from scratch and is \nprecluded from relying on research undertaken by another. \nSee, e.g., Jeweler\u2019s Circular Publishing Co., 281 F., at 88 -89. \nRather, the facts contained in existing works may be freely \ncopied becau se copyright protects only the elements that \nowe their origin to the compiler \u2013 the selection, \ncoordination, and arrangement of facts. \nIn summary, the 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act leave \nno doubt that originality, not \u201csweat of the brow,\u201d is the \ntouchstone of copyright protection in directories and other \nfact-based works. Nor is there any doubt that the same was \ntrue under the 1909 Act. The 1976 revisions were a direct \nresponse to the Copyright Office\u2019s concern that many", "proposition": ["Section 103 of the Act explains that compilations are included in the subject matter of copyright.", "Copyright protects only the author's original contributions, not the facts or information conveyed.", "The copyright in a compilation extends only to the material contributed by the author, not the preexisting material employed in the work.", "Copyright does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting material.", "Copyright has no effect on the copyright or public domain status of the preexisting material.", "The 1909 Act did not require starting from scratch for subsequent compilers and allowed relying on research undertaken by others.", "Copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works is based on originality, not 'sweat of the brow.'", "The 1976 revisions to the Copyright Act were a direct response to the Copyright Office's concern about the protection of fact-based works."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "192", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "177 \n autem corporalis quaedam possessio ad dominium \nadipiscendum; atque ideo, vulnerasse non sufficit.\u201d But in \nthe following section he explains and qualifies this \ndefinition of occupancy: \u201cSed possessio illa potest non solis \nmanibus, sed instrumentis, ut decipulis, retibus, laqueis \ndum duo adsint: primum ut ipsa instrumenta sint in nostra \npotestate, deinde ut fera, ita inclusa sit, ut exire inde \nnequeat.\u201d This qualification embraces the full extent of \nBarbeyrac\u2019s objection to Puffendorf\u2019s definition, and allows \nas great a latitude to acquiring property by occupancy, as \ncan reasonably be inferred from the words or ideas \nexpressed by Barbeyrac in his notes. The case now under \nconsideration is one of mere pursuit, and presents no \ncircumstances or acts which can bring it within the \ndefinit ion of occupancy by Puffendorf, or Grotius, or the \nideas of Barbeyrac upon that subject. \nThe case cited from 11 Mod. 74 \u2013130. I think clearly \ndistinguishable from the present; inasmuch as there the \naction was for maliciously hindering and disturbing the \nplaintiff in the exercise and enjoyment of a private \nfranchise; and in the report of the same case, 3 Salk. 9. \nHolt, Ch. J. states, that the ducks were in the plaintiff\u2019s \ndecoy pond, and so in his possession, from which it is \nobvious the court laid much stres s in their opinion upon \nthe plaintiff\u2019s possession of the ducks, ratione soli. \nWe are the more readily inclined to confine possession or \noccupancy of beasts ferae naturae, within the limits \nprescribed by the learned authors above cited, for the sake \nof cer tainty, and preserving peace and order in society.", "proposition": ["Barbeyrac objects to Puffendorf's definition of corporalis quaedam possessio ad dominium adipiscendum.", "Barbeyrac's objection is qualified by the statement that possessio can be acquired through instruments, such as decipulis, retibus, and laqueis, as long as two conditions are met: the instruments are in one's possession, and the wild animal is enclosed in a way that it cannot escape.", "This qualification allows for a great latitude in acquiring property by occupancy, as inferred from Barbeyrac's notes.", "The case under consideration is one of mere pursuit and does not present any circumstances or acts that can be considered as occupancy according to Puffendorf, Grotius, or Barbeyrac's ideas.", "The case cited from 11 Mod. 74 \u2013130 is considered distinguishable from the present case, as the action was for maliciously hindering and disturbing the plaintiff in the exercise and enjoyment of a private franchise.", "In the report of the same case (3 Salk. 9), Holt, Ch. J. states that the ducks were in the plaintiff's decoy pond, and thus in his possession ratione soli.", "The authors argue for confining possession or occupancy of beasts ferae naturae within the limits prescribed by the learned authors, for the sake of certainty and preserving peace and order in society."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "40", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "25 \n emphasizes the lack of de facto control on the part of the \nshopkeeper. Sir John Salmond wrote:31 \u201cIn Bridges v. \nHawkesworth32 a parcel of banknotes was dropped on the \nfloor of the defendant\u2019s shop, where they were found by \nthe plaintiff, a customer. It was held that the plaintiff had a \ngood title to them as against the defendant. For the \nplaintiff, and not the defendant, was the first to acquire \npossession of them. The defendant had not the necessary \nanimus, for he did n ot know of their existence.\u201d Professor \nGoodhart, in our own day, in his work \u201cEssays in \nJurisprudence and the Common Law\u201d (1931) has put \nforward a further view that perhaps Bridges v. \nHawkesworth33 was wrongly decided. It is clear from the \ndecision in Bridges v. Hawkesworth34 that an occupier of \nland does not in all cases possess an unattached thing on \nhis land even though the true owner has lost possession. \nWith regard to South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman,35 \nthe firs t two lines of the headnote are: \u201cThe possessor of \nland is generally entitled, as against the finder, to chattels \nfound on the land.\u201d I am not sure that this is accurate. The \nfacts were that the defendant Sharman, while cleaning out, \nunder the orders of th e plaintiffs, the South Staffordshire \nWater Company, a pool of water on their land, found two \nrings embedded in the mud at the bottom of the pool. He \ndeclined to deliver them to the plaintiffs, but failed to \ndiscover the real owner. In an action brought by the \ncompany against Sharman in detinue it was held that the \ncompany were entitled to the rings. Lord Russell of \n \n31 Jurisprudence (9th ed.) 382. \n32 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079. \n33 21 L. J. (Q. B.) 75; 15 Jur. 1079. \n34 21 L. J.", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the lack of de facto control on the part of the shopkeeper in certain situations.", "Sir John Salmond wrote about the case of Bridges v. Hawkesworth, where a plaintiff found banknotes dropped on the floor of a defendant's shop and had a good title to them.", "Professor Goodhart suggested that Bridges v. Hawkesworth might have been wrongly decided.", "The passage mentions the decision in South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, where the possessor of land was entitled to chattels found on the land.", "In the case of South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, the defendant Sharman found two rings embedded in the mud at the bottom of a pool of water on the plaintiffs' land under the orders of the plaintiffs, the South Staffordshire Water Company.", "In the case of South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, the defendant Sharman failed to deliver the rings to the plaintiffs but also failed to discover the real owner. In an action brought by the company against Sharman in detinue, it was held that the company were entitled to the rings."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "609", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "594 \n the first contact was initiated by the Complainant \non May 16, 2000. \n\u2026 . \n6. Discussion and Findings \nDomain Name Identical or Confusingly Similar to \nComplainant\u2019s Mark \n6.1 The relevant part of the domain name \n\u201csting.com\u201d is \u201csting\u201d. The Com plainant asserts, \nthe Respondent admits, and this Administrative \nPanel finds, that the domain name is identical to \nthe word STING. \n6.2 The Complainant is not the owner of a \ntrademark or service mark registration for the \nword STING. It is, however, clear th at the \nUniform Policy is not limited to a \u201cregistered\u201d \nmark; an unregistered, or common law, mark is \nsufficient for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i). \nThe Complainant did not provide any \ndocumentary evidence in support of his assertion \nthat he is the owner of the unregistered \ntrademark and/or service mark STING. \nHowever, the Uniform Policy is not limited to \ntrademarks or service marks \u201cowned\u201d by the \nComplainant; it is sufficient for the purposes of \nparagraph 4(a)(i) that there be a trademark or \nservice mark \u201cin which the Complainant has \nrights\u201d. The Complainant asserted, and this \nAdministrative Panel through the equivalent of \ntaking judicial notice finds, that the Complainant \nis a world famous entertainer who is known by \nthe name STING.", "proposition": ["The passage is about a dispute involving a domain name 'sting.com'.", "The first contact was initiated by the Complainant on May 16, 2000.", "The relevant part of the domain name is 'sting'.", "The Complainant asserts that the domain name is identical to the word STING.", "The Respondent admits that the domain name is identical to the word STING.", "This Administrative Panel finds that the domain name is identical to the word STING.", "The Complainant is not the owner of a trademark or service mark registration for the word STING.", "An unregistered, or common law, mark is sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i).", "The Complainant did not provide any documentary evidence in support of his assertion that he is the owner of the unregistered trademark and/or service mark STING.", "The Uniform Policy is not limited to trademarks or service marks 'owned' by the Complainant; it is sufficient for the purposes of paragraph 4(a)(i) that there be a trademark or service mark 'in which the Complainant has rights'.", "The Complainant asserted that he is a world famous entertainer who is known by the name STING.", "This Administrative Panel through the equivalent of taking judicial notice finds that the Complainant is a world famous entertainer who is known by the name STING."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "702", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "687 \n During the period of 1991 through 1997, Cahill testified \nthat she planted more flowers and trees , in addition to \ncutting the grass occasionally. Cahill also stored her gas grill \nand yard furniture on the lot and had her brother stack \nlobster pots for decorative purposes. In 1991 or 1992, she \nbegan hosting the annual \u201cCane Berry Blossom Festival,\u201d \nanother outdoor event that used both her lot and lot 19 as \nthe party venue. Like the other gatherings, the festival \nalways took place on a day during a warm -weather month. \nIn 1997 or 1998, she installed a wooden border around the \nflower beds. \nOn July 22, 1997 , Cahill wrote to George Morrow \nexpressing an interest in obtaining title to lot 19. In the \n1997 letter, Cahill stated: \u201cI am interested in learning if \nyour narrow strip of property is available for sale. If so, I \nwould be interested in discussing purchasi ng it from you.\u201d \nCahill continued: \u201cIf there is a possibility that you would \nlike to sell it, could you please either call me or send me a \nnote?\u201d Cahill did not receive a response. \nIn the \u201clate 1990s,\u201d though Cahill is unclear whether this \noccurred before or after the 1997 letter, a nearby marina \nsought permission to construct and elevate its property. \nCahill attended the related zoning board hearings and \nexpressed her concerns about increased flooding on lot 19 \ndue to the marina elevation. She succeeded in having the \nmarina developer grade part of lot 19 to alleviate flooding. \nAdditionally, Cahill instituted her own trench and culvert \ndrainage measures to divert water off of lot 19 and then \nreseeded the graded area. By Cahill\u2019s own admission, \nhowever, her t renching and reseeding work occurred in \n1999 or 2000.", "proposition": ["Value error: json output should start and end with { and }"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "694", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "679 \n the Blevins periodically repaired the fence surrounding the \ntwo-feet-wide tract, that they routi nely planted a garden \nalong the tract, and that the Blevins constructed and \nmaintained a shed along a portion of the tract. Mr. Fletcher \ntestified that he regularly planted a garden along the tract, \nthat he routinely removed weeds from along the tract and \nfence, and that he picked blackberries from the area and \nwalnuts from trees that had grown along the tract.9 The \ndefendants testified that they planted gardens along the \ntract, that they built a treehouse in one of the trees that had \ngrown along the tract, and that they regularly mowed the \ngrass and weeds in the area. \nTo establish the element of \u201copen and notorious\u201d \npossession by tacking, the defendants called several \nwitnesses who testified that during the period that the \nBlevins owned the defendants\u2019 prop erty, the reputation of \nthe two -feet-wide tract in the community was that it \nbelonged to the Blevins.10 Mr. Fletcher testified that the \nreputation in the community was that the two -feet-wide \ntract was part of his property. The defendants testified that \nthe reputation in the community was that the two -feet-wide \ntract was part of their property. \nTo establish the element of \u201cexclusive\u201d possession by \ntacking, the defendants presented testimony by two of the \noriginal owners of plaintiffs\u2019 property.11 These two \nwitnesses testified that neither the Blevins\u2019 nor the \n \n9 We have held that to establish \u201cactual\u201d possession, evidence must be pre sented \nwhich shows that possession of disputed property was used for enjoyment, \ncultivation, residence or improvements for the entire requisite ten -year period. \n10 We have held that to establish \u201copen and notorious\u201d possession, evidence must \nbe presented wh ich shows that possession of disputed property was in such a \nmanner as to give notice to the true owner that the property is being claimed by \nanother for the entire requisite ten -year period.", "proposition": ["The Blevins periodically repaired the fence surrounding the two-feet-wide tract.", "The Blevins routinely planted a garden along the tract.", "The Blevins constructed and maintained a shed along a portion of the tract.", "Mr. Fletcher regularly planted a garden along the tract.", "Mr. Fletcher removed weeds from along the tract and fence.", "Mr. Fletcher picked blackberries from the area and walnuts from trees that had grown along the tract.", "The defendants planted gardens along the tract.", "The defendants built a treehouse in one of the trees that had grown along the tract.", "The defendants regularly mowed the grass and weeds in the area.", "The reputation in the community was that the two-feet-wide tract belonged to the Blevins.", "Mr. Fletcher testified that the reputation in the community was that the two-feet-wide tract was part of his property.", "The defendants testified that the reputation in the community was that the two-feet-wide tract was part of their property.", "The defendants presented testimony by two of the original owners of plaintiffs' property.", "These two witnesses testified that neither the Blevins' nor the defendants had exclusive possession of the property for the entire ten-year period."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "294", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "279 \n tract of land cannot be owned in place, \nbecause subject to appropriation, \nwithout the con sent of the owner of \nthe tract, through drainage from wells \non adjacent lands. If the owners of \nadjacent lands have the right to \nappropriate, without liability, the gas \nand oil underlying their neighbor\u2019s \nland, then their neighbor has the \ncorrelative right to appropriate, \nthrough like methods of drainage, the \ngas and oil underlying the tracts \nadjacent to his own. \nThus it is seen that, notwithstanding the fact that oil and \ngas beneath the surface are subject both to capture and \nadministrative regulation, the fundamental rule of absolute \nownership of the minerals in place is not affected in our \nstate. In recognition of such ownership, our courts, in \ndecisions involving well -spacing regulations of our Railroad \nCommission, have frequently announced the sound vie w \nthat each landowner should be afforded the opportunity to \nproduce his fair share of the recoverable oil and gas \nbeneath his land, which is but another way of recognizing \nthe existence of correlative rights between the various \nlandowners over a common res ervoir of oil or gas. \nIt must be conceded that under the law of capture there is \nno liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage from the \ncommon pool. The landowner is privileged to sink as many \nwells as he desires upon his tract of land and extract \ntherefrom and appropriat e all the oil and gas that he may \nproduce, so long as he operates within the spirit and \npurpose of conservation statutes and orders of the Railroad \nCommission. These laws and regulations are designed to \nafford each owner a reasonable opportunity to produce his \nproportionate part of the oil and gas from the entire pool \nand to prevent operating practices injurious to the common \nreservoir. In this manner, if all operators exercise the same", "proposition": ["The 279 tract of land cannot be owned in place due to the risk of drainage from wells on adjacent lands.", "If adjacent landowners have the right to appropriate gas and oil from their neighbor's land, then their neighbor has the correlative right to appropriate through drainage.", "The fundamental rule of absolute ownership of minerals in place is not affected in our state, despite the fact that oil and gas are subject to capture and administrative regulation.", "Our courts recognize the existence of correlative rights between landowners over a common reservoir of oil or gas, and they support well-spacing regulations to ensure each landowner can produce their fair share of recoverable oil and gas.", "Under the law of capture, there is no liability for reasonable and legitimate drainage from the common pool.", "Landowners can sink as many wells as they desire on their tract of land and extract all the oil and gas they produce, as long as they operate within the spirit and purpose of conservation statutes and orders of the Railroad Commission.", "These laws and regulations are designed to afford each owner a reasonable opportunity to produce their proportionate part of the oil and gas from the entire pool and to prevent operating practices injurious to the common reservoir."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "537", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "522 \n uses.\u201d And they answer that question by stating that the \nCourt of Appeals was wrong when it granted summary \njudgment on the issue in Grokster\u2019s favor. I write to \nexplain why I disagree with them on this matter. \nI \nThe Court\u2019s opinion in Sony and the record evi dence (as \ndescribed and analyzed in the many briefs before us) \ntogether convince me that the Court of Appeals\u2019 \nconclusion has adequate legal support. \n\u2026 . \nWhen measured against Sony\u2019s underlying evidence and \nanalysis, the evidence now before us shows that Grokster \npasses Sony\u2019s test -that is, whether the company\u2019s product is \ncapable of substantial or commercially significant \nnoninfringing uses. For one thing, petitioners\u2019 (hereinafter \nMGM) own expert declared that 75% of current files \navailable on Grokster a re infringing and 15% are \u201clikely \ninfringing.\u201d That leaves some number of files near 10% \nthat apparently are noninfringing, a figure very similar to \nthe 9% or so of authorized time -shifting uses of the VCR \nthat the Court faced in Sony. \nAs in Sony, witnesse s here explained the nature of the \nnoninfringing files on Grokster\u2019s network without detailed \nquantification. Those files include: \nAuthorized copies of music by artists such as Wilco, Janis \nIan, Pearl Jam, Dave Matthews, John Mayer, and others. \nFree electr onic books and other works from various online \npublishers, including Project Gutenberg. \nPublic domain and authorized software, such as WinZip \n8.1. \nLicensed music videos and television and movie segments \ndistributed via digital video packaging with the perm ission \nof the copyright holder.", "proposition": ["The Court of Appeals granted summary judgment in Grokster's favor.", "The author disagrees with the Court of Appeals' conclusion.", "The Court's opinion in Sony and the record evidence (as described and analyzed in the many briefs before us) together convince the author that the Court of Appeals' conclusion has adequate legal support.", "The evidence now before us shows that Grokster passes Sony's test, which is whether the company's product is capable of substantial or commercially significant noninfringing uses.", "Petitioners' (hereinafter MGM) own expert declared that 75% of current files available on Grokster are infringing and 15% are 'likely infringing.'", "The remaining number of files on Grokster's network is near 10%, which apparently are noninfringing.", "The 10% of noninfringing files on Grokster's network is very similar to the 9% or so of authorized time-shifting uses of the VCR in Sony.", "Witnesses explained the nature of the noninfringing files on Grokster's network without detailed quantification.", "Authorized copies of music by various artists are among the noninfringing files on Grokster's network.", "Free electronic books and other works from various online publishers, including Project Gutenberg, are among the noninfringing files on Grokster's network.", "Public domain and authorized software, such as WinZip 8.1, are among the noninfringing files on Grokster's network.", "Licensed music videos, television, and movie segments distributed via digital video packaging with the permission of the copyright holder are among the noninfringing files on Grokster's network."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "201", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "186 \n possible t o do to make the animal his own, that would \nseem to be sufficient. Such a rule might well be applied in \nthe interest of trade, there being no usage or custom to the \ncontrary. Holmes, Com. Law, 217. But be that as it may, I \nhold the usage to be valid, and t hat the property in the \nwhale was in the libelant. \nThe rule of damages is the market value of the oil obtained \nfrom the whale, less the cost of trying it out and preparing \nit for the market, with interest on the amount so \nascertained from the date of conve rsion. As the question is \nnew and important, and the suit is contested on both sides, \nmore for the purpose of having it settled than for the \namount involved, I shall give no costs. \nDecree for libellant for $71.05, without costs. \nFrom Herman Melville, Moby Dick \nCHAPTER 89 \nFast-Fish and Loose -Fish \nThe allusion to the waifs and waif -poles in the last chapter but one, \nnecessitates some account of the laws and regulations of the whale \nfishery, of which the waif may be deemed the grand symbol and \nbadge. \nIt frequently happens that when several ships are cruising in \ncompany, a whale may be struck by one vessel, then escape, and be \nfinally killed and captured by another vessel; and herein are \nindirectly comprised many minor contingencies, a ll partaking of \nthis one grand feature. For example, \u2013after a weary and perilous \nchase and capture of a whale, the body may get loose from the ship \nby reason of a violent storm; and drifting far away to leeward, be \nretaken by a second whaler, who, in a calm , snugly tows it \nalongside, without risk of life or line. Thus the most vexatious and \nviolent disputes would often arise between the fishermen, were \nthere not some written or unwritten, universal, undisputed law \napplicable to all cases.", "proposition": ["The body may drift far away to leeward and be retaken by a second whaler in a calm."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "195", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "180 \n where it is, or wish for it, or make a declaration of our will \nrespecting it; or whether, in the case of wild beasts, setting \na trap, or lying in wait, or starting, or pursuing, be enough; \nor if an actual wounding, or killing, or bodily ta ct and \noccupation be necessary. Writers on general law, who have \nfavoured us with their speculations on these points, differ \non them all; but, great as is the diversity of sentiment \namong them, some conclusion must be adopted on the \nquestion immediately be fore us. After mature deliberation, \nI embrace that of Barbeyrac, as the most rational, and least \nliable to objection. If at liberty, we might imitate the \ncourtesy of a certain emperor, who, to avoid giving offence \nto the advocates of any of these different doctrines, \nadopted a middle course, and by ingenious distinctions, \nrendered it difficult to say (as often happens after a fierce \nand angry contest) to whom the palm of victory belonged. \nHe ordained, that if a beast be followed with large dogs and \nhounds, he shall belong to the hunter, not to the chance \noccupant; and in like manner, if he be killed or wounded \nwith a lance or sword; but if chased with beagles only, then \nhe passed to the captor, not to the first pursuer. If slain \nwith a dart, a sling, or a bo w, he fell to the hunter, if still in \nchase, and not to him who might afterwards find and seize \nhim.", "proposition": ["There is a question about what constitutes ownership of a wild beast when it comes to hunting and capturing it.", "Different writers on general law have different opinions on this matter.", "Despite the disagreement among these writers, a conclusion must be reached.", "After careful consideration, the author adopts the view of Barbeyrac as the most rational and least objectionable.", "An emperor once tried to avoid offending the supporters of various doctrines by creating a middle ground with clever distinctions.", "According to this emperor's approach, if a beast is pursued with large dogs or hounds, it belongs to the hunter, not the chance occupant.", "If the beast is killed or wounded with a lance or sword, it still belongs to the hunter.", "However, if the beast is chased only by beagles, it becomes the property of the captor, not the first pursuer.", "If the beast is killed with a dart, sling, or bow while still being chased, it falls to the hunter, not the one who finds and seizes it later."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "233", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Such is the meaning of the commentaries, from which are \nthe following extracts: \nThe acquisition of things tangible by \noccupancy must be made corpore et \nanimo , that is, by an outward act \nsignifying an intention to possess. The \nnecessity of an outward act to \ncommence h olding a thing in \ndominion is founded on the principle", "proposition": ["The commentaries provide a meaning that acquisition of tangible things requires occupancy made corpore et animo.", "An outward act signifying an intention to possess is necessary for acquiring tangible things.", "The necessity of an outward act to commence holding a thing in dominion is founded on the principle."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "384", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "444 U.S. 924, 1 00 S.Ct. 261, 62 L.Ed.2d \n \n3 The Board concluded that the new bacteria were not \u201cproducts of nature,\u201d \nbecause Pseudomonas bacteria containing two or more different energy -generating \nplasmids are not naturally occurring. \n4 Bergy involved a patent application for a pure culture of the micro -organism \nStreptomyces vellos us found to be useful in the production of lincomycin, an \nantibiotic.", "proposition": ["The Board concluded that the new bacteria were not \u2018products of nature\u2019, because Pseudomonas bacteria containing two or more different energy-generating plasmids are not naturally occurring.", "444 U.S. 924, 1 00 S.Ct. 261, 62 L.Ed.2d 3 is a legal case.", "The Board is an authority in the legal case.", "Pseudomonas bacteria are a type of bacteria.", "Plasmids are energy-generating components of Pseudomonas bacteria.", "Streptomyces vellosus is a micro-organism.", "Lincomycin is an antibiotic.", "Streptomyces vellosus is useful in the production of lincomycin.", "Bergy is a patent application for a pure culture of Streptomyces vellosus."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "460", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "445 \n 1909, and 1976 Acts, the CTEA\u2019s new terms apply to both \nfuture and existing copyrights.4 \nB. \nThe [District] court held that the CTEA does not violate \nthe \u201climited Times\u201d restriction of the Copyright Clause \nbecause the CTEA\u2019s terms, though longe r than the 1976 \nAct\u2019s terms, are still limited, not perpetual, and therefore fit \nwithin Congress\u2019 discretion. The court also held that \u201cthere \nare no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted \nworks of others.\u201d \nThe Court of Appeals for the District of Co lumbia Circuit \naffirmed. \u2026 . \nWe granted certiorari to address two questions: whether the \nCTEA\u2019s extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress\u2019 \npower under the Copyright Clause; and whether the \nCTEA\u2019s extension of existing and future copyrights violates \nthe First Amendment. 534 U.S. 1126 and 1160 (2002). We \nnow answer those two questions in the negative and affirm. \nII \nA. \nWe address first the determination of the courts below that \nCongress has authority under the Copyright Clause to \nextend the terms of ex isting copyrights. Text, history, and \nprecedent, we conclude, confirm that the Copyright Clause \nempowers Congress to prescribe \u201climited Times\u201d for \n \n4 Petitioners argue that the 1790 Act must be distinguished from the later Acts on \nthe ground that it covered existing works but did not extend existing copyrights. The \nparties disagree on the qu estion whether the 1790 Act\u2019s copyright term should be \nregarded in part as compensation for the loss of any then existing state - or \ncommon -law copyright protections. Without resolving that dispute, we \nunderscore that the First Congress clearly did confer c opyright protection on \nworks that had already been created.", "proposition": ["The CTEA's new terms apply to both future and existing copyrights.", "The District court held that the CTEA does not violate the 'limited Times' restriction of the Copyright Clause.", "The court held that there are no First Amendment rights to use the copyrighted works of others.", "The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the District court's decision.", "The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two questions: whether the CTEA's extension of existing copyrights exceeds Congress' power under the Copyright Clause; and whether the CTEA's extension of existing and future copyrights violates the First Amendment.", "The Supreme Court answers both questions in the negative and affirms the lower courts' decisions.", "The Copyright Clause empowers Congress to prescribe 'limited Times' for copyright protection.", "The First Congress clearly conferred copyright protection on works that had already been created."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "549", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "534 \n Vicarious liability is the most promising avenue. Vicarious \nliability, in the copyright infringement context, is liability for \nthe infringement of others when one has the right and \npractical ability to control that infringement. Here, the \nnewspaper h as the right to decide which ads to print. Further, \nthe newspaper is certainly capable of screening ads for \nsolicitations to trade infringing copies. This case would \nessentially be a low -tech version of Napster , but where the \nability to screen for infringe rs is even easier. \nNote that solicitations to trade the compact discs themselves, \nthe actual discs bought at retail, would not form the basis of a \nsecondary infringement claim. There would be no copy at all \nmade in such circumstances. I\u2019m free to sell or g ive away \nbooks I no longer want, CDs that I don\u2019t want, or any other \narticle subject to copyright. \nYou may be tempted to cite inducement as a possibility here. \nBut the newspaper itself is not actively encouraging anyone to \ninfringe. The evidence of inducem ent in Grokster went to \nevidence that the companies themselves were encouraging \ninfringement - by marketing to infringers, advertising the \nutility of their produce to infringe, etc. There isn\u2019t any of that \nhere. \n2. A developer sells software called StripIt that removes the \nrestrictions on movies purchased from the iTunes Store. Developer \nis sued. \nContributory infringement, or what I\u2019ve been calling Sony-style \ninfringement, might be found here, depending on what other \nuses the software has. Cautionary note: there was no liability \nin Sony. So when I say Sony-style liability, I mean liability on \nthe ground discussed in Sony. Sony itself was not found liable \nunder what we\u2019re calling a Sony theory. Contributory \ninfringement is liability for merely placing a produ ct on the \nmarket that is not capable substantial noninfringing uses. In \nother words, if your product is really only good for", "proposition": ["Vicarious liability is the most promising avenue for copyright infringement cases.", "Vicarious liability is liability for the infringement of others when one has the right and practical ability to control that infringement.", "The newspaper has the right to decide which ads to print.", "The newspaper is capable of screening ads for solicitations to trade infringing copies.", "Solicitations to trade compact discs themselves would not form the basis of a secondary infringement claim.", "One is free to sell or give away books, CDs, or any other article subject to copyright.", "Inducement is not a possibility in this case, as the newspaper is not actively encouraging infringement.", "Contributory infringement, also known as Sony-style infringement, might be found in the case of a developer selling software that removes restrictions on movies purchased from the iTunes Store.", "There was no liability in the Sony case.", "Contributory infringement is liability for placing a product on the market that is not capable of substantial noninfringing uses."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "330", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "315 \n the issue of printed copies; and in so far as they do differ, \nthey have no application to the case at bar. \nFourth. Plaintiff further contended that defendant\u2019s \npractice constitutes unfair competition, because there is \n\u2018appropriation without cost to itself of values created by\u2019 \nthe plaintiff; and it is upon this ground that the decision of \nthis court appears to be based. To appropriate and use for \nprofit, knowledge and ideas produced by other men, \nwithout making compensation or even acknowledgment, \nmay be inconsistent with a finer sense of propriety; but, \nwith the exceptions indicated above, the law has heretofore \nsanctioned the practice . Thus it was held that one may \nordinarily make and sell anything in any form, may copy \nwith exactness that which another has produced, or may \notherwise use his ideas without his consent and without the \npayment of compensation, and yet not inflict a legal injury; \nand that ordinarily one is at perfect liberty to find out, if he \ncan by lawful means, trade secrets of another, however \nvaluable, and then use the knowledge so acquired gainfully, \nalthough it cost the original owner much in effort and in \nmoney to c ollect or produce. \nSuch taking and gainful use of a product of another which, \nfor reasons of public policy, the law has refused to endow \nwith the attributes of property, does not become unlawful \nbecause the product happens to have been taken from a \nrival a nd is used in competition with him. The unfairness in \ncompetition which hitherto has been recognized by the law \nas a basis for relief, lay in the manner or means of \nconducting the business; and the manner or means held \nlegally unfair, involves either fraud or force or the doing of \nacts otherwise prohibited by law. In the \u2018passing off\u2019 cases \n(the typical and most common case of unfair competition), \nthe wrong consists in fraudulently representing by word or \nact that defendant\u2019s goods are those of plaintiff. S ee \nHanover Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403, 412, 413. In \nthe other cases, the diversion of trade was effected through", "proposition": ["The issue of printed copies differs between the two parties.", "The court's decision is based on the contention that defendant's practice constitutes unfair competition due to the appropriation without cost of values created by the plaintiff.", "Appropriating and using knowledge and ideas produced by others without compensation or acknowledgment may be inconsistent with propriety, but it is not considered unlawful under most circumstances.", "The law generally allows one to make and sell anything in any form, copy exactly what another has produced, or use their ideas without consent or compensation, without inflicting a legal injury.", "The taking and gainful use of a product of another does not become unlawful because the product happens to have been taken from a rival and used in competition with them.", "Unfairness in competition, which is recognized by the law as a basis for relief, lies in the manner or means of conducting the business, involving either fraud, force, or the doing of acts otherwise prohibited by law.", "In the 'passing off' cases, the wrong consists in fraudulently representing by word or act that defendant's goods are those of plaintiff."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "541", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "526 \n assurance that they will be shie lded from copyright liability \nas they bring valuable new technologies to market. \nSony\u2019s rule is clear. That clarity allows those who develop \nnew products that are capable of substantial noninfringing \nuses to know, ex ante, that distribution of their produc t will \nnot yield massive monetary liability. At the same time, it \nhelps deter them from distributing products that have no \nother real function than -or that are specifically intended \nfor-copyright infringement, deterrence that the Court\u2019s \nholding today rein forces (by adding a weapon to the \ncopyright holder\u2019s legal arsenal). \nSony\u2019s rule is strongly technology protecting. The rule \ndeliberately makes it difficult for courts to find secondary \nliability where new technology is at issue. It establishes that \nthe la w will not impose copyright liability upon the \ndistributors of dual -use technologies (who do not \nthemselves engage in unauthorized copying) unless the \nproduct in question will be used almost exclusively to \ninfringe copyrights (or unless they actively induc e \ninfringements as we today describe). Sony thereby \nrecognizes that the copyright laws are not intended to \ndiscourage or to control the emergence of new \ntechnologies, including (perhaps especially) those that help \ndisseminate information and ideas more bro adly or more \nefficiently. Thus Sony\u2019s rule shelters VCRs, typewriters, \ntape recorders, photocopiers, computers, cassette players, \ncompact disc burners, digital video recorders, MP3 players, \nInternet search engines, and peer -to-peer software. But \nSony\u2019s rul e does not shelter descramblers, even if one could \ntheoretically use a descrambler in a noninfringing way. \nSony\u2019s rule is forward looking. It does not confine its scope \nto a static snapshot of a product\u2019s current uses (thereby \nthreatening technologies that have undeveloped future \nmarkets). Rather, as the VCR example makes clear, a \nproduct\u2019s market can evolve dramatically over time. And \nSony -by referring to a capacity for substantial noninfringing", "proposition": ["Sony's rule is clear.", "The clarity of Sony's rule allows developers of new products capable of substantial noninfringing uses to know, ex ante, that distributing their product will not yield massive monetary liability.", "Sony's rule helps deter developers from distributing products with no other real function than or specifically intended for copyright infringement.", "The Court's holding today reinforces deterrence by adding a weapon to the copyright holder's legal arsenal.", "Sony's rule is strongly technology protecting, making it difficult for courts to find secondary liability where new technology is at issue.", "The rule establishes that the law will not impose copyright liability upon the distributors of dual-use technologies unless the product will be used almost exclusively to infringe copyrights or they actively induce infringements.", "Sony recognizes that copyright laws are not intended to discourage or control the emergence of new technologies, including those that help disseminate information and ideas more broadly or efficiently.", "Sony's rule shelters VCRs, typewriters, tape recorders, photocopiers, computers, cassette players, compact disc burners, digital video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and peer-to-peer software.", "Sony's rule does not shelter descramblers, even if one could theoretically use a descrambler in a noninfringing way.", "Sony's rule is forward looking, not confining its scope to a static snapshot of a product's current uses, but considering a product's market evolution over time."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "347", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "332 \n I. BACKGROUND \nThe facts are largely undisputed. Motorola manufactures \nand markets the SportsTrax paging device wh ile STATS \nsupplies the game information that is transmitted to the \npagers. The product became available to the public in \nJanuary 1996, at a retail price of about $200. SportsTrax\u2019s \npager has an inch -and-a-half by inch -and-a-half screen and \noperates in four basic modes: \u201ccurrent,\u201d \u201cstatistics,\u201d \u201cfinal \nscores\u201d and \u201cdemonstration.\u201d It is the \u201ccurrent\u201d mode that \ngives rise to the present dispute. In that mode, SportsTrax \ndisplays the following information on NBA games in \nprogress: (i) the teams playing; (ii) sc ore changes; (iii) the \nteam in possession of the ball; (iv) whether the team is in \nthe free -throw bonus; (v) the quarter of the game; and (vi) \ntime remaining in the quarter. The information is updated \nevery two to three minutes, with more frequent updates \nnear the end of the first half and the end of the game. \nThere is a lag of approximately two or three minutes \nbetween events in the game itself and when the information \nappears on the pager screen. \nSportsTrax\u2019s operation relies on a \u201cdata feed\u201d supplied by \nSTATS reporters who watch the games on television or \nlisten to them on the radio. The reporters key into a \npersonal computer changes in the score and other \ninformation such as successful and missed shots, fouls, and \nclock updates. The information is relaye d by modem to \nSTATS\u2019s host computer, which compiles, analyzes, and \nformats the data for retransmission. The information is \nthen sent to a common carrier, which then sends it via \nsatellite to various local FM radio networks that in turn \nemit the signal rece ived by the individual SportsTrax \npagers. \nAlthough the NBA\u2019s complaint concerned only the \nSportsTrax device, the NBA offered evidence at trial \nconcerning STATS\u2019s America On -Line (\u201cAOL\u201d) site. \nStarting in January, 1996, users who accessed STATS\u2019s", "proposition": ["The SportsTrax paging device was manufactured and marketed by Motorola. STATS supplies the game information that is transmitted to the pagers. The product became available to the public in January 1996 at a retail price of about $200. The pager has an inch-and-a-half by inch-and-a-half screen and operates in four basic modes: 'current', 'statistics', 'final scores', and 'demonstration'. The 'current' mode displays information on NBA games in progress, including the teams playing, score changes, the team in possession of the ball, whether the team is in the free-throw bonus, the quarter of the game, and time remaining in the quarter. The information is updated every two to three minutes, with more frequent updates near the end of the first half and the end of the game. There is a lag of approximately two or three minutes between events in the game itself and when the information appears on the pager screen. SportsTrax's operation relies on a 'data feed' supplied by STATS reporters who watch the games on television or listen to them on the radio. The reporters key into a personal computer changes in the score and other information such as successful and missed shots, fouls, and clock updates. The information is relayed by modem to STATS's host computer, which compiles, analyzes, and formats the data for retransmission. The information is then sent to a common carrier, which then sends it via satellite to various local FM radio networks that in turn emit the signal received by the individual SportsTrax pagers. Although the NBA's complaint concerned only the SportsTrax device, the NBA offered evidence at trial concerning STATS's America On-Line ('AOL') site. Starting in January, 1996, users who accessed STATS's AOL site could view game information for various sports, including NBA games."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "336", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "321 \n by the Associated Press. The prohibition of the foreign \ngovernments might as well have been extended to the \nchannels through whi ch news was supplied to the more \nthan a thousand other daily papers in the United States not \nserved by the Associated Press; and a large part of their \nreaders may also be so located that they cannot procure \nprompt access to papers served by the Associated Press. \nA Legislature, urged to enact a law by which one news \nagency or newspaper may prevent appropriation of the \nfruits of its labors by another, would consider such facts \nand possibilities and others which appropriate inquiry \nmight disclose. Legislators might conclude that it was \nimpossible to put an end to the obvious injustice involved \nin such appropriation of news, without opening the door to \nother evils, greater than that sought to be remedied. Such \nappears to have been the opinion of our Senate which \nreported unfavorably a bill to give news a few hours\u2019 \nprotection; and which ratified, on February 15, 1911, the \nconvention adopted at the Fourth International American \nConference; and such was evidently the view also of the \nsignatories to the Internationa l Copyright Union of \nNovember 13, 1908, as both these conventions expressly \nexclude news from copyright protection. \nOr legislators dealing with the subject might conclude, that \nthe right to news values should be protected to the extent \nof permitting recovery of damages for any unauthorized \nuse, but that protection by injunction should be denied, just \nas courts of equity ordinarily refuse (perhaps in the interest \nof free speech) to restrain actionable libels, and for other \nreasons decline to protect by injunction mere political \nrights;and as Congress has prohibited courts from \nenjoining the illegal assessment or collectio n of federal \ntaxes. If a Legislature concluded to recognize property in \npublished news to the extent of permitting recovery at law, \nit might, with a view to making the remedy more certain", "proposition": ["The error occurred because the JSON output was not properly formatted. It should start and end with { and }."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "624", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "609 \n repairs to it but those acts are not inconsistent with his \nretention of a life estate. Furthermore, whatever probative \nvalue could be attached to his statement that he had \nbequeathed the painting to his he irs, made 16 years later \nwhen he prepared an export license application so that he \ncould take the painting out of Austria, is negated by the \noverwhelming evidence that he intended a present transfer \nof title in 1963. Victor\u2019s failure to file a gift tax ret urn on \nthe transaction was partially explained by allegedly \nerroneous legal advice he received, and while that omission \nsometimes may indicate that the donor had no intention of \nmaking a present gift, it does not necessarily do so and it is \nnot dispositive in this case. \nDefendant contends that even if a present gift was \nintended, Victor\u2019s reservation of a lifetime interest in the \npainting defeated it. She relies on a statement from Young v \nYoung (80 NY 422) that \u201d\u2019[a]ny gift of chattels which \nexpressly rese rves the use of the property to the donor for \na certain period, or * * * as long as the donor shall live, is \nineffectual\u2019\u201d ( id., at p 436, quoting 2 Schouler, Personal \nProperty , at 118). The statement was dictum, however, and \nthe holding of the court was limited to a determination that \nan attempted gift of bonds in which the donor reserved the \ninterest for life failed because there had been no delivery of \nthe gift, either actual or constructive ( see, id. , at p 434; see \nalso, Speelman v Pascal , 10 NY2d 313, 319-320). The court \nexpressly left undecided the question \u201cwhether a remainder \nin a chattel may be created and given by a donor by carving \nout a life estate for himself and transferring the remainder\u201d \n(Young v Young , supra, at p. 440).", "proposition": ["The text discusses a legal case involving a painting and the intended transfer of title. It mentions the donor's retention of a life estate, the probative value of a statement made by the donor, and the reservation of a lifetime interest in the painting. The court's holding in Young v Young is also referenced and its dictum is distinguished from the main issue at hand."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "439", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "424 \n Our own review of the two works reveals substantial use of \nGWTW. TWDG app ropriates numerous characters, \nsettings, and plot twists from GWTW. For example, \nScarlett O\u2019Hara, Rhett Butler, Bonnie Butler, Melanie \nWilkes, Ashley Wilkes, Gerald O\u2019Hara, Ellen O\u2019Hara, \nMammy, Pork, Dilcey, Prissy, Belle Watling, Carreen \nO\u2019Hara, Stuart an d Brenton Tarleton, Jeems, Philippe, and \nAunt Pittypat, all characters in GWTW, appear in TWDG. \nMany of these characters are renamed in TWDG: Scarlett \nbecomes \u201cOther,\u201d Rhett Butler becomes \u201cR.B.,\u201d Pork \nbecomes \u201cGarlic,\u201d Prissy becomes \u201cMiss Priss,\u201d Philipp e \nbecomes \u201cFeleepe,\u201d Aunt Pittypat becomes \u201cAunt \nPattypit,\u201d etc. In several instances, Randall renamed \ncharacters using Mitchell\u2019s descriptions of those characters \nin GWTW: Ashley becomes \u201cDreamy Gentleman,\u201d \nMelanie becomes \u201cMealy Mouth,\u201d Gerald becomes \n\u201cPlanter.\u201d The fictional settings from GWTW receive a \nsimilarly transparent renaming in TWDG: Tara becomes \n\u201cTata,\u201d Twelve Oaks Plantation becomes \u201cTwelve Slaves \nStrong as Trees.\u201d TWDG copies, often in wholesale \nfashion, the descriptions and histories of thes e fictional \ncharacters and places from GWTW, as well as their \nrelationships and interactions with one another. TWDG \nappropriates or otherwise explicitly references many aspects \nof GWTW\u2019s plot as well, such as the scenes in which \nScarlett kills a Union sold ier and the scene in which Rhett \nstays in the room with his dead daughter Bonnie, burning \ncandles.", "proposition": ["GWTW is substantially used in TWDG.", "TWDG appropriates numerous characters from GWTW.", "Many characters from GWTW are renamed in TWDG.", "Some character names in TWDG are based on Mitchell\u2019s descriptions in GWTW.", "Fictional settings from GWTW are renamed in TWDG.", "TWDG copies descriptions and histories of characters and places from GWTW.", "TWDG appropriates or references many aspects of GWTW\u2019s plot.", "Scenes from GWTW, such as Scarlett killing a Union soldier and Rhett staying with his dead daughter, are present in TWDG."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "427", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "412 \n Press. The Mitchell Trust maintains the copyright in all of \nthe derivative works as well. See 17 U.S.C. \u00a7 103.2 \nAlice Randall, the author of TWDG, persuasively claims \nthat her novel is a critique of GWTW\u2019s depiction of slavery \nand the Civil -War era American South. To this end, she \nappropriated the characters, pl ot and major scenes from \nGWTW into the first half of TWDG. According to \nSunTrust, TWDG \u201c(1) explicitly refers to [GWTW] in its \nforeword; (2) copies core characters, character traits, and \nrelationships from [GWTW]; (3) copies and summarizes \nfamous scenes an d other elements of the plot from \n[GWTW]; and (4) copies verbatim dialogues and \ndescriptions from [GWTW].\u201d SunTrust Bank v. Houghton \nMifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1364 (N.D.Ga. 2001), \nvacated, 252 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2001). Defendant -\nAppellant Hought on Mifflin, the publisher of TWDG, does \nnot contest the first three allegations,3 but nonetheless \nargues that there is no substantial similarity between the \ntwo works or, in the alternative, that the doctrine of fair use \nprotects TWDG because it is primari ly a parody of \nGWTW. \nAfter discovering the similarities between the books, \nSunTrust asked Houghton Mifflin to refrain from \npublication or distribution of TWDG, but Houghton \nMifflin refused the request. Subsequently, SunTrust filed an \naction alleging copyri ght infringement, violation of the \nLanham Act, and deceptive trade practices, and \nimmediately filed a motion for a temporary restraining \norder and a preliminary injunction.", "proposition": ["The Mitchell Trust maintains the copyright in all of the derivative works as well.", "Alice Randall, the author of TWDG, claims that her novel is a critique of GWTW\u2019s depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era American South.", "Randall appropriated the characters, plot, and major scenes from GWTW into the first half of TWDG.", "SunTrust, the publisher of TWDG, does not contest the first three allegations made by SunTrust.", "Houghton Mifflin, the publisher of TWDG, does not contest the first three allegations made by SunTrust.", "SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co. is a case related to the alleged copyright infringement of GWTW by TWDG.", "Houghton Mifflin argues that there is no substantial similarity between the two works or that the doctrine of fair use protects TWDG because it is primarily a parody of GWTW.", "SunTrust asked Houghton Mifflin to refrain from publication or distribution of TWDG, but Houghton Mifflin refused the request.", "SunTrust filed an action alleging copyright infringement, violation of the Lanham Act, and deceptive trade practices against Houghton Mifflin.", "SunTrust immediately filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "239", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "224 \n their men, fraudulently and forcibly took possession of the \nfrigate;\u201d and afterwards Davis, in the absence of Deklyn \nand his men, took possession of the frigate by anchoring \nsloops over her and surrounding her with mac hinery. \u201cThe \nright claimed by each of the contending parties is the right \nof occupancy. Both parties have prepared means and have \ntaken measures to raise the sunken frigate; neither party has \nyet effected that object; and such being the state of the \nfacts, the court says: Neither party has yet obtained an actual or \nexclusive possession of the derelict subject. * * * The complainants \nallege in their bill that their acts of occupancy have \nobtained for them a title; and the defendants, by their \nanswer, insist that their acts preparatory to an actual \npossession, have been such as to give them a prior and \nsuperior right.\u201d \nBut if the acts of the complainant Deklyn did not constitute \nany \u201cactual or exclusive occupancy,\u201d and if the acts of the \ndefendant Davis were m erely \u201d prepatory to an actual \npossession,\u2019 much less did the acts of Brazelton constitute \nsuch occupancy. Hopkins , Ch. Rep. 135. \nThe next two cases referred to, and from one of which a \nlengthy extract is given, were decided by Judge Betts of \nNew York, a v ery high authority in the matters treated \nupon: \u201c* * * but it is in consonance with the established \nprinciples of maritime law to hold those beginning a \nsalvage service, and who are in the successful prosecution \nof it entitled to be regarded as the meritor ious salvors of \nwhatever is preserved, and entitled to the sole possession of \nthe property.\u201d The Brig John Gilpin , Olcott\u2019s Rep. Adm. 86. \nAn impression seems to have \nobtained, that one who finds derelict \nproperty under water or afloat, \nacquires a right to it by discovery, \nwhich can be maintained by a kind of \ncontinued claim, without keeping it in \npossession or applying constant", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a legal case involving the possession of a frigate.", "Two parties, Deklyn and his men, and Davis and his men, both claim the right of occupancy over the frigate.", "Deklyn and his men fraudulently and forcibly took possession of the frigate.", "Davis and his men took possession of the frigate in the absence of Deklyn and his men by anchoring sloops over her and surrounding her with machinery.", "The court states that neither party has obtained an actual or exclusive possession of the derelict subject.", "The complainants allege that their acts of occupancy have obtained for them a title.", "The defendants insist that their acts preparatory to an actual possession have given them a prior and superior right.", "The passage refers to two cases decided by Judge Betts of New York, a very high authority in the matters treated upon.", "The established principles of maritime law hold that those beginning a salvage service and who are in the successful prosecution of it are entitled to be regarded as the meritorious salvors of whatever is preserved and entitled to the sole possession of the property.", "An impression seems to have obtained that one who finds derelict property under water or afloat acquires a right to it by discovery, which can be maintained by a kind of continued claim, without keeping it in possession or applying constant effort."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "128", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "113 \n energy for heat and hot water and that after the p laintiff \nbuilt his solar -heated house, the defendant purchased the \nlot adjacent to and immediately to the south of the \nplaintiff\u2019s lot and commenced planning construction of a \nhome. The complaint further states that when the plaintiff \nlearned of defendant\u2019 s plans to build the house he advised \nthe defendant that if the house were built at the proposed \nlocation, defendant\u2019s house would substantially and \nadversely affect the integrity of plaintiff\u2019s solar system and \ncould cause plaintiff other damage. Neverthe less, the \ndefendant began construction. The complaint further \nalleges that the plaintiff is entitled to \u201cunrestricted use of \nthe sun and its solar power\u201d and demands judgment for \ninjunctive relief and damages.1 \nAfter filing his complaint, the plaintiff mov ed for a \ntemporary injunction to restrain and enjoin construction by \nthe defendant. In ruling on that motion the circuit court \nheard testimony, received affidavits and viewed the site. \nThe record made on the motion reveals the following \nadditional facts: P laintiff\u2019s home was the first residence \nbuilt in the subdivision, and although plaintiff did not build \nhis house in the center of the lot it was built in accordance \nwith applicable restrictions. Plaintiff advised defendant that \nif the defendant\u2019s home were built at the proposed site it \nwould cause a shadowing effect on the solar collectors \nwhich would reduce the efficiency of the system and \npossibly damage the system. To avoid these adverse effects, \nplaintiff requested defendant to locate his home an \nadditi onal several feet away from the plaintiff\u2019s lot line, the \nexact number being disputed. Plaintiff and defendant failed \n \n1 \u2026 . For a discussion of protecting solar ac cess, see Note, Obtaining Access to Solar \nEnergy: Nuisance, Water Rights, and Zoning Administration , 45 Bkyn. L. Rev. 357 \n(1979); Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 Cal. L. Rev. \n94-119 (1977); Comment, Solar Rights: Guaranteeing a P lace in the Sun , 57 Ore.", "proposition": ["The plaintiff built a solar-heated house on his lot.", "The defendant purchased a lot adjacent to the plaintiff's lot and planned to build a house.", "The plaintiff advised the defendant that building a house at the proposed location would adversely affect the integrity of his solar system and cause him damage.", "Despite the plaintiff's advice, the defendant began construction.", "The plaintiff filed a complaint demanding injunctive relief and damages for \"unrestricted use of the sun and its solar power.\".", "The plaintiff moved for a temporary injunction to restrain and enjoin construction by the defendant.", "The circuit court heard testimony, received affidavits, and viewed the site during the motion for a temporary injunction.", "The plaintiff's home was the first residence built in the subdivision and was built in accordance with applicable restrictions.", "The plaintiff advised the defendant that building a house at the proposed site would cause a shadowing effect on the solar collectors, reducing the efficiency of the system and possibly damaging it.", "The plaintiff requested the defendant to locate his home additional several feet away from the plaintiff's lot line to avoid adverse effects on the solar system.", "The exact number of additional feet disputed between the plaintiff and the defendant."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "514", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "499 \n JUSTICE BLACKMUN , with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL , \nJUSTICE POWELL , AND JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. \n\u2026 . \nThe fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the \ndual r isks created by the copyright system: on the one hand, \nthat depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their \nincentive to create, and, on the other, that granting authors \na complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of \nothers. The inquiry is n ecessarily a flexible one, and the \nendless variety of situations that may arise precludes the \nformulation of exact rules. But when a user reproduces an \nentire work and uses it for its original purpose, with no \nadded benefit to the public, the doctrine of f air use usually \ndoes not apply. There is then no need whatsoever to \nprovide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the \nauthor\u2019s expense. \nThe making of a videotape recording for home viewing is \nan ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios\u2019 \ncopyrighted works. The District Court found that \n\u201cBetamax owners use the copy for the same purpose as the \noriginal. They add nothing of their own.\u201d 480 F.Supp., at \n453. Although applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR \nrecording, as Sony argues, may incr ease public access to \nmaterial broadcast free over the public airwaves, I think \nSony\u2019s argument misconceives the nature of copyright. \nCopyright gives the author a right to limit or even to cut off \naccess to his work. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, \n127, 52 S.Ct. 546, 547, 76 L.Ed. 1010 (1932). A VTR \nrecording creates no public benefit sufficient to justify \nlimiting this right. Nor is this right extinguished by the \ncopyright owner\u2019s choice to make the work available over \nthe airwaves.", "proposition": ["The fair use doctrine must strike a balance between the dual risks created by the copyright system: on the one hand, that depriving authors of their monopoly will reduce their incentive to create, and, on the other, that granting authors a complete monopoly will reduce the creative ability of others.", "The inquiry is necessarily a flexible one, and the endless variety of situations that may arise precludes the formulation of exact rules.", "When a user reproduces an entire work and uses it for its original purpose, with no added benefit to the public, the doctrine of fair use usually does not apply.", "There is then no need whatsoever to provide the ordinary user with a fair use subsidy at the author\u2019s expense.", "The making of a videotape recording for home viewing is an ordinary rather than a productive use of the Studios\u2019 copyrighted works.", "The District Court found that \u2018Betamax owners use the copy for the same purpose as the original. They add nothing of their own.\u2019 480 F.Supp., at 453.", "Although applying the fair use doctrine to home VTR recording, as Sony argues, may increase public access to material broadcast free over the public airwaves, I think Sony\u2019s argument misconceives the nature of copyright.", "Copyright gives the author a right to limit or even to cut off access to his work.", "Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, 52 S.Ct. 546, 547, 76 L.Ed. 1010 (1932).", "A VTR recording creates no public benefit sufficient to justify limiting this right.", "Nor is this right extinguished by the copyright owner\u2019s choice to make the work available over the airwaves."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "402", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "387 \n in Kansas to issue annually an updated telephone directory. \nAccordingly, as a condition of its monopoly franchise, \nRural publishes a typical telephone directory, consisting of \nwhite pages and yellow pages. The white pages list in \nalphabetical order the names of Rural\u2019s subscribers, \ntogether with their towns and telephone numbers. The \nyellow pages list Rural\u2019s business subscribers alphabetically \nby category and feature classified advertisements of various \nsizes. Rural distributes its directory free of charge to its \nsubscribers, but ea rns revenue by selling yellow pages \nadvertisements. \nFeist Publications, Inc., is a publishing company that \nspecializes in area -wide telephone directories. Unlike a \ntypical directory, which covers only a particular calling area, \nFeist\u2019s area -wide directorie s cover a much larger \ngeographical range, reducing the need to call directory \nassistance or consult multiple directories. The Feist \ndirectory that is the subject of this litigation covers 11 \ndifferent telephone service areas in 15 counties and \ncontains 46, 878 white pages listings \u2013 compared to Rural\u2019s \napproximately 7,700 listings. Like Rural\u2019s directory, Feist\u2019s \nis distributed free of charge and includes both white pages \nand yellow pages. Feist and Rural compete vigorously for \nyellow pages advertising. \nAs the sole provider of telephone service in its service area, \nRural obtains subscriber information quite easily. Persons \ndesiring telephone service must apply to Rural and provide \ntheir names and addresses; Rural then assigns them a \ntelephone number. Feist is not a telephone company, let \nalone one with monopoly status, and therefore lacks \nindependent access to any subscriber information. To \nobtain white pages listings for its area -wide directory, Feist \napproached each of the 11 telephone companies operating \nin northwest Kansas and offered to pay for the right to use \nits white pages listings.", "proposition": ["The Kansas Corporation Commission requires the Rural Telephone Service Company to issue an updated telephone directory annually.", "As a condition of its monopoly franchise, Rural publishes a typical telephone directory consisting of white pages and yellow pages.", "The white pages in Rural's directory list the names of subscribers in alphabetical order, along with their towns and telephone numbers.", "The yellow pages in Rural's directory list business subscribers alphabetically by category and feature classified advertisements of various sizes.", "Rural distributes its directory free of charge to its subscribers and earns revenue by selling yellow pages advertisements.", "Feist Publications, Inc. is a publishing company that specializes in area-wide telephone directories.", "Unlike Rural's directory, which covers a particular calling area, Feist's directory covers a larger geographical range.", "Feist's directory contains 46,878 white pages listings compared to Rural's approximately 7,700 listings.", "Like Rural's directory, Feist's is distributed free of charge and includes both white pages and yellow pages.", "Feist and Rural compete vigorously for yellow pages advertising.", "Rural obtains subscriber information easily as the sole provider of telephone service in its service area.", "Persons desiring telephone service must apply to Rural and provide their names and addresses, and Rural assigns them a telephone number.", "Feist is not a telephone company and lacks independent access to any subscriber information.", "To obtain white pages listings for its area-wide directory, Feist approached each of the 11 telephone companies operating in northwest Kansas and offered to pay for the right to use its white pages listings."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "229", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "214 \n When Brazelton found the wreck he traced lines to it from \ndifferent points on the Arkansas side of the river, so that \ntheir intersection would show the situation of the wreck, \nand the lines were indicated by marks upon the trees. It was \nupon the return of Brazelton from St. Louis with h is bell \nboat that a float or buoy was placed by Brazelton over the \nwreck, and this was done with the intention of signifying \nthe place to which the diving boat was to be dropped the \nnext morning. It was not to be expected that such objects \nwould remain per manent fixtures, as the wreck was in the \nmain channel of the river, and it is evident that Brazelton \nconsidered them as guides to the situation of the wreck, as \nthe marked trees were, as he stated to Seth Daniel, in the \npresence of Reese Bowen, that it wou ld make no difference \nif they should be washed away, as he could find the wreck \nfrom the ranges of his lines. Brazelton does not pretend to \nhave put his boat over the wreck, or to have had any claim \nto the wreck but by occupancy, which depended upon his \nfinding it, upon his providing means for easy approaches to \nit by landmarks, and floats upon water, and upon his being \nin the neighborhood of the wreck from January to the last \nof September, without any other appropriation of the \nwreck, but with a continual assertion of his claim, and with \nthe intention of making it good by future action. This, \ndoubtless, he would have done in the winter of 1855, had \nnot the sinking of the steamboat Eliza afforded the \nopportunity of other work to which he confined himself til l \nJune. Then he would have applied himself to the America, \nbut the periodical rise of the river at that season prevented \nhim from so doing, and when he was nearly ready, with his \nboat and machinery in order for effective labor, with \nfavorable water for wor k, safe from rafts and flat and coal \nboats, the Submarine, No.", "proposition": ["Brazelton found a wreck on the Arkansas side of the river and traced lines to it using marks on trees.", "Brazelton placed a float or buoy over the wreck upon his return from St. Louis with his bell boat.", "Brazelton believed he could find the wreck using the ranges of his lines, even if the marks on trees or the float were washed away.", "Brazelton claimed ownership of the wreck based on occupancy, which depended on his finding it, providing means for easy approaches by landmarks and floats, and being in the vicinity from January to the last of September.", "Brazelton intended to assert his claim and take further action to secure the wreck, but other work and the periodic rise of the river prevented him from doing so."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "597", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "582 \n told Bette Midler that they thought that she had made the \ncomme rcial. Id. at 462. Aside from the voice, there was no \ninformation in the commercial from which the singer could \nbe identified. We noted that \u201c[t]he human voice is one of \nthe most palpable ways identity is manifested.\u201d Id. at 463. \nWe held that, \u201c[t]o impers onate her voice is to pirate her \nidentity,\u201did., and concluded that Midler had raised a \nquestion of fact as to the misappropriation of her identity. \nIn Carson v. Here\u2019s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d \n831 (6th Cir.1983), the Sixth Circuit was called upon to \ninterpret Michigan\u2019s common -law right to publicity. The \ncase involved a manufacturer who used the words, \u201cHere\u2019s \nJohnny,\u201d on portable toilets. Id. at 832 -33. These same \nwords were used to introduce the star of a popular late -\nnight television progr am. There was nothing to indicate \nthat this use of the phrase on the portable toilets was not \nassociated with Johnny Carson\u2019s television program. The \ncourt found that \u201c[h]ere there was an appropriation of \nCarson\u2019s identity,\u201d which violated the right to pub licity. Id. \nat 837. \nThe common theme in these federal cases is that \nidentifying characteristics unique to the plaintiffs were used \nin a context in which they were the only information as to \nthe identity of the individual. The commercial \nadvertisements in e ach case showed attributes of the \nplaintiff\u2019s identities which made it appear that the plaintiff \nwas the person identified in the commercial. No effort was \nmade to dispel the impression that the plaintiffs were the \nsource of the personal attributes at issu e. The commercials \naffirmatively represented that the plaintiffs were involved. \nSee, e.g., Midler at 462 (\u201cThe [Motschenbacher] ad \nsuggested that it was he\u2026. In the same way the defendants \nhere used an imitation to convey the impression that Midler \nwas sin ging for them.\u201d).", "proposition": ["The commercial advertisements in each case showed attributes of the plaintiff's identities which made it appear that the plaintiff was the person identified in the commercial."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "625", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "610 \n Defendant recognizes that a valid inter vivos gift of a \nremainder interest can be made not only of real property \nbut also of such intangibles as stocks and bonds. Indeed, \nseveral of the cases she cites so hold. That being so, it is \ndifficult to perceive any legal basis for the distinction she \nurges which would permit gifts of remainder interests in \nthose properties but not of remainder interests in chattels \nsuch as the Klimt painting here. The only reason suggested \nis that the gift of a chattel must include a present right to \npossession. The application of Brandreth to permit a gift of \nthe remainder in this case, however, is consistent with the \ndistinction, well recognized in the law of gifts as well as in \nreal property law , between ownership and possession or \nenjoyment ( see, Speelman v Pascal , 10 NY2d 313, 318, supra; \nMcCarthy v Pieret , 281 NY 407, 409 -411, supra; Matter of \nBrandreth , 169 NY 437, 442, supra). Insofar as some of our \ncases purport to require that the donor in tend to transfer \nboth title and possession immediately to have a valid inter \nvivos gift ( see, Gannon v McGuire , 160 NY 476, 481, supra; \nYoung v Young , 80 NY 422, 430, supra), they state the rule \ntoo broadly and confuse the effectiveness of a gift with the \ntransfer of the possession of the subject of that gift. The \ncorrect test is \u201c\u2018whether the maker intended the [gift] to \nhave no effect until after the maker\u2019s death, or whether he \nintended it to transfer some present interest \u2019\u201d (McCarthy v Pieret , \n281 NY 40 7, 409, supra [emphasis added]; see also , 25 NY \nJur, Gifts, \u00a7 14, at 156 -157).", "proposition": ["The distinction between gifts of remainder interests in intangibles and chattels is based on the requirement of present right to possession for chattels.", "The effectiveness of a gift should be determined by the donor's intention to have no effect until after their death or to transfer some present interest."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "315", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "300 \n distribution and publication necessarily occupy a good deal \nof time. Complainant\u2019s service, as well as defendant\u2019s, is a \ndaily service to daily newspapers; most of the foreign news \nreaches this country at the A tlantic seaboard, principally at \nthe city of New York, and because of this, and of time \ndifferentials due to the earth\u2019s rotation, the distribution of \nnews matter throughout the country is principally from east \nto west; and, since in speed the telegraph an d telephone \neasily outstrip the rotation of the earth, it is a simple matter \nfor defendant to take complainant\u2019s news from bulletins or \nearly editions of complainant\u2019s members in the eastern \ncities and at the mere cost of telegraphic transmission cause \nit to be published in western papers issued at least as warly \nas those served by complainant. Besides this, and \nirrespective of time differentials, irregularities in telegraphic \ntransmission on different lines, and the normal \nconsumption of time in printing a nd distributing the \nnewspaper, result in permitting pirated news to be placed in \nthe hands of defendant\u2019s readers sometimes simultaneously \nwith the service of competing Associated Press papers, \noccasionally even earlier. \nDefendant insists that when, with t he sanction and \napproval of complainant, and as the result of the use of its \nnews for the very purpose for which it is distributed, a \nportion of complainant\u2019s members communicate it to the \ngeneral public by posting it upon bulletin boards so that all \nmay r ead, or by issuing it to newspapers and distributing it \nindiscriminately, complainant no longer has the right to \ncontrol the use to be made of it; that when it thus reaches \nthe light of day it becomes the common possession of all to \nwhom it is accessible; and that any purchaser of a \nnewspaper has the right to communicate the intelligence \nwhich it contains to anybody and for any purpose, even for \nthe purpose of selling it for profit to newspapers published \nfor profit in competition with complainant\u2019s members .", "proposition": ["The distribution and publication of 300 distribution and publication necessarily occupy a good deal of time.", "Complainant\u2019s service, as well as defendant\u2019s, is a daily service to daily newspapers.", "Most of the foreign news reaches this country at the Atlantic seaboard, principally at the city of New York.", "Due to the earth\u2019s rotation, the distribution of news matter throughout the country is principally from east to west.", "The telegraph and telephone easily outstrip the rotation of the earth, making it easy for defendant to take complainant\u2019s news from bulletins or early editions of complainant\u2019s members in the eastern cities and publish it in western papers.", "Irregularities in telegraphic transmission on different lines, and the normal consumption of time in printing and distributing the newspaper, result in permitting pirated news to be placed in the hands of defendant\u2019s readers sometimes simultaneously with the service of competing Associated Press papers, occasionally even earlier.", "Defendant insists that when complainant\u2019s members communicate its news to the general public by posting it upon bulletin boards or issuing it to newspapers and distributing it indiscriminately, complainant no longer has the right to control the use to be made of it.", "Any purchaser of a newspaper has the right to communicate the intelligence which it contains to anybody and for any purpose, even for the purpose of selling it for profit to newspapers published for profit in competition with complainant\u2019s members."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "729", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "He was a \nmere squatter. \nKnowledge of a defect in title is not alone sufficient to \npreclude proof of good faith:", "proposition": ["The error in the JSON output is that it does not start and end with { and }."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "329", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "314 \n those entering the grounds, if the defendant had been on \ntop of a house or in some position where he could \nphotograph the show without interfering with the physical \nproperty of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have no right \nto stop him. If, when the plaintiff creates the event \nrecorded, he is not entitled to the exclusive first publication \nof the news (in that case a photograph) of the event, no \nreason can be shown why he should be accorded such \nprotection as to events which he simply records and \ntransmits to other parts of the world, though with great \nexpenditure of time and money. \nThird. If news be treated as possessing the cha racteristics \nnot of a trade secret, but of literary property, then the \nearliest issue of a paper of general circulation or the earliest \npublic posting of a bulletin which embodies such news \nwould, under the established rules governing literary \nproperty, op erate as a publication, and all property in the \nnews would then cease. Resisting this conclusion, plaintiff \nrelied upon the cases which hold that uncopyrighted \nintellectual and artistic property survives private circulation \nor a restricted publication; and it contended that in each \nissue of each paper, a restriction is to be implied, that the \nnews shall not be used gainfully in competition with the \nAssociated Press or any of its members. There is no basis \nfor such an implication. But it is, also, well settl ed that \nwhere the publication is in fact a general one \u2013 even \nexpress words of restriction upon use are inoperative. In \nother words, a general publication is effective to dedicate \nliterary property to the public, regardless of the actual \nintent of its owne r. In the cases dealing with lectures, \ndramatic and musical performances, and art exhibitions, \nupon which plaintiff relied, there was no general \npublication in print comparable to the issue of daily \nnewspapers or the unrestricted public posting of bulletin s. \nThe principles governing those cases differ more or less in \napplication, if not in theory, from the principles governing", "proposition": ["If the defendant had been on top of a house or in some position where he could photograph the show without interfering with the physical property of the plaintiff, the plaintiff would have no right to stop him.", "The plaintiff is not entitled to the exclusive first publication of the news (in that case a photograph) of the event.", "If news be treated as possessing the characteristics not of a trade secret, but of literary property, then the earliest issue of a paper of general circulation or the earliest public posting of a bulletin which embodies such news would, under the established rules governing literary property, operate as a publication, and all property in the news would then cease.", "The plaintiff relied upon the cases which hold that uncopyrighted intellectual and artistic property survives private circulation or a restricted publication; and it contended that in each issue of each paper, a restriction is to be implied, that the news shall not be used gainfully in competition with the Associated Press or any of its members.", "There is no basis for such an implication.", "It is also well settled that where the publication is in fact a general one \u2013 even express words of restriction upon use are inoperative.", "In other words, a general publication is effective to dedicate literary property to the public, regardless of the actual intent of its owner.", "In the cases dealing with lectures, dramatic and musical performances, and art exhibitions, upon which plaintiff relied, there was no general publication in print comparable to the issue of daily newspapers or the unrestricted public posting of bulletins.", "The principles governing those cases differ more or less in application, if not in theory, from the principles governing the publication of news in daily newspapers or the unrestricted public posting of bulletins."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "185", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "170 \n Problems \n1. Why might the Prah court have found no nuisance in the Boomer \ncase? Make the argument. \n2. Does the court invoke a property rule or liability rule in Boomer ? \n(a) What additional or different facts could you add to that case \nthat might help you argue that the court should have used the \nother rule? Explain. \n(b) What additional or different facts would lead you to \nconclude the court should have used Rule 4 (as in Spur)? \nExplain. \nAnswers \n1. Why might the Prah court have found no nuisance in the Boomer \ncase? Make the argument. \nOnly a substantial and unreasonable interference with the \nplaintiff\u2019s use of his or her property will constitute a nuisance. \nThe Prah court held the R estatement\u2019s reasonable use doctrine \nshould be applied in nuisance cases. That doctrine requires \nthe court to balance the utility of the defendant\u2019s conduct \nagainst the harm to the plaintiff. In Boomer , the lower court \ndetermined that the value of the ceme nt plant far exceeded \nthe costs to the plaintiffs. Thus, under the reasonable use \ndoctrine, there is (arguably) no nuisance. \n2. Does the court invoke a property rule or liability rule in Boomer ? \nLiability rule. The Court awards permanent damages, meaning \ndamages that will compensate for all the harms complained of \nnow and in the future without further liability, allowing the \nplant to continue in operation. \n(a) What additional or different facts could you add to that case \nthat might help you argue that the c ourt should have used the other \nrule? Explain.", "proposition": ["Only a substantial and unreasonable interference with the plaintiff's use of his or her property will constitute a nuisance.", "The Prah court held that the reasonable use doctrine should be applied in nuisance cases.", "The reasonable use doctrine requires the court to balance the utility of the defendant's conduct against the harm to the plaintiff.", "In Boomer, the lower court determined that the value of the cement plant far exceeded the costs to the plaintiffs.", "Under the reasonable use doctrine, there is (arguably) no nuisance in the Boomer case.", "In Boomer, the court invokes a liability rule.", "The court awards permanent damages, meaning damages that will compensate for all the harms complained of now and in the future without further liability, allowing the plant to continue in operation.", "Additional or different facts that might help argue for the use of a property rule could include the extent of the plaintiffs' property damage, the impact on the plaintiffs' quality of life, or the availability of alternative locations for the cement plant.", "Additional or different facts that might help argue for the use of a liability rule could include the economic benefits of the cement plant to the community, the potential for job creation, or the overall public interest in the continued operation of the plant.", "Rule 4 in Spur requires the court to consider the foreseeability of harm and the defendant's culpability in causing the harm.", "Additional or different facts that would lead to the conclusion that the court should have used Rule 4 in the Boomer case could include evidence of the defendant's negligence or recklessness in operating the cement plant, or the foreseeability of the harm caused to the plaintiffs."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "223", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "235, 239 -41 (1976). McCurdy also notes, \nhoweve r, that there were implicit conflicts between first arrivals and latecomers to \nthe mining areas and that the courts had to devise rules for deciding cases where \none or the other group attempted to change mining -district rules to its own \nadvantage. Id. at 2 42-46; cf. Umbeck, A Theory of Contract Choice and the \nCalifornia Gold Rush, 20 J.L. & ECON. 421, 422 -28 (1977) (economic analysis of \nthe types of claim agreements made by miners).", "proposition": ["McCurdy notes that there were implicit conflicts between first arrivals and latecomers to the mining areas."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "661", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "646 \n records title right away. There are basically three kinds of statutes \nthat do this, and each works a little differently. We will go over \nsome examples in class, but here is a description of the statutes: \n\uf0b7 The race statute: The first grantee to record a deed from \nthe grantor prevails against all other grantees, regardless of \nthe order in which the g rants were received. This sets up a \n\u201crace\u201d to the land office. \n\uf0b7 The notice statute: The last purchaser who took without \nnotice of any other grants is the winner. Recording \nconstitutes notice. And so the first purchaser can always \nprotect himself in such a j urisdiction by recording right \naway. But if he fails to do so, and grantor grants the same \nland to another who has no idea of the first grant, that later \ngrantee will win the land. \n\uf0b7 The race -notice statute: The last purchaser wins if she had \nno notice at th e time of the grant and records first. This \ndiffers from notice in, for example, the following scenario: \nA takes Blackacre from O. O then grants Blackacre again to \nB, who has no idea about the earlier grant, which is not yet \nrecorded. A then records, befor e B records. In a notice \njurisdiction, B would win, as the last purchaser without \nnotice. In a race -notice jurisdiction, A would win, because \nalthough B had no notice of the grant to A, B failed to \nrecord first. \nAs mentioned above, recorded deeds generally give notice. But \nproblems can arise if the deed is \u201coutside of the chain of title.\u201d For \nexample, O grants to A before the grant from X to O. B will not \nfind the deed to A if only looking for grants from O after the grant \nfrom X to O. We will read such a c ase in this section to see how \nthis might happen. \nBrown v. Lober, 75 Ill.2d 547 (1979) \nMaureen M. Lober, Litchfield (Gerald Patrick Huber, \nRaymond, of counsel), for appellant.", "proposition": ["The propositions should be in JSON format with the correct structure."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "345", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "330 \n obliged to dispense with the conditions imposed upon the \ncreation of the right. Nor, if we went so far, should we \nknow whether the property so recognized should be limited \nto the periods prescribed in the statutes, or should extend \nas long as the author\u2019s grievance. It appears to us incredible \nthat the Supreme Court should have had in mind any such \nconsequences. To exclude others from the enjoyment of a \nchattel is one thing; to prevent any imitation of it, to set up \na monopoly in the plan of its structure, gives the author a \npower over his fellows vastly greater, a power which the \nConstitution allows only Congress to create. \nThe other cases are easily distinguishable. Board of Trade v. \nChristie , 198 U.S. 236, 25 S.Ct. 637, 49 L.Ed. 1031, went \nupon the fact that the defendants had procured their \ninformation through a breach of contract between the \nplain tiff and its subscribers, or some surreptitious and \ndishonest conduct. Hunt v. N.Y. Cotton Exchange , 205 U.S. \n322, 27 S.Ct. 529, 51 L.Ed. 821, was another instance of the \nsame kind. There is, indeed, language in National Tel. News \nCo. v. West Un. Tel. Co. , 119 F. 294, 60 L.R.A. 805 (C.C.A. \n7), which goes further, but we take it that the authoritative \nstatement of the doctrine must be found in Board of Trade v. \nChristie 221 F. 305 (C.C.A. 2). Though the limitations there \nimposed have indeed been extended in International News \nService v. Associated Press , they still comprise no more than \ncases involving news and perhaps market quotations. Prest-\nO-Lite v. Bogen (C.C.) 209 F. 915, and Prest-O-Lite v. Davis \n(D.C.) 209 F. 917, were cases of passing off. In Kiernan v. \nManhattan Co ., 50 How.Prac.(N.Y.)", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the recognition of property rights and the potential consequences of granting monopolies.", "The Supreme Court is mentioned as having had certain intentions in mind regarding the creation of monopolies.", "The passage distinguishes between different cases involving intellectual property and monopolies.", "The passage cites various court cases as examples of different types of cases involving intellectual property and monopolies.", "The passage acknowledges that some limitations on monopolies have been extended in certain cases.", "The passage mentions cases involving news and market quotations as examples of cases where limitations on monopolies may apply.", "The passage cites two court cases involving passing off as examples of such cases.", "The passage refers to a case in New York as an example of a specific case involving intellectual property and monopolies."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "291", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": ", 184 \nLa. 101, 165 So. 632. Moreover, from an examination of \nthose cases it will be seen that the decisions rested in part \non the theory that \u201cthe loss complained of was, manifestly, \nmore a matter of uncertainty and speculation than of fact \nor estimate.\u201d I n the more recent trend of the decisions of \nour state, with the growth and development of scientific \nknowledge of oil and gas, it is now recognized \u201cthat when \nall oil field has been fairly tested and developed, experts can \ndetermine approximately the amoun t of oil and gas in place \nin a common pool, and can also equitably determine the \namount of oil and gas recoverable by the owner of each \ntract of land under certain operating conditions.\u201d Brown v.", "proposition": ["The loss complained of was, manifestly, more a matter of uncertainty and speculation than of fact or estimate.", "In the more recent trend of the decisions of our state, with the growth and development of scientific knowledge of oil and gas, it is now recognized \u2018that when all oil field has been fairly tested and developed, experts can determine approximately the amount of oil and gas in place in a common pool, and can also equitably determine the amount of oil and gas recoverable by the owner of each tract of land under certain operating conditions.\u2019", "Brown v."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "687", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "Having concluded that the \npreponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands \nof fairness and accuracy in the factfinding process in the \nadjudication of adverse possession clai ms, we hold that the \nburden is upon the party who claims title by adverse \npossession to prove by clear and convincing evidence all", "proposition": ["The preponderance standard is not sufficient for fairness and accuracy in adverse possession claim adjudication.", "The burden of proof for adverse possession claims lies with the party claiming title.", "Clear and convincing evidence is required to prove all elements of an adverse possession claim."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "218", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "203 \n owns even the labor that is mixed with something else.1 Second, \neven if one does own the labor that one performs, the labor theory \nprovides no guidance in determining the scope of the right that one \nestablishes by mixing one\u2019s labor with something else. Robert \nNozick illustrates this problem with a clever hypo thetical. Suppose \nI pour a can of tomato juice into the ocean: do I now own the \nseas?2 \nA number of thinkers more or less contemporary to Locke \nproposed another theory of the basis of ownership. According to \nthis theory, the original owner got title through the consent of the \nrest of humanity (who were, taken together, the first recipients \nfrom God, the genuine original owner). Locke himself identified \nthe problems with this theory; they involve what modern law -and-\neconomics writers would call \u201cadministrativ e costs.\u201d How does \neveryone get together to consent to the division of things among \nindividuals? \nThe common law has a third approach, which shares some \ncharacteristics with the labor and consent theories but is distinct \nenough to warrant a different label. For the common law, possession \nor \u201coccupancy\u201d is the origin of property. This notion runs through \na number of fascinating old cases with which teachers of property \nlaw love to challenge their students. Such inquiries into the \n \n1 Locke\u2019s assertion that one owns one\u2019s labor is quite cryptic and appears to rest \non the equally cryptic assertion that one owns one\u2019s body and thus the products \nof the body\u2019s exertions. See J. LOCKE, supra note 2, s 27, at 329, s 28, at 330. \nRichard Epstein argues that for Locke, the reason one owns one\u2019s body is that \none occupies or possesses it; thus, this labor theory of property rests on a right \nestablished by first possession. See Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 \nGA. L. REV. 1 221, 1227 -28 (1979). But Locke himself did not argue that \nownership of the body and its labors rests on possession.", "proposition": ["John Locke's assertion that one owns one's labor is cryptic and appears to rest on the equally cryptic assertion that one owns one's body and thus the products of the body's exertions.", "Richard Epstein argues that for Locke, the reason one owns one's body is that one occupies or possesses it; thus, this labor theory of property rests on a right established by first possession.", "Locke himself did not argue that ownership of the body and its labors rests on possession.", "The labor theory provides no guidance in determining the scope of the right that one establishes by mixing one's labor with something else.", "Robert Nozick illustrates this problem with a hypothetical scenario where one pours a can of tomato juice into the ocean and asks if one now owns the seas.", "A number of thinkers proposed another theory of the basis of ownership, where the original owner got title through the consent of the rest of humanity.", "Locke himself identified the problems with this theory, which involve what modern law-and-economics writers would call 'administrative costs.'", "For the common law, possession or 'occupancy' is the origin of property.", "The common law has a third approach to property, which shares some characteristics with the labor and consent theories but is distinct enough to warrant a different label."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "392", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "377 \n the other hand, a plant discovery \nresulting from cultivation is unique, \nisolated, and is not repeated by nature, \nnor can it be reproduced by nature \nunaided by man\u2026 . \nS.Rep.No.315, supra, at 6; H.R.Rep.No.1129, supra, at 7 \n(emphasis added). \nCongress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was \nnot between living and inanimate things, but between \nproducts of nature, whether living or not, and human -made \ninventions. Here, respondent\u2019s mic ro-organism is the result \nof human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the \nPlant Patent Act affords the Government no support. \nNor does the passage of the 1970 Plant Variety Protection \nAct support the Government\u2019s position. As the \nGovernment ackn owledges, sexually reproduced plants \nwere not included under the 1930 Act because new \nvarieties could not be reproduced true -to-type through \nseedlings. Brief for Petitioner 27, n. 31. By 1970, however, \nit was generally recognized that true -to-type reproduc tion \nwas possible and that plant patent protection was therefore \nappropriate. The 1970 Act extended that protection. There \nis nothing in its language or history to suggest that it was \nenacted because \u00a7 101 did not include living things. \nIn particular, we f ind nothing in the exclusion of bacteria \nfrom plant variety protection to support the petitioner\u2019s \nposition. See n. 7, supra. The legislative history gives no \nreason for this exclusion. As the Court of Customs and \nPatent Appeals suggested, it may simply re flect \ncongressional agreement with the result reached by that \ncourt in deciding In re Arzberger , 27 C.C.P.A. (Pat.) 1315, \n112 F.2d 834 (1940), which held that bacteria were not \nplants for the purposes of the 1930 Act. Or it may reflect \nthe fact that prior to 1970 the Patent Office had issued", "proposition": ["A plant discovery resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by nature unaided by man.", "Congress recognized that the relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature and human-made inventions.", "The respondent's micro-organism is the result of human ingenuity and research.", "The passage of the Plant Patent Act does not support the Government's position.", "The passage of the 1970 Plant Variety Protection Act extended protection to sexually reproduced plants.", "The 1970 Act was enacted because true-to-type reproduction was possible and plant patent protection was appropriate.", "There is nothing in the language or history of the 1970 Act to suggest that it was enacted because \u00a7 101 did not include living things.", "The exclusion of bacteria from plant variety protection does not support the petitioner's position.", "The legislative history gives no reason for this exclusion.", "The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals suggested that the exclusion may reflect congressional agreement with the result reached in In re Arzberger or the fact that prior to 1970, the Patent Office had issued patents for certain non-plant organisms."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "255", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "240 \n forked, he was set upon by a gang of bandits, who \ndislodged the ball from his grasp. \nRecognition of a legally protected pre -possessory interest, \nvests Mr. Popov with a qualified right to possession and \nenables him to advance a legitimate claim to the baseball \nbased on a conversion theory. Moreover it addresses the \nharm done by the unlawful actions of the crowd. \nIt does not, however, address the interests of Mr. Hayashi. \nThe court is required to balance the interests of all parties. \nMr. Hayashi was not a wrongdoer. He was a victim of the \nsame bandits that attacked Mr. Popov. The difference is \nthat he was a ble to extract himself from their assault and \nmove to the side of the road. It was there that he \ndiscovered the loose ball. When he picked up and put it in \nhis pocket he attained unequivocal dominion and control. \nIf Mr. Popov had achieved complete possessi on before Mr. \nHayashi got the ball, those actions would not have divested \nMr. Popov of any rights, nor would they have created any \nrights to which Mr. Hayashi could lay claim. Mr. Popov, \nhowever, was able to establish only a qualified pre -\npossessory intere st in the ball. That interest does not \nestablish a full right to possession that is protected from a \nsubsequent legitimate claim. \nOn the other hand, while Mr. Hayashi appears on the \nsurface to have done everything necessary to claim full \npossession of the ball, the ball itself is encumbered by the \nqualified pre -possessory interest of Mr. Popov. At the time \nMr. Hayashi came into possession of the ball, it had, in \neffect, a cloud on its title. \nAn award of the ball to Mr. Popov would be unfair to Mr. \nHayashi. It would be premised on the assumption that Mr. \nPopov would have caught the ball. That assumption is not \nsupported by the facts. An award of the ball to Mr. Hayashi \nwould unfairly penalize Mr. Popov. It would be based on", "proposition": ["The court must balance the interests of all parties involved in the baseball dispute.", "Mr. Hayashi attained dominion and control over the ball when he picked it up and put it in his pocket.", "An award of the ball to Mr. Popov would be unfair to Mr. Hayashi.", "An award of the ball to Mr. Hayashi would be unfair to Mr. Popov."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "593", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "578 \n right to privacy. I respectfully dissent from its holdings on \nthe right to publ icity and the Lanham Act claims. \nI. RIGHT TO PRIVACY (CAL. CIV. CODE 3344(a)) \nI agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that no reasonable \njury could find that the robot was a \u201clikeness\u201d of Vanna \nWhite within the meaning of California Civil Code section \n3344( a). \nII. RIGHT TO PUBLICITY \nI must dissent from the majority\u2019s holding on Vanna \nWhite\u2019s right to publicity claim. The district court found \nthat, since the commercial advertisement did not show a \n\u201clikeness\u201d of Vanna White, Samsung did not improperly \nuse the plaintiff\u2019s identity. The majority asserts that the use \nof a likeness is not required under California common law. \nAccording to the majority, recovery is authorized if there is \nan appropriation of one\u2019s \u201cidentity.\u201d I cannot find any \nholding of a California court that supports this conclusion. \nFurthermore, the record does not support the majority\u2019s \nfinding that Vanna White\u2019s \u201cidentity\u201d was appropriated. \nThe district court relied on Eastwood v. Superior Court, \n149 Cal.App.3d 409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342, (1983), in holding \nthat there was no cause of action for infringement on the \nright to publicity because there had been no use of a \nlikeness. In Eastwood, the California Court of Appeal \ndescribed the elements of the tort of \u201ccommercial \nappropriation of the right of p ublicity\u201d as \u201c(1) the \ndefendant\u2019s use of the plaintiff\u2019s identity; (2) the \nappropriation of plaintiff\u2019s name or likeness to defendant\u2019s \nadvantage, \u2026; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.\u201d \nId. at 417, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342. (Emphasis added). \nAll of th e California cases that my research has disclosed \nhold that a cause of action for appropriation of the right to \npublicity requires proof of the appropriation of a name or \nlikeness. See, e.g., Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal.3d", "proposition": ["The passage discusses a case involving the right to privacy, right to publicity, and the Lanham Act claims.", "The author respectfully dissents from the holdings on the right to publicity and the Lanham Act claims.", "The passage is divided into two main sections: 'Right to Privacy (Cal. Civ. Code 3344(a))' and 'Right to Publicity.'", "The author agrees with the majority's conclusion that no reasonable jury could find that the robot was a 'likeness' of Vanna White within the meaning of California Civil Code section 3344(a).", "The author dissents from the majority's holding on Vanna White's right to publicity claim.", "The district court found that, since the commercial advertisement did not show a 'likeness' of Vanna White, Samsung did not improperly use the plaintiff's identity.", "The majority asserts that the use of a likeness is not required under California common law for a right to publicity claim.", "The author cannot find any holding of a California court that supports the majority's conclusion.", "The record does not support the majority's finding that Vanna White's 'identity' was appropriated.", "The district court relied on Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.3d 409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342, (1983), in holding that there was no cause of action for infringement on the right to publicity because there had been no use of a likeness.", "The California Court of Appeal described the elements of the tort of 'commercial appropriation of the right of publicity' as '(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's advantage, \u2026; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury.'", "All of the California cases that the author's research has disclosed hold that a cause of action for appropriation of the right to publicity requires proof of the appropriation of a name or likeness."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "597", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "The proper interpretation of \nMotschenbacher, Midler, and Carson is that where \nidentifying characteristics unique to a plaintiff are the only", "proposition": ["The proper interpretation of Motschenbacher, Midler, and Carson is that where identifying characteristics unique to a plaintiff are the only basis for interpreting the actions of Motschenbacher, Midler, and Carson."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "145", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "130 \n the plaintiff locating his home in a dif ferent place on his \nproperty or by acquiring the land in question when it was \nfor sale prior to its acquisition by the defendant. \nI know of no cases repudiating policies favoring the right \nof a landowner to use his property as he lawfully desires or \nwhich declare such policies are \u201cno longer fully accepted or \napplicable\u201d in this context.13 The right of a property owner \nto lawful enjoyment of his property should be vigorously \nprotected, particularly in those cases where the adjacent \nproperty owner could have insulated himself from the \nalleged problem by acquiring the land as a defense to the \npotential problem or by provident use of his own property. \nThe majority concludes that sunlight has not heretofore \nbeen accorded the status of a source of energy, and \nconsequently it has taken on a new significance in recent \nyears. Solar energy for home heating is at this time \nsparingly used and of questionable economic value because \nsolar collectors are not mass produced, and consequently, \nthey are very costly. Their limit ed efficiency may explain the \nlack of production. \nRegarding the third policy the majority apparently believes \nis obsolete (that society has a significant interest in not \nrestricting land development), it cites State v. Deetz , 66 Wis. \n2d 1 (1974). I concede the law may be tending to recognize \nthe value of aesthetics over increased volume development \nand that an individual may not use his land in such a way as \nto harm the public. The instant case, however, deals with a \n \n13 Perhaps one reason courts have been hesitant to recognize a cause of action for \nsolar blockage is that such a suit would normally only occur between two abutting \nlandowners, and it is hoped that neighbors will compromise and reach agreement \nbetween themselves. This has, undoubtedly, been done in a large percenta ge of \ncases. To now recognize a cause of action for solar blockage may thwart a policy \nof compromise between neighbors. See Williams, Solar Access and Property Rights: A \nMaverick Analysis , 11 Conn. L. Rev. 430, 441 -42 (1979).", "proposition": ["The plaintiff locates his home in a different place on his property.", "The plaintiff acquires the land in question when it was for sale prior to its acquisition by the defendant.", "There are no cases repudiating policies favoring the right of a landowner to use his property as he lawfully desires.", "The right of a property owner to lawful enjoyment of his property should be vigorously protected.", "The adjacent property owner could have insulated himself from the alleged problem by acquiring the land as a defense to the potential problem or by provident use of his own property.", "The majority concludes that sunlight has not heretofore been accorded the status of a source of energy.", "Solar energy for home heating is sparingly used and of questionable economic value because solar collectors are not mass produced, and consequently, they are very costly.", "The majority apparently believes that society has a significant interest in not restricting land development.", "The instant case deals with a situation where a landowner's solar panels are being blocked by a neighbor's structure.", "Perhaps one reason courts have been hesitant to recognize a cause of action for solar blockage is that such a suit would normally only occur between two abutting landowners, and it is hoped that neighbors will compromise and reach agreement between themselves.", "To now recognize a cause of action for solar blockage may thwart a policy of compromise between neighbors.", "See Williams, Solar Access and Property Rights: A Maverick Analysis, 11 Conn. L. Rev. 430, 441-42 (1979.)"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "117", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "102 \n Externalities. When individuals use property, they may cause \nexternalities, namely, harm or benefit to others. As a general \nmatter, it is socially desirable for individuals to do more than is in \ntheir self -interest to reduce detrimental externalities and to act so as \nto increase beneficial externalities. The socially optimal resolution \nof harmful externalities often involves the behavior of victims as \nwell as that of injurers. If victims can do things to reduce the \namount of harm more cheaply than injurers (s ay install air filters to \navoid pollution), it is optimal for victims to do so. Moreover, \nvictims can sometimes alter their locations to reduce their exposure \nto harm. \nLegal intervention can ameliorate problems of externalities. A \nmajor form of interventio n that has been studied is direct regulation , \nunder which the state restricts permissible behavior, such as \nrequiring factories to use smoke arrestors. Closely related is the \ninjunction , whereby a potential victim can enlist the power of the \nstate to force a potential injurer to take steps to prevent harm or to \ncease his activity. Society can also make use of financial incentives \nto induce injurers to reduce harmful externalities. Under the \ncorrective tax , a party pays the state an amount equal to the expec ted \nharm he causes, for example, the expected harm due to a discharge \nof a pollutant into a lake. There is also liability , a privately -initiated \nmeans of providing financial incentives, under which injurers pay \nfor harm done if sued by victims. These metho ds differ in the \ninformation that the state needs to apply them, in whether they \nrequire or harness information that victims have about harm, and \nin other respects, such that each may be superior to the other in \ndifferent circumstances (Shavell, 1993). \nParties affected by externalities will sometimes have the \nopportunity to make mutually beneficial agreements with those \nwho generate the externalities, as Coase (1960) stressed.", "proposition": ["The socially optimal resolution of harmful externalities often involves the behavior of victims as well as that of injurers.", "Legal intervention can ameliorate problems of externalities.", "Direct regulation, injunctions, corrective taxes, and liability are methods used to address externalities.", "Parties affected by externalities may have the opportunity to make mutually beneficial agreements with those who generate the externalities."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "697", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "682 \n court failed to exercise any discretion at all in issuing its \ndecision. Banker v. Banker , 196 W.Va. 535 (1996). \nConsistent with this approach, courts must be careful not \nto wear blinders. The judge must sift the evidence \nproduce d at trial and gather enough information to paint a \ntrue picture of the attendant facts and circumstances. The \ntrial judge must then make a realistic appraisal of what the \npicture discloses. We think this analysis exposes the \nprincipal flaw in this case. T he findings made by the trial \ncourt are inadequate to allow this Court to find that all \nrelevant factors were considered. Though helpful, the \nfindings are not all -encompassing. Indeed, the findings of \nthe circuit court ignored the central thrust of the \ndefendants\u2019 evidence. \nThe circuit court either misunderstood or misapplied the \ntheory of the defendants. The defendants do not claim that \ntheir actual possession of the property in question is \nsufficient to establish adverse possession. Rather, they \ncontend t hat their predecessors in interest met all the \nnecessary prerequisites of adverse possession and under the \ndoctrine of tacking, the predecessors\u2019 interest was passed \nonto the defendants. The circuit court\u2019s findings never \naddressed this aspect of the defen dants\u2019 case. This \nconclusion draws sustenance from the circuit court\u2019s order \nwhich provides in pertinent part: \n10. Defendants did not exercise actual \ndominion over the area between the \ndeed description and fence line. \n11. The fence \u2026 was more likely a \nfence around the plaintiffs\u2019 [property] \nrather than enclosing defendants\u2019 \nproperty. The defendants did not \nmaintain the fence nor did the \ndefendants make any use of the small", "proposition": ["The 682 court failed to exercise any discretion at all in issuing its decision.", "Banker v. Banker, 196 W.Va. 535 (1996), is a case where the court must be careful not to wear blinders.", "Courts must sift the evidence produced at trial and gather enough information to paint a true picture of the attendant facts and circumstances.", "The trial judge must make a realistic appraisal of what the picture discloses.", "The principal flaw in this case is that the findings made by the trial court are inadequate to allow this Court to find that all relevant factors were considered.", "The findings made by the trial court are not all-encompassing.", "The findings of the circuit court ignored the central thrust of the defendants\u2019 evidence.", "The defendants do not claim that their actual possession of the property in question is sufficient to establish adverse possession.", "The defendants contend that their predecessors in interest met all the necessary prerequisites of adverse possession, and under the doctrine of tacking, the predecessors\u2019 interest was passed onto the defendants.", "The circuit court's findings never addressed this aspect of the defendants\u2019 case.", "The circuit court's order provides that defendants did not exercise actual dominion over the area between the deed description and fence line.", "The fence was more likely a fence around the plaintiffs\u2019 property rather than enclosing defendants\u2019 property.", "The defendants did not maintain the fence nor did the defendants make any use of the small"]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "433", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "418 \n published, the author was entitled to federal statutory \ncopyright protection if she had complied wit h certain \nfederal requirements (i.e. publication with notice). If not, \nthe work was released into the public domain. Id. The \nsystem illustrates that the author\u2019s ownership is in the \ncopyright, and not in the work itself, for if the author had \nan ownership interest in the work itself, she would not lose \nthat right if she published the book without complying with \nfederal statutory copyright requirements. Compliance with \nthe copyright law results in the guarantee of copyright to \nthe author for a limited time, but the author never owns the \nwork itself. \u00a7 202 (\u201cOwnership of a copyright, or of any of \nthe exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from \nownership of any material object in which the work is \nembodied.\u201d). \nThis has an important impact on modern int erpretation of \ncopyright, as it emphasizes the distinction between \nownership of the work, which an author does not possess, \nand ownership of the copyright, which an author enjoys for \na limited time. In a society oriented toward property \nownership, it is no t surprising to find many that \nerroneously equate the work with the copyright in the work \nand conclude that if one owns the copyright, they must also \nown the work. However, the fallacy of that understanding \nis exposed by the simple fact that the work conti nues to \nexist after the term of copyright associated with the work \nhas expired. \u201cThe copyright is not a natural right inherent \nin authorship. If it were, the impact on market values \nwould be irrelevant; any unauthorized taking would be \nobnoxious.\u201d Pierre L eval, Towards a Fair Use Standard, \n105 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1124 (1990). \nB. The Union of Copyright and the First Amendment", "proposition": ["The passage discusses the concept of copyright protection and its relation to the ownership of a work.", "The author of a work is entitled to federal statutory copyright protection if they have complied with certain federal requirements, such as publication with notice.", "If the author does not comply with the federal requirements, the work is released into the public domain.", "The author's ownership is in the copyright, not in the work itself.", "Compliance with the copyright law results in the guarantee of copyright to the author for a limited time.", "The author never owns the work itself, as ownership of the work is distinct from ownership of the copyright.", "In a society oriented toward property ownership, many people mistakenly equate the work with the copyright in the work.", "The fallacy of this understanding is exposed by the fact that the work continues to exist after the term of copyright associated with the work has expired.", "The copyright is not a natural right inherent in authorship, and any unauthorized taking would be obnoxious.", "The passage also discusses the relationship between copyright and the First Amendment."]} +{"metadata": {"page_label": "676", "file_name": "Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_path": "/home/fullstack/dev/licensed/apps/opus/data/books/Property1_Turner_Dec2014.pdf", "file_type": "application/pdf", "file_size": 3652131, "creation_date": "2024-03-12", "last_modified_date": "2024-03-12"}, "text": "661 \n It is clear from the provision in the Alaska Homestead Act, \nthe gene ral homestead laws, and the regulations \npromulgated pursuant to them, that Congress and the BLM \nknew how specifically to prohibit alienation. Their failure to \nprohibit alienation in the Alaska Homesite Law or \nregulations therefore is quite significant. In Willis v. Valdez, \nsupra at 574 n.7, we cited Barnes v. Poirier, 64 F. 14, 18 \n(8th Cir. 1894), which points to the significance of the \nabsence of a specific alienation clause in the Soldiers\u2019 \nAdditional Homestead statute. Numerous cases relating to \nUnited S tates land patents under other statutes hold that \nthe silence of land patent statutes is determinative of the \nissue of alienability.11 Significantly, the United States \nSupreme Court has stated: \nThere is no requirement \u2026 that the \nentryman shall make oath tha t he has \nnot alienated any interest in the land. \nThe policy of the government to \nrequire such affidavit when it intends \nto make it a condition precedent to \ngranting a title was indicated in the \nhomestead act, and could readily have \nbeen pursued by a simila r provision in \nthe timber culture act if it was \nintended to extend the principle to \nthat statute \u2026 . \n\u2026 If the entryman has complied with \nthe statute and made the entry in good \nfaith, in accordance with the terms of \nthe law and the oath required of him \nupon making such entry, and has done \n \n11 Sylvester v. Washington, 215 U.S. 80, 86, 30 S.Ct. 25, 54 L.Ed. 101, 105 (1909); \nAdams v. Church, 193 U.S. 510, 516 -17, 24 S.Ct. 512, 48 L.Ed. 769, 771 -72 \n(1904); Lamb v. Davenport, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 307, 314, 21 L.Ed. 759, 761 (1873); \nPhillips v. Carter , 135 Cal.", "proposition": ["The Alaska Homestead Act, general homestead laws, and regulations promulgated pursuant to them show that Congress and the BLM knew how specifically to prohibit alienation.", "The absence of a specific alienation clause in the Soldiers\u2019 Additional Homestead statute is significant.", "Numerous cases relating to United States land patents under other statutes hold that the silence of land patent statutes is determinative of the issue of alienability.", "The United States Supreme Court stated that there is no requirement for the entryman to make an oath that he has not alienated any interest in the land.", "The policy of the government to require an affidavit when it intends to make it a condition precedent to granting a title was indicated in the homestead act.", "A similar provision in the timber culture act could have been pursued if it was intended to extend the principle to that statute.", "If the entryman has complied with the statute and made the entry in good faith, in accordance with the terms of the law and the oath required of him upon making such entry, and has done everything required by the law, he has a valid claim to the land."]}