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United States Supreme Court FOGARTY v. UNITED STATES(1950) No. 1669 Argued: October 10, 1950Decided: November 6, 1950 </s> In the circumstances of this case, held that the corporation of which petitioner is trustee in bankruptcy and which had contracts with the Navy Department for the production of war materials, did not, on or before August 14, 1945, file with the Navy Department a "written request for relief" within the meaning of 3 of the War Contract Hardship Claims Act of August 7, 1946, and therefore was not entitled to relief under that Act. Pp. 8-14. </s> (a) Congress intended the term "written request for relief" to mean written notice presented prior to August 14, 1945, to an agency which was authorized to grant relief under 201 of the First War Powers Act. P. 13. </s> (b) No particular from of notice is required; but, whatever the form of notice, it must be sufficient to apprise the agency that it was being asked to grant extra-legal relief under the First War Powers Act for losses sustained in the performance of war contracts. P. 13. </s> (c) Documents which sought payment as a matter of right, not relief as a matter of grace, were not sufficient to apprise the Navy Department that it was being asked to accord relief under the First War Powers Act. P. 14. </s> 176 F.2d 599, affirmed. </s> In a suit against the United States under the War Contract Hardship Claims Act of August 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 902, 41 U.S.C. 106, the District Court entered summary judgment for the United States. 80 F. Supp. 90. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 176 F.2d 599. This Court granted certiorari. 339 U.S. 909 . Affirmed, p. 14. </s> George M. Shkoler argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Henry S. Blum. [340 U.S. 8, 9] </s> Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Samuel D. Slade and Hubert H. Margolies. </s> Raoul Berger filed a brief for Howard Industries, Inc., as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner, as trustee in bankruptcy of Inland Waterways, Inc., brought suit against the United States in the District Court of Minnesota, Fifth Division, under the War Contract Hardship Claims Act, popularly known as the Lucas Act, adopted August 7, 1946, 60 Stat. 902, 41 U.S.C. 106 note, to recover $328,804.42 as losses alleged to have been sustained under certain contracts with the Navy Department for the production of war supplies and materials. On motion, summary judgment was entered for the United States. 80 F. Supp. 90. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 176 F.2d 599. The suit turns on the interpretation and meaning to be ascribed to parts of the federal statute. Because we deemed resolution of the issues important, especially in view of asserted conflicts of decision in the interpretation of the statute among other federal courts, certiorari was granted. 339 U.S. 909 . </s> The facts are not in dispute. Inland Waterways, financed by a Government guaranteed loan and advances under the contracts, entered into several contracts and supplemental agreements with the Navy Department, dated from September 18, 1941, to October 30, 1942, for the production of submarine chasers and plane rearming boats. Little progress had been made under the contracts when, on December 18, 1942, Inland Waterways filed a petition for reorganization in bankruptcy. Petitioner [340 U.S. 8, 10] was appointed trustee in bankruptcy. The United States filed claims in these proceedings based primarily on the unpaid balance of the loan plus interest, the cost of completing incomplete and defective work on ships delivered under the contracts, and decreased costs resulting from certain changes in the plans and specifications. Petitioner filed a counterclaim based primarily on payments due for progress in construction, overtime work, changes in plans and specifications and in wage rates involving increased cost to Inland Waterways, and the value of partially completed work requisitioned by the Government and the cost of its preservation. In support of his counterclaim, petitioner submitted to the bankruptcy court a petition for compensation for requisitioned property and a number of invoices purporting to bill the Navy Department for goods and services, all of which had previously been submitted to agencies of the Navy Department. On February 20, 1945, the Government and petitioner executed an agreement compromising these claims upon payment of some $16,000 by the United States to petitioner. The settlement agreement embodies a mutual general release in the broadest of terms and was approved by the bankruptcy court. </s> Petitioner initiated his efforts to secure relief under the Lucas Act on February 1, 1947, by filing a claim with the War Contracts Relief Board of the Navy Department based on the same matters which had been the subject of the compromise agreement effected some two years before in the bankruptcy proceedings. The same documents submitted in support of the counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, plus the counterclaim itself, were relied on by petitioner as showing a timely request for relief under the Lucas Act. The Board denied the claim. This suit followed under 6 of the Lucas Act. </s> The only question decided by the Court of Appeals was that petitioner did not file with the Navy Department [340 U.S. 8, 11] on or before August 14, 1945, a "written request for relief" within the meaning of 3 of the Lucas Act. We direct our attention to the correctness of that holding. Neither the Act nor the regulations of the President thereunder define the term. Pertinent parts of the Act are set forth in the margin. 1 </s> Shortly after Pearl Harbor, Congress granted to the President under 201 of the First War Powers Act, 55 Stat. 838, 839, 50 U.S.C. App. 611, the power to authorize Government agencies to make amendments and modifications of contracts for war supplies without regard to consideration if "such action would facilitate the prosecution of the war." Throughout the war, departments and agencies of the Government utilized the provisions of the Act and regulations thereunder to alleviate hardships encountered by war contractors in an economy geared to all-out war. After the termination of hostilities August 14, 1945, however, departments of the Government took different views of their powers under the Act and regulations. [340 U.S. 8, 12] Some continued to exercise those powers, while others took the position that they were no longer applicable, since the war was over and contract modifications could not "facilitate the prosecution of the war." This resulted in a disparity of treatment of claimants for the relief of the Act whose claims had been filed but not acted upon before August 14, 1945. Whether such a contractor was to be accorded relief under the Act depended on the view the department with which he had contracted took of the Act. This situation motivated congressional action. See S. Rep. No. 1669, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 accompanying S. 1477, which became the Lucas Act. </s> This legislative history illuminates, for purposes of the question at hand, the relation of the First War Powers and the Lucas Acts. The words of the Lucas Act itself shed further light on that subject. Like 201 of the First War Powers Act, the Lucas Act contemplates relief by grace and not in recognition of legal rights. It speaks in 1 of "equitable claims . . . for losses . . . in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts," and in 2, of "fair and equitable settlement of claims." Further, [340 U.S. 8, 13] the Act limits the departments and agencies which may grant relief to those which were authorized to grant relief under the First War Powers Act. Finally, it limits claims upon which relief may be granted to those which had been presented "on or before August 14, 1945." As we have seen, that date was the one around which departments and agencies adopted the differing views of the First War Powers Act which necessitated congressional action. </s> In the light of the foregoing considerations and the relation of the Lucas Act to the First War Powers Act, we think Congress intended the term "written request for relief" to mean written notice presented prior to August 14, 1945, to an agency which was authorized to grant relief under 201 of the First War Powers Act. Since there is no definition of the term in the Act or regulations, and since the legislative history of the Act does not show that any settled usage of the term was brought to the attention of Congress, no particular form of notice is required. But whatever the form of notice, it must be sufficient to apprise the agency that it was being asked to grant extra-legal relief under the First War Powers Act for losses sustained in the performance of war contracts. </s> Petitioner, in attempting to establish an interpretation of the Lucas Act which would allow him to maintain this suit, has placed much reliance on events which occurred in Congress subsequent to its enactment. The second session of the Eighty-first Congress passed H. R. 3436, which was vetoed by the President. 96 Cong. Rec. 8291, 8658, 9602. Thereafter, Congress passed S. 3906, which failed of enactment over another veto of the President. 96 Cong. Rec. 12911, 14652. Petitioner's arguments is that these bills and their legislative history show that Congress had a different intent in passing the Lucas Act than that attributed to it by its administrators and some of the courts. If there is anything in these subsequent [340 U.S. 8, 14] events at odds with our finding of the meaning of 3, it would not supplant the contemporaneous intent of the Congress which enacted the Lucas Act. Cf. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 281 -282. </s> We do not think that the documents relied on by petitioner come within the meaning of the term "written request for relief." Neither the counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, nor the petition for compensation for requisitioned property, nor the invoices for extras, sought relief as a matter of grace. They sought payment as a matter of right. The counterclaim demanded judgment of the bankruptcy court. The petition for requisitioned property and the invoices were legal claims for compensation under contract. As such, they constituted a basis for suit in court. See, e. g., 28 U.S.C. 1346. That petitioner himself thought of them as judicially cognizable claims is evidenced by the fact that he included them in the counterclaim filed with the bankruptcy court, which obviously had no jurisdiction to award any extra-legal relief under the First War Powers Act. </s> None of the documents relied on by petitioner was sufficient to apprise the Navy Department that it was being asked to accord relief under the First War Powers Act. We must therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that no "written request for relief" was filed, and, therefore, that recovery was not available to petitioner under the Lucas Act. We do not reach alternative questions. The judgment is </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 SEC. 1. ". . . where work, supplies, or services have been furnished between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, under a contract or subcontract, for any department or agency of the Government which prior to the latter date was authorized to enter into contracts and amendments or modifications of contracts under section 201 of the First War Powers Act, 1941 . . . such departments and agencies are hereby authorized, in accordance with regulations to be prescribed by the President . . . to consider, adjust, and settle equitable claims . . . for losses (not including diminution of anticipated profits) incurred between September 16, 1940, and August 14, 1945, without fault or negligence on their part in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts. . . . </s> "SEC. 2. (a) In arriving at a fair and equitable settlement of claims under this Act . . . . </s> "SEC. 3. Claims for losses shall not be considered unless filed with the department or agency concerned within six months after the date of approval of this Act, and shall be limited to losses with respect to which a written request for relief was filed with such department or agency on or before August 14, 1945 . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 "This bill, as amended, would afford financial relief to those contractors who suffered losses in the performance of war contracts in those cases where the claim would have received favorable consideration under the First War Powers Act and Executive Order No. 9001 if action had been taken by the Government prior to the capitulation of the Japanese Government. However, upon the capitulation, the position was taken by certain departments and agencies of the Government involved, that no relief should be granted under the authority which then existed, unless the action was required in order to insure continued production necessary to meet post VJ-day requirements. This was on the basis that the First War Powers Act was enacted to aid in the successful prosecution of the war and not as an aid to the contractors. As a result, a number of claims which were in process at the time of the surrender of the Japanese Government, or which had not been presented prior to such time, were denied even though the facts in a particular case would have justified favorable action if such action had been taken prior to surrender." </s> [340 U.S. 8, 15]

United States Supreme Court PURKETT v. ELEM(1995) No. 94-802 Argued: Decided: May 15, 1995 </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Respondent was convicted of second-degree robbery in a Missouri court. During jury selection, he objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike two black men from the jury panel, an objection arguably based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The prosecutor explained his strikes: </s> "I struck [juror] number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair. Also, he had a mustache and a goatee type beard. And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache and goatee type beard. Those are the only two people on the jury . . . with facial hair . . . . And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me." App. to pet. for Cert. A-41. </s> The prosecutor further explained that he feared that juror number 24, who had had a sawed-off shotgun pointed at him during a supermarket robbery, would believe that "to have a robbery you have to have a gun, and there is no gun in this case." Ibid. </s> The state trial court, without explanation, overruled </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 2] </s> respondent's objection and empaneled the jury. On direct appeal, respondent renewed his Batson claim. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the "state's explanation constituted a legitimate `hunch'" and that "[t]he circumstances fail[ed] to raise the necessary inference of racial discrimination." State v. Elem, 747 S. W. 2d 772, 775 (Mo. App. 1988). </s> Respondent then filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, asserting this and other claims. Adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the District Court concluded that the Missouri courts' determination that there had been no purposeful discrimination was a factual finding entitled to a presumption of correctness under 2254(d). Since the finding had support in the record, the District Court denied respondent's claim. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus. It said: </s> "[W]here the prosecution strikes a prospective juror who is a member of the defendant's racial group, solely on the basis of factors which are facially irrelevant to the question of whether that person is qualified to serve as a juror in the particular case, the prosecution must at least articulate some plausible race-neutral reason for believing that those factors will somehow affect the person's ability to perform his or her duties as a juror. In the present case, the prosecutor's comments, `I don't like the way [he] look[s], with the way the hair is cut. . . . And the mustache[] and the beard[] look suspicious to me,' do not constitute such legitimate race-neutral reasons for striking juror 22." 25 F.3d 679, 683 (1994). </s> It concluded that the "prosecution's explanation for striking juror 22 . . . was pretextual," and that the state trial court had "clearly erred" in finding that striking juror number 22 had not been intentional discrimination. Id., at 684. </s> Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step 1), the burden of production shifts to the </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 3] </s> proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation (step 2). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358 -359 (1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 375 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment); Batson, supra, at 96-98. The second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. "At this [second] step of the inquiry, the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Hernandez, 500 U.S., at 360 (plurality opinion); id., at 374 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). </s> The Court of Appeals erred by combining Batson's second and third steps into one, requiring that the justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also at least minimally persuasive, i.e., a "plausible" basis for believing that "the person's ability to perform his or her duties as a juror" will be affected. 25 F.3d, at 683. It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant - the step in which the trial court determines whether the opponent of the strike has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, supra, at 98; Hernandez, supra, at 359 (plurality opinion). At that stage, implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination. But to say that a trial judge may choose to disbelieve a silly or superstitious reason at step 3 is quite different from saying that a trial judge must terminate the inquiry at step 2 when the race-neutral reason is silly or superstitious. The latter violates the principle that the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Cf. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 7-8). </s> The Court of Appeals appears to have seized on our admonition in Batson that to rebut a prima facie case, the proponent of a strike "must give a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his `legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges," Batson, 476 U.S., at 98 , n. 20 (quoting Texas Dept. of Community Affairs </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 4] </s> v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981)), and that the reason must be "related to the particular case to be tried," 476 U.S., at 98 . See 25 F.3d, at 682, 683. This warning was meant to refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith. What it means by a "legitimate reason" is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. See Hernandez, supra, at 359; cf. Burdine, supra, at 255 ("The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant"). </s> The prosecutor's proffered explanation in this case - that he struck juror number 22 because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache, and a beard - is race-neutral and satisfies the prosecution's step 2 burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for the strike. "The wearing of beards is not a characteristic that is peculiar to any race." EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. 635 F.2d 188, 190, n. 3 (CA3 1980). And neither is the growing of long, unkempt hair. Thus, the inquiry properly proceeded to step 3, where the state court found that the prosecutor was not motivated by discriminatory intent. </s> In habeas proceedings in federal courts, the factual findings of state courts are presumed to be correct, and may be set aside, absent procedural error, only if they are "not fairly supported by the record." 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) (8). See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 432 (1983). Here the Court of Appeals did not conclude or even attempt to conclude that the state court's finding of no racial motive was not fairly supported by the record. For its whole focus was upon the reasonableness of the asserted nonracial motive (which it thought required by step 2) rather than the genuineness of the motive. It gave no proper basis for overturning the state court's finding of no racial motive, a finding which turned primarily on an assessment of credibility, see Batson, supra, at 98, n. 21. Cf. Marshall, supra, at 434. </s> Accordingly, respondent's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for a writ of certiorari are granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 5] </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins, dissenting. </s> In my opinion it is unwise for the Court to announce a law-changing decision without first ordering full briefing and argument on the merits of the case. The Court does this today when it overrules a portion of our opinion in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 1 </s> In Batson, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids a prosecutor to use peremptory challenges to exclude African Americans from jury service because of their race. The Court articulated a three-step process for proving such violations. First, a pattern of peremptory challenges of black jurors may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose. Second, the prosecutor may rebut that prima face [facie] case by tendering a race-neutral explanation for the strikes. Third, the court must decide whether that explanation is pretextual. Id., at 96-98. At the second step of this inquiry, neither a mere denial of improper motive nor an incredible explanation will suffice to rebut the prima facie showing of discriminatory purpose. At a minimum, as the Court held in Batson, the prosecutor "must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." Id., at 98. 2 </s> Today the Court holds that it did not mean what it said in Batson. Moreover, the Court resolves a novel procedural </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 6] </s> question without even recognizing its importance to the unusual facts of this case. </s> I </s> In the Missouri trial court, the judge rejected the defendant's Batson objection to the prosecutor's peremptory challenges of two jurors, juror number 22 and juror number 24, on the ground that the defendant had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, because the defendant had failed at the first step of the Batson inquiry, the judge saw no need even to confirm the defendant's assertion that jurors 22 and 24 were black; 3 nor did the judge require the prosecutor to explain his challenges. The prosecutor nevertheless did volunteer an explanation, 4 but the judge evaluated neither its credibility nor its sufficiency. </s> The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, relying partly on the ground that the use of one-third of the prosecutor's peremptories to strike black veniremen did not require an explanation, State v. Elem, 747 S. W. 2d 772, 774 (1988), and </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 7] </s> partly on the ground that if any rebuttal was necessary then the volunteered "explanation constituted a legitimate `hunch,'" id., at 775. The court thus relied, alternatively, on steps one and two of the Batson analysis without reaching the question whether the prosecutor's explanation might have been pretextual under step three. </s> The Federal District Court accepted a magistrate's recommendation to deny petitioner's petition for habeas corpus without conducting a hearing. The magistrate had reasoned that state-court findings on the issue of purposeful discrimination are entitled to deference. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27. Even though the trial court had made no such findings, the magistrate treated the statement by the Missouri Court of Appeals that the prosecutor's reasons "constituted a legitimate `hunch'" as a finding of fact that was supported by the record. 5 When the case reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the parties apparently assumed that petitioner had satisfied the first step of the Batson analysis. 6 The disputed issue in the Court of Appeals was whether the trial judge's contrary finding was academic because the prosecutor's volunteered statement satisfied step two and had not been refuted in step three. </s> The Court of Appeals agreed with the State that excluding juror 24 was not error because the prosecutor's concern about that juror's status as a former victim of a robbery was related to the case at hand. 25 F.3d 679, 681, 682 (1994). The court did, however, find a Batson violation with respect to juror 22. In rejecting the prosecutor's "race-neutral" explanation for the strike, the Court of Appeals faithfully applied the standard that we articulated in Batson: The explanation was not "`related to the particular case to be tried.'" Id., at 683, quoting 476 U.S., at 98 (emphasis in Court of Appeals opinion). </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 8] </s> Before applying the Batson test, the Court of Appeals noted that its analysis was consistent with both the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of Batson in State v. Antwine, 743 S. W. 2d 51 (1987) (en banc), and this Court's intervening opinion in Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991). 25 F.3d, at 683. Referring to the second stage of the three-step analysis, the Antwine court had observed: </s> "We do not believe, however, that Batson is satisfied by `neutral explanations' which are no more than facially legitimate, reasonably specific and clear. Were facially neutral explanations sufficient without more, Batson would be meaningless. It would take little effort for prosecutors who are of such a mind to adopt rote `neutral explanations' which bear facial legitimacy but conceal a discriminatory motive. We do not believe the Supreme Court intended a charade when it announced Batson." 743 S. W. 2d at 65. </s> In Hernandez, this Court rejected a Batson claim stemming from a prosecutor's strikes of two Spanish-speaking Latino jurors. The prosecutor explained that he struck the jurors because he feared that they might not accept an interpreter's English translation of trial testimony given in Spanish. Because the prosecutor's explanation was directly related to the particular case to be tried, it satisfied the second prong of the Batson standard. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals noted, 25 F.3d, at 683, the plurality opinion in Hernandez expressly observed that striking all venirepersons who speak a given language, "without regard to the particular circumstances of the trial," might constitute a pretext for racial discrimination. 500 U.S., at 371 -372 (opinion of KENNEDY, J.). 7 Based on our precedent, the Court of Appeals was entirely correct to conclude that the peremptory strike of juror 22 </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 9] </s> violated Batson because the reason given was unrelated to the circumstances of the trial. 8 </s> Today, without argument, the Court replaces the Batson standard with the surprising announcement that any neutral explanation, no matter how "implausible or fantastic," ante, at 3, even if it is "silly or superstitious," ibid., is sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. A trial court must accept that neutral explanation unless a separate "step three" inquiry leads to the conclusion that the peremptory challenge was racially motivated. The Court does not attempt to explain why a statement that "the juror had a beard," or "the juror's last name began with the letter `S'" should satisfy step two, though a statement that "I had a hunch" should not. See ante, at 4; Batson, 476 U.S., at 98 . It is not too much to ask that a prosecutor's explanation for his strikes be race neutral, reasonably specific, and trial related. Nothing less will serve to rebut the inference of race-based discrimination that arises when the defendant has made out a prima facie case. Cf. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). That, in any event, is what we decided in Batson. </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 10] </s> II </s> The Court's peremptory disposition of this case overlooks a tricky procedural problem. Ordinarily, a federal appeals court reviewing a claim of Batson error in a habeas corpus proceeding must evaluate, with appropriate deference, the factual findings and legal conclusions of the state trial court. But in this case, the only finding the trial judge made was that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case. Everyone now agrees that finding was incorrect. The state trial judge, holding that the defendant had failed at step one, made no finding with respect to the sufficiency or credibility of the prosecutor's explanation at step two. The question, then, is whether the reviewing court should (1) go on to decide the second step of the Batson inquiry, (2) reverse and remand to the District Court for further proceedings, or (3) grant the writ conditioned on a proper step-two and (if necessary) step-three hearing in the state trial court. This Court's opinion today implicitly ratifies the Court of Appeals' decision to evaluate on its own whether the prosecutor had satisfied step two. I think that is the correct resolution of this procedural question, but it deserves more consideration than the Court has provided. </s> In many cases, a state trial court or a federal district court will be in a better position to evaluate the facts surrounding peremptory strikes than a federal appeals court. But I would favor a rule giving the appeals court discretion, based on the sufficiency of the record, to evaluate a prosecutor's explanation of his strikes. In this case, I think review is justified because the prosecutor volunteered reasons for the challenges. The Court of Appeals reasonably assumed that these were the same reasons the prosecutor would have given had the trial court required him to respond to the prima facie case. The Court of Appeals, in its discretion, could thus evaluate the explanations for their sufficiency. This presents a pure legal question, and nothing is gained by remand if the appeals court can resolve that question on the facts before it. </s> Assuming the Court of Appeals did not err in reaching step two, a new problem arises when that court (or, as in today's case, this Court) conducts the step-two inquiry and decides that the prosecutor's explanation was sufficient. Who may evaluate </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 11] </s> whether the prosecutor's explanation was pretextual under step three of Batson? Again, I think the question whether the Court of Appeals decides, or whether it refers the question to a trial court, should depend on the state of the record before the Court of Appeals. Whatever procedure is contemplated, however, I think even this Court would acknowledge that some implausible, fantastic, and silly explanations could be found to be pretextual without any further evidence. Indeed, in Hernandez the Court explained that a trial judge could find pretext based on nothing more than a consistent policy of excluding all Spanish-speaking jurors if that characteristic was entirely unrelated to the case to be tried. 500 U.S., at 371 -372 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.). Parallel reasoning would justify a finding of pretext based on a policy of excusing jurors with beards if beards have nothing to do with the pending case. </s> In some cases, conceivably the length and unkempt character of a juror's hair and goatee-type beard might give rise to a concern that he is a nonconformist who might not be a good juror. In this case, however, the prosecutor did not identify any such concern. He merely said he did not "`like the way [the juror] looked,'" that the facial hair "`look[ed] suspicious.'" Ante, at 1. I think this explanation may well be pretextual as a matter of law; it has nothing to do with the case at hand, and it is just as evasive as "I had a hunch." Unless a reviewing court may evaluate such explanations when a trial judge fails to find that a prima facie case has been established, appellate or collateral review of Batson claims will amount to nothing more than the meaningless charade that the Missouri Supreme Court correctly understood Batson to disfavor. Antwine, 743 S. W. 2d, at 65. </s> In my opinion, preoccupation with the niceties of a three-step analysis should not foreclose meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial explanations that are entirely unrelated to the case to be tried. I would adhere to the Batson rule that such an explanation does not satisfy step two. Alternatively, I would hold that, in the absence of an explicit trial court finding on the issue, a reviewing court may hold that such an explanation is pretextual as a matter of law. The Court's unnecessary tolerance of silly, fantastic, and implausible explanations, together with its assumption that there </s> [ PURKETT v. ELEM, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 12] </s> is a difference of constitutional magnitude between a statement that "I had a hunch about this juror based on his appearance," and "I challenged this juror because he had a mustache," demeans the importance of the values vindicated by our decision in Batson. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 This is the second time this Term that the Court has misused its summary reversal authority in this way. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. ___, ___-___ (1995) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 2 We explained: "Nor may the prosecutor rebut the defendant's case merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive or `affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.' Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S., at 632 . If these general assertions were accepted as rebutting a defendant's prima facie case, the Equal Protection Clause `would be but a vain and illusory requirement.' Norris v. Alabama, [294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935)]. The prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried. The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S., at 97 -98 (footnotes omitted). </s> [Footnote 3 The following exchange took place between the defense attorney and the trial judge: </s> "MR. GOULET: Mr. Larner stated that the reason he struck was because of facial hair and long hair as prejudicial. Number twenty-four, Mr. William Hunt, was a victim in a robbery and he stated that he could give a fair and impartial hearing. To make this a proper record if the Court would like to call up these two individuals to ask them if they are black or will the Court take judicial notice that they are black individuals? </s> "THE COURT: I am not going to do that, no, sir." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-42. </s> [Footnote 4 The prosecutor stated: </s> "I struck number twenty-two because of his long hair. He had long curly hair. He had the longest hair of anybody on the panel by far. He appeared to me to not be a good juror for that fact, the fact that he had long hair hanging down shoulder length, curly, unkempt hair. Also, he had a mustache and a goatee-type beard. And juror number twenty-four also has a mustache and a goatee type beard. Those are the only two people on the jury, numbers twenty-two and twenty-four with facial hair of any kind of all the men and, of course, the women, those are the only two with the facial hair. And I don't like the way they looked, with the way the hair is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the beards look suspicious to me. And number twenty-four had been in a robbery in a supermarket with a sawed-off shotgun pointed at his face, and I didn't want him on the jury as this case does not involve a shotgun, and maybe he would feel to have a robbery you have to have a gun, and there is no gun in this case." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-41. </s> [Footnote 5 The magistrate stated: "The Court of Appeals determined that the prosecutor's reasons for striking the men constituted a legitimate `hunch' . . . . The record supports the Missouri Court of Appeals' finding of no purposeful discrimination." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-27. </s> [Footnote 6 In this Court, at least, the State does not deny that the prosecutor's pattern of challenges established a prima facie case of discrimination. </s> [Footnote 7 True, the plurality opinion in Hernandez stated that explanations unrelated to the particular circumstances of the trial "may be found by the trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination," 500 U.S., at 372 , and thus it specifically referred to the third step in the Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), analysis. Nevertheless, if this comment was intended to modify the Batson standard for determining the sufficiency of the prosecutor's response to a prima facie case, it was certainly an obtuse method of changing the law. </s> [Footnote 8 In my opinion, it is disrespectful to the conscientious judges on the Court of Appeals who faithfully applied an unambiguous standard articulated in one of our opinions to say that they appear "to have seized on our admonition in Batson . . . that the reason must be `related to the particular case to be tried,' 476 U.S., at 98 ." Ante, at 4. Of course, they "seized on" that point because we told them to. The Court of Appeals was following Batson's clear mandate. To criticize those judges for doing their jobs is singularly inappropriate. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is not the only court to have taken our admonition in Batson seriously. Numerous courts have acted on the assumption that we meant what we said when we required the prosecutor's neutral explanation to be "related to the particular case to be tried." See, e.g., Jones v. Ryan, 987 F.2d 960, 974 (CA3 1993); Ex parte Bird, 594 So.2d 676, 682-683 (Ala. 1991); State v. Henderson, 112 Ore. App. 451, 456, 829 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1992); Whitsey v. State, 796 S. W. 2d 707, 713-716 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 176, 186-187, 380 S. E. 2d 1, 6-7 (1989); State v. Butler, 731 S. W. 2d 265, 271 (Mo. App. 1987); Slappy v. State, 503 So.2d 350, 355 (Fla. App. 1987); Walker v. State, 611 So.2d 1133, 1142 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Huntley v. State, 627 So.2d 1011, 1012 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). This Court today calls into question the reasoning of all of these decisions without even the courtesy of briefing and argument. Page I

United States Supreme Court ALOHA AIRLINES, INC. v. DIRECTOR OF TAXATION(1983) No. 82-585 Argued: October 4, 1983Decided: November 1, 1983 </s> A Hawaii statute imposes a tax on the annual gross income of airlines operating within the State, and declares that such tax is a means of taxing an airline's personal property. Section 7(a) of the Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973 (ADAA) prohibits a State from levying a tax, "directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom," but provides that property taxes are not included in this prohibition. Appellant airlines each brought an action for refund of taxes assessed under the Hawaii statute, claiming that the statute was pre-empted by 7(a). The Hawaii Tax Appeal Court rejected this pre-emption argument, and the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed. </s> Held: </s> Section 7(a) pre-empts the Hawaii statute. Pp. 11-15. </s> (a) When a federal statute unambiguously forbids a State to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry affecting interstate commerce, as 7(a) does here by its plain language, courts need not look beyond the federal statute's plain language to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted. P. 12. </s> (b) Moreover, nothing in the ADAA's legislative history suggests that Congress intended to limit 7(a)'s pre-emptive effect to taxes on airline passengers or to save gross receipts taxes such as the one Hawaii imposes. Although 7(a) was enacted to deal primarily with local head taxes on airline passengers, the legislative history contains many references to the fact that 7(a) pre-empts state taxes on gross receipts of airlines. Pp. 12-13. </s> (c) The fact that the Hawaii tax is styled as a property tax measured by gross receipts rather than as a straightforward gross receipts tax does not entitle the tax to escape pre-emption under 7(a)'s property tax exemption. Such styling of the tax does not mask the fact that the purpose and effect of the tax are to impose a levy upon the gross receipts [464 U.S. 7, 8] of airlines, thus making it at least an "indirect" tax on such receipts. Pp. 13-14. </s> 65 Haw. 1, 647 P.2d 263, reversed and remanded. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 82-586, Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation of Hawaii, also on appeal from the same court. </s> Richard L. Griffith argued the cause for appellants in both cases. With him on the briefs were Michael A. Shea, Richard R. Clifton, Hugh Shearer, and H. Mitchell D'Olier. </s> William D. Dexter argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Kevin T. Wakayama.Fn </s> Fn [464 U.S. 7, 8] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alaska et al. by Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, and Jeffrey D. Goltz, Assistant Attorney General, Norman C. Gorsuch, Attorney General of Alaska, and Diane T. Colvin, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Michael C. Turpen, Attorney General of Oklahoma, Chauncey H. Browning, Attorney General of West Virginia, and Jack C. McClung, Deputy Attorney General; and for the Multistate Tax Commission et al. by Eugene F. Corrigan. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the State of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Peter H. Schiff, and Francis V. Dow, Assistant Attorney General; and for the Air Transport Association of America by Andrew C. Hartzell, Jr. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These appeals present the question whether 49 U.S.C. 1513(a) pre-empts a Hawaii statute that imposes a tax on the gross income of airlines operating within the State. We conclude that the Hawaii tax is pre-empted. </s> I </s> In 1970, Congress committed the Federal Government to assisting States and localities in expanding and improving the Nation's air transportation system. See Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, 84 Stat. 219. In the same session, Congress established the Airport and Airway Trust Fund to funnel federal resources to local airport expansion and improvement projects. See Airport and Airway [464 U.S. 7, 9] Revenue Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-258, 208, 84 Stat. 250. As originally devised, the Trust Fund received its revenues from several federal aviation taxes, including an 8% tax on domestic airline tickets, a $3 head tax on international flights out of the United States, and a 5% tax on air freight. See 203, 204, 84 Stat. 238, 240 (codified, as amended, at 26 U.S.C. 4261, 4271 (1976 ed. and Supp. V)). See generally Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978). </s> Once the Airport and Airway Development Act was passed and the Trust Fund established, the question arose whether States and municipalities were still free to impose additional taxes on airlines and air travelers. In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972), this Court ruled that neither the Commerce Clause nor the Airport and Airway Development Act precluded state or local authorities from assessing head taxes on passengers boarding flights at state or local airports. In particular the Court noted: "No federal statute or specific congressional action or declaration evidences a congressional purpose to deny or pre-empt state and local power to levy charges designed to help defray the costs of airport construction and maintenance." Id., at 721. </s> Following the Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport decision, Committees in both Houses of Congress held hearings on local taxation of air transportation. 1 Both Committees concluded that the proliferation of local taxes burdened interstate air transportation, and, when coupled with the federal Trust Fund levies, imposed double taxation on air travelers. 2 To deal with these problems, Congress passed 7(a) of the [464 U.S. 7, 10] Airport Development Acceleration Act of 1973 (ADAA), the provision at issue in these appeals. See Pub. L. 93-44, 7(a), 87 Stat. 90. That section, which is currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 1513, 3 reads: </s> "(a) No State . . . shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom. . . . </s> "(b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a State . . . from the levy or collection of taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a) of this section, including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services. . . ." </s> For States with taxes that were in effect prior to May 21, 1970, and would be pre-empted by 1513(a), Congress postponed the effective date of the section until December 31, 1973. Ibid. </s> II </s> Appellants Aloha Airlines, Inc., and Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., are both commercial airlines that carry passengers, freight, and mail among the islands of Hawaii. Throughout the periods relevant to these appeals, appellants have been Hawaii public service companies, see Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-2, 269-1 (1976 and Supp. 1982), and subject to the State's public service company tax, which provides: </s> "There shall be levied and assessed upon each airline a tax of four per cent of its gross income each year from the airline business . . . . The tax imposed by this section is a means of taxing the personal property of the airline or other carrier, tangible and intangible, including [464 U.S. 7, 11] going concern value, and is in lieu of the [general excise] tax imposed by chapter 237 but is not in lieu of any other tax." 239-6 (1976). </s> In 1978, appellant Aloha Airlines sought refunds for taxes assessed under this provision for the carriage of passengers between 1974 and 1977 on the ground that 49 U.S.C. 1513(a) had pre-empted Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 as of December 31, 1973. In 1979, appellant Hawaiian Airlines filed a similar action seeking a refund for taxes paid between 1974 and 1978. In separate decisions, the Tax Appeal Court of the State of Hawaii rejected appellants' pre-emption arguments, In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., No. 1772 (June 9, 1978); In re Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Nos. 1853, 1868 (Jan. 4, 1980). On consolidated appeal, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed, one justice dissenting, In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., 65 Haw. 1, 647 P.2d 263 (1982). Appellants then filed timely notices of appeal, this Court noted probable jurisdiction, 459 U.S. 1101 (1983), and we now reverse. </s> III </s> The plain language of 49 U.S.C. 1513(a) would appear to invalidate Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6. Section 1513(a) expressly pre-empts gross receipts taxes on the sale of air transportation or the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce, and Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 is a state tax on the gross receipts 4 of airlines selling air transportation and carrying persons traveling in air commerce. The Hawaii Supreme Court sought to avoid this direct conflict by looking beyond the language of 1513(a) to Congress' purpose in enacting the statute. The court concluded that Congress passed the ADAA to deal with the proliferation of local and state head taxes on airline passengers in the early 1970's. Since Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 is imposed upon air carriers [464 U.S. 7, 12] as opposed to air travelers, the Hawaii court reasoned that the provision did not come within the ambit of 1513(a)'s prohibitions. </s> We cannot agree with the Hawaii Supreme Court's analysis. First, when a federal statute unambiguously forbids the States to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry affecting interstate commerce, courts need not look beyond the plain language of the federal statute to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is pre-empted. 5 Thus, the Hawaii Supreme Court erred in failing to give effect to the plain meaning of 1513(a). 6 </s> Second, even if the absence of an express proscription made it necessary to go beyond the plain language of 1513(a), [464 U.S. 7, 13] nothing in the legislative history of the ADAA suggests that Congress intended to limit 1513(a)'s pre-emptive effect to taxes on airline passengers or to save gross receipts taxes like 239-6. 7 Although Congress passed 1513(a) to deal primarily with local head taxes on airline passengers, the legislative history abounds with references to the fact that 1513(a) also pre-empts state taxes on the gross receipts of airlines. 8 For example, Senator Cannon, one of the ADAA's sponsors, clearly stated in floor debate: "The bill prohibits the levying of State or local head taxes, fees, gross receipts taxes or other such charges either on passengers or on the carriage of such passengers in interstate commerce." 119 Cong. Rec. 3349 (1973). </s> Finally, we are unpersuaded by appellee's contention that, because the Hawaii Legislature styled 239-6 as a property tax measured by gross receipts rather than a straightforward gross receipts tax, the provision should escape preemption under 1513(b)'s exemption for property taxes. The manner in which the state legislature has described and categorized 239-6 9 cannot mask the fact that the purpose [464 U.S. 7, 14] and effect of the provision are to impose a levy upon the gross receipts of airlines. Section 1513(a) expressly prohibits States from taxing "directly or indirectly" gross receipts derived from air transportation. Beyond question, a property tax that is measured by gross receipts constitutes at least an "indirect" tax on the gross receipts of airlines. A state statute that imposes such a tax is therefore pre-empted. 10 </s> IV </s> In conclusion, we join with state courts of Alaska and New York 11 in the view that 1513(a) proscribes the imposition of [464 U.S. 7, 15] state and local taxes on gross receipts derived from air transportation or the carriage of persons in air commerce. The judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See Hearings on S. 2397 et al. before the Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., 129-198 (1972); Hearings on H. R. 2337 et al. before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972). </s> [Footnote 2 See S. Rep. No. 93-12, pp. 17, 20-21 (1973); H. R. Rep. No. 93-157, pp. 4-5 (1973). </s> [Footnote 3 In 1982, Congress amended 49 U.S.C. 1513 to prohibit discriminatory property taxes imposed on air carriers. See Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97-248, 532, 96 Stat. 701 (codified at 49 U.S.C. 1513(d) (1982 ed.)). Being enacted after the relevant periods, this amendment has no bearing on these appeals. </s> [Footnote 4 Appellee concedes that the phrase "gross income," under Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6, is synonymous with the phrase "gross receipts" used in 49 U.S.C. 1513(a). See Brief for Appellee 7, n. 2. </s> [Footnote 5 The Hawaii Supreme Court apparently considered itself obliged by Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947), and its progeny to examine thoroughly Congress' intentions before declaring Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 pre-empted. In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., 65 Haw. 1, 13-16, 647 P.2d 263, 272-273 (1982). Rice and its progeny, however, involved the implicit pre-emption of state statutes. Rules developed in these cases apply when a court must decide whether a state law should be pre-empted even though Congress has not expressly legislated pre-emption. These rules, therefore, have little application when a court confronts a federal statute like 1513(a) that explicitly pre-empts state laws. </s> [Footnote 6 The Hawaii Supreme Court professed confusion over the "paradox" between 1513(a)'s prohibition on certain state taxes on air transportation and 1513(b)'s reservation of the States' primary sources of revenue, such as property taxes, net income taxes, franchise taxes, and sales or use taxes. In re Aloha Airlines, Inc., supra, at 16, 647 P.2d, at 273. We find no paradox between 1513(a) and 1513(b). Section 1513(a) pre-empts a limited number of state taxes, including gross receipts taxes imposed on the sale of air transportation or the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce. Section 1513(b) clarifies Congress' view that the States are still free to impose on airlines and air carriers "taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a)," such as property taxes, net income taxes, and franchise taxes. While neither the statute nor its legislative history explains exactly why Congress chose to distinguish between gross receipts taxes imposed on airlines and the taxes reserved in 1513(b), the statute is quite clear that Congress chose to make the distinction, and the courts are obliged to honor this congressional choice. </s> [Footnote 7 Indeed, Congress was presented an opportunity to exempt gross receipts taxes from 1513(a), and declined to grant the exemption. During House hearings on the ADAA, a representative of the Ohio Tax Commission asked the Subcommittee responsible for the bill to expand 1513(b) to permit state "gross receipts taxes fairly apportioned to a State," so that Ohio could maintain a gross receipts tax similar to Hawaii's 239-6. See Hearings on H. R. 4082 before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 246-253 (1973). When Congress enacted the ADAA without Ohio's proposed amendment, the State Attorney General issued an opinion concluding that Ohio's gross receipts tax was preempted. See Ohio Op. Atty. Gen. No. 73-117 (Nov. 20, 1973). </s> [Footnote 8 See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 93-12, p. 6 (1973); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-225. p. 5 (1973); 119 Cong. Rec. 18045 (1973) (statement of Sen. Cannon); id., at 17345 (statement of Rep. Devine). </s> [Footnote 9 The most likely explanation for the seemingly curious way in which the legislature characterized 239-6 is that, at one time, this Court distinguished between the manner in which a state statute was measured and [464 U.S. 7, 14] the subject matter of the tax when assessing the validity of the tax under the Commerce Clause. Compare Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959) (upholding a property tax measured by gross receipts), with Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954) (striking down a functionally equivalent business privilege tax). But cf. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). The constitutionality of 239-6 is of course not at issue in these appeals. </s> [Footnote 10 The unambiguous proscription contained in 1513(a) compels us to conclude that it pre-empts Haw. Rev. Stat. 239-6 as well as other state taxes imposed on or measured by the gross receipts of airlines. Amici point out that several States have taxation statutes similar to 239-6 and that the ability of those States to retain revenues collected from airlines during the past decade will be affected by our decision today. We acknowledge that our interpretation of 1513(a) may result in the disruption of state systems of taxation; we are, however, bound by the plain language of the statute. Congress clearly has the authority to regulate state taxation of air transportation in interstate commerce, see Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141, 150 (1979), and we trust that Congress will amend 1513(a) if it concludes, upon reconsideration, that the pre-emptive sweep of the current version is too great. </s> [Footnote 11 Wein Air Alaska, Inc. v. State, No. 3AN 81-8582 Civil (Alaska Super. Ct., May 6, 1983), appeal docketed (Alaska Sup. Ct.); Air Transport Assn. of America v. New York State Dept. of Taxation and Finance, 91 App. Div. 2d 169, 458 N. Y. S. 2d 709, aff'd, 59 N. Y. 2d 917, 453 N. E. 2d 548 (1983), cert. pending, No. 83-162; cf. State ex rel. Arizona Dept. of Revenue v. Cochise Airlines, 128 Ariz. 432, 626 P.2d 596 (App. 1980) ( 1513(a) pre-empts state gross receipts taxes on the carriage of passengers, but not freight, in air commerce); see also Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 453 Pa. 181, 309 A. 2d 157 (1973) (finding a Philadelphia head tax on air passengers pre-empted). </s> [464 U.S. 7, 16]

United States Supreme Court SPINELLI v. UNITED STATES(1969) No. 8 Argued: Decided: January 27, 1969 </s> Petitioner was convicted of illegal interstate gambling activities despite his claim that the Commissioner's warrant authorizing the FBI search that uncovered evidence used at his trial violated the Fourth Amendment. He argued that the FBI agent's supporting affidavit did not afford probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The affidavit alleged that: the FBI had followed petitioner on five days, on four of which he had been seen crossing one of two bridges leading from Illinois to St. Louis, Missouri, and had been seen parking his car at a St. Louis apartment house parking lot; he was seen one day to enter a particular apartment; the apartment contained two telephones with specified numbers; petitioner was known to affiant as a gambler and associate of gamblers; and the FBI had "been informed by a confidential reliable informant" that petitioner was "operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones" which had been assigned the specified numbers. Viewing the information in the affidavit in its totality the Court of Appeals deemed the principles of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , satisfied and upheld the conviction. Held: The informant's tip, an essential part of the affidavit in this case, was not sufficient (even as corroborated by other allegations) to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause that a crime was being committed. Pp. 412-420. </s> (a) The tip was inadequate under the standards of Aguilar, supra, since it did not set forth any reason to support the conclusion that the informant was "reliable" and did not sufficiently state the underlying circumstances from which the informant had concluded that petitioner was running a bookmaking operation or sufficiently detail his activities to enable the Commissioner to know that he was relying on more than casual rumor or general reputation. Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 . Pp. 415-417. </s> (b) Nor was the tip's reliability sufficiently enhanced by the FBI's corroboration of certain limited aspects of the informant's report through the use of independent sources. Pp. 417-418. [393 U.S. 410, 411] </s> (c) The FBI's surveillance of petitioner and its investigation of the telephone company records do not independently suggest criminal conduct when taken by themselves. P. 418. </s> 382 F.2d 871, reversed and remanded. </s> Irl B. Baris argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Joseph J. Connolly argued the cause for the United States, pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Sidney M. Glazer. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> William Spinelli was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 1952 1 of traveling to St. Louis, Missouri, from a nearby Illinois suburb with the intention of conducting gambling activities proscribed by Missouri law. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 563.360 (1959). At every appropriate stage in the proceedings in the lower courts, the petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the warrant which authorized the FBI search that uncovered the evidence necessary for his conviction. At each stage, Spinelli's challenge was treated in a different way. At a pretrial suppression hearing, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that Spinelli [393 U.S. 410, 412] lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment objection. A unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected the District Court's ground, a majority holding further that the warrant was issued without probable cause. After an en banc rehearing, the Court of Appeals sustained the warrant and affirmed the conviction by a vote of six to two. 382 F.2d 871. Both the majority and dissenting en banc opinions reflect a most conscientious effort to apply the principles we announced in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), to a factual situation whose basic characteristics have not been at all uncommon in recent search warrant cases. Believing it desirable that the principles of Aguilar should be further explicated, we granted certiorari, 390 U.S. 942 , our writ being later limited to the question of the constitutional validity of the search and seizure. 2 </s> 391 U.S. 933 . For reasons that follow we reverse. </s> In Aguilar, a search warrant had issued upon an affidavit of police officers who swore only that they had "received reliable information from a credible person and do believe" that narcotics were being illegally stored on the described premises. While recognizing that the constitutional requirement of probable cause can be satisfied by hearsay information, this Court held the [393 U.S. 410, 413] affidavit inadequate for two reasons. First, the application failed to set forth any of the "underlying circumstances" necessary to enable the magistrate independently to judge of the validity of the informant's conclusion that the narcotics were where he said they were. Second, the affiant-officers did not attempt to support their claim that their informant was "`credible' or his information `reliable.'" The Government is, however, quite right in saying that the FBI affidavit in the present case is more ample than that in Aguilar. Not only does it contain a report from an anonymous informant, but it also contains a report of an independent FBI investigation which is said to corroborate the informant's tip. We are, then, required to delineate the manner in which Aguilar's two-pronged test should be applied in these circumstances. </s> In essence, the affidavit, reproduced in full in the Appendix to this opinion, contained the following allegations: 3 </s> 1. The FBI had kept track of Spinelli's movements on five days during the month of August 1965. On four of these occasions, Spinelli was seen crossing one of two bridges leading from Illinois into St. Louis, Missouri, between 11 a. m. and 12:15 p. m. On four of the five days, Spinelli was also seen parking his car in a lot used by residents of an apartment house at 1108 Indian Circle Drive in St. Louis, between 3:30 p. m. and 4:45 p. m. 4 </s> [393 U.S. 410, 414] On one day, Spinelli was followed further and seen to enter a particular apartment in the building. </s> 2. An FBI check with the telephone company revealed that this apartment contained two telephones listed under the name of Grace P. Hagen, and carrying the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136. </s> 3. The application stated that "William Spinelli is known to this affiant and to federal law enforcement agents and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers." </s> 4. Finally, it was stated that the FBI "has been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136." </s> There can be no question that the last item mentioned, detailing the informant's tip, has a fundamental place in this warrant application. Without it, probable cause could not be established. The first two items reflect only innocent-seeming activity and data. Spinelli's travels to and from the apartment building and his entry into a particular apartment on one occasion could hardly be taken as bespeaking gambling activity; and there is surely nothing unusual about an apartment containing two separate telephones. Many a householder indulges himself in this petty luxury. Finally, the allegation that Spinelli was "known" to the affiant and to other federal and local law enforcement officers as a gambler and an associate of gamblers is but a bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 46 (1933). [393 U.S. 410, 415] </s> So much indeed the Government does not deny. Rather, following the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, the Government claims that the informant's tip gives a suspicious color to the FBI's reports detailing Spinelli's innocent-seeming conduct and that, conversely, the FBI's surveillance corroborates the informant's tip, thereby entitling it to more weight. It is true, of course, that the magistrate is obligated to render a judgment based upon a common-sense reading of the entire affidavit. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). We believe, however, that the "totality of circumstances" approach taken by the Court of Appeals paints with too broad a brush. Where, as here, the informer's tip is a necessary element in a finding of probable cause, its proper weight must be determined by a more precise analysis. </s> The informer's report must first be measured against Aguilar's standards so that its probative value can be assessed. If the tip is found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report should then be considered. At this stage as well, however, the standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate's decision. He must ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration? Aguilar is relevant at this stage of the inquiry as well because the tests it establishes were designed to implement the long-standing principle that probable cause must be determined by a "neutral and detached magistrate," and not by "the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). A magistrate cannot be said to have properly discharged his constitutional duty if he relies on an informer's tip which - even [393 U.S. 410, 416] when partially corroborated - is not as reliable as one which passes Aguilar's requirements when standing alone. </s> Applying these principles to the present case, we first consider the weight to be given the informer's tip when it is considered apart from the rest of the affidavit. It is clear that a Commissioner could not credit it without abdicating his constitutional function. Though the affiant swore that his confidant was "reliable," he offered the magistrate no reason in support of this conclusion. Perhaps even more important is the fact that Aguilar's other test has not been satisfied. The tip does not contain a sufficient statement of the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation. We are not told how the FBI's source received his information - it is not alleged that the informant personally observed Spinelli at work or that he had ever placed a bet with him. Moreover, if the informant came by the information indirectly, he did not explain why his sources were reliable. Cf. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965). In the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation. </s> The detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), provides a suitable benchmark. While Hereford, the Government's informer in that case, did not state the way in which he had obtained his information, he reported that Draper had gone to Chicago the day before by train and that he would return to Denver by train with three ounces of heroin on one of two specified mornings. Moreover, [393 U.S. 410, 417] Hereford went on to describe, with minute particularity, the clothes that Draper would be wearing upon his arrival at the Denver station. A magistrate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way. 5 Such an inference cannot be made in the present case. Here, the only facts supplied were that Spinelli was using two specified telephones and that these phones were being used in gambling operations. This meager report could easily have been obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar. </s> Nor do we believe that the patent doubts Aguilar raises as to the report's reliability are adequately resolved by a consideration of the allegations detailing the FBI's independent investigative efforts. At most, these allegations indicated that Spinelli could have used the telephones specified by the informant for some purpose. This cannot by itself be said to support both the inference that the informer was generally trustworthy and that he had made his charge against Spinelli on the basis of information obtained in a reliable way. Once again, Draper provides a relevant comparison. Independent police work in that case corroborated much more than one small detail that had been provided by the informant. There, the police, upon meeting the inbound Denver train on the second morning specified by informer Hereford, saw a man whose dress corresponded precisely to Hereford's detailed description. It was then apparent that the informant had not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth; since the report was of the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been [393 U.S. 410, 418] obtained in a reliable way, it was perfectly clear that probable cause had been established. </s> We conclude, then, that in the present case the informant's tip - even when corroborated to the extent indicated - was not sufficient to provide the basis for a finding of probable cause. This is not to say that the tip was so insubstantial that it could not properly have counted in the magistrate's determination. Rather, it needed some further support. When we look to the other parts of the application, however, we find nothing alleged which would permit the suspicions engendered by the informant's report to ripen into a judgment that a crime was probably being committed. As we have already seen, the allegations detailing the FBI's surveillance of Spinelli and its investigation of the telephone company records contain no suggestion of criminal conduct when taken by themselves - and they are not endowed with an aura of suspicion by virtue of the informer's tip. Nor do we find that the FBI's reports take on a sinister color when read in light of common knowledge that bookmaking is often carried on over the telephone and from premises ostensibly used by others for perfectly normal purposes. Such an argument would carry weight in a situation in which the premises contain an unusual number of telephones or abnormal activity is observed, cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 302 (1967), but it does not fit this case where neither of these factors is present. 6 All that remains to be considered is the flat statement that Spinelli was "known" to the FBI and others as a gambler. But just as a simple assertion of police suspicion is not itself a sufficient basis for a magistrate's finding of probable cause, we do not believe it may be used to give [393 U.S. 410, 419] additional weight to allegations that would otherwise be insufficient. </s> The affidavit, then, falls short of the standards set forth in Aguilar, Draper, and our other decisions that give content to the notion of probable cause. 7 In holding as we have done, we do not retreat from the established propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); that affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967); that in judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions on the use of their common sense, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 -271 (1960). But we cannot sustain this warrant without diluting important safeguards that assure that the judgment of a disinterested judicial officer will interpose itself between the police and the citizenry. 8 </s> [393 U.S. 410, 420] </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. </s> AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANT. </s> I, Robert L. Bender, being duly sworn, depose and say that I am a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and as such am authorized to make searches and seizures. </s> That on August 6, 1965, at approximately 11:44 a. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation driving a 1964 Ford convertible, Missouri license HC3-649, onto the Eastern approach of the Veterans Bridge leading from East St. Louis, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri. </s> That on August 11, 1965, at approximately 11:16 a. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation driving a 1964 Ford convertible, Missouri license HC3-649, onto the Eastern approach of the Eads Bridge leading from East St. Louis, Illinois, to St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, at approximately 11:18 a. m. on August 11, 1965, I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid Ford convertible from the Western approach of the Eads Bridge into St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, at approximately 4:40 p. m. on August 11, 1965, I observed the aforesaid Ford convertible, bearing Missouri license HC3-649, parked in a parking lot used by residents of The Chieftain Manor Apartments, approximately one block east of 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> On August 12, 1965, at approximately 12:07 p. m., [393 U.S. 410, 421] William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation driving the aforesaid 1964 Ford convertible onto the Eastern approach of the Veterans Bridge from East St. Louis, Illinois, in the direction of St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, on August 12, 1965, at approximately 3:46 p. m., I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid 1964 Ford convertible onto the parking lot used by the residents of The Chieftain Manor Apartments approximately one block east of 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> Further, on August 12, 1965, at approximately 3:49 p. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation entering the front entrance of the two-story apartment building located at 1108 Indian Circle Drive, this building being one of The Chieftain Manor Apartments. </s> On August 13, 1965, at approximately 11:08 a. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation driving the aforesaid Ford convertible onto the Eastern approach of the Eads Bridge from East St. Louis, Illinois, heading towards St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, on August 13, 1965, at approximately 11:11 a. m., I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid Ford convertible from the Western approach of the Eads Bridge into St. Louis, Missouri. </s> Further, on August 13, 1965, at approximately 3:45 p. m., I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid 1964 Ford convertible onto the parking area used by residents of The Chieftain Manor Apartments, said parking area being approximately one block from 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> Further, on August 13, 1965, at approximately 3:55 p. m., William Spinelli was observed by an Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation entering the corner apartment located on the second floor in the southwest corner, known as Apartment F, of the two-story [393 U.S. 410, 422] apartment building known and numbered as 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> On August 16, 1965, at approximately 3:22 p. m., I observed William Spinelli driving the aforesaid Ford convertible onto the parking lot used by the residents of The Chieftain Manor Apartments approximately one block east of 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> Further, an Agent of the F. B. I. observed William Spinelli alight from the aforesaid Ford convertible and walk toward the apartment building located at 1108 Indian Circle Drive. </s> The records of the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company reflect that there are two telephones located in the southwest corner apartment on the second floor of the apartment building located at 1108 Indian Circle Drive under the name of Grace P. Hagen. The numbers listed in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Company records for the aforesaid telephones are WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136. </s> William Spinelli is known to this affiant and to federal law enforcement agents and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers. </s> The Federal Bureau of Investigation has been informed by a confidential reliable informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136. </s> /s/ Robert L. Bender, Robert L. Bender, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation. </s> Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of August, 1965, at St. Louis, Missouri. </s> /s/ William R. O'Toole. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The relevant portion of the statute reads: </s> "(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in interstate . . . commerce . . . with intent to - </s> . . . . . </s> "(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on . . . any unlawful activity, and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. </s> "(b) As used in this section `unlawful activity' means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling . . . in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 We agree with the Court of Appeals that Spinelli has standing to raise his Fourth Amendment claim. The issue arises because at the time the FBI searched the apartment in which Spinelli was alleged to be conducting his bookmaking operation, the petitioner was not on the premises. Instead, the agents did not execute their search warrant until Spinelli was seen to leave the apartment, lock the door, and enter the hallway. At that point, petitioner was arrested, the key to the apartment was demanded of him, and the search commenced. Since petitioner would plainly have standing if he had been arrested inside the apartment, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960), it cannot matter that the agents preferred to delay the arrest until petitioner stepped into the hallway - especially when the FBI only managed to gain entry into the apartment by requiring petitioner to surrender his key. </s> [Footnote 3 It is, of course, of no consequence that the agents might have had additional information which could have been given to the Commissioner. "It is elementary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought to the magistrate's attention." Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 109 , n. 1 (emphasis in original). Since the Government does not argue that whatever additional information the agents may have possessed was sufficient to provide probable cause for the arrest, thereby justifying the resultant search as well, we need not consider that question. </s> [Footnote 4 No report was made as to Spinelli's movements during the period between his arrival in St. Louis at noon and his arrival at the parking [393 U.S. 410, 414] lot in the late afternoon. In fact, the evidence at trial indicated that Spinelli frequented the offices of his stockbroker during this period. </s> [Footnote 5 While Draper involved the question whether the police had probable cause for an arrest without a warrant, the analysis required for an answer to this question is basically similar to that demanded of a magistrate when he considers whether a search warrant should issue. </s> [Footnote 6 A box containing three uninstalled telephones was found in the apartment, but only after execution of the search warrant. </s> [Footnote 7 In those cases in which this Court has found probable cause established, the showing made was much more substantial than the one made here. Thus, in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 104 (1965), FBI agents observed repeated deliveries of loads of sugar in 60-pound bags, smelled the odor of fermenting mash, and heard "`sounds similar to that of a motor or a pump coming from the direction of' Ventresca's house." Again, in McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303 -304 (1967), the informant reported that McCray "`was selling narcotics and had narcotics on his person now in the vicinity of 47th and Calumet.'" When the police arrived at the intersection, they observed McCray engaging in various suspicious activities. 386 U.S., at 302 . </s> [Footnote 8 In the view we have taken of this case, it becomes unnecessary to decide whether the search warrant was properly executed, or whether it sufficiently described the things that were seized. [393 U.S. 410, 423] </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. </s> An investigator's affidavit that he has seen gambling equipment being moved into a house at a specified address will support the issuance of a search warrant. The oath affirms the honesty of the statement and negatives the lie or imagination. Personal observation attests to the facts asserted - that there is gambling equipment on the premises at the named address. </s> But if the officer simply avers, without more, that there is gambling paraphernalia on certain premises, the warrant should not issue, even though the belief of the officer is an honest one, as evidenced by his oath, and even though the magistrate knows him to be an experienced, intelligent officer who has been reliable in the past. This much was settled in Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933), where the Court held insufficient an officer's affidavit swearing he had cause to believe that there was illegal liquor on the premises for which the warrant was sought. The unsupported assertion or belief of the officer does not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269 (1960); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29 (1927). </s> What is missing in Nathanson and like cases is a statement of the basis for the affiant's believing the facts contained in the affidavit - the good "cause" which the officer in Nathanson said he had. If an officer swears that there is gambling equipment at a certain address, the possibilities are (1) that he has seen the equipment; (2) that he has observed or perceived facts from which the presence of the equipment may reasonably be inferred; and (3) that he has obtained the information from someone else. If (1) is true, the affidavit is good. But in (2), the affidavit is insufficient unless the perceived facts are given, for it is the magistrate, not the [393 U.S. 410, 424] officer, who is to judge the existence of probable cause. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). With respect to (3), where the officer's information is hearsay, no warrant should issue absent good cause for crediting that hearsay. Because an affidavit asserting, without more, the location of gambling equipment at a particular address does not claim personal observation of any of the facts by the officer, and because of the likelihood that the information came from an unidentified third party, affidavits of this type are unacceptable. </s> Neither should the warrant issue if the officer states that there is gambling equipment in a particular apartment and that his information comes from an informant, named or unnamed, since the honesty of the informant and the basis for his report are unknown. Nor would the missing elements be completely supplied by the officer's oath that the informant has often furnished reliable information in the past. This attests to the honesty of the informant, but Aguilar v. Texas, supra, requires something more - did the information come from observation, or did the informant in turn receive it from another? Absent additional facts for believing the informant's report, his assertion stands no better than the oath of the officer to the same effect. Indeed, if the affidavit of an officer, known by the magistrate to be honest and experienced, stating that gambling equipment is located in a certain building is unacceptable, it would be quixotic if a similar statement from an honest informant were found to furnish probable cause. A strong argument can be made that both should be acceptable under the Fourth Amendment, but under our cases neither is. The past reliability of the informant can no more furnish probable cause for believing his [393 U.S. 410, 425] current report than can previous experience with the officer himself. </s> If the affidavit rests on hearsay - an informant's report - what is necessary under Aguilar is one of two things: the informant must declare either (1) that he has himself seen or perceived the fact or facts asserted; or (2) that his information is hearsay, but there is good reason for believing it - perhaps one of the usual grounds for crediting hearsay information. The first presents few problems: since the report, although hearsay, purports to be first-hand observation, remaining doubt centers on the honesty of the informant, and that worry is dissipated by the officer's previous experience with the informant. The other basis for accepting the informant's report is more complicated. But if, for example, the informer's hearsay comes from one of the actors in the crime in the nature of admission against interest, the affidavit giving this information should be held sufficient. </s> I am inclined to agree with the majority that there are limited special circumstances in which an "honest" informant's report, if sufficiently detailed, will in effect verify itself - that is, the magistrate when confronted with such detail could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way. See ante, at 417. Detailed information may sometimes imply that the informant himself has observed the facts. Suppose an informant with whom an officer has had satisfactory experience states that there is gambling equipment in the living room of a specified apartment and describes in detail not only the equipment itself but also the appointments and furnishings in the apartment. Detail like this, if true at all, must rest on personal observation either of the informant or of someone else. If the latter, we know nothing of the third person's honesty or [393 U.S. 410, 426] sources; he may be making a wholly false report. But it is arguable that on these facts it was the informant himself who has perceived the facts, for the information reported is not usually the subject of casual, day-to-day conversation. Because the informant is honest and it is probable that he has viewed the facts, there is probable cause for the issuance of a warrant. </s> So too in the special circumstances of Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), the kind of information related by the informant is not generally sent ahead of a person's arrival in a city except to those who are intimately connected with making careful arrangements for meeting him. The informant, posited as honest, somehow had the reported facts, very likely from one of the actors in the plan, or as one of them himself. The majority's suggestion is that a warrant could have been obtained based only on the informer's report. I am inclined to agree, although it seems quite plain that if it may be so easily inferred from the affidavit that the informant has himself observed the facts or has them from an actor in the event, no possible harm could come from requiring a statement to that effect, thereby removing the difficult and recurring questions which arise in such situations. </s> Of course, Draper itself did not proceed on this basis. Instead, the Court pointed out that when the officer saw a person getting off the train at the specified time, dressed and conducting himself precisely as the informant had predicted, all but the critical fact with respect to possessing narcotics had then been verified and for that reason the officer had "reasonable grounds" to believe also that Draper was carrying narcotics. Unquestionably, verification of arrival time, dress, and gait reinforced the honesty of the informant - he had not reported a made-up story. But if what Draper stands for is that the existence of the tenth and critical fact [393 U.S. 410, 427] is made sufficiently probable to justify the issuance of a warrant by verifying nine other facts coming from the same source, I have my doubts about that case. </s> In the first place, the proposition is not that the tenth fact may be logically inferred from the other nine or that the tenth fact is usually found in conjunction with the other nine. No one would suggest that just anyone getting off the 10:30 train dressed as Draper was, with a brisk walk and carrying a zipper bag, should be arrested for carrying narcotics. The thrust of Draper is not that the verified facts have independent significance with respect to proof of the tenth. The argument instead relates to the reliability of the source: because an informant is right about some things, he is more probably right about other facts, usually the critical, unverified facts. </s> But the Court's cases have already rejected for Fourth Amendment purposes the notion that the past reliability of an officer is sufficient reason for believing his current assertions. Nor would it suffice, I suppose, if a reliable informant states there is gambling equipment in Apartment 607 and then proceeds to describe in detail Apartment 201, a description which is verified before applying for the warrant. He was right about 201, but that hardly makes him more believable about the equipment in 607. But what if he states that there are narcotics locked in a safe in Apartment 300, which is described in detail, and the apartment manager verifies everything but the contents of the safe? I doubt that the report about the narcotics is made appreciably more believable by the verification. The informant could still have gotten his information concerning the safe from others about whom nothing is known or could have inferred the presence of narcotics from circumstances which a magistrate would find unacceptable. </s> The tension between Draper and the Nathanson-Aguilar line of cases is evident from the course followed [393 U.S. 410, 428] by the majority opinion. First, it is held that the report from a reliable informant that Spinelli is using two telephones with specified numbers to conduct a gambling business plus Spinelli's reputation in police circles as a gambler does not add up to probable cause. This is wholly consistent with Aguilar and Nathanson: the informant did not reveal whether he had personally observed the facts or heard them from another and, if the latter, no basis for crediting the hearsay was presented. Nor were the facts, as MR. JUSTICE HARLAN says, of such a nature that they normally would be obtainable only by the personal observation of the informant himself. The police, however, did not stop with the informant's report. Independently, they established the existence of two phones having the given numbers and located them in an apartment house which Spinelli was regularly frequenting away from his home. There remained little question but that Spinelli was using the phones, and it was a fair inference that the use was not for domestic but for business purposes. The informant had claimed the business involved gambling. Since his specific information about Spinelli using two phones with particular numbers had been verified, did not his allegation about gambling thereby become sufficiently more believable if the Draper principle is to be given any scope at all? I would think so, particularly since the information from the informant which was verified was not neutral, irrelevant information but was material to proving the gambling allegation: two phones with different numbers in an apartment used away from home indicates a business use in an operation, like bookmaking, where multiple phones are needed. The Draper approach would reasonably justify the issuance of a warrant in this case, particularly since the police had some awareness of Spinelli's past activities. The majority, however, [393 U.S. 410, 429] while seemingly embracing Draper, confines that case to its own facts. Pending full-scale reconsideration of that case, on the one hand, or of the Nathanson-Aguilar cases on the other, I join the opinion of the Court and the judgment of reversal, especially since a vote to affirm would produce an equally divided Court. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. </s> In my view, this Court's decision in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), was bad enough. That decision went very far toward elevating the magistrate's hearing for issuance of a search warrant to a full-fledged trial, where witnesses must be brought forward to attest personally to all the facts alleged. But not content with this, the Court today expands Aguilar to almost unbelievable proportions. Of course, it would strengthen the probable-cause presentation if eyewitnesses could testify that they saw the defendant commit the crime. It would be stronger still if these witnesses could explain in detail the nature of the sensual perceptions on which they based their "conclusion" that the person they had seen was the defendant and that he was responsible for the events they observed. Nothing in our Constitution, however, requires that the facts be established with that degree of certainty and with such elaborate specificity before a policeman can be authorized by a disinterested magistrate to conduct a carefully limited search. </s> The Fourth Amendment provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In this case a search warrant was issued supported by an oath and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The supporting oath was [393 U.S. 410, 430] three printed pages and the full text of it is included in an Appendix to the Court's opinion. The magistrate, I think properly, held the information set forth sufficient facts to show "probable cause" that the defendant was violating the law. Six members of the Court of Appeals also agreed that the affidavit was sufficient to show probable cause. A majority of this Court today holds, however, that the magistrate and all of these judges were wrong. In doing so, they substitute their own opinion for that of the local magistrate and the circuit judges, and reject the en banc factual conclusion of the Eighth Circuit and reverse the judgment based upon that factual conclusion. I cannot join in any such disposition of an issue so vital to the administration of justice, and dissent as vigorously as I can. </s> I repeat my belief that the affidavit given the magistrate was more than ample to show probable cause of the petitioner's guilt. The affidavit meticulously set out facts sufficient to show the following: </s> 1. The petitioner had been shown going to and coming from a room in an apartment which contained two telephones listed under the name of another person. Nothing in the record indicates that the apartment was of that large and luxurious type which could only be occupied by a person to whom it would be a "petty luxury" to have two separate telephones, with different numbers, both listed under the name of a person who did not live there. </s> 2. The petitioner's car had been observed parked in the apartment's parking lot. This fact was, of course, highly relevant in showing that the petitioner was extremely interested in some enterprise which was located in the apartment. </s> 3. The FBI had been informed by a reliable informant that the petitioner was accepting wagering information by telephones - the particular telephones located in the [393 U.S. 410, 431] apartment the defendant had been repeatedly visiting. Unless the Court, going beyond the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, wishes to require magistrates to hold trials before issuing warrants, it is not necessary - as the Court holds - to have the affiant explain "the underlying circumstances from which the informer concluded that Spinelli was running a bookmaking operation." Ante, at 416. </s> 4. The petitioner was known by federal and local law enforcement agents as a bookmaker and an associate of gamblers. I cannot agree with the Court that this knowledge was only a "bald and unilluminating assertion of suspicion that is entitled to no weight in appraising the magistrate's decision." Ante, at 414. Although the statement is hearsay that might not be admissible in a regular trial, everyone knows, unless he shuts his eyes to the realities of life, that this is a relevant fact which, together with other circumstances, might indicate a factual probability that gambling is taking place. </s> The foregoing facts should be enough to constitute probable cause for anyone who does not believe that the only way to obtain a search warrant is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty. Even Aguilar, on which the Court relies, cannot support the contrary result, at least as that decision was written before today's massive escalation of it. In Aguilar the Court dealt with an affidavit that stated only: </s> "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin . . . and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law." 378 U.S., at 109 . </s> The Court held, over the dissent of Mr. Justice Clark, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and myself, that this unsupported conclusion of an unidentified informant provided no basis [393 U.S. 410, 432] for the magistrate to make an independent judgment as to the persuasiveness of the facts relied upon to show probable cause. Here, of course, we have much more, and the Court in Aguilar was careful to point out that additional information of the kind presented in the affidavit before us now would be highly relevant: </s> "If the fact and results of such a surveillance had been appropriately presented to the magistrate, this would, of course, present an entirely different case." 378 U.S., at 109 , n. 1. </s> In the present case even the two-judge minority of the court below recognized, as this Court seems to recognize today, that this additional information took the case beyond the rule of Aguilar. Six of the other circuit judges disagreed with the two dissenting judges, finding that all the circumstances considered together could support a reasonable judgment that gambling probably was taking place. I fully agree with this carefully considered opinion of the court below. </s> I regret to say I consider today's decision an indefensible departure from the principles of our former cases. Less than four years ago we reaffirmed these principles in United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965): </s> "If the teachings of the Court's cases are to be followed and the constitutional policy served, affidavits for search warrants . . . must be tested and interpreted by magistrates and courts in a commonsense and realistic fashion. . . . Technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings have no proper place in this area." </s> See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 700 -701 (1931). </s> Departures of this kind are responsible for considerable uneasiness in our lower courts, and I must say I [393 U.S. 410, 433] am deeply troubled by the statements of Judge Gibson in the court below: </s> "I am, indeed, disturbed by decision after decision of our courts which place increasingly technical burdens upon law enforcement officials. I am disturbed by these decisions that appear to relentlessly chip away at the ever narrowing area of effective police operation. I believe the holdings in Aguilar, and Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) are sufficient to protect the privacy of individuals from hastily conceived intrusions, and I do not think the limitations and requirements on the issuance of search warrants should be expanded by setting up over-technical requirements approaching the now discarded pitfalls of common law pleadings. Moreover, if we become increasingly technical and rigid in our demands upon police officers, I fear we make it increasingly easy for criminals to operate, detected but unpunished. I feel the significant movement of the law beyond its present state is unwarranted, unneeded, and dangerous to law enforcement efficiency." (Dissenting from panel opinion.) </s> The Court of Appeals in this case took a sensible view of the Fourth Amendment, and I would wholeheartedly affirm its decision. </s> Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , decided in 1961, held for the first time that the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) are now applicable to the States. That Amendment provides that search warrants shall not be issued without probable cause. The existence of probable cause is a factual matter that calls for the determination of a factual question. While no statistics are immediately available, questions of probable cause to issue search [393 U.S. 410, 434] warrants and to make arrests are doubtless involved in many thousands of cases in state courts. All of those probable-cause state cases are now potentially reviewable by this Court. It is, of course, physically impossible for this Court to review the evidence in all or even a substantial percentage of those cases. Consequently, whether desirable or not, we must inevitably accept most of the fact findings of the state courts, particularly when, as here in a federal case, both the trial and appellate courts have decided the facts the same way. It cannot be said that the trial judge and six members of the Court of Appeals committed flagrant error in finding from evidence that the magistrate had probable cause to issue the search warrant here. It seems to me that this Court would best serve itself and the administration of justice by accepting the judgment of the two courts below. After all, they too are lawyers and judges, and much closer to the practical, everyday affairs of life than we are. </s> Notwithstanding the Court's belief to the contrary, I think that in holding as it does, the Court does: </s> "retreat from the established propositions that only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause, Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); that affidavits of probable cause are tested by much less rigorous standards than those governing the admissibility of evidence at trial, McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967); that in judging probable cause issuing magistrates are not to be confined by niggardly limitations or by restrictions on the use of their common sense, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965); and that their determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 -271 (1960)." Ante, at 419. [393 U.S. 410, 435] </s> In fact, I believe the Court is moving rapidly, through complex analyses and obfuscatory language, toward the holding that no magistrate can issue a warrant unless according to some unknown standard of proof he can be persuaded that the suspect defendant is actually guilty of a crime. I would affirm this conviction. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, dissenting. </s> My Brother HARLAN's opinion for the Court is animated by a conviction which I share that "[t]he security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police - which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment - is basic to a free society." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). </s> We may well insist upon a sympathetic and even an indulgent view of the latitude which must be accorded to the police for performance of their vital task; but only a foolish or careless people will deduce from this that the public welfare requires or permits the police to disregard the restraints on their actions which historic struggles for freedom have developed for the protection of liberty and dignity of citizens against arbitrary state power. </s> As Justice Jackson (dissenting) stated in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 -181 (1949): </s> "[The provisions of the Fourth Amendment] are not mere second-class rights but belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know that the [393 U.S. 410, 436] human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and seizure by the police." </s> History 1 teaches us that this protection requires that the judgment of a judicial officer be interposed between the police, hot in pursuit of their appointed target, and the citizen; 2 that the judicial officer must judge and not merely rubber-stamp; and that his judgment must be based upon judicially reliable facts adequate to demonstrate that the search is justified by the probability that it will yield the fruits or instruments of crime - or, as this Court has only recently ruled, tangible evidence of its commission. 3 The exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant have always been narrowly restricted 4 because of this Court's long-standing awareness of the fundamental role of the magistrate's judgment in the preservation of a proper balance between individual freedom and state power. See Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 700 (1948). </s> Today's decision deals, not with the necessity of obtaining a warrant prior to search, but with the difficult problem of the nature of the showing that must be made [393 U.S. 410, 437] before the magistrate to justify his issuance of a search warrant. While I do not subscribe to the criticism of the majority expressed by my Brother BLACK in dissent, I believe - with all respect - that the majority is in error in holding that the affidavit supporting the warrant in this case is constitutionally inadequate. </s> The affidavit is unusually long and detailed. In fact, it recites so many minute and detailed facts developed in the course of the investigation of Spinelli that its substance is somewhat obscured. It is paradoxical that this very fullness of the affidavit may be the source of the constitutional infirmity that the majority finds. Stated in language more direct and less circumstantial than that used by the FBI agent who executed the affidavit, it sets forth that the FBI has been informed that Spinelli is accepting wagers by means of telephones numbered WY 4-0029 and WY 4-0136; that Spinelli is known to the affiant agent and to law enforcement agencies as a bookmaker; that telephones numbered WY 4-0029 and WY 4-0136 are located in a certain apartment; that Spinelli was placed under surveillance and his observed movements were such as to show his use of that apartment and to indicate that he frequented the apartment on a regular basis. </s> Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), holds that the reference in an affidavit to information described only as received from "a confidential reliable informant," standing alone, is not an adequate basis for issuance of a search warrant. The majority agrees that the "FBI affidavit in the present case is more ample than that in Aguilar," but concludes that it is nevertheless constitutionally inadequate. The majority states that the present affidavit fails to meet the "two-pronged test" of Aguilar because (a) it does not set forth the basis for the assertion that the informer is "reliable" and (b) it fails to state the "underlying circumstances" upon which the [393 U.S. 410, 438] informant based his conclusion that Spinelli was engaged in bookmaking. </s> The majority acknowledges, however, that its reference to a "two-pronged test" should not be understood as meaning that an affidavit deficient in these respects is necessarily inadequate to support a search warrant. Other facts and circumstances may be attested which will supply the evidence of probable cause needed to support the search warrant. On this general statement we are agreed. Our difference is that I believe such facts and circumstances are present in this case, and the majority arrives at the opposite conclusion. </s> Aguilar expressly recognized that if, in that case, the affidavit's conclusory report of the informant's story had been supplemented by "the fact and results of . . . a surveillance . . . this would, of course, present an entirely different case." 378 U.S., at 109 , n. 1. In the present case, as I view it, the affidavit showed not only relevant surveillance, entitled to some probative weight for purposes of the issuance of a search warrant, but also additional, specific facts of significance and adequate reliability: that Spinelli was using two telephone numbers, identified by an "informant" as being used for bookmaking, in his illegal operations; that these telephones were in an identified apartment; and that Spinelli, a known bookmaker, 5 frequented the apartment. Certainly, this is enough. </s> A policeman's affidavit should not be judged as an entry in an essay contest. It is not "abracadabra." 6 </s> [393 U.S. 410, 439] As the majority recognizes, a policeman's affidavit is entitled to common-sense evaluation. So viewed, I conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit should be affirmed. </s> [Footnote 1 "The knock at the door, whether by day or by night, as a prelude to a search, without authority of law but solely on the authority of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of English-speaking peoples." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949). See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 -70 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See generally with respect to the history of the Fourth Amendment N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (1937). </s> [Footnote 2 See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 -14 (1948). </s> [Footnote 3 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). </s> [Footnote 4 See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 311 (1967) (concurring opinion). </s> [Footnote 5 Although Spinelli's reputation standing alone would not, of course, justify the search, this Court has held that such a reputation may make the informer's report "much less subject to scepticism than would be such a charge against one without such a history." Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960). </s> [Footnote 6 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 418 (1967) (dissent) (relating to jury instructions). </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting. </s> For substantially the reasons stated by my Brothers BLACK and FORTAS, I believe the warrant in this case was supported by a sufficient showing of probable cause. I would therefore affirm the judgment. </s> [393 U.S. 410, 440]

United States Supreme Court BOYNTON v. VIRGINIA(1960) No. 7 Argued: October 12, 1960Decided: December 5, 1960 </s> For refusing to leave the section reserved for white people in a restaurant in a bus terminal, petitioner, a Negro interstate bus passenger, was convicted in Virginia courts of violating a state statute making it a misdemeanor for any person "without authority of law" to remain upon the premises of another after having been forbidden to do so. On appeal, he contended that his conviction violated the Interstate Commerce Act and the Equal Protection, Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution; but his conviction was sustained by the State Supreme Court. On petition for certiorari to this Court, he raised only the constitutional questions. Held: </s> 1. Notwithstanding the fact that the petition for certiorari presented only the constitutional questions, this Court will consider the statutory issue, which involves essentially the same problem - racial discrimination in interstate commerce. P. 457. </s> 2. Under 216 (d) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which forbids any interstate common carrier by motor vehicle to subject any person to unjust discrimination, petitioner had a federal right to remain in the white portion of the restaurant, he was there "under authority of law," and it was error to affirm his conviction. Pp. 457-463. </s> (a) When a bus carrier has volunteered to make terminal and restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers as a regular part of their transportation, and the terminal and restaurant have acquiesced and cooperated in this undertaking, the terminal and restaurant must perform these services without discriminations prohibited by the Act. Pp. 457-461. </s> (b) Although the courts below made no findings of fact, the evidence in this case shows such a situation here. Pp. 461-463. </s> Reversed. </s> Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Martin A. Martin, Clarence W. Newsome, Jack Greenberg, Louis H. Pollak and Constance Baker Motley. [364 U.S. 454, 455] </s> Walter E. Rogers, Special Assistant to the Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were A. S. Harrison, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and R. D. McIlwaine III, Assistant Attorney General. </s> Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Tyler, Philip Elman, Harold H. Greene and David Rubin filed a brief for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The basic question presented in this case is whether an interstate bus passenger is denied a federal statutory or constitutional right when a restaurant in a bus terminal used by the carrier along its route discriminates in serving food to the passenger solely because of his color. </s> Petitioner, a Negro law student, bought a Trailways bus ticket from Washington, D.C., to Montgomery, Alabama. He boarded a bus at 8 p. m. which arrived at Richmond, Virginia, about 10:40 p. m. When the bus pulled up at the Richmond "Trailways Bus Terminal" the bus driver announced a forty-minute stopover there. Petitioner got off the bus and went into the bus terminal to get something to eat. In the station he found a restaurant in which one part was used to serve white people and one to serve Negroes. Disregarding this division, petitioner sat down on a stool in the white section. A waitress asked him to move over to the other section where there were "facilities" to serve colored people. Petitioner told her he was an interstate bus passenger, refused to move and ordered a sandwich and tea. The waitress then brought the Assistant Manager, who "instructed" petitioner to "leave the white portion of the restaurant and advised him he could be served in the colored portion." Upon petitioner's refusal to leave an officer was called and petitioner was arrested and later tried, convicted and [364 U.S. 454, 456] fined ten dollars in the Police Justice's Court of Richmond on a charge that he "Unlawfully did remain on the premises of the Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, Inc. after having been forbidden to do so" by the Assistant Manager. (Emphasis supplied.) The charge was based on 18-225 of the Code of Virginia of 1950, as amended (1958), which provides in part: </s> "If any person shall without authority of law go upon or remain upon the lands or premises of another, after having been forbidden to do so by the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in charge of such land, . . . he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by confinement in jail not exceeding thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Hustings Court of Richmond, where, as in the Police Court, he admitted that he had remained in the white portion of the Terminal Restaurant although ordered not to do so. His defense in both courts was that he had a federal right as an interstate passenger of Trailways to be served without discrimination by this restaurant used by the bus carrier for the accommodation of its interstate passengers. On this basis petitioner claimed he was on the restaurant premises lawfully, not "unlawfully" as charged, and that he remained there with, not "without authority of law." His federal claim to this effect was spelled out in a motion to dismiss the warrant in Hustings Court, which was overruled both before and after the evidence was heard. Pointing out that the restaurant was an integral part of the bus service for interstate passengers such as petitioner, and asserting that refusal to serve him was a discrimination based on color, the motion to dismiss charged [364 U.S. 454, 457] that application of the Virginia law to petitioner violated the Interstate Commerce Act and the Equal Protection, Due Process and Commerce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. On appeal the Virginia Supreme Court held that the conviction was "plainly right" and affirmed without opinion, thereby rejecting petitioner's assignments of error based on the same grounds of discrimination set out in his motion to dismiss in Hustings Court but not specifically charging that the discrimination violated the Interstate Commerce Act. We think, however, that the claims of discrimination previously made under the Act are sufficiently closely related to the assignments that were made to be considered within the scope of the issues presented to the State Supreme Court. We granted certiorari because of the serious federal questions raised concerning discrimination based on color. 361 U.S. 958 . </s> The petition for certiorari we granted presented only two questions: first, whether the conviction of petitioner is invalid as a burden on commerce in violation of Art. I, 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution; and second, whether the conviction violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ordinarily we limit our review to the questions presented in an application for certiorari. We think there are persuasive reasons, however, why this case should be decided, if it can, on the Interstate Commerce Act contention raised in the Virginia courts. Discrimination because of color is the core of the two broad constitutional questions presented to us by petitioner, just as it is the core of the Interstate Commerce Act question presented to the Virginia courts. Under these circumstances we think it appropriate not to reach the constitutional questions but to proceed at once to the statutory issue. </s> The Interstate Commerce Act, as we have said, uses language of the broadest type to bar discriminations of all kinds. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., [364 U.S. 454, 458] 333 U.S. 169, 175 , and cases cited. We have held that the Act forbids railroad dining cars to discriminate in service to passengers on account of their color. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 ; see also Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80, 97 . </s> Section 216 (d) of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 316 (d), which applies to motor carriers, provides in part: </s> "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier by motor vehicle engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person . . . in any respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular person . . . to any unjust discrimination or any unjust or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever . . . ." </s> So far as relevant to our problem, the provisions of 216 (d) quoted are the same as those in 3 (1) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 3 (1), except that the latter refers to railroads as defined in Part I of the Act instead of motor carriers as defined in Part II. Section 3 (1) was the basis for this Court's holding in Henderson v. United States, supra, that it was an "undue or unreasonable prejudice" under that section for a railroad to divide its dining car by curtains, partitions and signs in order to separate passengers according to race. The Court said that under 3 (1) "[w]here a dining car is available to passengers holding tickets entitling them to use it, each such passenger is equally entitled to its facilities in accordance with reasonable regulations." Id., 339 U.S., at 824 . The Henderson case largely rested on Mitchell v. United States, supra, which pointed out that while the railroads might not be required by law to furnish dining car facilities, yet if they did, substantial equality of treatment of persons traveling [364 U.S. 454, 459] under like conditions could not be refused consistently with 3 (1). It is also of relevance that both cases upset Interstate Commerce Commission holdings, the Court stating in Mitchell that since the "discrimination shown was palpably unjust and forbidden by the Act" no room was left for administrative or expert judgment with reference to practical difficulties. Id., 313 U.S., at 97 . </s> It follows from the Mitchell and Henderson cases as a matter of course that should buses in transit decide to supply dining service, discrimination of the kind shown here would violate 216 (d). Cf. Williams v. Carolina Coach Co., 111 F. Supp. 329, aff'd, 207 F.2d 408, and Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 64 M. C. C. 769. Although this Court has not decided whether the same result would follow from a similar discrimination in service by a restaurant in a railroad or bus terminal, we have no doubt that the reasoning underlying the Mitchell and Henderson cases would compel the same decision as to the unlawfulness of discrimination in transportation services against interstate passengers in terminals and terminal restaurants owned or operated or controlled by interstate carriers. This is true as to railroad terminals because they are expressly made carriers by 1 (3) (a) of the Act, 1 49 U.S.C. 1 (3) (a), and as to bus terminals because 203 (a) (19) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 303 (a) (19), specifically includes interstate transportation facilities and property operated or controlled by a [364 U.S. 454, 460] motor carrier within the definition of the "services" and "transportation" to which the motor carrier provisions of the Act apply. 2 </s> Respondent correctly points out, however, that, whatever may be the facts, the evidence in this record does not show that the bus company owns or actively operates or directly controls the bus terminal or the restaurant in it. But the fact that 203 (a) (19) says that the protections of the motor carrier provisions of the Act extend to "include" facilities so operated or controlled by no means should be interpreted to exempt motor carriers from their statutory duty under 216 (d) not to discriminate should they choose to provide their interstate passengers with services that are an integral part of transportation through the use of facilities they neither own, control nor operate. The protections afforded by the Act against discriminatory transportation services are not so narrowly limited. We have held that a railroad cannot escape its statutory duty to treat its shippers alike either by use of facilities it does not own or by contractual arrangement with the owner of those facilities. United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., supra. And so here, without regard to contracts, if the bus carrier has volunteered to make terminal and restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers as a regular part of their transportation, and the terminal and restaurant have acquiesced and cooperated in this undertaking, the terminal and restaurant must perform these services without discriminations prohibited by the Act. In the performance of these services [364 U.S. 454, 461] under such conditions the terminal and restaurant stand in the place of the bus company in the performance of its transportation obligations. Cf. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F.2d 922, 925-926, cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 . Although the courts below made no findings of fact, we think the evidence in this case shows such a relationship and situation here. </s> The manager of the restaurant testified that it was not affiliated in any way with the Trailways Bus Company and that the bus company had no control over the operation of the restaurant, but that while the restaurant had "quite a bit of business" from local people, it was primarily or partly for the service of the passengers on the Trailways bus. This last statement was perhaps much of an understatement, as shown by the lease agreement executed in writing and signed both by the "Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc.," as lessor, and the "Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, Inc.," as lessee. The first part of the document showed that Trailways Terminal was then constructing a "bus station" with built-in facilities "for the operation of a restaurant, soda fountain, and news stand." Terminal covenanted to lease this space to Restaurant for its use; to grant Restaurant the exclusive right to sell foods and other things usually sold in restaurants, newsstands, soda fountains and lunch counters; to keep the terminal building in good repair and to furnish certain utilities. Restaurant on its part agreed to use its space for the sale of commodities agreed on at prices that are "just and reasonable"; to sell no commodities not usually sold or installed in a bus terminal concession without Terminal's permission; to discontinue the sale of any commodity objectionable to Terminal; to buy, maintain, and replace equipment subject to Terminal's approval in writing as to its quality; to make alterations and additions only after Terminal's written consent and approval; to make no "sales on buses [364 U.S. 454, 462] operating in and out said bus station" but only "through the windows of said buses"; to keep its employees neat and clean; to perform no terminal service other than that pertaining to the operation of its restaurant as agreed on; and that neither Restaurant nor its employees were to "sell transportation of any kind or give information pertaining to schedules, rates or transportation matters, but shall refer all such inquiries to the proper agents of" Terminal. In short, as Terminal and Restaurant agreed, "the operation of the restaurant and the said stands shall be in keeping with the character of service maintained in an up-to-date, modern bus terminal." </s> All of these things show that this terminal building, with its grounds, constituted one project for a single purpose, and that was to serve passengers of one or more bus companies - certainly Trailways' passengers. The restaurant area was specifically designed and built into the structure from the beginning to fill the needs of bus passengers in this "up-to-date, modern bus terminal." Whoever may have had technical title or immediate control of the details of the various activities in the terminal, such as waiting-room seating, furnishing of schedule information, ticket sales, and restaurant service, they were all geared to the service of bus companies and their passengers, even though local people who might happen to come into the terminal or its restaurant might also be accommodated. Thus we have a well-coordinated and smoothly functioning plan for continuous cooperative transportation services between the terminal, the restaurant and buses like Trailways that made stopovers there. All of this evidence plus Trailways' use on this occasion shows that Trailways was not utilizing the terminal and restaurant services merely on a sporadic or occasional basis. This bus terminal plainly was just as essential and necessary, and as available for that matter, to passengers and carriers like Trailways that used it, as though such carriers [364 U.S. 454, 463] had legal title and complete control over all of its activities. 3 Interstate passengers have to eat, and the very terms of the lease of the built-in restaurant space in this terminal constitute a recognition of the essential need of interstate passengers to be able to get food conveniently on their journey and an undertaking by the restaurant to fulfill that need. Such passengers in transit on a paid interstate Trailways journey had a right to expect that this essential 4 transportation food service voluntarily provided for them under such circumstances would be rendered without discrimination prohibited by the Interstate Commerce Act. Under the circumstances of this case, therefore, petitioner had a federal right to remain in the white portion of the restaurant. He was there under "authority of law" - the Interstate Commerce Act - and it was error for the Supreme Court of Virginia to affirm his conviction. </s> Because of some of the arguments made here it is necessary to say a word about what we are not deciding. We are not holding that every time a bus stops at a wholly independent roadside restaurant the Interstate Commerce Act requires that restaurant service be supplied in harmony with the provisions of that Act. We decide only this case, on its facts, where circumstances show that the terminal and restaurant operate as an integral part of the [364 U.S. 454, 464] bus carrier's transportation service for interstate passengers. Under such circumstances, an interstate passenger need not inquire into documents of title or contractual arrangements in order to determine whether he has a right to be served without discrimination. </s> The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia is reversed and the cause is remanded to that Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co., 297 I. C. C. 335, 347-348, in which the Interstate Commerce Commission held that a railroad terminal discriminates in violation of 3 (1) if it maintains waiting rooms for the exclusive use of Negroes. The Commission regarded assignment to accommodations or facilities in a railroad terminal solely on the basis of race as an implication of inherent inferiority and found it to be unreasonable. </s> [Footnote 2 "The `services' and `transportation' to which this chapter applies include all vehicles operated by, for, or in the interest of any motor carrier irrespective of ownership or of contract, express or implied, together with all facilities and property operated or controlled by any such carrier or carriers, and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce or in the performance of any service in connection therewith." </s> [Footnote 3 Cf. Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. Co., 135 I. C. C. 633, 634-635, in which the Commission held that railroad-owned hotels and restaurants used for railroad passengers and employees, and as an incident to the operation and management of the railroad, should be accorded a common-carrier classification. </s> [Footnote 4 Because the evidence shows that this terminal restaurant was utilized as an integral part of the transportation of interstate passengers, we need not decide whether discrimination on the basis of color by a bus terminal lessee restaurant would violate 216 (d) in the absence of such circumstances. Cf. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. St. Louis-S. F. R. Co., supra, at 343-344. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, with whom MR. JUSTICE CLARK joins, dissenting. </s> Neither in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia nor in his petition for certiorari or in his brief on the merits in this Court did petitioner challenge the judgment on the ground that it was obtained in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. I therefore respectfully submit that, under our rules and decisions, no such question is presented or open for consideration here. 1 But even if the Court properly may proceed, as it has proceeded, to decide the case under that Act, and not at all on the constitutional grounds solely relied on by petitioner. 2 I must say, with all deference, that the facts in this record do not show that petitioner was convicted of trespass in violation of that Act. </s> For me, the decisive question in this case is whether petitioner had a legal right to remain in the restaurant [364 U.S. 454, 465] involved after being ordered to leave it by the proprietor. If he did not have that legal right, however arising, he was guilty of trespass and, unless proscribed by some federal law, his conviction therefor was legally adjudged under 18-225 of the Code of Virginia. 3 </s> If the facts in this record could fairly be said to show that the restaurant was a facility "operated or controlled by any [motor] carrier or carriers, and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce," 203 (a) (19) of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 303 (a) (19), I would agree that petitioner had a legal right to remain in and to insist on service by that restaurant and, hence, was not guilty of trespass in so remaining and insisting though in defiance of the manager's order to leave, for 216 (d) of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 316 (d), makes it unlawful for a motor carrier while engaged in interstate commerce "to subject any particular person . . . to any unjust discrimination," and this Court has held that any discrimination by a carrier against its interstate passenger on account of his color in the use of its dining facilities is an unjust discrimination. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 . Cf. Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 . </s> But I respectfully submit that those are not the facts shown by this record. As I read it, there is no evidence in this record even tending to show that the restaurant was "operated or controlled by any such carrier," directly or indirectly. Instead, all of the relevant evidence, none [364 U.S. 454, 466] of which was contradicted, shows that the restaurant was owned and controlled by a noncarrier who alone operated it as a local and private enterprise. The evidence was very brief, consisting only of an exhibit (a lease) and the testimony of the assistant manager of the restaurant, of a police officer and of petitioner - all, except the exhibit, being contained on 10 pages of the printed record. The lease is in the usual and common form and terms. By it, the owner of the building, Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc., a Virginia corporation, as lessor, demised to the restaurant company, Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, Inc., a Virginia corporation, as lessee, certain described "space" in the lessor's bus station building in Richmond, Virginia, "for use by Lessee as a restaurant, lunchroom, soda fountain and news stand," for a term of five years from December 2, 1953 (with an option in the lessee to renew, on the same terms, for an additional five-year term), at an annual rental of $30,000 (payable in equal monthly installments) plus 12% of lessee's gross receipts from the demised premises in excess of $275,000 (payable at the end of each year). 4 </s> [364 U.S. 454, 467] </s> There is not a word of evidence that any carrier had any interest in or control over the lessee or its restaurant. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that the lease or the lessee's restaurant operations under it were anything other than bona fide and for a legitimate and private business purpose. Indeed, there is not a word of evidence in the record tending to show that any carrier even had any interest in or control over the lessor corporation that owned the building. In truth, the record does not even show the name of the carrier on which petitioner was traveling or identify it other than as "Trailways." 5 On [364 U.S. 454, 468] the other hand, the assistant manager of the restaurant testified, without suggestion of contradiction, that "[t]he company that operates the restaurant is not affiliated in any way with the bus company," and that "[t]he bus company has no control over the operation of the restaurant." There was simply no evidence to the contrary. </s> The Court seems to agree that "[r]espondent correctly points out [that] . . . the evidence in this record does not show that the bus company owns or actively operates or directly controls the bus terminal or the restaurant in it." But it seems to hold, as I read its opinion, that a motor carrier's regular "use" of a restaurant, though it be "neither own[ed], control[led] nor operate[d]" by the motor carrier, makes the restaurant a facility "operated or controlled by [the motor] carrier or carriers" within the meaning of 203 (a) (19) of the Interstate Commerce Act. I must respectfully disagree. To me, it seems rather plain that when Congress, in 203 (a) (19), said that the "`services' and `transportation'" to which Part II of the Act applies shall include "all vehicles . . . together with all facilities and property operated or controlled by any such carrier or carriers, and used in the transportation of passengers or property in interstate or foreign commerce or in the performance of any service in connection therewith," it hardly meant to include a private restaurant, "neither owned, operated nor controlled" by a carrier. Surely such "use" of a private restaurant by a motor carrier as results from stopping and opening its buses in front of or near a restaurant does not make the restaurant a facility "operated or controlled by" the carrier, within the meaning of 203 (a) (19) or in any true sense. This simple, and I think obvious, principle was recognized and correctly applied by the Commission as recently as November 1955 in N. A. A. C. P. v. St. Louis, S. F. R. Co., 297 I. C. C. 335. There, the railroad terminal or station building in [364 U.S. 454, 469] Richmond, Virginia, was owned by Richmond Terminal Railway Company 6 - itself a carrier under 3 (1) of Part I of the Act - which had leased space in that building to Union News Company for a term of 10 years, but subject to termination at the option of either party on 90 days' notice, for use as a restaurant. 7 In rejecting the contention that the Union News Company's operation of the restaurant on a racially segregated basis violated 3 (1) of Part I of the Act, the Commission said: </s> "Unless the operation of the lunchrooms can be found to be that of a common carrier subject to part I of the act, it cannot be regulated under section 3 (1), and we are unable so to find on the facts before us." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 344. </s> and the Commission concluded: </s> "We further find that the operation by a lessee (noncarrier) of separate lunchroom facilities for white and colored persons in the railway station at Richmond, constitutes a function or service which is not within the jurisdiction of this Commission." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 348. [364 U.S. 454, 470] </s> I would agree with the Court that "if the bus carrier [had] volunteered to make . . . restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers as a regular part of their transportation, and the . . . restaurant [had] acquiesced . . . in this undertaking," the restaurant would then have been bound to serve the carrier's interstate passengers without discrimination. For, in that case, the restaurant would have been made a facility of the carrier, within the meaning of 203 (a) (19), and 216 (d) would inhibit both the carrier and the restaurant from discriminating against the carrier's interstate passengers on account of their color, or on any other account, in the use of the restaurant facilities thus provided. Henderson v. United States, supra. But that is not this case. As we have shown, there is no evidence in this record that the carrier on which petitioner was traveling, whatever may have been its name, had "volunteered to make . . . restaurant facilities and services available to its interstate passengers" at this restaurant "as a regular part of their transportation," or that the proprietor of this restaurant ever "acquiesced" in any such "undertaking." There is no evidence of any agreement, express or implied, between the proprietor of this restaurant and any bus carrier. Instead, the undisputed evidence is that the restaurant was not in any way affiliated with or controlled by any bus carrier. On this evidence, I am unable to find any basis to support a conclusion that this restaurant was in some way made a facility of the bus carrier, or subject to Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act. </s> For these reasons, I cannot agree on this record that petitioner's conviction of trespass under 18-225 of the Code of Virginia was had in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. Since the Court's opinion does not explore the constitutional grounds relied on by petitioner, I refrain from intimating any views on those subjects. </s> [Footnote 1 See our Rules 23 (1) (c) and 40 (1) (d) (1): Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 362 , n. 16, and cases cited. </s> [Footnote 2 The only grounds relied on by petitioner in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia and in his petition for certiorari and brief on the merits in this Court were that his conviction is invalid as an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, 8, cl. 3, and also violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 18-225 of the Code of Virginia, in relevant part, provides: </s> "If any person shall without authority of law go upon or remain upon the lands or premises of another, after having been forbidden to do so by the owner, lessee, custodian or other person lawfully in charge of such land, . . . he shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by confinement in jail not exceeding thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment." </s> [Footnote 4 Under other provisions of the lease, the lessee covenanted, in substance, that it would acquire and install in the leased space, at its own expense, all things, including plumbing and wiring, which may be reasonably necessary to the equipment and operation of the restaurant; to provide and pay for all gas and electric current, except for overhead lights; to keep the premises and employees neat and clean and to operate the restaurant "in keeping with the character of service maintained in an up-to-date, modern bus terminal"; that it would not keep any coin-controlled machines or sell intoxicants on the demised premises nor make "any sales on buses operating in and out [of] said bus station"; that it would "comply with all the ordinances of the City of Richmond, and the laws of the United States and the State of Virginia in respect to the conduct of business of Lessee on the demised premises"; to take good care of the premises, and to surrender them at the end of the term in the same condition as when received "ordinary wear and tear excepted." </s> [Footnote 5 Obviously recognizing these glaring deficiencies in the evidence, counsel for petitioner and for the Government, as amicus curiae, have submitted with their briefs in this Court copies of certain Annual Reports of Virginia Stage Lines, Inc. (which probably was the carrier on which petitioner was traveling), Carolina Coach Company, and of Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc. (the owner of the building and lessor of the space occupied by the lessee's restaurant), to the State Corporation Commission of Virginia, purporting to show that those companies were doing business in Virginia in 1958 and 1959, and a copy of certain pages of the Annual Report filed by Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., with the Interstate Commerce Commission for the year 1959, purporting to show that the capital stock of Trailways Bus Terminal, Inc., was owned in equal parts by Virginia Stage Lines, Inc., and Carolina Coach Company. But none of those documents was put in evidence nor brought to the attention of the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, and it appears, as contended by Virginia, that the Virginia court could not take judicial notice of those documents. See 8-264 and 8-266 of the Code of Virginia; Commonwealth v. Castner, 138 Va. 81, 121 S. E. 894; Sisk v. Town of Shenandoah, 200 Va. 277, 105 S. E. 2d 169; Bell v. Hagmann, 200 Va. 626, 107 S. E. 2d 426. In the light of these facts the proffered documents cannot be considered here. Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 354 ; Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177 . But even if those documents could be considered here, they would not aid petitioner, for they do not purport to show that any carrier had any interest in or control over the restaurant involved or in or over Bus Terminal Restaurant of Richmond, the company that owned and operated the restaurant. </s> [Footnote 6 The Richmond Terminal Railway Company was controlled jointly by two railroads - the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railway Co. and the Atlantic Coast Line. </s> [Footnote 7 The lease involved in that case was evidently similar to the one here. Speaking of that lease, the Commission said: </s> "The lease is silent as to racial segregation. The terminal has certain powers of supervision for a purpose which may be described as policing. The lessee is obligated to `comply with the requirements of the Department of Public Health, City of Richmond, and with all other lawful governmental rules and regulations.' The context, however, indicates that this requirement is for the purpose of keeping the premises in a neat, clean, and orderly condition, and does not render the lessee liable for violations of the Interstate Commerce Act." 297 I. C. C., at 343. </s> [364 U.S. 454, 471]

United States Supreme Court MORISSETTE v. UNITED STATES(1952) No. 12 Argued: Decided: January 7, 1952 </s> 1. A criminal intent is an essential element of an offense under 18 U.S.C. 641, which provides that "whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts" property of the United States is punishable by fine and imprisonment. Pp. 247-273. </s> (a) Mere omission from 641 of any mention of intent is not to be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes defined. United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 , and United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 , distinguished. Pp. 250-263. </s> (b) The history and purposes of 641 afford no ground for inferring any affirmative instruction from Congress to eliminate intent from the offense of "knowingly converting" or stealing government property. Pp. 263-273. </s> 2. Where intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury for determination in the light of all relevant evidence; and the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instructing the jury that the law raises a presumption of intent from a single act. Pp. 273-276. </s> 187 F.2d 427, reversed. </s> Petitioner was convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. 641. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 187 F.2d 427. This Court granted certiorari. 341 U.S. 925 . Reversed, p. 276. </s> Andrew J. Transue argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Robert W. Ginnane argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General McInerney and J. F. Bishop. [342 U.S. 246, 247] </s> MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This would have remained a profoundly insignificant case to all except its immediate parties had it not been so tried and submitted to the jury as to raise questions both fundamental and far-reaching in federal criminal law, for which reason we granted certiorari. 1 </s> On a large tract of uninhabited and untilled land in a wooded and sparsely populated area of Michigan, the Government established a practice bombing range over which the Air Force dropped simulated bombs at ground targets. These bombs consisted of a metal cylinder about forty inches long and eight inches across, filled with sand and enough black powder to cause a smoke puff by which the strike could be located. At various places about the range signs read "Danger - Keep Out - Bombing Range." Nevertheless, the range was known as good deer country and was extensively hunted. </s> Spent bomb casings were cleared from the targets and thrown into piles "so that they will be out of the way." They were not stacked or piled in any order but were dumped in heaps, some of which had been accumulating for four years or upwards, were exposed to the weather and rusting away. </s> Morissette, in December of 1948, went hunting in this area but did not get a deer. He thought to meet expenses of the trip by salvaging some of these casings. He loaded three tons of them on his truck and took them to a nearby farm, where they were flattened by driving a tractor over them. After expending this labor and trucking them to market in Flint, he realized $84. </s> Morissette, by occupation, is a fruit stand operator in summer and a trucker and scrap iron collector in winter. An honorably discharged veteran of World War II, [342 U.S. 246, 248] he enjoys a good name among his neighbors and has had no blemish on his record more disreputable than a conviction for reckless driving. </s> The loading, crushing and transporting of these casings were all in broad daylight, in full view of passers-by, without the slightest effort at concealment. When an investigation was started, Morissette voluntarily, promptly and candidly told the whole story to the authorities, saying that he had no intention of stealing but thought the property was abandoned, unwanted and considered of no value to the Government. He was indicted, however, on the charge that he "did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly steal and convert" property of the United States of the value of $84, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 641, which provides that "whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts" government property is punishable by fine and imprisonment. 2 Morissette was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two months or to pay a fine of $200. The Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. 3 </s> On his trial, Morissette, as he had at all times told investigating officers, testified that from appearances he believed the casings were cast-off and abandoned, that he did not intend to steal the property, and took it with no [342 U.S. 246, 249] wrongful or criminal intent. The trial court, however, was unimpressed, and ruled: "[H]e took it because he thought it was abandoned and he knew he was on government property. . . . That is no defense. . . . I don't think anybody can have the defense they thought the property was abandoned on another man's piece of property." The court stated: "I will not permit you to show this man thought it was abandoned. . . . I hold in this case that there is no question of abandoned property." The court refused to submit or to allow counsel to argue to the jury whether Morissette acted with innocent intention. It charged: "And I instruct you that if you believe the testimony of the government in this case, he intended to take it. . . . He had no right to take this property. . . . [A]nd it is no defense to claim that it was abandoned, because it was on private property. . . . And I instruct you to this effect: That if this young man took this property (and he says he did), without any permission (he says he did), that was on the property of the United States Government (he says it was), that it was of the value of one cent or more (and evidently it was), that he is guilty of the offense charged here. If you believe the government, he is guilty. . . . The question on intent is whether or not he intended to take the property. He says he did. Therefore, if you believe either side, he is guilty." Petitioner's counsel contended, "But the taking must have been with a felonious intent." The court ruled, however: "That is presumed by his own act." </s> The Court of Appeals suggested that "greater restraint in expression should have been exercised," but affirmed the conviction because, "As we have interpreted the statute, appellant was guilty of its violation beyond a shadow of doubt, as evidenced even by his own admissions." Its construction of the statute is that it creates several separate and distinct offenses, one being knowing [342 U.S. 246, 250] conversion of government property. The court ruled that this particular offense requires no element of criminal intent. This conclusion was thought to be required by the failure of Congress to express such a requisite and this Court's decisions in United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 , and United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 . </s> I. </s> In those cases this Court did construe mere omission from a criminal enactment of any mention of criminal intent as dispensing with it. If they be deemed precedents for principles of construction generally applicable to federal penal statutes, they authorize this conviction. Indeed, such adoption of the literal reasoning announced in those cases would do this and more - it would sweep out of all federal crimes, except when expressly preserved, the ancient requirement of a culpable state of mind. We think a resume of their historical background is convincing that an effect has been ascribed to them more comprehensive than was contemplated and one inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal law. </s> The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil. 4 A relation between some mental element and punishment for a [342 U.S. 246, 251] harmful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public prosecution. 5 Unqualified acceptance of this doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first be a "vicious will." 6 Common-law commentators of the Nineteenth Century early pronounced the same principle, 7 although a few exceptions not relevant to our present problem came to be recognized. 8 </s> Crime, as a compound concept, generally constituted only from concurrence of an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand, was congenial to an intense individualism [342 U.S. 246, 252] and took deep and early root in American soil. 9 As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation. Courts, with little hesitation or division, found an implication of the requirement as to offenses that were taken over from the common law. 10 The unanimity with which they have adhered to the central thought that wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal is emphasized by the variety, disparity and confusion of their definitions of the requisite but elusive mental element. However, courts of various jurisdictions, and for the purposes of different offenses, have devised working formulae, if not scientific ones, for the instruction of juries around such terms as "felonious intent," "criminal intent," "malice aforethought," "guilty knowledge," "fraudulent intent," "wilfulness," "scienter," to denote guilty knowledge, or "mens rea," to signify an evil purpose or mental culpability. By use or combination of these various tokens, they have sought to protect those who were not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-law crimes. </s> However, the Balint and Behrman offenses belong to a category of another character, with very different antecedents and origins. The crimes there involved depend [342 U.S. 246, 253] on no mental element but consist only of forbidden acts or omissions. This, while not expressed by the Court, is made clear from examination of a century-old but accelerating tendency, discernible both here 11 and in England, 12 to call into existence new duties and crimes which disregard any ingredient of intent. The industrial revolution [342 U.S. 246, 254] multiplied the number of workmen exposed to injury from increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms, driven by freshly discovered sources of energy, requiring higher precautions by employers. Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came to subject the wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers were not to observe new cares and uniformities of conduct. Congestion of cities and crowding of quarters called for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler times. Wide distribution of goods became an instrument of wide distribution of harm when those who dispersed food, drink, drugs, and even securities, did not comply with reasonable standards of quality, integrity, disclosure and care. Such dangers have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare. </s> While many of these duties are sanctioned by a more strict civil liability, 13 lawmakers, whether wisely or not, 14 </s> [342 U.S. 246, 255] have sought to make such regulations more effective by invoking criminal sanctions to be applied by the familiar technique of criminal prosecutions and convictions. This has confronted the courts with a multitude of prosecutions, based on statutes or administrative regulations, for what have been aptly called "public welfare offenses." These cases do not fit neatly into any of such accepted classifications of common-law offenses, such as those against the state, the person, property, or public morals. Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many [342 U.S. 246, 256] violations of such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize. While such offenses do not threaten the security of the state in the manner of treason, they may be regarded as offenses against its authority, for their occurrence impairs the efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently constituted. In this respect, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury is the same, and the consequences are injurious or not according to fortuity. Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. Also, penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage to an offender's reputation. Under such considerations, courts have turned to construing statutes and regulations which make no mention of intent as dispensing with it and holding that the guilty act alone makes out the crime. This has not, however, been without expressions of misgiving. </s> The pilot of the movement in this country appears to be a holding that a tavernkeeper could be convicted for selling liquor to an habitual drunkard even if he did not know the buyer to be such. Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849). Later came Massachusetts holdings that convictions for selling adulterated milk in violation of statutes forbidding such sales require no allegation or proof that defendant knew of the adulteration. Commonwealth v. Farren, 9 Allen 489 (1864); Commonwealth v. Nichols, 10 Allen 199 (1865); Commonwealth v. Waite, 11 Allen 264 (1865). Departures from the common-law tradition, [342 U.S. 246, 257] mainly of these general classes, were reviewed and their rationale appraised by Chief Justice Cooley, as follows: </s> "I agree that as a rule there can be no crime without a criminal intent; but this is not by any means a universal rule. . . . Many statutes which are in the nature of police regulations, as this is, impose criminal penalties irrespective of any intent to violate them; the purpose being to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the public which shall render violation impossible." People v. Roby, 52 Mich. 577, 579, 18 N. W. 365, 366 (1884). </s> After the turn of the Century, a new use for crimes without intent appeared when New York enacted numerous and novel regulations of tenement houses, sanctioned by money penalties. Landlords contended that a guilty intent was essential to establish a violation. Judge Cardozo wrote the answer: </s> "The defendant asks us to test the meaning of this statute by standards applicable to statutes that govern infamous crimes. The analogy, however, is deceptive. The element of conscious wrongdoing, the guilty mind accompanying the guilty act, is associated with the concept of crimes that are punished as infamous. . . . Even there it is not an invariable element. . . . But in the prosecution of minor offenses, there is a wider range of practice and of power. Prosecutions for petty penalties have always constituted in our law a class by themselves. . . . That is true though the prosecution is criminal in form." Tenement House Department v. McDevitt, 215 N. Y. 160, 168, 109 N. E. 88, 90 (1915). </s> Soon, employers advanced the same contention as to violations of regulations prescribed by a new labor law. Judge Cardozo, again for the court, pointed out, as a basis [342 U.S. 246, 258] for penalizing violations whether intentional or not, that they were punishable only by fine "moderate in amount," but cautiously added that in sustaining the power so to fine unintended violations "we are not to be understood as sustaining to a like length the power to imprison. We leave that question open." People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms Co., 225 N. Y. 25, 32-33, 121 N. E. 474, 477 (1918). </s> Thus, for diverse but reconcilable reasons, state courts converged on the same result, discontinuing inquiry into intent in a limited class of offenses against such statutory regulations. </s> Before long, similar questions growing out of federal legislation reached this Court. Its judgments were in harmony with this consensus of state judicial opinion, the existence of which may have led the Court to overlook the need for full exposition of their rationale in the context of federal law. In overruling a contention that there can be no conviction on an indictment which makes no charge of criminal intent but alleges only making of a sale of a narcotic forbidden by law, Chief Justice Taft, wrote: </s> "While the general rule at common law was that the scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it . . ., there has been a modification of this view in respect to prosecutions under statutes the purpose of which would be obstructed by such a requirement. It is a question of legislative intent to be construed by the court. . . ." United States v. Balint, supra, 251-252. </s> He referred, however, to "regulatory measures in the exercise of what is called the police power where the emphasis [342 U.S. 246, 259] of the statute is evidently upon achievement of some social betterment rather than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se," and drew his citation of supporting authority chiefly from state court cases dealing with regulatory offenses. Id., at 252. </s> On the same day, the Court determined that an offense under the Narcotic Drug Act does not require intent, saying, "If the offense be a statutory one, and intent or knowledge is not made an element of it, the indictment need not charge such knowledge or intent." United States v. Behrman, supra, at 288. </s> Of course, the purpose of every statute would be "obstructed" by requiring a finding of intent, if we assume that it had a purpose to convict without it. Therefore, the obstruction rationale does not help us to learn the purpose of the omission by Congress. And since no federal crime can exist except by force of statute, the reasoning of the Behrman opinion, if read literally, would work far-reaching changes in the composition of all federal crimes. Had such a result been contemplated, it could hardly have escaped mention by a Court which numbered among its members one especially interested and informed concerning the importance of intent in common-law crimes. 15 This might be the more expected since the Behrman holding did call forth his dissent, in which Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Brandeis joined, omitting any such mention. </s> It was not until recently that the Court took occasion more explicitly to relate abandonment of the ingredient of intent, not merely with considerations of expediency in obtaining convictions, nor with the malum prohibitum classification of the crime, but with the peculiar nature and quality of the offense. We referred to ". . . a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as [342 U.S. 246, 260] effective means of regulation," and continued, "such legislation dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct - awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public danger." But we warned: "Hardship there doubtless may be under a statute which thus penalizes the transaction though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting." United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 -281, 284. 16 </s> Neither this Court nor, so far as we are aware, any other has undertaken to delineate a precise line or set forth comprehensive criteria for distinguishing between crimes that require a mental element and crimes that do not. We attempt no closed definition, for the law on the subject is neither settled nor static. The conclusion reached in the Balint and Behrman cases has our approval and adherence for the circumstances to which it was there applied. A quite different question here is whether we will expand the doctrine of crimes without intent to include those charged here. </s> Stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents, were among the earliest offenses known to the law that existed before legislation; 17 they are invasions of rights of property which stir a sense of insecurity in the whole community and arouse public demand for retribution, the penalty is high and, when a sufficient amount is involved, the infamy is that of a felony, which, says Maitland, is ". . . as bad a word as you can give to man or thing." 18 State courts of last resort, on whom fall the heaviest burden [342 U.S. 246, 261] of interpreting criminal law in this country, have consistently retained the requirement of intent in larceny-type offenses. 19 If any state has deviated, the exception has neither been called to our attention nor disclosed by our research. </s> Congress, therefore, omitted any express prescription of criminal intent from the enactment before us in the light of an unbroken course of judicial decision in all [342 U.S. 246, 262] constituent states of the Union holding intent inherent in this class of offense, even when not expressed in a statute. Congressional silence as to mental elements in an Act merely adopting into federal statutory law a concept of crime already so well defined in common law and statutory interpretation by the states may warrant quite contrary inferences than the same silence in creating an offense new to general law, for whose definition the courts have no guidance except the Act. Because the offenses before this Court in the Balint and Behrman cases were of this latter class, we cannot accept them as authority for eliminating intent from offenses incorporated from the common law. Nor do exhaustive studies of state court cases disclose any well-considered decisions applying the doctrine of crime without intent to such enacted common-law offenses, 20 although a few deviations are notable as illustrative of the danger inherent in the Government's contentions here. 21 </s> [342 U.S. 246, 263] </s> The Government asks us by a feat of construction radically to change the weights and balances in the scales of justice. The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries. Such a manifest impairment of the immunities of the individual should not be extended to common-law crimes on judicial initiative. </s> The spirit of the doctrine which denies to the federal judiciary power to create crimes forthrightly 22 admonishes that we should not enlarge the reach of enacted crimes by constituting them from anything less than the incriminating components contemplated by the words used in the statute. And where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them. </s> We hold that mere omission from 641 of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that element from the crimes denounced. </s> II. </s> It is suggested, however, that the history and purposes of 641 imply something more affirmative as to elimination of intent from at least one of the offenses charged under it in this case. The argument does not contest [342 U.S. 246, 264] that criminal intent is retained in the offenses of embezzlement, stealing and purloining, as incorporated into this section. But it is urged that Congress joined with those, as a new, separate and distinct offense, knowingly to convert government property, under circumstances which imply that it is an offense in which the mental element of intent is not necessary. </s> Congress has been alert to what often is a decisive function of some mental element in crime. It has seen fit to prescribe that an evil state of mind, described variously in one or more such terms as "intentional," "wilful," "knowing," "fraudulent" or "malicious," will make criminal an otherwise indifferent act, 23 or increase the degree of the offense or its punishment. 24 Also, it has [342 U.S. 246, 265] at times required a specific intent or purpose which will require some specialized knowledge or design for some evil beyond the common-law intent to do injury. 25 The law under some circumstances recognizes good faith or blameless intent as a defense, partial defense, or as an element to be considered in mitigation of punishment. 26 And treason - the one crime deemed grave enough for definition in our Constitution itself - requires not only the duly witnessed overt act of aid and comfort to the enemy but also the mental element of disloyalty or adherence to the enemy. 27 In view of the care that has been bestowed upon the subject, it is significant that we have not found, nor has our attention been directed to, any instance in which Congress has expressly eliminated the mental element from a crime taken over from the common law. </s> The section with which we are here concerned was enacted in 1948, as a consolidation of four former sections of Title 18, as adopted in 1940, which in turn were derived from two sections of the Revised Statutes. The pertinent legislative and judicial history of these antecedents, [342 U.S. 246, 266] as well as of 641, is footnoted. 28 We find no other purpose in the 1948 re-enactment than to collect from scattered sources crimes so kindred as to belong in [342 U.S. 246, 267] one category. Not one of these had been interpreted to be a crime without intention and no purpose to differentiate between them in the matter of intent is disclosed. [342 U.S. 246, 268] No inference that some were and some were not crimes of intention can be drawn from any difference in classification or punishment. Not one fits the congressional classification of the petty offense; each is, at its least, a misdemeanor, and if the amount involved is one hundred [342 U.S. 246, 269] or more dollars each is a felony. 29 If one crime without intent has been smuggled into a section whose dominant offenses do require intent, it was put in ill-fitting and compromising company. The Government apparently did not believe that conversion stood so alone when it [342 U.S. 246, 270] drew this one-count indictment to charge that Morissette "did unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly steal and convert to his own use." 30 </s> Congress, by the language of this section, has been at pains to incriminate only "knowing" conversions. But, at common law, there are unwitting acts which constitute conversions. In the civil tort, except for recovery of exemplary damages, the defendant's knowledge, intent, motive, mistake, and good faith are generally irrelevant. 31 If one takes property which turns out to belong to another, his innocent intent will not shield him from making restitution or indemnity, for his well-meaning may not be allowed to deprive another of his own. </s> Had the statute applied to conversions without qualification, it would have made crimes of all unwitting, inadvertent and unintended conversions. Knowledge, of course, is not identical with intent and may not have been the most apt words of limitation. But knowing conversion [342 U.S. 246, 271] requires more than knowledge that defendant was taking the property into his possession. He must have had knowledge of the facts, though not necessarily the law, that made the taking a conversion. In the case before us, whether the mental element that Congress required be spoken of as knowledge or as intent, would not seem to alter its bearing on guilt. For it is not apparent how Morissette could have knowingly or intentionally converted property that he did not know could be converted, as would be the case if it was in fact abandoned or if he truly believed it to be abandoned and unwanted property. </s> It is said, and at first blush the claim has plausibility, that, if we construe the statute to require a mental element as part of criminal conversion, it becomes a meaningless duplication of the offense of stealing, and that conversion can be given meaning only by interpreting it to disregard intention. But here again a broader view of the evolution of these crimes throws a different light on the legislation. </s> It is not surprising if there is considerable overlapping in the embezzlement, stealing, purloining and knowing conversion grouped in this statute. What has concerned codifiers of the larceny-type offense is that gaps or crevices have separated particular crimes of this general class and guilty men have escaped through the breaches. The books contain a surfeit of cases drawing fine distinctions between slightly different circumstances under which one may obtain wrongful advantages from another's property. The codifiers wanted to reach all such instances. Probably every stealing is a conversion, but certainly not every knowing conversion is a stealing. "To steal means to take away from one in lawful possession without right with the intention to keep wrongfully." (Italics added.) Irving Trust Co. v. Leff, 253 N. Y. 359, 364, 171 N. E. 569, 571. Conversion, however, may be consummated without [342 U.S. 246, 272] any intent to keep and without any wrongful taking, where the initial possession by the converter was entirely lawful. Conversion may include misuse or abuse of property. It may reach use in an unauthorized manner or to an unauthorized extent of property placed in one's custody for limited use. Money rightfully taken into one's custody may be converted without any intent to keep or embezzle it merely by commingling it with the custodian's own, if he was under a duty to keep it separate and intact. It is not difficult to think of intentional and knowing abuses and unauthorized uses of government property that might be knowing conversions but which could not be reached as embezzlement, stealing or purloining. Knowing conversion adds significantly to the range of protection of government property without interpreting it to punish unwitting conversions. </s> The purpose which we here attribute to Congress parallels that of codifiers of common law in England 32 and in the States 33 and demonstrates that the serious problem [342 U.S. 246, 273] in drafting such a statute is to avoid gaps and loopholes between offenses. It is significant that the English and State codifiers have tried to cover the same type of conduct that we are suggesting as the purpose of Congress here, without, however, departing from the common-law tradition that these are crimes of intendment. </s> We find no grounds for inferring any affirmative instruction from Congress to eliminate intent from any offense with which this defendant was charged. </s> III. </s> As we read the record, this case was tried on the theory that even if criminal intent were essential its presence (a) should be decided by the court (b) as a presumption [342 U.S. 246, 274] of law, apparently conclusive, (c) predicated upon the isolated act of taking rather than upon all of the circumstances. In each of these respects we believe the trial court was in error. </s> Where intent of the accused is an ingredient of the crime charged, its existence is a question of fact which must be submitted to the jury. State court authorities cited to the effect that intent is relevant in larcenous crimes are equally emphatic and uniform that it is a jury issue. The settled practice and its reason are well stated by Judge Andrews in People v. Flack, 125 N. Y. 324, 334, 26 N. E. 267, 270: </s> "It is alike the general rule of law and the dictate of natural justice that to constitute guilt there must be not only a wrongful act, but a criminal intention. Under our system (unless in exceptional cases), both must be found by the jury to justify a conviction for crime. However clear the proof may be, or however incontrovertible may seem to the judge to be the inference of a criminal intention, the question of intent can never be ruled as a question of law, but must always be submitted to the jury. Jurors may be perverse; the ends of justice may be defeated by unrighteous verdicts, but so long as the functions of the judge and jury are distinct, the one responding to the law, the other to the facts, neither can invade the province of the other without destroying the significance of trial by court and jury. . . ." </s> It follows that the trial court may not withdraw or prejudge the issue by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act. It often is tempting to cast in terms of a "presumption" a conclusion which a court thinks probable from given facts. The Supreme Court of Florida, for example, in a larceny case, from selected circumstances which are present in this case, has [342 U.S. 246, 275] declared a presumption of exactly opposite effect from the one announced by the trial court here: </s> ". . . But where the taking is open and there is no subsequent attempt to conceal the property, and no denial, but an avowal, of the taking a strong presumption arises that there was no felonious intent, which must be repelled by clear and convincing evidence before a conviction is authorized. . . ." Kemp v. State, 146 Fla. 101, 104, 200 So. 368, 369. </s> We think presumptive intent has no place in this case. A conclusive presumption which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense. A presumption which would permit but not require the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own volition. A presumption which would permit the jury to make an assumption which all the evidence considered together does not logically establish would give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. 34 In either case, this presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime. Such incriminating presumptions are not to be improvised by the judiciary. Even congressional power to facilitate convictions by substituting presumptions for proof is not without limit. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 . </s> Moreover, the conclusion supplied by presumption in this instance was one of intent to steal the casings, and it was based on the mere fact that defendant took them. The court thought the only question was, "Did he intend [342 U.S. 246, 276] to take the property?" That the removal of them was a conscious and intentional act was admitted. But that isolated fact is not an adequate basis on which the jury should find the criminal intent to steal or knowingly convert, that is, wrongfully to deprive another of possession of property. Whether that intent existed, the jury must determine, not only from the act of taking, but from that together with defendant's testimony and all of the surrounding circumstances. </s> Of course, the jury, considering Morissette's awareness that these casings were on government property, his failure to seek any permission for their removal and his self-interest as a witness, might have disbelieved his profession of innocent intent and concluded that his assertion of a belief that the casings were abandoned was an after-thought. Had the jury convicted on proper instructions it would be the end of the matter. But juries are not bound by what seems inescapable logic to judges. They might have concluded that the heaps of spent casings left in the hinterland to rust away presented an appearance of unwanted and abandoned junk, and that lack of any conscious deprivation of property or intentional injury was indicated by Morissette's good character, the openness of the taking, crushing and transporting of the casings, and the candor with which it was all admitted. They might have refused to brand Morissette as a thief. Had they done so, that too would have been the end of the matter. </s> Reversed. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concurs in the result. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 341 U.S. 925 . </s> [Footnote 2 18 U.S.C. 641, so far as pertinent, reads: </s> "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or being made under contract for the United States or any department or agency thereof; </s> . . . . . </s> "Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both." </s> [Footnote 3 Morissette v. United States, 187 F.2d 427. </s> [Footnote 4 For a brief history and philosophy of this concept in Biblical, Greek, Roman, Continental and Anglo-American law, see Radin, Intent, Criminal, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 126. For more extensive treatment of the development in English Law, see 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 448-511. "Historically, our substantive criminal law is based upon a theory of punishing the vicious will. It postulates a free agent confronted with a choice between doing right and doing wrong and choosing freely to do wrong." Pound, Introduction to Sayre, Cases on Criminal Law (1927). </s> [Footnote 5 In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 , we observed that "Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence." We also there referred to ". . . a prevalent modern philosophy of penology that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime." Id., at 247. Such ends would seem illusory if there were no mental element in crime. </s> [Footnote 6 4 Bl. Comm. 21. </s> [Footnote 7 Examples of these texts and their alterations in successive editions in consequence of evolution in the law of "public welfare offenses," as hereinafter recited, are traced in Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55, 66. </s> [Footnote 8 Exceptions came to include sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached age of consent. Absence of intent also involves such considerations as lack of understanding because of insanity, subnormal mentality, or infancy, lack of volition due to some actual compulsion, or that inferred from doctrines of coverture. Most extensive inroads upon the requirement of intention, however, are offenses of negligence, such as involuntary manslaughter or criminal negligence and the whole range of crimes arising from omission of duty. Cf. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 316 Mass. 383, 55 N. E. 2d 902 (1944). </s> [Footnote 9 Holmes, The Common Law, considers intent in the chapter on The Criminal Law, and earlier makes the pithy observation: "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked." P. 3. Radin, Intent, Criminal, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 126, 127, points out that in American law "mens rea is not so readily constituted from any wrongful act" as elsewhere. </s> [Footnote 10 In the Balint case, Chief Justice Taft recognized this but rather overstated it by making no allowance for exceptions such as those mentioned in n. 8. </s> [Footnote 11 This trend and its causes, advantages and dangers have been considered by Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55; Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549; Hall, Interrelations of Criminal Law and Torts, 43 Col. L. Rev. 753, 967. </s> [Footnote 12 The changes in English law are illustrated by Nineteenth Century English cases. In 1814, it was held that one could not be convicted of selling impure foods unless he was aware of the impurities. Rex v. Dixon, 3 M. & S. 11 (K. B. 1814). However, thirty-two years later, in an action to enforce a statutory forfeiture for possession of adulterated tobacco, the respondent was held liable even though he had no knowledge of, or cause to suspect, the adulteration. Countering respondent's arguments, Baron Parke said, "It is very true that in particular instances it may produce mischief, because an innocent man may suffer from his want of care in not examining the tobacco he has received, and not taking a warranty; but the public inconvenience would be much greater, if in every case the officers were obliged to prove knowledge. They would be very seldom able to do so." Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 404, 417 (Exch. 1846). Convenience of the prosecution thus emerged as a rationale. In 1866, a quarry owner was held liable for the nuisance caused by his workmen dumping refuse into a river, in spite of his plea that he played no active part in the management of the business and knew nothing about the dumping involved. His knowledge or lack of it was deemed irrelevant. Regina v. Stephens, L. R. 1 Q. B. 702 (1866). Bishop, referring to this decision, says, "The doctrine of this English case may almost be deemed new in the criminal law . . . . And, properly limited, the doctrine is eminently worthy to be followed hereafter." 1 Bishop, New Criminal Law (8th ed. 1892), 1076. After these decisions, statutes prohibiting the sale of impure or adulterated food were enacted. Adulteration of Food Act (35 & 36 Vict., c. 74, 2 (1872)); Sale of Food and Drugs Act of 1875 (38 & 39 Vict., c. 63). A conviction under the former was sustained in a holding that no guilty knowledge or intent need be [342 U.S. 246, 254] proved in a prosecution for the sale of adulterated butter, Fitzpatrick v. Kelly, L. R. 8 Q. B. 337 (1873), and in Betts v. Armstead, L. R. 20 Q. B. D. 771 (1888), involving the latter statute, it was held that there was no need for a showing that the accused had knowledge that his product did not measure up to the statutory specifications. </s> [Footnote 13 The development of strict criminal liability regardless of intent has been roughly paralleled by an evolution of a strict civil liability for consequences regardless of fault in certain relationships, as shown by Workmen's Compensation Acts, and by vicarious liability for fault of others as evidenced by various Motor Vehicle Acts. </s> [Footnote 14 Consequences of a general abolition of intent as an ingredient of serious crimes have aroused the concern of responsible and disinterested students of penology. Of course, they would not justify judicial disregard of a clear command to that effect from Congress, but they do admonish us to caution in assuming that Congress, without clear expression, intends in any instance to do so. </s> Radin, Intent, Criminal, 8 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 126, 130, says, ". . . as long as in popular belief intention and the freedom of the will are [342 U.S. 246, 255] taken as axiomatic, no penal system that negates the mental element can find general acceptance. It is vital to retain public support of methods of dealing with crime." Again, "The question of criminal intent will probably always have something of an academic taint. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the determination of the boundary between intent and negligence spells freedom or condemnation for thousands of individuals. The watchfulness of the jurist justifies itself at present in its insistence upon the examination of the mind of each individual offender." </s> Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55, 56, says: "To inflict substantial punishment upon one who is morally entirely innocent, who caused injury through reasonable mistake or pure accident, would so outrage the feelings of the community as to nullify its own enforcement." </s> Hall, Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal Law, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549, 569, appears somewhat less disturbed by the trend, if properly limited, but, as to so-called public welfare crimes, suggests that "There is no reason to continue to believe that the present mode of dealing with these offenses is the best solution obtainable, or that we must be content with this sacrifice of established principles. The raising of a presumption of knowledge might be an improvement." (Italics added.) </s> In Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 703 , the Court said, "But the law at the same time is not so unreasonable as to attach culpability, and consequently to impose punishment, where there is no intention to evade its provisions . . . ." </s> [Footnote 15 Holmes, The Common Law. </s> [Footnote 16 For the place of the mental element in offenses against the revenues, see Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 ; United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518 . </s> [Footnote 17 2 Russell on Crime (10th ed., Turner, 1950) 1037. </s> [Footnote 18 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 465. </s> [Footnote 19 Examples of decision in diverse jurisdictions may be culled from any digest. Most nearly in point are Johnson v. State, 36 Tex. 375, holding that to take a horse running at large on the range is not larceny in the absence of an intent to deprive an owner of his property; Jordan v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. R. 414, 296 S. W. 585, that, if at the time of taking parts from an automobile the accused believed that the car had been abandoned by its owner, he should be acquitted; Fetkenhauer v. State, 112 Wis. 491, 88 N. W. 294, that an honest, although mistaken, belief by defendant that he had permission to take property should be considered by the jury; and Devine v. People, 20 Hun (N. Y.) 98, holding that a claim that an act was only a practical joke must be weighed against an admitted taking of property. </s> Others of like purport are Farzley v. State, 231 Ala. 60, 163 So. 394; Nickerson v. State, 22 Ala. App. 640, 119 So. 243; People v. Williams, 73 Cal. App. 2d 154, 166 P.2d 63; Schiff v. People, 111 Colo. 333, 141 P.2d 892; Kemp v. State, 146 Fla. 101, 200 So. 368; Perdew v. Commonwealth, 260 Ky. 638, 86 S.W.2d 534, holding that appropriation by a finder of lost property cannot constitute larceny in the absence of intent; People v. Shaunding, 268 Mich. 218, 255 N. W. 770; People v. Will, 289 N. Y. 413, 46 N. E. 2d 498; Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432; Thomas v. Kessler, 334 Pa. 7, 5 A. 2d 187; Barnes v. State, 145 Tex. Cr. R. 131, 166 S.W.2d 708; Sandel v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. R. 132, 97 S. W. 2d 225; Weeks v. State, 114 Tex. Cr. R. 406, 25 S.W.2d 855; Heskew v. State, 18 Tex. Ct. App. 275; Page v. Commonwealth, 148 Va. 733, 138 S. E. 510, holding reversible error to exclude evidence having a tendency to throw light on the question of the bona fides of one accused of larceny; Butts v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 800, 133 S. E. 764; State v. Levy, 113 Vt. 459, 35 A. 2d 853, holding that the taking of another's property in good faith by inadvertence or mistake does not constitute larceny. </s> [Footnote 20 Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Col. L. Rev. 55, 73, 84, cites and classifies a large number of cases and concludes that they fall roughly into subdivisions of (1) illegal sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3) sales of misbranded articles, (4) violations of antinarcotic Acts, (5) criminal nuisances, (6) violations of traffic regulations, (7) violations of motor-vehicle laws, and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health or well-being of the community. </s> [Footnote 21 Sayre points out that in criminal syndicalism or sedition cases, where the pressure to convict is strong, it has been accomplished by dispensing with the element of intent, in some instances by analogy with the public welfare offense. Examples are State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 195 P. 211; People v. Ruthenberg, 229 Mich. 315, 201 N. W. 358; State v. Kahn, 56 Mont. 108, 182 P. 107; State v. Smith, 57 Mont. 563, 190 P. 107. Compare People v. McClennegen, 195 Cal. 445, 234 P. 91. This although intent is of the very essence of offenses based on disloyalty. Cf. Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 ; Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 , where innocence of intention will defeat a charge even of treason. </s> [Footnote 22 United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32; United States v. Gooding, 12 Wheat. 460. </s> [Footnote 23 18 U.S.C. 81, Arson: ". . . willfully and maliciously . . ."; 18 U.S.C. 113, Assault: "(a) . . . with intent to commit murder or rape . . . . (b) . . . with intent to commit any felony, except murder or rape . . ."; 18 U.S.C. 152, Bankruptcy - concealment of assets, false oaths and claims, bribery: ". . . knowingly and fraudulently . . ."; 18 U.S.C. 201, Bribery and Graft: ". . . with intent to influence . . ."; 18 U.S.C. 471, Counterfeiting and Forgery: ". . . with intent to defraud . . ."; 18 U.S.C. 594, Intimidation of voters: ". . . for the purpose of . . ."; 18 U.S.C. 1072, Concealing escaped prisoner: ". . . willfully . . ."; 61 Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. 162, Interference with a member of the National Labor Relations Board or an agent of the Board in his performance of his duties: ". . . willfully . . ."; 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U.S.C. 216 (a), Violations of provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act: ". . . willfully . . ."; 37 Stat. 251, 21 U.S.C. 23, Packing or selling misbranded barrels of apples: ". . . knowingly . . . ." </s> [Footnote 24 18 U.S.C. 1112, Manslaughter, ". . . the unlawful killing of a human being without malice," if voluntary, carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment not to exceed ten years. If the killing is "with malice aforethought," the crime is murder, 18 U.S.C. 1111, and, if of the first degree, punishable by death or life imprisonment, or, if of the second degree, punishable by imprisonment for any term of years or life. </s> [Footnote 25 18 U.S.C. 242; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 . </s> [Footnote 26 I. R. C. 145 (a), 145 (b), 53 Stat. 62, as amended, 26 U.S.C. 145 (a), 145 (b), as construed in Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 ; 52 Stat. 1069, 29 U.S.C. 216(a), stating the criminal sanctions for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, provides that: "No person shall be imprisoned under this subsection except for an offense committed after the conviction of such person for a prior offense under this subsection." N. Y. Penal Law, 1306, provides that, "Upon an indictment for larceny it is a sufficient defense that the property was appropriated openly and avowedly, under a claim of title preferred in good faith, even though such claim is untenable." </s> [Footnote 27 U.S. Const., Art. III, 3, cl. 1. </s> This provision was to prevent incrimination of mere mental operations such as "compassing" the death of the King. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 . To hold that a mental element is necessary to a crime is, of course, not to say that it is all that is necessary. </s> [Footnote 28 The Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. 641 states that it is derived from 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 82, 87, 100, and 101 which, in turn, are from Rev. Stat. 5438 and 5439. We shall consider only the 1940 code sections and their interpretations. </s> 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 82 reads: </s> "Whoever shall take and carry away or take for his use, or for the use of another, with intent to steal or purloin . . . any property of the United States . . . shall be punished as follows . . . ." </s> In United States v. Anderson, 45 F. Supp. 943, a prosecution for conspiracy to violate that section, District Judge Yankwich said: </s> "It has been before the courts in very few cases. But such courts as have had cases under it, including our own Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, have held that the object of the section is to introduce the crime of larceny into the Federal Criminal Code. </s> "In Frach v. Mass, 9 Cir., 1939, 106 F.2d 820, 821, we find these words: `Larceny of property of the United States is made a crime by 18 U.S.C.A. 82.' </s> "This means of course, that in interpreting the statute, we may apply the principles governing the common law crime of larceny, as interpreted by the courts of various states." 45 F. Supp. at 945. </s> United States v. Trinder, 1 F. Supp. 659, was a prosecution of a group of boys, under 82, for "stealing" a government automobile. They had taken it for a joy ride without permission, fully intending to return it when they were through. Their plans went awry when the auto came to grief against a telephone pole. In dismissing the complaint, the District Judge said: </s> "Upon principle and authority there was no stealing but merely trespass; secret borrowing. At common law and likewise by the federal statute (18 USCA 82) adopting common-law terms, stealing in general imports larceny; that is, felonious taking and intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property." 1 F. Supp. at 660. </s> 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 87, entitled "Embezzling arms and stores," provides: </s> "Whoever shall steal, embezzle, or knowingly apply to his own use, or unlawfully sell, convey, or dispose of, any ordnance, arms, ammunition, clothing, subsistence, stores, money, or other property of the United States, furnished or to be used for the military or naval [342 U.S. 246, 267] service, shall be punished as prescribed in sections 80 and 82-86 of this title." </s> No cases appear to have been decided relating to the element of intent in the acts proscribed in that section. </s> 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 100, "Embezzling public moneys or other property," states that: </s> "Whoever shall embezzle, steal, or purloin any money, property, record, voucher, or valuable thing whatever, of the moneys, goods, chattels, records, or property of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." </s> The only noted case of consequence is Crabb v. Zerbst, 99 F.2d 562 (C. A. 5th Cir.), to which the dissent below referred at some length. The appellant there was convicted of feloniously taking and carrying away certain personal property of the United States in violation of 46 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 99, and had been sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. He argued that the five-year limitation of sentence in 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 100 for stealing property of the United States reduced the ten-year limitation in 99 for feloniously taking and carrying away property of the United States to five years also. </s> The Court of Appeals rejected his argument, holding that the crime of "stealing" in 100 was separate and distinct from the offense specified in 99, on the ground that 100 was a broadening of the common-law crime of larceny to foreclose any avenue by which one might, in the process of pleading, escape conviction for one offense by proving that he had committed another only a hair's breadth different. </s> In the course of its opinion, it advanced the following pertinent observations: </s> "That felonious taking and carrying away of property which may be the subject of the offense constitutes the common law offense of larceny cannot be disputed. . . . However, it is doubtful if at common law any fixed definition or formula [as to the meaning of `larceny'] was not strained in its application to some of the cases clearly constituting the offense. Modern criminal codes treat the offense in various ways. Some define the offense by following the old cases and are merely declaratory of the common law, while others [342 U.S. 246, 268] have broadened the offense to include offenses previously known as embezzlement, false pretenses, and even felonious breaches of trust. </s> . . . . . </s> "As pointed out above, the modern tendency is to broaden the offense of larceny, by whatever name it may be called, to include such related offenses as would tend to complicate prosecutions under strict pleading and practice. In some of these statutes the offense is denominated `theft' or `stealing.' No statute offers a clearer example of compromise between the common law and the modern code than the two sections here involved. Section 46 [18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 99] deals with robbery and larceny, the description of the latter being taken from the common law. Section 47 [18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 100] denounces the related offenses which might be included with those described in section 46 under a code practice seeking to avoid the pitfalls of technical pleading. In it the offense of embezzlement is included by name, without definition. Then to cover such cases as may shade into larceny, as well as any new situation which may arise under changing modern conditions and not envisioned under the common law, it adds the words steal or purloin . . . . Stealing, having no common law definition to restrict its meaning as an offense, is commonly used to denote any dishonest transaction whereby one person obtains that which rightfully belongs to another, and deprives the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, but may or may not involve the element of stealth usually attributed to the word purloin. . . . Thus, in any case involving larceny as defined by the common law, section 46 [18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 99] would apply. Where the offense is embezzlement, or its nature so doubtful as to fall between larceny and embezzlement, it may be prosecuted under section 47 [18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 100]." 99 F.2d at 564-565. </s> The reference in Crabb v. Zerbst to 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 99, the robbery and larceny statute then operative, suggests examination of its successor in today's code. For purpose of clarification, that section states that: </s> "Whoever shall rob another of any kind or description of personal [342 U.S. 246, 269] property belonging to the United States, or shall feloniously take and carry away the same, shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both." </s> The Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. 641 makes no mention of it as a successor to that section. The present robbery statute is 18 U.S.C. 2112, "Personal property of United States," providing that: </s> "Whoever robs another of any kind or description of personal property belonging to the United States, shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years." </s> The Reviser's Note to that section recites that it is derived from 99 of the 1940 Code, and "That portion of said section 99 relating to felonious taking was omitted as covered by section 641 of this title," which makes it clear that, notwithstanding the absence of any reference to 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 99 in the Note to 18 U.S.C. 641, the crime of larceny by a felonious taking and carrying away has been transported directly from the former into the latter. </s> 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 101 is the forerunner of that part of present 641 dealing with receiving stolen property, and has no application to the problem at hand. </s> The history of 641 demonstrates that it was to apply to acts which constituted larceny or embezzlement at common law and also acts which shade into those crimes but which, most strictly considered, might not be found to fit their fixed definitions. It is also pertinent to note that it renders one subject to its penalty who "knowingly converts to his own use" property of the United States. The word "converts" does not appear in any of its predecessors. 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 82 is applicable to one who "take[s] for his [own] use . . . with intent to steal or purloin . . . ." 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 87 uses the words "knowingly apply to his own use." Neither 18 U.S.C. (1940 ed.) 99, 100, nor 101 has any words resembling "knowingly converts to his own use." The 1948 Revision was not intended to create new crimes but to recodify those then in existence. We find no suggestion that a guilty intent was not a part of each crime now embodied in 641. </s> [Footnote 29 18 U.S.C. 1, 641. </s> [Footnote 30 Had the indictment been limited to a charge in the words of the statute, it would have been defective if, in the light of the common law, the statute itself failed to set forth expressly, fully, and clearly all elements necessary to constitute the offense. United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611 . </s> [Footnote 31 Harker v. Dement, 9 Gill (Md.) 7, 52 Am. Dec. 670 (1850); Railroad Co. v. O'Donnell, 49 Ohio St. 489, 32 N. E. 476 (1892). The rationale underlying such cases is that when one clearly assumes the rights of ownership over property of another no proof of intent to convert is necessary. It has even been held that one may be held liable in conversion even though he reasonably supposed that he had a legal right to the property in question. Row v. Home Sav. Bank, 306 Mass. 522, 29 N. E. 2d 552 (1940). For other cases in the same vein, see those collected in 53 Am. Jur. 852-854. These authorities leave no doubt that Morissette could be held liable for a civil conversion for his taking of the property here involved, and the instructions to the jury might have been appropriate in such a civil action. This assumes of course that actual abandonment was not proven, a matter which petitioner should be allowed to prove if he can. </s> [Footnote 32 The Larceny Act of 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 50, an Act "to consolidate and simplify the Law relating to Larceny triable on Indictment and Kindred Offences," provides: </s> "1. For the purposes of this Act - </s> "(1) A person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof: </s> "Provided that a person may be guilty of stealing any such thing notwithstanding that he has lawful possession thereof, if, being a bailee or part owner thereof, he fraudulently converts the same to his own use or the use of any person other than the owner . . . ." </s> For the growth and development of the crime of larceny in England, see 2 Russell on Crime (10th ed., Turner, 1950), 1037-1222, from which the material above was taken. </s> [Footnote 33 N. Y. Penal Law, 1290, defines larceny as follows: </s> "A person who, with the intent to deprive or defraud another of the use and benefit of property or to appropriate the same to the use [342 U.S. 246, 273] of the taker, or of any other person other than the true owner, wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds, by any means whatever, from the possession of the true owner or of any other person any money, personal property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind, steals such property and is guilty of larceny." </s> The same section provides further that it shall be no defense to a prosecution that: </s> "2. The accused in the first instance obtained possession of, or title to, such property lawfully, provided he subsequently wrongfully withheld or appropriated such property to his own use or the use of any person not entitled to the use and benefit of such property . . . ." </s> The Historical Note to that section discloses that it represents an attempt to abolish the distinctions between kinds of larcenies. Laws 1942, c. 732, 1, provided: </s> "It is hereby declared as the public policy of the state that the best interests of the people of the state will be served, and confusion and injustice avoided, by eliminating and abolishing the distinctions which have hitherto differentiated one sort of theft from another, each of which, under section twelve hundred and ninety of the penal law, was denominated a larceny, to wit: common law larceny by asportation, common law larceny by trick and device, obtaining property by false pretenses, and embezzlement." </s> [Footnote 34 Cf. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 59; Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumption, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 906. </s> [342 U.S. 246, 277]

United States Supreme Court R. J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO CO. v. DURHAM COUNTY(1986) No. 85-1021 Argued: October 6, 1986Decided: December 9, 1986 </s> Appellant, a New Jersey corporation with its principal office and only manufacturing facilities located in North Carolina, blends tobacco imported from foreign countries with domestic tobacco in producing finished tobacco products virtually all of which are consumed in the United States. Upon importation, the foreign tobacco is placed under customs bond given by appellant, and is stored in one or more of the customs-bonded warehouses owned and maintained by appellant in appellee Forsyth and Durham Counties, N.C., usually for a 2-year period to permit aging. Appellant pays the required customs duties upon withdrawal of the tobacco from the warehouses. Under North Carolina statutes, tobacco present in the State on January 1 of each year is subject to a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax levied and collected by counties and municipalities. In listing its taxable personal property for 1983 in appellee counties, appellant claimed that, under the ruling in Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145 , its imported tobacco in customs-bonded warehouses was immune from state taxation on federal constitutional grounds. The counties' tax supervisors denied the claim, and the denials were upheld on administrative appeals. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting appellant's contentions that the tax violated the Import-Export and Due Process Clauses, and distinguished Xerox, reasoning that it prohibited state taxation only of imported goods stored under bond and awaiting export, not of those destined for domestic manufacture and consumption. Appellant filed with the North Carolina Supreme Court both a notice of appeal and a petition for discretionary review. The court granted a motion to dismiss for lack of a substantial constitutional question and denied appellant's petition. Appellant then filed with this Court an appeal from the North Carolina Supreme Court and another appeal from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. [479 U.S. 130, 131] </s> Held: </s> 1. This Court has appellate jurisdiction as to the North Carolina Supreme Court's judgment, under 28 U.S.C. 1257(2), which extends such jurisdiction to review a "final" judgment "rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had . . . where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity." Pp. 136-139. </s> (a) Appellant properly challenged on federal constitutional grounds the validity of North Carolina's ad valorem property tax, and there was a final judgment in favor of validity. Cf. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 . Pp. 136-138. </s> (b) The appeal from the North Carolina Supreme Court, not the North Carolina Court of Appeals, is the proper one under 1257(2). A North Carolina statute gives a litigant an appeal of right to the State Supreme Court from any Court of Appeals decision that "directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States." In the absence of positive assurance to the contrary by the North Carolina Supreme Court, its grant of appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a substantial federal constitutional question constitutes a decision on the merits affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment, not a determination that the State Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. Pp. 138-139. </s> 2. Consistent with the Supremacy Clause, a State may impose a non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods stored in a customs-bonded warehouse and destined for domestic manufacture and sale. The holding in Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, supra, is limited to its factual situation, that is, where taxed imported goods in customs-bonded warehouses are intended for transshipment in foreign commerce. North Carolina's taxation of appellant's goods does not contradict the purposes of the federal statutory scheme governing customs-bonded warehouses to promote foreign commerce and to aid certain sectors of American economic life. To invalidate the North Carolina tax would place domestic tobacco, which is subject to the ad valorem property tax while aging, at a distinct disadvantage to the imported tobacco; domestic producers and local taxpayers would "subsidize" the growers of imported tobacco. Nor does the taxation here conflict with the central purpose behind customs-bonded warehouses: to ensure that federal customs duties are collected. The federal statutes and regulations that guide monitoring the movement of imported goods and the warehouse proprietor's conduct with respect to such goods both guarantee the collection of federal revenues and are not so comprehensive as to leave no room for North Carolina's assessment of ad valorem taxes. Pp. 139-152. [479 U.S. 130, 132] </s> 3. Application of the North Carolina tax to appellant's imported tobacco does not violate the Import-Export Clause. The focus of Import-Export Clause cases is on the nature of the tax at issue, not the nature of the goods as imports. North Carolina's tax does not offend the policies behind the Clause: concern that a state tax might interfere with federal regulation of foreign commerce; fear that on account of such state taxation the Federal Government will lose an important source of revenue; and a desire to maintain harmony among the States, which would be disturbed if seaboard States could tax goods merely flowing through their ports to other States not so favorably situated. Cf. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 . Pp. 152-155. </s> 4. North Carolina's tax does not violate the Due Process Clause. A state tax comports with the Clause if the taxing power exerted by the State bears a "fiscal relation" to protection, opportunities, and benefits given by the State. In light of the police, fire, and other services provided to appellant's imported tobacco by North Carolina counties and cities, such a "fiscal relation" clearly exists in this case. P. 156. </s> No. 85-1021, 314 N.C. 540, 335 S. E. 2d 21, affirmed. No. 85-1022, appeal dismissed; reported below: 73 N.C. App. 475, 326 S. E. 2d 911. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 85-1022, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, North Carolina, et al., on appeal from the Court of Appeals of North Carolina. </s> Erwin N. Griswold argued the cause for appellant in both cases. With him on the briefs were Bob C. Griffo, Hugh Calkins, Kathleen B. Burke, John C. Duffy, Jr., James W. McGrath, Thomas L. Kummer, and John A. Cocklereece, Jr. </s> Rex E. Lee argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief were Carter G. Phillips, S. C. Kitchen, Thomas Russell Odom, P. Eugene Price, Jr., Jonathan V. Maxwell, and John G. Wolfe III.Fn </s> Fn [479 U.S. 130, 132] Benna Ruth Solomon and Beate Bloch filed a brief for the National Association of Counties et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case 1 presents the narrow but important question whether a State may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods stored under bond in a customs [479 U.S. 130, 133] warehouse and destined for domestic manufacture and sale. </s> I </s> Appellant R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company is a New Jersey corporation with its principal office in Winston-Salem, N.C. Reynolds manufactures finished tobacco products for sale to distributors and other authorized purchasers. App. to Juris. Statement 26a. Virtually all its products are consumed in the United States. Id., at 31a. Its only manufacturing facilities are in Winston-Salem, where it blends imported tobacco with domestic tobacco in its manufacturing process. 2 </s> The foreign tobacco is shipped to a port of entry in the United States and is placed under customs bond given by Reynolds to secure the payment of federal import duties. See 19 U.S.C. 1555 (1982 ed., Supp. III). The tobacco is then transported by truck or rail to one or more of the 88 customs-bonded warehouses owned and maintained by Reynolds in Forsyth and Durham Counties, N.C. 3 Because [479 U.S. 130, 134] nearly all imported tobacco requires aging, it is usually in the warehouses for two years. Reynolds pays the required customs duties upon withdrawal of tobacco from the warehouses. Reynolds stores its domestic tobacco in nonbonded warehouses in the same two counties. It receives identical city and county police, fire, and other public services at its customs-bonded and nonbonded warehouses. App. to Juris. Statement 32a. </s> Tobacco present in North Carolina on January 1 of each year is subject to an ad valorem property tax in the amount of 60% of the rate generally applicable to other property. 4 See N.C. Gen. Stat. 105-277(a) and 105-285 (1985). Counties and municipalities are authorized to levy and collect property taxes, but they must do so in a manner uniform throughout the State. See 105-272. In listing its taxable personal property for 1983 in Durham and Forsyth Counties, Reynolds claimed that, under this Court's ruling in Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145 (1982), its imported tobacco in customs-bonded warehouses was immune from taxation on federal constitutional grounds. App. 4-13. The tax supervisors for the respective counties denied this claim, and the County Boards of Equalization and Review upheld the denials. Id., at 15-23. </s> Reynolds then filed appeals (consolidated for hearing) with the North Carolina Property Tax Commission, sitting as the State Board of Equalization and Review. Reynolds again [479 U.S. 130, 135] contended that the taxation of the imported tobacco was at odds with Xerox. The Commission, however, found Xerox distinguishable because the warehoused goods under consideration in that case were destined for foreign markets and were lodged only temporarily in customs-bonded warehouses in this country, whereas Reynolds' tobacco was not so destined and had "nothing temporary about its existence in this country." App. to Juris. Statement 35a-36a. The Commission, id., at 36a, likened the Reynolds facts, instead, to those of American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 271 Cal. App. 2d 437, 77 Cal. Rptr. 570 (1969), appeal dism'd, 396 U.S. 273 (1970), where a nondiscriminatory tax on imported goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses and destined for domestic consumption was upheld. </s> The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission's decision. In re R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 73 N.C. App. 475, 326 S. E. 2d 911 (1985). The court first rejected Reynolds' contention that the tax violated the Import-Export Clause, because the tax was clearly not an impost or duty. Id., at 478-480, 326 S. E. 2d, at 914-915. The court then distinguished Xerox, reasoning that it prohibited state taxation only of goods stored under bond and awaiting export, not of those destined for domestic manufacture and consumption. 73 N.C. App., at 482-483, 326 S. E. 2d, at 916-917. Following the California Court of Appeal's conclusion in American Smelting that customs-bonded warehouses were not meant to create a "warehouse enclave" for foreign goods destined to be sold and consumed in domestic commerce, the North Carolina court observed that it would be unfair to "exempt imported tobacco aging in customs bonded warehouses from property taxation while imposing these taxes on domestically-grown tobacco aging in ordinary warehouses." 73 N.C. App., at 483-484, 326 S. E. 2d, at 917. Finally, the court dismissed Reynolds' due process claim, finding that the appropriate test was "`whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, [479 U.S. 130, 136] opportunities and benefits given by the state.'" Id., at 485, 326 S. E. 2d, at 918, quoting Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). Because there was no dispute that the imported tobacco received the benefit of local services, the imposition of the ad valorem tax did not constitute a due process violation. 73 N.C. App., at 485-486, 326 S. E. 2d, at 918. </s> Reynolds then filed with the North Carolina Supreme Court a notice of appeal and a petition for discretionary review. The Supreme Court granted the counties' subsequent motion to dismiss for lack of a substantial constitutional question and denied Reynolds' petition. In re R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 314 N.C. 540, 335 S. E. 2d 21 (1985). </s> Reynolds appealed to this Court. 5 We postponed consideration of our jurisdiction to the hearing on the merits. 475 U.S. 1009 (1986). </s> II </s> Under 28 U.S.C. 1257, appellate jurisdiction lies in this Court to review a "final" judgment "rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had . . . (2) . . . where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity." </s> A </s> The initial jurisdictional question presented here is whether Reynolds properly challenged the validity of North Carolina's ad valorem property tax and whether there was a final judgment in favor of validity. Because the North Carolina Court of Appeals sustained the tax against Reynolds' claim that, as applied to its imported tobacco, the tax was repugnant to the Import-Export, Supremacy, and Due Process [479 U.S. 130, 137] Clauses, and the North Carolina Supreme Court concluded that no substantial constitutional question was raised by the appeal, our appellate jurisdiction would seem to be assured. Appellees contend, however, that jurisdiction under 1257(2) has not been established because Reynolds failed to make "`an explicit and timely insistence'" in the North Carolina courts that the State's tax statute, as applied to it, violated the Federal Constitution. Brief for Appellees 12, quoting Charleston Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 185 (1945). Appellees argue that Reynolds challenged merely the assessment or levy of the tax by North Carolina authorities, a situation where appellate jurisdiction does not lie. We find the argument unpersuasive. </s> In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), this Court was faced with a similar challenge to appellate jurisdiction. Appellees in that case asserted that Japanese shipping companies had been denied only a constitutional immunity from taxation for their shipping containers and that the California courts had not sustained the tax statute against federal constitutional attack. See id., at 440. Contrary to that suggestion, this Court found that the appellants had challenged the constitutionality of the tax statute, as applied, and that the California courts had sustained the statute's validity. Id., at 441. We further observed that "a state statute is sustained within the meaning of 1257(2) when a state court holds it applicable to a particular set of facts as against the contention that such application is invalid on federal grounds." Ibid. </s> The situation presented by the present case is like that in Japan Line: Reynolds explicitly drew the ad valorem property tax, as applied to its imported tobacco, into constitutional question, and the North Carolina courts upheld the validity of the tax. See also Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S., at 149 ; McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 219 , n. 12 (1981). Thus, under 1257(2), there was a final state-court [479 U.S. 130, 138] judgment in favor of the validity of the tax, and Reynolds properly challenged it. </s> B </s> Reynolds draws our attention to a jurisdictional detail that is unresolved. It has not been made clear which North Carolina court, in circumstances like those present here, is the "highest court" from which an appeal lies under 1257. North Carolina, with exceptions not pertinent here, gives a litigant an appeal of right to its Supreme Court from any decision of its Court of Appeals that "directly involves a substantial question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this State." N.C. Gen. Stat. 7A-30 (Supp. 1985). As Reynolds explains, the grant of appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of a substantial federal constitutional question by the North Carolina Supreme Court could be interpreted as a decision on the merits affirming the Court of Appeals' judgment, or it could be viewed as a determination by that court that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. See Brief for Appellant 11. Depending upon how the dismissal is to be characterized, appeal here would properly lie from the Supreme Court or, on the other hand, from the Court of Appeals. 6 </s> We have resolved that we should decide this jurisdictional question so that practitioners may be certain of their ground. In the absence of positive assurance to the contrary from the North Carolina Supreme Court, we consider that court's dismissal of Reynolds' appeal to be a decision on the merits. Cf. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037 -1044 (1983). With no such contrary assurance in the present record, we [479 U.S. 130, 139] conclude that it is the appeal from that court that is the proper one under 1257. </s> When confronted with a comparable situation arising from Ohio, this Court ruled that the appeal lies from the Ohio Supreme Court and not from that State's Court of Appeals. See Matthews v. Huwe, 269 U.S. 262, 265 (1925); Hetrick v. Village of Lindsey, 265 U.S. 384, 386 (1924). See also Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 515 (1927). 7 In Matthews, Chief Justice Taft, an Ohioan writing for the Court, explained the appropriateness of the appeal from the Ohio Supreme Court: </s> "It is one of those not infrequent cases in which decision of the merits of the case also determines jurisdiction. The petition was dismissed, not because the court was really without jurisdiction, for it could have taken it, but because the question was regarded as frivolous, which is a different thing from finding that the petition was not in character one which the Court could consider." 269 U.S., at 265 . </s> This reasoning is applicable to the present case: there is no question that the North Carolina Supreme Court had jurisdiction to hear Reynolds' appeal, but it determined not to do so in light of its conclusion that the appeal raised no substantial constitutional question. </s> We therefore regard the appeal in No. 85-1021 (from the Supreme Court of North Carolina) as the proper one, and we dismiss the appeal in No. 85-1022 (from the North Carolina Court of Appeals) for want of jurisdiction. [479 U.S. 130, 140] </s> III </s> On the merits, the crucial issue is whether Congress has exercised its power under the Supremacy Clause to pre-empt ad valorem state taxation of imported goods that are stored in customs-bonded warehouses and that are destined for domestic markets. Under this Clause the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2. In determining whether Congress has invoked this pre-emption power, we give primary emphasis to the ascertainment of congressional intent. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). This may be manifested in several ways. Ibid.; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986). Chief among the indications of an intent to pre-empt is where Congress has legislated so comprehensively that it has left no room for supplementary state legislation. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra. Pre-emption may also be found where state legislation would impede the purposes and objectives of Congress. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). In undertaking this analysis, however, we must be mindful of the principle that "federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons - either that the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so ordained." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973) ("So here, we may not overlook the body of law relating to the sensitive interrelationship between statutes adopted by the separate, yet coordinate, federal and state sovereignties"). See Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491, 500 -501 (1984). </s> In Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145 (1982), this Court recently dealt with the issue of pre-emption of state [479 U.S. 130, 141] taxation on imported goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses. It there examined the narrow question "whether a state may impose nondiscriminatory ad valorem personal property taxes on imported goods stored under bond in a customs warehouse and destined for foreign markets." Id., at 146. 8 At the outset of its pre-emption analysis, the Court in Xerox, examined the legislative history of the Warehousing Act of 1846, 9 Stat. 53, the forerunner of the present statutory scheme, in order to uncover the objectives behind the customs-bonded warehouse. The Court observed: "The Act stimulated foreign commerce by allowing goods in transit in foreign commerce to remain in secure storage, duty free, until they resumed their journey in export." 459 U.S., at 150 . The Court further noted that making this country a center of world commerce was a desired and conceivable goal in light of our favorable geographic location between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans that would facilitate the "transshipment of goods." Id., at 150-151. Moreover, for the drafters of the Act, the promotion of foreign commerce went hand in hand with the growth of American shipping and mercantile industries. Id., at 151. The Court concluded: "To these ends, Congress was willing to waive all duty on goods that were reexported from the warehouse, and to defer, for a [479 U.S. 130, 142] prescribed period, the duty on goods destined for American consumption." Ibid. </s> The Court, therefore, had to determine whether state taxation of the copiers destined for export would contradict the purpose of promoting foreign commerce and the related goal of aiding certain sectors of American economic life. It limited its pre-emption analysis to whether taxation would impede the congressional objectives. It particularly relied upon its earlier decision in McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940), where it had found that the federal warehouse scheme pre-empted a New York City sales tax on oil imported under customs bond, refined in a customs-bonded warehouse, 9 and sold as ships' stores for vessels destined for abroad. As the Court in Xerox noted, the tax at issue in McGoldrick would detract from the benefit American refiners received in their freedom from customs duties on the oil and thus undermined the advantage they gained in the competition with their foreign counterparts. 459 U.S., at 152 (citing McGoldrick, 309 U.S., at 429 ). Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the Xerox Court concluded that the waiver of customs duties benefited those merchants who used American ports "as transshipment centers," gave them a competitive advantage over importers using storage facilities in other countries, and thus promoted foreign commerce to the United States. 459 U.S., at 153 . Because the waiver so clearly furthered the Act's purposes, any attempt to remove its benefit, such as would occur through state taxation, was incompatible with these goals. The Court thus ruled that state property tax on the copiers was pre-empted. 10 </s> [479 U.S. 130, 143] </s> In a summary of its holding, however, this Court rather broadly stated that "state property taxes on goods stored under bond in a customs warehouse are pre-empted by Congress' comprehensive regulation of customs duties." Id., at 154. Reynolds would conclude from that sentence that the holding in Xerox precludes state taxation of any goods in a customs warehouse, regardless of their destination. 11 As is [479 U.S. 130, 144] clear from what has been said above, however, we accept Xerox's holding and the quoted sentence as limited to the factual situation presented in that case, that is, where the goods are intended for transshipment. </s> It is difficult, moreover, to believe that the purposes in forming the customs-bonded warehouse scheme identified by the Court in Xerox would be disserved by the imposition of ad valorem property taxes on Reynolds' imported tobacco. It makes sense to conclude that state property taxation may discourage an importer whose goods are destined for transshipment in foreign commerce from using American ports and facilities, particularly when the same importer is granted an exemption from customs duties on all goods exported. Similar taxation would hardly deter an importer who, like Reynolds, stores goods in customs-bonded warehouses for up to two years for domestic manufacture and consumption, the storage period arguably being part of the manufacturing process because the tobacco requires aging. 12 Unlike Xerox, [479 U.S. 130, 145] moreover, Reynolds is not completely free of import duties on its goods but simply has them deferred. 13 Thus, rather than being a charge that detracts from the absolute benefit of the waiver of duties, the state tax here is in addition to the payment of duties and might well be considered as nothing more than an expected cost of doing business. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S., at 156 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Furthermore, while the tax on goods destined for foreign markets would have harmful effects on American industry and workers by discouraging importers from using American ships and ports, to invalidate the North Carolina tax would place domestic tobacco, which is subject to the ad valorem property tax while aging, at a distinct disadvantage to the imported tobacco. Domestic producers and local taxpayers would thus "subsidize" the growers of imported tobacco. 14 See In re R. J. Reynolds, 73 N.C. App., at 484, [479 U.S. 130, 146] 326 S. E. 2d, at 917 ("Also, since this imported tobacco receives the same local governmental services, such as police and fire protection, as domestic tobacco, local taxpayers [479 U.S. 130, 147] would be forced to provide a subsidy in excess of a million dollars to Reynolds"). Permitting imposition of a tax thus leads to equal treatment for imported and domestic tobacco. </s> One of the Warehousing Act's major goals, manifested in its scheme of deferral and waiver of duties, was to promote the importer's flexibility with respect to his goods. Under the system in place prior to the Warehousing Act, an importer was required to pay the duties in cash when the goods were unloaded from the vessel; if no duties were paid, interest on them would immediately accrue and would have to be satisfied, or the customs officials would sell the goods for the charges. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 790 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Dix). 15 What this meant for the merchant who did not have a ready source of funds was that he would be forced to part with a portion of his goods, often in an unfavorable market, in order to raise money to pay the duties. Id., at 792; see also H. R. Rep. No. 411, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-3 (1846). Moreover, an importer who was unsure about the ultimate destination of the goods would be penalized by keeping them in warehouses in this country, for he would lose the benefit of the use of the money that had been paid for the customs duties. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 792 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Dix). By permitting an importer to defer duties for a set period of time and to have a waiver of duties on reexported goods, the Warehousing Act enabled the importer, without any threat of financial loss, to place his goods in domestic markets or to return them to foreign commerce and, by this flexibility, encouraged importers to use American facilities. 16 </s> [479 U.S. 130, 148] </s> It is difficult to discern how imposition of an ad valorem tax will affect an importer's flexibility in a situation where, as here, goods are destined for domestic markets. Given that the tobacco is aging in the customs-bonded warehouses in preparation for domestic manufacture and sale in this country, Reynolds does not occupy the position of an importer looking for the best market, domestic or foreign, in which to place the stored goods. 17 In any event, Reynolds clearly benefits from the flexibility created by the Warehousing Act. By being allowed to defer customs duties on the imported tobacco for up to five years, Reynolds is able to decide how much imported tobacco to use in its manufacturing process at any given time, depending upon the demand for its products in the domestic market. </s> Nor is there any suggestion that taxation here would conflict with the central purpose behind the customs-bonded warehouses: to ensure that federal customs duties are collected. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S., at 155 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Not only is the present statutory and regulatory framework sufficient to permit customs officials to monitor the entrance and removal of goods from warehouses and thus to guarantee collection of federal revenue, but Reynolds does not explain how, on the facts of this case, imposition of the North Carolina tax will prevent customs [479 U.S. 130, 149] officials from receiving the duties. 18 See n. 3, supra. And the present statutes and regulations that guide this monitoring and the warehouse proprietor's own conduct with respect to the imported goods are not so comprehensive as to leave no room for North Carolina's assessment of ad valorem taxes. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S., at 230 ; Louisiana Public Service Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S., at 370 . Although the regulations are not themselves controlling on the pre-emption issue, see Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S., at 152 , n. 8, where, as in this case, Congress has entrusted an agency with the task of promulgating regulations to carry out the purposes of a statute, see 19 U.S.C. 1556, as part of the pre-emption analysis we must consider whether the regulations evidence a desire to occupy a field completely. See Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 -154 (1982). Pre-emption should not be inferred, however, simply because the agency's regulations are comprehensive. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 716 -718 (1985). In this case, the current regulations, while detailed, appear to contemplate some concurrent state regulation and, arguably, even state taxation. 19 </s> [479 U.S. 130, 150] </s> Finally, we agree with the North Carolina Court of Appeals that this case presents a factual situation similar to that in American Smelting and that the California Court of Appeal's reasoned decision is therefore pertinent. 20 The Court of Appeal considered whether metal-bearing ores and concentrates to be treated in a customs-bonded smelting and refining warehouse, 21 some to be reexported and others to be used in domestic markets, were subject to a local property tax. Relying upon McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940), the Court of Appeal concluded that the refined materials destined to reenter the exportation stream were exempt from local taxation. 271 Cal. App. 2d, at 481, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 601. With respect to similar materials intended for domestic consumption, however, the court concluded that "neither the laws, nor the regulations, nor the precedents . . . show a congressional intent to interfere with the right of the state to tax goods which have been imported for, and [479 U.S. 130, 151] have been appropriated to, processing for domestic consumption." Ibid. The Court of Appeal could see no reason why state taxation on such goods would interfere with the primary benefit to be given the importer - deferral of the duties, and the Federal Government's concern with collecting its customs duties. It thus concluded that there was no reason why this taxation should depend upon when the goods were withdrawn from the warehouses. Id., at 469-470, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 593-594. A customs-bonded warehouse was not to become an "enclave of foreign commerce," id., at 470, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 594, nor was it to give the operator of the smelter a "bounty" that would enable it to prevail in its competition over "domestic smelters refining domestic ores." Id., at 474, 77 Cal. Rptr., at 596-597. So also here, regardless of the imposition of the North Carolina ad valorem tax, Reynolds will be able to defer payment of the customs duties; the Federal Government will receive its customs revenue; and domestic producers of tobacco will not suffer in their competition with the imported tobacco. 22 </s> [479 U.S. 130, 152] </s> We therefore hold that, consistent with the Supremacy Clause, a State may impose a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax on imported goods stored in a customs-bonded warehouse and destined for domestic manufacture and sale. </s> IV </s> We turn to Reynolds' remaining constitutional arguments that the North Carolina ad valorem property tax violates the Import-Export 23 and Due Process Clauses. The Court has stated that its decision in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), "adopted a fundamentally different approach [479 U.S. 130, 153] to cases claiming the protection of the Import-Export Clause." Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353, 359 (1984); see also Washington Revenue Dept. v. Association of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 752 -754 (1978). We explained this approach, and its distinction from the earlier analysis, in Limbach: </s> "To repeat: we think it clear that this Court in Michelin specifically abandoned the concept that the Import-Export Clause constituted a broad prohibition against all forms of state taxation that fell on imports. Michelin changed the focus of Import-Export Clause cases from the nature of the goods as imports to the nature of the tax at issue. The new focus is not on whether the goods have lost their status as imports but is, instead, on whether the tax sought to be imposed is an `Impost or Duty.'" 466 U.S., at 360 . </s> In Michelin, we concluded that a Georgia nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax, which had been assessed upon imported tires and tubes stored in a warehouse, was not the kind of tax prohibited by the Import-Export Clause, inasmuch as it did not offend the policies behind the Clause: concern that an impost or duty might interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of commercial relations with foreign governments; fear that on account of such state taxation the Federal Government would lose an important source of revenue; and a desire to maintain harmony among the States, which would be disturbed if seaboard States could tax goods "merely flowing through their ports" to other States not so favorably situated. 423 U.S., at 285 -286. </s> The nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax at issue here seems indistinguishable from the tax in Michelin in terms of these policies. The North Carolina tax does not interfere with the Federal Government's regulation of foreign commerce, for, as we have seen, it falls on imported and domestic goods alike and does not single out imported goods for unfavorable treatment. See id., at 286. Having concluded [479 U.S. 130, 154] that the tax does not impede the collection of customs duties, it follows that it neither impairs an important source of revenue for the Federal Government nor replaces the federal duty with one of its own. Ibid. Rather, the property tax is nothing more than a means "by which a State apportions the cost of such services as police and fire protection among the beneficiaries according to their respective wealth." Id., at 287. If imposition of the tax happens to have the "incidental effect," ibid., of discouraging some importation of foreign goods, prohibiting this result is not a function of the Import-Export Clause. Finally, in light of the services provided in exchange for this tax, it hardly constitutes the kind of exaction by the seaboard States on goods destined for inland States that the Framers sought to prevent by the Clause. Id., at 288. A failure to assess the tax would shift the tax burden from Reynolds and the ultimate consumers of its tobacco products to the local taxpayers of North Carolina - a result completely at odds with Michelin. See id., at 289. Accordingly, we conclude that the application of the tax to Reynolds' imported tobacco does not violate the Import-Export Clause. </s> This Court has observed that in Michelin it limited its holding to the imported goods "`no longer in transit.'" Washington Revenue Dept., 435 U.S., at 755 (quoting Michelin, 423 U.S., at 302 ). Reynolds contends that, because goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses are by definition "in transit," this case does not fall within the scope of Michelin's holding. 24 This reasoning, however, is unpersuasive. [479 U.S. 130, 155] The imported tobacco here, we repeat, has nothing transitory about it: it has reached its State - indeed, its county - of destination and only the payment of the customs duty, after the appropriate aging, separates it from entrance into the domestic market. More importantly, an automatic "in transit" status for goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses can be inferred only if Congress intended to confer it upon all goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses. See Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S., at 157 (POWELL, J., dissenting). As we have seen, state taxation of such goods destined for domestic markets is contrary to none of the purposes for which Congress established the customs-bonded warehouse scheme. It strains reason to think that, although Congress could have directly pre-empted state taxation in this situation by declaring it to be in conflict with the purposes of customs-bonded warehouses or by directing the United States Customs Service to issue regulations governing taxation of stored goods, Congress decided to achieve the same effect in a more roundabout fashion by giving the goods the talismanic "in transit" status. [479 U.S. 130, 156] </s> We also find no merit in Reynolds' due process claim. As noted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, it is well settled that a state tax comports with the Due Process Clause if "the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state." Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S., at 444 ; see 1 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak, & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law 13.2, p. 669 (1986). In light of the police, fire, and other services provided to Reynolds' imported tobacco by the North Carolina counties and cities, such a "fiscal relation" clearly exists in this case. Although Reynolds contends that goods located in customs-bonded warehouses are outside the taxing jurisdiction of the State because of their "in transit" status, for the reasons given above this argument no more succeeds in the due process context than it does when addressed to the Import-Export Clause analysis. </s> In No. 85-1021, the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina is affirmed. The appeal in No. 85-1022 is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Although there are two appeals (by the same appellant), there is but one case. See Part II, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 The imported tobacco comes from Bulgaria, Syria, Lebanon, Brazil, and a few other places. App. to Juris. Statement 29a. </s> [Footnote 3 Pursuant to federal regulation, a private party may have a building or part of a building designated as a customs-bonded warehouse for the purpose of storing imported goods. See 19 U.S.C. 1555-1565 (1982 ed. and Supp. III); 19 CFR 19.1-19.12 (1986). A customs officer supervises the operation of the warehouse, although labor on the stored merchandise is performed by the proprietor. The regulations prescribe, among other things, the manner in which goods enter and leave the warehouse, 19.6, the records the proprietor must keep, 19.12, and the supervision the customs officer is to perform, 19.4. Customs warehouses are divided into eight classes. 19.1(a). Reynolds has two types, Class 2 and Class 8. Its Class 8 warehouses are storage sheds for the cleaning, sorting, and repacking of tobacco. See 19.1(a)(8). Its Class 2 warehouses are used exclusively for the storage of tobacco. See 19.1(a)(2). It is customary for Reynolds in the course of its manufacturing process to move imported tobacco from storage in its Class 8 warehouses to its Class 2 warehouses located in Reynolds' manufacturing areas. App. to Juris. Statement 30a. Reynolds owns these warehouses and the [479 U.S. 130, 134] land thereunder, is their sole user, and pays all maintenance expenses and property taxes on them. Id., at 30a, 32a. Goods may remain in a customs-bonded warehouse for up to five years from the date of importation without payment of customs duties. 19 U.S.C. 1557(a). Once goods are withdrawn, however, duties are due unless the goods are to be exported. Ibid. When Reynolds is ready to use imported tobacco, its practice is to pay the duty and to move the tobacco out of the Class 2 areas in order to process it with domestic tobacco. App. 90. When this move has been made, the imported tobacco is incorporated in the finished tobacco products within two weeks. Id., at 91. </s> [Footnote 4 There is no equal protection issue in this case. </s> [Footnote 5 Reynolds took care to file one appeal (No. 85-1021) from the North Carolina Supreme Court and another (No. 85-1022) from the North Carolina Court of Appeals. See App. to Juris. Statement 39a, 41a. </s> [Footnote 6 Although Reynolds has informed this Court that the Clerk of the North Carolina Supreme Court advised it that a dismissal "for lack of a substantial constitutional question is not regarded by that Court as a decision on the merits," Reynolds observes that there is no reported decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina that discusses the effect of such a dismissal. Brief for Appellant 11, n. 8. </s> [Footnote 7 We acknowledge that this Court, in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), allowed certiorari to issue to an Ohio Court of Appeals after the Ohio Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal for lack of a substantial constitutional question. See id., at 616. The "highest court" requirement, however, was not addressed in that case. We note that treating the North Carolina Supreme Court's summary dismissal as a decision on the merits accords with this Court's view of its own summary dispositions. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). </s> [Footnote 8 The facts in Xerox reinforce the narrowness of the question examined: the imported goods, Xerox copiers, were plainly designed for sale in Latin America, inasmuch as the operating instructions were in Spanish or Portuguese, the machines, as constructed, would not function on the type of electric current that is standard in the United States, it would have cost $100 to convert each machine for domestic sale, and none of the copiers was ever sold in the United States. 459 U.S., at 147 -148. In fact, when Texas authorities began to assess ad valorem personal property taxes on the copiers, Xerox immediately shipped them to a foreign trade zone, from which it continued to send the machines to Latin America, and exhibited no intention to convert them for domestic use. Id., at 148. Accordingly, in Xerox the bonded goods were destined to be shipped abroad, unlike Reynolds' tobacco, which is destined for domestic markets. </s> [Footnote 9 The warehouses with which McGoldrick was concerned were of Class 6, see 309 U.S., at 422 , defined in the present regulations as those "for the manufacture in bond, solely for exportation, of articles made in whole or in part of imported materials or of materials subject to internal-revenue tax." 19 CFR 19.1(a)(6) (1986); see also 19 U.S.C. 1311. </s> [Footnote 10 The Court remarked that the factual distinctions between McGoldrick and the case before it - namely, that in McGoldrick the oil could be sold only as ships' stores and the tax assessed was a sales tax, whereas Xerox could have paid the duty and withdrawn the copiers for domestic sale and was subject to a property tax - were "distinctions without a legal difference." Xerox, 459 U.S., at 153 . According to Reynolds, this remark reveals that the Court was unconcerned in its analysis with whether the goods stored in customs-bonded warehouses were destined for domestic markets or for export. Taken in context, however, the Court's comment suggests the opposite to us: that Xerox had the option to sell the copiers domestically was not significant, given its clear intention to ship them to Latin America; thus, the copiers were as much destined for transshipment in foreign commerce as was the oil in McGoldrick. The difference in the types of taxes in the two cases was of no importance, for imposition of either tax would detract from the benefit accruing to the importer from the waiver of the duty. That the Court in Xerox was concerned solely with goods destined for transshipment in foreign commerce is further demonstrated by the other case upon which it principally relied, District of Columbia v. International Distributing Corp., 118 U.S. App. D.C. 71, 331 F.2d 817 (1964), where the Court of Appeals proscribed a District of Columbia excise tax on the sale of beverages to foreign embassies while the beverages were still in a customs-bonded warehouse. Although this Court, 459 U.S., at 154 , cited language from International Distributing Corp., 118 U.S. App. D.C., at 73-74, 331 F.2d, at 819-820, to the effect that customs-bonded warehouses were "federal enclaves free of state taxation" and goods housed therein were outside the taxing jurisdiction of the District until removed, the case appeared to turn on the fact that international law, recognized by Congress, granted diplomatic personnel the right to import goods duty free and tax free for their own use. Id., at 74, 331 F.2d, at 820. Arguably, then, the beverages at issue in International Distributing Corp. were still in foreign commerce. The Court's additional quotation from Fabbri v. Murphy, 95 U.S. 191, 197 -198 (1877), see 459 U.S., at 154 , is not inconsistent with this reading of McGoldrick and International Distributing Corp. See n. 24, infra. </s> [Footnote 11 Reynolds also notes that counsel for both Xerox and the state taxing authorities expressed the opinion, in response to questions at oral argument [479 U.S. 130, 144] in the Xerox case in this Court, that the holding would apply either to goods destined for foreign commerce or to those earmarked for domestic use. Reynolds therefore argues here that the Court did intend its broad language to cover both types of goods. Brief for Appellant 17; Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12. Although the questioning at oral argument in Xerox suggests that the Court may well have been inquiring into a situation different from the facts before it - not an infrequent occurrence at oral argument - the Court limited the analysis in its opinion to goods in transshipment. </s> [Footnote 12 Because Reynolds' only manufacturing facility is in Forsyth County, there is no suggestion that Reynolds will discontinue its importation of foreign tobacco if the tax is allowed to stand, and that the tax thus will affect foreign commerce adversely. In fact, Reynolds has been importing foreign tobacco into North Carolina for approximately 25 years. See App. 88-89. Reynolds has been paying the North Carolina ad valorem property tax on its imported tobacco at least since this Court in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), abandoned the "original package" doctrine that had barred property taxes on imported inventory retained in its original package in the hands of the importer. That doctrine had prevented state taxation on Reynolds' imported tobacco. See Reply Brief for Appellant 7, n. 9. It may be noted, however, that Reynolds has filed suit in state court seeking refunds of property taxes it paid on imported [479 U.S. 130, 145] tobacco for 1980, 1981, and 1982, has paid under protest the taxes for 1984 and 1985, and has claimed - and been denied - an exemption for 1986. See Brief for Appellees 7, n. 8. </s> [Footnote 13 The cost of the imported tobacco for which Reynolds sought exemption is $519,059,527. App. to Juris. Statement 28a-29a. The customs duties on this tobacco amount to approximately $42-48 million. Id., at 32a. The tax at issue is about $5 million annually. Brief for Appellees 31, n. 34. </s> [Footnote 14 North Carolina does grant domestic tobacco (and other "farm products") an exemption from taxation for the year following the one in which the product is grown if it is in "an unmanufactured state" and "owned by the original producer." 2D N.C. Gen. Stat. 105-275(4) (1985). Although this tends to equalize competition between imported and domestic tobacco, it is not clear from the record that Reynolds' domestic tobacco is eligible for the benefit of 105-275(4). Even if all of Reynolds' tobacco received the benefit of that provision, it would still not be on an equal competitive footing with imported tobacco, which would be exempt from property taxes for up to five years as long as it is stored in customs-bonded warehouses. See 19 U.S.C. 1557(a). There is no indication in the legislative history of the Warehousing Act that one of the goals of the customs-bonded warehouse system was to benefit imported goods in their competition with domestic goods. In fact, when the bill was debated in the Congress, legislators expressed concern [479 U.S. 130, 146] that the deferral of duties would benefit the foreign merchant at his domestic counterpart's expense: "The foreigner could warehouse his goods, safely and cheaply, for three years, without being compelled to pay the duties. He can sell the goods out as he finds customers; and by continuing the practice of invoicing his goods at a cheaper rate than the American merchant can, he will always place himself in a more advantageous position, and the effect would be to drive the latter out of business." Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1042 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Huntington). See also Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 1166 (1846) (remarks of Rep. Smith). In response to these criticisms, Senator Dix, one of the sponsors of the bill in the Senate, explained that deferral of duties would not give foreign importers and goods such a benefit: "Whether goods are stored in the countries where they are produced, or in our own cities, is of no consequence so far as the question of competition with our domestic products is concerned, unless it can be shown that in the latter case (storing in our own cities) they will be brought into the domestic market at a cost materially less. This, it is believed, cannot be readily shown. Whether stored at home or abroad, the expense of bringing merchandise into the domestic market must be nearly the same. In either case it has the same processes to perform. It must be transported from the factories or workshops where it is produced, to the sea; it must be shipped, carried across the ocean, brought into our ports, and before it can enter into the domestic market to be sold, the impost or duty must be paid. The charges and exactions are the same in both cases. If it is placed in store here and allowed to remain for a limited period without paying duty, it is in no better condition, so far as cost is concerned, than it would have been if it had been kept in store in the country where it was produced, unless storage here is cheaper, and this is questionable." Id., at 795. Senator Dix noted that some benefit might accrue to importers of foreign goods because of the deferral of duties (i. e., interest on the amount for the duties during the deferral period), but he considered that to be immaterial and, in any event, more than offset by the promotion of foreign commerce. Id., at 795-796. Thus, rather than believing that the Act improved the competitive position of foreign goods and their importers, Senator Dix disavowed this purpose and discounted any such effect. </s> [Footnote 15 The pre-Warehousing Act system, which required payment of a cash duty as high as 40% of the value of the goods, see H. R. Rep. No. 411, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1846), was itself a response to an earlier system that had allowed importers to defer payment of customs duties for as long as nine months. See Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 790 (1846) (remarks of Sen. Dix). </s> [Footnote 16 Although there were efforts in both the House and the Senate to require a merchant to designate at the outset which portion of his goods was [479 U.S. 130, 148] intended for reexport or for domestic use, such attempts were rejected. See Journal of the Senate, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 406-407 (1846); Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1178 (1846). Rejection of such amendments suggests that Congress intended to give maximum flexibility to the importer who was unsure of the ultimate destination of the goods. </s> [Footnote 17 We make no determination with respect to warehoused goods that are not, as are those here, destined for the domestic market. We leave for another day such questions as what degree of probability of shipment to foreign markets must be shown to invoke the tax exemption, and whether, with regard to goods for which that showing has been made, state taxes may nevertheless be annually assessed but not collected until release into the domestic market occurs. </s> [Footnote 18 Although Reynolds suggests that practical problems may arise for an importer whose goods are subject to state taxation and who must decide which goods to designate for domestic use, Brief for Appellant 25, this case presents no such practical difficulties. Here, all the goods are destined for domestic manufacture. As has been noted, Reynolds has paid the tax in question for several years without, apparently, experiencing any serious difficulty. See n. 12, supra. </s> [Footnote 19 For example, an applicant for the proprietorship of a bonded warehouse must estimate the "maximum duties and taxes" that will be due on goods stored therein at any one time. 19 CFR 19.2(a) (1986). Under this regulation, state taxation is entirely consistent with the supervisory control over stored goods exercised by customs officers. Pursuant to 19.7, moreover, warehoused goods shall be "liable for the expenses of labor and storage . . . and for all other expenses accruing upon the goods." Expenses might be read here to include state ad valorem property taxes. Under 19.12(b)(3), to maintain the security of the merchandise a warehouse [479 U.S. 130, 150] proprietor is to comply with Treasury Regulations, but in the event of a conflict between them and "any local, state or Federal standard," the latter shall control. This suggests that dual federal and state regulation of customs-bonded warehouses is not only possible but contemplated under the regulations. </s> [Footnote 20 Reynolds contends that in light of the decision in Xerox the summary dismissal in American Smelting is entitled to no precedential value. Reply Brief for Appellant 8. Given the limited focus in Xerox, we do not think that the decision in that case is at odds with American Smelting or affects the precedential weight, albeit limited, of the summary dismissal for want of a substantial federal question. See American Smelting & Refining Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 396 U.S. 273 (1970); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S., at 344 . </s> [Footnote 21 It is irrelevant that the warehouses in American Smelting were Class 7 customs-bonded warehouses designed "for smelting and refining imported metal-bearing materials for exportation or domestic consumption," 19 CFR 19.1(7) (1986); see also 19 U.S.C. 1312(a), and different from the Class 2 and Class 8 warehouses at issue here. We note that McGoldrick, which the Court considered as precedent for its decision in Xerox, concerned Class 6 warehouses, designed for the manufacture of articles destined solely for exportation and not of the type used by Xerox. See n. 9, supra. </s> [Footnote 22 Reynolds also argues that the legislative history of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948, which, among other things, amended the Foreign Trade Zones Act, ch. 590, 48 Stat. 998, codified, as amended, at 19 U.S.C. 81a-81u (1982 ed. and Supp. III), shows that Congress understood the Xerox holding to be broad, i. e., as prohibiting local taxation on all goods stored in customs warehouses. That legislation provides a statutory exemption from state and local property taxes for goods held in a foreign trade zone. While foreign trade zones are more difficult to establish than customs-bonded warehouses, they do permit a wider range of operations. See 19 U.S.C. 81c (1982 ed., Supp. III); 1 R. Sturm, Customs Law & Administration 18.1, pp. 45-52 (1986); Note, 17 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 555, 564-565 (1983). Reynolds buttresses its argument with statements in the legislative history to the effect that, by passing this amendment, Congress was bringing the prohibition of taxation of imported goods in foreign trade zones in line with a similar prohibition in customs-bonded warehouses. See, e. g., 129 Cong. Rec. 14501 (1983) (statement of Sen. Tower); H. R. Rep. No. 98-267, p. 35 (1983); S. Rep. No. 98-308, p. 36 (1983). Just as in the case of imported goods in customs-bonded warehouses, those stored in foreign [479 U.S. 130, 152] trade zones are subject to import duties only when they are withdrawn for domestic consumption. See 19 U.S.C. 81c (1982 ed., Supp. III). Such statements given in the context of a different piece of legislation dealing with a different part of the customs scheme are not persuasive as to congressional purpose with respect to customs-bonded warehouses. See Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117 -118, and n. 13 (1980) (congressional statements explaining intent of previous legislation are entitled to less weight than the statute's language and its legislative history before enactment). Moreover, the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 had a narrow focus: the legislators from Texas sought to pre-empt state taxation of goods in foreign trade zones because Texas, alone among the States, permitted this taxation and thus businesses were discouraged from locating such zones in that State. See 129 Cong. Rec. 14501 (1983) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen) ("The Bentsen-Tower bill addresses a very narrow problem dealing with foreign trade zones in the State of Texas"). Foreign trade zones are valued because they actually promote domestic industry and create jobs. Ibid. Given that the taxation of goods in foreign trade zones could arguably harm domestic industry, while exemption from taxation of the imported goods in the present case would serve to discriminate against domestic producers, there appears to be a sufficient justification for the difference in state taxation with respect to these customs entities. There is no evidence that Reynolds also uses foreign trade zones for the purpose of aging its imported tobacco. Cf. Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S., at 148 (when threatened with local taxes, Xerox immediately shipped its copiers to a foreign trade zone). </s> [Footnote 23 "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except . . . ." U.S. Const., Art. I, 10, cl. 2. </s> [Footnote 24 For this argument, Reynolds particularly relies upon the Xerox Court's favorable citation of International Distributing Corp. to the effect that the goods in customs warehouses were outside the District of Columbia's jurisdiction, 459 U.S., at 154 (citing 118 U.S. App. D.C., at 73-74, 331 F.2d, at 819-820), and the Court's remark that "`Congress did not regard the importation as complete while the goods remained in the custody of the proper officers of customs,'" ibid. (quoting Fabbri v. Murphy, 95 U.S., at 197 -198). In our view, such reliance is misplaced. The Court in Xerox declined to reach the Import-Export Clause issue and was [479 U.S. 130, 155] concerned only with the possible pre-emption of state taxes in the limited context of goods destined to reenter the export stream. Thus, the citations are consistent with Xerox's restricted conclusion that such goods should not be subject to ad valorem property taxes. By themselves these cases do not give any significant weight to Reynolds' present contention. Although there is language in International Distributing Corp. concerning the locality's jurisdiction over goods in customs-bonded warehouses, as we observed above, see n. 10, supra, the decision turned on reciprocity in permitting diplomatic personnel to bring in goods duty and tax free and did not deal with the Import-Export Clause issue. Reynolds' reliance on Fabbri is not helpful either, because that case involved a dispute over whether an importer would be required to pay interest on the customs duty, in addition to the duty itself, when imported goods were withdrawn over a year after they had been stored. 95 U.S., at 193 . Once again, no Import-Export Clause issue was raised in the case, and the remark from Fabbri specifically addresses the appropriateness of the interest charge: that interest was to be paid so long as the goods were in customs officials' custody. Id., at 197-198. </s> [479 U.S. 130, 157]

United States Supreme Court McADAMS v. McSURELY(1978) No. 76-1621 Argued: March 1, 1978Decided: June 26, 1978 </s> Certiorari dismissed. Reported below: 180 U.S. App. D.C. 101, 553 F.2d 1277. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Friedman and Assistant Attorney General Babcock. </s> Morton Stavis argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Doris Peterson, Nancy Stearns, Dan Jack Combs, and Charles N. Mason, Jr. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The writ of certiorari is dismissed as improvidently granted. </s> [438 U.S. 189, 190]

United States Supreme Court MATSUSHITA ELEC. INDUSTRIAL CO. v. ZENITH RADIO(1986) No. 83-2004 Argued: November 12, 1985Decided: March 26, 1986 </s> Petitioners are 21 Japanese corporations or Japanese-controlled American corporations that manufacture and/or sell "consumer electronic products" (CEPs) (primarily television sets). Respondents are American corporations that manufacture and sell television sets. In 1974, respondents brought an action in Federal District Court, alleging that petitioners, over a 20-year period, had illegally conspired to drive American firms from the American CEP market by engaging in a scheme to fix and maintain artificially high prices for television sets sold by petitioners in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain low prices for the sets exported to and sold in the United States. Respondents claim that various portions of this scheme violated, inter alia, 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act. After several years of discovery, petitioners moved for summary judgment on all claims. The District Court then directed the parties to file statements listing all the documentary evidence that would be offered if the case went to trial. After the statements were filed, the court found the bulk of the evidence on which respondents relied was inadmissible, that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged conspiracy, and that any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable. Summary judgment therefore was granted in petitioners' favor. The Court of Appeals reversed. After determining that much of the evidence excluded by the District Court was admissible, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in granting a summary judgment and that there was both direct and circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy. Based on inferences drawn from the evidence, the Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese market. </s> Held: </s> The Court of Appeals did not apply proper standards in evaluating the District Court's decision to grant petitioners' motion for summary judgment. Pp. 582-598. </s> (a) The "direct evidence" on which the Court of Appeals relied - petitioners' alleged supracompetitive pricing in Japan, the "five company [475 U.S. 574, 575] rule" by which each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five American distributors, and the "check prices" (minimum prices fixed by agreement with the Japanese Government for CEPs exported to the United States) insofar as they established minimum prices in the United States - cannot by itself give respondents a cognizable claim against petitioners for antitrust damages. Pp. 582-583. </s> (b) To survive petitioners' motion for a summary judgment, respondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable injury. If the factual context renders respondents' claims implausible, i. e., claims that make no economic sense, respondents must offer more persuasive evidence to support their claims than would otherwise be necessary. To survive a motion for a summary judgment, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of 1 of the Sherman Act must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently. Thus, respondents here must show that the inference of a conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed respondents. Pp. 585-588. </s> (c) Predatory pricing conspiracies are by nature speculative. They require the conspirators to sustain substantial losses in order to recover uncertain gains. The alleged conspiracy is therefore implausible. Moreover, the record discloses that the alleged conspiracy has not succeeded in over two decades of operation. This is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist. The possibility that petitioners have obtained supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market does not alter this assessment. Pp. 588-593. </s> (d) Mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct that the antitrust laws are designed to protect. There is little reason to be concerned that by granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of conspiracy is speculative or ambiguous, courts will encourage conspiracies. Pp. 593-595. </s> (e) The Court of Appeals erred in two respects: the "direct evidence" on which it relied had little, if any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy, and the court failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing. In the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither petitioners' pricing practices, their conduct in the Japanese market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distributions in the American market sufficed to create a "genuine issue for trial" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). On remand, the Court of Appeals may consider whether there is other, unambiguous evidence of the alleged conspiracy. Pp. 595-598. </s> 723 F.2d 238, reversed and remanded. [475 U.S. 574, 576] </s> POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and MARSHALL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 598. </s> Donald J. Zoeller argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John L. Altieri, Jr., Harold G. Levison, Peter J. Gartland, James S. Morris, Kevin R. Keating, Charles F. Schirmeister, Ira M. Millstein, A. Paul Victor, Jeffrey L. Kessler, Carl W. Schwarz, Michael E. Friedlander, William H. Barrett, Donald F. Turner, and Henry T. Reath. </s> Charles F. Rule argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Wallace, Charles S. Stark, Robert B. Nicholson, Edward T. Hand, Richard P. Larm, Abraham D. Sofaer, and Elizabeth M. Teel. </s> Edwin P. Rome argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were William H. Roberts, Arnold I. Kalman, Philip J. Curtis, and John Borst, Jr. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Government of Japan by Stephen M. Shapiro; and for the American Association of Exporters and Importers et al. by Robert Herzstein and Hadrian R. Katz. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Government of Australia et al. by Mark R. Joelson and Joseph P. Griffin; and for the Semiconductor Industry Association by Joseph R. Creighton. </s> JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case requires that we again consider the standard district courts must apply when deciding whether to grant summary judgment in an antitrust conspiracy case. </s> I </s> Stating the facts of this case is a daunting task. The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69 pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than three times as long. In re Japanese Electronic Products [475 U.S. 574, 577] Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238 (CA3 1983); 513 F. Supp. 1100 (ED Pa. 1981). Two respected District Judges each have authored a number of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the parties have filed a 40-volume appendix in this Court that is said to contain the essence of the evidence on which the District Court and the Court of Appeals based their respective decisions. </s> We will not repeat what these many opinions have stated and restated, or summarize the mass of documents that constitute the record on appeal. Since we review only the standard applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, and not the weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence, we find it unnecessary to state the facts in great detail. What follows is a summary of this case's long history. </s> A </s> Petitioners, defendants below, are 21 corporations that manufacture or sell "consumer electronic products" (CEPs) - for the most part, television sets. Petitioners include both Japanese manufacturers of CEPs and American firms, controlled by Japanese parents, that sell the Japanese-manufactured products. Respondents, plaintiffs below, are Zenith Radio Corporation (Zenith) and National Union Electric Corporation (NUE). Zenith is an American firm that manufactures and sells television sets. NUE is the corporate successor to Emerson Radio Company, an American firm that manufactured and sold television sets until 1970, when it withdrew from the market after sustaining substantial losses. Zenith and NUE began this lawsuit in 1974, 1 claiming that petitioners had illegally conspired to drive [475 U.S. 574, 578] American firms from the American CEP market. According to respondents, the gist of this conspiracy was a "`scheme to raise, fix and maintain artificially high prices for television receivers sold by [petitioners] in Japan and, at the same time, to fix and maintain low prices for television receivers exported to and sold in the United States.'" 723 F.2d, at 251 (quoting respondents' preliminary pretrial memorandum). These "low prices" were allegedly at levels that produced substantial losses for petitioners. 513 F. Supp., at 1125. The conspiracy allegedly began as early as 1953, and according to respondents was in full operation by sometime in the late 1960's. Respondents claimed that various portions of this scheme violated 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, and the Antidumping Act of 1916. </s> After several years of detailed discovery, petitioners filed motions for summary judgment on all claims against them. The District Court directed the parties to file, with preclusive effect, "Final Pretrial Statements" listing all the documentary evidence that would be offered if the case proceeded to trial. Respondents filed such a statement, and petitioners responded with a series of motions challenging the admissibility of respondents' evidence. In three detailed opinions, the District Court found the bulk of the evidence on which Zenith and NUE relied inadmissible. 2 </s> The District Court then turned to petitioners' motions for summary judgment. In an opinion spanning 217 pages, the court found that the admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of the alleged [475 U.S. 574, 579] conspiracy. At bottom, the court found, respondents' claims rested on the inferences that could be drawn from petitioners' parallel conduct in the Japanese and American markets, and from the effects of that conduct on petitioners' American competitors. 513 F. Supp., at 1125-1127. After reviewing the evidence both by category and in toto, the court found that any inference of conspiracy was unreasonable, because (i) some portions of the evidence suggested that petitioners conspired in ways that did not injure respondents, and (ii) the evidence that bore directly on the alleged price-cutting conspiracy did not rebut the more plausible inference that petitioners were cutting prices to compete in the American market and not to monopolize it. Summary judgment therefore was granted on respondents' claims under 1 of the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act. Because the Sherman Act 2 claims, which alleged that petitioners had combined to monopolize the American CEP market, were functionally indistinguishable from the 1 claims, the court dismissed them also. Finally, the court found that the Robinson-Patman Act claims depended on the same supposed conspiracy as the Sherman Act claims. Since the court had found no genuine issue of fact as to the conspiracy, it entered judgment in petitioners' favor on those claims as well. 3 </s> [475 U.S. 574, 580] </s> B </s> The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed. 4 The court began by examining the District Court's evidentiary rulings, and determined that much of the evidence excluded by the District Court was in fact admissible. 723 F.2d, at 260-303. These evidentiary rulings are not before us. See 471 U.S. 1002 (1985) (limiting grant of certiorari). </s> On the merits, and based on the newly enlarged record, the court found that the District Court's summary judgment decision was improper. The court acknowledged that "there are legal limitations upon the inferences which may be drawn from circumstantial evidence," 723 F.2d, at 304, but it found that "the legal problem . . . is different" when "there is direct evidence of concert of action." Ibid. Here, the court concluded, "there is both direct evidence of certain kinds of concert of action and circumstantial evidence having some tendency to suggest that other kinds of concert of action may have occurred." Id., at 304-305. Thus, the court reasoned, cases concerning the limitations on inferring conspiracy from ambiguous evidence were not dispositive. Id., at 305. Turning to the evidence, the court determined that a factfinder reasonably could draw the following conclusions: </s> 1. The Japanese market for CEPs was characterized by oligopolistic behavior, with a small number of producers meeting regularly and exchanging information on price and other matters. Id., at 307. This created the opportunity for a stable combination to raise both prices and profits in Japan. American firms could not attack such a combination because the Japanese Government imposed significant barriers to entry. Ibid. </s> 2. Petitioners had relatively higher fixed costs than their American counterparts, and therefore needed to [475 U.S. 574, 581] operate at something approaching full capacity in order to make a profit. Ibid. </s> 3. Petitioners' plant capacity exceeded the needs of the Japanese market. Ibid. </s> 4. By formal agreements arranged in cooperation with Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), petitioners fixed minimum prices for CEPs exported to the American market. Id., at 310. The parties refer to these prices as the "check prices," and to the agreements that require them as the "check price agreements." </s> 5. Petitioners agreed to distribute their products in the United States according to a "five company rule": each Japanese producer was permitted to sell only to five American distributors. Ibid. </s> 6. Petitioners undercut their own check prices by a variety of rebate schemes. Id., at 311. Petitioners sought to conceal these rebate schemes both from the United States Customs Service and from MITI, the former to avoid various customs regulations as well as action under the antidumping laws, and the latter to cover up petitioners' violations of the check-price agreements. </s> Based on inferences from the foregoing conclusions, 5 the Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese market. The court apparently did not consider whether it was as plausible to conclude that petitioners' price-cutting behavior was independent and not conspiratorial. [475 U.S. 574, 582] </s> The court found it unnecessary to address petitioners' claim that they could not be held liable under the antitrust laws for conduct that was compelled by a foreign sovereign. The claim, in essence, was that because MITI required petitioners to enter into the check-price agreements, liability could not be premised on those agreements. The court concluded that this case did not present any issue of sovereign compulsion, because the check-price agreements were being used as "evidence of a low export price conspiracy" and not as an independent basis for finding antitrust liability. The court also believed it was unclear that the check prices in fact were mandated by the Japanese Government, notwithstanding a statement to that effect by MITI itself. Id., at 315. </s> We granted certiorari to determine (i) whether the Court of Appeals applied the proper standards in evaluating the District Court's decision to grant petitioners' motion for summary judgment, and (ii) whether petitioners could be held liable under the antitrust laws for a conspiracy in part compelled by a foreign sovereign. 471 U.S. 1002 (1985). We reverse on the first issue, but do not reach the second. </s> II </s> We begin by emphasizing what respondents' claim is not. Respondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations' economies. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (CA2 1945) (L. Hand, J.); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law § 236d (1978). 6 Nor can respondents recover damages for [475 U.S. 574, 583] any conspiracy by petitioners to charge higher than competitive prices in the American market. Such conduct would indeed violate the Sherman Act, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940), but it could not injure respondents: as petitioners' competitors, respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise the market price in CEPs. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 -489 (1977). Finally, for the same reason, respondents cannot recover for a conspiracy to impose non-price restraints that have the effect of either raising market price or limiting output. Such restrictions, though harmful to competition, actually benefit competitors by making supracompetitive pricing more attractive. Thus, neither petitioners' alleged supracompetitive pricing in Japan, nor the five company rule that limited distribution in this country, nor the check prices insofar as they established minimum prices in this country, can by themselves give respondents a cognizable claim against petitioners for antitrust damages. The Court of Appeals therefore erred to the extent that it found evidence of these alleged conspiracies to be "direct evidence" of a conspiracy that injured respondents. See 723 F.2d, at 304-305. [475 U.S. 574, 584] </s> Respondents nevertheless argue that these supposed conspiracies, if not themselves grounds for recovery of antitrust damages, are circumstantial evidence of another conspiracy that is cognizable: a conspiracy to monopolize the American market by means of pricing below the market level. 7 The thrust of respondents' argument is that petitioners used their monopoly profits from the Japanese market to fund a concerted campaign to price predatorily and thereby drive respondents and other American manufacturers of CEPs out of business. Once successful, according to respondents, petitioners would cartelize the American CEP market, restricting output and raising prices above the level that fair competition would produce. The resulting monopoly profits, respondents contend, would more than compensate petitioners for the losses they incurred through years of pricing below market level. </s> The Court of Appeals found that respondents' allegation of a horizontal conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing, 8 </s> [475 U.S. 574, 585] if proved, 9 would be a per se violation of 1 of the Sherman Act. 723 F.2d, at 306. Petitioners did not appeal from that conclusion. The issue in this case thus becomes whether respondents adduced sufficient evidence in support of their theory to survive summary judgment. We therefore examine the principles that govern the summary judgment determination. </s> III </s> To survive petitioners' motion for summary judgment, 10 respondents must establish that there is a genuine issue of material [475 U.S. 574, 586] fact as to whether petitioners entered into an illegal conspiracy that caused respondents to suffer a cognizable injury. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e); 11 First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288 -289 (1968). This showing has two components. First, respondents must show more than a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws; they must show an injury to them resulting from the illegal conduct. Respondents charge petitioners with a whole host of conspiracies in restraint of trade. Supra, at 582-583. Except for the alleged conspiracy to monopolize the American market through predatory pricing, these alleged conspiracies could not have caused respondents to suffer an "antitrust injury," Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S., at 489 , because they actually tended to benefit respondents. Supra, at 582-583. Therefore, unless, in context, evidence of these "other" conspiracies raises a genuine issue concerning the existence of a predatory pricing conspiracy, that evidence cannot defeat petitioners' summary judgment motion. </s> Second, the issue of fact must be "genuine." Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 56(c), (e). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), 12 its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. See DeLuca v. Atlantic Refining Co., 176 F.2d 421, 423 (CA2 1949) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 943 (1950); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure 2727 (1983); Clark, Special Problems [475 U.S. 574, 587] in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 493, 504-505 (1950). Cf. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944). In the language of the Rule, the nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e) (emphasis added). See also Advisory Committee Note to 1963 Amendment of Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), 28 U.S.C. App., p. 626 (purpose of summary judgment is to "pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial"). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Cities Service, supra, at 289. </s> It follows from these settled principles that if the factual context renders respondents' claim implausible - if the claim is one that simply makes no economic sense - respondents must come forward with more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary. Cities Service is instructive. The issue in that case was whether proof of the defendant's refusal to deal with the plaintiff supported an inference that the defendant willingly had joined an illegal boycott. Economic factors strongly suggested that the defendant had no motive to join the alleged conspiracy. 391 U.S., at 278 -279. The Court acknowledged that, in isolation, the defendant's refusal to deal might well have sufficed to create a triable issue. Id., at 277. But the refusal to deal had to be evaluated in its factual context. Since the defendant lacked any rational motive to join the alleged boycott, and since its refusal to deal was consistent with the defendant's independent interest, the refusal to deal could not by itself support a finding of antitrust liability. Id., at 280. </s> Respondents correctly note that "[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., [475 U.S. 574, 588] 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). But antitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a 1 case. Thus, in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), we held that conduct as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy. Id., at 764. See also Cities Service, supra, at 280. To survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of 1 must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possibility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently. 465 U.S., at 764 . Respondents in this case, in other words, must show that the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that could not have harmed respondents. See Cities Service, supra, at 280. </s> Petitioners argue that these principles apply fully to this case. According to petitioners, the alleged conspiracy is one that is economically irrational and practically infeasible. Consequently, petitioners contend, they had no motive to engage in the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; indeed, they had a strong motive not to conspire in the manner respondents allege. Petitioners argue that, in light of the absence of any apparent motive and the ambiguous nature of the evidence of conspiracy, no trier of fact reasonably could find that the conspiracy with which petitioners are charged actually existed. This argument requires us to consider the nature of the alleged conspiracy and the practical obstacles to its implementation. </s> IV </s> A </s> A predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative. Any agreement to price below the competitive level requires the conspirators to forgo profits that free competition would offer them. The forgone profits may be considered an investment in the future. For the investment to be rational, [475 U.S. 574, 589] the conspirators must have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered. As then-Professor Bork, discussing predatory pricing by a single firm, explained: </s> "Any realistic theory of predation recognizes that the predator as well as his victims will incur losses during the fighting, but such a theory supposes it may be a rational calculation for the predator to view the losses as an investment in future monopoly profits (where rivals are to be killed) or in future undisturbed profits (where rivals are to be disciplined). The future flow of profits, appropriately discounted, must then exceed the present size of the losses." R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 145 (1978). </s> See also McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ. 289, 295-297 (1980). As this explanation shows, the success of such schemes is inherently uncertain: the short-run loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully neutralizing the competition. Moreover, it is not enough simply to achieve monopoly power, as monopoly pricing may breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the excess profits. The success of any predatory scheme depends on maintaining monopoly power for long enough both to recoup the predator's losses and to harvest some additional gain. Absent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will materialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant period of time, "[t]he predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance that it will pay off." Easter-brook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 263, 268 (1981). For this reason, there is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. See, e. g., Bork, supra, at 149-155; Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 699 (1975); Easterbrook, supra; Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing - An Empirical Study, [475 U.S. 574, 590] 4 Antitrust Law & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971); McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N. J.) Case, 1 J. Law & Econ. 137 (1958); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ., at 292-294. See also Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 651 F.2d 76, 88 (CA2 1981) ("[N]owhere in the recent outpouring of literature on the subject do commentators suggest that [predatory] pricing is either common or likely to increase"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982). </s> These observations apply even to predatory pricing by a single firm seeking monopoly power. In this case, respondents allege that a large number of firms have conspired over a period of many years to charge below-market prices in order to stifle competition. Such a conspiracy is incalculably more difficult to execute than an analogous plan undertaken by a single predator. The conspirators must allocate the losses to be sustained during the conspiracy's operation, and must also allocate any gains to be realized from its success. Precisely because success is speculative and depends on a willingness to endure losses for an indefinite period, each conspirator has a strong incentive to cheat, letting its partners suffer the losses necessary to destroy the competition while sharing in any gains if the conspiracy succeeds. The necessary allocation is therefore difficult to accomplish. Yet if conspirators cheat to any substantial extent, the conspiracy must fail, because its success depends on depressing the market price for all buyers of CEPs. If there are too few goods at the artificially low price to satisfy demand, the would-be victims of the conspiracy can continue to sell at the "real" market price, and the conspirators suffer losses to little purpose. </s> Finally, if predatory pricing conspiracies are generally unlikely to occur, they are especially so where, as here, the prospects of attaining monopoly power seem slight. In order to recoup their losses, petitioners must obtain enough market power to set higher than competitive prices, and then must sustain those prices long enough to earn in excess profits [475 U.S. 574, 591] its what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices. See Northeastern Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra, at 89; Areeda & Turner, 88 Harv. L. Rev., at 698. Two decades after their conspiracy is alleged to have commenced, 13 petitioners appear to be far from achieving this goal: the two largest shares of the retail market in television sets are held by RCA and respondent Zenith, not by any of petitioners. 6 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 81-2331 (CA3), pp. 2575a-2576a. Moreover, those shares, which together approximate 40% of sales, did not decline appreciably during the 1970's. Ibid. Petitioners' collective share rose rapidly during this period, from one-fifth or less of the relevant markets to close to 50%. 723 F.2d, at 316. 14 Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals found, however, that petitioners' share presently allows them to charge monopoly prices; to the contrary, respondents contend that the conspiracy is ongoing - that petitioners are still artificially depressing the market price in order to drive Zenith out of the market. The data in the record strongly suggest that that goal is yet far distant. 15 </s> [475 U.S. 574, 592] </s> The alleged conspiracy's failure to achieve its ends in the two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the conspiracy does not in fact exist. Since the losses in such a conspiracy accrue before the gains, they must be "repaid" with interest. And because the alleged losses have accrued over the course of two decades, the conspirators could well require a correspondingly long time to recoup. Maintaining supracompetitive prices in turn depends on the continued cooperation of the conspirators, on the inability of other would-be competitors to enter the market, and (not incidentally) on the conspirators' ability to escape antitrust liability for their minimum price-fixing cartel. 16 Each of these factors weighs more heavily as the time needed to recoup losses grows. If the losses have been substantial - as would likely be necessary [475 U.S. 574, 593] in order to drive out the competition 17 - petitioners would most likely have to sustain their cartel for years simply to break even. </s> Nor does the possibility that petitioners have obtained supracompetitive profits in the Japanese market change this calculation. Whether or not petitioners have the means to sustain substantial losses in this country over a long period of time, they have no motive to sustain such losses absent some strong likelihood that the alleged conspiracy in this country will eventually pay off. The courts below found no evidence of any such success, and - as indicated above - the facts actually are to the contrary: RCA and Zenith, not any of the petitioners, continue to hold the largest share of the American retail market in color television sets. More important, there is nothing to suggest any relationship between petitioners' profits in Japan and the amount petitioners could expect to gain from a conspiracy to monopolize the American market. In the absence of any such evidence, the possible existence of supracompetitive profits in Japan simply cannot overcome the economic obstacles to the ultimate success of this alleged predatory conspiracy. 18 </s> B </s> In Monsanto, we emphasized that courts should not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible, because the effect of such practices is often to deter procompetitive conduct. Monsanto, 465 U.S., at 762 -764. [475 U.S. 574, 594] Respondents, petitioners' competitors, seek to hold petitioners liable for damages caused by the alleged conspiracy to cut prices. Moreover, they seek to establish this conspiracy indirectly, through evidence of other combinations (such as the check-price agreements and the five company rule) whose natural tendency is to raise prices, and through evidence of rebates and other price-cutting activities that respondents argue tend to prove a combination to suppress prices. 19 But cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of competition. Thus, mistaken inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. See Monsanto, supra, at 763-764. "[W]e must be concerned lest a rule or precedent that authorizes a search for a particular type of undesirable pricing behavior end up by discouraging legitimate price competition." Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 234 (CA1 1983). </s> In most cases, this concern must be balanced against the desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and punished. That balance is, however, unusually one-sided in cases such as this one. As we earlier explained, supra, at 588-593, predatory pricing schemes require conspirators to suffer losses in order eventually to realize their illegal gains; moreover, the [475 U.S. 574, 595] gains depend on a host of uncertainties, making such schemes more likely to fail than to succeed. These economic realities tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring: unlike most other conduct that violates the antitrust laws, failed predatory pricing schemes are costly to the conspirators. See Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1, 26 (1984). Finally, unlike predatory pricing by a single firm, successful predatory pricing conspiracies involving a large number of firms can be identified and punished once they succeed, since some form of minimum price-fixing agreement would be necessary in order to reap the benefits of predation. Thus, there is little reason to be concerned that by granting summary judgment in cases where the evidence of conspiracy is speculative or ambiguous, courts will encourage such conspiracies. </s> V </s> As our discussion in Part IV-A shows, petitioners had no motive to enter into the alleged conspiracy. To the contrary, as presumably rational businesses, petitioners had every incentive not to engage in the conduct with which they are charged, for its likely effect would be to generate losses for petitioners with no corresponding gains. Cf. Cities Service, 391 U.S., at 279 . The Court of Appeals did not take account of the absence of a plausible motive to enter into the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy. It focused instead on whether there was "direct evidence of concert of action." 723 F.2d, at 304. The Court of Appeals erred in two respects: (i) the "direct evidence" on which the court relied had little, if any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; and (ii) the court failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing. </s> The "direct evidence" on which the court relied was evidence of other combinations, not of a predatory pricing conspiracy. Evidence that petitioners conspired to raise prices in Japan provides little, if any, support for respondents' [475 U.S. 574, 596] claims: a conspiracy to increase profits in one market does not tend to show a conspiracy to sustain losses in another. Evidence that petitioners agreed to fix minimum prices (through the check-price agreements) for the American market actually works in petitioners' favor, because it suggests that petitioners were seeking to place a floor under prices rather than to lower them. The same is true of evidence that petitioners agreed to limit the number of distributors of their products in the American market - the so-called five company rule. That practice may have facilitated a horizontal territorial allocation, see United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), but its natural effect would be to raise market prices rather than reduce them. 20 Evidence that tends to support any of these collateral conspiracies thus says little, if anything, about the existence of a conspiracy to charge below-market prices in the American market over a period of two decades. </s> That being the case, the absence of any plausible motive to engage in the conduct charged is highly relevant to whether a "genuine issue for trial" exists within the meaning of Rule 56(e). Lack of motive bears on the range of permissible conclusions that might be drawn from ambiguous evidence: if petitioners had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, [475 U.S. 574, 597] the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy. See Cities Service, supra, at 278-280. Here, the conduct in question consists largely of (i) pricing at levels that succeeded in taking business away from respondents, and (ii) arrangements that may have limited petitioners' ability to compete with each other (and thus kept prices from going even lower). This conduct suggests either that petitioners behaved competitively, or that petitioners conspired to raise prices. Neither possibility is consistent with an agreement among 21 companies to price below market levels. Moreover, the predatory pricing scheme that this conduct is said to prove is one that makes no practical sense: it calls for petitioners to destroy companies larger and better established than themselves, a goal that remains far distant more than two decades after the conspiracy's birth. Even had they succeeded in obtaining their monopoly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that they could recover the losses they would need to sustain along the way. In sum, in light of the absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither petitioners' pricing practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese market, nor their agreements respecting prices and distribution in the American market, suffice to create a "genuine issue for trial." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e). 21 </s> On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to consider whether there is other evidence that is sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired to price predatorily for two decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do so. The evidence must "ten[d] to exclude the possibility" that petitioners underpriced respondents to compete for business rather than to implement an economically [475 U.S. 574, 598] senseless conspiracy. Monsanto, 465 U.S., at 764 . In the absence of such evidence, there is no "genuine issue for trial" under Rule 56(e), and petitioners are entitled to have summary judgment reinstated. </s> VI </s> Our decision makes it unnecessary to reach the sovereign compulsion issue. The heart of petitioners' argument on that issue is that MITI, an agency of the Government of Japan, required petitioners to fix minimum prices for export to the United States, and that petitioners are therefore immune from antitrust liability for any scheme of which those minimum prices were an integral part. As we discussed in Part II, supra, respondents could not have suffered a cognizable injury from any action that raised prices in the American CEP market. If liable at all, petitioners are liable for conduct that is distinct from the check-price agreements. The sovereign compulsion question that both petitioners and the Solicitor General urge us to decide thus is not presented here. </s> The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 NUE had filed its complaint four years earlier, in the District Court for the District of New Jersey. Zenith's complaint was filed separately in 1974, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The two cases were consolidated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 1974. </s> [Footnote 2 The inadmissible evidence included various government records and reports, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125 (ED Pa. 1980), business documents offered pursuant to various hearsay exceptions, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980), and a large portion of the expert testimony that respondents proposed to introduce. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp. 1313 (ED Pa. 1981). </s> [Footnote 3 The District Court ruled separately that petitioners were entitled to summary judgment on respondents' claims under the Antidumping Act of 1916. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1190 (ED Pa. 1980). Respondents appealed this ruling, and the Court of Appeals reversed in a separate opinion issued the same day as the opinion concerning respondents' other claims. In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 319 (CA3 1983). </s> Petitioners ask us to review the Court of Appeals' Antidumping Act decision along with its decision on the rest of this mammoth case. The Antidumping Act claims were not, however, mentioned in the questions presented in the petition for certiorari, and they have not been independently argued by the parties. See this Court's Rule 21.1(a). We therefore decline the invitation to review the Court of Appeals' decision on those claims. </s> [Footnote 4 As to 3 of the 24 defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the entry of summary judgment. Petitioners are the 21 defendants who remain in the case. </s> [Footnote 5 In addition to these inferences, the court noted that there was expert opinion evidence that petitioners' export sales "generally were at prices which produced losses, often as high as twenty-five percent on sales." 723 F.2d, at 311. The court did not identify any direct evidence of below-cost pricing; nor did it place particularly heavy reliance on this aspect of the expert evidence. See n. 19, infra. </s> [Footnote 6 The Sherman Act does reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the conduct has an effect on American commerce. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) ("A conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries"). The effect [475 U.S. 574, 583] on which respondents rely is the artificially depressed level of prices for CEPs in the United States. </s> Petitioners' alleged cartelization of the Japanese market could not have caused that effect over a period of some two decades. Once petitioners decided, as respondents allege, to reduce output and raise prices in the Japanese market, they had the option of either producing fewer goods or selling more goods in other markets. The most plausible conclusion is that petitioners chose the latter option because it would be more profitable than the former. That choice does not flow from the cartelization of the Japanese market. On the contrary, were the Japanese market perfectly competitive petitioners would still have to choose whether to sell goods over-seas, and would still presumably make that choice based on their profit expectations. For this reason, respondents' theory of recovery depends on proof of the asserted price-cutting conspiracy in this country. </s> [Footnote 7 Respondents also argue that the check prices, the five company rule, includes monopolization of the American market through predatory pricing. The argument is mistaken. However one decides to describe the contours of the asserted conspiracy - whether there is one conspiracy or several - respondents must show that the conspiracy caused them an injury for which the antitrust laws provide relief. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 -540 (1983); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 -489 (1977); see also Note, Antitrust Standing, Antitrust Injury, and the Per Se Standard, 93 Yale L. J. 1309 (1984). That showing depends in turn on proof that petitioners conspired to price predatorily in the American market, since the other conduct involved in the alleged conspiracy cannot have caused such an injury. </s> [Footnote 8 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the asserted conspiracy as one to price "predatorily." This term has been used chiefly in cases in which a single firm, having a dominant share of the relevant market, cuts its prices in order to force competitors out of the market, or perhaps to deter potential entrants from coming in. E. g., Southern Pacific Communications Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 238 U.S. App. D.C. 309, 331-336, 740 F.2d 980, 1002-1007 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005 </s> [475 U.S. 574, 585] (1985). In such cases, "predatory pricing" means pricing below some appropriate measure of cost. E. g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 232-235 (CA1 1983); see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 698 , 701, 702, n. 14 (1967). </s> There is a good deal of debate, both in the cases and in the law reviews, about what "cost" is relevant in such cases. We need not resolve this debate here, because unlike the cases cited above, this is a Sherman Act 1 case. For purposes of this case, it is enough to note that respondents have not suffered an antitrust injury unless petitioners conspired to drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure of cost. An agreement without these features would either leave respondents in the same position as would market forces or would actually benefit respondents by raising market prices. Respondents therefore may not complain of conspiracies that, for example, set maximum prices above market levels, or that set minimum prices at any level. </s> [Footnote 9 We do not consider whether recovery should ever be available on a theory such as respondents' when the pricing in question is above some measure of incremental cost. See generally Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 697, 709-718 (1975) (discussing cost-based test for use in 2 cases). As a practical matter, it may be that only direct evidence of below-cost pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong inference that rational businesses would not enter into conspiracies such as this one. See Part IV-A, infra. </s> [Footnote 10 Respondents argued before the District Court that petitioners had failed to carry their initial burden under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). Cf. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 244 U.S. App. D.C. 160, 756 F.2d 181, [475 U.S. 574, 586] cert. granted, 474 U.S. 944 (1985). That issue was resolved in petitioners' favor, and is not before us. </s> [Footnote 11 Rule 56(e) provides, in relevant part: </s> "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." </s> [Footnote 12 See n. 10, supra. </s> [Footnote 13 NUE's complaint alleges that petitioners' conspiracy began as early as 1960; the starting date used in Zenith's complaint is 1953. NUE Complaint § 52; Zenith Complaint § 39. </s> [Footnote 14 During the same period, the number of American firms manufacturing television sets declined from 19 to 13. 5 App. to Brief for Appellant in No. 81-2331 (CA3), p. 1961a. This decline continued a trend that began at least by 1960, when petitioners' sales in the United States market were negligible. Ibid. See Zenith Complaint §§ 35, 37. </s> [Footnote 15 Respondents offer no reason to suppose that entry into the relevant market is especially difficult, yet without barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices for an extended time. Judge Easterbrook, commenting on this case in a law review article, offers the following sensible assessment: </s> "The plaintiffs [in this case] maintain that for the last fifteen years or more at least ten Japanese manufacturers have sold TV sets at less than cost in order to drive United States firms out of business. Such conduct cannot possibly produce profits by harming competition, however. If the Japanese firms drive some United States firms out of business, they could not [475 U.S. 574, 592] recoup. Fifteen years of losses could be made up only by very high prices for the indefinite future. (The losses are like investments, which must be recovered with compound interest.) If the defendants should try to raise prices to such a level, they would attract new competition. There are no barriers to entry into electronics, as the proliferation of computer and audio firms shows. The competition would come from resurgent United States firms, from other foreign firms (Korea and many other nations make TV sets), and from defendants themselves. In order to recoup, the Japanese firms would need to suppress competition among themselves. On plaintiffs' theory, the cartel would need to last at least thirty years, far longer than any in history, even when cartels were not illegal. None should be sanguine about the prospects of such a cartel, given each firm's incentive to shave price and expand its share of sales. The predation recoupment story therefore does not make sense, and we are left with the more plausible inference that the Japanese firms did not sell below cost in the first place. They were just engaged in hard competition." Easter-brook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Texas L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1984) (footnotes omitted). </s> [Footnote 16 The alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners can recoup their losses. In light of the large number of firms involved here, petitioners can achieve this only by engaging in some form of price fixing after they have succeeded in driving competitors from the market. Such price fixing would, of course, be an independent violation of 1 of the Sherman Act. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). </s> [Footnote 17 The predators' losses must actually increase as the conspiracy nears its objective: the greater the predators' market share, the more products the predators sell; but since every sale brings with it a loss, an increase in market share also means an increase in predatory losses. </s> [Footnote 18 The same is true of any supposed excess production capacity that petitioners may have possessed. The existence of plant capacity that exceeds domestic demand does tend to establish the ability to sell products abroad. It does not, however, provide a motive for selling at prices lower than necessary to obtain sales; nor does it explain why petitioners would be willing to lose money in the United States market without some reasonable prospect of recouping their investment. </s> [Footnote 19 Respondents also rely on an expert study suggesting that petitioners have sold their products in the American market at substantial losses. The relevant study is not based on actual cost data; rather, it consists of expert opinion based on a mathematical construction that in turn rests on assumptions about petitioners' costs. The District Court analyzed those assumptions in some detail and found them both implausible and inconsistent with record evidence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 505 F. Supp., at 1356-1363. Although the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's finding that the expert report was inadmissible, the court did not disturb the District Court's analysis of the factors that substantially undermine the probative value of that evidence. See 723 F.2d, at 277-282. We find the District Court's analysis persuasive. Accordingly, in our view the expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has little probative value in comparison with the economic factors, discussed in Part IV-A, supra, that suggest that such conduct is irrational. </s> [Footnote 20 The Court of Appeals correctly reasoned that the five company rule might tend to insulate petitioners from competition with each other. 723 F.2d, at 306. But this effect is irrelevant to a conspiracy to price predatorily. Petitioners have no incentive to underprice each other if they already are pricing below the level at which they could sell their goods. The far more plausible inference from a customer allocation agreement such as the five company rule is that petitioners were conspiring to raise prices, by limiting their ability to take sales away from each other. Respondents - petitioners' competitors - suffer no harm from a conspiracy to raise prices. Supra, at 582-583. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that the five company rule had any significant effect of any kind, since the "rule" permitted petitioners to sell to their American subsidiaries, and did not limit the number of distributors to which the subsidiaries could resell. 513 F. Supp., at 1190. </s> [Footnote 21 We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy. Our decision in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), establishes that conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy does not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy. Id., at 763-764. See supra, at 588. </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> It is indeed remarkable that the Court, in the face of the long and careful opinion of the Court of Appeals, reaches the result it does. The Court of Appeals faithfully followed the relevant precedents, including First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968), and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984), and it kept firmly in mind the principle that proof of a conspiracy should not be fragmented, see Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962). After surveying the massive record, including very [475 U.S. 574, 599] significant evidence that the District Court erroneously had excluded, the Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence taken as a whole creates a genuine issue of fact whether petitioners engaged in a conspiracy in violation of 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. In my view, the Court of Appeals' opinion more than adequately supports this judgment. </s> The Court's opinion today, far from identifying reversible error, only muddies the waters. In the first place, the Court makes confusing and inconsistent statements about the appropriate standard for granting summary judgment. Second, the Court makes a number of assumptions that invade the factfinder's province. Third, the Court faults the Third Circuit for nonexistent errors and remands the case although it is plain that respondents' evidence raises genuine issues of material fact. </s> I </s> The Court's initial discussion of summary judgment standards appears consistent with settled doctrine. I agree that "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Ante, at 587 (quoting Cities Service, supra, at 289). I also agree that "`[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'" Ante, at 587 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). But other language in the Court's opinion suggests a departure from traditional summary judgment doctrine. Thus, the Court gives the following critique of the Third Circuit's opinion: </s> "[T]he Court of Appeals concluded that a reasonable factfinder could find a conspiracy to depress prices in the American market in order to drive out American competitors, which conspiracy was funded by excess profits obtained in the Japanese market. The court apparently did not consider whether it was as plausible to conclude [475 U.S. 574, 600] that petitioners' price-cutting behavior was independent and not conspiratorial." Ante, at 581. </s> In a similar vein, the Court summarizes Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., supra, as holding that "courts should not permit factfinders to infer conspiracies when such inferences are implausible . . . ." Ante, at 593. Such language suggests that a judge hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff. Cities Service and Monsanto do not stand for any such proposition. Each of those cases simply held that a particular piece of evidence standing alone was insufficiently probative to justify sending a case to the jury. 1 These holdings in no way undermine [475 U.S. 574, 601] the doctrine that all evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. </s> If the Court intends to give every judge hearing a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case the job of determining if the evidence makes the inference of conspiracy more probable than not, it is overturning settled law. If the Court does not intend such a pronouncement, it should refrain from using unnecessarily broad and confusing language. </s> II </s> In defining what respondents must show in order to recover, the Court makes assumptions that invade the factfinder's province. The Court states with very little discussion that respondents can recover under 1 of the Sherman Act only if they prove that "petitioners conspired to drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate measure of cost." Ante, at 585, n. 8. This statement is premised on the assumption that "[a]n agreement without these features would either leave respondents in the same position as would market forces or would actually benefit respondents by raising market prices." Ibid. In making this assumption, the Court ignores the contrary conclusions of respondents' expert DePodwin, whose report in very relevant part was erroneously excluded by the District Court. </s> The DePodwin Report, on which the Court of Appeals relied along with other material, indicates that respondents were harmed in two ways that are independent of whether petitioners priced their products below "the level necessary to sell their products or . . . some appropriate measure of cost." Ibid. First, the Report explains that the price-raising scheme in Japan resulted in lower consumption of petitioners' goods in that country and the exporting of more of petitioners' goods to this country than would have occurred had prices in Japan been at the competitive level. Increasing [475 U.S. 574, 602] exports to this country resulted in depressed prices here, which harmed respondents. 2 Second, the DePodwin Report indicates that petitioners exchanged confidential proprietary information and entered into agreements such as the five company rule with the goal of avoiding intragroup competition in the United States market. The Report explains that petitioners' restrictions on intragroup competition caused respondents to lose business that they would not have lost had petitioners competed with one another. 3 </s> [475 U.S. 574, 603] </s> The DePodwin Report alone creates a genuine factual issue regarding the harm to respondents caused by Japanese cartelization and by agreements restricting competition among petitioners in this country. No doubt the Court prefers its own economic theorizing to Dr. DePodwin's, but that is not a reason to deny the factfinder an opportunity to consider Dr. DePodwin's views on how petitioners' alleged collusion harmed respondents. 4 </s> [475 U.S. 574, 604] </s> The Court, in discussing the unlikelihood of a predatory conspiracy, also consistently assumes that petitioners valued profit-maximization over growth. See, e. g., ante, at 595. In light of the evidence that petitioners sold their goods in this country at substantial losses over a long period of time, see Part III-B, infra, I believe that this is an assumption that should be argued to the factfinder, not decided by the Court. </s> III </s> In reversing the Third Circuit's judgment, the Court identifies two alleged errors: "(i) [T]he `direct evidence' on which the [Court of Appeals] relied had little, if any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy; and (ii) the court failed to consider the absence of a plausible motive to engage in predatory pricing." Ante, at 595. The Court's position is without substance. </s> A </s> The first claim of error is that the Third Circuit treated evidence regarding price fixing in Japan and the so-called five company rule and check prices as "`direct evidence' of a conspiracy that injured respondents." Ante, at 583 (citing In re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 304-305 (1983)). The passage from the Third [475 U.S. 574, 605] Circuit's opinion in which the Court locates this alleged error makes what I consider to be a quite simple and correct observation, namely, that this case is distinguishable from traditional "conscious parallelism" cases, in that there is direct evidence of concert of action among petitioners. Ibid. The Third Circuit did not, as the Court implies, jump unthinkingly from this observation to the conclusion that evidence regarding the five company rule could support a finding of antitrust injury to respondents. 5 The Third Circuit twice specifically noted that horizontal agreements allocating customers, though illegal, do not ordinarily injure competitors of the agreeing parties. Id., at 306, 310-311. However, after reviewing evidence of cartel activity in Japan, collusive establishment of dumping prices in this country, and longterm, below-cost sales, the Third Circuit held that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that the five company rule was not a simple price-raising device: </s> "[A] factfinder might reasonably infer that the allocation of customers in the United States, combined with price-fixing in Japan, was intended to permit concentration of the effects of dumping upon American competitors while eliminating competition among the Japanese manufacturers in either market." Id., at 311. </s> I see nothing erroneous in this reasoning. </s> B </s> The Court's second charge of error is that the Third Circuit was not sufficiently skeptical of respondents' allegation that petitioners engaged in predatory pricing conspiracy. But [475 U.S. 574, 606] the Third Circuit is not required to engage in academic discussions about predation; it is required to decide whether respondents' evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact. The Third Circuit did its job, and remanding the case so that it can do the same job again is simply pointless. </s> The Third Circuit indicated that it considers respondents' evidence sufficient to create a genuine factual issue regarding long-term, below-cost sales by petitioners. Ibid. The Court tries to whittle away at this conclusion by suggesting that the "expert opinion evidence of below-cost pricing has little probative value in comparison with the economic factors . . . that suggest that such conduct is irrational." Ante, at 594, n. 19. But the question is not whether the Court finds respondents' experts persuasive, or prefers the District Court's analysis; it is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to respondents, a jury or other factfinder could reasonably conclude that petitioners engaged in long-term, below-cost sales. I agree with the Third Circuit that the answer to this question is "yes." </s> It is misleading for the Court to state that the Court of Appeals "did not disturb the District Court's analysis of the factors that substantially undermine the probative value of [evidence in the DePodwin Report respecting below-cost sales]." Ibid. The Third Circuit held that the exclusion of the portion of the DePodwin Report regarding below-cost pricing was erroneous because "the trial court ignored DePodwin's uncontradicted affidavit that all data relied on in his report were of the type on which experts in his field would reasonably rely." 723 F.2d, at 282. In short, the Third Circuit found DePodwin's affidavit sufficient to create a genuine factual issue regarding the correctness of his conclusion that petitioners sold below cost over a long period of time. Having made this determination, the court saw no need - nor do I - to address the District Court's analysis point by point. The District Court's criticisms of DePodwin's [475 U.S. 574, 607] methods are arguments that a factfinder should consider. </s> IV </s> Because I believe that the Third Circuit was correct in holding that respondents have demonstrated the existence of genuine issues of material fact, I would affirm the judgment below and remand this case for trial. </s> [Footnote 1 The Court adequately summarizes the quite fact-specific holding in Cities Service. Ante, at 587. </s> In Monsanto, the Court held that a manufacturer's termination of a price-cutting distributor after receiving a complaint from another distributor is not, standing alone, sufficient to create a jury question. 465 U.S., at 763 -764. To understand this holding, it is important to realize that under United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), it is permissible for a manufacturer to announce retail prices in advance and terminate those who fail to comply, but that under Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), it is impermissible for the manufacturer and its distributors to agree on the price at which the distributors will sell the goods. Thus, a manufacturer's termination of a price-cutting distributor after receiving a complaint from another distributor is lawful under Colgate, unless the termination is pursuant to a shared understanding between the manufacturer and its distributors respecting enforcement of a resale price maintenance scheme. Monsanto holds that to establish liability under Dr. Miles, more is needed than evidence of behavior that is consistent with a distributor's exercise of its prerogatives under Colgate. Thus, "[t]here must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting independently." 465 U.S., at 764 . Monsanto does not hold that if a terminated dealer produces some further evidence of conspiracy beyond the bare fact of postcomplaint termination, the judge hearing a motion for summary judgment should balance all the evidence pointing toward conspiracy against all the evidence pointing toward independent action. </s> [Footnote 2 Dr. DePodwin summarizes his view of the harm caused by Japanese cartelization as follows: </s> "When we consider the injuries inflicted on United States producers, we must again look at the Japanese television manufacturers' export agreement as part of a generally collusive scheme embracing the Japanese domestic market as well. This scheme increased the supply of television receivers to the United States market while restricting supply in the Japanese market. If Japanese manufacturers had competed in both domestic and export markets, they would have sold more in the domestic market and less in the United States. A greater proportion of Japanese production capacity would have been devoted to domestic sales. Domestic prices would have been lower and export prices would have been higher. The size of the price differential between domestic and export markets would have diminished practically to the vanishing point. Consequently, competition among Japanese producers in both markets would have resulted in reducing exports to the United States and United States prices would have risen. In addition, investment by the United States industry would have increased. As it was, however, the influx of sets at depressed prices cut the rates of return on television receiver production facilities in the United States to so low a level as to make such investment uneconomic. </s> "We can therefore conclude that the American manufacturers of television receivers would have made larger sales at higher prices in the absence of the Japanese cartel agreements. Thus, the collusive behavior of Japanese television manufacturers resulted in a very severe injury to those American television manufacturers, particularly to National Union Electric Corporation, which produced a preponderance of television sets with screen sizes of nineteen inches and lower, especially those in the lower range of prices." 5 App. to Brief for Appellants in No. 81-2331 (CA3), pp. 1629a-1630a. </s> [Footnote 3 The DePodwin Report has this, among other things, to say in summarizing the harm to respondents caused by the five company rule, [475 U.S. 574, 603] exchange of production data, price coordination, and other allegedly anti-competitive practices of petitioners: </s> "The impact of Japanese anti-competitive practices on United States manufacturers is evident when one considers the nature of competition. When a market is fully competitive, firms pit their resources against one another in an attempt to secure the business of individual customers. However, when firms collude, they violate a basic tenet of competitive behavior, i. e., that they act independently. United States firms were confronted with Japanese competitors who collusively were seeking to destroy their established customer relationships. Each Japanese company had targeted customers which it could service with reasonable assurance that its fellow Japanese cartel members would not become involved. But just as importantly, each Japanese firm would be assured that what was already a low price level for Japanese television receivers in the United States market would not be further depressed by the actions of its Japanese associates. </s> "The result was a phenomenal growth in exports, particularly to the United States. Concurrently, Japanese manufacturers, and the defendants in particular, made large investments in new plant and equipment and expanded production capacity. It is obvious, therefore, that the effect of the Japanese cartel's concerted actions was to generate a larger volume of investment in the Japanese television industry than would otherwise have been the case. This added capacity both enabled and encouraged the Japanese to penetrate the United States market more deeply than they would have had they competed lawfully." Id., at 1628a-1629a. </s> For a more complete statement of DePodwin's explanation of how the alleged cartel operated, and the harms it caused respondents, see id., at 1609a-1642a. This material is summarized in a chart found id., at 1633a. </s> [Footnote 4 In holding that Parts IV and V of the Report had been improperly excluded, the Court of Appeals said: </s> "The trial court found that DePodwin did not use economic expertise in reaching the opinion that the defendants participated in a Japanese television [475 U.S. 574, 604] cartel. 505 F. Supp. at 1342-46. We have examined the excluded portions of Parts IV and V in light of the admitted portions, and we conclude that this finding is clearly erroneous. As a result, the court also held the opinions to be unhelpful to the factfinder. What the court in effect did was to eliminate all parts of the report in which the expert economist, after describing the conditions in the respective markets, the opportunities for collusion, the evidence pointing to collusion, the terms of certain undisputed agreements, and the market behavior, expressed the opinion that there was concert of action consistent with plaintiffs' conspiracy theory. Considering the complexity of the economic issues involved, it simply cannot be said that such an opinion would not help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine that fact in issue." In re Japanese Electronics Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 238, 280 (1983). </s> The Court of Appeals had similar views about Parts VI and VII. </s> [Footnote 5 I use the Third Circuit's analysis of the five company rule by way of example; the court did an equally careful analysis of the parts the cartel activity in Japan and the check prices could have played in an actionable conspiracy. See generally id., at 303-311. </s> In discussing the five-company rule, I do not mean to imply any conclusion on the validity of petitioners' sovereign compulsion defense. Since the Court does not reach this issue, I see no need of my addressing it. </s> [475 U.S. 574, 608]

United States Supreme Court VAN LARE v. HURLEY(1975) No. 74-453 Argued: March 26, 1975Decided: May 19, 1975 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 74-5054, Taylor et al. v. Lavine, Commissioner, Department of Social Services of New York, et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. </s> Petitioners in No. 74-5054 brought class actions in two District Courts challenging New York's "lodger" regulations, which require a pro-rata reduction in shelter allowance of a family receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) solely because a parent allows a nonlegally responsible person to reside in the home. Petitioners claimed that the state regulations conflicted with a provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 606 (a), which in relevant part defines a dependent child as one "who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent," and an implementing regulation, 45 CFR 233.90 (a), which provides that in determining a child's financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment "the income only of the [legally obligated] parent . . . will be considered available . . . in the absence of proof of actual contributions." Petitioners also contended that the state regulations were violative of due process and equal protection. Each District Court held that the New York regulations were in conflict with the federal statutory and regulatory provisions. The Court of Appeals held that there was no such conflict and reversed the judgments and remanded the cases for convention of a three-judge court to decide the constitutional challenges. That court sustained petitioners' due process claim. This Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal from the three-judge court holding (No. 74-453) and granted certiorari in the case of the judgment of the Court of Appeals (No. 74-5054). Held: The New York "lodger" regulations, which are based on the assumption that the nonpaying lodger is contributing to the welfare of the household, without inquiry into whether he in fact does [421 U.S. 338, 339] so, violate the Social Security Act and implementing regulations. Pp. 344-348. </s> (a) A State is barred from assuming that nonlegally responsible persons will apply their resources to aid the welfare child, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 ; Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 , yet under the New York regulations the nonpaying lodger's mere presence results in a decrease in benefits though he may contribute nothing to the needy child. Pp. 346-347. </s> (b) The New York regulations cannot be justified on the ground that the lodger's presence establishes the existence of excess space because if that were so the allowance would remain reduced after the lodger leaves, which is not the case. P. 347. </s> (c) The regulations do not prohibit lodgers from living in welfare homes and therefore cannot be justified on the ground that they are designed to prevent lodgers (who are ineligible for welfare) from receiving welfare benefits. Pp. 347-348. </s> No. 74-453, 380 F. Supp. 167, vacated and remanded; No. 74-5054, 497 F.2d 1208, reversed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and DOUGLAS, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 348. </s> Judith A. Gordon, Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellants in No. 74-453 and respondents in No. 74-5054. With her on the briefs were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General, and Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General. </s> Martin A. Schwartz argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees in No. 74-453 and petitioners in No. 74-5054. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question presented is whether New York regulations reducing pro rata the shelter allowance provided recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) to the extent there are nonpaying lodgers living [421 U.S. 338, 340] in the household conflict with the Social Security Act and federal regulations. We conclude that the state provisions conflict with federal law and are therefore invalid. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971). </s> I </s> AFDC is a categorical public assistance program established by the Social Security Act of 1935. Its operation has been described in several recent opinions. See, e. g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 408 (1970); King v. Smith, supra, at 313. AFDC provides federal funds to States on a matching funds basis to aid the "needy child . . . who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with" any of the several listed relatives. 42 U.S.C. 606 (a). States that seek to qualify for federal AFDC funding must operate a program not in conflict with the Social Security Act. Townsend v. Swank, supra, at 286. </s> Each of the petitioners in No. 74-5054 receives AFDC on behalf of herself and her minor children. This includes a shelter allowance computed as an item of need separate from other necessities such as food and clothing. N. Y. Soc. Serv. Law 131-a. Each petitioner's shelter allowance was reduced by New York officials because she allowed a person not a recipient of AFDC and who had no legal obligation to support her family to reside in the household. 1 The reduction was authorized by New York regulations which provide: </s> "18 N. Y. C. R. R. 352.31: [421 U.S. 338, 341] </s> "(a) For applicant or recipient. </s> . . . . . </s> "(3) When a female applicant or recipient is living with a man to whom she is not married, other than on an occasional or transient basis, his available income and resources shall be applied in accordance with the following: </s> . . . . . </s> "(iv) When the man is unwilling to assume responsibility for the woman or her children, and there are no children of which he is the acknowledged or adjudicated father, he shall be treated as a lodger in accordance with section 352.30 (d)." 2 </s> "18 N. Y. C. R. R. 352.30: </s> "352.30 Persons included in the budget. </s> . . . . . </s> "(d) A non-legally responsible relative or unrelated person in the household, who is not applying for nor receiving public assistance shall not be included in the budget and shall be deemed to be a [421 U.S. 338, 342] lodger or boarding lodger. The amount which the lodger or boarding lodger pays shall be verified and treated as income to the family. For the lodger, the amount in excess of $15 per month shall be considered as income; for such boarding lodgers, the amount in excess of $60 per month shall be considered as income. In the event a lodger does not contribute at least $15 per month, the family's shelter allowance including fuel for heating, shall be a pro rata share of the regular shelter allowance." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> No lodger of any petitioner contributed $15 a month, and pursuant to the italicized sentence, each petitioner's shelter allowance was therefore reduced by a pro rata share. For example, the shelter allowance of $150 monthly being paid to a family of four was reduced to $120 after the lodger moved in. </s> Petitioners challenged the New York regulations in separate actions in two Federal District Courts. 3 They alleged that in making the presence of the lodger a basis for assuming the availability of income, the regulations were invalid for conflict with 42 U.S.C. 606 (a), supra, and the following regulation, 45 CFR 233.90 (a) (1974), that implements that statute: </s> "A State plan under title IV-A of the Social Security [421 U.S. 338, 343] Act [relating to the AFDC program] must provide that the determination whether a child has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent, or (if the State plan includes such cases) the unemployment of his father, will be made only in relation to the child's natural or adoptive parent, or in relation to the child's stepparent who is ceremonially married to the child's natural or adoptive parent and is legally obligated to support the child under State law of general applicability which requires stepparents to support stepchildren to the same extend [sic] that natural or adoptive parents are required to support their children. Under this requirement, the inclusion in the family, or the presence in the home, of a `substitute parent' or `man-in-the-house' or any individual other than one described in this paragraph is not an acceptable basis for a finding of ineligibility or for assuming the availability of income by the State. In establishing financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment, only such net income as is actually available for current use on a regular basis will be considered, and the income only of the parent described in the first sentence of this paragraph will be considered available for children in the household in the absence of proof of actual contributions." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> Without reaching the recipients' constitutional challenges - denial of due process and equal protection, and infringement of rights of privacy and free association - each District Court adjudged the state regulations to be invalid for conflict with 42 U.S.C. 606 (a) and 45 CFR 233.90 (a), supra, and granted declaratory and [421 U.S. 338, 344] injunctive relief. 4 Both judgments were appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that the New York rules were not in conflict with federal law, reversed the judgments, and remanded for convention of a three-judge court to decide the constitutional challenges. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (1974). The three-judge court that was convened sustained the due process challenge to the New York rules. 380 F. Supp. 167 (ED & SDNY 1974). We noted probable jurisdiction of appellants' appeal from the three-judge court holding, 419 U.S. 1045 (1974) (No. 74-453), and also granted certiorari to the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 419 U.S. 1046 (1974) (No. 74-5054). We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in No. 74-5054 and reverse. Since in that circumstance we need not address the constitutional decision in No. 74-453, we vacate the judgment in that case and remand with directions to dismiss as moot. Cf. United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). </s> II </s> Title 42 U.S.C. 606 (a) was previously construed in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). That case involved an Alabama "substitute father" regulation, which denied AFDC benefits to children of a mother who cohabited in or outside her home with an able-bodied man. It was irrelevant under the state regulation whether the man was legally obligated to support the children or whether he did in fact contribute to their support. Alabama contended that its rule simply defined nonabsent "parent" under 42 U.S.C. 606 (a). The regulation was claimed to be justified as having the purpose of [421 U.S. 338, 345] discouraging illicit sexual relationships and of putting "informal" families on a par with ordinary families. We concluded that this was an insufficient justification, holding that it is "inconceivable . . . that Alabama is free to discourage immorality and illegitimacy by the device of absolute disqualification of needy children." King v. Smith, supra, at 326. For, in light of the purpose of AFDC to aid needy children, we held, on the statutory language and legislative history, that the term "parent" in 606 (a) must be read to include "only those persons with a legal duty of support." 392 U.S., at 327 . A broader definition would fail to provide the economic security for needy children which was Congress' primary goal. Id., at 329-330. Thus the Alabama regulation was invalid because its definition of "parent" conflicted with that of the Social Security Act. Id., at 333. </s> The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) codified the holding of King v. Smith in 45 CFR 233.90 (a), supra, the regulation at issue in the instant case. 5 Its key provision specifies that in determining a child's financial eligibility and the amount of the assistance payment, "the income only of the [legally obligated] parent . . . will be considered available . . . in the absence of proof of actual contributions." 45 CFR 233.90 (a). We applied this regulation in Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970). Lewis presented the question of the validity of a California rule which provided that in computing payments to needy children who lived with their mother and stepfather or "an adult male person assuming the role of spouse" (MARS), consideration should be given to the income of the stepfather or MARS. Id., at 554. We held the California rule invalid as in conflict with the Social Security Act, the HEW regulation, [421 U.S. 338, 346] 45 CFR 233.90 (a), and King v. Smith, supra. We said that "[i]n the absence of proof of actual contribution, California may not consider the child's `resources' to include either the income of a nonadopting stepfather who is not legally obligated to support the child as is a natural parent, or the income of a MARS - whatever the nature of his obligation to support." 397 U.S., at 559 -560. In short, we held that the Social Security Act precludes treating a person who is not a natural or adoptive parent as a breadwinner "unless the bread is actually set on the table." Id., at 559. </s> III </s> Thus the New York regulations at issue are also invalid. This is clearly so insofar as they are based on the assumption that the nonpaying lodger is contributing to the welfare household, without inquiry into whether he in fact does so. Section 352.31 (a) (3), supra, provides that "[w]hen a . . . recipient is living with a man to whom she is not married . . . his available income and resources shall be applied in accordance with the following . . . (iv) . . . he shall be treated as a lodger in accordance with section 352.30 (d)." (Emphasis supplied.) Plainly treating someone as a lodger is an impermissible means of "applying available income and resources." Under 352.30 (d), supra, when a lodger pays less than $15 a month, the family's shelter allowance is reduced pro rata. Respondents themselves concede in this Court that the regulations are designed so that the lodger will not "be excused from providing his share of shelter cost." Brief for Respondents in Opposition to Pet. for Cert. 9. </s> Thus under the New York regulations the nonpaying lodger's mere presence results in a decrease in benefits. Yet the lodger, like the Alabama "substitute father" or the California "MARS," may be contributing nothing to [421 U.S. 338, 347] the needy child. King v. Smith, supra, and Lewis v. Martin, supra, construe the federal law and regulations as barring the States from assuming that nonlegally responsible persons will apply their resources to aid the welfare child. Those cases therefore compel a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> Respondents argue, however, that in any event the New York regulations may be justified on other grounds. They argue first that the presence of the lodger is evidence that the AFDC family has excess room and therefore that its shelter allowance exceeds its needs. That, however, is not how the New York regulations are applied. When a nonpaying lodger moves in, the shelter allowance is reduced pro rata with no regard to space considerations. When the lodger moves out the allowance is returned to its original amount. That practice clearly reveals that the existence of excess space is not the basis of the reduction, because otherwise the allowance would remain reduced after the lodger leaves. Thus, the fact that the allowance varies with the lodger's presence demonstrates that it is keyed, as the regulations plainly imply, to the impermissible assumption that the lodger is contributing income to the family. 6 </s> Another, somewhat related, justification asserted is that the shelter allowance is reduced to prevent lodgers, who by definition are ineligible for welfare, from receiving welfare benefits. The regulations, however, do not prohibit lodgers from living in welfare homes. The lodger may stay on after the allowance is reduced, and the State takes no further action. 7 The only victim of [421 U.S. 338, 348] the state regulations is thus the needy child who suffers reduced benefits. But States may not seek to accomplish policies aimed at lodgers by depriving needy children of benefits. King v. Smith, supra, at 326; Lewis v. Martin, supra. </s> The judgment in No. 74-5054 is reversed and the judgment in No. 74-453 is vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss as moot. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Petitioner Hurley's lodger was an unrelated male friend, petitioner Taylor's was her sister, and petitioner Otey's was her 23-year-old son. </s> [Footnote 2 Effective July 26, 1974, after the Court of Appeals decision in No. 74-5054, 352.31 (a) (3) was amended to provide: "(3) When an applicant or recipient is living, other than on an occasional or transient basis, with a person to whom such applicant or recipient is not married, the available income and resources of such person shall be applied in accordance with the following: . . . . . "(iv) When the person is unwilling to assume responsibility for the applicant or recipient or his or her children and there are no children for whom such person is legally responsible, such person shall be treated as a lodger in accordance with subdivision (d) of section 352.30 of this Part." Even prior to this amendment, the pro rata reduction in shelter allowance was applied without regard to the gender of the nonpaying lodger. See n. 1, supra. This was apparently because the reductions were pursuant to 18 N. Y. C. R. R. 352.30 (d), which makes no reference to gender. </s> [Footnote 3 Petitioner Hurley's action was brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Hurley v. Van Lare, 72 Civ. 3423. Petitioners Taylor and Otey brought their action in the Eastern District of New York. Taylor v. Lavine, 73 Civ. 699. Each District Court certified class action status for the case before it, the class consisting of "all residents of the State of New York who are or were or will be receiving public assistance, and who have had their grants of public assistance reduced, terminated, suspended or denied, or who are or may be threatened with reduction, termination, suspension, or denial of public assistance, solely because of the presence of a noncontributing lodger in the home pursuant to 18 NYCRR 352.31 (a) (3) (iv) and 352.30 (d)." App. 99, 144. </s> [Footnote 4 Hurley v. Van Lare, 365 F. Supp. 186 (SDNY 1973). The opinion of the District Judge in Taylor v. Lavine, supra, is unreported. </s> [Footnote 5 As originally phrased, the regulation was numbered 45 CFR 203.1. See Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 556 (1970). </s> [Footnote 6 Indeed it would seem implausible to assume that the presence of a lodger establishes beyond peradventure the existence of excess space. A lodger might simply be sleeping on the couch in an already overcrowded apartment. </s> [Footnote 7 "Proration of the shelter allowance lowers the amount of money available to the welfare family, but it does not prevent the family [421 U.S. 338, 348] from providing its lodger with free living space by diverting part of its basic grant to pay the rent. . . . [T]here is evidence that poor families often find the presence of a lodger worth a sacrifice in income." Recent Cases, Welfare Law - AFDC - Proration of Shelter Allowance, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 654, 657 (1975). See also Note, AFDC Income Attribution: The Man-In-the-House and Welfare Grant Reductions, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1370, 1373-1374 (1970). </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. </s> I do not think that the New York nonpaying-lodgers regulation is in conflict with federal statutory law, for the reasons stated by Judge Hays in his opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Taylor v. Lavine, 497 F.2d 1208 (1974). I therefore reach the constitutional issues presented in No. 74-453, and conclude that the regulation is not constitutionally impermissible, for the reasons set forth by Judge Hays in his dissenting opinion in Hurley v. Van Lare, 380 F. Supp. 167, 177 (ED & SDNY 1974). I would thus affirm in No. 74-5054 and reverse in No. 74-453. </s> [421 U.S. 338, 349]

United States Supreme Court DeBACKER v. BRAINARD(1969) No. 15 Argued: Decided: November 12, 1969 </s> 1. Appellant juvenile's challenge in habeas corpus proceeding on ground that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to trial by jury is inappropriate for resolution by this Court since the hearing before a Nebraska juvenile court judge at which appellant was adjudged a delinquent was conducted before this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 , which were held in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 , to apply only prospectively, and appellant would therefore have had no constitutional right to a jury trial had he been tried as an adult in a criminal proceeding. </s> 2. It is not appropriate for this Court to decide whether Nebraska law providing for proof of delinquency in a juvenile proceeding under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard violates due process requirements where no objection to that standard was made at the hearing by appellant, who took no direct appeal, and his counsel acknowledged that the evidence was sufficient to support the delinquency finding even under a reasonable-doubt standard. </s> 3. Because standing alone the issue could not be subject to review by an appeal, this Court declines, in view of the barrenness of the record, to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction to pass on appellant's contention that the prosecutor's assertedly unreviewable discretion under Nebraska case law whether to proceed against appellant in juvenile court rather than in ordinary criminal proceedings violated due process. </s> 183 Neb. 461, 161 N. W. 2d 508, appeal dismissed; certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted. </s> William G. Line, by appointment of the Court, 394 U.S. 914 , argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. </s> Richard L. Kuhlman argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Melvin Kent Kammerlohr, Assistant Attorney General of Nebraska. [396 U.S. 28, 29] </s> Alfred L. Scanlan, by special leave of Court, argued the cause and filed a brief for the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges as amicus curiae. </s> Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and Derald E. Granberg and Gloria F. DeHart, Deputy Attorneys General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> After a hearing before a juvenile court judge, appellant DeBacker was found to be a "delinquent child" 1 and ordered committed to the Boys' Training School at Kearney, Nebraska. 2 DeBacker did not seek direct review of his commitment, but instead sought state habeas corpus. The Nebraska District Court dismissed appellant's petition, a divided Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed, 3 and last Term we noted probable jurisdiction over the present appeal, 393 U.S. 1076 . Because we find that resolution of the constitutional issues presented by appellant would not be appropriate in the circumstances [396 U.S. 28, 30] of this case, the appeal is dismissed. See Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 . </s> 1. Appellant asks this Court to decide whether the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments, in light of this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 ; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 ; and In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 , require a trial by jury in a state juvenile court proceeding based on an alleged act of the juvenile which, if committed by an adult, would, under the Duncan and Bloom cases, require a jury trial if requested. In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 , we held that Duncan and Bloom "should receive only prospective application" and stated that we would "not reverse state convictions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois." 392 U.S., at 633 , 635. Because appellant's juvenile court hearing was held on March 28, 1968 - prior to the date of the decisions in Duncan and Bloom - appellant would have had no constitutional right to a trial by jury if he had been tried as an adult in a criminal proceeding. It thus seems manifest that this case is not an appropriate one for considering whether the Nebraska statute which provides that juvenile hearings be "without a jury," Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-206.03 (2), is constitutionally invalid in light of Duncan and Bloom. 4 </s> [396 U.S. 28, 31] </s> 2. Appellant next asks this Court to decide whether the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for burden of proof in juvenile court proceedings, required by Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-206.03 (3), satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, at the appellant's juvenile court hearing, his counsel neither objected to the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, nor asked the judge to make a ruling based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In explaining why he did not seek a direct appeal from the juvenile court's determination that appellant had committed the act upon which rested the delinquent child finding, appellant's counsel stated at oral argument before this Court: </s> "[I]t has been pointed out that I did not attack the sufficiency of the evidence. </s> "Of course, the reason for that is obvious. The evidence is more than sufficient to sustain a conviction of what he did. An appeal on the sufficiency of the evidence would have been close to frivolous." (Tr. 41-42.) </s> Later in oral argument counsel acknowledged that "[n]o matter what the standard was . . . [o]ur evidence just isn't insufficient." (Tr. 47.) And when specifically asked whether "[t]he evidence was sufficient even under a reasonable doubt standard," counsel responded: "Even under a reasonable doubt standard . . . ." (Tr. 47.) </s> Given this commendably forthright explanation by appellant's counsel, this case is not an appropriate vehicle for consideration of the standard of proof in juvenile proceedings. 5 </s> [396 U.S. 28, 32] </s> 3. Appellant finally asks us to decide whether due process is denied because, as it is claimed, the Nebraska prosecutor had unreviewable discretion whether he would proceed against appellant in juvenile court rather than in ordinary criminal proceedings. The record shows (1) that appellant did not make this contention before the juvenile court judge; (2) that appellant raised the issue in his habeas corpus petition but that it was not passed on by the Nebraska District Court; (3) that appellant did not press the District Court's failure to consider this issue in his appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court, and made only passing reference to the issue in his brief to that court; and (4) that the opinions of the Nebraska Supreme Court did not pass on the issue, or even refer to the contention. Given the barrenness of the record on this issue, in the exercise of our discretion, we decline to pass on it. So far as we have been made aware, this issue does not draw into question the validity of any Nebraska statute. 6 Therefore, it could not standing alone, be subject to review in this Court by way of an appeal. See 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2). "[I]nsofar as notation of probable jurisdiction may be [396 U.S. 28, 33] regarded as a grant of the certiorari writ" as to this issue, we dismiss such writ as improvidently granted. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 513 . </s> For the foregoing reasons this appeal is </s> Dismissed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "Delinquent child shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance." Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-201 (4). Appellant was charged with having a forged check in his possession with the intent to utter it as genuine, an act which for an adult would be forgery under Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-601 (2). </s> [Footnote 2 Appellant was 17 when committed, and it appears that under Nebraska law he could be kept in the training school until his 21st birthday. </s> [Footnote 3 Four of the seven justices of the Nebraska Supreme Court thought the Nebraska statutory provisions which require that juvenile hearings be without a jury, Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-206.03 (2), and be based on the preponderance of the evidence, Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-206.03 (3), were unconstitutional. The Nebraska Constitution provides, however, that: "No legislative act shall be held unconstitutional except by the concurrence of five judges." Neb. Const., Art. V, 2. </s> [Footnote 4 Although a comment made by appellant's counsel at oral argument before this Court (in response to a question) suggests reliance also on the Equal Protection Clause for the claim that a jury trial was constitutionally required (Tr. 5), an examination of the record clearly reveals that this was not any part of the basis on which probable jurisdiction was noted here. Appellant made no equal protection claim before the juvenile court, in his petition for habeas corpus to the state courts, or in his jurisdictional statement or brief in this Court. The Sixth Amendment as reflected in the Fourteenth was the exclusive basis for appellant's claim that he had a right to a jury trial. (See "Questions Presented" in Jurisdictional Statement 3-4, and [396 U.S. 28, 31] Appellant's Brief 2.) Nor has any of the Nebraska courts below passed on any equal protection claim. </s> [Footnote 5 This Court has recently noted probable jurisdiction to consider this issue in In re Winship (No. 85, Misc.), probable jurisdiction noted, post, p. 885. </s> [Footnote 6 In his petition for state habeas corpus, appellant did not allege as to this issue that any Nebraska statutory provision was invalid. Instead he claimed: "Petitioner is deprived of his liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States when his right to a jury trial and the protective procedures of the criminal code are left to depend on the uncontrolled discretion of the prosecutor as to whether petitioner should be proceeded against in juvenile court or should be informed against in District Court under the provisions of the code of criminal procedure." If it can be fairly said that the prosecutor's discretion under Nebraska law is "uncontrolled," or not subject to review, this is not because of any explicit statutory provision making it such, cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-205.04, but because of language in Nebraska case law. See State v. McCoy, 145 Neb, 750, 18 N. W. 2d 101 (1945); Fugate v. Ronin, 167 Neb, 70, 75, 91 N. W. 2d 240, 243-244 (1958). </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting. </s> For the reasons set forth herein and in the dissenting opinion of my Brother DOUGLAS, I dissent and would reverse the judgment below. </s> In February 1968 appellant, who was then 17 years old, was charged under the laws of Nebraska with being a "delinquent child" 1 because he had a forged bank check which he intended to use for his own purposes. 2 At the hearing on this charge he asked for a jury trial, arguing that this was a right guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution and that a statute prohibiting juries in "delinquency" proceedings 3 was therefore unconstitutional. </s> This Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), held that juveniles charged with being "delinquents" as a [396 U.S. 28, 34] result of committing a criminal act were entitled to certain constitutional safeguards - namely, notice of the issues involved, benefit of counsel, protection against compulsory self-incrimination, and confrontation of the witnesses against them. I can see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution for allowing persons like appellant the benefit of those rights and yet denying them a jury trial, a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the English-speaking world. </s> The Court here decides that it would not be "appropriate" to decide this issue in light of DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). That case held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial - made applicable to the States in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) - did not apply in state proceedings held prior to May 20, 1968. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and I dissented in that case as we have in every case holding that constitutional decisions would take effect only from the day they were announced. 4 I think this doctrine of prospective-only application is nothing less than judicial amendment of the Constitution, since it results in the Constitution's meaning one thing the day prior to a particular decision and something entirely different the next day even though the language remains the same. Under our system of government such amendments cannot constitutionally be made by judges but only by the action of Congress and the people. Depriving defendants of jury trials prior to Duncan violated the Constitution just as much as would similar deprivations after [396 U.S. 28, 35] that decision, yet this Court treats these equal deprivations with clearly unequal justice. I cannot agree to such refusals to apply what appear to me to be the clear commands of the Constitution. </s> [Footnote 1 Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-201 (4) provides that: "Delinquent child shall mean any child under the age of eighteen years who has violated any law of the state or any city or village ordinance." </s> [Footnote 2 The State charged that appellant "unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly [had] in his possession and custody a certain false, forged and counterfeited bank check . . . with the intent . . . to utter and publish said false, forged and counterfeited bank check as true and genuine, knowing the same to be a false, forged and counterfeited bank check, and with the intent then and there and thereby to prejudice, damage and defraud . . ., well knowing the same to be falsely made, forged and counterfeited, contrary to the form of the Statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nebraska." App. 1-2. It is undisputed that such acts constitute the crime of forgery under state law. Neb. Rev. Stat. 28-601 (2). </s> [Footnote 3 Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-206.03 (2) provides that juvenile hearings "shall be conducted by the judge without a jury in an informal manner . . . ." </s> [Footnote 4 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 640 (1965) (dissenting opinion); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 736 (1966) (dissenting opinion); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 , 303 (1967) (dissenting opinions); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 (1968) (dissenting opinion); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 835 (1969) (dissenting opinion); see also Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 254 (1969) (concurring in judgment). </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 , I stated my view that the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 , which guaranteed to adults in serious criminal cases and contempts the right to a trial by jury, should be given retroactive effect. * In light of this view, I am unable to join the Court's per curiam opinion in this case, holding that because appellant's juvenile court hearing was held prior to the date of the decisions in Duncan and Bloom the Court is precluded from deciding appellant's right to a jury trial. </s> I would reach the merits and hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require a jury trial as a matter of right where the delinquency charged is an offense that, if the person were an adult, would be a crime triable by jury. Such is this case, for behind the facade of delinquency is the crime of forgery. </s> As originally conceived, the juvenile court was to be a clinic, not a court; the judge and all of the attendants were visualized as white-coated experts there to supervise, enlighten, and cure - not to punish. </s> These white-coated people were surrogates, so to speak, of the natural parent. As stated in one of the leading cases: </s> "To save a child from becoming a criminal, or from continuing in a career of crime, to end in maturer [396 U.S. 28, 36] years in public punishment and disgrace, the legislature surely may provide for the salvation of such a child, if its parents or guardian be unable or unwilling to do so, by bringing it into one of the courts of the state without any process at all, for the purpose of subjecting it to the state's guardianship and protection. The natural parent needs no process to temporarily deprive his child of its liberty by confining it in his own home, to save it and to shield it from the consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness, nor is the state, when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place of the father for the same purpose, required to adopt any process as a means of placing its hands upon the child to lead it into one of its courts. When the child gets there and the court, with the power to save it, determines on its salvation, and not its punishment, it is immaterial how it got there. The act simply provides how children who ought to be saved may reach the court to be saved." Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905). </s> This new agency - which stood in the shoes of the parent or guardian - was to draw on all the medical, psychological, and psychiatric knowledge of the day and transform the delinquent. These experts motivated by love were to transform troubled children into normal ones, saving them from criminal careers. </s> Many things happened that prevented this dream from becoming a widespread reality. First, municipal budgets were not equal to the task of enticing experts to enter this field in large numbers. Second, such experts as we had, notably the psychiatrists and analysts, were drawn away by the handsome fees they could receive for rehabilitating the rich. Third, the love and tenderness alone, possessed by the white-coated judge and attendants, were not sufficient to untangle the web of subconscious [396 U.S. 28, 37] influences that possessed the troubled youngster. Fourth, correctional institutions designed to care for these delinquents often became miniature prisons with many of the same vicious aspects as the adult models. Fifth, the secrecy of the juvenile proceedings led to some overreaching and arbitrary actions. </s> As Mr. Justice Fortas stated in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 : "There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." </s> In Kent, the Court held that a valid waiver of the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia required "a hearing, including access by . . . counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and . . . a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision." Id., at 557. Although the opinion in that case emphasized that "the basic requirements of due process and fairness" be satisfied in such proceedings, id., at 553, the decision itself turned on the language of a federal statute. </s> The first expansive treatment of the constitutional requirements of due process in juvenile court proceedings was undertaken in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 . That case involved a 15-year-old boy who had been committed by an Arizona juvenile court to the State Industrial School "for the period of his minority, unless sooner discharged by due process of law" for allegedly making lewd telephone calls. The Court in Gault abandoned the view that due process was a concept alien to the philosophy and work of the juvenile courts. Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the Court, stated: "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." Id., at 28. The Court held that a juvenile is entitled to adequate and timely notice [396 U.S. 28, 38] of the charges against him, the right to counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination. </s> Since the decision in Gault, lower courts have divided on the question whether there is a right to jury trial in juvenile proceedings. Those courts which have granted the right felt that it was implicit in Gault. Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1968); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N. M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968); In re Rindell, 2 BNA Cr. L. 3121 (Providence, R. I., Fam. Ct., Jan. 1968). Those who have denied the right have reasoned either that jury trial is not a fundamental right applicable to the States or that it is not consistent with the concept of a juvenile court. People v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 725, 289 N. Y. S. 2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211 Pa. Super. 62, 234 A. 2d 9 (1967). Duncan and Bloom have negated the former reason. Whether a jury trial is in conflict with the juvenile court's underlying philosophy is irrelevant, for the Constitution is the Supreme Law of the land. </s> Given the fundamental nature of the right to jury trial as expressed in Duncan and Bloom, there is, as I see it, no constitutionally sufficient reason to deprive the juvenile of this right. The balancing of the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile proceeding with the due process requirement of a jury trial is a matter for a future Constitutional Convention. </s> The idea of a juvenile court certainly was not the development of a juvenile criminal court. It was to have a healthy specialized clinic, not to conduct criminal trials in evasion of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. Where there is a criminal trial charging a criminal offense, whether in conventional terms or in the language of delinquency, all of the procedural requirements of the Constitution and Bill of Rights come into play. </s> I would reverse this judgment. </s> [Footnote * This has been my position with respect to all comparable constitutional decisions. See, e. g., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 255 -256 (dissenting opinion); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 (dissenting opinion); and cases cited therein. </s> [396 U.S. 28, 39]

United States Supreme Court COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. BANKS(2005) No. 03-892 Argued: November 1, 2004Decided: January 24, 2005 </s> Respondent Banks settled his federal employment discrimination suit against a California state agency and respondent Banaitis settled his Oregon state case against his former employer, but neither included fees paid to their attorneys under contingent-fee agreements as gross income on their federal income tax returns. In each case petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency, which the Tax Court upheld. In Banks' case, the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that the amount Banks paid to his attorney was not includable as gross income. In Banaitis' case, the Ninth Circuit found that because Oregon law grants attorneys a superior lien in the contingent-fee portion of any recovery, that part of Banaitis' settlement was not includable as gross income. Held:When a litigant's recovery constitutes income, the litigant's income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee. Pp.5-12. (a)Two preliminary observations help clarify why this issue is of consequence. First, taking the legal expenses as miscellaneous itemized deductions would have been of no help to respondents because the Alternative Minimum Tax establishes a tax liability floor and does not allow such deductions. Second, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004--which amended the Internal Revenue Code to allow a taxpayer, in computing adjusted gross income, to deduct attorney's fees such as those at issue--does not apply here because it was passed after these cases arose and is not retroactive. Pp.5-6. </s> (b)The Code defines "gross income" broadly to include all economic gains not otherwise exempted. Under the anticipatory assignment of income doctrine, a taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from gross income by assigning the gain in advance to another party, e.g., Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, because gains should be taxed "to those who earn them," id., at 114. The doctrine is meant to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation through arrangements and contracts devised to prevent income from vesting in the one who earned it. Id., at 115. Because the rule is preventative and motivated by administrative and substantive concerns, this Court does not inquire whether any particular assignment has a discernible tax avoidance purpose. Pp.6-7. </s> (c)The Court agrees with the Commissioner that a contingent-fee agreement should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a portion of the client's income from any litigation recovery. In an ordinary case attribution of income is resolved by asking whether a taxpayer exercises complete dominion over the income in question. However, in the context of anticipatory assignments, where the assignor may not have dominion over the income at the moment of receipt, the question is whether the assignor retains dominion over the income-generating asset. Looking to such control preserves the principle that income should be taxed to the party who earns the income and enjoys the consequent benefits. In the case of a litigation recovery the income-generating asset is the cause of action derived from the plaintiff's legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion over this asset throughout the litigation. Respondents' counterarguments are rejected. The legal claim's value may be speculative at the moment of the assignment, but the anticipatory assignment doctrine is not limited to instances when the precise dollar value of the assigned income is known in advance. In these cases, the taxpayer retained control over the asset, diverted some of the income produced to another party, and realized a benefit by doing so. Also rejected is respondents' suggestion that the attorney-client relationship be treated as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes. In fact, that relationship is a quintessential principal-agent relationship, for the client retains ultimate dominion and control over the underlying claim. The attorney can make tactical decisions without consulting the client, but the client still must determine whether to settle or proceed to judgment and make, as well, other critical decisions. The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act in the principal's interests, and so it is appropriate to treat the full recovery amount as income to the principal. This rule applies regardless of whether the attorney-client contract or state law confers any special rights or protections on the attorney, so long as such protections do not alter the relationship's fundamental principal-agent character. The Court declines to comment on other theories proposed by respondents and their amici, which were not advanced in earlier stages of the litigation or examined by the Courts of Appeals. Pp.7-10. </s> (d)This Court need not address Banks' contention that application of the anticipatory assignment principle would be inconsistent with the purpose of statutory fee-shifting provisions, such as those applicable in his case brought under 42 U.S.C. §§1981, 1983, and 2000(e) et seq. He settled his case, and the fee paid to his attorney was calculated based solely on the contingent-fee contract. There was no court-ordered fee award or any indication in his contract with his attorney or the settlement that the contingent fee paid was in lieu of statutory fees that might otherwise have been recovered. Also, the American Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps most, claims governed by fee-shifting statutes. P. 11. No. 03-892, 345 F.3d 373; No. 03-907, 340 F.3d 1074, reversed and remanded. Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Rehnquist, C.J., who took no part in the decision of the cases. </s> COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,PETITIONER </s> 03-892v. </s> JOHN W. BANKS, II on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the sixth circuit </s> COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,PETITIONER </s> 03-907v. </s> SIGITAS J. BANAITIS on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the ninth circuit [January 24, 2005] </s> Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question in these consolidated cases is whether the portion of a money judgment or settlement paid to a plaintiff's attorney under a contingent-fee agreement is income to the plaintiff under the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. I). The issue divides the courts of appeals. In one of the instant cases, Banks v. Commissioner, 345 F.3d 373 (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the contingent-fee portion of a litigation recovery is not included in the plaintiff's gross income. The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also adhere to this view, relying on the holding, over Judge Wisdom's dissent, in Cotnam v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 119, 125-126 (CA5 1959). Srivastava v. Commissioner, 220 F.3d 353, 363-365 (CA5 2000); Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1279-1280 (CA11 2001). In the other case under review, Banaitis v. Commissioner, 340 F.3d 1074 (2003), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee is excluded from the plaintiff's gross income if state law gives the plaintiff's attorney a special property interest in the fee, but not otherwise. Six Courts of Appeals have held the entire litigation recovery, including the portion paid to an attorney as a contingent fee, is income to the plaintiff. Some of these Courts of Appeals discuss state law, but little of their analysis appears to turn on this factor. Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d 107, 113-116 (CA2 2004); Kenseth v. Commissioner, 259 F.3d 881, 883-884 (CA7 2001); Baylin v. United States, 43 F.3d 1451, 1454-1455 (CA Fed. 1995). Other Courts of Appeals have been explicit that the fee portion of the recovery is always income to the plaintiff regardless of the nuances of state law. O'Brien v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 707, 712 (1962), aff'd, 319 F.2d 532 (CA3 1963) (per curiam); Young v. Commissioner, 240 F.3d 369, 377-379 (CA4 2001); Hukkanen-Campbell v. Commissioner, 274 F.3d 1312, 1313-1314 (CA10 2001). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 541 U.S. 958 (2004). </s> We hold that, as a general rule, when a litigant's recovery constitutes income, the litigant's income includes the portion of the recovery paid to the attorney as a contingent fee. We reverse the decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. </s> I </s> A. Commissioner v. Banks </s> In 1986, respondent John W. Banks, II, was fired from his job as an educational consultant with the California Department of Education. He retained an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and filed a civil suit against the employer in a United States District Court. The complaint alleged employment discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§1981 and 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq., and Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §12965 (West 1986). The original complaint asserted various additional claims under state law, but Banks later abandoned these. After trial commenced in 1990, the parties settled for $464,000. Banks paid $150,000 of this amount to his attorney pursuant to the fee agreement. </s> Banks did not include any of the $464,000 in settlement proceeds as gross income in his 1990 federal income tax return. In 1997 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued Banks a notice of deficiency for the 1990 tax year. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination, finding that all the settlement proceeds, including the $150,000 Banks had paid to his attorney, must be included in Banks' gross income. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part. 345 F.3d 373 (2003). It agreed the net amount received by Banks was included in gross income but not the amount paid to the attorney. Relying on its prior decision in Estate of Clarks v. Commissioner, 202 F.3d 854 (2000), the court held the contingent-fee agreement was not an anticipatory assignment of Banks' income because the litigation recovery was not already earned, vested, or even relatively certain to be paid when the contingent-fee contract was made. A contingent-fee arrangement, the court reasoned, is more like a partial assignment of income-producing property than an assignment of income. The attorney is not the mere beneficiary of the client's largess, but rather earns his fee through skill and diligence. 345 F.3d, at 384-385 (quoting Estate of Clarks, supra, at 857-858). This reasoning, the court held, applies whether or not state law grants the attorney any special property interest (e.g., a superior lien) in part of the judgment or settlement proceeds. </s> B. Commissioner v. Banaitis </s> After leaving his job as a vice president and loan officer at the Bank of California in 1987, Sigitas J. Banaitis retained an attorney on a contingent-fee basis and brought suit in Oregon state court against the Bank of California and its successor in ownership, the Mitsubishi Bank. The complaint alleged that Mitsubishi Bank willfully interfered with Banaitis' employment contract, and that the Bank of California attempted to induce Banaitis to breach his fiduciary duties to customers and discharged him when he refused. The jury awarded Banaitis compensatory and punitive damages. After resolution of all appeals and post-trial motions, the parties settled. The defendants paid $4,864,547 to Banaitis; and, following the formula set forth in the contingent-fee contract, the defendants paid an additional $3,864,012 directly to Banaitis' attorney. </s> Banaitis did not include the amount paid to his attorney in gross income on his federal income tax return, and the Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 340 F.3d 1074 (2003). In contrast to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, the Banaitis court viewed state law as pivotal. Where state law confers on the attorney no special property rights in his fee, the court said, the whole amount of the judgment or settlement ordinarily is included in the plaintiff's gross income. Id., at 1081. Oregon state law, however, like the law of some other States, grants attorneys a superior lien in the contingent-fee portion of any recovery. As a result, the court held, contingent-fee agreements under Oregon law operate not as an anticipatory assignment of the client's income but as a partial transfer to the attorney of some of the client's property in the lawsuit. </s> II To clarify why the issue here is of any consequence for tax purposes, two preliminary observations are useful. The first concerns the general issue of deductibility. For the tax years in question the legal expenses in these cases could have been taken as miscellaneous itemized deductions subject to the ordinary requirements, 26 U.S.C. §§67-68 (2000 ed. and Supp. I), but doing so would have been of no help to respondents because of the operation of the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT). For noncorporate individual taxpayers, the AMT establishes a tax liability floor equal to 26 percent of the taxpayer's "alternative minimum taxable income" (minus specified exemptions) up to $175,000, plus 28 percent of alternative minimum taxable income over $175,000. §§55(a), (b) (2000 ed.). Alternative minimum taxable income, unlike ordinary gross income, does not allow any miscellaneous itemized deductions. §§56(b)(1)(A)(i). Second, after these cases arose Congress enacted the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, 118 Stat. 1418. Section 703 of the Act amended the Code by adding §62(a)(19). Id., at 1546. The amendment allows a taxpayer, in computing adjusted gross income, to deduct "attorney fees and court costs paid by, or on behalf of, the taxpayer in connection with any action involving a claim of unlawful discrimination." Ibid. The Act defines "unlawful discrimination" to include a number of specific federal statutes, §§62(e)(1) to (16), any federal whistle-blower statute, §62(e)(17), and any federal, state, or local law "providing for the enforcement of civil rights" or "regulating any aspect of the employment relationship ... or prohibiting the discharge of an employee, the discrimination against an employee, or any other form of retaliation or reprisal against an employee for asserting rights or taking other actions permitted by law," §62(e)(18). Id., at 1547-1548. These deductions are permissible even when the AMT applies. Had the Act been in force for the transactions now under review, these cases likely would not have arisen. The Act is not retroactive, however, so while it may cover future taxpayers in respondents' position, it does not pertain here. </s> III The Internal Revenue Code defines "gross income" for federal tax purposes as "all income from whatever source derived." 26 U.S.C. §61(a). The definition extends broadly to all economic gains not otherwise exempted. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1955); Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S. 28, 49 (1949). A taxpayer cannot exclude an economic gain from gross income by assigning the gain in advance to another party. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 604 (1948); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116-117 (1940). The rationale for the so-called anticipatory assignment of income doctrine is the principle that gains should be taxed "to those who earn them," Lucas, supra, at 114, a maxim we have called "the first principle of income taxation," Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-740 (1949). The anticipatory assignment doctrine is meant to prevent taxpayers from avoiding taxation through "arrangements and contracts however skillfully devised to prevent [income] when paid from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it." Lucas, 281 U.S., at 115. The rule is preventative and motivated by administrative as well as substantive concerns, so we do not inquire whether any particular assignment has a discernible tax avoidance purpose. As Lucas explained, "no distinction can be taken according to the motives leading to the arrangement by which the fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew." Ibid. Respondents argue that the anticipatory assignment doctrine is a judge-made antifraud rule with no relevance to contingent-fee contracts of the sort at issue here. The Commissioner maintains that a contingent-fee agreement should be viewed as an anticipatory assignment to the attorney of a portion of the client's income from any litigation recovery. We agree with the Commissioner. </s> In an ordinary case attribution of income is resolved by asking whether a taxpayer exercises complete dominion over the income in question. Glenshaw Glass Co., supra, at 431; see also Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S. 203, 209 (1990); Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., 405 U.S. 394, 403 (1972). In the context of anticipatory assignments, however, the assignor often does not have dominion over the income at the moment of receipt. In that instance the question becomes whether the assignor retains dominion over the income-generating asset, because the taxpayer "who owns or controls the source of the income, also controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his wants." Horst, supra, at 116-117. See also Lucas, supra, at 114-115; Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 124-125 (1940); Sunnen, supra, at 604. Looking to control over the income-generating asset, then, preserves the principle that income should be taxed to the party who earns the income and enjoys the consequent benefits. </s> In the case of a litigation recovery the income-generating asset is the cause of action that derives from the plaintiff's legal injury. The plaintiff retains dominion over this asset throughout the litigation. We do not understand respondents to argue otherwise. Rather, respondents advance two counterarguments. First, they say that, in contrast to the bond coupons assigned in Horst, the value of a legal claim is speculative at the moment of assignment, and may be worth nothing at all. Second, respondents insist that the claimant's legal injury is not the only source of the ultimate recovery. The attorney, according to respondents, also contributes income-generating assets--effort and expertise--without which the claimant likely could not prevail. On these premises respondents urge us to treat a contingent-fee agreement as establishing, for tax purposes, something like a joint venture or partnership in which the client and attorney combine their respective assets--the client's claim and the attorney's skill--and apportion any resulting profits. </s> We reject respondents' arguments. Though the value of the plaintiff's claim may be speculative at the moment the fee agreement is signed, the anticipatory assignment doctrine is not limited to instances when the precise dollar value of the assigned income is known in advance. Lucas, supra; United States v. Bayse, 410 U.S. 441, 445, 450-452 (1973). Though Horst involved an anticipatory assignment of a predetermined sum to be paid on a specific date, the holding in that case did not depend on ascertaining a liquidated amount at the time of assignment. In the cases before us, as in Horst, the taxpayer retained control over the income-generating asset, diverted some of the income produced to another party, and realized a benefit by doing so. As Judge Wesley correctly concluded in a recent case, the rationale of Horst applies fully to a contingent-fee contract. Raymond v. United States, 355 F.3d, at115-116. That the amount of income the asset would produce was uncertain at the moment of assignment is of no consequence. </s> We further reject the suggestion to treat the attorney-client relationship as a sort of business partnership or joint venture for tax purposes. The relationship between client and attorney, regardless of the variations in particular compensation agreements or the amount of skill and effort the attorney contributes, is a quintessential principal-agent relationship. Restatement (Second) of Agency §1, Comment e (1957) (hereinafter Restatement); ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3, Comments 1, 1.7 1 (2002). The client may rely on the attorney's expertise and special skills to achieve a result the client could not achieve alone. That, however, is true of most principal-agent relationships, and it does not alter the fact that the client retains ultimate dominion and control over the underlying claim. The control is evident when it is noted that, although the attorney can make tactical decisions without consulting the client, the plaintiff still must determine whether to settle or proceed to judgment and make, as well, other critical decisions. Even where the attorney exercises independent judgment without supervision by, or consultation with, the client, the attorney, as an agent, is obligated to act solely on behalf of, and for the exclusive benefit of, the client-principal, rather than for the benefit of the attorney or any other party. Restatement §§13, 39, 387. </s> The attorney is an agent who is duty bound to act only in the interests of the principal, and so it is appropriate to treat the full amount of the recovery as income to the principal. In this respect Judge Posner's observation is apt: "[T]he contingent-fee lawyer [is not] a joint owner of his client's claim in the legal sense any more than the commission salesman is a joint owner of his employer's accounts receivable." Kenseth, 259 F.3d, at 883. In both cases a principal relies on an agent to realize an economic gain, and the gain realized by the agent's efforts is income to the principal. The portion paid to the agent may be deductible, but absent some other provision of law it is not excludable from the principal's gross income. </s> This rule applies whether or not the attorney-client contract or state law confers any special rights or protections on the attorney, so long as these protections do not alter the fundamental principal-agent character of the relationship. Cf. Restatement §13, Comment b, and §14G, Comment a (an agency relationship is created where a principal assigns a chose in action to an assignee for collection and grants the assignee a security interest in the claim against the assignor's debtor in order to compensate the assignee for his collection efforts). State laws vary with respect to the strength of an attorney's security interest in a contingent fee and the remedies available to an attorney should the client discharge or attempt to defraud the attorney. No state laws of which we are aware, however, even those that purport to give attorneys an "ownership" interest in their fees, e.g., 340 F.3d, at 1082-1083 (discussing Oregon law); Cotnam, 263 F.2d, at 125 (discussing Alabama law), convert the attorney from an agent to a partner. </s> Respondents and their amici propose other theories to exclude fees from income or permit deductibility. These suggestions include: (1) The contingent-fee agreement establishes a Subchapter K partnership under 26 U.S.C. §§702, 704, and 761, Brief for Respondent Banaitis in No. 03-907, p.5-21; (2) litigation recoveries are proceeds from disposition of property, so the attorney's fee should be subtracted as a capital expense pursuant to §§1001, 1012, and 1016, Brief for Association of Trial Lawyers ofAmerica as Amicus Curiae 23-28, Brief for CharlesDavenport as Amicus Curiae 3-13; and (3) the fees are deductible reimbursed employee business expenses under §62(a)(2)(A) (2000 ed. and Supp. I), Brief for Stephen Cohen as Amicus Curiae. These arguments, it appears, are being presented for the first time to this Court. We are especially reluctant to entertain novel propositions of law with broad implications for the tax system that were not advanced in earlier stages of the litigation and not examined by the Courts of Appeals. We decline comment on these supplementary theories. In addition, we do not reach the instance where a relator pursues a claim on behalf of the United States. Brief for Taxpayers Against Fraud Education Fund as Amicus Curiae 10-20. </s> IV The foregoing suffices to dispose of Banaitis' case. Banks' case, however, involves a further consideration. Banks brought his claims under federal statutes that authorize fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs' attorneys. He contends that application of the anticipatory assignment principle would be inconsistent with the purpose of statutory fee shifting provisions. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 86 (1990) (observing that statutory fees enable "plaintiffs to employ reasonably competent lawyers without cost to themselves if they prevail"). In the federal system statutory fees are typically awarded by the court under the lodestar approach, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983), and the plaintiff usually has little control over the amount awarded. Sometimes, as when the plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief, or when the statute caps plaintiffs' recoveries, or when for other reasons damages are substantially less than attorney's fees, court-awarded attorney's fees can exceed a plaintiff's monetary recovery. See, e.g., Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 564-565 (1986) (compensatory and punitive damages of $33,350; attorney's fee award of $245,456.25). Treating the fee award as income to the plaintiff in such cases, it is argued, can lead to the perverse result that the plaintiff loses money by winning the suit. Furthermore, it is urged that treating statutory fee awards as income to plaintiffs would undermine the effectiveness of fee-shifting statutes in deputizing plaintiffs and their lawyers to act as private attorneys general. We need not address these claims. After Banks settled his case, the fee paid to his attorney was calculated solely on the basis of the private contingent-fee contract. There was no court-ordered fee award, nor was there any indication in Banks' contract with his attorney, or in the settlement agreement with the defendant, that the contingent fee paid to Banks' attorney was in lieu of statutory fees Banks might otherwise have been entitled to recover. Also, the amendment added by the American Jobs Creation Act redresses the concern for many, perhaps most, claims governed by fee-shifting statutes. *** </s> For the reasons stated, the judgments of the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. The Chief Justice took no part in the decision of these cases. </s> FOOTNOTES*Footnote *Together with No. 03-907, Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Banaitis, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

United States Supreme Court BROWN v. GSA(1976) No. 74-768 Argued: Decided: June 1, 1976 </s> Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, proscribes federal employment discrimination and establishes an administrative and judicial enforcement system. The statute provides that personnel actions affecting federal employees or job applicants "shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," 717 (a); delegates enforcement authority to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), 717 (b); and permits an aggrieved employee to file a civil action in a federal district court for review of his claim of employment discrimination. After first seeking relief from the agency allegedly guilty of discrimination, he may seek further review from the CSC, or, alternatively, within 30 days of receipt of notice of the agency's final decision, file suit in federal district court without appealing to the CSC. If he appeals to the CSC he may file suit within 30 days of the CSC's final decision. In any event he may file a civil action if, after 180 days from the filing of the charge or appeal, the agency or the CSC has not taken final action. 717 (c). Petitioner, a Negro, who claimed that respondent agency (GSA) had racially discriminated against him by not promoting him to a higher grade, filed a complaint with the GSA. After an adverse decision he was accorded a hearing by a CSC complaints examiner, who in February 1973 found that there was no discrimination, and in March 1973 the GSA rendered its final decision upholding the examiner. Petitioner was advised of that decision and of the further procedure available to him. Forty-two days later he brought suit in the District Court, alleging jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "with particular reference to" 717. He also alleged jurisdiction under the general federal-question statute, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. The District Court granted respondents' motion to dismiss made on the ground that petitioner had not filed the complaint within the 30-day period specified by 717 (c), and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: Section 717 provides the exclusive [425 U.S. 820, 821] judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment, and since petitioner failed to file a timely complaint under 717 (c), the District Court properly dismissed his complaint. Pp. 824-835. </s> (a) The legislative history indicates that Congress, which was persuaded that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy, intended by the 1972 legislation to create an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination. Pp. 824-829. </s> (b) The balance, completeness, and structural integrity of 717 are inconsistent with petitioner's contention that the judicial remedy of 717 (c) was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial remedies. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 , distinguished. Pp. 832-834. </s> (c) A precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 . Pp. 834-835. </s> 507 F.2d 1300, affirmed. </s> STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 835. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. </s> Eric Schnapper argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Jack Greenberg, James M. Nabrit III, Charles Stephen Ralston, Melvyn R. Leventhal, Barry L. Goldstein, and Jeff Greenup. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Wallace argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant Attorney General Lee, Mark L. Evans, Robert E. Kopp, and Neil H. Koslowe. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The principal question presented by this case is whether 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment. [425 U.S. 820, 822] </s> The petitioner, Clarence Brown, is a Negro who has been employed by the General Services Administration since 1957. 1 He is currently classified in grade GS-7 and has not been promoted since 1966. In December 1970 Brown was referred, along with two white colleagues, for promotion to grade GS-9 by his supervisors. All three were rated "highly qualified," and the promotion was given to one of the white candidates for the position. Brown filed a complaint with the GSA Equal Employment Opportunity Office alleging that racial discrimination had biased the selection process. That complaint was withdrawn when Brown was told that other GS-9 positions would soon be available. </s> Another GS-9 position did become vacant in June 1971, for which the petitioner along with two others was recommended as "highly qualified." Again a white applicant was chosen. Brown filed a second administrative complaint with the GSA Equal Employment Opportunity Office. After preparation and review of an investigative report, the GSA Regional Administrator notified the petitioner that there was no evidence that race had played a part in the promotion. Brown requested a hearing, and one was held before a complaints examiner of the Civil Service Commission. In February 1973, the examiner issued his findings and recommended decision. He found no evidence of racial discrimination; rather, he determined that Brown had not been advanced because he had not been "fully cooperative." </s> The GSA rendered its final decision in March 1973. The agency's Director of Civil Rights informed Brown [425 U.S. 820, 823] by letter of his conclusion that considerations of race had not entered the promotional process. The Director's letter told Brown that if he chose, he might carry the administrative process further by lodging an appeal with the Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission and that, alternatively, he could file suit within 30 days in federal district court. 2 </s> Forty-two days later Brown filed suit in a Federal District Court. The complaint alleged jurisdiction under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 103, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), "with particular reference to" 717; under 28 U.S.C. 1331 (general federal-question jurisdiction); under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 [425 U.S. 820, 824] U.S.C. 2201, 2202; and under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1981. 3 </s> The respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, on the ground that Brown had not filed the complaint within 30 days of final agency action as required by 717 (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. IV). The District Court granted the motion. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of dismissal. 507 F.2d 1300 (1974). It held, first, that the 717 remedy for federal employment discrimination was retroactively available to any employee, such as the petitioner, whose administrative complaint was pending at the time 717 became effective on March 24, 1972. 4 The appellate court held, second, that 717 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination, and that the complaint had not been timely filed under that statute. Finally, the court ruled that if 717 did not pre-empt other remedies, then the petitioner's complaint was still properly dismissed because of his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies. We granted certiorari, 421 U.S. 987 (1975), to consider the important issues of federal law presented by this case. </s> The primary question in this litigation is not difficult to state: Is 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as added by 11 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), [425 U.S. 820, 825] the exclusive individual remedy available to a federal employee complaining of job-related racial discrimination? But the question is easier to state than it is to resolve. Congress simply failed explicitly to describe 717's position in the constellation of antidiscrimination law. We must, therefore, infer congressional intent in less obvious ways. As Mr. Chief Justice Marshall once wrote for the Court: "Where the mind labours to discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be derived . . . ." United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805). </s> Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1970 ed. and Supp. IV). Until it was amended in 1972 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, however, Title VII did not protect federal employees. 42 U.S.C. 2000e (b). Although federal employment discrimination clearly violated both the Constitution, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), and statutory law, 5 U.S.C. 7151, before passage of the 1972 Act, the effective availability of either administrative or judicial relief was far from sure. Charges of racial discrimination were handled parochially within each federal agency. A hearing examiner might come from outside the agency, but he had no authority to conduct an independent examination, and his conclusions and findings were in the nature of recommendations that the agency was free to accept or reject. 5 Although review lay in the Board of Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission, Congress found "skepticism" among federal employees "regarding the Commission's record in obtaining just resolutions of complaints and adequate remedies. This has, in turn, discouraged persons from filing complaints with the Commission [425 U.S. 820, 826] for fear that doing so will only result in antagonizing their supervisors and impairing any future hope of advancement." 6 </s> If administrative remedies were ineffective, judicial relief from federal employment discrimination was even more problematic before 1972. Although an action seeking to enjoin unconstitutional agency conduct would lie, 7 it was doubtful that backpay or other compensatory relief for employment discrimination was available at the time that Congress was considering the 1972 Act. For example, in Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had held in 1969 that there was no jurisdictional basis to support the plaintiff's suit alleging that the Corps of Engineers had discriminatorily refused to promote him. Damages for alleged discrimination were held beyond the scope of the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, since no express or implied contract was involved. 415 F.2d, at 1278. And the plaintiff's cause of action under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701-706, and the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, was held to be barred by sovereign immunity, since his claims for promotion would necessarily involve claims against the Treasury: </s> "A suit against an officer of the United States is one against the United States itself `if the decree would operate against' the sovereign; Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57, 58 . . . (1963) [,] or if `the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration,' Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 738 , . . . (1947); or if the effect of the judgment would be [425 U.S. 820, 827] `to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act,' Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 704 , . . . (1949)." 415 F.2d, at 1277. 8 </s> See also Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d 1348 (CA5 1971) (no jurisdiction over suit by a Negro alleging wrongful discharge from Corps of Engineers). 9 </s> Concern was evinced during the hearings before the committees of both Houses over the apparent inability of federal employees to engage the judicial machinery in cases of alleged employment discrimination. See, e. g., Hearings on S. 2515 et al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 296, 301, 308, 318 (1971); Hearings on H. R. 1746 before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 320, 322, 385-386, 391-392 (1971). Although there was considerable disagreement over whether a civil action would lie to remedy agency discrimination, the committees ultimately concluded that judicial review was not available at all or, if available, that some forms of relief were foreclosed. Thus, the Senate Report observed: "The testimony of the Civil Service Commission notwithstanding, the committee found that an aggrieved Federal employee does not have access to the courts. In many cases, the employee must overcome a U.S. Government defense of sovereign immunity or failure to exhaust administrative remedies [425 U.S. 820, 828] with no certainty as to the steps required to exhaust such remedies. Moreover, the remedial authority of the Commission and the courts has also been in doubt." S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 16 (1971). Similarly, the House Committee stated: "There is serious doubt that court review is available to the aggrieved Federal employee. Monetary restitution or back pay is not attainable. In promotion situations, a critical area of discrimination, the promotion is often no longer available." H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 25 (1971). </s> The conclusion of the committees was reiterated during floor debate. Senator Cranston, coauthor of the amendment relating to federal employment, asserted that it would, "[f]or the first time, permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in discrimination cases . . . ." 118 Cong. Rec. 4929 (1972). Senator Williams, sponsor and floor manager of the bill, stated that it "provides, for the first time, to my knowledge, for the right of an individual to take his complaint to court." Id., at 4922. </s> The legislative history thus leaves little doubt that Congress was persuaded that federal employees who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy. And the case law suggests that that conclusion was entirely reasonable. Whether that understanding of Congress was in some ultimate sense incorrect is not what is important in determining the legislative intent in amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act to cover federal employees. For the relevant inquiry is not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the state of the law was. 10 </s> This unambiguous congressional perception seems to [425 U.S. 820, 829] indicate that the congressional intent in 1972 was to create an exclusive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of federal employment discrimination. We need not, however, rest our decision upon this inference alone. For the structure of the 1972 amendment itself fully confirms the conclusion that Congress intended it to be exclusive and pre-emptive. </s> Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp. IV), proscribes federal employment discrimination and establishes an administrative and judicial enforcement system. 11 Section 717 (a) provides that all personnel actions affecting federal employees [425 U.S. 820, 830] and applicants for federal employment "shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." [425 U.S. 820, 831] </s> Sections 717 (b) and (c) establish complementary administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms designed to eradicate federal employment discrimination. Subsection (b) delegates to the Civil Service Commission full authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) [425 U.S. 820, 832] "through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay," to issue "rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate" to carry out its responsibilities under the Act, and to review equal employment opportunity plans that are annually submitted to it by each agency and department. </s> Section 717 (c) permits an aggrieved employee to file a civil action in a federal district court to review his claim of employment discrimination. Attached to that right, however, are certain preconditions. Initially, the complainant must seek relief in the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him. He then may seek further administrative review with the Civil Service Commission or, alternatively, he may, within 30 days of receipt of notice of the agency's final decision, file suit in federal district court without appealing to the Civil Service Commission. If he does appeal to the Commission, he may file suit within 30 days of the Commission's final decision. In any event, the complainant may file a civil action if, after 180 days from the filing of the charge or the appeal, the agency or Civil Service Commission has not taken final action. </s> Sections 706 (f) through (k), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) through 2000e-5 (k) (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), which are incorporated "as applicable" by 717 (d), govern such issues as venue, the appointment of attorneys, attorneys' fees, and the scope of relief. Section 717 (e), finally, retains within each governmental agency "primary responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment . . . ." </s> The balance, completeness, and structural integrity of 717 are inconsistent with the petitioner's contention that the judicial remedy afforded by 717 (c) was designed merely to supplement other putative judicial relief. His view fails, in our estimation, to accord due [425 U.S. 820, 833] weight to the fact that unlike these other supposed remedies, 12 717 does not contemplate merely judicial relief. Rather, it provides for a careful blend of administrative and judicial enforcement powers. Under the petitioner's theory, by perverse operation of a type of Gresham's law, 717, with its rigorous administrative exhaustion requirements and time limitations, would be driven out of currency were immediate access to the courts under other, less demanding statutes permissible. The crucial administrative role that each agency together with the Civil Service Commission was given by Congress in the eradication of employment discrimination would be eliminated "by the simple expedient of putting a different label on [the] pleadings." Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 -490 (1973). It would require the suspension of disbelief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading. </s> The petitioner relies upon our decision in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), for the proposition that Title VII did not repeal pre-existing remedies for employment discrimination. In Johnson the Court held that in the context of private employment Title VII did not pre-empt other remedies. But that decision is inapposite here. In the first place, there were no problems of sovereign immunity in the context of the Johnson case. Second, the holding in Johnson rested upon the explicit legislative history of the 1964 Act which "`manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.'" 421 U.S., at 459 , quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974). Congress made clear "`that the remedies available to the individual [425 U.S. 820, 834] under Title VII are co-extensive with the indiv[i]dual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and that the two procedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.'" 421 U.S., at 459 , quoting H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 415 -417 (1968). There is no such legislative history behind the 1972 amendments. Indeed, as indicated above, the congressional understanding was precisely to the contrary. </s> In a variety of contexts the Court has held that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies. In Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, for example, state prisoners whose good-time credits had been canceled for disciplinary reasons brought suit under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1983, in conjunction with a habeas corpus action. Although acknowledging that the civil rights statute was, by its terms, literally applicable, we held that challenges to the fact or duration of imprisonment appropriately lie only under habeas corpus, the "more specific act." Permitting such challenges to be brought under the general, civil rights statute, where exhaustion is not required, would undermine the "strong policy requiring exhaustion of state remedies" when prisoners challenge the length of their confinement. 411 U.S., at 488 -490. The Court has reached similar results in cases in which injured federal employees have claimed the right to proceed under facially applicable tort recovery statutes. E. g., United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966) (18 U.S.C. 4126; Federal Tort Claims Act); Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act; Suits in Admiralty Act); Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act; Public Vessels Act). We have consistently [425 U.S. 820, 835] held that a narrowly tailored employee compensation scheme pre-empts the more general tort recovery statutes. See also Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957); Stonite Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561 (1942) (in patent cases, venue is governed exclusively by statute dealing specifically with patent cases; general venue statute held inapplicable). </s> In the case at bar, as in Preiser and the other cases cited above, the established principle leads unerringly to the conclusion that 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment. </s> We hold, therefore, that since Brown failed to file a timely complaint under 717 (c), the District Court properly dismissed the case. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 After the petition for writ of certiorari was filed, the petitioner was laterally transferred to another Government agency. That transfer does not affect his claim for backpay or for equitable relief. The petitioner is still classified as a GS-7 and still wants the specific GS-9 position in the GSA for which he applied in 1971. </s> [Footnote 2 The letter stated in part: </s> "Therefore, based upon my findings, I am rendering the final agency decision on the complaint as follows: </s> "That the evidence in the case does not support the complaint of racial discrimination for promotion against you, but that you should receive career and performance counseling from your immediate supervisor to help you formulate plans to receive appropriate training and to correct your deficiencies as noted by management. </s> "If this decision does not meet with your satisfaction, you may file an appeal in writing, either in person or by mail, with the Board of Appeals and Review, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Washington, DC 20415. The Board's decision is the final administrative appeal. This appeal must be filed within 15 calendar days of receipt of this letter. </s> "If you choose to appeal to the Board of Appeals and Review, you retain the right to file a civil action in Federal district court within 30 calendar days after receipt of the Board's final decision on your appeal. You also have the right to file a civil action in Federal district court within 30 calendar days of receipt of this letter or 180 days after filing an appeal with the Board of Appeals and Review if no decision has been made." </s> [Footnote 3 Brown later moved for leave to amend his complaint to allege additional grounds of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1343 (4) and the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346 (a) and (b), and to allege that more than $10,000 was in controversy. The District Court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals did not review that order of denial. </s> [Footnote 4 The parties have apparently acquiesced in this holding by the Court of Appeals, and we have no occasion to disturb it. </s> [Footnote 5 S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 14 (1971). </s> [Footnote 6 Ibid.; see H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 24 (1971). </s> [Footnote 7 See, e. g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). </s> [Footnote 8 By parity of reasoning, sovereign immunity would, of course, also bar claims against federal agencies for damages and promotion brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and under the general federal-question jurisdictional grant of 28 U.S.C. 1331. </s> [Footnote 9 But see DeLong v. Hampton, 422 F.2d 21 (CA3 1970) (jurisdiction in district court to review determination by the Civil Service Commission that plaintiff was properly dismissed). </s> [Footnote 10 The petitioner maintains that in 1972, despite adverse court decisions, 42 U.S.C. 1981; the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361; the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346; 28 U.S.C. 1331 (general federal-question jurisdiction); and the Administrative Procedure Act, [425 U.S. 820, 829] 5 U.S.C. 702, all conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts in federal employment discrimination cases. </s> [Footnote 11 Title 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16 (1970 ed., Supp. IV) reads in full: </s> "(a) Discriminatory practices prohibited; employees or applicants for employment subject to coverage. </s> "All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment (except with regard to aliens employed outside the limits of the United States) in military departments as defined in section 102 of Title 5, in executive agencies (other than the General Accounting Office) as defined in section 105 of Title 5 (including employees and applicants for employment who are paid from non-appropriated funds), in the United States Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, in those units of the Government of the District of Columbia having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of the legislative and judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive service, and in the Library of Congress shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. </s> "(b) Civil Service Commission; enforcement powers; issuance of rules, regulations, etc.; annual review and approval of national and regional equal employment opportunity plans; review and evaluation of equal employment opportunity programs and publication of progress reports; consultations with interested parties; compliance with rules, regulations, etc.; contents of national and regional equal employment opportunity plans; authority of Librarian of Congress. </s> "Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the Civil Service [425 U.S. 820, 830] Commission shall have authority to enforce the provisions of subsection (a) of this section through appropriate remedies, including reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this section, and shall issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this section. The Civil Service Commission shall - </s> "(1) be responsible for the annual review and approval of a national and regional equal employment opportunity plan which each department and agency and each appropriate unit referred to in subsection (a) of this section shall submit in order to maintain an affirmative program of equal employment opportunity for all such employees and applicants for employment; </s> "(2) be responsible for the review and evaluation of the operation of all agency equal employment opportunity programs, periodically obtaining and publishing (on at least a semiannual basis) progress reports from each such department, agency, or unit; and </s> "(3) consult with and solicit the recommendations of interested individuals, groups, and organizations relating to equal employment opportunity. </s> "The head of each such department, agency, or unit shall comply with such rules, regulations, orders, and instructions which shall include a provision that an employee or applicant for employment shall be notified of any final action taken on any complaint of discrimination filed by him thereunder. The plan submitted by each department, agency, and unit shall include, but not be limited to - </s> "(1) provision for the establishment of training and education programs designed to provide a maximum opportunity for employees to advance so as to perform at their highest potential; and </s> "(2) a description of the qualifications in terms of training and experience relating to equal employment opportunity for the principal and operating officials of each such department, agency, or unit responsible for carrying out the equal employment opportunity program and of the allocation of personnel and resources proposed by such department, agency, or unit to carry out its equal employment opportunity program. </s> "With respect to employment in the Library of Congress, authorities [425 U.S. 820, 831] granted in this subsection to the Civil Service Commission shall be exercised by the Librarian of Congress. </s> "(c) Civil action by employee or applicant for employment for redress of grievances; time for bringing of action; head of department, agency, or unit as defendant. </s> "Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency, or unit referred to in subsection (a) of this section, or by the Civil Service Commission upon an appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, Executive Order 11478 or any succeeding Executive orders, or after one hundred and eighty days from the filing of the initial charge with the department, agency, or unit or with the Civil Service Commission on appeal from a decision or order of such department, agency, or unit until such time as final action may be taken by a department, agency, or unit, an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which civil action the head of the department, agency, or unit, as appropriate, shall be the defendant. </s> "(d) Section 2000e-5 (f) through (k) of this title applicable to civil actions. </s> "The provisions of section 2000e-5 (f) through (k) of this title, as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder. </s> "(e) Government agency or official not relieved of responsibility to assure nondiscrimination in employment or equal employment opportunity. </s> "Nothing contained in this Act shall relieve any Government agency or official of its or his primary responsibility to assure non-discrimination in employment as required by the Constitution and statutes or of its or his responsibilities under Executive Order 11478 relating to equal employment opportunity in the Federal Government." </s> [Footnote 12 See n. 10, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. </s> Prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 there was uncertainty as to what federal judicial remedies, if any, were available to persons injured by racially discriminatory employment practices in the private sector. 1 Against that background of uncertainty, Congress enacted a comprehensive remedial statute which did not expressly state whether it was exclusive of, or supplementary to, whatever other remedies might exist. [425 U.S. 820, 836] </s> In 1972 when Congress amended the statute to cover federal employees, there was similar uncertainty about what remedies were available to such employees. Since both the 1964 statute and the 1972 amendment were enacted in comparable settings, and since both pieces of legislation implement precisely the same important national interests, it is reasonable to infer that Congress intended to resolve the question of exclusivity in the same way at both times. </s> As the legislative history discussed in Chandler v. Roudebush, post, p. 840, demonstrates, Congress intended federal employees to have the same rights available to remedy racial discrimination as employees in the private sector. 2 Since the law is now well settled that victims of racial discrimination in the private sector have a choice of remedies and are not limited to Title VII, 3 federal employees should enjoy parallel rights. [425 U.S. 820, 837] The reasoning which governed the decisions in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 , and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 , applies with equal force to federal employees. There is no evidence, either in the statute itself or in its history, that Congress intended the 1972 amendment to be construed differently from the basic statute. </s> The fact that Congress incorrectly assumed that federal employees would have no judicial remedy if 717 had not been enacted 4 undermines rather than supports [425 U.S. 820, 838] the Court's conclusion that Congress intended to repeal or amend laws that it did not think applicable. Indeed, the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor rejected an amendment which would have explicitly provided that 717 would be the exclusive remedy for federal employees. 5 In sum, the legislative history of 717 discloses a clear intent to provide federal employees with rights that parallel those available to employees in the private sector, no evidence of an intention to make the remedy exclusive, and the rejection of an amendment which would have so provided. 6 </s> [425 U.S. 820, 839] </s> The burden of persuading us that we should interpolate such an important provision into a complex, carefully drafted statute is a heavy one. Since that burden has not been met, I would simply read the statute as Congress wrote it. </s> [Footnote 1 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 , and Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 , were not decided until 1974 and 1975 respectively. </s> [Footnote 2 "In 1972 Congress extended the protection of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (1970 ed. and Supp. IV), to employees of the Federal Government. A principal goal of the amending legislation, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, was to eradicate `"entrenched discrimination in the Federal service,"' Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 547 , by strengthening internal safeguards and by according `[a]ggrieved [federal] employees or applicants . . . the full rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the private sector under title VII.'" Chandler v. Roudebush, post, at 841. </s> [Footnote 3 In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., supra, at 47-49, MR. JUSTICE POWELL for a unanimous Court stated: </s> "[L]egislative enactments in this area have long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination. In the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000a et seq., Congress indicated that it considered the policy against discrimination to be of the `highest priority.' Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, [390 U.S. 400 ,] 402. Consistent with this view, Title VII provides for consideration of employment-discrimination claims in several forums. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (b) (1970 ed., Supp. II) [425 U.S. 820, 837] (EEOC); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (c) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (state and local agencies); 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (f) (1970 ed., Supp. II) (federal courts). And, in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later submission to another. Moreover, the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. The clear inference is that Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employment discrimination." </s> In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, supra, at 459, it was noted: </s> "Despite Title VII's range and its design as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimination in employment, the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his search for relief. . . . In particular, Congress noted `that the remedies available to the individual under Title VII are co-extensive with the indiv[i]dual's right to sue under the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and that the two procedures augment each other and are not mutually exclusive.' H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 19 (1971). See also S. Rep. No. 92-415, p. 24 (1971). Later, in considering the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have deprived a claimant of any right to sue under 1981. 118 Cong. Rec. 3371-3373 (1972)." </s> [Footnote 4 Since the Court does not question the proposition that other remedies would have been available if not foreclosed by its exclusive reading of 717, no purpose would be served by discussing the [425 U.S. 820, 838] status of any alternative remedy. In view of the Court's holding, it is equally pointless to discuss the respondents' contention that the action is barred by petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In this connection, however, the discussion in Johnson, supra, at 461, is instructive. </s> [Footnote 5 The minority of the committee in stating its views on H. R. 1746 in the final Committee report included the following paragraph: </s> "Failure to Make Title VII an Exclusive Federal Remedy. Despite the enactment of title VII of the Civil Rights Act, charges of discriminatory employment conditions may still be brought under prior existing federal statutes such as the National Labor Relations Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In view of the comprehensive prohibitions against discrimination contained in title VII, and the intent of the committee bill to consolidate procedures and remedies under one agency, it would be consistent to make title VII the exclusive remedy. No public interest is served in continuing to permit a multiplicity of statutes or forums to deal with discrimination in employment. However, our attempt to amend the Committee bill to make title VII an exclusive remedy (except for pattern or practice suits) was rejected. In our view, the failure to make this an exclusive remedy merely encourages an individual who has lost his case in one forum under one statute to relitigate his case in still another forum under another federal statute." H. R. Rep. No. 92-238, p. 66 (1971). </s> [Footnote 6 To the extent that multiple remedies may impose an undesirable burden on employers, it seems to me that the problem is most apt [425 U.S. 820, 839] to be redressed in an impartial manner by assuming that Congress intended to subject - and will continue to subject - public and private employers to similar rules. </s> [425 U.S. 820, 840]

United States Supreme Court MICHAEL M. v. SONOMA COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT(1981) No. 79-1344 Argued: November 4, 1980Decided: March 23, 1981 </s> Petitioner, then a 17 1/2-year-old male, was charged with violating California's "statutory rape" law, which defines unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on both state and federal constitutional grounds, asserting that the statute unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender since men alone were criminally liable thereunder. The trial court and the California Court of Appeal denied relief, and on review the California Supreme Court upheld the statute. </s> Held: </s> The judgment is affirmed. Pp. 468-476; 481-487. </s> 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P.2d 572, affirmed. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, JUSTICE STEWART, and JUSTICE POWELL, concluded that the statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 468-476. </s> (a) Gender-based classifications are not "inherently suspect" so as to be subject to so-called "strict scrutiny," but will be upheld if they bear a "fair and substantial relationship" to legitimate state ends. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 . Because the Equal Protection Clause does not "demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons" or require "things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the same," Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 , a statute will be upheld where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances. Pp. 468-469. </s> (b) One of the purposes of the California statute in which the State has a strong interest is the prevention of illegitimate teenage pregnancies. The statute protects women from sexual intercourse and pregnancy at an age when the physical, emotional, and psychological consequences are particularly severe. Because virtually all of the significant harmful and identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it [450 U.S. 464, 465] elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. Pp. 470-473. </s> (c) There is no merit in petitioner's contention that the statute is impermissibly underinclusive and must, in order to pass judicial scrutiny, be broadened so as to hold the female as criminally liable as the male. The relevant inquiry is not whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the line chosen by the California Legislature is within constitutional limitations. In any event, a gender-neutral statute would frustrate the State's interest in effective enforcement since a female would be less likely to report violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to prosecution. The Equal Protection Clause does not require a legislature to enact a statute so broad that it may well be incapable of enforcement. Pp. 473-474. </s> (d) Nor is the statute impermissibly overbroad because it makes unlawful sexual intercourse with prepubescent females, incapable of becoming pregnant. Aside from the fact that the statute could be justified on the grounds that very young females are particularly susceptible to physical injury from sexual intercourse, the Constitution does not require the California Legislature to limit the scope of the statute to older teenagers and exclude young girls. P. 475. </s> (e) And the statute is not unconstitutional as applied to petitioner who, like the girl involved, was under 18 at the time of sexual intercourse, on the asserted ground that the statute presumes in such circumstances that the male is the culpable aggressor. The statute does not rest on such an assumption, but instead is an attempt to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent for men. The age of the man is irrelevant since young men are as capable as older men of inflicting the harm sought to be prevented. P. 475. </s> BLACKMUN, J., concluded that the California statutory rape law is a sufficiently reasoned and constitutional effort to control at its inception the problem of teenage pregnancies, and that the California Supreme Court's judgment should be affirmed on the basis of the applicable test for gender-based classifications as set forth in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 , and Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 . Pp. 481-487. </s> REHNQUIST, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART and POWELL, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 476. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 481. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which WHITE and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 488. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 496. [450 U.S. 464, 466] </s> Gregory F. Jilka argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> Sandy R. Kriegler, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were George Deukmejian, Attorney General, Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Assistant Attorney General, S. Clark Moore, Assistant Attorney General, and William R. Pounders, Deputy Attorney General. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., for the American Civil Liberties Union et al; and by John W. Karr for the Women's Legal Defense Fund. </s> Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Heymann, and Sara Criscitelli filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE STEWART, and JUSTICE POWELL joined. </s> The question presented in this case is whether California's "statutory rape" law, 261.5 of the Cal. Penal Code Ann. (West Supp. 1981), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 261.5 defines unlawful sexual intercourse as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of the perpetrator, where the female is under the age of 18 years." The statute thus makes men alone criminally liable for the act of sexual intercourse. </s> In July 1978, a complaint was filed in the Municipal Court of Sonoma County, Cal., alleging that petitioner, then a 17 1/2-year-old male, had unlawful sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 18, in violation of 261.5. The evidence adduced at a preliminary hearing showed that at approximately midnight on June 3, 1978, petitioner and two friends approached Sharon, a 16 1/2-year-old female, and her sister as they waited at a bus stop. Petitioner and Sharon, [450 U.S. 464, 467] who had already been drinking, moved away from the others and began to kiss. After being struck in the face for rebuffing petitioner's initial advances, Sharon submitted to sexual intercourse with petitioner. Prior to trial, petitioner sought to set aside the information on both state and federal constitutional grounds, asserting that 261.5 unlawfully discriminated on the basis of gender. The trial court and the California Court of Appeal denied petitioner's request for relief and petitioner sought review in the Supreme Court of California. </s> The Supreme Court held that "section 261.5 discriminates on the basis of sex because only females may be victims, and only males may violate the section." 25 Cal. 3d 608, 611, 601 P.2d 572, 574. The court then subjected the classification to "strict scrutiny," stating that it must be justified by a compelling state interest. It found that the classification was "supported not by mere social convention but by the immutable physiological fact that it is the female exclusively who can become pregnant." Ibid. Canvassing "the tragic human costs of illegitimate teenage pregnancies," including the large number of teenage abortions, the increased medical risk associated with teenage pregnancies, and the social consequences of teenage childbearing, the court concluded that the State has a compelling interest in preventing such pregnancies. Because males alone can "physiologically cause the result which the law properly seeks to avoid," the court further held that the gender classification was readily justified as a means of identifying offender and victim. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of the California Supreme Court. 1 </s> [450 U.S. 464, 468] </s> As is evident from our opinions, the Court has had some difficulty in agreeing upon the proper approach and analysis in cases involving challenges to gender-based classifications. The issues posed by such challenges range from issues of standing, see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), to the appropriate standard of judicial review for the substantive classification. Unlike the California Supreme Court, we have not held that gender-based classifications are "inherently suspect" and thus we do not apply so-called "strict scrutiny" to those classifications. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975). Our cases have held, however, that the traditional minimum rationality test takes on a somewhat "sharper focus" when gender-based classifications are challenged. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 n.[*] (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring). In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), for example, the Court stated that a gender-based classification will be upheld if it [450 U.S. 464, 469] bears a "fair and substantial relationship" to legitimate state ends, while in Craig v. Boren, supra, at 197, the Court restated the test to require the classification to bear a "substantial relationship" to "important governmental objectives." </s> Underlying these decisions is the principle that a legislature may not "make overbroad generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and women or which demean the ability or social status of the affected class." Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (plurality opinion of STEWART, J.). But because the Equal Protection Clause does not "demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons" or require "`things which are different in fact . . . to be treated in law as though they were the same,'" Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966), quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940), this Court has consistently upheld statutes where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances. Parham v. Hughes, supra; Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). As the Court has stated, a legislature may "provide for the special problems of women." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975). </s> Applying those principles to this case, the fact that the California Legislature criminalized the act of illicit sexual intercourse with a minor female is a sure indication of its intent or purpose to discourage that conduct. 2 Precisely why the legislature desired that result is of course somewhat less clear. This Court has long recognized that "[i]nquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter," United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 -384 (1968); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971), and the [450 U.S. 464, 470] search for the "actual" or "primary" purpose of a statute is likely to be elusive. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 -277 (1973). Here, for example, the individual legislators may have voted for the statute for a variety of reasons. Some legislators may have been concerned about preventing teenage pregnancies, others about protecting young females from physical injury or from the loss of "chastity," and still others about promoting various religious and moral attitudes towards premarital sex. </s> The justification for the statute offered by the State, and accepted by the Supreme Court of California, is that the legislature sought to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancies. That finding, of course, is entitled to great deference. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373 -374 (1967). And although our cases establish that the State's asserted reason for the enactment of a statute may be rejected, if it "could not have been a goal of the legislation," Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, at 648, n. 16, this is not such a case. </s> We are satisfied not only that the prevention of illegitimate pregnancy is at least one of the "purposes" of the statute, but also that the State has a strong interest in preventing such pregnancy. At the risk of stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies, which have increased dramatically over the last two decades, 3 have significant social, medical, and economic consequences for both the mother and her child, and the State. 4 </s> [450 U.S. 464, 471] Of particular concern to the State is that approximately half of all teenage pregnancies end in abortion. 5 And of those children who are born, their illegitimacy makes them likely candidates to become wards of the State. 6 </s> We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young women are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, emotional, and psychological consequences of sexual activity. The statute at issue here [450 U.S. 464, 472] protects women from sexual intercourse at an age when those consequences are particularly severe. 7 </s> The question thus boils down to whether a State may attack the problem of sexual intercourse and teenage pregnancy directly by prohibiting a male from having sexual intercourse with a minor female. 8 We hold that such a statute is [450 U.S. 464, 473] sufficiently related to the State's objectives to pass constitutional muster. </s> Because virtually all of the significant harmful and inescapably identifiable consequences of teenage pregnancy fall on the young female, a legislature acts well within its authority when it elects to punish only the participant who, by nature, suffers few of the consequences of his conduct. It is hardly unreasonable for a legislature acting to protect minor females to exclude them from punishment. Moreover, the risk of pregnancy itself constitutes a substantial deterrence to young females. No similar natural sanctions deter males. A criminal sanction imposed solely on males thus serves to roughly "equalize" the deterrents on the sexes. </s> We are unable to accept petitioner's contention that the statute is impermissibly underinclusive and must, in order to pass judicial scrutiny, be broadened so as to hold the female as criminally liable as the male. It is argued that this statute is not necessary to deter teenage pregnancy because a gender-neutral statute, where both male and female would be subject to prosecution, would serve that goal equally well. The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it might have been, but whether the line chosen by the California Legislature is within constitutional limitations. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S., at 356 , n. 10. </s> In any event, we cannot say that a gender-neutral statute would be as effective as the statute California has chosen to enact. The State persuasively contends that a gender-neutral statute would frustrate its interest in effective enforcement. Its view is that a female is surely less likely to report [450 U.S. 464, 474] violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to criminal prosecution. 9 In an area already fraught with prosecutorial difficulties, we decline to hold that the Equal Protection Clause requires a legislature to enact a statute so broad that it may well be incapable of enforcement. 10 </s> [450 U.S. 464, 475] </s> We similarly reject petitioner's argument that 261.5 is impermissibly overbroad because it makes unlawful sexual intercourse with prepubescent females, who are, by definition, incapable of becoming pregnant. Quite apart from the fact that the statute could well be justified on the grounds that very young females are particularly susceptible to physical injury from sexual intercourse, see Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (CA1 1979), it is ludicrous to suggest that the Constitution requires the California Legislature to limit the scope of its rape statute to older teenagers and exclude young girls. </s> There remains only petitioner's contention that the statute is unconstitutional as it is applied to him because he, like Sharon, was under 18 at the time of sexual intercourse. Petitioner argues that the statute is flawed because it presumes that as between two persons under 18, the male is the culpable aggressor. We find petitioner's contentions unpersuasive. Contrary to his assertions, the statute does not rest on the assumption that males are generally the aggressors. It is instead an attempt by a legislature to prevent illegitimate teenage pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent for men. The age of the man is irrelevant since young men are as capable as older men of inflicting the harm sought to be prevented. </s> In upholding the California statute we also recognize that this is not a case where a statute is being challenged on the grounds that it "invidiously discriminates" against females. [450 U.S. 464, 476] To the contrary, the statute places a burden on males which is not shared by females. But we find nothing to suggest that men, because of past discrimination or peculiar disadvantages, are in need of the special solicitude of the courts. Nor is this a case where the gender classification is made "solely for . . . administrative convenience," as in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (emphasis omitted), or rests on "the baggage of sexual stereotypes" as in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S., at 283 . As we have held, the statute instead reasonably reflects the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than on the male. </s> Accordingly the judgment of the California Supreme Court is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The lower federal courts and state courts have almost uniformly concluded that statutory rape laws are constitutional. See, e. g., Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (CA1 1979); Hall v. McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232 (CA4 1976); Hall v. State, 365 So.2d 1249, 1252-1253 (Ala. App. 1978), cert. denied, 365 So.2d 1253 (Ala. 1979); State v. Gray, 122 Ariz. [450 U.S. 464, 468] 445, 446-477, 595 P.2d 990, 991-992 (1979); People v. Mackey, 46 Cal. App. 3d 755, 760-761, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975); People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 551 P.2d 703 (1976); State v. Brothers, 384 A.2d 402 (Del. Super. 1978); In re W. E. P., 318 A. 2d 286, 289-290 (DC 1974); Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 303-304, 260 S. E. 2d 40, 41-42 (1979); State v. Drake, 219 N. W. 2d 492, 495-496 (Iowa 1974); State v. Bell, 377 So.2d 303 (La. 1979); State v. Rundlett, 391 A. 2d 815 (Me. 1978); Green v. State, 270 So.2d 695 (Miss. 1972); In re J. D. G., 498 S. W. 2d 786, 792-793 (Mo. 1973); State v. Meloon, 116 N. H. 669, 366 A. 2d 1176 (1976); State v. Thompson, 162 N. J. Super. 302, 392 A. 2d 678 (1978); People v. Whidden, 51 N. Y. 2d 457, 415 N. E. 2d 927 (1980); State v. Wilson, 296 N.C. 298, 311-313, 250 S. E. 2d 621, 629-630 (1979); Olson v. State, 588 P.2d 1018 (Nev. 1979); State v. Elmore, 24 Ore. App. 651, 546 P.2d 1117 (1976); State v. Ware, ___ R. I. ___, 418 A. 2d 1 (1980); Roe v. State, 584 S. W. 2d 257, 259 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979); Ex parte Groves, 571 S. W. 2d 888, 892-893 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Moore v. McKenzie, 236 S. E. 2d 342, 342-343 (W. Va. 1977); Flores v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 509, 510-511, 230 N. W. 2d 637, 638 (1975). Contra, Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (CA8 1980); United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (CA9 1980); Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (CA1 1977) (limited in Rundlett v. Oliver, supra), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978). </s> [Footnote 2 The statute was enacted as part of California's first penal code in 1850, 1850 Cal. Stats., ch. 99, 47, p. 234, and recodified and amended in 1970. </s> [Footnote 3 In 1976 approximately one million 15-to-19-year-olds became pregnant, one-tenth of all women in that age group. Two-thirds of the pregnancies were illegitimate. Illegitimacy rates for teenagers (births per 1,000 unmarried females ages 14 to 19) increased 75% for 14-to-17-year-olds between 1961 and 1974 and 33% for 18-to-19-year-olds. Alan Guttmacher Institute, 11 Million Teenagers 10, 13 (1976); C. Chilman, Adolescent Sexuality In a Changing American Society 195 (NIH Pub. No. 80-1426, 1980). </s> [Footnote 4 The risk of maternal death is 60% higher for a teenager under the age of 15 than for a women in her early twenties. The risk is 13% higher [450 U.S. 464, 471] for 15-to-19-year-olds. The statistics further show that most teenage mothers drop out of school and face a bleak economic future. See, e. g., 11 Million Teenagers, supra, at 23, 25; Bennett & Bardon, The Effects of a School Program On Teenager Mothers and Their Children, 47 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 671 (1977); Phipps-Yonas, Teenage Pregnancy and Motherhood, 50 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 403, 414 (1980). </s> [Footnote 5 This is because teenagers are disproportionately likely to seek abortions. Center for Disease Control, Abortion Surveillance 1976, pp. 22-24 (1978). In 1978, for example, teenagers in California had approximately 54,000 abortions and 53,800 live births. California Center for Health Statistics, Reproductive Health Status of California Teenage Women 1, 23 (Mar. 1980). </s> [Footnote 6 The policy and intent of the California Legislature evinced in other legislation buttresses our view that the prevention of teenage pregnancy is a purpose of the statute. The preamble to the Pregnancy Freedom of Choice Act, for example, states: "The legislature finds that pregnancy among unmarried persons under 21 years of age constitutes an increasing social problem in the State of California." Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. 16145 (West 1980). </s> Subsequent to the decision below, the California Legislature considered and rejected proposals to render 261.5 gender neutral, thereby ratifying the judgment of the California Supreme Court. That is enough to answer petitioner's contention that the statute was the "`accidental by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females.'" Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment)). Certainly this decision of the California Legislature is as good a source as is this Court in deciding what is "current" and what is "outmoded" in the perception of women. </s> [Footnote 7 Although petitioner concedes that the State has a "compelling" interest in preventing teenage pregnancy, he contends that the "true" purpose of 261.5 is to protect the virtue and chastity of young women. As such, the statute is unjustifiable because it rests on archaic stereotypes. What we have said above is enough to dispose of that contention. The question for us - and the only question under the Federal Constitution - is whether the legislation violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not whether its supporters may have endorsed it for reasons no longer generally accepted. Even if the preservation of female chastity were one of the motives of the statute, and even if that motive be impermissible, petitioner's argument must fail because "[i]t is a familiar practice of constitutional law that this court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968). In Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979), for example, the Court rejected one asserted purpose as impermissible, but then considered other purposes to determine if they could justify the statute. Similarly, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976), the Court distinguished Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), on the grounds that the purposes of the ordinance there were not open to impeachment by evidence that the legislature was actually motivated by an impermissible purpose. See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 , n. 21 (1977); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 91 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). </s> [Footnote 8 We do not understand petitioner to question a State's authority to make sexual intercourse among teenagers a criminal act, at least on a gender-neutral basis. In Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 694 , n. 17 (1977) (plurality opinion of BRENNAN, J.), four Members of the Court assumed for the purposes of that case that a State may regulate the sexual behavior of minors, while four other Members of the Court more emphatically stated that such regulation would be permissible. Id., at 702, 703 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and concurring in result); id., at 705-707, 709 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 713 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and [450 U.S. 464, 473] concurring in judgment); id., at 718 (REHNQUIST, J., dissenting). The Court has long recognized that a State has even broader authority to protect the physical, mental, and moral well-being of its youth, than of its adults. See, e. g., Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 72 -74 (1976); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 -640(1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). </s> [Footnote 9 Petitioner contends that a gender-neutral statute would not hinder prosecutions because the prosecutor could take into account the relative burdens on females and males and generally only prosecute males. But to concede this is to concede all. If the prosecutor, in exercising discretion, will virtually always prosecute just the man and not the woman, we do not see why it is impermissible for the legislature to enact a statute to the same effect. </s> [Footnote 10 The question whether a statute is substantially related to its asserted goals is at best an opaque one. It can be plausibly argued that a gender-neutral statute would produce fewer prosecutions than the statute at issue here. See STEWART, J., concurring, post, at 481, n. 13. JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissent argues, on the other hand, that </s> "even assuming that a gender-neutral statute would be more difficult to enforce, . . . [c]ommon sense . . . suggests that a gender-neutral statutory rape law is potentially a greater deterrent of sexual activity than a gender-based law, for the simple reason that a gender-neutral law subjects both men and women to criminal sanctions and thus arguably has a deterrent effect on twice as many potential violators." Post, at 493-494 (emphasis deleted). </s> Where such differing speculations as to the effect of a statute are plausible, we think it appropriate to defer to the decision of the California Supreme Court, "armed as it was with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage and potential impact of [the statute], and familiar with the milieu in which that provision would operate." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 -379 (1967). </s> It should be noted that two of the three cases relied upon by JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent are readily distinguishable from the instant one. See post, at 490, n. 3. In both Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (CA8 1980), and Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (CA1 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978), the respective governments asserted that the purpose of the statute was to protect young women from physical injury. Both courts rejected the justification on the grounds that there had been no showing that young females are more likely than males to suffer physical injury from sexual intercourse. They further held, contrary to our decision, that [450 U.S. 464, 475] pregnancy prevention was not a "plausible" purpose of the legislation. Thus neither court reached the issue presented here, whether the statute is substantially related to the prevention of teenage pregnancy. Significantly, Meloon has been severely limited by Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495 (CA1 1979), where the court upheld a statutory rape law on the ground that the State had shown that sexual intercourse physically injures young women more than males. Here, of course, even JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissent does not dispute that young women suffer disproportionately the deleterious consequences of illegitimate pregnancy. </s> JUSTICE STEWART, concurring. </s> Section 261.5, on its face, classifies on the basis of sex. A male who engages in sexual intercourse with an underage female who is not his wife violates the statute; a female who engages in sexual intercourse with an underage male who is not her husband does not. 1 The petitioner contends that this state law, which punishes only males for the conduct in question, violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to the equal protection of the law. The Court today correctly rejects that contention. </s> A </s> At the outset, it should be noted that the statutory discrimination, when viewed as part of the wider scheme of California law, is not as clearcut as might at first appear. Females are not freed from criminal liability in California for engaging in sexual activity that may be harmful. It is unlawful, for example, for any person, of either sex, to molest, annoy, or contribute to the delinquency of anyone under 18 years of [450 U.S. 464, 477] age. 2 All persons are prohibited from committing "any lewd or lascivious act," including consensual intercourse, with a child under 14. 3 And members of both sexes may be convicted for engaging in deviant sexual acts with anyone under 18. 4 Finally, females may be brought within the proscription of 261.5 itself, since a female may be charged with aiding and abetting its violation. 5 </s> Section 261.5 is thus but one part of a broad statutory scheme that protects all minors from the problems and risks attendant upon adolescent sexual activity. To be sure, 261.5 creates an additional measure of punishment for males who engage in sexual intercourse with females between the ages of 14 and 17. 6 The question then is whether the Constitution prohibits a state legislature from imposing this additional sanction on a gender-specific basis. </s> B </s> The Constitution is violated when government, state or federal, invidiously classifies similarly situated people on the basis of the immutable characteristics with which they were [450 U.S. 464, 478] born. Thus, detrimental racial classifications by government always violate the Constitution, for the simple reason that, so far as the Constitution is concerned, people of different races are always similarly situated. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (dissenting opinion); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (concurring opinion); Brown v. Board of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 ; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (dissenting opinion). By contrast, while detrimental gender classifications by government often violate the Constitution, they do not always do so, for the reason that there are differences between males and females that the Constitution necessarily recognizes. In this case we deal with the most basic of these differences: females can become pregnant as the result of sexual intercourse; males cannot. </s> As was recognized in Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 , "a State is not free to make overbroad generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and women or which demean the ability or social status of the affected class." Gender-based classifications may not be based upon administrative convenience, or upon archaic assumptions about the proper roles of the sexes. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 ; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 ; Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 . But we have recognized that in certain narrow circumstances men and women are not similarly situated; in these circumstances a gender classification based on clear differences between the sexes is not invidious, and a legislative classification realistically based upon those differences is not unconstitutional. See Parham v. Hughes, supra; Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 -317; Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 ; cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (concurring opinion). "[G]ender-based classifications are not invariably invalid. When men and women are not in fact similarly situated in the area covered by the legislation in question, the Equal Protection Clause is not violated." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (dissenting opinion). [450 U.S. 464, 479] </s> Applying these principles to the classification enacted by the California Legislature, it is readily apparent that 261.5 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Young women and men are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and risks associated with intercourse and pregnancy, and the statute is realistically related to the legitimate state purpose of reducing those problems and risks. </s> C </s> As the California Supreme Court's catalog shows, the pregnant unmarried female confronts problems more numerous and more severe than any faced by her male partner. 7 She alone endures the medical risks of pregnancy or abortion. 8 She suffers disproportionately the social, educational, and emotional consequences of pregnancy. 9 Recognizing this disproportion, [450 U.S. 464, 480] California has attempted to protect teenage females by prohibiting males from participating in the act necessary for conception. 10 </s> The fact that males and females are not similarly situated with respect to the risks of sexual intercourse applies with the same force to males under 18 as it does to older males. The risk of pregnancy is a significant deterrent for unwed young females that is not shared by unmarried males, regardless of their age. Experienced observation confirms the common sense notion that adolescent males disregard the possibility of pregnancy far more than do adolescent females. 11 And to the extent that 261.5 may punish males for intercourse with prepubescent females, that punishment is justifiable because of the substantial physical risks for prepubescent females that are not shared by their male counterparts. 12 </s> [450 U.S. 464, 481] </s> D </s> The petitioner argues that the California Legislature could have drafted the statute differently, so that its purpose would be accomplished more precisely. "But the issue, of course, is not whether the statute could have been drafted more wisely, but whether the lines chosen by the . . . [l]egislature are within constitutional limitations." Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 , n. 10. That other States may have decided to attack the same problems more broadly, with gender-neutral statutes, does not mean that every State is constitutionally compelled to do so. 13 </s> E </s> In short, the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that the physiological differences between men and women must be disregarded. While those differences must never be permitted to become a pretext for invidious discrimination, no such discrimination is presented by this case. The Constitution surely does not require a State to pretend that demonstrable differences between men and women do not really exist. </s> [Footnote 1 But see n. 5 and accompanying text, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 See Cal. Penal Code Ann. 272, 647a (West Supp. 1981). </s> [Footnote 3 Cal. Penal Code Ann. 288 (West Supp. 1981). See People v. Dontanville, 10 Cal. App. 3d 783, 796, 89 Cal. Rptr. 172, 180 (2d Dist.). </s> [Footnote 4 See Cal. Penal Code Ann. 286 (b) (1), 288a (b) (1) (West Supp. 1981). </s> [Footnote 5 See Cal. Penal Code Ann. 31 (West 1970); People v. Haywood, 131 Cal. App. 2d 259, 280 P.2d 180 (2d Dist.); People v. Lewis, 113 Cal. App. 2d 468, 248 P.2d 461 (1st Dist.). According to statistics maintained by the California Department of Justice Bureau of Criminal Statistics, approximately 14% of the juveniles arrested for participation in acts made unlawful by 261.5 between 1975 and 1979 were females. Moreover, an underage female who is as culpable as her male partner, or more culpable, may be prosecuted as a juvenile delinquent. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code Ann. 602 (West Supp. 1981); In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 867-869, 464 P.2d 127, 136-138. </s> [Footnote 6 Males and females are equally prohibited by 288 from sexual intercourse with minors under 14. Compare Cal. Penal Code Ann. 288 (West Supp. 1981) with Cal. Penal Code Ann. 18, 264 (West Supp. 1981). </s> [Footnote 7 The Court noted that from 1971 through 1976, 83.6% of the 4,860 children born to girls under 15 in California were illegitimate, as were 51% of those born to girls 15 to 17. The court also observed that while accounting for only 21% of California pregnancies in 1976, teenagers accounted for 34.7% of legal abortions. See ante, at 470, n. 3. </s> [Footnote 8 There is also empirical evidence that sexual abuse of young females is a more serious problem than sexual abuse of young males. For example, a review of five studies found that 88% of sexually abused minors were female. Jaffe, Dynneson, & ten Bensel, Sexual Abuse of Children 129 Am. J. of Diseases of Children 689, 690 (1975). Another study, involving admissions to a hospital emergency room over a 3-year period, reported that 86 of 100 children examined for sexual abuse were girls. Orr & Prietto, Emergency Management of Sexually Abused Children, 133 Am. J. of Diseased Children 630 (1979). See also State v. Craig, 169 Mont. 150, 156-157, 545 P.2d 649, 653; Sarafino, An Estimate of Nationwide Incidence of Sexual Offenses Against Children, 58 Child Welfare 127, 131 (1979). </s> [Footnote 9 Most teenage mothers do not finish high school and are disadvantaged economically thereafter. See Moore, Teenage Childbirth and Welfare Dependency, 10 Family Planning Perspectives 233-235 (1978). The suicide rate for teenage mothers is seven times greater than that for teenage girls without children. F. Nye, School-Age Parenthood (Wash. State U. Ext. Bull. No. 667) 8 (1976). And 60% of adolescent mothers aged 15 to 17 [450 U.S. 464, 480] are on welfare within two to five years of the birth of their children. Teenage Pregnancy, Everybody's Problem 3-4 (DHEW Publication (HSA) No. 77-5619). </s> [Footnote 10 Despite the increased availability of contraceptives and sex education the pregnancy rates for young women are increasing. See Alan Guttmacher Institute, 11 Million Teenagers 12 (1976). See generally C. Chilman, Adolescent Sexuality in a Changing American Society (NIH Pub. No. 80-1426, 1980). </s> The petitioner contends that the statute is overinclusive because it does not allow a defense that contraceptives were used, or that procreation was for some other reason impossible. The petitioner does not allege, however, that he used a contraceptive, or that pregnancy could not have resulted from the conduct with which he was charged. But even assuming the petitioner's standing to raise the claim of overbreadth, it is clear that a statute recognizing the defenses he suggests would encounter difficult if not impossible problems of proof. </s> [Footnote 11 See, e.g., Phipps-Yonas, Teenage Pregnancy and Motherhood, 50 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 403, 412 (1980). See also State v. Rundlett, 391 A. 2d 815, 819, n. 13, 822 (Me.); Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d 495, 502 (CA1). </s> [Footnote 12 See Barnes v. State, 244 Ga. 302, 260 S. E. 2d 40; see generally Orr & Prietto, supra; Jaffee, Dynneson, & ten Bensel, supra; Chilman, supra. </s> [Footnote 13 The fact is that a gender-neutral statute would not necessarily lead to a closer fit with the aim of reducing the problems associated with teenage pregnancy. If both parties were equally liable to prosecution, a female would be far less likely to complain; the very complaint would be self-incriminating. Accordingly, it is possible that a gender-neutral statute would result in fewer prosecutions than the one before us. </s> In any event, a state legislature is free to address itself to what it believes to be the most serious aspect of a broader problem. "[T]he Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 -487; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 . </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in the judgment. </s> It is gratifying that the plurality recognizes that "[a]t the risk of stating the obvious, teenage pregnancies . . . have increased dramatically over the last two decades" and "have significant social, medical, and economic consequences for both [450 U.S. 464, 482] the mother and her child, and the State." Ante, at 470 (footnotes omitted). There have been times when I have wondered whether the Court was capable of this perception, particularly when it has struggled with the different but not unrelated problems that attend abortion issues. See, for example, the opinions (and the dissenting opinions) in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); and today's opinion in H. L. v. Matheson, ante, p. 389. </s> Some might conclude that the two uses of the criminal sanction - here flatly to forbid intercourse in order to forestall teenage pregnancies, and in Matheson to prohibit a physician's abortion procedure except upon notice to the parents of the pregnant minor - are vastly different proscriptions. But the basic social and privacy problems are much the same. Both Utah's statute in Matheson and California's statute in this case are legislatively created tools intended to achieve similar ends and addressed to the same societal concerns: the control and direction of young people's sexual activities. The plurality opinion impliedly concedes as much when it notes that "approximately half of all teenage pregnancies end in abortion," and that "those children who are born" are "likely candidates to become wards of the State," Ante, at 471, and n. 6. </s> I, however, cannot vote to strike down the California statutory rape law, for I think it is a sufficiently reasoned and constitutional effort to control the problem at its inception. For me, there is an important difference between this state action and a State's adamant and rigid refusal to face, or even to recognize, the "significant . . . consequences" - to the woman - of a forced or unwanted conception. I have found it difficult to rule constitutional, for example, state efforts to block, at that later point, a woman's attempt to deal with the enormity of the problem confronting her, just as I have rejected state efforts to prevent women from rationally taking [450 U.S. 464, 483] steps to prevent that problem from arising. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In contrast, I am persuaded that, although a minor has substantial privacy rights in intimate affairs connected with procreation, California's efforts to prevent teenage pregnancy are to be viewed differently from Utah's efforts to inhibit a woman from dealing with pregnancy once it has become an inevitability. </s> Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), was an opinion which, in large part, I joined, id., at 214. The plurality opinion in the present case points out, ante, at 468-469, the Court's respective phrasings of the applicable test in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), and in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S., at 197 . I vote to affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of California and to uphold the State's gender-based classification on that test and as exemplified by those two cases and by Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). </s> I note, also, that 261.5 of the California Penal Code is just one of several California statutes intended to protect the juvenile. JUSTICE STEWART, in his concurring opinion, appropriately observes that 261.5 is "but one part of a broad statutory scheme that protects all minors from the problems and risks attendant upon adolescent sexual activity." Ante, at 477. </s> I think, too, that it is only fair, with respect to this particular petitioner, to point out that his partner, Sharon, appears not to have been an unwilling participant in at least the initial stages of the intimacies that took place the night of June 3, 1978. * Petitioner's and Sharon's nonacquaintance [450 U.S. 464, 484] with each other before the incident; their drinking; their withdrawal from the others of the group; their foreplay, in which she willingly participated and seems to have encouraged; [450 U.S. 464, 485] and the closeness of their ages (a difference of only one year and 18 days) are factors that should make this case an unattractive one to prosecute at all, and especially to prosecute [450 U.S. 464, 486] as a felony, rather than as a misdemeanor chargeable under 261.5. But the State has chosen to prosecute in that [450 U.S. 464, 487] manner, and the facts, I reluctantly conclude, may fit the crime. </s> [Footnote * Sharon at the preliminary hearing testified as follows: </s> "Q [by the Deputy District Attorney]. On June the 4th, at approximately midnight - midnight of June the 3rd, were you in Rohnert Park? [450 U.S. 464, 484] </s> "A. [by Sharon]. Yes. </s> "Q. Is that in Sonoma County? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Did anything unusual happen to you that night in Rohnert Park? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Would you briefly describe what happened that night? Did you see the defendant that night in Rohnert Park? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Where did you first meet him? </s> "A. At a bus stop. </s> "Q. Was anyone with you? </s> "A. My sister. </s> "Q. Was anyone with the defendant? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. How many people were with the defendant? </s> "A. Two. </s> "Q. Now, after you met the defendant, what happened? </s> "A. We walked down to the railroad tracks. </s> "Q. What happened at the railroad tracks? </s> "A. We were drinking at the railroad tracks and we walked over to this bush and he started kissing me and stuff, and I was kissing him back, too, at first. Then, I was telling him to stop - </s> "Q. Yes. </s> "A. - and I was telling him to slow down and stop. He said, `Okay, okay.' But then he just kept doing it. He just kept doing it and then my sister and two other guys came over to where we were and my sister said - told me to get up and come home. And then I didn't - </s> "Q. Yes. </s> "A. - and then my sister and - </s> "Q. All right. </s> "A. - David, one of the boys that were there, started walking home and we stayed there and then later - </s> "Q. All right. </s> "A. - Bruce left Michael, you know. </s> "The Court: Michael being the defendant? </s> "The Witness: Yeah. We was laying there and we were kissing each other, and then he asked me if I wanted to walk him over to the park; so we walked over to the park and we sat down on a bench and then he [450 U.S. 464, 485] started kissing me again and we were laying on the bench. And he told me to take my pants off. </s> "I said, `No,' and I was trying to get up and he hit me back down on the bench and then I just said to myself, `Forget it,' and I let him do what he wanted to do and he took my pants off and he was telling me to put my legs around him and stuff - </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. Did you have sexual intercourse with the defendant? </s> "A. Yeah. </s> "Q. He did put his penis into your vagina? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. You said that he hit you? </s> "A. Yeah. </s> "Q. How did he hit you? </s> "A. He slugged me in the face. </s> "Q. With what did he slug you? </s> "A. His fist. </s> "Q. Where abouts in the face? </s> "A. On my chin. </s> "Q. As a result of that, did you have any bruises or any kind of an injury? </s> "A. Yeah. </s> "Q. What happened? </s> "A. I had bruises. </s> "The Court: Did he hit you one time or did he hit you more than once? </s> "The Witness: He hit me about two or three times. </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. Now, during the course of that evening, did the defendant ask you your age? </s> "A. Yeah. </s> "Q. And what did you tell him? </s> "A. Sixteen. </s> "Q. Did you tell him you were sixteen? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Now, you said you had been drinking, is that correct? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Would you describe your condition as a result of the drinking? [450 U.S. 464, 486] </s> "A. I was a little drunk." App. 20-23. </s> CROSS-EXAMINATION </s> "Q. Did you go off with Mr. M. away from the others? </s> "A. Yeah. </s> "Q. Why did you do that? </s> "A. I don't know. I guess I wanted to. </s> "Q. Did you have any need to go to the bathroom when you were there. </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. And what did you do? </s> "A. Me and my sister walked down the railroad tracks to some bushes and went to the bathroom. </s> "Q. Now, you and Mr. M., as I understand it, went off into the bushes, is that correct? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Okay. And what did you do when you and Mr. M. were there in the bushes? </s> "A. We were kissing and hugging. </s> "Q. Were you sitting up? </s> "A. We were laying down. </s> "Q. You were lying down. This was in the bushes? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. How far away from the rest of them were you? </s> "A. They were just bushes right next to the railroad tracks. We just walked off into the bushes; not very far. </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. So your sister and the other two boys came over to where you were, you and Michael were, is that right? </s> "A. Yeah. </s> "Q. What did they say to you, if you remember? </s> "A. My sister didn't say anything. She said, `Come on, Sharon, let's go home.' </s> "Q. She asked you to go home with her? </s> "A. (Affirmative nod.) </s> "Q. Did you go home with her? </s> "A. No. </s> "Q. You wanted to stay with Mr. M.? </s> "A. I don't know. </s> "Q. Was this before or after he hit you? [450 U.S. 464, 487] </s> "A. Before. </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. What happened in the five minutes that Bruce stayed there with you and Michael? </s> "A. I don't remember. </s> "Q. You don't remember at all? </s> "A. (Negative head shake.) </s> "Q. Did you have occasion at that time to kiss Bruce? </s> "A. Yeah. </s> "Q. You did? You were kissing Bruce at that time? </s> "A. (Affirmative nod.) </s> "Q. Was Bruce kissing you? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. And were you standing up at this time? </s> "A. No, we were sitting down. </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. Okay. So at this point in time you had left Mr. M. and you were hugging and kissing with Bruce, is that right? </s> "A. Yeah. </s> "Q. And you were sitting up. </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Was your sister still there then? </s> "A. No. Yeah, she was at first. </s> "Q. What was she doing? </s> "A. She was standing up with Michael and David. </s> "Q. Yes. Was she doing anything with Michael and David? </s> "A. No, I don't think so. </s> "Q. Whose idea was it for you and Bruce to kiss? Did you initiate that? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. What happened after Bruce left? </s> "A. Michael asked me if I wanted to go walk to the park. </s> "Q. And what did you say? </s> "A. I said, `Yes.' </s> "Q. And then what happened? </s> "A. We walked to the park. </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. How long did it take you to get to the park? </s> "A. About ten or fifteen minutes. [450 U.S. 464, 488] </s> "Q. And did you walk there? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Did Mr. M. ever mention his name? </s> "A. Yes." Id., at 27-32. [450 U.S. 464, 488] </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICES WHITE and MARSHALL join, dissenting. </s> I </s> It is disturbing to find the Court so splintered on a case that presents such a straightforward issue: Whether the admittedly gender-based classification in Cal. Penal Code Ann. 261.5 (West Supp. 1981) bears a sufficient relationship to the State's asserted goal of preventing teenage pregnancies to survive the "mid-level" constitutional scrutiny mandated by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 1 Applying the analytical framework provided by our precedents, I am convinced that there is only one proper resolution of this issue: the classification must be declared unconstitutional. I fear that the plurality opinion and JUSTICES STEWART and BLACKMUN reach the opposite result by placing too much emphasis on the desirability of achieving the State's asserted statutory goal - prevention of teenage pregnancy - and not enough emphasis on the fundamental question of whether the sex-based discrimination [450 U.S. 464, 489] in the California statute is substantially related to the achievement of that goal. 2 </s> II </s> After some uncertainty as to the proper framework for analyzing equal protection challenges to statutes containing gender-based classifications, see ante, at 468, this Court settled upon the proposition that a statute containing a gender-based classification cannot withstand constitutional challenge unless [450 U.S. 464, 490] the classification is substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental objective. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, ante, at 459; Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210 -211 (1977); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316 -317 (1977); Craig v. Boren, supra, at 197. This analysis applies whether the classification discriminates against males or against females. Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 394; Orr v. Orr, supra, at 278-279; Craig v. Boren, supra, at 204. The burden is on the government to prove both the importance of its asserted objective and the substantial relationship between the classification and that objective. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, ante, at 461; Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., supra, at 151-152; Caban v. Mohammed, supra, at 393; Craig v. Boren, supra, at 204. And the State cannot meet that burden without showing that a gender-neutral statute would be a less effective means of achieving that goal. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., supra, at 151-152; Orr v. Orr, supra, at 281, 283. 3 </s> The State of California vigorously asserts that the "important governmental objective" to be served by 261.5 is the prevention of teenage pregnancy. It claims that its statute furthers this goal by deterring sexual activity by males - the class of persons it considers more responsible for causing those pregnancies. 4 But even assuming that prevention of teenage [450 U.S. 464, 491] pregnancy is an important governmental objective and that it is in fact an objective of 261.5, see infra, at 494-496, California still has the burden of proving that there are fewer teenage pregnancies under its gender-based statutory rape law than there would be if the law were gender neutral. To meet this burden, the State must show that because its statutory rape law punishes only males, and not females, it more effectively deters minor females from having sexual intercourse. 5 </s> The plurality assumes that a gender-neutral statute would be less effective than 261.5 in deterring sexual activity because a gender-neutral statute would create significant enforcement problems. The plurality thus accepts the State's assertion that </s> "a female is surely less likely to report violations of the statute if she herself would be subject to criminal prosecution. [450 U.S. 464, 492] In an area already fraught with prosecutorial difficulties, we decline to hold that the Equal Protection Clause requires a legislature to enact a statute so broad that it may well be incapable of enforcement." Ante, at 473-474 (footnotes omitted). </s> However, a State's bare assertion that its gender-based statutory classification substantially furthers an important governmental interest is not enough to meet its burden of proof under Craig v. Boren. Rather, the State must produce evidence that will persuade the court that its assertion is true. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S., at 200 -204. </s> The State has not produced such evidence in this case. Moreover, there are at least two serious flaws in the State's assertion that law enforcement problems created by a gender-neutral statutory rape law would make such a statute less effective than a gender-based statute in deterring sexual activity. </s> First, the experience of other jurisdictions, and California itself, belies the plurality's conclusion that a gender-neutral statutory rape law "may well be incapable of enforcement." There are now at least 37 States that have enacted gender-neutral statutory rape laws. Although most of these laws protect young persons (of either sex) from the sexual exploitation of older individuals, the laws of Arizona, Florida, and Illinois permit prosecution of both minor females and minor males for engaging in mutual sexual conduct. 6 California has introduced no evidence that those States have been handicapped [450 U.S. 464, 493] by the enforcement problems the plurality finds so persuasive. 7 Surely, if those States could provide such evidence, we might expect that California would have introduced it. </s> In addition, the California Legislature in recent years has revised other sections of the Penal Code to make them gender-neutral. For example, Cal. Penal Code Ann. 286 (b) (1) and 288a (b)(1) (West Supp. 1981), prohibiting sodomy and oral copulation with a "person who is under 18 years of age," could cause two minor homosexuals to be subjected to criminal sanctions for engaging in mutually consensual conduct. Again, the State has introduced no evidence to explain why a gender-neutral statutory rape law would be any more difficult to enforce than those statutes. </s> The second flaw in the State's assertion is that even assuming that a gender-neutral statute would be more difficult to enforce, the State has still not shown that those enforcement problems would make such a statute less effective than a gender-based statute in deterring minor females from engaging in sexual intercourse. 8 Common sense, however, suggests [450 U.S. 464, 494] that a gender-neutral statutory rape law is potentially a greater deterrent of sexual activity than a gender-based law, for the simple reason that a gender-neutral law subjects both men and women to criminal sanctions and thus arguably has a deterrent effect on twice as many potential violators. Even if fewer persons were prosecuted under the gender-neutral law, as the State suggests, it would still be true that twice as many persons would be subject to arrest. The State's failure to prove that a gender-neutral law would be a less effective deterrent than a gender-based law, like the State's failure to prove that a gender-neutral law would be difficult to enforce, should have led this Court to invalidate 261.5. </s> III </s> Until very recently, no California court or commentator had suggested that the purpose of California's statutory rape law was to protect young women from the risk of pregnancy. Indeed, the historical development of 261.5 demonstrates that the law was initially enacted on the premise that young women, in contrast to young men, were to be deemed legally incapable of consenting to an act of sexual intercourse. 9 Because [450 U.S. 464, 495] their chastity was considered particularly precious, those young women were felt to be uniquely in need of the State's protection. 10 In contrast, young men were assumed to [450 U.S. 464, 496] be capable of making such decisions for themselves; the law therefore did not offer them any special protection. </s> It is perhaps because the gender classification in California's statutory rape law was initially designed to further these outmoded sexual stereotypes, rather than to reduce the incidence of teenage pregnancies, that the State has been unable to demonstrate a substantial relationship between the classification and its newly asserted goal. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S., at 223 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). But whatever the reason, the State has not shown that Cal. Penal Code 261.5 is any more effective than a gender-neutral law would be in deterring minor females from engaging in sexual intercourse. It has therefore not met its burden of proving that the statutory classification is substantially related to the achievement of its asserted goal. </s> I would hold that 261.5 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and I would reverse the judgment of the California Supreme Court. </s> [Footnote 1 The California Supreme Court acknowledged, and indeed the parties do not dispute, that Cal. Penal Code Ann. 261.5 (West Supp. 1981) discriminates on the basis of sex. Ante, at 467. Because petitioner is male, he faces criminal felony charges and a possible prison term while his female partner remains immune from prosecution. The gender of the participants, not their relative responsibility, determines which of them is subject to criminal sanctions under 261.5. </s> As the California Supreme Court stated in People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531, 393 P.2d 673, 674 (1964) (footnote omitted): </s> "[E]ven in circumstances where a girl's actual comprehension contradicts the law's presumption [that a minor female is too innocent and naive to understand the implications and nature of her act], the male is deemed criminally responsible for the act, although himself young and naive and responding to advances which may have been made to him." </s> [Footnote 2 None of the three opinions upholding the California statute fairly applies the equal protection analysis this Court has so carefully developed since Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The plurality opinion, for example, focusing on the obvious and uncontested fact that only females can become pregnant, suggests that the statutory gender discrimination, rather than being invidious, actually ensures equality of treatment. Since only females are subject to a risk of pregnancy, the plurality opinion concludes that "[a] criminal sanction imposed solely on males . . . serves to roughly `equalize' the deterrents on the sexes." Ante, at 473. JUSTICE STEWART adopts a similar approach. Recognizing that "females can become pregnant as the result of sexual intercourse; males cannot," JUSTICE STEWART concludes that "[y]oung women and men are not similarly situated with respect to the problems and risks associated with intercourse and pregnancy," and therefore 261.5 "is realistically related to the legitimate state purpose of reducing those problems and risks" (emphasis added). Ante, at 478, 479. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, conceding that some limits must be placed on a State's power to regulate "the control and direction of young people's sexual activities," also finds the statute constitutional. Ante, at 482. He distinguishes the State's power in the abortion context, where the pregnancy has already occurred, from its power in the present context, where the "problem [is] at its inception." He then concludes, without explanation, that "the California statutory rape law . . . is a sufficiently reasoned and constitutional effort to control the problem at its inception." Ibid. </s> All three of these approaches have a common failing. They overlook the fact that the State has not met its burden of proving that the gender discrimination in 261.5 is substantially related to the achievement of the State's asserted statutory goal. My Brethren seem not to recognize that California has the burden of proving that a gender-neutral statutory rape law would be less effective than 261.5 in deterring sexual activity leading to teenage pregnancy. Because they fail to analyze the issue in these terms, I believe they reach an unsupportable result. </s> [Footnote 3 Gender-based statutory rape laws were struck down in Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636 (CA8 1980), United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216 (CA9 1980), and Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602 (CA1 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978), precisely because the government failed to meet this burden of proof. </s> [Footnote 4 In a remarkable display of sexual stereotyping, the California Supreme Court stated: </s> "The Legislature is well within its power in imposing criminal sanctions against males, alone, because they are the only persons who may physiologically [450 U.S. 464, 491] cause the result which the law properly seeks to avoid." 25 Cal. 3d 608, 612, 601 P.2d 572, 575 (1979) (emphasis in original). </s> [Footnote 5 Petitioner has not questioned the State's constitutional power to achieve its asserted objective by criminalizing consensual sexual activity. However, I note that our cases would not foreclose such a privacy challenge. </s> The State is attempting to reduce the incidence of teenage pregnancy by imposing criminal sanctions on those who engage in consensual sexual activity with minor females. We have stressed, however, that </s> "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (footnote omitted). </s> Minors, too, enjoy a right of privacy in connection with decisions affecting procreation. Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 693 (1977). Thus, despite the suggestion of the plurality to the contrary, ante, at 472-473, n. 8, it is not settled that a State may rely on a pregnancy-prevention justification to make consensual sexual intercourse among minors a criminal act. </s> [Footnote 6 See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-1405 (1978); Fla. Stat. 794.05 (1979); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, § 11-5 (1979). In addition, eight other States permit both parties to be prosecuted when one of the participants to a consensual act of sexual intercourse is under the age of 16. See Kan. Stat. Ann. 21-3503 (1974); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 265, 23 (West Supp. 1981); Mich. Comp. Laws 750.13 (1970); Mont. Code Ann. 45-5-501 to 45-5-503 (1979); N. H. Rev. Stat. 632-A:3 (Supp. 1979); Tenn. Code Ann. 39-3705 (4) (Supp. 1979); Utah Code Ann. 76-5-401 (Supp. 1979); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, 3252 (3) (Supp. 1980). </s> [Footnote 7 There is a logical reason for this. In contrast to laws governing forcible rape, statutory rape laws apply to consensual sexual activity. Force is not an element of the crime. Since a woman who consents to an act of sexual intercourse is unlikely to report her partner to the police - whether or not she is subject to criminal sanctions - enforcement would not be undermined if the statute were to be made gender neutral. See n. 8, infra. </s> [Footnote 8 As it is, 261.5 seems to be an ineffective deterrent of sexual activity. Cf. Carey v. Population Services International, supra, at 695 (substantial reason to doubt that limiting access to contraceptives will substantially discourage early sexual behavior). According to statistics provided by the State, an average of only 61 juvenile males and 352 adult males were arrested for statutory rape each year between 1975 and 1978. Brief for Respondent 19. During each of those years there were approximately one million Californian girls between the ages of 13-17. Cal. Dept. of Finance, Population Projections for California Counties, 1975-2020, with Age/Sex Detail to 2000, Series E-150 (1977). Although the record in this case [450 U.S. 464, 494] does not indicate the incidence of sexual intercourse involving those girls during that period, the California State Department of Health estimates that there were almost 50,000 pregnancies among 13-to-17-year-old girls during 1976. Cal. Dept. of Health, Birth and Abortion Records, and Physician Survey of Office Abortions (1976). I think it is fair to speculate from this evidence that a comparison of the number of arrests for statutory rape in California with the number of acts of sexual intercourse involving minor females in that State would likely demonstrate to a male contemplating sexual activity with a minor female that his chances of being arrested are reassuringly low. I seriously question, therefore, whether 261.5 as enforced has a substantial deterrent effect. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S., at 214 (STEVENS, J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 9 California's statutory rape law had its origins in the Statutes of Westminster enacted during the reign of Edward I at the close of the 13th century (3 Edw. 1, ch. 13 (1275); 13 Edw. 1, ch. 34 (1285)). The age of consent at that time was 12 years, reduced to 10 years in 1576 (18 Eliz. 1, ch. 7, 4). This statute was part of the common law brought to the United States. Thus, when the first California penal statute was enacted, it contained a provision (1850 Cal. Stats., ch. 99, 47, p. 234) that proscribed sexual intercourse with females under the age of 10. In 1889, the California statute was amended to make the age of consent 14 (1889 Cal. Stats., ch. 191, 1, p. 223). In 1897, the age was advanced to 16 (1897 Cal. Stats., ch. 139, 1, p. 201). In 1913 it was fixed at 18, where it now remains (1913 Cal. Stats., ch. 122, 1, p. 212). </s> Because females generally have not reached puberty by the age of 10, it is inconceivable that a statute designed to prevent pregnancy would be directed at acts of sexual intercourse with females under that age. </s> The only legislative history available, the draftsmen's notes to the Penal Code of 1872, supports the view that the purpose of California's statutory rape law was to protect those who were too young to give consent. The draftsmen explained that the "[statutory rape] provision embodies the well settled rule of the existing law; that a girl under ten years of age is incapable of giving any consent to an act of intercourse which can reduce it below the grade of rape." Code Commissioners' note, subd. 1, following Cal. Penal Code 261, p. 111 (1st ed. 1872). There was no mention whatever of pregnancy prevention. See also Note, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objectives of the Consent Standard, 62 Yale L. J. 55, 74-76 (1952). </s> [Footnote 10 Past decisions of the California courts confirm that the law was designed to protect the State's young females from their own uninformed decisionmaking. In People v. Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 214-215, 39 P. 607, 608-609 (1895), for example, the California Supreme Court stated: </s> "The obvious purpose of [the statutory rape law] is the protection of society by protecting from violation the virtue of young and unsophisticated girls. . . . It is the insidious approach and vile tampering with their persons that primarily undermines the virtue of young girls, and eventually destroys it; and the prevention of this, as much as the principal act, must undoubtedly have been the intent of the legislature." </s> As recently as 1964, the California Supreme Court decided People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d, at 531, 393 P.2d, at 674, in which it stated that the under-age female </s> "is presumed too innocent and naive to understand the implications and nature of her act. . . . The law's concern with her capacity or lack thereof [450 U.S. 464, 496] to so understand is explained in part by a popular conception of the social, moral and personal values which are preserved by the abstinence from sexual indulgence on the part of a young woman. An unwise disposition of her sexual favor is deemed to do harm both to herself and the social mores by which the community's conduct patterns are established. Hence the law of statutory rape intervenes in an effort to avoid such a disposition." </s> It was only in deciding Michael M. that the California Supreme Court decided, for the first time in the 130-year history of the statute, that pregnancy prevention had become one of the purposes of the statute. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> Local custom and belief - rather than statutory laws of venerable but doubtful ancestry - will determine the volume of sexual activity among unmarried teenagers. 1 The empirical [450 U.S. 464, 497] evidence cited by the plurality demonstrates the futility of the notion that a statutory prohibition will significantly affect the volume of that activity or provide a meaningful solution to the problems created by it. 2 Nevertheless, as a matter of constitutional power, unlike my Brother BRENNAN, see ante, at 491, n. 5, I would have no doubt about the validity of a state law prohibiting all unmarried teenagers from engaging in sexual intercourse. The societal interests in reducing the incidence of venereal disease and teenage pregnancy are sufficient, in my judgment, to justify a prohibition of conduct that increases the risk of those harms. 3 </s> My conclusion that a nondiscriminatory prohibition would be constitutional does not help me answer the question whether a prohibition applicable to only half of the joint participants in the risk-creating conduct is also valid. It cannot be true that the validity of a total ban is an adequate justification for a selective prohibition; otherwise, the constitutional objection to discriminatory rules would be meaningless. The question in this case is whether the difference between males and females justifies this statutory discrimination based entirely on sex. 4 </s> [450 U.S. 464, 498] </s> The fact that the Court did not immediately acknowledge that the capacity to become pregnant is what primarily differentiates the female from the male 5 does not impeach the validity of the plurality's newly found wisdom. I think the plurality is quite correct in making the assumption that the joint act that this law seeks to prohibit creates a greater risk of harm for the female than for the male. But the plurality surely cannot believe that the risk of pregnancy confronted by the female - any more than the risk of venereal disease confronted by males as well as females - has provided an effective deterrent to voluntary female participation in the risk-creating conduct. Yet the plurality's decision seems to rest on the assumption that the California Legislature acted on the basis of that rather fanciful notion. [450 U.S. 464, 499] </s> In my judgment, the fact that a class of persons is especially vulnerable to a risk that a statute is designed to avoid is a reason for making the statute applicable to that class. The argument that a special need for protection provides a rational explanation for an exemption is one I simply do not comprehend. 6 </s> In this case, the fact that a female confronts a greater risk of harm than a male is a reason for applying the prohibition to her - not a reason for granting her a license to use her own judgment on whether or not to assume the risk. Surely, if we examine the problem from the point of view of society's interest in preventing the risk-creating conduct from occurring at all, it is irrational to exempt 50% of the potential violators. See dissent of JUSTICE BRENNAN, ante, at 493-494. And, if we view the government's interest as that of a parens patriae seeking to protect its subjects from harming themselves, the discrimination is actually perverse. Would a rational parent making rules for the conduct of twin children of opposite sex simultaneously forbid the son and authorize the daughter to engage in conduct that is especially harmful to the daughter? That is the effect of this statutory classification. </s> If pregnancy or some other special harm is suffered by one of the two participants in the prohibited act, that special harm no doubt would constitute a legitimate mitigating factor in deciding what, if any, punishment might be appropriate in a given case. But from the standpoint of fashioning a general preventive rule - or, indeed, in determining appropriate punishment when neither party in fact has suffered any special [450 U.S. 464, 500] harm - I regard a total exemption for the members of the more endangered class as utterly irrational. </s> In my opinion, the only acceptable justification for a general rule requiring disparate treatment of the two participants in a joint act must be a legislative judgment that one is more guilty than the other. The risk-creating conduct that this statute is designed to prevent requires the participation of two persons - one male and one female. 7 In many situations it is probably true that one is the aggressor and the other is either an unwilling, or at least a less willing, participant in the joint act. If a statute authorized punishment of only one participant and required the prosecutor to prove that participant had been the aggressor, I assume that the discrimination would be valid. Although the question is less clear, I also assume, for the purpose of deciding this case, that it would be permissible to punish only the male participant, if one element of the offense were proof that he had been the aggressor, or at least in some respects the more responsible participant in the joint act. The statute at issue in this case, however, requires no such proof. The question raised by this statute is whether the State, consistently with the Federal Constitution, may always punish the male and never the female when they are equally responsible or when the female is the more responsible of the two. </s> It would seem to me that an impartial lawmaker could give only one answer to that question. The fact that the California Legislature has decided to apply its prohibition only to [450 U.S. 464, 501] the male may reflect a legislative judgment that in the typical case the male is actually the more guilty party. Any such judgment must, in turn, assume that the decision to engage in the risk-creating conduct is always - or at least typically - a male decision. If that assumption is valid, the statutory classification should also be valid. But what is the support for the assumption? It is not contained in the record of this case or in any legislative history or scholarly study that has been called to our attention. I think it is supported to some extent by traditional attitudes toward male-female relationships. But the possibility that such a habitual attitude may reflect nothing more than an irrational prejudice makes it an insufficient justification for discriminatory treatment that is otherwise blatantly unfair. For, as I read this statute, it requires that one, and only one, of two equally guilty wrongdoers be stigmatized by a criminal conviction. </s> I cannot accept the State's argument that the constitutionality of the discriminatory rule can be saved by an assumption that prosecutors will commonly invoke this statute only in cases that actually involve a forcible rape, but one that cannot be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 That assumption implies that a State has a legitimate interest in convicting a defendant on evidence that is constitutionally insufficient. Of course, the State may create a lesser-included offense that would authorize punishment of the more guilty party, but surely the interest in obtaining convictions on inadequate [450 U.S. 464, 502] proof cannot justify a statute that punishes one who is equally or less guilty than his partner. 9 </s> Nor do I find at all persuasive the suggestion that this discrimination is adequately justified by the desire to encourage females to inform against their male partners. Even if the concept of a wholesale informant's exemption were an acceptable enforcement device, what is the justification for defining the exempt class entirely by reference to sex rather than by reference to a more neutral criterion such as relative innocence? Indeed, if the exempt class is to be composed entirely of members of one sex, what is there to support the view that the statutory purpose will be better served by granting the informing license to females rather than to males? If a discarded male partner informs on a promiscuous female, a timely threat of prosecution might well prevent the precise harm the statute is intended to minimize. </s> Finally, even if my logic is faulty and there actually is some speculative basis for treating equally guilty males and females differently, I still believe that any such speculative justification would be outweighed by the paramount interest in evenhanded enforcement of the law. A rule that authorizes punishment of only one of two equally guilty wrongdoers violates the essence of the constitutional requirement that the sovereign must govern impartially. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 "Common sense indicates that many young people will engage in sexual activity regardless of what the New York Legislature does; and further, that the incidence of venereal disease and premarital pregnancy is affected by the availability or unavailability of contraceptives. Although [450 U.S. 464, 497] young persons theoretically may avoid those harms by practicing total abstention, inevitably many will not." Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 714 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and in judgment). </s> [Footnote 2 If a million teenagers became pregnant in 1976, see ante, at 470, n. 3, there must be countless violations of the California statute. The statistics cited by JUSTICE BRENNAN also indicate, as he correctly observes, that the statute "seems to be an ineffective deterrent of sexual activity." See ante, at 493-494, n. 8. </s> [Footnote 3 See Carey v. Population Services International, supra, at 713 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and in judgment). </s> [Footnote 4 Equal protection analysis is often said to involve different "levels of scrutiny." It may be more accurate to say that the burden of sustaining an equal protection challenge is much heavier in some cases than in others. Racial classifications, which are subjected to "strict scrutiny," are presumptively invalid because there is seldom, if ever, any legitimate reason for treating citizens differently because of their race. On the other hand, [450 U.S. 464, 498] most economic classifications are presumptively valid because they are a necessary component of most regulatory programs. In cases involving discrimination between men and women, the natural differences between the sexes are sometimes relevant and sometimes wholly irrelevant. If those differences are obviously irrelevant, the discrimination should be treated as presumptively unlawful in the same way that racial classifications are presumptively unlawful. Cf. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). But if, as in this case, there is an apparent connection between the discrimination and the fact that only women can become pregnant, it may be appropriate to presume that the classification is lawful. This presumption, however, may be overcome by a demonstration that the apparent justification for the discrimination is illusory or wholly inadequate. Thus, instead of applying a "mid-level" form of scrutiny in all sex discrimination cases, perhaps the burden is heavier in some than in others. Nevertheless, as I have previously suggested, the ultimate standard in these, as in all other equal protection cases, is essentially the same. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 -212 (STEVENS, J., concurring). Professor Cox recently noted that however the level of scrutiny is described, in the final analysis, "the Court is always deciding whether in its judgment the harm done to the disadvantaged class by the legislative classification is disproportionate to the public purposes the measure is likely to achieve." Cox, Book Review, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 706 (1981). </s> [Footnote 5 See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 162 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 6 A hypothetical racial classification will illustrate my point. Assume that skin pigmentation provides some measure of protection against cancer caused by exposure to certain chemicals in the atmosphere and, therefore, that white employees confront a greater risk than black employees in certain industrial settings. Would it be rational to require black employees to wear protective clothing but to exempt whites from that requirement? It seems to me that the greater risk of harm to white workers would be a reason for including them in the requirement - not for granting them an exemption. </s> [Footnote 7 In light of this indisputable biological fact, I find somewhat puzzling the California Supreme Court's conclusion, quoted by the plurality, ante, at 467, that males "are the only persons who may physiologically cause the result which the law properly seeks to avoid." 25 Cal. 3d 608, 612, 601 P.2d 572, 575 (1979) (emphasis in original). Presumably, the California Supreme Court was referring to the equally indisputable biological fact that only females may become pregnant. However, if pregnancy results from sexual intercourse between two willing participants - and the California statute is directed at such conduct - I would find it difficult to conclude that the pregnancy was "caused" solely by the male participant. </s> [Footnote 8 According to the State of California: </s> "The statute is commonly employed in situations involving force, prostitution, pornography or coercion due to status relationships, and the state's interest in these situations is apparent." Brief for Respondent 3. </s> See also id., at 23-25. The State's interest in these situations is indeed apparent and certainly sufficient to justify statutory prohibition of forcible rape, prostitution, pornography, and nonforcible, but nonetheless coerced, sexual intercourse. However, it is not at all apparent to me how this state interest can justify a statute not specifically directed to any of these offenses. </s> [Footnote 9 Both JUSTICE REHNQUIST and JUSTICE BLACKMUN apparently attach significance to the testimony at the preliminary hearing indicating that the petitioner struck his partner. See opinion of REHNQUIST, J., ante, at 467; opinion of BLACKMUN, J., ante, at 483-488, n. In light of the fact that the petitioner would be equally guilty of the crime charged in the complaint whether or not that testimony is true, it obviously has no bearing on the legal question presented by this case. The question is not whether "the facts . . . fit the crime," opinion of BLACKMUN, J., ante, at 487 - that is a question to be answered at trial - but rather, whether the statute defining the crime fits the constitutional requirement that justice be administered in an evenhanded fashion. </s> [450 U.S. 464, 503]

United States Supreme Court STAFFORD v. BRIGGS(1980) No. 77-1546 Argued: April 24, 1979Decided: February 20, 1980 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 78-303, Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, et al. v. Driver et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. </s> In No. 77-1546, respondents, who had been among those subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury in Florida investigating a possible conspiracy to cause a riot, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against petitioners (the then United States Attorney and Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida, and a Federal Bureau of Investigation agent) and a Department of Justice attorney, individually and in their official capacities, alleging a conspiracy to deprive respondents of various statutory and constitutional rights, and seeking damages and a declaratory judgment. Petitioners, each of whom resided in Florida, were served by certified mail, and the Department of Justice attorney, who resided in the District of Columbia, was served personally. Respondents relied on 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 (Act), 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e), which provides in part that "[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority . . . may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose . . ., or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action," and that delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer in such an action may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought. The District Court dismissed the action, ruling that venue was improper and that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over petitioners. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 2 permits damages actions against federal officials to be brought in any district in which any one defendant resides, and that since the Department of Justice attorney was a resident of the District of Columbia venue there was proper. In No. 78-303, respondents, whose mail between the United States and the Soviet Union had allegedly been opened by the Central Intelligence [444 U.S. 527, 528] Agency, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island against petitioners (the then Director and Deputy Director of the CIA) and others, in their individual and official capacities, alleging that interference with respondents' mail violated their constitutional rights, and seeking damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Petitioners and the other defendants were served outside of Rhode Island by certified mail. The District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of process, but certified the questions involved for an immediate appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's order as to petitioners, who were CIA officials when the complaint was filed, but reversed as to those defendants who had left their Government positions at the time of filing, holding that 2 applied to damages actions against federal officials in their individual capacities and provided the mechanism for obtaining personal jurisdiction, over them, and that accordingly venue was proper in Rhode Island because one of the respondents resided there. </s> Held: </s> Section 2 of the Act does not apply to actions for money damages brought against federal officials in their individual capacities. Pp. 533-545. </s> (a) Section 2's language "is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority" can reasonably be read as describing the character of the defendant at the time of suit, and, so read, limits a covered "civil action" to one against a federal official who is at that time acting, or failing to act, in an official or apparently official way. Such a "civil action" is that referred to in 1 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, which gives district courts jurisdiction of "any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." Pp. 535-536. </s> (b) The Act's legislative history clearly indicates that Congress intended nothing more than to provide nationwide venue for the convenience of individual plaintiffs in actions that are nominally against an individual officer but are in reality against the Government. A suit for money damages which must be paid out of the pocket of the private individual who happens to be - or formerly was - employed by the Government plainly is not one "essentially against the United States," and thus is not encompassed by the venue provisions of 2. Pp. 536-543. </s> (c) If 2 were construed to govern damages actions against federal officers individually, suits could be brought against those officers while in Government service - and could be pressed even after the officer has [444 U.S. 527, 529] left service - in any one of the 95 federal districts covering the 50 states and other areas within federal jurisdiction. This would place federal officers, solely by reason of their Government service, in a very different posture in personal damages suits from that of all other persons, since under 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b) damages suits against private persons must be brought in the district where all the defendants reside or in which the claim arose. Such was not the intent of Congress. Pp. 544-545. </s> No. 77-1546, 186 U.S. App. D.C. 170, 569 F.2d 1; and No. 78-303, 577 F.2d 147, reversed and remanded. </s> BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 545. WHITE, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. MARSHALL, J., took no part in the decision of the cases. </s> Peter Megargee Brown reargued the cause for petitioners in No. 77-1546. With him on the briefs was Earl H. Nemser. Mr. Nemser reargued the cause for petitioners in No. 78-303. With him on the briefs was Mr. Brown. </s> Doris Peterson reargued the cause for respondents in No. 77-1546. With her on the briefs were Morton Stavis, Nancy Stearns, Robert L. Boehm, Cameron Cunningham, Brady Coleman, Jack Levine, and Philip Hirschkop. Melvin L. Wulf reargued the cause for respondents in No. 78-303. With him on the brief were Leon Friedman and Burt Neuborne. </s> Elinor H. Stillman reargued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 78-303. On the brief urging reversal in both cases were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Babcock, Deputy Solicitor General Easterbrook, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., and Robert E. Kopp. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari in these cases to decide whether the venue provisions contained in 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e), apply to actions [444 U.S. 527, 530] for money damages brought against federal officials in their individual capacities. 439 U.S. 1113 (1979). </s> I </s> No. 77-1546 </s> Stafford et al. v. Briggs et al. </s> In 1972, petitioner William Stafford was United States Attorney and petitioner Stuart Carrouth was an Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of Florida. Guy Goodwin was an attorney in the Department of Justice. 1 Together they conducted grand jury proceedings in Florida, inquiring into the possibility that various individuals had conspired and engaged in interstate travel with intent to cause a riot. Respondents were among those subpoenaed to appear. At the request of respondents' counsel, the District Judge responsible for the proceedings called Goodwin to the stand and asked him to state, under oath, whether any of the witnesses represented by respondents' counsel was an agent or informant of the Government. Goodwin replied that none was. </s> Respondents later brought this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against Goodwin, Stafford, Carrouth, and petitioner Claude Meadow, an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Each was sued individually and in his official capacity. Respondents alleged that Goodwin had testified falsely in furtherance of a conspiracy among petitioners and Goodwin to deprive respondents of various statutory and constitutional rights. Each respondent sought a declaratory judgment, $50,000 in compensatory damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages. Petitioners, each of whom resided in Florida, were served by certified mail; Goodwin, whose residence was in the District of Columbia, was served personally. [444 U.S. 527, 531] </s> Respondents relied on 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, which, as amended and codified in Title 28 of the United States Code, provides: </s> " 1391. Venue generally </s> . . . . . </s> "(e) A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or an agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. Additional persons may be joined as parties to any such action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and with such other venue requirements as would be applicable if the United States or one of its officers, employees, or agencies were not a party. </s> "The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought." </s> Petitioners requested transfer of the action to the Northern District of Florida, or, alternatively, dismissal for improper venue and insufficiency of process. The District Court denied the motion to transfer but granted the motion to dismiss, ruling that venue was improper and that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the petitioners. 2 </s> [444 U.S. 527, 532] </s> Respondents appealed the District Court's order dismissing the case against petitioners, and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e) permits damages actions against federal officials to be brought in any district in which any one defendant resides. Briggs v. Goodwin, 186 U.S. App. D.C. 170, 569 F.2d 1 (1977). Because Goodwin was a resident of the District of Columbia, venue there was proper. The court also held that there was no constitutional infirmity in the statute as applied. It refused to apply the "minimum contacts" analysis of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and held that in a case such as this there is no constitutional requirement that defendants have any contacts with the place in which a particular federal court sits before they may be sued in that court. </s> No. 78-303 </s> Colby et al. v. Driver et al. </s> From 1953 to 1973 at the International Airport in New York, the Central Intelligence Agency opened and made photographic copies of certain mail traveling between the United States and the Soviet Union. 3 </s> Petitioner Vernon Walters was appointed Deputy Director of Central Intelligence in 1972; petitioner William Colby was appointed Director of Central Intelligence in 1973. Both petitioners were in office in 1975 when respondents, acting on behalf of themselves and others whose mail had allegedly been opened by the CIA, brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Respondents alleged that the interference with their mail to and from the [444 U.S. 527, 533] Soviet Union violated their constitutional rights. Their suit, brought against both present and former federal officials in their individual and official capacities, requested declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including $20,000 for each letter opened and punitive damages of $100,000 for each member of the plaintiff class. </s> Petitioners and the other defendants were served outside of Rhode Island by certified mail. All the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and insufficiency of process, claiming that no defendant resided in or had substantial contacts with Rhode Island and that the complaint failed to allege that any activity had occurred there. The District Court denied these motions but certified the questions involved for an immediate appeal. </s> The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court as to petitioners, who were CIA officials when the complaint was filed, but it reversed as to those defendants who had left their Government positions at the time of filing. Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1978). 4 The court held that 1391 (e) applied to damages actions against federal officials in their individual capacities and provided the mechanism for obtaining personal jurisdiction over them. Venue was proper in Rhode Island because one of the respondents resided there. The court also rejected petitioners' challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, ruling that minimum contacts analysis was not relevant in this situation. </s> II </s> Soon after the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, this Court held that Congress had not granted the federal [444 U.S. 527, 534] trial courts generally the power to issue writs of mandamus. McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch 504 (1813). The federal courts in the District of Columbia, which derived power to issue the writ from the common law of the State of Maryland, were the sole exception. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524 (1838). </s> To avoid this jurisdictional obstacle, litigants seeking mandamus-type relief outside of the District of Columbia often brought suits for injunctive or declaratory relief instead. But in most cases a superior federal officer was an indispensable party. See, e. g., Williams v. Fanning, 332 U.S. 490 (1947). Because of the legal fiction that officers of such rank resided only where they were stationed - usually the District of Columbia - effective service could be obtained only there. And with the restrictive venue provisions then in effect, joinder of such an official required that the action be brought in the District of Columbia. See 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b) (1946 ed., Supp. II), amended in Pub. L. 89-714, 80 Stat. 1111 (1966). The net result was that persons in distant parts of the country claiming injury by reason of the acts or omissions of a federal officer or agency were faced with significant expense and inconvenience in bringing suits for enforcement of claimed rights. </s> In response to this problem, Congress enacted the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962. Section 1 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, provides that actions in the nature of mandamus can be brought in any district court of the United States. 5 Section 2 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e), provides a similarly expanded choice of venue and authorizes service by certified mail on federal officers or agencies located outside the district in which such a suit is filed. [444 U.S. 527, 535] </s> The 1962 legislation thus makes it more convenient for aggrieved persons to file actions in the nature of mandamus. Respondents argue, however, that much more was intended. They contend that by using the general language "civil action," Congress intended to include in the expanded venue provision not only mandamus-type actions but all civil actions, including those seeking money damages from federal officers as individuals. </s> The language of 1391 (e) does refer to "a civil action." Recitation of that fact, however, but begins our inquiry, as this Court noted over a century ago when faced with a similar problem of statutory interpretation: </s> "The general words used in the clause . . . taken by themselves, and literally construed, without regard to the object in view, would seem to sanction the claim of the plaintiff. But this mode of expounding a statute has never been adopted by any enlightened tribunal - because it is evident that in many cases it would defeat the object which the Legislature intended to accomplish. And it is well settled that, in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law. . . ." Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857). </s> Looking first to "the whole statute," two things are apparent: (1) 1 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 is explicitly limited to "action[s] in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. 1361. (2) The "civil action" referred to in 2 of the Act is one "in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority. . . ." 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e) (emphasis added). The highlighted language, [444 U.S. 527, 536] cast by Congress in the present tense, can reasonably be read as describing the character of the defendant at the time of the suit. So read, it limits a covered "civil action" to one against a federal official or agency who is at that time acting - or failing to act - in an official or apparently official way. 6 Such "civil actions" are those referred to in 1 of the Act, i. e., "action[s] in the nature of mandamus." </s> Our analysis does not stop with the language of the statute; we must also look to "the objects and policy of the law." Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How., at 194. In order to "give [the Act] such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature . . . according to its true intent and meaning," ibid., we turn to the legislative history. Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 , n. 4 (1971). See also United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 374 , n. 4 (1978); Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1, 9 -10 (1976). </s> III </s> H. R. 10089, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), was a precursor of the bill which eventually became the 1962 Act. Congressman Budge, the author of H. R. 10089, explained its purpose: </s> "As it is now, there is no opportunity for a judicial review of the action of any decision that is made by a Federal officer in charge out there [in the field], no matter how arbitrary or capricious, because it is too expensive to come back here [to Washington, D.C.] to litigate it." Hearings on H. R. 10089 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (May 26 and June 2, 1960). 7 </s> [444 U.S. 527, 537] </s> As often happens, the dialogue between witnesses, Members, and Committee Counsel reveals considerable initial confusion as to the extent of the problem and the proposed solution. Of course, the very purpose of hearing witnesses is to expose problems, probe for solutions, and reach a consensus. At one point Congressman Poff, in an obvious effort to clarify the responses, asked the Department of Justice witness, Donald MacGuineas: </s> "Mr. POFF. Wouldn't you say the author's objective is to give a citizen who has a legitimate complaint against his Government the right to sue his Government at the place where the wrong was committed? </s> "Mr. MACGUINEAS. The difficulty, if I may say so, Congressman, with your statement, is you speak of the right to sue his Government. Now, that proposition in itself raises very difficult and complicated legal questions which I touched upon at my appearance last week. </s> "You must first decide whether a particular suit is actually a suit against the man in his official capacity or whether it i[s] a suit against the Government officer in his individual capacity. If it is the latter, it is not in any sense a suit against the Government." Id., at 54. </s> Committee Counsel later asked the Department of Justice witness: </s> "Suppose in order to take care of a body of law which seems to say that when a government official does something wrong he is acting in his individual capacity, we added the following language - `acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority'?" Id., at 61. </s> Mr. MacGuineas' response, which must now be recognized as prophetic, was that such language might later be misinterpreted as covering a damages action against a person holding Government office. This, he said, would raise "serious policy questions" by allowing a Government official to be sued in the [444 U.S. 527, 538] plaintiff's home district while a private defendant in the same kind of action could be sued only in the district of his residence. The Chairman, Mr. Forrester, and the ranking senior Committee Member, Mr. Poff, both stated that they shared the same concern. Id., at 62-63. </s> Judge Albert Maris, then Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, testified that such an "injustice" to the Government officer could be avoided only by requiring a damages suit to be brought in the district of his residence or where the cause of action arose. "That," said Judge Maris, "is the normal procedure in the law. That is what ordinarily happens in the ordinary law suit." Id., at 86. Congressman Dowdy, one of the four Members present, then said: </s> "Speaking to the point you were talking about, I don't understand that we have in consideration suits for money damages. That would be maybe where a person is being sued as an individual." Id., at 87. </s> When Judge Maris stated his view that cases involving money damages would not be involved, Mr. Dowdy agreed: "They would not be covered by this [proposed legislation]." Ibid. </s> Finally, near the conclusion of the hearing, the bill's author, Mr. Budge, stated: </s> "We always get off into these slander type actions which is not what I am seeking at all. When Mr. MacGuineas stated here this morning that he was not sure of the purpose of the legislation, I think that is perhaps true, because I have no intention of bringing [within this bill] tort actions against individual government employees. All I am seeking to do is to have the review of their official actions take place in the United States District Court where the determination was made." Id., at 102 (emphasis added). </s> Following the hearings, the Subcommittee redrafted H. R. 10089. The revised version, H. R. 12622, 86th Cong., 2d [444 U.S. 527, 539] Sess. (1960), among other things, added the language "or under color of legal authority" to the phrase "acting in his official capacity." Far from being intended as the master key which would unlock the door to nationwide venue for money damages actions brought against an official as an individual, this language was specifically intended only to alleviate the hardships caused by a relatively narrow but nagging problem, as the Committee Report made clear: </s> "By including the officer or employee, both in his official capacity and acting under color of legal authority, the committee intends to make the proposed section 1391 (e) applicable not only to those cases where an action may be brought against an officer or employee in his official capacity. It intends to include also those cases where the action is nominally brought against the officer in his individual capacity even though he was acting within the apparent scope of his authority and not as a private citizen. Such actions are also in essence against the United States but are brought against the officer or employee as an individual only to circumvent what remains of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The considerations of policy which demand that an action against an official may be brought locally rather than in the District of Columbia require similar venue provisions where the action is based upon the fiction that the officer is acting as an individual. There is no intention, however, to alter the venue requirements of Federal law insofar as suits resulting from the official's private actions are concerned." H. R. Rep. No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3-4 (1960) (emphasis added). </s> The Committee's statement of the legislation's purpose also sheds considerable light on the congressional intent: </s> "The purpose of this bill is to make it possible to bring actions against Government officials and agencies in U.S. district courts outside the District of Columbia, which, [444 U.S. 527, 540] because of certain existing limitations on jurisdiction and venue, may now be brought only in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia." Id., at 1 (emphasis added). </s> In context, this clearly confines the intended thrust of 1391 (e) to mandamus-type actions. See supra, at 533-534. The Report continues: </s> "Section 2 [ 1391 (e)] is the venue section of the bill. Its purpose is similar to that of section 1. It is designed to permit an action which is essentially against the United States to be brought locally rather than requiring that it be brought in the District of Columbia simply because Washington is the official residence of the officer or agency sued." H. R. Rep. No. 1936, supra, at 2 (emphasis added). 8 </s> Although H. R. 12622 passed the House in 1960, the Senate adjourned without acting on it. See H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (1961). The same bill was reintroduced in the next Congress as H. R. 1960, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The Committee Report was republished as H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), and the bill was referred to the Senate. </s> The Senate Judiciary Committee also solicited comments on the bill from the Department of Justice. The Department suggested, inter alia, that it would be prudent to effect the [444 U.S. 527, 541] venue reform by amending the Administrative Procedure Act so that "suits for money judgments against officers" would be "unquestionably eliminate[d]." See Letter from Deputy Attorney General White to Senator Eastland (Feb. 28, 1962), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1962). Although the Senate Committee in its Report commented on other suggestions proffered by the Justice Department, in this instance it made no response at all. 9 Respondents and the Courts of Appeals rely on this failure to respond as indicating an intention that the venue provisions were to apply to actions for money damages brought against a federal official in his individual capacity. </s> We are not persuaded by this negative inference. Several passages affirmatively state the limited nature of the bill: The Senate Committee's statement of the bill's purpose is exactly the same as that found in the House Report. Compare S. Rep. No. 1992, supra, at 2, with H. R. Rep. No. 536, supra, at 1. The Committee also states that "[t]he bill, as amended, is intended to facilitate review by the Federal courts of administrative actions," S. Rep. No. 1992, supra, at 2 (emphasis added), which does not afford a basis for reading the language of the statute to include money damages actions against individuals. And the following comment as to the bill's venue provisions appears in the Report: </s> "The committee is of the view that the current state of the law respecting venue in actions against Government officials is contrary to the sound and equitable administration of justice. Frequently, the administrative determinations involved are made not in Washington [444 U.S. 527, 542] but in the field. In either event, these are actions which are in essence against the United States. The Government official is defended by the Department of Justice whether the action is brought in the District of Columbia or in any other district. U.S. attorneys are present in every judicial district. Requiring the Government to defend Government officials and agencies in places other than Washington would not appear to be a burdensome imposition." S. Rep. No. 1992, supra, at 3 (emphasis added). </s> Here again is confirmation that there was no thought to expand the venue provisions except as to actions "in essence against the United States," since the Government is not "required" to defend personal actions in which a Government employee is a defendant. </s> What emerges is that the bill's author, the Committees, and the Congress intended nothing more than to provide nationwide venue for the convenience of individual plaintiffs in actions which are nominally against an individual officer but are in reality against the Government. A suit for money damages which must be paid out of the pocket of the private individual who happens to be - or formerly was - employed by the Federal Government plainly is not one "essentially against the United States," and thus is not encompassed by the venue provisions of 1391 (e). 10 </s> This is not the first time an overbroad interpretation of 1391 (e) has been rejected by this Court. In Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487 (1971), the question was whether in a habeas corpus proceeding "any custodian, or one in the chain of command, as well as the person detained, must be [444 U.S. 527, 543] in the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court." Id., at 489. While recognizing that habeas corpus is "a civil action," we noted that reference to 1391 (e) did not provide the answer. In the opinion for the Court, Mr. Justice Douglas stated: </s> "Although by 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e) . . . Congress has provided for nationwide service of process in a `civil action in which each defendant is an officer or employee of the United States,' the legislative history of that section is barren of any indication that Congress extended habeas corpus jurisdiction. That section was enacted to broaden the venue of civil actions which could previously have been brought only in the District of Columbia. See H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 1; S. Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 2." 401 U.S., at 490 , n. 4. (Emphasis added.) </s> As we have noted, the "civil actions which could previously have been brought only in the District of Columbia" were suits for mandamus, not actions for money damages. See supra, at 533-534. The clear purport of our statement in Schlanger is that Congress did not intend the phrase "civil action" to be given the sweeping definition argued for it in that case, and that the Court was required to turn to the legislative history to determine which "civil actions" 1391 (e) governed. </s> IV </s> The conclusion derived from the legislative history that 1391 (e) does not cover the type of suits here at issue is buttressed by consideration of the consequences of the broad interpretation urged upon us by respondents. The conditions and venue provisions under which officers of the United States may be sued, while in office or after leaving office, have serious implications for defendants as well as for those seeking relief. An officer of the Government while so employed may have numerous mandamus-type suits naming him or her as a party. [444 U.S. 527, 544] Without doubt, under 1391 (e), venue lies in every one of the 95 federal districts, and suits may be pending in a dozen or several dozen at any one time. Even though the burden of defending multiple suits while in office may be onerous, the United States Attorney in each of the districts and the Department of Justice carry that burden. In a mandamus suit only rarely would the officer himself be obliged to travel to the district in which the case was heard; if so obliged, the travel would be at Government expense. When an official leaves office, his personal involvement in a mandamus suit effectively ends and his successor carries on. No personal cost or inconvenience is incurred, either while in office or later. It was with this understanding that Congress sought to ameliorate the inconvenience and expense to private plaintiffs seeking relief from the action or inaction of their Government. H. R. Rep. No. 536, at 3; S. Rep. No. 1992, at 3. </s> Suits for money damages for which an individual office-holder may be found personally liable are quite different. If 1391 (e) were construed to govern actions for money damages against federal officers individually, suits could be brought against these federal officers while in Government service - and could be pressed even after the official has left federal service - in any one of the 95 federal districts covering the 50 states and other areas within federal jurisdiction. This would place federal officers, solely by reason of their Government service, in a very different posture in personal damages suits from that of all other persons, since under 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b), suits against private persons for money damages must be brought "in the judicial district where all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose." 11 </s> [444 U.S. 527, 545] </s> There is, however, no indication that a Congress concerned with "the sound and equitable administration of justice," H. R. Rep. No. 536, at 3; S. Rep. No. 1992, at 3, intended to impose on those serving their Government the burden of defending personal damages actions in a variety of distant districts after leaving office. Absent a clear indication that Congress intended such a sweeping effect, we will not infer such a purpose nor will we interpret a statute to effect that result. "We think these laws ought to be construed in the spirit in which they were made - that is, as founded in justice - and should not be strained by technical constructions to reach cases which Congress evidently could not have contemplated, without departing from the principle upon which they were legislating, and going far beyond the object they intended to accomplish." Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How., at 197. </s> The judgments of the Courts of Appeals in No. 77-1546 and No. 78-303 are reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Goodwin is not a party in the case before this Court. </s> [Footnote 2 Goodwin joined petitioners in making the transfer request. He also moved for dismissal on grounds of prosecutorial immunity. This motion was denied. See Briggs v. Goodwin, 384 F. Supp. 1228 (DC 1974), [444 U.S. 527, 532] aff'd, 186 U.S. App. D.C. 179, 569 F.2d 10 (1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978). </s> [Footnote 3 See Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, S. Rep. No. 94-755, Book 3, pp. 559-677 (1976). </s> [Footnote 4 The court concluded that because 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e) was drafted in the present tense, Congress did not mean it to apply to former officials. Although respondents sought certiorari on this question, we declined review. 439 U.S. 1114 (1979). </s> [Footnote 5 " 1361. Action to compel an officer of the United States to perform his duty </s> "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." </s> [Footnote 6 Congress' use of the language "under color of legal authority" is explained in the House Committee Report as an effort to circumvent the sovereign immunity doctrine. See infra, at 538-539. </s> [Footnote 7 A certified copy of these unpublished hearings has been lodged with the Clerk of this Court. </s> [Footnote 8 Respondents' argument that 1391 (e) should apply to personal damages actions is based on an isolated passage in the Committee Report: </s> "The venue problem also arises in an action against a Government official seeking damages from him for actions which are claimed to be without legal authority but which were taken by the official in the course of performing his duty." H. R. Rep. No. 1936, at 3. </s> In the face of the consistently expressed intent of the Committee to include only actions essentially against the Government, we decline to treat this one cryptic sentence as dispositive of the legislative intent. See Blackburn v. Goodwin, 608 F.2d 919 (CA2 1979). </s> [Footnote 9 The only arguable reference is a passage taken verbatim from the House Report which mentions that the venue problem also arises in suits against officials for damages for acts taken in the course of performing official duties. See S. Rep. No. 1992, at 3. Inasmuch as this passage, like much of the Senate Report, is but a recitation of language used earlier in the House Report, see n. 8, supra, it obviously was not drafted in response to the Justice Department's letter. </s> [Footnote 10 In deciding whether an action is in reality one against the Government, the identity of the named parties defendant is not controlling; the dispositive inquiry is "who will pay the judgment?" See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). Here, it is against individuals and not against the Government that a money judgment is sought. </s> [Footnote 11 Under this provision the case against petitioner Stafford could have been brought only in the Northern District of Florida where the alleged claim arose. As to petitioner Colby, the proper venue would have been the Eastern District of New York where the alleged claim arose, or perhaps the Eastern District of Virginia, where some acts may have occurred at the headquarters of the CIA. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. </s> The Court today holds that in a suit against a federal officer for allegedly wrongful actions under color of legal authority, the venue provisions of 2 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962, 28 U.S.C. 1391 (e), are applicable only if the officer is simply a nominal defendant, and the plaintiff's real grievance is against the Government. I disagree. It is my view that 1391 (e) means what it says, and that it thus [444 U.S. 527, 546] applies as well to a suit for damages against a federal officer for his own wrongdoing. </s> I </s> When Congress enacted 1391 (e) in 1962, this Court had recognized two types of suits against federal officers acting under color of legal authority. 1 See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682 . The first of these two types of suits was based on a legal fiction designed to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity. This fiction enabled an aggrieved party to obtain equitable relief in a case nominally directed against a federal officer if the officer had acted either unconstitutionally or in excess of his statutory authority. The theory underlying the fiction was that the relief sought was against the officer in his individual capacity, rather than against the Government. Id., at 689-690. But, since any sovereign can act only through its agents, the reality was that the relief sought was in fact against the Government itself. The second type of suit, by contrast, was a direct action against the federal officer in his individual capacity for actions taken under color of legal authority. Id., at 687. Such a suit typically sought to assess personal monetary liability against the officer. </s> The issue here is whether the venue and service of process provisions of 1391 (e) were intended to apply to both of these kinds of suits. Section 1391 (e) provides in relevant part: </s> "A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority . . ., may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause of action arose, or [444 U.S. 527, 547] (3) any real property involved in the action is situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action. . . . </s> "The summons and complaint in such an action shall be served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure except that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer . . . as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought." </s> Since either of the two types of suits described above is properly characterized as "[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States . . . acting . . . under color of legal authority," it is quite clear that they both fall within the plain meaning of 1391 (e). 2 Thus, by its own terms, 1391 (e) unambiguously extends to the second type of suit against a federal officer, that is, one in which, as here, money damages are sought directly from the federal officer himself. </s> II </s> Relying on legislative history and policy considerations, the Court turns its back on the words of the statute and holds that it does not cover a suit against a federal officer for money damages. The legislative history, according to the Court, indicates that the general purpose of Congress in enacting the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 (Act) was to remove then [444 U.S. 527, 548] existing jurisdictional and venue obstacles to suits against federal officers for mandamus-type relief outside the District of Columbia. The legislative history further indicates, in the Court's view, that the specific, and exclusive, concern of Congress in adding to 1391 (e) the phrase at issue here, "acting . . . under color of legal authority," was to ensure that the provision would govern suits against federal officers for equitable relief. Thus the Court concludes that the proper construction of the phrase "acting . . . under color of legal authority" is coextensive with the sole concern to which it was purportedly addressed. This construction is said to find further support in the policies underlying the Act. 3 </s> The Court thus purports to rely on the familiar rule that "`in interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law.'" Ante, at 535, quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 -202. This reliance is misplaced, however, since neither the legislative history nor public policy is inconsistent with the plain meaning of 1391 (e). </s> A </s> The forerunner of the Act was introduced as H. R. 10089, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). That bill provided: </s> "A civil action in which each defendant is an officer of the United States in his official capacity, a person acting under him, or an agency of the United States, may be brought in any judicial district where a plaintiff in the action resides." (Emphasis added.) [444 U.S. 527, 549] </s> Following hearings and the submission of written comments on H. R. 10089 to a House Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, a new bill was introduced that parallels closely the current language of the Act. The new bill, H. R. 12622, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), contained two sections: the first vested all district courts with jurisdiction to hear suits seeking mandamus-type relief; 4 the second broadened the venue alternatives for a suit against a federal officer "acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority." (Emphasis added.) This bill passed the House in 1960, but the Senate adjourned without acting on it. The same bill was then reintroduced in the next Congress, H. R. 1960, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), and, with only minor amendments, was enacted by both the House and the Senate. </s> The question here is why Congress expanded the ambit of the second section of the Act, now 1391 (e), to include not only a suit against a federal officer "acting in his official capacity," but also a suit against a federal officer "acting . . . under color of legal authority." The Court says that the legislative history reveals that the phrase "acting . . . under color of legal authority" was added to 1391 (e) for the sole purpose of including within its coverage suits against federal officers for equitable relief. This view is said to find support in the positions announced by members of the House Subcommittee during the hearings on H. R. 10089, and in the Committee Reports that accompanied the subsequent versions of the bill. </s> I would have to agree that a principal purpose of adding the phrase "acting . . . under color of legal authority" to 1391 (e) was to ensure that the venue provisions would apply to suits against federal officers for equitable relief. At the Subcommittee [444 U.S. 527, 550] Hearings on H. R. 10089, the proponent of the bill, Representative Budge, explained the basic problem to which it was addressed - that, in light of then existing venue and jurisdictional obstacles, "there is no opportunity for a judicial review of the action of any decision that is made by a Federal officer in charge out there [in the field], no matter how arbitrary or capricious, because it is too expensive to come back here [to Washington, D.C.] to litigate it." Hearings on H. R. 10089 before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 19-20 (1960). </s> The record of the testimony at the Subcommittee hearings, however, reveals substantial confusion both as to the scope of the problem and the manner in which it ought to be resolved. During the hearings, a representative of the Justice Department observed that since the bill, as drafted, applied only to a suit against a federal officer "in his official capacity," there would remain unresolved the venue and jurisdictional problems in the context of a suit for equitable relief brought against a federal officer in his individual capacity to sidestep the problem of sovereign immunity. Id., at 32-33. In response, the Subcommittee's counsel proposed the addition of the language at issue here: "Suppose in order to take care of a body of law which seems to say that when a government official does something wrong he is acting in his individual capacity, we added the following language - `acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority.'" Id., at 61 (emphasis added). That phrase was then incorporated in the redrafted bill, H. R. 12622, as well as subsequent bills. The Committee Reports accompanying those bills confirm that Congress intended 1391 (e) to govern suits against federal officers for equitable relief. </s> Although a principal purpose of adding the phrase "acting . . . under color of legal authority" to 1391 (e) thus undoubtedly was to ensure that the venue provision would apply to suits against federal officers for equitable relief, it is not at all clear [444 U.S. 527, 551] from the legislative history that Congress sought only to include such suits within the broadened ambit of the provision. Whatever may have been the intent of the Subcommittee members who conducted the hearings on the original bill, the Committee Reports accompanying subsequent bill - all of which included the phrase "acting . . . under color of legal authority" - indicated an intent to reach suits against federal officers not only for equitable relief, but also for money damages. In describing the scope of the problem addressed by the Act, the Committee Reports indicated that "[t]he venue problem also arises in an action against a Government official seeking damages from him for actions which are claimed to be without legal authority but which were taken by the official in the course of performing his duty." H. R. Rep. No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1960); H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961); S. Rep. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1961) (emphasis added). </s> It is also significant that at least one of these Committee Reports, that of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was issued after the then Deputy Attorney General had recommended that the venue reform be tied in directly to the Administrative Procedure Act. Letter from Deputy Attorney General White to Senator Eastland (Feb. 28, 1962), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 1992, supra, at 6. "This," he observed, "[would] unquestionably eliminat[e] suits for money judgments against officers." Ibid. Although the Committee acted upon other suggestions in that letter, it took no steps whatsoever to narrow the ambit of 1391 (e) to exclude suits for money damages. Rather, as stated above, the Committee Report indicated that the venue problem to which the bill was addressed applied to such suits. </s> B </s> It is also instructive that shortly after the Act was signed into law, then Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach circulated a memorandum to all United States Attorneys to assist [444 U.S. 527, 552] them in defending suits brought under the newly enacted legislation. In that memorandum, he noted: </s> "The venue provision [ 1391 (e)] is applicable to suits against Government officials and agencies for injunctions and damages as well as suits for mandatory relief. . . . As an example, suits for damages for alleged libel or slander by Government officials (which the Department defends on the ground that statements made by a Government official within the scope of his authority are absolutely privileged . . .) fall within the venue provision of this statute." </s> It is thus clear that the Justice Department regarded 1391 (e) as applicable to suits against federal officers for money damages for actions taken under color of legal authority. </s> The significance of this memorandum is twofold. First, it represents a contemporaneous interpretation of 1391 (e) that is wholly at odds with that adopted by the Court. Second, it indicates that the Justice Department has long assumed a special responsibility for representing federal officers sued for money damages for actions taken under color of legal authority. This longstanding responsibility is carried forth in current regulations. See 28 CFR 50.15, 50.16 (1979). </s> The fact that the Justice Department, in most circumstances, will provide such representation substantially undercuts the Court's policy argument that to construe 1391 (e) to govern suits for money damages would undermine the "sound and equitable administration of justice," see H. R. Rep. No. 536, supra, at 3; S. Rep. No. 1992, supra, at 3, by "plac[ing] federal officers, solely by reason of their Government service, in a very different posture in personal damages suits from that of all other persons, since under 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b), suits against private persons for money damages must be brought `in the judicial district where all the defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.'" Ante, at 544. The Court's argument overlooks the fact that since the Government [444 U.S. 527, 553] is willing to provide representation in a suit against a federal officer for money damages, the federal officer is relieved of the greatest burden involved in defending himself. </s> III </s> The petitioners also argue that principles of due process militate against construing 1391 (e) to govern suits against federal officers for money damages. This argument turns on the fact that 1391 (e) provides not only for expanded venue, but also for nationwide service of process. It is the petitioners' position that a serious due process problem arises when the provisions of 1391 (e) are taken to mean what they say, so as to permit a federal district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a federal officer who lacks sufficient "minimum contacts" with the State or district in which the federal court sits. 5 </s> The petitioners concede that previous cases in this area have involved the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that a state court may acquire personal jurisdiction only if there exist "minimum contacts" between the defendant and the forum State. Reasoning by analogy, however, the petitioners [444 U.S. 527, 554] argue that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice inherent in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment similarly limit the exercise of congressional power to provide for nationwide in personam jurisdiction. </s> The short answer to this argument is that due process requires only certain minimum contacts between the defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 ; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 . The issue is not whether it is unfair to require a defendant to assume the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum, but rather whether the court of a particular sovereign has power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a named defendant. The cases before us involve suits against residents of the United States in the courts of the United States. No due process problem exists. </s> This is not to say that a federal officer in a suit for money damages is without recourse in the event he is sued in an inconvenient place. A federal district court is vested with broad authority "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, [to] . . . transfer any civil action to any other district . . . where it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. 1404 (a). It is not unreasonable to expect that district courts would look sympathetically upon a motion for a change of venue in any case where a federal officer could show that he would be substantially prejudiced if the suit were not transferred to a more convenient forum. </s> For the reasons stated, I think that 1391 (e) means exactly what it says, and that its provisions present no constitutional problem whatever. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgments in both of these cases. </s> [Footnote 1 For purposes of brevity, I hereafter refer to "suits against federal officers acting under color of legal authority" simply as "suits against federal officers." </s> [Footnote 2 The Court argues that since 1391 (e) is written in the present tense ("[a] civil action in which a defendant is an officer or employee of the United States . . . acting in his official capacity or under color of legal authority" (emphasis added)), the phrase "acting . . . under color of legal authority" is properly construed as applying only to a nominal suit against a federal officer for equitable relief. Such a suit, the Court notes, is necessarily brought against a defendant who is presently serving as a federal officer. Ante, at 535-536. This argument falls short of the mark, however, for many suits against federal officers for money damages, such as those at issue here, are brought against the officers while they are still in Government service. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court also finds support for its construction of 1391 (e) in our holding in Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 , n. 4, that 1391 (e) does not apply to habeas corpus actions. This reliance is misplaced, because the Schlanger decision turned on the sui generis nature of habeas corpus actions which, though "technically `civil,' . . . [are] not automatically subject to all the rules governing ordinary civil actions." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 4 This section of the bill, with minor modifications, was later enacted as 1 of the Act, 28 U.S.C. 1361, which provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." </s> [Footnote 5 The petitioners also argue, on statutory grounds, that 1391 (e) does not confer personal jurisdiction. It is the petitioners' position that 1391 (e) was designed only to govern venue and service of process, not to confer personal jurisdiction. The flaw in this argument is that, as a general rule, service of process is the means by which a court obtains personal jurisdiction over a defendant, and in the cases before us the petitioners have failed to demonstrate that there was any defect in the means by which service of process was effected. </s> It cannot seriously be argued that 1391 (e) does not authorize extra-territorial service of process, for it provides that in civil actions governed by 1391 (e) "the delivery of the summons and complaint to the officer or agency as required by the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which the action is brought." The legislative history, moreover, confirms that Congress intended extraterritorial service of process for all cases governed by 1391 (e). See H. R. Rep. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1961). </s> [444 U.S. 527, 555]

United States Supreme Court FORT STEWART SCHOOLS v. FLRA(1990) No. 89-65 Argued: January 10, 1990Decided: May 29, 1990 </s> During collective bargaining, petitioner schools, which are owned and operated by the Army at a military facility, declined to negotiate with respondent Fort Stewart Association of Educators (Union) over proposals relating to a salary increase and fringe benefits. Respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority held that the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS or Statute) required petitioner to bargain over the proposals. The Court of Appeals affirmed. </s> Held: </s> The Authority did not err in ruling that petitioner was required to bargain over the Union's proposals. Pp. 644-657. </s> (a) The Authority's conclusion that the Union's proposals related to "conditions of employment" within the meaning of the Statute, over which covered employers are required to bargain, is based upon a permissible construction and is entitled to deference absent an unambiguous expression of congressional intent to the contrary. Cf. Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 -843. The Statute defines "conditions of employment" as matters "affecting working conditions," but excludes matters (1) relating to prohibited partisan political activities; (2) relating to the classification of positions; or (3) specifically provided for by federal statute. Although, in isolation, the term "working conditions" might be read to connote only the physical conditions under which an employee labors, the structure of the statutory definition tends to negate that meaning, which would render the first two exceptions unnecessary. There is no merit to petitioner's contention that, although the term "conditions of employment" may generally include any matter insisted upon as a prerequisite to accepting employment, it does not include wages. Wages are the quintessential prerequisite to accepting employment. Nor is the inclusion in the National Labor Relations Act and the Postal Reorganization Act of specific references to "wages" relevant here; those statutes deal with labor-management relations in entirely different spheres, and nothing in the FSLMRS indicates that it is to be read in pari materia with them. Statements in the legislative history suggesting that the FSLMRS duty to bargain does not extend to wage and fringe-benefit proposals are also irrelevant, in light of indications that these statements were based on [495 U.S. 641, 642] the erroneous belief that the wages and benefits of all Executive Branch employees are fixed by law and are therefore eliminated from the "conditions of employment" definition by the third statutory exception. Pp. 644-650. </s> (b) The Union's proposals are not exempted from the statutory duty to bargain by an FSLMRS provision specifying that "nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any [agency] management official . . . to determine the [agency's] budget." Under the Authority's precedents interpreting this provision, petitioner had the burden of proving that the Union's proposals would result in significant and unavoidable increases in petitioner's costs. Since petitioner placed nothing in the record to document its total costs or even its current total teachers' salaries, the Authority reasonably determined that it could not conclude from an increase in one budget item of indeterminate amount whether petitioner's costs as a whole would be significantly and unavoidably increased. Pp. 650-653. </s> (c) Title 20 U.S.C. 241 - which directs agencies establishing schools on federally owned property to limit expenditures to "an amount per pupil which will not exceed the per pupil cost of free public education provided [by] comparable communities in the State" - and an implementing Army regulation - which requires that federal school salary schedules equal those in the private sector - do not relieve petitioner of its duty to bargain on the ground that the Union's proposed salary increase would require petitioner to pay its teachers more than employees in local civilian school systems. In rejecting this argument, the Authority relied on an FSLMRS provision requiring, "to the extent not inconsistent with Federal law," bargaining over the subject of an agency regulation "if the Authority has determined . . . that no compelling need . . . exists for the . . . regulation," and on its own implementing regulation declaring that a "compelling need" exists if, among other things, the agency regulation in question implements a statutory mandate that is "essentially nondiscretionary in nature." It cannot be said that the salary equality requirement is "essentially nondiscretionary in nature," since 241 mandates equivalence only in total per pupil expenditure, not in each separate element of educational cost. Pp. 653-657. </s> 860 F.2d 396, affirmed. </s> SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. MARSHALL, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, at p. 657. </s> Christopher J. Wright argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Roberts, [495 U.S. 641, 643] Assistant Attorney General Gerson, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, William Kanter, and Jacob M. Lewis. </s> William E. Persina argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief for respondent Federal Labor Relations Authority was Jill A. Griffin. Richard J. Hirn and Ronald R. Austin filed a brief for respondent Fort Stewart Association of Educators. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations et al. by Jeremiah A. Collins, Laurence Gold, Mark D. Roth, Kevin M. Grile, and Lawrence A. Poltrock; and for the National Treasury Employees Union by Gregory O'Duden and Kerry L. Adams. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In this case we review the decision of the Federal Labor Relations Authority that petitioner Fort Stewart Schools, a Federal Government employer, is required to bargain with the labor union representing its employees over a proposal relating to wages and fringe benefits. </s> I </s> Respondent Fort Stewart Association of Educators (Union), is the collective-bargaining representative of the employees of two elementary schools at Fort Stewart, a United States military facility in Georgia. The schools, petitioner here, are owned and operated by the United States Army under authority of 64 Stat. 1107, 20 U.S.C. 241(a), which directs the Secretary of Health and Human Services to "make such arrangements . . . as may be necessary to provide free public education" for children living on federally owned property. The present controversy arose when, during the course of collective-bargaining negotiations, the Union submitted to the schools proposals relating to mileage reimbursement, various types of paid leave, and a salary increase. Petitioner declined to negotiate these matters, claiming that they were not subject to bargaining under Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, sometimes referred [495 U.S. 641, 644] to as the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq. (FSLMRS or Statute). The Union sought the aid of the Federal Labor Relations Authority pursuant to 7105(a)(2)(D) and (E) and the Authority held that the Union's proposals were negotiable. Fort Stewart Assn. of Educators, 28 F. L. R. A. 547 (1987). Upon a petition for review by petitioner and cross-petitions for enforcement by the Authority and the Union, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Authority's decision, 860 F.2d 396 (1988), and we granted certiorari, 493 U.S. 807 (1989). </s> II </s> The FSLMRS requires a federal agency to negotiate in good faith with the chosen representative of employees covered by the Statute, 5 U.S.C. 7114(a)(4), and makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to do so, 7116(a)(5). The scope of the negotiating obligation is set forth in 7102. which confers upon covered employees the right, through their chosen representative, "to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment." 7102(2). Section 7103(a)(14) defines "conditions of employment" as follows: </s> "`conditions of employment' means personnel policies, practices, and matters, whether established by rule, regulation, or otherwise, affecting working conditions, except that such term does not include policies, practices, and matters - </s> "(A) relating to political activities prohibited under subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title; </s> "(B) relating to the classification of any position; or </s> "(C) to the extent such matters are specifically provided for by Federal statute . . . ." </s> In construing these provisions, and the other provisions of the FSLMRS at issue in this case, the Authority was interpreting the statute that it is charged with implementing, see [495 U.S. 641, 645] 7105. We must therefore review its conclusions under the standard set forth in Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). If, upon examination of "the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole," K mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988), it is clear that the Authority's interpretation is incorrect, then we need look no further, "for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron, 467 U.S., at 842 -843. If, on the other hand, "the statute is silent or ambiguous" on the point at issue, we must decide "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Ibid. </s> The Authority concluded that the Union's proposals related to "conditions of employment," following its decision in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 1897, 24 F. L. R. A. 377, 379 (1986) (AFGE). 28 F. L. R. A., at 550-551. Petitioner claims that this was error because 7103(a)(14) defines "conditions of employment" as matters affecting "working conditions," and because the latter term most naturally connotes "the physical conditions under which an employee labors," Brief for Petitioner 17. The difficulty here, of course, is that the word "conditions" has two common meanings. It can mean matters "established or agreed upon as a requisite to the doing . . . of something else"; and it can also mean "attendant circumstances," or an "existing state of affairs." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 473 (1961). Whereas the term "conditions of employment" in 7102 seems to us equally susceptible of both meanings, petitioner is correct that the term "working conditions" in the defining provision of 7103(a)(14) more naturally refers, in isolation, only to the "circumstances" or "state of affairs" attendant to one's performance of a job. See Department of Defense Dependents Schools v. FLRA, 274 U.S. App. D.C. 299, 301, 863 F.2d 988, 990 (1988) ("The term `working conditions' ordinarily calls to [495 U.S. 641, 646] mind the day-to-day circumstances under which an employee performs his or her job"), rehearing en banc granted, No. 87-1733 (Feb. 6, 1989). Even if, however, it could not reasonably be interpreted to bear the other meaning in isolation, here it is not in isolation, but forms part of a paragraph whose structure, as a whole, lends support to the Authority's broader reading. </s> As set forth above, 7103(a)(14) specifically excepts from the definition of "conditions of employment" (and thus suggests are covered by the term "working conditions") "policies, practices, and matters . . . relating to political activities prohibited under subchapter III of chapter 73 of this title." The subchapter referred to contains restrictions on partisan political activities of federal employees and protects them from being required or coerced to engage in political activity. It is barely conceivable, but most unlikely, that this provision of 7103(a)(14) was meant to exclude from collective-bargaining proposals that would somehow infect with politics the "physical conditions" of the workplace; it seems much more plausibly directed at "conditions of employment" in the sense of qualifications demanded of, or obligations imposed upon, employees. And the second exception set forth in 7103(a)(14), as set forth above, unquestionably assumes that "conditions of employment" (and hence "working conditions") bears this broader meaning. The exception of "policies, practices, and matters . . . relating to the classification of any position" would be utterly unnecessary if petitioner's interpretation of "working conditions" were correct. </s> It might reasonably be argued, of course, that these two exceptions are indeed technically unnecessary, and were inserted out of an abundance of caution - a drafting imprecision venerable enough to have left its mark on legal Latin (ex abundanti cautela). But petitioner does not make this argument. Indeed, in its reply brief petitioner claims that it is "a serious distortion of [its] position," Reply Brief for Petitioner 2, to characterize it, as respondent Union does, as asserting [495 U.S. 641, 647] that "negotiations over `working conditions' are limited to the physical conditions under which an employee labors." Brief for Respondent Union 11. Petitioner asserts that, to the contrary, it "recognize[s] that the phrase `conditions of employment' is no doubt susceptible of diverse interpretations," including an interpretation whereby it would embrace "any subject which is insisted upon as a prerequisite for continued employment," Reply Brief for Petitioner 2 (internal quotations omitted); and petitioner even acknowledges, with apparent approval, that the phrase in the present statute "has been extended beyond the purely physical conditions of the workplace," ibid. The textual argument is thus abandoned. Petitioner seeks to persuade us, not (as respondent Union does) that the term "conditions of employment" (as defined to include only "working conditions") bears one, rather than the other, of its two possible meanings; but rather to persuade us that it bears some third meaning no one has ever conceived of, so that it includes other insisted-upon prerequisites for continued employment, but does not include the insisted-upon prerequisite par excellence, wages. And this new unheard-of meaning, petitioner contends, is so "unambiguously expressed," Chevron, supra, at 843, that we must impose it upon the agency initially responsible for interpreting the statute, despite the deference otherwise accorded under Chevron. To describe this position is sufficient to reject it, but we nonetheless examine briefly the elements petitioner sets forth to establish that "conditions of employment" clearly has a meaning here that it bears nowhere else. </s> Petitioner points to the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq., which authorizes bargaining over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment," 158(d), and to the Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. 1201 et seq., which grants postal workers the right to bargain over "wages, hours, and working conditions." Note following 1201. Because each of these statutes specifically refers to wages, the argument [495 U.S. 641, 648] runs, we must infer from the absence of such a reference in the FSLMRS that Congress did not mean to include them. But those other statutes deal with labor-management relations in entirely different fields of employment, and the FSLMRS contains no indication that it is to be read in pari materia with them. The first of those provisions does (perhaps) show that the term "conditions of employment" can be used to refer only to physical circumstances of employment; and the second of them does (perhaps) show that "working conditions" is more naturally used to mean that - but those are points we have already conceded. </s> Petitioner discusses at great length the legislative history of the Statute, from which it has culled a formidable number of statements suggesting that certain members and committees of Congress did not think the duty to bargain would extend to proposals relating to wages and fringe benefits. A Senate Report, for example, states unequivocally that "[t]he bill permits unions to bargain collectively on personnel policies and practices, and other matters affecting working conditions within the authority of agency managers. . . . It excludes bargaining on economic matters . . . ." S. Rep. No. 95-969, pp. 12-13 (1978). A House Report recounts that the bill "does not permit . . . bargaining on wages and fringe benefits . . ." H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 12 (1978). To like effect are numerous floor statements by both sponsors and opponents. 1 </s> [495 U.S. 641, 649] </s> The trouble with these statements, to the extent they are relevant to our inquiry, is that they may have been wrong. The wages and fringe benefits of the overwhelming majority of Executive Branch employees are fixed by law, in accordance with the General Schedules of the Civil Service Act, see 5 U.S.C. 5332, and are therefore eliminated from the definition of "conditions of employment" by the third exception in 7103(a)(14) set forth above - which excludes "matters . . . specifically provided for by Federal statute." 5 U.S.C. 7103(a) (14)(C). Employees of schools established under 241 are among a miniscule minority of federal employees whose wages are exempted from operation of the General Schedules. Title 20 U.S.C. 241(a) provides that an agency establishing such a school may fix "the compensation, tenure, leave, hours of work, and other incidents of the employment relationship" of its employees "without regard to the Civil Service Act and rules." Ibid. See also AFGE, 24 F. L. R. A., at 378. The legislative materials to which petitioner refers display no awareness of this exception. To the contrary, numerous statements, many from the same sources to which petitioner points, display the erroneous belief that the wages and fringe benefits of all Executive Branch employees were set by statute. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 12 (1978) ("Federal pay will continue to be set in accordance with the pay provisions of title 5, and fringe benefits, including retirement, insurance, and leave, will continue to be set by Congress"); id., at 44 ("Rates of overtime pay are not bargainable, because they are specifically provided for by statute"). 2 Thus, all of the statements to which petitioner [495 U.S. 641, 650] refers may have rested upon the following syllogism: The wages and fringe benefits of all federal employees are specifically provided for by federal statute; "conditions of employment" subject to the duty to bargain do not include "matters . . . specifically provided for by Federal statute"; therefore "conditions of employment" subject to the duty to bargain do not include the wages and fringe benefits of all federal employees. Since the premise of that syllogism is wrong, so may be its expressed conclusion. There is no conceivable persuasive effect in legislative history that may reflect nothing more than the speakers' incomplete understanding of the world upon which the statute will operate. Cf. Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 824 (1990) (expectation by Members of Congress that all Title VII suits would be tried in federal court, "even if universally shared," does not establish that the statute requires such suits to be brought in federal court). </s> III </s> Petitioner next argues that, even if the Union's proposals relate to "conditions of employment" subject to bargaining under 7102, they are exempted from the statutory duty to bargain by 7106, which provides that "nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any management official of any agency . . . to determine the . . . budget . . . of the agency . . . ." 5 U.S.C. 7106. The Authority rejected that claim by applying the test established in its decision in American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 2 F. L. R. A. 604 (1980), enf'd on other grounds sub nom. [495 U.S. 641, 651] Department of Defense v. FLRA, 212 U.S. App. D.C. 256, 659 F.2d 1140 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982): </s> "To establish that a proposal directly interferes with an agency's right to determine its budget under section 7106(a)(1) of the Statute, an agency must make a substantial showing that the proposal requires the inclusion of a particular program or amount in its budget or that the proposal will result in significant and unavoidable increases in cost not affected [sic: offset] by compensating benefits." 28 F. L. R. A., at 551 (emphasis added). </s> Because petitioner did not contend that the Union's proposal required "the inclusion of a particular program or amount in its budget," the only question for the Authority was whether petitioner had made out its case under the underscored standard. The Authority held that it had not, finding that petitioner had shown neither that its costs would be significantly and unavoidably increased were it to accept the proposals offered by the Union, nor that "any increased costs . . . would not be offset by compensating benefits." Id., at 552. </s> The parties initially dispute which entity is the relevant "agency" for purposes of determining whether the Union's proposals would "affect the authority of any management official of any agency . . . to determine the . . . budget . . . of the agency . . . ." 5 U.S.C. 7106(a). The Authority concluded only that petitioner had not satisfied 7106(a) with respect to its own budget, i. e., that of the schools at the Fort Stewart Army base. The Court of Appeals upheld the Authority's decision, but did so by reference to the budget of the Army as a whole, which it noted "includes bases, troops, weapons, vehicles, other equipment, salaries for all other officers, and expenses for its eight other schools." 860 F.2d, at 405-406. We cannot, however, uphold the Authority's decision on that basis, for it is elementary that if an agency's decision is to be sustained in the courts on any rationale under which the agency's factual or legal determinations are [495 U.S. 641, 652] entitled to deference, it must be upheld on the rationale set forth by the agency itself. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 93 -95 (1943). Because petitioner does not challenge, as a ground for reversing the Authority's decision, its determination to look only to petitioner's budget, we assume without deciding that that determination was correct. </s> Petitioner does not take issue with the Authority's premise that 7106 does not make a proposal nonnegotiable simply because it "imposes a cost upon the agency which requires the expenditure of appropriated agency funds." See 28 F. L. R. A., at 607. Rather, petitioner argues that "the application of the FLRA's rule here - particularly the conclusion that the proposal calling for a 13.5% pay raise would not significantly affect the agency's budget - is plainly flawed." Brief for Petitioner 28. Petitioner also claims that "the other aspect of the FLRA's rule - requiring management to show that a significant increase in costs would not be offset by compensating benefits - is not reasonable or consistent with the statute, because it negates management's right to set the agency budget." Ibid. </s> The latter observation has some force if the Authority's definition of "compensating benefits" is as petitioner describes it. Petitioner claims that, in order to prove that the cost of a given proposal is not outweighed by "compensating benefits," an agency must disprove not only monetary benefits, but also nonmonetary "intangible" benefits such as the positive effects that a proposed change might have on employee morale. Although counsel for the Authority agreed with petitioner's statement of its test at oral argument before this Court, it is not entirely clear from the Authority's cases that the "benefits" side of the calculus is as all embracing as petitioner suggests. Cf. International Association of Fire Fighters Local F-61, 3 F. L. R. A. 438, 452 (1980) (rejecting agency's claim of no "compensating benefits" where "the agency has made no substantial demonstration that the increased costs . . . will not be offset by increased employee [495 U.S. 641, 653] performance, reduced turnover, fewer grievances and the like"). Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Authority could possibly derive a test measured by nonmonetary benefits from a provision that speaks only to the agency's "authority . . . to determine . . . [its] budget," a phrase that can only be understood to refer to the allocation of funds within the agency. </s> We need not dwell on this point, however, because the Authority's first ground for its decision is supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner has challenged neither the Authority's requirement that an agency show a significant and unavoidable increase in its costs, nor the Authority's finding that petitioner failed to submit any evidence on that point in this case. Rather, it asks us to hold that a proposal calling for a 13.5% salary increase would necessarily result in a "significant and unavoidable" increase in the agency's overall costs. We cannot do that without knowing even so rudimentary a fact as the percentage of the agency's budget attributable to teachers' salaries. Under the Authority's precedents, petitioner had the burden of proof on this point, but it placed nothing in the record to document its total costs or even its current total teachers' salaries. The Authority reasonably determined that it could not conclude from an increase in one budget item of indeterminate amount whether petitioner's costs as a whole would be "significant[ly] and unavoidabl[y]" increased. 3 </s> IV </s> Petitioner's final argument rests upon 20 U.S.C. 241, which directs the agency establishing a school thereunder to "ensure that the education provided pursuant to such arrangement is comparable to free public education provided [495 U.S. 641, 654] for children in comparable communities in the State," 241 (a), and to limit expenditures "[t]o the maximum extent practicable" to "an amount per pupil which will not exceed the per pupil cost of free public education provided for children in comparable communities in the State," 241 (e). In implementing this provision, the Army has promulgated a regulation stating that education provided under 241 "will be considered comparable to free public education offered by selected communities of the State" when 10 specified factors, including "[s]alary schedules" are, "to the maximum extent practicable, equal." Army Reg. 352-3, 1-7(h) (1980). Petitioner claims - and we assume for purposes of this discussion - that in order to accept the Union's proposals, it would have to contravene this regulation because the proposed salaries would exceed those of employees of the local school systems. </s> It is a familiar rule of administrative law that an agency must abide by its own regulations. Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957). That says nothing, however, about whether an agency can be compelled to negotiate about a change in its regulations. The latter question is addressed by 5 U.S.C. 7117(a) (2), which provides, insofar as applicable to the regulation here, that "[t]he duty to bargain in good faith shall, to the extent not inconsistent with Federal law or any Government-wide rule or regulation, extend to matters which are the subject of any agency rule or regulation . . . only if the Authority has determined under subsection (b) of this section that no compelling need (as determined under regulations prescribed by the Authority) exists for the rule or regulation." (Emphasis added.) Section 7117(b) sets out the procedures by which the Authority is to make its "compelling need" determination, see generally FLRA v. Aberdeen Proving Ground, Department of Army, 485 U.S. 409 (1988), and 7105(a)(2)(D) instructs the Authority to "prescribe criteria" for that determination. [495 U.S. 641, 655] </s> Pursuant to this last provision, the Authority has adopted the following regulation: </s> "A compelling need exists for an agency rule or regulation concerning any condition of employment when the agency demonstrates that the rule or regulation meets any one or more of the following illustrative criteria: </s> "(a) The rule or regulation is essential, as distinguished from helpful or desirable, to the accomplishment of the mission or the execution of functions of the agency . . . in a manner which is consistent with the requirements of an effective and efficient government. </s> "(b) The rule or regulation is necessary to insure the maintenance of basic merit principles. </s> "(c) The rule or regulation implements a mandate to the agency . . . under law or other outside authority, which implementation is essentially nondiscretionary in nature." 5 CFR 2424.11 (1989). </s> Before the Authority, petitioner rested its entire case upon the assertion that the last of these criteria was satisfied by the provision of Army Regulation 352-3 which requires salaries equal to those of local schools, since that provision "implements the mandate" of 241(a). The Authority disagreed, following its decision in Fort Knox Teachers Assn., 27 F. L. R. A. 203, 215, 216 (1987), which said that no "compelling need" for Army Regulation 352-3 exists because 241 does not require the agency "to match exactly the conditions of employment of teachers in local school districts" or "to restrict the Agency's discretion as to the particular employment practices which could be adopted." </s> Petitioner argues that, although "[s]ection 241 does not specifically provide that teachers' salaries . . . must be set by comparison with those at local public schools," Brief for Petitioner 32, it does state that "[f]or the purpose of providing such comparable education," teachers' salaries and benefits "may be fixed without regard to the [General Schedules set out in the] Civil Service Act," 20 U.S.C. 241(a). According [495 U.S. 641, 656] to petitioner, "it is a fair reading of [ 241] to conclude that Congress excepted [wages and fringe benefits] from the civil service laws so that they would be set by comparison with those at public schools." Brief for Petitioner 33. That is not so. All that can reasonably be deduced from the exclusion of the General Schedules is that Congress expected teachers' wages and benefits to be one of the elements that the federal agency could adjust in order to render per pupil expenditure comparable to that in local public schools. But to be able to adjust is not to be required to make equal. The statute requires equivalence ("[t]o the maximum extent practicable") in total per pupil expenditure, not in each separate element of educational cost. An agency may well decide to pay teachers more or less than teachers in local schools, in order that it may expend less or more than local schools for other needs of the educational program. It is thus impossible to say that the requirement of Army Reg. 352-3 that teachers' salaries be "to the maximum extent practicable, equal" was "essentially nondiscretionary in nature" within the meaning of 2424.11(c). </s> Petitioner insists, however, that reading 2424.11 this strictly renders that regulation in violation of the Statute, which never requires bargaining over any matter covered by a regulation except "to the extent not inconsistent with Federal law." See 7117(a)(2); see also 7117(a)(1). Thus, to recognize a compelling need for a regulation "only if it implements a statutory mandate that leaves an agency absolutely no room for discretion," Brief for Petitioner 33, n. 23, is to render the "compelling need" exception of 7117(a)(2) a nullity, for bargaining over such a regulation would be "inconsistent with Federal law" anyway. We may assume, without deciding, that petitioner is correct that any rule that meets the 2424.11(c) "essentially nondiscretionary" standard as interpreted by the Authority would necessarily be a rule required by law. There is some support for that equivalency in the Authority's cases. See, e. g., Fort Knox [495 U.S. 641, 657] Teachers Assn., 25 F. L. R. A. 1119 (1987). But see National Border Patrol Council, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, 23 F. L. R. A. 106 (1986); National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1153, 26 F. L. R. A. 505 (1987). Even so, the Authority's regulation does not eliminate the "compelling need" exception. Petitioner's argument ignores the existence of subsections (a) and (b) of 2424.11, which provide alternative methods of proving "compelling need." In this case, to be sure, petitioner chose not to assert a claim that Army Regulation 352-3 was either "essential . . . to the accomplishment of the mission or the execution of functions of the agency," 5 CFR 2424.11(a) (1989), or "necessary to insure the maintenance of basic merit principles," 2424.11(b). But, those alternatives were available and suffice to give the regulation for which there is a "compelling need" an existence quite independent of the regulation whose elimination would be inconsistent with law. </s> For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See 124 Cong. Rec. 25716, 29182 (1978) (remarks of Rep. Udall) ("We do not permit bargaining over pay and fringe benefits, but on other issues relating to an employee's livelihood") ("There is not really any argument in this bill or in this title about Federal collective bargaining for wages and fringe benefits and retirement"); id., at 24286, 25720 (remarks of Rep. Clay) ("[E]mployees still . . . cannot bargain over pay") ("I . . . want to assure my colleagues that there is nothing in this bill which allows Federal employees the right . . . to negotiate over pay and money-related fringe benefits"); id., at 27549 (remarks of Sen. Sasser) ("[E]xclusive representatives of Federal employees may not bargain over pay or fringe benefits"). </s> [Footnote 2 Statements from the floor are to like effect. See id., at 25721, 25722 (remarks of Rep. Ford) ("[N]o matters that are governed by statute (such as pay, money-related fringe benefits, retirement, and so forth) could be altered by a negotiated agreement") ("It is not the intent of this provision to interfere with the current system of providing the employees in question with retirement benefits, life insurance benefits, health insurance benefits, and workmen's compensation. Those benefits would not become negotiable and would continue to be paid to those employees exclusively pursuant [495 U.S. 641, 650] to the Federal statutes in effect"); id., at 29182 (remarks of Sen. Udall) ("All these major regulations about wages and hours and retirement and benefits will continue to be established by law through congressional action"); id., at 29174 (remarks of Rep. Collins) (criticizing the bill as too broad because it excluded from the scope of bargaining only "matter[s] relating to discrimination, political activities, and those few specifically prescribed by law - for example, pay and benefits"). </s> [Footnote 3 Because petitioner loses under the standard set out in the second part of the Authority's test, and because neither party challenges that standard, we need not reach the question discussed in JUSTICE MARSHALL's opinion, viz., whether the Authority's interpretation of the phrase "to determine the . . . budget" in 7106 is too generous to the Government. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring. </s> I write separately to emphasize that management's prerogative to "determine . . . the . . . budget . . . of the agency," 5 U.S.C. 7106(a)(1), is reasonably, and perhaps necessarily, subject to a narrower reading than the one adopted by the Federal Labor Relations Authority. The Authority presently interprets that prerogative as exempting from the duty to bargain proposals that either (1) require the inclusion of a particular program or operation in the agency's budget or prescribe the amount to be allocated to them in the budget, or (2) result in significant and unavoidable increases in costs not offset by compensating benefits. American Federation of Govt. Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE), 2 F. L. R. A. 604, 608 (1980), enf'd on other grounds sub nom. Department of Defense v. FLRA, 212 U.S. App. D.C. 256, 659 F.2d 1140 (1981). Section 7106(a)(1) is more naturally read, however, [495 U.S. 641, 658] as withdrawing from mandatory bargaining only those proposals addressed to the budget per se, not those that would result in significantly increased expenditures by the agency. </s> As the Authority stated in formulating its test, "`budget' means a statement of the financial position of a body for a definite period of time based on detailed estimates of planned or expected expenditures during the period and proposals for financing them." AFGE, supra, at 608 (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966)). To "determine the budget," then, means to calculate in advance the funds available to the agency and the allocation of those funds among the agency's programs and operations. See AFGE, supra, at 608. The language of the statute thus exempts from the duty to bargain only those proposals that would involve the union in the budget process itself. This interpretation also accords more closely with Congress' intent that the management prerogatives in 7106 be construed narrowly. See, e. g., 124 Cong. Rec. 29183 (1978) (statement by Rep. Udall, author of the language in 7106) ( 7106 is "to be treated narrowly as an exception to the general obligation to bargain over conditions of employment"); id., at 29187 (statement of Rep. Clay) ("[I]t is essential that only those proposals that directly and integrally go to the specified management rights be barred from the negotiations"); H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 44 (1978) ("The committee intends that section 7106 . . . be read to favor collective bargaining whenever there is doubt as to the negotiability of a subject or a proposal"). </s> The first part of the Authority's test accords with the plain meaning of the budget provision. The second part, however, is at best a stretch of the statutory language. Proposals that impose "significant" and "unavoidable" costs on the agency do not interfere with the agency's prerogative to determine which programs and operations to include in its budget and how to allocate funds among them. Such proposals may of course affect budgetary decisions, but to remove [495 U.S. 641, 659] them from bargaining would eliminate bargaining over many important matters altogether, without any indication that Congress intended to do so. </s> The Union's proposals in this case would clearly not fall within the agency's budget prerogative because they do not require union involvement in the budget process. Because the Union's proposals are negotiable even under the agency's "significant cost" test, we need not decide whether that test is inconsistent with the statute. The Court's opinion, however, does not foreclose a future challenge to that test. </s> [495 U.S. 641, 660]

United States Supreme Court ALBRECHT v. U.S.(1947) No. 148-to-151 Argued: January 8, 1947Decided: February 3, 1947 </s> [329 U.S. 599, 600] Messrs. Richmond C. Coburn and Samuel M. Watson, both of St. Louis, Mo., for petitioners. Mr. Roger P. Marquis, of Washington, D.C., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. The question here is whether the Government is obligated to pay interest in connection with the following land purchase arrangements and condemnation proceedings. The Government made separate contracts with the petitioners to buy certain lands from them to be used for a public purpose. The contracts stipulated a purchase price to be paid at an indefinite future time when certain conditions had been fulfilled. 1 They also granted the Government the right to immediate possession. Later the Government questioned the validity of the contracts and attempted to rescind them on the ground that by reason of fraud and other things the contract prices were grossly excessive and represented far more than the 'just compensation' required by the Fifth Amendment. It filed condemnation proceedings in District Courts under 40 Stat. 241, as amended, 50 U.S.C. 171, 50 U.S.C.A. 171, asking the Courts to fix 'just compensation' after hearing evidence on that subject. It also filed a declaration of taking under 46 [329 U.S. 599, 601] Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. 258a, 40 U.S.C.A. 258a, at the same time depositing in the Courts sums of money, substantially less than the contract prices, which it estimated to be the true 'just compensation' for the property taken. The Courts then entered orders divesting the property owners of all title and vesting it in the Government. A companion case in which a District Court held an identical contract valid was appealed and eventually reached this Court. Prior to and pending this appeal these petitioners vigorously asserted the validity of the terms of the contracts which fixed the agreed prices for transfer of possession and title to their properties. Several years later this Court upheld the validity of the identical contract in the companion case. 2 Thereupon the Government, complying with that decision, paid the full contract purchase prices into the District Courts. It prayed that the landowners' compensation be fixed as the contract price without interest. Petitioners asserted that they had a right to interest from the time of the 'taking' guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment's provision for 'just compensation.' The Government contended that the 'just compensation' provision was not applicable, and that petitioners had no right to interest because their purchase contracts did not provide for it. One District Court decided this question in favor of the Government, 60 F.Supp. 741, but two decided against it. 61 F.Supp. 199. 3 The Circuit Court of Ap- [329 U.S. 599, 602] peals held for the Government. 8 Cir., 155 F.2d 73, 77. In a case involving somewhat similar facts, United States v. Baugh, 149 F.2d 190, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had decided against the Government. Because of the apparent conflict presented and because the question is of widespread importance, we granted certiorari. The facts and issues, so far as we deem them relevant to disposition of all the cases, are identical, and so we consider all of them together. We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the Government is not obligated to pay interest in these cases. It is true that in cases submitted to them for determination of 'just compensation,' courts have evolved a rule whereby an element of compensation designated as interest is sometimes allowed. Under this rule, and in the absence of an agreement of the parties fixing compensation, courts first fix the fair market value of property as of the time it is taken. The property owner, against whom there is no counterclaim, is always entitled to payment of this much. But where payment of that fair market value is deferred, it has been held that something more than fair market value is required to make the property owner whole, to afford him 'just compensation.' This additional element of compensation has been measured in terms of reasonable interest. Thus, 'just compensation' in the constitutional sense, has been held, absent a settlement between the parties, to be fair market value at the time of taking plus 'interest' from that date to the date of payment. 4 </s> But the method used by courts to determine 'just compensation' in an adversary proceeding where the parties [329 U.S. 599, 603] have failed previously to agree on its amount is not the exclusive method for determining that question. The Fifth Amendment does not prohibit landowners and the Government from agreeing between themselves as to what is just compensation for property taken. See Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 , 60 S.Ct. 231. Nor does it bar them from embodying that agreement in a contract, as was done here. And certainly where a party to such a contract stands upon its terms to enforce them for his own advantage, he cannot at the same time successfully disavow those terms so far as he conceives them to be to his disadvantage. That is precisely the position of the petitioners here. They made contracts for the transfer and possession of lands, at prices concerning which they have never complained. At the end of the prolonged litigation, the Government was barred from showing that compensations fixed by the contracts were not just, but were excessive. Having thus bound the Government to the contract prices as the measure of 'just compensation', which prices, to say the least, generously meet the Fifth Amendment's 'just compensation' requirement, they now seek to escape the burdens of these identical contract provisions. They invoke the Fifth Amendment in pursuit of something more than the compensation for which their contracts provide- contracts which they are not willing to abandon. The answer to their contention is that in this posture of the cases these transactions have passed out of the range of the Fifth Amendment. For the reasoning on which interest is added to value as a part of 'just compensation' in court condemnation proceedings is not applicable to this situation. That reasoning is that when a court determines just ompensation, it first fixes bare value at the time of the taking and adds a sum to compensate for deferred payment of bare value so as to make the property owner whole as required by the Fifth Amendment. We [329 U.S. 599, 604] do not think this formula fits contractual arrangements for compensation. Exactly what factor the parties consider, in addition to bare value, cannot easily be ascertained. This very group of transactions illustrates that there may be many such additional factors. For example, all the contracts here provided for immediate Government possession, though none contemplated immediate payments. We cannot know what amounts were added in the bargains to the bare market values as estimated, though unarticulated, allowances for the anticipated delays in payment. And other factors, which need not be enumerated, entered into the contract prices. These things demonstrate the inadvisability of applying a constitutional rule as to interest, specially designed to enable courts to calculate 'just compensation,' to an entirely different situation in which parties, supposedly with due regard to their own interests, bargain between themselves as to compensation. Since these petitioners have chosen to stand on their contract terms as to the amount they will receive for their property, rather than to have 'just compensation,' in the constitutional sense, fixed by the courts, we must look to those terms for the measure of their compensation, including their right to that part of compensation which courts have called interest. We have not overlooked the contention that this conclusion is in conflict with our holding in Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 , 60 S. Ct. 231. We do not think it is. That was also a case in which a statute authorized Government agents to purchase property, and a price had been agreed on prior to condemnation proceedings. But the asserted interest claim was there denied. The decision in that case reasserted the principle that interest in condemnation proceedings does not begin until there has been a taking. After noting the several incidents asserted to constitute a taking, we held that there was no interval between the [329 U.S. 599, 605] taking of the property there and payment for it. Thus the question we have considered here was neither directly involved, raised, nor given special consideration. A further incidental distinction between that case and this is that in the Danforth case the contract did not anticipate that the taking would precede payment. Turning now to the right to interest under the contracts, and apart from the contention regarding the Fifth Amendment, we find that the contracts have no provision for payment of interest. No statute authorizes the payment of interest in cases like this. In the absence of specific contract or statutory provisions no interest runs against the Government even though the Government's payment for the contract purchases be delayed. See Smyth v. United States, 302 U.S. 329, 353 , 58 S.Ct. 248, 252, 114 A.L.R. 807; United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585, 588 , 67 S.Ct. 398, 399; United States v. New York Rayon Importing Co. et al., 329 U.S. 654, 659 , 67 S.Ct. 601, 604. There is some argument that interest should be allowed because the Declaration of Taking Act, 46 Stat.1421, 40 U.S.C. 258a, 40 U.S.C.A. 258a, under which condemnation proceedings were filed, authorizes payment of interest from the date property is taken. Cf. United States v. Thayer- West Point Hotel Co., supra, 329 U.S. 585, 588 , 67 S.Ct. 398, 399. This provision, however, is no more than a statutory embodiment of the rule for determining constitutional 'just compensation' in the absence of a governing contract, and what we have already said is equally applicable to the claim for interest under the statute. It contains no specific provision for interest on Government contracts of purchase. And here, while the litigation was under the condemnation statute, the petitioners' reliance on the purchase price provisions of the contracts as to value took these claims for interest outside the purview of the interest provisions of the Declaration of Taking Act, and left them to be governed by the interest rules which would have applied had suit been [329 U.S. 599, 606] brought by petitioners to enforce the contract terms. Petitioners were barred from receiving interest in any proceeding for the reason that their contracts contained no promise to pay interest. AFFIRMED. </s> Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting. 'The stipulation merely had the effect of relieving the Government from having to make proof as to what was just compensation and of running the risk of having an amount fixed which might be unsatisfactory.' United States v. Baugh, 5 Cir., 149 F.2d 190, 192. The landowners' 'right to have interest is found in the Constitution and is neither found nor lost in the contract.' Id., 149 F.2d at page 193. The justness of the claim for interest in these cases is underlined by the fact that the land was taken over four years before full payment was made. The United States renounced these contracts and retained possession of the properties by the Declaration of Taking Act which by its terms, 46 Stat. 1421, 40 U.S.C. 258a, entitled the condemnee to interest on the value from the date of taking except as to sums paid into court. After the decision in Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 , 65 S.Ct. 442, the Government carried out its condemnation suits and obtained titles to these properties by condemnation. </s> In these condemnation actions the agreed price, stated in the contracts, became the 'just compensation' of the Declaration of Taking Act and by that Act interest was due for such amount as had not been deposited with the trial court when the declaration was filed. Interest for the period between the declaration and the payment of the value into the trial court should be allowed on the amount by which the sum fixed in the final decree exceeded the sum deposited with the declaration of taking. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 The first contract condition as to payment was that it should be made upon conveyance of a good and merchantable title. The second was that if 'for any reason' the Attorney General did not approve the title, the Government could obtain a good title by condemnation proceedings in an appropriate district court in which event the agreed compensation was to be deposited in court. </s> [Footnote 2 Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49 , 65 S.Ct. 442. [Footnote 3 Some of the petitioners claimed interest from the date the Government took possession of the lands under the contract to the date the Government deposited the full contract price. One petitioner claimed interest only from the date of the filing of the declaration of taking on the difference on that date between the sum the Government deposited as the estimated 'just compensation' and the full contract price finally deposited. Interest was awarded by the two District Courts on this latter theory only from the date of the declaration of taking. </s> [Footnote 4 Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 306 , 43 S. Ct. 354, 356; Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496 , 497 S., 57 S.Ct. 244, 251; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 16 , 17 S., 54 S.Ct. 26, 27, 28, 96 A.L.R. 1; United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119, 123 , 58 S.Ct. 799, 801.

United States Supreme Court COMMUNITY TELEVISION OF SO. CAL. v. GOTTFRIED(1983) No. 81-298 Argued: October 12, 1982Decided: February 22, 1983 </s> Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides that no otherwise qualified handicapped individual shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Respondent Gottfried (respondent) filed a petition with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requesting it to deny renewal of a public television station's license because the station allegedly (1) had failed to discharge its obligation under the Communications Act of 1934 to ascertain the problems, needs, and interests of the deaf and hearing-impaired population within its service area, and (2) had violated 504. Respondent filed similar objections to the renewal of seven commercial television station licenses. Consolidating all eight proceedings, the FCC held that the licensees' efforts to ascertain the special needs of the community were adequate; that the facts alleged by respondent did not give rise to a substantial and material question whether any of the licensees had abused its discretion in its programing; that 504 did not apply to the commercial licensees; and that while the public television station might be governed by 504, the allegations against that station under 504 were premature unless and until the agency with authority to enforce compliance determined that the station had violated the Rehabilitation Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the FCC's order relating to the commercial stations but vacated the renewal of the public station's license and remanded for further proceedings. Because the public station as a recipient of federal financial assistance was under a duty to comply with 504, the court, while not holding that the station had violated 504 or that its programming efforts were less satisfactory than the commercial licensees' efforts, held that nevertheless a stricter "public interest" standard should be applied to a licensee covered by 504 than to a commercial licensee, and that the FCC could not find the service of public stations to be adequate to justify license renewal without at least inquiring into their efforts to meet the programming needs of the hearing impaired. [459 U.S. 498, 499] </s> Held: </s> Section 504 does not require the FCC to review a public television station's license renewal application under a different standard than applies to a commercial licensee's renewal application. Pp. 508-512. </s> (a) Congress did not intend the Rehabilitation Act to impose any special enforcement obligation on the FCC. The FCC is not a funding agency and has no responsibility for enforcing 504. Moreover, there is not a word in the Act's legislative history suggesting that the Act was intended to alter the FCC's standard for reviewing the programming decisions of public television licensees. Pp. 508-510. </s> (b) The fact that a public television station has a duty to comply with the Rehabilitation Act does not support the conclusion that the FCC must evaluate the station's service to the handicapped community by a more stringent standard than that applicable to commercial stations. P. 511. </s> (c) Unless and until a differential standard has been promulgated with respect to public television stations as against commercial stations, the FCC acts within its authority when it declines to impose a greater obligation to provide special programming for the hearing impaired on a public licensee than on a commercial licensee. Pp. 511-512. </s> 210 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 655 F.2d 297, reversed in part. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE BLACKMUN, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 513. </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 81-799, Federal Communications Commission v. Gottfried et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Edgar F. Czarra, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner in No. 81-298. With him on the briefs were Mark D. Nozette and Richard A. Meserve. Samuel A. Alito, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner in No. 81-799. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, Stephen A. Sharp, and C. Grey Pash, Jr. </s> Charles M. Firestone argued the cause for respondents Gottfried et al. in both cases. With him on the brief were Abraham Gottfried and Stanley Fleishman. J. Roger Wollenberg, Timothy B. Dyk, Ralph E. Goldberg, and Eleanor S. Applewhaite filed a brief for CBS Inc., respondent under this Court's Rule 19.6.Fn </s> Fn [459 U.S. 498, 499] Harry R. Sheppard filed a brief for Deaf Counseling, Advocacy and Referral Agency, Inc., et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. [459 U.S. 498, 500] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question presented is whether 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 1 requires the Federal Communications Commission to review a public television station's license renewal application under a different standard than it applies to a commercial licensee's renewal application. Contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 210 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 655 F.2d 297 (1981), we conclude that it does not. </s> I </s> On October 28, 1977, respondent Sue Gottfried filed a formal petition with the Federal Communications Commission requesting it to deny renewal of the television license of station KCET-TV in Los Angeles. She advanced two principal grounds for denial: First, that the licensee had failed to discharge its obligation to ascertain the problems, needs, and interests of the deaf and hearing-impaired population within its service area; and second, that the licensee had [459 U.S. 498, 501] violated, and remained in violation of, 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 2 </s> Correspondence attached to Gottfried's petition included complaints about KCET-TV's failure to carry enough programming with special captioning 3 or other aids to benefit the hearing-impaired members of the audience. The exhibits emphasized the station's failure to broadcast the ABC evening news in captioned form prior to May 23, 1977, and its subsequent failure to broadcast the captioned program during prime time. </s> In a verified opposition to the petition, the licensee recounted in some detail its efforts to ascertain the problems of the community it served, including the deaf and the hearing impaired, by a community leader survey and by a general public survey. App. in No. 79-1722 (CADC), pp. 102-105. The licensee also described its programming efforts to respond to the special needs of the hearing impaired, 4 and [459 U.S. 498, 502] explained why its two daily broadcasts of the ABC captioned news had usually been scheduled for 11:30 p. m. and 6:30 a. m. The licensee specifically denied that it had violated 504 and averred that the Commission is not an appropriate forum for the adjudication of Rehabilitation Act claims. Id., at 113. </s> On December 22, 1977, Gottfried filed a verified response, criticizing the station's public survey, and commenting further on the station's failure to rebroadcast ABC captioned news programs before May 23, 1977. The response renewed the charge that the station had violated 504, 5 and asserted that the Federal Communications Commission was indeed the proper forum to evaluate that charge. 6 </s> [459 U.S. 498, 503] </s> Gottfried also filed separate formal objections to the renewal of seven commercial television station licenses in the Los Angeles area. E. g., id., at 199. The Commission consolidated all eight proceedings and ruled on Gottfried's objections in a single memorandum opinion adopted on August 8, 1978. 69 F. C. C. 2d 451. </s> The Commission first reviewed its own efforts to encourage the industry to serve the needs of the hearing impaired. In 1970, the Commission had issued a Public Notice to all licensees, advising them of the special needs of the deaf in responding to emergency situations as well as in appreciating general television programming. 7 In 1972, the Commission had granted authority to the Public Broadcasting System to begin experimentation with a "closed" captioning system, which would enable hearing-impaired persons with specially equipped television sets to receive captioned information that could not be seen by the remainder of the viewing audience. 8 </s> [459 U.S. 498, 504] In 1976, the Commission had adopted a rule requiring television licensees to broadcast emergency information visually. In that year, however, the Commission had also concluded that there were so many unanswered questions - both technical and financial - concerning the most effective means of improving television service for the hearing impaired, that it remained "the responsibility of each licensee to determine how it [could] most effectively meet those needs." 9 The Commission summarized its views concerning mandated forms of technology by noting that "there is no requirement that any television licensee - commercial or noncommercial - provide open or closed captioning or any other form of special visual program material other than for broadcasting emergency information." Id., at 455. </s> The Commission then turned to Gottfried's objections to the eight license renewals. It approached the question whether the renewals would serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity from three different perspectives: ascertainment, programming, and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It first found that the licensees' efforts to ascertain the special needs of the community were adequate. Next, it held that the facts alleged by Gottfried did not give rise to a substantial and material question whether any of the eight stations had abused its discretion in its selection of programming matter. The Commission explained that it is more difficult to provide special programming for the hearing impaired than for other segments of the community; 10 in the [459 U.S. 498, 505] absence of any Commission requirement for specialized programming techniques, it found "no basis to fault a licensee for failure to provide these options for the deaf and hearing impaired in the station service area." Id., at 458. </s> The Commission held that 504 of the Rehabilitation Act had no application to the seven commercial licensees because they were not alleged to have received any federal financial assistance. The Commission agreed that KCET-TV might be governed by 504, and that a violation of the Act would need to be considered in a license renewal proceeding, but it saw no reason to consider 504 in the absence of an adverse finding by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare - "the proper governmental agency to consider such matters." Id., at 459. </s> On May 29, 1979, the Commission adopted a second memorandum opinion and order denying Gottfried's petition for reconsideration. 72 F. C. C. 2d 273. The Commission again reviewed Gottfried's 504 charge and again concluded that the Rehabilitation Act does not apply to commercial stations and that the allegations against KCET-TV under that Act were premature unless and until the agency with authority to enforce compliance determined that the station had violated its provisions. The Commission also rejected Gottfried's additional argument that it had a duty to adopt regulations to implement 504. Finally, the Commission refused to hold that either its omission of a rule requiring "captioning or other techniques to enable the deaf and hearing impaired to have full access to television broadcasts," or the failure of the licensees to provide such services, was a violation of the "public interest" standard embodied in 309 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. The Commission held: [459 U.S. 498, 506] </s> "We find no error and nothing inconsistent in concluding that licensees are serving the public interest although they are not currently providing captioning, in view of the fact that we have not required licensees to undertake such an activity. Furthermore, to judge a licensee's qualifications on the basis of the retroactive application of such a requirement would, in our opinion, raise serious questions of fundamental fairness. Thus, there is no inconsistency or error in our finding that the subject licensees had met their public interest burden even though they did not caption their programming." Id., at 279. </s> Gottfried appealed the decision of the Commission to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 402. The Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the Commission's order that related to the commercial stations but vacated the renewal of the KCET-TV license and remanded for further proceedings. 210 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 655 F.2d 297 (1981). </s> The court held that Congress did not intend the Commission's renewal of a broadcast license to be considered a form of "financial assistance" within the meaning of 504 and therefore that the Rehabilitation Act did not directly apply to the seven commercial stations. The court was persuaded, however, that the Act reflected a national policy of extending increased opportunities to the hearing impaired and that commercial stations must therefore make some accommodation for the hard of hearing, given the Communications Act's general requirement that licensees serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." 47 U.S.C. 307(d), 309(a), 309(d). In the absence of a more specific statutory directive than that contained in the public interest standard, however, the court accepted the Commission's judgment that the commercial licenses should be renewed. "Recognizing that the Commission possesses special competence in weighing the factors of technological feasibility and economic viability that the concept of the public interest must embrace, we defer today [459 U.S. 498, 507] to its judgment." 210 U.S. App. D.C., at 202-203, 655 F.2d, at 315-316 (footnote omitted). </s> The majority of the Court of Appeals reached a different conclusion with respect to KCET-TV. As a recipient of federal financial assistance, the public station was admittedly under a duty to comply with 504. The Court of Appeals did not hold that KCET-TV had violated 504, or that its efforts to provide programming for the hearing impaired were less satisfactory than the efforts of the commercial licensees; nevertheless, it held that a stricter "public interest" standard should be applied to a licensee covered by 504 than to a commercial licensee. Its narrow holding was that the Commission could not find the service of public stations "to be adequate to justify renewal without at least inquiring specifically into their efforts to meet the programming needs of the hearing impaired." Id., at 188, 655 F.2d, at 301. </s> Judge McGowan dissented in part. He agreed with the majority's view concerning commercial stations that rulemaking would be "a better, fairer, and more effective vehicle for considering how the broadcast industry is required to provide the enjoyment and educational benefits of television to persons with impaired hearing," id., at 188, 203, 655 F.2d, at 301, 316, than case-by-case adjudication in license renewal proceedings. He felt, however, that the same standard should be applied to public stations until regulations had been issued by the Department of Education dealing specifically with the rights of access of the hearing impaired to television programs. 11 Judge McGowan stated: "[F]orm is favored over substance when commercial stations are, for this reason, spared the expense and uncertainty of renewal hearings, and a noncommercial station is not. Neither, on the record before us, had advance notice during their expired license terms of what was, and therefore could reasonably be, expected [459 U.S. 498, 508] of them with respect to the wholly laudable, but technically complex, objective of providing access for the hearing impaired." Id., at 204, 655 F.2d, at 317. </s> Both the Commission and the licensee petitioned for certiorari. Because of the serious implications of the Court of Appeals' holding on the status of licenses of public broadcasting stations, we granted both petitions. 454 U.S. 1141 (1982). </s> II </s> All parties agree that the public interest would be served by making television broadcasting more available and more understandable to the substantial portion of our population that is handicapped by impaired hearing. 12 The Commission recognized this component of the public interest even before the enactment of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see The Use of Telecasts to Inform and Alert Viewers with Impaired Hearing, 26 F. C. C. 2d 917 (1970), and that statute confirms the federal interest in developing the opportunities for all individuals with handicaps to live full and independent lives. No party suggests that a licensee, whether commercial or public, may simply ignore the needs of the hearing impaired in discharging its responsibilities to the community which it serves. 13 </s> [459 U.S. 498, 509] </s> We are not persuaded, however, that Congress intended the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to impose any new enforcement obligation on the Federal Communications Commission. 14 As originally enacted, the Act did not expressly allocate enforcement responsibility. See Pub. L. 93-112, Tit. V, 504, 87 Stat. 394. Nevertheless, since 504 was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it was understood that responsibility for enforcing it, insofar as it regulated private recipients of federal funds, would lie with those agencies administering the federal financial assistance programs. See S. Rep. No. 93-1297, pp. 39-40 (1974). When the Act was amended in 1978, that understanding was made explicit. See Pub. L. 95-602, Tit. I, 119, 92 Stat. 2982; n. 1, supra. It is clear that the Commission is not a funding agency and has never been thought to have responsibility for enforcing 504. 15 Furthermore, there is not a [459 U.S. 498, 510] word in the legislative history of the Act suggesting that it was intended to alter the Commission's standard for reviewing the programming decisions of public television licensees. </s> If a licensee should be found guilty of violating the Rehabilitation Act, or indeed of violating any other federal statute, the Commission would certainly be obligated to consider the possible relevance of such a violation in determining whether or not to renew the lawbreaker's license. 16 But in the absence of a direction in the Rehabilitation Act itself, and without any expression of such intent in the legislative history, we are unwilling to assume that Congress has instructed the Federal Communications Commission to take original jurisdiction over the processing of charges that its regulatees have violated that Act. 17 </s> [459 U.S. 498, 511] </s> The fact that a public television station has a duty to comply with the Rehabilitation Act does not support the quite different conclusion that the Commission must evaluate a public station's service to the handicapped community by a more stringent standard than that applicable to commercial stations. The interest in having all television stations - public and commercial - consider and serve their handicapped viewers is equally strong. By the same token, it is equally unfair to criticize a licensee - whether public or commercial - for failing to comply with a requirement of which it had no notice. 18 As both the majority and the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals observed, rulemaking is generally a "better, fairer, and more effective" method of implementing a new industrywide policy than is the uneven application of conditions in isolated license renewal proceedings. That observation should be as determinative in relicensing a public station as it is in relicensing a commercial station. </s> A federal agency providing financial assistance to a public television station may, of course, attach conditions to its subsidy [459 U.S. 498, 512] that will have the effect of subjecting such a licensee to more stringent requirements than must be met by a commercial licensee. Or regulations may be promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act that impose special obligations on the subsidized licensee. Conceivably, the Federal Communications Commission might determine that the policies underlying the Communications Act require extraordinary efforts to make certain types of programming universally accessible, thereby placing heightened responsibility on certain stations. But unless and until such a differential standard has been promulgated, the Federal Communications Commission does not abuse its discretion in interpreting the public interest standard, see FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582 (1981), when it declines to impose a greater obligation to provide special programming for the hearing impaired on a public licensee than on a commercial licensee. 19 </s> The Court of Appeals was unanimous in its holding that the renewal of the seven commercial licensees was consistent with the public interest requirement in 309 of the Federal Communications Act. Neither that court nor the Commission suggested that there was anything in the record that would justify treating the public licensee differently from the commercial licensees if both classes were to be judged under the same standard. The Court of Appeals' affirmance of the Commission's rejection of Gottfried's objection to the renewal of the commercial licenses therefore requires a like disposition of the objections to the renewal of the KCET-TV license. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it vacated the order of the Commission. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 394, as amended, and as set forth in 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976 ed., Supp. V), provides: </s> " 794. Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and programs; promulgation of rules and regulations </s> "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706 (7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by an Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier than the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so submitted to such committees." </s> [Footnote 2 In her petition, Gottfried alleged, in part: </s> "That the Licensee has violated, and remains in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, in that the Licensee has received and is receiving Federal financial assistance and has discriminated and is discriminating against the Petitioners `solely by reason of [their] handicap', and said Petitioners have been and are `excluded from participation in [and have been and are denied] the benefits of, [and have been and are being] subjected to discrimination' under the television services in connection with which Licensee has been and is receiving Federal financial assistance." App. in No. 79-1722 (CADC), p. 26 (brackets in original). </s> [Footnote 3 "Captioning" refers to any of several technologies, see Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F. C. C. 2d 378 (1976), that project written text onto a television image so that deaf viewers receive information that is communicated to others by the soundtrack. See also n. 8, infra. </s> [Footnote 4 "Contrary to Petitioners' unsupported charges (Petition, p. 3), KCET has responded to the needs of deaf and hearing-impaired persons in its service area. It has done so with three different types of programming: (a) Captioned ABC Evening News; (b) a variety of other programs, including children's programs, which were captioned or signed so as to be understandable to the deaf and hearing-impaired; and (c) special programs which [459 U.S. 498, 501] have directly addressed needs and concerns of the deaf and hearing-impaired. </s> . . . . . </s> "Over the past three years, KCET has presented more than 960 programs which were either captioned, signed or, in rare instances, which had no spoken words in them at all. All of these programs were understandable to the deaf and hearing-impaired. In many instances, KCET has promoted these programs by listing them as designed for the hearing-impaired audience. During the past three years, in addition to ABC Captioned News, these broadcasts have included such programs as `Zoom', `Once Upon a Classic', `Nova', films of Ingmar Bergman, `The Tribal Eye', `Masterpiece Theatre', `Adams Chronicles', `President Carter's Clinton, Massachusetts Town Meeting', and many others. </s> "In addition to programs designed to be understood by the deaf and hearing-impaired, KCET has devoted several special programs to substantive issues affecting those groups." App. in No. 79-1722 (CADC), pp. 106, 109. </s> [Footnote 5 The response stated: </s> "[T]he station has not been responsive to the needs of the deaf and hearing impaired. In the station's viewing area, the deaf 20% of the population are not getting 20% of broadcast time; they were not even getting what other deaf in other viewing areas were receiving." Id., at 148. </s> [Footnote 6 The response continued: </s> "The Commission is a proper forum for the adjudication of claims of discrimination in broadcasting, as it is the Commission's obligation - even apart from the Act - to determine how the station has discharged its public [459 U.S. 498, 503] trust obligations. The Act and the regulations thereunder, merely give further statutory and regulatory emphasis to that which the Commission is already charged to do under the law." Id., at 150. </s> [Footnote 7 The Use of Telecasts to Inform and Alert Viewers with Impaired Hearing, 26 F. C. C. 2d 917 (1970). The Commission described the effect of its 1970 action as follows: </s> "[I]t was suggested that television stations could make use of visual as well as oral announcements of emergencies, utilize the fac[e] of newscasters wherever possible so as to permit lip reading, and feature visualization of materials in news, weather, and sports programs. The Commission hoped that the notice would alert licensees to our concern for the needs of the hearing impaired citizen and make television a truly valuable medium for that segment of the population - estimated by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to include 13.4 million persons. We observed, however, that `it may be necessary to begin rule making looking toward the adoption of minimum requirements.'" 69 F. C. C. 2d, at 454. </s> [Footnote 8 "Through the use of an encoder at the transmitting end and a decoder at the receiving end, this closed captioning system could supply visual information - captioning - of the aural portion of the television program to those hearing impaired persons whose television sets were equipped to receive the captioned information while the rest of the viewing public would receive the normal visual and aural transmission. This differs from `open' [459 U.S. 498, 504] captioning utilized, for example, by PBS in its rebroadcast of the ABC Evening News. Open captioning is transmitted to all viewers who see a printed display of the text of the aural transmission at the bottom of the visual transmission." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 9 Captioning for the Deaf, 63 F. C. C 2d, at 389. </s> [Footnote 10 "Generally speaking, [special programming for other segments of the community] can be achieved without any additional production techniques other than those utilized for regular programming. Obviously, that is not the situation confronting a licensee who might wish to program for the aurally handicapped. For such programming to be effective, it must offer some specific form of visual communication: sign language interpretations, [459 U.S. 498, 505] captioning, or extensive utilization of charts, signs, and facial closeups to permit lip reading. Even sign language and lip reading efforts, according to Gottfried, serve to limit the number of deaf and hearing impaired since many do not effectively understand these methods." 69 F. C. C. 2d, at 458. </s> [Footnote 11 Judge McGowan pointed out that on January 19, 1981, the Department of Education had issued a notice of intent to develop such regulations, and invited comments by March 5, 1981. 210 U.S. App. D.C., at 204, 655 F.2d, at 317. See 46 Fed. Reg. 4954. </s> [Footnote 12 "Estimates of the number of citizens who have impaired hearing and therefore have need for the receipt of news and entertainment material through appropriate television programming range from 8.5 million to 20 million. Many of these persons, it appears, live alone and oftentimes do not receive important new information unless advised by neighbors or friends." The Use of Telecasts to Inform and Alert Viewers with Impaired Hearing, 26 F. C. C. 2d 917 (1970). </s> [Footnote 13 As the Commission has observed: </s> "In the fulfillment of his obligation the broadcaster should consider the tastes, needs and desires of the public he is licensed to serve . . . . He should reasonably attempt to meet all such needs and interests on an equitable basis." Report and Statement on Policy Re: Commission's En Banc Programming Inquiry, 25 Fed. Reg. 7291, 7295 (1960). </s> Accord, In re Applications of Alabama Educational Television Comm'n, 50 F. C. C. 2d 461, 472 (1975); In re Applications of Capitol Broadcasting Co., 38 F. C. C. 1135, 1139 (1965). </s> [Footnote 14 If such an enforcement obligation existed, it would have to derive from the Rehabilitation Act itself, since the general words "public interest" in the Communications Act are not sufficient to create it. In McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944), we observed that an agency charged with promoting the "public interest" in a particular substantive area may not simply "ignore" the policies underlying other federal statutes. Id., at 80. But we also emphasized that such an agency is not automatically given "either the duty or the authority to execute numerous other laws." Id., at 79. Thus, in McLean Trucking the Interstate Commerce Commission had an administrative duty to consider the effect of a motor carrier merger on competing motor carriers in determining whether the merger would effectuate overall transportation policy, id., at 87, yet was "not to measure proposals for all-rail or all-motor consolidations by the standards of the anti-trust laws," id., at 85. Here, the FCC has an administrative duty to consider the needs of handicapped citizens in determining whether a license renewal would effectuate the policies behind the Communications Act but is by no means required to measure proposals for public television license renewals by the standards of 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. </s> [Footnote 15 In 1976, the President designated the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare as the agency responsible for coordinating the implementation of 504. See Exec. Order No. 11914, 3 CFR 117 (1977). In 1980 that Executive Order was revoked and replaced by Exec. Order No. 12250, [459 U.S. 498, 510] 3 CFR 298 (1981), which transferred the coordination and enforcement of authority for 504 from HEW to the Department of Justice. Regulations previously adopted by HEW remain in effect pending the adoption of new regulations by the Department of Justice. See 28 CFR pt. 41 (1982). </s> [Footnote 16 The Commission has explained its policy as follows: </s> "Normally, we have declined to explore matters currently being litigated before the courts or to duplicate the ongoing investigative efforts of other government agencies charged with the responsibility of interpreting and enforcing the laws in question. Our restraint in this respect has not been predicated upon the unlikelihood of proving the violation of law. Indeed, conduct which does not contravene law may still run afoul of the public interest standard. . . . By our forbearance we have sought to maintain a proper working relationship with the judiciary and other governmental agencies and to avoid burdening applicants with unnecessary, costly multiple proceedings." FCC Form 303, 59 F. C. C. 2d 750, 763 (1976). </s> [Footnote 17 This is not to say that the Commission may permit a licensee to ignore the needs of particular groups within the viewing public. The point is that the Commission's duties derive from the Communications Act, not from other federal statutes. In NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 670 , n. 7 (1976), for example, this Court noted that the Commission's equal opportunity regulations could be regarded as "necessary . . . to ensure that its licensees' programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups." We then reiterated, however, that an agency's general duty to [459 U.S. 498, 511] enforce the public interest does not require it to assume responsibility for enforcing legislation that is not directed at the agency: </s> "It is useful again to draw on the analogy of federal labor law. No less than in the federal legislation defining the national interest in ending employment discrimination, Congress in its earlier labor legislation unmistakably defined the national interest in free collective bargaining. Yet it could hardly be supposed that in directing the Federal Power Commission to be guided by the `public interest,' Congress thereby instructed it to take original jurisdiction over the processing of charges of unfair labor practices on the part of its regulatees." Id., at 671. </s> [Footnote 18 We have previously emphasized the desirability of making changes in licensing policies prospective. In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 811 (1978), we wrote: </s> "One of the most significant advantages of the administrative process is its ability to adapt to new circumstances in a flexible manner, see FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S., at 137 -138, and we are unwilling to presume that the Commission acts unreasonably when it decides to try out a change in licensing policy primarily on a prospective basis." </s> [Footnote 19 We note the Commission's argument that, if a differential standard were appropriate, commercial stations would be better able to afford the costs associated with special programming than public television stations, which cannot sell advertising and which serve the public in large part by airing programs of specialized interest that lack the mass appeal required for broadcast on network affiliates. [459 U.S. 498, 513] </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. </s> In determining that the "public interest" would be served by renewal of the broadcast license of public station KCET-TV, the FCC refused to consider whether the station had violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 during its previous license term. The Court today holds that this refusal to consider the Rehabilitation Act did not constitute an abuse of discretion. In concluding that the FCC was free to disregard the Rehabilitation Act, the Court emphasizes that "the Commission's duties derive from the Communications Act, not from other federal statutes," ante, at 510, n. 17, and that there is no evidence that Congress intended to vest the Commission with power to enforce the Rehabilitation Act, ante, at 509. Because the Court's decision is not supported by either precedent or any sound view of the administrative process, I respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> This Court's decisions establish that where an agency has a statutory duty, as does the FCC, 1 to assess the "public interest" in implementing a particular regulatory scheme, the agency must give at least some consideration to other federal statutes that are pertinent to its administrative decision. Although the open-ended phrase "public interest" "take[s] meaning from the purposes of the regulatory legislation" that defines the particular agency's responsibilities, NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976), the agency may not focus on those purposes to the complete exclusion of the policies reflected in other relevant statutes. </s> The principle that an agency may not ignore a relevant Act of Congress was clearly set forth by Justice Rutledge in his [459 U.S. 498, 514] opinion for the Court in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944). In McLean Trucking the ICC had approved a proposed consolidation as "`consistent with the public interest.'" Id., at 75-76, quoting 49 U.S.C. 5 (2) (b). While recognizing that the ICC's duties derived primarily from the Interstate Commerce Act and related legislation specifically regulating commerce, Justice Rutledge rejected any suggestion that the ICC could therefore ignore other relevant statutes in deciding whether a proposed transaction would serve the "public interest": </s> "To secure the continuous, close and informed supervision which enforcement of legislative mandates frequently requires, Congress has vested expert administrative bodies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission with broad discretion and has charged them with the duty to execute stated and specific statutory policies. That delegation does not necessarily include either the duty or the authority to execute numerous other laws. Thus, here, the Commission has no power to enforce the Sherman Act as such. It cannot decide definitively whether the transaction contemplated constitutes a restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize which is forbidden by that Act. The Commission's task is to enforce the Interstate Commerce Act and other legislation which deals specifically with transportation facilities and problems. That legislation constitutes the immediate frame of reference within which the Commission operates; and the policies expressed in it must be the basic determinants of its action. </s> "But in executing those policies the Commission may be faced with overlapping and at times inconsistent policies embodied in other legislation enacted at different times and with different problems in view. When this is true, it cannot, without more, ignore the latter." 321 U.S., at 79 -80 (emphasis added). [459 U.S. 498, 515] </s> The Court held that the ICC was obligated to take the Sherman Act into account in deciding whether to approve the proposed consolidation, even though Congress had not given the Commission either the power or the duty to enforce the Act. 2 </s> Similarly, in Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485 (1967), this Court concluded that "the broad terms `public interest' and `lawful object' [in 20a (2) of the Interstate Commerce Act] negate the existence of a mandate to the ICC to close its eyes to facts indicating that the transaction may exceed limitations imposed by other relevant laws." Id., at 492. JUSTICE BRENNAN explained in his opinion for the Court that "[c]ommon sense and sound administrative policy point to the conclusion that such broad statutory standards require at least some degree of consideration of control and anticompetitive consequences when suggested by the circumstances surrounding a particular transaction." Ibid. Accordingly, the Court held that the ICC was required to consider the anticompetitive effect under 7 of the Clayton Act of a proposed stock issuance by a carrier even though that Act confers no enforcement power on the ICC. </s> In Southern S. S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942), this Court recognized that the National Labor Relations Board must consider federal statutes independent of federal labor law where they are relevant to an issue to be [459 U.S. 498, 516] decided by the Board. Although the Court acknowledged the breadth of the Board's discretion, id., at 46, it concluded that the Board had no discretion to disregard pertinent federal laws: "the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act so single-mindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives." Id., at 47. The Court ruled that the Board had abused its discretion in ordering the reinstatement of striking seamen without considering whether the strike had violated either a federal law requiring crew members to promise obedience to their superiors or provisions of the Federal Criminal Code proscribing mutiny and revolt aboard ship. </s> These decisions establish that, however broad an administrative agency's discretion in implementing a regulatory scheme may be, the agency may not ignore a relevant Act of Congress. The agency need not conclusively determine what the statute in question requires or forbids. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, supra, at 79 (ICC "cannot decide definitively whether the transaction contemplated constitutes a restraint of trade or an attempt to monopolize"). If the agency, after considering the relevant statute, concludes that it should not prevent achievement of the objectives embodied in the regulatory scheme that the agency is specifically empowered to implement, and states reasons for this conclusion, the agency's determination will not lightly be overturned. But the agency cannot simply "close its eyes" to the existence of the statute. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, supra, at 492. </s> There are good reasons for this Court's insistence that administrative agencies consider relevant statutes. The objectives of Congress would be ill served if each administrative agency were permitted to disregard any statute that it is not specifically authorized to enforce. "No agency entrusted with determinations of public convenience and necessity is an island. It fits within a national system of regulatory control [459 U.S. 498, 517] of industry." Palisades Citizens Assn., Inc. v. CAB, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 346, 349, 420 F.2d 188, 191 (1969). As the Court observed in Southern S. S. Co., "[f]requently the entire scope of Congressional purpose calls for careful accommodation of one statutory scheme to another." 316 U.S., at 47 . There can be no accommodation, careful or otherwise, if an agency refuses even to consider a relevant statute. </s> II </s> In light of the principle established by our prior decisions, the Court of Appeals correctly held that it was an abuse of discretion for the FCC to refuse to consider respondent's allegation that KCET-TV had violated 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 3 </s> The relevance of the alleged violation to the Commission's licensing decision is beyond dispute. The chief purpose of the Communications Act was "to make available . . . to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service." 47 U.S.C. 151 (emphasis added). See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943). The deaf constitute a substantial segment of the population. Ante, at 508, n. 12. If, as this Court has stated, the Commission has an "obligation . . . to ensure that its licensees' programming fairly reflects the tastes and viewpoints of minority groups," [459 U.S. 498, 518] NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S., at 670 , n. 7, then surely it also has an obligation to consider whether a licensee has denied meaningful programming of any kind to a sizable minority group. </s> Since respondent's allegation that KCET-TV had violated the Rehabilitation Act was relevant to the FCC's determination of whether renewal of the station's license would serve the "public interest," the Commission should have give "at least some degree of consideration" to the Act. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S., at 492 . There is no reason to depart from our traditional insistence that administrative agencies take into account any federal statute that is pertinent to an administrative decision. 4 As the Court noted in Southern S. S. Co., consideration of any pertinent statutes "is not too much to demand of an administrative body." 316 U.S., at 47 . The decision of the Court of Appeals demanded no more than this, and the handicapped individuals protected by the Rehabilitation Act are entitled to no less. </s> [Footnote 1 The FCC is directed by statute to grant an application for renewal of a broadcast license only if it finds that the "public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby." 47 U.S.C. 307 (c) (1982 ed.). </s> [Footnote 2 The majority errs in attempting to distinguish McLean Trucking by quoting Justice Rutledge's statement that the ICC was "not to measure proposals for all-rail or all-motor consolidations by the standards of the anti-trust laws." 321 U.S., at 85 , quoted ante, at 509, n. 14. The issue here is not whether the FCC should have measured KCET-TV's application by the same standards that would apply in a proceeding to enforce the Rehabilitation Act, but whether the FCC should have given at least some consideration to the policies underlying the Act. In McLean Trucking the Court made it clear that the ICC was not free to ignore the policies underlying the antitrust laws. In addition to the passage quoted in the text, see 321 U.S., at 86 ("Congress . . . neither has made the anti-trust laws wholly inapplicable to the transportation industry nor has authorized the Commission in passing on a proposed merger to ignore their policy"). </s> [Footnote 3 Section 504 provides in pertinent part that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. 794 (1976 ed., Supp. V). Respondents alleged that KCET-TV had violated the Rehabilitation Act by, among other things, failing, for most of its license term, to broadcast a captioned version of the ABC Evening News that was made available to it free of charge by the Public Broadcasting Service, and by thereafter failing to broadcast the program during any prime time hours. It is undisputed that KCET-TV conducts a "program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" within the meaning of 504. </s> [Footnote 4 Contrary to the Court's suggestion, ante, at 512, a requirement that the Commission take the Rehabilitation Act into account in its licensing decisions involving public stations would not necessarily subject such stations to a more stringent standard than that applicable to commercial stations, which are not covered by the Act. In the exercise of its discretion, there is nothing to stop the Commission from imposing an equally or more demanding standard on commercial stations if it properly explains why such a standard is justified by the purposes of the Communications Act. For example, commercial stations may be better able to afford the costs of special programming. See ante, at 512, n. 19. What the Commission cannot do under our prior decisions is simply ignore the Rehabilitation Act in a licensing proceeding in which that Act is relevant. </s> [459 U.S. 498, 519]

United States Supreme Court MINCEY v. ARIZONA(1978) No. 77-5353 Argued: February 21, 1978Decided: June 21, 1978 </s> During a narcotics raid on petitioner's apartment by an undercover police officer and several plainclothes policemen, the undercover officer was shot and killed, and petitioner was wounded, as were two other persons in the apartment. Other than looking for victims of the shooting and arranging for medical assistance, the narcotics agents, pursuant to a police department directive that police officers should not investigate incidents in which they are involved, made no further investigation. Shortly thereafter, however, homicide detectives arrived on the scene to take charge of the investigation, and they proceeded to conduct an exhaustive four-day warrantless search of the apartment, which included the opening of dresser drawers, the ripping up of carpets, and the seizure of 200 to 300 objects. In the evening of the same day as the raid, one of the detectives went to the hospital where petitioner was confined in the intensive-care unit, and, after giving him Miranda warnings, persisted in interrogating him while he was lying in bed barely conscious, encumbered by tubes, needles, and a breathing apparatus, and despite the fact that he repeatedly asked that the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer. Subsequently, petitioner was indicted for, and convicted of, murder, assault, and narcotics offenses. At his trial in an Arizona court, during which much of the evidence introduced against him was the product of the four-day search, and on appeal, petitioner contended that the evidence used against him had been unlawfully seized from his apartment without a warrant and that statements obtained from him at the hospital, used to impeach his credibility, were inadmissible because they had not been made voluntarily. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the murder and assault convictions on state-law grounds, but affirmed the narcotics convictions, holding that the warrantless search of a homicide scene is permissible under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and that petitioner's statements in the hospital were voluntary. Held: </s> 1. The "murder scene exception" created by the Arizona Supreme Court to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the warrantless search of petitioner's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had occurred there. Pp. 388-395. [437 U.S. 385, 386] </s> (a) The search cannot be justified on the ground that no constitutionally protected right of privacy was invaded, it being one thing to say that one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened right of privacy in his person, and quite another to argue that he also has a lessened right of privacy in his entire house. Pp. 391-392. </s> (b) Nor can the search be justified on the ground that a possible homicide inevitably presents an emergency situation, especially since there was no emergency threatening life or limb, all persons in the apartment having been located before the search began. Pp. 392-393. </s> (c) The seriousness of the offense under investigation did not itself create exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search, where there is no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant and there is no suggestion that a warrant could not easily and conveniently have been obtained. Pp. 393-394. </s> (d) The Arizona Supreme Court's guidelines for the "murder scene exception" did not afford sufficient protection to a person in whose home a homicide or assault occurs, where they conferred unbridled discretion upon the individual officer to interpret such terms as "reasonable . . . search," "serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play," and "reasonable period," it being this kind of judgmental assessment of the reasonableness and scope of a proposed search that the Fourth Amendment requires be made by a neutral and objective magistrate, not a police officer. Pp. 394-395. </s> 2. Due process requires that the statements obtained from petitioner in the hospital not be used in any way against him at his trial, where it is apparent from the record that they were not "the product of his free and rational choice," Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 , but to the contrary that he wanted not to answer his interrogator, and that while he was weakened by pain and shock, isolated from family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely conscious, his will was simply overborne. While statements made by a defendant in circumstances violating the strictures of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , are admissible for impeachment if their "trustworthiness . . . satisfies legal standards," Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 ; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 , any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law. Pp. 396-402. </s> 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273, reversed and remanded. </s> STEWART, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in Part I of which REHNQUIST, J., joined. MARSHALL, J., [437 U.S. 385, 387] filed a concurring opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 402. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 405. </s> Richard Oseran argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Frederick S. Klein. </s> Galen H. Wilkes, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Bruce E. Babbitt, Attorney General, Philip G. Urry, Assistant Attorney General, and William J. Schafer III. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> On the afternoon of October 28, 1974, undercover police officer Barry Headricks of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad knocked on the door of an apartment in Tucson, Ariz., occupied by the petitioner, Rufus Mincey. Earlier in the day, Officer Headricks had allegedly arranged to purchase a quantity of heroin from Mincey and had left, ostensibly to obtain money. On his return he was accompanied by nine other plainclothes policemen and a deputy county attorney. The door was opened by John Hodgman, one of three acquaintances of Mincey who were in the living room of the apartment. Officer Headricks slipped inside and moved quickly into the bedroom. Hodgman attempted to slam the door in order to keep the other officers from entering, but was pushed back against the wall. As the police entered the apartment, a rapid volley of shots was heard from the bedroom. Officer Headricks emerged and collapsed on the floor. When other officers entered the bedroom they found Mincey lying on the floor, wounded and semiconscious. Officer Headricks died a few hours later in the hospital. </s> The petitioner was indicted for murder, assault, 1 and three [437 U.S. 385, 388] counts of narcotics offenses. He was tried at a single trial and convicted on all the charges. At his trial and on appeal, he contended that evidence used against him had been unlawfully seized from his apartment without a warrant and that statements used to impeach his credibility were inadmissible because they had not been made voluntarily. The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the murder and assault convictions on state-law grounds, 2 but affirmed the narcotics convictions. 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273. It held that the warrantless search of a homicide scene is permissible under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and that Mincey's statements were voluntary. We granted certiorari to consider these substantial constitutional question. 434 U.S. 902 . </s> I </s> The first question presented is whether the search of Mincey's apartment was constitutionally permissible. After the shooting, the narcotics agents, thinking that other persons in the apartment might have been injured, looked about quickly for other victims. They found a young woman wounded in the bedroom closet and Mincey apparently unconscious in the bedroom, as well as Mincey's three acquaintances (one of whom had been wounded in the head) in the living room. Emergency assistance was requested, and some medical aid was administered to Officer Headricks. But the agents refrained from further investigation, pursuant to a Tucson Police Department directive that police officers should not investigate incidents in which they are involved. They neither searched further nor seized any evidence; they merely guarded the suspects and the premises. </s> Within 10 minutes, however, homicide detectives who had [437 U.S. 385, 389] heard a radio report of the shooting arrived and took charge of the investigation. They supervised the removal of Officer Headricks and the suspects, trying to make sure that the scene was disturbed as little as possible, and then proceeded to gather evidence. Their search lasted four days, 3 during which period the entire apartment was searched, photographed, and diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, closets, and cupboards, and inspected their contents; they emptied clothing pockets; they dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors; they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed them for examination. Every item in the apartment was closely examined and inventoried, and 200 to 300 objects were seized. In short, Mincey's apartment was subjected to an exhaustive and intrusive search. No warrant was ever obtained. </s> The petitioner's pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of this search was denied after a hearing. Much of the evidence introduced against him at trial (including photographs and diagrams, bullets and shell casings, guns, narcotics, and narcotics paraphernalia) was the product of the four-day search of his apartment. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reaffirmed previous decisions in which it had held that the warrantless search of the scene of a homicide is constitutionally permissible. 4 It stated its ruling as follows: </s> "We hold a reasonable, warrantless search of the scene of a homicide - or of a serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play - [437 U.S. 385, 390] does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution where the law enforcement officers were legally on the premises in the first instance. . . . For the search to be reasonable, the purpose must be limited to determining the circumstances of death and the scope must not exceed that purpose. The search must also begin within a reasonable period following the time when the officials first learn of the murder (or potential murder)." 115 Ariz., at 482, 566 P.2d, at 283. </s> Since the investigating homicide detectives knew that Officer Headricks was seriously injured, began the search promptly upon their arrival at the apartment, and searched only for evidence either establishing the circumstances of death or "relevant to motive and intent or knowledge (narcotics, e.g.)." id., at 483, 566 P.2d, at 284, the court found that the warrantless search of the petitioner's apartment had not violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. </s> We cannot agree. The Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (footnotes omitted); see also South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 381 (POWELL, J., concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 ; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 ; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 . The Arizona Supreme Court did not hold that the search of the petitioner's apartment fell within any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement previously recognized by this Court, but rather that the search of a homicide scene should be recognized as an additional exception. </s> Several reasons are advanced by the State to meet its "burden [437 U.S. 385, 391] . . . to show the existence of such an exceptional situation" as to justify creating a new exception to the warrant requirement. See Vale v. Louisiana, supra, at 34; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 . 51. None of these reasons, however, persuades us of the validity of the generic exception delineated by the Arizona Supreme Court. </s> The first contention is that the search of the petitioner's apartment did not invade any constitutionally protected right of privacy. See Katz v. United States, supra. This argument appears to have two prongs. On the one hand, the State urges that by shooting Officer Headricks, Mincey forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy in his apartment. We have recently rejected a similar waiver argument in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 505 -506; it suffices here to say that this reasoning would impressibly convict the suspect even before the evidence against him was gathered. 5 On the other hand, the State contends that the police entry to arrest Mincey was so great an invasion of his privacy that the additional intrusion caused by the search was constitutionally irrelevant. But this claim is hardly tenable in light of the extensive nature of this search. It is one thing to say that one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened right of privacy in his person. See United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 808 -809; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 . It is quite another to argue that he also has a lessened right of privacy in his entire house. Indeed this very argument was rejected when it was advanced to support the warrantless search of a dwelling where a search occurred as "incident" to the arrest of its occupant. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n. 12. [437 U.S. 385, 392] Thus, this search cannot be justified on the ground that no constitutionally protected right of privacy was invaded. </s> The State's second argument in support of its categorical exception to the warrant requirement is that a possible homicide presents an emergency situation demanding immediate action. We do not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state 6 and federal 7 cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, supra, at 509-510. "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency." Wayne v. [437 U.S. 385, 393] United States, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 241, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (opinion of Burger, J.). And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Michigan v. Tyler, supra, at 509-510; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S., at 465 -466. </s> But a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 25 -26, and it simply cannot be contended that this search was justified by any emergency threatening life or limb. All the persons in Mincey's apartment had been located before the investigating homicide officers arrived there and began their search. And a four-day search that included opening dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rationalized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search. </s> Third, the State points to the vital public interest in the prompt investigation of the extremely serious crime of murder. No one can doubt the importance of this goal. But the public interest in the investigation of other serious crimes is comparable. If the warrantless search of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the scene of a rape, a robbery, or a burglary? "No consideration relevant to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation" of such a doctrine. Chimel v. California, supra, at 766. </s> Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 481. The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 . 6-11. For this reason, warrants are [437 U.S. 385, 394] generally required to search a person's home or his person unless "the exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 -15. See, e. g., Chimel v. California, supra (search of arrested suspect and area within his control for weapons or evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 -300 ("hot pursuit" of fleeing suspect); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 -771 (imminent destruction of evidence); see also supra, at 392-393. </s> Except for the fact that the offense under investigation was a homicide, there were no exigent circumstances in this case, as, indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized. 115 Ariz., at 482, 566 P.2d, at 283. There was no indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed, or removed during the time required to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the police guard at the apartment minimized that possibility. And there is no suggestion that a search warrant could not easily and conveniently have been obtained. We decline to hold that the seriousness of the offense under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search. </s> Finally, the State argues that the "murder scene exception" is constitutionally permissible because it is narrowly confined by the guidelines set forth in the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court, see supra, at 389-390. 8 In light of the extensive search that took place in this case it may be questioned what protection the guidelines afford a person in whose home a homicide or assault occurs. Indeed, these so-called guidelines [437 U.S. 385, 395] are hardly so rigidly confining as the State seems to assert. They confer unbridled discretion upon the individual officer to interpret such terms as "reasonable . . . search," "serious personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play," and "reasonable period." It is precisely this kind of judgmental assessment of the reasonableness and scope of a proposed search that the Fourth Amendment requires be made by a neutral and objective magistrate, not a police officer. See, e. g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 316 ; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra, at 449-453; Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 371 ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 -482. </s> It may well be that the circumstances described by the Arizona Supreme Court would usually be constitutionally sufficient to warrant a search of substantial scope. But the Fourth Amendment requires that this judgment in each case be made in the first instance by a neutral magistrate. </s> "The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, supra, at 13-14. </s> In sum, we hold that the "murder scene exception" created by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments - that the warrantless search of Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible simply because a homicide had recently occurred there." 9 </s> [437 U.S. 385, 396] </s> II </s> Since there will presumably be a new trial in this case, 10 it is appropriate to consider also the petitioner's contention that statements he made from a hospital bed were involuntary, and therefore could not constitutionally be used against him at his trial. </s> Mincey was brought to the hospital after the shooting and taken immediately to the emergency room where he was examined and treated. He had sustained a wound in his hip, resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis of his right leg. Tubes were inserted into his throat to help him breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep him from vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder. He received various drugs, and a device was attached to his arm so that he could be fed intravenously. He was then taken to the intensive care unit. </s> At about eight o'clock that evening, Detective Hust of the Tucson Police Department came to the intensive care unit to interrogate him. Mincey was unable to talk because of the tube in his mouth, and so he responded to Detective Hust's questions by writing answers on pieces of paper provided by the hospital. 11 Hust told Mincey he was under arrest for the murder of a police officer, gave him the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , and began to ask questions about the events that had taken place in Mincey's apartment a few hours earlier. Although Mincey asked repeatedly that the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, Hust continued to question him until almost midnight. [437 U.S. 385, 397] </s> After a pretrial hearing, see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , the trial court found that Mincey had responded to this interrogation voluntarily. 12 When Mincey took the witness stand at his trial his statements in response to Detective Hust's questions were used in an effort to impeach his testimony in several respects. 13 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court indicated its belief that because Detective Hust had failed to honor Mincey's request for a lawyer, the statements would have been inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case in chief. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. But, relying on Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 , and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 , it held that since the trial court's finding of voluntariness was not "clear[ly] and manifest[ly]" erroneous the statements were properly used for purposes of impeachment. 115 Ariz., at 480, 566 P.2d, at 281. </s> Statements made by a defendant in circumstances violating the strictures of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, are admissible for [437 U.S. 385, 398] impeachment if their "trustworthiness . . . satisfies legal standards." Harris v. New York, supra, at 224; Oregon v. Hass, supra, at 722. But any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law "even though there is ample evidence aside from the confession to support the conviction." Jackson v. Denno, supra, at 376; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 518 ; Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 537 ; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 ; see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 and n. 8. If, therefore, Mincey's statements to Detective Hust were not "`the product of a rational intellect and a free will,'" Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 307 , quoting Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 , his conviction cannot stand. In making this critical determination, we are not bound by the Arizona Supreme Court's holding that the statements were voluntary. Instead, this Court is under a duty to make an independent evaluation of the record. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 -742; Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 515-516. </s> It is hard to imagine a situation less conducive to the exercise of "a rational intellect and a free will" than Mincey's. He had been seriously wounded just a few hours earlier, and had arrived at the hospital "depressed almost to the point of coma," according to his attending physician. Although he had received some treatment, his condition at the time of Hust's interrogation was still sufficiently serious that he was in the intensive care unit. 14 He complained to Hust that the pain in his leg was "unbearable." He was evidently confused and unable to think clearly about either the events of that afternoon or the circumstances of his interrogation, since some [437 U.S. 385, 399] of his written answers were on their face not entirely coherent. 15 Finally, while Mincey was being questioned he was lying on his back on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing apparatus. He was, in short, "at the complete mercy" of Detective Hust, unable to escape or resist the thrust of Hust's interrogation. Cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35, 38 . </s> In this debilitated and helpless condition, Mincey clearly expressed his wish not to be interrogated. As soon as Hust's questions turned to the details of the afternoon's events, Mincey wrote: "This is all I can say without a lawyer." Hust nonetheless continued to question him, and a nurse who was present suggested it would be best if Mincey answered. Mincey gave unresponsive or uninformative answers to several more questions, and then said again that he did not want to talk without a lawyer. Hust ignored that request and another made immediately thereafter. 16 Indeed, throughout the interrogation [437 U.S. 385, 400] Mincey vainly asked Hust to desist. Moreover, he complained several times that he was confused or unable to think clearly, or that he could answer more accurately [437 U.S. 385, 401] the next day. 17 But despite Mincey's entreaties to be let alone, Hust ceased the interrogation only during intervals when Mincey lost consciousness or received medical treatment, and after each such interruption returned relentlessly to his task. The statements at issue were thus the result of virtually continuous questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge of consciousness. </s> There were not present in this case some of the gross abuses that have led the Court in other cases to find confessions involuntary, such as beatings, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , or "truth serums," see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 . But "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S., at 206 . Determination of whether a statement is involuntary "requires more than a mere color-matching of cases." Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442 . It requires careful evaluation of all the circumstances of the interrogation. 18 </s> It is apparent from the record in this case that Mincey's statements were not "the product of his free and rational choice." Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 . To the contrary, the undisputed evidence makes clear that Mincey wanted not to answer Detective Hust. But Mincey was weakened by pain and shock, isolated from family, friends, and legal counsel, and barely conscious, and his will was simply [437 U.S. 385, 402] overborne. Due process of law requires that statements obtained as these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant at his trial. </s> III </s> For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The assault charge was based on the wounding of a person in the living room who was hit by a bullet that came through the wall. </s> [Footnote 2 The state appellate court held that the jury had been improperly instructed on criminal intent. It appears from the record in this case that the retrial of the petitioner on the murder and assault charges was stayed by the trial court after certiorari was granted by this Court. </s> [Footnote 3 The police also returned to the apartment in November 1974, at the request of the petitioner's landlord, to remove property of the petitioner that remained in the apartment after his lease had expired on October 31. </s> [Footnote 4 State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 489 P.2d 44; State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 517 P.2d 1277; State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by the defendant whose conviction was upheld in State v. Sample, supra, on the ground, inter alia, that the warrantless search of the homicide scene violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819. </s> [Footnote 5 Moreover, this rationale would be inapplicable if a homicide occurred at the home of the victim or of a stranger, yet the Arizona cases indicate that a warrantless search in such a case would also be permissible under the "murder scene exception." Cf. State v. Sample, supra, at 409, 489 P.2d, at 46. </s> [Footnote 6 E. g., People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 731, 753-757, 528 P.2d 1, 18-21; Patrick v. State, 227 A. 2d 486, 488-490 (Del.); People v. Brooks, 7 Ill. App. 3d 767, 775-777, 289 N. E. 2d 207, 212-214; Maxey v. State, 251 Ind. 645, 649-650, 244 N. E. 2d 650, 653-654; Davis v. State, 236 Md. 389, 395-397, 204 A. 2d 76, 80-82; State v. Hardin, 90 Nev. 10, 518 P.2d 151; State v. Gosser, 50 N. J. 438, 446-448, 236 A. 2d 377, 381-382; People v. Mitchell, 39 N. Y. 2d 173, 347 N. E. 2d 607; State v. Pires, 55 Wis. 2d 597, 603-605, 201 N. W. 2d 153, 156-158. Other cases are collected in Note, The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and the Fourth Amendment, 43 Ford. L. Rev. 571, 584 n. 102 (1975). See also ALI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure SS 260.5 (Prop. Off. Draft 1975). By citing these cases and those in the note following, of course, we do not mean to approve the specific holding of each case. </s> [Footnote 7 E. g., Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364-365 (CA8); United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (CA2); Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 238-243, 318 F.2d 205, 209-214 (opinion of Burger, J.); United States v. James, 408 F. Supp. 527, 533 (SD Miss.); United States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1086-1087 (Del.), aff'd, 481 F.2d 94 (CA3); see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 -299; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 -456; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 -15. </s> [Footnote 8 The State also relies on the fact that observance of these guidelines can be enforced by a motion to suppress evidence. But the Fourth Amendment "is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action." Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n. 12. </s> [Footnote 9 To what extent, if any, the evidence found in Mincey's apartment was permissibly seized under established Fourth Amendment standards will be for the Arizona courts to resolve on remand. </s> [Footnote 10 See also n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 11 Because of the way in which the interrogation was conducted, the only contemporaneous record consisted of Mincey's written answers. Hust testified that the next day he went over this document and made a few notes to help him reconstruct the conversation. In a written report dated about a week later. Hust transcribed Mincey's answers and added the questions he believed he had asked. It was this written report that was used to cross-examine Mincey at his subsequent trial. </s> [Footnote 12 The trial court made no findings of fact, nor did it make a specific finding of voluntariness, and the petitioner contends that admission of the statements therefore violated Jackson v. Denno. We agree with the Arizona Supreme Court, however, that the finding of voluntariness "appear[s] from the record with unmistakable clarity." Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544 . The petitioner had originally moved to suppress his written answers to Hust's questions on two grounds: that they had been elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , and that they had been involuntary. During the hearing, the prosecution stipulated that the answers would be used only to impeach the petitioner if he took the witness stand. Any violation of Miranda thus became irrelevant. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 ; Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 . The testimony and the briefs and arguments of counsel were thereafter directed solely to whether the answers had been voluntarily given, and the court specifically ruled that they would be admissible for impeachment purposes only. The court thus necessarily held that Mincey's responses to Hust's interrogation were voluntary. </s> [Footnote 13 In light of our holding that Mincey's hospital statements were not voluntarily given, it is unnecessary to reach his alternative contention that their use against him was impermissible because they were not sufficiently inconsistent with his trial testimony. </s> [Footnote 14 A nurse testified at the suppression hearing that the device used to aid Mincey's respiration was reserved for "more critical" patients. Moreover, Mincey apparently remained hospitalized for almost a month after the shooting. According to docket entries in the trial court his arraignment was postponed several times because he was still in the hospital; he was not arraigned until November 26, 1974. </s> [Footnote 15 For example, two of the answers written by Mincey were: "Do you me Did he give me some money (no)" and "Every body know Every body." And Mincey apparently believed he was being questioned by several different policemen, not Hust alone; although it was Hust who told Mincey he had killed a policeman, later in the interrogation Mincey indicated he thought it was someone else. </s> [Footnote 16 In his reconstruction of the interrogation, see n. 11, supra, Hust stated that, after he asked Mincey some questions to try to identify one of the other victims, the following ensued: </s> "HUST: . . . What do you remember that happened? </s> "MINCEY: I remember somebody standing over me saying `move nigger, move.' I was on the floor beside the bed. </s> "HUST: Do you remember shooting anyone or firing a gun? </s> "MINCEY: This is all I can say without a lawyer. </s> "HUST: If you want a lawyer now, I cannot talk to you any longer, however, you don't have to answer any questions if you don't want to. Do you still want to talk to me? </s> "MINCEY: (Shook his head in an affirmative manner.) </s> "HUST: What else can you remember? </s> "MINCEY: I'm going to have to put my head together. There are so [437 U.S. 385, 400] many things that I don't remember I. Like how did they get into the apartment? </s> "HUST: How did who get into the apartment? </s> "MINCEY: Police. </s> "HUST: Did you sell some narcotics to the guy that was shot? </s> "MINCEY: Do you mean, did he give me some money? </s> "HUST: Yes. </s> "MINCEY: No. </s> "HUST: Did you give him a sample? </s> "MINCEY: What do you call a sample? </s> "HUST: A small amount of drug or narcotic to test? </s> "MINCEY: I can't say without a lawyer. </s> "HUST: Did anyone say police or narcs when they came into the apartment? </s> "MINCEY: Let me get myself together first. You see, I'm not for sure everything happened so fast. I can't answer at this time because I don't think so, but I can't say for sure. Some questions aren't clear to me at the present time. </s> "HUST: Did you shoot anyone? </s> "MINCEY: I can't say, I have to see a lawyer." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> While some of Mincey's answers seem relatively responsive to the questions, it must be remembered that Hust added the questions at a later date, with the answers in front of him. See n. 11, supra. The reliability of Hust's report is uncertain. For example, Hust claimed that immediately after Mincey first expressed a desire to remain silent, Hust said Mincey need not answer any questions but Mincey responded by indicating that he wanted to continue. There is no contemporaneous record supporting Hust's statement that Mincey acted so inconsistently immediately after asserting his wish not to respond further, nor did the nurse who was present during the interrogation corroborate Hust. The Arizona Supreme Court apparently disbelieved Hust in this respect, since it stated that "after each indication from [Mincey] that he wanted to consult an attorney or that he wanted to stop answering questions, the police officer continued to question [him]." 115 Ariz., at 479, 566 P.2d, at 280 (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 17 In addition to the statements quoted in n. 16, supra, Mincey wrote at various times during the interrogation: "There are a lot of things that aren't clear," "Thats why I have to have time to redo everything that happened in my mind," and "I'm not sure as of now." He also wrote: "If its possible to get a lawyer now. We can finish the talk. He could direct me in the right direction where as without a lawyer I might saw something thinking that it means something else." And at another point he wrote: "Lets rap tomarrow, face to face. I can't give facts. If something happins that I don't know about." Before the interrogation ended, Mincey made two further requests for a lawyer. </s> [Footnote 18 E. g., Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 480 ; Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 708 ; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513 -514. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, concurring. </s> I join the opinion of the Court, which holds that petitioner's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments have been violated. I write today to emphasize a point that is illustrated by the instant case, but that applies more generally to all cases in which we are asked to review Fourth Amendment issues arising out of state criminal convictions. </s> It is far from clear that we would have granted certiorari solely to resolve the involuntary-statement issue in this case, for that could have been resolved on federal habeas corpus. With regard to the Fourth Amendment issue, however, we had little choice but to grant review, because our decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), precludes federal habeas consideration of such issues. In Stone the Court held that, "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial." Id., at 494 (footnotes omitted). Because of this holding, petitioner would not have been able to present to a federal habeas court the Fourth Amendment claim that the Court today unanimously upholds. </s> The additional responsibilities placed on this Court in the wake of Stone become apparent upon examination of decisions [437 U.S. 385, 403] of the Arizona Supreme Court on the Fourth Amendment issue presented here. The Arizona court created its "murder scene exception" in a 1971 case. State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 409-410, 489 P.2d 44, 46-47. A year later, when the defendant in that case sought federal habeas corpus relief, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled, as we do today, that the exception could not be upheld under the Fourth Amendment. Sample v. Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 821-822 (1972). When the Arizona Supreme Court next gave plenary consideration to the issue, prior to our decision in Stone, it apparently felt bound by the Ninth Circuit's Sample decision, although it found the case before it to be distinguishable. State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, 324, 518 P.2d 570, 574 (1974). 1 </s> When the Arizona Supreme Court rendered its decision in the instant case, however, it took a different approach. The decision, issued nearly a year after Stone, merely noted that the Ninth Circuit had "disagreed" with the Arizona court's view of the validity of the murder-scene exception. 115 Ariz. 472, 482 n. 4, 566 P.2d 273, 283 n. 4 (1977). It thus created an effective "conflict" for us to resolve. Cf. this Court's Rule 19 (1) (b). If certiorari had not been granted, we would have left standing a decision of the State's highest court on a question of federal constitutional law that had been resolved in a directly opposing way by the highest federal court having [437 U.S. 385, 404] special responsibility for the State. Regardless of which court's view of the Constitution was the correct one, such nonuniformity on Fourth Amendment questions is obviously undesirable; it is as unfair to state prosecutors and judges - who must make difficult determinations regarding what evidence is subject to exclusion - as it is to state criminal defendants. </s> Prior to Stone v. Powell, there would have been no need to grant certiorari in a case such as this, since the federal habeas remedy would have been available to the defendant. Indeed, prior to Stone petitioner here probably would not even have had to utilize federal habeas, since the Arizona courts were at that earlier time more inclined to follow the federal constitutional pronouncements of the Ninth Circuit, as discussed above. But Stone eliminated the habeas remedy with regard to Fourth Amendment violations, thus allowing state-court rulings to diverge from lower federal-court rulings on these issues and placing a correspondingly greater burden on this Court to ensure uniform federal law in the Fourth Amendment area. </s> At the time of Stone my Brother BRENNAN wrote that "institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility that this Court can adequately oversee whether state courts have properly applied federal law." 428 U.S., at 526 (dissenting opinion); see id., at 534. Because of these constraints, we will often be faced with a Hobson's choice in cases of less than national significance that could formerly have been left to the lower federal courts: either to deny certiorari and thereby let stand divergent state and federal decisions with regard to Fourth Amendment rights; or to grant certiorari and thereby add to our calendar, which many believe is already overcrowded, cases that might better have been resolved elsewhere. In view of this problem and others, 2 I hope that the [437 U.S. 385, 405] Court will at some point reconsider the wisdom of Stone v. Powell. 3 </s> [Footnote 1 In its Mincey opinion, 115 Ariz. 472, 482, 566 P.2d 273, 283 (1977), the Arizona Supreme Court indicated that one case other than Sample and Duke involved the murder-scene exception. State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 517 P.2d 1277 (1974). The two-sentence opinion in the latter case, however, provides no explanation of the underlying facts and does not cite to either the Arizona court's or the Ninth Circuit's decision in Sample. There is thus no way to determine whether the situation in Berger was in any way comparable to those in Sample, Duke, and Mincey, nor any way to determine whether the Berger court simply disregarded the Ninth Circuit's Sample decision or instead, as in Duke (decided just two weeks after Berger), viewed Sample as distinguishable. </s> [Footnote 2 The Stone holding has not eased the burden on the lower federal courts as much as the Stone majority might have hoped, since those courts have [437 U.S. 385, 405] had to struggle over what this Court meant by "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim," 428 U.S., at 494 . See, e. g., Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (CA2 1977); United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 562 F.2d 903 (CA3 1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (CA5 1977). </s> [Footnote 3 A bill currently pending in the Congress would have the effect of overruling Stone v. Powell, S. 1314, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see 123 Cong. Rec. 11347-11353 (1977). </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> Petitioner was indicted for murder, assault, and three counts of narcotics offenses. He was convicted on all charges. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona reversed all but the narcotics convictions. 115 Ariz. 472, 566 P.2d 273 (1977). In his petition for certiorari, petitioner challenged the introduction of evidence material to his narcotics convictions that was seized during a lengthy warrantless search of his apartment. Petitioner also challenged on voluntariness grounds the introduction of various statements made to the police relating to the murder charge. We granted certiorari, 434 U.S. 902 , and the Court today reverses the Supreme Court of Arizona on both issues. While I agree with the Court that the warrantless search was not justifiable on the grounds advanced by the Arizona Supreme Court, I dissent from the Court's holding that Mincey's statements were involuntary and thus inadmissible. </s> I </s> I join Part I of the Court's opinion. As the Supreme Court of Arizona recognized, the four-day warrantless search of petitioner's apartment did not, on the facts developed at trial, "fit within [any] usual `exigent circumstances' exception." 115 Ariz., at 482, 566 P.2d, at 283. Instead, the State of [437 U.S. 385, 406] Arizona asks us to adopt a separate "murder scene" exception to the warrant requirement and the Court, for the reasons stated in its opinion, correctly rejects this invitation. </s> I write separately on this issue only to emphasize that the question of what, if any, evidence was seized under established Fourth Amendment standards is left open for the Arizona courts to resolve on remand. Ante, at 395 n. 9. Much of the evidence introduced by the State at trial was apparently removed from the apartment the same day as the shooting. App. 40. And the State's brief suggests that some evidence - for example, blood on the floor - required immediate examination. Brief for Respondent 70-71. The question of what evidence would have been "lost, destroyed, or removed" if a warrant had been obtained, ante, at 394, otherwise required an immediate search, or was in plain view should be considered on remand by the Arizona courts. </s> In considering whether exigencies required the search for or seizure of particular evidence, the previous events within the apartment cannot be ignored. I agree with the Court that the police's entry to arrest Mincey, followed by the shooting and the search for victims, did not justify the later four-day search of the apartment. Ante, at 391-392. But the constitutionality of a particular search is a question of reasonableness and depends on "a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), we held that once a motor vehicle had been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, police officers could constitutionally order the driver out of the vehicle. In so holding, we emphasized that the challenged intrusion was "occasioned not by the initial stop of the vehicle, which was admittedly justified, but by the order to get out of the car. We think this additional intrusion can only be described as de minimis." [437 U.S. 385, 407] Id., at 111. Similarly, in the instant case, the prior intrusions occasioned by the shooting and the police's response thereto may legitimize a search under some exigencies that in tamer circumstances might not permit a search. </s> II </s> The Court in Part II of its opinion advises the Arizona courts on the admissibility of certain statements made by Mincey that are relevant only to the murder charge. Because Mincey's murder conviction was reversed by the Arizona Supreme Court, and it is not certain that there will be a retrial. I would not reach this issue. Since the Court addresses the issue, however, I must register my disagreement with its conclusion. </s> Before trial, Mincey moved to suppress as involuntary certain statements that he had made while confined in an intensive care unit some hours after the shooting. As the Court acknowledges, the trial court found "`with unmistakable clarity'" that the statements were voluntary, ante, at 397 n. 12, and the Supreme Court of Arizona unanimously affirmed. 115 Ariz., at 479-480, 566 P.2d, at 280-281. This Court now disagrees and holds that "Mincey's statements were not `the product of his free and rational choice'" and therefore "cannot be used in any way against [him] at his trial." Ante, at 401, 402. Because I believe that the Court both has failed to accord the state-court finding the deference that the Court has always found such findings due and also misapplied our past precedents, I dissent. </s> As the Court notes, ante, at 398, past cases of this Court hold that a state-court finding as to voluntariness which is "not fairly supported by the record cannot be conclusive of federal rights." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 316 (1963) (emphasis added). Instead, these cases require the Court to "make an independent determination on the undisputed facts." Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952) (emphasis added); [437 U.S. 385, 408] Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 404 (1945). It is well established that, "for purposes of review in this Court, the determination of the trial judge or of the jury will ordinarily be taken to resolve evidentiary conflicts and may be entitled to some weight even with respect to the ultimate conclusion on the crucial issue of voluntariness." Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963). See Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 238 (1941); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 , and n. 5 (1960). Such deference, particularly on the resolution of evidentiary conflicts, "is particularly apposite because the trial judge and jury are closest to the trial scene and thus afforded the best opportunity to evaluate contradictory testimony." Haynes, supra, at 516. </s> The Court in this case, however, ignores entirely some evidence of voluntariness and distinguishes away yet other testimony. There can be no discounting that Mincey was seriously wounded and laden down with medical equipment. Mincey was certainly not able to move about and, because of the breathing tube in his mouth, had to answer Detective Hust's questions on paper. But the trial court was certainly not required to find, as the Court would imply, that Mincey was "a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge of consciousness." Ante, at 401. Nor is it accurate to conclude that Detective Hust "ceased the interrogation only during intervals when Mincey lost consciousness or received medical treatment, and after each such interruption returned relentlessly to his task." Ibid. </s> As the Arizona Supreme Court observed in affirming the trial court's finding of voluntariness, Mincey's nurse </s> "testified that she had not given [Mincey] any medication and that [he] was alert and able to understand the officer's questions. . . . She said that [Mincey] was in moderate pain but was very cooperative with everyone. The interrogating officer also testified that [Mincey] did not appear to be under the influence of drugs and that [437 U.S. 385, 409] [his] answers were generally responsive to the questions." 115 Ariz., at 480, 566 P.2d, at 281. </s> See App. 50-51 (testimony of Detective Hust), 63 and 66 (testimony of Nurse Graham). 1 The uncontradicted testimony of Detective Hust also reveals a questioning that was far from "relentless." While the interviews took place over a three-hour time span, the interviews were not "very long; probably not more than an hour total for everything." Id., at 59. Hust would leave the room whenever Mincey received medical treatment "or if it looked like he was getting a little bit exhausted." Ibid. According to Detective Hust, Mincey never "los[t] consciousness at any time." Id., at 58. </s> As the Court openly concedes, there were in this case none of the "gross abuses that have led the Court in other cases to find confessions involuntary, such as beatings . . . or `truth serums.'" Ante, at 401. Neither is this a case, however, where the defendant's will was "simply overborne" by "mental coercion." Cf. Blackburn v. Alabama, supra, at 206; Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741 (1966); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519, 521 (1968). As the Supreme Court of Arizona observed, it was the testimony of both Detective Hust and Nurse Graham "that neither mental or physical force nor abuse was used on [Mincey] . . . . Nor were any promises made." 115 Ariz., at 480, 566 P.2d. at 281. See App. 58-59 (testimony of Detective Hust) and 63 (testimony of Nurse Graham). According to Mincey's own testimony, he wanted [437 U.S. 385, 410] to help Hust "the best I could" and tried to answer each question "to the best of my recollection at the time that this was going on." Id., at 86. Mincey did not claim that he felt compelled by Detective Hust to answer the questions propounded. 2 Cf. Greenwald, supra, at 521. </s> By all of these standards enunciated in our previous cases, I think the Court today goes too far in substituting its own judgment for the judgment of a trial court and the highest court of a State, both of which decided these disputed issues differently than does this Court, and both of which were a good deal closer to the factual occurrences than is this Court. Admittedly we may not abdicate our duty to decide questions of constitutional law under the guise of wholly remitting to state courts the function of fact finding which is a necessary ingredient of the process of constitutional decision. But the authorities previously cited likewise counsel us against going to the other extreme, and attempting to extract from a cold record bits and pieces of evidence which we then treat as the "facts" of the case. I believe that the trial court was entitled to conclude that, notwithstanding Mincey's medical condition, his statements in the intensive care unit were admissible. The fact that the same court might have been equally entitled to reach the opposite conclusion does not justify this Court's adopting the opposite conclusion. </s> I therefore dissent from Part II of the Court's opinion. </s> [Footnote 1 The Supreme Court of Arizona also emphasized "the fact that [Mincey] was able to write his answers in a legible and fairly sensible fashion." 115 Ariz., at 480 n. 3, 566 P.2d, at 281 n. 3. The Court concedes that "Mincey's answers seem relatively responsive to the questions," ante, at 400 n. 16, but chooses to ignore this evidence on the ground that the "reliability of Hust's report is uncertain." Ibid. Despite the contrary impression given by the Court, ibid., the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion casts no doubt on the testimony or report of Detective Hust. The Court is thus left solely with its own conclusion as to the reliability of various witnesses based on a re-examination of the record on appeal. </s> [Footnote 2 While Mincey asked at several points to see a lawyer, he also expressed his willingness to continue talking to Detective Hust even without a lawyer. See ante, at 399-400, n. 16. As the Court notes, since Mincey's statements were not used as part of the prosecution's case in chief but only in impeachment, any violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was irrelevant. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). </s> [437 U.S. 385, 411]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. A & P TRUCKING CO.(1958) No. 32 Argued: October 20, 1958Decided: December 8, 1958 </s> A partnership may be prosecuted as an entity under 222 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act for "knowingly and willfully" violating certification requirements and motor carrier regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission and under 18 U.S.C. 835 for "knowingly" violating regulations for the safe transportation in interstate commerce of explosives and other dangerous articles. Pp. 121-127. </s> (a) The words "knowingly and willfully" in 222 (a) and the word "knowingly" in 835 do not eliminate partnerships from the coverage of these statutes. Pp. 125-126. </s> (b) A partnership can violate each of these statutes quite apart from the participation and knowledge of the partners as individuals. Pp. 126-127. </s> Reversed. </s> Ralph S. Spritzer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Anderson, Beatrice Rosenberg and Jerome M. Feit. </s> Anthony J. Cioffi argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was August W. Heckman. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case raises issues similar to those involved in United States v. American Freightways Co., 352 U.S. 1020 , where a dismissal of an information charging a partnership entity with violations of 18 U.S.C. 835 was affirmed by an equally divided Court. </s> Appellees, two partnerships, were charged, as entities, in separate informations with violations of 18 U.S.C. 835, which makes it criminal knowingly to violate Interstate [358 U.S. 121, 122] Commerce Commission regulations for the safe transportation in interstate commerce of "explosives and other dangerous articles." Appellee A & P Trucking Company was also charged with numerous violations of 49 U.S.C. 322 (a) ( 222 (a) of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935). 1 The District Court dismissed, on motion, the informations on the ground that a partnership entity cannot be guilty of violating the statutes involved. The Government appealed directly to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C. 3731, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 356 U.S. 917 . For reasons set forth below we hold that the informations were erroneously dismissed. </s> 49 U.S.C. 322 (a), the comprehensive misdemeanor provision of the Motor Carrier Act, provides that "any person knowingly and willfully violating any provision of this chapter [Part II of the Interstate Commerce [358 U.S. 121, 123] Act], or any rule, regulation, requirement, or order [of the Interstate Commerce Commission] thereunder, or any term or condition of any certificate, permit, or license, for which a penalty is not otherwise herein provided, shall, upon conviction thereof, be fined . . . ." The Motor Carrier Act also contains its own definition of the word "person": "The term `person' means any individual, firm, copartnership, corporation, company, association, or jointstock association; . . . ." (Italics supplied.) 49 U.S.C. 303 (a). </s> 18 U.S.C. 835 provides that "whoever knowingly violates any such regulation [ICC regulations pertaining to the safe transport of dangerous articles] shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; . . . ." The section makes such regulations binding on "all common carriers" engaged in interstate commerce. And 1 U.S.C. 1, part of a chapter entitled "Rules of Construction" and in light of which 835 must be read, provides that "in determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise - . . . the words `person' and `whoever' include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals; . . . ." (Italics supplied.) The word "whoever" in 18 U.S.C. 835 must, therefore, be construed to include partnerships "unless the context indicates otherwise." 2 </s> We think that partnerships as entities may be proceeded against under both 322 (a) and 835. The purpose [358 U.S. 121, 124] of both statutes is clear: to ensure compliance by motor carriers, among others, with safety and other requirements laid down by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the exercise of its statutory duty to regulate the operations of interstate carriers for hire. In the effectuation of this policy it certainly makes no difference whether the carrier which commits the infraction is organized as a corporation, a joint stock company, a partnership, or an individual proprietorship. The mischief is the same, and we think that Congress intended to make the consequences of infraction the same. </s> True, the common law made a distinction between a corporation and a partnership, deeming the latter not a separate entity for purposes of suit. But the power of Congress to change the common-law rule is not to be doubted. See United States v. Adams Express Co., 229 U.S. 381 . We think it beyond dispute that it has done so in 322 (a) for, as we have seen, "person" in that section is expressly defined in the Motor Carrier Act to include partnerships. We think it likewise has done so in 835, since we find nothing in that section which would justify our not applying to the word "whoever" the definition given it in 1 U.S.C. 1, which includes partnerships. Section 835 makes regulations promulgated by the ICC for the transportation of dangerous articles binding on all common carriers. In view of the fact that many motor carriers are organized as partnerships rather than as corporations, the conclusion is not lightly to be reached that Congress intended that some carriers should not be subject to the full gamut of sanctions provided for infractions of ICC regulations merely because of the form under which they were organized to do business. 3 More particularly, we perceive [358 U.S. 121, 125] no reason why Congress should have intended to make partnership motor carriers criminally liable for infractions of 322 (a), but not for violations of 835. 4 </s> It is argued that the words "knowingly" ( 835) and "knowingly and willfully" ( 322 (a)) by implication eliminate partnerships from the coverage of the statutes, because a partnership, as opposed to its individual partners, cannot so act. But the same inability so to act in fact is true, of course, with regard to corporations and other associations; yet it is elementary that such impersonal entities can be guilty of "knowing" or "willful" violations of regulatory statutes through the doctrine of respondeat superior. Thus in United States v. Adams Express Co., supra, in which the Adams Express Co., a joint stock association, was indicted for "wilfully" receiving sums for expressage in excess of its scheduled rates, Mr. Justice Holmes said, at pp. 389-390: </s> "It has been notorious for many years that some of the great express companies are organized as joint stock associations, and the reason for the amendment hardly could be seen unless it was intended to bring those associations under the act. As suggested in the argument for the Government, no one, certainly not the defendant, seems to have doubted that the statute now imposes upon them the duty to file schedules of rates. . . . But if it imposes upon them the duties under the words common carrier as interpreted, it is reasonable to suppose that the same [358 U.S. 121, 126] words are intended to impose upon them the penalty inflicted on common carriers in case those duties are not performed. . . . </s> "The power of Congress hardly is denied. The constitutionality of the statute as against corporations is established, New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492 , and no reason is suggested why Congress has not equal power to charge the partnership assets with a liability and to personify the company so far as to collect a fine by a proceeding against it by the company name. That is what we believe that Congress intended to do. . . ." </s> The policy to be served in this case is the same. The business entity cannot be left free to break the law merely because its owners, stockholders in the Adams case, partners in the present one, do not personally participate in the infraction. The treasury of the business may not with impunity obtain the fruits of violations which are committed knowingly by agents of the entity in the scope of their employment. 5 Thus pressure is brought on those who own the entity to see to it that their agents abide by the law. 6 </s> We hold, therefore, that a partnership can violate each of the statutes here in question quite apart from the participation and knowledge of the partners as individuals. [358 U.S. 121, 127] The corollary is, of course, that the conviction of a partnership cannot be used to punish the individual partners, who might be completely free of personal guilt. As in the case of corporations, the conviction of the entity can lead only to a fine levied on the firm's assets. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The information as to appellee A & P Trucking Company charged in one count an offense under 18 U.S.C. 835 through the transportation by truck of chromic acid without the markings or placardings prescribed by 49 CFR 77.823 (a). It charged in 34 other counts offenses under 49 U.S.C. 322 (a), consisting of failure to comply with 49 CFR 191.8, which prescribes physical examinations and certificates for drivers of trucks (one count), violation of 49 CFR, 1958 Cum. Pocket Supp., 193.95 (a), which requires that common-carrier trucks be equipped with fire extinguishers (one count), and violation of 49 U.S.C. 306 (a), which forbids the operation of a common-carrier truck in interstate commerce without a certificate of convenience and necessity (32 counts). The information as to appellee Hopla Trucking Company charged two violations of 18 U.S.C. 835, in that Hopla shipped methanol, a flammable liquid, without properly marking or placarding the truck as required by 49 CFR 77.823 (a), and without its driver having in his possession a paper showing the prescribed labels required for the outside containers of the methanol as required by 49 CFR 77.817. </s> Subsequent to the filing of the information against A & P Trucking Company, 49 U.S.C. 322 (a) was amended to increase the fines provided for its violation. See 49 U.S.C. (Supp. V) 322 (a). </s> [Footnote 2 It is significant that the definition of "whoever" in 1 U.S.C. 1 was first enacted into law as part of the very same statute which enacted into positive law the revised Criminal Code. 62 Stat. 683, 859 (1948). The connection between 1 U.S.C. 1 and the Criminal Code, which includes 835, is thus more than a token one, the very same statute which creates the crime admonishing that "whoever" is to be liberally interpreted. </s> [Footnote 3 Congress has specifically included partnerships within the definition of "person" in a large number of regulatory Acts, thus showing its intent to treat partnerships as entities. See, e. g., Civil Aeronautics [358 U.S. 121, 125] Act, 52 Stat. 979, 49 U.S.C. 401 (27); Federal Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1066, 47 U.S.C. 153 (i); Shipping Act, 39 Stat. 729, 46 U.S.C. 801; Tariff Act, 46 Stat. 708, 19 U.S.C. 1401 (d). </s> [Footnote 4 The fact that 835 provides for imprisonment, as well as fine, for its violation, whereas 322 (a) provides only for fines, does not lead to a different conclusion. Cf. United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50 . </s> [Footnote 5 Since the two informations were held insufficient on their face, we must, for present purposes, accept as true their allegations that the offenses charged were not inadvertently committed. </s> [Footnote 6 Gordon v. United States, 347 U.S. 909 , relied on by appellees, is not to the contrary. That case held merely that individual partners could not be convicted of "willfully" violating the Defense Production Act of 1950 without a showing that they had knowledge of the criminal acts of their agents. Cf. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 . Here the Government does not seek to hold the individual partners, but only the partnerships as entities. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER concur, dissenting in part. </s> 18 U.S.C. 835, unlike the Motor Carrier Act, has not explicitly subjected partnerships to criminal liability, and I do not think that such liability should be implied, for we are dealing with a penal statute which should be narrowly construed. </s> As Chief Justice Marshall wrote in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95, "The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative, not in the judicial department." </s> With that approach we would not allow this criminal sanction to attach under 18 U.S.C. 835. A corporation is an artificial, legally created entity that can have no "knowledge" itself and is said to have "knowledge" only through its employees. On the other hand a partnership means A, B, and C - the individuals who compose it. In this country the entity theory has not in general been extended to the partnership. Judge Learned Hand summarized the history in Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590, 591-592. If Dean Ames had had his way, the mercantile or entity theory of the partnership would have prevailed. But those who took up the drafting of the Uniform Partnership Act after his death adhered to the common-law attitude toward a partnership - that [358 U.S. 121, 128] it is an aggregation of individuals. That is to say, the Act adopted the aggregate rather than the entity theory. And that Act is in force in about three-fourths of the States. One who combs the reports today can find cases espousing the entity theory. But they are in the minority and consciously reject the other theory. As Professor Williston has shown, the main stream of American partnership law follows the British course of treating the partnership in the pluralistic sense. The Uniform Partnership Act, 63 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 196, 208. We should therefore assume that this criminal statute, written against that background, reflects the conventional aggregate, not the exceptional entity, theory of the partnership. </s> We are dealing with a statute where liability depends on "culpable intent," as stated in Boyce Motor Lines, Inc., v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 342 . The partners could not be held criminally responsible for the acts of their employees. Gordon v. United States, 347 U.S. 909 . The partnership, being no more than the aggregate of the partners, should stand on the same footing, unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise. Title 1 U.S.C. 1 defines "person" in any Act of Congress to include a partnership, "unless the context indicates otherwise." The context of 18 U.S.C. 835 does indicate otherwise for the Act punishes only those who knowingly violate it. The aggregate theory of partnership law teaches that there can be no vicarious criminal liability where no partner is culpable. </s> If the rule of strict construction of a criminal statute is to obtain, 18 U.S.C. 835 must be read narrowly to reflect the prevailing view of partnership law. If the entity theory is to be applied for the purpose of imposing criminal penalties on partnership assets, where the partners are wholly innocent of any wrongful act, it should be done only on the unequivocal command of Congress, as is the case under the Motor Carrier Act. </s> [358 U.S. 121, 129]

United States Supreme Court IDAHO METAL WORKS v. WIRTZ(1966) No. 30 Argued: December 8, 1965Decided: February 24, 1966 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 31, Wirtz, Secretary of Labor v. Steepleton General Tire Co., Inc., et al., on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. </s> In No. 30 the employer, petitioner, has 12 workers who fabricate, install and repair sheet metal products. While about 60% of sales in number are to the general public, about 83% of gross income comes from work done, generally on individual specifications for sizable pieces of equipment, for five potato processing companies which dehydrate and freeze potatoes for interstate shipment. In reply to respondent's claim that it was violating the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, petitioner denied that its workers engaged in or produced goods for interstate commerce and asserted that it was a "retail or service establishment" under 13 (a) (2) of the Act, which exempts certain establishments 75% of whose dollar volume of sales is not for resale and is recognized as retail sales or services in the industry. Petitioner showed that 75% of its dollar volume was not for resale and that its officials and salesmen who sell to it regarded the business as retail. The District Court agreed with petitioner, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Respondent employer in No. 31 is a franchised tire dealer with 47 employees engaged in selling, recapping and repairing tires. More than half its gross income comes from sales and repairs of tires furnished to businesses using heavy industrial or construction vehicles or fleets of trucks, operating to a sizable but unspecified extent in interstate commerce. Respondent alleged that it came within the 13 (a) (2) exemption and showed that 75% of its sales were not for resale and that the industry's use of the word retail applied to all sales not for resale, despite the commercial character of the tires and an established pattern of quantity discounts. Petitioner showed that the word retail was used by the industry in other senses which excluded commercial sales and that respondent's commercial customers did not regard [383 U.S. 190, 191] their purchases as at retail. Petitioner also introduced his official guidelines, which class as nonretail all sales to fleets of five or more vehicles at "wholesale prices," defined as those charged on sales for resale or on sales to 10-vehicle fleets. The District Court held respondent to be within the interstate commerce coverage of the Act but to be entitled to the exemption, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Held: </s> 1. The industry-usage test is not in itself controlling in determining when business transactions are retail sales under the Act. Pp. 199-202. </s> 2. While the typical retail sale is one involving goods or services that are frequently acquired for family or personal use, Congress also intended that the retail exemption extend somewhat beyond consumer goods and services, to include certain nondomestic or nonconsumer products - for example, farm implements and certain types of trucks. Pp. 203-204. </s> 3. Within the category of goods and services that can be sold at retail, not every sale can be so classified. Sales for resale are excluded by the language of the exemption, and the legislative history and common usage indicate that the term retail becomes less appropriate as the quantity and price discount increase in a transaction. Pp. 204-205. </s> 4. The sheet metal company is disqualified as a retail establishment since 83% of its gross income is derived from the fabrication and maintenance of potato processing equipment, which appears to have no private or noncommercial utility and bears little resemblance to those strictly commercial articles which may be sold at retail. Pp. 205-207. </s> 5. The tire company, which as the employer has the burden of proof in establishing its exemption under 13 (a) (2), has not met that burden, as it has failed to show that the transactions qualified as retail under the Secretary's guidelines for retail sales, which in pertinent part are sustained in view of the common conception of the term retail as excluding sales made in quantity and at significant discounts, and in view of the legislative history in respect thereto. Pp. 207-209. </s> 335 F.2d 952, affirmed; 330 F.2d 804, reversed. </s> Eli A. Weston argued the cause for petitioner in No. 30. On the brief was T. H. Eberle. [383 U.S. 190, 192] </s> Bessie Margolin argued the cause for petitioner in No. 31. With her on the briefs were Solicitor General Marshall, Ralph S. Spritzer, Philip B. Heymann, Charles Donahue and Caruthers G. Berger. </s> Charles Donahue argued the cause for respondent in No. 30. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Marshall, Philip B. Heymann, Bessie Margolin, Robert E. Nagle and Caruthers G. Berger. </s> Lucius E. Burch, Jr., argued the cause for respondents in No. 31. With him on the brief was Tom Mitchell, Jr. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The common question presented by these two cases is the meaning of the phrase "retail or service establishment" as that language is used in the exemptive provisions of the federal wage and hour statute. We first set forth the statute and describe the two cases before us, then examine the history and content of the exempting clause, and finally apply the resulting analysis to the facts of each case. </s> I. </s> The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 enacted a comprehensive scheme providing for minimum wages and overtime pay for workers "engaged in" or "in the production of goods for" interstate and foreign commerce. 1 Among other exemptions, Congress by 13 (a) (2) of the Act has excluded from the statute's wage and hour protections those employees working for certain "retail [383 U.S. 190, 193] or service" establishments. 2 To qualify for this exemption in its present form, an establishment must meet three tests: first, it must make more than 50% of its annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services within the State; 3 second, it must meet one of four tests designated "(i)-(iv)," chiefly designed to prevent most very large employers from enjoying the exemption; 4 third, it must be a "retail or service establishment." Regarding this third requirement - which is the focus of this decision - 13 (a) (2) states that "[a] `retail or service establishment' shall mean an establishment 75 per centum of whose annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services [383 U.S. 190, 194] (or of both) is not for resale and is recognized as retail sales or services in the particular industry." </s> Of the cases before us, the first one, No. 30, stems from two consolidated actions brought by the Secretary of Labor against Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. (Idaho Sheet). By one action the Secretary sought to enjoin future disregard of the Act's overtime provisions, and by the other he sought to collect on behalf of one employee unpaid overtime compensation for a period during the year 1960. See 15-17, 52 Stat. 1068-1069, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 215-217 (1964 ed.). The ensuing litigation established that Idaho Sheet operates a plant in Burley, Idaho, where it employs about 12 workers to fabricate, install, and maintain sheet metal products. Many articles are sold to individuals, farmers, and local merchants, the plant has display racks to show its wares, and about 60% of sales in number are said to be to "the general public" as opposed to industrial customers. About 83% of the gross income, however, is derived from metal work done on equipment used by five potato processing companies which dehydrate and freeze the potatoes for interstate shipment. </s> For its defense, Idaho Sheet denied its workers were engaged in or producing goods for interstate commerce. It also claimed to be an exempt retail or service establishment, adducing proof that over 75% of its dollar volume of sales was not for resale and that its officials and salesmen who sell to it regarded the business as retail. The District Court held that Idaho Sheet was outside the interstate commerce coverage of the Act and was in any case exempt. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed on both points and held in favor of the Secretary. 335 F.2d 952. We granted certiorari limited to the question whether Idaho Sheet was a retail or service establishment within the meaning of the Act. 380 U.S. 905 . [383 U.S. 190, 195] </s> In the other case before us, No. 31, the Secretary of Labor sued the Steepleton General Tire Company (Steepleton) and its president to require compliance with the minimum wage, overtime pay, and record-keeping provisions of the Act. Steepleton, which is located in Memphis, Tennessee, and employs about 47 workers, is a franchised tire dealer engaged in the sale, recapping, and repair of tires. Some of Steepleton's income derives from dealings with private customers but more than half the gross income comes from sales and repairs of tires furnished to businesses operating heavy industrial or construction vehicles or operating fleets of trucks; apparently a sizable though unspecified portion of these commercial customers operated their equipment in interstate commerce. </s> The District Court determined that Steepleton came within the interstate commerce coverage of the Act, and that issue is no longer in the case. Alleging itself to be exempt under 13 (a) (2), Steepleton showed that 75% or more of its sales were not for resale and that the industry's predominant and long-standing use of the word retail applied that term to all tire sales not for resale, despite the commercial character of the tires and the established pattern of quantity discounts. The only explanation offered for this use was that it conformed to many state sales tax statutes. The Secretary showed that the industry sometimes used the word retail in other senses that excluded commercial sales and that commercial customers of Steepleton did not regard their purchases as retail transactions. The District Court held Steepleton to be entitled to the exemption. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court in all respects, 330 F.2d 804, and we granted certiorari at the behest of the Secretary to consider whether Steepleton qualified as a retail or service establishment. 380 U.S. 904 . [383 U.S. 190, 196] </s> The approach of the Sixth Circuit, which took industry usage as controlling, and that of the Ninth Circuit, which rejected it as the sole test, represent irreconcilable interpretations of the critical statutory language. While support can be mustered for both views, we believe the Ninth Circuit is correct and on this point follow our earlier decision in Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290 . After rejecting the industry's usage as controlling, we face the further difficult question of what criteria do determine when business transactions are retail under the Act; to this question it is still less easy to return a clear-cut answer, but our analysis of the matter leads us to conclude that neither Idaho Sheet nor Steepleton qualifies as a retail or service establishment. </s> II. </s> To construe the present language of the exemption demands a knowledge of its origins. Section 13 (a) (2), as it appeared in the 1938 enactment, used the present phrase "retail or service establishment" to delimit the exemption but did not further define the concept. 5 The Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Administrator initially made his interpretation of the retail exemption known through an Interpretative Bulletin and through various official statements. 6 To summarize very generally, the Administrator viewed a retail establishment as one selling goods or services to private individuals for personal or family consumption; sales of these same [383 U.S. 190, 197] goods or services to businesses or state agencies remained retail if sold at the normal price charged private consumers or in quantities a private consumer would buy. See Interp. Bull. No. 6, § 14, in 1942 WH Manual, p. 330. However, there were deviations from this consumer-goods standard in favor of employers, notable instances being the exemption of farm implement dealers and linen supply firms supplying commercial customers. See Statements of the Administrator, in 1944-1945 WH Manual, pp. 469-470. </s> In 1946 this Court decided Roland Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 , holding inter alia that a business engaged in commercial wiring, electrical contracting for industry, and repair and replacement of electric motors and generators did not constitute a retail or service establishment. The opinion used considerable language suggesting that no sale of any article for business or profit-making use as opposed to personal consumption could qualify as a retail sale, a position which supported the result but went far beyond a necessary holding. See 326 U.S., at 673 -677. This case, and several others in this vein, 7 prompted the Administrator to report to Congress that certain hitherto exempt classes of business were endangered - notably farm equipment dealers - and to recommend amending legislation. See 1948 Wage and Hour Division, Annual Report, pp. 120-121. </s> The Administrator proposed, so far as immediately relevant, to define a retail establishment as one deriving 75% of its income from retail sales and then to define as retail sales those made to private individuals for personal or family consumption, sales of the same items to any other customer if not for resale and if similar in type [383 U.S. 190, 198] and quantity, and sales to farmers of goods of the type and quantity used on the ordinary farm. When Congress convened in 1949, a number of bills were introduced to amend the Act in various respects. The bill reported out by the House committee and the substitute measure first debated by the House adopted the Administrator's basic proposal, but a further substitute backed by an opposing coalition and introduced as an amendment during the debates finally prevailed and was sent to the Senate. 8 This bill as passed contained the definition of exempt retail and service establishments that became law in 1949 and which remains the law today. 9 The Senate during the debate of its own committee-reported bill, which did not amend the retail exemption, amended the Senate bill to conform to the House's revision of 13 (a) (2). 10 Thus, when the House-Senate conference committee met to iron out other differences in the respective versions of the legislation, uniformity in the amendment to 13 (a) (2) already existed. The debates on the retail exemption in each House were substantial and several legislative documents construe the amended section. 11 </s> [383 U.S. 190, 199] </s> In light of the legislative history, the first question to be faced is whether the 1949 amendment requires the Secretary to treat as retail any sale of goods or services not for resale that is most customarily described or labeled as a retail transaction by those in the industry, acting of course in good faith. If the answer were yes, then both Idaho Sheet and Steepleton would deserve exemptions without more ado, since admittedly the predominant or sole usage of those in the industry applied the term retail to the questioned sales. It should not be said that this reading is without support. Most importantly, it would appear to follow from the most literal reading of the statute; the phrase "recognized as retail . . . in the particular industry" well lends itself to an inquiry into how the businessmen concerned term their dealings. Some statements in the debates explicitly foster this reading, for example, the comment by Senator Holland who sponsored the amendment in the Senate that under his approach, "for different commodities . . . we have to find the definition which is understood by the people dealing in that industry." 95 Cong. Rec. 12519. 12 We do not agree with the Government that this reading is necessarily infirm because the Secretary and courts may have to seek a standard or predominant use of the word retail among several uses extant in the industry. Certainly we do not agree with the further suggestion that this literal reading must give the industry self-determination as to whether the exemption [383 U.S. 190, 200] applies; courts are not incompetent to distinguish between a legitimized usage fixed by established practice and one recently instituted with the aim of avoiding the law. </s> On balance, however, the arguments against this literal reading are more persuasive. At the start, such a reading would attribute to Congress a purpose going well beyond its reiterated explanation that the amendment was designed to overturn the sweeping principle of the Roland case. The legislative history is replete with evidence that the target of the amendment was Roland's proposition that no sale to a business purchaser could be a retail sale, which Senator Holland condemned by comparing the different status it gave to the sale of a batch of towels to a housewife and the same sale to a hotelkeeper. 95 Cong. Rec. 12494. 13 Further, for every suggestion in the debates that Congress intended also wholly to revamp the exemption by substituting an overriding industry-usage test, there are statements that point in the other direction. Thus, Senator Holland observed that his amendment would not undo the commonly held view that quantity sales at discount prices are generally nonretail. 14 It was said that the "recognizing" [383 U.S. 190, 201] is done by the Administrator and the courts as well as the merchant, 95 Cong. Rec. 12510 (remarks of Senator Holland), and that due weight must be given to the "actual practice" in the industry, Senate Conf. Majority Statement, 95 Cong. Rec. 14877, and the "well-settled habits of business," 95 Cong. Rec. 12510 (remarks of Senator Holland). The lists set forth of potentially retail businesses include almost only those selling consumer goods and services. See House Conf. Rep., p. 25 (quoted p. 203, infra); 95 Cong. Rec. 11003-11004 (remarks of Mr. Lucas); 95 Cong. Rec. 12502 (remarks of Senator Holland). There are denials that the industries' own interpretations of a retail sale will be decisive. 15 </s> The conclusive consideration for us in rejecting the industry-usage test is that it would compel results flatly inconsistent with those Congress explicitly contemplated and might indeed work a major revolution in the Act's coverage not acknowledged in any legislative statement or report before us. The prime example of this threatened inconsistency is the problem presented to this Court in 1959 by Mitchell v. Kentucky Finance Co., 359 U.S. 290 , [383 U.S. 190, 202] where a business making small personal loans and purchasing conditional sale contracts from retailers claimed to be an exempt retail or service establishment. Although the company introduced persuasive evidence that the industry regarded its transactions as retail, the Court denied the exemption in the face of the legislative history indicating a limited purpose for the 1949 amendment and containing an express statement that "[t]he amendment does not exempt banks, insurance companies, building and loan associations, credit companies, newspapers, telephone companies, gas and electric utility companies, telegraph companies, etc., because there is no concept of retail selling or servicing in these industries." House Conf. Rep., pp. 25-26. See Senate Conf. Majority Statement, 95 Cong. Rec. 14877. If weight is to be given to statements about the nonretail status of quantity sales at discounts, see n. 14, supra, congressional intent would be similarly frustrated by the truck tire industry's retail designation of all sales not for resale no matter how great the quantity and discount. In view of the use of the word retail in the truck tire and credit industries, it would hardly be surprising to find that newspaper, telephone, or gas and electric companies label their sales to consumers as retail. Yet the legislative history is so explicitly opposed to the extension of the retail exemption to such businesses as to provide the final argument against adopting an industry-usage test that could dictate that result. </s> Since we reject the industry's usage as the single touchstone, the question arises what meaning is to be given to the term retail. In approaching this question we agree with the Secretary that it is generally helpful to ask first whether the sale of a particular type of goods or services can ever qualify as retail whatever the terms of sale; if and only if the answer is affirmative is it then [383 U.S. 190, 203] necessary to determine the terms or circumstances that make a sale of those goods or services a retail sale. </s> Plainly the typical retail transaction is one involving goods or services that are frequently acquired for family or personal use. As examples of sales that could qualify as retail, the House Conference Report lists those made "by the grocery store, the hardware store, the coal dealer, the automobile dealer selling passenger cars or trucks, the clothing store, the dry goods store, the department store, the paint store, the furniture store, the drug store, the shoe store, the stationer, the lumber dealer, etc. . . ." House Conf. Rep., p. 25 (sale of farm machinery is another example given). See also 95 Cong. Rec. 11003-11004 (remarks of Mr. Lucas); 95 Cong. Rec. 12502 (remarks of Senator Holland). Of course Congress' conceded intent to overrule the Roland principle means sales of such goods or services can be retail "whether made to private householders or to business users," House Conf. Rep., p. 25, but the goods and services listed nearly all share the common characteristic that they are often purchased by householders. The legislative recital of telephone, gas and electric, and credit companies along with a number of others as businesses outside the exemption, see p. 202, supra, demonstrates that not everything the consumer purchases can be a retail sale of goods or services, but the breadth of this qualification need not here be explored. </s> What is important for this decision is that Congress also intended that the retail exemption extend in some measure beyond consumer goods and services to embrace certain products almost never purchased for family or noncommercial use. An indisputable example is the sale of farm implements. See House Conf. Rep., p. 25. Another instance is trucks, at least of some varieties, whose "retailability" is assumed in the legislative history, [383 U.S. 190, 204] e. g., 95 Cong. Rec. 12497 (remarks of Senator Holland), and confirmed by the presence of another exemption in the Act that would otherwise be difficult to understand. 16 See also 95 Cong. Rec. 12495 (remarks of Senator Holland) (retailability of modest office desk). We cannot draw a precise line between such articles and those like industrial machinery which can never be sold at retail, see House Conf. Rep., p. 26, but a few characteristics of items like small trucks and farm implements may offer some guidance: their employment is very widespread as is that of consumer goods; they are often distributed in stores or showrooms and by means not dissimilar to those used for consumer goods; and perhaps it can be said that they are very frequently used in commercial activities of limited scope. While the list of strictly commercial items whose sale can be deemed retail is presumably very small, their existence precludes use of the uncomplicated "consumer goods" test proposed by the Administrator in 1949. See pp. 197-198, supra. </s> Within the category of goods and services that can be sold at retail, naturally not every sale can be so classified. The exemption itself excludes any sale for resale and beyond that, references in the legislative history, n. 14, supra, and common parlance certainly suggest that the term retail becomes less apt as the quantity and the price discount increase in a particular transaction. Again, we do not believe the word usage of the industry must [383 U.S. 190, 205] be given conclusive force. The legislative comments on discounting just cited are to the contrary; and the statute cannot easily be read to make usage control whether a particular sale is retail after we have rejected that test in deciding whether sale of a given item can ever be retail. The Secretary has in fact quite properly looked carefully at usage and practice in each industry before taking a position, 29 CFR 779.323 (1965), but he cannot be hamstrung by the terminology of a particular trade. In view of the diversity of structure and marketing practices in different industries, flexibility is certainly appropriate, and we do not here further attempt to adduce general rules. We do note that the considerable discretion possessed by the Secretary as the one responsible for the actual administration of the Act should not be understressed. Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463, 471 ; see United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 549 . </s> III. </s> In light of the premises now established, resolution of the two cases before us can be accomplished readily. Turning first to Idaho Sheet Metal Works, we believe it is disqualified as a retail establishment by the 83% of its gross income derived from metal work relating to the potato processing equipment. The company has stressed the wide public it serves, the display racks and other retail facilities in its building, the irregular intervals at which work on the potato equipment is performed, and the company's lineage tracing back to the "tin shops" of yesterday. All these factors may bear upon the classification of its other sales, and if those were its sole business or three-quarters of it the company might well deserve the exemption. But 13 (a) (2) is explicit in its treatment of establishments whose sales are variegated: a business is characterized by its sales and no more than [383 U.S. 190, 206] 25% of the dollar volume may derive from sales designated nonretail without loss of the exemption. See n. 2, supra. In this instance 83% of the gross income is made by sale or servicing of the potato processing equipment and we do not believe those transactions before us can be labeled retail whatever the particular terms. </s> This last conclusion follows naturally from the admitted facts. The pretrial order described the potato equipment fabricated and maintained by Idaho Sheet as vats, storage tanks, hoods, elevator buckets, and chutes. Hoods were described at trial by one purchaser as being "five feet square on the bottom and about four feet high where they go to the vent stacks." He also testified that the tanks held as much as "5,000 pounds of peeled potatoes," and that chutes were about 12 feet long. If this testimony is not fairly representative of the nature of the equipment under scrutiny, there is no indication of that from Idaho Sheet, upon which lies the burden of establishing the facts requisite to an exemption. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388 . The type of equipment described plainly appears to have no private or noncommercial utility. Nor does it bear much resemblance to those strictly commercial articles earlier named that may be sold at retail. Unlike small trucks and farm equipment, the market for these goods is highly limited, and far from being stock items purchased off the shelf, these articles were generally fabricated to meet individual specifications. 17 In the 83% of its business relating to the potato equipment, Idaho Sheet seems hardly distinguishable from "an establishment engaged [383 U.S. 190, 207] in the sale and servicing of manufacturing machinery and manufacturing equipment used in the production of goods," which the House Conference Report flatly stated could not be exempt. House Conf. Rep., p. 26. Since in our view this potato equipment cannot be the subject of a retail sale, we have no occasion to consider the company's claim that the pricing and quantity of its particular sales of the equipment conform to retail standards. </s> The second case, involving the Steepleton tire business, is in some respects more intricate. The Government has alleged, and Steepleton does not deny, that better than half the company's dollar volume derives from sales to companies operating fleets of commercial vehicles and other heavy industrial machinery such as earth-moving equipment. The Government's first ground for withholding the exemption is that tire transactions relating to large trucks and industrial vehicles are intrinsically nonretail whatever the terms. It analogizes these vehicles to industrial machinery and then would treat the tires just as the trucks. And it stresses the ties between these vehicles and interstate commerce. </s> Admitting that the argument has force, we do not accept it. Among the few strictly commercial articles that Congress pretty plainly viewed as retailable were trucks in at least some varieties, as we have already shown. No reason appears why the sale of tires for those trucks should be distinguished and not allowed to qualify as retailable items. The strength of the Government's position lies in its readiness to separate big trucks and tires from little trucks and tires. The Secretary, however, seemingly has chosen not to classify truck tires on this basis but instead treats all truck tires as capable of being sold at retail. 18 A decision of this [383 U.S. 190, 208] kind, no doubt turning in part on problems of administration and facets of industry practice, clearly implicates the Secretary's discretion, and we see no cause to disturb its exercise in this case. </s> Steepleton is, nevertheless, deprived of the retail establishment exemption because - as the Government alternatively contended - it has failed to show that the tire dealings in question were made on terms and in circumstances that qualify them as retail within the Secretary's guidelines. The guidelines class as nonretail all sales to fleets of five or more vehicles at "wholesale prices," a wholesale price being defined as that charged on sales for resale or on sales to 10-vehicle fleets. See n. 18, supra. These guidelines, reportedly designed after inquiry into industry practices, are quite evidently aimed at excluding from the retail category sales generally made at significant discounts and in quantity. Given the common conception of the term retail and references in the legislative history to discount sales, see n. 14, supra, we see no reason not to sustain these guidelines; indeed, the company does not even appear to discuss them, save as is implicit in its claims that the Secretary's position here does not correspond to word usage in the industry. </s> In concluding that Steepleton has not proved itself exempt, a certain indefiniteness in the record should be noted. The Government showed at trial that many of [383 U.S. 190, 209] the sales were to large fleets, that a number of purchasers said they received discounts, that the practice in the industry was to grant significant discounts for fleet sales, that some sales were for resale or pursuant to bids to public agencies, and pointed out other facts directed at showing nonexemption under the guidelines. Despite this evidence, there is unclarity as to the precise percentages of dollar volume attributable to the various sales that the guidelines label nonretail. However, the burden of proof respecting exemptions is upon the company, as earlier indicated, and since we uphold the Secretary's test, that burden has not been met. If Steepleton had alleged on appeal that it could meet the Secretary's standards if they prevailed, even then we would hesitate to order a remand since the Secretary's position has been known from the outset. In all events, Steepleton has not even claimed in this Court that the Secretary's standards could be met. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 30 is affirmed; the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 31 is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 201-219 (1964 ed.). Sections 6-7, codified as 206-207, respectively cover minimum wages and overtime pay. The commerce coverage of the Act, through a special definition of "production," is drawn in generous terms. See 3 (j), codified as 203 (j). </s> [Footnote 2 52 Stat. 1067, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 213 (a) (2) (1964 ed.). The section provides that the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Act shall not apply to: "(2) any employee employed by any retail or service establishment, more than 50 per centum of which establishment's annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services is made within the State in which the establishment is located, if such establishment - ". . . [meets one of four tests, designated `(i)-(iv)' and framed with reference to another section of the Act]. "A `retail or service establishment' shall mean an establishment 75 per centum of whose annual dollar volume of sales of goods or services (or of both) is not for resale and is recognized as retail sales or services in the particular industry." </s> [Footnote 3 This requirement has been met by the companies in this case. Section 13 (a) (4) of the Act, added in 1949 by 63 Stat. 917, 29 U.S.C. 213 (a) (4) (1964 ed.), provides that an establishment that makes or processes the goods it sells may qualify as exempt if it meets the tests of 13 (a) (2) and "is recognized as a retail establishment in the particular industry" and makes more than 85% of its annual dollar volume of sales of such goods within the State. So far as the companies in this case may be deemed to make or process the goods they sell, the Government is apparently satisfied that the added requirements of 13 (a) (4) have been met or at least is unwilling to rely upon them. </s> [Footnote 4 These four tests were added to 13 (a) (2) in 1961 by 75 Stat. 71. The Government has not suggested that this amendment would disqualify either of the companies in the present case. </s> [Footnote 5 The 1938 version read: "(a) The provisions of sections 6 and 7 shall not apply with respect to . . . (2) any employee engaged in any retail or service establishment the greater part of whose selling or servicing is in intrastate commerce." 52 Stat. 1067. </s> [Footnote 6 This Bulletin, designated No. 6, appears along with other official statements in various editions of the BNA Wage and Hour Manual (hereafter cited as WH Manual), e. g., 1942 edition. The Secretary's present views are stated in 29 CFR 779-779. 515 (1965). </s> [Footnote 7 See Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 ; Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463 . See also McComb v. Factory Stores Co., 81 F. Supp. 403; McComb v. Diebert, 16 CCH Labor Cas. § 64,982. </s> [Footnote 8 The bill reported out of committee was H. R. 3190, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., accompanied by H. R. Rep. No. 267. The first substitute was H. R. 5856, brought to debate by H. Res. 183. The final, successful version retained the number H. R. 5856 but was drawn from H. R. 5894. See generally 6 Lab. Rel. Rep., p. 90:459 (1961). </s> [Footnote 9 The only difference between the 1949 version of 13 (a) (2) and current law derives from the 1961 amendment to the section, which is not relevant in this case. See n. 4, supra, and accompanying text. </s> [Footnote 10 The bill reported out of committee was S. 653, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., accompanied by S. Rep. No. 640. The amendment was offered at 95 Cong. Rec. 12491 and passed at 95 Cong. Rec. 12520. </s> [Footnote 11 The principal debates appear at various points in 95 Cong. Rec. 11002-11203 (House), 12490-12520 (Senate). No initial committee reports discuss the ultimately successful version of 13 (a) (2) but a pertinent statement of the House members of the conference [383 U.S. 190, 199] committee appears in H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 24-26 (hereafter cited as House Conf. Rep.). There is also a relevant but less authoritative statement of the majority of Senate conferees (hereafter cited as Senate Conf. Majority Statement) appearing at 95 Cong. Rec. 14877. </s> [Footnote 12 Other comments in some measure favoring the most literal construction are those assuming that each industry has an established understanding of what is a retail sale, e. g., 95 Cong. Rec. 12502 (remarks of Senator Holland), 12516 (remarks of Senator [383 U.S. 190, 200] Taft); those few which seem to equate "recognized as retail" with "regarded as retail," 95 Cong. Rec. 11003 (remarks of Mr. Lucas, sponsor of the prevailing version in the House), 12502 (remarks of Senator Holland); and one or two suggesting that a discount sale may qualify as retail, 95 Cong. Rec. 11003 (remarks of Mr. Lucas), 11199 (remarks of Mr. McConnell). </s> [Footnote 13 See House Conf. Rep., p. 24 ("This clarification [the amended 13 (a) (2)] is needed in order to obviate the sweeping ruling of the Administrator and the courts that no sale of goods or services for business use is retail. See Roland Electrical Co. v. Walling . . . ."); 95 Cong. Rec. 11003 (remarks of Mr. Lucas); 95 Cong. Rec. 11203 (remarks of Mr. Celler). </s> [Footnote 14 "Of course if . . . [a sale is `made in such quantity that discounts are allowed'] it comes in the category of wholesale sales." [383 U.S. 190, 201] 95 Cong. Rec. 12501. Perhaps more ambiguously, Senator Holland also stated: "If sales were made in sufficient quantity so there would be a discount and they would be regarded not as retail sales, but as wholesale sales, they would lose their exemption." 95 Cong. Rec. 12497. See also 95 Cong. Rec. 12505. But cf. 95 Cong. Rec. 11003 (remarks of Mr. Lucas). </s> [Footnote 15 "Mr. DOUGLAS. I understand that the interpretation which would be made would be that given to `retail sale' by a trade association. "Mr. HOLLAND. That is one criterion, of course; but I do not believe the Senator from Illinois, and certainly not the Senator from Florida, would wish to delegate full authority in the matter to a trade association or any other interested group." 95 Cong. Rec. 12501. See also 95 Cong. Rec. 12510 (remarks of Senator Holland). </s> [Footnote 16 Section 13 (a) (19), added in 1961 by 75 Stat. 73, 29 U.S.C. 213 (a) (19) (1964 ed.), exempts from the minimum wage and overtime pay requirements "any employee of a retail or service establishment which is primarily engaged in the business of selling automobiles, trucks, or farm implements" regardless of whether the establishment meets the further tests of 13 (a) (2), notably those added in 1961, see n. 4, supra, and accompanying text. Quite evidently this section contemplates that a business primarily selling trucks may be a retail establishment. </s> [Footnote 17 The company relies upon Wirtz v. Modern Trashmoval, Inc., 323 F.2d 451, in which the Fourth Circuit as an alternative ground of decision held a trash collection business to be a retail or service establishment under the Act. We need go no further than to say the case is quite distinguishable; trash removal is not only a wide-spread need in the commercial world but is required by private families. </s> [Footnote 18 29 CFR 779.373 (1965) relevantly provides that for purposes of 13 (a) (2) "all sales of tires, tubes, accessories and tire repair [383 U.S. 190, 208] services, including retreading and recapping" are classified as retail, with a series of exceptions including: "(d) Sales to fleet accounts at wholesale prices: . . . a `fleet account' is a customer operating five or more automobiles or trucks for business purposes. Wholesale prices . . . are prices equivalent to, or less than, those typically charged on sales for resale. . . . If the establishment makes no sales of truck tires for resale, the wholesale price . . . [is] the price charged . . . on sales of truck tires to fleet accounts operating 10 or more commercial vehicles, or if the establishment makes no such sales . . . [it is] the price typically charged in the area on [such] sales . . . ." </s> [383 U.S. 190, 210]

United States Supreme Court ROCHELLE BROSSEAU v. KENNETH J. HAUGEN(2004) No. 03-1261 Argued: Decided: December 13, 2004 </s> Per Curiam. </s> Officer Rochelle Brosseau, a member of the Puyallup, Washington, Police Department, shot Kenneth Haugen in the back as he attempted to flee from law enforcement authorities in his vehicle. Haugen subsequently filed this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington pursuant to Rev. Stat. §1979, 42 U.S.C. §1983. He alleged that the shot fired by Brosseau constituted excessive force and violated his federal constitutional rights.1 The District Court granted summary judgment to Brosseau after finding she was entitled to qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 339 F.3d 857 (2003). Following the two-step process set out in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Court of Appeals found, first, that Brosseau had violated Haugen's Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and, second, that the right violated was clearly established and thus Brosseau was not entitled to qualified immunity. Brosseau then petitioned for writ of certiorari, requesting that we review both of the Court of Appeals' determinations. We grant the petition on the second, qualified immunity question and reverse. </s> The material facts, construed in a light most favorable to Haugen, are as follows.2 On the day before the fracas, Glen Tamburello went to the police station and reported to Brosseau that Haugen, a former crime partner of his, had stolen tools from his shop. Brosseau later learned that there was a felony no-bail warrant out for Haugen's arrest on drug and other offenses. The next morning, Haugen was spray-painting his Jeep Cherokee in his mother's driveway. Tamburello learned of Haugen's whereabouts, and he and cohort Matt Atwood drove a pickup truck to Haugen's mother's house to pay Haugen a visit. A fight ensued, which was witnessed by a neighbor who called 911. </s> Brosseau heard a report that the men were fighting in Haugen's mother's yard and responded. When she arrived, Tamburello and Atwood were attempting to get Haugen into Tamburello's pickup. Brosseau's arrival created a distraction, which provided Haugen the opportunity to get away. Haugen ran through his mother's yard and hid in the neighborhood. Brosseau requested assistance, and, shortly thereafter, two officers arrived with a K-9 to help track Haugen down. During the search, which lasted about 30 to 45 minutes, officers instructed Tamburello and Atwood to remain in Tamburello's pickup. They instructed Deanna Nocera, Haugen's girlfriend who was also present with her 3-year-old daughter, to remain in her small car with her daughter. Tamburello's pickup was parked in the street in front of the driveway; Nocera's small car was parked in the driveway in front of and facing the Jeep; and the Jeep was in the driveway facing Nocera's car and angled somewhat to the left. The Jeep was parked about 4 feet away from Nocera's car and 20 to 30 feet away from Tamburello's pickup. </s> An officer radioed from down the street that a neighbor had seen a man in her backyard. Brosseau ran in that direction, and Haugen appeared. He ran past the front of his mother's house and then turned and ran into the driveway. With Brosseau still in pursuit, he jumped into the driver's side of the Jeep and closed and locked the door. Brosseau believed that he was running to the Jeep to retrieve a weapon. </s> Brosseau arrived at the Jeep, pointed her gun at Haugen, and ordered him to get out of the vehicle. Haugen ignored her command and continued to look for the keys so he could get the Jeep started. Brosseau repeated her commands and hit the driver's side window several times with her handgun, which failed to deter Haugen. On the third or fourth try, the window shattered. Brosseau unsuccessfully attempted to grab the keys and struck Haugen on the head with the barrel and butt of her gun. Haugen, still undeterred, succeeded in starting the Jeep. As the Jeep started or shortly after it began to move, Brosseau jumped back and to the left. She fired one shot through the rear driver's side window at a forward angle, hitting Haugen in the back. She later explained that she shot Haugen because she was "'fearful for the other officers on foot who [she] believed were in the immediate area, [and] for the occupied vehicles in [Haugen's] path and for any other citizens who might be in the area.'" 339 F.3d, at 865. </s> Despite being hit, Haugen, in his words, "'st[ood] on the gas'"; navigated the "'small, tight space'" to avoid the other vehicles; swerved across the neighbor's lawn; and continued down the street. Id., at 882. After about a half block, Haugen realized that he had been shot and brought the Jeep to a halt. He suffered a collapsed lung and was airlifted to a hospital. He survived the shooting and subsequently pleaded guilty to the felony of "eluding." Wash. Rev. Code §46.61.024 (1994). By so pleading, he admitted that he drove his Jeep in a manner indicating "a wanton or wilful disregard for the lives . . . of others." Ibid. He subsequently brought this §1983 action against Brosseau. *** When confronted with a claim of qualified immunity, a court must ask first the following question: "Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right?" Saucier v. Katz, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). These cases establish that claims of excessive force are to be judged under the Fourth Amendment's "'objective reasonableness'" standard. Id., at 388. Specifically with regard to deadly force, we explained in Garner that it is unreasonable for an officer to "seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead." 471 U.S., at 11. But "[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force." Ibid. </s> We express no view as to the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision on the constitutional question itself. We believe that, however that question is decided, the Court of Appeals was wrong on the issue of qualified immunity.3 </s> Qualified immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the circumstances she confronted. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S., at 206 (qualified immunity operates "to protect officers from the sometimes 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force'"). Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct. If the law at that time did not clearly establish that the officer's conduct would violate the Constitution, the officer should not be subject to liability or, indeed, even the burdens of litigation. </s> It is important to emphasize that this inquiry "must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition." Id., at 201. As we previously said in this very context: "[T]here is no doubt that Graham v. Connor, supra, clearly establishes the general proposition that use of force is contrary to the Fourth Amendment if it is excessive under objective standards of reasonableness. Yet that is not enough. Rather, we emphasized in Anderson [v. Creighton,] 'that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been "clearly established" in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' 483 U.S. [635,] 640 [(1987)]. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Id., at 201-202. </s> The Court of Appeals acknowledged this statement of law, but then proceeded to find fair warning in the general tests set out in Graham and Garner. 339 F.3d, at 873-874. In so doing, it was mistaken. Graham and Garner, following the lead of the Fourth Amendment's text, are cast at a high level of generality. See Graham v. Connor, supra, at 396 ("'[T]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application'"). Of course, in an obvious case, these standards can "clearly establish" the answer, even without a body of relevant case law. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (noting in a case where the Eighth Amendment violation was "obvious" that there need not be a materially similar case for the right to be clearly established). See also Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1283 (CA11 2002) (explaining in a Fourth Amendment case involving an officer shooting a fleeing suspect in a vehicle that, "when we look at decisions such as Garner and Graham, we see some tests to guide us in determining the law in many different kinds of circumstances; but we do not see the kind of clear law (clear answers) that would apply" to the situation at hand). The present case is far from the obvious one where Graham and Garner alone offer a basis for decision. </s> We therefore turn to ask whether, at the time of Brosseau's actions, it was "'"clearly established"'" in this more "'particularized'" sense that she was violating Haugen's Fourth Amendment right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S., at 202. The parties point us to only a handful of cases relevant to the "situation [Brosseau] confronted": whether to shoot a disturbed felon, set on avoiding capture through vehicular flight, when persons in the immediate area are at risk from that flight.4 Ibid. Specifically, Brosseau points us to Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328 (CA8 1993), and Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (CA6 1992). </s> In these cases, the courts found no Fourth Amendment violation when an officer shot a fleeing suspect who presented a risk to others. Cole v. Bone, supra, at 1333 (holding the officer "had probable cause to believe that the truck posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm to innocent motorists as well as to the officers themselves"); Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d, at 347 (noting "a car can be a deadly weapon" and holding the officer's decision to stop the car from possibly injuring others was reasonable). Smith is closer to this case. There, the officer and suspect engaged in a car chase, which appeared to be at an end when the officer cornered the suspect at the back of a dead-end residential street. The suspect, however, freed his car and began speeding down the street. At this point, the officer fired a shot, which killed the suspect. The court held the officer's decision was reasonable and thus did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It noted that the suspect, like Haugen here, "had proven he would do almost anything to avoid capture" and that he posed a major threat to, among others, the officers at the end of the street. Ibid. </s> Haugen points us to Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5 F.3d 230 (CA7 1993), where the court found summary judgment inappropriate on a Fourth Amendment claim involving a fleeing suspect. There, the court concluded that the threat created by the fleeing suspect's failure to brake when an officer suddenly stepped in front of his just-started car was not a sufficiently grave threat to justify the use of deadly force. Id., at 234. </s> These three cases taken together undoubtedly show that this area is one in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case. None of them squarely governs the case here; they do suggest that Brosseau's actions fell in the "'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.'" Saucier v. Katz, supra, at 206. The cases by no means "clearly establish" that Brosseau's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment. </s> The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. </s> ROCHELLE BROSSEAU v. KENNETH J. HAUGEN on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 03-1261.Decided December 13, 2004 </s> Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Ginsburg join, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion but write separately to express my concern about the matter to which the Court refers in footnote 3, namely, the way in which lower courts are required to evaluate claims of qualified immunity under the Court's decision in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). As the Court notes, ante, at ___, (slip op., at 4), Saucier requires lower courts to decide (1) the constitutional question prior to deciding (2) the qualified immunity question. I am concerned that the current rule rigidly requires courts unnecessarily to decide difficult constitutional questions when there is available an easier basis for the decision (e.g., qualified immunity) that will satisfactorily resolve the case before the court. Indeed when courts' dockets are crowded, a rigid "order of battle" makes little administrative sense and can sometimes lead to a constitutional decision that is effectively insulated from review, see Bunting v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1025 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For these reasons, I think we should reconsider this issue. </s> ROCHELLE BROSSEAU v. KENNETH J. HAUGEN on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit No. 03-1261.Decided December 13, 2004 </s> Justice Stevens, dissenting. </s> In my judgment, the answer to the constitutional question presented by this case is clear: Under the Fourth Amendment, it was objectively unreasonable for Officer Brosseau to use deadly force against Kenneth Haugen in an attempt to prevent his escape. What is not clear is whether Brosseau is nonetheless entitled to qualified immunity because it might not have been apparent to a reasonably well trained officer in Brosseau's shoes that killing Haugen to prevent his escape was unconstitutional. In my opinion that question should be answered by a jury. I </s> Law enforcement officers should never be subject to damages liability for failing to anticipate novel developments in constitutional law. Accordingly, whenever a suit against an officer is based on the alleged violation of a constitutional right that has not been clearly established, the qualified immunity defense is available. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Prompt dismissal of such actions protects officers from unnecessary litigation and accords with this Court's wise "policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of constitutional questions." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 859 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). When, however, the applicable constitutional rule is well settled, "we should address the constitutional question at the outset." Ibid.; see also Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). The constitutional limits on the use of deadly force have been clearly established for almost two decades. In 1985, we held that the killing of an unarmed burglar to prevent his escape was an unconstitutional seizure. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1. We considered, and rejected, the State's contention that the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures should be construed in light of the common-law rule, which allowed the use of whatever force was necessary to effectuate the arrest of a fleeing felon. Id., at 12-13. We recognized that the common-law rule had been fashioned "when virtually all felonies were punishable by death" and long before guns were available to the police, and noted that modern police departments in a majority of large cities allowed the firing of a weapon only when a felon presented a threat of death or serious bodily harm. Id., at 13-19. We concluded that "changes in the legal and technological context" had made the old rule obsolete. Id., at 15. </s> Unlike most "excessive force" cases in which the degree of permissible force varies widely from case to case, the only issue in a "deadly force" case is whether the facts apparent to the officer justify a decision to kill a suspect in order to prevent his escape. </s> In Garner we stated the governing rule: "The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable. It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape. Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failure to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.... A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.... </s> "Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given." Id., at 11-12. </s> The most common justifications for the use of deadly force are plainly inapplicable to this case. Respondent Haugen had not threatened anyone with a weapon, and petitioner Brosseau did not shoot in order to defend herself.1 Haugen was not a person who had committed a violent crime; nor was there any reason to believe he would do so if permitted to escape. Indeed, there is nothing in the record to suggest he intended to harm anyone.2 The "threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others," ibid., that provides the sole justification for Brosseau's use of deadly force was the risk that while fleeing in his vehicle Haugen would accidentally collide with a pedestrian or another vehicle. Whether Brosseau's shot enhanced or minimized that risk is debatable, but the risk of such an accident surely did not justify an attempt to kill the fugitive.3 Thus, I have no difficulty in endorsing the Court's assumption that Brosseau's conduct violated the Constitution. II </s> An officer is entitled to qualified immunity, despite having engaged in constitutionally deficient conduct, if, in doing so, she did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002). Accordingly, we have recognized that "general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning," United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997), and have firmly rejected the notion that "an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful," Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Thus, the Court's search for relevant case law applying the Garner standard to materially similar facts is both unnecessary and ill-advised. See Hope, 536 U.S., at 741 ("Although earlier cases involving'fundamentally similar' facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding"); see also Lanier, 520 U.S., at 269. Indeed, the cases the majority relies on are inapposite and, in fact, only serve to illuminate the patent unreasonableness of Brosseau's actions.4 </s> Rather than uncertainty about the law, it is uncertainty about the likely consequences of Haugen's flight--or, more precisely, uncertainty about how a reasonable officer making the split-second decision to use deadly force would have assessed the foreseeability of a serious accident--that prevents me from answering the question of qualified immunity that this case presents. This is a quintessentially "fact-specific" question, not a question that judges should try to answer "as a matter of law." Cf. Anderson, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); id., at 233 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bryant v. U.S. Treasury Dept., Secret Service, 903 F.2d 717, 720 (CA9 1990) ("Whether a reasonable officer could have believed he had probable cause is a question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment or a directed verdict in a §1983 action based on [the] lack of probable cause is proper only if there is only one reasonable conclusion a jury could reach")). The bizarre scenario described in the record of this case convinces me that reasonable jurors could well disagree about the answer to the qualified immunity issue. My conclusion is strongly reinforced by the differing opinions expressed by the Circuit Judges who have reviewed the record. III </s> The Court's attempt to justify its decision to reverse the Court of Appeals without giving the parties an opportunity to provide full briefing and oral argument is woefully unpersuasive. If Brosseau had deliberately shot Haugen in the head and killed him, the legal issues would have been the same as those resulting from the nonfatal wound. I seriously doubt that my colleagues would be so confident about the result as to decide the case without the benefit of briefs or argument on such facts.5 At a minimum, the Ninth Circuit's decision was not clearly erroneous, and the extraordinary remedy of summary reversal is not warranted on these facts. See R. Stern, E. Gressman, & S. Shapiro, Supreme Court Practice 281 (6th ed. 1986). In sum, the constitutional limits on an officer's use of deadly force have been well settled in this Court's jurisprudence for nearly two decades, and, in this case, Officer Brosseau acted outside of those clearly delineated bounds. Nonetheless, in my judgment, there is a genuine factual question as to whether a reasonably well-trained officer standing in Brosseau's shoes could have concluded otherwise, and that question plainly falls with the purview of the jury. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Haugen also asserted pendent state-law claims and claims against the city and police department. These claims are not presently before us. Footnote 2Because this case arises in the posture of a motion for summary judgment, we are required to view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Haugen. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Footnote 3We have no occasion in this case to reconsider our instruction in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), that lower courts decide the constitutional question prior to deciding the qualified immunity question. We exercise our summary reversal procedure here simply to correct a clear misapprehension of the qualified immunity standard. Footnote 4The parties point us to a number of other cases in this vein that postdate the conduct in question, i.e., Brosseau's February 21, 1999, shooting of Haugen. See Cowan ex rel. Estate of Cooper v. Breen, 352 F.3d 756, 763 (CA2 2003); Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1281-1282 (CA11 2002); Scott v. Clay County, Tennessee, 205 F.3d 867, 877 (CA6 2000); McCaslin v. Wilkins, 183 F.3d 775, 778-779 (CA8 1999); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 288-296 (CA3 1999). These decisions, of course, could not have given fair notice to Brosseau and are of no use in the clearly established inquiry. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Although Brosseau attested that she believed Haugen may have been attempting to retrieve a weapon from the floorboard of his vehicle sometime during the struggle, a fact which Haugen hotly contests, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that, at the time the shot was fired, Brosseau believed, or any reasonable officer would have thought, that Haugen had access to a weapon at that moment. Footnote 2At the time of the shooting, Brosseau had the following facts at her disposal. Haugen had a felony no-bail warrant for a nonviolent drug offense, was suspected in a nonviolent burglary, and had been fleeing from law enforcement on foot for approximately 30 to 45 minutes without incident. At the behest of Brosseau, the private individuals on the scene were inside their respective vehicles. Haugen's girlfriend and daughter were in a small car approximately four feet in front and slightly to the right of Haugen's Jeep; Glen Tamburello and Matt Atwood were inside a pickup truck on the street blocking the driveway, approximately 20 to 30 feet from Haugen's Jeep. The only two police officers on foot at the scene were last seen in a neighbor's backyard, two houses down and to the right of the driveway. Footnote 3The evidence supporting Haugen's allegation that Brosseau did "willfully fire her weapon with the intent to murder me," 1 Record, Doc. No. 1, includes a statement by a defense expert that Brosseau had "clearly articulated her intention to use deadly force," id., Doc. No. 24. Moreover, the report of the Puyallup, Washington, Police Department Firearms Review Board stated that Brosseau "chose to use deadly force to stop Haugen," 2 id., Doc. No. 27, Exh. H. Footnote 4In Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328 (CA8 1993), an 18-wheel tractor-trailer sped through a tollbooth and engaged the police in a high-speed pursuit in excess of 90 miles per hour on a high-traffic interstate during the holiday season. During the course of the pursuit, the driver passed traffic on both shoulders of the interstate, repeatedly attempted to ram several police cars, drove more than 100 passenger vehicles off the road, ran through several roadblocks, and continued driving after the officer shot out the wheels of the fugitive's truck. Id., at 1330-1331. Only then did the officer finally resort to deadly force to disable the driver. Similarly, in Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (CA6 1992), the suspect led a police officer on a high-speed chase, reaching speeds in excess of 90 miles per hour. When the officer initially cornered the suspect in a field, the driver repeatedly swerved directly toward the police car, forcing the officer to move out of the way and allowing the suspect to continue the chase. Id., at 344. Only after additional officers cornered the suspect for a second time, and after the suspect smashed directly into an unoccupied police car and began to flee again, did the officer finally shoot the driver. Ibid. </s> In stark contrast, at the time Brosseau shot Haugen, the Jeep was immobile, or at best, had just started moving. Haugen had not driven at excess speeds; nor had he rammed, or attempted to ram, nearby police cars or passenger vehicles. In sum, there was no ongoing or prior high-speed car chase to inform the probable cause analysis. Footnote 5The Court's recitation of the facts that led up to the shooting obscures the undisputed point that no one contends Haugen was the kind of dangerous person--perhaps a terrorist or an escaped convict on a crime spree--who would have been a danger to the community if he had been allowed to escape. The factual issues relate only to the danger that he posed while in the act of escaping.

United States Supreme Court WISSNER v. WISSNER(1950) No. 119 Argued: Decided: February 6, 1950 </s> An insured under a National Service Life Insurance policy, who was domiciled in California, as was his wife, designated his mother as principal beneficiary and his father as contingent beneficiary. Premiums on the policy were paid from the insured's Army pay. Since his death the proceeds of the policy were being paid to his mother in monthly installments. The insured's widow brought suit in a California court, alleging that, under the state community property law, she was entitled to one-half the proceeds of the policy. The court gave judgment to the widow for one-half of the payments already received and required payment to her of one-half of all future payments immediately upon receipt thereof. Held: </s> 1. The judgment of the state court was invalid as in conflict with the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940. Pp. 656-660. </s> (a) Under 38 U.S.C. 802 (g), the proceeds of such a policy belong to the named beneficiary; and the judgment below would nullify the soldier's choice and frustrate the purpose of Congress. Pp. 658-659. </s> (b) So far as it ordered diversion of future payments, the judgment contravenes the provision of 38 U.S.C. 454a that payments to the named beneficiary "shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary . . . ." P. 659. </s> (c) A different result is not required by decisions holding exemptions relating to pensions and veterans' relief inapplicable when alimony or the support of wife or children is in issue. Pp. 659-660. </s> 2. The National Service Life Insurance Act is a valid exercise of the congressional powers over national defense. Pp. 660-661. </s> 3. No issue under the Fifth Amendment is presented; because the Act precludes any claim by the widow of a "vested" right in the proceeds of the insurance. P. 661. </s> 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201 P.2d 837, reversed. [338 U.S. 655, 656] </s> In a suit in a California state court, by the widow of an insured under a National Service Life Insurance policy, to recover one-half the proceeds of the policy, the state court gave judgment for the plaintiff. The District Court of Appeal affirmed. 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201 P.2d 837. The State Supreme Court denied a hearing. On appeal to this Court, reversed, p. 661. </s> Carlos J. Badger argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were W. Coburn Cook and Vernon F. Gant. </s> Leslie A. Cleary argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was William Zeff. </s> By special leave of Court, Morton Hollander argued the cause for the United States, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison and Paul A. Sweeney. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We are to determine whether the California community property law, as applied in this case, conflicts with certain provisions of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940; 1 and if so, whether the federal law is consistent with the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The cause is here on appeal from the final judgment of a California District Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court of California having denied a hearing. Reading the opinion below as a decision that the federal statute was unconstitutional, we noted probable jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1257 (1). </s> The material facts are not in dispute. Appellants are the parents, and appellee the widow, of Major Leonard O. Wissner, who died in India in 1945 in the service of the [338 U.S. 655, 657] United States Army. He had enlisted in the Army in November 1942 and in January 1943 subscribed to a National Service Life Insurance policy in the principal sum of $10,000, which policy was in effect at the date of his death. The opinion below indicates that the decedent and appellee were estranged at the time he entered the Army or shortly thereafter. In January 1943 he requested his attorney to "get an insurance policy away" from appellee. After six months in the service decedent stopped the allotment to his wife, and in September 1943 expressed the wish that he "could find some way of forcing plaintiff to a settlement and a divorce." It is not surprising, therefore, that, without the knowledge or consent of his wife, the Major named his mother principal and his father contingent beneficiary under his National Service Life Insurance policy. Since his death the United States Veterans' Administration has been paying his mother the proceeds of the policy in monthly installments. </s> In 1947 the Major's widow brought action against the appellants in the Superior Court for Stanislaus County, State of California, alleging that under California community property law she was entitled to one-half the proceeds of the policy. Appellants answered that their designation as beneficiaries was "final and conclusive as against any claimed rights" of appellee. The court found that the decedent and his widow had been married in 1930, and until the date of Major Wissner's death had been legally domiciled there and subject to the state's community property laws. Major Wissner's army pay, which was held to be community property under California law, 2 was the source of the premiums paid on the policy. [338 U.S. 655, 658] But no claim was made for the premiums; the widow sought the proceeds of the insurance. The court concluded that, consistent with California law in the ordinary insurance case, the proceeds of this policy "were and are the community property" of the widow and the decedent, and entered judgment for appellee for one-half the amount of payments already received, plus interest, and required appellants to pay appellee one-half of all future payments "immediately upon the receipt thereof" by appellees or either thereof. The District Court of Appeal affirmed, 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201 P.2d 837 (1949), holding that appellee had a "vested right" to the insurance proceeds, and the Supreme Court of California denied a hearing, one judge dissenting. </s> We are of the opinion that the decision below was incorrect. The National Service Life Insurance Act is the congressional mode of affording a uniform and comprehensive system of life insurance for members and veterans of the armed forces of the United States. A liberal policy toward the serviceman and his named beneficiary is everywhere evident in the comprehensive statutory plan. Premiums are very low and are waived during the insured's disability; costs of administration are borne by the United States; liabilities may be discharged out of congressional appropriations. </s> The controlling section of the Act provides that the insured "shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or beneficiaries of the insurance [within a designated class], . . . and shall . . . at all times have the right to change the beneficiary or beneficiaries . . . ." 38 U.S.C. 802 (g). Thus Congress has spoken with force and clarity in directing that the proceeds belong to the named beneficiary and no other. Pursuant to the congressional command, the Government contracted to pay the insurance to the insured's choice. He chose his mother. It is plain to us that the judgment of the lower court, as [338 U.S. 655, 659] to one-half of the proceeds, substitutes the widow for the mother, who was the beneficiary Congress directed shall receive the insurance money. We do not share appellee's discovery of congressional purpose that widows in community property states participate in the payments under the policy, contrary to the express direction of the insured. Whether directed at the very money received from the Government or an equivalent amount, the judgment below nullifies the soldier's choice and frustrates the deliberate purpose of Congress. It cannot stand. </s> The judgment under review has a further deficiency so far as it ordered the diversion of future payments as soon as they are paid by the Government to the mother. At least in this respect, the very payments received under the policy are to be "seized," in effect, by the judgment below. This is in flat conflict with the exemption provision contained in 38 U.S.C. 454a, made a part of this Act by 38 U.S.C. 816: Payments to the named beneficiary "shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary. . . ." </s> We recognize that some courts have ruled that this and similar exemptions relating to pensions and veterans' relief do not apply when alimony or the support of wife or children is in issue. See Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 71 App. D.C. 350, 112 F.2d 177 (1940); Tully v. Tully, 159 Mass. 91, 34 N. E. 79 (1893); Hodson v. New York City Employees' Retirement System, 243 App. Div. 480, 278 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1935); In re Guardianship of Bagnall, 238 Iowa 905, 29 N. W. 2d 597 (1947), and cases therein cited. But cf. Brewer v. Brewer, 19 Tenn. App. 209, 239-241, 84 S. W. 2d 1022, 1040 (1933). We shall not attempt to epitomize a legal system at least as ancient as the customs [338 U.S. 655, 660] of the Visigoths, 3 but we must note that the community property principle rests upon something more than the moral obligation of supporting spouse and children: the business relationship of man and wife for their mutual monetary profit. See de Funiak, Community Property, 11 (1943). Venerable and worthy as this community is, it is not, we think, as likely to justify an exception to the congressional language as specific judicial recognition of particular needs, in the alimony and support cases. Our view of those cases, whatever it may be, is irrelevant here. 4 Further, Congress has provided in the National Service Life Insurance Act that the chosen beneficiary of the life insurance policy shall be, during life, the sole owner of the proceeds. </s> The constitutionality of the congressional mandate above expounded need not detain us long. Certainly Congress in its desire to afford as much material protection as possible to its fighting force could wisely provide a plan of insurance coverage. Possession of government insurance, payable to the relative of his choice, might well directly enhance the morale of the serviceman. The exemption provision is his guarantee of the complete and full performance of the contract to the exclusion of conflicting claims. The end is a legitimate one within [338 U.S. 655, 661] the congressional powers over national defense, and the means are adapted to the chosen end. The Act is valid. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819). And since the statute which made the insurance proceeds possible was explicit in announcing that the insured shall have the right to designate the recipient of the insurance, and that "No person shall have a vested right" to those proceeds, 38 U.S.C. 802 (i), appellee could not, in law, contemplate their capture. The federal statute establishes the fund in issue, and forestalls the existence of any "vested" right in the proceeds of federal insurance. Hence no constitutional question is presented. However "vested" her right to the proceeds of nongovernmental insurance under California law, that rule cannot apply to this insurance. Compare W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934). See Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U.S. 85 (1938); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918). </s> The judgment below is </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 54 Stat. 1008, as amended, 38 U.S.C. 801 et seq. Amendments added in 1946, 60 Stat. 781, do not concern us here. </s> [Footnote 2 We assume the correctness of the lower court's statement of state law. See also French v. French, 17 Cal. 2d 775, 112 P.2d 235 (1941). The view we take of this case makes it unnecessary to decide whether California is entitled to call army pay community property. </s> [Footnote 3 See Lobingier, An Historical Introduction to Community Property Law, 8 Nat. Univ. L. Rev. (No. 2), p. 45 (1928); de Funiak, Community Property, c. II (1943). </s> [Footnote 4 There are, of course, support aspects to the community property principle, and in some cases they may be of considerable importance. Likewise alimony may not be limited to the amount essential to support the divorced spouse. But we do not think the Congress would have intended decision to turn on factual variations in the spouse's need. If there is a distinction to be drawn, we think it must be based upon a generalization as to the dominating characteristics of a particular class of cases - alimony cases, support cases, community property cases. The alimony cases have uniformly been decided on that basis. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON, dissenting. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, and I are unable to agree with the majority in this case. The husband's earnings are community property under 161a, California Civil Code. The wife has a vested interest in one-half of such earning. United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 ; Bank of America v. Mantz, 4 Cal. 2d 322, 49 P.2d 279; Cooke v. Cooke, 65 Cal. App. 2d 260, 150 P.2d 514. </s> If the premiums on a policy in a private insurance company had been paid out of community property without [338 U.S. 655, 662] the wife's consent, the wife could claim her proportionate share of the insurance. Grimm v. Grimm, 26 Cal. 2d 173, 157 P.2d 841; Cooke v. Cooke, supra; Bazzell v. Endriss, 41 Cal. App. 2d 463, 107 P.2d 49; Mundt v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 2d 416, 95 P.2d 966. 1 </s> It is claimed that the exemption provision of the federal statute prevents the same rule from applying here. This provision, 49 Stat. 609, 38 U.S.C. 454a, provides: </s> "Payments of benefits due or to become due . . . shall be exempt from the claims of creditors, and shall not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the beneficiary." </s> What did Congress contemplate by the enactment of this provision? I think the statute presupposes that the beneficiary is the undisputed owner of the proceeds, and that a creditor has sought to reach the fund on an independent claim. Under those circumstances the remedy is denied, for the statute immunizes the fund from levy or attachment. That is not the case before us. The nature of this dispute is a claim by the wife that she is the owner of a half portion of these proceeds because such proceeds are the fruits of funds originally hers. </s> And recognition of her status as an owner glaringly reveals the irrelevancy of the choice of beneficiary provision. 54 Stat. 1010, 38 U.S.C. 802 (g). Congress stated that the serviceman was to have the right to designate his beneficiary. When he has done so all other persons than the [338 U.S. 655, 663] one selected are foreclosed from claiming the proceeds as beneficiary. No further effect has the statute. Here the wife makes no claim to rights as a beneficiary. I am not persuaded that either the choice of beneficiary or the exemption provision should carry the implication of wiping out family property rights, which traditionally have been defined by state law. Fully to respect the right which Congress gave the serviceman to designate his beneficiary does not require disrespect of settled family law and the incidents of the family relationship. As noted in the opinion of the Court, analogous occasions have found courts expressing greater reluctance to obliterate rights recognized by the states. 2 </s> Even accepting the Court's view that the exemption provision applies to the wife, it was intended to protect the fund from attachment, levy, or seizure only so long as it could be identified as a fund. No attachment, levy, or seizure is attempted here. This was an action at law for a money judgment. Appellee obtained a judgment for one-half of the payments that had been collected by the beneficiaries and for one-half of those to be collected thereafter. Payments received under the policy are only the measure of the recovery. </s> To allow such a judgment does not interfere with the fund or the free designation of the beneficiary by the serviceman. I cannot believe that Congress intended to [338 U.S. 655, 664] say to a serviceman, "You may take your wife's property and purchase a policy of insurance payable to your mother, and we will see that your defrauded wife gets none of the money." Certainly Congress did not intend to upset the long-standing community property law of the states where it was not necessary for the protection of the Government in its relation to the soldier or to the integrity of the fund from "attachment, levy, or seizure." These are words of art. They have a definite meaning and usage in the law. This usage is not present here. I find nothing in the section that prohibits the beneficiary from being sued at any time on a matter growing out of the transaction by which the soldier acquired the insurance, at least where there is no attempt to attach, levy, or seize the fund. It was the fund Congress was interested in protecting, not the beneficiary. I would affirm. </s> [Footnote 1 ". . . the only test applied to this problem has been whether the premiums (on a policy issued on the life of a husband after coverture) are paid entirely from community funds. If so, the policy becomes a community asset and the nonconsenting wife may recover an undivided one-half thereof . . . without regard to the disproportionate size of the premium when compared with the face of the policy." Mundt v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 35 Cal. App. 2d at 421, 95 P.2d at 969. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court has sought to distinguish, unsuccessfully I think, the many cases holding that payments received as pension, disability insurance, or veterans' compensation are not exempted from claims for alimony or family support by exemption statutes in the pattern of 454a. Exhaustive discussions may be found in In re Bagnall's Guardianship, 238 Iowa 905, 29 N. W. 2d 597; Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 71 App. D.C. 350, 112 F.2d 177. See also Gaskins v. Security-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles, 30 Cal. App. 2d 409, 86 P.2d 681; Hollis v. Bryan, 166 Miss. 874, 143 So. 687. Cf. Note, 11 A. L. R. 123 and succeeding annotations. </s> [338 U.S. 655, 665]

United States Supreme Court U.S. v. UNION CENTRAL LIFE INS. CO.(1961) No. 52 Argued: November 7, 1961Decided: December 18, 1961 </s> Because a Michigan statute then required that a notice of a federal tax lien must contain a description of the land upon which the lien was claimed and it was the practice of county officials to refuse to accept for recording notices of federal tax liens not containing such descriptions, notice of a federal tax lien "upon all property" of certain delinquent taxpayers (not describing the property) was filed instead in the office of the Clerk of the Federal District Court for the judicial district in which certain real estate belonging to them was situated, as provided in 3672 (a) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended. Held: No state law "authorized the filing of such notice in an office within the State," within the meaning of 3672 (a) (1), and the federal tax lien was valid and entitled to priority over a mortgage recorded subsequently in accordance with state law. Pp. 291-296. </s> 361 Mich. 283, 105 N. W. 2d 196, reversed. </s> I. Henry Kutz argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Oberdorfer and Fred E. Youngman. </s> H. William Butler argued the cause and filed briefs for respondent. </s> Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE BLACK, announced by MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER. </s> Robert G. Peters, Jr., and his wife, of Oakland County, Michigan, failed to pay their 1952 federal income taxes. In January 1954 an assessment for this delinquency was filed in the Internal Revenue Collector's Office at Detroit, Michigan, at which time a lien arose "in favor of the United States upon all property" of the two delinquent [368 U.S. 291, 292] taxpayers. 1 Some 10 months after the Government's tax lien arose, Mr. and Mrs. Peters executed a mortgage on real property they owned in Oakland County to secure an indebtedness to the respondent Union Central Life Insurance Company. They defaulted in payment of the mortgage, and Union Central filed this action to foreclose in the Circuit Court of Oakland County, joining the United States as a party defendant because of its asserted lien. </s> The company claimed priority for its mortgage over the earlier created federal lien because no notice of the federal lien had been filed with the register of deeds in Oakland County as then required by Michigan law. 2 For this alleged priority the company relied on 3672 (a) (1) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, as amended, providing that a federal tax lien shall not be valid as against any mortgagee until notice has been filed "In the office in which the filing of such notice is authorized by the law of the State or Territory in which the property subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has by law authorized the filing of such notice in an office within the State or Territory." The Government, however, claimed that Michigan had not "authorized" filing within the meaning of the statute and that the case should be governed by 3672 (a) (2) which provides that "whenever the State . . . has not by law authorized the filing of such notice in an office within the State," the notice may be filed in "the office of the clerk of the United States district court for the judicial district in which the property subject to the lien is situated." Since the federal lien had been filed in the District Court months before the mortgage was executed and filed in the county register of deeds' [368 U.S. 291, 293] office, the Government claimed that its lien had priority. The Government's contention that Michigan had not "authorized" a state office for filing the federal tax notice was based on the fact that the Michigan law purporting to authorize such filing expressly required that a federal tax lien notice contain "a description of the land upon which a lien is claimed," even though the form long used for filing federal tax lien notices in the District Courts throughout the United States does not contain a description of any particular property upon which the lien is asserted. In support of its contention the Government pointed to the fact that in 1953 the Michigan Attorney General ruled that federal tax lien notices not containing such a description are not entitled to recordation, and it is stipulated that from the time of that ruling, up to 1956, 3 "it was the policy of the office of the Register of Deeds for said County of Oakland not to accept for recording notices of Federal tax liens which did not contain a legal description of any land." </s> Because the United States had not filed a notice complying with the Michigan law, the Michigan Circuit and Supreme Courts held the federal lien to be subordinate to the mortgage, 361 Mich. 283, 105 N. W. 2d 196. While this holding is in accord with Youngblood v. United States, 141 F.2d 912 (C. A. 6th Cir.), it conflicts with United States v. Rasmuson, 253 F.2d 944 (C. A. 8th Cir.). In order to settle this conflict and because of the importance of the question in the administration of the revenue laws, we granted certiorari. 365 U.S. 858 . </s> The Michigan requirement that notice of the federal tax lien be filed in Michigan is, of course, not controlling unless Congress has made it so, for the subject of federal taxes, including "remedies for their collection, has always been conceded to be independent of the legislative action [368 U.S. 291, 294] of the States." United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210, 214 . While 3672 (a) (1) unquestionably requires notice of a federal lien to be filed in a state office when the State authoritatively designates an office for that purpose, the section does not purport to permit the State to prescribe the form or the contents of that notice. Since such an authorization might well result in radically differing forms of federal tax notices for the various States, it would run counter to the principle of uniformity which has long been the accepted practice in the field of federal taxation. Moreover, a required compliance with Michigan law would mean that the federal tax lien would be superior to all those entitled to notice only as to the property described in the notice even though 3670 broadly creates a lien "upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to" a taxpayer. This language has been held to include in the lien all property owned by the delinquent taxpayer both at the time the lien arises and thereafter until it is paid. 4 It seems obvious that this expansive protection for the Government would be greatly reduced if to enforce it government agents were compelled to keep aware at all times of all property coming into the hands of its tax delinquents. Imposition of such a task by the Michigan law could seriously cripple the Government in the collection of its taxes, and to attribute to Congress a purpose so to weaken the tax liens it has created would require very clear language. The history of 3672 belies any such congressional purpose. </s> In 1893 this Court decided in United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 , that the federal tax lien could be enforced against bona fide purchasers who had no notice of the lien, despite a state law attempting to defeat the lien unless it has been recorded. In order to grant relief from the Snyder rule, Congress in 1913 passed an Act requiring, [368 U.S. 291, 295] much as the provision here in question did, that the tax liens should not be "valid as against any mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor" until notice was filed with the clerk of an appropriate District Court or, whenever a State authorized such filing, in the office of a county recorder of deeds. 5 This statute was amended in 1928 by adding that the lien would not be valid until notice was filed "in accordance with the law of the State or Territory in which the property subject to the lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has by law provided for the filing of such notice . . . ." 6 (Emphasis supplied.) Following this in United States v. Maniaci, 36 F. Supp. 293, aff'd, 116 F.2d 935, both a United States District Court and a Court of Appeals refused to enforce a federal tax lien on Michigan property because the notice of lien, although filed both in a District Court and in the office of the proper Michigan register of deeds, did not contain the description of the property required by Michigan law. In this holding emphasis was placed on the clause added in 1928, requiring notice to be filed "in accordance with the law of the State or Territory in which the property subject to the lien is situated . . . ." </s> Less than two years after the Maniaci holding Congress again amended the lien notice provisions, struck out "in accordance with the law of the State or Territory" and substituted the language in the section here controlling that notice was not valid until filed "In the office in which the filing of such notice is authorized by the law of the State or Territory." 7 The reports of the House and Senate Committees reporting this amendment point strongly to a purpose to get away from the ruling in the Maniaci case and make it clear that, while notice of a [368 U.S. 291, 296] federal lien must be filed in a state office where authorized by a State, the notice is sufficient if given in the form long used by the Department "without regard to other general requirements with respect to recording prescribed by the law of such State or Territory." 8 The Department never accepted the Maniaci case and its practice has been to use forms which do not contain a particular description of any property owned by a delinquent taxpayer. The notice provisions were once more amended in the 1954 Code, this time providing that the notice shall be valid if in the Department form "notwithstanding any law of the State or Territory regarding the form or content of a notice of lien." 9 The House Report stated that this amendment was merely "declaratory of the existing procedure and in accordance with the long-continued practice of the Treasury Department." 10 </s> The Michigan law authorizing filing only if a description of the property was given placed obstacles to the enforcement of federal tax liens that Congress had not permitted, and consequently no state office was "authorized" for filing within the meaning of the federal statute. It was therefore error for the Michigan courts to fail to give priority to the Government's lien here, notice of which had been filed in the District Court in accordance with federal law. </s> The judgment of the Michigan Supreme Court is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Sections 3670 and 3671 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, in effect at that time. </s> [Footnote 2 Act 104, Public Acts of Michigan of 1923, repealed April 13, 1956, by Act 107, Public Acts of Michigan of 1956. </s> [Footnote 3 Act 104 was repealed April 13, 1956. </s> [Footnote 4 Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 . </s> [Footnote 5 37 Stat. 1016. </s> [Footnote 6 45 Stat. 876. </s> [Footnote 7 56 Stat. 957, 3672 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended. </s> [Footnote 8 H. R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 173. See also S. Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 248. </s> [Footnote 9 Section 6323 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. </s> [Footnote 10 H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A406-A407. </s> [368 U.S. 291, 297]

United States Supreme Court SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., L. P., ET AL. v. APCC SERVICES, INC., ET AL.(2008) No. 07-552 Argued: April 21, 2008Decided: June 23, 2008 </s> A payphone customer making a long-distance call with an access code or 1-800 number issued by a long-distance carrier pays the carrier (which completes the call). The carrier then compensates the payphone operator (which connects the call to the carrier in the first place). The payphone operator can sue the long-distance carrier for any compensation that the carrier fails to pay for these "dial-around" calls. Many payphone operators assign their dial-around claims to billing and collection firms (aggregators) so that, in effect, these aggregators can bring suit on their behalf. A group of aggregators (respondents here) were assigned legal title to the claims of approximately 1,400 payphone operators. The aggregators separately agreed to remit all proceeds to those operators, who would then pay the aggregators for their services. After entering into these agreements, the aggregators filed federal-court lawsuits seeking compensation from petitioner long-distance carriers. The District Court refused to dismiss the claims, finding that the aggregators had standing, and the D.C. Circuit ultimately affirmed. Held:An assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Pp.3-23. (a)History and precedent show that, for centuries, courts have found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; where assignment is at issue, courts--both before and after the founding--have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. And while precedents of this Court, Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302, Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U.S. 117, and Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, do not conclusively resolve the standing question here, they offer powerful support for the proposition that suits by assignees for collection have long been seen as "amenable" to resolution by the judicial process, Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102. Pp.3-16. </s> (b)Petitioners offer no convincing reason to depart from the historical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event, the aggregators satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in this Court's more modern decisions. Petitioners argue that the aggregators have not themselves suffered an injury and that assignments for collection do not transfer the payphone operators' injuries. But the operators assigned their claims lock, stock, and barrel, and precedent makes clear that an assignee can sue based on his assignor's injuries. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765. In arguing that the aggregators cannot satisfy the redressability requirement because they will remit their recovery to the payphone operators, petitioners misconstrue the nature of the redressability inquiry, which focuses on whether the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed through the litigation--not on what the plaintiff ultimately intends to do with the money recovered. See, e.g., id., at 771. Petitioners' claim that the assignments constitute nothing more than a contract for legal services is overstated. There is an important distinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assigning a claim to a lawyer. The latter confers a property right (which creditors might attach); the former does not. Finally, as a practical matter, it would be particularly unwise to abandon history and precedent in resolving the question here, for any such ruling could be overcome by, e.g., rewriting the agreement to give the aggregator a tiny portion of the assigned claim itself, perhaps only a dollar or two. Pp.16-20 </s> (c)Petitioners' reasons for denying prudential standing--that the aggregators are seeking redress for third parties; that the litigation represents an effort by the aggregators and payphone operators to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's class-action requirements; and that practical problems could arise because the aggregators are suing, e.g., payphone operators may not comply with discovery requests or honor judgments--are unpersuasive. And because there are no allegations that the assignments were made in bad faith and because the assignments were made for ordinary business purposes, any other prudential questions need not be considered here. Pp.20-23. 489 F.3d 1249, affirmed. Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Roberts, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. </s> SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L.P., etal., PETITIONERS v. APCC SERVICES, INC., etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit [June 23, 2008] </s> Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question before us is whether an assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Because history and precedent make clear that such an assignee has long been permitted to bring suit, we conclude that the assignee does have standing. I </s> When a payphone customer makes a long-distance call with an access code or 1-800 number issued by a long-distance communications carrier, the customer pays the carrier (which completes that call), but not the payphone operator (which connects that call to the carrier in the first place). In these circumstances, the long-distance carrier is required to compensate the payphone operator for the customer's call. See 47 U.S.C. §226; 47 CFR §64.1300 (2007). The payphone operator can sue the long-distance carrier in court for any compensation that the carrier fails to pay for these "dial-around" calls. And many have done so. See Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc. v. Metrophones Telecommunications, Inc., 550 U.S. ___ (2007) (finding that the Communications Act of 1934 authorizes such suits). Because litigation is expensive, because the evidentiary demands of a single suit are often great, and because the resulting monetary recovery is often small, many payphone operators assign their dial-around claims to billing and collection firms called "aggregators" so that, in effect, these aggregators can bring suit on their behalf. See Brief for Respondents 3. Typically, an individual aggregator collects claims from different payphone operators; the aggregator promises to remit to the relevant payphone operator (i.e., the assignor of the claim) any dial-around compensation that is recovered; the aggregator then pursues the claims in court or through settlement negotiations; and the aggregator is paid a fee for this service. </s> The present litigation involves a group of aggregators who have taken claim assignments from approximately 1,400 payphone operators. Each payphone operator signed an Assignment and Power of Attorney Agreement (Agreement) in which the payphone operator "assigns, transfers and sets over to [the aggregator] for purposes of collection all rights, title and interest of the [payphone operator] in the [payphone operator's] claims, demands or causes of action for 'Dial-Around Compensation' . . . due the [payphone operator] for periods since October 1, 1997." App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a. The Agreement also "appoints" the aggregator as the payphone operator's "true and lawful attorney-in-fact." Ibid. The Agreement provides that the aggregator will litigate "in the [payphone operator's] interest." Id., at 115a. And the Agreement further stipulates that the assignment of the claims "may not be revoked without the written consent of the [aggregator]." Ibid. The aggregator and payphone operator then separately agreed that the aggregator would remit all proceeds to the payphone operator and that the payphone operator would pay the aggregator for its services (typically via a quarterly charge). </s> After signing the agreements, the aggregators (respondents here) filed lawsuits in federal court seeking dial-around compensation from Sprint, AT&T, and other long-distance carriers (petitioners here). AT&T moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the aggregators lack standing to sue under Article III of the Constitution. The District Court initially agreed to dismiss, APCC Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 254 F.Supp. 2d 135, 140-141 (DC 2003), but changed its mind in light of a "long line of cases and legal treatises that recognize a well-established principle that assignees for collection purposes are entitled to bring suit where [as here] the assignments transfer absolute title to the claims." APCC Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 41, 45 (DC 2003). After consolidating similar cases, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that the aggregators have standing to sue, but held that the relevant statutes do not create a private right of action. APCC Servs., Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co., 418 F.3d 1238 (2005) (per curiam). This Court granted the aggregators' petition for certiorari on the latter statutory question, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Global Crossing, supra. APPC Services, Inc. v. Sprint Communications Co. 550 U.S. ___ (2007). On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the orders of the District Court allowing the litigation to go forward. 489 F.3d 1249, 1250 (2007) (per curiam). The long-distance carriers then asked us to consider the standing question. We granted certiorari, and we now affirm. II </s> We begin with the most basic doctrinal principles: Article III, §2, of the Constitution restricts the federal "judicial Power" to the resolution of "Cases" and "Controversies." That case-or-controversy requirement is satisfied only where a plaintiff has standing. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006). And in order to have Article III standing, a plaintiff must adequately establish: (1) an injury in fact (i.e., a "concrete and particularized" invasion of a "legally protected interest"); (2) causation (i.e., a "'fairly ... trace[able]'" connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant); and (3) redressability (i.e., it is "'likely'" and not "merely 'speculative'" that the plaintiff's injury will be remedied by the relief plaintiff seeks in bringing suit). Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992) (calling these the "irreducible constitutional minimum" requirements). In some sense, the aggregators clearly meet these requirements. They base their suit upon a concrete and particularized "injury in fact," namely, the carriers' failure to pay dial-around compensation. The carriers "caused" that injury. And the litigation will "redress" that injury--if the suits are successful, the long-distance carriers will pay what they owe. The long-distance carriers argue, however, that the aggregators lack standing because it was the payphone operators (who are not plaintiffs), not the aggregators (who are plaintiffs), who were "injured in fact" and that it is the payphone operators, not the aggregators, whose injuries a legal victory will truly "redress": The aggregators, after all, will remit all litigation proceeds to the payphone operators. Brief for Petitioners 18. Thus, the question before us is whether, under these circumstances, an assignee has standing to pursue the assignor's claims for money owed. </s> We have often said that history and tradition offer a meaningful guide to the types of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998) ("We have always taken [the case-or-controversy requirement] to mean cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process" (emphasis added)); GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 382 (1980) ("The purpose of the case-or-controversy requirement is to limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process" (emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (in crafting Article III, "the framers ... gave merely the outlines of what were to them the familiar operations of the English judicial system and its manifestations on this side of the ocean before the Union"). Consequently, we here have carefully examined how courts have historically treated suits by assignors and assignees. And we have discovered that history and precedent are clear on the question before us: Assignees of a claim, including assignees for collection, have long been permitted to bring suit. A clear historical answer at least demands reasons for change. We can find no such reasons here, and accordingly we conclude that the aggregators have standing. A </s> We must begin with a minor concession. Prior to the 17th century, English law would not have authorized a suit like this one. But that is because, with only limited exceptions, English courts refused to recognize assignments at all. See, e.g., Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 48a, 77 Eng. Rep. 994, 997 (K. B. 1612) (stating that "no possibility, right, title, nor thing in action, shall be granted or assigned to strangers" (footnote omitted)); Penson & Highbed's Case, 4 Leo. 99, 74 Eng. Rep. 756 (K.B. 1590) (refusing to recognize the right of an assignee of a right in contract); see also 9 J. Murray, Corbin on Contracts §47.3, p. 134 (rev. ed. 2007) (noting that the King was excepted from the basic rule and could, as a result, always receive assignments). Courts then strictly adhered to the rule that a "chose in action"--an interest in property not immediately reducible to possession (which, over time, came to include a financial interest such as a debt, a legal claim for money, or a contractual right)--simply "could not be transferred to another person by the strict rules of the ancient common law." See 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *442. To permit transfer, the courts feared, would lead to the "multiplying of contentions and suits," Lampet's Case, supra, at 48a, 77 Eng. Rep., at 997, and would also promote "maintenance," i.e., officious intermeddling with litigation, see Holdsworth, History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common Law, 33 Harv. L.Rev. 997, 1006-1009 (1920). </s> As the 17th century began, however, strict anti-assignment rules seemed inconsistent with growing commercial needs. And as English commerce and trade expanded, courts began to liberalize the rules that prevented assignments of choses in action. See 9 Corbin, supra, §47.3, at 134 (suggesting that the "pragmatic necessities of trade" induced "evolution of the common law"); Holdsworth, supra, at 1021-1022 (the "common law" was "induced" to change because of "considerations of mercantile convenience or necessity"); J. Ames, Lectures on Legal History 214 (1913) (noting that the "objection of maintenance" yielded to "the modern commercial spirit"). By the beginning of the 18th century, courts routinely recognized assignments of equitable (but not legal) interests in a chose in action: Courts of equity permitted suits by an assignee who had equitable (but not legal) title. And courts of law effectively allowed suits either by the assignee (who had equitable, but not legal title) or the assignor (who had legal, but not equitable title). </s> To be more specific, courts of equity would simply permit an assignee with a beneficial interest in a chose in action to sue in his own name. They might, however, require the assignee to bring in the assignor as a party to the action so as to bind him to whatever judgment was reached. See, e.g., Warmstrey v. Tanfield, 1 Ch. Rep. 29, 21 Eng. Rep. 498 (1628-1629); Fashion v. Atwood, 2 Ch. Cas. 36, 22 Eng. Rep. 835 (1688); Peters v. Soame, 2 Vern. 428, 428-429, 23 Eng. Rep. 874 (Ch. 1701); Squib v. Wyn, 1 P. Wms. 378, 381, 24 Eng. Rep. 432, 433 (Ch. 1717); Lord Carteret v. Paschal, 3 P. Wms. 197, 199, 24 Eng. Rep. 1028, 1029 (Ch. 1733); Row v. Dawson, 1 Ves. sen. 331, 332-333, 27 Eng. Rep. 1064, 1064-1065 (Ch. 1749). See also M. Smith, Law of Assignment: The Creation and Transfer of Choses in Action 131 (2007) (by the beginning of the 18th century, "it became settled that equity would recognize the validity of the assignment of both debts and of other things regarded by the common law as choses in action"). </s> Courts of law, meanwhile, would permit the assignee with an equitable interest to bring suit, but nonetheless required the assignee to obtain a "power of attorney" from the holder of the legal title, namely, the assignor, and further required the assignee to bring suit in the name of that assignor. See, e.g., Cook, Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 Harv. L.Rev. 816, 822 (1916) ("[C]ommon law lawyers were able, through the device of the 'power of attorney' ... to enable the assignee to obtain relief in common law proceedings by suing in the name of the assignor"); 29 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §74.2, pp. 214-215 (4th ed. 2003). Compare, e.g., Barrow v. Gray, Cro. Eliz. 551, 78 Eng. Rep. 797 (Q. B. 1653), and South & Marsh's Case, 3 Leo. 234, 74 Eng. Rep. 654 (Exch. 1686) (limiting the use of a power of attorney to cases in which the assignor owed the assignee a debt), with Holdsworth, supra, at 1021 (noting that English courts abandoned that limitation by the end of the 18th century). At the same time, courts of law would permit an assignor to sue even when he had transferred away his beneficial interest. And they permitted the assignor to sue in such circumstances precisely because the assignor retained legal title. See, e.g., Winch v. Keeley, 1 T. R. 619, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284 (K. B. 1787) (allowing the bankrupt assignor of a chose in action to sue a debtor for the benefit of the assignee because the assignor possessed legal, though not equitable, title). </s> The upshot is that by the time Blackstone published volume II of his Commentaries in 1766, he could dismiss the "ancient common law" prohibition on assigning choses in action as a "nicety ... now disregarded." 2 Blackstone, supra, at *442. B </s> Legal practice in the United States largely mirrored that in England. In the latter half of the 18th century and throughout the 19th century, American courts regularly "exercised their powers in favor of the assignee," both at law and in equity. 9 Corbin on Contracts §47.3, at 137. See, e.g., McCullum v. Coxe, 1 Dall. 139 (Pa. 1785) (protecting assignee of a debt against a collusive settlement by the assignor); Dennie v. Chapman, 1 Root 113, 115 (Conn. Super. 1789) (assignee of a nonnegotiable note can bring suit "in the name of the original promisee or his administrator"); Andrews v. Beecker, 1 Johns. Cas. 411, 411-412, n. (N. Y. Sup. 1800) ("Courts of law ... are, in justice, bound to protect the rights of the assignees, as much as a court of equity, though they may still require the action to be brought in the name of the assignor"); Riddle & Co. v. Mandeville, 5 Cranch 322 (1809) (assignees of promissory notes entitled to bring suit in equity). Indeed, §11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 specifically authorized federal courts to take "cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of an assignee" so long as federal jurisdiction would lie if the assignor himself had brought suit. 1 Stat. 79. Thus, in 1816, Justice Story, writing for a unanimous Court, summarized the practice in American courts as follows: "Courts of law, following in this respect the rules of equity, now take notice of assignments of choses in action, and exert themselves to afford them every support and protection." Welch v. Mandeville, 1 Wheat. 233, 236. He added that courts of equity have "disregarded the rigid strictness of the common law, and protected the rights of the assignee of choses in action," and noted that courts of common law "now consider an assignment of a chose in action as substantially valid, only preserving, in certain cases, the form of an action commenced in the name of the assignor." Id., at 237, n. </s> It bears noting, however, that at the time of the founding (and in some States well before then) the law did permit the assignment of legal title to at least some choses in action. In such cases, the assignee could bring suit on the assigned claim in his own name, in a court of law. See, e.g., 3 Va. Stat. at Large 378, Ch. XXXIV (W. Hening ed. 1823) (reprinted 1969) (Act of Oct. 1705) (permitting any person to "assign or transfer any bond or bill for debt over to any other person" and providing that "the asignee or assignees, his and their executors and administrators by virtue of such assignment shall and may have lawfull power to commence and prosecute any suit at law in his or their own name or names"); Act of May 28, 1715, Ch. XXVIII, Gen. Laws of Penn. 60 (J. Dunlop 2d ed. 1849) (permitting the assignment of "bonds, specialties, and notes" and authorizing "the person or persons, to whom the said bonds, specialties or notes, are ... assigned" to "commence and prosecute his, her, or their actions at law"); Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, §4, 1 Stat. 322 ("[I]t shall be lawful for any inventor, his executor or administrator to assign the title and interest in the said invention, at anytime, and the assignee ... shall thereafter stand in the place of the original inventor, both as to right and responsibility"). C </s> By the 19th century, courts began to consider the specific question presented here: whether an assignee of a legal claim for money could sue when that assignee had promised to give all litigation proceeds back to the assignor. During that century American law at the state level became less formalistic through the merger of law and equity, through statutes more generously permitting an assignor to pass legal title to an assignee, and through the adoption of rules that permitted any "real party in interest" to bring suit. See 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1541, pp. 320-321 (2d ed. 1990) (hereinafter Wright & Miller); see also 9 Corbin, supra, §47.3, at 137. The courts recognized that pre-existing law permitted an assignor to bring suit on a claim even though the assignor retained nothing more than naked legal title. Since the law increasingly permitted the transfer of legal title to an assignee, courts agreed that assignor and assignee should be treated alike in this respect. And rather than abolish the assignor's well-established right to sue on the basis of naked legal title alone, many courts instead extended the same right to an assignee. See, e.g., Clark & Hutchins, The Real Party in Interest, 34 Yale L.J. 259, 264-265 (1925) (noting that the changes in the law permitted both the assignee with "naked legal title" and the assignee with an equitable interest in a claim to bring suit). Thus, during the 19th century, most state courts entertained suits virtually identical to the litigation before us: suits by individuals who were assignees for collection only, i.e., assignees who brought suit to collect money owed to their assignors but who promised to turn over to those assignors the proceeds secured through litigation. See, e.g., Webb & Hepp v. Morgan, McClung & Co., 14 Mo. 428, 431 (1851) (holding that the assignees of a promissory note for collection only can bring suit, even though they lack a beneficial interest in the note, because the assignment "creates in them such legal interest, that they thereby become the persons to sue"); Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N.Y. 349, 350, 353 (1871) (allowing suit by the assignee of a cause of action even though the assignors "'expected to receive the amount recovered in the action,'" because the assignee, as "legal holder of the claim," was "the real party in interest"); Searing v. Berry, 58 Iowa 20, 23, 24, 11 N.W. 708, 709 (1882) (where legal title to a judgment was assigned "merely for the purpose of enabling plaintiff to enforce the collection" and the assignor in fact retained the beneficial interest, the plaintiff-assignee could "prosecute this suit to enforce the collection of the judgment"); Grant v. Heverin, 77 Cal. 263, 265, 19 P. 493 (1888) (holding that the assignee of a bond could bring suit, even though he lacked a beneficial interest in the bond, and adopting the rule that an assignee with legal title to an assigned claim can bring suit even where the assignee must "account to the assignor" for "a part of the proceeds" or "is to account for the whole proceeds" (internal quotation marks omitted)); McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 638, 637, 29 P. 209, 210 (1892) (holding that the assignee of promissory notes was the real party in interest, even though the assignment was "for the purpose of collection" and the assignee had "no interest other than that of the legal holder of said notes"); Wines v. Rio Grande W.R. Co., 9 Utah 228, 235, 33 P. 1042, 1044, 1045 (1893) (holding that an assignee could bring suit based on causes of action assigned to him "simply to enable him to sue" and who "would turn over to the assignors all that was recovered in the action, after deducting [the assignors'] proportion of the expenses of the suit"); Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo. App. 489, 492, 39 P. 355, 357, 356 (1895) (permitting suit by a party who was assigned legal title to contractual rights, where the assignor retained the beneficial interest, noting that the doctrine that "prevails in Colorado" is that the assignee may bring suit in his own name "although there may be annexed to the transfer the condition that when the sum is collected the whole or some part of it must be paid over to the assignor"). See also Appendix, infra (collecting cases from numerous other States approving of suits by assignees for collection). </s> Of course, the dissent rightly notes, some States during this period of time refused to recognize assignee-for-collection suits, or otherwise equivocated on the matter. See post, at 12-13. But so many States allowed these suits that by 1876, the distinguished procedure and equity scholar John Norton Pomeroy declared it "settled by a great preponderance of authority, although there is some conflict" that an assignee is "entitled to sue in his own name" whenever the assignment vests "legal title" in the assignee, and notwithstanding "any contemporaneous, collateral agreement by virtue of which he is to receive a part only of the proceeds ...or even is to thus account [to the assignor] for the whole proceeds." Remedies and Remedial Rights §132, p. 159 (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). Other contemporary scholars reached the same basic conclusion. See, e.g., P. Bliss, A Treatise upon the Law of Pleading §51, p. 69 (2d ed. 1887) (stating that "[m]ost of the courts have held that where negotiable paper has been indorsed, or other choses in action have been assigned, it does not concern the defendant for what purpose the transfer has been made" and giving examples of States permitting assignees to bring suit even where they lacked a beneficial interest in the assigned claims (emphasis added)). See also Clark & Hutchins, supra, at 264 ("many, probably most, American jurisdictions" have held that "an assignee who has no beneficial interest, like an assignee for collection only, may prosecute an action in his own name" (emphasis added)). Even Michael Ferguson's California Law Review Comment--which the dissent cites as support for its argument about "the divergent practice" among the courts, post, at 14--recognizes that "[a] majority of courts has held that an assignee for collection only is a real party in interest" entitled to bring suit. See Comment, The Real Party in Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant's Interest in the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 Cal. L.Rev. 1452, 1475 (1967) (emphasis added); see also id., at 1476, n. 118 (noting that even "[t]he few courts that have wavered on the question have always ended up in the camp of the majority" (emphasis added)). </s> During this period, a number of federal courts similarly indicated approval of suits by assignees for collection only. See, e.g., Bradford v. Jenks, 3 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (No. 1,769) (CC Ill. 1840) (stating that the plaintiff, the receiver of a bank, could bring suit in federal court to collect on a note owed to that bank if he sued as the bank's assignee, not its receiver, but ultimately holding that the plaintiff could not sue as an assignee because there was no diversity jurisdiction); Orr v. Lacy, 18 F. Cas. 834 (No. 10,589) (CC Mich. 1847) (affirming judgment for the plaintiff, the endorsee of a bill of exchange, on the ground that, as endorsee, he had the "legal right" to bring suit notwithstanding the fact that the proceeds of the litigation would be turned over to the endorser); Murdock v. The Emma Graham, 17 F. Cas. 1012, 1013 (No. 9,940) (DC SD Ohio 1878) (permitting the assignee of a claim for injury to a "float or barge" to bring suit when, "under the assignment," the assignor's creditors would benefit from the litigation); The Rupert City, 213 F. 263, 266-267 (WD Wash. 1914) (assignees of claims for collection only could bring suit in maritime law because "an assignment for collection ... vest[s] such an interest in [an] assignee as to entitle him to sue"). </s> Even this Court long ago indicated that assignees for collection only can properly bring suit. For example, in Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302 (1902), the plaintiff sued to collect on a number of municipal bonds and coupons whose "legal title" had been vested in him but which were transferred to him "for collection only." Id., at 324. The Court, in a unanimous decision, ultimately held that the federal courts could not hear his suit because the amount-in-controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction would not have been satisfied if the bondholders and coupon holders had sued individually. See id., at 328-329. However, before reaching this holding, the Court expressly stated that the suit could properly be brought in federal court "if the only objection to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is that the plaintiff was invested with the legal title to the bonds and coupons simply for purposes of collection." Id., at 325. </s> Next, in Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U.S. 117 (1920), a large number of cattle shippers assigned to Spiller (the secretary of a Cattle Raiser's Association) their individual reparation claims against railroads they said had charged them excessive rates. The Federal Court of Appeals held that Spiller could not bring suit because, in effect, he was an assignee for collection only and would be passing back to the cattle shippers any money he recovered from the litigation. In a unanimous decision, this Court reversed. The Court wrote that the cattle shippers' "assignments were absolute in form" and "plainly" "vest[ed] the legal title in Spiller." Id., at 134. The Court conceded that the assignments did not pass "beneficial or equitable title" to Spiller. Ibid. But the Court then said that "this was not necessary to support the right of the assignee to claim an award of reparation and enable him to recover it by action at law brought in his own name but for the benefit of the equitable owners of the claims." Ibid. The Court thereby held that Spiller's legal title alone was sufficient to allow him to bring suit in federal court on the aggregated claims of his assignors. </s> Similarly, in Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 (1939), this Court unanimously held that (under New York law) a plaintiff, an assignee for collection, had "dominion over the claim for purposes of suit" because the assignment purported to "'sell, assign, transfer and set over' the chose in action" to the assignee. Id., at 289. More importantly for present purposes, the Court said that the assignment's "legal effect was not curtailed by the recital that the assignment was for purposes of suit and that its proceeds were to be turned over or accounted for to another." Ibid. </s> To be clear, we do not suggest that the Court's decisions in Waite, Spiller, and Titus conclusively resolve the standing question before us. We cite them because they offer additional and powerful support for the proposition that suits by assignees for collection have long been seen as "amenable" to resolution by the judicial process. Steel Co., 523 U.S., at 102. </s> Finally, we note that there is also considerable, more recent authority showing that an assignee for collection may properly sue on the assigned claim in federal court. See, e.g., 6A Wright & Miller §1545, at 346-348 (noting that an assignee with legal title is considered to be a real party in interest and that as a result "federal courts have held that an assignee for purposes of collection who holds legal title to the debt according to the governing substantive law is the real party in interest even though the assignee must account to the assignor for whatever is recovered in the action"); 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments §184, pp. 262-263 (1999) ("An assignee for collection or security only is within the meaning of the real party in interest statutes and entitled to sue in his or her own name on an assigned account or chose in action, although he or she must account to the assignor for the proceeds of the action, even when the assignment is without consideration" (footnote omitted)). See also Rosenblum v. Dingfelder, 111 F.2d 406, 407 (CA2 1940); Staggers v. Otto Gerdau Co., 359 F.2d 292, 294 (CA2 1966); Dixie Portland Flour Mills, Inc. v. Dixie Feed & Seed Co., 382 F.2d 830, 833 (CA6 1967); Klamath-Lake Pharmaceutical Assn. v. Klamath Medical Serv. Bur., 701 F.2d 1276, 1282 (CA9 1983). D </s> The history and precedents that we have summarized make clear that courts have long found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; that where assignment is at issue, courts--both before and after the founding-- have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and that there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. We find this history and precedent "well nigh conclusive" in respect to the issue before us: Lawsuits by assignees, including assignees for collection only, are "cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process." Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 777-778 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). III </s> Petitioners have not offered any convincing reason why we should depart from the historical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event, we find that the assignees before us satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in more modern decisions of this Court. Petitioners argue, for example, that the aggregators have not themselves suffered any injury in fact and that the assignments for collection "do not suffice to transfer the payphone operators' injuries." Brief for Petitioners 18. It is, of course, true that the aggregators did not originally suffer any injury caused by the long-distance carriers; the payphone operators did. But the payphone operators assigned their claims to the aggregators lock, stock, and barrel. See APPC Servs., 418 F.3d, at 1243 (there is "no reason to believe the assignment is anything less than a complete transfer to the aggregator" of the injury and resulting claim); see also App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a (Agreement provides that each payphone operator "assigns, transfers and sets over" to the aggregator "all rights, title and interest" in dial-around compensation claims). And within the past decade we have expressly held that an assignee can sue based on his assignor's injuries. In Vermont Agency, supra, we considered whether a qui tam relator possesses Article III standing to bring suit under the False Claims Act, which authorizes a private party to bring suit to remedy an injury (fraud) that the United States, not the private party, suffered. We held that such a relator does possess standing. And we said that is because the Act "effect[s] a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim" and that assignment of the "United States' injury in fact suffices to confer standing on [the relator]." Id., at 773, 774. Indeed, in Vermont Agency we stated quite unequivocally that "the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor." Id., at 773. </s> Petitioners next argue that the aggregators cannot satisfy the redressability requirement of standing because, if successful in this litigation, the aggregators will simply remit the litigation proceeds to the payphone operators. But petitioners misconstrue the nature of our redressability inquiry. That inquiry focuses, as it should, on whether the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed through the litigation--not on what the plaintiff ultimately intends to do with the money he recovers. See, e.g., id., at 771 (to demonstrate redressability, the plaintiff must show a "substantial likelihood that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact" (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added)); Lujan, 504 U.S., at 561 ("[I]t must be likely . . . that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision" (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added)). Here, a legal victory would unquestionably redress the injuries for which the aggregators bring suit. The aggregators' injuries relate to the failure to receive the required dial-around compensation. And if the aggregators prevail in this litigation, the long-distance carriers would write a check to the aggregators for the amount of dial-around compensation owed. What does it matter what the aggregators do with the money afterward? The injuries would be redressed whether the aggregators remit the litigation proceeds to the payphone operators, donate them to charity, or use them to build new corporate headquarters. Moreover, the statements our prior cases made about the need to show redress of the injury are consistent with what numerous authorities have long held in the assignment context, namely, that an assignee for collection may properly bring suit to redress the injury originally suffered by his assignor. Petitioners might disagree with those authorities. But petitioners have not provided us with a good reason to reconsider them. </s> The dissent argues that our redressability analysis "could not be more wrong," because "[w]e have never approved federal-court jurisdiction over a claim where the entire relief requested will run to a party not before the court. Never." Post, at 5 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). But federal courts routinely entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are not themselves directly bringing suit. Trustees bring suits to benefit their trusts; guardians adlitem bring suits to benefit their wards; receivers bring suit to benefit their receiverships; assignees in bankruptcy bring suit to benefit bankrupt estates; executors bring suit to benefit testator estates; and so forth. The dissent's view of redressability, if taken seriously, would work a sea change in the law. Moreover, to the extent that trustees, guardians adlitem, and the like have some sort of "obligation" to the parties whose interests they vindicate through litigation, see post, at 7-8, n.2, the same is true in respect to the aggregators here. The aggregators have a contractual obligation to litigate "in the [payphone operator's] interest." App. to Pet. for Cert. 115a. (And if the aggregators somehow violate that contractual obligation, say, by agreeing to settle the claims against the long-distance providers in exchange for a kickback from those providers, each payphone operator would be able to bring suit for breach of contract.) </s> Petitioners also make a further conceptual argument. They point to cases in which this Court has said that a party must possess a "personal stake" in a case in order to have standing under Article III. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). And petitioners add that, because the aggregators will not actually benefit from a victory in this case, they lack a "personal stake" in the litigation's outcome. The problem with this argument is that the general "personal stake" requirement and the more specific standing requirements (injury in fact, redressability, and causation) are flip sides of the same coin. They are simply different descriptions of the same judicial effort to assure, in every case or controversy, "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination." Ibid. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 13) ("At bottom, the gist of the question of standing is whether petitioners have such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Courts, during the past two centuries, appear to have found that "concrete adverseness" where an assignee for collection brings a lawsuit. And petitioners have provided us with no grounds for reaching a contrary conclusion. </s> Petitioners make a purely functional argument, as well. Read as a whole, they say, the assignments in this litigation constitute nothing more than a contract for legal services. We think this argument is overstated. There is an important distinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assigning a claim to a lawyer (on the lawyer's promise to remit litigation proceeds). The latter confers a property right (which creditors might attach); the former does not. </s> Finally, we note, as a practical matter, that it would be particularly unwise for us to abandon history and precedent in resolving the question before us. Were we to agree with petitioners that the aggregators lack standing, our holding could easily be overcome. For example, the Agreement could be rewritten to give the aggregator a tiny portion of the assigned claim itself, perhaps only a dollar or two. Or the payphone operators might assign all of their claims to a "Dial-Around Compensation Trust" and then pay a trustee (perhaps the aggregator) to bring suit on behalf of the trust. Accordingly, the far more sensible course is to abide by the history and tradition of assignee suits and find that the aggregators possess Article III standing. IV </s> Petitioners argue that, even if the aggregators have standing under Article III, we should nonetheless deny them standing for a number of prudential reasons. See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (prudential standing doctrine "embodies judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction" (internal quotation marks omitted)). First, petitioners invoke certain prudential limitations that we have imposed in prior cases where a plaintiff has sought to assert the legal claims of third parties. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) (expressing a "reluctance to exert judicial power when the plaintiff's claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties"); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) ("In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons"); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 (1984) (a plaintiff ordinarily "'cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties'"). </s> These third-party cases, however, are not on point. They concern plaintiffs who seek to assert not their own legal rights, but the legal rights of others. See, e.g., Warth, supra, at 499 (plaintiff "generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties" (emphasis added)); see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) (lawyers lack standing to assert the constitutional rights of defendants deprived of appointed counsel on appeal); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (permitting a criminal defendant to assert rights of juror discriminated against because of race); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (permitting beer vendors to assert rights of prospective male customers aged 18 to 21 who, unlike females of the same ages, were barred from purchasing beer). Here, the aggregators are suing based on injuries originally suffered by third parties. But the payphone operators assigned to the aggregators all "rights, title and interest" in claims based on those injuries. Thus, in the litigation before us, the aggregators assert what are, due to that transfer, legal rights of their own. The aggregators, in other words, are asserting first-party, not third-party, legal rights. Moreover, we add that none of the third-party cases cited by petitioners involve assignments or purport to overturn the longstanding doctrine permitting an assignee to bring suit on an assigned claim. </s> Second, petitioners suggest that the litigation here simply represents an effort by the aggregators and the payphone operators to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23's class-action requirements. But we do not understand how "circumvention" of Rule 23 could constitute a basis for denying standing here. For one thing, class actions are permissive, not mandatory. More importantly, class actions constitute but one of several methods for bringing about aggregation of claims, i.e., they are but one of several methods by which multiple similarly situated parties get similar claims resolved at one time and in one federal forum. See Rule 20(a) (permitting joinder of multiple plaintiffs); Rule 42 (permitting consolidation of related cases filed in the same district court); 28 U.S.C. §1407 (authorizing consolidation of pretrial proceedings for related cases filed in multiple federal districts); §1404 (making it possible for related cases pending in different federal courts to be transferred and consolidated in one district court); D. Herr, Annotated Manual for Complex Litigation §20.12, p. 279 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that "[r]elated cases pending in different federal courts may be consolidated in a single district" by transfer under 28 U.S.C. §1404(a)); J. Tidmarsh & R. Trangsrud, Complex Litigation and the Adversary System 473-524 (1998) (section on "Transfer Devices that Aggregate Cases in a Single Venue"). Because the federal system permits aggregation by other means, we do not think that the payphone operators should be denied standing simply because they chose one aggregation method over another. </s> Petitioners also point to various practical problems that could arise because the aggregators, rather than the payphone operators, are suing. In particular, they say that the payphone operators may not comply with discovery requests served on them, that the payphone operators may not honor judgments reached in this case, and that petitioners may not be able to bring, in this litigation, counterclaims against the payphone operators. See Brief for Petitioners 46-48. Even assuming all that is so, courts have long permitted assignee lawsuits notwithstanding the fact that such problems could arise. Regardless, courts are not helpless in the face of such problems. For example, a district court can, if appropriate, compel a party to collect and to produce whatever discovery-related information is necessary. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 26(b)(1), 30-31, 33-36. That court might grant a motion to join the payphone operators to the case as "required" parties. See Rule 19. Or the court might allow the carriers to file a third-party complaint against the payphone operators. See Rule 14(a). And the carriers could always ask the Federal Communications Commission to find administrative solutions to any remaining practical problems. Cf. 47 U.S.C. §276(b)(1)(A) (authorizing the FCC to "prescribe regulations" that "ensure that all payphone service providers are fairly compensated for each and every completed [dial-around] call"). We do not say that the litigation before us calls for the use of any such procedural device. We mention them only to explain the lack of any obvious need for the remedy that the carriers here propose, namely, denial of standing. </s> Finally, we note that in this litigation, there has been no allegation that the assignments were made in bad faith. We note, as well, that the assignments were made for ordinary business purposes. Were this not so, additional prudential questions might perhaps arise. But these questions are not before us, and we need not consider them here. V </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. It is so ordered. Appendix </s> Examples of cases in which state courts entertained or otherwise indicated approval of suits by assignees for collection only. References to "Pomeroy's rule" are references to the statement of law set forth in J. Pomeroy, Remedies and Remedial Rights §132, p. 159 (1876). 1. Webb & Hepp v. Morgan, McClung & Co., 14 Mo. 428, 431 (1851) (holding that the assignees of a promissory note for collection only can bring suit, even though they lack a beneficial interest in the note, because the assignment "creates in them such legal interest, that they thereby become the persons to sue"); </s> 2. Castner v. Austin Sumner & Co., 2 Minn. 44, 47-48 (1858) (holding that the assignees of promissory notes were proper plaintiffs, regardless of the arrangement they and their assignor had made in respect to the proceeds of the litigation, because the defendants "can only raise the objection of a defect of parties to the suit, when it appears that some other person or party than the Plaintiffs have such a legal interest in the note that a recovery by the Plaintiffs would not preclude it from being enforced, and they be thereby subjected to the risk of another suit for the same subject-matter" (emphasis added)); </s> 3.Cottle v. Cole, 20 Iowa 481, 485-486 (1866) (holding that the assignee could sue, notwithstanding the possibility that the assignor was the party "beneficially interested in the action," because "[t]he course of decision in this State establishes this rule, viz.: that the party holding the legal title of a note or instrument may sue on it though he be an agent or trustee, and liable to account to another for the proceeds of the recovery"); </s> 4.Allen v. Brown, 44 N.Y. 228, 231, 234 (1870) (opinion of Hunt, Comm'r) (holding that the assignee with legal title to a cause of action was "legally the real party in interest" "[e]ven if he be liable to another as a debtor upon his contract for the collection he may thus make"); </s> 5.Meeker v. Claghorn, 44 N.Y. 349, 350, 353 (1871) (opinion of Earl, Comm'r) (allowing suit by the assignee of a cause of action even though the assignors "'expected to receive the amount recovered in the action,'" because the assignee, as "legal holder of the claim," was "the real party in interest"); </s> 6.Hays v. Hathorn, 74 N.Y. 486, 490 (1878) (holding that so long as an assignee has legal title to the assigned commercial paper, the assignee may bring suit even if the assignment was "merely for the purpose of collection" and he acts merely as "equitable trustee" for the assignor, i.e., the assignor maintains the beneficial interest in the paper); </s> 7.Searing v. Berry, 58 Iowa 20, 23, 24, 11 N.W. 708, 709 (1882) (where legal title to a judgment was assigned "merely for the purpose of enabling plaintiff to enforce the collection" and the assignor in fact retained the beneficial interest, the plaintiff-assignee could "prosecute this suit to enforce the collection of the judgment"); </s> 8.Haysler v. Dawson, 28 Mo. App. 531, 536 (1888) (holding, in light of the "recognized practice in this state," that the assignee could bring suit to recover on certain accounts even where the assignment of the accounts had been made "with the agreement that they were to [be] [he]ld solely for the purpose of [the litigation]," i.e., the assignor maintained the beneficial interest in the accounts (emphasis added)); </s> 9.Grant v. Heverin, 77 Cal. 263, 265, 264, 19 P. 493 (1888) (holding that the assignee of a bond could bring suit, even though he lacked a beneficial interest in the bond, and endorsing Pomeroy's rule as "a clear and correct explication of the law"); </s> 10.Young v. Hudson, 99 Mo. 102, 106, 12 S.W. 632, 633 (1889) (holding that an assignee could sue to collect on an account for merchandise sold, even though the money would be remitted to the assignor, because "[a]n assignee of a chose in action arising out of contract, may sue upon it in his own name, though the title was passed to him only for the purpose of collection"); </s> 11.Jackson v. Hamm, 14 Colo. 58, 61, 23 P. 88, 88-89 (1890) (holding that the assignee of a judgment was "the real party in interest" and was "entitled to sue in his own name," even though the beneficial interest in the judgment was held by someone else); </s> 12.Saulsbury v. Corwin, 40 Mo. App. 373, 376 (1890) (permitting suit by an assignee of a note who "had no interest in the note" on the theory that "[o]ne who holds negotiable paper for collection merely may sue on it in his own name"); </s> 13.Anderson v. Reardon, 46 Minn. 185, 186, 48 N.W. 777 (1891) (where plaintiff had been assigned a claim on the "understanding" that he would remit the proceeds to the assignor less the "amount due him for services already rendered, and to be thereafter rendered" to the assignor, the plaintiff could bring suit, even though he had "already collected on the demand enough to pay his own claim for services up to that time," because "[i]t is no concern of the defendant whether the assignee of a claim receives the money on it in his own right or as trustee of the assignor"); </s> 14.McDaniel v. Pressler, 3 Wash. 636, 638, 637, 29 P. 209, 210 (1892) (holding that the assignee of promissory notes was the real party in interest, even the assignment was "for the purpose of collection" and the assignee had "no interest other than that of the legal holder of said notes"); </s> 15.Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. v. Heipler, 49 Minn. 395, 396, 52 N.W. 33 (1892) (upholding the plaintiff-assignee's judgment where that assignee "held the legal title to the demand" and notwithstanding the fact that "there was an agreement between the [assignor] and the plaintiff that the latter took the [assignment] only for collection"); </s> 16.Wines v. Rio Grande W. R. Co., 9 Utah 228, 235, 33 P. 1042, 1044, 1045 (1893) (adopting Pomeroy's rule and holding that an assignee could bring suit based on causes of action assigned to him "simply to enable him to sue" and who "would turn over to the assignors all that was recovered in the action, after deducting their proportion of the expenses of the suit"); </s> 17.Greig v. Riordan, 99 Cal. 316, 323, 33 P. 913, 916 (1893) (holding that the plaintiff-assignee could sue on claims assigned by multiple parties "for collection," stating that "[i]t is [a] matter of common knowledge that for the purpose of saving expense commercial associations and others resort to this method" and repeating the rule that "[i]n such cases the assignee becomes the legal holder of a chose in action, which is sufficient to entitle him to recover"); </s> 18.Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo. App. 489, 492, 39 P. 355, 357, 356 (1895) (permitting suit by a party who was assigned legal title to contractual rights, where the assignor retained the beneficial interest, noting that the doctrine that "prevails in Colorado" is that the assignee may bring suit in his own name "although there may be annexed to the transfer the condition that when the sum is collected the whole or some part of it must be paid over to the assignor"); </s> 19.Cox's Executors v. Crockett & Co., 92 Va. 50, 58, 57, 22 S.E. 840, 843 (1895) (finding that suit by assignor following an adverse judgment against assignee was barred by res judicata but endorsing Pomeroy's rule that an assignee could bring suit as the "real party in interest" even where the assignee must "account to the assignor, or other person, for the residue, or even is to thus account for the whole proceeds" of the litigation); </s> 20.Sroufe v. Soto Bros. & Co., 5 Ariz. 10, 11, 12, 43 P. 221 (1896) (holding that state law permits "a party to maintain an action on an account which has been assigned to him for the purpose of collection, only" because such parties are "holders of the legal title of said accounts"); </s> 21.Ingham v. Weed, 5 Cal. Unreported Cases, 645, 649, 48 P. 318, 320 (1897) (holding that the assignees of promissory notes could bring suit where the assignors retained part of the beneficial interest in the outcome, and expressly noting that the assignees could bring suit even if the entire interest in the notes had been assigned to them as "agents for collection" because, citing Pomeroy and prior California cases "to the same effect," an assignee can bring suit where he has "legal title" to a claim, notwithstanding "any contemporaneous collateral agreement" by which he is to account to the assignor for part or even "the whole proceeds"); </s> 22.Citizens Bank v. Corkings 9 S.D. 614, 615, 616, 70 N.W. 1059, 1060, rev'd on other grounds, 10 S.D. 98, 72 N.W. 99 (1897) (holding that where the assignee "took a formal written assignment absolute in terms, but with the understanding that he would take the claim, collect what he could, and turn over to the company the proceeds thereof less the expenses of collection," the assignee could sue because the "rule is that a written or verbal assignment, absolute in terms, and vesting in the assignee the apparent legal title to a chose in action, is unaffected by a collateral contemporaneous agreement respecting the proceeds"); </s> 23.Chase v. Dodge, 111 Wis. 70, 73, 86 N.W. 548, 549 (1901) (adopting New York's rule that an assignee is the real party in interest so long as he "holds the legal title" to an assigned claim, regardless of the existence of "any private or implied understanding" between the assignor and assignee concerning the beneficial interest (internal quotation marks omitted)); </s> 24.Roth v. Continental Wire Co., 94 Mo. App. 236, 262-264, 68 S.W. 594, 602 (1902) (noting that Missouri has adopted Pomeroy's rule and holding that the trial court did not err in excluding evidence that plaintiff was assigned the cause of action for collection only); </s> 25.Manley v. Park, 68 Kan. 400, 402, 75 P. 557, 558 (1904) (overruling prior state cases and holding that where the assignment of a bond or note vests legal title in the assignee, the assignee can bring suit even where the assignee promises to remit to the assignor "a part or all of the proceeds" (emphasis added)); </s> 26.Eagle Mining & Improvement Co. v. Lund, 14 N.M. 417, 420-422, 94 P. 949, 950 (1908) (adopting the rule that the assignee of a note can bring suit even where the assignor, not the assignee, maintains the beneficial interest in the note); </s> 27.Harrison v. Pearcy & Coleman, 174 Ky. 485, 488, 487, 192 S.W. 513, 514-515 (1917) (holding that the assignee could bring suit to collect on a note, even though he was "an assignee for the purpose of collection only" and had "no financial interest in the note"). </s> 28.James v. Lederer-Strauss & Co., 32 Wyo. 377, 233 P. 137, 139 (1925) ("By the clear weight of authority a person to whom a chose in action has been assigned for the purpose of collection may maintain an action thereon ... and as such is authorized by statute in this state to maintain an action in his own name"). </s> SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L.P., etal., PETITIONERS v. APCC SERVICES, INC., etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit [June 23, 2008] </s> Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito join, dissenting. </s> The majority concludes that a private litigant may sue in federal court despite having to "pass back ... all proceeds of the litigation," Brief for Respondents 9, thus depriving that party of any stake in the outcome of the litigation. The majority reaches this conclusion, in flat contravention of our cases interpreting the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III, by reference to a historical tradition that is, at best, equivocal. That history does not contradict what common sense should tell us: There is a legal difference between something and nothing. Respondents have nothing to gain from their lawsuit. Under settled principles of standing, that fact requires dismissal of their complaint.1 I </s> Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of the federal courts to actual "Cases" and "Controversies." §2. As we have recently reaffirmed, "[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies." DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997); internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike the political branches, directly elected by the people, the courts derive their authority under Article III, including the power of judicial review, from "the necessity ... of carrying out the judicial function of deciding cases." Cuno, supra, at 340. That is why Article III courts "may exercise power only ... 'as a necessity,'" that is, only when they are sure they have an actual case before them. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892)). "If a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so." Cuno, supra, at 341. Given the importance of assuring a court's jurisdiction before deciding the merits of a case, "[w]e have always insisted on strict compliance with th[e] jurisdictional standing requirement." Raines, supra, at 819. And until today, it has always been clear that a party lacking a direct, personal stake in the litigation could not invoke the power of the federal courts. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 (1992) (plaintiff must demonstrate a "concrete private interest in the outcome of [the] suit"); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. ___, ___ (2007) (per curiam) (slip op., at 3) (plaintiff must seek relief that "directly and tangibly benefits him" (quoting Lujan, supra, at 574; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, n. 15 (1982) (Article III requires a litigant to show that a favorable decision "will relieve a discrete injury to himself" (emphasis added)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) ("The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party" (emphasis added)). </s> In recent years, we have elaborated the standing requirements of Article III in terms of a three-part test--whether the plaintiff can demonstrate an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged actions of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102-103 (1998). But regardless of how the test is articulated, "the point has always been the same: whether a plaintiff 'personally would benefit in a tangible way from the court's intervention.'" Id., at 103, n.5 (quoting Warth, supra, at 508; emphasis added). An assignee who has acquired the bare legal right to prosecute a claim but no right to the substantive recovery cannot show that he has a personal stake in the litigation. The Court's decision today is unprecedented. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), does not support it. Vermont Agency, in recognizing that a qui tam relator as assignee of the United States had standing to sue, did not dispense with the essential requirement of Article III standing that the plaintiff have a "concrete private interest in the outcome of [the] suit." Id., at 772 (quoting Lujan, supra, at 573; internal quotation marks omitted). In Vermont Agency, the qui tam relator's bounty was sufficient to establish standing because it represented a "partial assignment of the Government's damages claim," encompassing both a legal right to assert the claim and a stake in the recovery. 529 U.S., at 773. Thus, it was clear that the False Claims Act gave the "relator himself an interest in the lawsuit," in addition to "the right to retain a fee out of the recovery." Id., at 772. </s> Here, respondents are authorized to bring suit on behalf of the payphone operators, but they have no claim to the recovery. Indeed, their take is not tied to the recovery in any way. Respondents receive their compensation based on the number of payphones and telephone lines operated by their clients, see App. 198, not based on the measure of damages ultimately awarded by a court or paid by petitioners as part of a settlement. Respondents received the assignments only as a result of their willingness to assume the obligation of remitting any recovery to the assignors, the payphone operators. That is, after all, the entire point of the arrangement. The payphone operators assigned their claims to respondents "for purposes of collection," App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a; respondents never had any share in the amount collected. The absence of any right to the substantive recovery means that respondents cannot benefit from the judgment they seek and thus lack Article III standing. "When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose." Bob Dylan, Like A Rolling Stone, on Highway 61 Revisited (Columbia Records 1965). </s> To be sure, respondents doubtless have more than just a passing interest in the litigation. As collection agencies, respondents must demonstrate that they are willing to make good on their threat to pursue their clients' claims in litigation. Even so, "an interest that is merely a 'byproduct' of the suit itself cannot give rise to a cognizable injury in fact for Article III standing purposes." Vermont Agency, supra, at 773. The benefit respondents would receive--the general business goodwill that would result from a successful verdict, the ability to collect dial-around compensation for their clients more effectively--is nothing more than a byproduct of the current litigation. Such an interest cannot support their standing to sue in federal court. Cf. Steel Co., supra, at 107 (the costs of investigating and prosecuting a substantive claim do not give rise to standing to assert the claim); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 70 (1986) (an interest in recovering attorney's fees does not confer standing to litigate the underlying claim). </s> The undeniable consequence of today's decision is that a plaintiff need no longer demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation. Instead, the majority has replaced the personal stake requirement with a completely impersonal one. The right to sue is now the exact opposite of a personal claim--it is a marketable commodity. By severing the right to recover from the right to prosecute a claim, the Court empowers anyone to bring suit on any claim, whether it be the first assignee, the second, the third, or so on. But, as we have said in another context, standing is not "commutative." Cuno, 547 U.S., at 352. Legal claims, at least those brought in federal court, are not fungible commodities. </s> The source of the Court's mistake is easy to identify. The Court goes awry when it asserts that the standing inquiry focuses on whether the injury is likely to be redressed, not whether the complaining party's injury is likely to be redressed. See ante, at 17-18. That could not be more wrong. We have never approved federal-court jurisdiction over a claim where the entire relief requested will run to a party not before the court. Never. The Court commits this mistake by treating the elements of standing as separate strands rather than as interlocking and related elements meant to ensure a personal stake. Our cases do not condone this approach. </s> The Court expressly rejected such an argument in Vermont Agency, where the relator argued that he was "suing to remedy an injury in fact suffered by the United States." 529 U.S., at 771. We dismissed the argument out of hand, noting that "[t]he Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining party." Id., at 771-772 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S., at 499; emphasis in Vermont Agency; internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court's analysis in that section of the opinion concerned the right of the relator to assert the United States' injury, the Court treated it as axiomatic that any "redress" must also redound to the benefit of the relator. </s> In Steel Co., the Court similarly rejected a basis for standing that turned on relief sought--the imposition of civil penalties--that was "payable to the United States Treasury," but not to the plaintiff. 523 U.S., at 106. We observed that the plaintiff sought "not remediation of its own injury," but merely the "vindication of the rule of law." Ibid. (emphasis added). Importantly, the Court recognized that "[r]elief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement." Id., at 107. Again, the Court's emphasis on the party's injury makes clear that the basis for rejecting standing in Steel Co. was the fact that the remedy sought would not benefit the party before the Court. </s> The majority's view of the Article III redressability requirement is also incompatible with what we said in Raines, 521 U.S. 811. In that case, we held that individual Members of Congress lacked standing to contest the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act. We observed that the Congressmen "do not claim that they have been deprived of something to which they personally are entitled." Id., at 821. Rather, the Members sought to enforce a right that ran to their office, not to their person. "If one of the Members were to retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would be possessed by his successor instead. The claimed injury thus runs (in a sense) with the Member's seat, a seat which the Member holds ... as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal power." Ibid. We therefore held that the individual Members did "not have a sufficient 'personal stake' in th[e] dispute" to maintain their challenge. Id., at 830. See also Warth, supra, at 506 (denying standing where "the record is devoid of any indication" that the requested "relief would benefit petitioners"); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 39, 42 (1976) (denying standing to plaintiffs who did not "stand to profit in some personal interest" because it was "purely speculative" whether the relief sought "would result in these respondents' receiving the hospital services they desire" (emphasis added)). </s> The majority finds that respondents have a sufficient stake in this litigation because the substantive recovery will initially go to them, and "[w]hat does it matter what the aggregators do with the money afterward?" Ante, at 18. The majority's assertion implies, incorrectly, that respondents have, or ever had, a choice of what to do with the recovery. It may be true that a plaintiff's independent decision to pledge his recovery to another, as in respondents' hypothetical of an "original owner of a claim who signs a collateral agreement with a charity obligating herself to donate every penny she recovers in [the] litigation," Brief for Respondents 21, would not divest the plaintiff of Article III standing. But respondents never had the right to direct the disposition of the recovery; they have only the right to sue. The hypothetical plaintiff who chooses to pledge her recovery to charity, by contrast, will secure a personal benefit from the recovery. Unlike respondents' claims, the hypothetical plaintiff's pre-existing claim is not tied in any way to her separate agreement to direct her recovery to charity. She has more than the right to sue; she has the right to exercise her independent authority to direct the proceeds as she sees fit. In that situation, the Article III requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation is satisfied.2 </s> The Court believes that these standing principles, embodying a "core component derived directly from the Constitution," Allen, 468 U.S., at 751, that is of "particular importance in ensuring that the Federal Judiciary respects the proper--and properly limited--role of the courts in a democratic society," and that is "crucial in maintaining the tripartite allocation of power set forth in the Constitution," Cuno, 547 U.S., at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted), should yield "as a practical matter" to the prospect that a contrary "holding could easily be overcome," ante, at 20. The Court chooses to elevate expediency above the strictures imposed by the Constitution. That is a tradeoff the Constitution does not allow. Cf. Raines, supra, at 820 ("[W]e must put aside the natural urge to proceed directly to the merits of this important dispute and to 'settle' it for the sake of convenience and efficiency"). Perhaps it is true that a "dollar or two," ante, at 20, would give respondents a sufficient stake in the litigation. Article III is worth a dollar. And in any case, the ease with which respondents can comply with the requirements of Article III is not a reason to abandon our precedents; it is a reason to adhere to them. II </s> Given all this, it is understandable that the majority opts to minimize its reliance on modern standing principles and to retreat to a broad, generalized reading of the historical tradition of assignments. But that history does not support the majority's conclusion. The first problem lies in identifying the relevant tradition. Much of the majority's historical analysis focuses on the generic (and undisputed) point that common law and equity courts eventually permitted assignees to sue on their assigned claims. See ante, at 5-10. I would treat that point as settled as much by stare decisis, see Vermont Agency, 529 U.S., at 773, as by the historic practice of the King's Bench and Chancery. But the general history of assignments says nothing about the particular aspect of suits brought on assigned claims that is relevant to this case: whether an assignee who has acquired the legal right to sue, but no right to any substantive recovery, can maintain an action in court. On that precise question, the historical sources are either nonexistent or equivocal. A </s> None of the English common-law sources on which the majority relies establishes that assignments of this sort would be permitted either at law or in equity. As the majority's discussion makes clear, both systems permitted suits brought on assignments--either in equity by an assignee having a beneficial interest in the litigation, or at law by an assignee who had a power of attorney and sued in the name of the assignor. See ante, at 6-8. But at all times, suits based on assignments remained subject to the prohibition on champerty and maintenance. See 7 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 535-536 (1926).3 By the 18th century, an assignment no longer constituted maintenance per se, see id., at 536, but it appears to have been an open question whether an assignment of the "[b]are [r]igh[t] to [l]itigate" would fail as "[s]avouring" of champerty and maintenance, see M. Smith, Law of Assignment: The Creation and Transfer of Choses in Action 318, 321 (2007). In order to sustain an assignment of the right to sue, the assignment had to include the transfer of a property interest to which the right of action was incident or subsidiary. Id., at 321-322; see also Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. Exch. 481, 160 Eng. Rep. 196 (1835); Dickinson v. Burrell, 35 Beav. 257, 55 Eng. Rep. 894 (1866); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence §1040h, pp. 234-235 (8th ed. 1861); R. Megarry & P. Baker, Snell's Principles of Equity 82 (25th ed. 1960). American courts as well understood the common-law rule to require a transfer of interest to the assignee--over and above the "naked right to bring a suit"--that gave the assignee a "valuable right of property." Traer v. Clews, 115 U.S. 528, 541 (1885). A New York court, surveying the English sources, concluded that "an assignment to the plaintiff of the assignor's right to maintain and prosecute an action for the specific performance of defendants' agreement, amounts to nothing more than an assertion that the assignor has undertaken to assign to the plaintiff a bare right to litigate for the former's benefit exclusively." Williams v. Boyle, 1 Misc. 364, 367, 20 N.Y.S. 720, 722 (Ct. Common Pleas 1892). To secure standing in a court of equity, the court held, "it must appear that the assignee's successful prosecution of the action is susceptible of personal enjoyment by him...." Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> So while there is no doubt that at common law, courts of law and equity sought ways of protecting the rights of assignees, they did not do so to the exclusion of the age-long objection to maintenance, which could be found when the assignee lacked a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the litigation. During the common-law period at least, it remained an open question whether an assignee for collection, who by agreement took nothing from the suit, had a sufficient interest in the assigned debt to support his right to sue. </s> To be sure, the assignments at issue here purport to give respondents "all rights, title and interest" in the payphone operators' claims for dial-around compensation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 114a. But when severed from the right to retain any of the substantive recovery, it is not clear that common-law courts of law or equity would have treated the assigned right to litigate as incidental or subsidiary to the interest represented by the claim itself. Cf. 7 Holdsworth, supra, at 538 ("[I]t was not till certain classes of rights ... became more freely assignable in equity, that it became necessary to distinguish between the cases in which assignment was permitted and cases in which it was not; and it is for this reason that we find very little clear authority on these questions till quite modern times").4 </s> I do not take the majority's point to be that the common-law tradition supplies the answer to this question. As the majority concedes, it was not until the 19th century that "courts began to consider the specific question presented here." Ante, at 10. But even granting this starting point, the Court's recitation of the 19th-century tradition fails to account for the deep divergence in practice regarding the right of assignees with no stake in the substantive recovery to maintain an action in court. </s> The majority concedes that "some States during this period of time refused to recognize assignee-for-collection suits," ante, at 12, but that refusal was substantially more widespread than the majority acknowledges. See Robbins v. Deverill, 20 Wis. 142 (1865); Bostwick v. Bryant, 113 Ind. 448, 16 N. E. 378 (1888); Moses v. Ingram, 99 Ala. 483, 12 So. 374 (1893); Brown v. Ginn, 66 Ohio St. 316, 64 N. E. 123 (1902); Coombs v. Harford, 99 Me. 426, 59 A. 529 (1904); Martin v. Mask, 158 N. C. 436, 74 S. E. 343 (1912). These courts concluded that assignees having no legal or beneficial interest to vindicate could not sue on the assigned claims. </s> Several more States, including some enlisted by the majority, only eventually recognized the right of assignees for collection to sue after taking inconsistent positions on the issue. In fact, the rule regarding assignees for collection only was so unsettled that the Kansas Supreme Court reversed itself twice in the span of 19 years. Compare Krapp v. Eldridge, 33 Kan. 106, 5 P. 372 (1885) (assignees for collection only may sue as the real party in interest), with Stewart v. Price, 64 Kan. 191, 67 P. 553 (1902) (assignees for collection only may not sue), with Manley v. Park, 68 Kan. 400, 75 P. 557 (1904) (assignees for collection only may sue again). During this period, many other courts reversed course on the flinty problem posed by assignees for collection only. See Hoagland v. Van Etten, 23 Neb. 462, 36 N.W. 755 (1888), overruled by Archer v. Musick, 147 Neb. 1018, 25 N.W. 2d 908 (1947); State ex rel. Freebourn v. Merchant's Credit Serv., Inc., 104 Mont. 76, 66 P.2d 337 (1937), overruled by Rae v. Cameron, 112 Mont. 159, 114 P.2d 1060 (1941). </s> The majority's survey of 19th-century judicial practice thus ignores a substantial contrary tradition during this period. That tradition makes clear that state courts did not regularly "entertai[n] suits virtually identical to the litigation before us." Ante, at 10. In reality, all that the majority's cases show is that the question whether assignees for collection could maintain an action in court was hotly contested--a live issue that spawned much litigation and diverse published decisions. The confusion was much remarked on by courts of this period, even those that ultimately sided with the Court's understanding of the prevailing practice. See, e.g., Gomer v. Stockdale, 5 Colo. App. 489, 492, 39 P. 355, 356 (1895) ("There is much controversy in the various states respecting that almost universal code provision, that a suit must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest"); Compton v. Atwell, 207 F. 2d 139, 140-141 (CADC 1953) ("[W]hether an assignee for collection only is the real party in interest ... has produced a variance of judicial opinion" and "has so divided other courts"). </s> Commentators have also called attention to the divergent practice. As the majority notes, John Norton Pomeroy observed that "there is some conflict" on the question whether an assignee for collection obligated to "account for the whole proceeds ... is entitled to sue in his own name." Remedies and Remedial Rights §132, p. 159 (1876) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also M. Ferguson, Comment, The Real Party in Interest Rule Revitalized: Recognizing Defendant's Interest in the Determination of Proper Parties Plaintiff, 55 Cal. L. Rev. 1452, 1475 (1967) ("Nowhere do the courts manifest more confusion than in deciding whether an assignee for collection only is a real party in interest"); Note, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 587, 588 (1953) (observing that "[t]here is, however, little agreement among the courts as to the meaning and purpose of [real party in interest] provisions" and noting that they have been construed "to prevent the owner of the bare legal title to a chose in action from suing"). Indeed, notable legal commentators of the period argued against permitting suits by assignees for collection. See, e.g., 1 J. Kerr, Law of Pleading and Practice §586, pp. 791-792 (1919) ("[T]he party in whom the legal interest is vested is not always the real party in interest. 'The 'real party in interest' is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment in the cause.... The rule should be restricted to parties whose interests are in issue, and are to be affected by the decree"). </s> This unsettled and conflicting state of affairs is understandable given the transformation in the understanding of the common-law prohibition on suits by assignees with no beneficial interest. The immediate cause for this transformation was the merger of law and equity, and the creation of real party in interest provisions intended to reconcile the two forms of actions. Allen v. Brown, 44 N.Y. 228, 231 (1870) (noting that New York code provision allowing assignees to sue as the real party in interest "abolishe[d] the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity"); see ante, at 10. The fusion of law and equity forced courts to confront the novel question of what to do with assignees for collection only, who could not sue at law in their own name, and who could not recover on a bill in equity for the lack of any beneficial interest to enforce. Were such assignees, under the new system, real parties in interest who could bring suit? It is not surprising that courts took conflicting positions on this question, a question for which the historical tradition did not provide an answer. Given this, it is difficult to characterize a practice as showing what sort of cases and controversies were "traditionally amenable to ... the judicial process," Steel Co., 523 U.S., at 102 (emphasis added), when the practice was a self-conscious break in tradition. </s> In Vermont Agency, by contrast, the Court relied on a long and unbroken tradition of informer statutes that reached back to the 14th century and prevailed up to the "period immediately before and after the framing of the Constitution." 529 U.S., at 776. The Court noted that the American Colonies "pass[ed] several informer statutes expressly authorizing qui tam suits," and that the First Congress itself "enacted a considerable number of informer statutes." Ibid. This tradition provided relevant evidence of what the Framers in 1787 would have understood the terms "case" and "controversy" to mean. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (the Article III "[j]udicial power could come into play only in matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert feel of lawyers constituted 'Cases' or 'Controversies'").5 </s> There is certainly no comparable tradition here. The belated innovations of the mid- to late-19th-century courts come too late to provide insight into the meaning of Article III. Although we have sometimes looked to cases postdating the founding era as evidence of common-law traditions, we have never done so when the courts self-consciously confronted novel questions arising from a break in the received tradition, or where the practice of later courts was so divergent. A belated and equivocal tradition cannot fill in for the fundamental requirements of Article III where, as here, those requirements are so plainly lacking. B </s> Nor do our own cases establish that we "long ago indicated that assignees for collection only can properly bring suit." Ante, at 14. (If the majority truly believed that, one would expect the cases to be placed front and center in the Court's analysis, rather than as an afterthought.) None addressed the requirements of Article III, and so none constitutes binding precedent. See Steel Co., supra, at 91 ("[D]rive-by jurisdictional rulings of this sort ... have no precedential effect"); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352, n. 2 (1996) ("[W]e have repeatedly held that the existence of unaddressed jurisdictional defects has no precedential effect"). In Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S. 302 (1902), we addressed the then-existing statutory provision that barred jurisdiction over suits "improperly or collusively made or joined ... for the purpose of creating a case cognizable or removable under this act." Id., at 325. We held that a plaintiff who took legal title of multiple bonds "for purposes of collection" could not satisfy the statute when the bonds individually did not meet the amount in controversy requirement. Ibid. The Court did not say that the "suit could properly be brought in federal court," ante, at 14, if the only objection was the limitation placed on the plaintiff's assignment; instead, the Court remarked that such a limited assignment would not violate the statutory prohibition on suits that are "improperly or collusively made or joined," Waite, supra, at 325. </s> In Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U.S. 117 (1920), the plaintiff, secretary of the Cattle Raisers' Association, sued to enforce an order of reparations issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which found that the defendant railroads had charged excessive shipping rates to the members of the association. The question before the Court was the validity of the lower court's ruling that the assignments to the plaintiff--which reserved a beneficial interest in the assignors, the individual members of the association--did not vest legal title in the secretary "so as [to] authorize the commission to make the award of damages in his name." Id., at 134. We concluded that the agency was authorized to issue the reparations order in the name of the plaintiff because the assignments were "absolute in form." Ibid. We then concluded that "beneficial or equitable title" was not necessary for the plaintiff "to claim an award of reparation" and enforce that award in his own name in court. Ibid. In other words, the Court addressed merely the question whether it was appropriate for a federal agency (not bound by the constraints of Article III) to enter an award in the plaintiff's name. In no way did the Court endorse the right of an assignee for collection to sue as an initial matter in federal court. </s> Nor did the Court address Article III standing requirements in Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282 (1939). There, we found that an assignment "for purposes of suit," where the assignee had an obligation to account for the proceeds (in part) to another, did not render the assignment invalid under New York state law. Id., at 289. Thus, we held that the Ohio courts had failed to give full faith and credit to an earlier, valid New York court judgment. Id., at 292. If we had been presented with the Article III question, we would likely have found it significant that the plaintiff-assignee stood to take the balance of any recovery after the proceeds were used to discharge the debts of the assignor (plaintiff's brother) and the plaintiff's wife. Id., at 286. But in any event, the Court's conclusion that the assignment was valid under New York law, where the restrictions of Article III do not operate, does not support the view that suits by assignees for collection are permissible in federal courts. C </s> When we have looked to history to confirm our own Article III jurisdiction, we have relied on a firmly entrenched historical tradition that served to confirm the application of modern standing principles. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S., at 774-778. The Court's decision today illustrates the converse approach. It relies on an equivocal and contradictory tradition to override the clear application of the case-or-controversy requirement that would otherwise bar respondents' suit. But perhaps we should heed the counsels of hope rather than despair. The majority, after all, purports to comply with our Article III precedents, see ante, at 16-18, so those precedents at least live to give meaning to "the judiciary's proper role in our system of government" another day. Raines, 521 U.S., at 818. What is more, the majority expressly and repeatedly grounds its finding of standing on its conclusion that "history and precedent are clear" that these types of suits "have long been permitted," ante, at 5, and that there is "a strong tradition" of such suits "during the past two centuries," ante, at 16, 19. This conclusion is, for the reasons we have set forth, achingly wrong--but at least the articulated test is clear and daunting. </s> Finally, there is the majority's point that all this fuss could have been avoided for a dollar, see ante, at 20--a price, by this point, that most readers would probably be happy to contribute. The price will be higher in future standing cases. And when it is--when standing really matters--it would be surprising if the Court were to look to a case in which it did not. </s> I would vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1Because respondents have failed to demonstrate that they have Article III standing to bring their claims, I do not reach the question whether prudential considerations would also bar their suit. Footnote 2The majority believes that the examples of trustees, guardians ad litem, receivers, and executors show that "federal courts routinely entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that are not themselves directly bringing suit." Ante, at 18. None of these examples is pertinent to the question here. "A guardian ad litem or next friend ... is a nominal party only; the ward is the real party in interest...." 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1548, pp. 373-374 (2d ed. 1990). A receiver "is considered to be an officer of the court, and therefore not an agent of the parties, whose appointment is incident to other proceedings in which some form of primary relief is sought." 12 id., §2981, at 9-10 (2d ed. 1997) (footnote omitted). Trustees hold legal title to the assets in the trust estate and have an independent fiduciary obligation to sue to preserve those assets. The trustee's discharge of its legal obligation is an independent, personal benefit that supports the trustee's standing to sue in federal court. The majority's response that assignees for collection only have a "contractual obligation to litigate," ante, at 19, is unavailing, because the contractual obligation to sue and remit the proceeds of any recovery was a condition of the assignment of the claim in the first place. The majority's reasoning is perfectly circular: A suit pursuant to a contract to remit proceeds satisfies Article III because there is a contract to remit proceeds. </s> In any event, the majority cannot dispute the point that suits by trustees, guardians ad litem, executors, and the like make up a settled, continuous practice "of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process." Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). As shown below, the same cannot be said for suits by assignees for collection only. See infra, at 12-15. Footnote 3Blackstone defined maintenance as the "officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it.... This is an offense against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *134-*135. Champerty "is a species of maintenance, ... being a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant campum partire, to divide the land or other matter sued for between them, if they prevail at law; whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party's suit at his own expense." Id., at *135. Footnote 4The fact that a bankrupt assignor could sue at law to recover debts for the benefit of an assignee creditor, see ante, at 8 (citing Winch v. Keeley, 1 T. R. 619, 99 Eng. Rep. 1284 (K. B. 1787)), says nothing about the issue in this case. It is of course true that one has standing to sue when the result of a favorable judgment will be the discharge of a debt or other legal obligation. The only legal obligation respondents seek to discharge is the obligation to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the payphone operators. But as explained above, a party lacking the independent right to direct the disposition of the proceeds cannot demonstrate the personal stake required to invoke the authority of an Article III court. See supra, at 7. Footnote 5The statutes from the American Colonies add nothing to the majority's historical argument. See ante, at 9-10. Exceptions (some created by statute) to the general rule against assignments at law arose early in the common-law period, including exceptions for executors and administrators of estates, assignees in bankruptcy, negotiable instruments, and assignments involving the sovereign. See 29 R. Lord, Williston on Contracts §74.2, pp. 214-215 (4th ed. 2003). What none of these exceptions provides for, however, are suits brought by assignees for collection only--i.e., assignees who have no share in the substantive recovery. Such assignees, as the majority acknowledges, did not attract the attention of courts until the 19th century. See ante, at 10.

United States Supreme Court YATES v. AIKEN(1988) No. 86-6060 Argued: December 2, 1987Decided: January 12, 1988 </s> Petitioner was tried in state court on charges of murder and armed robbery stemming from a 1981 store robbery during which his accomplice and the storekeeper's mother were killed in a fight after petitioner left the store. Although petitioner testified that the mother had not even entered the store before he left and that he had not intended to kill or harm anyone, the jury was instructed "that malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon." After his conviction and death sentence were affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from that court, arguing, inter alia, that the burdenshifting instruction given at trial was unconstitutional under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 . While the habeas corpus application was pending, petitioner also called to the state court's attention this Court's subsequent decision in Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 . After this Court summarily vacated the state court's summary denial of the writ and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Francis," the state court, although acknowledging that the jury instruction suffered from the same infirmities addressed in Francis, denied relief on state-law grounds without considering whether Francis might apply retroactively and without discussing Sandstrom. </s> Held: </s> As a matter of federal law, petitioner's conviction cannot stand in light of Francis. Pp. 215-218. </s> (a) Sandstrom, which had been decided before petitioner's trial took place, established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits jury instructions that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of proof on the critical question of intent in a criminal prosecution. Francis was merely an application of that governing principle. Accordingly, respondents' argument that a newly announced constitutional rule should not generally be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review cannot operate to deny petitioner the benefit of Francis. That argument simply does not apply where the "new" holding is merely an application of a rule that was well settled at the time of conviction. Pp. 215-217. </s> (b) The State's contention that it has the authority to establish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings and to refuse therein to apply a new rule of federal constitutional law retroactively is rejected since Francis did not announce a new rule and since the state court's opinion [484 U.S. 211, 212] does not place any limit on the issues it will entertain in collateral proceedings. Having considered the merits of the federal claim, that court has the duty to grant the relief that federal law requires. Pp. 217-218. </s> 290 S. C. 231, 349 S. E. 2d 84, reversed and remanded. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> David I. Bruck argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> Donald J. Zelenka, Chief Deputy Attorney General of South Carolina, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner and an accomplice robbed a country store in South Carolina in 1981. After petitioner left the store, a fight occurred in which the accomplice and the storekeeper's mother were both killed. Petitioner was convicted of murder and armed robbery and sentenced to death. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1982. State v. Yates, 280 S. C. 29, 310 S. E. 2d 805, cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124 (1983). </s> At his trial, petitioner testified that the victim had not even entered the store before he left and that he had not intended to kill or to harm anyone. The jury, however, was instructed "that malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon." 1 A few months after petitioner's conviction was affirmed, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that it was error to give such an instruction. See State v. Elmore, 279 S. C. 417, 308 S. E. 2d 781 (1983). Thereafter, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the South Carolina Supreme Court, arguing that the burden-shifting instruction given at his trial was unconstitutional under the state court's reasoning in Elmore and under our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). While the application for habeas corpus was pending, we decided another [484 U.S. 211, 213] case involving a burden-shifting instruction, Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), and petitioner promptly called that decision to the attention of the State Supreme Court. The court denied the writ without opinion. </s> Petitioner then sought a writ of certiorari in this Court. We summarily vacated the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remanded the case "for further consideration in light of Francis v. Franklin." Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896 (1985). On remand, the state court determined that the jury instruction at petitioner's trial "suffered from the same infirmities present in Elmore and addressed in Francis v. Franklin." 290 S. C. 231, 233, 349 S. E. 2d 84, 85 (1986). Nevertheless, the court held that petitioner was not entitled to relief. As an explanation for its holding, the court stated that its decision in Elmore should not be applied retroactively to invalidate a conviction that was final when Elmore was decided. The opinion did not consider whether the decision in Francis v. Franklin might apply retroactively and also did not discuss our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, on which petitioner had relied. </s> In dissent, Justice Finney reasoned that Elmore and Francis v. Franklin should be applied retroactively because an instruction that shifts the burden of proof on an element of the offense - particularly in a capital case - substantially impairs the truth-finding function of the jury. Moreover, he reasoned, given our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana in 1979, the case did not represent a significant change in the law. 2 </s> [484 U.S. 211, 214] </s> We granted certiorari because we were concerned that the South Carolina Supreme Court had not fully complied with our mandate. 480 U.S. 945 (1987). We now reverse. </s> I </s> Our order remanding the case for further consideration in the light of Francis v. Franklin was predicated entirely on the fact that petitioner's challenge to the jury instruction asserted a substantial federal question. Our opinion in Francis explained why a challenge of this kind is supported by the Federal Constitution: </s> "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment `protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.' In re Winship, [397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)]. This `bedrock, "axiomatic and elementary" [constitutional] principle,' id., at 363, prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, at 520-524; Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 , 215 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 -701 (1975); see also Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 -275 (1952). The prohibition protects the `fundamental value determination of our society,' given voice in Justice Harlan's concurrence in Winship, that `it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.' 397 U.S., at 372 . See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 -526 (1958)." 471 U.S., at 313 . </s> The portion of the state court's opinion concluding that the instruction in petitioner's case was infirm for the reasons "addressed [484 U.S. 211, 215] in Francis" was responsive to our mandate, but the discussion of the question whether the decision in Elmore should be applied retroactively was not. Our mandate contemplated that the state court would consider whether, as a matter of federal law, petitioner's conviction could stand in the light of Francis. Since the state court did not decide that question, we shall do so. </s> II </s> The South Carolina Attorney General submits that we should adopt Justice Harlan's theory that a newly announced constitutional rule should not be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review unless the rule places "certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe," Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), or enunciates a procedural rule that is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," id., at 693. Under this theory, the Attorney General argues, petitioner would not be entitled to the benefit of our ruling in Franklin. </s> We have already endorsed Justice Harlan's retroactivity analysis for cases pending on direct appeal, see Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322 (1987); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982), and we have noted, as Justice Harlan did, Mackey, supra, at 682-687; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 260 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the important distinction between direct review and collateral review. Compare Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (holding that Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review), with Griffith, supra, at 322-323 (holding that Batson does apply retroactively to cases pending on direct review); see, e. g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (right to appointed counsel on direct appeal not applicable in collateral proceedings). To decide this case, however, it is not necessary [484 U.S. 211, 216] to determine whether we should go further and adopt Justice Harlan's reasoning as to the retroactivity of cases announcing new constitutional rules to cases pending on collateral review. </s> Although Justice Harlan believed that most collateral attacks on final judgments should be resolved by reference to the state of the law at the time of the petitioner's conviction, he emphasized the proposition that many "new" holdings are merely applications of principles that were well settled at the time of conviction. As he explained in Desist: </s> "The theory that the habeas petitioner is entitled to the law prevailing at the time of his conviction is, however, one which is more complex than the Court has seemingly recognized. First, it is necessary to determine whether a particular decision has really announced a `new' rule at all or whether it has simply applied a well-established constitutional principle to govern a case which is closely analogous to those which have been previously considered in the prior case law. . . . One need not be a rigid partisan of Blackstone to recognize that many, though not all, of this Court's constitutional decisions are grounded upon fundamental principles whose content does not change dramatically from year to year, but whose meanings are altered slowly and subtly as generation succeeds generation. In such a context it appears very difficult to argue against the application of the `new' rule in all habeas cases since one could never say with any assurance that this Court would have ruled differently at the time the petitioner's conviction became final." 394 U.S., at 263 -264. </s> This reasoning, which we previously have endorsed, 3 is controlling in this case because our decision in Francis was [484 U.S. 211, 217] merely an application of the principle that governed our decision in Sandstrom v. Montana, which had been decided before petitioner's trial took place. We explicitly so held in Francis itself: </s> "The question before the Court in this case is almost identical to that before the Court in Sandstrom: whether the challenged jury instruction had the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof enunciated in Winship on the critical question of . . . state of mind,' 442 U.S., at 521 , by creating a mandatory presumption of intent upon proof by the State of other elements of the offense." 471 U.S., at 313 . </s> "Sandstrom v. Montana made clear that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the State from making use of jury instructions that have the effect of relieving the State of the burden of proof enunciated in Winship on the critical question of intent in a criminal prosecution. 442 U.S., at 521 . Today we reaffirm the rule of Sandstrom and the wellspring due process principle from which it was drawn. The Court of Appeals faithfully and correctly applied this rule, and the court's judgment is therefore affirmed." Id., at 326-327. </s> III </s> Respondents also argue that South Carolina has the authority to establish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings and to refuse to apply a new rule of federal constitutional law retroactively in such a proceeding. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, as we have just explained, [484 U.S. 211, 218] Francis did not announce a new rule. Second, we do not read the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion as having placed any limit on the issues that it will entertain in collateral proceedings. Since it has considered the merits of the federal claim, it has a duty to grant the relief that federal law requires. </s> The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See App. 7; Tr. 1208. </s> [Footnote 2 "The doctrine against burden shifting presumptions set out in Francis v. Franklin, [471 U.S. 307 (1985)], is not a clear break with prior law. The United States Supreme Court in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 . . . (1979), decided prior to Yates, held that conclusive presumptions or instructions which shift the burden of persuasion violate the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement that in every criminal trial, the state is required to prove each element of the criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court went on to hold, concerning Elmore-type errors, that conclusive presumptions conflict with the presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused. These presumptions, likewise, extend [484 U.S. 211, 214] to every element of the crime and invade the truth-finding function which, in a criminal case, the law assigns solely to the jury." 290 S. C., at 239, 349 S. E. 2d, at 88-89. </s> [Footnote 3 We stated in United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549 (1982): </s> "[W]hen a decision of this Court merely has applied settled precedents to new and different factual situations, no real question has arisen as to whether [484 U.S. 211, 217] the later decision should apply retrospectively. In such cases, it has been a foregone conclusion that the rule of the later case applies in earlier cases, because the later decision has not in fact altered that rule in any material way." </s> See also Truesdale v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 527 (1987) (per curiam); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Lee v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 461, 462 (1979) (per curiam). </s> [484 U.S. 211, 219]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. ALLEN-BRADLEY CO.(1957) No. 78 Argued: December 13, 1956Decided: January 22, 1957 </s> Under 124 (f) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, as amended, the War Production Board had authority to certify that only a part of the cost of essential wartime expansion of production facilities of a private manufacturer was "necessary in the interest of national defense," so as to be amortizable within five years or less under 23 (t) and 124 for income-tax purposes. Pp. 306-311. </s> 134 Ct. Cl. 800, reversed. </s> Hilbert P. Zarky argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Philip Elman and Joseph F. Goetten. </s> Harvey W. Peters argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1940 this country embarked on the greatest program of defense preparedness in its history. Such an undertaking called for a vast expansion of the nation's industrial capacity. New and improved facilities were desperately needed, not only for the production of guns, planes and the other obvious weapons of war, but also for the innumerable items that are essential to the prosecution of large-scale conflict. This unprecedented program of expansion demanded the full and immediate cooperation of everyone who could lend assistance. While the Government attempted to secure the necessary facilities by building them itself or by extending emergency construction loans to private business, it soon appeared that these methods would not be adequate to meet the needs of defense. Private capital was called on for assistance in [352 U.S. 306, 307] the task. However business exhibited a reluctance to build new war plants because of widespread fears that such facilities would become wholly useless when the emergency had passed. In response to these fears, Congress acted to lessen the financial risks involved in the private construction of emergency facilities. Among other things it amended the 1939 Internal Revenue Code by adding 23 (t) and 124, 1 which allowed business to write off the cost of new facilities as a deduction against taxable income within a period of five years or less, regardless of the actual economic life of the facilities, provided they had been certified by the proper executive agency as "necessary in the interest of national defense." This accelerated amortization privilege generally enabled those businesses receiving it to reduce their federal income taxes with the net result that a large part of the construction costs was, at least temporarily, borne by the Federal Government through a reduction in its tax receipts. </s> This case involves a question of the proper interpretation of 124 (f), a vital part of these accelerated amortization provisions. The essential facts are not in dispute. During the Second World War the respondent Allen-Bradley Company produced radio parts and other materials needed by the Government to carry on the war. These products were in critically short supply and at the request of government procurement officers respondent repeatedly increased and improved its facilities in order to boost its output. In connection with such expansions it applied to the War Production Board, which was then the certifying authority, for certificates that the improvements were necessary to the national defense. The Board issued nine different certificates of necessity to respondent but the dispute here involves only three of these certificates. Each of these three stated that the facilities [352 U.S. 306, 308] covered by it were necessary in the interest of national defense but only up to a specified percentage of their total cost. This "partial certification" was made pursuant to a policy adopted by the Board in 1943 that it would certify essential facilities, which could reasonably be expected to have peacetime utility, only to the extent that their costs were attributable to the wartime increase in prices. Respondent accepted these partial certifications, proceeded with the expansion and in its tax returns for 1944 and 1945 deducted an amount based on the accelerated amortization of that part of the total cost which had been certified by the Board. </s> In 1953 respondent first raised the claim which is the basis of this suit that the Board had no authority to certify only part of the cost of a necessary emergency facility. Respondent concedes that the Board had discretion to refuse to issue any certificate at all, but contends that once it decided that a facility was necessary to the national defense its function was at an end and that any attempt by it to limit the certification to a part of the cost of such facility was a nullity. Therefore, respondent contends, it was entitled to accelerate the amortization of the full cost of those facilities covered by the three partial certificates and not just that part of the full cost which had been certified by the Board. On the basis of these contentions respondent filed the present action in the Court of Claims to recover an alleged overpayment of its 1944 and 1945 income taxes. The Court of Claims accepted respondent's arguments and rendered judgment for it. 134 Ct. Cl. 800. We granted certiorari, 351 U.S. 981 , because of the conflict between this decision and that of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. National Lead Co., 230 F.2d 161. </s> The language of the crucial section 124 (f) is ambiguous. It specifies that in determining the amount of the [352 U.S. 306, 309] wartime construction costs which are to be available for the special amortization privilege: </s> "(1) There shall be included only so much of the amount . . . as is properly attributable to such construction . . . after December 31, 1939, as [the War Production Board] has certified as necessary in the interest of national defense during the emergency period . . . ." </s> Respondent argues that the phrase "only so much of the amount" in this section refers simply to that part of the cost of facilities that is attributable to construction after 1939. On the other hand the Government contends that this qualifying phrase refers not only to those costs incurred after 1939, but also to that portion of those costs which the War Production Board has certified is necessary to the national defense. We believe that either interpretation is possible; that neither is compelled. But those who were responsible for the administration of the Act consistently interpreted 124 (f) as authorizing them to certify that only a part of the costs of construction after 1939 was necessary to the national defense. 2 </s> The legislative history shows that Congress intended that the administrators of the certification program were to have broad discretion in exercising their power. These administrators were faced with extremely complicated problems in attempting to accomplish the desired objective of Congress in the face of constant and drastic changes in conditions. And as the nation's industrial capacity became more adequate they carefully balanced the need for the proposed expansion against the loss of [352 U.S. 306, 310] revenue to the Government caused by accelerated amortization before issuing a certificate. The power to certify only a portion of the cost gave them a more flexible instrument to balance these conflicting objectives. </s> It appears that Congress kept close supervision over the certification program and the special amortization privilege. For example, 124 was amended five times during the war; 3 two of these amendments altered 124 (f) itself in a manner which did not affect the language decisive of the present controversy. But no attempt was made to restrain the administrators from issuing certificates covering only a part of the cost of necessary facilities, although it seems apparent that responsible committees of Congress were aware that 124 (f) had been consistently interpreted and applied by the certifying authorities as permitting them to issue such certifications. In fact a special Senate "watch-dog" committee was established to continually study and investigate the program for construction of war plants and facilities including the ". . . benefits accruing to contractors with respect to amortization for the purposes of taxation or otherwise . . . ." 4 </s> Perhaps 124 (f) could have been construed differently. But it was not. Construed as it was, it served its purpose. It contributed materially to the phenomenal expansion of our industrial plants which was so necessary for successful prosecution of the war. Certificates issued for only a portion of the cost of necessary facilities were accepted by business in general, and respondent in particular - apparently without substantial objection. The technique employed in 124 (f) was a new one and those who drafted that section could not be certain how it would [352 U.S. 306, 311] work in practice. They could not foresee the many problems that would arise in the administration of this sweeping power which could be used to encourage expansion of any industry producing materials useful in the all-out war effort. Therefore it is not strange that the provision was loosely drawn and, in some respects, imprecise. However it would have been strange in these circumstances if Congress had embarked on this new course without leaving wide discretion for flexible administration in the light of the day-to-day grind of experience. The language of 124 (f) lends itself to such flexibility. </s> We hold that the Board had authority under 124 (f) to issue certificates, as in this case, certifying that only a part of the cost of essential wartime improvements was necessary to the national defense. Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Claims must be reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 54 Stat. 998-1003, as amended, 26 U.S.C. 23 (t), 124. </s> [Footnote 2 See War Department Regulations, Issuance of Necessity Certificates, 7 Fed. Reg. 4233 (1942); War Production Board Regulations, Issuance of Necessity Certificates, 8 Fed. Reg. 16964 (1943). And compare Treas. Reg. 111, 29.124-6. </s> [Footnote 3 55 Stat. 4, 55 Stat. 757, 56 Stat. 50, 56 Stat. 850 and 59 Stat. 525. </s> [Footnote 4 S. Res. 71, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (87 Cong. Rec. 1615), and S. Res. 6, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (89 Cong. Rec. 331). </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring. </s> Both the terms of the statute, and the fact that two courts of such special expertise in tax matters as the Tax Court and Court of Claims have sustained the taxpayer's position, 1 leave me doubtful as to whether, under the statutory provisions in question, 2 the War Production Board had the right to issue partial certificates. The Court finds ambiguity in the statute, but, in resolving that ambiguity as it has, does little more than point out [352 U.S. 306, 312] that Congress did not interfere with the authority claimed by the Board. </s> However, in my view the scope of the Board's powers need not be reached in this case, because, for the reasons given by Judge Lumbard in his opinion for the unanimous Court of Appeals in Commissioner v. National Lead Co., 230 F.2d 161, I think it clear that respondent cannot maintain the present action. On that basis I join in the Court's decision. </s> [Footnote 1 National Lead Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T. C. 988: Allen-Bradley Co. v. United States. 134 Ct. Cl. 800. </s> [Footnote 2 26 U.S.C. 124 (f) (1), from which the Court quotes, must be read in context with 26 U.S.C. 124 (e) (1) and 124 (f) (3). Together these sections provide: </s> 124 (e) (1). "As used in this section, the term `emergency facility' means any facility, land, building, machinery, or equipment, or part thereof, the construction, reconstruction, erection, installation, or acquisition of which was completed after December 31, 1939, and [352 U.S. 306, 312] with respect to which a certificate under subsection (f) has been made. . . ." </s> 124 (f). "In determining, for the purposes of subsection (a) . . . the adjusted basis of an emergency facility - </s> "(1) There shall be included only so much of the amount otherwise constituting such adjusted basis as is properly attributable to such construction, reconstruction, erection, installation, or acquisition after December 31, 1939, as either the Secretary of War or the Secretary of the Navy has certified as necessary in the interest of national defense during the emergency period, which certification shall be under such regulations as may be prescribed from time to time by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of the President." </s> 124 (f) (3). ". . . In no event and notwithstanding any of the other provisions of this section, no amortization deduction shall be allowed in respect of any emergency facility for any taxable year - </s> "(C) unless a certificate in respect thereof under paragragh (1) shall have been made (i) prior to the filing of the taxpayer's return for such taxable year, or prior to the making of an election . . . to take the amortization deduction, or (ii) before December 1, 1941, whichever is later . . . ." </s> On December 17, 1943, the powers under these sections were transferred by the President to the War Production Board. </s> [352 U.S. 306, 313]

United States Supreme Court CHEMICAL WASTE MGMT., INC. v. HUNT(1992) No. 91-471 Argued: April 21, 1992Decided: June 1, 1992 </s> Petitioner, Chemical Waste Management, Inc., operates a commercial hazardous waste land disposal facility in Emelle, Alabama, that receives both in-state and out-of-state wastes. An Alabama Act imposes, inter alia, a fee on hazardous wastes disposed of at in-state commercial facilities, and an additional fee on hazardous wastes generated outside, but disposed of inside, the State. Petitioner filed suit in state court, requesting declaratory relief against respondent state officials and seeking to enjoin the Act's enforcement. The trial court declared, among other things, that the additional fee violated the Commerce Clause, finding that the only basis for the fee is the waste's origin. The State Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fee advanced legitimate local purposes that could not be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. </s> Held: </s> 1. Alabama's differential treatment of out-of-state waste violates the Commerce Clause. Pp. 4-13. </s> (a) No State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to the free flow of interstate commerce. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 ; Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, post, p. 353. The State Act's additional fee facially discriminates against hazardous waste generated outside Alabama, and the Act has plainly discouraged the full operation of petitioner's facility. Such a burdensome tax imposed on interstate commerce alone is generally forbidden and is typically struck down without further inquiry. However, here the State argues that the additional fee serves legitimate local purposes. Pp. 339-343. </s> (b) Alabama has not met its burden of showing the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 . Alabama's concern about the volume of waste entering the Emelle facility could be alleviated by less discriminatory means - such as applying an additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of within Alabama, a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting such waste across state roads, or an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage [504 U.S. 334, 335] landfilled at Emelle - which would curtail volume from all sources. Additionally, any concern touching on environmental conservation and Alabama citizens' health and safety does not vary with the waste's point of origin, and the State has the power to monitor and regulate more closely the transportation and disposal of all hazardous waste within its borders. Even possible future financial and environmental risks to be borne by Alabama do not vary with the waste's State of origin in a way allowing foreign, but not local, waste to be burdened. Pp. 343-346. </s> (c) This Court's decisions regarding quarantine laws do not counsel a different conclusion. The additional fee may not legitimately be deemed a quarantine law, because Alabama permits both the generation and landfilling of hazardous waste within its borders and the importation of additional hazardous waste. Moreover, the quarantine laws upheld by this Court "did not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 629. This Court's decision in Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 - upholding a state ban on the importation of baitfish after Maine showed that such fish were subject to parasites foreign to in-state baitfish and that there were no less discriminatory means of protecting its natural resources - likewise offers no respite to Alabama, since here the hazardous waste is the same regardless of its point of origin and adequate means other than overt discrimination meet Alabama's concerns. Pp. 346-348. </s> 2. On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court must consider the appropriate relief to petitioner. See, e.g., McKesson Corp. v. Fla. Dept. of Business Regulations, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 . Pp. 348-349. </s> 584 So.2d 1367 (Ala. 1991), reversed and remanded. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 349. </s> Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Kenneth S. Geller, Evan M. Tager, Fournier J. Gale III, H. Thomas Wells, Jr., James T. Banks, and John T. Van Gessel. </s> Bert S. Nettles argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were William D. Little, Assistant Attorney General of Alabama, William D. Coleman, Jim B. Grant, Jr., J. Wade Hope, Alton B. Parker, Jr., J. Mark Hart, and Mark D. Hess. [504 U.S. 334, 336] </s> Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Acting Assistant Attorney General Hartman, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Harriet S. Shapiro, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., Anne S. Almy, Louise F. Milkman, and Gerald H. Yamada. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for American Trucking Associations, Inc., by Daniel R. Barney, Robert Digges, Jr., and Walter Hellerstein; and for the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council et al. by Stuart H. Newberger, Ridgway M. Hall, Jr., Clifton S. Elgarten, David Case, and Bruce Parker. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of New York by Robert Abrams, Attorney General, Jerry Boone, Solicitor General, and David A. Munro, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of South Carolina et al. by T. Travis Medlock, Attorney General of South Carolina, Edwin E. Evans, Chief Deputy Attorney General, James Patrick Hudson, Deputy Attorney General, Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Treva G. Ashworth, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Walton J. McLeod III, Jacquelyn S. Dickman, Samuel L. Finklea III, Charles F. Lettow, and Matthew D. Slater, Robert T. Stephen, Attorney General of Kansas, Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah, and Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana; for the National Governors' Association et al. by Richard Ruda and Michael G. Dzialo; and for the State of Ohio et al. by Lee Fisher, Attorney General of Ohio, Mary Kay Smith, Assistant Attorney General, and Nancy J. Miller, Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky, and Stan Cox, Assistant Attorney General, Linley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephan, Attorney General of Kansas, Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General of Louisiana, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Tom Udall, Attorney General of New Mexico, Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General of South Dakota, Paul Van Dam, Attorney General of Utah, Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General of Wyoming, and Charles W. Burson, Attorney General of Tennessee. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Alabama imposes a hazardous waste disposal fee on hazardous wastes generated outside the State and disposed of at a commercial facility in Alabama. The fee does not apply to such waste having a source in Alabama. The Alabama [504 U.S. 334, 337] Supreme Court held that this differential treatment does not violate the Commerce Clause. We reverse. </s> I </s> Petitioner, Chemical Waste Management, Inc., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oak Brook, Illinois, owns and operates one of the Nation's oldest commercial hazardous waste land disposal facilities, located in Emelle, Alabama. Opened in 1977 and acquired by petitioner in 1978, the Emelle facility is a hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility operating pursuant to permits issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 90 Stat. 2795, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 90 Stat. 2003, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 2601 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. II), and by the State of Alabama under Ala.Code 22-3012(i) (1990). Alabama is 1 of only 16 States that have commercial hazardous waste landfills, and the Emelle facility is the largest of the 21 landfills of this kind located in these 16 States. Brief for National Governors' Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae 3, citing E. Smith, EI Digest 26-27 (Mar. 1992). </s> The parties do not dispute that the wastes and substances being landfilled at the Emelle facility "include substances that are inherently dangerous to human health and safety and to the environment. Such waste consists of ignitable, corrosive, toxic and reactive wastes which contain poisonous and cancer-causing chemicals and which can cause birth defects, genetic damage, blindness, crippling and death." 1 </s> [504 U.S. 334, 338] 584 So.2d 1367, 1373 (Ala. 1991). Increasing amounts of out-of-state hazardous wastes are shipped to the Emelle facility for permanent storage each year. From 1985 through 1989, the tonnage of hazardous waste received per year has more than doubled, increasing from 341,000 tons in 1985 to 788,000 tons by 1989. Of this, up to 90% of the tonnage permanently buried each year is shipped in from other States. </s> Against this backdrop, Alabama enacted Act No. 90-326 (Act). Ala. Code 2230B-1 to 22-30B-18 (1990 and Supp. 1991). Among other provisions, the Act includes a "cap" that generally limits the amount of hazardous wastes or substances 2 that may be disposed of in any 1-year period, and the amount of hazardous waste disposed of during the first year under the Act's new fees becomes the permanent ceiling in subsequent years. Ala.Code 22-30B-2.3 (1990). The cap applies to commercial facilities that dispose of over 100,000 tons of hazardous wastes or substances per year, but only the Emelle facility, as the only commercial facility operating within Alabama, meets this description. The Act also imposes a "base fee" of $25.60 per ton on all hazardous wastes and substances disposed of at commercial facilities, to be paid by the operator of the facility. Ala.Code 22-30B-2(a) (Supp. 1991). Finally, the Act imposes the "additional fee" at issue here, which states in full: </s> "For waste and substances which are generated outside of Alabama and disposed of at a commercial site for [504 U.S. 334, 339] the disposal of hazardous waste or hazardous substances in Alabama, an additional fee shall be levied at the rate of $72.00 per ton." 22-30B-2(b). </s> Petitioner filed suit in state court requesting declaratory relief against respondents and seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Act. In addition to state-law claims, petitioner contended that the Act violated the Commerce, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, and was pre-empted by various federal statutes. The trial court declared the base fee and the cap provisions of the Act to be valid and constitutional; but, finding the only basis for the additional fee to be the origin of the waste, the trial court declared it to be in violation of the Commerce Clause. App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a-88a. Both sides appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the rulings concerning the base fee and cap provisions, but reversed the decision regarding the additional fee. The court held that the fee at issue advanced legitimate local purposes that could not be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, and was therefore valid under the Commerce Clause. 584 So.2d, at 1390. </s> Chemical Waste Management, Inc., petitioned for writ of certiorari, challenging all aspects of the Act. Because of the importance of the federal question and the likelihood that it had been decided in a way conflicting with applicable decisions of this Court, this Court's Rule 10.1(c), we granted certiorari limited to petitioner's Commerce Clause challenge to the additional fee. 502 U.S. 1070 (1992). We now reverse. </s> II </s> No State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to the free flow [504 U.S. 334, 340] of interstate trade. 3 Today, in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, post, p. 353, we have also considered a Commerce Clause challenge to a Michigan law prohibiting private landfill operators from accepting solid waste originating outside the county in which their facilities operate. In striking down that law, we adhered to our decision in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), where we found New Jersey's prohibition of solid waste from outside that State to amount to economic protectionism barred by the Commerce Clause: </s> "`[T]he evil of protectionism can reside in legislative means, as well as legislative ends. Thus, it does not matter whether the ultimate aim of ch. 363 is to reduce the waste disposal costs of New Jersey residents or to save remaining open lands from pollution, for we assume New Jersey has every right to protect its residents' [504 U.S. 334, 341] pocketbooks as well as their environment. And it may be assumed as well that New Jersey may pursue those ends by slowing the flow of all waste into the State's remaining landfills, even though interstate commerce may incidentally be affected. But whatever New Jersey's ultimate purpose, it may not be accompanied by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently. Both on its face and in its plain effect, ch. 363 violates this principle of nondiscrimination. </s> "`The Court has consistently found parochial legislation of this kind to be constitutionally invalid, whether the ultimate aim of the legislation was to assure a steady supply of milk by erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside competition, Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. [511,] 522-524 [(1935)]; or to create jobs by keeping industry within the State, Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 [(1928)]; Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 [(1928)]; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. [385,] 403-404 [(1948)]; or to preserve the State's financial resources from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants, Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 -174 [(1941)].'" Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, post, at 360 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 626-627). </s> To this list may be added cases striking down a tax discriminating against interstate commerce, even where such tax was designed to encourage the use of ethanol, and thereby reduce harmful exhaust emissions, New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 279 (1988), or to support inspection of foreign cement to ensure structural integrity, Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 379 -380 (1939). For in all of these cases, "a presumably legitimate goal was sought to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the [504 U.S. 334, 342] State from the national economy." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 627. </s> The Act's additional fee facially discriminates against hazardous waste generated in States other than Alabama, and the Act overall has plainly discouraged the full operation of petitioner's Emelle facility. 4 Such burdensome taxes imposed on interstate commerce alone are generally forbidden: "[A] State may not tax a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State." Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984); see also Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446, 455 (1886); Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 439 (1880). Once a state tax is found to discriminate against out-of-state commerce, it is typically struck down without further inquiry. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 -407 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 -760 (1981); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 -337 (1977). </s> The State, however, argues that the additional fee imposed on out-of-state hazardous waste serves legitimate local purposes related to its citizens' health and safety. Because the additional fee discriminates both on its face and in practical effect, the burden falls on the State "to justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake." Hunt v. Washington Apple State Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); see also Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, post, at 359; New Energy Co., supra, at 278-279. "At a minimum such facial discrimination invokes the strictest scrutiny of any purported legitimate local purpose and of the absence of [504 U.S. 334, 343] nondiscriminatory alternatives." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). 5 </s> The State's argument here does not significantly differ from the Alabama Supreme Court's conclusions on the legitimate local purposes of the additional fee imposed, which were: </s> "The Additional Fee serves these legitimate local purposes that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives: (1) protection of the health and safety of the citizens of Alabama from toxic substances; (2) conservation of the environment and the state's natural resources; (3) provision for compensatory revenue for the costs and burdens that out-of-state waste generators impose by dumping their hazardous waste in Alabama; (4) reduction of the overall flow of wastes traveling on the state's highways, which flow creates a great risk to the health and safety of the state's citizens." 584 So.2d, at 1389. </s> These may all be legitimate local interests, and petitioner has not attacked them. But only rhetoric, and not explanation, emerges as to why Alabama targets only interstate hazardous waste to meet these goals. As found by the trial court, "[a]lthough the Legislature imposed an additional fee of $72.00 per ton on waste generated outside Alabama, there [504 U.S. 334, 344] is absolutely no evidence before this Court that waste generated outside Alabama is more dangerous than waste generated in Alabama. The Court finds under the facts of this case that the only basis for the additional fee is the origin of the waste." App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a-84a. In the face of such findings, invalidity under the Commerce Clause necessarily follows, for "whatever [Alabama's] ultimate purpose, it may not be accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S., at 626 -627; see New Energy Co., 486 U.S., at 279 -280. The burden is on the State to show that "the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism," 6 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (emphasis added), and it has not carried this burden. Cf. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, post, at 361. </s> Ultimately, the State's concern focuses on the volume of the waste entering the Emelle facility. 7 Less discriminatory [504 U.S. 334, 345] alternatives, however, are available to alleviate this concern, not the least of which are a generally applicable per-ton additional fee on all hazardous waste disposed of within Alabama, cf. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 619 (1981), or a per-mile tax on all vehicles transporting hazardous waste across Alabama roads, cf. American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 286 (1987), or an evenhanded cap on the total tonnage landfilled at Emelle, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 626, which would curtail volume from all sources. 8 To the extent Alabama's concern touches environmental conservation and the health and safety of its citizens, such concern does not vary with the point of origin of the waste, and it remains within the State's power to monitor and regulate more closely the transportation [504 U.S. 334, 346] and disposal of all hazardous waste within its borders. Even with the possible future financial and environmental risks to be borne by Alabama, such risks likewise do not vary with the waste's State of origin in a way allowing foreign, but not local, waste to be burdened. 9 In sum, we find the additional fee to be "an obvious effort to saddle those outside the State" with most of the burden of slowing the flow of waste into the Emelle facility. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S., at 629 . "That legislative effort is clearly impermissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution." Ibid. </s> Our decisions regarding quarantine laws do not counsel a different conclusion. 10 The Act's additional fee may not legitimately be deemed a quarantine law, because Alabama permits both the generation and landfilling of hazardous [504 U.S. 334, 347] waste within its borders and the importation of still more hazardous waste subject to payment of the additional fee. In any event, while it is true that certain quarantine laws have not been considered forbidden protectionist measures, even though directed against out-of-state commerce, those laws "did not discriminate against interstate commerce as such, but simply prevented traffic in noxious articles, whatever their origin." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 629. 11 As the Court has stated in Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S., at 443 : </s> "In the exercise of its police powers, a State may exclude from its territory, or prohibit the sale therein of any articles which, in its judgment, fairly exercised, are prejudicial to the health or which would endanger the lives or property of its people. But if the State, under the guise of exerting its police powers, should make such exclusion or prohibition applicable solely to articles, of that kind, that may be produced or manufactured in other States, the courts would find no difficulty in holding such legislation to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States." </s> See also Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 151 (1902); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472 (1878). [504 U.S. 334, 348] </s> The law struck down in Philadelphia v. New Jersey left local waste untouched, although no basis existed by which to distinguish interstate waste . But "[i]f one is inherently harmful, so is the other. Yet New Jersey has banned the former, while leaving its landfill sites open to the latter." 437 U.S., at 629 . Here, the additional fee applies only to interstate hazardous waste, but at all points from its entrance into Alabama until it is landfilled at the Emelle facility, every concern related to quarantine applies perforce to local hazardous waste, which pays no additional fee. For this reason, the additional fee does not survive the appropriate scrutiny applicable to discriminations against interstate commerce. </s> Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), provides no additional justification. Maine there demonstrated that the out-of-state baitfish were subject to parasites foreign to in-stat baitfish. This difference posed a threat to the State's natural resources, and absent a less discriminatory means of protecting the environment - and none was available - the importation of baitfish could properly be banned. Id., at 140. To the contrary, the record establishes that the hazardous waste at issue in this case is the same regardless of its point of origin. As noted in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, "our conclusion would be different if the imported waste raised health or other concerns not presented by [Alabama] waste." Post, at 367. Because no unique threat is posed, and because adequate means other than overt discrimination meet Alabama's concerns, Maine v. Taylor provides the State no respite. </s> III </s> The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion, including consideration of the appropriate relief to petitioner. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, Fla. Dept. of Business Regulations, [504 U.S. 334, 349] 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990); Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 251 -253 (1987). </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 As used in RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6903(5), the term "hazardous waste" means: </s> "a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may - </s> "(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or [504 U.S. 334, 338] </s> "(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported or disposed of, or otherwise managed. </s> RCRA directs the EPA to establish a comprehensive "cradle to grave" system regulating the generation, transport, storage, treatment and disposal of hazardous wastes, 6921-6939b, which includes identification and listing of hazardous wastes, 6921. At present, there are more than 500 such listed wastes. See 40 CFR pt. 261, subpt. D (1991). </s> [Footnote 2 "Hazardous substance(s)" and "hazardous waste(s)" are defined terms in the Act, 22301(3) and 22-301(4), but these definitions largely parallel the meanings given under federal law. </s> [Footnote 3 The Alabama Supreme Court assumed that the disposal of hazardous waste constituted an article of commerce, and the State does not explicitly argue here to the contrary. In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, post, at 359, we have reaffirmed the idea that "[s]olid waste, even if it has no value, is an article of commerce." As stated in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 -623 (1978): "All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset. . . . Just as Congress has power to regulate the interstate movement of these wastes, States are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they restrict that movement." The definition of "hazardous waste" makes clear that it is simply a grade of solid waste, albeit one of particularly noxious and dangerous propensities, see n. 1, supra, but whether the business arrangements between out-of-state generators of hazardous waste and the Alabama operator of a hazardous waste landfill are viewed as "sales" of hazardous waste or "purchases" of transportation and disposal services, "the commercial transactions unquestionably have an interstate character. The Commerce Clause thus imposes some constraints on [Alabama's] ability to regulate these transactions." Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, post, at 359. See National Solid Wastes Management Assn. v. Alabama Dept. of Environmental Mgmt., 910 F.2d 713, 718-719 (CA11 1990), modified, 924 F.2d 1001, cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1206 (1991). </s> [Footnote 4 The Act went into effect July 15, 1990. The volume of hazardous waste buried at the Emelle facility fell dramatically from 791,000 tons in 1989 to 290,000 tons in 1991. </s> [Footnote 5 To some extent, the State attempts to avail itself of the more flexible approach outlined in, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986), and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), but this lesser scrutiny is only available "where other legislative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent discrimination against interstate trade." Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S., at 624 (emphasis added). We find no room here to say that the Act presents "effects upon interstate commerce that are only incidental" ibid. for the Act's additional fee, on its face, targets only out-of-state hazardous waste. While no "clear line" separates close cases on which scrutiny should apply, "this is not a close case." Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 n. 12 (1992). </s> [Footnote 6 The Alabama Supreme Court found no "economic protectionism" here, and thus purported to distinguish Philadelphia v. New Jersey, based on its conclusions that the legislature was motivated by public health and environmental concerns. 584 So.2d 1367, 1388-1389 (1991). This narrow focus on the intended consequence of the additional fee does not conform to our precedents, for "[a] finding that state legislation constitutes "economic protectionism" may be made on the basis of either discriminatory purpose, see Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 352 -353 (1977), or discriminatory effect, see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra." Bacchus Imports, Ltd v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984). The "virtually per se rule of invalidity," Philadelphia v. New Jersey, supra, at 624, applies "not only to laws motivated solely by a desire to protect local industries from out-of-state competition, but also to laws that respond to legitimate local concerns by discriminating arbitrarily against interstate trade." Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 , n.19 (1986). </s> [Footnote 7 "The risk created by hazardous waste and other similarly dangerous waste materials is proportional to the volume of such waste materials present, and may be controlled by controlling that volume." Brief for Respondents 38 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). </s> [Footnote 8 The State asserts: " equal fee, at any level, would necessarily fail to serve the State's purpose. An equal fee high enough to provide any significant deterrent to the importation of hazardous waste for landfilling in the State would amount to an attempt by the State to avoid its responsibility to deal with its own problems, by tending to cause in-state waste to be exported for disposal. An equal fee not so high as to amount to an attempt to force Alabama's own problems to be borne by citizens of other states would fail to provide any significant reduction in the enormous volumes of imported hazardous waste being dumped in the State. At the point where an equal fee would become effective to serve the State's purpose in protecting public health and the environment from uncontrolled volumes of imported waste, that equal fee would also become an avoidance of the State's responsibility to deal with its own waste problems." Id., at 46. These assertions are without record support and, in any event, do not suffice to validate plain discrimination against interstate commerce. See New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 280 (1988); Hale v. Bimco Trading, Inc., 306 U.S. 375, 380 (1939): "That no Florida cement needs any inspection, while all foreign cement requires inspection at a cost of fifteen cents per hundredweight, is too violent an assumption to justify the discrimination here disclosed." The additional fee is certainly not a "`last ditch' attempt" to meet Alabama's expressed purposes "after nondiscriminatory alternatives have proved unfeasible. It is rather a choice of the most discriminatory [tax] even though nondiscriminatory alternatives would seem likely to fulfill the State's purported legitimate local purpose more effectively." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 338 (1979). </s> [Footnote 9 The State presents no argument here, as it did below, that the additional fee makes out-of-state generators pay their "fair share" of the costs of Alabama waste disposal facilities, or that the additional fee is justified as a "compensatory tax." The trial court rejected these arguments, App. to Pet. for Cert. 88a, n. 6., finding the former foreclosed by American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 287 -289 (1987), and the latter to be factually unsupported by a requisite "substantially equivalent" tax imposed solely on in-state waste, as required by, e.g., Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 242 -244 (1987). Various amici assert that the discrimination patent in the Act's additional fee is consistent with congressional authorization. We pretermit this issue, for it was not the basis for the decision below and has not been briefed or argued by the parties here. </s> [Footnote 10 The State collects and refers to the following decisions, inter alia, as "quarantine cases:" Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439 (1939); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52 (1915); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902); Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902); Smith v. St. Louis & Southwestern R. Co., 181 U.S. 248 (1901); Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U.S. 198 (1901); Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613 (1898); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1878). </s> [Footnote 11 "The hostility is to the thing itself, not to merely interstate shipments of the thing; and an undiscriminating hostility is at least nondiscriminatory. But that is not the case here. The State of Illinois is quite willing to allow the storage and even the shipment for storage of spent nuclear fuel in Illinois, provided only that its origin is intrastate." Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214 (CA7 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983); cf. Oregon-Washington Co. v. Washington, supra, at 96: inspection followed by quarantine of hay from fields infested with weevils is "a real quarantine law, and not a mere inhibition against importation of alfalfa from a large part of the country without regard to the condition which might make its importation dangerous. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. </s> I have already had occasion to set out my view that States need not ban all waste disposal as a precondition to protecting themselves from hazardous or noxious materials brought across the State's borders. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (REHNQUIST J., dissenting). In a case also decided today, I express my further view that States may take actions legitimately directed at the preservation of the State's natural resources, even if those actions incidentally work to disadvantage some out-of-state waste generators. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, post, p. 368 (REHNQUIST C.J., dissenting). I dissent today, largely for the reasons I have set out in those two cases. Several additional comments that pertain specifically to this case, though, are in order. </s> Taxes are a recognized and effective means for discouraging the consumption of scarce commodities - in this case, the safe environment that attends appropriate disposal of hazardous wastes. Cf. 26 U.S.C. 4681, 4682 (1982 ed., Supp. III) (tax on ozone-depleting chemicals); 26 U.S.C. 4064 (gas guzzler excise tax). I therefore see nothing unconstitutional in Alabama's use of a tax to discourage the export of this commodity to other States, when the commodity is a public good that Alabama has helped to produce. Cf. Fort Gratiot, post, at 372 (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting). Nor do I see any significance in the fact that Alabama has chosen to adopt a differential tax, rather than an outright ban. Nothing in the Commerce Clause requires Alabama to adopt an "all or nothing" regulatory approach to noxious materials coming [504 U.S. 334, 350] from without the State. See Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933) (upholding State's partial ban on cattle importation). </s> In short, the Court continues to err by its failure to recognize that waste - in this case admittedly hazardous waste - presents risks to the public health and environment that a State may legitimately wish to avoid, and that the State may pursue such an objective by means less Draconian than an outright ban. Under force of this Court's precedent, though, it increasingly appears that the only avenue by which a State may avoid the importation of hazardous wastes is to ban such waste disposal altogether, regardless of the waste's source of origin. I see little logic in creating, and nothing in the Commerce Clause that requires us to create, such perverse regulatory incentives. The Court errs in substantial measure because it refuses to acknowledge that a safe and attractive environment is the commodity really at issue in cases such as this. See Fort Gratiot, post, at 369, n. (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting). The result is that the Court today gets it exactly backward when it suggests that Alabama is attempting to "isolate itself from a problem common to the several States." Ante, at 339. To the contrary, it is the 34 States that have no hazardous waste facility whatsoever, not to mention the remaining 15 States with facilities all smaller than Emelle, that have isolated themselves. </s> There is some solace to be taken in the Court's conclusion, ante, at 344-345, that Alabama may impose a substantial fee on the disposal of all hazardous waste, or a per-mile fee on all vehicles transporting such waste, or a cap on total disposals at the Emelle facility. None of these approaches provide Alabama the ability to tailor its regulations in a way that the State will be solving only that portion of the problem that it has created. See Fort Gratiot, post, at 370-371 (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting). But they do at least give Alabama some mechanisms for requiring waste-generating States to compensate Alabama for the risks the Court declares Alabama must run. [504 U.S. 334, 351] </s> Of course, the costs of any of the proposals that the Court today approves will be less than fairly apportioned. For example, should Alabama adopt a flat transportation or disposal tax, Alabama citizens will be forced to pay a disposal tax equal to that faced by dumpers from outside the State. As the Court acknowledges, such taxes are a permissible effort to recoup compensation for the risks imposed on the State. Yet Alabama's general tax revenues presumably already support the State's various inspection and regulatory efforts designed to ensure the Emelle facility's safe operation. Thus, Alabamians will be made to pay twice, once through general taxation and a second time through a specific disposal fee. Permitting differential taxation would, in part, do no more than recognize that, having been made to bear all the risks from such hazardous waste sites, Alabama should not in addition be made to pay more than others in supporting activities that will help to minimize the risk. </s> Other mechanisms also appear open to Alabama to achieve results similar to those that are seemingly foreclosed today. There seems to be nothing, for example, that would prevent Alabama from providing subsidies or other tax breaks to domestic industries that generate hazardous wastes. Or Alabama may, under the market participant doctrine, open its own facility catering only to Alabama customers. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206 -208 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 -437 (1980); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). But certainly we have lost our way when we require States to perform such gymnastics when such performances will in turn produce little difference in ultimate effects. In sum, the only sure byproduct of today's decision is additional litigation. Assuming that those States that are currently the targets for large volumes of hazardous waste do not simply ban hazardous waste sites altogether, they will undoubtedly continue to search for a way to limit their risk from sites in operation. And each new arrangement [504 U.S. 334, 352] will generate a new legal challenge, one that will work to the principal advantage only of those States that refuse to contribute to a solution. </s> For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. </s> [504 U.S. 334, 353]

United States Supreme Court BOYLE v. UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.(1988) No. 86-492 Argued: October 13, 1987Decided: June 27, 1988 </s> David A. Boyle, a United States Marine helicopter copilot, drowned when his helicopter crashed off the Virginia coast. Petitioner, the personal representative of the heirs and estate of Boyle, brought this diversity action in Federal District Court against the Sikorsky Division of respondent corporation (Sikorsky), alleging, inter alia, under Virginia tort law, that Sikorsky had defectively designed the helicopter's copilot emergency escape-hatch system. The jury returned a general verdict for petitioner, and the court denied Sikorsky's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions that judgment be entered for Sikorsky. It found that, as a matter of federal law, Sikorsky could not be held liable for the allegedly defective design because Sikorsky satisfied the requirements of the "military contractor defense." </s> Held: </s> 1. There is no merit to petitioner's contention that, in the absence of federal legislation specifically immunizing Government contractors, federal law cannot shield contractors from liability for design defects in military equipment. In a few areas involving "uniquely federal interests," state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts. The procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of uniquely federal interest. A dispute such as the present one, even though between private parties, implicates the interests of the United States in this area. Once it is determined that an area of uniquely federal interest is implicated, state law will be displaced only where a "significant conflict" exists between an identifiable federal policy or interest and the operation of state law, or the application of state law would frustrate specific objectives of federal legislation. Here, the state-imposed duty of care that is the asserted basis of the contractor's liability is precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract. But even in this situation, it would be unreasonable to say that there is always a "significant conflict" between state law and a federal policy or interest. In search of a limiting principle to identify when a significant [487 U.S. 500, 501] conflict is present, the Court of Appeals relied on the rationale of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 . This produces results that are in some respects too broad and in some respects too narrow. However, the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act does demonstrate the potential for, and suggest the outlines of, "significant conflict" between federal interest and state law in this area. State law is displaced where judgment against the contractor would threaten a discretionary function of the Government. In sum, state law which imposes liability for design defects in military equipment is displaced where (a) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (b) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (c) the supplier warned the United States about dangers in the use of the equipment known to the supplier but not to the United States. Pp. 504-513. </s> 2. Also without merit is petitioner's contention that since the Government contractor defense formulated by the Court of Appeals differed from the instructions given by the District Court to the jury, the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trial requires a remand for trial on the new theory. If the evidence presented in the first trial would not suffice, as a matter of law, to support a jury verdict under the properly formulated defense, judgment could properly be entered for respondent at once, without a new trial. It is unclear from the Court of Appeals' opinion, however, whether it was in fact deciding that no reasonable jury could, under the properly formulated defense, have found for petitioner on the facts presented, or rather was assessing on its own whether the defense had been established. The latter would be error, since whether the facts established the conditions for the defense is a question for the jury. The case is remanded for clarification of this point. Pp. 513-514. </s> 792 F.2d 413, vacated and remanded. </s> SCALIA, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 515. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 531. </s> Louis S. Franecke reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John O. Mack. </s> Philip A. Lacovara reargued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs were Lewis T. Booker, W. Stanfield Johnson, and William R. Stein. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Ayer reargued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant [487 U.S. 500, 502] Attorney General Willard, Deputy Assistant Attorneys General Spears and Willmore, and Christopher J. Wright. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Edwin Lees Shaw by Joel D. Eaton and Robert L. Parks; and for Joan S. Tozer et al. by Michael J. Pangia. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States by Herbert L. Fenster, Raymond B. Biagini, and Robin S. Conrad; for the Defense Research Institute, Inc., by James W. Morris III, Ann Adams Webster, and Donald F. Pierce; for Grumman Aerospace Corp. by James M. FitzSimons, Frank J. Chiarchiaro, Charles M. Shaffer, Jr., L. Joseph Loveland, and Gary J. Toman; for the National Security Industrial Association et al. by Kenneth S. Geller and Andrew L. Frey; and for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., et al. by Michael Hoenig, David B. Hamm, William H. Crabtree, and Edward P. Good. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America by Robert L. Habush, Dale Haralson, and Denneen L. Peterson; for Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. by R. David Broiles, George Galerstein, and James W. Hunt; and for UNR Industries, Inc., by Joe G. Hollingsworth. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case requires us to decide when a contractor providing military equipment to the Federal Government can be held liable under state tort law for injury caused by a design defect. </s> I </s> On April 27, 1983, David A. Boyle, a United States Marine helicopter copilot, was killed when the CH-53D helicopter in which he was flying crashed off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia, during a training exercise. Although Boyle survived the impact of the crash, he was unable to escape from the helicopter and drowned. Boyle's father, petitioner here, brought this diversity action in Federal District Court against the Sikorsky Division of United Technologies Corporation (Sikorsky), which built the helicopter for the United States. [487 U.S. 500, 503] </s> At trial, petitioner presented two theories of liability under Virginia tort law that were submitted to the jury. First, petitioner alleged that Sikorsky had defectively repaired a device called the servo in the helicopter's automatic flight control system, which allegedly malfunctioned and caused the crash. Second, petitioner alleged that Sikorsky had defectively designed the copilot's emergency escape system: the escape hatch opened out instead of in (and was therefore ineffective in a submerged craft because of water pressure), and access to the escape hatch handle was obstructed by other equipment. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of petitioner and awarded him $725,000. The District Court denied Sikorsky's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. </s> The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions that judgment be entered for Sikorsky. 792 F.2d 413 (CA4 1986). It found, as a matter of Virginia law, that Boyle had failed to meet his burden of demonstrating that the repair work performed by Sikorsky, as opposed to work that had been done by the Navy, was responsible for the alleged malfunction of the flight control system. Id., at 415-416. It also found, as a matter of federal law, that Sikorsky could not be held liable for the allegedly defective design of the escape hatch because, on the evidence presented, it satisfied the requirements of the "military contractor defense," which the court had recognized the same day in Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (CA4 1986). 792 F.2d, at 414-415. </s> Petitioner sought review here, challenging the Court of Appeals' decision on three levels: First, petitioner contends that there is no justification in federal law for shielding Government contractors from liability for design defects in military equipment. Second, he argues in the alternative that even if such a defense should exist, the Court of Appeals' formulation of the conditions for its application is inappropriate. Finally, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not remanding for a jury determination of whether the elements [487 U.S. 500, 504] of the defense were met in this case. We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 1029 (1986). </s> II </s> Petitioner's broadest contention is that, in the absence of legislation specifically immunizing Government contractors from liability for design defects, there is no basis for judicial recognition of such a defense. We disagree. In most fields of activity, to be sure, this Court has refused to find federal pre-emption of state law in the absence of either a clear statutory prescription, see, e. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), or a direct conflict between federal and state law, see, e. g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 -143 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). But we have held that a few areas, involving "uniquely federal interests," Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981), are so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control that state law is pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory directive) by the courts - so-called "federal common law." See, e. g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 -729 (1979); Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 -427 (1964); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593, 597 (1959); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 -367 (1943); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 457 -458 (1942). </s> The dispute in the present case borders upon two areas that we have found to involve such "uniquely federal interests." We have held that obligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts are governed exclusively by federal law. See, e. g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592 -594 (1973); Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 , [487 U.S. 500, 505] 456 (1945); Clearfield Trust, supra. The present case does not involve an obligation to the United States under its contract, but rather liability to third persons. That liability may be styled one in tort, but it arises out of performance of the contract - and traditionally has been regarded as sufficiently related to the contract that until 1962 Virginia would generally allow design defect suits only by the purchaser and those in privity with the seller. See General Bronze Corp. v. Kostopulos, 203 Va. 66, 69-70, 122 S. E. 2d 548, 551 (1961); see also Va. Code 8.2-318 (1965) (eliminating privity requirement). </s> Another area that we have found to be of peculiarly federal concern, warranting the displacement of state law, is the civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty. We have held in many contexts that the scope of that liability is controlled by federal law. See, e. g., Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988); Howard v. Lyons, supra, at 597; Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 569 -574 (1959) (plurality opinion); id., at 577 (Black, J., concurring); see also Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (CA2 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). The present case involves an independent contractor performing its obligation under a procurement contract, rather than an official performing his duty as a federal employee, but there is obviously implicated the same interest in getting the Government's work done. 1 </s> We think the reasons for considering these closely related areas to be of "uniquely federal" interest apply as well to [487 U.S. 500, 506] the civil liabilities arising out of the performance of federal procurement contracts. We have come close to holding as much. In Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), we rejected an attempt by a landowner to hold a construction contractor liable under state law for the erosion of 95 acres caused by the contractor's work in constructing dikes for the Government. We said that "if [the] authority to carry out the project was validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Congress, there is no liability on the part of the contractor for executing its will." Id., at 20-21. The federal interest justifying this holding surely exists as much in procurement contracts as in performance contracts; we see no basis for a distinction. </s> Moreover, it is plain that the Federal Government's interest in the procurement of equipment is implicated by suits such as the present one - even though the dispute is one between private parties. It is true that where "litigation is purely between private parties and does not touch the rights and duties of the United States," Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956), federal law does not govern. Thus, for example, in Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 30 (1977), which involved the question whether certain private parties could sue as third-party beneficiaries to an agreement between a municipality and the Federal Aviation Administration, we found that state law was not displaced because "the operations of the United States in connection with FAA grants such as these . . . would [not] be burdened" by allowing state law to determine whether third-party beneficiaries could sue, id., at 30, and because "any federal interest in the outcome of the [dispute] before us `[was] far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern.'" Id., at 32-33, quoting Parnell, supra, at 33-34; see also Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum [487 U.S. 500, 507] Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966). 2 But the same is not true here. The imposition of liability on Government contractors will directly affect the terms of Government contracts: either the contractor will decline to manufacture the design specified by the Government, or it will raise its price. Either way, the interests of the United States will be directly affected. </s> That the procurement of equipment by the United States is an area of uniquely federal interest does not, however, end the inquiry. That merely establishes a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for the displacement of state law. 3 Displacement will occur only where, as we have variously described, a "significant conflict" exists between an identifiable "federal policy or interest and the [operation] of state law," Wallis, supra, at 68, or the application of state law would "frustrate specific objectives" of federal legislation, Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S., at 728 . The conflict with federal policy need not be as sharp as that which must exist for ordinary pre-emption when Congress legislates "in a field which the States have traditionally occupied." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S., at 230 . Or to put the point differently, the [487 U.S. 500, 508] fact that the area in question is one of unique federal concern changes what would otherwise be a conflict that cannot produce pre-emption into one that can. 4 But conflict there must be. In some cases, for example where the federal interest requires a uniform rule, the entire body of state law applicable to the area conflicts and is replaced by federal rules. See, e. g., Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S., at 366 -367 (rights and obligations of United States with respect to commercial paper must be governed by uniform federal rule). In others, the conflict is more narrow, and only particular elements of state law are superseded. See, e. g., Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S., at 595 (even assuming state law should generally govern federal land acquisitions, particular state law at issue may not); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S., at 597 (state defamation law generally applicable to federal official, but federal privilege governs for statements made in the course of federal official's duties). </s> In Miree, supra, the suit was not seeking to impose upon the person contracting with the Government a duty contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract. Rather, it was the contractual duty itself that the private plaintiff (as third-party beneficiary) sought to enforce. Between Miree [487 U.S. 500, 509] and the present case, it is easy to conceive of an intermediate situation, in which the duty sought to be imposed on the contractor is not identical to one assumed under the contract, but is also not contrary to any assumed. If, for example, the United States contracts for the purchase and installation of an air-conditioning unit, specifying the cooling capacity but not the precise manner of construction, a state law imposing upon the manufacturer of such units a duty of care to include a certain safety feature would not be a duty identical to anything promised the Government, but neither would it be contrary. The contractor could comply with both its contractual obligations and the state-prescribed duty of care. No one suggests that state law would generally be pre-empted in this context. </s> The present case, however, is at the opposite extreme from Miree. Here the state-imposed duty of care that is the asserted basis of the contractor's liability (specifically, the duty to equip helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism petitioner claims was necessary) is precisely contrary to the duty imposed by the Government contract (the duty to manufacture and deliver helicopters with the sort of escape-hatch mechanism shown by the specifications). Even in this sort of situation, it would be unreasonable to say that there is always a "significant conflict" between the state law and a federal policy or interest. If, for example, a federal procurement officer orders, by model number, a quantity of stock helicopters that happen to be equipped with escape hatches opening outward, it is impossible to say that the Government has a significant interest in that particular feature. That would be scarcely more reasonable than saying that a private individual who orders such a craft by model number cannot sue for the manufacturer's negligence because he got precisely what he ordered. </s> In its search for the limiting principle to identify those situations in which a "significant conflict" with federal policy or interests does arise, the Court of Appeals, in the lead case [487 U.S. 500, 510] upon which its opinion here relied, identified as the source of the conflict the Feres doctrine, under which the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not cover injuries to Armed Services personnel in the course of military service. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Military contractor liability would conflict with this doctrine, the Fourth Circuit reasoned, since the increased cost of the contractor's tort liability would be added to the price of the contract, and "[s]uch pass-through costs would . . . defeat the purpose of the immunity for military accidents conferred upon the government itself." Tozer, 792 F.2d, at 408. Other courts upholding the defense have embraced similar reasoning. See, e. g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 565-566 (CA5 1985); Tillett v. J. I. Case Co., 756 F.2d 591, 596-597 (CA7 1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 449 (CA9 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). We do not adopt this analysis because it seems to us that the Feres doctrine, in its application to the present problem, logically produces results that are in some respects too broad and in some respects too narrow. Too broad, because if the Government contractor defense is to prohibit suit against the manufacturer whenever Feres would prevent suit against the Government, then even injuries caused to military personnel by a helicopter purchased from stock (in our example above), or by any standard equipment purchased by the Government, would be covered. Since Feres prohibits all service-related tort claims against the Government, a contractor defense that rests upon it should prohibit all service-related tort claims against the manufacturer - making inexplicable the three limiting criteria for contractor immunity (which we will discuss presently) that the Court of Appeals adopted. On the other hand, reliance on Feres produces (or logically should produce) results that are in another respect too narrow. Since that doctrine covers only service-related injuries, and not injuries caused by the military to civilians, it could not be invoked to prevent, for example, a civilian's suit against the manufacturer of fighter planes, based on a state [487 U.S. 500, 511] tort theory, claiming harm from what is alleged to be needlessly high levels of noise produced by the jet engines. Yet we think that the character of the jet engines the Government orders for its fighter planes cannot be regulated by state tort law, no more in suits by civilians than in suits by members of the Armed Services. </s> There is, however, a statutory provision that demonstrates the potential for, and suggests the outlines of, "significant conflict" between federal interests and state law in the context of Government procurement. In the FTCA, Congress authorized damages to be recovered against the United States for harm caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of Government employees, to the extent that a private person would be liable under the law of the place where the conduct occurred. 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). It excepted from this consent to suit, however, </s> "[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." 28 U.S.C. 2680(a). </s> We think that the selection of the appropriate design for military equipment to be used by our Armed Forces is assuredly a discretionary function within the meaning of this provision. It often involves not merely engineering analysis but judgment as to the balancing of many technical, military, and even social considerations, including specifically the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness. And we are further of the view that permitting "second-guessing" of these judgments, see United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984), through state tort suits against contractors would produce the same effect sought to be avoided by the FTCA exemption. The financial burden of judgments against the contractors would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the [487 U.S. 500, 512] United States itself, since defense contractors will predictably raise their prices to cover, or to insure against, contingent liability for the Government-ordered designs. To put the point differently: It makes little sense to insulate the Government against financial liability for the judgment that a particular feature of military equipment is necessary when the Government produces the equipment itself, but not when it contracts for the production. In sum, we are of the view that state law which holds Government contractors liable for design defects in military equipment does in some circumstances present a "significant conflict" with federal policy and must be displaced. 5 </s> We agree with the scope of displacement adopted by the Fourth Circuit here, which is also that adopted by the Ninth Circuit, see McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., supra, at 451. Liability for design defects in military equipment cannot be imposed, pursuant to state law, when (1) the United States approved reasonably precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the United States about the dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier but not to the United States. The first two of these conditions assure that the suit is within the area where the policy of the "discretionary function" would be frustrated - i. e., they assure that the design feature in question was considered by a Government officer, and not merely by the contractor itself. The third condition is necessary because, in its absence, the displacement of state tort law would create some incentive for the manufacturer to withhold knowledge of risks, since conveying that knowledge might disrupt the contract but withholding it would produce no liability. We adopt this provision lest our effort to protect [487 U.S. 500, 513] discretionary functions perversely impede them by cutting off information highly relevant to the discretionary decision. </s> We have considered the alternative formulation of the Government contractor defense, urged upon us by petitioner, which was adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 746 (1985), cert. pending, No. 85-1529. That would preclude suit only if (1) the contractor did not participate, or participated only minimally, in the design of the defective equipment; or (2) the contractor timely warned the Government of the risks of the design and notified it of alternative designs reasonably known by it, and the Government, although forewarned, clearly authorized the contractor to proceed with the dangerous design. While this formulation may represent a perfectly reasonable tort rule, it is not a rule designed to protect the federal interest embodied in the "discretionary function" exemption. The design ultimately selected may well reflect a significant policy judgment by Government officials whether or not the contractor rather than those officials developed the design. In addition, it does not seem to us sound policy to penalize, and thus deter, active contractor participation in the design process, placing the contractor at risk unless it identifies all design defects. </s> III </s> Petitioner raises two arguments regarding the Court of Appeals' application of the Government contractor defense to the facts of this case. First, he argues that since the formulation of the defense adopted by the Court of Appeals differed from the instructions given by the District Court to the jury, the Seventh Amendment guarantee of jury trial required a remand for trial on the new theory. We disagree. If the evidence presented in the first trial would not suffice, as a matter of law, to support a jury verdict under the properly formulated defense, judgment could properly be entered for the respondent at once, without a new trial. And that is so even though (as petitioner claims) respondent failed to [487 U.S. 500, 514] object to jury instructions that expressed the defense differently, and in a fashion that would support a verdict. See St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 118 -120 (1988) (plurality opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., WHITE, and SCALIA, JJ.); Ebker v. Tan Jay Int'l, Ltd., 739 F.2d 812, 825-826, n. 17 (CA2 1984) (Friendly, J.); 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 2537, pp. 599-600 (1971). </s> It is somewhat unclear from the Court of Appeals' opinion, however, whether it was in fact deciding that no reasonable jury could, under the properly formulated defense, have found for the petitioner on the facts presented, or rather was assessing on its own whether the defense had been established. The latter, which is what petitioner asserts occurred, would be error, since whether the facts establish the conditions for the defense is a question for the jury. The critical language in the Court of Appeals' opinion was that "[b]ecause Sikorsky has satisfied the requirements of the military contractor defense, it can incur no liability for . . . the allegedly defective design of the escape hatch." 792 F.2d, at 415. Although it seems to us doubtful that the Court of Appeals was conducting the factual evaluation that petitioner suggests, we cannot be certain from this language, and so we remand for clarification of this point. If the Court of Appeals was saying that no reasonable jury could find, under the principles it had announced and on the basis of the evidence presented, that the Government contractor defense was inapplicable, its judgment shall stand, since petitioner did not seek from us, nor did we grant, review of the sufficiency-of-the-evidence determination. If the Court of Appeals was not saying that, it should now undertake the proper sufficiency inquiry. </s> Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case is remanded. </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissent misreads our discussion here to "intimat[e] that the immunity [of federal officials] . . . might extend . . . [to] nongovernment employees" such as a Government contractor. Post, at 523. But we do not address this issue, as it is not before us. We cite these cases merely to demonstrate that the liability of independent contractors performing work for the Federal Government, like the liability of federal officials, is an area of uniquely federal interest. </s> [Footnote 2 As this language shows, JUSTICE BRENNAN'S dissent is simply incorrect to describe Miree and other cases as declining to apply federal law despite the assertion of interests "comparable" to those before us here. Post, at 521-522. </s> [Footnote 3 We refer here to the displacement of state law, although it is possible to analyze it as the displacement of federal-law reference to state law for the rule of decision. Some of our cases appear to regard the area in which a uniquely federal interest exists as being entirely governed by federal law, with federal law deigning to "borro[w]," United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594 (1973), or "incorporat[e]" or "adopt" United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 , 729, 730 (1979), state law except where a significant conflict with federal policy exists. We see nothing to be gained by expanding the theoretical scope of the federal pre-emption beyond its practical effect, and so adopt the more modest terminology. If the distinction between displacement of state law and displacement of federal law's incorporation of state law ever makes a practical difference, it at least does not do so in the present case. </s> [Footnote 4 Even before our landmark decision in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943), the distinctive federal interest in a particular field was used as a significant factor giving broad pre-emptive effect to federal legislation in that field: </s> "It cannot be doubted that both the state and the federal [alien] registration laws belong `to that class of laws which concern the exterior relation of this whole nation with other nations and governments.' Consequently the regulation of aliens is . . . intimately blended and intertwined with responsibilities of the national government . . . . And where the federal government, in the exercise of its superior authority in this field, has enacted a complete scheme of regulation and has therein provided a standard for the registration of aliens, states cannot, inconsistently with the purpose of Congress, conflict or interfere with, curtail or complement, the federal law, or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 -67 (1941) (citation omitted). </s> [Footnote 5 JUSTICE BRENNAN's assumption that the outcome of this case would be different if it were brought under the Death on the High Seas Act, Act of Mar. 30, 1920, ch. 111, 1 et seq., (1982 ed., Supp. IV), 41 Stat. 537, codified at 46 U.S.C. App. 761 et seq., is not necessarily correct. That issue is not before us, and we think it inappropriate to decide it in order to refute (or, for that matter, to construct) an alleged inconsistency. [487 U.S. 500, 515] </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, dissenting. </s> Lieutenant David A. Boyle died when the CH-53D helicopter he was copiloting spun out of control and plunged into the ocean. We may assume, for purposes of this case, that Lt. Boyle was trapped under water and drowned because respondent United Technologies negligently designed the helicopter's escape hatch. We may further assume that any competent engineer would have discovered and cured the defects, but that they inexplicably escaped respondent's notice. Had respondent designed such a death trap for a commercial firm, Lt. Boyle's family could sue under Virginia tort law and be compensated for his tragic and unnecessary death. But respondent designed the helicopter for the Federal Government, and that, the Court tells us today, makes all the difference: Respondent is immune from liability so long as it obtained approval of "reasonably precise specifications" - perhaps no more than a rubber stamp from a federal procurement officer who might or might not have noticed or cared about the defects, or even had the expertise to discover them. </s> If respondent's immunity "bore the legitimacy of having been prescribed by the people's elected representatives," we would be duty bound to implement their will, whether or not we approved. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (dissenting opinion of SCALIA, J.). Congress, however, has remained silent - and conspicuously so, having resisted a sustained campaign by Government contractors to legislate for them some defense. 1 The Court - unelected and unaccountable to the people - has unabashedly stepped into [487 U.S. 500, 516] the breach to legislate a rule denying Lt. Boyle's family the compensation that state law assures them. This time the injustice is of this Court's own making. </s> Worse yet, the injustice will extend far beyond the facts of this case, for the Court's newly discovered Government contractor defense is breathtakingly sweeping. It applies not only to military equipment like the CH-53D helicopter, but (so far as I can tell) to any made-to-order gadget that the Federal Government might purchase after previewing plans - from NASA's Challenger space shuttle to the Postal Service's old mail cars. The contractor may invoke the defense in suits brought not only by military personnel like Lt. Boyle, or Government employees, but by anyone injured by a Government contractor's negligent design, including, for example, the children who might have died had respondent's helicopter crashed on the beach. It applies even if the Government has not intentionally sacrificed safety for other interests like speed or efficiency, and, indeed, even if the equipment is not of a type that is typically considered dangerous; thus, the contractor who designs a Government building can invoke the defense when the elevator cable snaps or the walls collapse. And the defense is invocable regardless of how blatant or easily remedied the defect, so long as the contractor missed it and the specifications approved by the Government, however unreasonably dangerous, were "reasonably precise." Ante, at 512. </s> In my view, this Court lacks both authority and expertise to fashion such a rule, whether to protect the Treasury of the United States or the coffers of industry. Because I would leave that exercise of legislative power to Congress, where our Constitution places it, I would reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate petitioner's jury award. </s> I </s> Before our decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts sitting in diversity were generally free, in the absence of a controlling state statute, to fashion [487 U.S. 500, 517] rules of "general" federal common law. See, e. g., Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). Erie renounced the prevailing scheme: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State." 304 U.S., at 78 . The Court explained that the expansive power that federal courts had theretofore exercised was an unconstitutional "`invasion of the authority of the State and, to that extent, a denial of its independence.'" Id., at 79 (citation omitted). Thus, Erie was deeply rooted in notions of federalism, and is most seriously implicated when, as here, federal judges displace the state law that would ordinarily govern with their own rules of federal common law. See, e. g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947). 2 </s> In pronouncing that "[t]here is no federal general common law," 304 U.S., at 78 , Erie put to rest the notion that the grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal courts is itself authority to fashion rules of substantive law. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973). As the author of today's opinion for the Court pronounced for a unanimous Court just two months ago, "`"`we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded . . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'"'" Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 500 (1988) (citations omitted). Just as "[t]here is no federal pre-emption in vacuo, without a constitutional text or a federal statute to assert it," id., at 503, federal common law cannot supersede state law in vacuo out of no [487 U.S. 500, 518] more than an idiosyncratic determination by five Justices that a particular area is "uniquely federal." </s> Accordingly, we have emphasized that federal common law can displace state law in "few and restricted" instances. Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963). "[A]bsent some congressional authorization to formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international disputes implicating conflicting rights of States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty cases." Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (footnotes omitted). "The enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their elected representatives in Congress." Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 -313 (1981). See also Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 32 (1977). State laws "should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied." United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). </s> II </s> Congress has not decided to supersede state law here (if anything, it has decided not to, see n. 1, supra) and the Court does not pretend that its newly manufactured "Government contractor defense" fits within any of the handful of "narrow areas," Texas Industries, supra, at 641, of "uniquely federal interests" in which we have heretofore done so, 451 U.S., at 640 . Rather, the Court creates a new category of "uniquely federal interests" out of a synthesis of two whose origins predate Erie itself: the interest in administering the "obligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts," ante, [487 U.S. 500, 519] at 504, and the interest in regulating the "civil liability of federal officials for actions taken in the course of their duty," ante, at 505. This case is, however, simply a suit between two private parties. We have steadfastly declined to impose federal contract law on relationships that are collateral to a federal contract, or to extend the federal employee's immunity beyond federal employees. And the Court's ability to list 2, or 10, inapplicable areas of "uniquely federal interest" does not support its conclusion that the liability of Government contractors is so "clear and substantial" an interest that this Court must step in lest state law does "major damage." Yazell, supra, at 352. </s> A </s> The proposition that federal common law continues to govern the "obligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts" is nearly as old as Erie itself. Federal law typically controls when the Federal Government is a party to a suit involving its rights or obligations under a contract, whether the contract entails procurement, see Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947), a loan, see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726 (1979), a conveyance of property, see Little Lake Misere, supra, at 591-594, or a commercial instrument issued by the Government, see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943), or assigned to it, see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 457 (1942). Any such transaction necessarily "radiate[s] interests in transactions between private parties." Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33 (1956). But it is by now established that our power to create federal common law controlling the Federal Government's contractual rights and obligations does not translate into a power to prescribe rules that cover all transactions or contractual relationships collateral to Government contracts. </s> In Miree v. DeKalb County, supra, for example, the county was contractually obligated under a grant agreement with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to "`restrict [487 U.S. 500, 520] the use of land adjacent to . . . the Airport to activities and purposes compatible with normal airport operations including landing and takeoff of aircraft.'" Id., at 27 (citation omitted). At issue was whether the county breached its contractual obligation by operating a garbage dump adjacent to the airport, which allegedly attracted the swarm of birds that caused a plane crash. Federal common law would undoubtedly have controlled in any suit by the Federal Government to enforce the provision against the county or to collect damages for its violation. The diversity suit, however, was brought not by the Government, but by assorted private parties injured in some way by the accident. We observed that "the operations of the United States in connection with FAA grants such as these are undoubtedly of considerable magnitude," id., at 30, and that "the United States has a substantial interest in regulating aircraft travel and promoting air travel safety," id., at 31. Nevertheless, we held that state law should govern the claim because "only the rights of private litigants are at issue here," id., at 30, and the claim against the county "will have no direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury," id., at 29 (emphasis added). </s> Miree relied heavily on Parnell, supra, and Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., supra, the former involving commercial paper issued by the United States and the latter involving property rights in federal land. In the former case, Parnell cashed certain bonds guaranteed by the Government that had been stolen from their owner, a bank. It is beyond dispute that federal law would have governed the United States' duty to pay the value bonds upon presentation; we held as much in Clearfield Trust, supra. Cf. Parnell, supra, at 34. But the central issue in Parnell, a diversity suit, was whether the victim of the theft could recover the money paid to Parnell. That issue, we held, was governed by state law, because the "litigation [was] purely between private parties and [did] not touch the rights and duties of the United States." 352 U.S., at 33 (emphasis added). [487 U.S. 500, 521] </s> The same was true in Wallis, which also involved a Government contract - a lease issued by the United States to a private party under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV) - governed entirely by federal law. See 384 U.S., at 69 . Again, the relationship at issue in this diversity case was collateral to the Government contract: It involved the validity of contractual arrangements between the lessee and other private parties, not between the lessee and the Federal Government. Even though a federal statute authorized certain assignments of lease rights, see id., at 69, 70, and n. 8, and imposed certain conditions on their validity, see id., at 70, we held that state law, not federal common law, governed their validity because application of state law would present "no significant threat to any identifiable federal policy or interest," id., at 68. </s> Here, as in Miree, Parnell, and Wallis, a Government contract governed by federal common law looms in the background. But here, too, the United States is not a party to the suit and the suit neither "touch[es] the rights and duties of the United States," Parnell, supra, at 33, nor has a "direct effect upon the United States or its Treasury," Miree, 433 U.S., at 29 . The relationship at issue is at best collateral to the Government contract. 3 We have no greater power to displace state law governing the collateral relationship in the Government procurement realm than we had to dictate federal rules governing equally collateral relationships in the areas of aviation, Government-issued commercial paper, or federal lands. </s> That the Government might have to pay higher prices for what it orders if delivery in accordance with the contract exposes [487 U.S. 500, 522] the seller to potential liability, see ante, at 507, does not distinguish this case. Each of the cases just discussed declined to extend the reach of federal common law despite the assertion of comparable interests that would have affected the terms of the Government contract - whether its price or its substance - just as "directly" (or indirectly). Ibid. Third-party beneficiaries can sue under a county's contract with the FAA, for example, even though - as the Court's focus on the absence of "direct effect on the United States or its Treasury," 433 U.S., at 29 (emphasis added), suggests - counties will likely pass on the costs to the Government in future contract negotiations. Similarly, we held that state law may govern the circumstances under which stolen federal bonds can be recovered, notwithstanding Parnell's argument that "the value of bonds to the first purchaser and hence their salability by the Government would be materially affected." Brief for Respondent Parnell in Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Parnell, O. T. 1956, No. 21, pp. 10-11. As in each of the cases declining to extend the traditional reach of federal law of contracts beyond the rights and duties of the Federal Government, "any federal interest in the outcome of the question before us `is far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the application of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern.'" Miree, supra, at 32-33, quoting Parnell, 352 U.S., at 33 -34. </s> B </s> Our "uniquely federal interest" in the tort liability of affiliates of the Federal Government is equally narrow. The immunity we have recognized has extended no further than a subset of "officials of the Federal Government" and has covered only "discretionary" functions within the scope of their legal authority. See, e. g., Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959) (plurality); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396 (CA2 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 503 (1927) (per curiam); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). Never before [487 U.S. 500, 523] have we so much as intimated that the immunity (or the "uniquely federal interest" that justifies it) might extend beyond that narrow class to cover also nongovernment employees whose authority to act is independent of any source of federal law and that are as far removed from the "functioning of the Federal Government" as is a Government contractor, Howard, supra, at 597. </s> The historical narrowness of the federal interest and the immunity is hardly accidental. A federal officer exercises statutory authority, which not only provides the necessary basis for the immunity in positive law, but also permits us confidently to presume that interference with the exercise of discretion undermines congressional will. In contrast, a Government contractor acts independently of any congressional enactment. Thus, immunity for a contractor lacks both the positive law basis and the presumption that it furthers congressional will. </s> Moreover, even within the category of congressionally authorized tasks, we have deliberately restricted the scope of immunity to circumstances in which "the contributions of immunity to effective government in particular contexts outweigh the perhaps recurring harm to individual citizens," Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 320 (1973); see Barr, supra, at 572-573, because immunity "contravenes the basic tenet that individuals be held accountable for their wrongful conduct," Westfall, supra, at 295. The extension of immunity to Government contractors skews the balance we have historically struck. On the one hand, whatever marginal effect contractor immunity might have on the "effective administration of policies of government," its "harm to individual citizens" is more severe than in the Government-employee context. Our observation that "there are . . . other sanctions than civil tort suits available to deter the executive official who may be prone to exercise his functions in an unworthy and irresponsible manner," Barr, 360 U.S., at 576 ; see also id., at 571, offers little deterrence to the Government contractor. On the other hand, a grant of immunity to Government [487 U.S. 500, 524] contractors could not advance "the fearless, vigorous, and effective administration of policies of government" nearly as much as does the current immunity for Government employees. Ibid. In the first place, the threat of a tort suit is less likely to influence the conduct of an industrial giant than that of a lone civil servant, particularly since the work of a civil servant is significantly less profitable, and significantly more likely to be the subject of a vindictive lawsuit. In fact, were we to take seriously the Court's assertion that contractors pass their costs - including presumably litigation costs - through, "substantially if not totally, to the United States," ante, at 511, the threat of a tort suit should have only marginal impact on the conduct of Government contractors. More importantly, inhibition of the Government official who actually sets Government policy presents a greater threat to the "administration of policies of government," than does inhibition of a private contractor, whose role is devoted largely to assessing the technological feasibility and cost of satisfying the Government's predetermined needs. Similarly, unlike tort suits against Government officials, tort suits against Government contractors would rarely "consume time and energies" that "would otherwise be devoted to governmental service." 360 U.S., at 571 . </s> In short, because the essential justifications for official immunity do not support an extension to the Government contractor, it is no surprise that we have never extended it that far. </s> C </s> Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), the sole case cited by the Court immunizing a Government contractor, is a slender reed on which to base so drastic a departure from precedent. In Yearsley we barred the suit of landowners against a private Government contractor alleging that its construction of a dam eroded their land without just compensation in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We relied in part on the observation that the plaintiffs failed to state a Fifth Amendment claim [487 U.S. 500, 525] (since just compensation had never been requested, much less denied) and at any rate the cause of action lay against the Government, not the contractor. See id., at 21 ("[T]he Government has impliedly promised to pay [the plaintiffs] compensation and has afforded a remedy for its recovery by a suit in the Court of Claims") (citations omitted). It is therefore unlikely that the Court intended Yearsley to extend anywhere beyond the takings context, and we have never applied it elsewhere. </s> Even if Yearsley were applicable beyond the unique context in which it arose, it would have little relevance here. The contractor's work "was done pursuant to a contract with the United States Government, and under the direction of the Secretary of War and the supervision of the Chief of Engineers of the United States, . . . as authorized by an Act of Congress." Id., at 19. See also W. A. Ross Construction Co. v. Yearsley, 103 F.2d 589, 591 (CA8 1939) (undisputed allegation that contractor implemented "stabilized bank lines as set and defined by the Government Engineers in charge of this work for the Government"). In other words, unlike respondent here, the contractor in Yearsley was following, not formulating, the Government's specifications, and (so far as is relevant here) followed them correctly. Had respondent merely manufactured the CH-53D helicopter, following minutely the Government's own in-house specifications, it would be analogous to the contractor in Yearsley, although still not analytically identical since Yearsley depended upon an actual agency relationship with the Government, see 309 U.S., at 22 ("The action of the agent is `the act of the government'") (citation omitted), which plainly was never established here. See, e. g., Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 564 (CA5 1985). Cf. United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982). But respondent's participation in the helicopter's design distinguishes this case from Yearsley, which has never been read to immunize the discretionary acts of those who perform service contracts for the Government. [487 U.S. 500, 526] </s> III </s> In a valiant attempt to bridge the analytical canyon between what Yearsley said and what the Court wishes it had said, the Court invokes the discretionary function exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a). The Court does not suggest that the exception has any direct bearing here, for petitioner has sued a private manufacturer (not the Federal Government) under Virginia law (not the FTCA). Perhaps that is why respondent has three times disavowed any reliance on the discretionary function exception, even after coaching by the Court, 4 as has the Government. 5 </s> [487 U.S. 500, 527] </s> Notwithstanding these disclaimers, the Court invokes the exception, reasoning that federal common law must immunize Government contractors from state tort law to prevent erosion of the discretionary function exception's policy of foreclosing judicial "`second-guessing'" of discretionary governmental decisions. Ante, at 511, quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). The erosion the Court fears apparently is rooted not in a concern that suits against Government contractors will prevent them from designing, or the Government from commissioning the design of, precisely the product the Government wants, but in the concern that such suits might preclude the Government from purchasing the desired product at the price it wants: "The financial burden of judgments against the contractors," the Court fears, "would ultimately be passed through, substantially if not totally, to the United States itself." Ante, at 511. </s> Even granting the Court's factual premise, which is by no means self-evident, the Court cites no authority for the proposition that burdens imposed on Government contractors, but passed on to the Government, burden the Government in a way that justifies extension of its immunity. However substantial such indirect burdens may be, we have held in other contexts that they are legally irrelevant. See, e. g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 521 (1988) (our cases have "completely foreclosed any claim that the nondiscriminatory imposition of costs on private entities that pass them on to . . . the Federal Government unconstitutionally burdens . . . federal functions"). </s> Moreover, the statutory basis on which the Court's rule of federal common law totters is more unstable than any we have ever adopted. In the first place, we rejected an analytically similar attempt to construct federal common law out of the FTCA when we held that the Government's waiver [487 U.S. 500, 528] of sovereign immunity for the torts of its employees does not give the Government an implied right of indemnity from them, even though the "[t]he financial burden placed on the United States by the Tort Claims Act [could conceivably be] so great that government employees should be required to carry part of the burden." United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 510 (1954). So too here, the FTCA's retention of sovereign immunity for the Government's discretionary acts does not imply a defense for the benefit of contractors who participate in those acts, even though they might pass on the financial burden to the United States. In either case, the most that can be said is that the position "asserted, though the product of a law Congress passed, is a matter on which Congress has not taken a position." Id., at 511 (footnote omitted). </s> Here, even that much is an overstatement, for the Government's immunity for discretionary functions is not even "a product of" the FTCA. Before Congress enacted the FTCA (when sovereign immunity barred any tort suit against the Federal Government) we perceived no need for a rule of federal common law to reinforce the Government's immunity by shielding also parties who might contractually pass costs on to it. Nor did we (or any other court of which I am aware) identify a special category of "discretionary" functions for which sovereign immunity was so crucial that a Government contractor who exercised discretion should share the Government's immunity from state tort law. 6 </s> Now, as before the FTCA's enactment, the Federal Government is immune from "[a]ny claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance [of] a discretionary function," including presumably any claim that petitioner might have brought against the Federal Government based upon respondent's negligent design of the helicopter in which Lt. Boyle died. [487 U.S. 500, 529] There is no more reason for federal common law to shield contractors now that the Government is liable for some torts than there was when the Government was liable for none. The discretionary function exception does not support an immunity for the discretionary acts of Government contractors any more than the exception for "[a]ny claim [against the Government] arising out of assault," 2680(h), supports a personal immunity for Government employees who commit assaults. Cf. Sheridan v. United States, ante, at 400. In short, while the Court purports to divine whether Congress would object to this suit, it inexplicably begins and ends its sortilege with an exception to a statute that is itself inapplicable and whose repeal would leave unchanged every relationship remotely relevant to the accident underlying this suit. </s> Far more indicative of Congress' views on the subject is the wrongful-death cause of action that Congress itself has provided under the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), Act of Mar. 30, 1920, ch. 111, 1 et seq., 41 Stat. 537, codified at 46 U.S.C. App. 761 et seq. (1982 ed., Supp. IV) - a cause of action that could have been asserted against United Technologies had Lt. Boyle's helicopter crashed a mere three miles further off the coast of Virginia Beach. It is beyond me how a state-law tort suit against the designer of a military helicopter could be said to present any conflict, much less a "`significant conflict,'" with "federal interests . . . in the context of Government procurement," ante, at 511, when federal law itself would provide a tort suit, but no (at least no explicit) Government-contractor defense, 7 against the same [487 U.S. 500, 530] designer for an accident involving the same equipment. See Pet. for Cert. in Sikorsky Aircraft Division, United Technologies Corp. v. Kloss, O. T. 1987, No. 87-1633, pp. 3-6 (trial court holds that family of marine can bring a wrongful-death cause of action under the DOHSA against United Technologies for the negligent design of a United States Marine Corps CH-53D helicopter in which he was killed when it crashed 21 miles offshore), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988). </s> IV </s> At bottom, the Court's analysis is premised on the proposition that any tort liability indirectly absorbed by the Government so burdens governmental functions as to compel us to act when Congress has not. That proposition is by no means uncontroversial. The tort system is premised on the assumption that the imposition of liability encourages actors to prevent any injury whose expected cost exceeds the cost of prevention. If the system is working as it should, Government contractors will design equipment to avoid certain injuries (like the deaths of soldiers or Government employees), which would be certain to burden the Government. The Court therefore has no basis for its assumption that tort liability will result in a net burden on the Government (let alone a clearly excessive net burden) rather than a net gain. </s> Perhaps tort liability is an inefficient means of ensuring the quality of design efforts, but "[w]hatever the merits of the policy" the Court wishes to implement, "its conversion into law is a proper subject for congressional action, not for any creative power of ours." Standard Oil, 332 U.S., at 314 -315. It is, after all, "Congress, not this Court or the other federal courts, [that] is the custodian of the national purse. By the same token [Congress] is the primary and most often the exclusive arbiter of federal fiscal affairs. And these comprehend, as we have said, securing the treasury or the Government against financial losses however inflicted . . . ." Ibid. (emphasis added). See also Gilman, supra, [487 U.S. 500, 531] at 510-512. If Congress shared the Court's assumptions and conclusion it could readily enact "A BILL [t]o place limitations on the civil liability of government contractors to ensure that such liability does not impede the ability of the United States to procure necessary goods and services," H. R. 4765, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see also S. 2441, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). It has not. </s> Were I a legislator, I would probably vote against any law absolving multibillion dollar private enterprises from answering for their tragic mistakes, at least if that law were justified by no more than the unsupported speculation that their liability might ultimately burden the United States Treasury. Some of my colleagues here would evidently vote otherwise (as they have here), but that should not matter here. We are judges not legislators, and the vote is not ours to cast. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 See, e. g., H. R. 4765, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (limitations on civil liability of Government contractors); S. 2441, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (same). See also H. R. 2378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (indemnification of civil liability for Government contractors); H. R. 5883, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (same); H. R. 1504, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (same); H. R. 5351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (same). </s> [Footnote 2 Not all exercises of our power to fashion federal common law displace state law in the same way. For example, our recognition of federal causes of action based upon either the Constitution, see e. g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), or a federal statute, see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), supplements whatever rights state law might provide, and therefore does not implicate federalism concerns in the same way as does pre-emption of a state-law rule of decision or cause of action. Throughout this opinion I use the word "displace" in the latter sense. </s> [Footnote 3 True, in this case the collateral relationship is the relationship between victim and tortfeasor, rather than between contractors, but that distinction makes no difference. We long ago established that the principles governing application of federal common law in "contractual relations of the Government . . . are equally applicable . . . where the relations affected are noncontractual or tortious in character." United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947). </s> [Footnote 4 "QUESTION: [Would it be] a proper judicial function to craft the contours of the military contractor defense . . . even if there were no discretionary function exemption in the Federal Tort Claims Act? </s> "MR. LACOVARA: I think, yes. . . . [I]t ought not to make a difference to the contractor, or to the courts, I would submit, whether or not the Government has a discretionary function exception under the Federal Tort Claims Act. . . . </s> "QUESTION: I think your position would be the same if Congress had never waived its sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act. . . . </s> "MR. LACOVARA: That's correct. . . . </s> "QUESTION: Now wait. I really don't understand that. It seems to me you can make the argument that there should be preemption if Congress wanted it, but how are we to perceive that's what Congress wanted if in the Tort Claims Act, Congress had said the Government itself should be liable for an ill designed helicopter? Why would we have any reason to think that Congress wanted to preempt liability of a private contractor for an ill designed helicopter? </s> . . . . . </s> "QUESTION: . . . [Y]our preemption argument, I want to be sure I understand it - does not depend at all on the Federal Tort Claims Act, as I understand it. . . . </s> "MR. LACOVARA: That's correct." Tr. of Oral Arg. 33-35 (reargument Apr. 27, 1988). </s> [Footnote 5 "QUESTION: Does the Government's position depend at all on the discretionary function exemption in the Federal Tort Claims Act? </s> "MR. AYER: Well, that's a hard question to answer. . . . I think my answer to you is, no, ultimately it should not." Id., at 40-41. </s> [Footnote 6 Some States, of course, would not have permitted a stranger to the contract to bring such a tort suit at all, but no one suggested that this rule of state tort law was compelled by federal law. </s> [Footnote 7 But cf. Tozer v. LTV Corp., 792 F.2d 403 (CA4 1986) (applying defense in DOHSA case), cert. pending, No. 86-674; Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736 (CA11 1985) (same), cert. pending, No. 85-1529; Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Division of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352 (CA3) (same), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821 (1985); McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (CA9 1983) (same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984). </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. </s> When judges are asked to embark on a lawmaking venture, I believe they should carefully consider whether they, or a legislative body, are better equipped to perform the task at hand. There are instances of so-called interstitial lawmaking that inevitably become part of the judicial process. 1 But when we are asked to create an entirely new doctrine - to answer "questions of policy on which Congress has not spoken," United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 511 (1954) - we have a special duty to identify the proper decisionmaker before trying to make the proper decision. [487 U.S. 500, 532] </s> When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the conflicting interests in the efficient operation of a massive governmental program and the protection of the rights of the individual - whether in the social welfare context, the civil service context, or the military procurement context - I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the Congress. That is the central message of the unanimous decision in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); 2 that is why I joined the majority in Schweiker v. Chilicky, ante, p. 412, 3 a case decided only three days ago; and that is why I am so distressed by the majority's decision today. For in this case, as in United States v. Gilman, supra: "The selection of that policy which is most advantageous to the whole involves a host of considerations that must be weighed and appraised. That function is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them." Id., at 511-513. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions. A common-law judge could not say I think the doctrine of consideration a bit of historical nonsense and shall not enforce it in my court. No more could a judge exercising the limited jurisdiction of admiralty say I think well of the common-law rules of master and servant and propose to introduce them here en bloc." Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1971) (Holmes, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 2 "[W]e decline to create a new substantive legal liability without legislative aid and as at the common law, because we are convinced that Congress is in a better position to decide whether or not the public interest would be served by creating it." 462 U.S., at 390 (internal quotation omitted). </s> [Footnote 3 "Congressional competence at `balancing governmental efficiency and the rights of [individuals],' Bush, 462 U.S., at 389 , is no more questionable in the social welfare context than it is in the civil service context. Cf. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 -224 (1988)." Ante, at 425. </s> [487 U.S. 500, 533]

United States Supreme Court JONES v. THOMAS(1989) No. 88-420 Argued: April 26, 1989Decided: June 19, 1989 </s> Respondent Thomas was convicted of both attempted robbery and first-degree felony murder arising out of the same incident and was sentenced to consecutive terms of 15 years for the attempted robbery and life imprisonment for the felony murder, with the 15-year sentence to run first. This conviction was affirmed on appeal. While Thomas' motion for postconviction relief was pending in Missouri trial court, the Governor commuted his 15-year sentence to time served. After the Missouri Supreme Court, in unrelated cases, held that the state legislature had not intended to allow separate punishments for both felony murder and the underlying felony, the trial court vacated the attempted robbery conviction and the corresponding sentence. The court left the felony-murder conviction in place, but credited the time served under the attempted robbery conviction against the life sentence. The State Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order and rejected Thomas' argument that, since he had completed his commuted sentence, his continued confinement under the longer sentence violated the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple sentences for the same offense. Thomas then sought a writ of habeas corpus in the Federal District Court. The court denied relief, ruling that Thomas had not suffered a double jeopardy violation because he had not been subjected to a greater punishment than intended by the legislature. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that under this Court's decisions in Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, and In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 , once Thomas had satisfied one of the two sentences that could have been imposed by law, he could not be required to serve the other. It held further that Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 - which held that an unlawful conviction of felony murder and the underlying felony could be remedied by resentencing on a lesser included offense of nonfelony murder - was inapposite, since the prisoner in that case had not completed either of his sentences. </s> Held: </s> The state-court remedy fully vindicated Thomas' double jeopardy rights. In the multiple punishments context, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended. Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 . As a result of the state trial court's ruling, Thomas now stands convicted of felony murder alone and his confinement under [491 U.S. 376, 377] the single sentence imposed for that crime with credit for time already served is not double jeopardy. Thomas' reliance on Lange, supra, and Bradley, supra, is misplaced. Both cases involved alternative punishments that were prescribed by the legislature for a single criminal act, whereas the issue here involves separate sentences imposed for what the sentencing court thought to be separately punishable offenses, one far more serious than the other. Bradley also involved alternative sentences of two different types, fine and imprisonment. While it would not have been possible to "credit" a fine against time in prison, crediting time served under one sentence against the term of another has long been an accepted practice. Moreover, in a true alternative sentences case, it is difficult to say that the legislature intended one punishment over the other, for the legislature viewed each alternative as appropriate for some cases. Here, however, the legislature plainly intended that the person who committed murder during a felony would be convicted of felony murder or separately of the felony and nonfelony murder. It did not intend that an attempted robbery conviction would suffice as an alternative sanction for murder. Extension of Bradley beyond its facts would also lead to anomalous results since, had Thomas been sentenced to life imprisonment first, he would not have had a double jeopardy claim; and since he concedes that the unlawful imposition of concurrent sentences can be cured by vacating the shorter of the two even where it has been completed. Sentencing is not a game where a wrong move by a judge means immunity for the prisoner. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166 -167. Pp. 380-387. </s> 844 F.2d 1337, reversed and remanded. </s> KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 387. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined, and in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, except as to the footnote, post, p. 388. </s> Stephen D. Hawke, Assistant Attorney General of Missouri, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were William L. Webster, Attorney General, and John M. Morris III, Assistant Attorney General. </s> Springfield Baldwin, by appointment of the Court, 489 U.S. 1006 , argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the United States by Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Assistant Attorney General Dennis, [491 U.S. 376, 378] and Brian J. Martin; and for the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation by Kent S. Scheidegger and Charles L. Hobson. [491 U.S. 376, 378] </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> After it became apparent that two consecutive sentences had been imposed where state law permitted but one, a Missouri court vacated the shorter of the two and credited the time already served against the remaining sentence. At the time the court entered its order, the prisoner had completed serving the shorter sentence. The question presented is whether the longer sentence can remain in force, consistent with double jeopardy principles. </s> I </s> Respondent Larry Thomas attempted to rob a St. Louis, Missouri, auto parts store in 1972. Inside the store, respondent drew a gun and announced a holdup. One of the store's customers was armed, and he tried to thwart the robbery. Respondent shot and killed him in an exchange of gunfire. Respondent was convicted in 1973 by a St. Louis Circuit Court jury both of attempted robbery and of first-degree felony murder for killing during the commission of a felony. The trial court sentenced respondent to consecutive terms of 15 years for the attempted robbery and life imprisonment for the felony murder, with the 15-year sentence to run first. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed respondent's conviction on direct appeal. State v. Thomas, 522 S. W. 2d 74 (Mo. App. 1975). </s> In 1977, respondent sought state postconviction relief, arguing that it was improper for the trial court to impose separate sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony. While respondent's case was pending, the Missouri Supreme Court accepted this argument in unrelated cases, holding that the Missouri Legislature had not intended to allow separate punishments under the felony-murder statute. [491 U.S. 376, 379] See State v. Morgan, 612 S. W. 2d 1 (1981) (en banc); State v. Olds, 603 S. W. 2d 501 (1980) (en banc). 1 </s> In June 1981, with respondent's postconviction motion still pending, the Governor of Missouri commuted his 15-year sentence for attempted robbery to "a term ending June 16, 1981." Respondent remained in prison under the murder sentence. In 1982, the state trial court vacated respondent's attempted robbery conviction and 15-year sentence, holding under Olds, supra, that respondent could not be required to serve both sentences. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the order vacating the sentence, but rejected respondent's argument that he was entitled to immediate release. Respondent had argued that because he had completed the shorter, commuted sentence, his continued confinement under the longer sentence constituted double jeopardy. The Missouri Court noted that respondent was in no way prejudiced by the trial court's ruling, as his entire time of incarceration was credited against the life sentence. Thomas v. State, 665 S. W. 2d 621 (1983). </s> Respondent then sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri denied relief, holding that respondent had not suffered a double jeopardy violation because he had not been subjected to greater punishment than intended by the legislature. A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. 816 F.2d 364 (1987). The majority opinion noted that as a result of the Governor's commutation, respondent had legally satisfied the 15-year sentence. See State v. Cerny, 248 S. W. 2d 844 (Mo. 1952). It further held that under this Court's decisions in Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), and In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943), once [491 U.S. 376, 380] respondent completed one of the two sentences that could have been imposed by law, he could not be required to serve any part of the other. The majority went on, however, to hold that the double jeopardy violation could be cured under this Court's decision in Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986), which held that an unlawful conviction of both felony murder and the underlying felony could be remedied by resentencing on a lesser included offense of nonfelony murder. The panel therefore granted a conditional writ, so that respondent could be resentenced for the non-jeopardy-barred offense of nonfelony murder or released. </s> Judge McMillian concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed that respondent's double jeopardy rights were violated, but stated that he would not allow resentencing because he preferred the analysis of JUSTICE BRENNAN's dissenting opinion in Mathews. 816 F.2d, at 371. Judge Bowman dissented, concluding that the double jeopardy prohibition against multiple punishments was not violated because respondent would serve time only under the life sentence, which was a single valid punishment intended by the legislature. Judge Bowman joined Judge Hanson, however, in holding that respondent could be resentenced under Mathews. </s> The Eighth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and ordered respondent's unconditional release. 844 F.2d 1337 (1988). The court held that under Lange, supra, and Bradley, supra, respondent could not be punished further once he had satisfied the sentence for attempted robbery. The court further held that Mathews, supra, was inapplicable because the prisoner in that case had not completed either of his sentences. Four judges dissented. We granted certiorari, 488 U.S. 1003 (1989), and now reverse. </s> II </s> The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be "subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." The Clause affords [491 U.S. 376, 381] three protections to the criminal defendant. The first two, which are the most familiar, protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, and against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. See, e. g., Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984). Neither of these protections against successive prosecutions is involved here. Rather, respondent's initial conviction and sentence for both felony murder and the underlying felony violated the third aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the protection against "multiple punishments for the same offense" imposed in a single proceeding. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). The constitutional question in this case is what remedy is required to cure the admitted violation. </s> The answer turns on the interest that the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect. Our cases establish that in the multiple punishments context, that interest is "limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature." United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989); see Johnson, supra, at 499; Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 -367 (1983). The purpose is to ensure that sentencing courts do not exceed, by the device of multiple punishments, the limits prescribed by the legislative branch of government, in which lies the substantive power to define crimes and prescribe punishments. See, e. g., Johnson, supra, at 499. In this case, respondent's conviction of both felony murder and attempted robbery gave rise to a double jeopardy claim only because the Missouri Legislature did not intend to allow conviction and punishment for both felony murder and the underlying felony. E. g., Hunter, supra, at 368; see also Morgan, supra, at 1; Olds, supra, at 510 (construing Missouri statute). </s> Given that, in its application to the case before us, "the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended," Hunter, supra, at 366, the state-court [491 U.S. 376, 382] remedy fully vindicated respondent's double jeopardy rights. The Missouri court vacated the attempted robbery conviction and sentence and credited the time that respondent had served under that conviction against the remaining sentence for felony murder. This remedy of crediting time already served against the sentence that remained in place is consistent with our approach to multiple punishments problems in other contexts. See Pearce, supra, at 718-719 (credit for time served applied on resentencing at second trial following appeal). Respondent now stands convicted of felony murder alone, and his continued confinement under the single sentence imposed for that crime is not double jeopardy. 2 </s> Respondent, as did the Court of Appeals below, relies on this Court's opinions in Lange, supra, and Bradley, supra, for the proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires immediate release for the prisoner who has satisfied the shorter of two consecutive sentences that could not both lawfully be imposed. We think this approach depends on an overly broad reading of those precedents. Lange and Bradley do contain language to the effect that once a defendant "had fully suffered one of the alternative punishments to which alone the law subjected him, the power of the court to punish further was gone." 18 Wall., at 176. But application of this language to the facts presented here is neither compelled by precedent nor supported by any double jeopardy principle. </s> In Ex parte Lange, the defendant had been convicted of stealing mail bags, a federal offense punishable by either a $200 fine or a 1-year prison term. The trial court, however, [491 U.S. 376, 383] sentenced Lange to a $200 fine and one year in prison. Lange paid the fine and spent five days in prison before seeking a writ of habeas corpus from the trial court. The trial judge then vacated the earlier judgment and sentenced Lange to one year's imprisonment from that date. Lange sought a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, which held that he was entitled to be released. The Court noted that Lange's fine had already passed into the Treasury and could not be returned to him. If the second sentence were enforced, Lange would therefore have paid a $200 fine and spent a year plus five days in prison. See id., at 175. This punishment would obviously have exceeded that authorized by the legislature. Lange therefore stands for the uncontested proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment in excess of that authorized by the legislature, see United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980), and not for the broader rule suggested by its dictum. </s> In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943), provides a closer analogy to this case. The defendant in Bradley was sentenced for contempt to a $500 fine and six months' imprisonment under a statute that provided only for fine or imprisonment. Bradley was taken to prison, and two days later paid the fine. The trial court then realized its mistake, amended its sentencing order by omitting the fine and retaining only the 6-month prison sentence, and instructed the Clerk to return the fine to Bradley's attorney, who refused to accept it. This Court, in a brief opinion citing Lange, held that Bradley was entitled to be released, stating that where "one valid alternative provision of the original sentence has been satisfied, the petitioner is entitled to be freed of further restraint." 318 U.S., at 52 . </s> Strict application of Bradley would support respondent here. Under this view, satisfaction of one of two alternatives that could lawfully be imposed (e. g., the fine in Bradley and the commuted sentence here) is dispositive, and any attempt to correct the erroneous sentence by repaying the fine [491 U.S. 376, 384] or crediting time served would be futile. We think this approach ignores important differences between this case and Bradley. Bradley and Lange both involved alternative punishments that were prescribed by the legislature for a single criminal act. The issue presented here, however, involves separate sentences imposed for what the sentencing court thought to be separately punishable offenses, one far more serious than the other. The alternative sentences in Bradley, moreover, were of a different type, fine and imprisonment. While it would not have been possible to "credit" a fine against time in prison, crediting time served under one sentence against the term of another has long been an accepted practice. See, e. g., North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). </s> In a true alternative sentences case such as Bradley, it would be difficult to say that one punishment or the other was intended by the legislature, for the legislature viewed each alternative as appropriate for some cases. But here the legislature plainly intended one of two results for persons who committed murder in the commission of a felony: Either they were to be convicted of felony murder, or they were to be convicted separately of the felony and of nonfelony murder. 3 It cannot be suggested seriously that the legislature [491 U.S. 376, 385] intended an attempted robbery conviction to suffice as an alternative sanction for murder. The suggestion of JUSTICE SCALIA's dissent, that the same analysis of legislative intent applies to the $200 fine imposed in Lange, post, at 390, is difficult to understand. By the terms of the statute itself, the legislature in Lange plainly did intend that in some cases the sentencing judge would impose "a mere $200 fine for the gravity of offense at issue there." Ibid. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA observes that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects not only against punishment in excess of legislative intent, but also against additions to a sentence in a subsequent proceeding that upset a defendant's legitimate expectation of finality. Post, at 393-394. But this case does not present the situation posited by the dissent where a judge imposes only a 15-year sentence under a statute that permitted 15 years to life, has second thoughts after the defendant serves the sentence, and calls him back to impose another 10 years. Post, at 392. Here we must determine whether [491 U.S. 376, 386] the resentencing of respondent was indeed the imposition of an additional sentence, or a valid remedy for improper "cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial." Hunter, 459 U.S., at 366 . There can be no doubt it was the latter. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA's discussion of the defendant's expectation of finality makes no independent contribution to the inquiry, for in the end the dissent's argument boils down to Bradley. Respondent plainly had no expectation of serving only an attempted robbery sentence when he was convicted by the Missouri trial court. Indeed, since Morgan and Olds had not been decided when respondent was sentenced, his expectation at that point was to serve both consecutive sentences. Once it was established that Missouri law would not allow imposition of both sentences, respondent had an expectation in serving "either 15 years (on the one sentence) or life (on the other sentence)." Post, at 395. The dissent rejects our conclusion that the Missouri court's remedy fulfilled that expectation as "ruled out by Bradley." Ibid. But as discussed above, we do not think the law compels application of Bradley beyond its facts. Instead, we believe that the intent of the legislature, which this aspect of the Double Jeopardy Clause serves to protect, provides the standard for evaluating the Missouri court's remedy for the Clause's violation. </s> Extension of Bradley to these facts would also lead to anomalous results. Under respondent's theory, for example, everything depends on the order in which the consecutive sentences were originally imposed. Had respondent been sentenced to the life sentence first, he would be serving the very same term, but could advance no double jeopardy claim. There is no indication that the order of the sentences was of the slightest importance to the sentencing judge, and there is no reason constitutional adjudication should turn on such fortuities. Respondent also concedes that where concurrent sentences are imposed, unlawful imposition of two sentences may be cured by vacating the shorter of the two sentences even where it has been completed. See Hardy v. [491 U.S. 376, 387] United States, 292 F.2d 192 (CA8 1961); United States v. Leather, 271 F.2d 80 (CA7 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 831 (1960). Ironically, respondent's argument for immediate release thus depends on the fact that he was given consecutive terms, which are typically reserved for more culpable offenders. We have previously observed that "[t]he Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner." Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166 -167 (1947). We will not depart from that principle today, and we decline to extend Bradley beyond its facts. </s> III </s> Double jeopardy is an area of the law filled with technical rules, and the protections it affords defendants might at times be perceived as technicalities. This is irrelevant where the ancient and important principles embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause are implicated. "Violations of the Double Jeopardy Clause are no less serious than violations of other constitutional protections." Mathews, 475 U.S., at 255 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). But neither the Double Jeopardy Clause nor any other constitutional provision exists to provide unjustified windfalls. The Missouri court's alteration of respondent's sentence to a single term for felony murder with credit for time served provided suitable protection of his double jeopardy rights. </s> The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for dismissal of respondent's petition. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 After the Missouri Supreme Court decided Morgan and Olds, the Missouri Legislature amended the felony murder statute. The statute now provides that punishment may be imposed for both felony murder (now defined as second-degree murder) and the underlying felony. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.021(2) (1986). </s> [Footnote 2 Even if the Double Jeopardy Clause provided an absolute bar to multiple punishments in a single trial regardless of legislative intent, see Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 369 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), the fact would remain that respondent is now serving only a single sentence for a single offense. Under any view of the substantive content of the double jeopardy bar against multiple punishments, respondent has had every benefit the Clause affords. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the state court could not cure the double jeopardy violation through the alternative procedure approved in Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986), is therefore difficult to understand. In Mathews, we held that a violation of the double jeopardy rule against multiple punishments for the same offense in successive trials could be cured by resentencing to a lesser included offense that was not jeopardy barred. In that case, Mathews was first convicted of aggravated robbery. In a separate trial, he was then convicted of felony murder based on the robbery. The second conviction violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. See, e. g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682 (1977) (per curiam) (successive prosecutions for felony murder and the underlying felony a double jeopardy violation). Yet Mathews' conviction of felony murder necessarily entailed a jury finding that he was guilty of the lesser included offense of nonfelony murder. Because nonfelony murder is not the "same offense" as aggravated robbery, there was no double jeopardy bar to a successive [491 U.S. 376, 385] prosecution for that offense. We therefore held that the violation could be cured by resentencing respondent for nonfelony murder, unless Mathews could show prejudice from the admission of evidence on the felony-murder charge that would not have been admissible as to nonfelony murder, in which case he would be entitled to a new trial. </s> The Court of Appeals concluded that Mathews was not applicable to this case because the prisoner in Mathews had not completed his sentence for robbery prior to the resentencing for nonfelony murder, while here Thomas satisfied the attempted robbery sentence. 844 F.2d 1337, 1342 (CA8 1988). This distinction has no legal significance. Because nonfelony murder is not the same offense as attempted robbery, see, e. g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (defining "same offense"), there would be no double jeopardy bar to punishing Thomas for that offense, even through a second full trial. The rule of Morris v. Mathews merely allows entry of judgment without the need for a new trial where the jury's verdict of guilt as to felony murder in the first trial necessarily included a determination that the defendant committed nonfelony murder. Under the Missouri felony-murder statute that applied to Thomas, the jury did make this determination, and there is no reason that Mathews could not have applied here if the state court had chosen that course. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. </s> I join in JUSTICE SCALIA's dissenting opinion, with the exception of its closing footnote. I adhere to my view that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires, except in very limited circumstances, that all charges against a defendant growing out [491 U.S. 376, 388] of a single criminal transaction be tried in one proceeding. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 -460 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring); Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 257 -258 (1986) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). For this reason I do not agree that the State is free to retry respondent for a non-jeopardy-barred lesser included offense. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, and with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join as to all but the footnote, dissenting. </s> This is not the first time we have been called upon to consider whether a criminal defendant's satisfaction of one of two alternative penalties prevents a court from imposing (or reimposing) the second penalty in a subsequent proceeding. In Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163 (1874), the first case to recognize the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against multiple punishment, petitioner was convicted of stealing mailbags from the Post Office, under a statute carrying a punishment of either imprisonment for up to one year or a fine of up to $200. The presiding judge erroneously imposed the maximum of both punishments. After petitioner had paid his fine (which was remitted by the Clerk of Court to the United States Treasury) and had spent five days in prison, the judge realized his mistake and entered an order vacating the former judgment and resentencing petitioner to one year in prison. This Court stated that because petitioner had "fully performed, completed, and endured one of the alternative punishments which the law prescribed for that offence," id., at 176, the court's "power to punish for that offence was at an end," ibid. (emphasis added). Holding that the judge's second order violated petitioner's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court ordered that petitioner be freed. </s> More recently, in In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943), a District Judge found petitioner guilty of contempt and sentenced him to six months in prison and a $500 fine. Petitioner began serving his prison sentence, and his attorney [491 U.S. 376, 389] paid the fine to the Clerk of the Court three days later. The fine was not paid into the Treasury. Later that day, having discovered that the relevant statute permitted imprisonment or fine, but not both, the court issued a new order amending the sentence to omit the fine and instructed the Clerk to return the $500 to petitioner. Petitioner refused to accept the money. We held that order to be "a nullity." Id., at 52. </s> "When, on October 1, the fine was paid to the clerk and receipted for by him, the petitioner had complied with a portion of the sentence which could lawfully have been imposed. As the judgment of the court was thus executed so as to be a full satisfaction of one of the two alternative penalties of the law, the power of the court was at an end." Ibid. </s> The present case is indistinguishable from Lange and Bradley. Here, as there, only one of two available punishments could lawfully be imposed for the conduct in question; and here, as there, the defendant fully satisfied one of the two. Under the law of the State of Missouri, respondent's actions in the Reid Auto Parts store on November 8, 1972, allowed the State to convict him of attempted armed robbery, with a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison, or of felony murder, with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. The State could not convict him or punish him for both offenses. Therefore, once respondent "fully suffered one of the alternative punishments to which alone the law subjected him, the power of the court to punish further was gone." Ex parte Lange, supra, at 176. In the present case, as in Bradley, the State attempted in a second proceeding to "give back" the detriment respondent had suffered as a result of the fully satisfied alternative - by crediting the 15-year sentence for attempted armed robbery that he had already served against the second (life) sentence that had been imposed. But I see no more reason to allow a crediting here than there was to allow a refund in Bradley. Does this produce, as the Court [491 U.S. 376, 390] alleges, an "anomalous resul[t]," ante, at 386, and an "unjustified windfal[l]," ante, at 387? Undoubtedly. Just as it did in Bradley. And just as the Double Jeopardy Clause often does (to an even greater degree) in other contexts - where, for example, a prosecutorial error after the jury has been impaneled permits the defendant to go off scot free. E. g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 737 -738 (1963). </s> The Court candidly recognizes that a "[s]trict application of Bradley," ante, at 383, compels the conclusion that requiring respondent to serve the life sentence after completion of the 15-year sentence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. It advances three related arguments, however, to explain why "strict application" can be avoided. I find none of them persuasive. </s> Most readily answered is the contention that "Bradley and Lange both involved alternative punishments that were prescribed by the legislature for a single criminal act." Ante, at 384. This in no way distinguishes those cases, since it describes the facts of this case just as well. Although the sentencing court undoubtedly thought attempted armed robbery and felony murder "to be separately punishable offenses," ibid., that court, we now know, was wrong. Under the correct view of Missouri law, the 15-year sentence and the life sentence were "alternative punishments . . . prescribed by the legislature for a single criminal act," ibid. The Court states that "[i]t cannot be suggested seriously that the legislature intended an attempted robbery conviction to suffice as an alternative sanction for murder," ante, at 384-385. Perhaps not, but it might also have been said in Lange that the legislature did not intend a mere $200 fine for the gravity of offense at issue there. Just as the judge in that case frustrated the probable legislative intent by inadvertently imposing the lesser penalty that was available, unaware that it would preclude the greater, so the judge in the present case frustrated the probable legislative intent by inadvertently entering the lesser conviction and sentence, unaware that it would preclude the greater. But that is beside the point. [491 U.S. 376, 391] The Double Jeopardy Clause is not a device designed to assure effectuation of legislative intent - but to the contrary is often the means of frustrating it. The relevant question pertaining to legislative intent is not whether the Missouri Legislature intended an attempted armed robbery sentence for the crime of murder, but whether it intended that both a felony-murder sentence and an attempted armed robbery sentence could be imposed for the same crime. The Missouri Supreme Court has said not. See State v. Morgan, 612 S. W. 2d 1 (1981); State v. Olds, 603 S. W. 2d 501, 510 (1980). That being so, if respondent has served one of the two alternative sentences that could lawfully be imposed, he cannot be required to serve the other as well. </s> Second, the Court distinguishes Bradley on the ground that there "[t]he alternative sentences . . . were of a different type, fine and imprisonment," ante, at 384, so that it would not have been possible to credit the satisfied fine against the as-yet-unserved sentence. It is difficult to imagine, however, why the difference between a credit and a refund (which could have been made in Bradley) should be of constitutional dimensions insofar as the Double Jeopardy Clause is concerned. Bradley, of course, did not rely upon any difference in the nature of the two punishments, but upon the mere fact that one of them had been completely executed. "As the judgment of the court was thus executed so as to be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative punishments of the law, the power of the court was at an end." 318 U.S., at 52 . Likewise Lange: </s> "[I]n that very case, and for that very offence, the prisoner had fully performed, completed, and endured one of the alternative punishments which the law prescribed . . . . [T]hus . . . [the court's] power to punish for that offence was at an end. . . . [T]he authority of the court to punish the prisoner was gone. The power was exhausted; its further exercise was prohibited." 18 Wall., at 176. [491 U.S. 376, 392] </s> Finally, the Court states that in the multiple punishments context, "`the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.'" Ante, at 381, quoting Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983). If that were true it would certainly permit proceedings quite foreign to our criminal-law tradition. If, for example, a judge imposed only a 15-year sentence under a statute that permitted 15 years to life, he could - as far as the Court's understanding of the Double Jeopardy Clause is concerned - have second thoughts after the defendant has served that time, and add on another 10 years. I am sure that cannot be done, because the Double Jeopardy Clause is a statute of repose for sentences as well as for proceedings. Done is done. The Court is able to quote Hunter for this unusual result only because its quotation is incomplete. What we said in that case, and have subsequently repeated in other cases, is that "[w]ith respect to cumulative sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended." Ibid. See also id., at 368 (The Double Jeopardy Clause does not "preclud[e] the imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punishments pursuant to those statutes") (emphasis added); id., at 368-369 ("Where . . . a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes . . . the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial") (emphasis added). </s> In both of the cases in which we have applied the Court's "legislative intent" formulation of the Double Jeopardy Clause to uphold the imposition of multiple penalties, the penalties had been imposed (or would have been imposed) in a single proceeding. See Missouri v. Hunter, supra (defendant convicted of both armed criminal action and the underlying felony of armed robbery in single trial); Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984) (defendant pleaded guilty to two lesser [491 U.S. 376, 393] offenses and trial court dismissed three greater offenses, stating that prosecution would be barred under Double Jeopardy Clause). But when the added punishment, even though authorized by the legislature, was imposed in a later proceeding, we held that the Double Jeopardy Clause was a bar. In United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 , n. 10 (1989), we said: </s> "That the Government seeks the civil penalty in a second proceeding is critical in triggering the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Since a legislature may authorize cumulative punishment under two statutes for a single course of conduct, the multiple-punishment inquiry in the context of a single proceeding focuses on whether the legislature actually authorized the cumulative punishment. See Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 -500 (1984). On the other hand, when the Government has already imposed a criminal penalty and seeks to impose additional punishment in a second proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the possibility that the Government is seeking the second punishment because it is dissatisfied with the sanction obtained in the first proceeding." </s> See also id., at 450 ("In a single proceeding the multiple punishment issue would be limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by the legislature") (emphasis added); ibid. ("Nor does the decision [in Halper] prevent the Government from seeking and obtaining both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily authorized civil penalties in the same proceeding") (emphasis added). </s> In the present case, of course, it was not the same proceeding but a second proceeding that added time to the 15-year sentence the defendant had already satisfied for his crime. In those circumstances, our cases establish that the relevant double jeopardy criterion is not only whether the total [491 U.S. 376, 394] punishment authorized by the legislature has been exceeded, but also whether the addition upsets the defendant's legitimate "expectation of finality in the original sentence," United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980). In the latter case we upheld against a double jeopardy challenge a statute that allowed the Government to appeal as inadequate a District Court's sentence for a "dangerous special offender." We did so because, by reason of the appeal provision itself, the defendant had no legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence. See id., at 136-137. </s> We applied the same rule in Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28 (1985) (per curiam). There the defendant was convicted of 56 counts of forgery and 56 counts of theft. The trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment on one theft count and a term of probation on one forgery count, and suspended sentence on the remaining counts. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the theft count on which the defendant had been sentenced was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and denied, on double jeopardy grounds, the State's request that the case be remanded for resentencing on the nonbarred theft counts. We did not reverse that disposition outright, but remanded so that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania might consider, pursuant to DiFrancesco, "whether the Pennsylvania laws in effect at the time allowed the State to obtain review of the sentences on the counts for which the sentence had been suspended." 474 U.S., at 30 . It is clear from DiFrancesco and Goldhammer that when a sentence is increased in a second proceeding "the application of the double jeopardy clause . . . turns on the extent and legitimacy of a defendant's expectation of finality in that sentence. If a defendant has a legitimate expectation of finality, then an increase in that sentence is prohibited . . . ." United States v. Fogel, 264 U.S. App. D.C. 292, 302, 829 F.2d 77, 87 (1987) (Bork, J.). </s> The principle enunciated in DiFrancesco also explains our decision in Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1947). [491 U.S. 376, 395] There the defendant was convicted of operating an illegal still, a crime which carried a mandatory sentence of a $100 fine and a term in prison. The trial court originally sentenced the defendant only to the term of imprisonment. When the court realized its mistake five hours later, it recalled the defendant for resentencing and imposed the $100 fine as well. We held that the resentencing did not violate the defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause. There, as in DiFrancesco, the defendant could not argue that his legitimate expectation of finality in the original sentence had been violated, because he was charged with knowledge that the court lacked statutory authority to impose the subminimum sentence in the first instance. See 330 U.S., at 166 , 167. See also United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520, 524 (CA9 1986) (stating that defendant can have no legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal sentence); United States v. Edmondson, 792 F.2d 1492, 1496, n. 4 (CA9 1986) (same). </s> Applying DiFrancesco and Bozza here, it seems to me respondent must prevail. There is no doubt that the court had authority to impose the 15-year sentence, and respondent therefore had a legitimate expectation of its finality. There are only two grounds on which that could possibly be contested: (1) that the court had authority to impose a 15-year sentence, but not both a 15-year sentence and life, or (2) that his legitimate expectation was not necessarily 15 years, but rather either 15 years (on the one sentence) or life (on the other sentence). But at least where, as here, the one sentence has been fully served, these alternative approaches to defining his legitimate expectation are ruled out by Bradley. There also it could have been said that the court had no authority to impose both the $500 fine and the six months' imprisonment; and there also it could have been said that the defendant's legitimate expectation was not necessarily a $500 fine, but either a $500 fine or six months' imprisonment. But we in effect rejected those approaches, holding that once the fine had been paid a subsequent proceeding could not replace [491 U.S. 376, 396] it with the alternative penalty. There is simply no basis for departing from that holding here. </s> The Double Jeopardy Clause is and has always been, not a provision designed to assure reason and justice in the particular case, but the embodiment of technical, prophylactic rules that require the Government to turn square corners. Whenever it is applied to release a criminal deserving of punishment it frustrates justice in the particular case, but for the greater purpose of assuring repose in the totality of criminal prosecutions and sentences. There are many ways in which these technical rules might be designed. We chose one approach in Bradley - undoubtedly not the only possible approach, but also not one that can be said to be clearly wrong. (The fact that it produces a "windfall" separates it not at all from other applications of the double jeopardy guarantee.) With technical rules, above all others, it is imperative that we adhere strictly to what we have stated the rules to be. A technical rule with equitable exceptions is no rule at all. Three strikes is out. The State broke the rules here, and must abide by the result. </s> For these reasons, I believe the Court of Appeals was correct to set aside respondent's life sentence. I would therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and respectfully dissent from the Court's disposition of this case. * </s> [Footnote * I agree with the Court, ante, at 384-385, n. 3, that the Court of Appeals erred in saying that the State could not resentence or retry respondent for a non-jeopardy-barred lesser included offense, see Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237 (1986). Since it is undisputed, however, that the State has made no attempt to do that, that portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion was the purest dictum, and no basis for reversal of its judgment. </s> [491 U.S. 376, 397]

United States Supreme Court ARNOLD TOURS v. CAMP(1970) No. 602 Argued: Decided: November 23, 1970 </s> Court of Appeals erred in dismissing complaint for lack of standing of petitioner travel agents seeking to invalidate respondent Comptroller of the Currency's ruling that national banks may provide travel services for their customers, as 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act "arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it." Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 . </s> Certiorari granted; 428 F.2d 359, reversed and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Petitioners are 42 independent travel agents doing business in Massachusetts. They ask for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Comptroller of the Currency and the South Shore National Bank. They seek to invalidate a ruling by the Comptroller that, incidental to their banking services, national banks may provide travel services for their customers. 1 Petitioners allege that as a result they have lost substantial business and profits and stand to lose even greater business in the future. They contend the Comptroller exceeded his authority when he authorized national banks to provide travel services. [400 U.S. 45, 46] </s> The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 408 F.2d 1147 (CA1 1969). Following our decisions last Term in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 , and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 , we vacated and remanded the case for reconsideration ( 397 U.S. 315 ) and the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its previous decision. </s> Here, as in Data Processing, we are concerned with 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act, 76 Stat. 1132, 12 U.S.C. 1864. 2 In Data Processing we did not rely on any legislative history showing that Congress desired to protect data processors alone from competition. 3 Moreover, we noted a growing trend "toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative action." 397 U.S., at 154 . We held that 4 "arguably brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it." Id., at 156. Nothing in the opinion limited 4 to protecting only competitors in the data-processing field. When national banks begin to provide travel services for their customers, they compete with travel agents no less than they compete with data processors when they provide data-processing services to their customers. 4 </s> [400 U.S. 45, 47] </s> Accordingly the writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN would set the case for argument. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Paragraph 7475 of the Comptroller's Manual for National Banks provides: "Incident to those powers vested in them under 12 U.S.C. 24, national banks may provide travel services for their customers and receive compensation therefor. Such services may include the sale of trip insurance and the rental of automobiles, as agent for a local rental service. In connection therewith, national banks may advertise, develop, and extend such travel services for the purpose of attracting customers to the bank." </s> [Footnote 2 "No bank service corporation may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank services for banks." </s> [Footnote 3 The only legislative history of the Bank Service Corporation Act mentioned in the opinion was that 4 was a "`response to the fears expressed by a few senators, that without such a prohibition, the bill would have enabled "banks to engage in a nonbanking activity," S. Rep. No. 2105 [87th Cong., 2d Sess., 7-12] (Supplemental views of Senators Proxmire, Douglas, and Neuberger), and thus constitute "a serious exception to the accepted public policy which strictly limits banks to banking." (Supplemental views of Senators Muskie and Clark).'" 397 U.S., at 155 . </s> [Footnote 4 The final question under Data Processing, whether judicial review of the administrative decision has been precluded, was specifically resolved against the Comptroller in that case. 397 U.S., at 157 . </s> [400 U.S. 45, 48]

United States Supreme Court SWANSON v. TRAER(1957) No. 149 Argued: March 27, 1957Decided: June 10, 1957 </s> This is a stockholders' derivative suit brought in a Federal District Court in Illinois on grounds of diversity of citizenship by citizens of Nevada against an Illinois corporation, certain individual citizens of Illinois, a Delaware corporation and an Indiana corporation. The complaint alleged a conspiracy to defraud the Illinois corporation through sales to it of certain properties in which some of the directors were personally interested. It also averred a demand on the directors to bring suit, their refusal to do so, and the futility of making any demand on the stockholders. The Court of Appeals concluded that there was no such hostility to the plaintiffs as to make the Illinois corporation "antagonistic" to its stockholders, and it realigned that corporation as a party plaintiff and affirmed dismissal of the suit, on the ground that there was no diversity jurisdiction. Held: The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded. Pp. 115-117. </s> (a) The management is definitely and distinctly opposed to the institution of this litigation; it is, therefore, "antagonistic" to the stockholders; and the corporation was properly made a defendant. Smith v. Sperling, ante, p. 91. P. 116. </s> (b) Whether the stockholders may sue on behalf of their corporation is a question of local law on which the Court of Appeals did not rule; and the case is remanded to it for consideration of that question. Pp. 116-117. </s> 230 F.2d 228, reversed and remanded. </s> James E. Doyle argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Avern B. Scolnik, Philip F. La Follette and William H. Bowman. </s> James E. S. Baker and Marland Gale argued the cause for respondents. On the brief with Mr. Baker were Kenneth F. Burgess, Calvin P. Sawyier, Thomas L. Marshall, [354 U.S. 114, 115] Charles F. Short, Jr. and Wesley G. Hall for Traer et al. On the brief with Mr. Gale was C. Frank Reavis for the National City Lines, Inc., et al., respondents. </s> Francis X. Busch and James J. Magner filed a brief for the Chicago North Shore & Milwaukee Railway, respondent. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case, a companion case to No. 316, Smith v. Sperling, ante, p. 91, presents another aspect of the problem of realignment of parties in a stockholders' derivative suit that is brought in a Federal District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff-stockholders are citizens of Nevada and stockholders in the Chicago North Shore & Milwaukee Ry. Co., an Illinois corporation. It was made a defendant along with individuals, who are citizens of Illinois, a Delaware corporation, and an Indiana corporation. The complaint charged a conspiracy to defraud the Railway Co. The alleged fraud consisted of a series of sales of transit properties to the Railway Co., properties in which it is charged some of the directors were personally interested. The complaint averred a demand on the directors to bring suit, a refusal on their part, and the futility of making any demand on the stockholders. </s> Answers were filed and motions made to dismiss. The District Court dismissed the bill on the ground that no showing had been made that the refusal of the management to act to redress the alleged wrong was not a decision entrusted to the good-faith judgment of the directors. In other words, the District Court concluded that the controversy did not fall within the exceptional group of cases where the stockholder may dispute the management and take the reins of corporate litigation in his own hands. [354 U.S. 114, 116] </s> On appeal, the Court of Appeals did not reach that question. Though it appeared from the record that the directors were opposed to the bringing of the suit, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no such hostility to the plaintiffs as to make it "antagonistic" within the meaning of the cases. It accordingly realigned the corporation as a party plaintiff. Since there were then Illinois citizens on each side of the litigation, the requisite diversity was not present and the orders dismissing the bill were affirmed. 230 F.2d 228. The case is here on a writ of certiorari. 352 U.S. 865 . </s> For the reasons stated in Smith v. Sperling, supra, we think this case is an instance where the management - for good reasons or for bad - is definitely and distinctly opposed to the institution of this litigation. The management is, therefore, antagonistic to the stockholders as that conception has been used in the cases. It follows that the corporation was properly made a defendant. </s> There remains for consideration the question ruled on by the District Court and which the Court of Appeals did not reach, viz. whether this suit is of that exceptional character which stockholders may bring. </s> As we stated in Smith v. Sperling, ante, p. 91, since our decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 , the question whether in these diversity suits a stockholder may sue on behalf of his corporation is governed by local law. See Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 -556. The classical description of those situations is contained in Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 460 : </s> "Some action or threatened action of the managing board of directors or trustees of the corporation which is beyond the authority conferred on them by their charter or other source of organization; </s> "Or such a fraudulent transaction completed or contemplated by the acting managers, in connection [354 U.S. 114, 117] with some other party, or among themselves, or with other shareholders as will result in serious injury to the corporation, or to the interests of the other shareholders; </s> "Or where the board of directors, or a majority of them, are acting for their own interest, in a manner destructive of the corporation itself, or of the rights of the other shareholders; </s> "Or where the majority of shareholders themselves are oppressively and illegally pursuing a course in the name of the corporation, which is in violation of the rights of the other shareholders, and which can only be restrained by the aid of a court of equity." </s> Whether local law follows that definition or adopts another and whether this case falls within the one provided by local law is a question on which the Court of Appeals has not ruled. We therefore remand the case to it for consideration of the question. </s> Reversed. </s> [For opinion of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, joined by MR. JUSTICE BURTON, MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, see ante, p. 98.] </s> [354 U.S. 114, 118]

United States Supreme Court CLARK COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT v. SHIRLEY A. BREEDEN(2001) No. 00-866 Argued: Decided: April 23, 2001 </s> Per Curiam. </s> Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a), it is unlawful "for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]." In 1997, respondent filed a §2000e-3(a) retaliation claim against petitioner Clark County School District. The claim as eventually amended alleged that petitioner had taken two separate adverse employment actions against her in response to two different protected activities in which she had engaged. The District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner, No. CV-S-97-365-DWH(RJJ) (D. Nev., Feb. 9, 1999), but a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed over the dissent of Judge Fernandez, No. 99-15522, 2000 WL 991821 (July 19, 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished), judgt. order reported at 232 F.3d 893. We grant the writ of certiorari and reverse. </s> On October 21, 1994, respondent's male supervisor met with respondent and another male employee to review the psychological evaluation reports of four job applicants. The report for one of the applicants disclosed that the applicant had once commented to a co-worker, "I hear making love to you is like making love to the Grand Canyon." Brief in Opposition 3. At the meeting respondent's supervisor read the comment aloud, looked at respondent and stated, "I don't know what that means." Ibid. The other employee then said, "Well, I'll tell you later," and both men chuckled. Ibid. Respondent later complained about the comment to the offending employee, to Assistant Superintendent George Ann Rice, the employee's supervisor, and to another assistant superintendent of petitioner. Her first claim of retaliation asserts that she was punished for these complaints. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has applied §2000e-3(a) to protect employee "oppos[ition]" not just to practices that are actually "made ... unlawful" by Title VII, but also to practices that the employee could reasonably believe were unlawful. 2000 WL 991821, at *1 (stating that respondent's opposition was protected "if she had a reasonable, good faith belief that the incident involving the sexually explicit remark constituted unlawful sexual harassment"); Trent v. Valley Electric Assn. Inc., 41 F.3d 524, 526 (CA9 1994). We have no occasion to rule on the propriety of this interpretation, because even assuming it is correct, no one could reasonably believe that the incident recounted above violated Title VII. </s> Title VII forbids actions taken on the basis of sex that "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a)(1). Just three Terms ago, we reiterated, what was plain from our previous decisions, that sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII only if it is "so 'severe or pervasive' as to 'alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 (1998) (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (some internal quotation marks omitted)). See also Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (Only harassing conduct that is "severe or pervasive" can produce a "constructive alteratio[n] in the terms or conditions of employment"); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (Title VII "forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the 'conditions' of the victim's employment"). Workplace conduct is not measured in isolation; instead, "whether an environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive" must be judged "by 'looking at all the circumstances,' including the 'frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.'" Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 787-788 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). Hence, "[a] recurring point in [our] opinions is that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the 'terms and conditions of employment.'" Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 788 (citation and quotation marks omitted). </s> No reasonable person could have believed that the single incident recounted above violated Title VII's standard. The ordinary terms and conditions of respondent's job required her to review the sexually explicit statement in the course of screening job applicants. Her co-workers who participated in the hiring process were subject to the same requirement, and indeed, in the District Court respondent "conceded that it did not bother or upset her" to read the statement in the file. App. to Pet. for Cert. 15 (District Court opinion). Her supervisor's comment, made at a meeting to review the application, that he did not know what the statement meant; her co-worker's responding comment; and the chuckling of both are at worst an "isolated inciden[t]" that cannot remotely be considered "extremely serious," as our cases require, Faragher v. Boca Raton, supra, at 788. The holding of the Court of Appeals to the contrary must be reversed. </s> Besides claiming that she was punished for complaining to petitioner's personnel about the alleged sexual harassment, respondent also claimed that she was punished for filing charges against petitioner with the Nevada Equal Rights Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and for filing the present suit. Respondent filed her lawsuit on April 1, 1997; on April 10, 1997, respondent's supervisor, Assistant Superintendent Rice, "mentioned to Allin Chandler, Executive Director of plaintiff's union, that she was contemplating transferring plaintiff to the position of Director of Professional Development Education," App. to Pet. for Cert. 11-12 (District Court opinion); and this transfer was "carried through" in May, Brief in Opposition 8. In order to show, as her defense against summary judgment required, the existence of a causal connection between her protected activities and the transfer, respondent "relie[d] wholly on the temporal proximity of the filing of her complaint on April 1, 1997 and Rice's statement to plaintiff's union representative on April 10, 1997 that she was considering transferring plaintiff to the [new] position." App. to Pet. for Cert. 21-22 (District Court opinion). The District Court, however, found that respondent did not serve petitioner with the summons and complaint until April 11, 1997, one day after Rice had made the statement, and Rice filed an affidavit stating that she did not become aware of the lawsuit until after April 11, a claim that respondent did not challenge. Hence, the court concluded, respondent "ha[d] not shown that any causal connection exists between her protected activities and the adverse employment decision." Id., at 21. </s> The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on two facts: The EEOC had issued a right-to-sue letter to respondent three months before Rice announced she was contemplating the transfer, and the actual transfer occurred one month after Rice learned of respondent's suit. 2000 WL 991821, at *3. The latter fact is immaterial in light of the fact that petitioner concededly was contemplating the transfer before it learned of the suit. Employers need not suspend previously planned transfers upon discovering that a Title VII suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no evidence whatever of causality. </s> As for the right-to-sue letter: Respondent did not rely on that letter in the District Court and did not mention it in her opening brief on appeal. Her demonstration of causality all along had rested upon the connection between the transfer and the filing of her lawsuit--to which connection the letter was irrelevant. When, however, petitioner's answering brief in the Court of Appeals demonstrated conclusively the lack of causation between the filing of respondent's lawsuit and Rice's decision, respondent mentioned the letter for the first time in her reply brief, Reply Brief in No. 99-15522 (CA9) pp. 9-10. The Ninth Circuit's opinion did not adopt respondent's utterly implausible suggestion that the EEOC's issuance of a right-to-sue letter--an action in which the employee takes no part--is a protected activity of the employee, see 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a). Rather, the opinion suggests that the letter provided petitioner with its first notice of respondent's charge before the EEOC, and hence allowed the inference that the transfer proposal made three months later was petitioner's reaction to the charge. See 2000 WL 991821, at *3. This will not do. </s> First, there is no indication that Rice even knew about the right-to-sue letter when she proposed transferring respondent. And second, if one presumes she knew about it, one must also presume that she (or her predecessor) knew almost two years earlier about the protected action (filing of the EEOC complaint) that the letter supposedly disclosed. (The complaint had been filed on August 23, 1995, and both Title VII and its implementing regulations require that an employer be given notice within 10 days of filing, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-5(b), (e)(1); 29 CFR §1601.14 (2000).) The cases that accept mere temporal proximity between an employer's knowledge of protected activity and an adverse employment action as sufficient evidence of causality to establish a prima facie case uniformly hold that the temporal proximity must be "very close," O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (CA10 2001). See e.g., Richmond v. Oneok, Inc., 120 F.3d 205, 209 (CA10 1997) (3-month period insufficient); Hughes v. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-1175 (CA7 1992) (4-month period insufficient). Action taken (as here) 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at all. </s> In short, neither the grounds that respondent presented to the District Court, nor the ground she added on appeal, nor even the ground the Court of Appeals developed on its own, sufficed to establish a dispute substantial enough to withstand the motion for summary judgment. The District Court's granting of that motion was correct. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. It is so ordered.

United States Supreme Court KARAHALIOS v. FEDERAL EMPLOYEES(1989) No. 87-636 Argued: January 17, 1989Decided: March 6, 1989 </s> Petitioner - a language instructor for the Defense Language Institute, a federal agency - was not a union member but was within a bargaining unit for which respondent union was the exclusive bargaining agent. He was promoted to a reopened "course developer" position, which had previously been occupied by one Kuntelos, who was demoted when the Institute first abolished the position. After respondent agreed to arbitrate on behalf of Kuntelos (who was a member of its board) and successfully argued that the position should be declared vacant for refilling, the Institute reassigned the job to Kuntelos, demoted petitioner, and denied his direct protest. Respondent refused to prosecute petitioner's grievances because of a perceived conflict of interest with its previous Kuntelos advocacy. Petitioner then filed unfair labor practice charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), alleging, inter alia, that respondent had breached its duty of fair representation. The FLRA's General Counsel upheld this charge and ordered that a complaint be issued against respondent, which entered into a settlement whereby it posted notice guaranteeing representation to all employees seeking a single position. When the General Counsel rejected petitioner's contention on appeal that the settlement provided him no relief, he filed a damages suit in the District Court, which held that his charge against respondent was judicially cognizable, since the grant of exclusive union representation contained in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or Act) impliedly gives federal employees a private right of action to safeguard their right to fair representation. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for petitioner, stating that the CSRA's statutory scheme, which creates both an express duty of fair representation and a remedy in the FLRA for infringement of this duty, precludes implication of a parallel right to sue in federal court. </s> Held: </s> Title VII of the CSRA does not confer on federal employees a private cause of action against a breach by a union representing such employees of its statutory duty of fair representation. Pp. 531-537. </s> (a) Title VII's express language does not create a private cause of action, and there is nothing in the Act's language, structure, or legislative history from which a congressional intent to provide such a remedy [489 U.S. 527, 528] can be implied. In fact, Title VII's provisions demonstrate that Congress vested exclusive enforcement authority over the duty of fair representation in the FLRA and its General Counsel, since the Title renders a breach of that duty an unfair labor practice, which is adjudicated by the FLRA upon the General Counsel's complaint, and since the Title provides recourse to the courts in only three instances, none of which directly relate to the enforcement of the duty of fair representation. To hold that the district courts must entertain such cases in the first instance would seriously weaken the congressional scheme. Pp. 532-534. </s> (b) A congressional intent to provide a private CSRA cause of action cannot be implied from that Act's similarities to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Railway Labor Act, under which this Court has recognized implicit judicial causes of action to enforce the fair representation duty in the private sector. Unlike the CSRA, neither of those statutes expressly recognizes that duty or provides any administrative remedy for its enforcement. Furthermore, the implication in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 , of a private NLRA cause of action was intended to preserve courts' pre-existing jurisdiction to enforce the fair representation duty after the National Labor Relations Board tardily assumed jurisdiction, whereas, under the pre-CSRA regulatory scheme, there was no equivalent judicial role. Moreover, Vaca and earlier cases stressed that it was critical that unions represent all employees in good faith, since the pertinent statutes deprived bargaining unit employees of their individual rights to bargain by providing for exclusive bargaining agents. In contrast, federal employment does not rest on contract in the private sector sense; the deprivation a federal employee suffers from the election of a bargaining agent - if there is such a deprivation - is not clearly comparable to the private sector predicament; and the collective-bargaining mechanisms created by Title VII do not deprive employees of remedies otherwise provided by statute or regulation. Vaca also rested in part on the fact that private collective-bargaining contracts were enforceable in the courts under 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, whereas no provision equivalent to 301 exists in the CSRA. Pp. 534-536. </s> 821 F.2d 1389, affirmed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Thomas R. Duffy argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Glenn M. Taubman and Todd G. Brower. </s> H. Stephen Gordon argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were David Silberman and Laurence Gold. [489 U.S. 527, 529] </s> Richard G. Taranto argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, William E. Persina, and Arthur A. Horowitz. * </s> [Footnote * Gregory O'Duden and Elaine Kaplan filed a brief for the National Treasury Employees Union as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question before the Court is whether Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or Act), 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), confers on federal employees a private cause of action against a breach by a union representing federal employees of its statutory duty of fair representation. Because we decide that Congress vested exclusive enforcement authority over this duty in the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) and its General Counsel, we agree with the Court of Appeals that no private cause of action exists. Hence we affirm. </s> Petitioner, Efthimios Karahalios, is a Greek language instructor for the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, California (Institute). Karahalios was not a union member but was within a bargaining unit of professional employees for which respondent, the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263 (Union), was the exclusive bargaining agent. In 1976, the Institute reopened its "course developer" position, for which opening Karahalios applied. Previously, the position had been occupied by one Simon Kuntelos, who had been demoted to instructor in 1971, when the Institute first abolished the course developer position. Because Kuntelos declined to seek the reopened job through the competitive application process, Karahalios won the position after scoring 81 on the required examination. </s> Kuntelos filed a grievance, asserting that the Institute's job award to Karahalios infringed the collective-bargaining agreement, and that Kuntelos should have been assigned the [489 U.S. 527, 530] position without a competitive application process. The Union agreed to arbitrate on behalf of Kuntelos (a Union board member), and successfully argued that the position be declared vacant for refilling. Because promotion selection procedures had altered, Kuntelos was permitted considerably more time on the examination. He scored 83, and in May 1978, the Institute reassigned the course developer opening to Kuntelos and demoted Karahalios to instructorship status. </s> The Institute denied Karahalios' direct protest against the substitution; likewise, the Union refused to prosecute his grievances because of a perceived conflict of interest with its previous Kuntelos advocacy. Karahalios filed unfair labor practice charges with the FLRA challenging both adverse decisions: He alleged, first, that the Institute violated its collective-bargaining agreement; and, second, that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. The General Counsel of the FLRA upheld Karahalios' second charge, and ordered that a complaint be issued against the Union. The Union and the FLRA's Regional Director, however, entered into a settlement whereby the Union posted notice guaranteeing representation to all employees seeking a single position. The General Counsel rejected Karahalios' contention on appeal that the settlement provided him no relief. </s> Karahalios then filed a damages suit in the District Court, restating his charges against the Institute and the Union. The District Court, in its first of three published orders, dismissed on jurisdictional grounds Karahalios' claim against the Institute, but declared judicially cognizable his unfair labor practice charge against the Union. Specifically, the District Court held that 28 U.S.C. 1331 supports jurisdiction because the CSRA's grant of exclusive union representation impliedly supplies to federal employees a private right of action to safeguard their right to fair representation. After trial, the District Court ruled that the Union's actions - notably its decisions to arbitrate for Kuntelos without consulting, [489 U.S. 527, 531] or even notifying, Karahalios, and, subsequently, to refuse to represent Karahalios - breached its duty of fair representation owed to him. The court confined damages to attorney's fees, however, explaining that both applicants were too similarly matched to allow judicial distinction. </s> The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the CSRA's statutory scheme, which creates both an express duty of fair representation and a remedy in the FLRA for infringement of this duty, precludes implication of a parallel right to sue in federal courts. We granted Karahalios' petition for certiorari. 486 U.S. 1041 (1988). </s> Prior to 1978, labor relations in the federal sector were governed by a 1962 Executive Order administered by a Federal Labor Relations Council whose decisions were not subject to judicial review. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 91 -92 (1983). Since 1978, Title VII of the CSRA has been the controlling authority. Of particular relevance here, 5 U.S.C. 7114(a)(1) provides that a labor organization that has been accorded the exclusive right of representing employees in a designated unit "is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor organization membership." 1 This provision is "virtually identical" to that found in the Executive Order and is the source of the collective-bargaining agent's duty of fair representation. See National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1453, 23 F. L. R. A. 686, 690 (1986). 2 This duty also [489 U.S. 527, 532] parallels the fair representation obligation of a union in the private sector that has been found implicit in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), and the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. 151 et seq. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 -183 (1967); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 205 -207 (1944). </s> Title VII also makes it clear that a breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice, for it provides that it is "an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . to otherwise fail or refuse to comply with any provision of this chapter." 7116(b)(8). Under 7118, unfair labor practice complaints are adjudicated by the FLRA, which is authorized to order remedial action appropriate to carry out the purposes of Title VII, including an award of backpay against either the agency or the labor organization that has committed the unfair practice. </s> There is no express suggestion in Title VII that Congress intended to furnish a parallel remedy in a federal district court to enforce the duty of fair representation. The Title provides recourse to the courts in only three instances: with specified exceptions, persons aggrieved by a final FLRA order may seek review in the appropriate court of appeals, 7123(a); the FLRA may seek judicial enforcement of its orders, 7123(b); and temporary injunctive relief is available to the FLRA to assist it in the discharge of its duties, 7123(d). </s> Petitioner nevertheless insists that a cause of action to enforce the Union's fair representation duty should be implied. Such a claim poses an issue of statutory construction: The "ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action," California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (citations omitted); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569 (1979). Unless such "congressional intent can be inferred from the language of the statute, [489 U.S. 527, 533] the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy simply does not exist." Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). It is also an "elemental canon" of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must be especially reluctant to provide additional remedies. Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). In such cases, "[i]n the absence of strong indicia of contrary congressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the remedies it considered appropriate." Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1, 15 (1981); see also Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 93 (1981). </s> These guideposts indicate that the Court of Appeals was quite correct in concluding that neither the language nor the structure of the Act shows any congressional intent to provide a private cause of action to enforce federal employees unions' duty of fair representation. That duty is expressly recognized in the Act, and an administrative remedy for its breach is expressly provided for before the FLRA, a body created by Congress to enforce the duties imposed on agencies and unions by Title VII, including the duty of fair representation. Nothing in the legislative history of Title VII has been called to our attention indicating that Congress contemplated direct judicial enforcement of the union's duty. Indeed, the General Counsel of the FLRA was to have exclusive and final authority to issue unfair labor practice complaints, and only those matters mentioned in 7123 were to be judicially reviewable. H. R. Rep. No. 95-1403, p. 52 (1978). All complaints of unfair labor practices were to be filed with the FLRA. S. Rep. No. 95-969, p. 107 (1978). Furthermore, Title VII contemplates the arbitration of unsettled grievances, but a House proposal that the duty to arbitrate could be enforced in federal court in the first instance [489 U.S. 527, 534] was ultimately rejected. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1717, p. 157 (1978). There exists no equivalent to 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (LMRA), 61 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. 185, which permits judicial enforcement of private collective-bargaining contracts. </s> Petitioner, however, relies on another source to find the necessary congressional intent to provide him with a cause of action. Petitioner urges that Title VII was modeled after the NLRA and that the authority of the FLRA was meant to be similar to that of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Because this Court found implicit in the NLRA a private cause of action against unions to enforce their fair representation duty even after the NLRB had construed the NLRA to make a breach of the duty an unfair labor practice, petitioner argues that Congress must have intended to preserve this judicial role under Title VII. Much of the argument rests on our decision in Vaca v. Sipes, supra. There are, however, several difficulties with this argument. </s> In the first place, Title VII is not a carbon copy of the NLRA, nor is the authority of the FLRA the same as that of the NLRB. The NLRA, like the RLA, did not expressly make a breach of the duty of fair representation an unfair labor practice and did not expressly provide for the enforcement of such a duty by the NLRB. That duty was implied by the Court because members of bargaining units were forced to accept unions as their exclusive bargaining agents. Because employees had no administrative remedy for a breach of the duty, we recognized a judicial cause of action on behalf of the employee. This occurred both under the RLA, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., supra; Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952), and also under the LMRA, Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Vaca v. Sipes, supra. Very dissimilarly, Title VII of the CSRA not only expressly recognizes the fair representation duty but also provides for its administrative enforcement. [489 U.S. 527, 535] </s> To be sure, prior to Vaca, the NLRB had construed 7 and 8(b) of the NLRA to impose a duty of fair representation on union bargaining agents and to make its breach an unfair labor practice. See Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N. L. R. B. 181 (1962), enf. denied, NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (CA2 1963). The issue in Vaca, some years later, was whether, in light of Miranda Fuel Co., the courts still had jurisdiction to enforce the unions' duty. As we understood our inquiry, it was whether Congress, in enacting 8(b) in 1947, had intended to oust the courts of their role of enforcing the duty of fair representation implied under the NLRA. We held that the "tardy assumption" of jurisdiction by the NLRB was insufficient reason to abandon our prior cases, such as Syres. </s> In the case before us, there can be no mistaking Congress' intent to create a duty previously without statutory basis, and no mistaking the authority of the FLRA to enforce that duty. Also, because the courts played no role in enforcing a union's fair representation duty under Executive Order No. 11491 10e, 3 CFR 861 (1966-1970 Comp.), and subsequent amended orders, under the pre-CSRA regulatory regime, there was not in this context any pre-existing judicial role that at least arguably Congress intended to preserve. 3 </s> Moreover, in Vaca and the earlier cases, it was stressed that by providing for exclusive bargaining agents, the pertinent statutes deprived bargaining unit employees of their individual rights to bargain for wages, hours, and working conditions. Hence it was critical that unions be required to represent all in good faith. Again, Title VII operates in a different context. As the United States as amicus explains, federal employment does not rest on contract in the private sector sense; nor is it clear that the deprivation a federal employee suffers from the election of a bargaining agent - if [489 U.S. 527, 536] there is such a deprivation - is comparable to the private sector predicament. Moreover, the collective-bargaining mechanisms created by Title VII do not deprive employees of recourse to any of the remedies otherwise provided by statute or regulation. See the CSRA, 5 U.S.C. 7114(a)(5) and 7121(e)(1). </s> We also note that Vaca rested in part on the fact that private collective-bargaining contracts were enforceable in the federal courts under LMRA 301. Because unfair representation claims most often involve a claim of breach by the employer and since employers are suable under 301, the implied fair representation cause of action allows claims against an employer and a union to be adjudicated in one action. Section 301 has no equivalent under Title VII; there is no provision in that Title for suing an agency in federal court. </s> We therefore discern no basis for finding congressional intent to provide petitioner with a cause of action against the Union. Congress undoubtedly was aware from our cases such as Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), that the Court had departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim urging that an implied statutory cause of action should be recognized, and that such issues were being resolved by a straightforward inquiry into whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action. Had Congress intended the courts to enforce a federal employees union's duty of fair representation, we would expect to find some evidence of that intent in the statute or its legislative history. We find none. Just as in United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 445 (1988), we held that the CSRA's "integrated scheme of administrative and judicial review" foreclosed an implied right to Court of Claims review, we follow a similar course here. See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388 (1983). To be sure, courts play a role in CSRA 7116(b)(8) fair representation cases, but only sitting in review of the FLRA. To hold that the district courts must entertain such cases in the first instance would seriously undermine what we deem to be the congressional [489 U.S. 527, 537] scheme, namely to leave the enforcement of union and agency duties under the Act to the General Counsel and the FLRA and to confine the courts to the role given them under the Act. </s> Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 7114(a)(1) reads, in full: "A labor organization which has been accorded exclusive recognition is the exclusive representative of the employees in the unit it represents, and is entitled to act for, and negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering, all employees in the unit. An exclusive representative is responsible for representing the interests of all employees in the unit it represents without discrimination and without regard to labor organization membership." </s> [Footnote 2 The Executive Order precursor provision likewise was interpreted to impose on federal unions the duty of fair representation. See National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1453, 23 F. L. R. A., at 690. </s> [Footnote 3 Because such orders were not legislative, courts generally refused judicial enforcement. See, e. g., Kuhn v. National Association of Letter Carriers, Branch 5, 570 F.2d 757, 760-761 (CA8 1978). </s> [489 U.S. 527, 538]

United States Supreme Court CITY OF FRESNO v. CALIFORNIA(1963) No. 51 Argued: January 7, 1963Decided: April 15, 1963 </s> Claimants to water rights along the San Joaquin River below the Friant Dam in California brought suit against the United States, local officials of the United States Bureau of Reclamation, and a number of irrigation and utility districts to enjoin the storage and diversion of water at the dam, which is part of the Central Valley Reclamation Project, authorized by Congress and undertaken by the Bureau of Reclamation under the Act of August 26, 1937, 50 Stat. 844. The suit was brought originally in a State Court and was removed to a Federal District Court. The City of Fresno intervened as a party plaintiff and, in addition to injunctive relief, sought a declaratory judgment as to (1) its rights to underground water fed by the river, (2) its statutory priority, under California law, to the use of water for municipal or domestic purposes, (3) its prior right under the California statutes because of its location, and (4) its entitlement to project water from the United States at the same rate charged for water delivered for irrigation purposes. Held: </s> 1. The suit against the United States must fail for lack of consent; the relief against the Reclamation Bureau officials must also fail as being in truth against the United States; the United States had seized, in whole or in part, the water rights asserted by the claimants; and their recourse was through a suit under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346, for damages. Dugan v. Rank, ante, p. 609. Pp. 628-629. </s> 2. Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 does not mean that state law may operate to prevent the United States from exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire the water rights of others. Pp. 629-630. </s> 3. Fresno has no preferential rights to contract for project water, but may receive it only if, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Interior, irrigation will not be adversely affected. Pp. 630-631. </s> 4. Under 9 (c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, authority and discretion to fix rates covering irrigation as well as municipal water service was delegated to the Secretary of the Interior; and the [372 U.S. 627, 628] officials of the Bureau of Reclamation acted entirely within the scope of their authority in operating the Project as they did and fixing the rates for water in accordance with congressional mandate, as approved by this Court in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 . Pp. 631-632. </s> 293 F.2d 340, 307 F.2d 96, affirmed as to this petitioner. </s> Claude L. Rowe argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was John H. Lauten. </s> Solicitor General Cox argued the cause for the United States et al., respondents. With him on the brief were J. William Doolittle, William H. Veeder and Roger P. Marquis. </s> Denver C. Peckinpah, Adolph Moskovitz, James K. Abercrombie, Irl Davis Brett and J. O. Reavis filed a brief for the Delano-Earlimart Irrigation District et al., respondents. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case arises out of No. 31, Dugan v. Rank, decided today, ante, p. 609. As set out in our opinion in that case the original suit was instituted against certain local United States Reclamation Bureau officials and several Irrigation and Utility Districts by a number of claimants to water rights along the San Joaquin River below Friant Dam. Subsequently the United States, over its protest, was made a party and the petitioner here, the City of Fresno, intervened as a party plaintiff. Fresno sought, in addition to the injunctive relief requested by the other parties, a declaration as to (1) its water rights as an overlying owner, i. e., rights to underground water fed by the river; (2) its statutory priority, under California law, to the use of water for municipal or domestic purposes, Calif. Water Code, 1460; (3) its prior right, under the California County of Origin and Watershed Acts, because of its location, Calif. Water Code, 11460, 11463; and (4) its [372 U.S. 627, 629] entitlement to project water from the United States at the same rate charged for water delivered for irrigation purposes. In the District Court Fresno prevailed on all points. In the Court of Appeals this judgment was set aside "insofar as it relates to the terms upon which the City of Fresno is entitled to receive water from the United States at Friant Dam," 293 F.2d 340, 360, because in establishing the rate at which water would be delivered the respondent officials were acting "within the scope of their statutory authority and were carrying out the duties imposed upon them by their official positions. . . . The complaint of Fresno in this regard is a complaint against the United States and this dispute may not be entertained judicially without a waiver of sovereign immunity on the part of the United States." Id., at 352. With regard to the claim that it enjoyed water rights superior to those of the United States, the Court of Appeals refused to decide, saying on rehearing that "If and when such rights have been established in accordance with state law, Fresno may be able effectively to protest the impounding of waters by these defendants in contravention of such rights." Id., at 360. </s> Our opinion in Dugan v. Rank, supra, controls the decision in this case. There we decided that the suit against the United States must fail for lack of consent; that the relief against the Reclamation Bureau officials must also fail as being in truth against the United States; that the United States had seized, in whole or in part, the water rights asserted by the claimants; and that their recourse was through a Tucker Act suit. 28 U.S.C. 1346. The same is true here. </s> We agree entirely with the disposition of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner seems to say that 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902, 32 Stat. 390, 43 U.S.C. 383, requires compliance with California statutes relating to preferential rights of counties and watersheds of origin and to the [372 U.S. 627, 630] priority of domestic over irrigation uses. However, 8 does not mean that state law may operate to prevent the United States from exercising the power of eminent domain to acquire the water rights of others. This was settled in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958). Rather, the effect of 8 in such a case is to leave to state law the definition of the property interests, if any, for which compensation must be made. </s> We also note that the County of Origin and Watershed Acts, upon which the city relies, do not grant the preference claimed. Under these statutes the area of preference is ". . . a watershed or area wherein water originates, or an area immediately adjacent thereto which can conveniently be supplied with water therefrom . . . ." Calif. Water Code, 11460. The area of service from Friant Dam would include Kern and Tulare Counties as well as Fresno and Madera. (See map in 142 F. Supp., at 40.) The preference under the Acts is not limited to that area closest to the stream, but extends beyond the watershed and to areas adjacent thereto which can "conveniently be supplied with water therefrom," which from the map would seem to include the Friant-Kern as well as the Madera Canal areas. Likewise, the claim as to the preference of water devoted to domestic uses is unfounded. Section 9 (c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 1194, as amended, 43 U.S.C. 485h (c), provides: "No contract relating to municipal water supply or miscellaneous purposes . . . shall be made unless, in the judgment of the Secretary [of the Interior], it will not impair the efficiency of the project for irrigation purposes." In United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), we were concerned with an issue regarding the nature of the Friant Dam unit of the Project and, contrary to petitioner's contention, concluded "that Congress realistically elected to treat it as a reclamation project." Id., at 739. It therefore appears clear that [372 U.S. 627, 631] Fresno has no preferential rights to contract for project water, but may receive it only if, in the Secretary's judgment, irrigation will not be adversely affected. </s> As to the rates charged for municipal water, this same 9 (c), supra, delegates authority and discretion to the Secretary of the Interior to fix rates covering irrigation as well as municipal water service. It provides that the yardstick for determining rates shall be such "as in the Secretary's judgment will produce revenues at least sufficient to cover an appropriate share of the annual operation and maintenance cost and an appropriate share of such fixed charges as the Secretary deems proper . . . ." The Secretary exercised this discretion and so notified the Congress as to the basis for his determination of the appropriate charge for municipal water. Allocation of Costs and Feasibility Report of February 24, 1947, H. R. Doc. No. 146, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 19; 1 Engle, Central Valley Project Doc. (1956), H. R. Doc. No. 416, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 574, 594-596. This report estimated a rate of $10 per acre-foot for municipal water and about $3 per acre-foot or less for irrigation water. Id., at 594-596. The latter rate was based on farm benefits as well as the ability of the user to pay over a protracted period. It was estimated that this rate would return during the repayment period only about one-fourth of the project capital cost allocated to irrigation. Id., at 576-577, 597. As to municipal rates, the return during the same period was estimated at over three times the project capital cost allocated to the delivery of municipal water. * This surplus, together with that from project electric energy, would be used to pay project costs allocated to irrigation but which were beyond the ability of the irrigators to pay. [372 U.S. 627, 632] Congress has been kept advised as to the manner in which these rate schedules are operating. 2 Engle, Central Valley Project Doc. (1957), H. R. Doc. No. 246, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-84, 261-262. </s> In accordance with the Secretary's estimates, long-term contracts for Friant Dam water provide for a rate of $3.50 per acre-foot for Class 1 water and $1.50 for Class 2, while contracts for municipal water supply call for $10 per acre-foot. It appears amply clear that the Reclamation Bureau officials were acting entirely within the scope of their authority in operating the Project in this manner and fixing the rates for water in accordance with congressional mandate, all of which has specifically received our approval in Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, supra, at 295. </s> The judgment, insofar as it relates to this petition of the City of Fresno, is affirmed and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals with directions to vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand the case with instructions to dismiss the same. </s> It is so ordered. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [Footnote * The payments for irrigation water amounted to $58,545,475, while project capital cost allocated to irrigation was $221,551,600. Municipal water rates would return $29,667,932, while project capital cost allocated to municipal water supply was $9,091,800. </s> [372 U.S. 627, 633]

United States Supreme Court BOARD OF EDUCATION, NEW YORK CITY v. HARRIS(1979) No. 78-873 Argued: Decided: November 28, 1979 </s> Section 702 (b) of the Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA or Act) states that the Act's purpose is to provide federal financial assistance "to meet the special needs incident to the elimination of minority group segregation and discrimination among students and faculty in elementary and secondary schools," to encourage "the voluntary elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation" in such schools, and to aid schoolchildren "in overcoming the educational disadvantages of minority group isolation." Section 703 pronounces as federal policy that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to the Act should "be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States." And 706 (d) (1) (B) declares an educational agency ineligible for assistance if, after the date of the Act, it had in effect any practice "which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel from minority groups" or "otherwise engage[s] in discrimination . . . in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees." Petitioner Board of Education's applications for ESAA assistance were denied by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), based upon statistical evidence flowing from a compliance investigation under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and showing a pattern of racially disproportionate assignments of minority teachers in the school system in relation to the number of minority students enrolled at the respective schools. No substantive rebuttal or explanation for the statistical disparities was presented. Petitioner Board then brought suit in District Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the racially disproportionate teacher assignments resulted from provisions of state law, provisions of collective-bargaining agreements, licensing requirements for particular teaching positions, a bilingual-instruction consent decree, and demographic changes in student population. The District Court concluded that HEW should have considered these proffered justifications for the statistical disparities, and remanded the case to HEW for [444 U.S. 130, 131] further consideration. On remand, HEW determined that such justifications did not adequately rebut the prima facie evidence of discrimination established by the statistics, and the District Court upheld HEW's finding of ineligibility and denied relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner Board's contention that HEW was required to establish that the statistical disparities resulted from purposeful or intentional discrimination in the constitutional sense. </s> Held: </s> 1. Discriminatory impact is the standard by which ineligibility under ESAA is to be measured, irrespective of whether the discrimination relates to "demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel" or to "the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees." The overall structure of the Act, Congress' statements of purpose and policy in 702 and 703, the legislative history, and the text of 706 (d) (1) (B) all point in the direction of such a disparate-impact test. To treat as ineligible only an applicant with a past or a conscious present intent to perpetuate racial isolation would defeat the stated objective of ending de facto as well as de jure segregation. Pp. 140-150. </s> 2. A prima facie case of discriminatory impact may be made by a proper statistical study. The burden of rebutting such a statistical case is on the petitioner Board. P. 151. </s> 584 F.2d 576, affirmed. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which POWELL and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 152. </s> Joseph F. Bruno argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Allen G. Schwartz and L. Kevin Sheridan. </s> Solicitor General McCree argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Days, Deputy Solicitor General Claiborne, Jessica Dunsay Silver, Marie E. Klimesz, and Vincent F. O'Rourke, Jr. * </s> [Footnote * Charles A. Bane, Thomas D. Barr, Norman Redlich, Robert A. Murphy, and Norman J. Chachkin filed a brief for the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as amicus curiae urging affirmance. [444 U.S. 130, 132] </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents a narrow, but important, issue of statutory interpretation. It concerns a school district's eligibility for federal financial assistance under the 1972 Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA or Act), 86 Stat. 354, as amended, 20 U.S.C. 1601-1619. 1 Because the federal funds available under the Act are limited, educational agencies compete for those funds. </s> I </s> By 702 (a) of the Act, 86 Stat. 354, 20 U.S.C. 1601 (a), Congress found "that the process of eliminating or preventing minority group isolation and improving the quality of education for all children often involves the expenditure of additional funds to which local educational agencies do not have access." Accordingly, in 702 (b), Congress stated that the purpose of the legislation was to provide financial assistance "to meet the special needs incident to the elimination of minority group segregation and discrimination among students and faculty in elementary and secondary schools," to encourage "the voluntary elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation" in such schools, and to aid school-children "in overcoming the educational disadvantages of minority group isolation." Section 703 pronounced as United States policy that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to the Act should "be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States." And, by 706 (d) (1), an educational agency was expressly declared ineligible for assistance if, after the date of the Act (June 23, 1972), it </s> "(B) had in effect any practice, policy, or procedure [444 U.S. 130, 133] which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel from minority groups in conjunction with desegregation or the implementation of any plan or the conduct of any activity described in this section, or otherwise engaged in discrimination based upon race, color, or national origin in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees of the agency." 2 </s> The Act, in 710 (a), provides that an agency desiring to receive assistance for a fiscal year shall submit an application "at such time, in such form, and containing such information" as the Assistant Secretary for Education of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) "shall require by regulation." The application is then reviewed by that office and is ranked according to criteria set out in 710 (c), as implemented by regulation. See 45 CFR 185.14 (1978). The essential first step is a determination 3 that the applicant [444 U.S. 130, 134] is not ineligible under 706 (d) (1). This determination is made initially by HEW's Office for Civil Rights. The burden, presumably, is on the applicant to establish its eligibility. </s> II </s> Petitioner Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York filed three applications for ESAA assistance for the fiscal year 1977-1978. Its revised Basic Grant Application, the only one now at issue, was given a sufficiently favorable ranking so as initially to be considered for funding in the amount of $3,559,132. On July 1, 1977, however, HEW by letter informed the Board that it did not meet the Act's eligibility requirements. App. 27. In line with the provisions of 45 CFR 185.46 (b) (1978), an informal meeting was held on July 22. Although HEW then withdrew some of its adverse findings, it still concluded that the Board had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for revocation of its determination of ineligibility. HEW reasoned that, in the language of 45 CFR 185.43 (b) (2) (1978), the Board's "assignment of full-time classroom teachers to [its] schools [was] in such a manner as to identify [one or more] of such schools as intended for students of a particular race, color, or national origin." </s> The ineligibility determination rested upon statistics developed by HEW's Office for Civil Rights during a 1976 compliance investigation of the Board's school system under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 252, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq. From these statistics, HEW concluded that it was possible to identify a number of schools as intended for either minority or nonminority students, solely because of the composition of the faculties. The statistics revealed that, during the 1975-1976 school year, 62.6% of high school pupils were members of a minority, but only 8.3% of high school teachers were minority members. Further, 70% of the minority high school teachers were assigned to schools at which [444 U.S. 130, 135] the minority student enrollments exceeded 76%. Conversely, in those high schools where minority student enrollments were less than 40%, there was a disproportionately low percentage of minority teachers. App. 29, 42-43. </s> The statistical study showed like patterns at the junior high and elementary levels. The percentage of minority junior high teachers was 16.7, and these teachers were concentrated in districts with the highest percentages of minority students. Id., at 29. For the elementary schools, the citywide percentage of minority teachers was 14.3, and these were placed primarily in districts with the largest minority student enrollments. Id., at 28-29. HEW also relied upon findings it had made earlier that the Board was in violation of Title VI of the 1964 Act. </s> At the informal meeting of July 22, HEW limited its inquiry to the accuracy of the statistics upon which it had rested its decision to deny funding. No substantive rebuttal or explanation for the statistical disparities was presented. On September 16, 1977, HEW issued its formal opinion adhering to its decision of July 1 to deny funding. Brief for Petitioners 8. </s> The present action then was promptly instituted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York to obtain declaratory relief, to enjoin HEW from enforcing its determination of ineligibility, and to award the initially earmarked funds to the Board. 4 The complaint contained no challenge to the accuracy or sufficiency of HEW's statistics. Rather, petitioner Board took the position that the racially disproportionate teacher assignments resulted from provisions of state law, from provisions of collective-bargaining agreements, from licensing requirements for [444 U.S. 130, 136] particular teaching positions, from a consent decree relating to bilingual instruction (Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Education, 72 Civ. 4002 (SDNY Aug. 29, 1974); see Aspira of New York, Inc. v. Board of Education, 65 F. R. D. 541 (SDNY 1975)), and from demographic changes in student population. The Board expressly denied that it had engaged in intentional or purposeful discrimination. App. 134-149. </s> Initially, the District Court, after its review of the administrative record and after a hearing, denied the Board's motion for summary judgment and granted HEW's cross-motion, thus affirming the denial of funding. The court said: </s> "[T]here was a reasonable basis for a decision that it had so discriminated. This Court's powers are extremely limited. In this respect, considering the high school statistics, the State statutes, the United Federation of Teachers agreements, the wishes of individual Black principals, the desires of the individual Parent-Teachers Associations, community school board and Black and Black and White communities, the Administrator could find a practice, policy or procedure after June 23, 1972, resulting in the identification of schools as intended for students of a particular race, color or national origin through the assignment of teachers to those schools. </s> "Accordingly, with the greatest reluctance because it is the children of the schools who will suffer from this decision of the Administrator, the Court grants the Government's motion for summary judgment." Id., at 69-70. </s> The Board's request for reargument, however, was granted. The District Court then concluded that HEW should have considered the justifications proffered for the statistical disparities. The matter was therefore remanded to HEW for further consideration consistent with an opinion the court issued. In that opinion, the court stated: </s> "The relevant statute, regulations and cases indicate a failure of H. E. W. Before declaring a school board [444 U.S. 130, 137] ineligible for ESAA funds, H. E. W. must find either that (1) the school board was maintaining an illegally segregated school system on June 23, 1972 and it took no effective steps to desegregate after that date or (2) it had a practice after June 23, 1972 that was segregative in intent, design or foreseeable effect. It may rely on statistics alone to make this finding, but it may not ignore evidence tending to rebut the inferences drawn from the statistics. </s> . . . . . </s> [T]he Constitution mandates that the plaintiffs must have an opportunity to rebut a statistical prima facie case of discrimination." App. to Pet. for Cert. 102-104. </s> After the administrative hearing on remand, HEW notified the Board that its explanation for the racially identifiable staffing patterns did not adequately rebut the prima facie evidence of discrimination established by the statistics. This determination centered on disparities in 10 of the 110 secondary schools operated by the Board and serving predominantly nonminority student bodies. App. 109-110. HEW's letter of March 22, 1978, to the Chancellor discussed the several justifications offered and concluded that each was insufficient. Id., at 102-114. </s> The Board once again sought relief in the District Court. On April 18, that court upheld HEW's finding of ineligibility as supported by substantial evidence, and denied relief. Id., at 150-153. The Board appealed and obtained a stay preserving the funds at issue pending appellate review. </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed. Board of Education of City School Dist. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (CA2 1978). On the appeal, the Board still did not contest the finding that certain of its schools were racially identifiable "as a result of the significant disparities in staff assignments." Id., at 585. The Board, instead, argued that HEW was required "to establish that the disparities resulted from purposeful or intentional [444 U.S. 130, 138] discrimination in the constitutional sense." Ibid. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention. It held that Congress has the authority "to establish a higher standard, more protective of minority rights, than constitutional minimums require," and that "Congress intended to permit grant disqualification not only for purposeful discrimination but also for discrimination evidenced simply by an unjustified disparity in staff assignments." Id., at 588. It further concluded that HEW's denial of funding was not arbitrary or capricious. Id., at 589. The several proffered justifications were either inadequate to explain the disparities or were unsupported by facts appearing on the record. Ibid. </s> Because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. Sub nom. Board of Education of City School Dist. v. Califano, 440 U.S. 905 (1979). The stay preserving the funds remains in effect. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 41 (b). </s> III </s> Our primary concern is with the intent of Congress. Section 706 sets forth the eligibility criteria for ESAA funding. In subsection (a) (1) it authorizes a grant to a local educational agency that (i) is implementing a desegregation plan approved by a court, or by HEW "as adequate under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," or (ii), "without having been required to do so," has a plan to eliminate or reduce minority group isolation. </s> Critical to the resolution of the issue in this case, however, are the ineligibility provisions of 706 (d) (1) (B), quoted above in Part I of this opinion. Ineligibility comes about if the agency either has in effect a practice "which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismissal of . . . personnel from minority groups," or "otherwise engage[s] in discrimination . . . in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees." The mere reading of this language reveals that it suffers from imprecision of expression and less than careful draftsmanship. The first portion clearly speaks in terms of effect [444 U.S. 130, 139] or impact. The second portion, arguably, might be said to possess an overtone of intent. There is nothing specifically indicating that this difference exists or, if it does, that it was purposefully drawn by Congress. The existence and significance of the difference are important for petitioner Board, for we are concerned here not with "disproportionate demotion or dismissal of . . . personnel," but with racial "discrimination" in the "assignment of employees." </s> The Board, as a consequence, argues that it was not the aim of Congress to permit HEW to find that an applicant was ineligible for funding because of its staff assignments unless those assignments were purposefully discriminatory and thus violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; it follows, says the Board, that disproportionate impact alone, without proof of purposeful discrimination, is insufficient. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973), are cited. The Board, in other words, would have us interpret the assignment clause as one imposing a constitutional standard. It contends that the test under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act also provides the measure under ESAA of disqualifying discrimination and of ineligibility. It claims that HEW's finding of intentional discrimination erroneously relied upon a foreseeability test, and that, even if such a test were applicable, the finding was based solely on statistical evidence of disparate impact and that such evidence is insufficient. </s> Respondents, in their turn, preliminarily assert that it is unnecessary to argue about the correctness of HEW's finding on the administrative record, and that it is also unnecessary to pursue the dictum of the Court of Appeals to the effect that Title VI condemns practices having a disparate racial impact, although no purposeful discrimination is shown. See 584 F.2d, at 589; but see Parent Assn. of Andrew Jackson High [444 U.S. 130, 140] School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 715-716 (CA2 1979). Respondents argue that there is no place here for equivocation: under 45 CFR 185.43 (b) (2) (1978), an agency is ineligible for funding if it has assigned full-time teachers to schools "in such a manner as to identify any of such schools as intended for students of a particular race, color, or national origin." This, it is said, is an objective criterion. Respondents note that the Board's only argument is that on the record no finding properly could be made that the assignment patterns resulted from intentional or purposeful discrimination, and thus, unless the constitutional standard applies, the Board effectively has conceded that the denial of funds was permissible. For the respondents, then, the sole issue is whether the Act authorizes the withholding of funds when the applicant's faculty assignments, although not shown to amount to purposeful racial discrimination violative of the Equal Protection Clause, are not justified by educational needs. </s> IV </s> Intent v. Impact. The denial of funds to the Board resulted from a violation of HEW's regulation, that is, teacher assignments that served to identify certain schools racially. This led to ineligibility irrespective of whether it was the product of purposeful discrimination. The controversy thus comes down to the question whether that interpretation by regulation is consistent with the governing statute. While perhaps it might be possible to theorize and to parse the language of 706 (d) (1) (B), as the Board so strongly urges, in such a way as to conclude that impact alone is sufficient for ineligibility with respect to "demotion or dismissal," but intent is necessary with respect to "assignment of employees," we conclude that the wording of the statute is ambiguous. This requires us to look closely at the structure and context of the statute and to review its legislative history. When we do this, we are impelled to a conclusion [444 U.S. 130, 141] adverse to the Board's position here. We hold that impact or effect governs both prongs of the ineligibility provision of 706 (d) (1) (B). The overall structure of the Act, Congress' statements of purpose and policy, the legislative history, and the text of 706 (d) (1) (B) all point in the direction of an impact test. </s> A reading of the Act in its entirety indisputably demonstrates that Congress was disturbed about minority segregation and isolation as such, de facto as well as de jure, and that, with respect to the former, it intended the limited funds it made available to serve as an enticement device to encourage voluntary elimination of that kind of segregation. The Board acknowledges that the Act was conceived in part to provide "a financial impetus to de facto segregated systems to voluntarily desegregate." Brief for Petitioners 22. </s> That it was effect, and not intent, that was dominant in the congressional mind when ESAA was enacted is apparent from the specific findings set forth in 702. Congress' concern was stated expressly to be about "minority group isolation and improving the quality of education for all children." The stated purpose of the legislation was the elimination of this isolation. The focus clearly is on actual effect, not on discriminatory intent. Furthermore, the pronouncement of federal policy, set forth in 703, speaks in terms of national uniformity with respect to "conditions of segregation by race" in the schools. All "guidelines and criteria," presumably including those governing ineligibility, must "be applied uniformly," and "without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation." This, too, looks to effect, not purpose. </s> There can be no disagreement about the underlying philosophy of the Act. At the time of ESAA's passage, it was generally believed that the courts, when implementing the Constitution, could not reach de facto segregation. See, e. g., 117 Cong. Rec. 11519 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Mondale). Congress, apparently, was not then in much of a mood to mandate a change in the status quo. The midground solution found [444 U.S. 130, 142] and adopted was the enticement approach "to encourage the voluntary elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation," as 702 (a) (2) of the Act recites. Thus, it would make no sense to allow a grant to a school district that, although not violating the Constitution, was maintaining a de facto segregated system. To treat as ineligible only an applicant with a past or a conscious present intent to perpetuate racial isolation would defeat the stated objective of ending de facto as well as de jure segregation. </s> Other provisions of the Act indicate that an effect test is the Act's rule, not its exception. Section 706 (d) (1) (A) disqualifies an agency that transfers property or makes services available to a private school or system without first determining ("knew or reasonably should have known") that the recipient does not discriminate. Here, plainly, ineligibility results from something other than invidious motive; the applicant is ineligible even when it is merely negligent in failing to discover the character of the recipient's operations. Similarly, 706 (d) (1) (C), which has to do with the assignment of children to particular classes within a school, provides for ineligibility whenever "any procedure . . . results in the separation of minority group from nonminority group children for a substantial portion of the school day." The only exception is where there is "bona fide ability grouping." These strike us as "effect," not "intent," provisions. 5 </s> Close analysis of 706 (d) (1) (B), the specific provision at issue, also convinces us that its focus is on impact, not intent. [444 U.S. 130, 143] The Board concedes, almost inescapably, that with respect to disproportionate demotion or dismissal of personnel, Congress imposed only an objective or disparate-impact test. Brief for Petitioners 25; Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6. We agree. Unless a solid reason for a distinction exists, one would expect that, for such closely connected statutory phrases, a similar standard was to apply to assignment of employees. The presence of the word "otherwise" in the second portion of 706 (d) (1) (B) ("or otherwise engaged in discrimination . . . in the . . . assignment of employees"), while perhaps not persuasive in itself alone, is not without significance. It lends weight to the argument that a disparate-impact standard also controls assignment practices. </s> We also find support for this interpretation in the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare concerning the Emergency School Aid and Quality Integrated Education Act of 1971, which was one of the proposed ESAA bills: </s> "This clause [the one that later became 706 (d) (1) (B) of ESAA] renders ineligible any local educational agency which discriminates in its employment practices, and specifically presumes one practice to be discriminatory: the disproportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel from minority groups in conjunction with desegregating its schools or establishing integrated schools." S. Rep. No. 92-61, p. 41 (1971). </s> The words "presumes one practice" are emphasized by the Board, however, and are claimed to indicate that the Senate Committee was making "a significant and conscious distinction between the language of the section which relates to `demotion or dismissal' and that which relates to `hiring, promotion or assignment.'" Brief for Petitioners 26. </s> If there is a distinction between the two phrases, however, it is not inconsistent with the general impact orientation of 706 (d) (1) (B). For the impact approach itself embraces at least two separate standards: a rebuttable disparate-impact [444 U.S. 130, 144] test and a stricter irrebuttable disproportionate-impact test. To the extent that the "demotion or dismissal" clause sets a higher standard for school boards to meet, it corresponds to the irrebuttable impact test. Indeed, another passage of the Senate Committee Report states: </s> "For the purposes of this bill, disproportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel is considered discriminatory and constitutes per se a violation of this provision, when it occurs in conjunction with desegregation, the establishment of an integrated school, or reducing, eliminating or preventing minority group isolation." S. Rep. No. 92-61, at 18-19. </s> The reference to a per se violation strongly suggests that there was to be no excuse for a significant disparity in treatment of the races with respect to demotions or dismissals, "when [the disparity] occurs in conjunction with desegregation, the establishment of an integrated school, or reducing, eliminating or preventing minority group isolation." (Emphasis added.) 6 In contrast, the rebuttable impact test governing hiring, promotion, and assignment, permits the school board to justify apparently disproportionate treatment. </s> Other aspects of the legislative history also are supportive of our interpretation. Not without relevance is the emergence of the so-called "Stennis Amendment," now 703 (a), that pronounced national policy. The concept of a nationally uniform standard was proposed by Senator Stennis of Mississippi in April 1971 in the debate on the proposed Emergency School Aid and Quality Integrated Education Act of 1971, S. 1557, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See 117 Cong. Rec. 11508-11520 (1971). Proponents of the Amendment argued that school districts in the South were being forced to desegregate in order to receive federal emergency assistance, while those elsewhere could continue to receive such assistance despite existing segregation [444 U.S. 130, 145] conditions. 7 Opponents were concerned that the proposed amendment might be read as cutting back on desegregation efforts in States that had segregated their schools by law. 8 The Stennis Amendment was adopted and was included in the final version of ESAA when it was enacted as Title VII of the Education Amendments of 1972. Senator Stennis summarized his proposal in the final debate. 9 </s> [444 U.S. 130, 146] </s> This history of 703 (a) indicates that the statute means exactly what it says: the same standard is to govern nationwide, and is to apply to de facto segregation as well as to de jure segregation. 10 It suggests ineligibility rules that focus [444 U.S. 130, 147] on actualities, not on history, on consequences, not on intent. 11 </s> The Board's reliance on a colloquy between Congressman Pucinski, ESAA's sponsor in the House, and Congressman Each does not persuade us otherwise. Mr. Each inquired whether "the Secretary [will] be authorized to apply the holding in the Singleton case [Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (CA5 1969), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290 (1970)] - which is that you have to have a perfect racial balance in the faculty in every single school in your district - as a condition or requirement for assistance under this program." Mr. Pucinski's response was: "The answer is absolutely not." 117 Cong. Rec. 39332 (1971). [444 U.S. 130, 148] </s> While it might be argued that this passing exchange intimates some limit on HEW's ability to require complete elimination of de facto segregation as a condition of ESAA eligibility, we do not regard the regulation at issue here as at all inconsistent with the colloquy, and we find no indication in the legislative history that any Member of Congress voted in favor of the amendment in reliance on an understanding that it would weaken the eligibility conditions. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 713 -7[BAD TEXT]6 (1979). HEW, by its regulation, does not require faculties to be in perfect racial balance. It prohibits only faculty assignments that make schools racially identifiable. That is a much narrower requirement. </s> Finally, there is some significance in the fact that Congress was aware of HEW's existing regulation when ESAA was reenacted in 1978. See n. 1, supra. The House version included a waiver-of-ineligibility provision to respond to complaints about the application of the regulation to Los Angeles and New York City. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-1137, pp. 95-96 (1978). 12 The waiver provision was dropped in the Conference Committee Report. See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1753, p. 286 (1978). It is of interest to note that the president of the American Federation of Teachers, as a witness, recommended to the Senate "that the ESAA be reformed to require a finding of discrimination, not simply a numerical imbalance, before ESAA funds can be cut off." Education Amendments of 1977, Hearings on S. 1753 before the Subcommittee [444 U.S. 130, 149] on Education, Arts and Humanities of the Senate Committee on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 1275 (1977) (emphasis added). No such change, however, was made. This strongly suggests that Congress acquiesced in HEW's interpretation of the statute. See Andrus v. Allard, ante, at 57. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974). </s> There is no force in the suggestion that a decision adverse to the Board here will serve to harm or penalize the very children who are the objects of the beneficial provisions of the Act. A ruling of ineligibility does not make the children who attend the New York City schools any worse off; it does serve to deny them benefits that in theory would make them better off. The funds competed for, however, are not wasted, for they are utilized, in any event, to benefit other similarly disadvantaged children. It is a matter of benefit, not of deprival, and it is a matter of selectivity. </s> For these several reasons, we readily conclude that the discrimination that disqualifies for funding under ESAA is not discrimination in the Fourteenth Amendment sense. Disproportionate impact in assignment of employees is sufficient to occasion ineligibility. Specific intent to discriminate is not an imperative. There thus is no need here for the Court to be concerned with the issue whether Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 incorporates the constitutional standard. See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Consideration of that issue would be necessary only if there were a positive indication either in Title VI or in ESAA that the two Acts were intended to be coextensive. The Board stresses the fact that a desegregation plan approved by HEW as sufficient under Title VI is expressly said to satisfy the eligibility requirements of 706 (a). The ineligibility provisions of 706 (d), however, contain additional requirements, and there is no indication that mere compliance with Title VI satisfies them. Nor does the fact that a violation [444 U.S. 130, 150] of Title VI makes a school system ineligible for ESAA funding mean that only a Title VI violation disqualifies. </s> It does make sense to us that Congress might impose a stricter standard under ESAA than under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A violation of Title VI may result in a cutoff of all federal funds, and it is likely that Congress would wish this drastic result only when the discrimination is intentional. In contrast, only ESAA funds are rendered unavailable when an ESAA violation is found. And since ESAA funds are available for the furtherance of a plan to combat de facto segregation, a cutoff to the system that maintains segregated faculties seems entirely appropriate. The Board's proffered distinction between funding and eligibility, that is, that a de jure segregated system was to be required to desegregate in order to receive assistance, but a de facto system was not, contravenes the basic thrust of ESAA. We are not persuaded by the suggestions to the contrary in Board of Education, Cincinnati v. HEW, 396 F. Supp. 203, 255 (SD Ohio 1975), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 532 F.2d 1070 (CA6 1976), and in Bradley v. Milliken, 432 F. Supp. 885, 886-887 (ED Mich. 1977). 13 </s> [444 U.S. 130, 151] </s> Proof of Impact. It is unnecessary to indulge in any detailed comment about the proof of impact in this case. The Court of Appeals did not discuss whether the statistical evidence flowing from the 1976 compliance investigation established a prima facie case. This apparently was because petitioners did not challenge the accuracy or sufficiency of respondents' data and statistics, but relied on justifications to explain the statistical disproportions in teacher assignments. </s> As we have indicated, the disparate-impact test in the second part of 706 (d) (1) (B) is rebuttable. We conclude, however, that the burden is on the party against whom the statistical case has been made. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 497 -498, and n. 19 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). That burden perhaps could be carried by proof of "educational necessity," analogous to the "business necessity" justification applied under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.; see, e. g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 581 -583 (1978) (dissenting opinion). </s> The Court of Appeals ruled that each of the justifications asserted by petitioners, which included compliance with requirements of state law and collective-bargaining agreements, teacher preferences, unequal distributions of licenses in certain areas, compliance with the provisions of the bilingual-instruction consent decree, and demographic changes in student population, either was insufficient as a matter of law or was not supported by evidence in the record. Petitioners did not contest these conclusions in their petition for a writ of certiorari or in their brief in this Court. Thus, we express no opinion on whether any of the justifications proffered by the Board would satisfy its burden. </s> V </s> In sum, we hold that discriminatory impact is the standard by which ineligibility under ESAA is to be measured, irrespective [444 U.S. 130, 152] of whether the discrimination relates to "demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel" or to "the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees"; that a prima facie case of discriminatory impact may be made by a proper statistical study and, in fact, was so made here; and that the burden of rebutting that case was on the Board. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Act was technically repealed and simultaneously re-enacted, with amendments not material here, by Title VI of the Education Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 95-561, 92 Stat. 2252, 2268, effective Sept. 30, 1979. The re-enactment is recodified as 20 U.S.C. 3191-3207 (1976 ed., Supp. II). Because they govern this case and have been used throughout the litigation, the statutory references herein are to the 1972 Act, as amended, and to the old Code sections. </s> [Footnote 2 A school district found to be ineligible may apply for a waiver of its ineligibility. 706 (d) (1), (2), and (3). The statute's waiver provision authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to permit funding of an otherwise ineligible applicant if the applicant specifies the reason for its ineligibility and submits "such information and assurances as the Secretary shall require by regulation in order to insure that any practice, policy, or procedure, or other activity resulting in the ineligibility has ceased to exist or occur and include[s] such provisions as are necessary to insure that such activities do not reoccur after the submission of the application." </s> The waiver provision is not involved in this case. In a subsequent proceeding provoked by the Secretary's denial of a waiver to petitioner Board for the fiscal year 1978-1979, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the decision of the District Court to remand the case to HEW for reconsideration. Board of Education of the City of New York v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599 (1979). See Brief for Petitioners 21, n. [*]; Brief for Respondents 2, n. 2. </s> [Footnote 3 "No application for assistance . . . shall be approved prior to a determination by the Secretary that the applicant is not ineligible by reason of this subsection." 706 (d) (4). </s> [Footnote 4 Although the litigation was instituted by petitioner Board (and its Chancellor) and by a number of Community School Districts, only the Board's request for funds remains contested. See Brief for Petitioners 8, n. [**]; Brief for Respondents 3, n. 3; Reply Brief for Petitioners 3, n. [*]. </s> [Footnote 5 There is a definite exception to this pattern in 706 (d) (1) (D). This is conceded by HEW. Brief for Respondents 16. In subsection (D) the statute speaks of any practice "such as limiting curricular or extra-curricular activities (or participation therein by children) in order to avoid the participation of minority group children in such activities." This, clearly, is language of intent and motive. But in this context a mere effect test would be out of place and mischievous, for it would automatically condemn every administrative decision not to offer a particular course or program, however benign or however dictated by budgetary exigencies. </s> [Footnote 6 The authors of the Report, of course, were aware of massive firings of black teachers in the South. S. Rep. No. 92-61, at 18. </s> [Footnote 7 "The Stennis amendment would provide that there be a national school policy applied equally to all States, localities, regions, and sections of the United States. The adoption of this amendment would help to eliminate the use of the `double standard,' which has resulted in the requirements for the integration of the public schools being given a very stringent application in the South and a very lenient application elsewhere. </s> . . . . . </s> "I have never been able to understand how a 10-year-old colored student in a public school in Harlem, Watts, or South Chicago, is expected to look around and see nothing but black faces in his classroom and say to himself: `This kind of racial separation does not hurt me because the State of Illinois does not have a law requiring me to attend all-black schools. I should not feel hurt by this racial separation because it is the result of housing patterns that just accidentally developed.'" 117 Cong. Rec. 11511-11512 (1971) (remarks of Sen. Eastland). </s> See also id., at 11508-11510 (remarks of Sen. Stennis). </s> [Footnote 8 "What worries me is this: It could be argued, if this became law, that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare could be told, `Do not seek a remedy against an instance where there is official discrimination unless you can also tell me how you can uniformly find the same kind of remedy available to eliminate segregation which does not have an official basis.' </s> "The way it reads, I believe that argument might be made. </s> . . . . . </s> "I fear this amendment could be construed as an endorsement of weakened enforcement throughout this Nation. The reason why I oppose it . . . is that I fear it will be read as a policy statement calling for a national policy of nonenforcement." Id., at 11517-11518 (remarks of Sen. Mondale). </s> See also id., at 11516-11517 (remarks of Sen. Javits). </s> [Footnote 9 "That is what the conferees have done and that language speaks for itself. For the first time, if this conference report is adopted and the bill [444 U.S. 130, 146] is signed into law, we will have a uniform national policy in school desegregation matters, North, South, East, and West applied uniformly without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation. That is the Stennis amendment, pure and simple." 118 Cong. Rec. 18844 (1972). </s> [Footnote 10 The dissent suggests that no support for an impact standard is provided by the Stennis Amendment, since that Amendment also applies to Title VI, and Title VI does not incorporate an impact test. The Stennis Amendment, as enacted, however, was broken into two subsections, with subsection 703 (a) applying to guidelines and criteria under ESAA, and subsection 703 (b) applying to guidelines and criteria under Title VI. The Conference Report on this section explained the distinction: </s> "The House amendment stated the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to this title shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States in dealing with conditions of segregation by race in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation. The Senate amendment stated the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act . . . and this title shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States in dealing with conditions of segregation by race whether de jure or de facto in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation. The conference substitute retains both the Senate and House provisions but deletes the reference in the Senate amendment to this title. The conference substitute's version of the Senate provision, therefore, restates the policy contained in section 2 (a) of Pub. L. 91-230 and in no way supersedes subsection (b) of such section." S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-798, pp. 212-213 (1972). (Emphasis added.) </s> It is clear from this explanation that the House version became 703 (a), and the Senate version became 703 (b). The explanation that the conference version of the Senate provision does not supersede 2 (b) of Pub. L. 91-230 is critical. Section 2 of Pub. L. 91-230, 84 Stat. 121, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-6, provides in relevant part: </s> "(a) It is the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . dealing with conditions of segregation by race, whether de jure or de facto, in [444 U.S. 130, 147] the schools of the local educational agencies of any State shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States whatever the origin or cause of such segregation. </s> "(b) Such uniformity refers to one policy applied uniformly to de jure segregation wherever found and such other policy as may be provided pursuant to law applied uniformly to de facto segregation wherever found." (Emphasis added.) </s> Thus, the version of the Stennis Amendment which applies under Title VI, as explained by 2 (b) of Pub. L 91-230, is significantly different from the ESAA version of the Stennis Amendment. In view of this difference, it is not at all "wholly incongruous to hold in this case that the Stennis Amendment supports a mere `disparate impact' reading of the term `discrimination' in 706 (d) (1) (B) of ESAA, when only two Terms ago five Members of the Court construed the prohibition against `discrimination' in federally funded programs under Title VI, which is equally subject to the Stennis Amendment, to incorporate a purposeful-discrimination test," as the dissent asserts, post, at 160. Programs funded under Title VI are not "equally" subject to the Stennis Amendment; they are subject to a different version of the Stennis Amendment. </s> [Footnote 11 Petitioner Board acknowledges that for funding purposes, the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation was "erased" in ESAA. Brief for Petitioners 23, 32. But it would tie this erasure only to the eligibility standards of 706 (a) (1) (court-ordered, HEW-approved, or voluntary plan of desegregation) and not to the ineligibility criteria of 706 (d). </s> We do not so limit or circumscribe the statute. Section 703 (a) applies to all "guidelines and criteria." </s> [Footnote 12 "In an attempt to deal with this problem, the Committee bill adopts an amendment making clear that school districts which are undertaking efforts to integrate their faculty but which have not yet fully achieved that goal may nonetheless obtain a waiver of ineligibility. Presently, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is interpreting the law as requiring school districts to complete faculty integration before they can apply for funds. The purpose of this amendment is to assist those school districts while they are trying to achieve that goal." </s> [Footnote 13 We find the reasoning of the District Court in Robinson v. Vollert, 411 F. Supp. 461, 472-475 (SD Tex. 1976), rev'd, 602 F.2d 87 (CA5 1979), upon which the Board also relies, clearly distinguishable. This case concerned an attempt by HEW to impose conditions upon the receipt of ESAA funds different from those imposed by a court overseeing court-ordered desegregation. A court-ordered plan is deemed sufficient under Title VI. Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments of 1967, 112, 81 Stat. 787, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-5. The court in Vollert reasoned that a court-ordered plan also should be deemed in compliance with ESAA. While we do not pass upon the issue, it may be that what constitutes acceptable integration is the same under both Title VI and ESAA, and that HEW may not require a remedy different from that imposed by a court. Even so, that would not mean that what constitutes discrimination is the same under both statutes. ESAA was an attempt by Congress to bring about the same remedy without regard to the cause of the problem, while Title VI may have been intended to remedy the problem only when its cause was intentional discrimination. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. </s> The Court holds that the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 (ESAA) 1 renders ineligible for ESAA funding any school district whose faculty assignment policies have resulted in racial disparities, even in the total absence of any evidence of intentional racial discrimination. I disagree. It is my view that a school district is ineligible to receive ESAA funds only if it has acted with a racially discriminatory motive or intent in its faculty assignment policies. </s> I </s> The controversy in this case turns on the proper construction of 706 (d) (1) (B) of ESAA, which provides: </s> "No educational agency shall be eligible for assistance under this chapter if it has, after June 23, 1972 - </s> . . . . . </s> "(B) had in effect any practice, policy, or procedure which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismissal [444 U.S. 130, 153] of instructional or other personnel from minority groups in conjunction with desegregation or the implementation of any plan or the conduct of any activity described in this section, or otherwise engaged in discrimination based upon race, color, or national origin in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees of the agency. . . ." (Emphasis added.) </s> Since the only discriminatory activity alleged in this case involves the assignment of teachers, the inquiry must focus on the second (italicized) clause of 706 (d) (1) (B) The precise question is what Congress intended when it used the phrase "or otherwise engaged in discrimination." </s> In deciding that question, the starting point is the language of the statute itself. See, e. g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405 . That language, as the positions of the parties to this suit confirm, may be read in two different ways. The first, that urged by the respondents and endorsed by the Court, is that the ineligibility standard under the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B), like that under the first clause, turns solely on a finding of disparate racial impact. This reading is supported by the argument that the second clause, which renders ineligible for ESAA funding any school district "engaged in discrimination . . . in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of employees" is linked by the word "otherwise" to the first clause, which unambiguously contains a disparate-impact standard. The argument thus is based on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, construing the word "otherwise" to mean "in a similar manner" or "similarly." The second way to read the statute, that urged by the petitioners, is to find different ineligibility standards in the two clauses of 706 (d) (1) (B) - disparate impact alone under the first clause, and discriminatory motive or intent under the second. This reading of the statute is supported by the fact that although the first clause of 706 (d) (1) (B) is explicitly written in terms of disproportionate [444 U.S. 130, 154] impact, the second clause is framed in terms that, as the Court today perceives, "possess an overtone of intent." 2 Ante, at 139. Since the meaning of 706 (d) (1) (B) is thus concededly ambiguous, it is necessary to look beyond the statutory words in order to ascertain their meaning. </s> II </s> That inquiry may appropriately focus on whether the intent of Congress can be determined from a consideration of the legislative history of 706 (d) (1) (B) itself, or of other provisions of ESAA. 3 </s> [444 U.S. 130, 155] </s> A </s> The legislative history of the specific provision in issue reveals that the language that ultimately was enacted in 706 (d) (1) (B) first appeared in S. 1557, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., a bill reported out of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare in 1971. In explaining the language at issue here, the Committee noted: </s> "The phrase `disproportionate demotion or dismissal of instructional or other personnel from minority groups' is not modified or in any way diminished by the subsequent phrase `or otherwise engaged in discrimination based upon race, color or national origin,' which renders ineligible local educational agencies which have engaged in other discrimination, including discrimination in hiring, against minority group employees." S. Rep. No. 92-61, p. 19 (1971) (emphasis added). </s> It is thus apparent that the Senate Committee that drafted the language now appearing in 706 (d) (1) (B) not only recognized a distinction between the ineligibility standards under the first and second clauses, but also regarded the standard of ineligibility under the first clause as more burdensome to the applicant than the standard under the second. </s> The purpose of this differentiation is also made clear in the legislative history. Congress singled out staff demotions and dismissals as appropriate for a disparate-impact standard because it was well documented that desegregation activities had in some States resulted in the wholesale firing of Negro faculty members: "HEW statistics indicate that between 1968 [444 U.S. 130, 156] and 1970, in the States within the Fifth Judicial Circuit alone, the number of black teachers was reduced by 1,072, while the number of white teachers increased by 5,575." S. Rep. No. 92-61, supra, at 18. These statistics so disturbed Congress that it adopted a per se rule of ineligibility for disproportionate demotions or dismissals of Negro faculty members in conjunction with desegregation activities, even at the cost of withholding ESAA funds from school districts that had in no way intentionally discriminated against Negro faculty members. </s> The legislative history of 706 (d) (1) (B) thus strongly suggests that the petitioners have advanced the proper interpretation of the statute. This reading of 706 (d) (1) (B), under which the first clause is governed by disparate impact and the second by motive or intent, is consistent with the fact that Congress not only recognized a distinction between the ineligibility standards under the first and second clauses, but also regarded the standard of ineligibility under the first clause as more burdensome to the applicant than the standard under the second. </s> Apparently recognizing that the legislative history cannot support a reading of 706 (d) (1) (B) that gives the same meaning to the ineligibility standards under its first and second clauses, the Court observes: </s> "If there is a distinction between the two phrases, however, it is not inconsistent with the general impact orientation of 706 (d) (1) (B). For the impact approach itself embraces at least two separate standards: a rebuttable disparate-impact test and a stricter irrebuttable disproportionate-impact test. To the extent that the `demotion or dismissal' clause sets a higher standard for school boards to meet, it corresponds to the irrebuttable impact test." Ante, at 143-144. </s> To draw this distinction between the two clauses is, however, totally at odds with the Court's earlier endorsement of [444 U.S. 130, 157] the respondents' reading of the language of the provision. That reading depends wholly on the proposition that inasmuch as the first clause describes disparate impact, the presence of the word "otherwise" in the second clause "lends weight to the argument that a disparate-impact standard [is] also [the standard of ineligibility under the second clause]." Ante, at 143. It should follow that the standard contained in both clauses is the same - that the second clause incorporates the irrebuttable disparate-impact standard embodied in the first. The Court's contrary suggestion that an irrebuttable standard is contained in the first clause, but only a rebuttable standard in the second, is nowhere in the Court's opinion squared with the Court's express agreement with the respondents' reading of the language of 706 (d) (1) (B). 4 </s> [444 U.S. 130, 158] </s> The fact of the matter is that the legislative history simply belies the respondents' reading of the statutory language. That history strongly supports the conclusion that, while the first clause of 706 (d) (1) (B) incorporates a disparate-impact standard, the second clause makes ineligibility depend upon discriminatory motive or intent. </s> B </s> The other provisions of ESAA, and particularly the so-called Stennis Amendment, do not, it seems to me, support the weight the Court places upon them. 5 </s> [444 U.S. 130, 159] </s> The Stennis Amendment, enacted as 703 of ESAA, 86 Stat. 354, provides: </s> "(a) It is the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to [ESAA] shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States in dealing with conditions of segregation by race in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation. </s> "(b) It is the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States in dealing with conditions of segregation by race whether de jure or de facto in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State without regard to the origin or cause of such segregation." </s> The Court concludes that the Stennis Amendment and its legislative history "indicat[e] that the statute means exactly what it says: the same standard is to govern nationwide, and is to apply to de facto segregation as well as to de jure segregation. It suggests ineligibility rules that focus on actualities, not on history, on consequences, not on intent." Ante, at 146-147 (footnotes omitted). </s> My difficulty with this reasoning stems from the fact that the Stennis Amendment is applicable not only to ESAA, but also to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the latter has been construed to contain not a mere disparate-impact [444 U.S. 130, 160] standard, but a standard of intentional discrimination. In University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 , five Members of the Court concluded that Title VI, which prohibits discrimination in federally funded programs, prohibits only discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth. Id., at 281-287 (POWELL, J.); id., at 328-355 (BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.). Those constitutional provisions, in turn, have been construed to reach only purposeful discrimination. Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 ; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 ; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 ; Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 . It thus follows from Bakke that Title VI prohibits only purposeful discrimination. </s> It is wholly incongruous to hold in this case that the Stennis Amendment supports a mere "disparate impact" reading of the term "discrimination" in 706 (d) (1) (B) of ESAA, when only two Terms ago five Members of the Court construed the prohibition against "discrimination" in federally funded programs under Title VI, which is equally subject to the Stennis Amendment, to incorporate a purposeful-discrimination test. If Congress in fact intended the Stennis Amendment to establish a uniform national standard prohibiting action leading to disparate racial impact, then it is difficult to understand why this standard should not govern Title VI as well as 706 (d) (1) (B). 6 </s> [444 U.S. 130, 161] </s> III </s> The conclusion that ineligibility under the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B) depends upon a showing of a school district's purposeful discrimination is persuasively supported by the interpretations that have been given to analogous provisions of Title VI and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. When Congress enacted ESAA in 1972, it was not writing on a clean slate. To the contrary, when Congress left undefined the term "discrimination" in the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B), it had already enacted both Title VI of the 1964 Act, which provides that "[n]o person . . . shall . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," 7 and 703 (a) (1) of Title VII of that Act, which provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 8 These provisions are, in the absence of any explicit definition of "discrimination" in ESAA or its legislative history, a useful guide in determining what Congress intended when it concluded that school districts "engaged in discrimination" should be ineligible to receive ESAA funds. [444 U.S. 130, 162] </s> Title VI and 703 (a) (1) of Title VII point clearly toward the necessity of finding discriminatory motive or intent in order to hold a school district ineligible under the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B). 9 Title VI, as already pointed out, has been construed to prohibit only discrimination violative of the Fifth Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth, University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S., at 281 -287 (POWELL, J.); id., at 328-355 (BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ.); and, in turn, those constitutional provisions have been construed to prohibit only purposeful discrimination, Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, supra; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., supra; Washington v. Davis, supra; Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver Colo., supra. And, in construing 703 (a) (1) of Title VII, which, at its core, prohibits an employer from "treat[ing] some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 , n. 15, we have held that "[p]roof of discriminatory motive is critical," ibid. Accord, Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579 -580; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 , n. 18. 10 </s> [444 U.S. 130, 163] </s> If the term "discrimination" in 706 (d) (1) (B) was in fact intended to mean something other than what it means under Title VI and 703 (a) (1) of Title VII, Congress could have been expected to state the difference in explicit terms. Since there is no such expression of congressional intent, it follows that the meaning of the term "discrimination" under 706 (d) (1) (B) should be no different from its established meaning under Title VI and 703 (a) (1) of Title VII. 11 </s> For all these reasons, I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 20 U.S.C. 1601-1619. In 1978, Congress re-enacted ESAA with amendments not material here and recodified the statute at 20 U.S.C. 3191-3207 (1976 ed., Supp. II). See Education Amendments of 1978, Title VI, 92 Stat. 2252, 2268. The provision at issue here, former 706 (d) (1) (B), is now codified at 20 U.S.C. 3196 (c) (1) (B) (1976 ed., Supp. II). In the interest of consistency with the Court's opinion, all statutory references herein are to the original statutory and Code provisions. </s> [Footnote 2 The petitioners also argue that the doctrine of ejusdem generis is not appropriately applied in this context inasmuch as the word "otherwise" is not preceded by an enumeration of a number of types of conduct, but rather by a single type of highly particularized conduct. See 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction 47.17 (4th ed. 1973). In this context, the petitioners argue that the word "otherwise" conveys a sense not of similarity, but of contrast: the section first describes, without regard to motive or intent, disproportionate demotions or dismissals; then, in apparent contrast to the first type of conduct, it describes "discrimination" in the hiring, promotion, or assignment of staff. </s> [Footnote 3 The respondents also rely on the "general scheme" of ESAA for its reading of the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B) as incorporating no more than a disparate-impact ineligibility standard. This reliance is misplaced. Although one of the concerns of Congress in enacting ESAA was to eliminate minority isolation regardless of its cause, Congress also had in mind other important objectives in enacting the legislation. One such objective was to meet the special educational needs of minority group children from environments in which the dominant language is other than English. See S. Rep. No. 92-61, pp. 22-24 (1971). To attain this objective, Congress earmarked certain ESAA funds for programs to assist these children in developing linguistic skills in both English and the language they speak at home. 708 (c) of ESAA, 20 U.S.C. 1607 (c). </s> The respondents' construction of 706 (d) (1) (B), if literally applied, could wholly frustrate this congressional purpose by making ineligible for ESAA funds those school districts whose faculty assignment policies have caused racial disparaties resulting from bona fide efforts to meet the special educational needs of non-English-speaking children. In a situation where, for example, a school district is making special efforts to provide bilingual instruction to Spanish-speaking children, it would be hardly [444 U.S. 130, 155] surprising to find a disproportionate number of Hispanic teachers assigned to schools serving Hispanic students. Yet, if the disparate-impact test were literally applied, this bona fide attempt to advance the goals of ESAA would render the school district ineligible for further ESAA funding. It can hardly be said, therefore, that the overall purposes of ESAA unerringly point to the respondents' reading of the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B). </s> [Footnote 4 Yet another problem with the Court's conclusion that the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B) creates a rebuttable disparate-impact standard is the fact that the Court never explains its later suggestion that an applicant may rebut a prima facie showing of discrimination only by proof of error in the statistics or by an "`educational necessity' [showing], analogous to the `business necessity' justification applied under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." Ante, at 151. </s> By referring to the "business necessity" justification under Title VII, the Court apparently is construing the term "discrimination" in 706 (d) (1) (B) by reference to those cases under Title VII which have not required a showing of discriminatory intent on the part of the employer, e. g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 . Under the doctrine of those cases, a Title VII violation may be found if the plaintiff demonstrates that an employment practice has a disparate racial impact and the employer is then unable to justify the practice on the grounds of "business necessity." Id., at 431-432. By analogy to this type of employment discrimination, the Court apparently concludes that the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B) renders ineligible any school district whose faculty assignment policies have a disparate racial impact not justified by educational needs. </s> It is my view, however, that this category of Title VII cases has no bearing on the meaning of the term "discrimination" in the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B). Our cases make clear that the theory of "disparate impact" under Title VII is a gloss on the specific statutory language of 703 (a) (2) and 703 (h) of Title VII, see General Electric Co. v. [444 U.S. 130, 158] Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 137 ; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 , n. 21; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra, at 426, n. 1. Under 703 (a) (2), it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (a) (2). </s> Section 703 (h) provides that it is not unlawful for an employer "to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 (h). </s> The language of these provisions quite plainly does not track that in 706 (d) (1) (B), for 703 (a) (2) fails even to include the term "discrimination," and while the term does appear in 703 (h), it is expressly modified - "used to discriminate" - in such a manner as to incorporate a disparate-impact test. Since the language of 703 (a) (2) and 703 (h) of Title VII in no way resembles that at issue here, those provisions are obviously not an appropriate guide to the definition of "discrimination" under 706 (d) (1) (B). </s> If there is an appropriate analogy to Title VII, it is a quite different one. See Part III of this opinion. </s> [Footnote 5 The Court also finds support for its reading of 706 (d) (1) (B) in the fact that at least two of the three other ineligibility provisions in 706 (d) (1) do not require a showing of intent. Accordingly, the Court notes that "an effect test is the Act's rule, not its exception." Ante, at 142. </s> Even putting aside doubts as to the validity of the premise of this [444 U.S. 130, 159] argument (namely, that a statutory provision should be construed in accordance with the majority of arguably related provisions), the Court's tally of these other provisions is extremely questionable. In short, it seems clear that the ineligibility standard of 706 (d) (1) (A) does not, as the Court suggests, amount to an "effect" test. That provision by its own terms rather plainly requires at least a showing of negligence before a school district is rendered ineligible for ESAA funding. </s> [Footnote 6 In response, the Court argues that Congress enacted two different versions of the Stennis Amendment. Ante, at 146-147, n. 10. This argument is premised on the fact that the Conference Report indicated that 703 (b), the section of the Stennis Amendment applicable to Title VI, was intended to restate and not to supersede a provision in Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d-6, which provides: </s> "(a) It is the policy of the United States that guidelines and criteria established pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . [444 U.S. 130, 161] dealing with conditions of segregation by race, whether de jure or de facto, in the schools of the local educational agencies of any State shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States whatever the origin or cause of such segregation. </s> "(b) Such uniformity refers to one policy applied uniformly to de jure segregation wherever found and such other policy as may be provided pursuant to law applied uniformly to de facto segregation wherever found." (Emphasis added.) </s> The flaw in this argument is that the Conference Committee in no way indicated, as the Court seems to suggest, that 703 (a), the section of the Stennis Amendment applicable to ESAA, was to be construed any differently than 703 (b). </s> [Footnote 7 42 U.S.C. 2000d (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 8 [444 U.S. 130, 161] U.S.C. 2000e-2 (a) (1) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 9 There may be a difference between the standard of Title VI and that of 703 (a) (1) of Title VII. But it is clear that a finding of discrimination under either provision ultimately depends upon a finding of either discriminatory motive or discriminatory intent. </s> [Footnote 10 Because direct proof of an illicit motive is often unavailable, the cases under 703 (a) (1) have established a procedural mechanism under which an employer, once an employee has adduced sufficient evidence to give rise to an inference of a discriminatory motive, must bear the burden of establishing that he acted for "a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason." If the employer meets that burden, then the employee must show that the proffered explanation is in fact a pretext. Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S., at 575 -577; Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S., at 357 -360; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S., at 800 -805. This procedural mechanism is simply designed to provide a means of inferring an employer's motive in the absence of direct evidence. See Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, supra. </s> [Footnote 11 The Court finds support for its interpretation of 706 (d) (1) (B) in the fact that Congress, though aware that HEW had construed the section to incorporate a disparate-impact test, re-enacted it without change in 1978. Ante, at 148-149. This inaction by Congress, in the Court's view, "strongly suggests that Congress acquiesced in HEW's interpretation of the statute." Ante, at 149. </s> This argument might have force if the Court today construed 706 (d) (1) (B) the way HEW interpreted it in 1978. But the Court has not done so. The HEW regulation implementing 706 (d) (1) (B) provides, as it did in 1978, that: </s> "No educational agency shall be eligible for assistance under the Act if, after June 23, 1972, it has had or maintained in effect any other practice, policy, or procedure which results in discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin in the recruiting, hiring, promotion, payment, demotion, dismissal, or assignment of any of its employees . . ., including the assignment of full-time classroom teachers to the schools of such agency in such a manner as to identify any of such schools as intended for students of a particular race, color, or national origin." 45 CFR 185.43 (b) (2). </s> By lumping together "demotions and dismissals," on the one hand, with employee "assignments," on the other, the HEW regulation rather clearly equates the ineligibility standard of the second clause of 706 (d) (1) (B) with the irrebuttable disparate-impact standard of the first clause. By contrast, the Court says that the ineligibility standards under the two clauses substantially differ. Ante, at 143-144. Since the Court departs from HEW's 1978 interpretation of 706 (d) (1) (B), it is hard to see how the failure of Congress to overturn that interpretation lends support to the Court's different construction of the section in its opinion today. </s> [444 U.S. 130, 164]

United States Supreme Court LAKE COUNTRY ESTATES v. TAHOE PLANNING AGCY.(1979) No. 77-1327 Argued: December 4, 1978Decided: March 5, 1979 </s> California and Nevada entered into a Compact, later consented to by Congress, to create respondent Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) to coordinate and regulate development in the Lake Tahoe Basin resort area and to conserve its natural resources. The Compact authorized TRPA to adopt and enforce a regional plan for land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, and public services. Petitioners, Basin property owners, brought suit in Federal District Court alleging that TRPA and its individual members and executive officer (also respondents) had adopted a land-use ordinance that destroyed the value of petitioners' property in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and seeking monetary and equitable relief. To support their federal claim, petitioners asserted, inter alia, that respondents had acted under color of state law and that therefore their cause of action was authorized by 42 U.S.C. 1983, and jurisdiction was provided by 28 U.S.C. 1343. The District Court dismissed the complaint, holding that although a cause of action for "inverse condemnation" was sufficiently alleged, the action could not be maintained against TRPA because it had no authority to condemn property and that the individual respondents were immune from liability. The Court of Appeals, while reinstating the complaint against the individual respondents on other grounds, rejected petitioners' claims based on 1983 and 1343, holding that congressional approval had transformed the Compact into federal law with the result that respondents had acted pursuant to federal authority rather than under color of state law. The court further held that TRPA was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that with respect to the individual respondents they should be absolutely immune for conduct of a legislative character and qualifiedly immune for executive action. Held: </s> 1. Petitioners stated a cause of action under 1983 and hence properly invoked federal jurisdiction under 1343. The requirement of federal approval of the Compact did not foreclose a finding that respondents' conduct was "under color of state law" within the meaning of 1983. The facts with respect to TRPA's operation - such as that its implementation depended upon the appointment of members by [440 U.S. 391, 392] both States and their subdivisions and upon financing by counties; that the appointees, in discharging their duties as TRPA officials, also serve the interests of the appointing units; that federal involvement is limited to the appointment of one nonvoting member; and that each State has an absolute right to withdraw from the Compact - adequately characterize respondents' alleged actions as "under color of state law." Pp. 398-400. </s> 2. TRPA is not immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment. The States' intention in creating TRPA, the terms of the Compact, and TRPA's actual operation make clear that nothing short of an absolute rule would allow TRPA to claim sovereign immunity, and because the Eleventh Amendment prescribes no such rule, TRPA is subject to "the judicial power of the United States" within the meaning of that Amendment. Pp. 400-402. </s> 3. To the extent that the evidence discloses that the individual respondents were acting in a legislative capacity, they are entitled to absolute immunity from federal damages liability. "Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 , and this reasoning is equally applicable to federal, state, and regional legislators. Whatever potential damages liability regional legislators may face as a matter of state law, petitioners' federal claims do not encompass the recovery of damages from TRPA members acting in a legislative capacity. Pp. 402-406. </s> 566 F.2d 1353, reversed in part and affirmed in part. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, and in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined in part. BRENNAN, J., post, p. 406, and MARSHALL, J., post, p. 406, filed opinions dissenting in part. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in Part I of which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 408. </s> John J. Bartko argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Gary H. Moore, James B. Lewis, John S. Burd, and Joseph M. Lynn. </s> Kenneth C. Rollston argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents Tahoe Regional Planning Agency et al. E. Clement Shute, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of California. With him on the brief were Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, and Leonard M. [440 U.S. 391, 393] Sperry, Jr., Deputy Attorney General. Robert Frank List, Attorney General, and James H. Thompson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for respondent State of Nevada. Reginald Littrell filed a brief for respondents Henry et al. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari to decide whether the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, an entity created by Compact between California and Nevada, is entitled to the immunity that the Eleventh Amendment provides to the compacting States themselves. 1 </s> 436 U.S. 943 . The case also presents the question whether the individual members of the Agency's governing body are entitled to absolute immunity from federal damages claims when acting in a legislative capacity. </s> Lake Tahoe, a unique mountain lake, is located partly in California and partly in Nevada. The Lake Tahoe Basin, an area comprising 500 square miles, is a popular resort area that has grown rapidly in recent years. 2 </s> [440 U.S. 391, 394] </s> In 1968, the States of California and Nevada agreed to create a single agency to coordinate and regulate development in the Basin and to conserve its natural resources. As required by the Constitution, 3 in 1969 Congress gave its consent to the Compact, and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) was organized. 4 The Compact authorized TRPA to adopt and to enforce a regional plan for land use, transportation, conservation, recreation, and public services. 5 </s> Petitioners own property in the Lake Tahoe Basin. In 1973, they filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California alleging that TRPA, the individual members of its governing body, and its executive officer had adopted a land-use ordinance and general plan, and engaged in other conduct, that destroyed the economic value of petitioners' property. 6 Petitioners alleged that respondents had thereby taken their property without due process of law and without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. They sought monetary and equitable relief. </s> Petitioners advanced alternative theories to support their [440 U.S. 391, 395] federal claim. First, they asserted that the alleged violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments gave rise to an implied cause of action, comparable to the claim based on an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , and that jurisdiction could be predicated on 28 U.S.C. 1331. 7 Second, they claimed that respondents had acted under color of state law and therefore their cause of action was authorized by 42 U.S.C. 1983 8 and jurisdiction was provided by 28 U.S.C. 1343. 9 </s> The District Court dismissed the complaint. Although it concluded that the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of [440 U.S. 391, 396] action for "inverse condemnation," 10 it held that such an action could not be brought against TRPA because that agency did not have the authority to condemn property. The court also held that the individual defendants were immune from liability for the exercise of the discretionary functions alleged in the complaint. </s> On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of TRPA, but reinstated the complaint against the individual respondents. 566 F.2d 1353. Addressing first the questions of cause of action and jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals rejected petitioners' claims based on 1983 and 1343. The court held that congressional approval had transformed the Compact between the States into federal law. As a result, the respondents were acting pursuant to federal authority, rather than under color of state law, and 1983 and 1343 could not be invoked to provide a cause of action and federal jurisdiction. But the court accepted petitioners' alternative argument: It held that they had alleged a deprivation of due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, that an implied remedy comparable to that upheld in Bivens, supra, was available, and that federal jurisdiction was provided by 1331. </s> Having found a cause of action and a basis for federal jurisdiction, the court turned to the immunity questions. Although the point had not been argued, the Court of Appeals decided that the Eleventh Amendment immunized TRPA from suit in a federal court. With respect to the individual respondents, the Court of Appeals held that absolute immunity should be afforded for conduct of a legislative character and qualified immunity for executive action. Since the record did not adequately disclose whether the challenged conduct was legislative or executive, the court remanded for a hearing. </s> Petitioners ask this Court to hold that TRPA is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and that the individual [440 U.S. 391, 397] respondents are not entitled to absolute immunity when acting in a legislative capacity. Because none of the respondents filed a cross-petition for certiorari, we have no occasion to review the Court of Appeals' additional holding that a violation of the Due Process Clause was adequately alleged. 11 For purposes of our decision, we assume the sufficiency of those allegations. [440 U.S. 391, 398] </s> I </s> Before addressing the immunity issues, we must consider whether petitioners properly invoked the jurisdiction of a federal court. While respondents did not cross petition for certiorari, they now argue that the Bivens rationale does not apply to a claim based on the deprivation of property rather than liberty, and therefore the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional analysis was defective. </s> We do not normally address any issues other than those fairly comprised within the questions presented by the petition for certiorari and any cross-petitions. An exception to this rule is the question of jurisdiction: even if not raised by the parties, we cannot ignore the absence of federal jurisdiction. In this case, however, respondents' attack on the Court of Appeals' Bivens holding fails to support dismissal for want of jurisdiction for two reasons. </s> First, respondents' "jurisdictional" arguments are not squarely directed at jurisdiction itself, but rather at the existence of a remedy for the alleged violation of their federal rights. Faced with a similar claim in Mt. Healthy Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 , we found that the cause-of-action argument was "not of the jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own motion." Id., at 279. Since the petitioners in Mt. Healthy had "failed to preserve the issue whether the complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted," id., at 281, the Court simply assumed, without deciding, that the suit could properly be brought. </s> Second, even if the lack of a cause of action were considered a jurisdictional defect in a suit brought under 1331, 12 we may not dismiss for that reason if the record discloses that federal jurisdiction does in fact exist. In this case, we need not even reach the Bivens question to conclude that there is both a cause of action and federal jurisdiction. [440 U.S. 391, 399] </s> Section 1983 provides a remedy for individuals alleging deprivations of their constitutional rights by action taken "under color of state law." The Court of Appeals incorrectly assumed that the requirement of federal approval of the interstate Compact foreclosed the possibility that the conduct of TRPA and its officers could be found to be "under color of state law" within the meaning of 1983. 13 </s> The Compact had its genesis in the actions of the compacting States, and it remains part of the statutory law of both States. 14 The actual implementation of TRPA, after federal approval was obtained, depended upon the appointment of governing members and executives by the two States and their subdivisions and upon mandatory financing secured, by the terms of the Compact, from the counties. 15 In discharging their duties as officials of TRPA, the state and county appointees necessarily have also served the interests of the political units that appointed them. The federal involvement, by contrast, is limited to the appointment of one non-voting member to the governing board. 16 While congressional consent to the original Compact was required, the States may confer additional powers and duties on TRPA without further congressional action. And each State retains an absolute right to withdraw from the Compact. </s> Even if it were not well settled that 1983 must be given [440 U.S. 391, 400] a liberal construction, 17 these facts adequately characterize the alleged actions of the respondents as "under color of state law" within the meaning of that statute. Federal jurisdiction therefore rests on 1343, and there is no need to address the question whether there is an implied remedy for violation of the Fifth or the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> II </s> The Court of Appeals held that California and Nevada had delegated authority ordinarily residing in each of those States to TRPA. Because "the bi-state Authority serves as an agency of the participant states, exercising a specially aggregated slice of state power," the court concluded "that the TRPA is protected by sovereign immunity, preserved for the states by the Eleventh Amendment." 566 F.2d, at 1359-1360. </s> The reasoning of the Court of Appeals would extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to every bistate agency unless that immunity were expressly waived. TRPA argues that the propriety of this result is evidenced by the special constitutional requirement of congressional approval of any interstate compact. Any agency that is so important that it could not even be created by the States without a special Act of Congress should receive the same immunity that is accorded to the States themselves. </s> We cannot accept such an expansive reading of the Eleventh Amendment. By its terms, the protection afforded by that Amendment is only available to "one of the United States." It is true, of course, that some agencies exercising [440 U.S. 391, 401] state power have been permitted to invoke the Amendment in order to protect the state treasury from liability that would have had essentially the same practical consequences as a judgment against the State itself. 18 But the Court has consistently refused to construe the Amendment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and municipalities, even though such entities exercise a "slice of state power." 19 </s> If an interstate compact discloses that the compacting States created an agency comparable to a county or municipality, which has no Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Amendment should not be construed to immunize such an entity. Unless there is good reason to believe that the States structured the new agency to enable it to enjoy the special constitutional protection of the States themselves, and that Congress concurred in that purpose, there would appear to be no justification for reading additional meaning into the limited language of the Amendment. </s> California and Nevada have both filed briefs in this Court disclaiming any intent to confer immunity on TRPA. They point to provisions of their Compact that indicate that TRPA is to be regarded as a political subdivision rather than an arm of the State. Thus TRPA is described in Art. III (a) as a "separate legal entity" and in Art. VI (a) as a "political subdivision." Under the terms of the Compact, 6 of the 10 governing members of TRPA are appointed by counties and cities, and only 4 by the 2 States. 20 Funding under the [440 U.S. 391, 402] Compact must be provided by the counties, not the States. 21 Finally, instead of the state treasury being directly responsible for judgments against TRPA, Art. VII (f) expressly provides that obligations of TRPA shall not be binding on either State. </s> The regulation of land use is traditionally a function performed by local governments. Concern with the proper performance of that function in the bistate area was a primary motivation for the creation of TRPA itself, and gave rise to the specific controversy at issue in this litigation. Moreover, while TRPA, like cities, towns, and counties, was originally created by the States, its authority to make rules within its jurisdiction is not subject to veto at the state level. Indeed, that TRPA is not in fact an arm of the State subject to its control is perhaps most forcefully demonstrated by the fact that California has resorted to litigation in an unsuccessful attempt to impose its will on TRPA. 22 </s> The intentions of Nevada and California, the terms of the Compact, and the actual operation of TRPA make clear that nothing short of an absolute rule, such as that implicit in the holding of the Court of Appeals, would allow TRPA to claim the sovereign immunity provided by the Constitution to Nevada and California. Because the Eleventh Amendment prescribes no such rule, we hold that TRPA is subject to "the judicial power of the United States" within the meaning of that Amendment. 23 </s> III </s> We turn, finally, to petitioners' challenge to the Court of Appeals' holding that the individual respondents are absolutely [440 U.S. 391, 403] immune from federal damages liability for actions taken in their legislative capacities. </s> The immunity of legislators from civil suit for what they do or say as legislators has its roots in the parliamentary struggles of 16th- and 17th-century England; such immunity was consistently recognized in the common law and was taken as a matter of course by our Nation's founders. 24 In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 , this Court reasoned that Congress, in enacting 1983 as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, could not have intended "to overturn the tradition of legislative freedom achieved in England by Civil War and carefully preserved in the formation of State and National Governments here." 341 U.S., at 376 . It therefore held that state legislators are absolutely immune from suit under 1983 for actions "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity." 341 U.S., at 376 . </s> Petitioners do not challenge the validity of the holding in Tenney, or of the decisions recognizing the absolute immunity of federal legislators. 25 Rather, their claim is that absolute immunity should be limited to the federal and state levels, and should not extend to individuals acting in a legislative capacity at a regional level. In support of this proposed distinction, petitioners argue that the source of immunity for state legislators is found in constitutional provisions, such as the Speech or Debate Clause, which have no application to a body such as TRPA. In addition, they point out that because state legislatures have effective means of disciplining their members that TRPA does not have, the threat of possible [440 U.S. 391, 404] personal liability is necessary to deter lawless conduct by the governing members of TRPA. 26 </s> We find these arguments unpersuasive. The Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution 27 is no more applicable to the members of state legislatures than to the members of TRPA. The States are, of course, free to adopt similar clauses in their own constitutions, and many have in fact done so. 28 These clauses reflect the central importance attached to legislative freedom in our Nation. But the absolute immunity for state legislators recognized in Tenney reflected the Court's interpretation of federal law; the decision did not depend on the presence of a speech or debate clause in the constitution of any State, or on any particular set of state rules or procedures available to discipline erring legislators. Rather, the rule of that case recognizes the need for [440 U.S. 391, 405] immunity to protect the "public good." As Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out: </s> "Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not for their private indulgence but for the public good. One must not expect uncommon courage even in legislators. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon a jury's speculation as to motives. The holding of this Court in Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 130, that it was not consonant with our scheme of government for a court to inquire into the motives of legislators, has remained unquestioned." 341 U.S., at 377 . </s> This reasoning is equally applicable to federal, state, and regional legislators. 29 Whatever potential damages liability regional legislators may face as a matter of state law, we hold that petitioners' federal claims do not encompass the recovery of damages from the members of TRPA acting in a legislative capacity. 30 </s> [440 U.S. 391, 406] </s> Like the Court of Appeals, we are unable to determine from the record the extent to which petitioners seek to impose liability upon the individual respondents for the performance of their legislative duties. We agree, however, that to the extent the evidence discloses that these individuals were acting in a capacity comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they are entitled to absolute immunity from federal damages liability. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part and affirmed in part. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 . The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." </s> [Footnote 2 The Senate Report on the Compact describes the lake and its background as follows: "Lake Tahoe, a High Sierra Mountain lake, is famed for its scenic beauty and pristine clarity. Of recent geologic origin, the 190-square-mile lake bore little evidence of even natural aging processes when it was discovered by John Fremont in 1844. Because of its size, its 1,645-foot depth and its physical features, Lake Tahoe was able to resist pollution even when human activity began accelerating as a result of settlement and early logging operations. Even by 1962 its waters were still so transparent that a mental disc 20 centimeters in diameter reportedly could be seen at a depth of 136 feet and a light transmittance to a depth of nearly 500 feet as detected with hydrophotometer. "Only two other sizable lakes in the world are of comparable quality - Crater Lake in Oregon, which is protected as part of the Crater Lake [440 U.S. 391, 394] National Park, and Lake Baikal in the Soviet Union. Only Lake Tahoe, however, is so readily accessible from large metropolitan centers and is so adaptable to urban development." S. Rep. No. 91-510, pp. 3-4 (1969). </s> [Footnote 3 Article I, 10, cl. 3, of the Constitution provides: "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay." </s> [Footnote 4 See Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, 83 Stat. 360, Cal. Gov't Code Ann. 66800-66801 (West Supp. 1977), Nev. Rev. Stat. 277.190-277.230 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Compact). </s> [Footnote 5 Compact, Arts. V and VI. </s> [Footnote 6 The States of California and Nevada and the county of El Dorado were originally named as defendants but either were not properly served or have been dismissed as parties. </s> [Footnote 7 The amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. Title 28 U.S.C. 1331, the general federal-question jurisdiction statute, provides in part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States except that no such sum or value shall be required in any such action brought against the United States, any agency, thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." </s> [Footnote 8 Title 42 U.S.C. 1983 provides: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." </s> [Footnote 9 Title 28 U.S.C. 1343 provides in part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: . . . . . "(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." </s> [Footnote 10 See 2 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain 6.21 (rev. 3d ed. 1976). </s> [Footnote 11 The issue we do not address is clearly stated in the following footnote to the Court of Appeals opinion: "Under the strict standard of pleading called for by Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 . . . (1935), none of the complaints in any of the cases on appeal would withstand a motion to dismiss. They lack specific factual allegations which, if proved, would rebut the presumption of constitutionality that the Pacific States Court accorded acts of administrative and legislative bodies. "Although Pacific States has never been explicitly overruled, we do not believe that it represents the present state of the law because it was decided two years before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We find no precedent in the Ninth Circuit applying Pacific States to an analogous case since the Rules took effect. "In Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 . . . (1957), the Supreme Court explained the modern philosophy of pleading: "`[A]ll the Rules require is "a short and plain statement of the claim" that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. . . . The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper decision on the merits.' "Id., at 47-48, . . . (citations omitted). "Thus a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency unless it appears to a certainty that plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim. 2A J. Moore, Federal Practice § 12.08 (1975). "The allegations of `taking,' even though phrased in terms of inverse condemnation, are sufficient to show that appellants complained that the TRPA exercised its police powers improperly, and that they relied on the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 566 F.2d, at 1359 n. 9. </s> [Footnote 12 See University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 380 (WHITE, J.); United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229 . </s> [Footnote 13 The fact that the Compact at issue here required congressional consent to be effective clearly does not itself mean that action taken pursuant to it does not qualify as being "under color of state law." This Court has, in the past, accepted that state regulations are properly considered "state law" even though they required federal approval prior to their implementation. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 ; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 . </s> [Footnote 14 See n. 4, supra. </s> [Footnote 15 Compact, Arts. III (a), VII (a). </s> [Footnote 16 3, 83 Stat. 369. Section 6, 83 Stat. 369, also reserves to Congress the right to require TRPA to furnish information and data that it considers appropriate. </s> [Footnote 17 Section 1983 originated as 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. In introducing that Act in Congress, Representative Shellabarger pointed out: "This act is remedial and in aid of the preservation of human liberty and human rights. All statutes and constitutional provisions authorizing such statutes are liberally and beneficently construed . . . the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes." Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68 (1871). </s> [Footnote 18 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 ; Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459 . </s> [Footnote 19 See Mt. Healthy Board of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 ; Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 -721; Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 ; Compact, Art. VIII (b). </s> [Footnote 20 Compact, Art. III (a). In addition, 10 of the 17 members of the Advisory Planning Commission established by the Compact are to be associated with local agencies, 4 others are to be residents of the region, and only 1 is from state government. Compact, Art. III (h). </s> [Footnote 21 Compact, Art. VII (a). </s> [Footnote 22 See California v. TRPA, 516 F.2d 215 (CA9 1975). </s> [Footnote 23 Because of our disposition of this question, we need not address petitioners' argument that, even assuming that TRPA might be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, such protection was affirmatively waived by the compacting States. See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 . </s> [Footnote 24 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 -375; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239 n. 4; Developments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1133, 1200 (1977) (legislative immunity "enjoys a unique historical position"). </s> [Footnote 25 See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 ; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 . </s> [Footnote 26 In support of these arguments, petitioners invoke decisions of the Courts of Appeals denying absolute immunity to subordinate officials such as county supervisors and members of a park district board. Williams v. Anderson, 562 F.2d 1081, 1101 (CA8 1977) (school board members); Jones v. Diamond, 519 F.2d 1090, 1101 (CA5 1975) (county supervisors); Curry v. Gillette, 461 F.2d 1003, 1005 (CA6 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Marsh v. Curry, 409 U.S. 1042 (alderman); Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F.2d 222, 231 (CA7 1961) (members of park district board and village board of trustees); Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312, 314-315 (CA6 1958) (city commissioners); Cobb v. Malden, 202 F.2d 701, 706-707 (CA1 1953) (McGruder, C. J., concurring) (city councilmen). Respondents, on the other hand, contend that in most, if not all, of the cases in which absolute immunity has been denied, the individuals were not in fact acting in a legislative capacity. We need not resolve this dispute. Whether individuals performing legislative functions at the purely local level, as opposed to the regional level, should be afforded absolute immunity from federal damages claims is a question not presented in this case. </s> [Footnote 27 Article I, 6, of the United States Constitution provides in part that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [the Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place." </s> [Footnote 28 See Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 375. </s> [Footnote 29 There is no allegation in this complaint that any members of TRPA's governing board profited personally from the performance of any legislative act. App. 8-12. If the respondents have enacted unconstitutional legislation, there is no reason why relief against TRPA itself should not adequately vindicate petitioners' interests. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 . </s> [Footnote 30 This holding is supported by the analysis in Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 , which recognized absolute immunity for individuals performing judicial and prosecutorial functions within the Department of Agriculture. In that case, we rejected the argument that absolute immunity should be denied because the individuals were employed in the Executive Branch, reasoning that "[j]udges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities." Id., at 511. This reasoning also applies to legislators. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting in part. </s> I join Part I of MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN'S opinion dissenting in part. In addition I would not reach the question, which the Court discusses in dicta, ante, at 401, whether compacting States can create an agency protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. In all other respects I join the Court's opinion. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting in part. </s> The Court today extends absolute immunity to nonelected regional officials for their legislative acts. Because extension of such extraordinary protection is without support in either precedent or policy, I cannot join Part III of the Court's opinion. </s> In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951), this Court declined to construe 42 U.S.C. 1983 as abrogating state legislators' unqualified immunity from suits that arise out of their legislative activity. Underlying the decision in Tenney was a recognition of the unique status of the legislative privilege, maintained for several centuries at common law and enshrined in the Federal Constitution, Art. I, 6, as well as in all but seven of the States' constitutions. 341 U.S., at 372 -375. Absent evidence of explicit congressional intent, [440 U.S. 391, 407] the Court was unwilling to strip state legislators of a protection so long enjoyed when there remained power in the voters to "discourag[e] or correc[t]" abuses by their elected representatives. Id., at 378. </s> Neither of the premises on which Tenney rested can sustain today's holding. Immunity for appointed regional officials is without common-law antecedents or state constitutional status. Even the Compact does not purport to confer immunity on TRPA officials, and neither California nor Nevada has claimed any such intent in the briefs filed in the instant case. More significantly, none of TRPA's 10-member governing board is elected. Six are appointed by county and city governments in the area, two are appointed by the Governors of California and Nevada respectively, and two are members by virtue of their offices in state natural resource agencies. Compact, Art. III (a). Thus, no member of the board is directly accountable to the public for his legislative acts. To cloak these officials with absolute protection where control by the electorate is so attenuated subverts the very system of checks and balances that the doctrine of legislative privilege was designed to secure. Insulating appointed officials from liability, no matter how egregious their "legislative" misconduct, is unlikely to enhance the integrity of the decisional process. Nor will public support for the outcome of such processes be fostered by a scheme placing these decision-makers beyond constitutional constraints. </s> Equally troubling is the majority's refusal to confront the logical implications of its analysis. To be sure, the Court expressly reserves the question whether individuals performing legislative functions at the local level should be afforded absolute immunity from federal damages claims. Ante, at 404 n. 26. But the majority's reasoning in this case leaves little room to argue that municipal legislators stand on a different footing than their regional counterparts. Surely the Court's supposition that the "cost and inconvenience and distractions [440 U.S. 391, 408] of a trial" will impede officials in the "`uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty,'" ante, at 405, quoting Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377, applies with equal force whether the officials occupy local or regional positions. Moreover, the Court implies that the test for conferring unqualified immunity is purely functional. Ante, at 405 n. 30. If the sole inquiry under that test is the nature of the officials' responsibilities, see ibid., not the common-law and constitutional underpinnings of the privilege itself or the wisdom of extending it to nonelected officials, then presumably any appointed member of a municipal government can claim absolute protection for his legislative acts. </s> A doctrine that denies redress for constitutional wrongs should, in my judgment, be narrowly confined to those contexts where history and public policy compel its acceptance. Today's decision both expands the scope of immunity beyond such limits and lays the groundwork for further extension. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN joins as to Part I, dissenting in part. </s> I </s> I cannot conclude so easily, as the Court does, ante, at 405-406, that the members of TRPA are absolutely immune from liability from federal claims for what ultimately may be determined to be legislative acts. Nor do I know what the Court means by a "regional legislator" - other than its conclusion that members of TRPA are such - or where the line is now to be drawn between a "regional legislator" and a member of a public body somewhat farther down the scale of entities in our varied political structures. </s> It is difficult for me to associate the members of TRPA with federal or state legislators. Their duties are not solely legislative; they possess some executive powers. They are not in equipoise with other branches of government, and the concept [440 U.S. 391, 409] of separation of powers has no relevance to them. They are not subject to the responsibility and the brake of the electoral process. And there is no provision for discipline within the body, as the Houses of Congress and the state legislatures possess. </s> I therefore am not now prepared to agree that the members of TRPA enjoy absolute immunity, against federal claims, for their "legislative" acts. I think they are entitled to qualified immunity within the limitations outlined in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), and Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). Those cases, it seems to me, set forth the guidelines appropriate for this one, and I would follow them in the present context. </s> II </s> I also do not join the Court in its flat ruling, ante, at 404, that the Speech or Debate Clause of our Federal Constitution, Art. I, 6, has no application to state legislatures. That may well be, but some federal courts have ruled otherwise, Eslinger v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 225, 228 (CA4 1973) (holding the Clause to be applicable); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 563 F.2d 577, 582-583 (CA3 1977), and United States v. Gillock, 587 F.2d 284, 286 (CA6 1978) (both recognizing a federal common-law speech or debate privilege for state legislators based in part on the federal Speech or Debate Clause), and the controversy on this point remains a live one. See United States v. Craig, 528 F.2d 773, 776 (CA7), opinion on rehearing en banc, 537 F.2d 957, cert. denied sub nom. Market v. United States, 429 U.S. 999 (1976). Because the issue of application of the Clause to state legislatures (as distinguished from TRPA) is not presented here, I would not decide it with a passing fiat. </s> [440 U.S. 391, 410]

United States Supreme Court AMERICAN BROADCASTING COS. v. WRITERS GUILD(1978) No. 76-1121 Argued: December 5, 1977Decided: June 21, 1978 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 76-1153, Association of Motion Picture & Television Producers, Inc. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., et al.; and No. 76-1162, National Labor Relations Board v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Respondent union, which represents persons hired to perform writing functions for motion picture and television films (hereinafter respondent), had collective-bargaining contracts with a producers association (petitioner in No. 76-1153) and three television networks (petitioners in No. 76-1121). Among respondent's members are a large number of persons (so-called "hyphenates") who are engaged by petitioners primarily to perform executive and supervisory functions. Though the hyphenates, who include various categories of producers, directors, and story editors, have minor writing tasks, these are not covered in the collective-bargaining contracts; only if the hyphenates are employed to perform additional writing services are the rates therefore governed by those contracts. In connection with their regular, primary duties many of the hyphenates are represented by unions other than respondent. In anticipation of an economic strike upon expiration of its contracts with petitioners, respondent distributed strike rules to its members, including the hyphenates (to whom the rules were made expressly applicable). The rules included a prohibition against crossing a picket line established by respondent at any entrance of a struck premise. After the strike began, petitioners informed the hyphenates that they were expected to continue their regular supervisory functions, though they would not be asked to perform writing duties covered by the union contract. Thereafter respondent notified a large number of the hyphenates who had returned to work that they had violated one or more of the strike rules, including in many instances the ban on crossing a picket line. After ensuing disciplinary proceedings (at which there was no proof that hyphenates had performed any work covered by the recently expired [437 U.S. 411, 412] contracts) respondent imposed various penalties on the hyphenates. Meanwhile the association and network petitioners filed charges against respondent for allegedly violating 8 (b) (1) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain or coerce an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. After extensive hearings, the Administrative Law Judge made findings that the hyphenates' regular supervisory duties included the performance of grievance adjustment; that the employer insisted that hyphenates return to work, but only to perform supervisory, not rank-and-file, duties; and that the hyphenates who reported did only supervisory work and had the authority to adjust grievances, which they did when the occasion arose. He found that 8 (b) (1) (B) had been violated because, by keeping hyphenates from work, the union had deprived the employer of fully effective 8 (b) (1) (B) representatives. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) adopted these findings and conclusions, found that the union's disciplinary action was an unfair labor practice under that provision, and issued a remedial order against respondent. The Court of Appeals denied enforcement. Held: Respondent's actions against the hyphenates violated 8 (b) (1) (B). Pp. 429-438. </s> (a) In ruling upon a 8 (b) (1) (B) charge growing out of union discipline of a supervisory member who elects to work during a strike, the NLRB must inquire whether the sanction may adversely affect the supervisor's performance of his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment tasks and thereby coerce or restrain the employer contrary to that provision. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790 . Pp. 429-431. </s> (b) The NLRB's findings were based on substantial evidence that the hyphenates were coerced or restrained from reporting to work; that the employer was thereby deprived of the opportunity to choose particular supervisors as his collective-bargaining or his grievance-adjustment representatives during the strike; and that as to the hyphenates who reported to work there was adequate basis for concluding that the discipline would adversely affect the performance of their grievance-adjustment duties either during or after the strike. Moreover, since as the evidence showed, the union's policy was not to permit a member to resign during a strike and for six months thereafter, the employer could not free a supervisor from further threats of union discipline by requiring him to leave the union. Pp. 431-437. </s> 547 F.2d 159, reversed. [437 U.S. 411, 413] </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 438. </s> Norton J. Come reargued the cause for petitioner in No. 76-1162. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General McCree, John S. Irving, Carl L. Taylor, and John G. Elligers. Harry J. Keaton reargued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 76-1153. Charles G. Bakaly reargued the cause for petitioners in No. 76-1121. With him on the briefs was Gordon E. Krischer. </s> Julius Reich reargued the cause for respondent Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., in all cases. With him on the briefs was Paul P. Selvin. </s> Laurence Gold reargued the cause for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief was J. Albert Woll. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The issue in this litigation is whether a labor union commits an unfair labor practice when it disciplines a member who is a supervisory employee for crossing the union's picket line during a strike and performing his regular supervisory duties, which include the adjustment of grievances. </s> I </s> Respondent Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. (hereafter respondent), represents persons hired to perform writing functions for employers engaged in the production of motion pictures and television films, and in 1973 had contracts with certain petitioners that were about to expire. Petitioner in No. 76-1153 is the Association of Motion Picture and Television Producers, Inc., whose members are engaged in the production of motion pictures and television films. Petitioner [437 U.S. 411, 414] represents its members in the negotiation and administration of collective-bargaining contracts. The three television networks, NBC, CBS, and ABC, petitioners in No. 76-1121, are also engaged in the production of television films and negotiate and administer collective-bargaining contracts. In March 1973, respondent engaged in a strike against both of these groups of petitioners, picketed the various premises, and issued strike rules that it enforced against its own members. It is this action which gave rise to this case. </s> Among respondent's members are a substantial number of persons who were engaged by petitioners primarily to perform executive and supervisory functions including the selection and direction of writers and including certain limited writing duties. These persons are referred to as "hyphenates" and include various categories of producers, directors, and story editors. 1 Although the primary function of hyphenates is not to write, they do perform minor writing tasks (referred to in the contract as "A to H" functions) that are an integral part of their primary duties and that expressly are not covered by the contracts between petitioners and respondent. 2 </s> [437 U.S. 411, 415] Only in the event hyphenates are assigned or employed by petitioners to perform additional writing services are the rates for such services governed by the collective-bargaining contracts with respondent. In connection with the performance of their regular, primary duties, which, with the limited exception noted, do not include writing services, many, but not all, hyphenates are represented by labor organizations other than respondent. Some of the contracts between these other organizations and petitioners contained no-strike clauses when the events involved herein occurred. Certain hyphenates were pressured by these other labor organizations to honor these no-strike pledges by reporting to work. </s> Respondent, meanwhile, was preparing its own kinds of pressure to keep the hyphenates from working. In preparation for the strike, respondent issued and distributed to its members, including the hyphenates, some 31 strike rules. The rules, among other things, forbade any act prejudicial to the welfare of respondent such as conduct tending to defeat a strike or to weaken its effectiveness (Rule 1); prohibited all members "from crossing a picket line which is established by the Guild at any entrance" of a struck premises (Rule 12); forbade the entry of any struck premises for certain purposes and required notice to respondent when entry was made for other purposes (Rule 13); 3 and obliged members to accept picket duty when assigned by respondent (Rule 28). Another [437 U.S. 411, 416] rule (Rule 30), rescinded midway in the strike, provided that no member could work with any individual, including the writer-executive, who had violated union strike rules. 4 The strike rules' applicability to hyphenates was made clear in Rule 24: "All members, regardless of the capacity in which they are working, are bound by all strike rules and regulations in the same manner and to the same extent as members who confine their efforts to writing." The rules were widely publicized, and respondent repeatedly emphasized, orally and in writing, that it would enforce the rules against hyphenates. Nor could a hyphenate escape those strictures by resigning, for it was respondent's policy, once the strike was under way, [437 U.S. 411, 417] not to permit withdrawal from the union, then or for six months following the completion of negotiations. </s> Petitioners, however, informed the hyphenates that petitioners' operations were continuing and that the hyphenates were expected to report for work and perform their regular supervisory functions. Petitioners were careful to assure that hyphenates would not be requested to perform writing duties covered by the union contract. </s> Some hyphenates went to work, informing their employers, as respondent knew, that they would perform only their primary duties as producer, director, or story editor. Others refrained from reporting for work. Between April 6 and November 8, 1973, respondent notified more than 30 hyphenates who returned to work that they had been charged with violating one or more of the strike rules. Most often, the charges related to Rules 1, 12, and 13. 5 Various disciplinary trials ensued. In these proceedings, the evidence was that the hyphenates who returned to duty performed only the normal functions of the supervisory positions for which they were employed. There was no proof that hyphenates performed any work covered by the recently terminated contracts between petitioners and respondent. As the Administrative Law Judge observed, respondent "for the most part professed little or no interest in what kind of work was done during the strike" [437 U.S. 411, 418] by the hyphenates who chose to work. 6 Between June 25 and September 28, 1973, various penalties were imposed by respondent as the result of these disciplinary proceedings. The penalties included expulsions, suspensions, and quite substantial fines. 7 </s> Meanwhile, the Association and network petitioners had filed unfair labor practice charges, and the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board had issued complaints against respondent charging violations of 8 (b) (1) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (1) (B), which provides that "[i]t shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization . . . to restrain or coerce . . . an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." Extensive hearings followed, the Administrative [437 U.S. 411, 419] Law Judge ultimately recommending that the charges be sustained and making findings and conclusions that were adopted by the National Labor Relations Board. </s> These findings included an analysis of the primary functions for which the hyphenates were employed. It was concluded that all of the producers, directors, and story editors involved were employed to perform supervisory functions and were supervisors within the meaning of 2 (11) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 152 (11). It was also found that the hyphenates in each of these categories regularly had the authority and the task of adjusting grievances. 8 "It is clear, as has [437 U.S. 411, 420] been found, that the normal performance of the hyphenates' primary functions involves the adjustment of employee grievances, and, in the case of producers on distant location, to engage in collective bargaining with labor organizations." 9 Furthermore, the record indicated that "during the strike, where the situation arose, the hyphenates dealt with grievances of employees who worked during the strike, or, in any event, were available to deal with such matters in their normal capacities when and if such grievances arose." 10 It was also found that the hyphenates who reported for duty during the strike performed only their primary functions and did not engage in writing or do any work that had been covered by respondent's collective-bargaining contract. Significantly, none of the hyphenates was charged with violating the strike rule forbidding the performance of writing functions for a struck employer. During the disciplinary hearings, respondent was "not concerned with what work the hyphenates did when working during the strike," 11 although it would have been quite easy to determine these facts from testimony of union writers about that work was found completed upon their return. [437 U.S. 411, 421] </s> The ultimate factual conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge were that the hyphenates were supervisors "selected by their employers to adjust grievances"; 12 that in issuing strike rules and engaging in other conduct designed to compel the hyphenates to refrain from working respondent had "restrained and coerced the hyphenates from performing managerial and supervisory services for their employers during the strike, including the adjustment of employee grievances and participation in collective bargaining," and had thus "coerced and restrained those employers in the selection of representatives for collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (1) (B)"; 13 and that by charging, trying, and disciplining the hyphenates who chose to work and who, the Administrative Law Judge found, "performed managerial and supervisory functions including the adjustment of grievances on collective bargaining as required, and did not perform rank and file work," respondent "further coerced and restrained the employers" within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B). 14 </s> In arriving at these conclusions, the Administrative Law Judge rejected the claim that Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790 (1974) (FP&L), required a contrary result, saying that respondent's conduct "violated the plain meaning of the statute without the necessity of resort to statutory exegesis." 15 </s> On exceptions and supporting briefs, a majority of a three-member panel of the Board, except in one respect, 16 adopted as its own the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative [437 U.S. 411, 422] Law Judge. The Board also reasoned that FP&L, which involved supervisors who performed bargaining-unit work, did not extend to cases where union discipline was imposed upon supervisors who performed only their ordinary supervisorial functions (including the adjustment of grievances). The Board relied upon two of its cases decided subsequent to FP&L: Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 (Hammond Publishers, Inc.), 216 N. L. R. B. 903 (1975); New York Typographical Union No. 6, International Typographical Union, AFL-CIO (Daily Racing Form, a subsidiary of Triangle Publishers, Inc.), 216 N. L. R. B. 896 (1975). </s> On application to review by the networks and the Board's application to enforce, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied enforcement in a brief per curiam opinion indicating that, like the dissenting member of the Board, it considered FP&L, supra, to bar the results reached by the Board in this case. 547 F.2d 159 (1976). We granted the petitions for certiorari of the Board as well as of the Association and the networks because of an apparent conflict between the decision below and decisions in other Courts of Appeals and because of the recurring nature of the issue. 17 </s> 430 U.S. 982 (1977). </s> II </s> As the Court has set out in greater detail in its comprehensive review of 8 (b) (1) (B) in FP&L, the prohibition against restraining or coercing an employer in the selection of his bargaining representative was, until 1968, applied primarily to pressures exerted by the union directly upon the employer [437 U.S. 411, 423] to force him into a multiemployer bargaining unit or otherwise to dictate or control the choice of his representative for the purpose of collective bargaining or adjusting grievances in the course of administering an existing contract. In San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union No. 18, International Typographical Union (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N. L. R. B. 2173 (1968), however, the Board applied the section to prohibit union discipline of one of its member-supervisors for the manner in which he had performed his supervisory task of grievance adjustment. Although the union "sought the substitution of attitudes rather than persons, and may have exerted its pressures upon the [employer] by indirect rather than direct means," the ultimate fact was that the pressure interfered with the employer's control over his representative. "Realistically, the Employer would have to replace its foremen or face de facto nonrepresentation by them." Oakland Mailers, supra, at 2173. </s> The application of the section to indirect coercion of employers through pressure applied to supervisory personnel continued to evolve until the FP&L and Illinois Bell 18 cases reached the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and then this Court. In each of those cases, the union disciplined supervisor-members who had performed rank-and-file work behind a union picket line during a strike. In a companion case to Illinois Bell, 19 upon which Illinois Bell explicitly relied, 20 the Board found an infraction of 8 (b) [437 U.S. 411, 424] (1) (B), broadly construing its purpose "to assure to the employer that its selected collective-bargaining representatives will be completely faithful to its desires" and holding that this could not be achieved "if the union has an effective method, union disciplinary action, by which it can pressure such representatives to deviate from the interests of the employer." 21 In like fashion, in FP&L, the Board held that fining supervisors for doing rank-and-file work during a work stoppage "struck at the loyalty an employer should be able to expect from its representatives for the adjustment of grievances and therefore restrained and coerced employers in their selection of such representatives." 22 </s> The Court of Appeals overturned both decisions of the Board, holding that although the section could be properly applied to union efforts to discipline supervisors for their performance as collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment representatives, it could not reasonably be applied to prohibit union discipline of supervisors crossing picket lines to perform bargaining-unit work: "When a supervisor forsakes his supervisory role to do rank-and-file work ordinarily the domain of nonsupervisory employees, he is no longer acting as a management representative and no longer merits any immunity from discipline." 159 U.S. App. D.C., at 286, 487 F.2d, at 1157. </s> This Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals: </s> "The conclusion is thus inescapable that a union's discipline of one of its members who is a supervisory employee can constitute a violation of 8 (b) (1) (B) only when that discipline may adversely affect the supervisor's conduct in performing the duties of, and acting in his capacity as, grievance adjuster or collective bargainer on behalf of the employer." 417 U.S., at 804 -805. [437 U.S. 411, 425] </s> The Court thus rejected the claim that "even if the effect of [union] discipline did not carry over to the performance of the supervisor's grievance adjustment or collective bargaining functions," it was enough to show that the result would be "to deprive the employer of the full allegiance of, and control over, a representative he has selected for grievance adjustment or collective bargaining purposes." Id., at 807. Assuming without deciding that the Board's decision in Oakland Mailers fell within the outer reaches of 8 (b) (1) (B), the Court concluded that the Illinois Bell and FP&L decisions did not, because it was "certain that these supervisors were not engaged in collective bargaining or grievance adjustment, or in any activities related thereto, when they crossed union picket lines during an economic strike to engage in rank-and-file struck work." 417 U.S., at 805 . </s> Subsequent to FP&L, in applying 8 (b) (1) (B) to cases involving union discipline of supervisor-members, the Board directed its attention, as it understood FP&L to require, to the question whether the discipline may adversely affect the supervisor's conduct in performing his grievance-adjustment or collective-bargaining duties on behalf of the employer. In Hammond Publishers, supra, and Triangle Publishers, supra, the Board held that it was an unfair practice under 8 (b) (1) (B) for a union to discipline a supervisor-member whose regular duties included the adjustment of grievances for crossing a picket line to perform his regular functions during a strike. See also Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council (Skippy Enterprises, Inc.), 218 N. L. R. B. 1063 (1975). These cases rested on the Board's conclusion that such discipline imposed on the supervisor would have a "carryover" effect and would influence the supervisor in the performance of his adjustment functions after the strike and hence interfere with and coerce the employer in the choice of his grievance representative. See Triangle, 216 N. L. R. B., at 897; Hammond, 216 N. L. R. B., at 904. The Triangle decision [437 U.S. 411, 426] was not challenged in the courts, but Hammond was enforced, 176 U.S. App. D.C. 240, 539 F.2d 242 (1976), as was Skippy Enterprises, 532 F.2d 47 (CA7 1976). 23 </s> III </s> This case was tried to the Administrative Law Judge prior to the issuance of this Court's decision in FP&L, but hearings continued and the record was not closed until after the Court of Appeals' final decision in that case; and the FP&L opinion here was handed down on June 24, 1974, some three months before the Administrative Law Judge issued his recommended decision. As we have already indicated, the findings of the Administrative Law Judge, accepted by the Board, were that the hyphenates' regular supervisory duties included the performance of grievance adjustment; that the employer insisted that hyphenates return to work but only to perform supervisory, not rank-and-file, duties; 24 and that the hyphenates who reported did only supervisory work and had the [437 U.S. 411, 427] authority to adjust grievances which they did when the occasion arose. 25 After analyzing this Court's pronouncements in FP&L, the Administrative Law Judge rejected the claim that union discipline of a supervisor-member for working during a strike can never be a 8 (b) (1) (B) violation and went on to hold that under the test prescribed by FP&L, there was a violation here. His conclusions were that through its strike rules and other pressures "designed to compel such hyphenates from going to work during the strike," regardless of the tasks that they might perform, the union had "restrained and coerced the hyphenates from performing managerial and supervisory services for their employers during the strike, including the adjustment of employee grievances and participation in collective bargaining . . . ." 26 By "coercing or restraining" hyphenates from going in to do their normal work, which included grievance adjustment, or in the case of producers, on distant location, the task of collective bargaining, the union had "actually coerced and restrained their employers from selecting those persons as the employers' representatives for the adjustment of grievances and for collective bargaining during the strike." 27 He also concluded that by charging, trying, and disciplining those hyphenates who did report for work and by "threatening to blacklist in perpetuity . . . [and] to drive [them] out of the industry," 28 the union had coerced and restrained these hyphenates from performing their regular [437 U.S. 411, 428] duties in the normal manner, including the adjustment of grievances and collective bargaining. The employer, in turn, had been further coerced and restrained in the free selection of those hyphenates as his collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustment representatives. </s> The Administrative Law Judge thus found the section violated according to the test as elaborated in FP&L because, by keeping hyphenates from work, the union had deprived the employer of any opportunity to select those particular supervisors as his grievance-adjusting or collective-bargaining representatives 29 and because disciplining and threatening those supervisors who had reported for duty deprived the employer of fully effective 8 (b) (1) (B) representatives. Although [437 U.S. 411, 429] the Board embraced these findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge, 30 it also found that the disciplinary action taken by the union against those hyphenates who crossed the picket line was an unfair practice under 8 (b) (1) (B) as that section had been construed in Hammond and Triangle and that threats of such illegal discipline against others also violated the section. </s> IV </s> We cannot agree with what appears to be the fundamental position of the Court of Appeals and the union that under 8 (b) (1) (B), as the section was construed in FP&L, it is never an unfair practice for a union to discipline a supervisor-member for working during a strike, regardless of the work that he may perform behind the picket line. The opinion in FP&L expressly refrained from questioning Oakland Mailers or the proposition that an employer could be coerced or restrained within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B) not only by picketing or other direct actions aimed at him but also by debilitating discipline imposed on his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment representative. Indeed, after focusing on the purposes of the section, the Court in FP&L delineated the boundaries of when that "carryover" effect would violate 8 (b) (1) (B): whenever such discipline may adversely affect the supervisor's conduct in his capacity as a grievance adjustor or collective bargainer. In these situations - that is, when such impact might be felt - the employer would be deprived of the full services of his representatives and hence would be restrained and coerced in his selection of those representatives. </s> Furthermore, because this was the test prescribed and employed by the Court to adjudicate the very situation where [437 U.S. 411, 430] union discipline was imposed for crossing a picket line, it is unlikely that the Court anticipated that the test could never be satisfied in such disciplinary cases, that it could never be true that the sanction could or would affect the supervisor's collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment functions, or that the employer in such circumstances could never be restrained or coerced in the selection of his representatives. </s> This is not to say that every effort by a union to discipline a supervisor for crossing a picket line to do supervisory rather than rank-and-file work would satisfy the standards specified by FP&L, or that on facts present here there is necessarily a violation of 8 (b) (1) (B). But we are of the view that the Board correctly understood FP&L to mean that in ruling upon a 8 (b) (1) (B) charge growing out of union discipline of a supervisory member who elects to work during a strike, it may - indeed, it must - inquire whether the sanction may adversely affect the supervisor's performance of his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment tasks and thereby coerce or restrain the employer contrary to 8 (b) (1) (B). The Board addressed those issues here, and if its ultimate factual conclusions in this regard are capable of withstanding judicial review, it seems to us that its construction of the section fairly recognizes and respects the outer boundaries established by FP&L, and represents an "acceptable reading of the statutory language and a reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant statutory sections." NLRB v. Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 341 (1978). </s> Respondent objects that this construction of the Act impermissibly intrudes on the union's right to resort to economic sanctions during a strike. However, an employer also has economic rights during a strike, and the statute declares that, in the unrestrained freedom to select a grievance-adjustment and collective-bargaining representative, the employer's rights dominate. Ample leeway is already accorded to a union in permitting it to discipline any member, even a supervisor, for [437 U.S. 411, 431] performing struck work - to carry that power over to the case of purely supervisory work is an inappropriate extension and interference with the employer's prerogative. The Board has so ruled, and as the Court has often observed, "`[t]he function of striking [the] balance to effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations Board, subject to limited judicial review.'" NLRB v. Iron Workers, supra, at 350, quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers, 353 U.S. 87 . 96 (1957); NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 499 (1960). Here, in adjudicating as it did the intertwining interests of union, employer, and supervisor-member during an economic strike, we cannot say that the Board has moved into a new area of regulation not committed to it by Congress, ibid., or conclude that the role assumed by the Board is "fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the Act and the function of the sections relied upon." American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965); NLRB v. Iron Workers, supra. 31 </s> V </s> We are also unpersuaded that the Board's findings and conclusions are infirm on any of the grounds submitted. First, it is urged that there was an insufficient showing and insufficient findings that any hyphenates were coerced or restrained from reporting for work. But the Administrative Law Judge carefully detailed the strike rules that he expressly found were designed and enforced with the intent of restraining hyphenates from going to work and from performing the normal duties of their positions, which included the adjustment of [437 U.S. 411, 432] grievances. 32 It was also found that the hyphenates were especially vulnerable to pressure from the union and that many of them were actually restrained and prevented from performing their normal duties, including the adjustment of grievances. These are sufficiently clear findings that union pressures kept many hyphenates from the job, and, on the record before us, it approaches the frivolous to argue that there is insufficient evidence to support them. It also follows, as the Administrative Law Judge and the Board concluded, that as to those hyphenates whom the union kept from work, the employer was restrained and coerced within the meaning of 8 (b) (1) (B) by being totally deprived of the opportunity to choose these particular supervisors as his collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment representatives during the strike. </s> Second, as to those hyphenates who reported for work, it is strenuously urged that there is no basis for concluding that the discipline imposed upon them would adversely affect the performance of their grievance-adjustment duties either during or after the strike. Again, however, we are unwilling to differ with the Board in these respects. The inquiry whether union conduct would or might adversely affect the performance of the hyphenates' grievance-adjustment duties is, as petitioners assert, necessarily a matter of probabilities, and its resolution depends much on what experience would suggest are the justifiable inferences from the known facts. This seems to us to be peculiarly the kind of determination that Congress has assigned to the Board: </s> "An administrative agency with power after hearings to [437 U.S. 411, 433] determine on the evidence in adversary proceedings whether violations of statutory commands have occurred may infer within the limits of the inquiry from the proven facts such conclusions as reasonably may be based upon the facts proven. One of the purposes which lead to the creation of such boards is to have decisions based upon evidential facts under the particular statute made by experienced officials with an adequate appreciation of the complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration." Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945); Radio Officers v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 48 -49 (1954). </s> See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 227 (1963); Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1961). The Board's findings are "entitled to the greatest deference in recognition of its special competence in dealing with labor problems." American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, supra, at 316. </s> Furthermore, it does not strike us as groundless or lacking substantial evidence for the Board to conclude on this record that the discipline imposed would have the necessary adverse effect. Strike rules were distributed in February; the strikes against the Association began on March 4 and terminated June 24; the strikes against the networks began on March 29 and ended on July 12. Between April 6 and November 8 - both during and after the strikes - some 31 hyphenates who had worked during the strikes were charged with violating union rules, 33 15 hearings had been held prior to the closing of evidence in November 1973, and from June 25 to September 28, very substantial penalties were imposed in 10 cases although 9 have already been reduced on appeal. These penalties were widely publicized at the time of their imposition. [437 U.S. 411, 434] Other charges were pending and remained to be tried when the record was closed in this case. </s> These penalties were meted out at least in part because the accused hyphenates had complied with the orders of their employers by reporting for work and performing only their normal supervisory functions, including the adjustment of grievances, during the strike. Hyphenates who worked were thus faced not only with threats but also with the actuality of charges, trial, and severe discipline simply because they were working at their normal jobs. And if this were not enough, they were threatened with a union blacklist that might drive them from the industry. How long such hyphenates would remain on the job under such pressure was a matter no one, particularly the employer, could predict. </s> Moreover, after the strike, with the writers back at work, the hyphenates who had worked during the strike still faced charges and trials or were appealing large fines and long suspensions. At the same time, they were expected to perform their regular supervisory duties and to adjust grievances whenever the occasion demanded, functions requiring them to deal with the same union which was considering the appeal of their personal sanctions. As to these supervisors, who had felt the union's wrath, not for doing rank-and-file work contrary to union rules, but for performing only their primary supervisory duties during the strike and who were in a continuing controversy with the union, it was not untenable for the Board to conclude that these disciplined hyphenates had a diminished capacity to carry out their grievance-adjustment duties effectively and that the employer was deprived of the full range of services from his supervisors. 34 Such a hyphenate [437 U.S. 411, 435] might be tempted to give the union side of a grievance a more favorable slant while the threat of discipline remained, or while his own appeal of a union sanction was pending. At the very least, the employer could not be certain that a fined hyphenate would willingly answer the employer's call to duty during a subsequent work stoppage, particularly if it occurred in the near future. 35 For an employer in these circumstances to insure having satisfactory collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustment services would require a change in his representative. </s> As the Board has construed the Act from Oakland Mailers to Triangle, Hammond, and the cases now before us, such a likely impact on the employer constitutes sufficient restraint and coercion in connection with the selection of collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustment representatives to violate [437 U.S. 411, 436] 8 (b) (1) (B). In FP&L the Court declined the invitation to overrule Oakland Mailers, and we do so again. Union pressure on supervisors can affect either their willingness to serve as grievance adjusters or collective bargainers, or the manner in which they fulfill these functions; and either effect impermissibly coerces the employer in his choice of representative. 36 </s> Third, it is further urged that union discipline could not adversely affect a supervisor's later performance of his 8 (b) (1) (B) duties because the employer could require him to leave the union and thus free himself from further threats of union discipline. This submission has little force in this case, since, as the Administrative Law Judge found, the union's known policy was not to permit a member to resign during a strike and for a period of six months thereafter. For the entire period to which the Board's findings were addressed, hyphenates could not terminate their membership, and the [437 U.S. 411, 437] employer's only recourse would have been to replace them as his grievance representatives. </s> Carried to its logical end, this submission is simply another argument that union sanctions applied to supervisor-members who work during a strike can never violate 8 (b) (1) (B), because the employer could always insist that his supervisors either terminate union affiliation or face discharge. Yet, as we have noted, the test posited by this Court in FP&L plainly recognizes the possibility of a 8 (b) (1) (B) violation arising from union fines imposed during a strike. Moreover, if the argument were to be accepted, indirect pressures on the employer by sanctioning supervisor-members for the manner in which they perform their grievance-adjusting function (as in Oakland Mailers) would never be a violation because the supervisor could, at the employer's request, escape from union threats and sanctions. The Board's construction of the Act is to the contrary, however, and, as we have said, we are not prepared at this juncture to override it. 37 </s> [437 U.S. 411, 438] </s> Because we have concluded that the Board's construction of 8 (b) (1) (B) is not an unreasonable reading of its language or inconsistent with its purposes, and because we cannot say that the Board's findings lacked substantial evidence, we must reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Executive producers, with the help of producers and associate producers, have the primary responsibility for the production of films for motion pictures or for television. The responsibility begins with the idea or concept for the film or the series and carries through to the post-production stages after filming. Directors are in personal charge of the principal photography of the film. They are responsible for the employment of crew and actors and effectively direct such employees. Story editors, story consultants, script consultants, executive story editors, and executive story consultants principally assist the producer in the highly important function of dealing with scripts and writers. They have individual judgment, initiative, and responsibility, and their tasks are clearly supervisory. Approximately 80 hyphenate members of respondent were principally employed as producers of one kind or another, approximately 15 were directors, and another 15 were in the story editor category. </s> [Footnote 2 The finding of the Administrative Law Judge in this regard was: </s> "The important point is that when these executives and supervisors perform those functions excluded from the Respondent's bargaining agreements [437 U.S. 411, 415] they thereby perform functions which the parties have acknowledged do not constitute work reserved to Respondent's non-hyphenate members under the agreements, but rather are accepted as a normal part of the duties and responsibilities of the executives and supervisors (as hereinabove discussed) employed by the employers involved." (Footnote omitted.) App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-1162, p. 35a. </s> The contract provided that performance of any "A to H" writing "shall not constitute such person a writer hereunder." Id., at 33a. </s> [Footnote 3 Rule 13 provided: </s> "Members are prohibited from entering the premises of any struck producer for the purpose of discussion of the sale of material or contract of [437 U.S. 411, 416] employment, regardless of the time it is to take effect. Members are also prohibited from entering the premises of any struck producer for the purpose of viewing any film. . . . [S]hould a member find it necessary to visit the premises of a struck producer for any reason apart from the foregoing he should inform the Guild in advance of the nature of such prospective visit." Id., at 36a-37a. </s> [Footnote 4 Rule 30 provided: </s> "No member shall work with any individual, including a writer-executive who has been suspended from Guild membership by reason of his violation of strike rules, or has been found by the Council to have violated strike rules, in the event no disciplinary action was instituted against such person." Id., at 38a. </s> After the issuance of the initial complaint in this case, Rule 30 was rescinded by respondent in a letter to all of its members, which stated, among other things, that "because the old rule could be misconstrued to mean that the Guild was maintaining an improper sanction, a matter of anathema to this Guild, the Board of Directors rescinded old Rule 30 . . . ." The assessment of the Administrative Law Judge was: </s> "In particular, by threatening to blacklist in perpetuity such hyphenates who worked during the strike, the rules threatened to drive these hyphenates out of the industry. Though the mandatory effect of the rule was rescinded . . . there are other indications that Respondent's actions encourage a voluntary blacklist. . . . [T]he fact is that Respondent did suggest it, and it is now impossible to disentangle the consequences flowing from its actions." Id., at 69a-70a. </s> [Footnote 5 The Administrative Law Judge found that a typical notice of charges against a hyphenate contained the following: </s> "Specifically, you are charged with: (1) having crossed the Guild's picket lines . . . during the months of March, April, May and June 1973, without having informed the Guild in advance of the nature of your business with said company and without having obtained a Guild pass to enter said premises; (2) having during the months of March, April, May and June 1973, rendered services for . . . a company against whom the Guild was at such times on strike; and (3) refusing to perform picket duties during the strike after having been requested to do so by representatives of the Guild." Id., at 45a. (Footnote omitted.) </s> [Footnote 6 Id., at 43a-44a. Respondent, through counsel, took the position at the disciplinary hearings that the hyphenates charged were subject to discipline simply for crossing respondent's picket line, whether or not they crossed for the purpose of performing bargaining services for a struck employer. Respondent held that charges would properly lie even against hyphenates who had given assurances not to perform any writing services for a struck employer. </s> [Footnote 7 The Administrative Law Judge noted the penalties against 10 of the hyphenates charged and tried: </s> "Two were expelled from membership and fined $50,000 each; one was expelled from membership and fined $10,000; one was suspended from membership for 2 years and fined $10,000; one was suspended for 2 years and fined $7,500; one was suspended for 3 years and fined $5,000; one was expelled from membership and fined $2,000; one was expelled and fined $100; and one was suspended for 2 years and fined $100. These penalties received wide publicity in the local press and trade papers. The appeals of nine of these men has [sic] been voted upon by Respondent's membership at a special meeting and the penalties were drastically reduced. Apparently all remaining actions with respect to discipline of hyphenate-members for working during the strike are now being held in abeyance pending resolution of these cases." Id., at 46a. </s> [Footnote 8 The Administrative Law Judge found: </s> "The producer has substantial responsibility and authority in adjusting grievances between directors and craft employees, directors and actors and actresses, between two or more actors or actresses, and in other similar situations. Producers also have responsibility and authority to adjust grievances involving writers, as in the case of disputes between writers and story editors." Id., at 26a. </s> Executive producers supervise one or more producers, and associate producers assist the producer. </s> "Without distinguishing among them in detail, it is clear on this record that persons occupying these positions in the motion picture or television industries have the authority to hire, terminate, and responsibly direct other employees, and to adjust employee grievances, or to effectively recommend such action, and are thus supervisors within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the Act." Id., at 27a. </s> With respect to directors, the Administrative Law Judge determined that they </s> "hire or effectively recommend the employment of crew and actors, effectively direct such employees, and may discharge or effectively recommend the discharge of employees. They have authority to and do adjust grievances of such employees. It is found that persons performing the functions of director in the television and motion picture industries are supervisors and adjust grievances of employees within the meaning of the Act." Id., at 28a. </s> Story editors supervise writers in the development of ideas and the preparation of scripts. They interview and recommend the hiring of new [437 U.S. 411, 420] writers, and advise the producer concerning writers who should not be retained. </s> "On a television series, the story editor may participate with the producer in the initial determination of any dispute over screen credits. He also may serve as a buffer between management and the writer, as in ameliorating a writer's distress over material that has been rewritten. . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "On the basis of the entire record, it is found that those persons in the television and motion picture industries performing the functions of story editor, story consultant, script consultant, executive story editors, and executive story consultants are supervisors and adjust grievances of employees within the meaning of the Act." Id., at 29a-30a. </s> [Footnote 9 Id., at 57a. </s> [Footnote 10 Id., at 60a. </s> [Footnote 11 Id., at 59a. </s> [Footnote 12 Id., at 62a. </s> [Footnote 13 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 14 Id., at 63a. </s> [Footnote 15 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 16 The Board held that there had been a violation with respect to certain hyphenates in addition to those in the categories of producer, director, and story editor. </s> [Footnote 17 In Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v. NLRB, 176 U.S. App. D.C. 240, 539 F.2d 242 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit enforced the Board's order in Hammond Publishers, relied on by the Board in this case. In Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 47 (1976), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also took a position seemingly at odds with the judgment under review here. The issue is also a recurring one before the Board. </s> [Footnote 18 IBEW, Local 134 v. NLRB, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 242, 487 F.2d 1113, rev'd on rehearing en banc, 159 U.S. App. D.C. 272, 487 F.2d 1143 (1973), refusing to enforce IBEW, Local 134, 192 N. L. R. B. 85 (1971) (Illinois Bell), and IBEW Systems Council U-4, 193 N. L. R. B. 30 (1971) (FP&L). </s> [Footnote 19 Local Union No. 2150, IBEW, and Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 192 N. L. R. B. 77 (1971). </s> [Footnote 20 "We find no discernible difference between the two cases, and for the reasons set forth in that case, we find that, in the instant case, the Union violated Section 8 (b) (1) (B) . . . ." Illinois Bell, 192 N. L. R. B., at 86. </s> [Footnote 21 Id., at 78. </s> [Footnote 22 193 N. L. R. B., at 31. </s> [Footnote 23 In Hammond and Skippy, the supervisor also performed some rank-and-file work during the strike. The Board in Hammond characterized the amount of rank-and-file work as minimal, and only incidental to the supervisory functions, but in Skippy, the supervisor performed rank-and-file work for about 30% of his time. In light of the finding that the supervisors performed no rank-and-file writing in this case, we are not presented with that element of the Board's reasoning in Hammond and Skippy. </s> [Footnote 24 We note also respondent's argument that the limited writing duties - the A-to-H functions - normally performed by the hyphenates should be considered rank-and-file work within the meaning of FP&L. The Administrative Law Judge gave careful attention to the issue and concluded to the contrary, App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-1162, p. 59a, and the Board accepted his findings and conclusions in this respect. We also find them unexceptionable. The dissenting Board member did not premise his opinion on the A-to-H issue. We thus do not have here the situation where the disciplined supervisor has performed not only supervisory duties, including grievance adjustment, but also has done some rank-and-file tasks. See Hammond and Triangle, and also Wisconsin River Valley. </s> [Footnote 25 It is suggested that there was insufficient proof that the hyphenates who worked actually engaged in grievance adjustment of any kind during the strike. But the findings were to the contrary; and, in any event, there is no question that they were authorized to do so and were available for that purpose when and if the occasion arose. Section 8 (b) (1) (B) obviously can be violated by attempting coercively to control the choice of the employer's representative, before, as well as after, the representative has actually dealt with the grievance. </s> [Footnote 26 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-1162, p. 62a. </s> [Footnote 27 Id., at 64a. </s> [Footnote 28 Id., at 69a. </s> [Footnote 29 The Administrative Law Judge reasoned, as follows, in support of his conclusion. </s> "To illustrate: A person performing the function of a director acts in a managerial or supervisory capacity, which normally includes the adjustment of grievances of actors, actresses, craft employees and others. One occupying the position of a producer normally has a similar capacity and similar duties with respect to employee grievances. In addition, if the film is being shot on distant location the producer has authority to negotiate on the spot agreements with local unions. Thus when Respondent prevented or sought to prevent, such hyphenate members from going to work in their managerial and supervisory capacities as producers and directors during the strike, Respondent obviously coerced and restrained their employers in the selection of those specific producers and directors for the purpose of collective bargaining and the adjustment of grievances of employees working during the strike within the plain meaning of the statute. Similarly, those persons employed as story editors or in like classifications perform executive functions normally, and appear to have done so during the strike, in which the record indicates they were engaged as supervisors and actual or potential representatives of their employers for the adjustment of grievances. Respondent, by coercing or restraining persons in these classifications from going in to do their normal work thereby actually coerced and restrained their employers from selecting those persons as the employers' representatives for the adjustment of grievances and for collective bargaining during the strike." Id., at 63a-64a. (Footnote omitted.) </s> [Footnote 30 It is suggested by respondent that the Board did not fully adopt the approach of the Administrative Law Judge, but it is plain that, with the single exception noted above, the Board adopted all of the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge. </s> [Footnote 31 The Board's decision holding the union responsible under 8 (b) (1) (B) for the foreseeable course and consequences of its actions is not inconsistent with Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961), and NLRB v. News Syndicate Co., 365 U.S. 695 (1961). The holding does not rest on any assumption that the union will act illegally in the future. </s> [Footnote 32 The findings were also that: </s> "The record is convincing that Respondent, well aware of the primary supervisory, management, and executive functions of its hyphenate-members, drafted its strike rules and enforced them with the intent of compelling those hyphenate-members from going to work during the strike, without regard to the capacity in which they performed or the work done." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-1162, p. 69a. </s> [Footnote 33 Violations of Rules 1, 12, 13, and 28 were alleged. See, supra, at 415, 416, 417, and n. 3. </s> [Footnote 34 In determining that the Board had exceeded the limitations of the statute in the FP&L and Illinois Bell cases, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that when a supervisor acts as a grievance adjustor, "he is a representative of management, and as such he should be immune from union discipline. The unions participating in the present cases conceded as much at oral argument when they agreed that [437 U.S. 411, 435] when a supervisor crosses a picket line to perform supervisory work he remains immune from discipline. . . . The dividing line between supervisory and nonsupervisory work in the present context is sharply defined and easily understood." 159 U.S. App. D.C., at 286, 487 F.2d, at 1157. </s> As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said: </s> "[W]here supervisors cross picket lines to perform rank-and-file struck work, union discipline does not violate Section 8 (b) (1) (B) since it merely deprives the employer of services normally rendered by strikebreaking replacement employees." Skippy Enterprises, 532 F.2d 47, 53 (1976). </s> On the other hand, </s> "Where supervisors cross picket lines to perform regular supervisory duties, union discipline violates Section 8 (b) (1) (B) since it tends to deprive the employer of its supervisors' services - including their 8 (b) (1) (B) services - and because the supervisors would reasonably anticipate that union discipline would also be imposed if future performance of their 8 (b) (1) (B) functions did not meet with union approval." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 35 Union discipline might even result in depriving the employer of the supervisors' services forever, if the blacklist involved in this case had been successful. The employer would have had no choice but to let the hyphenate go, since the positions of director, producer, and script editor unavoidably require working with rank-and-file writers. </s> [Footnote 36 In the FP&L and Illinois Bell cases, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that its consistent view has been that the "basic rationale [of Oakland Mailers] is consistent with the purposes of Section 8 (b) (1) (B) . . . [for] management's right to a free selection would be hollow indeed if the union could dictate the manner in which the selected representative performed his collective bargaining and grievance adjustment duties." 159 U.S. App. D.C., at 282, 283, 487 F.2d, at 1153, 1154. The court also noted its agreement with New Mexico District Council of Carpenters and Joiners of America (A. S. Horner, Inc.), 177 N. L. R. B. 500 (1969), enf'd, 454 F.2d 1116 (CA10 1972), where a union member worked as a supervisor for a company which had no contract with the union. 159 U.S. App. D.C., at 284 n. 19, 487 F.2d, at 1155 n. 19. A fine imposed in these circumstances violated the section because compliance by the supervisor with the union's demands would have required his leaving his job and thus have "the effect of depriving the Company of the services of its selected representative for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances." 177 N. L. R. B., at 502. The Court of Appeals said that A. S. Horner "thus falls close to the original rationale of 8 (b) (1) (B) which was to permit the employer to keep the bargaining representative of his own choosing." 159 U.S. App. D.C., at 284 n. 19, 487 F.2d., at 1155 n. 19. </s> [Footnote 37 It is also argued that at the very least the Board erred with respect to director-hyphenates because there is no evidence and no finding that directors ever dealt with writers or adjusted their grievances even if producers and story editors did. Hence, it is alleged that union discipline of directors could not possibly affect their adjustment of writers' grievances during or after the strike for the simple reason that they had none to adjust. But during the strike, no supervisor, writer, director, producer, or story editor had writer grievances to adjust - at least no new grievances - because there were no writers on the job and only the possibility that there might be replacements or a few strikebreakers. Nevertheless, directors, as well as others, had adjustment duties with respect to other employees. The Administrative Law Judge found that directors "hire or effectively recommend the employment of crew and actors, effectively direct such employees, and . . . have authority to and do adjust grievances of such employees." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-1162, p. 28a. </s> Directors' willingness to work and to perform these duties subjected them to sanctions and financial loss, making them less than completely reliable and effective employer representatives for the duration of the strike, and [437 U.S. 411, 438] less likely to perform any supervisory task during future strikes. A union may no more interfere with the employer's choice of a grievance representative with respect to employees represented by other unions than with respect to those employees whom it itself represents. International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots, International Marine Division, 197 N. L. R. B. 400 (1972), enf'd 159 U.S. App. D.C. 11, 14, 486 F.2d 1271, 1274 (1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974), and International Organization of Masters, Mates and Pilots v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 554, 559-560 (CA5 1976). We note also that all hyphenates, including directors, were threatened with a permanent blacklist - a refusal by other Guild members, including producers, other directors, and story editors, as well as writers, to work with the offending director - and that revocation of the formal rule on April 30 did not completely remove the threat. Because of his central role, refusal to work with a director means refusal to participate at all in a particular film. The union thus threatened a strike by all of its members against the employer who permitted director-hyphenates to work, plainly an independent violation of 8 (b) (1) (B). The Administrative Law Judge found that of the 15 union members employed as directors by petitioners, 3 were charged with strike rule violations, and 1 was brought before a trial panel and disciplined. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-1162, p. 29a. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> The Court holds today that a labor union locked in a direct economic confrontation with an employer is powerless to impose sanctions on its own members who choose to pledge their loyalty to the adversary. Nothing in 8 (b) (1) (B) or any other provision of the National Labor Relations Act permits such a radical alteration of the natural balance of [437 U.S. 411, 439] power between labor and management. I therefore respectfully dissent. </s> A union's ability to maintain a unified front in its confrontations with management and to impose disciplinary sanctions on those who "adher[e] to the enemy in time of struggle" are essential to its survival as an effective organization. See Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 1049, 1066 (1951). An employer also has an interest in securing the loyalty of those who represent him in dealings with the union, and that interest is protected by specific provisions of the Act. 1 Thus, as the Court observed in Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790 (FP&L), very real concerns are raised on both sides when supervisory employees with collective-bargaining and grievance-adjustment responsibilities are also union members. But 8 (b) (1) (B) is not "any part of the solution to the generalized problem of supervisor-member conflict of loyalties." 417 U.S., at 813 . </s> That statutory provision was enacted for the primary purpose of prohibiting a union from exerting direct pressure on an employer to force him into a multiemployer bargaining unit or to dictate his choice of representatives for the settlement of employee grievances. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 21 (1947). The Court in FP&L reserved decision on whether union pressure expressly aimed at affecting the manner in which supervisor-members performed their collective-bargaining or grievance-adjustment functions might [437 U.S. 411, 440] fall within the "outer limits" of the proscription of 8 (b) (1) (B). 417 U.S., at 805 . See San Francisco-Oakland Mailers' Union NO. 18 (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N. L. R. B. 2173. But it flatly rejected the argument that union discipline aimed at enforcing uniform rules violated 8 (b) (1) (B) simply because it might have the ancillary effect of "depriv[ing] the employer of the full allegiance of, and control over, a representative he has selected for grievance adjustment or collective bargaining purposes." 417 U.S., at 807 . </s> In the present cases it is entirely clear that the union had no interest in restraining or coercing the employers in the selection of their bargaining or grievance-adjustment representatives, or in affecting the manner in which supervisory employees performed those functions. As the Court notes, ante, at 417-418, and n. 6, the union expressed no interest at the disciplinary trials in the kind of work that was done behind its picket lines. Its sole purpose was to enforce the traditional kinds of rules that every union relies on to maintain its organization and solidarity in the face of the potential hardship of a strike. Cf. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 181 -184. </s> In reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, this Court today forbids a union from disciplining a supervisor-member who crosses its picket line - who clearly gives "aid and comfort to the enemy" during a strike, see Summers, supra, at 1066 - solely because that action may have the incidental effect of depriving the employer of the hypothetical grievance-adjustment services of that particular supervisor for the duration of the strike. This ruling quite simply gives the employer the superior right to call on the loyalty of any supervisor with grievance-adjustment responsibilities, 2 whenever [437 U.S. 411, 441] the union to which the supervisor belongs calls him out on strike. In short, the Court's decision prevents a union with supervisory members from effectively calling and enforcing a strike. 3 </s> Nothing in 8 (b) (1) (B) permits such a sweeping limitation on the choice of economic weapons by unions that include supervisory employees among their members. On the contrary, as the Court clearly held in FP&L, supra, an employer's remedy if he does not want to share the loyalty of his supervisors with a union is to insist that his supervisory personnel not belong to a union; or if he does not welcome the consequences of his supervisors' union membership he may legally penalize them for engaging in union activities, see n. 1, supra, or "resolv[e] such conflicts as arise through the traditional procedures of collective bargaining." FP&L, supra, at 813. 4 </s> The sole function of 8 (b) (1) (B) is to protect an employer from any union coercion of the free choice of his bargaining or grievance-adjustment representative. In prohibiting union interference in his choice of representatives for dealings with the union, this statutory provision does not in any [437 U.S. 411, 442] way grant him a right to interfere in the union's relationship with its supervisor-members. 5 The statute leaves the balance of power in equipoise. The Court's decision, by contrast, tips it measurably in favor of the employer at the most delicate point of direct confrontation, by completely preventing the union from enlisting the aid of its supervisor-members in a strike effort. It seems to me that the Court's reading of 8 (b) (1) (B) is "fundamentally inconsistent with the structure of the Act and the function of the sections relied upon." American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 . </s> Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 This interest is protected by 2 (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, which excludes "supervisors" as defined in 2 (11) from the definition of "employees," thereby excluding them from the coverage of the Act. Thus an employer may discharge or otherwise penalize a supervisory employee for engaging in what would otherwise be protected concerted activity under the Act. In addition, 14 (a) of the Act provides that "no employer . . . shall be compelled to deem . . . supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law . . . relating to collective bargaining." See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Electrical Workers, 417 U.S. 790, 808 -811. </s> [Footnote 2 Since the power to adjust employee grievances is one of the statutory indicia of supervisory status under 2 (11) of the Act, many if not most [437 U.S. 411, 441] supervisory employees will fall within the Court's ruling when they are "restrain[ed] . . . from going to work and from performing the normal duties of their positions, which includ[e] the adjustment of grievances." Ante, at 431-432. </s> [Footnote 3 Under this rule, it would appear that a separate union consisting entirely of supervisory employees would commit an unfair labor practice if it ordered its members not to cross the picket lines of another union, or indeed, if it called an economic strike entirely on its own, since the employer would thereby be deprived of the services of his chosen grievance-adjustment representatives. </s> [Footnote 4 Alternatively, the employer may ease the dilemma of his supervisory employees by offering to provide their defense or to indemnify them against any fines that might be imposed by the union for a breach of strike discipline. Several of the employers in this case did in fact extend such offers to the hyphenates. See decision of the Administrative Law Judge, App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 76-1162, p. 42a. </s> [Footnote 5 In San Francisco-Oakland Mailers Union No. 18 (Northwest Publications, Inc.), 172 N. L. R. B. 2173, the Board found a violation of 8 (b) (1) (B) when a union expelled member-foremen for allegedly assigning bargaining-unit work in violation of the collective-bargaining agreement. It reasoned that the employer's statutory right to choose his bargaining representative would be rendered illusory if the union could effectively control the actions of any individual who happened to occupy the position. I adhere to the view expressed by the Court in FP&L, 417 U.S., at 805 , that this ruling is at best within the "outer limits" of 8 (b) (1) (B). </s> [437 U.S. 411, 443]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. SHUBERT(1955) No. 36 Argued: Decided: January 31, 1955 </s> In a civil antitrust action brought by the Government to restrain alleged violations of 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the complaint alleged, inter alia, that the defendants are engaged in the business of producing, booking and presenting legitimate theatrical attractions on a multistate basis; that this business requires a constant, continuous stream of interstate trade and commerce; and that the defendants have restrained this trade and commerce and have monopolized certain phases of it. Held: The complaint states a cause of action, and the Government is entitled to an opportunity to prove its allegations. Pp. 223-231. </s> (a) As described in the complaint, defendants' business of producing, booking and presenting legitimate theatrical attractions on a multistate basis constitutes "trade or commerce" that is "among the several States" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Pp. 225-227. </s> (b) Hart v. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 , followed. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 , and Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 , distinguished. Pp. 227-230. </s> (c) The Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions afford no basis for a conclusion that all business built around the performance of local exhibitions are exempt from the Sherman Act. Pp. 227-230. </s> 120 F. Supp. 15, reversed. </s> Philip Elman argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Sobeloff, Assistant Attorney General Barnes and Daniel M. Friedman. </s> Alfred McCormack argued the cause and filed a brief for appellees. With him on the brief were William Klein, Adolph Lund and Gerald Schoenfeld for Shubert et al., and John J. O'Connell for Heiman, appellees. [348 U.S. 222, 223] </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is a civil antitrust action brought by the Government in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Named as defendants are Lee Shubert, 1 Jacob J. Shubert, Marcus Heiman, and three corporations controlled by them. 2 The defendants are principally engaged in the business of producing legitimate theatrical attractions, 3 booking legitimate attractions in theatres throughout the United States, 4 and operating approximately 40 theatres in eight states for the presentation of legitimate attractions. 5 The Government's [348 U.S. 222, 224] complaint charges that the defendants, in the course of this business, have violated 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 6 On the defendants' motion, after this Court's decision in Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 , the District Court dismissed the Government's complaint on the authority of the Toolson decision, and Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 . 7 The case is here on direct appeal under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. 29. [348 U.S. 222, 225] </s> The Government's complaint, which is summarized in an appendix to this opinion, describes the interstate phases of the defendants' theatrical business in considerable detail. It concludes that the business of producing, booking, and presenting legitimate attractions requires </s> "a constant, continuous stream of trade and commerce between the States of the United States, consisting of the assemblage of personnel and property for rehearsals, the transportation of said personnel and property to various cities throughout the United States, the making and performing of contracts under which attractions are routed and presented in various States of the United States, and the transmission of applications, letters, memoranda, communications, commitments, contracts, money, checks, drafts and other media of exchange across State lines." </s> The complaint alleges that the defendants have restrained this trade and commerce, and have monopolized certain phases of it, through a conspiracy (a) to compel other producers to book their legitimate attractions exclusively through the defendants, (b) to exclude others from booking legitimate attractions, (c) to prevent competition in the presentation of legitimate attractions, (d) to discriminate in favor of their own productions with respect to booking and presentation, and (e) to combine their power in booking and presentation in order to maintain and strengthen their domination in each of these fields. The main relief sought by the Government is the divorcement of the booking and presentation branches of the business. </s> The allegations of the complaint, on a motion to dismiss, must of course be taken as true. And the defendants do not deny that the allegations state a cause of [348 U.S. 222, 226] action if their business is subject to the Sherman Act. The question presented is thus a narrow one: whether the business of producing, booking, and presenting legitimate attractions on a multistate basis constitutes "trade or commerce" that is "among the several States" within the meaning of those terms in the Sherman Act. </s> Both terms have been interpreted broadly in the decisions of this Court. "[T]rade or commerce" has been held to include the production, distribution, and exhibition of motion pictures (United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 ; Schine Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 ; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 ; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 ; Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 ; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291 ); real estate brokerage (United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 ); the gathering and distribution of news (Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 ); medical services to members of a health cooperative (American Medical Association v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 ); and insurance underwriting (United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533 ). A similarly liberal construction has been given the requirement of 1 and 2 that the "trade or commerce" be "among the several States." Thus, in the South-Eastern Underwriters case, the requirement was satisfied by a "continuous and indivisible stream of intercourse among the states" involving the transmission of large sums of money and communications by mail, telephone, and telegraph. Cf. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 303 U.S. 419, 432 -433; North American Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 327 U.S. 686, 694 -695. In the Associated Press case, the requirement was satisfied by the interstate dissemination of news. See also Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, [348 U.S. 222, 227] 342 U.S. 143 . And in the motion picture cases, the requirement was satisfied by the interstate transportation of films, Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, supra, even though the actual "showing of motion pictures is of course a local affair." United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra, at 183. See also Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 . 8 </s> These decisions, apart from Federal Baseball and Toolson, make it clear beyond question that the allegations of the Government's complaint bring the defendants within the scope of the Sherman Act, even though the actual performance of a legitimate stage attraction "is of course a local affair." The defendants contend, however, that Federal Baseball and Toolson have already established their immunity under the Act. While conceding, as they must, that the motion picture industry is subject to the antitrust laws, they insist that all other businesses built around the performance of local exhibitions are exempt. 9 We believe that Federal Baseball and Toolson afford no basis for such a conclusion. [348 U.S. 222, 228] </s> In Federal Baseball, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, was dealing with the business of baseball and nothing else. The Court considered the nature of the game, its history and league organization, the necessity of arranging games between cities in different states, and the resulting travel across state lines. The travel, the Court concluded, was "a mere incident, not the essential thing." On that basis, the Court held that "the restrictions by contract that prevented the plaintiff from getting players to break their bargains and the other conduct charged against the defendants were not an interference with commerce among the States." 259 U.S., at 209 . </s> At the very next Term, in Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 , the Court was directly concerned with the effect of the Federal Baseball decision on the status of the theatrical business under the Sherman Act. The complaint in the Hart case, much like the complaint here under review, alleged a conspiracy to control the booking and presentation of vaudeville acts in theatres throughout the country. The district court, like the district court in the instant case, dismissed the complaint on the authority of Federal Baseball. This Court, again speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, unanimously reversed. 10 The Court took note of the [348 U.S. 222, 229] plaintiff's argument "that in the transportation of vaudeville acts the apparatus sometimes is more important than the performers" and concluded that the complaint, at least to that extent, sufficiently alleged a violation of the Act to permit the case to go to trial. The Court distinguished Federal Baseball on the ground that "what in general is incidental, in some instances may rise to a magnitude that requires it to be considered independently." The Court thus established, contrary to the defendants' argument here, that Federal Baseball did not automatically immunize the theatrical business from the antitrust laws. </s> In Toolson, where the issue was the same as in Federal Baseball, the Court was confronted with a unique combination of circumstances. For over 30 years there had stood a decision of this Court specifically fixing the status of the baseball business under the antitrust laws and more particularly the validity of the so-called "reserve clause." During this period, in reliance on the Federal Baseball precedent, the baseball business had grown and developed. Compare Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 110 . And Congress, although it had actively considered the ruling, had not seen fit to reject it by amendatory legislation. Against this background, the Court in Toolson was asked to overrule Federal Baseball on the ground that it was [348 U.S. 222, 230] out of step with subsequent decisions reflecting present-day concepts of interstate commerce. The Court, in view of the circumstances of the case, declined to do so. But neither did the Court necessarily reaffirm all that was said in Federal Baseball. Instead, "[w]ithout re-examination of the underlying issues," the Court adhered to Federal Baseball "so far as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust laws." 346 U.S., at 357 . In short, Toolson was a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis. </s> The defendants would have us convert this narrow application of the rule into a sweeping grant of immunity to every business based on the live presentation of local exhibitions, regardless of how extensive its interstate phases may be. We cannot do so. If the Toolson holding is to be expanded - or contracted - the appropriate remedy lies with Congress. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 561 . Moreover, none of the considerations which led to the decision in Toolson are present here. This Court has never held that the theatrical business is not subject to the Sherman Act. On the contrary, less than a year after the Federal Baseball decision, the Court in the Hart case put the theatrical business on notice that Federal Baseball could not be relied upon as a basis for exemption from the antitrust laws. The rule of stare decisis undoubtedly embodies a policy of basic importance, but the rule cannot help the defendants here. If it is to be applied, Hart and the motion picture cases - not Federal Baseball and Toolson - are the controlling decisions. </s> We are not yet called upon to determine whether the defendants have in fact violated the Sherman Act or if they have what relief would be appropriate. We hold only that the allegations of the complaint state a cause [348 U.S. 222, 231] of action and that the Government is entitled to an opportunity to prove those allegations. The judgment of the court below is </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BURTON, retaining the views expressed in his dissent in the Toolson case, 346 U.S. 356, 357 , joins the opinion and judgment of the Court in this case. MR. JUSTICE REED joins in this concurrence. </s> MR. JUSTICE MINTON agrees with the judgment in this case because, as it comes here on the pleadings, it is controlled by the Hart case. Whether the Government can prove its case now to the satisfaction of present courts, which the plaintiff could not do in the Hart case, 12 F.2d 341, remains to be seen. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. </s> The defendants state at page 3 of their brief: "The allegations of the complaint are summarized adequately at pages 5 to 11 of the Government's brief." That portion of the Government's brief is set out below: </s> Production of a legitimate theatrical attraction involves (1) assembling of its component elements, including a script, financial backing, actors, stage hands, designers, advertising agents, scenery, costumes, lighting, and music; (2) rehearsals to weld the parts into an attraction suitable for presentation; (3) arranging for the booking and presentation of the attraction in a try-out town or towns, in New York City, and in road-show towns; and (4) transporting the entire cast and scenery to try-out towns, to New York City, and to road-show towns throughout the United States to fulfill these bookings and presentation arrangements (par. 24, R. 4). At the present time the cost of producing a play runs from $60,000 to $100,000, and of a musical from $200,000 to $300,000 [348 U.S. 222, 232] (par. 25, R. 4). Persons other than the producer usually supply the necessary financing (ibid.). Frequently the production is incorporated and shares of stock are sold to investors, or the producer organizes a limited partnership (ibid.). All the appellees invest in legitimate attractions (pars. 3-7, R. 1-3). </s> After the production has been assembled and rehearsals have been completed, the attraction is presented in one or more "try-out" towns for the purpose of judging audience reaction and correcting observed deficiencies (pars. 20, 26, R. 4, 5). Audience reaction in try-out towns is important in gauging subsequent financial success in New York City and on the road (par. 26, R. 5). The attraction is then presented in New York City (par. 27, R. 5). If the run there is successful, the attraction is sent on tour to "road-show" towns throughout the United States (ibid.). This road-show tour is an "integral part of the exploitation of the attraction" and is the source of a "substantial part" of its profits (ibid.). </s> With the exception of a few cities, a legitimate attraction ordinarily cannot profitably play in a road-show town for more than a limited period of time, seldom exceeding two weeks. The producer of a play must therefore obtain playing dates in a number of suitable road-show towns, arranged so as to minimize lay-offs and travel between engagements. Successful operation of a theatre in a road-show town requires scheduling legitimate attractions so as to keep the theatre as continuously occupied as possible during the theatrical season. Playing dates of a road-show town must therefore be arranged so as to meet the needs of both the producer and the theatre operator. (Par. 29, R. 5.) </s> UBO acts as middleman between producers and operators of theatres in try-out and road-show towns, but is regarded as the agent of the theatre operators and usually receives, as compensation for its services, five per cent of the operator's share of the theatre's gross receipts (par. 28, R. 5). Each year UBO enters into or renews agreements with theatre operators to act as their booking agent (par. 30, R. 5). After negotiation with the producer of an attraction, UBO tentatively schedules it at [348 U.S. 222, 233] various theatres throughout the United States, and contracts covering presentation at these theatres are subsequently executed (id., R. 5-6). The booking of legitimate attractions involves the cross-country routing of attractions in a constant stream to and from theatres in various cities throughout the United States (par. 28, R. 5). </s> The individual appellees control the booking of legitimate attractions in try-out and road-show towns in the United States (par. 37, R. 7). Apart from Select and a subsidiary thereof, UBO is the only concern in the country which books legitimate attractions throughout the United States (par. 5, R. 2). From 1932 to 1946, UBO followed a policy of entering into franchise agreements with theatre operators making UBO the exclusive booking agent for their theatres (par. 40, R. 8-9). About 1946, UBO discontinued formal franchise agreements and adopted in lieu thereof a system of listings which, as tacitly understood by the parties, continued the previous contract arrangements (id., R. 9). </s> The appellees operate or participate in the operation of approximately forty theatres in eight states (par. 42, R. 9). They operate or control all the theatres in "virtually all" key try-out towns, and in several important road-show towns (par. 41, R. 9). * Approximately fifty per cent of all the theatres in New York City are owned or operated by the Shubert appellees (pars. 15, 41, R. 3, 9). </s> In producing, booking, and presenting legitimate attractions, there is a constant, continuous stream of trade and commerce between the various states, consisting of [348 U.S. 222, 234] assemblage of personnel and property for rehearsals, transportation of such personnel and property to various cities, making and performing contracts under which attractions are routed and presented in various states, and transmission of applications, letters, memoranda, communications, contracts, money, checks, drafts, and other media of exchange across state lines (par. 49, R. 12). </s> The substantial elements of appellees' conspiracy to restrain and monopolize, attempted monopolization, and monopolization have been that the appellees, by concert of action: (a) compel producers to book their legitimate attractions exclusively through appellees; (b) exclude others from booking legitimate attractions; (c) prevent competition in presentation of these attractions; (d) discriminate in favor of their own productions with respect to booking and presentation; and (e) combine their power in booking and presentation in order to maintain and strengthen their domination in each of these fields (par. 51, R. 13). </s> The means which the appellees have used in carrying out the foregoing acts have included the following: </s> (1) Conditioning their investments in legitimate attractions produced by others, and conditioning the booking of legitimate attractions in try-out towns and in New York City, upon agreement by the producers to book these attractions exclusively through appellees (pars. 52 (a), (d), (e), R. 13). </s> (2) Forcing producers to book their legitimate attractions for an entire theatrical season exclusively through appellees (par. 52 (c), R. 13). </s> (3) Coercing producers who had booked through others to pay penalties or to accept discriminatory booking terms, as a condition of obtaining booking through them (par. 52 (f), R. 13). </s> (4) Entering into agreements with theatre operators whereby the operators agree to present only attractions booked through appellees, and appellees agree not to book for competing theatre operators (par. 52 (g), R. 13). </s> (5) Excluding legitimate attractions booked by others from theatres operated by appellees (par. 52 (h), R. 13). [348 U.S. 222, 235] </s> (6) Coercing and intimidating independent theatre operators in towns where appellees operate theatres to relinquish control of their theatres by threatening to deprive them, by virtue of appellees' control of booking, of access to legitimate attractions (par. 52 (k), R. 14). </s> Some of the effects of appellees' concerted actions have been that producers have been forced to book exclusively with appellees on non-competitive terms; persons have been denied the right to engage in the business of operating a booking office; operators of independent theatres competing with those of appellees have been systematically excluded from obtaining legitimate attractions and, in many cities, have been forced out of business; in cities in which the appellees operate theatres, persons have been denied the right to engage in the business of presenting legitimate attractions, and the public has been deprived of access to legitimate attractions and the benefits which flow from open competition; and interstate commerce in production, booking, and presentation has been unreasonably restrained, and in booking and presentation has been monopolized (par. 53, R. 14). </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Lee Shubert died prior to entry of the District Court's judgment. His executors have not been substituted as parties. </s> [Footnote 2 The corporations are the United Booking Office, Inc. ("UBO"), Select Theatres Corporation ("Select"), and L. A. B. Amusement Corporation ("L. A. B."). Since the filing of the complaint, L. A. B. has been dissolved and its assets vested in Marcus Heiman personally. </s> [Footnote 3 The complaint defines "legitimate attractions" as "stage attractions performed in person by professional actors" including "plays, musicals, and operettas" but not ordinarily including "stock company attractions, vaudeville, burlesque, bands, individual dancers, dance groups, concerts, and vocal or instrumental presentations." The complaint alleges that a play costs approximately $60,000 to $100,000 to produce, whereas a musical generally requires from $200,000 to $300,000. As much as one-third of the cost, according to the complaint, may be attributable to expenditures for scenery, props, and related items and services. </s> [Footnote 4 "Booking" is defined in the complaint as "the arrangements, generally made through a booking office, between producers and operators for the routing and presentation of legitimate attractions and the fixing of playing dates." The complaint alleges that UBO, apart from Select and a subsidiary thereof, is the only concern in the country that books legitimate attractions throughout the United States. </s> [Footnote 5 The complaint defines "presentation" as "the operation of a theatre or theatres and the exhibition of legitimate attractions therein." The defendants, according to the complaint, operate or control all the theatres in virtually all key "try-out" cities (including [348 U.S. 222, 224] Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore), all the theatres in several important "road-show" cities (including Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia), almost all the theatres in other important "road-show" cities (Chicago and Detroit), and approximately half of the theatres in New York City. </s> [Footnote 6 15 U.S.C. 1 and 2. These sections provide: </s> " 1. . . . Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . . Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1-7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . . </s> " 2. . . . Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ." </s> Section 4 confers jurisdiction on the district courts "to prevent and restrain violations of sections 1-7 of this title" in equity proceedings instituted under the direction of the Attorney General. </s> [Footnote 7 The court issued the following order: </s> "In principle, I can see no valid distinction between the facts of this case and those which were before the Supreme Court in the cases of Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S. Ct. 465, 66 L. Ed. 898, and Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356, 74 S. Ct. 78. </s> "Upon the authority of these adjudications the complaint in the above-entitled action will be dismissed." 120 F. Supp. 15, 16. </s> [Footnote 8 Moreover, once interstate commerce is established, the Sherman Act may be applied even to "local" restraints on that commerce. E. g., Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 ; United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn., 336 U.S. 460 ; United States v. Employing Plasterers Association, 347 U.S. 186 . Cf. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 118 -119. </s> [Footnote 9 The defendants seek to distinguish the motion picture cases on the ground that the product of the motion picture industry is "an article of trade . . . an inanimate thing - a reel of photographic film in a metal box - which moves into interstate commerce like any other manufactured product"; on the other hand, according to this argument, a legitimate theatrical attraction is "intangible and evanescent, unique and individual . . . an experience of living people." Compare United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533, 546 : ". . . Congress can regulate traffic though it consist [348 U.S. 222, 228] of intangibles." And see Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 . </s> That other segments of the entertainment business, besides the motion picture industry, may constitute interstate commerce is well established. See, e. g., Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (radio). </s> [Footnote 10 On remand, the trial court understood the Holmes opinion as authorizing a later dismissal if the plaintiff's evidence failed to establish that the transportation was more than "incidental." On that basis, the trial court dismissed the action and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 12 F.2d 341. This Court denied certiorari. 273 U.S. 703 . But, as the defendants admit, a denial of certiorari does not constitute [348 U.S. 222, 229] an expression on the merits. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 489 -497. That rule is particularly appropriate where the decision sought to be reviewed is essentially a factual determination. Compare Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Co., 336 U.S. 271, 274 -275. </s> For lower court decisions holding the theatrical business to be subject to the Sherman Act, see Judge Learned Hand in Marienelli v. United Booking Offices of America, 227 F. 165 (D.C. S. D. N. Y.), and Judge Charles Clark in Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647 (C. A. 2d Cir.), modified in 186 F.2d 637 (C. A. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 935 . But cf. San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825 (D.C. S. D. N. Y.), affirmed, 163 F.2d 310 (C. A. 2d Cir.), involving a personal employment contract under the Federal Arbitration Act. </s> [Footnote * The appellees control or operate the only theatre in Baltimore, the six theatres in Boston, seven of the nine theatres in Chicago, the only theatre in Cincinnati, the only theatre in Los Angeles, and the four theatres in Philadelphia (par. 42, R. 9-10). They have an interest in two of the three theatres in Detroit (par. 42 E, R. 10). The only theatre in New Haven is operated under a five-year agreement with a subsidiary of Select, which provides that the operator will accept only attractions booked through this subsidiary (par. 43, R. 11). UBO has exclusive booking rights for the only theatre in Toledo, Ohio (par. 45, R. 11). </s> The "key" try-out towns are Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Haven (par. 26, R. 4). [Footnote in original.] </s> [348 U.S. 222, 236]

United States Supreme Court BARTNICKI et al. v. VOPPER, aka WILLIAMS, et al.(2001) No. 99-1687 Argued: December 5, 2000Decided: May 21, 2001 </s> During contentious collective-bargaining negotiations between a union representing teachers at a Pennsylvania high school and the local school board, an unidentified person intercepted and recorded a cell phone conversation between the chief union negotiator and the union president (hereinafter petitioners). After the parties accepted a nonbinding arbitration proposal generally favorable to the teachers, respondent Vopper, a radio commentator, played a tape of the intercepted conversation on his public affairs talk show in connection with news reports about the settlement. Petitioners filed this damages suit under both federal and state wiretapping laws, alleging, among other things, that their conversation had been surreptitiously intercepted by an unknown person; that respondent Yocum, the head of a local organization opposed to the union's demands, had obtained the tape and intentionally disclosed it to, inter alios, media representatives; and that they had repeatedly published the conversation even though they knew or had reason to know that it had been illegally intercepted. In ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court concluded that, under the statutory language, an individual violates the federal Act by intentionally disclosing the contents of an electronic communication when he or she knows or has reason to know that the information was obtained through an illegal interception, even if the individual was not involved in that interception; found that the question whether the interception was intentional raised a genuine issue of material fact; and rejected respondents' defense that they were protected by the First Amendment even if the disclosures violated the statutes, finding that the statutes werecontent-neutral laws of general applicability containing no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech. The Third Circuit accepted an interlocutory appeal, and the United States, also a petitioner, intervened to defend the federal Act's constitutionality. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court found the statutes invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the private interests at stake, and remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for respondents. </s> Held:The First Amendment protects the disclosures made by respondents in this suit. Pp. 6-20. </s> (a)Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended, generally prohibits the interception of wire, electronic, and oral communications. Title 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) applies to the person who willfully intercepts such communications and subsection (c) to any person who, knowing or having reason to know that the communication was obtained through an illegal interception, willfully discloses its contents. Pp. 6-9. </s> (b)Because of this suit's procedural posture, the Court accepts that the interception was unlawful and that respondents had reason to know that. Accordingly, the disclosures violated the statutes. In answering the remaining question whether the statutes' application in such circumstances violates the First Amendment, the Court accepts respondents' submissions that they played no part in the illegal interception, that their access to the information was obtained lawfully, and that the conversations dealt with a matter of public concern. Pp. 9-10. </s> (c) Section 2511(1)(c) is a content-neutral law of general applicability. The statute's purpose is to protect the privacy of wire, electronic, and oral communications, and it singles out such communications by virtue of the fact that they were illegally intercepted--by virtue of the source rather than the subject matter. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791. On the other hand, the prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of speech. Pp. 10-12. </s> (d)In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, this Court upheld the press' right to publish information of great public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party. In so doing, this Court focused on the stolen documents' character and the consequences of public disclosure, not on the fact that the documents were stolen. Ibid. It also left open the question whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but also the ensuing publication. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 535, n. 8. The issue here is a narrower version of that question: Where the publisher has lawfully obtained information from a source who obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing publication based on the defect in a chain? The Court's refusal to construe the issue more broadly is consistent with its repeated refusal to answer categorically whether the publication of truthful information may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment. Accordingly, the Court considers whether, given the facts here, the interests served by §2511(1)(c) justify its restrictions on speech. Pp.12-14. </s> (e)The first interest identified by the Government--removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations--does not justify applying §2511(1)(c) to an otherwise innocent disclosure of public information. The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to punish the person engaging in it. It would be remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party. In virtually all §2511(1)(a), (c), or (d) violations, the interceptor's identity has been known. There is no evidence that Congress thought that the prohibition against disclosures would deter illegal interceptions, and no evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition reduces the number of such interceptions. Pp.14-16. </s> (f)The Government's second interest--minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted--is considerably stronger. Privacy of communication is an important interest. However, in this suit, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy. The profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open supported this Court's holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, that neither factual error nor defamatory content, nor a combination of the two, sufficed to remove the First Amendment shield from criticism of official conduct. Parallel reasoning requires the conclusion that a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern. Pp. 16-20. </s> 200 F.3d 109, affirmed. </s> Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which O'Connor, J., joined. Rehnquist, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined. </s> GLORIA BARTNICKI and ANTHONY F. KANE, Jr., PETITIONERS </s> 99-1687v. </s> FREDERICK W. VOPPER, aka FRED WILLIAMS, et al. </s> UNITED STATES, PETITIONER </s> 99-1728v. </s> FREDERICK W. VOPPER, aka FRED WILLIAMS, et al. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit </s> [May 21, 2001] </s> Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases raise an important question concerning what degree of protection, if any, the First Amendment provides to speech that discloses the contents of an illegally intercepted communication. That question is both novel and narrow. Despite the fact that federal law has prohibited such disclosures since 1934,1 this is the first time that we have confronted such an issue. </s> The suit at hand involves the repeated intentional disclosure of an illegally intercepted cellular telephone conversation about a public issue. The persons who made the disclosures did not participate in the interception, but they did know--or at least had reason to know--that the interception was unlawful. Accordingly, these cases present a conflict between interests of the highest order--on the one hand, the interest in the full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest in individual privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private speech. The Framers of the First Amendment surely did not foresee the advances in science that produced the conversation, the interception, or the conflict that gave rise to this action. It is therefore not surprising that Circuit judges, as well as the Members of this Court, have come to differing conclusions about the First Amendment's application to this issue. Nevertheless, having considered the interests at stake, we are firmly convinced that the disclosures made by respondents in this suit are protected by the First Amendment. </s> I </s> During 1992 and most of 1993, the Pennsylvania State Education Association, a union representing the teachers at the Wyoming Valley West High School, engaged in collective-bargaining negotiations with the school board. Petitioner Kane, then the president of the local union, testified that the negotiations were "`contentious'" and received "a lot of media attention." App. 97, 92. In May 1993, petitioner Bartnicki, who was acting as the union's "chief negotiator," used the cellular phone in her car to call Kane and engage in a lengthy conversation about the status of the negotiations. An unidentified person intercepted and recorded that call. </s> In their conversation, Kane and Bartnicki discussed the timing of a proposed strike, id., at 41-45, difficulties created by public comment on the negotiations, id., at 46, and the need for a dramatic response to the board's intransigence. At one point, Kane said: "`If they're not gonna move for three percent, we're gonna have to go to their, their homes . . . To blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys. (PAUSES). Really, uh, really and truthfully because this is, you know, this is bad news. (UNDECIPHERABLE).'" Ibid. </s> In the early fall of 1993, the parties accepted a non-binding arbitration proposal that was generally favorable to the teachers. In connection with news reports about the settlement, respondent Vopper, a radio commentator who had been critical of the union in the past, played a tape of the intercepted conversation on his public affairs talk show. Another station also broadcast the tape, and local newspapers published its contents. After filing suit against Vopper and other representatives of the media, Bartnicki and Kane (hereinafter petitioners) learned through discovery that Vopper had obtained the tape from Jack Yocum, the head of a local taxpayers' organization that had opposed the union's demands throughout the negotiations. Yocum, who was added as a defendant, testified that he had found the tape in his mailbox shortly after the interception and recognized the voices of Bartnicki and Kane. Yocum played the tape for some members of the school board, and later delivered the tape itself to Vopper. </s> II </s> In their amended complaint, petitioners alleged that their telephone conversation had been surreptitiously intercepted by an unknown person using an electronic device, that Yocum had obtained a tape of that conversation, and that he intentionally disclosed it to Vopper, as well as other individuals and media representatives. Thereafter, Vopper and other members of the media repeatedly published the contents of that conversation. The amended complaint alleged that each of the defendants "knew or had reason to know" that the recording of the private telephone conversation had been obtained by means of an illegal interception. Relying on both federal and Pennsylvania statutory provisions, petitioners sought actual damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs.2 </s> After the parties completed their discovery, they filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Respondents contended that they had not violated the statute because (a) they had nothing to do with the interception, and (b) in any event, their actions were not unlawful since the conversation might have been intercepted inadvertently. Moreover, even if they had violated the statute by disclosing the intercepted conversation, respondents argued, those disclosures were protected by the First Amendment. The District Court rejected the first statutory argument because, under the plain statutory language, an individual violates the federal Act by intentionally disclosing the contents of an electronic communication when he or she "know[s] or ha[s] reason to know that the information was obtained" through an illegal interception.3 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 99-1687, pp. 53a-54a. Accordingly, actual involvement in the illegal interception is not necessary in order to establish a violation of that statute. With respect to the second statutory argument, the District Court agreed that petitioners had to prove that the interception in question was intentional,4 but concluded that the text of the interception raised a genuine issue of material fact with respect to intent. That issue of fact was also the basis for the District Court's denial of petitioners' motion. Finally, the District Court rejected respondents' First Amendment defense because the statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability that contained "no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech." Id., at 55a-56a. </s> Thereafter, the District Court granted a motion for an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(b). It certified as controlling questions of law: "(1) whether the imposition of liability on the media Defendants under the [wiretapping statutes] solely for broadcasting the newsworthy tape on the Defendant [Vopper's] radio/public affairs program, when the tape was illegally intercepted and recorded by unknown persons who were not agents of [the] Defendants, violates the First Amendment; and (2) whether imposition of liability under the aforesaid [wiretapping] statutes on Defendant Jack Yocum solely for providing the anonymously intercepted and recorded tape to the media Defendants violates the First Amendment." App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 99-1728, p. 76a. The Court of Appeals accepted the appeal, and the United States, also a petitioner, intervened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2403 in order to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute. </s> All three members of the panel agreed with petitioners and the Government that the federal and Pennsylvania wiretapping statutes are "content neutral" and therefore subject to "intermediate scrutiny." 200 F.3d 109, 121 (CA3 1999). Applying that standard, the majority concluded that the statutes were invalid because they deterred significantly more speech than necessary to protect the privacy interests at stake. The court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment for respondents. In dissent, Senior Judge Pollak expressed the view that the prohibition against disclosures was necessary in order to remove the incentive for illegal interceptions and to preclude compounding the harm caused by such interceptions through wider dissemination. In so doing, he agreed with the majority opinion in a similar case decided by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (1999). See also Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (CA5 2000).5 We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 530 U.S. 1260 (2000). </s> III </s> As we pointed out in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-49 (1967), sophisticated (and not so sophisticated) methods of eavesdropping on oral conversations and intercepting telephone calls have been practiced for decades, primarily by law enforcement authorities.6 In Berger, we held that New York's broadly written statute authorizing the police to conduct wiretaps violated the Fourth Amendment. Largely in response to that decision, and to our holding in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), that the attachment of a listening and recording device to the outside of a telephone booth constituted a search, "Congress undertook to draft comprehensive legislation both authorizing the use of evidence obtained by electronic surveillance on specified conditions, and prohibiting its use otherwise. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968)." Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 78 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The ultimate result of those efforts was Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211, entitled Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance. </s> One of the stated purposes of that title was "to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications." Ibid. In addition to authorizing and regulating electronic surveillance for law enforcement purposes, Title III also regulated private conduct. One part of those regulations, §2511(1), defined five offenses punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000, by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by both. Subsection (a) applied to any person who "willfully intercepts . . . any wire or oral communication." Subsection (b) applied to the intentional use of devices designed to intercept oral conversations; subsection (d) applied to the use of the contents of illegally intercepted wire or oral communications; and subsection (e) prohibited the unauthorized disclosure of the contents of interceptions that were authorized for law enforcement purposes. Subsection (c), the original version of the provision most directly at issue in this case, applied to any person who "willfully discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this subsection." The oral communications protected by the Act were only those "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation." 18 U.S.C. §2510(2). </s> As enacted in 1968, Title III did not apply to the monitoring of radio transmissions. In the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 1848, however, Congress enlarged the coverage of Title III to prohibit the interception of "electronic" as well as oral and wire communications. By reason of that amendment, as well as a 1994 amendment which applied to cordless telephone communications, 108 Stat. 4279, Title III now applies to the interception of conversations over both cellular and cordless phones.7 Although a lesser criminal penalty may apply to the interception of such transmissions, the same civil remedies are available whether the communication was "oral," "wire," or "electronic," as defined by 18 U.S.C. §2510 (1994 ed. and Supp. V). </s> IV </s> The constitutional question before us concerns the validity of the statutes as applied to the specific facts of this case. Because of the procedural posture of the case, it is appropriate to make certain important assumptions about those facts. We accept petitioners' submission that the interception was intentional, and therefore unlawful, and that, at a minimum, respondents "had reason to know" that it was unlawful. Accordingly, the disclosure of the contents of the intercepted conversation by Yocum to school board members and to representatives of the media, as well as the subsequent disclosures by the media defendants to the public, violated the federal and state statutes. Under the provisions of the federal statute, as well as its Pennsylvania analog, petitioners are thus entitled to recover damages from each of the respondents. The only question is whether the application of these statutes in such circumstances violates the First Amendment.8 </s> In answering that question, we accept respondents' submission on three factual matters that serve to distinguish most of the cases that have arisen under §2511. First, respondents played no part in the illegal interception. Rather, they found out about the interception only after it occurred, and in fact never learned the identity of the person or persons who made the interception. Second, their access to the information on the tapes was obtained lawfully, even though the information itself was intercepted unlawfully by someone else. Cf. Florida Star v.B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 536 (1989) ("Even assuming the Constitution permitted a State to proscribe receipt of information, Florida has not taken this step"). Third, the subject matter of the conversation was a matter of public concern. If the statements about the labor negotiations had been made in a public arena--during a bargaining session, for example--they would have been newsworthy. This would also be true if a third party had inadvertently overheard Bartnicki making the same statements to Kane when the two thought they were alone. </s> V </s> We agree with petitioners that §2511(1)(c), as well as its Pennsylvania analog, is in fact a content-neutral law of general applicability. "Deciding whether a particular regulation is content based or content neutral is not always a simple task. . . . As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-643 (1994). In determining whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, we look to the purpose behind the regulation; typically, "[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is `justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'" Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).9 </s> In this case, the basic purpose of the statute at issue is to "protec[t] the privacy of wire[, electronic,] and oral communications." S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 66 (1968). The statute does not distinguish based on the content of the intercepted conversations, nor is it justified by reference to the content of those conversations. Rather, the communications at issue are singled out by virtue of the fact that they were illegally intercepted--by virtue of the source, rather than the subject matter. </s> On the other hand, the naked prohibition against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech. Unlike the prohibition against the "use" of the contents of an illegal interception in §2511(1)(d),10 subsection (c) is not a regulation of conduct. It is true that the delivery of a tape recording might be regarded as conduct, but given that the purpose of such a delivery is to provide the recipient with the text of recorded statements, it is like the delivery of a handbill or a pamphlet, and as such, it is the kind of "speech" that the First Amendment protects.11 As the majority below put it, "[i]f the acts of `disclosing' and `publishing' information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that category, as distinct from the category of expressive conduct." 200 F.3d, at 120. </s> VI </s> As a general matter, "state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards." Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979). More specifically, this Court has repeatedly held that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need . . . of the highest order." Id., at 103; see also Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). </s> Accordingly, in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), the Court upheld the right of the press to publish information of great public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party. In so doing, that decision resolved a conflict between the basic rule against prior restraints on publication and the interest in preserving the secrecy of information that, if disclosed, might seriously impair the security of the Nation. In resolving that conflict, the attention of every Member of this Court was focused on the character of the stolen documents' contents and the consequences of public disclosure. Although the undisputed fact that the newspaper intended to publish information obtained from stolen documents was noted in Justice Harlan's dissent, id., at 754, neither the majority nor the dissenters placed any weight on that fact. </s> However, New York Times v. United States raised, but did not resolve the question "whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well."12 Florida Star, 491 U.S., at 535, n.8. The question here, however, is a narrower version of that still-open question. Simply put, the issue here is this: "Where the punished publisher of information has obtained the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source who has obtained it unlawfully, may the government punish the ensuing publication of that information based on the defect in a chain?" Boehner, 191 F.3d, at 484-485 (Sentelle, J., dissenting). </s> Our refusal to construe the issue presented more broadly is consistent with this Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment. Rather, </s> "[o]ur cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily. . . . We continue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment and privacy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case." Florida Star, 491 U.S., at 532-533. </s> See also Landmark Communications, 435 U.S., at 838. Accordingly, we consider whether, given the facts of this case, the interests served by §2511(1)(c) can justify its restrictions on speech. </s> The Government identifies two interests served by the statute--first, the interest in removing an incentive for parties to intercept private conversations, and second, the interest in minimizing the harm to persons whose conversations have been illegally intercepted. We assume that those interests adequately justify the prohibition in §2511(1)(d) against the interceptor's own use of information that he or she acquired by violating §2511(1)(a), but it by no means follows that punishing disclosures of lawfully obtained information of public interest by one not involved in the initial illegality is an acceptable means of serving those ends. </s> The normal method of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punishment on the person who engages in it. If the sanctions that presently attach to a violation of §2511(1)(a) do not provide sufficient deterrence, perhaps those sanctions should be made more severe. But it would be quite remarkable to hold that speech by a law-abiding possessor of information can be suppressed in order to deter conduct by a non-law-abiding third party. Although there are some rare occasions in which a law suppressing one party's speech may be justified by an interest in deterring criminal conduct by another, see, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982),13 this is not such a case. </s> With only a handful of exceptions, the violations of §2511(1)(a) that have been described in litigated cases have been motivated by either financial gain or domestic disputes.14 In virtually all of those cases, the identity of the person or persons intercepting the communication has been known.15 Moreover, petitioners cite no evidence that Congress viewed the prohibition against disclosures as a response to the difficulty of identifying persons making improper use of scanners and other surveillance devices and accordingly of deterring such conduct,16 and there is no empirical evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition against disclosures reduces the number of illegal interceptions.17 </s> Although this case demonstrates that there may be an occasional situation in which an anonymous scanner will risk criminal prosecution by passing on information without any expectation of financial reward or public praise, surely this is the exceptional case. Moreover, there is no basis for assuming that imposing sanctions upon respondents will deter the unidentified scanner from continuing to engage in surreptitious interceptions. Unusual cases fall far short of a showing that there is a "need of the highest order" for a rule supplementing the traditional means of deterring antisocial conduct. The justification for any such novel burden on expression must be "far stronger than mere speculation about serious harms." United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995).18 Accordingly, the Government's first suggested justification for applying §2511(1)(c) to an otherwiseinnocent disclosure of public information is plainlyinsufficient.19 </s> The Government's second argument, however, is considerably stronger. Privacy of communication is an important interest, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985),20 and Title III's restrictions are intended to protect that interest, thereby "encouraging the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private parties . . . ." Brief for United States 27. Moreover, the fear of public disclosure of private conversations might well have a chilling effect on private speech. </s> "In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that one's speech is being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas." President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 202 (1967). </s> Accordingly, it seems to us that there are important interests to be considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus. In considering that balance, we acknowledge that some intrusions on privacy are more offensive than others, and that the disclosure of the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself. As a result, there is a valid independent justification for prohibiting such disclosures by persons who lawfully obtained access to the contents of an illegally intercepted message, even if that prohibition does not play a significant role in preventing such interceptions from occurring in the first place. </s> We need not decide whether that interest is strong enough to justify the application of §2511(c) to disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-388 (1967) (reserving the question whether truthful publication of private matters unrelated to public affairs can be constitutionally proscribed). In other words, the outcome of the case does not turn on whether §2511(1)(c) may be enforced with respect to most violations of the statute without offending the First Amendment. The enforcement of that provision in this case, however, implicates the core purposes of the First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of public concern. </s> In this case, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the interest in publishing matters of public importance. As Warren and Brandeis stated in their classic law review article: "The right of privacy does not prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest." The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.Rev. 193, 214 (1890). One of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss of privacy. </s> "Exposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of press. `Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.'" Time, Inc. v. Hill, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).21 </s> Our opinion in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), reviewed many of the decisions that settled the "general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment." Id., at 269; see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). Those cases all relied on our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open," New York Times, 376 U.S., at 270; see Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Roth, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 342, 343, n.5, 345 (1946); Bridges, 314 U.S., at 270. </s> We think it clear that parallel reasoning requires the conclusion that a stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.22 The months of negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers at the Wyoming Valley West High School were unquestionably a matter of public concern, and respondents were clearly engaged in debate about that concern. That debate may be more mundane than the Communist rhetoric that inspired Justice Brandeis' classic opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S., at 372, but it is no less worthy of constitutional protection. </s> The judgment is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> GLORIA BARTNICKI and ANTHONY F. KANE, Jr., PETITIONERS </s> 99-1687v. </s> FREDERICK W. VOPPER, aka FRED WILLIAMS, et al. </s> UNITED STATES, PETITIONER </s> 99-1728v. </s> FREDERICK W. VOPPER, aka FRED WILLIAMS, et al. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit </s> [May 21, 2001] </s> Justice Breyer, with whom Justice O'Connor joins, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion because I agree with its "narrow" holding, see ante, at 1-2, limited to the special circumstances present here: (1) the radio broadcasters acted lawfully (up to the time of final public disclosure); and (2) the information publicized involved a matter of unusual public concern, namely a threat of potential physical harm to others. I write separately to explain why, in my view, the Court's holding does not imply a significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media. </s> As the Court recognizes, the question before us--a question of immunity from statutorily imposed civil liability--implicates competing constitutional concerns. Ante, at 17-18. The statutes directly interfere with free expression in that they prevent the media from publishing information. At the same time, they help to protect personal privacy--an interest here that includes not only the "right to be let alone," Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), but also "the interest . . . in fostering private speech," ante, at 2. Given these competing interests "on both sides of the equation, the key question becomes one of proper fit." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in part). See also Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). </s> I would ask whether the statutes strike a reasonable balance between their speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences. Or do they instead imposerestrictions on speech that are disproportionate when measured against their corresponding privacy and speech-related benefits, taking into account the kind, the importance, and the extent of these benefits, as well as the need for the restrictions in order to secure those benefits? What this Court has called "strict scrutiny"--with its strong presumption against constitutionality--is normally out of place where, as here, important competing constitutional interests are implicated. See ante, at 2 (recognizing "conflict between interests of the highest order"); ante, at 18 ("important interests to be considered on both sides of the constitutional calculus"); ibid. ("balanc[ing]" the interest in privacy "against the interest in publishing matters of public importance"); ante, at 18-19 (privacy interest outweighed in these cases). </s> The statutory restrictions before us directly enhance private speech. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (describing "`freedom not to speak publicly'" (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 348, 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968))). The statutes ensure the privacy of telephone conversations much as a trespass statute ensures privacy within the home. That assurance of privacy helps to overcome our natural reluctance to discuss private matters when we fear that our private conversations may become public. And the statutory restrictions consequently encourage conversations that otherwise might not take place. </s> At the same time, these statutes restrict public speech directly, deliberately, and of necessity. They include media publication within their scope not simply as a means, say, to deter interception, but also as an end. Media dissemination of an intimate conversation to an entire community will often cause the speakers serious harm over and above the harm caused by an initial disclosure to the person who intercepted the phone call. See Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 51-52 (1972). And the threat of that widespread dissemination can create a far more powerful disincentive to speak privately than the comparatively minor threat of disclosure to an interceptor and perhaps to a handful of others. Insofar as these statutes protect private communications against that widespread dissemination, they resemble laws that would award damages caused through publication of information obtained by theft from a private bedroom. See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.Rev. 193 (1890) (hereinafter Warren & Brandeis). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts §652D (1977). </s> As a general matter, despite the statutes' direct restrictions on speech, the Federal Constitution must tolerate laws of this kind because of the importance of these privacy and speech-related objectives. See Warren & Brandeis 196 (arguing for state law protection of the right to privacy). Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-351 (1967) ("[T]he protection of a person's general right to privacy--his right to be let alone by other people--is, like the protection of his property and of his very life, left largely to the law of the individual States"); ante, at 2 (protecting privacy and promoting speech are "interests of the highest order"). Rather than broadly forbid this kind of legislative enactment, the Constitution demands legislative efforts to tailor the laws in order reasonably to reconcile media freedom with personal, speech-related privacy. </s> Nonetheless, looked at more specifically, the statutes, as applied in these circumstances, do not reasonably reconcile the competing constitutional objectives. Rather, they disproportionately interfere with media freedom. For one thing, the broadcasters here engaged in no unlawful activity other than the ultimate publication of the information another had previously obtained. They "neither encouraged nor participated directly or indirectly in the interception." App. to Pet. for Cert. 33a. See also ante, at 9-10. No one claims that they ordered, counseled, encouraged, or otherwise aided or abetted the interception, the later delivery of the tape by the interceptor to an intermediary, or the tape's still later delivery by the intermediary to the media. Cf. 18 U.S.C. §2 (criminalizing aiding and abetting any federal offense); 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§6.6(b)-(c), pp. 128-129 (1986) (describing criminal liability for aiding and abetting). And, as the Court points out, the statutes do not forbid the receipt of the tape itself. Ante, at 9. The Court adds that its holding "does not apply to punishing parties for obtaining the relevant information unlawfully." Ante, at 17, n.19 (emphasis added). </s> For another thing, the speakers had little or no legitimate interest in maintaining the privacy of the particular conversation. That conversation involved a suggestion about "blow[ing] off . . . front porches" and "do[ing] some work on some of these guys," App. 46, thereby raising a significant concern for the safety of others. Where publication of private information constitutes a wrongful act, the law recognizes a privilege allowing the reporting of threats to public safety. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §595, Comment g (1977) (general privilege to report that "another intends to kill or rob or commit some other serious crime against a third person"); id., §652G (privilege applies to invasion of privacy tort). Cf. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §40, Comment c (1995) (trade secret law permits disclosures relevant to public health or safety, commission of crime or tort, or other matters of substantial public concern); Lachman v. Sperry-Sun Well Surveying Co., 457 F.2d 850, 853 (CA10 1972) (nondisclosure agreement not binding in respect to criminal activity); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 436, 551 P.2d 334, 343-344 (1976) (psychiatric privilege not binding in presence of danger to self or others). Even where the danger may have passed by the time of publication, that fact cannot legitimize the speaker's earlier privacy expectation. Nor should editors, who must make a publication decision quickly, have to determine present or continued danger before publishing this kind of threat. </s> Further, the speakers themselves, the president of a teacher's union and the union's chief negotiator, were "limited public figures," for they voluntarily engaged in a public controversy. They thereby subjected themselves to somewhat greater public scrutiny and had a lesser interest in privacy than an individual engaged in purely private affairs. See, e.g., ante, at 19 (respondents were engaged in matter of public concern); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974). See also Warren & Brandeis 215. </s> This is not to say that the Constitution requires anyone, including public figures, to give up entirely the right to private communication, i.e., communication free from telephone taps or interceptions. But the subject matter of the conversation at issue here is far removed from that in situations where the media publicizes truly private matters. See Michaels v. Internet Entertainment Group, Inc., 5 F.Supp. 2d 823, 841-842 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (broadcast of videotape recording of sexual relations between famous actress and rock star not a matter of legitimate public concern); W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser & Keeton on Law of Torts §117, p.857 (5th ed. 1984) (stating that there is little expectation of privacy in mundane facts about a person's life, but that "portrayal of . . . intimate private characteristics or conduct" is "quite a different matter"); Warren & Brandeis 214 (recognizing that in certain matters "the community has no legitimate concern"). Cf. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-455 (1976) (despite interest of public, divorce of wealthy person not a "public controversy"). Cf. also ante, at 18 ("[S]ome intrusions on privacy are more offensive than others"). </s> Thus, in finding a constitutional privilege to publish unlawfully intercepted conversations of the kind here at issue, the Court does not create a "public interest" exception that swallows up the statutes' privacy-protecting general rule. Rather, it finds constitutional protection for publication of intercepted information of a special kind. Here, the speakers' legitimate privacy expectations are unusually low, and the public interest in defeating those expectations is unusually high. Given these circumstances, along with the lawful nature of respondents' behavior, the statutes' enforcement would disproportionately harm media freedom. </s> I emphasize the particular circumstances before us because, in my view, the Constitution permits legislatures to respond flexibly to the challenges future technology may pose to the individual's interest in basic personal privacy. Clandestine and pervasive invasions of privacy, unlike the simple theft of documents from a bedroom, are genuine possibilities as a result of continuously advancing technologies. Eavesdropping on ordinary cellular phone conversations in the street (which many callers seem to tolerate) is a very different matter from eavesdropping on encrypted cellular phone conversations or those carried on in the bedroom. But the technologies that allow the former may come to permit the latter. And statutes thatmay seem less important in the former context may turn out to have greater importance in the latter. Legisla-tures also may decide to revisit statutes such as those before us, creating better tailored provisions designed to encourage, for example, more effective privacy-protecting technologies. </s> For these reasons, we should avoid adopting overly broad or rigid constitutional rules, which would unnecessarily restrict legislative flexibility. I consequently agree with the Court's holding that the statutes as applied here violate the Constitution, but I would not extend that holding beyond these present circumstances. </s> GLORIA BARTNICKI and ANTHONY F. KANE, Jr., PETITIONERS </s> 99-1687v. </s> FREDERICK W. VOPPER, aka FRED WILLIAMS, et al. </s> UNITED STATES, PETITIONER </s> 99-1728v. </s> FREDERICK W. VOPPER, aka FRED WILLIAMS, et al. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the third circuit </s> [May 21, 2001] </s> Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. </s> Technology now permits millions of important and confidential conversations to occur through a vast system of electronic networks. These advances, however, raise significant privacy concerns. We are placed in the uncomfortable position of not knowing who might have access to our personal and business e-mails, our medical and financial records, or our cordless and cellular telephone conversations. In an attempt to prevent some of the most egregious violations of privacy, the United States, the District of Columbia, and 40 States have enacted laws prohibiting the intentional interception and knowing disclosure of electronic communications.1 The Court holds that all of these statutes violate the First Amendment insofar as the illegally intercepted conversation touches upon a matter of "public concern," an amorphous concept that the Court does not even attempt to define. But the Court's decision diminishes, rather than enhances, the purposes of the First Amendment: chilling the speech of the millions of Americans who rely upon electronic technology to communicate each day. </s> Over 30 years ago, with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress recognized that the </s> "[t]remendous scientific and technological developments that have taken place in the last century have made possible today the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques. As a result of these developments, privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized by these techniques of surveillance.... No longer is it possible, in short, for each man to retreat into his home and be left alone. Every spoken word relating to each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage." S.Rep. No.1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 67 (1968) (hereinafter S.Rep. No.1097). </s> This concern for privacy was inseparably bound up with the desire that personal conversations be frank and uninhibited, not cramped by fears of clandestine surveillance and purposeful disclosure: </s> "In a democratic society privacy of communication is essential if citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that one's speech is being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas." President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 202 (1967). </s> To effectuate these important privacy and speech interests, Congress and the vast majority of States have proscribed the intentional interception and knowing disclosure of the contents of electronic communications.2 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c) (placing restrictions upon "any person who... intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication"). </s> The Court correctly observes that these are "content-neutral law[s] of general applicability" which serve recognized interests of the "highest order": "the interest in individual privacy and ... in fostering private speech." Ante, at 10, 2. It nonetheless subjects these laws to the strict scrutiny normally reserved for governmental attempts to censor different viewpoints or ideas. See ante, at 16 (holding that petitioners have not established the requisite "`need of the highest order'") (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)). There is scant support, either in precedent or in reason, for the Court's tacit application of strict scrutiny. </s> A content-neutral regulation will be sustained if </s> "`it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.'" Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994) (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). </s> Here, Congress and the Pennsylvania Legislature have acted "`without reference to the content of the regulated speech.'" Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986). There is no intimation that these laws seek "to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate" or that they "distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed." Turner Broadcasting, supra, at 641, 643. The antidisclosure provision is based solely upon the manner in which the conversation was acquired, not the subject matter of the conversation or the viewpoints of the speakers. The same information, if obtained lawfully, could be published with impunity. Cf.Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984) (upholding under intermediate scrutiny a protective order on information acquired during discovery in part because "the party may disseminate the identical information... as long as the information is gained through means independent of the court's processes"). As the concerns motivating strict scrutiny are absent, these content-neutral restrictions upon speech need pass only intermediate scrutiny. </s> The Court's attempt to avoid these precedents by reliance upon the Daily Mail string of newspaper cases is unpersuasive. In these cases, we held that statutes prohibiting the media from publishing certain truthful information--the name of a rape victim, Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), the confidential proceedings before a state judicial review commission, Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), and the name of a juvenile defendant, Daily Mail, supra; Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, Oklahoma Cty., 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam)--violated the First Amendment. In so doing, we stated that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order." Daily Mail, supra, at 103. Neither this Daily Mail principle nor any other aspect of these cases, however, justifies the Court's imposition of strict scrutiny here. </s> Each of the laws at issue in the Daily Mail cases regulated the content or subject matter of speech. This fact alone was enough to trigger strict scrutiny, see United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("[A] content-based speech restriction... can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny"), and suffices to distinguish these antidisclosure provisions. But, as our synthesis of these cases in Florida Star made clear, three other unique factors also informed the scope of the Daily Mail principle. </s> First, the information published by the newspapers had been lawfully obtained from the government itself.3 "Where information is entrusted to the government, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publication almost always exists for guarding against the dissemination of private facts." Florida Star, supra, at 534. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, supra, at 841, and n.12 (noting that the State could have taken steps to protect the confidentiality of its proceedings, such as holding in contempt commission members who breached their duty of confidentiality). Indeed, the State's ability to control the information undermined the claim that the restriction was necessary, for "[b]y placing the information in the public domain on official court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was thereby being served." Cox Broadcasting, supra, at 495. This factor has no relevance in the present cases, where we deal with private conversations that have been intentionally kept out of the public domain. </s> Second, the information in each case was already "publicly available," and punishing further dissemination would not have advanced the purported government interests of confidentiality. Florida Star, supra, at 535. Such is not the case here. These statutes only prohibit "disclos[ure]," 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5703(2) (2000), and one cannot "disclose" what is already in the public domain. See Black's Law Dictionary 477 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "disclosure" as "[t]he act or process of making known something that was previously unknown; a revelation of facts"); S.Rep. No.1097, at 93 ("The disclosure of the contents of an intercepted communication that had already become `public information' or `common knowledge' would not be prohibited"). These laws thus do not fall under the axiom that "the interests in privacy fade when the information involved already appears on the public record." Cox Broadcasting, supra, at 494-495. </s> Third, these cases were concerned with "the `timidity and self-censorship' which may result from allowing the media to be punished for publishing certain truthful information." Florida Star, 491 U.S., at 535. But fear of "timidity and self-censorship" is a basis for upholding, not striking down, these antidisclosure provisions: They allow private conversations to transpire without inhibition. And unlike the statute at issue in Florida Star, which had no scienter requirement, see id., at 539, these statutes only address those who knowingly disclose an illegally intercepted conversation.4 They do not impose a duty to inquire into the source of the information and one could negligently disclose the contents of an illegally intercepted communication without liability. </s> In sum, it is obvious that the Daily Mail cases upon which the Court relies do not address the question presented here. Our decisions themselves made this clear: "The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, the government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well." Florida Star, supra, at 535, n.8; see also Daily Mail, 443 U.S., at 105 ("Our holding in this case is narrow. There is no issue before us of unlawful press [conduct]"); Landmark Communications, 435 U.S., at 837 ("We are not here concerned with the possible applicability of the statute to one who secures the information by illegal means and thereafter divulges it").5 </s> Undaunted, the Court places an inordinate amount of weight upon the fact that the receipt of an illegally intercepted communication has not been criminalized. See ante, at 13-17. But this hardly renders those who knowingly receive and disclose such communications "law-abiding," ante, at 14, and it certainly does not bring them under the Daily Mail principle. The transmission of the intercepted communication from the eavesdropper to the third party is itself illegal; and where, as here, the third party then knowingly discloses that communication, another illegal act has been committed. The third party in this situation cannot be likened to the reporters in the Daily Mail cases, who lawfully obtained their information through consensual interviews or public documents. </s> These laws are content neutral; they only regulate information that was illegally obtained; they do not restrict republication of what is already in the public domain; they impose no special burdens upon the media; they have a scienter requirement to provide fair warning; and they promote the privacy and free speech of those using cellular telephones. It is hard to imagine a more narrowly tailored prohibition of the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications, and it distorts our precedents to review these statutes under the often fatal standard of strict scrutiny. These laws therefore should be upheld if they further a substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free speech, and they do. </s> Congress and the overwhelming majority of States reasonably have concluded that sanctioning the knowing disclosure of illegally intercepted communications will deter the initial interception itself, a crime which is extremely difficult to detect. It is estimated that over 20 million scanners capable of intercepting cellular transmissions currently are in operation, see Thompson, Cell Phone Snooping: Why Electronic Eavesdropping Goes Unpunished, 35 Am. Crim. L.Rev. 137, 149 (1997), notwithstanding the fact that Congress prohibited the marketing of such devices eight years ago, see 47 U.S.C. §302a(d).6 As Congress recognized, "[a]ll too often the invasion of privacy itself will go unknown. Only by striking at all aspects of the problem can privacy be adequately protected." S.Rep. No. 1097, at 69. See also Hearings on H.R. 3378 before the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. and 2d Sess., 290 (1986) ("Congress should be under no illusion... that the Department [of Justice], because of the difficulty of such investigations, would be able to bring a substantial number of successful prosecutions"). </s> Nonetheless, the Court faults Congress for providing "no empirical evidence to support the assumption that the prohibition against disclosures reduces the number of illegal interceptions," ante, at 15-16, and insists that "there is no basis for assuming that imposing sanctions upon respondents will deter the unidentified scanner from continuing to engage in surreptitious interceptions," ante, at 16. It is the Court's reasoning, not the judgment of Congress and numerous States regarding the necessity of these laws, which disappoints. </s> The "quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised." Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 391 (2000). "[C]ourts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress." Turner Broadcasting, 412 U.S. 94, 103 (1973)). This deference recognizes that, as an institution, Congress is far better equipped than the judiciary to evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing upon complex issues and that "[s]ound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to anticipate the likely impact of these events based on deductions and inferences for which complete empirical support may be unavailable." Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S., at 665. Although we must nonetheless independently evaluate such congressional findings in performing our constitutional review, this "is not a license to reweigh the evidence de novo, or to replace Congress' factual predictions with our own." Id., at666. </s> The "dry up the market" theory, which posits that it is possible to deter an illegal act that is difficult to police by preventing the wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of the crime, is neither novel nor implausible. It is a time-tested theory that undergirds numerous laws, such as the prohibition of the knowing possession of stolen goods. See 2 W.LaFave & A.Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §8.10(a), p.422 (1986) ("Without such receivers, theft ceases to be profitable. It is obvious that the receiver must be a principal target of any society anxious to stamp out theft in its various forms"). We ourselves adopted the exclusionary rule based upon similar reasoning, believing that it would "deter unreasonable searches," Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985), by removing an officer's "incentive to disregard [the Fourth Amendment]," Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).7 </s> The same logic applies here and demonstrates that the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than essential to further the interest of protecting the privacy of individual communications. Were there no prohibition on disclosure, an unlawful eavesdropper who wanted to disclose the conversation could anonymously launder the interception through a third party and thereby avoid detection. Indeed, demand for illegally obtained private information would only increase if it could be disclosed without repercussion. The law against interceptions, which the Court agrees is valid, would be utterly ineffectual without these antidisclosure provisions. </s> For a similar reason, we upheld against First Amendment challenge a law prohibiting the distribution of child pornography. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Just as with unlawfully intercepted electronic communications, we there noted the difficulty of policing the "low-profile, clandestine industry" of child pornography production and concurred with 36 legislatures that "[t]he most expeditious if not the only practical method of law enforcement may be to dry up the market for this material by imposing severe criminal penalties on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting the product." Id., at 760. In so doing, we did not demand, nor did Congress provide, any empirical evidence to buttress this basic syllogism. Indeed, we reaffirmed the theory's vitality in Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.103, 109-110 (1990), finding it "surely reasonable for the State to conclude that it will decrease the production of child pornography if it penalizes those who possess and view the product, thereby decreasing demand."8 </s> At base, the Court's decision to hold these statutes unconstitutional rests upon nothing more than the bald substitution of its own prognostications in place of the reasoned judgment of 41 legislative bodies and the United States Congress.9 The Court does not explain how or from where Congress should obtain statistical evidence about the effectiveness of these laws, and "[s]ince as a practical matter it is never easy to prove a negative, it is hardly likely that conclusive factual data could ever be assembled." Elkins, supra, at 218. Reliance upon the "dry up the market" theory is both logical and eminently reasonable, and our precedents make plain that it is "far stronger than mere speculation." United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995). </s> These statutes also protect the important interests of deterring clandestine invasions of privacy and preventing the involuntary broadcast of private communications. Over a century ago, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis recognized that "[t]he intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual." The Right to Privacy, 4Harv. L.Rev. 193, 196 (1890). "There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a... freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). One who speaks into a phone "is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); cf.Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 52 (1972) (compelling testimony about matters obtained from an illegal interception at a grand jury proceeding "compounds the statutorily proscribed invasion of... privacy by adding to the injury of the interception the insult of... disclosure"). </s> These statutes undeniably protect this venerable right of privacy. Concomitantly, they further the First Amendment rights of the parties to the conversation. "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence." Turner Broadcasting, 407 U.S. 297, 302 (1972), these statutes further the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" speech of the private parties, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Unlike the laws at issue in the Daily Mail cases, which served only to protect the identities and actions of a select group of individuals, these laws protect millions of people who communicate electronically on a daily basis. The chilling effect of the Court's decision upon these private conversations will surely be great: An estimated 49.1 million analog cellular telephones are currently in operation. See Hao, Nokia Profits from Surge in Cell Phones, Fla. Today, July 18, 1999, p.E1. </s> Although the Court recognizes and even extols the virtues of this right to privacy, see ante, at 17-18, these are "mere words," W. Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, act v, sc. 3, overridden by the Court's newfound right to publish unlawfully acquired information of "public concern," ante, at 10. The Court concludes that the private conversation between Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane is somehow a "debate .... worthy of constitutional protection." Ante, at 20. Perhaps the Court is correct that "[i]f the statements about the labor negotiations had been made in a public arena--during a bargaining session, for example--they would have been newsworthy." Ante, at 10. The point, however, is that Bartnicki and Kane had no intention of contributing to a public "debate" at all, and it is perverse to hold that another's unlawful interception and knowing disclosure of their conversation is speech "worthy of constitutional protection." Cf.Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) ("[O]ne important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide `what not to say'"). The Constitution should not protect the involuntary broadcast of personal conversations. Even where the communications involve public figures or concern public matters, the conversations are nonetheless private and worthy of protection. Although public persons may have forgone the right to live their lives screened from public scrutiny in some areas, it does not and should not follow that they also have abandoned their right to have a private conversation without fear of it being intentionally intercepted and knowingly disclosed. </s> The Court's decision to hold inviolable our right to broadcast conversations of "public importance" enjoys little support in our precedents. As discussed above, given the qualified nature of their holdings, the Daily Mail cases cannot bear the weight the Court places upon them. More mystifying still is the Court's reliance upon the "Pentagon Papers" case, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), which involved the United States' attempt to prevent the publication of Defense Department documents relating to the Vietnam War. In addition to involving Government controlled information, that case fell squarely under our precedents holding that prior restraints on speech bear "`a heavy presumption against ... constitutionality.'" Id., at 714. Indeed, it was this presumption that caused Justices Stewart and White to join the 6-to-3 per curiam decision. See id., at 730-731 (White,J., joined by Stewart,J., concurring) ("I concur in today's judgments, but only because of the concededly extraordinary protection against prior restraints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system"). By no stretch of the imagination can the statutes at issue here be dubbed "prior restraints." And the Court's "parallel reasoning" from other inapposite cases fails to persuade. Ante, at 20. </s> Surely "the interest in individual privacy," ante, at 2, at its narrowest must embrace the right to be free from surreptitious eavesdropping on, and involuntary broadcast of, our cellular telephone conversations. The Court subordinates that right, not to the claims of those who themselves wish to speak, but to the claims of those who wish to publish the intercepted conversations of others. Congress' effort to balance the above claim to privacy against a marginal claim to speak freely is thereby set at naught. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote * </s> Together with No. 99-1728, United States v. Vopper, aka Williams, etal., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> See 48 Stat. 1069, 1103. </s> Footnote 2 </s> Either actual damages, or "statutory damages of whichever is the greater of $100 a day for each day of violation or $10,000" may be recovered under 18 U.S.C. §2520(c)(2); under the Pennsylvania Act, the amount is the greater of $100 a day or $1,000, but the plaintiff may also recover punitive damages and reasonable attorney's fees. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5725(a) (2000). </s> Footnote 3 </s> Title 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c) provides that any person who "intentionally discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection; . . . shall be punished . . . ." The Pennsylvania Act contains a similar provision. </s> Footnote 4 </s> Title 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(a) provides: "(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter [§§2510-2520 (1994 ed. and Supp. V)] any person who-- </s> "(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic communication; . . . shall be punished . . . ." </s> Footnote 5 </s> In the Boehner case, as in this case, a conversation over a car cell phone was intercepted, but in that case the defendant knew both who was responsible for intercepting the conversation and how they had done it. 191 F.3d, at 465. In the opinion of the majority, the defendant acted unlawfully in accepting the tape in order to provide it to the media. Id., at 476. Apparently because the couple responsible for the interception did not eavesdrop "for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain," they were fined only $500. See Department of Justice Press Release, Apr. 23, 1997. In another similar case involving a claim for damages under §2511(1)(c), Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (CA5 2000), the media defendant in fact participated in the interceptions at issue. </s> Footnote 6 </s> In particular, calls placed on cellular and cordless telephones can be intercepted more easily than those placed on traditional phones. See Shubert v. Metrophone, Inc., 898 F.2d 401, 404-405 (CA3 1990). Although calls placed on cell and cordless phones can be easily intercepted, it is not clear how often intentional interceptions take place. From 1992 through 1997, less than 100 cases were prosecuted charging violations of 18 U.S.C. §2511. See Statement of James K. Kallstrom, Assistant Director in Charge of the New York Division of the FBI on February 5, 1997 before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection, Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives Regarding Cellular Privacy. However, information concerning techniques and devices for intercepting cell and cordless phone calls can be found in a number of publications, trade magazines, and sites on the Internet, see id., at 6, and at one set of congressional hearings in 1997, a scanner, purchased off the shelf and minimally modified, was used to intercept phone calls of Members of Congress. </s> Footnote 7 </s> See, e.g., Nix v. O'Malley, 160 F.3d 343, 346 (CA6 1998); McKamey v. Roach, 55 F. 3d 1236, 1240 (CA6 1995). </s> Footnote 8 </s> In answering this question, we draw no distinction between the media respondents and Yocum. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-266 (1964); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). </s> Footnote 9 </s> "But while a content-based purpose may be sufficient in certain circumstances to show that a regulation is content based, it is not necessary to such a showing in all cases. . . . Nor will the mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content." Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). </s> Footnote 10 </s> The Solicitor General has catalogued some of the cases that fall under subsection (d): "it is unlawful for a company to use an illegally intercepted communication about a business rival in order to create a competing product; it is unlawful for an investor to use illegally intercepted communications in trading in securities; it is unlawful for a union to use an illegally intercepted communication about management (or vice versa) to prepare strategy for contract negotiations; it is unlawful for a supervisor to use information in an illegally recorded conversation to discipline a subordinate; and it is unlawful for a blackmailer to use an illegally intercepted communication for purposes of extortion. See, e.g., 1968 Senate Report 67 (corporate and labor-management uses); Fultz v. Gilliam, 942 F.2d 396, 400 n.4 (6th Cir. 1991) (extortion); Dorris v. Absher, 959 F.Supp. 813, 815-817 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (workplace discipline), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 179 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 1999). The statute has also been held to bar the use of illegally intercepted communications for important and socially valuable purposes. See In re Grand Jury, 111 F.3d 1066, 1077-1079 (3d Cir. 1997)." Brief for United States 24. </s> Footnote 11 </s> Put another way, what gave rise to statutory liability in this case was the information communicated on the tapes. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 484 (CADC 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("What . . . is being punished . . . here is not conduct dependent upon the nature or origin of the tapes; it is speech dependent on the nature of the contents"). </s> Footnote 12 </s> That question was subsequently reserved in Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 837 (1978). </s> Footnote 13 </s> In cases relying on such a rationale, moreover, the speech at issue is considered of minimal value. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S., at 762 ("The value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis"). </s> The Government also points to two other areas of the law--namely, mail theft and stolen property--in which a ban on the receipt or possession of an item is used to deter some primary illegality. Brief for United States 14; see also post, at 11. Neither of those examples, though, involve prohibitions on speech. As such, they are not relevant to a First Amendment analysis. </s> Footnote 14 </s> The media respondents have included a list of 143 cases under §2511(1)(a) and 63 cases under §§2511(1)(c) and (d)--which must also involve violations of subsection (a)--in an appendix to their brief. The Reply Brief filed by the United States contains an appendix describing each of the cases in the latter group. </s> Footnote 15 </s> In only 5 of the 206 cases listed in the appendices, see n.14, supra, n.17, infra, was the identity of the interceptor wholly unknown. </s> Footnote 16 </s> The legislative history of the 1968 Act indicates that Congress' concern focused on private surveillance "in domestic relations and industrial espionage situations." S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 225 (1968). Similarly, in connection with the enactment of the 1986 amendment, one senator referred to the interest in protecting private communications from "a corporate spy, a police officer without probable cause, or just a plain snoop." 131 Cong. Rec. 24366 (1985) (statement of Sen. Leahy). </s> Footnote 17 </s> The dissent argues that we have not given proper respect to "congressional findings" or to "`Congress' factual predictions.'" Post, at 10. But the relevant factual foundation is not to be found in the legislative record. Moreover, the dissent does not argue that Congress did provide empirical evidence in support of its assumptions, nor, for that matter, does it take real issue with the fact that in the vast majority of cases involving illegal interceptions, the identity of the person or persons responsible for the interceptions is known. Instead, the dissent advances a minor disagreement with our numbers, stating that nine cases "involved an unknown or unproved eavesdropper." Post, at 13-14, n.9 (emphasis added). The dissent includes in that number cases in which the identity of the interceptor, though suspected, was not "proved" because the identity of the interceptor was not at issue or the evidence was insufficient. In any event, whether there are 5 cases or 9 involving anonymous interceptors out of the 206 cases under §2511, in most of the cases involving illegal interceptions, the identity of the interceptor is no mystery. If, as the proponents of the dry up the market theory would have it, it is difficult to identify the persons responsible for illegal interceptions (and thus necessary to prohibit disclosure by third parties with no connection to, or responsibility for, the initial illegality), one would expect to see far more cases in which the identity of the interceptor was unknown (and, concomitantly, far fewer in which the interceptor remained anonymous). Thus, not only is there a dearth of evidence in the legislative record to support the dry up the market theory, but what postenactment evidence is available cuts against it. </s> Footnote 18 </s> Indeed, even the burden of justifying restrictions on commercial speech requires more than "mere speculation or conjecture." Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 (1999). </s> Footnote 19 </s> Our holding, of course, does not apply to punishing parties for obtaining the relevant information unlawfully. "It would be frivolous to assert--and no one does in these cases--that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws. Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of news." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691 (1972). </s> Footnote 20 </s> "`The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.'" Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S., at 559 (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y. 2d 341, 348, 244 N.E. 2d 250, 255 (Ct. App.1968)). </s> Footnote 21 </s> Moreover, "our decisions establish that absent exceptional circumstances, reputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech." Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 634 (1990). </s> Footnote 22 </s> See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 535 (1989)(acknowledging "the `timidity and self-censorship' which may result from allowing the media to be punished for publishing truthfulinformation"). </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> See 18 U.S.C. §2511(1) (1994 ed. and Supp.V); Ala. Code §13A-11-30 etseq. (1994); Alaska Stat. Ann. §42.20.300(d) (2000); Ark. Code Ann. §5-60-120 (1997); Cal. Penal Code Ann. §631 (West 1999); Colo. Rev. Stat. §18-9-303 (2000); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §1336(b)(1) (1995); D.C. Code Ann. §23-542 (1996); Fla. Stat. §934.03(1) (Supp. 2001); Ga. Code Ann. §16-11-66.1 (1996); Haw. Rev. Stat. §803-42 (1993); Idaho Code §18-6702 (1997); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch.720, §5/14-2(b) (1999 Supp.); Iowa Code §808B.2 (1994); Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4002 (1995); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §526.060 (Michie 1999); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §15:1303 (1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 15, §710(3) (Supp. 2000); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. §10-402 (Supp. 2000); Mass. Gen. Laws §272:99(C)(3) (1997); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §750.539e (West 1991); Minn. Stat. §626A.02 (2000); Mo. Rev. Stat. §542.402 (2000); Neb. Rev. Stat. §86-702 (1999); Nev. Rev. Stat. §200.630 (1995); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §570-A:2 (Supp. 2000); N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:156A-3 (West Supp. 2000); N.M. Stat. Ann. §30-12-1 (1994); N.C. Gen. Stat. §15A-287 (1999); N.D. Cent. Code §12.1-15-02 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2933.52(A)(3) (1997); Okla. Stat., Tit. 13, §176.3 (2000 Supp.); Ore. Rev. Stat. §165.540 (1997); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5703 (2000); R.I. Gen. Laws §11-35-21 (2000); Tenn. Code Ann. §39-13-601 (1997); Tex. Penal Code Ann. §16.02 (Supp. 2001); Utah Code Ann. §77-23a-4 (1982); Va. Code Ann. §19.2-62 (1995); W.Va. Code §62-1D-3 (2000); Wis. Stat. §968.31(1) (1994); Wyo. Stat. Ann. §7-3-602 (1995). </s> Footnote 2 </s> "Electronic communication" is defined as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system." 18 U.S.C. §2510(12) (1994 ed., Supp.V). </s> Footnote 3 </s> The one exception was Daily Mail, where reporters obtained the juvenile defendant's name from witnesses to the crime. See 443 U.S., at 99. However, the statute at issue there imposed a blanket prohibition on the publication of the information. See id., at 98-99. In contrast, these antidisclosure provisions do not prohibit publication so long as the information comes from a legal source. </s> Footnote 4 </s> In 1986, to ensure that only the most culpable could face liability for disclosure, Congress increased the scienter requirement from "willful" to "intentional." 18 U.S.C. §2511(1)(c); see also S.Rep. No.99-541, p.6 (1986) ("In order to underscore that the inadvertent reception ofa protected communication is not a crime, the subcommittee changed the state of mind requirement under [Title III] from `willful' to`intentional'") </s> Footnote 5 </s> Tellingly, we noted in Florida Star that "[t]o the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail principle the publication of any information so acquired." 491 U.S., at 534; see also id., at 535 ("[I]t is highly anomalous to sanction persons other than the source of [the] release"). </s> Footnote 6 </s> The problem is pervasive because legal "radio scanners [may be] modified to intercept cellular calls." S.Rep. No.99-541, at 9. For example, the scanner at issue in Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (CADC 1999), had been recently purchased at Radio Shack. See Thompson, 35 Am. Crim. L.Rev., at 152 (citing Stratton, Scanner Wasn't Supposed to Pick up Call, But it Did, Orlando Sentinel, Jan. 18, 1997, p.A15). </s> Footnote 7 </s> In crafting the exclusionary rule, we did not first require empirical evidence. See Elkins, 364 U.S., at 218 ("Empirical statistics are not available to show that the inhabitants of states which follow the exclusionary rule suffer less from lawless searches and seizures than do those of states which admit evidence unlawfully obtained"). When it comes to this Court's awesome power to strike down an Act of Congress as unconstitutional, it should not be "do as we say, not as we do." </s> Footnote 8 </s> The Court attempts to distinguish Ferber and Osborne on the ground that they involved low-value speech, but this has nothing to do with the reasonableness of the "dry up the market" theory. The Court also posits that Congress here could simply have increased the penalty for intercepting cellular communications. See ante, at 14. But the Court's back-seat legislative advice does nothing to undermine the reasonableness of Congress' belief that prohibiting only the initial interception would not effectively protect the privacy interests of cellular telephone users. </s> Footnote 9 </s> The Court observes that in many of the cases litigated under §2511(1), "the person or persons intercepting the communication ha[ve] been known." Ante, at 15. Of the 206 cases cited in the appendices, 143 solely involved §2511(1)(a) claims of wrongful interception--disclosure was not at issue. It is of course unremarkable that intentional interception cases have not been pursued where the identity of the eavesdropper was unknown. Of the 61 disclosure and use cases with published facts brought under §§2511(1)(c) and (d), 9 involved an unknown or unproved eavesdropper, 1 involved a lawful pen register, and 5 involved recordings that were not surreptitious. Thus, as relevant, 46 disclosure cases involved known eavesdroppers. Whatever might be gleaned from this figure, the Court is practicing voodoo statistics when it states that it undermines the "dry up the market" theory. See ante, at 16, n.17. These cases say absolutely nothing about the interceptions and disclosures that have been deterred.

United States Supreme Court INSURANCE CORP. v. COMPAGNIE DES BAUXITES(1982) No. 81-440 Argued: March 23, 1982Decided: June 1, 1982 </s> Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) provides that a district court, as a sanction for failure to comply with discovery orders, may enter "[a]n order that the matters regarding which the [discovery] order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order." Asserting diversity jurisdiction, respondent, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in the Republic of Guinea, filed suit against various insurance companies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to recover on a business interruption policy. When certain of the defendants (a group of foreign insurance companies, including petitioners) raised the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, respondent attempted to use discovery in order to establish jurisdictional facts. After petitioners repeatedly failed to comply with the court's orders for production of the requested information, the court warned them that unless they complied by a specified date, it would assume, pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A), that it had personal jurisdiction. When petitioners again failed to comply, the court imposed the sanction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that imposition of the sanction fell within the trial court's discretion under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) and that the sanction did not violate petitioners' due process rights. </s> Held: </s> 1. Rule 37(b)(2)(A) may be applied to support a finding of personal jurisdiction without violating due process. Unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which is an Art. III as well as a statutory requirement, the requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows from the Due Process Clause and protects an individual liberty interest. Because it protects an individual interest, it may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped from raising the issue. Due process is violated by a rule establishing legal consequences of a failure to produce evidence only if the defendant's behavior will not support the presumption that "the refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of due process was but an admission of the want of [456 U.S. 694, 695] merit in the asserted defense." Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 351 . A proper application of Rule 37(b)(2)(A) will, as a matter of law, support such a presumption. Pp. 701-707. </s> 2. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying Rule 37(b)(2)(A) in this case. The record establishes that imposition of the sanction here satisfied the Rule's requirements that the sanction be both "just" and specifically related to the particular "claim" that was at issue in the discovery order. Pp. 707-709. </s> 651 F.2d 877, affirmed. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 709. </s> Edmund K. Trent argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Thomas P. Lawton III. </s> Cloyd R. Mellott argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dale Hershey, Robert W. Doty, Robert L. Byer, and Jordan S. Weltman. </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Rule 37(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a district court may impose sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders. Included among the available sanctions is: </s> "An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order." Rule 37(b)(2)(A). </s> The question presented by this case is whether this Rule is applicable to facts that form the basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant. May a district court, as a sanction for failure to comply with a discovery order directed at establishing jurisdictional facts, proceed on the basis that personal jurisdiction over the recalcitrant party has been established? [456 U.S. 694, 696] Petitioners urge that such an application of the Rule would violate due process: If a court does not have jurisdiction over a party, then it may not create that jurisdiction by judicial fiat. 1 They contend also that until a court has jurisdiction over a party, that party need not comply with orders of the court; failure to comply, therefore, cannot provide the ground for a sanction. In our view, petitioners are attempting to create a logical conundrum out of a fairly straightforward matter. </s> I </s> Respondent Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG) is a Delaware corporation, 49% of which is owned by the Republic of Guinea and 51% is owned by Halco (Mining) Inc. CBG's principal place of business is in the Republic of Guinea, where it operates bauxite mines and processing facilities. Halco, which operates in Pennsylvania, has contracted to perform certain administrative services for CBG. These include the procurement of insurance. </s> In 1973, Halco instructed an insurance broker, Marsh & McLennan, to obtain $20 million worth of business interruption insurance to cover CBG's operations in Guinea. The first half of this coverage was provided by the Insurance Company of North America (INA). The second half, or what is referred to as the "excess" insurance, was provided by a group of 21 foreign insurance companies, 2 14 of which are petitioners in this action (the excess insurers). 3 </s> [456 U.S. 694, 697] </s> Marsh & McLennan requested Bland Payne to obtain the excess insurance in the London insurance market. Pursuant to normal business practice </s> "[i]n late January and in February, 1974, Bland Payne presented to the excess insurer [petitioners] a placing slip in the amount of $10,000,000, in excess of the first $10,000,000. [Petitioners] initialed said placing slip, effective February 12, 1974, indicating the part of said $10,000,000 each was willing to insure." 4 Finding 27 of the District Court, 2 App. 347a. </s> Once the offering was fully subscribed, Bland Payne issued a cover note indicating the amount of the coverage and specifying the percentage of the coverage that each excess insurer had agreed to insure. No separate policy was issued; the excess insurers adopted the INA policy "as far as applicable." </s> Sometime after February 12, CBG allegedly experienced mechanical problems in its Guinea operation, resulting in a business interruption loss in excess of $10 million. Contending that the loss was covered under its policies, CBG brought suit when the insurers refused to indemnify CBG for the loss. Whatever the mechanical problems experienced by CBG, they were perhaps minor compared to the legal difficulties encountered in the courts. [456 U.S. 694, 698] </s> In December 1975, CBG filed a two-count suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, asserting jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The first count was against INA; the second against the excess insurers. INA did not challenge personal or subject-matter jurisdiction of the District Court. The answer of the excess insurers, however, raised a number of defenses, including lack of in personam jurisdiction. Subsequently, this alleged lack of personal jurisdiction became the basis of a motion for summary judgment filed by the excess insurers. 5 The issue in this case requires an account of respondent's attempt to use discovery in order to demonstrate the court's personal jurisdiction over the excess insurers. </s> Respondent's first discovery request - asking for "[c]opies of all business interruption insurance policies issued by Defendant during the period from January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1975" - was served on each defendant in August 1976. In January 1977, the excess insurers objected, on grounds of burdensomeness, to producing such policies. Several months later, respondent filed a motion to compel petitioners to produce the requested documents. In June 1978, the court orally overruled petitioners' objections. This was followed by a second discovery request in which respondent narrowed the files it was seeking to policies which "were delivered in . . . Pennsylvania . . . or covered a risk located in . . . Pennsylvania." Petitioners now objected that these documents were not in their custody or control; rather, they were kept by the brokers in London. The court ordered petitioners to request the information from the brokers, limiting the request to policies covering the period from 1971 to date. That was in July 1978; petitioners were given 90 days to produce the information. On November 8, petitioners [456 U.S. 694, 699] were given an additional 30 days to complete discovery. On November 24, petitioners filed an affidavit offering to make their records, allegedly some 4 million files, available at their offices in London for inspection by respondent. Respondent countered with a motion to compel production of the previously requested documents. On December 21, 1978, the court, noting that no conscientious effort had yet been made to produce the requested information and that no objection had been entered to the discovery order in July, gave petitioners 60 more days to produce the requested information. The District Judge also issued the following warning: </s> "[I]f you don't get it to him in 60 days, I am going to enter an order saying that because you failed to give the information as requested, that I am going to assume, under Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), subsection 2(A), that there is jurisdiction." 1 App. 115a. </s> A few moments later he restated the warning as follows: "I will assume that jurisdiction is here with this court unless you produce statistics and other information in that regard that would indicate otherwise." Id., at 116a. </s> On April 19, 1979, the court, after concluding that the requested material had not been produced, imposed the threatened sanction, finding that "for the purpose of this litigation the Excess Insurers are subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court due to their business contacts with Pennsylvania." Id., at 201a. Independently of the sanction, the District Court found two other grounds for holding that it had personal jurisdiction over petitioners. First, on the record established, it found that petitioners had sufficient business contacts with Pennsylvania to fall within the Pennsylvania long-arm statute. Second, in adopting the terms of the INA contract with CBG - a Pennsylvania insurance contract - the excess insurers implicitly agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the court. 6 </s> [456 U.S. 694, 700] </s> Except with respect to three excess insurers, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the jurisdictional holding, relying entirely upon the validity of the sanction. 7 Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877 (1981). That court specifically found that the discovery orders of the District Court did not constitute an abuse of discretion and that imposition of the sanction fell within the limits of trial court discretion under Rule 37(b): </s> "The purpose and scope of the ordered discovery were directly related to the issue of jurisdiction and the rule 37 sanction was tailored to establish as admitted those jurisdictional facts that, because of the insurers' failure to comply with discovery orders, CBG was unable to adduce through discovery." 651 F.2d, at 885. </s> Furthermore, it held that the sanction did not violate petitioners' due process rights, because it was no broader than "reasonably necessary" under the circumstances. </s> Because the decision below directly conflicts with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134 (1980), we granted certiorari. 8 </s> 454 U.S. 963 (1981). [456 U.S. 694, 701] </s> II </s> In McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917), another case involving an alleged lack of personal jurisdiction, Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, "great caution should be used not to let fiction deny the fair play that can be secured only by a pretty close adhesion to fact." Id., at 91. Petitioners' basic submission is that to apply Rule 37(b)(2) to jurisdictional facts is to allow fiction to get the better of fact and that it is impermissible to use a fiction to establish judicial power, where, as a matter of fact, it does not exist. In our view, this represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of personal jurisdiction. </s> The validity of an order of a federal court depends upon that court's having jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 -172 (1938); Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 465 (1874). The concepts of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, however, serve different purposes, and these different purposes affect the legal character of the two requirements. Petitioners fail to recognize the distinction between the two concepts - speaking instead in general terms of "jurisdiction" - although their argument's strength comes from conceiving of jurisdiction only as subject-matter jurisdiction. </s> Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The character of the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend are delineated in Art. III, 2, cl. 1. Jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is further limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of jurisdiction. Again, this reflects the constitutional source of federal judicial power: Apart from this Court, that power only [456 U.S. 694, 702] exists "in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Art. III, 1. </s> Subject-matter jurisdiction, then, is an Art. III as well as a statutory requirement; it functions as a restriction on federal power, and contributes to the characterization of the federal sovereign. Certain legal consequences directly follow from this. For example, no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court. Thus, the consent of the parties is irrelevant, California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), principles of estoppel do not apply, American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 17 -18 (1951), and a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction early in the proceedings. Similarly, a court, including an appellate court, will raise lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own motion. "[T]he rule, springing from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States is inflexible and without exception, which requires this court, of its own motion, to deny its jurisdiction, and, in the exercise of its appellate power, that of all other courts of the United States, in all cases where such jurisdiction does not affirmatively appear in the record." Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). 9 </s> None of this is true with respect to personal jurisdiction. The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty. 10 Thus, the test for personal jurisdiction [456 U.S. 694, 703] requires that "the maintenance of the suit . . . not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). </s> Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be waived. In McDonald v. Mabee, supra, the Court indicated that regardless of the power of the State to serve process, an individual may submit to the jurisdiction of the court by appearance. A variety of legal arrangements have been taken to represent express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court. In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964), we [456 U.S. 694, 704] stated that "parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court," and in Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Co., 350 U.S. 495 (1956), the Court upheld the personal jurisdiction of a District Court on the basis of a stipulation entered into by the defendant. In addition, lower federal courts have found such consent implicit in agreements to arbitrate. See Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (CA2 1964); 2 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice § 4.023., n. 22 (1982) and cases listed there. Furthermore, the Court has upheld state procedures which find constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state court in the voluntary use of certain state procedures. See Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67 -68 (1938) ("There is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent a state from adopting a procedure by which a judgment in personam may be rendered in a cross-action against a plaintiff in its courts . . . . It is the price which the state may exact as the condition of opening its courts to the plaintiff"); Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 29 -30 (1917) ("[W]hat acts of the defendant shall be deemed a submission to [a court's] power is a matter upon which States may differ"). Finally, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, which even an appellate court may review sua sponte, under Rule 12(h), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "[a] defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person . . . is waived" if not timely raised in the answer or a responsive pleading. </s> In sum, the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped from raising the issue. These characteristics portray it for what it is - a legal right protecting the individual. The plaintiff's demonstration of certain historical facts may make clear to the court that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendant as a matter of law - i. e., certain factual showings will have legal consequences - but this is not the only way in which the personal jurisdiction of the court may arise. The actions of the defendant may amount to a legal submission [456 U.S. 694, 705] to the jurisdiction of the court, whether voluntary or not. </s> The expression of legal rights is often subject to certain procedural rules: The failure to follow those rules may well result in a curtailment of the rights. Thus, the failure to enter a timely objection to personal jurisdiction constitutes, under Rule 12(h)(1), a waiver of the objection. A sanction under Rule 37(b)(2)(A) consisting of a finding of personal jurisdiction has precisely the same effect. As a general proposition, the Rule 37 sanction applied to a finding of personal jurisdiction creates no more of a due process problem than the Rule 12 waiver. Although "a court cannot conclude all persons interested by its mere assertion of its own power," Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, supra, at 29, not all rules that establish legal consequences to a party's own behavior are "mere assertions" of power. </s> Rule 37(b)(2)(A) itself embodies the standard established in Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909), for the due process limits on such rules. 11 There the Court held that it did not violate due process for a state court to strike the answer and render a default judgment against a defendant who failed to comply with a pretrial discovery order. Such a rule was permissible as an expression of "the undoubted right of the lawmaking power to create a presumption of fact as to the bad faith and untruth of an answer begotten from the suppression or failure to produce the proof ordered . . . . [T]he preservation of due process was secured by the presumption that the refusal to produce evidence material to the administration of due process was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense." Id., at 350-351. [456 U.S. 694, 706] </s> The situation in Hammond was specifically distinguished from that in Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), in which the Court held that it did violate due process for a court to take similar action as "punishment" for failure to obey an order to pay into the registry of the court a certain sum of money. Due process is violated only if the behavior of the defendant will not support the Hammond Packing presumption. A proper application of Rule 37(b)(2) will, as a matter of law, support such a presumption. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 -213 (1958). If there is no abuse of discretion in the application of the Rule 37 sanction, as we find to be the case here (see Part III), then the sanction is nothing more than the invocation of a legal presumption, or what is the same thing, the finding of a constructive waiver. </s> Petitioners argue that a sanction consisting of a finding of personal jurisdiction differs from all other instances in which a sanction is imposed, including the default judgment in Hammond Packing, because a party need not obey the orders of a court until it is established that the court has personal jurisdiction over that party. If there is no obligation to obey a judicial order, a sanction cannot be applied for the failure to comply. Until the court has established personal jurisdiction, moreover, any assertion of judicial power over the party violates due process. </s> This argument again assumes that there is something unique about the requirement of personal jurisdiction, which prevents it from being established or waived like other rights. A defendant is always free to ignore the judicial proceedings, risk a default judgment, and then challenge that judgment on jurisdictional grounds in a collateral proceedings. See Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn., 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931). By submitting to the jurisdiction of the court for the limited purpose of challenging jurisdiction, the defendant agrees to abide by that court's determination on the issue of jurisdiction: That decision will be res judicata on that issue in any further proceedings. Id., at 524; American Surety Co. [456 U.S. 694, 707] v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166 (1932). As demonstrated above, the manner in which the court determines whether it has personal jurisdiction may include a variety of legal rules and presumptions, as well as straightforward factfinding. A particular rule may offend the due process standard of Hammond Packing, but the mere use of procedural rules does not in itself violate the defendant's due process rights. </s> III </s> Even if Rule 37(b)(2) may be applied to support a finding of personal jurisdiction, the question remains as to whether it was properly applied under the circumstances of this case. Because the District Court's decision to invoke the sanction was accompanied by a detailed explanation of the reasons for that order and because that decision was upheld as a proper exercise of the District Court's discretion by the Court of Appeals, this issue need not detain us for long. What was said in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976), is fully applicable here: "The question, of course, is not whether this Court, or whether the Court of Appeals, would as an original matter have [applied the sanction]; it is whether the District Court abused its discretion in so doing" (citations omitted). For the reasons that follow, we hold that it did not. </s> Rule 37(b)(2) contains two standards - one general and one specific - that limit a district court's discretion. First, any sanction must be "just"; second, the sanction must be specifically related to the particular "claim" which was at issue in the order to provide discovery. While the latter requirement reflects the rule of Hammond Packing, supra, the former represents the general due process restrictions on the court's discretion. </s> In holding that the sanction in this case was "just," we rely specifically on the following. First, the initial discovery request was made in July 1977. Despite repeated orders from the court to provide the requested material, on December 21, 1978, the District Court was able to state that the petitioners [456 U.S. 694, 708] "haven't even made any effort to get this information up to this point." 1 App. 112a. The court then warned petitioners of a possible sanction. Confronted with continued delay and an obvious disregard of its orders, the trial court's invoking of its powers under Rule 37 was clearly appropriate. Second, petitioners repeatedly agreed to comply with the discovery orders within specified time periods. In each instance, petitioners failed to comply with their agreements. Third, respondent's allegation that the court had personal jurisdiction over petitioners was not a frivolous claim, and its attempt to use discovery to substantiate this claim was not, therefore, itself a misuse of judicial process. The substantiality of the jurisdictional allegation is demonstrated by the fact that the District Court found, as an alternative ground for its jurisdiction, that petitioners had sufficient contacts with Pennsylvania to fall within the State's long-arm statute. Supra, at 699. Fourth, petitioners had ample warning that a continued failure to comply with the discovery orders would lead to the imposition of this sanction. Furthermore, the proposed sanction made it clear that, even if there was not compliance with the discovery order, this sanction would not be applied if petitioners were to "produce statistics and other information" that would indicate an absence of personal jurisdiction. 1 App. 116a. In effect, the District Court simply placed the burden of proof upon petitioners on the issue of personal jurisdiction. 12 Petitioners failed to comply with the discovery order; they also failed to make any attempt to meet this burden of proof. This course of behavior, coupled with the ample warnings, demonstrates the "justice" of the trial court's order. </s> Neither can there be any doubt that this sanction satisfies the second requirement. CBG was seeking through discovery [456 U.S. 694, 709] to respond to petitioners' contention that the District Court did not have personal jurisdiction. Having put the issue in question, petitioners did not have the option of blocking the reasonable attempt of CBG to meet its burden of proof. It surely did not have this option once the court had overruled petitioners' objections. Because of petitioners' failure to comply with the discovery orders, CBG was unable to establish the full extent of the contacts between petitioners and Pennsylvania, the critical issue in proving personal jurisdiction. Petitioners' failure to supply the requested information as to its contacts with Pennsylvania supports "the presumption that the refusal to produce evidence . . . was but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense." Hammond Packing, 212 U.S., at 351 . The sanction took as established the facts - contacts with Pennsylvania - that CBG was seeking to establish through discovery. That a particular legal consequence - personal jurisdiction of the court over the defendants - follows from this, does not in any way affect the appropriateness of the sanction. </s> IV </s> Because the application of a legal presumption to the issue of personal jurisdiction does not in itself violate the Due Process Clause and because there was no abuse of the discretion granted a district court under Rule 37(b)(2), we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The petition with which we deal in this case was filed as a cross-petition in response to the petition for certiorari filed in No. 81-290, Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. We granted the cross-petition, limiting the grant to the question of the validity of the Rule 37(b)(2) sanction. 454 U.S. 963 (1981). We shall refer to the cross-petitioners as "petitioners" and to the cross-respondent as "respondent." </s> [Footnote 2 The District Court described these excess insurers as follows: </s> "Of the 21 Excess Insurers, five are English companies representing English domestic interests but insuring risks throughout the world, [456 U.S. 694, 697] particularly in Pennsylvania. Seven are English companies which represent non English parents, or affiliates. The United States, Japan and Israel are the nationalities of two each of the Excess Insurer Defendants. Switzerland and the Republic of Ireland are the nationalities of one each of the Excess Insurer Defendants. The remaining Excess Insurer Defendant is a Belgium Company which represents the United States parent." 1 App. 196a. </s> [Footnote 3 Four of the excess insurers did not contest personal jurisdiction in the District Court. Id., at 105a. The Court of Appeals directed the dismissal of the complaint with respect to three others. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 886 (1981). CBG challenges the latter action in its petition for certiorari in No. 81-290. </s> [Footnote 4 One of the excess insurers, L'Union Atlantique S.A. d'Assurances, does business in Brussels, and was sent a separate placing slip. </s> [Footnote 5 The motion for summary judgment was filed on May 20, 1977. In it, 17 of the excess insurers alleged a lack of in personam jurisdiction and all 21 excess insurers sought dismissal on the ground of forum non conveniens. The District Court denied the motion on April 19, 1979. </s> [Footnote 6 On March 22, 1979, the excess insurers instituted a suit against CBG in England, attacking the validity of the insurance contract. In its April 19 [456 U.S. 694, 700] decision, the District Court found that "the commencement of the separate action in England [was] oppressive, unfair, and an act of bad faith under all of the circumstances." 1 App. 203a. It, therefore, enjoined the continuation of that suit. This aspect of the District Court decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Respondent seeks certiorari review of that decision (see n. 1, supra). </s> [Footnote 7 It reversed as to three of the excess insurers on the grounds that they had complied with the discovery orders and that their contacts with Pennsylvania were not sufficient to justify exercise of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute. It also held that the District Court had abused its discretion in enjoining the action in England. Judge Gibbons dissented on the propriety of the sanction, arguing that the District Court had abused its discretion. He also expressed some doubt that a Rule 37 sanction could ever be used as the source of personal jurisdiction. 651 F.2d, at 892, n. 4. </s> [Footnote 8 In Familia de Boom, the Fifth Circuit held that a sanction under Rule 37(b)(2) is valid only if the court has personal jurisdiction over the party [456 U.S. 694, 701] that has refused compliance with a court order. Personal jurisdiction must, it held, appear from the record independently of the sanction. The Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, on the other hand, have agreed with the Third Circuit on the appropriateness of a sanction on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 (CA4 1971); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723 (CA8 1979). </s> [Footnote 9 A party that has had an opportunity to litigate the question of subject-matter jurisdiction may not, however, reopen that question in a collateral attack upon an adverse judgment. It has long been the rule that principles of res judicata apply to jurisdictional determinations - both subject matter and personal. See Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938). </s> [Footnote 10 It is true that we have stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction, as applied to state courts, reflects an element of federalism and the [456 U.S. 694, 703] character of state sovereignty vis-a-vis other States. For example, in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 -292 (1980), we stated: </s> "[A] state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist `minimum contacts' between the defendant and the forum State. The concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system." (Citation omitted.) </s> Contrary to the suggestion of JUSTICE POWELL, post, at 713-714, our holding today does not alter the requirement that there be "minimum contacts" between the nonresident defendant and the forum State. Rather, our holding deals with how the facts needed to show those "minimum contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to comply with court-ordered discovery. The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an independent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: Individual actions cannot change the powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may otherwise be protected. </s> [Footnote 11 The Advisory Committee Notes to the Rule specifically stated that "the provisions of the rule find support in [Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (1909)]." Final Report of Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 25 (1937). See also Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958). </s> [Footnote 12 Counsel for petitioners agreed to this characterization of the sanction at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 47-48. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in the judgment. </s> The Court rests today's decision on a constitutional distinction between "subject matter" and "in personam" jurisdiction. Under this distinction, subject-matter jurisdiction defines an Art. III limitation on the power of federal courts. By contrast, the Court characterizes the limits on in personam jurisdiction solely in terms of waivable personal rights and notions of "fair play." Having done so, it determines [456 U.S. 694, 710] that fundamental questions of judicial power do not arise in this case concerning the personal jurisdiction of a federal district court. </s> In my view the Court's broadly theoretical decision misapprehends the issues actually presented for decision. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Their personal jurisdiction, no less than their subject-matter jurisdiction, is subject both to constitutional and to statutory definition. When the applicable limitations on federal jurisdiction are identified, it becomes apparent that the Court's theory could require a sweeping but largely unexplicated revision of jurisdictional doctrine. This revision could encompass not only the personal jurisdiction of federal courts but "sovereign" limitations on state jurisdiction as identified in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 -293 (1980). Fair resolution of this case does not require the Court's broad holding. Accordingly, although I concur in the Court's judgment, I cannot join its opinion. </s> I </s> This lawsuit began when the respondent Compagnie des Bauxites brought a contract action against the petitioner insurance companies in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Alleging diversity jurisdiction, respondent averred that the District Court had personal jurisdiction of the petitioners, all foreign corporations, under the long-arm statute of the State of Pennsylvania. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 880-881 (CA3 1981). Petitioners, however, denied that they were subject to the court's personal jurisdiction under that or any other statute. Viewing the question largely as one of fact, the court ordered discovery to resolve the dispute. </s> Meantime, while respondent unsuccessfully sought compliance with its discovery requests, petitioners brought a parallel action in England's High Court of Justice, Queens Bench [456 U.S. 694, 711] Division. It was at this juncture that the current issues arose. Seeking to enjoin the English proceedings, respondent sought an injunction in the District Court. Petitioners protested that they were not subject to that court's personal jurisdiction and thus that they lay beyond its injunctive powers. But the District Court disagreed. As a jurisdictional prerequisite to its entry of the injunction, the court upheld its personal jurisdiction over petitioners. 1 It characterized its finding of jurisdiction partly as a sanction for petitioners' noncompliance with its discovery orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b). 2 </s> Rule 37(b) is not, however, a jurisdictional provision. As recognized by the Court of Appeals, the governing jurisdictional statute remains the long-arm statute of the State of Pennsylvania. See 651 F.2d, at 881. In my view the Court fails to make clear the implications of this central fact: that the District Court in this case relied on state law to obtain personal jurisdiction. </s> As courts of limited jurisdiction, the federal district courts possess no warrant to create jurisdictional law of their own. Under the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. 1652, they must apply state law "except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide . . . ." See generally Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Thus, in the absence of a federal rule or statute establishing a federal basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the personal jurisdiction of the district courts is determined in diversity cases by the law of the forum State. See, e. g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Co., 575 F.2d 1017 (CA2 1978); Wilkerson v. Fortuna Corp., [456 U.S. 694, 712] 554 F.2d 745 (CA5), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977); Poyner v. Erma Werke Gmbh, 618 F.2d 1186, 1187 (CA6 1980); Lakeside Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Constr. Co., 597 F.2d 596 (CA7 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980); Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fundraising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634 (CA8 1975); Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219, 226 (CA2 1963); Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 782 (CA9), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 864 (1978); Quarles v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 504 F.2d 1358 (CA10 1974). 3 </s> As a result of the District Court's dependence on the law of Pennsylvania to establish personal jurisdiction - a dependence mandated by Congress under 28 U.S.C. 1652 - its jurisdiction in this case normally would be subject to the same due process limitations as a state court. See, e. g., Forsythe v. Overmyer, supra, at 782; Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 445 (CA5 1979); Fisons Ltd. v. United States, 458 F.2d 1241, 1250 (CA7 1972). 4 Thus, the question arises how today's decision is related to cases restricting the personal jurisdiction of the States. </s> Before today our decisions had established that "minimum contacts" represented a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant. See, e. g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, [456 U.S. 694, 713] 444 U.S., at 291 -293; Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). In the absence of a showing of minimum contacts, a finding of personal jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant, even as a sanction, therefore would appear to transgress previously established constitutional limitations. The cases cannot be reconciled by a simple distinction between the constitutional limits on state and federal courts. Because of the District Court's reliance on the Pennsylvania long-arm statute - the applicable jurisdictional provision under the Rules of Decisions Act - the relevant constitutional limits would not be those imposed directly on federal courts by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but those applicable to state jurisdictional law under the Fourteenth. </s> The Court's decision apparently must be understood as related to our state jurisdictional cases in one of two ways. Both involve legal theories that fail to justify the doctrine adopted by the Court in this case. </s> A </s> Under traditional principles, the due process question in this case is whether "minimum contacts" exist between petitioners and the forum State that would justify the State in exercising personal jurisdiction. See, e. g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra, at 291-293; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at 251. By finding that the establishment of minimum contacts is not a prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, the Court may be understood as finding that "minimum contacts" no longer are a constitutional requirement for the exercise by a state court of personal jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant. 5 Whenever the Court's notions [456 U.S. 694, 714] of fairness are not offended, jurisdiction apparently may be upheld. </s> Before today, of course, our cases had linked minimum contacts and fair play as jointly defining the "sovereign" limits on state assertions of personal jurisdiction over unconsenting defendants. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, supra, at 292-293; see Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at 251. The Court appears to abandon the rationale of these cases in a footnote. See ante, at 702-703, n. 10. But it does not address the implications of its action. By eschewing reliance on the concept of minimum contacts as a "sovereign" limitation on the power of States - for, again, it is the State's long-arm statute that is invoked to obtain personal jurisdiction in the District Court - the Court today effects a potentially substantial change of law. For the first time it defines personal jurisdiction solely by reference to abstract notions of fair play. And, astonishingly to me, it does so in a case in which this rationale for decision was neither argued nor briefed by the parties. </s> B </s> Alternatively, it is possible to read the Court opinion, not as affecting state jurisdiction, but simply as asserting that Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represents a congressionally approved basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal district court. On this view Rule 37 vests the federal district courts with authority to take jurisdiction over persons not in compliance with discovery orders. This of course would be a more limited holding. Yet the Court does not cast its decision in these terms. And it provides no support for such an interpretation, either in the language or in the history of the Federal Rules. [456 U.S. 694, 715] </s> In the absence of such support, I could not join the Court in embracing such a construction of the Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 There is nothing in Rule 37 to suggest that it is intended to confer a grant of personal jurisdiction. Indeed, the clear language of Rule 82 seems to establish that Rule 37 should not be construed as a jurisdictional grant: "These rules shall not be construed to extend . . . the jurisdiction of the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein." Moreover, assuming that minimum contacts remain a constitutional predicate for the exercise of a State's in personam jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant, constitutional questions would arise if Rule 37 were read to permit a plaintiff in a diversity action to subject a defendant to a "fishing expedition" in a foreign jurisdiction. A plaintiff is not entitled to discovery to establish essentially speculative allegations necessary to personal jurisdiction. Nor would the use of Rule 37 sanctions to enforce discovery orders constitute a mere abuse of discretion in such a case. 7 For me at least, such a use of discovery would raise serious questions as to the constitutional as well as the statutory authority of a federal court - in a diversity case - to exercise personal jurisdiction [456 U.S. 694, 716] absent some showing of minimum contacts between the unconsenting defendant and the forum State. </s> II </s> In this case the facts alone - unaided by broad jurisdictional theories - more than amply demonstrate that the District Court possessed personal jurisdiction to impose sanctions under Rule 37 and otherwise to adjudicate this case. I would decide the case on this narrow basis. </s> As recognized both by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the respondent adduced substantial support for its jurisdictional assertions. By affidavit and other evidence, it made a prima facie showing of "minimum contacts." See 651 F.2d, at 881-882, 886, and n. 9. In the view of the District Court, the evidence adduced actually was sufficient to sustain a finding of personal jurisdiction independently of the Rule 37 sanction. App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a, 53a. 8 </s> Where the plaintiff has made a prima facie showing of minimum contacts, I have little difficulty in holding that its showing was sufficient to warrant the District Court's entry of discovery orders. And where a defendant then fails to comply with those orders, I agree that the prima facie showing may be held adequate to sustain the court's finding that minimum contacts exist, either under Rule 37 or under a theory of "presumption" or "waiver." </s> Finding that the decision of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed on this ground, I concur in the judgment of the Court. </s> [Footnote 1 A district court must have personal jurisdiction over a party before it can enjoin its actions. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 111 -112 (1969). </s> [Footnote 2 The court also found that petitioners in fact had undertaken sufficient business activity in the State to bring them within the reach of the Pennsylvania long-arm statute. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 51a, 53a. </s> [Footnote 3 As Judge Friendly explained in the leading case of Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d, at 226: </s> "State statutes determining what foreign corporations may be sued, for what, and by whom, are not mere whimsy; like most legislation they represent a balancing of various considerations - for example, affording a forum for wrongs connected with the state and conveniencing resident plaintiffs, while avoiding the discouragement of activity within the state by foreign corporations. We see nothing in the concept of diversity jurisdiction that should lead us to read into the governing statutes a Congressional mandate, unexpressed by Congress itself, to disregard the balance thus struck by the states." </s> [Footnote 4 It is not contended that there is any federal basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by the District Court. </s> [Footnote 5 The Court refers to the respondent's prima facie showing of "minimum contacts" only as one factor indicating that the District Court did not abuse [456 U.S. 694, 714] its discretion in entering a finding of personal jurisdiction as a sanction under Rule 37(b). See ante, at 708. Generally it views the requirement of personal jurisdiction as a right that may be "established or waived like other rights." Ante, at 706. </s> [Footnote 6 Jurisdiction over the person generally is dealt with by Rule 4, governing the methods of service through which personal jurisdiction may be obtained. Although Rule 4 deals expressly only with service of process, not with the underlying jurisdictional prerequisites, jurisdiction may not be obtained unless process is served in compliance with applicable law. See, e. g., Intermeat, Inc. v. American Poultry Co., 575 F.2d 1017 (CA2 1978); Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 445 (CA5 1979); D. Currie, Federal Courts 858 (2d ed. 1975). For this reason Rule 4 frequently has been characterized as a jurisdictional provision. See, e. g., 374 U.S. 869 (1963) (statement of Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting from adoption of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Currie, supra, at 858; Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. Rev. 9, 11. As applicable here, Rule 4 relies expressly on state law. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 4(d)(7) and (e). </s> [Footnote 7 Compare the Court's view. Ante, at 707. </s> [Footnote 8 The Court of Appeals deemed it unnecessary to review this alternative basis for the District Court's finding of jurisdiction. See 651 F.2d, at 886, and n. 9. </s> [456 U.S. 694, 717]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. O'BRIEN(1968) No. 232 Argued: January 24, 1968Decided: May 27, 1968 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 233, O'Brien v. United States, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certificate before a sizable crowd in order to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs. He was indicted, tried, and convicted for violating 50 U.S.C. App. 462 (b), a part of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, subdivision (3) of which applies to any person "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate . . .," the words italicized herein having been added by amendment in 1965. The District Court rejected O'Brien's argument that the amendment was unconstitutional because it was enacted to abridge free speech and served no legitimate legislative purpose. The Court of Appeals held the 1965 Amendment unconstitutional under the First Amendment as singling out for special treatment persons engaged in protests, on the ground that conduct under the 1965 Amendment was already punishable since a Selective Service System regulation required registrants to keep their registration certificates in their "personal possession at all times," 32 CFR 1617.1, and wilful violation of regulations promulgated under the Act was made criminal by 50 U.S.C. App. 462 (b) (6). The court, however, upheld O'Brien's conviction under 462 (b) (6), which in its view made violation of the nonpossession regulation a lesser included offense of the crime defined by the 1965 Amendment. Held: </s> 1. The 1965 Amendment to 50 U.S.C. App. 462 (b) (3) is constitutional as applied in this case. Pp. 375, 376-382. </s> (a) The 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free speech on its face. P. 375. </s> (b) When "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. P. 376. </s> (c) A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government and furthers [391 U.S. 367, 368] an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to that interest. The 1965 Amendment meets all these requirements. P. 377. </s> (d) The 1965 Amendment came within Congress' "broad and sweeping" power to raise and support armies and make all laws necessary to that end. P. 377. </s> (e) The registration certificate serves purposes in addition to initial notification, e. g., it proves that the described individual has registered for the draft; facilitates communication between registrants and local boards; and provides a reminder that the registrant must notify his local board of changes in address or status. The regulatory scheme involving the certificates includes clearly valid prohibitions against alteration, forgery, or similar deceptive misuse. Pp. 378-380. </s> (f) The pre-existence of the nonpossession regulation does not negate Congress' clear interest in providing alternative statutory avenues of prosecution to assure its interest in preventing destruction of the Selective Service certificates. P. 380. </s> (g) The governmental interests protected by the 1965 Amendment and the nonpossession regulation, though overlapping, are not identical. Pp. 380-381. </s> (h) The 1965 Amendment is a narrow and precisely drawn provision which specifically protects the Government's substantial interest in an efficient and easily administered system for raising armies. Pp. 381-382. </s> (i) O'Brien was convicted only for the wilful frustration of that governmental interest. The noncommunicative impact of his conduct for which he was convicted makes his case readily distinguishable from Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). P. 382. </s> 2. The 1965 Amendment is constitutional as enacted. Pp. 382-385. </s> (a) Congress' purpose in enacting the law affords no basis for declaring an otherwise constitutional statute invalid. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904). Pp. 383-384. </s> (b) Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), distinguished. Pp. 384-385. </s> 376 F.2d 538, vacated; judgment and sentence of District Court reinstated. [391 U.S. 367, 369] </s> Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., Beatrice Rosenberg, and Jerome M. Feit. </s> Marvin M. Karpatkin argued the cause for respondent in No. 232 and petitioner in No. 233. With him on the brief were Howard S. Whiteside, Melvin L. Wulf, and Rhoda H. Karpatkin. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> On the morning of March 31, 1966, David Paul O'Brien and three companions burned their Selective Service registration certificates on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse. A sizable crowd, including several agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, witnessed the event. 1 Immediately after the burning, members of the crowd began attacking O'Brien and his companions. An FBI agent ushered O'Brien to safety inside the courthouse. After he was advised of his right to counsel and to silence, O'Brien stated to FBI agents that he had burned his registration certificate because of his beliefs, knowing that he was violating federal law. He produced the charred remains of the certificate, which, with his consent, were photographed. </s> For this act, O'Brien was indicted, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. 2 He did not contest the fact [391 U.S. 367, 370] that he had burned the certificate. He stated in argument to the jury that he burned the certificate publicly to influence others to adopt his antiwar beliefs, as he put it, "so that other people would reevaluate their positions with Selective Service, with the armed forces, and reevaluate their place in the culture of today, to hopefully consider my position." </s> The indictment upon which he was tried charged that he "willfully and knowingly did mutilate, destroy, and change by burning . . . [his] Registration Certificate (Selective Service System Form No. 2); in violation of Title 50, App., United States Code, Section 462 (b)." Section 462 (b) is part of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948. Section 462 (b) (3), one of six numbered subdivisions of 462 (b), was amended by Congress in 1965, 79 Stat. 586 (adding the words italicized below), so that at the time O'Brien burned his certificate an offense was committed by any person, </s> "who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate . . . ." (Italics supplied.) </s> In the District Court, O'Brien argued that the 1965 Amendment prohibiting the knowing destruction or mutilation of certificates was unconstitutional because it was enacted to abridge free speech, and because it served no legitimate legislative purpose. 3 The District Court rejected these arguments, holding that the statute on its face did not abridge First Amendment rights, that the court was not competent to inquire into the motives of Congress in enacting the 1965 Amendment, and that the [391 U.S. 367, 371] Amendment was a reasonable exercise of the power of Congress to raise armies. </s> On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held the 1965 Amendment unconstitutional as a law abridging freedom of speech. 4 At the time the Amendment was enacted, a regulation of the Selective Service System required registrants to keep their registration certificates in their "personal possession at all times." 32 CFR 1617.1 (1962). 5 Wilful violations of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Universal Military Training and Service Act were made criminal by statute. 50 U.S.C. App. 462 (b) (6). The Court of Appeals, therefore, was of the opinion that conduct punishable under the 1965 Amendment was already punishable under the nonpossession regulation, and consequently that the Amendment served no valid purpose; further, that in light of the prior regulation, the Amendment must have been "directed at public as distinguished from private destruction." On this basis, the court concluded that the 1965 Amendment ran afoul of the First Amendment by singling out persons engaged in protests for special treatment. The court ruled, however, that O'Brien's conviction should be affirmed under the statutory provision, 50 U.S.C. App. 462 (b) (6), which in its view made violation of the nonpossession regulation a crime, because it regarded such violation to be a lesser included offense of the crime defined by the 1965 Amendment. 6 </s> [391 U.S. 367, 372] </s> The Government petitioned for certiorari in No. 232, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the statute unconstitutional, and that its decision conflicted with decisions by the Courts of Appeals for the Second 7 and Eighth Circuits 8 upholding the 1965 Amendment against identical constitutional challenges. O'Brien cross-petitioned for certiorari in No. 233, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining his conviction on the basis of a crime of which he was neither charged nor tried. We granted the Government's petition to resolve the conflict in the circuits, and we also granted O'Brien's cross-petition. We hold that the 1965 Amendment is constitutional both as enacted and as applied. We therefore vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment and sentence of the District Court without reaching the issue raised by O'Brien in No. 233. </s> I. </s> When a male reaches the age of 18, he is required by the Universal Military Training and Service Act to register with a local draft board. 9 He is assigned a Selective Service number, 10 and within five days he is issued a [391 U.S. 367, 373] registration certificate (SSS Form No. 2). 11 Subsequently, and based on a questionnaire completed by the registrant, 12 he is assigned a classification denoting his eligibility for induction, 13 and "[a]s soon as practicable" thereafter he is issued a Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110). 14 This initial classification is not necessarily permanent, 15 and if in the interim before induction the registrant's status changes in some relevant way, he may be reclassified. 16 After such a reclassification, the local board "as soon as practicable" issues to the registrant a new Notice of Classification. 17 </s> Both the registration and classification certificates are small white cards, approximately 2 by 3 inches. The registration certificate specifies the name of the registrant, the date of registration, and the number and address of the local board with which he is registered. Also inscribed upon it are the date and place of the registrant's birth, his residence at registration, his physical description, his signature, and his Selective Service number. The Selective Service number itself indicates his State of registration, his local board, his year of birth, and his chronological position in the local board's classification record. 18 </s> The classification certificate shows the registrant's name, Selective Service number, signature, and eligibility classification. It specifies whether he was so classified by his local board, an appeal board, or the President. It [391 U.S. 367, 374] contains the address of his local board and the date the certificate was mailed. </s> Both the registration and classification certificates bear notices that the registrant must notify his local board in writing of every change in address, physical condition, and occupational, marital, family, dependency, and military status, and of any other fact which might change his classification. Both also contain a notice that the registrant's Selective Service number should appear on all communications to his local board. </s> Congress demonstrated its concern that certificates issued by the Selective Service System might be abused well before the 1965 Amendment here challenged. The 1948 Act, 62 Stat. 604, itself prohibited many different abuses involving "any registration certificate, . . . or any other certificate issued pursuant to or prescribed by the provisions of this title, or rules or regulations promulgated hereunder . . . ." 62 Stat. 622. Under 12 (b) (1)-(5) of the 1948 Act, it was unlawful (1) to transfer a certificate to aid a person in making false identification; (2) to possess a certificate not duly issued with the intent of using it for false identification; (3) to forge, alter, "or in any manner" change a certificate or any notation validly inscribed thereon; (4) to photograph or make an imitation of a certificate for the purpose of false identification; and (5) to possess a counterfeited or altered certificate. 62 Stat. 622. In addition, as previously mentioned, regulations of the Selective Service System required registrants to keep both their registration and classification certificates in their personal possession at all times. 32 CFR 1617.1 (1962) (Registration Certificates); 19 32 CFR 1623.5 [391 U.S. 367, 375] (1962) (Classification Certificates). 20 And 12 (b) (6) of the Act, 62 Stat. 622, made knowing violation of any provision of the Act or rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto a felony. </s> By the 1965 Amendment, Congress added to 12 (b) (3) of the 1948 Act the provision here at issue, subjecting to criminal liability not only one who "forges, alters, or in any manner changes" but also one who "knowingly destroys, [or] knowingly mutilates" a certificate. We note at the outset that the 1965 Amendment plainly does not abridge free speech on its face, and we do not understand O'Brien to argue otherwise. Amended 12 (b) (3) on its face deals with conduct having no connection with speech. It prohibits the knowing destruction of certificates issued by the Selective Service System, and there is nothing necessarily expressive about such conduct. The Amendment does not distinguish between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only destruction engaged in for the purpose of expressing views. Compare Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 21 A law prohibiting destruction of Selective Service certificates no more abridges free speech on its face than a motor vehicle law prohibiting the destruction of drivers' licenses, or a tax law prohibiting the destruction of books and records. [391 U.S. 367, 376] </s> O'Brien nonetheless argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional in its application to him, and is unconstitutional as enacted because what he calls the "purpose" of Congress was "to suppress freedom of speech." We consider these arguments separately. </s> II. </s> O'Brien first argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as applied to him because his act of burning his registration certificate was protected "symbolic speech" within the First Amendment. His argument is that the freedom of expression which the First Amendment guarantees includes all modes of "communication of ideas by conduct," and that his conduct is within this definition because he did it in "demonstration against the war and against the draft." </s> We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled "speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; 22 substantial; 23 subordinating; 24 </s> [391 U.S. 367, 377] paramount; 25 cogent; 26 strong. 27 Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 1965 Amendment to 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and consequently that O'Brien can be constitutionally convicted for violating it. </s> The constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies and to make all laws necessary and proper to that end is broad and sweeping. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 755 -758 (1948); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918); see also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 -26 (1942). The power of Congress to classify and conscript manpower for military service is "beyond question." Lichter v. United States, supra, at 756; Selective Draft Law Cases, supra. Pursuant to this power, Congress may establish a system of registration for individuals liable for training and service, and may require such individuals within reason to cooperate in the registration system. The issuance of certificates indicating the registration and eligibility classification of individuals is a legitimate and substantial administrative aid in the functioning of this system. And legislation [391 U.S. 367, 378] to insure the continuing availability of issued certificates serves a legitimate and substantial purpose in the system's administration. </s> O'Brien's argument to the contrary is necessarily premised upon his unrealistic characterization of Selective Service certificates. He essentially adopts the position that such certificates are so many pieces of paper designed to notify registrants of their registration or classification, to be retained or tossed in the wastebasket according to the convenience or taste of the registrant. Once the registrant has received notification, according to this view, there is no reason for him to retain the certificates. O'Brien notes that most of the information on a registration certificate serves no notification purpose at all; the registrant hardly needs to be told his address and physical characteristics. We agree that the registration certificate contains much information of which the registrant needs no notification. This circumstance, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the certificate serves no purpose, but that, like the classification certificate, it serves purposes in addition to initial notification. Many of these purposes would be defeated by the certificates' destruction or mutilation. Among these are: </s> 1. The registration certificate serves as proof that the individual described thereon has registered for the draft. The classification certificate shows the eligibility classification of a named but undescribed individual. Voluntarily displaying the two certificates is an easy and painless way for a young man to dispel a question as to whether he might be delinquent in his Selective Service obligations. Correspondingly, the availability of the certificates for such display relieves the Selective Service System of the administrative burden it would otherwise have in verifying the registration and classification of all suspected delinquents. Further, since both certificates are in the nature of "receipts" attesting that the registrant [391 U.S. 367, 379] has done what the law requires, it is in the interest of the just and efficient administration of the system that they be continually available, in the event, for example, of a mix-up in the registrant's file. Additionally, in a time of national crisis, reasonable availability to each registrant of the two small cards assures a rapid and uncomplicated means for determining his fitness for immediate induction, no matter how distant in our mobile society he may be from his local board. </s> 2. The information supplied on the certificates facilitates communication between registrants and local boards, simplifying the system and benefiting all concerned. To begin with, each certificate bears the address of the registrant's local board, an item unlikely to be committed to memory. Further, each card bears the registrant's Selective Service number, and a registrant who has his number readily available so that he can communicate it to his local board when he supplies or requests information can make simpler the board's task in locating his file. Finally, a registrant's inquiry, particularly through a local board other than his own, concerning his eligibility status is frequently answerable simply on the basis of his classification certificate; whereas, if the certificate were not reasonably available and the registrant were uncertain of his classification, the task of answering his questions would be considerably complicated. </s> 3. Both certificates carry continual reminders that the registrant must notify his local board of any change of address, and other specified changes in his status. The smooth functioning of the system requires that local boards be continually aware of the status and whereabouts of registrants, and the destruction of certificates deprives the system of a potentially useful notice device. </s> 4. The regulatory scheme involving Selective Service certificates includes clearly valid prohibitions against the alteration, forgery, or similar deceptive misuse of certificates. [391 U.S. 367, 380] The destruction or mutilation of certificates obviously increases the difficulty of detecting and tracing abuses such as these. Further, a mutilated certificate might itself be used for deceptive purposes. </s> The many functions performed by Selective Service certificates establish beyond doubt that Congress has a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing their wanton and unrestrained destruction and assuring their continuing availability by punishing people who knowingly and wilfully destroy or mutilate them. And we are unpersuaded that the pre-existence of the nonpossession regulations in any way negates this interest. </s> In the absence of a question as to multiple punishment, it has never been suggested that there is anything improper in Congress' providing alternative statutory avenues of prosecution to assure the effective protection of one and the same interest. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958). 28 Here, the pre-existing avenue of prosecution was not even statutory. Regulations may be modified or revoked from time to time by administrative discretion. Certainly, the Congress may change or supplement a regulation. </s> Equally important, a comparison of the regulations with the 1965 Amendment indicates that they protect overlapping but not identical governmental interests, and that they reach somewhat different classes of wrongdoers. 29 The gravamen of the offense defined by the statute is the deliberate rendering of certificates unavailable for the various purposes which they may serve. Whether registrants keep their certificates in their personal [391 U.S. 367, 381] possession at all times, as required by the regulations, is of no particular concern under the 1965 Amendment, as long as they do not mutilate or destroy the certificates so as to render them unavailable. Although as we note below we are not concerned here with the nonpossession regulations, it is not inappropriate to observe that the essential elements of nonpossession are not identical with those of mutilation or destruction. Finally, the 1965 Amendment, like 12 (b) which it amended, is concerned with abuses involving any issued Selective Service certificates, not only with the registrant's own certificates. The knowing destruction or mutilation of someone else's certificates would therefore violate the statute but not the nonpossession regulations. </s> We think it apparent that the continuing availability to each registrant of his Selective Service certificates substantially furthers the smooth and proper functioning of the system that Congress has established to raise armies. We think it also apparent that the Nation has a vital interest in having a system for raising armies that functions with maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly responding to continually changing circumstances. For these reasons, the Government has a substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates. </s> It is equally clear that the 1965 Amendment specifically protects this substantial governmental interest. We perceive no alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 -408 (1963), and the cases cited therein. The 1965 Amendment prohibits such conduct and does nothing more. In other words, both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment are limited to the noncommunicative [391 U.S. 367, 382] aspect of O'Brien's conduct. The governmental interest and the scope of the 1965 Amendment are limited to preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective Service System. When O'Brien deliberately rendered unavailable his registration certificate, he wilfully frustrated this governmental interest. For this noncommunicative impact of his conduct, and for nothing else, he was convicted. </s> The case at bar is therefore unlike one where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful. In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), for example, this Court struck down a statutory phrase which punished people who expressed their "opposition to organized government" by displaying "any flag, badge, banner, or device." Since the statute there was aimed at suppressing communication it could not be sustained as a regulation of noncommunicative conduct. See also, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (concurring opinion). </s> In conclusion, we find that because of the Government's substantial interest in assuring the continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates, because amended 462 (b) is an appropriately narrow means of protecting this interest and condemns only the independent noncommunicative impact of conduct within its reach, and because the noncommunicative impact of O'Brien's act of burning his registration certificate frustrated the Government's interest, a sufficient governmental interest has been shown to justify O'Brien's conviction. </s> III. </s> O'Brien finally argues that the 1965 Amendment is unconstitutional as enacted because what he calls the "purpose" of Congress was "to suppress freedom of [391 U.S. 367, 383] speech." We reject this argument because under settled principles the purpose of Congress, as O'Brien uses that term, is not a basis for declaring this legislation unconstitutional. </s> It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive. As the Court long ago stated: </s> "The decisions of this court from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be exerted." McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904). </s> This fundamental principle of constitutional adjudication was reaffirmed and the many cases were collected by Mr. Justice Brandeis for the Court in Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 455 (1931). </s> Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, 30 because the benefit to sound decision-making in [391 U.S. 367, 384] this circumstance is thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a "wiser" speech about it. </s> O'Brien's position, and to some extent that of the court below, rest upon a misunderstanding of Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). These cases stand, not for the proposition that legislative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional. Thus, in Grosjean the Court, having concluded that the right of publications to be free from certain kinds of taxes was a freedom of the press protected by the First Amendment, struck down a statute which on its face did nothing other than impose [391 U.S. 367, 385] just such a tax. Similarly, in Gomillion, the Court sustained a complaint which, if true, established that the "inevitable effect," 364 U.S., at 341 , of the redrawing of municipal boundaries was to deprive the petitioners of their right to vote for no reason other than that they were Negro. In these cases, the purpose of the legislation was irrelevant, because the inevitable effect - the "necessary scope and operation," McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59 (1904) - abridged constitutional rights. The statute attacked in the instant case has no such inevitable unconstitutional effect, since the destruction of Selective Service certificates is in no respect inevitably or necessarily expressive. Accordingly, the statute itself is constitutional. </s> We think it not amiss, in passing, to comment upon O'Brien's legislative-purpose argument. There was little floor debate on this legislation in either House. Only Senator Thurmond commented on its substantive features in the Senate. 111 Cong. Rec. 19746, 20433. After his brief statement, and without any additional substantive comments, the bill, H. R. 10306, passed the Senate. 111 Cong. Rec. 20434. In the House debate only two Congressmen addressed themselves to the Amendment - Congressmen Rivers and Bray. 111 Cong. Rec. 19871, 19872. The bill was passed after their statements without any further debate by a vote of 393 to 1. It is principally on the basis of the statements by these three Congressmen that O'Brien makes his congressional-"purpose" argument. We note that if we were to examine legislative purpose in the instant case, we would be obliged to consider not only these statements but also the more authoritative reports of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. The portions of those reports explaining the purpose of the Amendment are reproduced in the Appendix in their entirety. While both reports make clear a concern with the "defiant" [391 U.S. 367, 386] destruction of so-called "draft cards" and with "open" encouragement to others to destroy their cards, both reports also indicate that this concern stemmed from an apprehension that unrestrained destruction of cards would disrupt the smooth functioning of the Selective Service System. </s> IV. </s> Since the 1965 Amendment to 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act is constitutional as enacted and as applied, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the judgment of conviction entered by the District Court. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstate the judgment and sentence of the District Court. This disposition makes unnecessary consideration of O'Brien's claim that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction on the basis of the nonpossession regulation. 31 </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT. </s> PORTIONS OF THE REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEES ON ARMED SERVICES OF THE SENATE AND HOUSE EXPLAINING THE 1965 AMENDMENT. </s> The "Explanation of the Bill" in the Senate Report is as follows: </s> "Section 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended, provides, among other things, that a person who forges, alters, or changes [391 U.S. 367, 387] a draft registration certificate is subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. There is no explicit prohibition in this section against the knowing destruction or mutilation of such cards. </s> "The committee has taken notice of the defiant destruction and mutilation of draft cards by dissident persons who disapprove of national policy. If allowed to continue unchecked this contumacious conduct represents a potential threat to the exercise of the power to raise and support armies. </s> "For a person to be subject to fine or imprisonment the destruction or mutilation of the draft card must be `knowingly' done. This qualification is intended to protect persons who lose or mutilate draft cards accidentally." S. Rep. No. 589, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). </s> And the House Report explained: </s> "Section 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, as amended, provides that a person who forges, alters, or in any manner changes his draft registration card, or any notation duly and validly inscribed thereon, will be subject to a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years. H. R. 10306 would amend this provision to make it apply also to those persons who knowingly destroy or knowingly mutilate a draft registration card. </s> "The House Committee on Armed Services is fully aware of, and shares in, the deep concern expressed throughout the Nation over the increasing incidences in which individuals and large groups of individuals openly defy and encourage others to defy the authority of their Government by destroying or mutilating their draft cards. </s> "While the present provisions of the Criminal Code with respect to the destruction of Government property [391 U.S. 367, 388] may appear broad enough to cover all acts having to do with the mistreatment of draft cards in the possession of individuals, the committee feels that in the present critical situation of the country, the acts of destroying or mutilating these cards are offenses which pose such a grave threat to the security of the Nation that no question whatsoever should be left as to the intention of the Congress that such wanton and irresponsible acts should be punished. </s> "To this end, H. R. 10306 makes specific that knowingly mutilating or knowingly destroying a draft card constitutes a violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act and is punishable thereunder; and that a person who does so destroy or mutilate a draft card will be subject to a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years." H. R. Rep. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 At the time of the burning, the agents knew only that O'Brien and his three companions had burned small white cards. They later discovered that the card O'Brien burned was his registration certificate, and the undisputed assumption is that the same is true of his companions. </s> [Footnote 2 He was sentenced under the Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. 5010 (b), to the custody of the Attorney General for a maximum period of six years for supervision and treatment. </s> [Footnote 3 The issue of the constitutionality of the 1965 Amendment was raised by counsel representing O'Brien in a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. At trial and upon sentencing, O'Brien chose to represent himself. He was represented by counsel on his appeal to the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 4 O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1967). </s> [Footnote 5 The portion of 32 CFR relevant to the instant case was revised as of January 1, 1967. Citations in this opinion are to the 1962 edition which was in effect when O'Brien committed the crime, and when Congress enacted the 1965 Amendment. </s> [Footnote 6 The Court of Appeals nevertheless remanded the case to the District Court to vacate the sentence and resentence O'Brien. In [391 U.S. 367, 372] the court's view, the district judge might have considered the violation of the 1965 Amendment as an aggravating circumstance in imposing sentence. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied O'Brien's petition for a rehearing, in which he argued that he had not been charged, tried, or convicted for nonpossession, and that nonpossession was not a lesser included offense of mutilation or destruction. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 542 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1967). </s> [Footnote 7 United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967). </s> [Footnote 8 Smith v. United States, 368 F.2d 529 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1966). </s> [Footnote 9 See 62 Stat. 605, as amended, 65 Stat. 76, 50 U.S.C. App. 453: 32 CFR 1613.1 (1962). </s> [Footnote 10 32 CFR 1621.2 (1962). </s> [Footnote 11 32 CFR 1613.43a (1962). </s> [Footnote 12 32 CFR 1621.9, 1623.1 (1962). </s> [Footnote 13 32 CFR 1623.1, 1623.2 (1962). </s> [Footnote 14 32 CFR 1623.4 (1962). </s> [Footnote 15 32 CFR 1625.1 (1962). </s> [Footnote 16 32 CFR 1625.1, 1625.2, 1625.3, 1625.4, and 1625.11 (1962). </s> [Footnote 17 32 CFR 1625.12 (1962). </s> [Footnote 18 32 CFR 1621.2 (1962). </s> [Footnote 19 32 CFR 1617.1 (1962), provides, in relevant part: </s> "Every person required to present himself for and submit to registration must, after he is registered, have in his personal possession at all times his Registration Certificate (SSS Form No. 2) [391 U.S. 367, 375] prepared by his local board which has not been altered and on which no notation duly and validly inscribed thereon has been changed in any manner after its preparation by the local board. The failure of any person to have his Registration Certificate (SSS Form No. 2) in his personal possession shall be prima facie evidence of his failure to register." </s> [Footnote 20 32 CFR 1623.5 (1962), provides, in relevant part: </s> "Every person who has been classified by a local board must have in his personal possession at all times, in addition to his Registration Certificate (SSS Form No. 2), a valid Notice of Classification (SSS Form No. 110) issued to him showing his current classification." </s> [Footnote 21 See text, infra, at 382. </s> [Footnote 22 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963). </s> [Footnote 23 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 464 (1958). </s> [Footnote 24 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). </s> [Footnote 25 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). </s> [Footnote 26 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960). </s> [Footnote 27 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408 (1963). </s> [Footnote 28 Cf. Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957). </s> [Footnote 29 Cf. Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961); Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957). </s> [Footnote 30 The Court may make the same assumption in a very limited and well-defined class of cases where the very nature of the constitutional question requires an inquiry into legislative purpose. The principal class of cases is readily apparent - those in which statutes have been challenged as bills of attainder. This Court's decisions have defined a bill of attainder as a legislative Act which inflicts punishment on named individuals or members of an easily ascertainable group without a judicial trial. In determining whether a particular statute is a bill of attainder, the analysis necessarily requires an inquiry into whether the three definitional elements - specificity in identification, punishment, and lack of a judicial trial - are contained in the statute. The inquiry into whether the challenged statute contains the necessary element of punishment has on occasion led the Court to examine the legislative motive in [391 U.S. 367, 384] enacting the statute. See, e. g., United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). Two other decisions not involving a bill of attainder analysis contain an inquiry into legislative purpose or motive of the type that O'Brien suggests we engage in in this case. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 -184 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 -97 (1958). The inquiry into legislative purpose or motive in Kennedy and Trop, however, was for the same limited purpose as in the bill of attainder decisions - i. e., to determine whether the statutes under review were punitive in nature. We face no such inquiry in this case. The 1965 Amendment to 462 (b) was clearly penal in nature, designed to impose criminal punishment for designated acts. </s> [Footnote 31 The other issues briefed by O'Brien were not raised in the petition for certiorari in No. 232 or in the cross-petition in No. 233. Accordingly, those issues are not before the Court. No. 747, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring. </s> The crux of the Court's opinion, which I join, is of course its general statement, ante, at 377, that: </s> "a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." </s> I wish to make explicit my understanding that this passage does not foreclose consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an "incidental" restriction upon expression, imposed by a regulation which furthers an "important or substantial" governmental interest and satisfies the Court's other criteria, in practice has the effect of entirely preventing a "speaker" [391 U.S. 367, 389] from reaching a significant audience with whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate. This is not such a case, since O'Brien manifestly could have conveyed his message in many ways other than by burning his draft card. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> The Court states that the constitutional power of Congress to raise and support armies is "broad and sweeping" and that Congress' power "to classify and conscript manpower for military service is `beyond question.'" This is undoubtedly true in times when, by declaration of Congress, the Nation is in a state of war. The underlying and basic problem in this case, however, is whether conscription is permissible in the absence of a declaration of war. 1 That question has not been briefed nor was it presented in oral argument; but it is, I submit, a question upon which the litigants and the country are entitled to a ruling. I have discussed in Holmes v. United States, post, p. 936, the nature of the legal issue and it will be seen from my dissenting opinion in that case that this Court has never ruled on [391 U.S. 367, 390] the question. It is time that we made a ruling. This case should be put down for reargument and heard with Holmes v. United States and with Hart v. United States, post, p. 956, in which the Court today denies certiorari. 2 </s> The rule that this Court will not consider issues not raised by the parties is not inflexible and yields in "exceptional cases" (Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 ) to the need correctly to decide the case before the court. E. g., Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 ; Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 . </s> In such a case it is not unusual to ask for reargument (Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 379 , n. 2, Frankfurter, J., concurring) even on a constitutional question not raised by the parties. In Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 , the petitioner had conceded that an administrative deportation arrest warrant would be valid for its limited purpose even though not supported by a sworn affidavit stating probable cause; but the Court ordered reargument on the question whether the warrant had been validly issued in petitioner's case. 362 U.S., at 219 , n., par. 1; 359 U.S. 940 . In Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 , the petitioner argued that an exclusionary rule should apply to the fruit of an unreasonable search by state officials solely because they acted in concert with federal officers (see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 ; Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 ). The Court ordered reargument on the question raised in a then pending case, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 : applicability of the Fourth Amendment to the States. U.S. Sup. Ct. Journal, October Term, 1947, p. 298. In Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 , the only issue presented, [391 U.S. 367, 391] according to both parties, was whether the record contained sufficient evidence of fraud to uphold an order of the Postmaster General. Reargument was ordered on the constitutional issue of abridgment of First Amendment freedoms. 333 U.S., at 181 -182; Journal, October Term, 1947, p. 70. Finally, in Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 96 , reargument was ordered on the question of unconstitutional vagueness of a criminal statute, an issue not raised by the parties but suggested at oral argument by Justice Jackson. Journal, October Term, 1947, p. 87. </s> These precedents demonstrate the appropriateness of restoring the instant case to the calendar for reargument on the question of the constitutionality of a peacetime draft and having it heard with Holmes v. United States and Hart v. United States. </s> [Footnote 1 Neither of the decisions cited by the majority for the proposition that Congress' power to conscript men into the armed services is "`beyond question'" concerns peacetime conscription. As I have shown in my dissenting opinion in Holmes v. United States, post, p. 936, the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 , decided in 1918, upheld the constitutionality of a conscription act passed by Congress more than a month after war had been declared on the German Empire and which was then being enforced in time of war. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 , concerned the constitutionality of the Renegotiation Act, another wartime measure, enacted by Congress over the period of 1942-1945 (id., at 745, n. 1) and applied in that case to excessive war profits made in 1942-1943 (id., at 753). War had been declared, of course, in 1941 (55 Stat. 795). The Court referred to Congress' power to raise armies in discussing the "background" ( 334 U.S., at 753 ) of the Renegotiation Act, which it upheld as a valid exercise of the War Power. </s> [Footnote 2 Today the Court also denies stays in Shiffman v. Selective Service Board No. 5, and Zigmond v. Selective Service Board No. 16, post, p. 930, where punitive delinquency regulations are invoked against registrants, decisions that present a related question. </s> [391 U.S. 367, 392]

United States Supreme Court MARINE ENGINEERS v. INTERLAKE CO.(1962) No. 166 Argued: April 16, 1962Decided: June 11, 1962 </s> The two petitioner labor unions represented marine engineers employed on the Great Lakes and elsewhere. Respondents owned and operated a fleet of bulk cargo vessels on the Great Lakes, and the marine engineers employed by them were not represented by any union. In a suit brought by respondents, a State Court enjoined peaceful picketing and other activities by the petitioner unions of a kind arguably prohibited by 8 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, if the petitioner unions were "labor organizations" within the contemplation of 8 (b). Although it was shown from recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board involving these unions that the Board was of the opinion that they were such "labor organizations," the State Court held that they were not, on the ground that only "supervisory" personnel were involved in the dispute. Held: The dispute was arguably within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, and, therefore, the State Court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction. San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 . Pp. 174-185. </s> (a) The principles of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon confined the State Court to deciding only whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to show that either of the petitioner unions was arguably a "labor organization" within the contemplation of 8 (b). Pp. 177-182. </s> (b) The evidence in this case, including recent decisions of the National Labor Relations Board, was sufficient to deprive the State Court of jurisdiction over this controversy. Pp. 182-183. </s> (c) Evidence having been introduced to show that the petitioner unions were arguably "labor organizations" for the purposes of 8 (b), it was the duty of the State Court to defer to the Board's determination, in the absence of a showing that this position had been authoritatively rejected by the courts or abandoned by the Board. P. 184. </s> 260 Minn. 1, 108 N. W. 2d 627, reversed. [370 U.S. 173, 174] </s> Lee Pressman argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was Richard H. Markowitz. </s> Raymond T. Jackson argued the cause for respondents. With him on the briefs was James P. Garner. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 , this Court held that the proper administration of the federal labor law requires state courts to relinquish jurisdiction not only over those controversies actually found to be within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board, but also over litigation arising from activities which might arguably be subject to that agency's cognizance. Only such a rule, the Court held, will preserve for the Labor Board its congressionally delegated function of deciding what is and what is not within its domain. 1 In the present case the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the petitioners, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association (MEBA) and its Local 101, were not "labor organizations" within the meaning of 8 (b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158 (b), and therefore not subject to the unfair labor practice provisions of that section of the statute. Accordingly, the court held that a state trial court had not erred in assuming jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving MEBA and Local 101, and in permanently enjoining them [370 U.S. 173, 175] from picketing found to be in violation of state law. 260 Minn. 1, 108 N. W. 2d 627. We granted certiorari, 368 U.S. 811 , to consider an asserted conflict between the Minnesota court's decision and our holding in the Garmon case. </s> The essential facts which gave rise to this controversy are not in dispute. The respondents owned and operated a fleet of bulk cargo vessels on the Great Lakes. MEBA and Local 101 were unions which represented marine engineers employed on the Great Lakes and elsewhere. 2 The marine engineers employed by the respondents were not represented by MEBA or any other union. </s> On November 11, 1959, the respondents' vessel, Samuel Mather, arrived at the dock of the Carnegie Dock and Fuel Company in Duluth, Minnesota. The following morning several members of Local 101 began to picket at the only entrance road to the Carnegie dock. They carried signs which read: "Pickands Mather Unfair to Organized Labor. This Dispute Only Involves P-M. M. E. B. A. Loc. 101 AFL-CIO." and "M. E. B. A. Loc. 101. AFL-CIO. Request P-M Engineers to Join with Organized Labor to Better Working Conditions. This Dispute Only Involves P-M." When the pickets appeared, employees of the Carnegie Dock and Fuel Company refused to continue unloading the Samuel Mather. As a result, the ship was forced to remain at the dock, and another of the respondents' steamers, the Pickands, was compelled to ride at anchor outside the harbor for a number of days, because the Carnegie dock could accommodate but one vessel at a time. [370 U.S. 173, 176] </s> Upon learning of the picket line, the respondents filed a complaint in the state court charging the union with several violations of state law. The complaint alleged, among other things, that the petitioners had induced Carnegie's employees to refuse to perform services, and that the petitioners had thus caused Carnegie to breach its contract with the respondents. The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the dispute was arguably subject to the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board and thus, under the Garmon doctrine, beyond the state court's cognizance. 3 Evidence was taken concerning the nature and effect of the picketing, the employment status of respondents' marine engineers, and, to a limited extent, the characteristics of MEBA and Local 101. The trial court concluded that the dispute was within its jurisdiction, and, finding the picketing to be in violation of Minnesota law, it issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the petitioners from picketing at or near any site where the respondents' vessels were loading or unloading, from inducing other employees or other firms not to perform services for the respondents, and from interfering in other specified ways with the respondents' operations. The injunction was later made permanent on the basis of the same record, and the court's judgment was affirmed on review by the Supreme Court of Minnesota. </s> The Garmon case dealt with rules of conduct - whether certain activities were protected by 7 or prohibited by 8 of the Act. In the present case it has hardly been disputed, nor could it be, that the petitioners' conduct was of a kind arguably prohibited by 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Act and thus within the primary jurisdiction of the Board, if MEBA and Local 101 were "labor organizations" [370 U.S. 173, 177] within the contemplation of 8 (b) generally. 4 The Minnesota courts determined, however, that those whom the petitioners represented and sought to enlist were "supervisors," that consequently neither of the petitioners was a "labor organization," and therefore that nothing in the Garmon doctrine precluded a state court from assuming jurisdiction. </s> It is the petitioners' contention that the issue to be determined in this case is not whether the state courts correctly decided their "labor organization" status, but whether the state courts were free to finally decide that issue at all. The petitioners contend that the principles of the Garmon decision confined the state court to deciding [370 U.S. 173, 178] only whether the evidence in this case was sufficient to show that either of them was arguably a "labor organization" within the contemplation of 8 (b). We agree, and hold that the evidence was sufficient to deprive the Minnesota courts of jurisdiction over this controversy. </s> We see no reason to assume that the task of interpreting and applying the statutory definition of a "labor organization" does not call for the same adjudicatory expertise that the Board must bring to bear when it determines the applicability of 7 and 8 of the Act to substantive conduct. Indeed, analysis of the problem makes clear that the process of defining the term "labor organization" is one which may often require the full range of Board competence. </s> The term "labor organization" is defined by 2 (5) of the Act, which says: </s> "The term `labor organization' means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 29 U.S.C. 152 (5). </s> The part of that definition at issue in the present case is the requirement that "employees participate" in the organization. As defined by 2 (3) of the Act, "[t]he term `employee' . . . shall not include . . . any individual employed as a supervisor . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 152 (3). 5 "Supervisor" is defined in turn by 2 (11) of the Act to mean: </s> ". . . any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, [370 U.S. 173, 179] recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment." 29 U.S.C. 152 (11). </s> The statutory definition of the term "supervisor" has been the subject of considerable litigation before the NLRB and in the federal courts. 6 It is immediately apparent, moreover, that the phrase "organization . . . in which employees participate" is far from self-explanatory. Several recurring questions stem from the fact that national [370 U.S. 173, 180] or even local unions may represent both "employees" and "supervisors." 7 For example, is employee participation in any part of a defendant national or local union sufficient, or must "employees" be involved in the immediate labor dispute? 8 What percentage or degree of employee participation in the relevant unit is required? 9 If an organization is open to "employees" or solicits their membership, must there be a showing that there are actually employee members? And, if a local union is not itself a "labor organization," are there conditions under which it may become subject to 8 (b) as an agent of some other organization which is? 10 </s> The considerations involved in answering these questions are largely of a kind most wisely entrusted initially to the agency charged with the day-to-day administration of the Act as a whole. The term "labor organization" appears in a number of sections of the Act. Section 8 (a) (2), for example, forbids employers to "dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 158 (a) (2). Section 8 (a) (3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer, by certain discriminatory conduct, "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 158 (a) (3). Section 9 (c), dealing with the largely [370 U.S. 173, 181] unreviewable area of representation elections, 11 refers repeatedly to both "employees" and "labor organizations." The policy considerations underlying these and other sections of the Act, and the relationship of a particular definitional approach under 8 (b) to the meaning of the same term in the various sections, must obviously be taken into account if the statute is to operate as a coherent whole. 12 A centralized adjudicatory process is also essential in working out a consistent approach to the status of the many separate unions which may represent interrelated occupations in a single industry. 13 Moreover, as the national agency charged with the administration of federal labor law, the Board should be free in the first instance to consider the whole spectrum of possible approaches to the question, ranging from a broad definition of "labor organization" in terms of an entire union to a narrow case-by-case consideration of the issue. Only the Board can knowledgeably weigh the effect of either choice upon the certainty and predictability of labor management relations, or assess the importance of simple administrative convenience in this area. 14 </s> [370 U.S. 173, 182] </s> For these reasons we conclude that the task of determining what is a "labor organization" in the context of 8 (b) must in any doubtful case begin with the National Labor Relations Board, and that the only workable way to assure this result is for the courts to concede that a union is a "labor organization" for 8 (b) purposes whenever a reasonably arguable case is made to that effect. Such a case was made in the Minnesota courts. </s> There persuasive evidence was introduced to show that all the marine engineers employed by the respondents were in fact supervisors. 15 It was also shown that MEBA had steadfastly maintained in proceedings before the NLRB that it was not a labor organization subject to 8 (b) of the Act. 16 However, the petitioners introduced into the record two recent Board decisions, one holding [370 U.S. 173, 183] that MEBA was subject to 8 (b) and was guilty of an unfair labor practice for engaging in an activity similar to that involved in this case, 17 and the other holding that marine engineers represented by a branch of Local 101 were "employees" for the purpose of a 9 (c) election. 18 The Board's order in the first case was enforced by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on January 13, 1960, during the pendency of the present litigation in the Minnesota trial court. 19 The state court's attention was expressly called to the Board's theory, subsequently adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, that the relevant unit of membership for determining what is a labor organization in a 8 (b) context is the entire union, and to the holding that the known membership of a few "employees," provisions in the union's constitution making membership available to "employees," and previous conduct indicative of "employee" representation were sufficient to render the national union a "labor organization." See 121 N. L. R. B., at 209-210; 274 F.2d ___, at 174-175. Three additional District Court decisions expressly holding that the Board had reasonable cause to believe that MEBA or Local 101 was subject to 8 (b) had been decided before the issuance of the Minnesota trial court's judgment in the present litigation, although the record does not show that these were specifically brought to the court's attention. 20 </s> [370 U.S. 173, 184] </s> This was a case, therefore, where a state court was shown not simply the arguable possibility of Labor Board jurisdiction over the controversy before it, but that the Board had actually determined the underlying issue upon which its jurisdiction depended, i. e., that MEBA was a "labor organization" for purposes of 8 (b) of the Act. In the absence of a showing that this position had been authoritatively rejected by the courts, 21 or abandoned by the Labor Board itself, we hold that it was the duty of the state court to defer to the Board's determination. 22 </s> [370 U.S. 173, 185] </s> The need for protecting the exclusivity of NLRB jurisdiction is obviously greatest when the precise issue brought before a court is in the process of litigation through procedures originating in the Board. While the Board's decision is not the last word, it must assuredly be the first. In addition, when the Board has actually undertaken to decide an issue, relitigation in a state court creates more than theoretical danger of actual conflict between state and federal regulation of the same controversy. 23 "Our concern" here, as it was in the Garmon case, 359 U.S., at 246 , "is with delimiting areas . . . which must be free from state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered." </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "At times it has not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the States was governed by 7 or 8 or was, perhaps, outside both these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudicate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the Act that these determinations be left in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board. What is outside the scope of this Court's authority cannot remain within a State's power and state jurisdiction too must yield to the exclusive primary competence of the Board." 359 U.S., at 244 -245. </s> [Footnote 2 The record shows that Local 101 was hardly a "local" in the conventional sense of that term. It had branch offices not only throughout the Great Lakes area, but also in Brooklyn, San Francisco, and Houston, among other places, and there were "approximately 35 to 40 locals in 101; some are very small, some are very large." </s> [Footnote 3 Potential NLRB jurisdiction under 8 (b) is the only basis upon which the petitioners have claimed preemption of state court jurisdiction. See note 4, infra. </s> [Footnote 4 On November 12, 1959, the day the picketing began, 8 (b) (4) (A) provided as follows: </s> "It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents - </s> . . . . . </s> "(4) to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . . ." 29 U.S.C. 158 (b) (4) (A). </s> Shortly thereafter the amendments made by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act became effective, and 8 (b) (4) (A) became 8 (b) (4) (B), 29 U.S.C. (Supp. II) 158 (b) (4) (B). The here-pertinent language of the amended sections remained virtually the same. </s> We express no opinion on the ultimate applicability of these provisions. Compare Sailors' Union of the Pacific (Moore Dry Dock Co.), 92 N. L. R. B. 547, with National Maritime Union (Standard Oil Co.), 121 N. L. R. B. 208, enforced, 274 F.2d 167. See generally, Local 761, Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 366 U.S. 667 . </s> [Footnote 5 The decision of Congress to forego regulation of labor relations between employers and their supervisory personnel was the product [370 U.S. 173, 179] of experience under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. The Board's assumption of jurisdiction over supervisors under the 1935 Act was approved by this Court in Packard Motor Car Co. v. Labor Board, 330 U.S. 485 . Congress passed the 1947 Act shortly thereafter, explicitly stating its purpose to free employers from compulsion to treat supervisory personnel as employees for the purpose of collective bargaining or organizational activity. S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 3-5, 28; H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 13-17. </s> [Footnote 6 Compare, e. g., Globe Steamship Co. (Great Lakes Engineers Brotherhood), 85 N. L. R. B. 475, with National Maritime Union (Standard Oil Co.), 121 N. L. R. B., at 209-210, and Graham Transp. Co. (Brotherhood of Marine Engineers), 124 N. L. R. B. 960. See generally, Labor Board v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 331; Labor Board v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571; Ohio Power Co. v. Labor Board, 176 F.2d 385; Labor Board v. Quincy Steel Casting Co., 200 F.2d 293. Summarizing the many federal court decisions in this area, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recently said, ". . . the gradations of authority `responsibly to direct' the work of others from that of general manager or other top executive to `straw boss' are so infinite and subtle that of necessity a large measure of informed discretion is involved in the exercise by the Board of its primary function to determine those who as a practical matter fall within the statutory definition of a `supervisor.'" Labor Board v. Swift & Co., 292 F.2d 561, 563. </s> [Footnote 7 See Labor Board v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., supra, n. 6; International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Di Giorgio Wine Co.), 87 N. L. R. B. 720, enforced, 89 U.S. App. D.C. 155, 191 F.2d 642. </s> [Footnote 8 See, e. g., National Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Labor Board, 274 F.2d 167, 173; International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots (Chicago Calumet Stevedoring Co.), 125 N. L. R. B. 113, 131-132. </s> [Footnote 9 See, e. g., International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Labor Board, 48 L. R. R. M. 2624 (C. A. D.C. Cir. 1960). </s> [Footnote 10 Compare International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Di Giorgio Wine Co.), 87 N. L. R. B., at 721, 743, with National Maritime Union (Standard Oil Co.), 121 N. L. R. B., at 210. </s> [Footnote 11 See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 . </s> [Footnote 12 Cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Di Giorgio Wine Co.), 87 N. L. R. B., at 741. </s> [Footnote 13 Cf. Globe Steamship Co. (Great Lakes Engineers Brotherhood), 85 N. L. R. B., at 478, 480. </s> [Footnote 14 See National Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Labor Board. 274 F.2d, at 175, where it was said: </s> "We earnestly suggest to the Board that the issue whether these two unions, whose activities concern almost every ocean and inland port of the United States, are `labor organizations' within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act deserves more thorough treatment than it has had here. Such an investigation would not, of course, have to be performed in every case. Once the Board determined on the basis of a full inquiry that MEBA and MMP were or were not labor organizations, the Board could rely on this unless there was evidence of a change." </s> [Footnote 15 The trial court relied, in part, upon the 1949 Labor Board decision in Globe Steamship Co., supra, n. 6, which held that certain marine engineers employed on Great Lakes vessels, including those of respondents, were "supervisors" for the purpose of a 9 (c) election petition. </s> [Footnote 16 Respondents introduced an affidavit, filed by MEBA in a prior NLRB proceeding, in which the union claimed to represent only supervisors. This is the affidavit quoted in note 1 of the dissenting opinion, post, p. 185. But, as petitioners pointed out, the Board concluded then, and has continued of the view, that petitioners are "labor organizations" despite such assertions. </s> The petitioners did not attempt to introduce specific evidence in the state court to prove that they actually represented employees who were not supervisors. Indeed, the record would seem to indicate that MEBA and Local 101 would ultimately prefer to be classified as supervisory unions outside the ambit of 8 of the Federal Act. The actual assertion of NLRB jurisdiction over these unions, however, at the very time the state court action was pending, was more than sufficient to create an arguable case for NLRB jurisdiction under 8. It would be entirely inconsistent with our holding in Garmon to require the unions affirmatively to abandon in the state court the position they wished to maintain before the NLRB. It would be equally inconsistent to give evidentiary weight to union affidavits dredged up from prior NLRB proceedings in which the Board rejected the union's self-characterizing claims. </s> [Footnote 17 National Maritime Union (Standard Oil Co.), supra, n. 4. </s> [Footnote 18 Graham Transp. Co. (Brotherhood of Marine Engineers), supra. n. 6. An official of Local 101 testified on direct examination that the Brotherhood of Marine Engineers "was merged in our local" on May 29, 1959. </s> [Footnote 19 National Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Labor Board, supra, n. 8. </s> [Footnote 20 Schauffler v. Local 101, Marine Engineers Ben. Assn., 180 F. Supp. 932; Penello v. Seafarers' International Union, 40 L. R. R. M. 2180 (D.C. E. D. Va., 1957); Douds v. Seafarers' International Union, 148 F. Supp. 953. </s> [Footnote 21 The trial court noted that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had determined that MEBA was not a "labor organization" within the meaning of 301 of the federal statute. A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. National Marine Eng. B. Assn., 250 F.2d 332. This case was subsequently distinguished by the Second Circuit in a case under 8 (b), National Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Labor Board, supra, n. 8, and in United States v. National Marine Engineers' Ben. Assn., 294 F.2d 385. Subsequent to the trial court's decision in the present case the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ordered the NLRB to take additional evidence and to reconsider its determination of a similar maritime union's status as a "labor organization." International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Labor Board, supra, n. 9. At the most these court decisions would only serve to cast some doubt on the validity of the Board's determination. But even if the doubt were much more substantial, the Garmon doctrine would require a state court to decline jurisdiction of the controversy. </s> [Footnote 22 To distinguish the several NLRB decisions on the ground that each involved marine engineers whose jobs were unlike those of the respondents' engineers, as the Minnesota courts sought to do, is inconsistent with all that Garmon teaches. Such a distinction can be made only on the assumption that the relevant unit in determining what is a "labor organization" for purposes of 8 (b) is no more than the group of employees involved in the then-pending dispute. The validity of this very assumption is currently being litigated before the Labor Board and reviewing courts. Far from having been authoritatively accepted, this limited view of the relevant unit has at least twice been expressly rejected. National Marine Engineers Beneficial Assn. v. Labor Board, 274 F.2d, at 173, enforcing 121 N. L. R. B. 208; International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots (Chicago [370 U.S. 173, 185] Calumet Stevedoring Co.), 125 N. L. R. B., at 131-132, remanded for reconsideration on other grounds, 48 L. R. R. M. 2624 (C. A. D.C. Cir. 1960). </s> [Footnote 23 Illustrative of this danger is a recent Federal District Court decision granting an application by a Regional Director of the Board for a temporary injunction against Local 101 prohibiting organizational activity similar to that involved in the present case. Schauffler v. Local 101, Marine Engineers Ben. Assn., supra, n. 20. See also other cases cited, n. 20, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> While I agree with the principles announced by the Court, I disagree with the result that is reached on the facts of this case. The record contains an affidavit of the President of this union, the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association (MEBA), which states that all members of the union, including the local involved in this case, perform supervisory functions. 1 </s> [370 U.S. 173, 186] </s> An officer of MEBA testified: </s> "Local 101 of the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association is comprised of those men who are licensed as marine engineers by the United States Coast Guard, and those men who perform the engineering duties of engineers, whether or not they are licensed by the Coast Guard." </s> The record makes clear that a licensed engineer has supervisory duties whenever there is someone working under him. That status is grounded in the historic distinction between licensed and unlicensed personnel and is shown by this record. 2 A union of masters and mates [370 U.S. 173, 187] would plainly be a union of supervisors and under present law not be qualified to represent ordinary seamen. If there are rare instances when an engineer on a tug, for example, is nothing more than an employee, that has not been shown in the record and is directly contrary to the affidavit of this union's president. </s> The trial court in this case said that the record "does not show" that this MEBA Local "admits to membership any non-supervisory employee, and in any event it is clear that its membership is composed primarily and almost exclusively of supervisors." That finding is not challenged here. Petitioners, placing all their hopes on the words of the trial court that this local is composed "primarily and almost exclusively of supervisors," say it may therefore be arguably and reasonably contended that the local is a labor organization within the meaning of the Act. </s> Section 2 (5) defines "labor organization" as any organization "in which employees participate" for the purpose "of dealing with employers concerning grievances," etc. </s> The word "employee" was redefined by Congress 3 following our decision in Packard Co. v. Labor Board, 330 U.S. 485 , so as to exclude "any individual employed as a supervisor." 2 (3). And 14 (a) provides that "Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a labor organization, but no employer subject to this Act shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining." [370 U.S. 173, 188] </s> There is not a shred of evidence in this record showing that any employee not a supervisor is a member of this union. There is therefore not a shred of evidence to show that this local of MEBA is a "labor organization." Since there is not, it has made no showing that it is entitled to any of the protections of the Federal Act. Such a showing is within its power to make. It apparently claims to be a "labor organization" when it is to its advantage to do so and protests against being so labeled when that position serves its end. 4 </s> If it desires the protection of the Federal Act, it should be required to come forth with evidence showing who its members are. In absence of such a showing, we should not disturb the rulings of the Minnesota courts, which on this record were fully justified in enjoining the picketing. It was indeed conceded by counsel for MEBA at the trial that the purpose of the picketing was "to improve the wages, hours and working conditions" of the "licensed engineers," not the wages, hours and working conditions of those few undisclosed individuals who it is now intimated may have been members of the union. </s> Since this local is not on this record a "labor organization," it does not come within the purview of 8 (b) (2) or 8 (b) (4), which makes certain practices, alleged to have taken place here, unfair labor practices. For 14, quoted above, returned supervisors to the basis which they enjoyed prior to the Federal Act. Bull S. S. Co. v. National Marine Eng. B. Assn., 250 F.2d 332. [370 U.S. 173, 189] </s> It matters not that at other times this local or MEBA may have been a "labor organization" for purposes of the Federal Act. 5 Apparently an engineer may at times be only an ordinary employee. 6 So for one operation this local may have members doing the work of nonsupervisory employees. Whether its status would therefore change from day-to-day or week-to-week might be presented in some case. It is not presented here, for, on a record showing only supervisors among the membership list, the union has no claim to shelter under the Federal Act. </s> [Footnote 1 "I can state most categorically that licensed marine engineers who comprise the entire members of MEBA, without a single exception in the nature of their work, have authority in the interests of the employer [370 U.S. 173, 186] for whom they may be working to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, fine, reward or discipline the unlicensed personnel who work in the engine department, over which the licensed engineers have supervision or responsibility to direct such unlicensed personnel in the engine department or adjust the grievances of the unlicensed personnel in the engine department, or to effectively recommend any such action. In furtherance of their duties, licensed engineers do not exercise the authority just described merely as a routine or clerical nature, but they must exercise the use of independent judgment. Every single member of MEBA performs work of the nature which I have just described. The type of marine personnel over whom the MEBA assumes jurisdiction and takes in as members, is precisely that which I have just described. We do not have any members who do not fall within such description, insofar as their duties and responsibilities are concerned." </s> [Footnote 2 The findings state: "All engineers and assistant engineers employed on Interlake vessels stand watches during which they are in charge of and responsible for the operation and condition of the vessel's propulsion mechanism and responsibly direct, control and supervise the work of the firemen, oilers and coal passers on duty during such watch; they hire, fire, transfer and change the status of and discipline the persons working under them and have authority to and do make effective recommendations respecting the employment and tenure of employment of the people working under them; they handle initially grievances of the employees who are subject to their supervision; the exercise [370 U.S. 173, 187] of authority by the engineers and assistant engineers requires the use of independent judgment and discretion; and all such engineers are required to be licensed by the United States Coast Guard." </s> [Footnote 3 See H. R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 23; S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 28. </s> [Footnote 4 Cf. with the decision below the contentions of MEBA in National Marine Engineers Ben. Assn. v. Labor Board, 274 F.2d 167, 170 ("MEBA says its membership is composed exclusively of supervisors") and Schauffler v. Local 101, Marine Engineers Ben. Assn., 180 F. Supp. 932, 935 (where the local involved in the present case argued that it was not a labor organization within the meaning of the Act). In National Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots of America, et al., 116 N. L. R. B. 1787, MEBA admitted it was a "labor organization" within the meaning of the Act. </s> [Footnote 5 The finding of the Labor Board in National Marine Engineers Ben. Assn. v. Labor Board, 274 F.2d 167, that MEBA was a "labor organization" turned on a narrow procedural point mentioned by the Court of Appeals: "MEBA and MMP know who their members are and, if they do not know what their members do, certainly they can find out. The Board could properly have thought that the matters placed in the record by the general counsel justified an inference that non-supervisors do participate in MEBA and MMP, and that this sufficed for the Board's finding to that effect unless they were rebutted by more convincing evidence than the unions offered here. We therefore cannot say the Board's finding that MEBA and MMP were labor organizations did not meet the standards laid down in Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 1951, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S. Ct. 456, 95 L. Ed. 456." 274 F.2d, at 175. </s> [Footnote 6 See National Marine Engineers Ben. Assn. v. Labor Board, 274 F.2d 167, 172-173: "The Board's general counsel did not dispute that two of the three engineers on the Franklin D. Roosevelt, the chief engineer and the relief chief engineer, were supervisors; but there was much argument whether the third should be so considered since he exercised supervisory duties only when neither the chief engineer nor the relief chief engineer was about. See N. L. R. B. v. Quincy Steel Casting Co., 1st Cir., 1952, 200 F.2d 293. The general counsel claimed that at least one of the engineers on the Sandra Marie could not have been a supervisor since he had no one to supervise. See General Foods Corp., 110 N. L. R. B. 1088 (1954). MEBA disputed this, as well as the contention relating to the third engineer on the Franklin D. Roosevelt, claiming that these engineers were qualified and on these ships normally would have someone to supervise." </s> [370 U.S. 173, 190]

United States Supreme Court U.S. v. MANUFACTURERS NAT. BANK(1960) No. 350 Argued: March 31, 1960Decided: June 13, 1960 </s> In 1936, respondent's decedent divested himself of his rights in certain insurance policies on his own life by assigning them to his wife; but he continued to pay the premiums on them until he died in 1954. The Internal Revenue Service determined that, under 811 (g) (2) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, the portion of the proceeds attributable to premiums paid by the insured after January 10, 1941, should be included in his estate for the purposes of the federal estate tax. Held: As thus applied, 811 (g) (2) (A) is constitutional. Pp. 194-201. </s> (a) The tax is not a direct tax on property which Congress cannot exact without apportionment among the States. Pp. 197-200. </s> (b) The tax is not retroactive and does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 200-201. </s> 175 F. Supp. 291, reversed. </s> Assistant Attorney General Kramer argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Rice, Daniel M. Friedman, Harry Baum and L. W. Post. </s> Henry I. Armstrong, Jr. argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was Louis F. Dahling. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question here is whether Section 811 (g) (2) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 is constitutional as applied in this case. That section, the "payment of premiums" provision in the 1939 Code, requires inclusion [363 U.S. 194, 195] of insurance proceeds in the gross estate of an insured where the proceeds are receivable by beneficiaries other than the executor but are attributable to premiums paid by the insured. 1 Inclusion is required regardless of whether the insured retained any policy rights. However, if the insured possessed no "incidents of ownership" after January 10, 1941, the premiums paid by him before that date are excluded in determining the portion of the proceeds for which he paid the premiums. 2 </s> [363 U.S. 194, 196] </s> The facts in the case are stipulated. The insured died testate on July 15, 1954. The taxpayer is his executor. On the estate tax return, the taxpayer included, as part of the gross estate, the proceeds of four insurance policies payable to the wife of the insured. These policies were originally issued to the insured, but he divested himself of the policy rights by assigning them to his wife on December 18, 1936. However, he continued to pay the premiums on the policies until he died. After his death, the proceeds were retained by the insurer for the benefit of the family, pursuant to the provisions of a settlement option selected by the wife. </s> In auditing the return, the Revenue Service determined that only the portion of the proceeds attributable to premiums paid by the insured after January 10, 1941, should be included in his estate. 3 Accordingly, the tax was adjusted and a refund was made. The executor then filed a claim for refund of the rest of the tax attributable to the inclusion of the proceeds. The executor claimed that because the decedent had divested himself of all interest in the policies in 1936, the tax constituted an unapportioned direct tax on property, invalid under [363 U.S. 194, 197] Article I, Sections 2 and 9, of the Constitution. 4 However, the Commissioner refused to allow the claim, and the present suit for refund followed. In the District Court, the executor added a claim that the tax is also invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment "because it is retroactive and discriminatory in its operation." </s> The District Court sustained the taxpayer's contention that, as applied in this case, Section 811 (g) (2) (A) is unconstitutional. It held that because the decedent retained no incidents of ownership in the policies after 1936, "no transfer of the property herein sought to be included in the estate of this decedent occurred at the time of his death." The court concluded that the tax was therefore a direct tax on the proceeds themselves and could not be levied without apportionment. 5 175 F. Supp. 291. The Government appealed directly to this Court under Sections 1252 and 2101 of Title 28, and we noted jurisdiction. 361 U.S. 880 . </s> The first objection to the tax is that it is a direct tax - that is, that it is not a tax upon a transfer or other taxable [363 U.S. 194, 198] event but is, instead, a tax upon property - which Congress cannot exact without apportionment. </s> This argument does not do justice to the evident intent of Congress to tax events, "as distinguished from [their] tangible fruits." Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 502 . From its inception, the estate tax has been a tax on a class of events which Congress has chosen to label, in the provision which actually imposes the tax, "the transfer of the net estate of every decedent." 6 (Emphasis added.) See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 . If there is any taxable event here which can fairly be said to be a "transfer" under this language in Section 810 of the 1939 Code, the tax is clearly constitutional without apportionment. For such a tax has always "been treated as a duty or excise, because of the particular occasion which gives rise to its levy." Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81 ; New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, supra, at 349. </s> Under the statute, the occasion for the tax is the maturing of the beneficiaries' right to the proceeds upon the death of the insured. Of course, if the insured possessed no policy rights, there is no transfer of any interest from him at the moment of death. But that fact is not material, for the taxable "transfer," the maturing of the beneficiaries' right to the proceeds, is the crucial last step in what Congress can reasonably treat as a testamentary disposition by the insured in favor of the beneficiaries. That disposition, which began with the payment of premiums by the insured, is completed by his death. His death creates a genuine enlargement of the beneficiaries' rights. It is the "generating source" of the full value of the proceeds. See Schwarz v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 2, 6. The maturing of the right to proceeds is therefore [363 U.S. 194, 199] an appropriate occasion for taxing the transaction to the estate of the insured. Cf. Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497, 503 , 504. </s> There is no inconsistency between such a view of the taxable event and the basic definition of the subject of the tax in Section 810. "Obviously, the word `transfer' in the statute, or the privilege which may constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such a restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of particular items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee. It must . . . at least include the transfer of property procured through expenditures by the decedent with the purpose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another." Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327, 337 . </s> It makes no difference that the payment of premiums occurred during the lifetime of the insured and indirectly effected an inter vivos transfer of property to the owner of the policy rights. Congress can properly impose excise taxes on wholly inter vivos gifts. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 . It may impose an estate tax on inter vivos transfers looking toward death. Milliken v. United States, 283 U.S. 15 . Surely, then, it may impose such a tax on the final step - the maturing of the right to proceeds - in a partly inter vivos transaction completed by death. The question is not whether there has been, in the strict sense of the word, a "transfer" of property owned by the decedent at the time of his death, but whether "the death has brought into being or ripened for the survivor, property rights of such character as to make appropriate the imposition of a tax upon that result . . . ." Tyler v. United States, supra, at 503. </s> Therefore, this tax, laid on the "ripening," at death, of rights paid for by the decedent, is not a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution. Cf. Chase National Bank v. United States, supra; Fernandez v. Wiener, [363 U.S. 194, 200] 326 U.S. 340 ; Tyler v. United States, supra; United States v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 363 . 7 </s> Further objections to the statute as applied in this case are predicated on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. </s> It is said that the statute operates retroactively. But the taxable event - the maturing of the policies at death - occurred long after the enactment of Section 811 (g) (2) (A) in 1942. Moreover, the payment of all but a few of the premiums in question occurred after the effective date of the statute, and those few were paid during the period after January 10, 1941, when regulations gave the insured fair notice of the likely tax consequences. See T. D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 427. 8 Therefore, the statute cannot be said to be retroactive in its impact. It is not material that the policies were purchased and the policy rights were assigned before the statute was enacted. The tax is not laid on the creation or transfer of the policy rights, and it "does not operate retroactively merely because some of the facts or conditions upon which its application depends came into being prior to the enactment of the tax." United States v. Jacobs, supra, at 367. </s> The taxpayer argues, however, that the enactment of the statute subjected the insured to a choice between unpleasant alternatives: "[H]e could stop paying the [363 U.S. 194, 201] premiums - in which case the policies would be destroyed; or, he could continue paying premiums - in which case they would be included in his estate." But when he gave away the policy rights, the possibility that he would eventually be faced with that choice was an obvious risk, in view of the administrative history of the "payment of premiums" test. See 1 Paul, Federal Estate and Gift Taxation, 10.13. The executor should not complain because his decedent gambled and lost. And, while it may be true that the insured could have avoided the tax only at the price of a loss on an investment already made, that fact alone does not prove that the lawmakers did "a wholly arbitrary thing," or that they "found equivalence where there was none," or that they "laid a burden unrelated to privilege or benefit." Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 679 . Without such a showing, it cannot be held that the tax offends due process. </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 These provisions were enacted, through amendment of 811 (g), by 404 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 944. As amended, 811 provides in pertinent part that: </s> "The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, except real property situated outside of the United States - </s> . . . . . </s> "(g) PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE. - </s> "(1) RECEIVABLE BY THE EXECUTOR. - To the extent of the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent. </s> "(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER BENEFICIARIES. - To the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent (A) purchased with premiums, or other consideration, paid directly or indirectly by the decedent, in proportion that the amount so paid by the decedent bears to the total premiums paid for the insurance, or (B) with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person. . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 404 (c), Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 945. Section 404 (c) provides that: </s> "The amendments made by subsection (a) [see note 1, supra] shall be applicable only to estates of decedents dying after the date of the enactment of this Act [October 21, 1942]; but in determining the proportion of the premiums or other consideration paid directly or indirectly by the decedent (but not the total premiums paid) the amount so paid by the decedent on or before January 10, 1941, shall [363 U.S. 194, 196] be excluded if at no time after such date the decedent possessed an incident of ownership in the policy." </s> January 10, 1941, was the effective date of a Treasury Regulation, T. D. 5032, 1941-1 Cum. Bull. 427, which provided for use of the "payment of premiums" test under 811 (g) as it existed prior to the 1942 amendments, see note 1, supra, regardless of whether the decedent retained any incidents of ownership. The regulation also provided, however, that premiums paid by the decedent before its effective date were to be excluded if the decedent did not thereafter possess any incidents of ownership. </s> It should be noted that the "payment of premiums" test was abandoned in the 1954 Code, which reverted to the exclusive use of the "incidents of ownership" test. See 26 U.S.C. 2042. </s> [Footnote 3 See note 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 4 Article I, 2, provides in pertinent part that: </s> "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . . ." </s> Article I, 9, provides in pertinent part that: </s> "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." </s> [Footnote 5 This result is in accord with Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381 (C. A. 7th Cir.), the reasoning of which the District Court "adopted" as its own. As the District Court recognized, Kohl is in conflict with Estate of Loeb v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 232 (C. A. 2d Cir.), affirming 29 T. C. 22; Schwarz v. United States, 170 F. Supp. 2; cf. Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866; Estate of Baker v. Commissioner, 30 T. C. 776. </s> [Footnote 6 Compare 201 of the Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 756, 777, with 810 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53 Stat. 120. In the 1954 Code, the word "taxable" was substituted for the word "net" in this provision. 26 U.S.C. 2001. </s> [Footnote 7 Our view of the nature of the taxable event here involved makes it unnecessary to discuss United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 , and other similar cases relied on by the District Court. Nor do we find it necessary to consider at length Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U.S. 238 , or its progeny. The Court in Frick did not reach the constitutional issue. </s> [Footnote 8 We do not agree with the holding in Kohl v. United States, 226 F.2d 381, that T. D. 5032 "transcended" 811 (g) as it existed in 1941 and that it was therefore "illegal and void." T. D. 5032, in effect, construed the controlling language in the earlier statute - "taken out by the decedent," 53 Stat. 122 - as meaning paid for by the insured. Such a construction was clearly not unreasonable. </s> [363 U.S. 194, 202]

United States Supreme Court FARMERS RESERVOIR & IRRIGATION CO. V. MCCOMB(1949) No. 128 Argued: December 16, 1948Decided: June 27, 1949 </s> Rehearing Denied Oct. 10, 1949. See . [ Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb 337 U.S. 755 (1949) ] </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 756] </s> Messrs. John P. Akolt, Frank N. Bancroft, Denver, Colo., for Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. Mr. Jeter S. Ray, Washington, D.C., for McComb. </s> Mr. Chief Justice VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court. The principal question to be decided in this case is whether the employees of a mutual ditch company are exempt from the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act1 as persons employed in agriculture. The company is the Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Company, a Colorado corporation having an authorized capital stock of $1,050,000 and an authorized bonded indebtedness of </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 757] </s> $850,000, $450,000 of which is presently outstanding in the hands of the public. The company has central offices in Denver. It owns four large and several small reservoirs and a system of canals from 200 to 300 miles long, all in Colorado. The sole activity of the corporation is the collection, storage and distribution of water for irrigation purposes. The water is diverted from the public streams of Colorado, stored in the company's reservoirs and distributed to farmers through the company's canals. The company is a mutual one. It does not sell water. It distributes it only to its own stockholders, who are each entitled to a limited quantity for each share of stock held. The income of the company is derived largely from assessments levied on the stockholders annually to pay for the costs of operating the system. There are no profits and no dividends. The company did not comply with either the record keeping or the wages and hours provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and the Administrator sought an injunction directed against continuation of these alleged violations. The company claimed that its employees were not subject to the Act. These employees fall into two categories. First, there are the field employees-ditch riders, lake tenders and maintenance men. Their activity, in general, consists of the physical operation, control and maintenance of the company's canals, reservoirs, and headgates. The second category comprises the company's office force in Denver. For purposes of this case it contains only one occupant-the company's bookkeeper. The District Court held that the field employees were engaged in the production of goods for commerce, as those terms are defined in 3 of the Act, but that the bookkeeper was not. It held, however, that all of the company's employees were exempt under 13(a)(6) as persons 'employed in agriculture.' This second hold- </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 758] </s> ing was reversed, as to the field employees, by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,2 one judge dissenting, and, in No. 128, we granted the company's petition for certiorari on the exemption issue. The Court of Appeals did not pass on the bookkeeper's status. It regarded his case as moot because his salary was said by the company, in its brief, to have been raised to $210 per month while the appeal was pending. The court regarded this as sufficient to establish his exemption as an administrative employee under 13(a)(1) of the Act and therefore limited its consideration and its reversal of the District Court to the field employees. In No. 196, we granted the Administrator's cross-petition with respect to the bookkeeper. It is conceded here that the courts below were correct in holding that the field employe are engaged in the production of goods for commerce. The company, however, argues that this requires the conclusion that they are employed in agriculture. This argument rests on the fact that the activities of the company and its employees are entirely confined within the State of Colorado. The company diverts water in Colorado, stores it in Colorado, distributes it in Colorado to farmers who, finally, consume it in Colorado. The only products moving in interstate commerce are the agricultural commodities produced by the farmers who consume the company's water. Hence, it is said that we can hold that the company's employees are engaged in the production of goods for interstate commerce only if we say that their work in supplying water to the farmers is an integral part of the production of the farm products which are shipped in interstate commerce. But that production is, of course agriculture. Hence, the company's employees, if they are engaged in the production of goods for commerce, must be exempt as persons employed in agriculture. </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 759] </s> The argument rests on a misconstruction of 3(j) of the Fair Labor Standards Act3-the section which the courts below relied on in concluding that the field employees of the company are engaged in the production of goods for commerce. Section 3(j) provides that 'for purposes of this Act an employee shall be deemed to have been engaged in the production of goods if such employee was employed * * * in any process or occupation necessary to the production thereof.'4 From the beginning, this Court has refused either to read this provision out of the Act by limiting the coverage of the Act to those actually engaged in production or, on the other hand, to expand it so as to include every process or occupation affecting production for commerce. We have held that if an occupation, not itself production for commerce, has 'a close and immediate tie' with the process of production, it comes within the provisions of 3(j).5 Applying this standard, the Court of Appeals quite properly held that the field employees here are engaged in an occupation necessary, in the statutory sense, for the production of agricultural commodities shipped in commerce. 6 </s> But the conclusion that the work is necessary to agricultural production does not require us to say that it is agricultural production. This distinction between ne- </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 760] </s> cessity and identity, or, differently phrased, between production in the normal sense and production in the special sense defined in 3(j) disposes of the company's contention. The question here is whether the occupation of the field employees of the ditch company can itself be termed agriculture. The answer to that question is not predetermined by the fact that the occupation is within the scope of the Act because it has a necessary connection, in commerce, with agricultural production. 7 </s> Agriculture, as an occupation, includes more than the elemental process of planting, growing and harvesting crops. There are a host of incidental activities which are necessary to that process. Whether a particular type of activity is agricultural depends, in large measure. upon </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 761] </s> the way in which that activity is organized in a particular society. The determination cannot be made in the abstract. In less advanced societies the agricultural function includes many types of activity which, in others, are not agricultural. The fashioning of tools, the provision of fertilizer, the processing of the product, to mention only a few examples, are functions which, in some societies, are performed on the farm by farmers as part of their normal agricultural routine. Economic progress, however, is characterized by a progressive division of labor and separation of function. Tools are made by a tool manufacturer, who specializes in that kind of work and supplies them to the farmer. The compost heap is replaced by factory produced fertilizers. Power is derived from electricity and gasoline rather than supplied by the farmer's mules. Wheat is ground at the mill. In this way functions which are necessary to the total economic process of supplying an agricultural product, become, in the process of economic development and specialization, separate and independent productive functions operated in conjunction with the agricultural function but no longer a part of it. Thus, the question as to whether a particular type of activity is agricultural is not determined by the necessity of the activity to agriculture nor by the physical similarity of the activity to that done by farmers in other situations. The question is whether the activity in the particular case is carried on as part of the agricultural function or is separately organized as an independent productive activity. The farmhand who cares for the farmer's mules or prepares his fertilizer is engaged in agriculture. But the maintenance man in a power plant8 and the packer in a fertilizer factory9 are not employed in agriculture, even </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 762] </s> if their activity is necessary to farmers and replaces work previously done by farmers. The production of power and the manufacture of fertilizer are independent productive functions, not agriculture. In the absence of a detailed definition of agriculture we should be compelled to determine whether the activity concerned in the present case- the diversion, storage and distribution of wate for irrigation purposes- is carried on as part of the agricultural function or is so separately organized and conducted as to be treated as an independent, nonagricultural productive function. Fortunately, however, the Fair Labor Standards Act provides a carefully considered definition which is of substantial aid in helping us to make that determination. The definition is contained in 3(f) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It says: 'Sec. 3(f). 'Agriculture' includes farming in all its branches and among other things includes the cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodities (including commodities defined as agricultural commodities in section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act, as amended), the raising of livestock, bees, furbearing animals, or poultry, and any practices (including any forestry or lumbering operations) performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for transportation to market.' </s> As can be readily seen this definition has two distinct branches. First, there is the primary meaning. Agriculture includes farming in all its branches. Certain specific practices such as cultivation and tillage of the soil, dairying, etc., are listed as being included in this primary meaning. Second, there is the broader mean- </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 763] </s> ing. Agriculture is defined to include things other than farming as so illustrated. It includes any practices, whether or not themselves farming practices, which are performed either by a farmer or on a farm, incidently to or in conjunction with 'such' farming operations. Dealing with these two branches of the definition in order it is clear, first, that the occupation in which the company's employees are engaged is not farming. The company owns no farms and raises no crops. Irrigation, strictly defined-that is the actual watering of the soil-may no doubt be called farming. And the work of the farmers in seeing to it that the water released from the company's ditches is properly distributed to the growing plants undoubtedly is included in farming as being part of the process of cultivating and tilling the soil. But the significant fact in this case is that this work is not done by the company's employees. There is a clear and definite division of function. The ditch company carries the water in its own canals to the lands of the farmers. When a farmer desires water so that he can irrigate his fields he notifies the company. Its employees then operate the headgates, which are located on the company's canals and which the farmers are forbidden to operate,10 so that the appropriate quantity of water can pass out of the company's canals and off the company's land into the farmer's irrigation ditches. The responsibility of the company's employees ceases when they so release the water. The water is supplied to the farmer at the headgates and he takes it over there and uses it, in his own laterals, as he sees fit, to irrigate his crops. </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 764] </s> The ditch company, then, is not engaged in cultivating or tilling the soil or in growing any agricultural commodity. It is contended, however, that it is nevertheless engaged in farming because of the use, in the definition, of the words 'production * * * of any agricultural * * * commodities' in addition to the words cultivation, tillage, harvesting, etc. Since produce is defined in 3(j) of the Act so as to include, 'for the purposes of this Act,' any occupation necessary t production, it is argued that production of agricultural commodities includes any occupation necessary to the production of agricultural commodities. It is thus argued that in the case of agriculture, as distinguished from other exemptions, Congress did provide that the exemption should include not only the occupation named but also all of those other occupations whose work is necessary to it. If Congress intended to convey that meaning by using the word production in the definition of agriculture we should, of course, give the definition its intended scope. But we do not 'make a fortress out of the dictionary.'11 And we have, therefore, consistently refused to pervert the process of interpretation by mechanically applying definitions in unintended contexts. Lawson v. Suwanee Fruit & S.S. Co., 1949, 336 U.S. 198 ; Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 1932, 286 U.S. 427 . In the present case, the legislative history confirms what a natural reading of the language of the agricultural exemption would indicate-the word production was not there used in the artificial and special sense in which it was defined in 3(j). Certainly, if it were meant in that sense, it would make surplusage of the remainder of the carefully wrought definition. And it would hardly have been innocuously placed among such specific terms as 'cultivation,' 'tillage,' 'growing,' and 'harvesting.' </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 765] </s> But we need not speculate on the congressional meaning. The history of the use of the word production is crystal clear. It was added to the definition of agriculture in order to take care of a special situation-the production of turpentine and gum rosins by a process involving the tapping of living trees. There had been indications that such activity would not be considered agriculture, since turpentine is neither cultivated nor grown. 12 And a special amendment, 15(g), had been added to the Agricultural Marketing Act specifying that commodities so produced were to be considered agricultural commodities for the purposes of that Act. 13 To insure the inclusion of the process within the agricultural exemption of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the word production was added to 3(f) in conjunction with the words 'including commodities defined as agricultural commodities in 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act as amended.'14 </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 766] </s> It is unnecessary to decide whether, in view of this history, the word production in the agricultural exemption should be limited to those specific products defined in 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act or should be given its normal meaning. The only question here is whether the word was used in the special expanded meaning defined in 3(j) of the present Act. It is clear that it was not used in this special sense. And it follows that it does not encompass the work of the company's employees who cannot be said, in any normal use of the term, to be engaged in the production of agricultural commodities. Their work is necessary to agricultural production, but it is not production. The work of the company's employees is not, then, farming. But, coming to the second branch of the definition of agriculture, it is equally clear that it does constitute a practice performed as an incident to or in conjunction with farming. If the Act exempted all such practices the company would be exempt. But the exemption is limited. Such practices are exempt only if they are performed by a farmer or on a farm. 15 </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 767] </s> This language was carefully considered by Congress. As originally introduced, the exemption covered such practices only if performed by a farmer. On the floor of the Senate it was objected that this would exclude the threshing of wheat or other functions necessary to the farmer if those functions were not performed by the farmer and his hands, but by separate companies organized for and devoted solely to that particular job. 16 To take care of that situation to words 'or on a farm' were added to the definition. Thus, the wheat threshing companies, even though they were separate enterprises, were included in the exemption because their work was incidental to farming and was done on the farm. 17 In the face of this careful use of language, we are required to limit the exemption as Congress intended it should be limited, to practices performed by a farmer or on a farm. In the present case it is clear that the work of the company's employees is done neither on a farm or by farmers. learly, it is not done on a farm. Nor, we think, is it done 'by a farmer.' Since we have already said that </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 768] </s> the company's employees are not engaged in farming, it is perhaps too obvious that the work that they do is not done by farmers. But an argument to the contrary is made. It is based on the fact that the company is a mutual one, owned by the farmers whom it serves. It is argued that the company is therefore merely a formal conduit or agent, by which the farmers cooperatively operate their common water supply system and cooperatively employ the men. The men are, therefore, said to be farmers because they are said to be employed by farmers. Even if it were conceded that the exemption includes the work of persons who do no farming but are employed by farmers, it still does include the company's employees because they are not, in fact, so employed. There is a difference between the hiring of mutual servants by a group of employers and the creation by them of a separate business organization, with its own officers, property, and bonded indebtedness, which in turn hires working men. Those working men are in no real sense employees of the shareholders of the organization. They are hired by the organization, fired by the organization, controlled and directed by the organization, and paid by it. The fact that the organization is a corporate one adds to the picture but is not controlling. The controlling fact is that the company has been set up by the farmers as an independent entity to operate an integrated, unitary water supply system. The function of supplying water has thus been divorced by the farmers from the farming operation and set up as a separate and self-contained activity in which the farmers are forbidden, by the company's by-laws, to interfere. 18 Those employed in that activity are employed by the company, not by the farmers who own the company. The fact that the company is not operated for profit is immaterial. </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 769] </s> It is nonetheless the employer. Of course, if Congress had intended the absence of profit to be material and had provided that the employees of agricultural cooperatives should be exempted because their work is done for the benefit of the farmers who own the cooperatives we should honor that provision. But the legislative history of the existing definition clearly shows that no such result was intended. 19 </s> We conclude therefore that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the field employees of the company are not exempt from the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as persons employed in agriculture. 20 There remains for consideration the bookkeeper's case. The Court of Appeals limited its reversal of the District Court to the field employees because it regarded the bookkeeper as exempt, in any event, as an administrative employee. We need not decide whether it erred in so doing since the company in this Court disclaims-as it did in the District Court- any reliance on the administrative exemption. And our discussion with regard to the field employees makes it clear that the Court of </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 770] </s> Appeals decision is, in the absence of any claim of administrative exemption, equally applicable to the bookkeeper. It has been stipulated that his work is a necessary part of the operation of the company's water supply system. The fact that it is clerical rather than manual is immaterial. Borden Co. v. Borella, 1945, 325 U.S. 679 3, 161 A.L.R. 1258. It follows that his case is on all fours with that of the field workers and that he is engaged, as they are, in the production of goods for commerce and is not exempt as employed in agriculture. The judgment of the Court of Appeals, reversing the District Court and remanding the case to it, should, therefore, be treated as applicable to both types of employee. As so modified, the judgment is affirmed. Modified and affirmed. </s> Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, concurring. Both in the employments which the Fair Labor Standards Act covers and in the exemptions it makes the Congress has cast upon the courts the duty of making distinctions that often are bound to be so nice as to appear arbitrary in relation to each other. A specific situation, like that presented in this case, presents a problem for construction which may with nearly equal reason be resolved one way rather than another. Except when a conflict between Courts of Appeals requires settlement by this Court, it does not seem to me very profitable to bring the individual cases here for adjudication. But since this case is here it has to be decided. The nature of the problem being what it is, I acquiesce in the judgment that commends itself to the majority of my brethren. </s> Mr. Justice JACKSON, dissenting. If employees operating these irrigation works are so necessary to the raising of crops destined for interstate commerce that they are 'producing goods for commerce' </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 771] </s> within the Fair Labor Standards Act, I cannot agree that they are not 'employed in agriculture' within its exemptions. It is admitted that as a separate enterprise this handling of irrigation water does not bring these employees within the Act regulating interstate commerce, because the water is captured, stored, transmitted, delivered and consumed solely within one state. The reasoning by which they are nevertheless brought under the Act is this: To deliver water on arid lands is so inseparable from agriculture thereon that it is to produce goods, that is, agricultural crops, for commerce. However, 29 U.S.C. 213(a)(6), 29 U.S.C.A. 213(a)(6), exempts individuals 'employed in agriculture.' It would seem logical that one who is producing agricultural products for commerce is 'employed in agriculture.' But according to the Court he is not. The irrigation activity seems endowed with some esoteric duplicity not apparent on its face. When we read 29 U.S.C. 206 or 207, 29 U.S.C.A. 206, 207, the irrigator is producing crops because his activity is inseparable from crop production; but when we read on a half-dozen sections and get to 29 U.S.C . 213(a)(6), 29 U.S.C.A. 213(a), (6), the irrigation has been converted into a distinct and disconnected enterprise. This paradox is attributed to the definition of agricuture in 29 U.S. C. 203(f), 29 U.S.C.A. 203(f), which is said to make a distinction between agricultural production 'in the normal sense' and the same thing 'in the special sense' of 3(j) of the statute, 29 U.S.C. 203(j), 29 U. S.C.A. 203(j). However, its text and history seem to show that the congressional purpose was not to make the agricultural exemption less comprehensive than 'normal' agricultural operations but to make certain that nothing connected with farming remained subject to the Act. It exempted 'any practices * * * performed by a farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in conjunction with farming * * * operations.' Thus the farm exemption did not end at the line fence. </s> [337 U.S. 755 , 772] </s> This irrigation seems to me to be 'performed by a farmer' and hence, by definition, part of the operation of agriculture. Certainly the agricultural exemption is not lost because farmers pool their capital through a mutual, nonprofit corporation for no other purpose whatever than to carry water to their own arid lands to make it possible to produce crops. The only purpose of the corporate form is to limit individual liability for a project which is subsidiary to each farmer's main enterprise but which is beyond the means or demands of any of them as individuals. Only the landowners can become stockholders; only the stockholders can become water users, and the operating costs and capital charges are met by assessing them in proportion to their water benefits. Employees engaged in the water operation would be on a quite different footing if it were a water company selling water to the public or the farmer for profit. If, as the Court holds, these employees are engaged in production of agricultural crops for commerce, I do not see how it can hold that they are not engaged in agriculture. If the Court could say 'To be or not to be: that is the question,' it might reasonably answer in support of either side. But here the Court tells us that the real solution of this dilemma is 'to be' and 'not to be' at the same time. While this is a unique contribution to the literature of statutory construction, I can only regret the great loss to the literature of the drama that this possibility was overlooked by the Bard of Avon. It will probably now be as great a surprise to the proponents of the agricultural exemption as it would have been to Shakespeare, had it been suggested to him. Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. 201Ä219, 29 U.S.C.A. 201Ä219. </s> [Footnote 2 1948, 167 F.2d 911. </s> [Footnote 3 52 Stat. 1061, 29 U.S.C. 203(j), 29 U.S.C.A. 203(j). [Footnote 4 Emphasis added. [Footnote 5 Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 1942, 316 U.S. 517, 525 , 1120, 1121; Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 1944, 323 U.S. 126 ; Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 1946, 326 U.S. 657, 663 , 415, 416. [Footnote 6 'Necessary' understates the case, The water supplied by the company's employees is, in this case, an indispensable prerequisite for agricultural production. Cultivation began only with irrigation and it will end if the irrigation ceases. Under such circumstances, there can be no doubt of the immediacy of the connection between the production, by the farmers, for commerce and the work of the petitioner's field employees in providing water for irrigation. </s> [Footnote 7 The fallacy of the notion that an exemption carries with it all occupations whose nexus with interstate commerce is the exempted occupation is demonstrated by authority as well as by logic. In Boutell v. Walling, 1946, 327 U.S. 463 ; for example, the question was whether men who wer employed by a service company to service trucks carrying goods in interstate commerce were exempt, under 13(b)(1), as the employees of an interstate carrier subject to regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Their only connection with commerce was their work on the trucks of the interstate carrier. The Court divided as to whether the employees were themselves employed by the carrier within the meaning of the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C.A. 301 et seq., and, therefore, exempt. But there was no suggestion in either of the opinions in the case that, if not employed by the carrier, they were nevertheless exempt because their only connection with interstate commerce was through an enterprise which was itself exempt. In only one case brought to our attention was a contention presented similar to that made here. In Dize v. Maddrix, 4 Cir., 1944, 144 F.2d 584, affirmed, 1945, 324 U.S. 697 ; the local manufacture of boxes was held to be within the Act because the boxes were used by fishermen to ship their fish in interstate commerce. The fishermen were exempt under a specific exemption in the Act covering fishing, and it was argued that the manufacturer of the boxes should therefore be exempt as 'fishing' because its only connection with commerce was through fishing. The argument was rejected summarily. </s> [Footnote 8 Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Ass'n v. Phillips, 8 Cir., 1946, 158 P.2d 698. [Footnote 9 McComb v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, 1 Cir., 1948, 165 F.2d 824. </s> [Footnote 10 Article VII, 5 of the Company's By-Laws provides as follows: 'All headgates in the Company's canals shall be operated and maintained by and under the exclusive control of this company and no stockholder or any other person shall have the right to interfere with, reconstruct, repair, change, or alter, open or close said headgates or any of them in any manner whatsoever.' </s> [Footnote 11 L. Hand, J., in Cabell v. Markham, 2 Cir., 1945, 148 F.2d 737, 739, affirmed Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S. 404 . </s> [Footnote 12 See S.Rep.No.230, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). [Footnote 13 46 Stat. 1550, 12 U.S.C. 1141j(g), 12 U.S.C.A. 1141j(g). This language originated in S. 2354, 71st Congress. That bill was reported to the Senate (S.Rep.No.230) and passed. 72 Cong.Rec. 7016 (1930). It did not come to a vote in the House. Its substance was added by the Senate to H.R. 16836, an amendment to the oleomargarine tax laws, and in this form became law. See 74 Cong.Rec. 6688, 7196 (1931). [Footnote 14 The word 'production' was not actually contained in either the House or Senate bills as originally passed. The Senate bill, S. 2475, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., as passed, contained the reference to 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act in the following way: '. . . 'agriculture' * * * further includes the definition contained in subdivision (g) of Section 15 of the Agricultural Marketing Act. * * *' See 81 Cong.Rec. 7659 (1937). This language was faulty, since the section referred to was not a definition of agriculture but of an agricultural commodity. The language was retained in this form when the bill was first debated in the House. See 82 Cong.Rec. 1580, 1690 (1937). The House voted to recommit the bill. Id. at 1835. In committee, the definition of agriculture was completely redrafted and the reference to the Agricultural Marketing Act omitted. See H.R.Rep.No.2182, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). The bill passed the House in this form. In conference, it was agreed that the House version of the definition of agriculture should be adopted, with three stated exceptions. Only one of the three is relevant hereÄthe reinsertion of the reference to the Agricultural Marketing Act. The word 'production' was added in conjunction with that reference and was obviously used only to make the reference grammatically correct. The committee report states the change in this way: 'The production of commodities defined as agricultural commodities in section 15(g) of the Agricultural Marketing Act is included within the definition of agriculture. * * *' H.R.Rep.No.2738, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., p. 29 (1938). </s> [Footnote 15 Although not relevant here, there is the additional requirement that the practices be incidental to 'such' farming. Thus processing, on a farm, of commodities produced by other farmers is incidental to or in conjunction with the farming operation of the other farmers and not incidental to or in conjunction with the farming operation of the farmer on whose premises the processing is done. Such processing is, therefore, not within the definition of agriculture. Bowie v. Gonzalez, 1 Cir., 1941, 117 F.2d 11. </s> [Footnote 16 'Mr. Tydings. * * * In the case I vizualize * * * the farmer is not performing the service. The man to whom I refer makes a business of doing nothing but threshing. He owns his own machine, and hauls it from farm to farm, and enters into contracts with farmers to thresh their crops; the point being that while he is dealing with an agricultural commodity, he is not necessarily a farmer, and he is not doing work ordinarily done by a farmer. 'Mr. Borah. He is doing the exact work which the farmer did before he took it up. </s> 'Mr. Tydings. That is true; but I do not think the bill is drawn in sufficient detail to bring the man to whom I refer under its provisions of exemption.' 81 Cong.Rec. 7653 (1937). See also the comments of Senator Bone, id. at 7659. </s> [Footnote 17 81 Cong.Rec. 7888 (1937). </s> [Footnote 18 See n. 10, supra. </s> [Footnote 19 The debate in both Houses shows a clear awareness that the employees of farmers cooperative associations would not be exempted as employees of farmers. At various times amendments were offered, and adopted, exempting the employees of certain types of cooperatives. See 81 Cong.Rec. 7947 (1937), 82 Cong.Rec. 1783 (1937). All such special exemptions were, however, omitted from the bill as it finally became law. See also Interpretative Bulletin No. 10, issued by the Administrator, Wage & Hour Division, 29 C.F.R. 780, 81Ä82 (Supp.1947). [Footnote 20 While it lacks relevance to the question of congressional intention in 1938, we may note that the precise question here involved was discussed at length on the Senate floor in 1946 in connection with certain amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act. It was clearly stated, without objection, that employees of an irrigation company which supplied water to farmers were, like the employees of a power company which supplies electricity to farmers, not exempt as employed in agriculture. 92 Cong.Rec. 2318Ä2319 (1946).

United States Supreme Court HUGHEY v. UNITED STATES(1990) No. 89-5691 Argued: March 27, 1990Decided: May 21, 1990 </s> Pursuant to a plea agreement, petitioner Hughey pleaded guilty to using one unauthorized MBank credit card. Under the restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA) - which authorize federal courts to order "a defendant convicted of an offense" to "make restitution to any victim of such offense," 18 U.S.C. 3579(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV) - the District Court ordered Hughey to pay $90,431 in restitution, the total of MBank's losses relating to his alleged theft and use of 21 cards from various MBank cardholders. Denying Hughey's motion to reduce and correct his sentence, the court rejected his argument that it had exceeded its authority in ordering restitution for offenses other than the offense of conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. </s> Held: </s> A VWPA restitution award is authorized only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction. Pp. 415-422. </s> (a) VWPA's plain language clearly links restitution to the offense of conviction. Given that the ordinary meaning of "restitution" is restoring someone to a position he occupied before a particular event, 3579's repeated focus on the offense of conviction suggests strongly that restitution is intended to compensate victims only for losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction. The Government's view that 3579(a) merely identifies the victim, but that the restitution amount is calculated in accordance with 3580(a) - which delineates "[p]rocedure[s] for issuing" restitution orders - is unconvincing. Section 3579(b), by giving detailed substantive guidance regarding the calculation of restitution, establishes the amount of restitution that courts can award. In addition, to regard 3580 rather than 3579 as fixing the substantive boundaries of such orders would ignore this Court's commitment to "giving effect to the meaning and placement of the words chosen by Congress." Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 645 . More significantly, because a general statutory term should be understood in light of the specific terms that surround it, 3580(a)'s catchall phrase - which directs courts to consider "such other factors as the court deems appropriate" in calculating the amount of restitution - should not be read to introduce into the calculus losses that [495 U.S. 411, 412] would expand a defendant's liability beyond the offense of conviction. That phrase is preceded by more specific considerations for determining whether to order, and the amount of, restitution, all of which are designed to limit, rather than to expand, the scope of any restitution order. Pp. 415-420. </s> (b) Any policy questions surrounding VWPA's offense-of-conviction limitation on restitution orders need not be resolved. Even were the statutory language ambiguous, longstanding principles of lenity preclude the resolution of the ambiguity against Hughey on the basis of general declarations of policy in the statute and legislative history. Pp. 420-422. </s> 877 F.2d 1256, reversed and remanded. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and BRENNAN, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined, and in which WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ., joined except as to Part II-C. </s> Lucien B. Campbell argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> Amy L. Wax argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With her on the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Dennis, and Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro. * </s> [Footnote * Victor A. Kovner and Leonard J. Koerner filed a brief for the City of New York as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> Thomas W. Brunner and Richard H. Gordin filed a brief for the Insurance Crime Prevention Institute et al. as amici curiae. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.Fn </s> The restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. 3579, 3580 (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), authorize federal courts, when sentencing defendants convicted of certain offenses, to order, "in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense." 18 U.S.C. 3579(a)(1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV). We must decide whether these provisions allow a court to order a defendant who is charged with multiple offenses but who is convicted [495 U.S. 411, 413] of only one offense to make restitution for losses related to the other alleged offenses. We hold that the language and structure of the Act make plain Congress' intent to authorize an award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction. 1 </s> I </s> In 1986, petitioner Frasiel L. Hughey was indicted for three counts of theft by a United States Postal Service employee and three counts of use of unauthorized credit cards. Petitioner pleaded guilty to count 4 of the indictment in exchange for the Government's agreement to dismiss the remaining counts and to forgo prosecution "for any other offense arising in the Western District of Texas as part of the scheme alleged in the indictment." App. 7. Count 4 charged "[t]hat on or about October 18, 1985, . . . [petitioner] [495 U.S. 411, 414] did knowingly and with intent to defraud use an unauthorized [MBank Mastercard credit card] issued to Hershey Godfrey, . . . and by such conduct did obtain things of value aggregating more than $1,000 . . . ." Id., at 5. During the plea proceeding and as part of the factual basis of petitioner's plea, the Government proffered evidence that petitioner had stolen not only Godfrey's card, but also at least 15 other cards. Id., at 10. Petitioner's counsel informed the court at that time that petitioner's plea was confined to the allegations in count 4 and that petitioner did "not mak[e] admissions to anything other than the facts pertaining to count four." Id., at 11. </s> After the plea hearing but before sentencing, the Government notified petitioner that it would propose that he be ordered to pay restitution of $147,646.89. The Government calculated that figure by adding the losses of several financial institutions, including MBank, that resulted from petitioner's alleged theft and use of approximately 30 credit cards. Petitioner objected to the proposed restitution order on the ground that the proposed figure was unauthorized because it "exceed[ed] the losses of any victims of the offense of which the Defendant was convicted." Id., at 13. The Government then submitted a revised restitution figure of $90,431, the total of MBank's losses relating to petitioner's alleged theft and use of 21 cards from various MBank cardholders. Petitioner countered that the appropriate restitution figure should be $10,412, the losses MBank sustained as a result of all unauthorized uses of the Godfrey credit card identified in the count for which he was convicted. </s> The District Court ordered petitioner to make restitution to MBank in the amount of $90,431. Id., at 78. Petitioner moved to reduce and correct his sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, arguing that the District Court had exceeded its authority in ordering restitution for offenses other than the offense of conviction. The District Court denied the motion. Id., at 82-85. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that "VWPA permits a [495 U.S. 411, 415] court to require restitution beyond that amount involved in the offense of conviction when there is a significant connection between the crime of conviction and similar actions justifying restitution." 877 F.2d 1256, 1264 (1989). </s> The courts of appeals have reached varying conclusions regarding a court's ability under VWPA to require an offender to pay restitution for acts other than those underlying the offense of conviction. 2 We granted certiorari to resolve this split in authority. 493 U.S. 1018 (1990). </s> II </s> A </s> As in all cases involving statutory interpretation, we look first to the language of the statute itself. Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685 (1985). Title 18 U.S.C. 3579(a) (1) (1982 ed., Supp. IV) provides that "a defendant [495 U.S. 411, 416] convicted of an offense" may be ordered to "make restitution to any victim of such offense." Other subsections of 3579 likewise link restitution to the offense of conviction. See 3579(b)(1) (listing damages recoverable "in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense"); 3579(b)(2) (listing damages recoverable "in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim"); 3579(b)(3) (listing damages recoverable "in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury [that] also results in the death of a victim"). As the Government concedes, Brief for United States 14, a straightforward reading of the provisions indicates that the referent of "such offense" and "an offense" is the offense of conviction. Given that the ordinary meaning of "restitution" is restoring someone to a position he occupied before a particular event, see, e. g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1936 (1986); Black's Law Dictionary 1180 (5th ed. 1979), the repeated focus in 3579 on the offense of which the defendant was convicted suggests strongly that restitution as authorized by the statute is intended to compensate victims only for losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction. </s> The Government argues, however, that 3579 answers only the question of who may receive restitution and offers no guidance as to how much restitution a court may order the defendant to pay. In the Government's view, 3579(a) indicates merely that to receive restitution, a victim must be a victim of the offense of conviction. Once such a victim is identified, the Government maintains, the amount of restitution is calculated in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 3580(a) (1982 ed.), which provides: </s> "The court, in determining whether to order restitution under section 3579 of this title and the amount of such restitution, shall consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial [495 U.S. 411, 417] resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate." </s> Specifically, the Government contends that the catchall phrase of 3580(a), which directs courts to consider "such other factors as the court deems appropriate," authorizes courts to include in their restitution calculus losses resulting from offenses other than the offense of conviction. </s> The Government's reading of 3579 and 3580 is unconvincing. As an initial matter, the detailed substantive guidance regarding the calculation of restitution that is found in subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) makes clear that 3579 3 </s> [495 U.S. 411, 418] does more than simply designate who is entitled to restitution under the Act; those provisions establish the amount of restitution that courts can award for various losses caused by the offense. </s> In addition, it would be anomalous to regard 3580, which delineates "[p]rocedure[s] for issuing order[s] of restitution," rather than 3579, which governs the court's authority to issue restitution orders, as fixing the substantive boundaries of such orders. The Government's argument ignores this Court's commitment to "giving effect to the meaning and placement of the words chosen by Congress." Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 645 (1990) (rejecting claim that Congress intended to limit private right of action under Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. 1801 et seq., in section other than "Enforcement Provisions" section in which Congress established private right of action). </s> More significantly, 3580(a)'s catchall phrase does not reflect a congressional intent to include in the restitution calculus losses beyond those caused by the offense of conviction. Section 3580(a) sets forth the considerations for "determining whether to order restitution under section 3579 of this title and the amount of such restitution." The first such consideration is "the amount of loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense." This language suggests persuasively that Congress intended restitution to be tied to the loss caused by the offense of conviction. Indeed, had Congress intended to permit a victim to recover for losses stemming from all conduct attributable to the defendant, including conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction, Congress would likely have chosen language other than "the offense," which refers without question to the offense of conviction. See supra, at 416. </s> The remaining considerations preceding the catchall phrase also are designed to limit, rather than to expand, the scope of any order of restitution. These factors - "the financial resources [495 U.S. 411, 419] of the defendant" and "the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant's dependents" - provide grounds for awarding less than full restitution under the statute. Congress plainly did not intend that wealthy defendants pay more in "restitution" than otherwise warranted because they have significant financial resources, nor did it intend a defendant's dependents to be forced to bear the burden of a restitution obligation because they have great "earning ability." In light of the principle of ejusdem generis - that a general statutory term should be understood in light of the specific terms that surround it - the catchall phrase should not be read to introduce into the restitution calculus losses that would expand a defendant's liability beyond the offense of conviction. Cf. Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 (1973) (holding that "catchall provision" is "to be read as bringing within a statute categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated"). Moreover, this reading of the catchall phrase harmonizes 3580(a) with 3579(a)(2), which states that "[i]f the court does not order restitution, or orders only partial restitution, under this section, the court shall state on the record the reasons therefor." If a court chooses to award partial or no restitution in accordance with 3579(a)(2), it must couch its refusal in terms of the criteria set forth in 3580(a). 4 </s> [495 U.S. 411, 420] </s> Section 3580(a) hence confirms, rather than undermines, our conclusion that the loss caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction establishes the outer limits of a restitution order. We reject as implausible the Government's contention that the "such other" language in 3580(a)'s catchall phrase imports into the restitution provisions a wholly new substantive dimension not otherwise evident in the statute. Rather, the factors listed in 3580(a), including the catchall factor, are intended to guide a court's discretion when it decides whether to award full or partial restitution under 3579. </s> B </s> The Government endeavors to buttress its interpretation of the statute by invoking the expansive declaration of purpose accompanying VWPA, see, e. g., 2(b)(2), note following 18 U.S.C. 1512 (one purpose of the Act is "to ensure that the Federal Government does all that is possible within limits of available resources to assist victims . . . without infringing on the constitutional rights of the defendant"), and by referring to portions of the legislative history that reflect Congress' goal of ensuring "that Federal crime victims receive the fullest possible restitution from criminal wrongdoers," 128 Cong. Rec. 27391 (1982) (remarks of Rep. Rodino). 5 </s> [495 U.S. 411, 421] The Government also emphasizes policy considerations that purportedly support court-ordered restitution for acts outside the offense of conviction. Without such authority, the Government insists, in many cases courts cannot compensate victims for the full losses they suffered as a result of a defendant's conduct. The potential for undercompensation is heightened by prosecutorial discretion in charging a defendant, the argument goes, because prosecutors often frame their indictments with a view to success at trial rather than to a victim's interest in full compensation. See, e. g., United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 405 (CA10 1986). Finally, the Government maintains that the extensive practice of plea bargaining would, as a practical matter, wholly undermine victims' ability to recover fully for their losses because prosecutors often drop charges of which a defendant may be guilty in exchange for a plea to one or more of the other charges. See, e. g., United States v. Berrios, 869 F.2d 25, 30 (CA2 1989). </s> These concerns are not insignificant ones, but neither are they unique to the issue of victim compensation. If a prosecutor chooses to charge fewer than the maximum possible number of crimes, the potential recovery of victims of crime is undoubtedly limited, but so too is the potential sentence that may be imposed on a defendant. And although a plea agreement does operate to limit the acts for which a court may order the defendant to pay restitution, it also ensures that restitution will be ordered as to the count or counts to which the defendant pleads guilty pursuant to the agreement. The essence of a plea agreement is that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Nothing in the statute suggests that Congress intended to exempt victims of crime from the effects of such a bargaining process. [495 U.S. 411, 422] </s> C </s> In any event, we need not resolve the policy questions surrounding VWPA's offense-of-conviction limitation on restitution orders. Even were the statutory language regarding the scope of a court's authority to order restitution ambiguous, longstanding principles of lenity, which demand resolution of ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant, Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 14 -15 (1978) (applying rule of lenity to federal statute that would enhance penalty), preclude our resolution of the ambiguity against petitioner on the basis of general declarations of policy in the statute and legislative history. See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990) ("Because construction of a criminal statute must be guided by the need for fair warning, it is rare that legislative history or statutory policies will support a construction of a statute broader than that clearly warranted by the text"). </s> III </s> The plain language of VWPA makes clear that the District Court's restitution order in this case was unauthorized. Petitioner pleaded guilty only to the charge that he fraudulently used the credit card of Hershey Godfrey. Because the restitution order encompassed losses stemming from alleged fraudulent uses of cards issued to persons other than Godfrey, such portions of the order are invalid. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Fn [495 U.S. 411, 412] JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE KENNEDY join all but Part II-C of this opinion. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The restitution provisions in effect at the time of petitioner's sentencing were recodified, effective November 1, 1987, pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 1987. Thus, 18 U.S.C. 3579 now appears as 18 U.S.C. 3663, and 18 U.S.C. 3580 appears as 18 U.S.C. 3664. We will refer to the provisions as they were codified at the time of petitioner's sentencing in April 1987. See 18 U.S.C. 3579, 3580 (1982 ed.). </s> Additionally, in 1986 Congress amended the language of 3579(a), replacing "victim of the offense" with "victim of such offense." Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, 100 Stat. 3619. The amendment - making this sole change - became effective on the date of its enactment, ibid., which was after petitioner committed the offense but prior to his sentencing. The parties agree that the change in language was not intended to alter the meaning of the provision. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-334, p. 7 (1985). But they disagree as to which version of the Act governs, because the House Report accompanying the amendment arguably supports petitioner's view that VWPA does not authorize courts to order restitution for losses beyond those caused by the offense of conviction. We agree with the implicit conclusion of the court below that the amended version applies to this case, see 877 F.2d 1256, 1258 (CA5 1989). though we note that our construction of the statute does not turn on the minor change in the language or on the legislative history accompanying the amendment, see n. 5, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 The Fifth Circuit's decision in this case follows the decisions of the Second and Tenth Circuits. See United States v. Berrios, 869 F.2d 25, 32 (CA2 1989) (permitting court to order restitution for losses beyond those "specified in the charge on which the defendant is convicted where the victim of that offense also suffered other losses as a result of the defendant's related course of conduct"); United States v. Duncan, 870 F.2d 1532, 1537 (CA10 1989) (permitting court to order restitution for "other criminal acts that had a significant connection to the act for which conviction was had"). The Sixth Circuit has held that a court may require a defendant to make restitution "to victims of the offense for which he was convicted." United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511, 512 (1985). The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[t]he amount of restitution [under VWPA] may not exceed the actual losses flowing from the offense for which the defendant has been convicted." United States v. Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1571 (1986) (citing United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 (CA11 1983) (construing Federal Probation Act, 18 U.S.C. 3651 (1982 ed.)). The Ninth Circuit has ruled that "in cases which involve a continuing scheme to defraud, `it is within the power of the court to require restitution of any amount up to the entire illicit gain from such a scheme, even if only some specific incidents are the basis of the guilty plea.'" United States v. Pomazi, 851 F.2d 244, 250 (1988) (quoting United States v. Davies, 683 F.2d 1052, 1055 (CA7 1982)). </s> [Footnote 3 Section 3579(b) provides in part: </s> "The [restitution] order may require that such defendant - </s> "(1) in the case of an offense resulting in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense - </s> "(A) return the property to the owner of the property or someone designated by the owner; or </s> "(B) if return of the property under subparagraph (A) is impossible, impractical, or inadequate, pay an amount equal to the greater of - </s> "(i) the value of the property on the date of the damage, loss, or destruction, or </s> "(ii) the value of the property on the date of sentencing, less the value (as of the date the property is returned) of any part of the property that is returned; </s> "(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim - </s> "(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; </s> "(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and </s> "(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of such offense; </s> "(3) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury [that] also results in the death of a victim, pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related services . . . ." </s> [Footnote 4 Under the Government's construction of 3580(a), a court that did not award restitution for acts beyond the offense of conviction would presumably be required to explain its refusal to do so under 3579(a)(2). The requirement that a court explain its refusal to award full restitution is more consistent with a scheme that establishes a clearly discernable outer limit of restitutionary liability than with one that permits an open-ended inquiry into losses resulting from the "defendant's related course of conduct," Berrios, 869 F.2d, at 32, or from "acts that had a significant connection to the act for which conviction was had," Duncan, 870 F.2d, at 1537. Further, the open-ended approach to restitution advocated by the Government, taken with 3579(a)(2)'s requirement that a court explain its refusal to award full restitution, would in some cases undermine the statute's goal of compensating victims. Section 3579(d) authorizes a court to decline to [495 U.S. 411, 420] award restitution altogether where "the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the fashioning of an order of restitution . . . outweighs the need to provide restitution to any victims." Determining the existence of, and resulting loss from, offenses other than the one supporting conviction will often be sufficiently difficult to implicate this provision. </s> [Footnote 5 We need not decide whether further support for our reading of the statutory provisions can be gleaned from the legislative history of the amended version of 3579(a). See n. 1, supra. We note, and the Government implicitly concedes, that whatever light the legislative history sheds on the issue is favorable to petitioner. See H. R. Rep. No. 99-334, p. 7 (1985) (citing H. R. Rep. No. 98-1017, p. 83, n. 43 (1984)) ("To order a defendant to make restitution to a victim of an offense for which the [495 U.S. 411, 421] defendant was not convicted would be to deprive the defendant of property without due process of law"). </s> [495 U.S. 411, 423]

United States Supreme Court CARPENTERS LOCAL v. LABOR BOARD(1961) No. 68 Argued: Decided: April 17, 1961 </s> An employer entered into a contract with the Brotherhood of Carpenters to employ members of the union and to abide by the rules and regulations of the union applicable to the locality where work was done. Upon undertaking work in a certain locality, the employer agreed to hire workers on referral from petitioner local union. Two applicants from another local union were denied employment because they could not get referral from petitioner local union. The National Labor Relations Board found that the unions had violated 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by maintaining and enforcing an agreement which established closed-shop preferential hiring conditions and by causing the employer to refuse to hire the two applicants. There was no evidence, however, that they had coerced any employee to become or remain a member. Held: On the record in this case, the Board was not authorized under 10 (c) to require the unions to refund dues and fees paid to them by their members. Virginia Electric Co. v. Labor Board, 319 U.S. 533 , distinguished. Pp. 652-656. </s> 273 F.2d 699, reversed. </s> Bernard Dunau argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Francis X. Ward. </s> Norton J. Come argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Stuart Rothman, Dominick L. Manoli and Duane B. Beeson. </s> J. Albert Woll, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. [365 U.S. 651, 652] </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner, United Brotherhood, entered into a contract with Mechanical Handling Systems, Inc. (which we will call the Company), whereby the Company agreed to work the hours, pay the wages, abide by the rules and regulations of the union applicable to the locality where the work is done, and employ members of the union. </s> The Company, undertaking work at Indianapolis, agreed to hire workers on referral from a local union, one of the petitioners in this case. Two applicants from another local union were denied employment by the Company because they could not get referral from petitioner local union. </s> The Board found that petitioners had violated 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136, 141, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 158, in maintaining and enforcing an agreement which established closed-shop preferential hiring conditions and in causing the Company to refuse to hire the two applicants. 122 N. L. R. B. 396. </s> After granting other relief the Board said: </s> "[A]s we find that dues, nonmembership dues, assessments, and work permit fees, 1 were collected under the illegal contract as the price employees paid in order to obtain or retain their jobs, we do not believe it would effectuate the policies of the Act to permit the retention of the payments which have been unlawfully exacted from the employees." [365 U.S. 651, 653] </s> It added that the remedial provisions "are appropriate and necessary to expunge the coercive effect" of petitioners' unfair labor practices. </s> On application of the Board, the Court of Appeals enforced the order. 273 F.2d 699. The case is here on a writ of certiorari, 363 U.S. 837 , in which petitioners challenge no part of the Board's order except the refund provision. </s> The provision for refund in this case is the product of a rule announced by the Board in the Brown-Olds case, 115 N. L. R. B. 594, which involved the use of a closed-shop agreement despite the ban in the Taft-Hartley Act. In that case a panel of three members of the five-member Board found a violation of the closed-shop provision of the Act. Two of the three agreed to an order of reimbursement to all employees for any assessments collected by the union within the period starting from six months prior to the date of the filing of the charge. One member, Ivar H. Peterson, dissented, saying that the reimbursement was inappropriate since there was an absence of "specific evidence of coercion and evidence that payments were required as a condition of employment." Id., 606. Later that remedy was extended to hiring arrangements, which though not operating in connection with a closed shop, were felt by the Board to have a coercive influence on applicants for work to join the union. Los Angeles-Seattle Motor Express, Inc., 121 N. L. R. B. 1629. </s> In neither of those cases nor in the present case was there any evidence that the union membership, fees, or dues were coerced. The Board as well as the Court of Appeals held that fact to be immaterial. Both said that the case was governed by Virginia Electric Co. v. Labor Board, 319 U.S. 533 ; and the Court of Appeals added that coercion was to be inferred as "there was present an implicit threat of loss of job if those fees were not paid." 273 F.2d, at 703. The Board argues, in support of [365 U.S. 651, 654] that position, that reimbursement of dues where hiring arrangements have been abused is protective of rights vindicated by the Act and authorized by 10 (c). 2 </s> We do not think this case is governed by Virginia Electric Co. v. Labor Board, supra. That case involved a company union whose very existence was unlawful. There were, indeed, findings that the union "was not the result of the employees' free choice" ( 319 U.S., at 537 ), and that the employees had to remain members of the union to retain their jobs. Id., 540. Return of dues was one of the means for disestablishing an unlawful union. Id., 541. Cf. Labor Board v. Mine Workers, 355 U.S. 453, 458 -459. </s> The unions in the present case were not unlawfully created. On the record before us they have engaged in prohibited activity. But there is no evidence that any of them coerced a single employee to join the union ranks or to remain as members. All of the employees affected by the present order were union members when employed on the job in question. So far as we know, they may have been members for years on end. No evidence was offered to show that even a single person joined the union with the view of obtaining work on this project. Nor was there any evidence that any who had voluntarily joined the union was kept from resigning for fear of retaliatory measures against him. This case is therefore quite different from Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U.S. 17 , [365 U.S. 651, 655] 48, where, discrimination having been shown, the inferences to be drawn were left largely to the Board. </s> The Board has broad discretion to adapt its remedies to the needs of particular situations so that "the victims of discrimination" may be treated fairly. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 194 . But the power of the Board "to command affirmative action is remedial, not punitive, and is to be exercised in aid of the Board's authority to restrain violations and as a means of removing or avoiding the consequences of violation where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the purposes of the Act." Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 236 . Where no membership in the union was shown to be influenced or compelled by reason of any unfair practice, no "consequences of violation" are removed by the order compelling the union to return all dues and fees collected from the members; and no "dissipation" of the effects of the prohibited action is achieved. Labor Board v. Mine Workers, supra, 463. The order in those circumstances becomes punitive and beyond the power of the Board. 3 Cf. Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U.S. 7, 10 . As Judge Pope said in Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Labor Board, 276 F.2d 63, 76, "reimbursing a lot of old-time union men" by refunding their dues is not a remedial measure in the competence of the Board to impose, unless there is support [365 U.S. 651, 656] in the evidence that their membership was induced, obtained, or retained in violation of the Act. It would be difficult, even with hostile eyes, to read the history of trade unionism except in terms of voluntary associations formed to meet pressing needs in a complex society. 4 </s> Reversed. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The monthly dues payable to the local union were $3.50 and the initiation fee $125. Dues and fees in lesser amounts were payable by apprentices. A member who is working within the jurisdiction of a district council who has not transferred his membership to a local union of the council pays for a working permit that is not less than 75 cents a month nor more than the local monthly dues. </s> [Footnote 2 Section 10 (c) provides in relevant part: </s> ". . . If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act: . . ." </s> [Footnote 3 Accord: Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Labor Board, 275 F.2d 914 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Labor Board v. United States Steel Corp., 278 F.2d 896 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Labor Board v. Local Union No. 85, 274 F.2d 344 (C. A. 5th Cir.); Labor Board v. International Union, 279 F.2d 951 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Labor Board, 276 F.2d 63 (C. A. 9th Cir.); Local 357 v. Labor Board, 107 U.S. App. D.C. 188, 275 F.2d 646. Cf.Labor Board v. Carpenters Local, 276 F.2d 583 (C. A. 1st Cir.); Perry Coal Co. v. Labor Board, 284 F.2d 910 (C. A. 7th Cir.). </s> [Footnote 4 See Millis and Montgomery, Organized Labor, Vol. III (1945), c. VIII. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins, concurring. </s> While I agree with the Court that Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Labor Board, 319 U.S. 533 , does not justify the Board's "Brown-Olds" remedy as it has been applied in this and other cases, I think the Board is entitled to be informed more fully why that should be so, since it may fairly be said that Virginia Electric could be taken as having invited the course the Board has been following. In joining the Court's opinion I shall therefore add some further views. </s> The Brown-Olds remedy is an order made under 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act which authorizes the Board, after finding an unfair labor practice, not only to issue a cease and desist order but also "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act . . . ." The remedy, which seems only to be applied if the unfair labor practice amounts either to employer domination of a union [ 8 (a) (2)] or discrimination in favor of union membership by an agreement between employer and union [ 8 (a) (3); 8 (b) (2)], typically requires that either the union or the employer reimburse all employees in the amount of [365 U.S. 651, 657] all moneys paid in dues, assessments, etc., since six months before the unfair labor practice charge was filed. The Board does not admit defensive evidence that some employees voluntarily made such payments. An illegal closed shop or discriminatory hiring practices create an irrebuttable presumption of coercion. See, e. g., Brown-Olds Plumbing & Heating Corp., 115 N. L. R. B. 594; Saltsman Construction Co., 123 N. L. R. B. 1176; Nassau & Suffolk Contractors' Assn., 123 N. L. R. B. 1393; Lummus Corp., 125 N. L. R. B. 1161. </s> The provision that the Board was to be allowed "to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act . . ." did not pass the Wagner Act Congress without objection to the uncontrolled breadth of this power. See Hearings before Senate Committee on Education and Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 448-449. This Court's construction of the scope of the power has reflected a similar concern. The Board has been told that it is without power to "effectuate the policies of this Act" by assessing punishments upon those who commit unfair labor practices. Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U.S. 7, 11 , 12. The primary purpose of the provision for other affirmative relief has been held to be to enable the Board to take measures designed to recreate the conditions and relationships that would have been had there been no unfair labor practice. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U.S. 197, 236 . Thus in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177 , this Court reversed the Board for refusing to allow an employer to show in mitigation of a backpay order that the employee unjustifiably refused to take desirable new employment during the period. In Republic Steel, supra, the Court refused to enforce an order requiring the employer to pay the full amount of back pay to an employee who had been paid to work for the Work Projects Administration in the meantime. In Labor [365 U.S. 651, 658] Board v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344 , the Court indicated that even an otherwise sensible procedure for computing back pay of an employee discriminatorily discharged must provide exceptions where the scheme would more than compensate the employee because of the seasonal nature of the employer's business. </s> The Board now emphasizes that its Brown-Olds remedy has a substantial tendency to deter employer-union encouragement of union membership in violation of 8 (a) (3) and 8 (b) (2). But it also correctly recognizes that in light of the Republic Steel case, supra, it must show more than that the remedy will tend to deter unfair labor practices. The Board must establish that the remedy is a reasonable attempt to put aright matters the unfair labor practice set awry. As I understand its contentions, the Board attempts to make this showing by arguing that wherever there has been a not insignificant unlawful encouragement to union membership all members should be taken to have been under the influence of coercion, whether or not they were aware of this influence or would have acted differently without it. The employees are said to have been coerced in much the same sense that a man contentedly sitting in the living room of his house may be said to be imprisoned by the barring of the doors whether or not he wants to leave. 1 Accordingly, the Board has considered unnecessary an [365 U.S. 651, 659] actual showing of employee unwillingness to belong to the union. </s> What we must decide, then, is whether it is within the power of the Board to provide dues-reimbursement relief for this type of imputed coercion, or, as the Board alternatively states its case, for the employee's loss of his statutory right to decide freely whether or not he shall be a union member. This issue is not satisfactorily resolved by simply pointing out that there has been no showing of forced payment of dues an employee was unwilling to pay, for, unless I misunderstand the Board, it is arguing that even a willing union member loses something when there is a violation of 8 (b) (2), namely the freedom of choice which the statute assures him. Nor, once we have recognized that a tendency to deter unfair labor practices is not alone sufficient justification for a Board order of affirmative relief, does the concept of punitiveness really advance a solution. Deterrence is certainly a desirable even though not in itself a sufficiently justifying effect of a Board order. </s> I think the Board should be denied the use of its Brown-Olds remedy in situations where, as here, it is not unlikely that a substantial number of employees were willing to pay dues for union membership because, as I see it, the amount of dues or other exactions paid is not a tenable way of estimating the value a willing union member would place on his right to choose freely whether or not he would be or remain a union member - as it were, on his right to change his mind. The amount of dues paid does perhaps provide a means of estimating the value of benefits received from the union. Or the amount of dues paid does perhaps measure the cost coercion imposes upon an employee who, if free to choose, would be unwilling to join the union (although even in this case a proper adjustment might have to take some account of the union [365 U.S. 651, 660] benefits the employee would not have received had he been merely a nonunion employee in a unionized bargaining unit). But I can find no rational relationship at all between the amount of dues paid and the value an employee who is willing to join a union would place on his freedom to change his mind. 2 In the absence of a showing of such a relationship, the Board's Brown-Olds order can no more be sustained than could its orders in the Phelps Dodge or Republic Steel cases. </s> A different result might follow in this case if Virginia Electric had held that such a relationship exists. But I think that case held only that, as a matter of statutory policy, an employee could not ever be deemed a willing member of a company-dominated union, cf. Matter of The Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N. L. R. B. 670, and that, on considerations of practicality, the employer who had violated the Act should bear the unapportionable costs of sustaining a union that served the employer's forbidden purposes at least as much as it served the employee's legitimate ones. </s> [Footnote 1 It is but another formulation of the same argument when the Board, in its brief, states that actual coercion is not required so long as the dues are collected pursuant to an illegal system: "[T]he validity of a reimbursement order is not contingent upon a showing that the employees paid monies to the union unwillingly. If the money were paid pursuant to an arrangement which violated the statute, it can be ordered refunded provided this would best effectuate the statutory policies. . . . That the money may have been collected anyhow by a legal means does not privilege the use of an illegal procedure to obtain it." </s> [Footnote 2 For example, an employee may be more willing to join a union which charges high dues and provides substantial benefits than a union which charges little and gives little. But the Board formula declares that in the case where the dues are higher the value of the loss of freedom of choice is greater. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER, dissenting. </s> The contract involved here not only required persons seeking employment in the unit to be members of the union, but also required each of them to obtain from the "Council" and present to the "union steward" on the job a "work permit" before going to work. That this closed-shop hiring arrangement "coerce[d] employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7," and "cause[d] [the] employer to discriminate against . . . employee[s] in violation of subsection (a) (3)" of the [365 U.S. 651, 661] Act, contrary to the explicit provisions of 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 158, is not here denied. </s> To assure protection and enforcement of the rights it had guaranteed to employees by the Act, Congress provided in 10 (c) that, upon the finding of an "unfair labor practice," "the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue . . . an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies" of the Act. </s> Finding that the closed-shop hiring arrangement involved here violated 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act and thus constituted an unfair labor practice, the Board, in fashioning a remedy which it deemed "necessary to expunge the coercive effect" of the violations and to "effectuate the policies of the Act," ordered the unions not only to cease the violations but also "to refund to the employees involved the dues . . . and work permit fees, paid by the employees as a price for their employment." The only question here is whether that remedy was within the Board's power. Like the Court of Appeals, I think it was. </s> Congress knew, of course, that it could not foresee the nature of all possible violations of the Act, and accordingly did not undertake to specify the precise remedy to be visited upon offenders for particular violations. </s> "[I]n the nature of things Congress could not catalogue all the devices and stratagems for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these policies in an infinite variety of specific situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of administration. The exercise of the process was committed to the Board, subject to limited judicial review. Because [365 U.S. 651, 662] the relation of remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence, courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion . . . . </s> "The Act does not create rights for individuals which must be vindicated according to a rigid scheme of remedies. It entrusts to an expert agency the maintenance and promotion of industrial peace." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 194 . </s> To hold that the Board is without power to do more than order the unions not to violate the Act in the future would be to deny any remedy whatever for violations. It is certain that Congress did not intend by the Act "to hold out to [employees] an illusory right for which it was denying them a remedy." Graham v. Brotherhood of Firemen, 338 U.S. 232, 240 . In directing the Board to order "such affirmative action . . . as will effectuate the policies of this Act," Congress seems clearly to have directed the Board to fashion and enforce a remedy "which it . . . deem[s] adequate to that end." Republic Steel Corp. v. Labor Board, 311 U.S. 7, 12 . </s> In "fashioning remedies to undo the effects of violations of the Act, the Board must draw on enlightenment gained from experience." Labor Board v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346 . And see Radio Officers' Union v. Labor Board, 347 U.S. 17, 49 . Based on its long experience up to 1956, that, despite the ban which the Taft-Hartley Amendments had imposed nine years earlier, closed-shop practices were still being followed in some industries, 1 the Board concluded that a remedy more [365 U.S. 651, 663] effective than a cease-and-desist order was required. And, following the teaching of this Court's opinion in Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Labor Board, 319 U.S. 533 , the Board decided that an appropriate additional remedy would be to require that the monies paid to the union under the illegal arrangement be refunded to the employees, and it accordingly so held in 1956 in United Association of Journeymen, etc., and Brown-Olds Plumbing & Heating Corp., 115 N. L. R. B. 594. 2 </s> [365 U.S. 651, 664] </s> In Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Labor Board, supra, this Court had upheld an identical remedy as within the Board's power. There an employer had committed an unfair labor practice by dominating a plant union in violation of 8 (1), (2) and (3) of the Act. In fashioning a remedy that it deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act, the Board ordered the employer not only to cease the practice but also to reimburse its employees for the dues withheld from their wages, pursuant to their signed authorizations, and paid to the union. Rejecting the employer's contention that this remedy was in excess of the Board's power, this Court said: </s> "[T]he Board has wide discretion in ordering affirmative action; its power is not limited to the illustrative example of one type of permissible affirmative order, namely, reinstatement with or without back pay. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U.S. 177, 187 -89. The particular means by which the effects of unfair labor practices are to be expunged are matters `for the Board not the courts to determine.' I. A. of M. v. Labor Board, supra, at p. 82; Labor Board v. Link-Belt Co., supra, at p. 600. Here the Board, in the exercise of its informed discretion, has expressly determined that reimbursement in full of the checked-off dues is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. We give considerable weight to that administrative determination. It should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act. There is no such showing here." 319 U.S., at 539 -540. [365 U.S. 651, 665] </s> Such an order, said the Court, "returns to the employees what has been taken from them" and restores to them "that truly unfettered freedom of choice which the Act demands." 319 U.S., at 541 . Surely, it is as correct to say here, as it was there, that "An order such as this, which deprives [a union] of advantages accruing from a particular method of subverting the Act, is a permissible method of effectuating the statutory policy," ibid., and that is all the order here purports to do. </s> It is argued that the Virginia case is distinguishable on the ground that it dealt with an employer-dominated union. But the question is one of power. The fact that the unfair labor practice there was by the employer rather than by the union, as here, is not a distinguishing difference. Nor does the fact that employees' rights were there infringed by a violation of 8 (1), (2) and (3) of the Act, whereas they are here infringed by a violation of 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act, make any difference. In each instance the violation constituted an unfair labor practice, and the question is whether, in fashioning a remedy to effectuate the policies of the Act, the Board has power, in its informed discretion, to order reimbursement of the dues paid under the illegal arrangement. It would seem that if the Board had power so to order in the Virginia case, as this Court held, it similarly has power so to order in this case. Nothing in the Virginia case appears to limit the Board's power of restitution to cases involving employer-dominated unions or to any other particular type of violation, but the power seems clearly enough to be invocable in any appropriate case, in the informed discretion of the Board, and such has been the understanding of the courts. 3 </s> [365 U.S. 651, 666] </s> The contentions that such an order of restitution is beyond the Board's power because the employees received some benefits from the union, despite the illegal hiring arrangement, and that to allow restitution of the dues collected by the union under the illegal arrangement would be to enforce a "penalty" which the Board has no power to assess, were fully answered to the contrary in the Virginia case, 319 U.S., at 542 -543. </s> To require specific proof of individual injury to all employees "would impose impossible administrative burdens," Labor Board v. Revere Metal Art Co., supra, at 101, and prevent effective enforcement of the Act. Hence that character and fullness of proof is not required. See Radio Officers' Union v. Labor Board, 347 U.S. 17, 48 -52. And inasmuch as the General Counsel of the Board may issue complaints only upon charges filed with him, id., at 53, and the Board's experience seems to have proved that only a few employees will be sufficiently daring and determined overtly to complain regardless of the nature of the violation, it would seem that the Board, in the exercise of its informed discretion, may reasonably conclude, even in the absence of specific proof of injury to all the employees, that full restitution of the dues collected by the union under an illegal arrangement is necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act. </s> For these reasons, I think the Board acted within its power in ordering restitution of the dues collected under the admittedly illegal arrangement here, that the Court of Appeals correctly enforced the order, and that its judgment should be affirmed. </s> [Footnote 1 As two apparently disinterested authorities have noted: </s> "[By 1945], the closed shop had become one of the basic features of industrial relations in the building industry. This situation has largely remained true in practice up to the present time, despite [365 U.S. 651, 663] the passage of legislation in 1947 prohibiting this type of provision from being included in collective agreements. </s> . . . . . </s> ". . . In all of the strongly unionized areas studied during the summer of 1952, employment arrangements equivalent to those under a closed shop were in effect. Membership in the union was almost universally regarded as a prerequisite for obtaining employment; in most instances men were employed directly or indirectly through the union itself. Both parties viewed this as standard practice and showed little or no concern for the illegality of the arrangement." Haber and Levinson, Labor Relations and Productivity in the Building Trades (Univ. of Michigan, 1956), pp. 62, 71. (Emphasis added.) </s> [Footnote 2 The Board there stated: </s> ". . . [T]he Taft-Hartley amendments have made unlawful all closed-shop contracts as contrary to public policy, proscribing such conduct by unions as unfair labor practices. The dues required and collected under such a contract . . . contravene that public policy. It is no longer required by the Act that the union be company-dominated in order for collection of dues to be unlawful under a closed-shop contract. Here, the dues and the assessments were required and collected pursuant to a contract which clearly contravened the public policy of the Act. Dues and assessments here collected constituted the price these employees paid in order to retain their jobs. We therefore conclude that the remedy of reimbursement of all such monies is appropriate and necessary to expunge the illegal effects of the unfair labor practices found here. </s> . . . . . </s> "It is our view that, where payment of dues is required under a closed-shop contract, as where assessments are required under an otherwise valid agreement, reimbursement of such monies actually [365 U.S. 651, 664] collected will best effectuate the policies of the Act. Otherwise the very fruits of the unfair labor practice itself will remain in the hands of the respondent. . . ." 115 N. L. R. B., at 600-601. </s> [Footnote 3 Labor Board v. Revere Metal Art Co., 280 F.2d 96, 101 (C. A. 2d Cir.); Labor Board v. Local 294, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 279 F.2d 83, 86-88 (C. A. 2d Cir.); O'Neill Intl. Detective Agency v. Labor Board, 46 L. R. R. M. 2503 (C. A. 3d Cir.); Dixie Bedding Co. v. Labor Board, 268 F.2d 901, 907 (C. A. 5th Cir.). </s> [365 U.S. 651, 667]

United States Supreme Court CALIFORNIAET AL . v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC., ET AL .(1998) No. 96-1400 Argued: December 1, 1997Decided: April 22, 1998 </s> </s> The S. S. Brother Jonathan and its cargo sank off the coast of Califor- </s> nia in 1865. Shortly after the disaster, five insurance companies paid claims for the loss of certain cargo, but it is unclear whether the ship and the remaining cargo were insured. There is no evidence that either the State or the insurance companies have attempted to locate or recover the wreckage. In this action, respondent Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR), which has located the wreck, seeks rights to the vessel and cargo under the Federal District Court's in rem admiralty jurisdiction. California moved to dismiss, claiming that it possesses title to the wreck either under the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA)-which provides that the Federal Government asserts and transfers title to a State of any "abandoned shipwreck" embedded in the State's submerged lands or on a State's submerged lands and included, or eligible for inclusion, in the National Register-or under Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §6313-which vests title in the State to all abandoned shipwrecks on or in the State's tide and submerged lands-and therefore DSR's in rem action is an action against the State in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. DSR countered that the ASA could not divest the federal courts of the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred by Article III, §2, of the Constitution and requested a warrant for the arrest of the vessel and its cargo. The District Court concluded that the State failed to demonstrate a "colorable claim" to the wreck under the ASA; found that the ASA pre-empts §6313; issued a warrant for the vessel's arrest; appointed DSR the vessel's custodian and made it the exclusive salvor; and decided that it would defer adjudication of title until after DSR completed the salvage operation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agree ing that the ASA pre-empts §6313; that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the federal court's jurisdiction over the in rem proceeding as to the application of the ASA; that the State did not prove that the Brother Jonathan is abandoned under the ASA; and that the wreck's uninsured portion should not be treated as abandoned. </s> Held: 1. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a federal court's jurisdiction over an in rem admiralty action where the res is not within the State's possession. Pp. 8-15. </s> (a) The federal courts have a unique role in admiralty cases as conferred by Article III, §2, cl. 1, of the Constitution. That jurisdiction encompasses proceedings in rem. The jurisdiction of federal courts is also constrained, however, by the Eleventh Amendment. Early cases appear to have assumed the federal courts' jurisdiction over admiralty in rem actions despite the Eleventh Amendment. Subsequent decisions altered the role of federal courts by explaining that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not wholly exempt from the Eleventh Amendment. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (New York I). Thus, this Court held that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over an in rem action against a tugboat operated by New York State, Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 503 (New York II) , and that Florida could not invoke the Eleventh Amendment to block the arrest of maritime artifacts in the State's possession where that possession was unlawful, Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (plurality opinion). However, those opinions did not address situations comparable to this case, in which DSR asserts rights to a res not in the State's possession. The action in New York I, although styled as an in rem action, was actually, as the Court explained in that decision, an in personam action against a state official; and the action in New York II was an in rem suit against a vessel that was property of the State, in its possession and employed for governmental use. Assertions in the opinions in Treasure Salvors , which might be read to suggest that a federal court may not undertake in rem adjudication of the State's interest in property without the State's consent, regardless of the status of the res, should not be divorced from the context of that case and reflexively applied to the very different circumstances presented by this case. Also, because Treasure Salvors addressed only the District Court's authority to issue a warrant to arrest artifacts, any references to what the lower courts could have done if adjudicating the artifacts' title do not control the outcome here. Nor does the fact that Treasure Salvors has been cited for the general proposition that federal courts cannot adjudicate a State's claim of title to property prevent a more nuanced application of that decision in the context of the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction. Pp. 8-14. (b) In considering whether the Eleventh Amendment applies where the State asserts claim in an admiralty action to a res not in its possession, this Court's decisions involving the Federal Government's sovereign immunity in in rem admiralty actions provide guidance, for the Court has recognized a correlation between sovereign immunity principles applicable to States and the Federal Government. Based on the longstanding precedent that the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction is barred only where the Federal Government actually possesses the disputed res, e.g., The Davis, 10 Wall. 15, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over the Brother Jonathan , and the District Court may adjudicate DSR's and the State's claims to the shipwreck. Pp. 14-15. </s> 2. Because the lower courts' conclusion that the Brother Jonathan was not abandoned for ASA purposes was influenced by the assumption that the Eleventh Amendment was relevant to the courts' inquiry, the case is remanded for reconsideration of the abandonment issue, with the clarification that the meaning of "abandoned" under the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty law. The District Court's full consideration of the ASA's application on remand might negate the need to address the issue whether the ASA preempts §6313, and, thus, this Court declines to undertake that analysis. Pp. 15-16. </s> 102 F. 3d 379, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. </s> O'CONNOR , J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. STEVENS , J., filed a concurring opinion. KENNEDY , J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG and BREYER , JJ., joined. </s> NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 96-1400 </s> CALIFORNIAAND STATE LANDS COMMISSION, PE-TITIONERS v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC., ET </s> AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [April 22, 1998] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This action, involving the adjudication of various claims to a historic shipwreck, requires us to address the interaction between the Eleventh Amendment and the in rem admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. Respondent Deep Sea Research, Inc. (DSR), located the ship, known as the S. S. Brother Jonathan , in California's territorial waters. When DSR turned to the federal courts for resolution of its claims to the vessel, California contended that the Eleventh Amendment precluded a federal court from considering DSR's claims in light of the State's asserted rights to the Brother Jonathan under federal and state law. We conclude that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the jurisdiction of a federal court over an in rem admiralty action where the res is not within the State's possession. </s> I </s> The dispute before us arises out of respondent DSR's assertion of rights to both the vessel and cargo of the Brother Jonathan , a 220-foot, wooden-hulled, double sidewheeled steamship that struck a submerged rock in July 1865 during a voyage between San Francisco and Vancouver. It took less than an hour for the Brother Jonathan to sink, and most of the ship's passengers and crew perished. The ship's cargo, also lost in the accident, included a shipment of up to $2 million in gold and a United States Army payroll that some estimates place at $250,000. See Nolte, Shipwreck: Brother Jonathan Discovered, San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 25, 1994, p. 1, reprinted in App. 127-131. One of few parts of the ship recovered was the wheel, which was later displayed in a saloon in Crescent City, California. R. Phelan, The Gold Chain 242 (1987). </s> Shortly after the disaster, five insurance companies paid claims totaling $48,490 for the loss of certain cargo. It is unclear whether the remaining cargo and the ship itself were insured. See Wreck of the Steamship Brother Jonathan, New York Times, Aug. 26, 1865, reprinted in App. 140-147. Prior to DSR's location of the vessel, the only recovery of cargo from the shipwreck may have occurred in the 1930's, when a fisherman found 22 pounds of gold bars minted in 1865 and believed to have come from the Brother Jonathan . The fisherman died, however, without revealing the source of his treasure. Nolte, supra , App. 130. There appears to be no evidence that either the State of California or the insurance companies that paid claims have attempted to locate or recover the wreckage. </s> In 1991, DSR filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California seeking rights to the wreck of the Brother Jonathan and its cargo under that court's in rem admiralty jurisdiction. California intervened, asserting an interest in the Brother Jonathan based on the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 (ASA), 102 Stat. 432, 43 U. S. C. §§2101-2106, which provides that the Federal Government asserts and transfers title to a State of any "abandoned shipwreck" that either is embedded in submerged lands of a State or is on a State's submerged lands "and is included in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register," §2105(a)(3). According to California, the ASA applies because the Brother Jonathan is abandoned and is both embedded on state land and eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places (National Register). California also laid claim to the Brother Jonathan under Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. §6313 (West Supp. 1998) (hereinafter §6313), which vests title in the State "to all abandoned shipwrecks . . . on or in the tide and submerged lands of California." </s> The District Court initially dismissed DSR's action without prejudice at DSR's initiative. The case was reinstated in 1994 after DSR actually located the Brother Jonathan four and one-half miles off the coast of Crescent City, where it apparently rests upright on the sea floor under more than 200 feet of water. Based on its possession of several artifacts from the Brother Jonathan , including china, a full bottle of champagne, and a brass spike from the ship's hull, DSR sought either an award of title to the ship and its cargo or a salvage award for its efforts in recovering the ship. DSR also claimed a right of ownership based on its purchase of subrogation interests from some of the insurance companies that had paid claims on the ship's cargo. </s> In response, the State of California entered an appearance for the limited purpose of filing a motion to dismiss DSR's in rem complaint for lack of jurisdiction. According to the State, it possesses title to the Brother Jonathan under either the ASA or §6313, and therefore, DSR's in rem action against the vessel is an action against the State in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. DSR disputed both of the State's statutory ownership claims, and argued that the ASA could not divest the federal courts of the exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction conferred by Article III, §2, of the United States Constitution. DSR also filed a motion requesting that the District Court issue a warrant for the arrest of the Brother Jonathan and its cargo, as well as an order appointing DSR the exclusive salvor of the shipwreck. </s> The District Court held two hearings on the motions. The first focused on whether the wreck is located within California's territorial waters, and the second concerned the possible abandonment, embeddedness, and historical significance of the shipwreck, issues relevant to California's claims to the res. For purposes of the pending motions, DSR stipulated that the Brother Jonathan is located upon submerged lands belonging to California. </s> After the hearings, the District Court concluded that the State failed to demonstrate a "colorable claim" to the Brother Jonathan under federal law, reasoning that the State had not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the ship is abandoned, embedded in the sea floor, or eligible for listing in the National Register as is required to establish title under the ASA. 883 F. Supp. 1343, 1357 (ND Cal. 1995). As for California's state law claim, the court determined that the ASA pre-empts §6313. Accordingly, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the Brother Jonathan , appointed DSR custodian of the shipwreck subject to further order of the court, and ordered DSR to take possession of the shipwreck as its exclusive salvor pending the court's determination of "the manner in which the wreck and its cargo, or the proceeds therefrom, should be distributed." 883 F. Supp., at 1364. </s> The District Court stated that it was not deciding whether "any individual items of cargo or personal property have been abandoned," explaining that "[a]t this stage in the litigation, DSR is not asking the court to award it salvage fees from the res of the wreck, or to otherwise make any order regarding title to or distribution of the wreck or its contents." Id. , at 1354. The District Court thought that the most prudent course would be to adjudi cate title after DSR completes the salvage operation. Following the District Court's ruling, the United States asserted a claim to any property on the Brother Jonathan belonging to the Federal Government. </s> The State appealed, arguing that its immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment does not hinge upon the demonstration by a preponderance of the evidence that the ASA applies to the Brother Jonathan . 102 F. 3d 379, 383 (CA9 1996). According to the State, it had established sufficient claim to the shipwreck under state law by "assert[ing] that the Brother Jonathan is on its submerged lands and that . . . §6313 vests title in the State to abandoned shipwrecks on its submerged lands." Id. , at 385. Underlying the State's argument was a challenge to the District Court's ruling that the ASA pre-empts the California statute. The State also maintained that it had a colorable claim to the Brother Jonathan under the ASA, arguing that it presented ample evidence of both abandonment and embeddedness, and that the District Court applied the wrong test by "requir[ing] that abandonment be shown by an affirmative act on the part of the original owner demonstrating intent to renounce ownership." Ibid. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's orders. The court first concluded that §6313 is pre-empted by the ASA because the state statute "takes title to shipwrecks that do not meet the requirements of the ASA and which are therefore within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts." Id., at 384. With respect to the State's claim under the ASA, the court presumed that "a federal court has both the power and duty to determine whether a case falls within its subject matter jurisdiction," and concluded that "it was appropriate for the district court to require the State to present evidence that the ASA applied to the Brother Jonathan , i.e. , that it was abandoned and either embedded or eligible for listing in the National Register, before dis missing the case." Id. , at 386. According to the court's reasoning, "in addressing the questions of abandonment, embeddedness, and historical significance of the wreck under the ASA, a federal court does not adjudicate the state's rights," because the ASA establishes the Federal Government's title to a qualifying shipwreck, which is then transferred to a State. Id. , at 387. Consequently, in the court's view, "a federal court may adjudicate the question of whether a wreck meets the requirements of the ASA without implicating the Eleventh Amendment." Ibid. </s> As to the specifics of the State's claim under the ASA, the court held that the District Court did not err in concluding that the State failed to prove that the Brother Jonathan is abandoned within the meaning of the statute. The court reasoned that, in the absence of a definition of abandonment in the ASA, "Congress presumably intended that courts apply the definition of abandonment that has evolved under maritime law." Ibid. In maritime law, the court explained, abandonment occurs either when title to a vessel has been affirmatively renounced or when circumstances give rise to an inference of abandonment. Here, the Court of Appeals concluded, the District Court's "failure to infer abandonment from the evidence presented by the State was not clearly erroneous," given the insurance companies' claims to the ship's insured cargo and undisputed evidence presented by DSR that the technology required to salvage the Brother Jonathan has been developed only recently. Id. , at 388. The court also rejected the State's bid to treat the uninsured portion of the wreck as abandoned, explaining that the District Court did not address the status of individual items of cargo or personal property, and that "divid[ing] the wreck of the Brother Jonathan into abandoned and unabandoned portions for the purposes of the ASA" would lead to both federal and state courts adjudicating the wreck's fate, which, in the court's view, would be "confusing and inefficient," and also "inconsistent with the general rule in maritime law of treating wrecks as a legally unified res ." Id. , at 389. </s> Summarizing its reasoning, the court stated that, "[b]ecause the law is reluctant to find abandonment, and because a finding of partial abandonment would deprive those holding title to the unabandoned portion of the wreck access to the federal forum, we hold that the Brother Jonathan is not abandoned." Ibid. (internal citation omitted). The court reserved the question whether there might be some point at which the insured portion of a shipwreck "becomes so negligible" that the entire wreck would be abandoned under the ASA. Ibid. The court also declined to take judicial notice of evidence that, during pendency of the appeal, the Brother Jonathan was determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register. </s> By concluding that the State must prove its claim to the Brother Jonathan by a preponderance of the evidence in order to invoke the immunity afforded by the Eleventh Amendment, the Ninth Circuit diverged from other Courts of Appeals that have held that a State need only make a bare assertion to ownership of a res. See Zych v. Wrecked Vessel Believed to be the Lady Elgin , 960 F. 2d 665, 670 (CA7), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 985 (1992); Maritime Underwater Surveys, Inc. v. The Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel , 717 F. 2d 6, 8 (CA1 1983). * We granted certiorari to address whether a State's Eleventh Amendment immunity in an in rem admiralty action depends upon evidence of the State's ownership of the res, and to consider the related questions whether the Brother Jonathan is subject to the ASA and whether the ASA pre- empts §6313. 520 U. S. ___ (1997). </s> II </s> The judicial power of federal courts extends "to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction." Art. III, §2, cl. 1. The federal courts have had a unique role in admiralty cases since the birth of this Nation, because "[m]aritime commerce was . . . the jugular vein of the Thirteen States." F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court 7 (1927). Accordingly, "[t]he need for a body of law applicable throughout the nation was recognized by every shade of opinion in the Constitutional Convention." Ibid. The constitutional provision was incorporated into the first Judiciary Act in 1789, and federal courts have retained "admiralty or maritime jurisdiction" since then. See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). That jurisdiction encompasses "maritime causes of action begun and carried on as proceedings in rem , that is, where a vessel or thing is itself treated as the offender and made the defendant by name or description in order to enforce a lien." Madruga v. Superior Court of Cal., County of San Diego, 346 U.S. 556, 560 (1954). </s> The jurisdiction of the federal courts is constrained, however, by the Eleventh Amendment, under which "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Although the Amendment, by its terms, "would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts," Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida , 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996), the Court has interpreted the Amendment more broadly. See, e.g. , Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991). According to this Court's precedents, a State may not be sued in federal court by one of its own citizens, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and a state official is immune from suit in federal court for actions taken in an official capacity, see Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). </s> The Court has not always charted a clear path in explaining the interaction between the Eleventh Amendment and the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction. Early cases involving the disposition of "prize" vessels captured during wartime appear to have assumed that federal courts could adjudicate the in rem disposition of the bounty even when state officials raised an objection. See United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115, 139-141 (1809). As Justice Story explained, in admiralty actions in rem , </s> "the jurisdiction of the [federal] court is founded upon the possession of the thing; and if the State should interpose a claim for the property, it does not act merely in the character of a defendant, but as an actor. Besides, the language of the [Eleventh] [A]mendment is, that 'the judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity .' But a suit in the admiralty is not, correctly speaking, a suit in law or in equity; but is often spoken of in contradistinction to both." </s> 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1689, pp. 491492 (5th ed. 1891). </s> Justice Washington, riding Circuit, expressed the same view in United States v. Bright , 24 F. Cas. 1232, 1236 (No. 14,647) (CC Pa. 1809), where he reasoned: </s> "[I]n cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction the property in dispute is generally in the possession of the court, or of persons bound to produce it, or its equivalent, and the proceedings are in rem. The court decides in whom the right is, and distributes the proceeds accordingly. In such a case the court need not depend upon the good will of a state claiming an interest in the thing to enable it to execute its decree. All the world are parties to such a suit, and of course are bound by the sentence. The state may interpose her claim and have it decided. But she cannot lie by, and, after the decree is passed say that she was a party, and therefore not bound, for want of jurisdiction in the court." </s> Although those statements might suggest that the Eleventh Amendment has little application in in rem admiralty proceedings, subsequent decisions have altered that understanding of the federal courts' role. In Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (New York I) , the Court explained that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is not wholly exempt from the operation of the Eleventh Amendment, thereby rejecting the views of Justices Story and Washington. Id. , at 497-498. On the same day, in its opinion in Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 503 (1921) (New York II) , the Court likewise concluded that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over a wrongful death action brought in rem against a tugboat operated by the State of New York on the Erie Canal, although the Court did not specifically rely on the Eleventh Amendment in its holding. </s> The Court's most recent case involving an in rem admiralty action, Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982), addressed whether the Eleventh Amendment "bars an in rem admiralty action seeking to recover property owned by a state." Id. , at 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). A plurality of the Court suggested that New York II could be distinguished on the ground that, in Treasure Salvors , the State's possession of maritime artifacts was unauthorized, and the State therefore could not invoke the Eleventh Amendment to block their arrest. Id. , at 695-699 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897)). As the plurality explained, "since the state officials do not have a colorable claim to possession of the artifacts, they may not invoke the Eleventh Amendment to block execution of the warrant of arrest." 458 U.S., at 697 . </s> That reference to a "colorable claim" is at the crux of this case. Both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit interpreted the "colorable claim" requirement as imposing a burden on the State to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the Brother Jonathan meets the criteria set forth in the ASA. See 102 F. 3d, at 386; 883 F. Supp., at 1349. Other Courts of Appeals have concluded that a State need only make a bare assertion to ownership of a res in order to establish its sovereign immunity in an in rem admiralty action. See, e.g. , Zych , 960 F. 2d, at 670. </s> By our reasoning, however, either approach glosses over an important distinction present here. In this case, unlike in Treasure Salvors , DSR asserts rights to a res that is not in the possession of the State. The Eleventh Amendment's role in that type of dispute was not decided by the plurality opinion in Treasure Salvors , which decided "whether a federal court exercising admiralty in rem jurisdiction may seize property held by state officials under a claim that the property belongs to the State." 458 U.S., at 683 ; see also id. , at 697 ("In ruling that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar execution of the warrant, we need not decide the extent to which a federal district court exercising admiralty in rem jurisdiction over property before the court may adjudicate the rights of claimants to that property as against sovereigns that did not appear and voluntarily assert any claim that they had to the res"). </s> Nor did the opinions in New York I or New York II address a situation comparable to this case. The holding in New York I explained that, although the suit at issue was styled as an in rem libel action seeking recovery of damages against tugboats chartered by the State, the proceedings were actually "in the nature of an action in personam against [the Superintendent of Public Works of the State of New York], not individually, but in his [official] capacity." 256 U.S., at 501 . The action in New York II was an in rem suit against a vessel described as being "at all times mentioned in the libel and at present . . . the absolute property of the State of New York, in its possession and control, and employed in the public service of the State for governmental uses and purposes . . . ." 256 U.S., at 508 . As Justice White explained in his opinion in Treasure Salvors: </s> "The In re New York cases . . . reflect the special concern in admiralty that maritime property of the sovereign is not to be seized. . . . [They] are but the most apposite examples of the line of cases concerning in rem actions brought against vessels in which an official of the State, the Federal Government, or a foreign government has asserted ownership of the res. The Court's consistent interpretation of the respective but related immunity doctrines pertaining to such vessels has been, upon proper presentation that the sovereign entity claims ownership of a res in its possession , to dismiss the suit or modify its judgment accordingly." </s> 458 U.S., at 709 -710 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added). </s> It is true that statements in the fractured opinions in Treasure Salvors might be read to suggest that a federal court may not undertake in rem adjudication of the State's interest in property without the State's consent, regardless of the status of the res. See, e.g. , id., at 682 (plurality opinion) ("The court did not have power . . . to adjudicate the State's interest in the property without the State's consent"); id. , at 711 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("It is . . . beyond reasonable dispute that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court from deciding the rights and obligations of a State in a contract unless the State consents"). Those assertions, however, should not be divorced from the context of Treasure Salvors and reflexively applied to the very different circumstances presented by this case. In Treasure Salvors , the State had possession-albeit unlawfully-of the artifacts at issue. Also, the opinion addressed the District Court's authority to issue a warrant to arrest the artifacts, not the disposition of title to them. As the plurality explained, "[t]he proper resolution of [the Eleventh Amendment] issue . . . does not require -or permit-a determination of the State's ownership of the artifacts." Id., at 699 (emphasis added); see also id. , at 700 (noting that while adjudication of the State's right to the artifacts "would be justified if the State voluntarily advanced a claim to [them], it may not be justified as part of the Eleventh Amendment analysis, the only issue before us"). Thus, any references in Treasure Salvors to what the lower courts could have done if they had solely adjudicated title to the artifacts, rather than issued a warrant to arrest the res, do not control the outcome of this case, particularly given that it comes before us in a very different posture, i.e. , in an admiralty action in rem where the State makes no claim of actual possession of the res. </s> Nor does the fact that Treasure Salvors has been cited for the general proposition that federal courts cannot adjudicate a State's claim of title to property, see, e.g. , Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho , 521 U. S. ___, ___-___ (1997) (slip op., at 2-4) (O'CONNOR , J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id. , at ___-___ (slip op., at 911) (SOUTER , J., dissenting), prevent a more nuanced application of Treasure Salvors in the context of the federal courts' in rem admiralty jurisdiction. Although the Eleventh Amendment bars federal jurisdiction over general title disputes relating to State property interests, it does not necessarily follow that it applies to in rem admiralty actions, or that in such actions, federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction over property that the State does not actually possess. </s> In considering whether the Eleventh Amendment applies where the State asserts a claim in admiralty to a res not in its possession, this Court's decisions in cases involving the sovereign immunity of the Federal Government in in rem admiralty actions provide guidance, for this Court has recognized a correlation between sovereign immunity principles applicable to States and the Federal Government. See Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S., at 213 ; see also Treasure Salvors , supra, at 710 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (discussing analogy between immunity in " in rem actions brought against vessels in which an official of the State, the Federal Government, or a foreign government has asserted ownership of the res"). In one such case, The Davis, 10 Wall. 15 (1870), the Court explained that "proceedings in rem to enforce a lien against property of the United States are only forbidden in cases where, in order to sustain the proceeding, the possession of the United States must be invaded under process of the court." Id. , at 20. The possession referred to was "an actual possession, and not that mere constructive possession which is very often implied by reason of ownership under circumstances favorable to such implication." Id. , at 21; see also The Siren, 7 Wall. 152, 159 (1869) (describing "exemption of the government from a direct proceeding in rem against the vessel whilst in its custody"). The Court's jurisprudence respecting the sovereign immunity of foreign governments has likewise turned on the sovereign's possession of the res at issue. See, e.g. , The Pesaro, 255 U.S. 216, 219 (1921) (federal court's in rem jurisdiction not barred by mere suggestion of foreign government's ownership of vessel). While this Court's decision in The Davis was issued over a century ago, its fundamental premise remains valid in in rem admiralty actions, in light of the federal courts' consti tutionally established jurisdiction in that area and the fact that a requirement that a State possess the disputed res in such cases is "consistent with the principle which exempts the [State] from suit and its possession from disturbance by virtue of judicial process." The Davis , supra , at 21. Based on longstanding precedent respecting the federal courts' assumption of in rem admiralty jurisdiction over vessels that are not in the possession of a sovereign, we conclude that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over the Brother Jonathan and, therefore, that the District Court may adjudicate DSR's and the State's claims to the shipwreck. We have no occasion in this case to consider any other circumstances under which an in rem admiralty action might proceed in federal court despite the Eleventh Amendment. </s> III </s> There remains the issue whether the courts below properly concluded that the Brother Jonathan was not abandoned for purposes of the ASA. That conclusion was necessarily influenced by the assumption that the Eleventh Amendment was relevant to the courts' inquiry. The Court of Appeals' determination that the wreck and its contents are not abandoned for purposes of the ASA was affected by concerns that if "the vessel had been partially abandoned, both the federal court and the state court would be adjudicating the fate of the Brother Jonathan ." 102 F. 3d, at 389. Moreover, the District Court's inquiry was a preliminary one, based on the concern that it was premature "for the court to find that any individual items of cargo or personal property have been abandoned." 883 F. Supp., at 1354. In light of our ruling that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar complete adjudication of the competing claims to the Brother Jonathan in federal court, the application of the ASA must be reevaluated. Because the record before this Court is limited to the preliminary issues before the District Court, we decline to resolve whether the Brother Jonathan is abandoned within the meaning of the ASA. We leave that issue for reconsideration on remand, with the clarification that the meaning of "abandoned" under the ASA conforms with its meaning under admiralty law. </s> Our grant of certiorari also encompassed the question whether the courts below properly concluded that the ASA pre-empts §6313, which apparently operates to transfer title to abandoned shipwrecks not covered by the ASA to the State. Because the District Court's full consideration of the application of the ASA on remand might negate the need to address the pre-emption issue, we decline to undertake that analysis. </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals assuming jurisdiction over this case is affirmed, its judgment in all other respects is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 96-1400 </s> CALIFORNIAAND STATE LANDS COMMISSION, PE-TITIONERS v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC., ET </s> AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [April 22, 1998] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS , concurring. </s> In Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982), both the four Members of the plurality and the four dissenters agreed that the District Court "did not have power . . . to adjudicate the State's interest in the property without the State's consent." Id. , at 682; see also id., at 699-700; id. , at 703, n. (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). Our reasons for reaching that common conclusion were different, but I am now persuaded that all of us might well have reached a different conclusion if the position of Justices Story and Washington (that the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to any in rem admiralty action) had been brought to our attention. I believe that both opinions made the mistake of assuming that the Eleventh Amendment has the same application to an in rem admiralty action as to any other action seeking possession of property in the control of state officers. </s> My error, in writing for the plurality, was the assumption that the reasoning in Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897), and United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), which supported our holding that Treasure Salvors was entitled to possession of the artifacts, also precluded a binding determination of the State's interest in the property. Under the reasoning of those cases, the fact that the state officials were acting without lawful authority meant that a judgment against them would not bind the State. See 458 U.S., at 687 -688 ("In holding that the action was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court in Tindal emphasized that any judgment awarding possession to the plaintiff would not subsequently bind the State"). That reasoning would have been sound if we were deciding an ejectment action in which the right to possession of a parcel of real estate was in dispute; moreover, it seemed appropriate in Treasure Salvors because we were focusing on the validity of the arrest warrant. </s> Having given further consideration to the special characteristics of in rem admiralty actions, and more particularly to the statements by Justice Story and Justice Washington quoted at pages 9 and 10 of the Court's opinion,* I am now convinced that we should have affirmed the Treasure Salvors judgment in its entirety. Accordingly, I agree with the Court's holding that the State of California may be bound by a federal court's in rem adjudication of rights to the Brother Jonathan and its cargo. </s> U.S. Supreme Court </s> No. 96-1400 </s> CALIFORNIAAND STATE LANDS COMMISSION, PE-TITIONERS v. DEEP SEA RESEARCH, INC., ET </s> AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [April 22, 1998] </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY , with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG and JUSTICE BREYER join, concurring. </s> I join the opinion of the Court. In my view, the opinion's discussion of Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982), does not embed in our law the distinction between a State's possession or nonpossession for purposes of Eleventh Amendment analysis in admiralty cases. In light of the subsisting doubts surrounding that case and JUSTICE STEVENS ' concurring opinion today, it ought to be evident that the issue is open to reconsideration. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote *While the petition for certiorari in this case was pending, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit. See Fairport Int'l Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as The Captain Lawrence , 105 F. 3d 1078 (CA6 1997), cert. pending, No. 96-1936. [Footnote * See also Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1078-1083 (1983) (discussing the historical basis for this interpretation).

United States Supreme Court SULLIVAN v. LITTLE HUNTING PARK(1969) No. 33 Argued: October 13, 1969Decided: December 15, 1969 </s> Little Hunting Park is a Virginia nonstock corporation operating playground facilities and a community park for residents in an area in Fairfax County, Virginia. A membership share entitles a shareholder and his family to use its facilities, and under the bylaws when he rents his house he may assign the share to his tenant, subject to approval by the board of directors. The facilities have been open to any white persons in the geographic area. Petitioner Sullivan, who owned and lived in a house in the area, leased to petitioner Freeman another house which Sullivan owned therein and assigned to Freeman his membership share. The board refused approval of the assignment because Freeman was a Negro and thereafter expelled Sullivan from the corporation for protesting that action. Petitioners each then sued for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The trial court, concluding that Little Hunting Park was a private social club, dismissed the complaints. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia denied the appeals on the ground that they were not perfected as provided by law in that opposing counsel had not been given reasonable notice and opportunity, as required by a procedural rule of that court, to examine and correct the transcripts. Opposing counsel had been given three days' notice for that purpose and had not complained that the period was unreasonable. This Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgments, and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 . That court again rejected the appeals on the basis of its previous position that it lacked jurisdiction because of petitioners' failure to comply with its procedural rule. This Court again granted certiorari. Freeman no longer resides in the area served by Little Hunting Park and his claim is confined to damages. Held: </s> 1. The notice rule is discretionary and not jurisdictional, not having been so consistently applied by Virginia's highest court as to deprive it of jurisdiction to entertain the federal claim presented here or to bar this Court's review of this case by certiorari. Pp. 232-234. [396 U.S. 229, 230] </s> 2. Petitioner Sullivan's membership share in Little Hunting Park (which is clearly not a private social club) was an integral part of the lease and respondents' racially discriminatory refusal to approve the assignment to Freeman constituted a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1982, cf. Jones v. Mayer Co., supra, the right to lease being protected by that provision against the action of third parties as well as against the action of the lessor. Pp. 234-237. </s> 3. Sullivan has standing under 1982 to maintain this action as the "effective adversary" in Freeman's behalf. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 . P. 237. </s> 4. The Public Accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not affect the coverage of 42 U.S.C. 1982. See Jones v. Mayer Co., supra, at 413-417. Pp. 237-238. </s> 5. The state court's power to grant general injunctive relief includes the power to protect the federal right under 1982 here involved. P. 238. </s> 6. Petitioners are entitled to compensatory damages for violation of their rights under 1982 and, though such damages are measured by federal standards, both federal and state rules on damages may be used. Pp. 238-240. </s> 7. The fair-housing provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which was enacted long after petitioners brought their suits, do not foreclose relief here. P. 240. </s> Reversed. See: 209 Va. 279, 163 S. E. 2d 588. </s> Allison W. Brown, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Peter Ames Eveleth, Robert M. Alexander, Jack Greenberg, and James M. Nabrit III. </s> John Charles Harris argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, Louis F. Claiborne, Peter L. Strauss, and Joseph J. Connolly for the United States, and by Arnold Forster, Sol Rabkin, Melvin L. Wulf, Edwin J. Lukas, Samuel Rabinove, and Paul Hartman for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith et al. [396 U.S. 229, 231] </s> Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, announced by MR. JUSTICE BLACK. </s> This case, which involves an alleged discrimination against a Negro family in the use of certain community facilities, has been here before. The Virginia trial court dismissed petitioners' complaints and the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia denied the appeals saying that they were not perfected "in the manner provided by law in that opposing counsel was not given reasonable written notice of the time and place of tendering the transcript and a reasonable opportunity to examine the original or a true copy of it" under that court's Rule 5:1, 3 (f). 1 </s> The case came here and we granted the petition for certiorari and vacated the judgments and remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 . 392 U.S. 657 . On the remand, the Supreme Court of Appeals restated its prior position stating, "We had no jurisdiction in the cases when they were here before, and we have no jurisdiction now. We adhere to our orders refusing the appeals in these cases." 209 Va. 279, 163 S. E. 2d 588. We brought the case here the second time on a petition for certiorari. 394 U.S. 942 . [396 U.S. 229, 232] </s> I </s> When the case was first here respondents opposed the petition, claiming that Rule 5:1, 3 (f), was not complied with. Petitioners filed a reply brief addressing themselves to that question. Thus the point now tendered was fully exposed when the case was here before, though we ruled on it sub silentio. </s> In this case counsel for petitioners on June 9, 1967, gave oral notice to counsel for respondents that he was submitting the transcripts to the trial judge. He wrote counsel for respondents on the same day to the same effect, saying he was submitting the transcripts to the trial judge that day, filing motions to correct them, and asking the trial court to defer signing them for a ten-day period to allow counsel for respondents time to consent to the motions or have them otherwise disposed of by the court. The judge, being absent from his chambers on June 9, ruled that he had not received the transcripts until June 12. The motions to correct came on for a hearing June 16, at which time the judge ruled that he would not act on the motions until counsel for respondents had agreed or disagreed with the changes requested. After examining the transcripts between June 16 and June 19, counsel for respondents told counsel for petitioners that he had no objections to the corrections or to entry of orders granting the motions to correct. Counsel for respondents then signed the proposed orders which counsel for petitioners had prepared. The proposed orders were submitted to the trial judge on June 20; and on the same day he signed the transcripts, after they had been corrected. </s> As we read its cases, the Supreme Court of Appeals stated the controlling principle in the following language: </s> "The requirement that opposing counsel have a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript sets out the purpose of reasonable notice. If, after [396 U.S. 229, 233] receipt of notice, opposing counsel be afforded reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript, and to make objections thereto, if any he has, before it is signed by the trial judge, the object of reasonable notice will have been attained." Bacigalupo v. Fleming, 199 Va. 827, 835, 102 S. E. 2d 321, 326. </s> In that case opposing counsel had seven days to examine the record and make any objections. In the present case he had three days. But so far as the record shows he did not at the time complain that he was not given that "reasonable opportunity" he needed to examine and correct the transcripts. </s> Petitioners' counsel does not urge - nor do we suggest - that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has fashioned a novel procedural requirement for the first time in this case; cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 457 -458; past decisions of the state court refute any such notion. See Bacigalupo v. Fleming, supra; Bolin v. Laderberg, 207 Va. 795, 153 S. E. 2d 251; Cook v. Virginia Holsum Bakeries, 207 Va. 815, 153 S. E. 2d 209. 2 But those same decisions do not enable us [396 U.S. 229, 234] to say that the Virginia court has so consistently applied its notice requirement as to amount to a self-denial of the power to entertain the federal claim here presented if the Supreme Court of Appeals desires to do so. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 455 -457 (BLACK, J., dissenting). Such a rule, more properly deemed discretionary than jurisdictional, does not bar review here by certiorari. </s> II </s> Little Hunting Park, Inc., is a Virginia nonstock corporation organized to operate a community park and playground facilities for the benefit of residents in an area of Fairfax County, Virginia. A membership share entitles all persons in the immediate family of the shareholder to use the corporation's recreation facilities. Under the bylaws a person owning a membership share is entitled when he rents his home to assign the share to his tenant, subject to approval of the board of directors. Paul E. Sullivan and his family owned a house [396 U.S. 229, 235] in this area and lived in it. Later he bought another house in the area and leased the first one to T. R. Freeman, Jr., an employee of the U.S. Department of Agriculture; and assigned his membership share to Freeman. The board refused to approve the assignment because Freeman was a Negro. Sullivan protested that action and was notified that he would be expelled from the corporation by the board. A hearing was accorded him and he was expelled, the board tendering him cash for his two shares. </s> Sullivan and Freeman sued under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982 for injunctions and monetary damages. Since Freeman no longer resides in the area served by Little Hunting Park, Inc., his claim is limited solely to damages. </s> The trial court denied relief to each petitioner. We reverse those judgments. </s> In Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 , we reviewed at length the legislative history of 42 U.S.C. 1982. 3 We concluded that it reaches beyond state action and operates upon the unofficial acts of private individuals and that it is authorized by the Enabling Clause of the Thirteenth Amendment. We said: </s> "Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a promise of freedom - freedom to `go and come at pleasure' and to `buy and sell when they please' - would be left with `a mere paper guarantee' if Congress were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands [396 U.S. 229, 236] of a white man. At the very least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being a free man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a promise the Nation cannot keep." 392 U.S., at 443 . </s> The Virginia trial court rested on its conclusion that Little Hunting Park was a private social club. But we find nothing of the kind on this record. There was no plan or purpose of exclusiveness. It is open to every white person within the geographic area, there being no selective element other than race. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 -302. What we have here is a device functionally comparable to a racially restrictive covenant, the judicial enforcement of which was struck down in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> In Jones v. Mayer Co., the complaint charged a refusal to sell petitioner a home because he was black. In the instant case the interest conveyed was a leasehold of realty coupled with a membership share in a nonprofit company organized to offer recreational facilities to owners and lessees of real property in that residential area. It is not material whether the membership share be considered realty or personal property, as 1982 covers both. Section 1982 covers the right "to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." There is a suggestion that transfer on the books of the corporation of Freeman's share is not covered by any of those verbs. The suggestion is without merit. There has never been any doubt but that Freeman paid part of his $129 monthly rental for the [396 U.S. 229, 237] assignment of the membership share in Little Hunting Park. The transaction clearly fell within the "lease." The right to "lease" is protected by 1982 against the actions of third parties, as well as against the actions of the immediate lessor. Respondents' actions in refusing to approve the assignment of the membership share in this case was clearly an interference with Freeman's right to "lease." A narrow construction of the language of 1982 would be quite inconsistent with the broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded by 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, from which 1982 was derived. See 392 U.S., at 422 -437. </s> We turn to Sullivan's expulsion for the advocacy of Freeman's cause. If that sanction, backed by a state court judgment, can be imposed, then Sullivan is punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by 1982. Such a sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on property. That is why we said in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 259 , that the white owner is at times "the only effective adversary" of the unlawful restrictive covenant. Under the terms of our decision in Barrows, there can be no question but that Sullivan has standing to maintain this action. </s> We noted in Jones v. Mayer Co., that the Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 81, in no way impaired the sanction of 1982. 392 U.S., at 413 -417. What we said there is adequate to dispose of the suggestion that the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, in some way supersedes the provisions of the 1866 Act. For the hierarchy of administrative machinery provided by the 1964 Act is not at war with survival of the principles embodied in 1982. There is, moreover, a saving clause in the 1964 Act as respects "any [396 U.S. 229, 238] right based on any other Federal . . . law not inconsistent" with that Act. 4 </s> Section 1982 derived from the 1866 Act is plainly "not inconsistent" with the 1964 Act, which has been construed as not "pre-empting every other mode of protecting a federal `right' or as granting immunity" to those who had long been subject to federal law. United States v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 563, 566 . </s> We held in Jones v. Mayer Co. that although 1982 is couched in declaratory terms and provides no explicit method of enforcement, a federal court has power to fashion an effective equitable remedy. 392 U.S., at 414 , n. 13. That federal remedy for the protection of a federal right is available in the state court, if that court is empowered to grant injunctive relief generally, as is the Virginia court. Va. Code Ann. 8-610 (1957 Repl. Vol.). </s> Finally, as to damages, Congress, by 28 U.S.C. 1343 (4), created federal jurisdiction for "damages or . . . equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights . . . ." We reserved in Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S., at 414 -415, n. 14, the question of what damages, if any, might be appropriately recovered for a violation of 1982. </s> We had a like problem in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 , where suit was brought against federal officers for alleged [396 U.S. 229, 239] violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The federal statute did not in terms at least provide any remedy. We said: </s> "[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done." Id., at 684. </s> The existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies. See Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 569 -570. As stated in Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 : </s> "A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied . . . ." </s> Compensatory damages for deprivation of a federal right are governed by federal standards, as provided by Congress in 42 U.S.C. 1988, which states: </s> "The jurisdiction in civil . . . matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this chapter and Title 18, for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary [396 U.S. 229, 240] to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause . . . ." </s> This means, as we read 1988, that both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized, whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes. Cf. Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d 401. The rule of damages, whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired. We do not explore the problem further, as the issue of damages was not litigated below. </s> It is suggested, not by any party, but by the dissent, that any relief should await proceedings under the fair housing provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 82 Stat. 81, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. IV). But petitioners' suits were commenced on March 16, 1966, two years before that Act was passed. It would be irresponsible judicial administration to dismiss a suit because of an intervening Act 5 which has no possible application to events long preceding its enactment. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Rule 5:1 which is entitled "The Record on Appeal" states the following in 3 (f): "Such a transcript or statement not signed by counsel for all parties becomes part of the record when delivered to the clerk, if it is tendered to the judge within 60 days and signed at the end by him within 70 days after final judgment. It shall be forthwith delivered to the clerk who shall certify on it the date he receives it. Counsel tendering the transcript or statement shall give opposing counsel reasonable written notice of the time and place of tendering it and a reasonable opportunity to examine the original or a true copy of it. The signature of the judge, without more, will be deemed to be his certification that counsel had the required notice and opportunity, and that the transcript or statement is authentic. He shall note on it the date it was tendered to him and the date it was signed by him." </s> [Footnote 2 In Bolin v. Laderberg, 207 Va. 795, 153 S. E. 2d 251, appellants' counsel had delivered the transcript to appellees' counsel on November 24, 1965. The transcript was tendered to the trial judge on November 26, and was signed by him on December 3. Appellees moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that they had not been given "reasonable notice and opportunity" under Rule 5:1. The court stated that the motion should be overruled on the ground that Rule 5:1 provides that "[t]he signature of the judge, without more, will be deemed to be his certification that counsel had the required notice and opportunity, and that the transcript . . . is authentic." The court noted that the judge's "signature appears on the transcript without more and is, therefore, his certification that counsel for [appellees] had the required notice of tendering the transcript and the required opportunity to examine it." Id., at 797, 153 S. E. 2d, at 253. In Cook v. Virginia Holsum Bakeries, 207 Va. 815, 153 S. E. 2d 209, notice that the transcript would be tendered to the trial judge on [396 U.S. 229, 234] October 20, 1965, was given to counsel for the appellee on October 15. Appellant's counsel, however, did not obtain a copy of the transcript until October 19. At a conference held on that same date, counsel for both parties went over the transcript and agreed on certain corrections and additions. At the hearing on October 20, appellee's counsel claimed he had not been given the reasonable notice and opportunity required by Rule 5:1. He then suggested numerous changes, and the trial judge ordered the transcript altered to reflect those changes. The revised transcript was tendered to the trial judge the next day, October 21, and signed by him that same day. On appeal, appellee moved to dismiss on the ground that the Rule 5:1 requirements had not been satisfied. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals overruled the motion, stating: "The narrative was amended to meet the suggested changes of counsel for [appellee], and he conceded in oral argument before us that the statement signed by the trial judge was correct." Id., at 817, 153 S. E. 2d, at 210. </s> [Footnote 3 42 U.S.C. 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." </s> [Footnote 4 Section 207 (b) of the Act of July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 246, provides: "The remedies provided in this title shall be the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this title, but nothing in this title shall preclude any individual or any State or local agency from asserting any right based on any other Federal or State law not inconsistent with this title, including any statute or ordinance requiring nondiscrimination in public establishments or accommodations, or from pursuing any remedy, civil or criminal, which may be available for the vindication or enforcement of such right." </s> [Footnote 5 The Act is not fully effective until December 31, 1969. 42 U.S.C. 3603 (b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). Even at that time it will not apply to a "single-family house" if the house is sold without the services of a real estate broker and without the notice described in 3604 (c) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). See 3603 (b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). So no one knows whether the new Act would apply to these ancient transactions, even if they arose after December 31, 1969. [396 U.S. 229, 241] </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting. </s> In Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court decided that a little-used section of a 100-year-old statute prohibited private racial discrimination in the sale of real property. This construction of a very old statute, in no way required by its language, 1 and open to serious question in light of the statute's legislative history, 2 seemed to me unnecessary and unwise because of the recently passed, but then not yet fully effective, Fair Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 (hereafter Fair Housing Law). 3 Today, the Court goes yet beyond Jones (1) by implying a private right to damages for violations of 42 U.S.C. 1982; (2) by interpreting 1982 to prohibit a community recreation association from withholding, on the basis of race, approval of an assignment of a membership that was transferred incident to a lease of real property; and (3) by deciding that a white person who is expelled from a recreation association "for the advocacy of [a Negro's] cause" has "standing" to maintain an action for relief under 1982. </s> Because the Fair Housing Law will become fully effective less than three weeks from now, 4 I think the majority even more unwise than it was in Jones, in precipitately breathing still more life into 1982, which is both vague and open-ended, when Congress has provided [396 U.S. 229, 242] this modern statute, containing various detailed remedial provisions aimed at eliminating racial discrimination in housing. For this reason, which I elaborate in Part II, I would dismiss the writ in this case as improvidently granted. To provide examples of some of the difficulties the Court will inevitably encounter if it continues to employ 1982 in these sorts of cases, I examine in Part III the undiscriminating manner in which the majority deals with, and for the most part ignores, the complexities involved in (1) giving Sullivan relief and (2) engrafting a damage remedy onto 1982 in a case arising from a state court. But, first, I consider the threshold question of whether there is present in this case an adequate state ground which would bar review by this Court. </s> I </s> ADEQUACY OF THE STATE GROUND </s> The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, both before and after this Court's earlier remand, refused to consider the federal questions presented to it because it found that petitioners had failed to give opposing counsel "reasonable written notice of the time and place of tendering the transcript and a reasonable opportunity to examine the original or a true copy of it," in violation of Rule 5:1, 3 (f), of the local rules of court. 5 The majority here suggests that the State's procedural requirement, though not a "novel" one "fashioned . . . for the first time in this case," nevertheless had not been "so consistently applied . . . as to amount to a self-denial of the power to entertain the federal claim." The majority then goes on to conclude that because the State's procedural rule is "more properly deemed discretionary than jurisdictional," review should not be barred here. [396 U.S. 229, 243] I agree with the majority's conclusion that there is no adequate state ground shown, but I find myself unable to subscribe to the majority's reasoning, which appears to me unclear and confusing. </s> I am not certain what the majority means in its apparent distinction between rules that it deems "discretionary" and those that it deems "jurisdictional." Perhaps the majority wishes to suggest that the dismissals of petitioners' writs of error by the Supreme Court of Appeals were simply ad hoc discretionary refusals to accept plenary review of the lower court's decisions, analogous to this Court's denial of certiorari. If this were all the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had done, review of a federal question properly raised below would of course not be barred here. The mere discretionary refusal of the highest state court to grant review of a lower court decision does not provide an adequate state ground. In such circumstances, the decision of the lower court, rather than the order of the highest court refusing review, becomes the judgment of the "highest court of a State in which a decision could be had" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1257, our jurisdictional statute. 6 </s> But this case clearly does not present this kind of discretionary refusal of a state appellate court to accept review. Although the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals may well have the "discretion" to refuse review 7 in a particular case without giving reasons or reconciling its refusal with earlier decisions, the dismissal below was not simply an ad hoc exercise of the power not to review every case presented. Instead the state court dismissed the petitions for review for a stated reason, namely, a [396 U.S. 229, 244] lack of "jurisdiction to entertain the appeals because of the failure of counsel for the Sullivans and the Freemans to meet the requirements of Rule 5:1, 3 (f)." When a state appellate court's refusal to consider the merits of a case is based on the failure to conform to a state rule of practice, review by this Court is barred unless this Court is able to find that application of the state rule of practice to the case at hand does not constitute an adequate state ground. This is so quite irrespective of whether the state appellate court had the power to refuse review for no reason at all. 8 </s> The majority might have another meaning in mind when it describes the State's procedural rule as "discretionary." It may be suggesting that "reasonable written notice," and "reasonable opportunity to examine" are such flexible standards that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has the "discretion" to decide a close case either of two ways without creating an obvious conflict with earlier decisions. If this is what the majority means by "discretionary rule," then I must register my disagreement. This kind of "discretion" is nothing more than "the judicial formulation of law," for a court has an obligation to be reasonably consistent and "to explain the decision, including the reason for according different treatment to the instant case." 9 Surely a state ground [396 U.S. 229, 245] is no less adequate simply because it involves a standard that requires a judgment of what is reasonable, and because the result may turn on a close analysis of the facts of a particular case in light of competing policy considerations. </s> Although the majority's loose use of the word "discretionary" may suggest that any decision made pursuant to a broad standard cannot provide an adequate state ground, I think examination of the earlier opinions of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, several of which are cited by the majority, provides the proper foundation for the result reached by the majority, under the principle of NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). </s> The finding of the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals of a violation of Rule 5:1, 3 (f), in this case was in my view based on a standard of reasonableness much stricter than that which could have been fairly extracted from the earlier Virginia cases applying the rule 10 and its predecessor statute. 11 In other words, although Rule 5:1, 3 (f), itself may not be novel, the standard implicitly governing the rule's application to the facts here was. I think it fair to conclude that in light of these earlier decisions, and the principle set forth in Bacigalupo v. Fleming, 199 Va. 827, 835, 102 S. E. 2d 321, 326 (1958), 12 the petitioners here might have justifiably [396 U.S. 229, 246] thought that review in the Supreme Court of Appeals would not be barred by the rule, notwithstanding Snead v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 850, 108 S. E. 2d 399 (1959), the one case cited below by the Virginia court, relied on here by respondent and yet somehow ignored by the majority. 13 Because "[n]ovelty in procedural requirements [396 U.S. 229, 247] cannot be permitted to thwart review in this Court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek vindication in state courts of their federal . . . rights," NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S., at 457 -458, I conclude that the decision below does not rest on an adequate state ground. </s> II </s> Because Congress has now provided a comprehensive scheme for dealing with the kinds of discrimination found in this case, I think it very unwise as a matter of policy for the Court to use 1982 as a broad delegation of power to develop a common law of forbidden racial discriminations. A comparison of 42 U.S.C. 1982 with the new Fair Housing Law, and consideration of the Court's task in applying each, demonstrate to me the need for restraint, and the appropriateness of dismissing the writ in this case, now grounded solely on an alleged violation of 1982. </s> Petitioners here complain of discrimination in the provision of recreation facilities ancillary to a rented house found in one of the four subdivisions served by Little Hunting Park. On the one hand, the Fair [396 U.S. 229, 248] Housing Law has a provision that explicitly makes it unlawful to "discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of . . . rental [of housing], or in the provisions of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, [or] color . . . ." 42 U.S.C. 3604 (b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). (Emphasis added.) In contrast, as the majority in Jones noted, 1982 "does not deal specifically with discrimination in the provision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of a dwelling," 392 U.S., at 413 . </s> By attempting to deal with the problem of discrimination in the provision of recreational facilities under 1982, the Court is forced, in the context of a very vague statute, to decide what transactions involve "property" for purposes of 1982. The majority states that "[i]t is not material whether the membership share [in Little Hunting Park] be considered realty or personal property, as 1982 covers both." But examination of the opinion will show that the majority has failed to explain why the membership share is either real or personal property for purposes of 1982. The majority's complete failure to articulate any standards for deciding what is property within the meaning of 1982 is a fair indication of the great difficulties courts will inevitably confront if 1982 is used to remedy racial discrimination in housing. And lurking in the background are grave constitutional issues should 1982 be extended too far into some types of private discrimination. 14 </s> Not only does 1982 fail to provide standards as to the types of transactions in which discrimination is unlawful, but it also contains no provisions for enforcement, either public or private. To give its construction of the statute effect, the Court has had to imply remedies [396 U.S. 229, 249] that Congress has not explicitly provided - injunctive relief in Jones, and now a right to damages here. See Part III, infra. </s> These remedies are expressly provided for in the Fair Housing Law, which, with its variety of techniques for enforcing its prohibition of housing discrimination, again stands in sharp contrast with 1982. First, an injured party can complain to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development who is empowered to investigate complaints, and use "informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion" to secure compliance with the law. 15 Should the Secretary's efforts prove unavailing, the complainant can go to court. 16 As an alternative to going first to HUD, it appears that a person may go directly to court to enforce his rights under the Fair Housing Law, 17 which expressly provides for a wide variety of relief, including restraining orders, injunctions, compensatory damages, and punitive damages up to $1,000. 18 Furthermore, the Act allows a court to appoint counsel and waive all fees for indigent plaintiffs, and to award costs and, in certain cases, counsel fees to a successful plaintiff. 19 In addition to actions initiated by private parties, the Attorney General is empowered to bring civil actions for preventive civil relief, and criminal actions to punish those who by force or threat of force willfully interfere with or intimidate [396 U.S. 229, 250] those who wish to exercise, or aid others in the exercise, of their rights under the Fair Housing Law. 20 </s> Given this comprehensive, contemporary statute, the limitations of which have not yet even been established, I believe that the Court should not decide this case but should instead dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 21 This Court's certiorari jurisdiction should not be exercised simply "for the benefit of the particular litigants," Rice v. Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70, 74 (1955), but instead for the "settlement of [issues] of importance to the public as distinguished from . . . the parties," Layne & Bowler Corp. v. Western Well Works, Inc., 261 U.S. 387, 393 (1923). Even from the perspective of the parties, this case has lost much of its practical importance due to the fact that Dr. Freeman's work has taken him and his family away from the area served by Little Hunting Park, thereby making moot his original claim for injunctive relief. 22 But more fundamentally, I think here, as I did in Jones, that the existence of the Fair Housing Law renders the decision of this case of little "importance to the public." For, although the 1968 Act does not cover this particular case, 23 should a Negro in the future rent a house but be [396 U.S. 229, 251] denied access to ancillary recreational facilities on account of race, he could in all likelihood secure relief under the provisions of the Fair Housing Law. 24 </s> III </s> The undiscriminating manner in which the Court has dealt with this case is both highlighted and compounded by the Court's failure to face, let alone resolve, two issues that lie buried beneath the surface of its opinion. Both issues are difficult ones, and the fact that the majority has not come to grips with them serves to illustrate the inevitable difficulties the Court will encounter if it continues to employ 1982 as a means for dealing with the many subtle human problems that are bound to arise as the goal of eliminating discriminatory practices in our national life is pursued. </s> A. RELIEF FOR SULLIVAN </s> Because the majority opinion is highly elliptical as to (1) the circumstances surrounding Sullivan's expulsion from Little Hunting Park, (2) the relief Sullivan sought in the state court, and (3) the decision of the trial court, it is necessary for me to begin my analysis simply by stating the facts of these aspects of the case. A full [396 U.S. 229, 252] examination of the record reveals, first, the necessity for a remand on the majority's own premises. It also makes apparent the majority's failure to provide any guidance as to the legal standards that should govern Sullivan's right to recovery on remand. An awareness of the complexity of the issues relevant to Sullivan's right to redress suggests further, I think, the appropriateness of a discretionary denial of review. </s> 1. The Circumstances of Sullivan's Expulsion. After the Board of Little Hunting Park refused to approve the assignment of a membership share from Sullivan to Freeman, Sullivan attempted to convince the Board to reverse its decision. To this end, Sullivan first met with members of the Board, and protested their actions. He subsequently mobilized a campaign both by other members of the club and by persons in the community as a whole to force the Board to reconsider its decision. The means used in this campaign, as the brief for petitioner Sullivan acknowledges, 25 included phone calls to members of the Board, letters to local clergy, and the circulation among the members of Little Hunting Park of a petition that called for a meeting of the full membership to consider Dr. Freeman's case. </s> On July 8 Sullivan received a letter from the Board which stated that it had determined that there was "due cause" to warrant a hearing in order to determine whether Sullivan should be expelled from Little Hunting Park, pursuant to its bylaws, for "conduct inimicable to the Corporation members." This letter referred to Sullivan's "non-acceptance of the Board's decision on the assignment of your membership to your tenant . . . along with the continued harassment of the board members" as the basis for the Board's "due cause" determination. [396 U.S. 229, 253] </s> The Board subsequently provided a detailed specification of its charges against Sullivan, 26 and these included, inter alia, allegations that Sullivan had (a) instigated a campaign by which board members were harassed by "unfriendly phone calls" accusing them of bigotry; (b) used "abusive" language in a phone call to the president of the Board; (c) written letters to local clergy, including the minister of the church which employed the president of Little Hunting Park, accusing board members of participation in "real moral evil"; and (d) used "violent and abusive language" to members of Little Hunting Park who had refused to sign his petition. After the hearing on these charges, the Board expelled Sullivan and tendered to him the current market value of the two membership shares that he held. </s> In response to these actions, Sullivan brought this suit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, against Little Hunting Park and its Board seeking as relief (1) an order compelling Little Hunting Park to reinstate his membership; (2) monetary damages in the amount of $15,000; and (3) an injunction requiring the Board to approve the assignment to Freeman and forbidding the Board to use race as a factor in considering membership. The trial court, after hearing disputed evidence as to the reasons for Sullivan's expulsion, found for the defendants. It stated that the [396 U.S. 229, 254] scope of its review of the Board's actions was "limited" because Little Hunting Park was a "private and social" club, and then went on to find that the Board had acted within "the powers conferred on it by the By-Laws" in expelling Sullivan, and that "there was ample evidence to justify [the Board's] conclusion that the complainant's acts were inimicable to the Corporation's members and to the Corporation." </s> 2. With this statement of the record in mind, several observations must be made about the majority's treatment of Sullivan's rights. First, in stating that "Sullivan's expulsion [was] for the advocacy of Freeman's cause," the majority surely cannot be taken to have resolved disputed testimony, and decided the facts underlying Sullivan's expulsion. If these facts are relevant to Sullivan's remedial rights, as surely they must be, then a remand for detailed findings seems unavoidable under the majority's own premises. </s> Second, the majority has not explained what legal standard should determine Sullivan's rights under 1982. The majority simply states that "Sullivan has standing to maintain this action" under 1982, without even acknowledging that some standard is essential for this case to be ultimately decided. </s> One can imagine a variety of standards, each based on different legal conclusions as to the "rights" and "duties" created by 1982, and each having very different remedial consequences. For example, does 1982 give Sullivan a right to relief only for injuries resulting from Little Hunting Park's interference with his statutory duty to Freeman under 1982? If so, what is Sullivan's duty to Freeman under 1982? Unless 1982 is read to impose a duty on Sullivan to protest Freeman's exclusion, he would be entitled to reinstatement under this standard only if the Board had expelled him for the simple act of assigning his share to Freeman. [396 U.S. 229, 255] </s> As an alternative, Sullivan might be thought to be entitled to relief from those injuries that flowed from the Board's violation of its "duty" to Freeman under 1982. Such a standard might suggest that Sullivan is entitled to damages that resulted from Little Hunting Park's initial refusal to accept the assignment to Freeman but again not to reinstatement. Or does the Court think that 1982 gives Sullivan a right to relief from injuries that result from his "legitimate" protest aimed at convincing the Board to accept Freeman? If so, what protest activities were legitimate here? Most extreme would be a standard that would give Sullivan relief from injuries that were the result of any actions he took to protest the Board's initial refusal, irrespective of Sullivan's means of protest. Only this standard would require reinstatement, irrespective of the disputed facts here. But this standard would mean that 1982 gave Sullivan a right to regain his membership even if the Board has expelled him for using intemperate and abusive threats as a means of protesting Freeman's exclusion. 27 </s> B. STATE COURT REMEDIES FOR FEDERAL RIGHTS </s> Because this case arises from a state court, it presents special problems which the majority overlooks, and which suggests again the undesirability of deciding this case in the context of this ancient statute. In deciding that there is a right to recover damages in this case, the majority overlooks the complications involved by dint of the fact that a state court is being asked to provide [396 U.S. 229, 256] a remedy for a federal right bottomed on a federal statute that itself has no remedial provisions. </s> Implied remedies for federal rights are sometimes solely a matter of federal law 28 and other times dependent, either wholly or partially, upon state law. 29 Difficult and complex questions are involved in determining what remedies a state court must 30 or must not 31 provide in cases involving federal rights. 32 </s> It should be noted that the majority's opinion, though perhaps deciding very little 33 only adds to the confusion already existing in this area. Section 1988 of Title 42, which the majority apparently thinks decides this case, is concerned with the remedial powers of federal district courts and it provides that the federal courts shall look to state law to find appropriate remedies when the applicable federal civil rights law is "deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies . . . ." But the majority turns this provision on its head by suggesting (1) that 1988 creates a federal remedy, apart from state law, when the remedial provisions of a civil rights statute, like 1982, are "deficient"; and (2) that 1988 itself somehow imposes this federal remedy on the States. [396 U.S. 229, 257] If 1988 says anything at all relevant for this case, it suggests that in those cases where it is appropriate to cure remedial deficiencies of a federal civil rights statute by implication, this is to be done by looking to state law to see what remedies, consistent with federal policies, would be available there. </s> By reason of these considerations, many of which could hardly have been foreseen at the time certiorari was granted, I would dismiss the writ in this case as improvidently granted. </s> [Footnote 1 392 U.S., at 452 -454 (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 2 392 U.S., at 454 -473 (dissenting opinion). See Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. Ct. Rev. 89, 99-122; The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 93-103 (1968). </s> [Footnote 3 Civil Rights Act of 1968, Tit. VIII, 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 4 The third and final stage in the expansion of the coverage of the Fair Housing Law takes effect after December 31, 1969. See 42 U.S.C. 3603 (b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 5 See n. 1 of the majority opinion, ante, at 231, for the text of the rule. </s> [Footnote 6 See, e. g., Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 159 -160 (1954). </s> [Footnote 7 It appears that plenary review by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is not a matter of right for many kinds of cases. See Va. Code Ann. 8-462 (1957 Repl. Vol.); Va. Const. 87, 88. </s> [Footnote 8 See Hammerstein v. Superior Court, 341 U.S. 491, 492 (1951); Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. McDonald, 214 U.S. 191 (1909); Newman v. Gates, 204 U.S. 89 (1907). </s> [Footnote 9 Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 187, 226. See id., at 225-226 for a discussion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK'S dissent in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 455 -457 (1965), which is cited by the majority. Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955), which is not cited by the majority, does not in my view support the reasoning of the majority. I think the result in Williams rests upon a determination of inconsistency in the application of the State's procedural requirements for a new trial. See 349 U.S., at 383 . </s> [Footnote 10 Bolin v. Laderberg, 207 Va. 795, 153 S. E. 2d 251 (1967); Cook v. Virginia Holsum Bakeries, 207 Va. 815, 153 S. E. 2d 209 (1967); Taylor v. Wood, 201 Va. 615, 112 S. E. 2d 907 (1960); Bacigalupo v. Fleming, 199 Va. 827, 102 S. E. 2d 321 (1958). </s> [Footnote 11 Stokely v. Owens, 189 Va. 248, 52 S. E. 2d 164 (1949); Grimes v. Crouch, 175 Va. 126, 7 S. E. 2d 115 (1940). </s> [Footnote 12 It can be seen from the passage quoted by the majority, see ante, at 232-233, that Bacigalupo interpreted the rule as requiring that (1) opposing counsel must have a reasonable opportunity to examine the transcript after he receives notice; and (2) based on this examination, opposing counsel must have a reasonable opportunity to make any objections he has to the accuracy of [396 U.S. 229, 246] the transcript before the transcript is signed by the trial judge. In this case, opposing counsel received notice by telephone on Friday, June 9, and by letter the following Monday. His opportunity to examine the transcript consisted of the time between Monday and Friday when the transcript was available to him in the judge's chambers; and the time between Friday, June 16, and Monday, the 19th, when he actually had in his possession a copy of the transcript. Any argument that this length of time, per se, is not reasonable opportunity is belied by Cook v. Virginia Holsum Bakeries, supra, where opposing counsel received a copy of a narrative only two days before the trial judge signed it, and the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found no violation of the rule. </s> [Footnote 13 In Snead, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals said: "It is important that time be given opposing counsel for a reasonable opportunity to analyze such statements characterized by defendant's counsel as being confusing. The entire testimony of a very material witness was left out of the narrative statement when it was presented to the trial judge and it was necessary for him to insert it. We are of the opinion that the notice delivered to the Commonwealth's Attorney at his residence, after office hours, thirty minutes before tendering a narrative statement of the evidence to the trial judge for his signature, does not constitute reasonable notice within the plain meaning of Rule 5:1, 3 (f) and that the terms of the Rule are mandatory and jurisdictional." 200 Va., at 854, 108 S. E. 2d, at 402. This case is far different from Snead in significant respects. First, in Snead the court was not confronted with a transcript but instead with a narrative; and this narrative was, by the admission of appellant's own counsel, "of a confusing nature and character." In this case, on the other hand, the record fails to show that counsel for respondent made any objection to the trial judge as to the adequacy of the notice, or to the accuracy of the transcript, see Taylor v. Wood, supra; Stokely v. Owens, supra. Furthermore, at oral argument before this Court, counsel for respondent could not point to a single inaccuracy in the transcript as signed by the [396 U.S. 229, 247] trial judge. Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. Second, in Snead opposing counsel was only given one-half hour's notice of a proposed tender to the judge for signature that night. In this case, although the transcript was sent to the judge at about the same time as opposing counsel received notice, that notice stated that the judge would not be asked to sign the transcript for a week, so counsel could first have an opportunity to examine it. Respondent suggests that the rule requires that opposing counsel have notice and an opportunity to examine the transcript before the transcript is given to the judge rather than simply before the judge signs it. No prior Virginia case of which we have been made aware has so stated, however, and the principle of Bacigalupo quoted by the majority suggests that the key is that there be an opportunity to inspect and to make objections before the judge signs the transcript. </s> [Footnote 14 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). </s> [Footnote 15 42 U.S.C. 3610 (a) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 16 Id., 3610 (d). </s> [Footnote 17 Id., 3612. See Fair Housing Law and Other Federal Civil Rights Laws and Executive Orders Relating to the Programs of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Equal Opportunity; Note, Discrimination in Employment and in Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 834, 839, 855-859, 862-863 (1969). </s> [Footnote 18 42 U.S.C. 3612 (c) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 19 Id., 3612 (b), 3612 (c). </s> [Footnote 20 Id., 3613, 3631. See id., 3617. </s> [Footnote 21 Cf. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961). </s> [Footnote 22 Given that the market price of a membership share in Little Hunting Park apparently ranged from $150 to $230 during the time in question, see Government's Amicus Brief 5, Freeman's compensatory damages will not, in all probability, be substantial. And, as I point out in the next section, unresolved factual issues may bar any relief at all for Sullivan. </s> [Footnote 23 The relevant events in this case all took place in 1965, long before the Fair Housing Law first went into effect on April 11, 1968. Whether the Fair Housing Law would protect Dr. Freeman were like events to take place again after December 31, 1969, in [396 U.S. 229, 251] part would depend upon whether the transaction between Sullivan and Freeman would fall within any of the categories described in n. 24, infra. On the facts as they appear in this record, the exemption found in 42 U.S.C. 3607 (1964 ed., Supp. IV) would not appear to bar recovery. </s> [Footnote 24 In addition to covering all single-family houses not owned by private individuals, and single-family houses owned by a private individual who owns more than three houses, the Fair Housing Law, after December 31, 1969, covers the rental of all single-family homes (a) rented with the help of a real estate broker; or (b) offered for rental through a written notice or advertisement which is discriminatory. See 42 U.S.C. 3603 (b) (1964 ed., Supp. IV). </s> [Footnote 25 See Petitioners' Brief 9-11, 39-50. </s> [Footnote 26 See Appendix 181-182, 185-186. The detailed specification of charges against Sullivan was given by Little Hunting Park as part of a settlement of a suit brought by Sullivan to enjoin the hearing on his expulsion. This earlier suit, which was dismissed by agreement between the parties, was brought by Sullivan because of the vagueness of the July 8 letter as to the conduct upon which the due-cause hearing was to be held. The settlement of this earlier suit also included a stipulation between Sullivan and Little Hunting Park as to future lawsuits, which respondents claimed below barred Sullivan's suit before us now. This aspect of the stipulation was noted, but not passed on, by the trial judge below. </s> [Footnote 27 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), upon which the majority appears to place heavy reliance, gives no guidance as to the extent a state court is obliged to allow a white person to recover affirmatively either damages or other relief after he has transferred a real estate interest to a Negro. In Barrows the Court held that damages could not be awarded against a white defendant sued for breach of a racially restrictive covenant. </s> [Footnote 28 See J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). </s> [Footnote 29 See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959). </s> [Footnote 30 Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (state court obligated to give treble damages, required by federal statute, for violation of Emergency Price Control Act). </s> [Footnote 31 See Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557, 560 n. 2 (1968) (Court did not decide whether the remedies available in a state court in a suit to enjoin a strike are limited to the remedies available under federal law). </s> [Footnote 32 See H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and The Federal System 474-477 (1953); Greene, Hybrid State Law in the Federal Courts, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 289, 315-319 (1969). </s> [Footnote 33 The majority, in its penultimate paragraph, appears not to decide whether the "rule of damages" is "drawn from federal or state sources." </s> [396 U.S. 229, 258]

United States Supreme Court U.S. v. SCHAEFER BREWING CO.(1958) No. 79 Argued: January 6, 1958Decided: April 7, 1958 </s> In respondent's suit against the Government in a Federal District Court for the recovery of money only, which was tried without a jury, the judge filed an opinion on April 14 granting respondent's motion for summary judgment, without specifying the amount, and the clerk noted that fact in the civil docket on the same date. On May 24, the judge signed and filed a formal document captioned "Judgment," which specified the exact amount of recovery, and the clerk noted that fact in the civil docket on the same date. The Government filed a notice of appeal within 60 days after the latter entry but more than 60 days after the former entry. Held: In the circumstances of this case, the appeal was taken within 60 days from the "entry of the judgment," as required by Rule 73 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it should not have been dismissed as untimely. Pp. 228-236. </s> (a) Whatever may be the practical needs, no present statute or rule requires that a final judgment be contained in a separate document so labeled. P. 232. </s> (b) When an opinion embodies the essential elements of a judgment for money and clearly evidences the judge's intention that it shall be his final act in the case and it has been filed and entered in the docket, the time to appeal starts to run under Rule 73 (a). Pp. 232-233. </s> (c) When an opinion leaves doubtful whether the judge intended it to be his final act in the case, the clerk's notation of it in the docket cannot constitute "entry of the judgment" within the meaning of Rule 58. P. 233. </s> (d) A final judgment for money must, at least, determine, or specify the means of determining, the amount; and an opinion which does not either expressly or by reference determine the amount of money awarded leaves doubtful whether it was intended by the judge to be his final act in the case. Pp. 233-234. </s> (e) The opinion in this case stated the amount of money illegally collected from respondent; but, by its failure to state the date [356 U.S. 227, 228] of payment, it failed to state facts necessary to compute the amount of interest to be included in the judgment; and this omission cannot be cured by a search of the record, because Rule 79 (a) requires the clerk's entry to show the "substance of [the] judgment." Pp. 234-235. </s> (f) In the circumstances of this case, the formal "Judgment" signed by the judge on May 24, rather than a statement in the opinion filed on April 14, must be considered the court's judgment, and the time for appeal ran from its entry in the docket. Pp. 235-236. </s> 236 F.2d 889, reversed. </s> Leonard B. Sand argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Rankin, Acting Assistant Attorney General Stull and I. Henry Kutz. Roger Fisher was also on a brief for the United States. </s> Thomas C. Burke argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Walter S. Orr. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITTAKER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents questions concerning the timeliness of an appeal by the Government from a summary judgment of a District Court to the Court of Appeals in an action for the recovery of money only. The basic question presented is which of two series of judicial and ministerial acts - one on April 14 and the other on May 24, 1955 - constituted the "judgment" and "entry of the judgment." If it was the former, the appeal was out of time, but if the latter, it was not. </s> The overt facts are clear and undisputed. Respondent sued the Government for $7,189.57, alleged to have been illegally assessed and collected from it as federal stamp taxes, and for interest thereon from the date of payment. After issue was joined, respondent moved for summary judgment. The district judge, after hearing the motion, [356 U.S. 227, 229] filed an opinion on April 14, 1955 (130 F. Supp. 322), in which, after finding that respondent had paid stamp taxes to the Government in the amount of $7,012.50 and interest in the amount of $177.07, but making no finding of the date or dates of payment, he referred to an earlier decision of the same legal question by his colleague, Judge Leibell, in United States v. National Sugar Refining Co., 113 F. Supp. 157, and concluded, saying: "I am in agreement with Judge Leibell's analysis and, accordingly, the plaintiff's motion is granted." Thereupon, the clerk made the following notation in the civil docket: "April 14, 1955. Rayfiel, J. Decision rendered on motion for summary judgment. Motion granted. See opinion on file." </s> Thereafter, on May 24, 1955, counsel for respondent presented to the judge, and the latter signed and filed, a formal document captioned "Judgment," which referred to the motion and the hearing of it and to the "opinion" of April 14, and then, </s> "ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff, The F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., recover of the defendant, United States of America, the sum of $7,189.57 and interest thereon from February 19, 1954 in the amount of $542.80, together with costs as taxed by the Clerk of the Court in the sum of $37, aggregating the sum of $7,769.37, and that plaintiff have judgment against defendant therefor." </s> On the same day the clerk stamped the document "Judgment Rendered: Dated: May 24th, 1955," and made the following notation in the civil docket: </s> "May 24, 1955. Rayfiel, J. Judgment filed and docketed against defendant in the sum of $7189.57 with interest of $542.80 together with costs $37 amounting in all to $7769.37. Bill of Costs attached to judgment." [356 U.S. 227, 230] </s> On July 21, 1955, the Government filed its notice of appeal from the order "entered in this action on May 25th, 1955 . . . ." Thereafter, respondent moved to dismiss the appeal upon the ground that the opinion of April 14 constituted the "judgment," that the clerk's entry of that date constituted "entry of the judgment," and that the appeal was not taken within 60 days from the "entry of the judgment," as required by Rule 73 (a). 1 The Court of Appeals, holding that the opinion of April 14 was a "decisive and complete act of adjudication," and that the notation made by the clerk in the civil docket on that date constituted "entry of the judgment" within the meaning of Rule 58 and adequately disclosed the "substance" of the judgment as required by Rule 79 (a), sustained the motion and dismissed the appeal as untimely. 236 F.2d 889. Because of an asserted conflict among the circuits 2 and the public importance of the proper interpretation and uniform application of the provisions of the Federal Rules governing the time within [356 U.S. 227, 231] which appeals may be taken from judgments of District Courts in actions for money only tried without a jury, we granted certiorari. 353 U.S. 907 . </s> Stated summarily, the Government contends (1) that practical considerations require that a final judgment be contained in a separate document so labeled; (2) that the district judge's opinion did not contain any of the elements of a final judgment for money nor manifest an intention that it was to be his final act in the case; (3) that it was only the formal judgment of May 24 which awarded any sum of money to respondent and which invoked the provisions of Rule 58, saying "When the court directs that a party recover only money or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction"; (4) that where, as here, a formal judgment is signed and filed by the judge it is prima facie his final decision, and, inasmuch as nothing in his opinion indicated any contrary intention, the formal "judgment" constituted his final decision; and (5) that the notation made by the clerk in the civil docket on April 14 did not indicate an award of any sum of money to respondent and, therefore, did not "show . . . the substance of [a money] judgment of the court," as required by Rule 79 (a) and, hence, did not constitute "the entry of [a] judgment" for money, within the meaning of Rule 58, nor start the running of the time to appeal under Rule 73 (a). </s> Resolution of these contentions depends principally upon the proper construction and application of the pertinent provisions of Rules 58 and 79 (a). Rule 58, in pertinent part, provides: </s> "When the court directs that a party recover only money or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction . . . . The notation of a judgment in the civil docket as provided by Rule 79 (a) constitutes [356 U.S. 227, 232] the entry of the judgment; and the judgment is not effective before such entry." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> So much of Rule 79 (a) as is pertinent here provides: </s> "All . . . judgments shall be noted . . . in the civil docket . . . . These notations shall be brief but shall show . . . the substance of each . . . judgment of the court . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> At the outset the Government contends that practical considerations - namely, certainty as to what judicial pronouncements are intended to be final judgments in order to avoid both premature and untimely appeals, to render certain the date of judgment liens, and to enable the procurement of writs of execution, transcripts and certified copies of judgments - require that a judgment be contained in a separate document so labeled, and urges us so to hold. Whatever may be the practical needs in these respects, the answer is that no present statute or rule so requires, as the Government concedes, and the decisional law seems settled that "[n]o form of words . . . is necessary to evince [the] rendition [of a judgment]." United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 534 . See also In re Forstner Chain Corporation, 177 F.2d 572, 576. </s> While an opinion may embody a final decision, the question whether it does so depends upon whether the judge has or has not clearly declared his intention in this respect in his opinion. Therefore, when, as here, the action is for money only - whether for a liquidated or an unliquidated amount, as Rule 58 makes no such distinction - it is necessary to determine whether the language of the opinion embodies the essential elements of a judgment for money and clearly evidences the judge's intention that it shall be his final act in the case. If it does so, it constitutes his final judgment and, under Rule 58, it "directs that a party recover [a sum of] money," and, [356 U.S. 227, 233] "upon receipt by [the clerk] of the [opinion]," requires him to "enter judgment forthwith" against the party found liable for the amount awarded, which is to be done by making a brief "notation of [the] judgment in the civil docket [showing the substance of the judgment of the court] as provided by Rule 79 (a)." When all of these elements clearly appear final judgment has been both pronounced and entered, and the time to appeal starts to run under the provisions of Rule 73 (a). And, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, the later filing and entry of a more formal judgment could not constitute a second final judgment in the case nor extend the time to appeal. 236 F.2d, at 892. </s> But, on the other hand, if the opinion leaves doubtful whether the judge intended it to be his final act in the case - and, in an action for money, failure to determine either expressly or by reference the amount to be awarded is strong evidence of such lack of intention - one cannot say that it "directs that a party recover [a sum of] money," as required by Rule 58 before the clerk "shall enter judgment forthwith"; nor can one say that the clerk's "notation in the civil docket" - if it sets forth no more substance than is contained or directed in the opinion, and being only a ministerial act (In re Forstner Chain Corporation, supra, 177 F.2d, at 576) it may do no more - "show[s] . . . the substance of [a] judgment" of the court, as required by Rule 79 (a), and "constitutes the entry of the judgment" against a party for a sum of money under Rule 58. </s> While, as stated, there is no statute or rule that specifies the essential elements of a final judgment, and this Court has held that "[n]o form of words and no peculiar formal act is necessary to evince [the] rendition [of a judgment]" (United States v. Hark, supra, at 534), yet it is obvious that a final judgment for money must, at least, determine, or specify the means for determining, the amount (United [356 U.S. 227, 234] States v. Cooke, 215 F.2d 528, 530); and an opinion, in such a case, which does not either expressly or by reference determine the amount of money awarded reveals doubt, at the very least, whether the opinion was "complete act of adjudication" - to borrow a phrase from the Court of Appeals - or was intended by the judge to be his final act in the case. </s> But respondent argues, as the Court of Appeals held, that the opinion stated the amount of money illegally collected from respondent and, therefore, adequately determined the amount awarded, and that inasmuch as the clerk's entry incorporated the opinion by reference, it, too, adequately stated the amount of the judgment. This contention might well be accepted were it not for the fact that the action also sought recovery of interest on the amount paid by respondent from the date of payment to the date of judgment, and for the fact that the opinion does not state the date or dates of payment and, hence, did not state facts necessary to compute the amount of interest to be included in the judgment. Cf. United States v. Cooke, supra, at 530. In an effort to counter the effect of these omissions, respondent states that a search of the record, which it urges we should make, would show that the Government's answer admitted the date of payment, and thus would furnish the information necessary to compute the amount of interest to be included in the judgment. It relies upon a statement in the Forstner case, supra, saying "Whether such a judgment has been rendered depends primarily upon the intention of the court, as gathered from the record as a whole . . . ." 177 F.2d, at 576. (Emphasis supplied.) This argument cannot be accepted under the facts here for the reason that Rule 79 (a) expressly requires that the clerk's entry "shall show . . . the substance of [the] judgment of the court . . . ." Surely the amount of a judgment for money is a vital part of its substance. To hold that one must [356 U.S. 227, 235] search the whole record to determine the amount, or the facts necessary to compute the amount, of a final judgment for money would be to ignore the quoted provision of Rule 79 (a). </s> In these circumstances, the rule declared by this Court in the Hark case - though a criminal case and, therefore, not governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which as we have shown afford no aid in determining judicial intent - is exactly apposite and controlling. </s> "Where, as here, a formal judgment is signed by the judge, this is prima facie the decision or judgment rather than a statement in an opinion or a docket entry. . . . The judge was conscious, as we are, that he was without power to extend the time for appeal. He entered a formal order of record. We are unwilling to assume that he deemed this an empty form or that he acted from a purpose indirectly to extend the appeal time, which he could not do overtly. In the absence of anything of record to lead to a contrary conclusion, we take the formal order of March 31 as in fact and in law the pronouncement of the court's judgment and as fixing the date from which the time for appeal ran." United States v. Hark, 320 U.S., at 534 -535. See also United States v. Higginson, 238 F.2d 439, 443. </s> The actions of all concerned - of the judge in not stating in his opinion the amount, or means for determining the amount, of the judgment; of the clerk in not stating the amount of the judgment in his notation on the civil docket; of counsel for the Government in not appealing from the "opinion"; of counsel for respondent in preparing and presenting to the judge a formal "judgment" on May 24; and, finally, of the judge himself in signing and filing the formal "judgment" on the latter date - clearly show that none of them understood the opinion [356 U.S. 227, 236] to be the judge's final act or to constitute his final judgment in the case. Therefore, as in Hark, we must take the court's formal judgment of May 24 and the clerk's entry thereof on that date as in fact and in law the pronouncement and entry of the judgment and as fixing the date from which the time for appeal ran. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Unless otherwise stated, all references herein to Rules are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. </s> [Footnote 2 The First Circuit in United States v. Higginson, 238 F.2d 439, declined to follow the Second Circuit's opinion in the instant case, unless the latter may be said to rest upon local Rule 10 (a) of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, providing, in part, that a "memorandum of the determination of a motion, signed by the judge, shall constitute the order," and concluded: "To the extent that the language of the Schaefer opinion might apply even where no such local rule exists, this decision is not in accord with it." Id., at 443. In its later case of Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517, the Second Circuit makes clear that it regards the Higginson opinion as in conflict with its opinion in the instant case, saying: "Since we viewed the local rule as merely corroborative of the practice actually required by F. R. 58, Judge Hartigan's opinion must be taken as disapproving our reasoning." Id., at 518. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Papanikolaou v. Atlantic Freighters, 232 F.2d 663, also appears, in result at least, to be in conflict with the Second Circuit's opinion in the instant case. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, dissenting. </s> This case presents the question whether an appeal by the Government to the Court of Appeals from a summary judgment rendered against it was taken within the sixty-day period established by Rule 73 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ultimately decision turns on the need felt for nation-wide uniformity in the detailed application of rules of procedure within the federal judicial system, as against regard for local conditions and experience in the different circuits in construing rules phrased in broad and functional terms. Though not so formulated by the Court, this is the underlying question for decision, for I cannot believe we brought here for review a discrete instance, a particular, nonrecurring set of circumstances, or that we wish to encourage petitions for certiorari to review, from time to time, other individual sets of circumstances. The issues on the basis of which the Government sought review in this case were said to be of importance because they affected "all litigants in the federal courts." </s> Respondent taxpayer sued to recover $7,189.57 in stamp taxes, an amount specifically set forth in its complaint, alleged to have been illegally assessed and collected from it, and moved for summary judgment. On April 14, 1955, the District Court filed a "Memorandum Decision" directed to the motion for summary judgment. [356 U.S. 227, 237] </s> In its opinion the court, relying on Judge Leibell's decision in United States v. National Sugar Refining Co., 113 F. Supp. 157, found that the tax, in the amount of $7,189.57, had been illegally collected, and concluded by stating that, "I am in agreement with Judge Leibell's analysis and, accordingly, the plaintiff's motion is granted." 130 F. Supp. 322, 324. On the same day the clerk made the following entry in the civil docket: "Rayfiel, J. Decision rendered on motion for summary judgment. Motion granted. See opinion on file." </s> Over a month later, on May 24, 1955, the court signed a paper, submitted to it by respondent, entitled "Judgment." This document recited that, respondent having moved for summary judgment, and the motion having been granted on April 14, 1955, and the court's opinion having been filed. "IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiff, The F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., recover of the defendant, United States of America, the sum of $7,189.57 and interest thereon from February 19, 1954 in the amount of $542.80, together with costs as taxed by the Clerk of the Court in the sum of $37, aggregating the sum of $7,769.37, and that plaintiff have judgment against defendant therefor." On that day the clerk made the following entry in the docket: "Rayfiel, J. Judgment filed and docketed against defendant in the sum of $7189.57 with interest of $542.80 together with costs $37 amounting in all to $7769.37. Bill of Costs attached to judgment." </s> The Government filed its notice of appeal on July 21, 1955, ninety-eight days after the decision granting the motion for summary judgment, and fifty-eight days after the entry of the formal judgment of May 24. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, six judges sitting en banc, unanimously dismissed the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal had not been filed within sixty days from the entry of judgment as required by [356 U.S. 227, 238] Rule 73 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that judgment had been entered on April 14, 1955, when the motion for summary judgment was granted, and not on May 24, 1955, when the formal "Judgment" was docketed. </s> Rule 73 (a) provides: </s> "When an appeal is permitted by law from a district court to a court of appeals the time within which an appeal may be taken shall be 30 days from the entry of the judgment appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by law, except that in any action in which the United States or an officer or agency thereof is a party the time as to all parties shall be 60 days from such entry . . . ." </s> Rule 54 (a) defines a "judgment" as: </s> "a decree and any order from which an appeal lies." </s> Rule 58, entitled "Entry of Judgment," provides that: </s> "Unless the court otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54 (b), judgment upon the verdict of a jury shall be entered forthwith by the clerk; but the court shall direct the appropriate judgment to be entered upon a special verdict or upon a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49. When the court directs that a party recover only money or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction; but when the court directs entry of judgment for other relief, the judge shall promptly settle or approve the form of the judgment and direct that it be entered by the clerk. The notation of a judgment in the civil docket as provided by Rule 79 (a) constitutes the entry of the judgment; and the judgment is not [356 U.S. 227, 239] effective before such entry. The entry of the judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> Rule 79 (a) describes the civil docket mentioned in Rule 58, and goes on to declare that: </s> "All papers filed with the clerk, all process issued and returns made thereon, all appearances, orders, verdicts, and judgments shall be noted chronologically in the civil docket . . . . These notations shall be brief but shall show the nature of each paper filed or writ issued and the substance of each order or judgment of the court . . . ." </s> Thus, before the time for appeal begins to run under Rule 73 (a), a judgment as contemplated in Rule 58 must have been rendered by the court and, in compliance with Rule 79 (a), entered by the clerk in the civil docket. The judgment must have been both properly rendered and properly entered, and the entry of judgment is the decisive procedural moment. In the present case the question is whether the memorandum decision of April 14, 1955, was a "judgment" within the meaning of the Rules, and if it was, whether the clerk's docket notation of that date showed the "substance" of the judgment. </s> The Rules nowhere define with mechanical exactitude the meaning of the term "judgment." Rule 54 (a), however, in stating that a judgment includes "a decree and any order from which an appeal lies," emphasizes that a judgment is not confined to judicial actions so described, but includes any act of the court that performs the function of a judgment in bringing litigation to its final determination. Rule 58 is pertinent to what that function is and in describing when a judgment shall be entered indirectly illumines what a judgment is within the contemplation of the Rules. Thus, when a jury returns a general verdict and there have been no interrogatories, [356 U.S. 227, 240] judgment on the verdict shall be entered forthwith by the clerk, without further direction from the court. When the case is tried to the court and the relief awarded is complex, the court must approve the form of the judgment and direct that it be entered by the clerk. However, when the court directs that a party recover money only, and that is the situation in the present case, or that all relief be denied, the clerk is to enter judgment forthwith upon receipt of the direction. </s> One thing is clear from a close reading of these Rules in the light of the general purpose "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 1. Simplicity and speed, when consonant with effective protection of the interests of the parties, are touchstones for the interpretation of all the Rules, especially those strategically placed to advance the litigation to its final conclusion. Thus, as regards the judgment contemplated by Rule 73 (a), no formal document stamped "judgment" is required, and the direction that a party recover money or that all relief be denied may be included in an informal memorandum, given at the end of a written opinion, or even delivered orally from the bench. Of the many decisions in the Courts of Appeals on this question, none has suggested that a judgment must be expressed in a formal, autonomous document, as is required by the cumbersome, wasteful practice in some States. Such a requirement would contradict the liberal policy of the Federal Rules. We have recognized, even in a criminal case not governed by these Rules, that "No form of words and no peculiar formal act is necessary to evince [the rendition of a judgment] . . . or to mature the right of appeal." United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531, 534 . The fact that by Rule 58 the court is expressly required to approve the form of the judgment when the relief granted is more complex than money or costs is surely convincing that [356 U.S. 227, 241] when only money or costs are awarded there is no such requirement. </s> The 1946 amendment to Rule 58 underscored the purpose not to require from the court a particular formal act or an explicit direction that judgment be entered. The Rule had provided that: "When the court directs the entry of a judgment that a party recover only money or costs or that there be no recovery, the clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction . . . ." 308 U.S. 737 . It was amended to read: "When the court directs that a party recover only money or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judgment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction . . . ." 329 U.S. 863 . According to the Notes of the Advisory Committee, "The substitution of the more inclusive phrase `all relief be denied' for the words `there be no recovery', makes it clear that the clerk shall enter the judgment forthwith in the situations specified without awaiting the filing of a formal judgment approved by the court." 28 U.S.C., p. 4343. (Emphasis supplied.) Moreover, the elimination of the words "the entry of a judgment" made it clear that it is the direction to recover that is the essential act, and not a direction explicitly to enter judgment or a direction framed in any particular manner. </s> Of course the court may, in the exercise of its control over the shape of the judgment and the time of its rendition, indicate that no judgment will be rendered until a formal document is drawn up, approved, and signed. The Rules themselves recognize that in many cases, according to the relief awarded, the careful formulation of a separate judgment may be indispensable to the proper disposition of the litigation. Moreover, a formal document evidencing the judgment may in some circumstances be necessary for execution, for registration [356 U.S. 227, 242] under state law, or for divers purposes unrelated to the taking of an appeal. In the present case, for example, the Government states that, under Treasury Department procedures, respondent could not have secured payment of the judgment without submitting a certified copy stating the precise amount of the judgment plus interest and costs. But these requirements, admitting their relevance to the particular purposes for which they are designed, do not justify eroding an important federal procedural policy in favor of speed and simplicity in taking appeals by demanding that because the definitive adjudication of a claim must be in a particular form for a particular purpose it must be so for all. </s> What is required under Rule 73 (a) is action by the court that clearly indicates that the issues presented by the litigation have been adjudicated, and that the decision is wholly completed and not dependent on further action by the court. Furthermore, since the parties must be in a position to make an intelligent choice whether or not to appeal, the court must inform them not only that it has decided the case, but what it has decided. In assessing the court's action to determine whether these requirements have been met and a judgment has been rendered within the meaning of Rule 73 (a), an appellate court naturally looks to the import of the trial court's action as it must reasonably have appeared to the parties. Certainty that the court has in fact rendered an appealable judgment is of course a vital consideration, so that meritorious appeals may not be lost through inadvertence. Surely such certainty can be attained by directing trial judges to explicitness in decision and expression without insisting on archaic formalities that pointlessly delay the course of the litigation. As Chief Judge Clark has indicated in an opinion following the decision in the present case, appellate rules should not be "adjusted to accommodate [356 U.S. 227, 243] carelessness, at cost of . . . serious losses in effective court procedure. . . ." Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517, 519. </s> It is readily apparent that these criteria set only very broad limits on the interpretation of judicial action and that considerable scope is left for variation according to local custom and practice, properly so in a country as diversified and vast as ours. In this regard the judgment in United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531 , supra, a criminal case involving an appeal direct to this Court under the Criminal Appeals Act, now 18 U.S.C. 3731, is not significantly different from a judgment under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. There the District Court rendered an opinion granting the defendants' motion to quash the indictment, and some weeks later signed a formal order to the same effect. This Court concluded that the formal order rather than the earlier opinion was the judgment of the court within the meaning of the statute, and that the appeal from it was timely. This conclusion was reached, however, only after finding that the customary practice in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts, from which the appeal had come, was to issue a formal order quashing an indictment and to regard it as the judgment. The Court expressly refused, because of the diversity of practice in the lower courts, to lay down a "hard and fast rule" that when a formal judgment is filed it must necessarily be regarded as the judgment for purposes of appeal. In saying that a formal judgment is prima facie the judgment of the court, we made it clear that this presumption could be overcome by a showing of local practice to the contrary. </s> In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bedford, 325 U.S. 283 , a case involving the timeliness of a petition for certiorari for review in this Court of a judgment of a Court of Appeals, we found that by common [356 U.S. 227, 244] understanding and long-continued practice in the Court of Appeals, the formal order of mandate rather than the opinion was regarded as the judgment of the court. The Court respected this practice because, as we said, "Whether the announcement of an opinion and its entry in the docket amounts to a judgment for purposes of appeal or whether that must await some later formal act, ought not to be decided on nice-spun argumentation in disregard of the judicial habits of the court whose judgment is called into question, of the bar practising before it, of the clerk who embodies its procedural traditions, as well as in conflict with the assumption of the reviewing court." 325 U.S., at 287 -288. Procedural requirements within the federal judicial system are not to be fitted to a Procrustean bed. To the extent that the Federal Rules clearly contemplate a certain manner of doing things, of course such explicitness must be respected. But when the Rules do not so require, and the subject is one intimately associated with local practice and custom and adequately dealt with on that basis, loyalty to the Rules precludes imposition of uniformity merely for its own sake. </s> In the Second Circuit a decision of a District Court, when it is a complete, clear, and final adjudication, is deemed the judgment of the court, even though a later, formal judgment is signed and filed at the instance of one of the parties. We have the word of a unanimous Court of Appeals for this. Moreover, we have the decisions of that court over a number of years consistently enforcing, without dissent, the practice to which it adheres in the present case. So active a litigant as the Government could hardly have been unaware that such was in fact the governing practice in the application of Rule 73 (a). The rule when first squarely stated in United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, Inc., 200 F.2d 936, [356 U.S. 227, 245] 938, reflected a position taken in a line of earlier authorities, 1 and it has since been repeated with increasing emphasis and clarity. 2 That court has continually admonished the District Courts to be clear and explicit in their adjudications so that certainty will not be sacrificed and litigants confused, but no less has it been concerned, because of the volume of litigation in the courts of that harried circuit and the widespread criticism of the law's delays, to formulate and enforce procedures that by their speed and simplicity will best expedite cases to a final determination. </s> If the decision of a District Court is, standing alone, a clear and final adjudication of the case, and at the time rendered sufficient to give notice of the running of the time for appeal, the Court of Appeals has refused to reassess its significance in the light of a later formal judgment. To give weight to the filing of the formal judgment in this situation, that court has found, would increase rather than diminish uncertainty and confusion, since the legal effect of the first decision would vary depending on the chance, often within the control of the parties as much as the court, that more formal action is taken later. The temptation would be too great to present a formal judgment for the court's approval simply to cast doubt on the finality of the earlier action, and thus improperly to extend the time for appeal. Although in other circuits a contrary position appears to have been taken and [356 U.S. 227, 246] weight is given to the later filing of a formal judgment, e. g., United States v. Higginson, 238 F.2d 439, 441-443 (C. A. 1st Cir.), it cannot be said that the view adopted by the Second Circuit is without reason or inappropriate to the needs and practicalities of litigation in that circuit. 3 In view of the varying problems in different circuits, we should, in this matter, leave to a Court of Appeals a considerable measure of freedom to interpret and form the practice in the District Courts in the light of its experience with the procedural relations between itself and those courts. </s> If the general rule of practice and interpretation in the Second Circuit is not in conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is also not unreasonable as applied in the present case. The opinion of the District Court clearly informed the parties that respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted, and nothing in the language of the court remotely suggested that any formal judgment or further action by the court was contemplated or necessary for finality of adjudication. The amount of the judgment was the amount, plus interest and costs, of the tax illegally assessed and collected, and this amount was recited in the opinion as an agreed fact. Rule 58 [356 U.S. 227, 247] specifically provides that the entry of judgment shall not be delayed for the taxing of costs, and since the date of the payment of the tax was not in dispute, the interest due was a simple, mathematically ascertainable item, and the failure to state it explicitly in the opinion neither qualified nor delayed the definitive aspect of the judgment. </s> The Court itself recognizes that a "judgment" for the purposes of appeal is no more than an action by the court that finally and completely adjudicates the issues presented by the litigation, and that ultimately the question is one of ascertaining the intention of the District Court in a given case. Nevertheless, the Court reverses the unanimous determination of the Court of Appeals on this question, and it appears to rest this unusual action on the slender reed that the opinion of the District Court failed to show on its face the amount of the interest. In judging whether the District Court intended to make a final disposition of the case, the Court of Appeals surely was correct in concluding that this trivial circumstance was more than outweighed by the other circumstances of the case. </s> There may be cases in which the trial court's decision is inconclusive and ambiguous as to whether further action is contemplated, or it may be impossible to determine the practical effect of the judgment without complicated computations or information not available at the time the court renders its decision. But the present case is not one of these. The different considerations such cases present do not justify us in striking down a reasonable procedural rule relevantly applied. Nor is it material that in this case it was respondent itself that submitted for the court's approval the formal judgment of May 24th. When the motion for summary judgment was granted on April 14th and a final judgment rendered according to the [356 U.S. 227, 248] established practice in the Second Circuit, the time for appeal commenced to run automatically by force of Rule 73 (a). The fact that the court or either of the parties later proceeded on the assumption that further action was necessary or desirable to obtain a judgment, or for whatever reason, could in no way enlarge the time within which to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court. Such action could not prevent either respondent or the Court of Appeals from insisting on the finality of the District Court's first decision. </s> What has been said in regard to the rendering of judgment applies equally to the entry of judgment on the civil docket. Rule 79 (a) requires that the notation on the docket be brief but show the "substance" of the judgment rendered. "Substance" in this context is not a term of Aristotelian metaphysics; it has no meaning apart from the realities of custom and practice and adequacy of notice to those whose conduct is governed by the docket entries and the information they reasonably convey. Such a practical reading of the Rule does not, contrary to the Government's contention, render nugatory the requirement that the substance of the judgment be shown, but properly interprets that requirement in terms of the purpose for which it was designed. </s> The docket entry in the present case recited that the motion for summary judgment had been granted, and referred to the court's opinion on file. The opinion in turn told of the amount of the judgment. Surely we cannot say, on a question so related to local custom and understanding, that the Court of Appeals erred in finding this sufficient notice to the parties that the case had been decided and how it had been decided. The docket entry standing alone would doubtless convey little to a stranger to the litigation. To those familiar with the case, however, and attentive to the question of appeal, it comprehensively [356 U.S. 227, 249] conveyed the vital information necessary to protect their interest. The use of the word "judgment," or the recital of the amount of the judgment in the docket as well as in the opinion would have done no more, and a flat rule that such recitals must be included would convert Rule 79 (a) from a common-sense direction to maintain a docket useful to the court, the clerk, and interested parties, into a demand for pointless technicalities that ultimately might well seriously inconvenience them. If the amount of the judgment must necessarily appear in the docket, so also, it can be argued, must the terms of an injunction, the substance of that judgment; but by such inclusions the usefulness of the docket as an index and brief history of the proceedings would be substantially impaired if not defeated. </s> It must be remembered that the problem before us concerns not the niceties of abstract logic or legal symmetry, but the practicalities of litigation and judicial administration in the federal courts of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, comprising the Second Circuit. Doubtless the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, insofar as they govern the time for taking appeals, must be observed throughout the country by all eleven Courts of Appeals. But since the Rules do not lay down self-defining specifications or mechanically enforceable details on many matters, including the rendition and entry of judgments, does due regard for the Rules require more than obedience to the functional purposes they express? Does their observance necessarily imply a nation-wide uniformity in their formal application? We have for review the practical construction given to Rule 73 (a) by a Court of Appeals with as large a volume of business as any. By this practice the appellate jurisdiction of that court has been guided for some years, and it has been approved by every appellate judge in the circuit who has had occasion [356 U.S. 227, 250] to consider the question. The membership of the Court of Appeals reflects the experience of judges among those of longest experience in our judiciary, both on the District Courts and the Courts of Appeals, judges who have had extensive experience at the bar both in private and public litigation, and judges of special competence in the domain of procedure. 4 A rule of procedure authenticated by such a weighty certificate of legitimacy should not be nullified out of regard for considerations of elegantia juris. Certainly we should not upset it unless compelled to do so by the clear requirements of unambiguous legislation or the enforcement of unassailable even if implicit standards for the fair administration of justice. </s> I would affirm the judgment. </s> [Footnote 1 See Leonard v. Prince Line, Ltd., 157 F.2d 987, 989; Murphy v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 158 F.2d 481, 484-485; Binder v. Commercial Travelers Mut. Acc. Assn., 165 F.2d 896, 901; Markert v. Swift & Co., 173 F.2d 517, 519, n. 2. </s> [Footnote 2 United States v. Roth, 208 F.2d 467; Napier v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 223 F.2d 28; Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517; Edwards v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 242 F.2d 888; Repan v. American President Lines, Ltd., 243 F.2d 876. </s> [Footnote 3 In its opinion in the present case the Court of Appeals invokes not only the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and its own carefully formulated views on the rendition of judgment as understood in those Rules, but also Rule 10 (a) of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York. This Rule provides that, "A memorandum of the determination of a motion, signed by the judge, shall constitute the order; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the court from making an order, either originally or on an application for resettlement, in more extended form." However, in Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517, following the decision in the present case, the Court of Appeals explained that it "viewed the local rule as merely corroborative of the practice actually required by F. R. 58 . . . ." 240 F.2d, at 518. </s> [Footnote 4 The court sitting on the present case included: Chief Judge Clark - 6 years' private practice, 19 years on the Court of Appeals, 21 years member of the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Frank - 22 years' private practice, 6 years' federal administrative service, 16 years on the Court of Appeals. Judge Medina - 35 years' private practice, 4 years on the District Court, 7 years on the Court of Appeals. Judge Hincks - 14 years' private practice, 22 years on the District Court, 5 years on the Court of Appeals. Judge Lumbard - 21 years' private practice, 6 years in the United States Attorney's Office, 3 years on the Court of Appeals. Judge Waterman - 29 years' private practice, 3 years on the Court of Appeals. Other judges who sat in United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, Inc., 200 F.2d 936, supra, or the cases cited in note 2 were: Judge Learned Hand - 12 years' private practice, 15 years on the District Court, 27 years on the Court of Appeals at retirement. Judge Augustus N. Hand - 19 years' private practice, 13 years on the District Court, 26 years on the Court of Appeals at retirement. Judge Swan - 13 years' private practice, 26 years on the Court of Appeals at retirement. Judge Chase - 7 years' private practice, 10 years on state courts, 25 years on the Court of Appeals at retirement. [356 U.S. 227, 251] </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. </s> The effort which has gone into this case has at least ended happily from the point of view of preserving the integrity of those provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bearing on the timeliness of appeals. The Court's opinion, and the dissent of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER which I have joined, are at one on the basic issue, namely, that entry of a formal judgment is not necessary to start the time for appeal running, and also agree that the determinative question in any given case is whether the District Court intended its decision on the merits to be a final disposition of the matter. After an en banc Court of Appeals had decided that the District Court in this instance did intend to make a final disposition of the case, I should have thought this Court would have considered it the better course to affirm the judgment below, with an appropriate suggestion to district judges to leave no room for argument about their intentions respecting finality, rather than to reverse the Court of Appeals on what was essentially an issue of fact. </s> Even so, the Court's action perhaps has a silver lining, for I daresay it will stimulate district judges to be more at pains in the future, cf. Matteson v. United States, 240 F.2d 517, 518, to give in their opinions in these "money" cases an affirmative indication of intention regarding the finality or nonfinality of their decisions. If such is the effect of this decision, it will be a healthy thing, for surely such a commonplace affair as the time for appeal should not be permitted to breed litigation. </s> [356 U.S. 227, 252]

United States Supreme Court CONNER v. SIMLER(1961) No. 685 Argued: Decided: June 12, 1961 </s> Rehearing and certiorari granted; judgment vacated; and case remanded. </s> Reported below: 282 F.2d 382. </s> Peyton Ford for petitioner. </s> John B. Ogden for respondent. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The petition for rehearing is granted. The order entered March 20, 1961, 365 U.S. 844 , denying the petition for writ of certiorari is vacated and the petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is granted. The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in the light of Southard v. MacDonald, 360 P.2d 940. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissent from vacation of the Court of Appeals judgment which held that the respondent Simler was entitled to have the facts of his case in the United States District Court determined by a jury as we believe is required by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, our prior decisions and the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. </s> [367 U.S. 486, 487]

United States Supreme Court CLINTON v. VIRGINIA(1964) No. 294 Argued: April 27, 1964Decided: May 4, 1964 </s> 204 Va. 275, 130 S. E. 2d 437, reversed. </s> Calvin H. Childress argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. </s> D. Gardiner Tyler, Assistant Attorney General of Virginia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the briefs was Robert Y. Button, Attorney General of Virginia. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The motion to strike the supplemental brief on behalf of the respondent is denied. The judgment is reversed. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 . </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, concurring: Since the Court finds that the "spiked" mike used by the police officers penetrated petitioner's premises sufficiently to be an actual trespass thereof, I join in the judgment. </s> MR. JUSTICE WHITE dissents. </s> [377 U.S. 158, 159]

United States Supreme Court LEHMAN BROTHERS v. SCHEIN(1974) No. 73-439 Argued: March 19, 1974Decided: April 29, 1974 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 73-440, Simon v. Schein et al., and No. 73-495, Investors Diversified Services, Inc., et al. v. Schein et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Shareholders' derivative diversity suits were brought in federal court in New York, alleging that the president of a Florida corporation as a fiduciary, with others, used inside information about projected corporate earnings for profit and hence was liable to the corporation for the unlawful profits. The District Court, looking to New York's choice-of-law rules, held that under Florida law, which it held governed, the defendants were not liable, and dismissed the complaints. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Florida law, though controlling, was not decisive, and that in this situation, Florida "would probably" apply a certain New York decision to impose liability. Held: While resort to an available certification procedure, such as is available in Florida, is not obligatory where there is doubt as to local law, and its use in a given case is discretionary, resort to such procedure seems particularly appropriate here in view of the novelty of the question, the unsettled state of Florida law, and the fact that when federal judges in New York attempt to predict uncertain Florida law, they act as "outsiders" not exposed to local law. Hence, the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals to reconsider whether the controlling issue of state law should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court. Pp. 389-392. </s> 478 F.2d 817, vacated and remanded. </s> DOUGLAS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. REHNQUIST, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 392. </s> James J. Hagan argued the cause for all petitioners. With him on the briefs for petitioner in No. 73-439 was Stephen P. Duggan. David Hartfield, Jr., and Laura [416 U.S. 386, 387] Banfield were on the brief for petitioner in No. 73-440. James V. Hayes, John E. Tobin, Richard Y. Holcomb, and Allan R. Freedman were on the briefs for petitioners in No. 73-495. </s> Donald N. Ruby argued the cause for all respondents. With him on the brief were Benedict Wolf, Edward A. Berman, and Victor P. Muskin. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases are here on petitions for certiorari and raise one identical question. </s> These are suits brought in the District Court for the Southern District of New York. Lum's, one of the respondents in the Lehman Bros. petition, is a Florida corporation with headquarters in Miami. Each of the three petitions, which we consolidated for oral argument, involves shareholders' derivative suits naming Lum's and others as defendants; and the basis of federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. 1332 (a) (1), about which there is no dispute. </s> The complaints allege that Chasen, president of Lum's, called Simon, a representative of Lehman Bros., and told him about disappointing projections of Lum's earnings, estimates that were confidential, not public. Simon is said to have told an employee of IDS 1 about them. On the next day, it is alleged that the IDS defendants sold [416 U.S. 386, 388] 83,000 shares of Lum's on the New York Stock Exchange for about $17.50 per share. Later that day the exchanges halted trading in Lum's stock and on the next trading day it opened at $14 per share, the public being told that the projected earnings would be "substantially lower" than anticipated. The theory of the complaints was that Chasen was a fiduciary but used the inside information along with others for profit and that Chasen and his group are liable to Lum's for their unlawful profits. </s> Lehman and Simon defended on the ground that the IDS sale was not made through them and that neither one benefited from the sales. Nonetheless plaintiffs claimed that Chasen and the other defendants were liable under Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N. Y. 2d 494, 248 N. E. 2d 910 (1969). Diamond proceeds on the theory that "inside" information of an officer or director of a corporation is an asset of the corporation which had been acquired by the insiders as fiduciaries of the company and misappropriated in violation of trust. </s> The District Court looked to the choice-of-law rules of the State of New York, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), and held that the law of the State of incorporation governs the existence and extent of corporate fiduciary obligations, as well as the liability for violation of them. Diamond did, indeed, so indicate, 24 N. Y. 2d, at 503-504, 248 N. E. 2d, at 915. </s> The District Court in examining Florida law concluded that, although the highest court in Florida has not considered the question, several district courts of appeal indicate that a complaint which fails to allege both wrongful acts and damage to the corporation must be dismissed. 2 The District Court went on to consider whether if Florida followed the Diamond rationale, defendants would be liable. It concluded that the [416 U.S. 386, 389] present complaints go beyond Diamond, as Chasen, the only fiduciary of Lum's involved in the suits, never sold any of his holdings on the basis of inside information. The other defendants were not fiduciaries of Lum's. 3 The District Court accordingly dismissed the complaints, 335 F. Supp. 329 (1971). </s> The Court of Appeals by a divided vote reversed the District Court. 478 F.2d 817 (CA2 1973). While the Court of Appeals held that Florida law was controlling, it found none that was decisive. So it then turned to the law of other jurisdictions, particularly that of New York, to see if Florida "would probably" interpret Diamond to make it applicable here. The Court of Appeals concluded that the defendants had engaged with Chasen "to misuse corporate property," id., at 822, and that the theory of Diamond reaches that situation, "viewing the case as the Florida court would probably view it." Ibid. There were emanations from other Florida decisions 4 that made the majority on the Court of Appeals feel that Florida would follow that reading of Diamond. Such a construction of Diamond, the Court of Appeals said, would have "the prophylactic effect of providing a disincentive to insider trading." Id., at 823. And so it would. Yet under the regime of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), a State can make just the opposite her law, providing there is no over-riding federal rule which pre-empts state law by reason of federal curbs on trading in the stream of commerce. </s> The dissenter on the Court of Appeals urged that that court certify the state-law question to the Florida Supreme Court as is provided in Fla. Stat. Ann. 25.031 [416 U.S. 386, 390] and its Appellate Rule 4.61. 478 F.2d, at 828. That path is open to this Court and to any court of appeals of the United States. We have, indeed, used it before 5 as have courts of appeals. 6 </s> Moreover when state law does not make the certification procedure available, 7 a federal court not infrequently will stay its hand, remitting the parties to the state court to resolve the controlling state law on which the federal rule may turn. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968). Numerous applications of that practice are reviewed in Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943), which teaches that the mere difficulty in ascertaining local law is no excuse for remitting the parties to a state tribunal for the start of another lawsuit. We do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure is available, [416 U.S. 386, 391] resort to it is obligatory. It does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism. 8 Its use in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court. </s> Here resort to it would seem particularly appropriate in view of the novelty of the question and the great unsettlement of Florida law, Florida being a distant State. When federal judges in New York attempt to predict uncertain Florida law, they act, as we have referred to ourselves on this Court in matters of state law, as "outsiders" lacking the common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction. </s> "Reading the Texas statutes and the Texas decisions as outsiders without special competence in Texas law, we would have little confidence in our independent judgment regarding the application of that law to the present situation. The lower court did deny that the Texas statutes sustained the Commission's assertion of power. And this represents the view of an able and experienced circuit judge of the circuit which includes Texas and of two capable district judges trained in Texas law." Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941). </s> See also MacGregor v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 315 U.S. 280, 281 (1942); Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 39 (1941). </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cases are remanded so that that court may reconsider [416 U.S. 386, 392] whether the controlling issue of Florida law should be certified to the Florida Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 4.61 of the Florida Appellate Rules. </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Investors Diversified Services, Inc., Investors Variable Payment Fund, Inc., and IDS New Dimensions Fund, Inc., were defendants in the Schein case. Of those, only Investors Diversified Services, Inc., is a defendant in the other derivative action brought by Gregorio. The dismissal of the third derivative action (Gildenhorn) was not pursued on appeal. One Sit and one Jundt, defendants alleged to be employees of IDS, Inc., were dismissed from the case by the District Court for lack of personal jurisdiction. There was no appeal from that dismissal. </s> [Footnote 2 E. g., Palma v. Zerbey, 189 So.2d 510, 511 (Fla. App. 1966). </s> [Footnote 3 The District Court also held that whether Chasen would be liable not for profiting himself from the inside information but for revealing it to others could not be reached as Chasen, a nonresident of New York, had not been properly served. </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927). </s> [Footnote 5 Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 249 (1963); Dresner v. City of Tallahassee, 375 U.S. 136 (1963). </s> [Footnote 6 Trail Builders Supply Co. v. Reagan, 430 F.2d 828 (CA5 1970); Gaston v. Pittman, 413 F.2d 1031 (CA5 1969); Martinez v. Rodriquez, 410 F.2d 729 (CA5 1969); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (CA5 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 394 F.2d 656 (CA5 1968); Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Shifflet, 380 F.2d 375 (CA5 1967); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (CA5 1963); Sun Insurance Office v. Clay, 319 F.2d 505 (CA5 1963). The Fifth Circuit's willingness to certify is in part a product of frequent state court repudiation of its interpretations of state law. See the cases summarized in United Services Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 328 F.2d 483, 486-487 (CA5 1964) (Brown, C. J., concurring). </s> [Footnote 7 Certification procedures are available in several States, including Colorado, Colo. Appellate Rule 21.1 (1970); Hawaii, Haw. Rev. Stat. 602-36 (1969); Louisiana, La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13:72.1 (Supp. 1973); Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 4, 57 (1964); Maryland, Md. Ann. Code, Art. 26, 161 (Supp. 1973); Massachusetts, Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:21 (1973); Montana, Mont. Sup. Ct. Rule 1 (1973); New Hampshire, N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 490 App. R. 20 (Supp. 1973); and Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. 2.60.010-2.60.030 (Supp. 1972). </s> [Footnote 8 See Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 Wayne L. Rev. 317 (1967); Kurland, Toward a Co-Operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F. R. D. 481 (1960); Note, Inter-Jurisdictional Certification: Beyond Abstention Toward Cooperative Judicial Federalism, 111 U. Pa. L. Rev. 344 (1963); Note, Florida's Interjurisdictional Certification: A Reexamination To Promote Expanded National Use, 22 U. Fla. L. Rev. 21 (1969). </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, concurring. </s> The Court says that use of state court certification procedures by federal courts "does, of course, in the long run save time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Ante, at 391. It also observes that "[w]e do not suggest that where there is doubt as to local law and where the certification procedure is available, resort to it is obligatory," ante, at 390-391, and further states that "[i]ts use in a given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court." Ante, at 391. I agree with each of these propositions, but I think it appropriate to emphasize the scope of the discretion of federal judges in deciding whether to use such certification procedures. </s> Petitioners here were defendants in the District Court. That court, applying applicable New York choice-of-law rules, decided that Florida law governs the case and, finding that the respondents' complaint requested relief which would extend the substantive law even beyond New York's apparently novel decision in Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N. Y. 2d 494, 248 N. E. 2d 910 (1969), dismissed the complaint on the merits. The Court of Appeals agreed that Florida law applied, but held that Florida law would permit recovery on the claim stated by respondents. The opinion of the dissenting judge of the Court of Appeals, disagreeing with the majority's analysis of Florida law, added in a concluding paragraph that in light of the uncertainty of Florida law, the Florida certification procedure should have been utilized by the Court of Appeals. On rehearing, [416 U.S. 386, 393] petitioners requested the Court of Appeals to utilize this procedure, but they concede that this is the first such request that they made. Thus petitioners seek to upset the result of more than two years of trial and appellate litigation on the basis of a point which they first presented to the Court of Appeals upon petition for rehearing. Cf. Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964). </s> The authority which Congress has granted this Court to review judgments of the courts of appeals undoubtedly vests us not only with the authority to correct errors of substantive law, but to prescribe the method by which those courts go about deciding the cases before them. Western Pacific Railroad Case, 345 U.S. 247 (1953). But a sensible respect for the experience and competence of the various integral parts of the federal judicial system suggests that we go slowly in telling the courts of appeals or the district courts how to go about deciding cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, cases which they see and decide far more often than we do. </s> This Court has held that a federal court may not remit a diversity plaintiff to state courts merely because of the difficulty in ascertaining local law, Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); it has also held that unusual circumstances may require a federal court having jurisdiction of an action to nonetheless abstain from deciding doubtful questions of state law, e. g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W. S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968) (per curiam). In each of these situations, our decisions have dealt with the issue of how to reconcile the exercise of the jurisdiction which Congress has conferred upon the federal courts with the important considerations of comity and cooperative federalism which [416 U.S. 386, 394] are inherent in a federal system, both of which must be subject to a single national policy within the federal judiciary. </s> At the other end of the spectrum, however, I assume it would be unthinkable to any of the Members of this Court to prescribe the process by which a district court or a court of appeals should go about researching a point of state law which arises in a diversity case. Presumably the judges of the district courts and of the courts of appeals are at least as capable as we are in determining what the Florida courts have said about a particular question of Florida law. </s> State certification procedures are a very desirable means by which a federal court may ascertain an undecided point of state law, especially where, as is the case in Florida, the question can be certified directly to the court of last resort within the State. But in a purely diversity case such as this one, the use of such a procedure is more a question of the considerable discretion of the federal court in going about the decisionmaking process than it is a question of a choice trenching upon the fundamentals of our federal-state jurisprudence. </s> While certification may engender less delay and create fewer additional expenses for litigants than would abstention, it entails more delay and expense than would an ordinary decision of the state question on the merits by the federal court. See Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, 363 U.S. 207, 226 -227 (1960) (dissenting opinion). The Supreme Court of Florida has promulgated an appellate rule, Fla. Appellate Rule 4.61 (1967), which provides that upon certification by a federal court to that court, the parties shall file briefs there according to a specified briefing schedule, that oral argument may be granted upon application, and that the parties shall pay the costs of the [416 U.S. 386, 395] certification. * Thus while the certification procedure is more likely to produce the correct determination of state law, additional time and money are required to achieve such a determination. </s> If a district court or court of appeals believes that it can resolve an issue of state law with available research materials already at hand, and makes the effort to do so, its determination should not be disturbed simply because the certification procedure existed but was not used. The question of whether certification on the facts of this case, particularly in view of the lateness of its suggestion by petitioners, would have advanced the goal of correctly disposing of this litigation on the state law issue is one which I would leave, and I understand that the Court would leave, to the sound judgment of the court making the initial choice. But since the Court has today for the first time expressed its view as to the use of certification procedures by the federal courts, I agree that it is appropriate to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the cases in order that the Court of Appeals may reconsider certification in light of the Court's opinion. </s> [Footnote * Fla. Appellate Rule 4.61 (1967) provides in part: "f. Costs of Certificate. The costs of the certificate and filing fee shall be equally divided between the parties unless otherwise ordered by this Court. "g. Briefs and Argument. The appellant or moving party in the federal court shall file and serve upon its adversary its brief on the question certified within 30 days after the filing of said certificate in the appellate court of this state having jurisdiction. The appellee or responding party in the federal court shall file and serve upon its adversary its brief within 20 days after the receipt of appellant's or moving party's brief and a reply brief shall be filed within 10 days thereafter. "h. Oral Argument. Oral argument may be granted upon application and, unless for good cause shown the time be enlarged by special order of the Court prior to the hearing thereon, the parties shall be allowed the same time as in other causes on the merits." </s> [416 U.S. 386, 396]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. GAGNON(1985) No. 84-690 Argued: Decided: March 18, 1985 </s> At a recess during respondents' Federal District Court trial for participation in a cocaine distribution conspiracy, the bailiff informed the judge - in the presence of respondents, their respective counsel, and the Assistant United States Attorney, but outside the jury's presence - that one of the jurors had expressed concern because he had noticed respondent Gagnon sketching jurors during the trial. After Gagnon's attorney admitted that Gagnon had been sketching jurors, the judge ordered that the practice cease immediately, and, upon such attorney's suggestion, the judge stated that she would speak with the juror in chambers. No respondent filed any objection or requested to be present at the discussion in chambers. At the in camera meeting, which Gagnon's counsel attended, the juror was informed that Gagnon was an artist and meant no harm, that the sketchings had been confiscated, and that Gagnon would sketch no more. The juror, upon being questioned by the judge and by Gagnon's counsel, indicated his willingness to continue as an impartial juror. The trial then resumed; a transcript of the in camera proceeding was made available to all of the parties; no objections to the proceeding or motions to disqualify the juror were made; and, after guilty verdicts were returned against all of the respondents, no post-trial motions concerning the incident were made. On a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed all of the respondents' convictions, holding that the in camera proceeding violated their rights under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 to be present "at every stage of the trial," as well as their right to be present under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. </s> Held: </s> 1. Respondents' rights under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause were not violated by the in camera discussion with the juror. The defense has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror. The right to presence, while rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. However, a defendant's presence is a condition of due process only to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. Here, the presence of respondents and their counsel at [470 U.S. 522, 523] the in camera discussion was not required to ensure fundamental fairness or a reasonably substantial opportunity to defend against the charge. </s> 2. Assuming that the conference with the juror was a "stage of the trial" for purposes of Rule 43, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that respondents had not waived their rights under the Rule to be present at the conference. Respondents neither requested to attend the conference nor, either before or after the conference, filed any objections to or motions concerning the conference. A district court need not get an express waiver from a defendant for every trial conference which a defendant may have a right to attend. The conclusion that respondents waived their Rule 43 rights comports both with the Rule's language and with the everyday practicalities of conducting a trial. </s> Certiorari granted; 721 F.2d 672, reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The four respondents were indicted on various counts and tried together in Federal District Court for participation in a large-scale cocaine distribution conspiracy. During the afternoon recess on the first day of trial the District Judge was discussing matters of law in open court with the respondents, their respective counsel, and the Assistant United States Attorney, outside the presence of the jury. The bailiff entered the courtroom and informed the judge that one of the jurors, Garold Graham, had expressed concern because he had noticed respondent Gagnon sketching portraits of the jury. Gagnon's attorney admitted that Gagnon had been sketching jury members during the trial. The District Judge ordered that the practice cease immediately. Gagnon's lawyer suggested that the judge question the juror to ascertain whether the sketching had prejudiced the juror against Gagnon. The judge then stated, still in open court in the presence of each respondent and his counsel: "I will talk to the juror in my chambers and make a determination. We'll stand at recess." No objections were made by any respondent and no respondent requested to be present at the discussion in chambers. </s> The District Judge then went into the chambers and called for juror Graham. The judge also requested the bailiff to bring Gagnon's counsel to chambers. There the judge, in [470 U.S. 522, 524] the company of Gagnon's counsel, discussed the sketching with the juror. The juror stated: </s> ". . . I just thought that perhaps because of the seriousness of the trial, and because of - whichever way the deliberations go, it kind of - it upset me, because - of what could happen afterwards." </s> The judge then explained that Gagnon was an artist, meant no harm, and the sketchings had been confiscated. The juror was assured that Gagnon would sketch no more. Graham stated that another juror had seen the sketching and made a comment to him about it but no one else seemed to have noticed, and no other jurors had discussed the matter. The judge then elicited from Graham his willingness to continue as an impartial juror. Gagnon's counsel asked two questions of the juror and then stated that he was satisfied. The in camera meeting broke up, and the trial resumed. A transcript of the in camera proceeding was available to all of the parties; at no time did any respondent mention or object to the in camera interview of the juror. No motions were made to disqualify Graham or the other juror who witnessed the sketching, nor did any respondent request that cautionary instructions be given to the jury. After the jury returned guilty verdicts no post-trial motions concerning the incident were filed with the District Court. </s> On the consolidated appeal, however, each respondent claimed that the District Court's discussion with the juror in chambers violated respondents' Sixth Amendment rights to an impartial jury and their rights under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 1 to be present at all stages of the [470 U.S. 522, 525] trial. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions of all respondents, holding that the in camera discussion with the juror violated respondents' rights under Rule 43 and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 721 F.2d 672 (1983). </s> The Court of Appeals held that all four respondents had due process and Rule 43 rights to be personally present at the in camera discussion, and these rights were substantial enough to be noticed as plain error on appeal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), notwithstanding respondents' failure to preserve the issue by raising it in the District Court. Although the juror was only worried about Gagnon's conduct, the Court of Appeals held that the juror's potential prejudice against Gagnon might harm all respondents because they were joint actors charged and tried together for conspiracy. </s> The court stated that it could find nothing in the record to "conclusively determine" that respondents waived their Rule 43 rights. The Court of Appeals found "no indication of whether Gagnon or the other defendants expressly or impliedly implicated their willingness to be absent from the [470 U.S. 522, 526] conference." 721 F.2d, at 677. That no objection was made to holding the conference without respondents was, to the court, irrelevant on the question of voluntary absence under Rule 43. Because the court found no waiver of the Rule 43 right to be present, it stated that a fortiori it could not conclude that respondents had made an intentional and knowing relinquishment of their due process right to be present. Ibid., citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Finally, the court held that the harmless-error rule did not excuse the errors committed by the District Court. </s> We think it clear that respondents' rights under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause were not violated by the in camera discussion with the juror. "[T]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right. The defense has no constitutional right to be present at every interaction between a judge and a juror, nor is there a constitutional right to have a court reporter transcribe every such communication." Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 125 -126 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). </s> The constitutional right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, e. g., Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), but we have recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), the Court explained that a defendant has a due process right to be present at a proceeding "whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. . . . [T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." Id., at 105-106, 108; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 , n. 15 (1975). The Court also cautioned in Snyder that the exclusion of a defendant from a trial proceeding [470 U.S. 522, 527] should be considered in light of the whole record. 291 U.S., at 115 . </s> In this case the presence of the four respondents and their four trial counsel at the in camera discussion was not required to ensure fundamental fairness or a "reasonably substantial . . . opportunity to defend against the charge." See Snyder, supra. The encounter between the judge, the juror, and Gagnon's lawyer was a short interlude in a complex trial; the conference was not the sort of event which every defendant had a right personally to attend under the Fifth Amendment. Respondents could have done nothing had they been at the conference, nor would they have gained anything by attending. Id., at 108. Indeed, the presence of Gagnon and the other respondents, their four counsel, and the prosecutor could have been counterproductive. Juror Graham had quietly expressed some concern about the purposes of Gagnon's sketching, and the District Judge sought to explain the situation to the juror. The Fifth Amendment does not require that all the parties be present when the judge inquires into such a minor occurrence. </s> The Court of Appeals also held that the conference with the juror was a "stage of the trial" at which Gagnon's presence was guaranteed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43. We assume for the purposes of this opinion that the Court of Appeals was correct in this regard. We hold, however, that the court erred in concluding that respondents had not waived their rights under Rule 43 to be present at the conference with the juror. </s> The Court of Appeals found the record insufficient to show a valid waiver of respondents' rights under Rule 43 because there was no proof that respondents expressly or impliedly indicated their willingness to be absent from the conference. The record shows, however, that the District Judge, in open court, announced her intention to speak with the juror in chambers, and then called a recess. The in camera discussion took place during the recess, and trial resumed shortly [470 U.S. 522, 528] thereafter with no change in the jury. Respondents neither then nor later in the course of the trial asserted any Rule 43 rights they may have had to attend this conference. Respondents did not request to attend the conference at any time. No objections of any sort were lodged, either before or after the conference. Respondents did not even make any post-trial motions, although post-trial hearings may often resolve this sort of claim. See Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 33; Rushen, supra, at 119-120, citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 218 -219 (1982); Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 230 (1954). We disagree with the Court of Appeals that failure to object is irrelevant to whether a defendant has voluntarily absented himself under Rule 43 from an in camera conference of which he is aware. The district court need not get an express "on the record" waiver from the defendant for every trial conference which a defendant may have a right to attend. As we have noted previously, "[t]here is scarcely a lengthy trial in which one or more jurors does not have occasion to speak to the trial judge about something, whether it relates to a matter of personal comfort or to some aspect of the trial." Rushen, supra, at 118. A defendant knowing of such a discussion must assert whatever right he may have under Rule 43 to be present. </s> Our holding today is in accord with our prior cases and is also consistent with the approach taken by many Courts of Appeals. 2 In Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973), the defendant did not return to the courthouse after the first morning of trial. The trial continued in his absence, resulting in guilty verdicts. After his later arrest and sentencing the defendant claimed that he was denied a right to be present [470 U.S. 522, 529] at trial under Rule 43 because mere voluntary absence was not an effective waiver of that right. We rejected this claim, id., at 19-20, and held that the defendant need not be expressly warned of rights under Rule 43. Nor did we require any type of waiver to exist on the record; the defendant's failure to assert his right was an adequate waiver. Similarly, respondents' total failure to assert their rights to attend the conference with the juror sufficed to waive their rights under Rule 43. </s> This analysis comports both with the language of Rule 43 and with the everyday practicalities of conducting a trial. If a defendant is entitled under Rule 43 to attend certain "stages of the trial" which do not take place in open court, the defendant or his counsel must assert that right at the time; they may not claim it for the first time on appeal from a sentence entered on a jury's verdict of "guilty." Rule 43(b) states that "the defendant shall be considered to have waived his right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present . . . voluntarily absents himself . . . ." See also Advisory Committee Notes on Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 43, 18 U.S.C. App., p. 646. Respondents knew the District Judge was holding a conference with the juror and with Gagnon's attorney, yet neither they nor their attorney made any effort to attend. Timely invocation of a Rule 43 right could at least have apprised the District Court of the claim, and very likely enabled it to accommodate a meritorious claim in whole or in part. Unlike the Court of Appeals, we find nothing in Rule 43 which requires that latter-day protests of the District Court's action with respect to a relatively minor incident be sustained, and the case tried anew. We hold that failure by a criminal defendant to invoke his right to be present under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 at a conference which he knows is taking place between the judge and a juror in chambers constitutes a valid waiver of that right. The petition for certiorari and respondents' motion to supplement [470 U.S. 522, 530] the record are granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Rule 43 provides: </s> "(a) Presence Required. The defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. </s> "(b) Continued Presence Not Required. The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the verdict shall not be prevented and [470 U.S. 522, 525] the defendant shall be considered to have waived his right to be present whenever a defendant, initially present, </s> "(1) voluntarily absents himself after the trial has commenced (whether or not he has been informed by the court of his obligation to remain during the trial), or </s> "(2) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will cause him to be removed from the courtroom, persists in conduct which is such as to justify his being excluded from the courtroom. </s> "(c) Presence Not Required. A defendant need not be present in the following situations: </s> "(1) A corporation may appear by counsel for all purposes. </s> "(2) In prosecutions for offenses punishable by fine or by imprisonment for not more than one year or both, the court, with the written consent of the defendant, may permit arraignment, plea, trial, and imposition of sentence in the defendant's absence. </s> "(3) At a conference or argument upon a question of law. </s> "(4) At a reduction of sentence under Rule 35." </s> [Footnote 2 See, e. g., United States v. Washington, 227 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 191-193, 705 F.2d 489, 496-498 (1983); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 997-998 (CA3), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); United States v. Bufalino, 576 F.2d 446, 450-451 (CA2), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 928 (1978); United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 987 (CA6 1978). </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL joins, dissenting. </s> Last Term this Court divided sharply in a case involving an ex parte contact between a judge and juror during a criminal trial. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114 , (1983) (per curiam). Five separate opinions issued. Two Justices urged the Court to decide the "important constitutional questions" raised by such ex parte juror contacts, see id., at 131 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); id., at 123 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), but diverged significantly in their analyses and conclusions. Compare id., at 140 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (ex parte contacts implicate three constitutional rights: "the right to counsel, . . . the `right to be present,' . . . [and] the right to an impartial jury") with id., at 125 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) ("[T]he mere occurrence of an ex parte conversation between a trial judge and a juror does not constitute a deprivation of any constitutional right"). JUSTICE BLACKMUN and I dissented, arguing that the case should be either given plenary consideration, id., at 122 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), or not reviewed at all, id., at 150-153 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). </s> In the face of this controversy, the bare per curiam majority explicitly declined to consider "[w]hether the error [of ex parte contact] was of constitutional dimension," id., at 117-118, n. 2, and held only that any error demonstrated on the particular facts at issue was harmless. Id., at 121. </s> Today, without so much as a nod to this recent reservation of the question, the Court decides that the odd facts of this case do not constitute "the sort of event which every defendant ha[s] a right personally to attend under the Fifth Amendment," citing the lone Member of the Court who would have [470 U.S. 522, 531] so decided last Term. Ante, at 526-527. No guiding standard for future application is provided; the Court simply invokes its power to decide this case. Such ad hoc resolutions invariably engender more problems than solutions for lower courts. </s> Moreover, the parties directly affected by today's decision have not even been permitted an opportunity to brief and argue the merits. Given the highly fact-specific nature of the case, my preference would be to deny the petition for certiorari. But if the merits are to be addressed, I would do so only upon full consideration after briefing and oral argument. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. </s> [470 U.S. 522, 532]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. STANDARD OIL CO.(1972) No. 71-527 Argued: Decided: January 24, 1972 </s> Section 3 of the Sherman Act applies to the unorganized Territory of American Samoa. Cf. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 . </s> 330 F. Supp. 371, reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The United States sought injunctive relief against appellee, alleging that appellee combined and conspired to restrain and monopolize the distribution and sale of petroleum products in American Samoa, in violation of 3 of the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 3. 1 The District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that American Samoa is not a "Territory of the United States" within the meaning of 3. 330 F. Supp. 371 (1971). The United States has appealed pursuant to the Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 29. We note probable jurisdiction and reverse. </s> American Samoa is a group of seven small islands in the South Pacific. Treaties with Great Britain and Germany [404 U.S. 558, 559] recognize the claims of the United States to the islands. 31 Stat. 1878, T. S. No. 314. By Act of Congress, 45 Stat. 1253, 48 U.S.C. 1661, powers to govern the islands are vested in the President, who has delegated the authority to the Secretary of the Interior, Exec. Order No. 10264, 16 Fed. Reg. 6417. </s> The District Court distinguished between "organized" and other Territories, holding that only the former are Territories within 3 and that American Samoa is not "organized." 2 </s> Section 3 extends to "any Territory of the United States." Congress, of course, did not have Samoa in mind when it enacted the Sherman Act. Yet, as this Court pointed out in holding that Puerto Rico is within the coverage of 3, "that is not enough. It is necessary to go further and to say that if the acquisition of that insular dependency had been foreseen, Congress would have so varied its comprehensive language as to exclude it from the operation of the act." Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 257 (1937). There is no more reason to think that Congress would have done so for Samoa than for Puerto Rico. The Court stressed in Puerto Rico that Congress intended by 3 "to exert all the power it possessed in respect of the subject matter - trade and commerce," and the Court therefore found it </s> "equally reasonable to conclude that Congress intended to include all territories to which its powers might extend. The same reason which requires the utmost liberality of construction in respect of the word `trade,' also requires the same degree of liberality of construction in respect of the word `territory'; and we hold, accordingly, that the word `territory' was used in its most comprehensive sense, as embracing [404 U.S. 558, 560] all organized territories, whether incorporated into the United States or not, including Puerto Rico." Id., at 259. </s> There is no question that Congress has power to apply the Sherman Act to Samoa. Because "Congress intended to include all Territories to which its powers might extend," it follows that Samoa is a "Territory" within the meaning of 3. We are not persuaded by the District Court's distinction, for purposes of 3, between organized and unorganized Territories. The Court held in Puerto Rico that "`territory' was used in its most comprehensive sense"; the Court's further reference to "organized territories" was simply an application of that construction to the facts of the case, for Puerto Rico was an organized Territory, as well as a response to the contention that Puerto Rico could not be included within 3 because it was not an "incorporated" Territory. We discern no reason, and appellee suggests none, why Congress would have wished to exclude unorganized Territories from the coverage of 3. </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 3 provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce in any Territory of the United States or of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of trade or commerce between any such Territory and another, or between any such Territory or Territories and any State or States or the District of Columbia, or with foreign nations, or between the District of Columbia and any State or States or foreign nations, is declared illegal." </s> [Footnote 2 An "organized" Territory is one in which a civil government has been established by an Organic Act of Congress. </s> [404 U.S. 558, 561]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. SHEARER(1985) No. 84-194 Argued: February 25, 1985Decided: June 27, 1985 </s> Respondent's decedent, her son who was an Army private, was off duty at Fort Bliss and away from the base when he was kidnaped and murdered by another serviceman, who was convicted of the murder in a New Mexico court and who had also been convicted by a German court of manslaughter in 1977 while assigned to an Army base in Germany. Respondent brought this action against the Government in Federal District Court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (Act), claiming that the Army's negligence caused her son's death. Respondent alleged that, although the Army knew that the other serviceman was dangerous, it "negligently and carelessly failed to exert a reasonably sufficient control over" him, "failed to warn other persons that he was at large, [and] negligently and carelessly failed to . . . remove [him] from active military duty." The District Court granted summary judgment for the Government, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding, inter alia, that Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 - which held that a soldier may not recover under the Act for injuries that "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service," id., at 146 - did not bar respondent's suit. </s> Held: </s> Recovery under the Act is barred by the Feres doctrine, which is based, inter alia, on the special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of suits under the Act on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if such suits were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty. The Court of Appeals erroneously placed great weight on the fact that respondent's son was off duty and away from the base when he was murdered; the situs of the murder is not nearly as important as whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions, and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline. Respondent's complaint strikes at the core of these concerns; her allegations go directly to the "management" of the military, calling into question basic choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman. To permit this type of suit would mean that commanding officers would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions. Nor is the Feres doctrine rendered inapplicable by respondent's focusing only [473 U.S. 52, 53] on this case with a claim of negligence, and by characterizing her claim as a challenge to a "straightforward personnel decision." By whatever name it is called, it is a decision of command. Pp. 57-59. </s> 723 F.2d 1102, reversed. </s> BURGER, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-B, and III, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part II-A, in which WHITE, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 59. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 60. POWELL, J., took no part in the decision of the case. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Geller argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, David A. Strauss, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Robert V. Zener. </s> William T. Cannon argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II-A. </s> We granted certiorari to decide whether the survivor of a serviceman, who was murdered by another serviceman, may recover from the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligently failing to prevent the murder. </s> I </s> Respondent is the mother and administratrix of Army Private Vernon Shearer. While Private Shearer was off duty at Fort Bliss and away from the base, he was kidnaped and murdered by another serviceman, Private Andrew Heard. A New Mexico court convicted Private Heard of Shearer's murder and sentenced him to a term of 15 to 55 years' imprisonment. </s> Respondent brought this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b) and 2671 et seq., claiming [473 U.S. 52, 54] that the Army's negligence caused Private Shearer's death. Respondent alleged that Private Heard, while assigned to an Army base in Germany in 1977, was convicted by a German court of manslaughter and sentenced to a 4-year prison term. Upon his discharge from that confinement in Germany, the Army transferred Private Heard to Fort Bliss. Respondent alleged that, although the Army knew that Private Heard was dangerous, it "negligently and carelessly failed to exert a reasonably sufficient control over" him and "failed to warn other persons that he was at large." App. 14. </s> The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the Government. The Court of Appeals reversed. 723 F.2d 1102 (CA3 1983). The court held that Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), did not bar respondent's suit because "[g]enerally an off-duty serviceman not on the military base and not engaged in military activity at the time of injury, can recover under FTCA." 723 F.2d, at 1106. The court also held that respondent's suit was not precluded by the intentional tort exception to the Act, 28 U.S.C. 2680(h). The Court of Appeals noted that respondent's complaint alleged negligence and reasoned that "if an assault and battery occurred as a `natural result' of the government's failure to exercise due care, the assault and battery may be deemed to have its roots in negligence and therefore it is within the scope of the FTCA." Id., at 1107. 1 </s> We granted certiorari. 469 U.S. 929 (1984). We reverse. </s> II </s> A </s> The Federal Tort Claims Act's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to "[a]ny claim arising out of assault [or] battery," 28 U.S.C. 2680(h), and it is clear that respondent's [473 U.S. 52, 55] claim arises out of the battery committed by Private Heard. No semantical recasting of events can alter the fact that the battery was the immediate cause of Private Shearer's death and, consequently, the basis of respondent's claim. </s> Respondent cannot avoid the reach of 2680(h) by framing her complaint in terms of negligent failure to prevent the assault and battery. Section 2680(h) does not merely bar claims for assault or battery; in sweeping language it excludes any claim arising out of assault or battery. We read this provision to cover claims like respondent's that sound in negligence but stem from a battery committed by a Government employee. Thus "the express words of the statute" bar respondent's claim against the Government. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217, 219 (1949). </s> The legislative history of 2680(h), although sparse, is entirely consistent with our interpretation. There is no indication that Congress distinguished between "negligent supervision" claims and respondeat superior claims, with only the latter excluded under the Act. Instead it appears that Congress believed that 2680(h) would bar claims arising out of a certain type of factual situation - deliberate attacks by Government employees. For example, Congress was advised by the Department of Justice that the exception would apply "where some agent of the Government gets in a fight with some fellow . . . [a]nd socks him." Tort Claims: Hearings on H. R. 5373 and H. R. 6463 before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 33 (1942). </s> It is clear that Congress passed the Tort Claims Act on the straightforward assurance that the United States would not be financially responsible for the assaults and batteries of its employees. See Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on S. 2690 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 39 (1940). No one suggested that liability would attach if the Government negligently failed to supervise such an assailant. [473 U.S. 52, 56] </s> This legislative understanding was reconfirmed in 1974 when Congress amended 2680(h) to waive sovereign immunity for claims arising out of the intentional torts of law enforcement officers. See Pub. L. 93-253, 2, 88 Stat. 50. The premise of the legislation was that unamended 2680(h) "protect[ed] the Federal Government from liability when its agents commit[ted] intentional torts such as assault and battery." S. Rep. No. 93-588, p. 3 (1973). Once again, Congress did not hint that it thought the Government's liability for an assault and battery turned on the adequacy of supervision or warnings. 2 </s> The Court's interpretation of parallel exceptions in 2680 also supports our decision. In United States, v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696 (1961), the Court held that the exception in 2680(h) for claims "arising out of . . . misrepresentation" covers cases in which negligence underlies the inaccurate representation. And in Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984), we held that the exception for claims "arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs" includes a claim for negligent handling. Because Congress viewed these exceptions in the same light as the exception at issue here, see, e. g., H. R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1945), it is inescapable that the phrase "arising out of assault [or] battery" is broad enough to encompass claims sounding in negligence. </s> Today's result is not inconsistent with the line of cases holding that the Government may be held liable for negligently failing to prevent the intentional torts of a non-employee under its supervision. See, e. g., Panella v. United States, 216 F.2d 622 (CA2 1954) (Harlan, J.). In enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act, Congress' focus was [473 U.S. 52, 57] on the extent of the Government's liability for the actions of its employees. See generally Panella, supra, at 626. Thus, in referring to assaults and batteries in 2680(h), Congress at least intended to exclude claims arising from such intentional torts committed by Government employees. </s> B </s> Our holding in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), was that a soldier may not recover under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries which "arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service." Id., at 146. Although the Court in Feres based its decision on several grounds, </s> "[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by the `peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty.'" United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954). </s> The Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and subsequent cases. Here, the Court of Appeals placed great weight on the fact that Private Shearer was off duty and away from the base when he was murdered. But the situs of the murder is not nearly as important as whether the suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions, see Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977), and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline, see Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 , 304 (1983). [473 U.S. 52, 58] </s> Respondent's complaint strikes at the core of these concerns. 3 In particular, respondent alleges that Private Shearer's superiors in the Army "negligently and carelessly failed to exert a reasonably sufficient control over Andrew Heard, . . . failed to warn other persons that he was at large, [and] negligently and carelessly failed to . . . remove Andrew Heard from active military duty." App. 14. This allegation goes directly to the "management" of the military; it calls into question basic choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman. 4 </s> Respondent's case is therefore quite different from Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949), where the Court allowed recovery under the Tort Claims Act for injuries caused by a negligent driver of a military truck. Unlike the negligence alleged in the operation of a vehicle, the claim here would require Army officers "to testify in court as to each other's decisions and actions." Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, supra, at 673. To permit this type of suit would mean that commanding officers would have to stand prepared to convince a civilian court of the wisdom of a wide range of military and disciplinary decisions; for example, whether to overlook a particular incident or episode, whether to discharge a serviceman, and whether and how to place restraints on a soldier's off-base conduct. But as we noted in Chappell v. Wallace, such "`complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, . . . and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments.'" 462 U.S., at 302 , quoting Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). [473 U.S. 52, 59] </s> Finally, respondent does not escape the Feres net by focusing only on this case with a claim of negligence, and by characterizing her claim as a challenge to a "straightforward personnel decision." Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. By whatever name it is called, it is a decision of command. The plaintiffs in Feres and Stencel Aero Engineering did not contest the wisdom of broad military policy; nevertheless, the Court held that their claims did not fall within the Tort Claims Act because they were the type of claims that, if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness. Similarly, respondent's attempt to hale Army officials into court to account for their supervision and discipline of Private Heard must fail. </s> III </s> Special Assistant to the Attorney General Holtzoff, testifying on behalf of the Attorney General, described the proposed Federal Tort Claims Act as "a radical innovation" and thus counseled Congress to "take it step by step." Tort Claims Against the United States: Hearings on H. R. 7236 before Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., 22 (1940). We hold that Congress has not undertaken to allow a serviceman or his representative to recover from the Government for negligently failing to prevent another serviceman's assault and battery. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Reversed. </s> JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the decision of this case. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Judge Garth dissented on the ground that respondent's claim is barred by Feres and the intentional tort exception to the Act. </s> [Footnote 2 This is true even though Congress had reason to believe that "several incidents" of "abusive, illegal and unconstitutional `no-knock' raids" by federal narcotics agents were the result of inadequate supervision. See S. Rep. No. 93-588, p. 2 (1973). </s> [Footnote 3 It is immaterial that this suit was brought by a representative of the serviceman; indeed, Feres itself was brought by an executrix. Feres v. United States 340 U.S. 135, 136 -137 (1950). </s> [Footnote 4 Although no longer controlling, other factors mentioned in Feres are present here. It would be anomalous for the Government's duty to supervise servicemen to depend on the local law of the various states, see id., at 143, 146; and the record shows that Private Shearer's dependents are entitled to statutory veterans' benefits. See id., at 144-145. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I do not join Part II-A of THE CHIEF JUSTICE's opinion. I do, however, join Part II-B and therefore concur in the judgment. [473 U.S. 52, 60] </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in the judgment. </s> While I am not a firm supporter of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), I can support Part II-B of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment. </s> [473 U.S. 52, 61]

United States Supreme Court MILLS v. ELECTRIC AUTO-LITE(1970) No. 64 Argued: November 13, 1969Decided: January 20, 1970 </s> Petitioners, minority shareholders of respondent Electric Auto-Lite Co., brought this action derivatively and on behalf of minority shareholders as a class to set aside a merger of Auto-Lite and the Mergenthaler Linotype Co. (which before the merger owned over half of Auto-Lite's stock). Petitioners charged that the proxy solicitation for the merger by Auto-Lite's management was materially misleading and violated 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 14a-9 thereunder in that the merger was recommended to Auto-Lite's shareholders by that company's directors without their disclosing that they were all nominees of and controlled by Mergenthaler. The District Court on petitioners' motion for summary judgment ruled that the claimed defect in the proxy statement was a material omission, and after a hearing concluded that without the votes of minority stockholders approval of the merger could not have been achieved and that a causal relationship had thus been shown between the finding of a 14 (a) violation and the alleged injury to petitioners. The court referred the case to a master to consider appropriate relief. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conclusion that the proxy statement was materially deficient but held that the granting of summary judgment with respect to causation was erroneous and that it was necessary to resolve at trial whether there was a causal relationship between the deficiency in the proxy statement and the merger. Finding that causation could not be directly established because of the impracticalities of determining how many votes were affected, the court ruled that the issue was to be determined by proof of fairness of the merger; and if the respondents could prove fairness it could be concluded that a sufficient number of shareholders would have approved the merger regardless of the misrepresentation. Held: </s> 1. Fairness of the merger terms does not constitute a defense to a private action for violation of 14 (a) of the Act complaining of materially misleading solicitation of proxies that authorized a corporate merger. Pp. 381-385. [396 U.S. 375, 376] </s> (a) Permitting liability to be foreclosed on the basis of a finding that the merger was fair would contravene the purpose of 14 (a) by bypassing the stockholders. Pp. 381-382. </s> (b) Imposing on small shareholders the burden of rebutting the corporation's evidence of fairness would discourage them from the private enforcement of proxy rules that "provides a necessary supplement to Commission action." J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 . Pp. 382-383. </s> (c) The evidence submitted at the hearing as to the causal relationship between the proxy material and the merger was sufficient to establish petitioners' cause of action. P. 383. </s> (d) Where, as here, there was proof that the misstatement or omission in the proxy statement was material, this showing that the defect might have been considered important in shaping the shareholders' vote is sufficient without proof, which the Court of Appeals erroneously held was necessary, that its effect was decisive. Pp. 384-385. </s> 2. In devising retrospective relief for violation of the proxy rules the federal courts should be guided by the principles of equity. Pp. 386-389. </s> (a) The fairness of the merger may be a relevant consideration in determining the appropriate relief, and the merger should be set aside only if a court of equity concludes from all the circumstances that it would be equitable to do so. Pp. 386-388. </s> (b) Damages should be recoverable here only to the extent that they can be proved. Pp. 388-389. </s> 3. Petitioners, who have established a violation of the securities laws by their corporation and its officials, are entitled to an interim award of litigation expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in proving the violation, since the expenses petitioners incurred were for the benefit of the corporation and the other stockholders. The Court does not decide the further question of reimbursement for litigation expenses incurred in any ensuing proceedings. Pp. 389-397. </s> 403 F.2d 429, vacated and remanded. </s> Arnold I. Shure argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were Robert A. Sprecher, Edward N. Gadsby, and Mozart G. Ratner. [396 U.S. 375, 377] </s> Albert E. Jenner, Jr., argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Jerold S. Solovy and John G. Stifler. </s> Solicitor General Griswold, Lawrence G. Wallace, Philip A. Loomis, Jr., David Ferber, and Meyer Eisenberg filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case requires us to consider a basic aspect of the implied private right of action for violation of 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1 recognized by this Court in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). As in Borak the asserted wrong is that a corporate merger was accomplished through the use of a proxy statement that was materially false or misleading. The question with which we deal is what causal relationship must be shown between such a statement and the merger to establish a cause of action based on the violation of the Act. </s> I </s> Petitioners were shareholders of the Electric Auto-Lite Company until 1963, when it was merged into Mergenthaler Linotype Company. They brought suit on the day before the shareholders' meeting at which the vote was to take place on the merger, against Auto-Lite, Mergenthaler, and a third company, American Manufacturing Company, Inc. The complaint sought an injunction against the voting by Auto-Lite's management of all proxies obtained by means of an allegedly misleading proxy solicitation; however, it did not seek a temporary restraining order, and the voting went ahead as scheduled the following day. Several months later [396 U.S. 375, 378] petitioners filed an amended complaint, seeking to have the merger set aside and to obtain such other relief as might be proper. </s> In Count II of the amended complaint, which is the only count before us, 2 petitioners predicated jurisdiction on 27 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78aa. They alleged that the proxy statement sent out by the Auto-Lite management to solicit shareholders' votes in favor of the merger was misleading, in violation of 14 (a) of the Act and SEC Rule 14a-9 thereunder. (17 CFR 240.14a-9.) Petitioners recited that before the merger Mergenthaler owned over 50% of the outstanding shares of Auto-Lite common stock, and had been in control of Auto-Lite for two years. American Manufacturing in turn owned about one-third of the outstanding shares of Mergenthaler, and for two years had been in voting control of Mergenthaler and, through it, of Auto-Lite. Petitioners charged that in light of these circumstances the proxy statement was misleading in that it told Auto-Lite shareholders that their board of directors recommended approval of the merger without also informing them that all 11 of Auto-Lite's directors were nominees of Mergenthaler and were under the "control and domination of Mergenthaler." Petitioners asserted the right to complain of this alleged violation both derivatively on behalf of Auto-Lite and as representatives of the class of all its minority shareholders. </s> On petitioners' motion for summary judgment with respect to Count II, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled as a matter of law that the claimed defect in the proxy statement was, in light of the circumstances in which the statement was made, a material omission. The District Court concluded, from its reading of the Borak opinion, that it had to hold a hearing [396 U.S. 375, 379] on the issue whether there was "a causal connection between the finding that there has been a violation of the disclosure requirements of 14 (a) and the alleged injury to the plaintiffs" before it could consider what remedies would be appropriate. (Unreported opinion dated February 14, 1966.) </s> After holding such a hearing, the court found that under the terms of the merger agreement, an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Auto-Lite shares was required for approval of the merger, and that the respondent companies owned and controlled about 54% of the outstanding shares. Therefore, to obtain authorization of the merger, respondents had to secure the approval of a substantial number of the minority shareholders. At the stockholders' meeting, approximately 950,000 shares, out of 1,160,000 shares outstanding, were voted in favor of the merger. This included 317,000 votes obtained by proxy from the minority shareholders, votes that were "necessary and indispensable to the approval of the merger." The District Court concluded that a causal relationship had thus been shown, and it granted an interlocutory judgment in favor of petitioners on the issue of liability, referring the case to a master for consideration of appropriate relief. (Unreported findings and conclusions dated Sept. 26, 1967; opinion reported at 281 F. Supp. 826 (1967)). </s> The District Court made the certification required by 28 U.S.C. 1292 (b), and respondents took an interlocutory appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 3 That court affirmed the District Court's conclusion [396 U.S. 375, 380] that the proxy statement was materially deficient, but reversed on the question of causation. The court acknowledged that, if an injunction had been sought a sufficient time before the stockholders' meeting, "corrective measures would have been appropriate." 403 F.2d 429, 435 (1968). However, since this suit was brought too late for preventive action, the courts had to determine "whether the misleading statement and omission caused the submission of sufficient proxies," as a prerequisite to a determination of liability under the Act. If the respondents could show, "by a preponderance of probabilities, that the merger would have received a sufficient vote even if the proxy statement had not been misleading in the respect found," petitioners would be entitled to no relief of any kind. Id., at 436. </s> The Court of Appeals acknowledged that this test corresponds to the common-law fraud test of whether the injured party relied on the misrepresentation. However, rightly concluding that "[r]eliance by thousands of individuals, as here, can scarcely be inquired into" (id., at 436 n. 10), the court ruled that the issue was to be determined by proof of the fairness of the terms of the merger. If respondents could show that the merger had merit and was fair to the minority shareholders, the trial court would be justified in concluding that a sufficient number of shareholders would have approved the merger had there been no deficiency in the proxy statement. In that case respondents would be entitled to a judgment in their favor. </s> Claiming that the Court of Appeals has construed this Court's decision in Borak in a manner that frustrates the statute's policy of enforcement through private litigation, the petitioners then sought review in this [396 U.S. 375, 381] Court. We granted certiorari, 394 U.S. 971 (1969), believing that resolution of this basic issue should be made at this stage of the litigation and not postponed until after a trial under the Court of Appeals' decision. 4 </s> II </s> As we stressed in Borak, 14 (a) stemmed from a congressional belief that "[f]air corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public exchange." H. R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 13. The provision was intended to promote "the free exercise of the voting rights of stockholders" by ensuring that proxies would be solicited with "explanation to the stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought." Id., at 14; S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 12; see 377 U.S., at 431 . The decision below, by permitting all liability to be foreclosed on the basis of a finding that the merger was fair, would allow the stockholders to be bypassed, at least where the only legal challenge to the merger is a suit for retrospective relief after the meeting has been held. A judicial appraisal of the merger's merits could be substituted for the actual and informed vote of the stockholders. [396 U.S. 375, 382] </s> The result would be to insulate from private redress an entire category of proxy violations - those relating to matters other than the terms of the merger. Even outrageous misrepresentations in a proxy solicitation, if they did not relate to the terms of the transaction, would give rise to no cause of action under 14 (a). Particularly if carried over to enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission itself, such a result would subvert the congressional purpose of ensuring full and fair disclosure to shareholders. </s> Further, recognition of the fairness of the merger as a complete defense would confront small shareholders with an additional obstacle to making a successful challenge to a proposal recommended through a defective proxy statement. The risk that they would be unable to rebut the corporation's evidence of the fairness of the proposal, and thus to establish their cause of action, would be bound to discourage such shareholders from the private enforcement of the proxy rules that "provides a necessary supplement to Commission action." J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S., at 432 . 5 </s> [396 U.S. 375, 383] </s> Such a frustration of the congressional policy is not required by anything in the wording of the statute or in our opinion in the Borak case. Section 14 (a) declares it "unlawful" to solicit proxies in contravention of Commission rules, and SEC Rule 14a-9 prohibits solicitations "containing any statement which . . . is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or misleading . . . ." Use of a solicitation that is materially misleading is itself a violation of law, as the Court of Appeals recognized in stating that injunctive relief would be available to remedy such a defect if sought prior to the stockholders' meeting. In Borak, which came to this Court on a dismissal of the complaint, the Court limited its inquiry to whether a violation of 14 (a) gives rise to "a federal cause of action for rescission or damages," 377 U.S., at 428 . Referring to the argument made by petitioners there "that the merger can be dissolved only if it was fraudulent or non-beneficial, issues upon which the proxy material would not bear," the Court stated: "But the causal relationship of the proxy material and the merger are questions of fact to be resolved at trial, not here. We therefore do not discuss this point further." Id., at 431. In the present case there has been a hearing specifically directed to the causation problem. The question before the Court is whether the facts found on the basis of that hearing are sufficient in law to establish petitioners' cause of action, and we conclude that they are. [396 U.S. 375, 384] </s> Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has been shown to be "material," as it was found to be here, that determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the defect was of such a character that it might have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of deciding how to vote. 6 This requirement that the defect have a significant propensity to affect the voting process is found in the express terms of Rule 14a-9, and it adequately serves the purpose of ensuring that a cause of action cannot be established by proof of a defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for which approval is sought, that correction of the defect or imposition of liability would not further the interests protected by 14 (a). </s> There is no need to supplement this requirement, as did the Court of Appeals, with a requirement of proof [396 U.S. 375, 385] of whether the defect actually had a decisive effect on the voting. Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation materials, was an essential link in the accomplishment of the transaction. This objective test will avoid the impracticalities of determining how many votes were affected, and, by resolving doubts in favor of those the statute is designed to protect, will effectuate the congressional policy of ensuring that the shareholders are able to make an informed choice when they are consulted on corporate transactions. Cf. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 226 F. Supp. 400, 411 (D.C. N. D. Ill. 1964); 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 962 n. 411 (2d ed. 1961); 5 id., at 2929-2930 (Supp. 1969). 7 </s> [396 U.S. 375, 386] </s> III </s> Our conclusion that petitioners have established their case by showing that proxies necessary to approval of the merger were obtained by means of a materially misleading solicitation implies nothing about the form of relief to which they may be entitled. We held in Borak that upon finding a violation the courts were "to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose," noting specifically that such remedies are not to be limited to prospective relief. 377 U.S., at 433 , 434. In devising retrospective relief for violation of the proxy rules, the federal courts should consider the same factors that would govern the relief granted for any similar illegality or fraud. One important factor may be the fairness of the terms of the merger. Possible forms of relief will include setting aside the merger or granting other equitable relief, but, as the Court of Appeals below noted, nothing in the statutory policy "requires the court to unscramble a corporate transaction merely because a violation occurred." 403 F.2d, at 436. In selecting a remedy the lower courts should exercise "`the sound discretion which guides the determinations of courts of equity,'" keeping in mind the role of equity as "the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims." Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 -330 (1944), quoting from Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943). </s> We do not read 29 (b) of the Act, 8 which declares contracts made in violation of the Act or a rule thereunder [396 U.S. 375, 387] "void . . . as regards the rights of" the violator and knowing successors in interest, as requiring that the merger be set aside simply because the merger agreement is a "void" contract. This language establishes that the guilty party is precluded from enforcing the contract against an unwilling innocent party, 9 but it does not compel the conclusion that the contract is a nullity, creating no enforceable rights even in a party innocent of the violation. The lower federal courts have read 29 (b), which has counterparts in the Holding Company Act, the Investment Company Act, and the Investment Advisers Act, 10 as rendering the contract merely voidable at the option of the innocent party. See, e. g., Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 792 (C. A. 8th Cir. 1967); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 213 (C. A. 9th Cir. 1962); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 288 F.2d 784, 787 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1961); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1968); Maher v. J. R. Williston & Beane, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 133, 138-139 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1967); cf. Green v. Brown, 276 F. Supp. 753, 757 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1967), remanded on other grounds, 398 F.2d 1006 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1968) (Investment Company Act). See also 5 Loss, supra, [396 U.S. 375, 388] at 2925-2926 (Supp. 1969); 6 id., at 3866. This interpretation is eminently sensible. The interests of the victim are sufficiently protected by giving him the right to rescind; to regard the contract as void where he has not invoked that right would only create the possibility of hardships to him or others without necessarily advancing the statutory policy of disclosure. </s> The United States, as amicus curiae, points out that as representatives of the minority shareholders, petitioners are not parties to the merger agreement and thus do not enjoy a statutory right under 29 (b) to set it aside. 11 Furthermore, while they do have a derivative right to invoke Auto-Lite's status as a party to the agreement, a determination of what relief should be granted in Auto-Lite's name must hinge on whether setting aside the merger would be in the best interests of the shareholders as a whole. In short, in the context of a suit such as this one, 29 (b) leaves the matter of relief where it would be under Borak without specific statutory language - the merger should be set aside only if a court of equity concludes, from all the circumstances, that it would be equitable to do so. Cf. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 456 , 463-464 (1969). </s> Monetary relief will, of course, also be a possibility. Where the defect in the proxy solicitation relates to the specific terms of the merger, the district court might appropriately order an accounting to ensure that the shareholders receive the value that was represented as coming to them. On the other hand, where, as here, the [396 U.S. 375, 389] misleading aspect of the solicitation did not relate to terms of the merger, monetary relief might be afforded to the shareholders only if the merger resulted in a reduction of the earnings or earnings potential of their holdings. In short, damages should be recoverable only to the extent that they can be shown. If commingling of the assets and operations of the merged companies makes it impossible to establish direct injury from the merger, relief might be predicated on a determination of the fairness of the terms of the merger at the time it was approved. These questions, of course, are for decision in the first instance by the District Court on remand, and our singling out of some of the possibilities is not intended to exclude others. </s> IV </s> Although the question of relief must await further proceedings in the District Court, our conclusion that petitioners have established their cause of action indicates that the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. 12 The result would have been not only that respondents, rather than petitioners, would have borne the costs of the appeal, but also, we think, that petitioners would have been entitled to an interim award of litigation expenses and reasonable attorneys' fees. Cf. Highway Truck Drivers Local 107 v. Cohen, 220 F. Supp. 735 (D.C. E. D. Pa. 1963). We agree with the position taken by petitioners, and by the United States as amicus, that petitioners, who have established a violation of the securities laws by their corporation and its officials, [396 U.S. 375, 390] should be reimbursed by the corporation or its survivor for the costs of establishing the violation. 13 </s> The absence of express statutory authorization for an award of attorneys' fees in a suit under 14 (a) does not preclude such an award in cases of this type. In a suit by stockholders to recover short-swing profits for their corporation under 16 (b) of the 1934 Act, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has awarded attorneys' fees despite the lack of any provision for them in 16 (b), "on the theory that the corporation which has received the benefit of the attorney's services should pay the reasonable value thereof." Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1943). The court held that Congress' inclusion in 9 (e) and 18 (a) of the Act of express provisions for recovery of attorneys' fees in certain other types of suits 14 "does not impinge [upon] the result we reach in the absence of statute, for those sections merely enforce an additional penalty against the wrongdoer." Ibid. </s> We agree with the Second Circuit that the specific provisions in 9 (e) and 18 (a) should not be read as denying to the courts the power to award counsel fees [396 U.S. 375, 391] in suits under other sections of the Act when circumstances make such an award appropriate, any more than the express creation by those sections of private liabilities negates the possibility of an implied right of action under 14 (a). The remedial provisions of the 1934 Act are far different from those of the Lanham Act, 35, 60 Stat. 439, 15 U.S.C. 1117, which have been held to preclude an award of attorneys' fees in a suit for trademark infringement. Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967). Since Congress in the Lanham Act had "meticulously detailed the remedies available to a plaintiff who proves that his valid trademark has been infringed," the Court in Fleischmann concluded that the express remedial provisions were intended "to mark the boundaries of the power to award monetary relief in cases arising under the Act." 386 U.S., at 719 , 721. By contrast, we cannot fairly infer from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose to circumscribe the courts' power to grant appropriate remedies. Cf. Bakery Workers Union v. Ratner, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 269, 274-275, 335 F.2d 691, 696-697 (1964). The Act makes no provision for private recovery for a violation of 14 (a), other than the declaration of "voidness" in 29 (b), leaving the courts with the task, faced by this Court in Borak, of deciding whether a private right of action should be implied. The courts must similarly determine whether the special circumstances exist that would justify an award of attorneys' fees, including reasonable expenses of litigation other than statutory costs. 15 </s> While the general American rule is that attorneys' fees are not ordinarily recoverable as costs, both the courts and Congress have developed exceptions to this rule for situations in which overriding considerations [396 U.S. 375, 392] indicate the need for such a recovery. 16 A primary judge-created exception has been to award expenses where a plaintiff has successfully maintained a suit, usually on behalf of a class, that benefits a group of others in the same manner as himself. See Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S., at 718 -719. To allow the others to obtain full benefit from the plaintiff's efforts without contributing equally to the litigation expenses would be to enrich the others unjustly at the plaintiff's expense. This suit presents such a situation. The dissemination of misleading proxy solicitations was a "deceit practiced on the stockholders as a group," J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S., at 432 , and the expenses of petitioners' lawsuit have been incurred for the benefit of the corporation and the other shareholders. </s> The fact that this suit has not yet produced, and may never produce, a monetary recovery from which the fees could be paid does not preclude an award based on this rationale. Although the earliest cases recognizing a right to reimbursement involved litigation that had produced or preserved a "common fund" for the benefit of a group, nothing in these cases indicates that the suit must actually bring money into the court as a prerequisite to the court's power to order reimbursement of expenses. 17 "[T]he foundation for the historic [396 U.S. 375, 393] practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than the conventional taxable costs is part of the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation." Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 166 (1939). This Court in Sprague upheld the District Court's power to grant reimbursement for a plaintiff's litigation expenses even though she had sued only on her own behalf and not for a class, because her success would have a stare decisis effect entitling others to recover out of specific assets of the same defendant. Although those others were not parties before the court, they could be forced to contribute to the costs of the suit by an order reimbursing the plaintiff from the defendant's assets out of which their recoveries later would have to come. The Court observed that "the absence of an avowed class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through stare decisis rather than through a decree - hardly touch[es] the power of equity in doing justice as between a party and the beneficiaries of his litigation." Id., at 167. </s> Other cases have departed further from the traditional metes and bounds of the doctrine, to permit reimbursement in cases where the litigation has conferred a substantial [396 U.S. 375, 394] benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to spread the costs proportionately among them. This development has been most pronounced in shareholders' derivative actions, where the courts increasingly have recognized that the expenses incurred by one shareholder in the vindication of a corporate right of action can be spread among all shareholders through an award against the corporation, regardless of whether an actual money recovery has been obtained in the corporation's favor. 18 For example, awards have been sustained in suits by stockholders complaining that shares of their corporation had been issued wrongfully for an inadequate consideration. 19 A successful suit of this type, resulting in cancellation of the shares, does not bring a fund into court or add to the assets of the corporation, but it does benefit the holders of the remaining shares by enhancing their value. Similarly, holders of voting trust certificates have been allowed reimbursement of their expenses from the corporation where they succeeded in terminating the voting trust and obtaining for all certificate holders the right to vote their shares. 20 In these cases there [396 U.S. 375, 395] was a "common fund" only in the sense that the court's jurisdiction over the corporation as nominal defendant made it possible to assess fees against all of the shareholders through an award against the corporation. 21 </s> In many of these instances the benefit conferred is capable of expression in monetary terms, if only by estimating the increase in market value of the shares attributable to the successful litigation. However, an increasing number of lower courts have acknowledged that a corporation may receive a "substantial benefit" from a derivative suit, justifying an award of counsel fees, regardless of whether the benefit is pecuniary in nature. 22 A leading case is Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Assn., 257 Minn. 362, 101 N. W. 2d 423 (1960), in which a stockholder was reimbursed for his expenses in obtaining a judicial declaration that the [396 U.S. 375, 396] election of certain of the corporation's directors was invalid. The Supreme Court of Minnesota stated: </s> "Where an action by a stockholder results in a substantial benefit to a corporation he should recover his costs and expenses. . . . [A] substantial benefit must be something more than technical in its consequence and be one that accomplishes a result which corrects or prevents an abuse which would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation or affect the enjoyment or protection of an essential right to the stockholder's interest." Id., at 366-367, 101 N. W. 2d, at 426-427. </s> In many suits under 14 (a), particularly where the violation does not relate to the terms of the transaction for which proxies are solicited, it may be impossible to assign monetary value to the benefit. Nevertheless, the stress placed by Congress on the importance of fair and informed corporate suffrage leads to the conclusion that, in vindicating the statutory policy, petitioners have rendered a substantial service to the corporation and its shareholders. Cf. Bakery Workers Union v. Ratner, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 269, 274, 335 F.2d 691, 696 (1964). Whether petitioners are successful in showing a need for significant relief may be a factor in determining whether a further award should later be made. But regardless of the relief granted, private stockholders' actions of this sort "involve corporate therapeutics," 23 and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important means of enforcement of the proxy statute. 24 To award attorneys' fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who has succeeded in establishing a cause of action is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the expenses but to impose [396 U.S. 375, 397] them on the class that has benefited from them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the suit. </s> For the foregoing reasons we conclude that the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be vacated and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 48 Stat. 895, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 78n (a). </s> [Footnote 2 In the other two counts, petitioners alleged common-law fraud and that the merger was ultra vires under Ohio law. </s> [Footnote 3 Petitioners cross-appealed from an order entered by the District Court two days after its summary judgment in their favor, deleting from that judgment a conclusion of law that "[u]nder the provisions of Section 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the merger effectuated through a violation of Section 14 of the Act is void." This deletion was apparently made for the purpose of avoiding any prejudice on the question of relief, which remained open for consideration [396 U.S. 375, 380] by the master. In light of its disposition of respondents' appeal, the Court of Appeals had no need to consider the cross-appeal. </s> [Footnote 4 Respondents ask this Court to review the conclusion of the lower courts that the proxy statement was misleading in a material respect. Petitioners naturally did not raise this question in their petition for certiorari, and respondents filed no cross-petition. Since reversal of the Court of Appeals' ruling on this question would not dictate affirmance of that court's judgment, which remanded the case for proceedings to determine causation, but rather elimination of petitioners' rights thereunder, we will not consider the question in these circumstances. United States v. American Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435 (1924); Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 535 -539 (1931); Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 300 U.S. 185, 191 -192 (1937); R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice 314, 315 (4th ed. 1969). </s> [Footnote 5 The Court of Appeals' ruling that "causation" may be negated by proof of the fairness of the merger also rests on a dubious behavioral assumption. There is no justification for presuming that the shareholders of every corporation are willing to accept any and every fair merger offer put before them; yet such a presumption is implicit in the opinion of the Court of Appeals. That court gave no indication of what evidence petitioners might adduce, once respondents had established that the merger proposal was equitable, in order to show that the shareholders would nevertheless have rejected it if the solicitation had not been misleading. Proof of actual reliance by thousands of individuals would, as the court acknowledged, not be feasible, see R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation, Cases and Materials 1001 (2d ed. 1968) and reliance on the nondisclosure of a fact is a particularly difficult matter to define or prove, see 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1766 (2d ed. 1961). In practice, therefore, the objective fairness of the proposal [396 U.S. 375, 383] would seemingly be determinative of liability. But, in view of the many other factors that might lead shareholders to prefer their current position to that of owners of a larger, combined enterprise, it is pure conjecture to assume that the fairness of the proposal will always be determinative of their vote. Cf. Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, 391 U.S. 492, 508 (1968). </s> [Footnote 6 Cf. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1965); General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 162 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1968); Restatement (Second) of Torts 538 (2) (a) (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964); 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 917 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id., at 3534 (Supp. 1969). In this case, where the misleading aspect of the solicitation involved failure to reveal a serious conflict of interest on the part of the directors, the Court of Appeals concluded that the crucial question in determining materiality was "whether the minority shareholders were sufficiently alerted to the board's relationship to their adversary to be on their guard." 403 F.2d, at 434. An adequate disclosure of this relationship would have warned the stockholders to give more careful scrutiny to the terms of the merger than they might to one recommended by an entirely disinterested board. Thus, the failure to make such a disclosure was found to be a material defect "as a matter of law," thwarting the informed decision at which the statute aims, regardless of whether the terms of the merger were such that a reasonable stockholder would have approved the transaction after more careful analysis. See also Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, Inc., 415 F.2d 1326 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1969). </s> [Footnote 7 We need not decide in this case whether causation could be shown where the management controls a sufficient number of shares to approve the transaction without any votes from the minority. Even in that situation, if the management finds it necessary for legal or practical reasons to solicit proxies from minority shareholders, at least one court has held that the proxy solicitation might be sufficiently related to the merger to satisfy the causation requirement, see Laurenzano v. Einbender, 264 F. Supp. 356 (D.C. E. D. N. Y. 1966); cf. Swanson v. American Consumer Industries, Inc., 415 F.2d 1326, 1331-1332 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1969); Eagle v. Horvath, 241 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1965); Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 271 F. Supp. 378, 381 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1967); Comment, Shareholders' Derivative Suit to Enforce a Corporate Right of Action Against Directors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 578, 582 (1966). But see Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213, 231-232 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1965); Barnett v. Anaconda Co., 238 F. Supp. 766, 770-774 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1965); Robbins v. Banner Industries, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 758, 762-763 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1966). See generally 5 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 2933-2938 (Supp. 1969). </s> [Footnote 8 Section 29 (b) provides in pertinent part: "Every contract made in violation of any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder . . . shall be void (1) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, [396 U.S. 375, 387] shall have made . . . any such contract, and (2) as regards the rights of any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the making . . . of such contract was in violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation . . . ." 15 U.S.C. 78cc (b). </s> [Footnote 9 See Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391 F.2d 357, 362-363 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1968); cf. Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422, 426-427 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1944). </s> [Footnote 10 See Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 26 (b), 49 Stat. 836, 15 U.S.C. 79z (b); Investment Company Act of 1940, 47 (b), 54 Stat. 846, 15 U.S.C. 80a-46 (b); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 215 (b), 54 Stat. 856, 15 U.S.C. 80b-15 (b). </s> [Footnote 11 If petitioners had submitted their own proxies in favor of the merger in response to the unlawful solicitation, as it does not appear they did, the language of 29 (b) would seem to give them, as innocent parties to that transaction, a right to rescind their proxies. But it is clear in this case, where petitioners' combined holdings are only 600 shares, that such rescission would not affect the authorization of the merger. </s> [Footnote 12 The Court of Appeals might have modified the judgment of the District Court to the extent that it referred the issue of relief to a master under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 53 (b). The Court of Appeals' opinion indicates doubt whether the referral was appropriate, 403 F.2d. at 436. This issue is not before us. </s> [Footnote 13 We believe that the question of reimbursement for these expenses has a sufficiently close relationship to the determination of what constitutes a cause of action under 14 (a) that it is appropriate for decision at this time. The United States urges the Court to consider also whether petitioners will be entitled to recoup expenses reasonably incurred in further litigation on the question of relief. We are urged to hold that such expenses should be reimbursed regardless of whether petitioners are ultimately successful in obtaining significant relief. However, the question of reimbursement for future expenses should be resolved in the first instance by the lower courts after the issue of relief has been litigated and a record has been established concerning the need for a further award. We express no view on the matter at this juncture. </s> [Footnote 14 These provisions deal, respectively, with manipulation of security prices and with misleading statements in documents filed with the Commission. See 15 U.S.C. 78i (e), 78r (a). </s> [Footnote 15 Cf. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1216, 1229 and n. 68 (1967). </s> [Footnote 16 Many commentators have argued for a more thoroughgoing abandonment of the rule. See, e. g., Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 792 (1966); Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 Iowa L. Rev. 75 (1963); McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 619 (1931); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. Colo. L. Rev. 202 (1966); Note, supra, n. 15. </s> [Footnote 17 See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 531 -537 (1882); Central R. R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); [396 U.S. 375, 393] Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 Col. L. Rev. 784 (1939). Even in the original "fund" case in this Court, it was recognized that the power of equity to award fees was not restricted to the court's ability to provide reimbursement from the fund itself: "It would be very hard on [the successful plaintiff] to turn him away without any allowance . . . . It would not only be unjust to him, but it would give to the other parties entitled to participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair advantage. He has worked for them as well as for himself; and if he cannot be reimbursed out of the fund itself, they ought to contribute their due proportion of the expenses which he has fairly incurred. To make them a charge upon the fund is the most equitable way of securing such contribution." Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S., at 532 . </s> [Footnote 18 See, e. g., Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 55 F. Supp. 945 (D.C. E. D. Pa. 1944); Runswick v. Floor, 116 Utah 91, 208 P.2d 948 (1949); cases cited n. 22, infra. See generally Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 658, 669-679 (1956); Smith, Recovery of Plaintiff's Attorney's Fees in Corporate Litigation, 40 L. A. Bar Bull. 15 (1964). </s> [Footnote 19 Hartman v. Oatman Gold Mining & Milling Co., 22 Ariz. 476, 198 P. 717 (1921); Greenough v. Coeur D'Alenes Lead Co., 52 Idaho 599, 18 P.2d 288 (1932); cf. Riverside Oil & Refining Co. v. Lynch, 114 Okla. 198, 243 P. 967 (1925). </s> [Footnote 20 Allen v. Chase Nat. Bank, 180 Misc. 259, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 245 (Sup. Ct. 1943), sequel to Allen v. Chase Nat. Bank, 178 Misc. 536, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 958 (Sup. Ct. 1942). </s> [Footnote 21 Cf. Note, Allowance of Counsel Fees Out of a "Fund in Court": The New Jersey Experience, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 634, 638-643 (1963). </s> [Footnote 22 See Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1957); Grant v. Hartman Ranch Co., 193 Cal. App. 2d 497, 14 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1961); Treves v. Servel, Inc., 38 Del. Ch. 483, 154 A. 2d 188 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1959); Saks v. Gamble, 38 Del. Ch. 504, 154 A. 2d 767 (1958); Yap v. Wah Yen Ki Tuk Tsen Nin Hue, 43 Haw. 37, 42 (1958); Berger v. Amana Society, 253 Iowa 378, 387, 111 N. W. 2d 753, 758 (1962); Bosch v. Meeker Cooperative Light & Power Assn., 257 Minn. 362, 101 N. W. 2d 423 (1960); Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 353, 149 N. Y. S. 2d 840 (Sup. Ct. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 3 N. Y. 2d 729, 143 N. E. 2d 516 (1957); Martin Foundation v. Phillip-Jones Corp., 283 App. Div. 729, 127 N. Y. S. 2d 649 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 197 Misc. 25, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 1949); 97 N. Y. S. 2d 492 (op. of Referee); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 274 App. Div. 988, 84 N. Y. S. 2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd per curiam, 299 N. Y. 718, 87 N. E. 2d 126 (1949); Smith, supra, n. 18; Shareholder Suits: Pecuniary Benefit Unnecessary for Counsel Fee Award, 13 Stan. L. Rev. 146 (1960). </s> [Footnote 23 Murphy v. North American Light & Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570 (D.C. S. D. N. Y. 1940). </s> [Footnote 24 Cf. Hornstein, supra, n. 18, at 659, 662-663. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I substantially agree with Parts II and III of the Court's opinion holding that these stockholders have sufficiently proved a violation of 14 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and are thus entitled to recover whatever damages they have suffered as a result of the misleading corporate statements, or perhaps to an equitable setting aside of the merger itself. I do not agree, however, to what appears to be the holding in Part IV that stockholders who hire lawyers to prosecute their claims in such a case can recover attorneys' fees in the absence of a valid contractual agreement so providing or an explicit statute creating such a right of recovery. The courts are interpreters, not creators, of legal rights to recover and if there is a need for recovery of attorneys' fees to effectuate the policies of the Act here involved, that need should in my judgment be met by Congress, not by this Court. </s> [396 U.S. 375, 398]

United States Supreme Court ENTERGY CORP. v. RIVERKEEPER, INC., ET AL.(2009) No. 07-588 Argued: December 2, 2008Decided: April 1, 2009 </s> Petitioners' powerplants have "cooling water intake structures" that threaten the environment by squashing against intake screens ("impingement") or suctioning into the cooling system ("entrainment") aquatic organisms from the water sources tapped to cool the plants. Thus, the facilities are subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act, which mandates that "[a]ny standard established pursuant to section 1311 ... or section 1316 ... and applicable to a point source shall require that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact." 33 U.S.C. §1326(b). Sections 1311 and 1316, in turn, employ a variety of "best technology" standards to regulate effluent discharge into the Nation's waters. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the §1326(b) regulations at issue after nearly three decades of making the "best technology available" determination on a case-by-case basis. Its "Phase I" regulations govern new cooling water intake structures, while the "Phase II" rules at issue apply to certain large existing facilities. In the latter rules, the EPA set "national performance standards," requiring most Phase II facilities to reduce "impingement mortality for [aquatic organisms] by 80 to 95 percent from the calculation baseline," and requiring a subset of facilities to reduce entrainment of such organisms by "60 to 90 percent from [that] baseline." 40 CFR §125.94(b)(1), (2). However, the EPA expressly declined to mandate closed-cycle cooling systems, or equivalent reductions in impingement and entrainment, as it had done in its Phase I rules, in part because the cost of rendering existing facilities closed-cycle compliant would be nine times the estimated cost of compliance with the Phase II performance standards, and because other technologies could approach the performance of closed-cycle operation. The Phase II rules also permit site-specific variances from the national performance standards, provided that the permit-issuing authority imposes remedial measures that yield results "as close as practicable to the applicable performance standards." §125.94(a)(5)(i), (ii). Respondents--environmental groups and various States--challenged the Phase II regulations. Concluding that cost-benefit analysis is impermissible under 33 U.S.C. §1326(b), the Second Circuit found the site-specific cost-benefit variance provision unlawful and remanded the regulations to the EPA for it to clarify whether it had relied on cost-benefit analysis in setting the national performance standards. Held:The EPA permissibly relied on cost-benefit analysis in setting the national performance standards and in providing for cost-benefit variances from those standards as part of the Phase II regulations. Pp.7-16. (a)The EPA's view that §1326(b)'s "best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact" standard permits consideration of the technology's costs and of the relationship between those costs and the environmental benefits produced governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute--not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844. The Second Circuit took "best technology" to mean the technology that achieves the greatest reduction in adverse environmental impacts at a reasonable cost to the industry, but it may also describe the technology that most efficiently produces a good, even if it produces a lesser quantity of that good than other available technologies. This reading is not precluded by the phrase "for minimizing adverse environmental impact." Minimizing admits of degree and is not necessarily used to refer exclusively to the "greatest possible reduction." Other Clean Water Act provisions show that when Congress wished to mandate the greatest feasible reduction in water pollution, it used plain language, e.g., "elimination of discharges of all pollutants," §1311(b)(2)(A). Thus, §1326(b)'s use of the less ambitious goal of "minimizing adverse environmental impact" suggests that the EPA has some discretion to determine the extent of reduction warranted under the circumstances, plausibly involving a consideration of the benefits derived from reductions and the costs of achieving them. Pp.7-9. </s> (b)Considering §1326(b)'s text, and comparing it with the text and statutory factors applicable to parallel Clean Water Act provisions, prompts the conclusion that it was well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation for the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit analysis is not categorically forbidden. In the Phase II rules the EPA sought only to avoid extreme disparities between costs and benefits, limiting variances from Phase II's "national performance standards" to circumstances where the costs are "significantly greater than the benefits" of compliance. 40 CFR §125.94(a)(5)(ii). In defining "national performance standards" the EPA assumed the application of technologies whose benefits approach those estimated for closed-cycle cooling systems at a fraction of the cost. That the EPA has for over thirty years interpreted §1326(b) to permit a comparison of costs and benefits, while not conclusive, also tends to show that its interpretation is reasonable and hence a legitimate exercise of its discretion. Even respondents and the Second Circuit ultimately recognize that some comparison of costs and benefits is permitted. The Second Circuit held that §1326(b) mandates only those technologies whose costs can be reasonably borne by the industry. But whether it is reasonable to bear a particular cost can very well depend on the resulting benefits. Likewise, respondents concede that the EPA need not require that industry spend billions to save one more fish. This concedes the principle, and there is no statutory basis for limiting the comparison of costs and benefits to situations where the benefits are de minimis rather than significantly disproportionate. Pp.9-16. 475 F.3d 83, reversed and remanded. Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. </s> ENTERGY CORPORATION, PETITIONER </s> 07-588v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. </s> PSEG FOSSIL LLC, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 07-589v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. </s> UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP, PETITIONER </s> 07-597v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit [April 1, 2009] </s> Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> These cases concern a set of regulations adopted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or agency) under §316(b) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1326(b). 69 Fed. Reg. 41576 (2004). Respondents--environmental groups and various States1--challenged those regulations, and the Second Circuit set them aside. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 99-100 (2007). The issue for our decision is whether, as the Second Circuit held, the EPA is not permitted to use cost-benefit analysis in determining the content of regulations promulgated under §1326(b). I </s> Petitioners operate--or represent those who operate--large powerplants. In the course of generating power, those plants also generate large amounts of heat. To cool their facilities, petitioners employ "cooling water intake structures" that extract water from nearby water sources. These structures pose various threats to the environment, chief among them the squashing against intake screens (elegantly called "impingement") or suction into the cooling system ("entrainment") of aquatic organisms that live in the affected water sources. See 69 Fed. Reg. 41586. Accordingly, the facilities are subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1251 et seq., which mandates: "Any standard established pursuant to section 1311 of this title or section 1316 of this title and applicable to a point source shall require that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact." §1326(b). </s> Sections 1311 and 1316, in turn, employ a variety of "best technology" standards to regulate the discharge of effluents into the Nation's waters. </s> The §1326(b) regulations at issue here were promulgated by the EPA after nearly three decades in which the determination of the "best technology available for minimizing [cooling water intake structures'] adverse environmental impact" was made by permit-issuing authorities on a case-by-case basis, without benefit of a governing regulation. The EPA's initial attempt at such a regulation came to nought when the Fourth Circuit determined that the agency had failed to adhere to the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 457 (1977). The EPA withdrew the regulation, 44 Fed. Reg. 32956 (1979), and instead published "draft guidance" for use in implementing §1326(b)'s requirements via site-specific permit decisions under §1342. See EPA, Office of Water Enforcement Permits Div., Draft Guidance for Evaluating the Adverse Impact of Cooling Water Intake Structures on the Aquatic Environment: Section 316(b) P.L. 92-500, (May 1, 1977), at http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/files/1977AEIguid.pdf, (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 30, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court's case file); 69 Fed. Reg. 41584 (describing system of case-by-case permits under the draft guidance). </s> In 1995, the EPA entered into a consent decree which, as subsequently amended, set a multiphase timetable for the EPA to promulgate regulations under §1326(b). See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Whitman, No. 93 Civ. 0314 (AGS), 2001 WL 1505497, *1 (SDNY, Nov. 27, 2001). In the first phase the EPA adopted regulations governing certain new, large cooling water intake structures. 66 Fed. Reg. 65256 (2001) (Phase I rules); see 40 CFR §§125.80(a), 125.81(a) (2008). Those rules require new facilities with water-intake flow greater than 10 million gallons per day to, among other things, restrict their inflow "to a level commensurate with that which can be attained by a closed-cycle recirculating cooling water system."2 §125.84(b)(1). New facilities with water-intake flow between 2 million and 10 million gallons per day may alternatively comply by, among other things, reducing the volume and velocity of water removal to certain levels. §125.84(c). And all facilities may alternatively comply by demonstrating, among other things, "that the technologies employed will reduce the level of adverse environmental impact ... to a comparable level" to what would be achieved by using a closed-cycle cooling system. §125.84(d). These regulations were upheld in large part by the Second Circuit in Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174 (2004). </s> The EPA then adopted the so-called "Phase II" rules at issue here.3 69 Fed. Reg. 41576. They apply to existing facilities that are point sources, whose primary activity is the generation and transmission (or sale for transmission) of electricity, and whose water-intake flow is more than 50 million gallons of water per day, at least 25 percent of which is used for cooling purposes. Ibid. Over 500 facilities, accounting for approximately 53 percent of the Nation's electric-power generating capacity, fall within Phase II's ambit. See EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Final Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, A3-13, Table A3-4 (Feb. 2004), online at http://www. epa.gov/waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/final/a3.pdf. Those facilities remove on average more than 214 billion gallons of water per day, causing impingement and entrainment of over 3.4 billion aquatic organisms per year. 69 Fed. Reg. 41586. </s> To address those environmental impacts, the EPA set "national performance standards," requiring Phase II facilities (with some exceptions) to reduce "impingement mortality for all life stages of fish and shellfish by 80 to 95 percent from the calculation baseline"; a subset of facilities must also reduce entrainment of such aquatic organisms by "60 to 90 percent from the calculation baseline." 40 CFR §125.94(b)(1), (2); see §125.93 (defining "calculation baseline"). Those targets are based on the environmental improvements achievable through deployment of a mix of remedial technologies, 69 Fed. Reg. 41599, which the EPA determined were "commercially available and economically practicable," id., at 41602. </s> In its Phase II rules, however, the EPA expressly declined to mandate adoption of closed-cycle cooling systems or equivalent reductions in impingement and entrainment, as it had done for new facilities subject to the Phase I rules. Id., at 41601. It refused to take that step in part because of the "generally high costs" of converting existing facilities to closed-cycle operation, and because "other technologies approach the performance of this option." Id., at 41605. Thus, while closed-cycle cooling systems could reduce impingement and entrainment mortality by up to 98 percent, id., at 41601, (compared to the Phase II targets of 80 to 95 percent impingement reduction), the cost of rendering all Phase II facilities closed-cycle-compliant would be approximately $3.5 billion per year, id., at 41605, nine times the estimated cost of compliance with the Phase II performance standards, id., at 41666. Moreover, Phase II facilities compelled to convert to closed-cycle cooling systems "would produce 2.4 percent to 4.0 percent less electricity even while burning the same amount of coal," possibly requiring the construction of "20 additional 400-MW plants ... to replace the generating capacity lost." Id., at 41605. The EPA thus concluded that "[a]lthough not identical, the ranges of impingement and entrainment reduction are similar under both options.... [Benefits of compliance with the Phase II rules] can approach those of closed-cycle recirculating at less cost with fewer implementation problems." Id., at 41606. </s> The regulations permit the issuance of site-specific variances from the national performance standards if a facility can demonstrate either that the costs of compliance are "significantly greater than" the costs considered by the agency in setting the standards, 40 CFR §125.94(a)(5)(i), or that the costs of compliance "would be significantly greater than the benefits of complying with the applicable performance standards," §125.94(a)(5)(ii). Where a variance is warranted, the permit-issuing authority must impose remedial measures that yield results "as close as practicable to the applicable performance standards." §125.94(a)(5)(i), (ii). </s> Respondents challenged the EPA's Phase II regulations, and the Second Circuit granted their petition for review and remanded the regulations to the EPA. The Second Circuit identified two ways in which the EPA could permissibly consider costs under 33 U.S.C. §1326(b): (1) in determining whether the costs of remediation "can be 'reasonably borne' by the industry," and (2) in determining which remedial technologies are the most cost-effective, that is, the technologies that reach a specified level of benefit at the lowest cost. 475 F.3d, at 99-100. See also id., at 98, and n.10. It concluded, however, that cost-benefit analysis, which "compares the costs and benefits of various ends, and chooses the end with the best net benefits," id., at 98, is impermissible under §1326(b), id., at 100. </s> The Court of Appeals held the site-specific cost-benefit variance provision to be unlawful. Id., at 114. Finding it unclear whether the EPA had relied on cost-benefit analysis in setting the national performance standards, or had only used cost-effectiveness analysis, it remanded to the agency for clarification of that point. Id., at 104-105. (The remand was also based on other grounds which are not at issue here.) The EPA suspended operation of the Phase II rules pending further rulemaking. 72 Fed. Reg. 37107 (2007). We then granted certiorari limited to the following question: "Whether [§1326(b)] ... authorizes the [EPA] to compare costs with benefits in determining 'the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact' at cooling water intake structures." 552 U. S. ___ (2008). II </s> In setting the Phase II national performance standards and providing for site-specific cost-benefit variances, the EPA relied on its view that §1326(b)'s "best technology available" standard permits consideration of the technology's costs, 69 Fed. Reg. 41626, and of the relationship between those costs and the environmental benefits produced, id., at 41603. That view governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute--not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-844 (1984).4 As we have described, §1326(b) instructs the EPA to set standards for cooling water intake structures that reflect "the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact." The Second Circuit took that language to mean the technology that achieves the greatest reduction in adverse environmental impacts at a cost that can reasonably be borne by the industry. 475 F.3d, at 99-100. That is certainly a plausible interpretation of the statute. The "best" technology--that which is "most advantageous," Webster's New International Dictionary 258 (2d ed. 1953)--may well be the one that produces the most of some good, here a reduction in adverse environmental impact. But "best technology" may also describe the technology that most efficiently produces some good. In common parlance one could certainly use the phrase "best technology" to refer to that which produces a good at the lowest per-unit cost, even if it produces a lesser quantity of that good than other available technologies. </s> Respondents contend that this latter reading is precluded by the statute's use of the phrase "for minimizing adverse environmental impact." Minimizing, they argue, means reducing to the smallest amount possible, and the "best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impacts," must be the economically feasible technology that achieves the greatest possible reduction in environmental harm. Brief for Respondents Riverkeeper, Inc. etal. 25-26. But "minimize" is a term that admits of degree and is not necessarily used to refer exclusively to the "greatest possible reduction." For example, elsewhere in the Clean Water Act, Congress declared that the procedures implementing the Act "shall encourage the drastic minimization of paperwork and interagency decision procedures." 33 U.S.C. §1251(f). If respondents' definition of the term "minimize" is correct, the statute's use of the modifier "drastic" is superfluous. </s> Other provisions in the Clean Water Act also suggest the agency's interpretation. When Congress wished to mandate the greatest feasible reduction in water pollution, it did so in plain language: The provision governing the discharge of toxic pollutants into the Nation's waters requires the EPA to set "effluent limitations [which] shall require the elimination of discharges of all pollutants if the Administrator finds ... that such elimination is technologically and economically achievable," §1311(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). See also §1316(a)(1) (mandating "where practicable, a standard [for new point sources] permitting no discharge of pollutants" (emphasis added)). Section 1326(b)'s use of the less ambitious goal of "minimizing adverse environmental impact" suggests, we think, that the agency retains some discretion to determine the extent of reduction that is warranted under the circumstances. That determination could plausibly involve a consideration of the benefits derived from reductions and the costs of achieving them. Cf. 40 CFR §125.83 (defining "minimize" for purposes of the Phase I regulations as "reduc[ing] to the smallest amount, extent, or degree reasonably possible"). It seems to us, therefore, that the phrase "best technology available," even with the added specification "for minimizing adverse environmental impact," does not unambiguously preclude cost-benefit analysis.5 </s> Respondents' alternative (and, alas, also more complex) argument rests upon the structure of the Clean Water Act. The Act provided that during its initial implementation period existing "point sources"--discrete conveyances from which pollutants are or may be discharged, 33 U.S.C. §1362(14)--were subject to "effluent limitations ... which shall require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available." §1311(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). (We shall call this the "BPT" test.) Following that transition period, the Act initially mandated adoption, by July 1, 1983 (later extended to March 31, 1989), of stricter effluent limitations requiring "application of the best available technology economically achievable for such category or class, which will result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants." §1311(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added); see EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U.S. 64, 69-70 (1980). (We shall call this the "BATEA" test.) Subsequent amendment limited application of this standard to toxic and nonconventional pollutants, and for the remainder established a (presumably laxer) test of "best conventional-pollutant control technology." §1311(b)(2)(E).6 (We shall call this "BCT.") Finally, §1316 subjected certain categories of new point sources to "the greatest degree of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology." §1316(a)(1) (emphasis added); §1316(b)(1)(B). (We shall call this the "BADT" test.) The provision at issue here, applicable not to effluents but to cooling water intake structures, requires, as we have described, "the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact," §1326(b) (emphasis added). (We shall call this the "BTA" test.) </s> The first four of these tests are elucidated by statutory factor lists that guide their implementation. To take the standards in (presumed) order of increasing stringency, see Crushed Stone, supra, at 69-70: In applying the BPT test the EPA is instructed to consider, among other factors, "the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved." §1314(b)(1)(B). In applying the BCT test it is instructed to consider "the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived." §1314(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). And in applying the BATEA and BADT tests the EPA is instructed to consider the "cost of achieving such effluent reduction." §§1314(b)(2)(B), 1316(b)(1)(B). There is no such elucidating language applicable to the BTA test at issue here. To facilitate comparison, the texts of these five tests, the clarifying factors applicable to them, and the entities to which they apply are set forth in the Appendix, infra. </s> The Second Circuit, in rejecting the EPA's use of cost-benefit analysis, relied in part on the propositions that (1) cost-benefit analysis is precluded under the BATEA and BADT tests; and (2) that, insofar as the permissibility of cost-benefit analysis is concerned, the BTA test (the one at issue here) is to be treated the same as those two. See 475 F.3d, at 98. It is not obvious to us that the first of these propositions is correct, but we need not pursue that point, since we assuredly do not agree with the second. It is certainly reasonable for the agency to conclude that the BTA test need not be interpreted to permit only what those other two tests permit. Its text is not identical to theirs. It has the relatively modest goal of "minimizing adverse environmental impact" as compared with the BATEA's goal of "eliminating the discharge of all pollutants." And it is unencumbered by specified statutory factors of the sort provided for those other two tests, which omission can reasonably be interpreted to suggest that the EPA is accorded greater discretion in determining its precise content. </s> Respondents and the dissent argue that the mere fact that §1326(b) does not expressly authorize cost-benefit analysis for the BTA test, though it does so for two of the other tests, displays an intent to forbid its use. This surely proves too much. For while it is true that two of the other tests authorize cost-benefit analysis, it is also true that all four of the other tests expressly authorize some consideration of costs. Thus, if respondents' and the dissent's conclusion regarding the import of §1326(b)'s silence is correct, it is a fortiori true that the BTA test permits no consideration of cost whatsoever, not even the "cost-effectiveness" and "feasibility" analysis that the Second Circuit approved, see supra, at 6, that the dissent would approve, post, at 1-2, and that respondents acknowledge. The inference that respondents and the dissent would draw from the silence is, in any event, implausible, as §1326(b) is silent not only with respect to cost-benefit analysis but with respect to all potentially relevant factors. If silence here implies prohibition, then the EPA could not consider any factors in implementing §1326(b)--an obvious logical impossibility. It is eminently reasonable to conclude that §1326(b)'s silence is meant to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency's hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so to what degree. </s> Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, see post, at 3-4, our decisions in Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001), and American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), do not undermine this conclusion. In American Trucking, we held that the text of §109 of the Clean Air Act, "interpreted in its statutory and historical context ... unambiguously bars cost considerations" in setting air quality standards under that provision. 531 U.S., at 471. The relevant "statutory context" included other provisions in the Clean Air Act that expressly authorized consideration of costs, whereas §109 did not. Id., at 467-468. American Trucking thus stands for the rather unremarkable proposition that sometimes statutory silence, when viewed in context, is best interpreted as limiting agency discretion. For the reasons discussed earlier, §1326(b)'s silence cannot bear that interpretation. </s> In American Textile, the Court relied in part on a statute's failure to mention cost-benefit analysis in holding that the relevant agency was not required to engage in cost-benefit analysis in setting certain health and safety standards. 452 U.S., at 510-512. But under Chevron, that an agency is not required to do so does not mean that an agency is not permitted to do so. </s> This extended consideration of the text of §1326(b), and comparison of that with the text and statutory factors applicable to four parallel provisions of the Clean Water Act, lead us to the conclusion that it was well within the bounds of reasonable interpretation for the EPA to conclude that cost-benefit analysis is not categorically forbidden. Other arguments may be available to preclude such a rigorous form of cost-benefit analysis as that which was prescribed under the statute's former BPT standard, which required weighing "the total cost of application of technology" against "the ... benefits to be achieved." See, supra, at 10. But that question is not before us. </s> In the Phase II requirements challenged here the EPA sought only to avoid extreme disparities between costs and benefits. The agency limited variances from the Phase II "national performance standards" to circumstances where the costs are "significantly greater than the benefits" of compliance. 40 CFR §125.94(a)(5)(ii). In defining the "national performance standards" themselves the EPA assumed the application of technologies whose benefits "approach those estimated" for closed-cycle cooling systems at a fraction of the cost: $389 million per year, 69 Fed. Reg. 41666, as compared with (1) at least $3.5 billion per year to operate compliant closed-cycle cooling systems, id., at 41605 (or $1 billion per year to impose similar requirements on a subset of Phase II facilities, id., at 41606), and (2) significant reduction in the energy output of the altered facilities, id., at 41605. And finally, EPA's assessment of the relatively meager financial benefits of the Phase II regulations that it adopted--reduced impingement and entrainment of 1.4 billion aquatic organisms, id., at 41661, Exh. XII-6, with annualized use-benefits of $83 million, id., at 41662, and non-use benefits of indeterminate value, id., at 41660-41661--when compared to annual costs of $389 million, demonstrates quite clearly that the agency did not select the Phase II regulatory requirements because their benefits equaled their costs. </s> While not conclusive, it surely tends to show that the EPA's current practice is a reasonable and hence legitimate exercise of its discretion to weigh benefits against costs that the agency has been proceeding in essentially this fashion for over 30 years. See Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219-220 (2002). As early as 1977, the agency determined that, while §1326(b) does not require cost-benefit analysis, it is also not reasonable to "interpret Section [1326(b)] as requiring use of technology whose cost is wholly disproportionate to the environmental benefit to be gained." Inre Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, 1 E.A.D. 332, 340 (1977). See also Inre Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp., EPA Decision of the General Counsel, NPDES Permits, No. 63, pp. 371, 381 (July 29, 1977) ("EPA ultimately must demonstrate that the present value of the cumulative annual cost of modifications to cooling water intake structures is not wholly out of proportion to the magnitude of the estimated environmental gains"); Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 597 F.2d 306, 311 (CA1 1979) (rejecting challenge to an EPA permit decision that was based in part on the agency's determination that further restrictions would be "'wholly disproportionate to any environmental benefit'"). While the EPA's prior "wholly disproportionate" standard may be somewhat different from its current "significantly greater than" standard, there is nothing in the statute that would indicate that the former is a permissible interpretation while the latter is not. </s> Indeed, in its review of the EPA's Phase I regulations, the Second Circuit seemed to recognize that §1326(b) permits some form of cost-benefit analysis. In considering a challenge to the EPA's rejection of dry cooling systems7 as the "best technology available" for Phase I facilities the Second Circuit noted that "while it certainly sounds substantial that dry cooling is 95 percent more effective than closed-cycle cooling, it is undeniably relevant that that difference represents a relatively small improvement over closed-cycle cooling at a very significant cost." Riverkeeper, 358 F.3d, at 194, n. 22. And in the decision below rejecting the use of cost-benefit analysis in the Phase II regulations, the Second Circuit nonetheless interpreted "best technology available" as mandating only those technologies that can "be reasonably borne by the industry." 475 F.3d, at 99. But whether it is "reasonable" to bear a particular cost may well depend on the resulting benefits; if the only relevant factor was the feasibility of the costs, their reasonableness would be irrelevant. </s> In the last analysis, even respondents ultimately recognize that some form of cost-benefit analysis is permissible. They acknowledge that the statute's language is "plainly not so constricted as to require EPA to require industry petitioners to spend billions to save one more fish or plankton." Brief for Respondents Riverkeeper, Inc. etal. 29. This concedes the principle--the permissibility of at least some cost-benefit analysis--and we see no statutory basis for limiting its use to situations where the benefits are de minimis rather than significantly disproportionate. *  *  * </s> We conclude that the EPA permissibly relied on cost-benefit analysis in setting the national performance standards and in providing for cost-benefit variances from those standards as part of the Phase II regulations. The Court of Appeals' reliance in part on the agency's use of cost-benefit analysis in invalidating the site-specific cost-benefit variance provision, 475 F.3d, at 114, was therefore in error, as was its remand of the national performance standards for clarification of whether cost-benefit analysis was impermissibly used, id., at 104-105. We of course express no view on the remaining bases for the Second Circuit's remand which did not depend on the permissibility of cost-benefit analysis. See id., at 108, 110, 113, 115, 117, 120.8 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT </s> Statutory </s> Standard </s> Statutorily Mandated Factors </s> Entities </s> Subject to Regulation BPT: </s> "[E]ffluent limitations ... which shall require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available." 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). </s> "Factors relating to the assessment of best practicable control technology currently available ... shall include consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved." 33 U.S.C. §1314(b)(1)(B). </s> Existing point sources during the Clean Water Act's initial implementation phase. </s> BCT: </s> "[E]ffluent limitations ... which shall require application of the best conventional pollutant control technology." 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(2)(E) (emphasis added). </s> "Factors relating to the assessment of best conventional pollutant control technology ... shall include consideration of the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived." 33 U.S.C. §1314(b)(4)(B). </s> Existing point sources that discharge "conventional pollutants" as defined by the EPA under 33 U.S.C. §1314(a)(4). </s> BATEA: </s> "[E]ffluent limitations ... which ... shall require application of the best available technology economically achievable ... which will result in reasonable further progress toward the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants." 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). </s> "Factors relating to the assessment of best available technology shall take into account ... the cost of achieving such effluent reduction." 33 U.S.C. §1314(b)(2)(B). </s> Existing point sources that discharge toxic pollutants and non-conventional pollutants. </s> BADT: </s> "[A] standard for the control of the discharge of pollutants which reflects the greatest degree of effluent reduction with the Administrator determines to be achievable through application of the best available demonstrated control technology." 33 U.S.C. §1316(a)(1) (emphasis added). </s> "[T]he Administrator shall take into consideration the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, and any non-water quality environmental impact and energy requirements." 33 U.S.C. §1316(b)(1)(B). </s> New point sources within the categories of sources identified by the EPA under 33 U.S.C. §1316(b)(1)(A). </s> BTA: </s> "Any standard ... applicable to a point source shall require that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact." 33 U.S.C. §1326(b). </s> N/A Point sources that operate cooling water intake structures. </s> ENTERGY CORPORATION, PETITIONER </s> 07-588v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. </s> PSEG FOSSIL LLC, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 07-589v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. </s> UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP, PETITIONER </s> 07-597v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit [April 1, 2009] </s> Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting. </s> Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §1326(b), which governs industrial powerplant water intake structures, provides that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA or Agency) "shall require" that such structures "reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact." The EPA has interpreted that mandate to authorize the use of cost-benefit analysis in promulgating regulations under §316(b). For instance, under the Agency's interpretation, technology that would otherwise qualify as the best available need not be used if its costs are "significantly greater than the benefits" of compliance. 40 CFR §125.94(a)(5)(ii) (2008). </s> Like the Court of Appeals, I am convinced that the EPA has misinterpreted the plain text of §316(b). Unless costs are so high that the best technology is not "available," Congress has decided that they are outweighed by the benefits of minimizing adverse environmental impact. Section 316(b) neither expressly nor implicitly authorizes the EPA to use cost-benefit analysis when setting regulatory standards; fairly read, it prohibits such use. I </s> As typically performed by the EPA, cost-benefit analysis requires the Agency to first monetize the costs and benefits of a regulation, balance the results, and then choose the regulation with the greatest net benefits. The process is particularly controversial in the environmental context in which a regulation's financial costs are often more obvious and easier to quantify than its environmental benefits. And cost-benefit analysis often, if not always, yields a result that does not maximize environmental protection. For instance, although the EPA estimated that water intake structures kill 3.4 billion fish and shellfish each year,1 see 69 Fed. Reg. 41586, the Agency struggled to calculate the value of the aquatic life that would be protected under its §316(b) regulations, id., at 41661. To compensate, the EPA took a shortcut: Instead of monetizing all aquatic life, the Agency counted only those species that are commercially or recreationally harvested, a tiny slice (1.8 percent to be precise) of all impacted fish and shellfish. This narrow focus in turn skewed the Agency's calculation of benefits. When the EPA attempted to value all aquatic life, the benefits measured $735 million.2 But when the EPA decided to give zero value to the 98.2 percent of fish not commercially or recreationally harvested, the benefits calculation dropped dramatically--to $83 million. Id., at 41666. The Agency acknowledged that its failure to monetize the other 98.2 percent of affected species "'could result in serious misallocation of resources,'" id., at 41660, because its "comparison of complete costs and incomplete benefits does not provide an accurate picture of net benefits to society."3 </s> Because benefits can be more accurately monetized in some industries than in others, Congress typically decides whether it is appropriate for an agency to use cost-benefit analysis in crafting regulations. Indeed, this Court has recognized that "[w]hen Congress has intended that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the face of the statute." American Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981). Accordingly, we should not treat a provision's silence as an implicit source of cost-benefit authority, particularly when such authority is elsewhere expressly granted and it has the potential to fundamentally alter an agency's approach to regulation. Congress, we have noted, "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions--it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes." Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 467-468 (2001). </s> When interpreting statutory silence in the past, we have sought guidance from a statute's other provisions. Evidence that Congress confronted an issue in some parts of a statute, while leaving it unaddressed in others, can demonstrate that Congress meant its silence to be decisive. We concluded as much in American Trucking. In that case, the Court reviewed the EPA's claim that §109 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §7409(a) (2000 ed.), authorized the Agency to consider implementation costs in setting ambient air quality standards. We read §109, which was silent on the matter, to prohibit Agency reliance on cost considerations. After examining other provisions in which Congress had given the Agency authority to consider costs, the Court "refused to find implicit in ambiguous sections of the CAA an authorization to consider costs that has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted." 531 U.S., at 467. Studied silence, we thus concluded, can be as much a prohibition as an explicit "no." </s> Further motivating the Court in American Trucking was the fact that incorporating implementation costs into the Agency's calculus risked countermanding Congress' decision to protect public health. The cost of implementation, we said, "is both so indirectly related to public health and so full of potential for canceling the conclusions drawn from direct health effects that it would surely have been expressly mentioned in [the text] had Congress meant it to be considered." Id., at 469. </s> American Trucking's approach should have guided the Court's reading of §316(b). Nowhere in the text of §316(b) does Congress explicitly authorize the use of cost-benefit analysis as it does elsewhere in the CWA. And the use of cost-benefit analysis, like the consideration of implementation costs in American Trucking, "pad[s]" §316(b)'s environmental mandate with tangential economic efficiency concerns. Id., at 468. Yet the majority fails to follow American Trucking despite that case's obvious relevance to our inquiry. II </s> In 1972, Congress amended the CWA to strike a careful balance between the country's energy demands and its desire to protect the environment. The Act required industry to adopt increasingly advanced technology capable of mitigating its detrimental environmental impact. Not all point sources were subject to strict rules at once. Existing plants were granted time to retrofit with the best technology while new plants were required to incorporate such technology as a matter of design. Although Congress realized that technology standards would necessarily put some firms out of business, see EPA v. National Crushed Stone Assn., 449 U.S. 64, 79 (1980), the statute's steady march was toward stricter rules and potentially higher costs. Section §316(b) was an integral part of the statutory scheme. The provision instructs that "[a]ny standard established pursuant to section 1311 of this title or section 1316 of this title and applicable to a point source shall require that the location, design, construction, and capacity of cooling water intake structures reflect the best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact." 33 U.S.C. §1326(b) (2006 ed.) (emphasis added).4 The "best technology available," or "BTA," standard delivers a clear command: To minimize the adverse environmental impact of water intake structures, the EPA must require industry to adopt the best technology available. </s> Based largely on the observation that §316(b)'s text offers little guidance and therefore delegates some amount of gap-filling authority to the EPA, the Court concludes that the Agency has discretion to rely on cost-benefit analysis. See ante, at 11-12. The Court assumes that, by not specifying how the EPA is to determine BTA, Congress intended to give considerable discretion to the EPA to decide how to proceed. Silence, in the majority's view, represents ambiguity and an invitation for the Agency to decide for itself which factors should govern its regulatory approach. </s> The appropriate analysis requires full consideration of the CWA's structure and legislative history to determine whether Congress contemplated cost-benefit analysis and, if so, under what circumstances it directed the EPA to utilize it. This approach reveals that Congress granted the EPA authority to use cost-benefit analysis in some contexts but not others, and that Congress intend to control, not delegate, when cost-benefit analysis should be used. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984).5 </s> Powerful evidence of Congress' decision not to authorize cost-benefit analysis in the BTA standard lies in the series of standards adopted to regulate the outflow, or effluent, from industrial powerplants. Passed at the same time as the BTA standard at issue here, the effluent limitation standards imposed increasingly strict technology requirements on industry. In each effluent limitation provision, Congress distinguished its willingness to allow the EPA to consider costs from its willingness to allow the Agency to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. And to the extent Congress permitted cost-benefit analysis, its use was intended to be temporary and exceptional. </s> The first tier of technology standards applied to existing plants--facilities for which retrofitting would be particularly costly. Congress required these plants to adopt "effluent limitations ... which shall require the application of the best practicable control technology currently available." 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(1)(A). Because this "best practicable," or "BPT," standard was meant to ease industry's transition to the new technology-based regime, Congress gave BPT two unique features: First, it would be temporary, remaining in effect only until July 1, 1983.6 Second, it specified that the EPA was to conduct a cost-benefit analysis in setting BPT requirements by considering "the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application."7 §1314(b)(1)(B). Permitting cost-benefit analysis in BPT gave the EPA the ability to cushion the new technology requirement. For a limited time, a technology with costs that exceeded its benefits would not be considered "best." </s> The second tier of technology standards required existing powerplants to adopt the "best available technology economically achievable" to advance "the national goal of eliminating the discharge of all pollutants." §1311(b)(2)(A). In setting this "best available technology," or "BAT,"8 standard, Congress gave the EPA a notably different command for deciding what technology would qualify as "best": The EPA was to consider, among other factors, "the cost of achieving such effluent reduction," but Congress did not grant it authority to balance costs with the benefits of stricter regulation. §1314(b)(2)(B). Indeed, in Crushed Stone this Court explained that the difference between BPT and BAT was the existence of cost-benefit authority in the first and the absence of that authority in the second. See 449 U.S., at 71 ("Similar directions are given the Administrator for determining effluent reductions attainable from the BAT except that in assessing BAT total cost is no longer to be considered in comparison to effluent reduction benefits"). </s> The BAT standard's legislative history strongly supports the view that Congress purposefully withheld cost-benefit authority for this tier of regulation. See ibid., n.10. The House of Representatives and the Senate split over the role cost-benefit analysis would play in the BAT provision. The House favored the tool, see H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 107 (1972), 1 Leg. Hist. 794, while the Senate rejected it, see 2 id., at 1183; id., at 1132. The Senate view ultimately prevailed in the final legislation, resulting in a BAT standard that was "not subject to any test of cost in relation to effluent reduction benefits or any form of cost/benefit analysis." 3 Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977: A Continuation of the Legislative History of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 95-14, p. 427 (1978). </s> The third and strictest regulatory tier was reserved for new point sources--facilities that could incorporate technology improvements into their initial design. These new facilities were required to adopt "the best available demonstrated control technology," or "BADT," which Congress described as "a standard ... which reflect[s] the greatest degree of effluent reduction." §1316(a)(1). In administering BADT, Congress directed the EPA to consider "the cost of achieving such effluent reduction." §1316(b)(1)(B). But because BADT was meant to be the most stringent standard of all, Congress made no mention of cost-benefit analysis. Again, the silence was intentional. The House's version of BADT originally contained an exemption for point sources for which "the economic, social, and environmental costs bear no reasonable relationship to the economic, social, and environmental benefit to be obtained." 1 Leg. Hist. 798. That this exemption did not appear in the final legislation demonstrates that Congress considered, and rejected, reliance on cost-benefit analysis for BADT. </s> It is in this light that the BTA standard regulating water intake structures must be viewed. The use of cost-benefit analysis was a critical component of the CWA's structure and a key concern in the legislative process. We should therefore conclude that Congress intended to forbid cost-benefit analysis in one provision of the Act in which it was silent on the matter when it expressly authorized its use in another.9 See, e.g., Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 7-8); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another ... , it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion" (internal quotation marks omitted)). This is particularly true given Congress' decision that cost-benefit analysis would play a temporary and exceptional role in the CWA to help existing plants transition to the Act's ambitious environmental standards.10 Allowing cost-benefit analysis in the BTA standard, a permanent mandate applicable to all powerplants, serves no such purpose and instead fundamentally weakens the provision's mandate.11 </s> Accordingly, I would hold that the EPA is without authority to perform cost-benefit analysis in setting BTA standards. To the extent the EPA relied on cost-benefit analysis in establishing its BTA regulations,12 that action was contrary to law, for Congress directly foreclosed such reliance in the statute itself.13 Chevron, 467 U.S., at 843. Because we granted certiorari to decide only whether the EPA has authority to conduct cost-benefit analysis, there is no need to define the universe of considerations upon which the EPA can properly rely in administering the BTA standard. I would leave it to the Agency to decide how to proceed in the first instance. III </s> Because the Court unsettles the scheme Congress established, I respectfully dissent. </s> ENTERGY CORPORATION, PETITIONER </s> 07-588v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. </s> PSEG FOSSIL LLC, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 07-589v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. </s> UTILITY WATER ACT GROUP, PETITIONER </s> 07-597v. </s> RIVERKEEPER, INC., etal. on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit [April 1, 2009] </s> Justice Breyer, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I agree with the Court that the relevant statutory language authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to compare costs and benefits. Ante, at 7-13. Nonetheless the drafting history and legislative history of related provisions, Pub. L. 92-500, §§301, 304, 86 Stat. 844, 850, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§1311, 1314, makes clear that those who sponsored the legislation intended the law's text to be read as restricting, though not forbidding, the use of cost-benefit comparisons. And I would apply that text accordingly. I </s> Section 301 provides that, not later than 1977, effluent limitations for point sources shall require the application of "best practicable control technology," §301(b)(1)(A), 86 Stat. 845 (emphasis added); and that, not later than 1983 (later extended to 1989), effluent limitations for categories and classes of point sources shall require application of the "best available technology economically achievable," §301(b)(2)(A), ibid. (emphasis added). Section 304(b), in turn, identifies the factors that the Agency shall take into account in determining (1) "best practicable control technology" and (2) "best available technology." 86 Stat. 851 (emphasis added). With respect to the first, the statute provides that the factors taken into account by the Agency "shall include consideration of the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from such application ... and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate." §304(b)(1)(B), ibid. With respect to the second, the statute says that the Agency "shall take into account . . . the cost of achieving such effluent reduction" and "such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate." §304(b)(2)(B), ibid. </s> The drafting history makes clear that the statute reflects a compromise. In the House version of the legislation, the Agency was to consider "the cost and the economic, social, and environmental impact of achieving such effluent reduction" when determining both "best practicable" and "best available" technology. H.R. 11896, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., §§304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (1972) (as reported from committee). The House Report explained that the "best available technology" standard was needed--as opposed to mandating the elimination of discharge of pollutants--because "the difference in the cost of 100 percent elimination of pollutants as compared to the cost of removal of 97-99 percent of the pollutants in an effluent can far exceed any reasonable benefit to be achieved. In most cases, the cost of removal of the last few percentage points increases expo[n]entially." H.R. Rep. No. 92-911, p. 103 (1972). </s> In the Senate version, the Agency was to consider "the cost of achieving such effluent reduction" when determining both "best practicable" and "best available" technology. S. 2770, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., §§304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (1971) (as reported from committee). The Senate Report explains that "the technology must be available at a cost ... which the Administrator determines to be reasonable." S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 52 (1971) (hereinafter S.Rep.). But it said nothing about comparing costs and benefits. </s> The final statute reflects a modification of the House's language with respect to "best practicable," and an adoption of the Senate's language with respect to "best available." S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, pp. 124-125 (1972). The final statute does not require the Agency to compare costs to benefits when determining "best available technology," but neither does it expressly forbid such a comparison. </s> The strongest evidence in the legislative history supporting the respondents' position--namely, that Congress intended to forbid comparisons of costs and benefits when determining the "best available technology"--can be found in a written discussion of the Act's provisions distributed to the Senate by Senator Edmund Muskie, the Act's principal sponsor, when he submitted the Conference Report for the Senate's consideration. 118 Cong. Rec. 33693 (1972). The relevant part of that discussion points out that, as to "best practicable technology," the statute requires application of a "balancing test between total cost and effluent reduction benefits." Id., at 33696; see §304(b)(1)(B). But as to "best available technology," it states: "While cost should be a factor in the Administrator's judgment, no balancing test will be required." Ibid.; see §304(b)(2)(B). And Senator Muskie's discussion later speaks of the agency "evaluat[ing] ... what needs to be done" to eliminate pollutant discharge and "what is achievable," both "without regard to cost." Ibid. </s> As this language suggests, the Act's sponsors had reasons for minimizing the EPA's investigation of, and reliance upon, cost-benefit comparisons. The preparation of formal cost-benefit analyses can take too much time, thereby delaying regulation. And the sponsors feared that such analyses would emphasize easily quantifiable factors over more qualitative factors (particularly environmental factors, for example, the value of preserving non-marketable species of fish). See S.Rep., at 47. Above all, they hoped that minimizing the use of cost-benefit comparisons would force the development of cheaper control technologies; and doing so, whatever the initial inefficiencies, would eventually mean cheaper, more effective cleanup. See id., at 50-51. </s> Nonetheless, neither the sponsors' language nor the underlying rationale requires the Act to be read in a way that would forbid cost-benefit comparisons. Any such total prohibition would be difficult to enforce, for every real choice requires a decisionmaker to weigh advantages against disadvantages, and disadvantages can be seen in terms of (often quantifiable) costs. Moreover, an absolute prohibition would bring about irrational results. As the respondents themselves say, it would make no sense to require plants to "spend billions to save one more fish or plankton." Brief for Respondents Riverkeeper, Inc., etal. 29. That is so even if the industry might somehow afford those billions. And it is particularly so in an age of limited resources available to deal with grave environmental problems, where too much wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps more serious) problems. </s> Thus Senator Muskie used nuanced language, which one can read as leaving to the Agency a degree of authority to make cost-benefit comparisons in a manner that is sensitive both to the need for such comparisons and to the concerns that the law's sponsors expressed. The relevant statement begins by listing various factors that the statute requires the Administrator to take into account when applying the phrase "practicable" to "classes and categories." 118 Cong. Rec. 33696. It states that, when doing so, the Administrator must apply (as the statute specifies) a "balancing test between total cost and effluent reduction benefits." Ibid. At the same time, it seeks to reduce the likelihood that the Administrator will place too much weight upon high costs by adding that the balancing test "is intended to limit the application of technology only where the additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving" a "marginal level of reduction." Ibid. </s> Senator Muskie's statement then considers the "different test" that the statute requires the Administrator to apply when determining the "'best available'" technology. Ibid. (emphasis added). Under that test, the Administrator "may consider a broader range of technological alternatives." Ibid. And in determining what is "'best available' for a category or class, the Administrator is expected to apply the same principles involved in making the determination of 'best practicable' ... except as to cost-benefit analysis." Ibid. (emphasis added). That is, "[w]hile cost should be a factor . . . no balancing test will be required." Ibid. (emphasis added). Rather, "[t]he Administrator will be bound by a test of reasonableness." Ibid. (emphasis added). The statement adds that the "'best available'" standard "is intended to reflect the need to press toward increasingly higher levels of control." Ibid. (emphasis added). And "the reasonableness of what is 'economically achievable' should reflect an evaluation of what needs to be done to move toward the elimination of the discharge of pollutants and what is achievable through the application of available technology--without regard to cost." Ibid. (emphasis added). </s> I believe, as I said, that this language is deliberately nuanced. The statement says that where the statute uses the term "best practicable," the statute requires comparisons of costs and benefits; but where the statute uses the term "best available," such comparisons are not "required." Ibid. (emphasis added). Senator Muskie does not say that all efforts to compare costs and benefits are forbidden. </s> Moreover, the statement points out that where the statute uses the term "best available," the Administrator "will be bound by a test of reasonableness." Ibid. (emphasis added). It adds that the Administrator should apply this test in a way that reflects its ideal objective, moving as closely as is technologically possible to the elimination of pollution. It thereby says the Administrator should consider, i.e., take into account, how much pollution would still remain if the best available technology were to be applied everywhere--"without regard to cost." Ibid. It does not say that the Administrator must set the standard based solely on the result of that determination. (It would be difficult to reconcile the alternative, more absolute reading of this language with the Senator's earlier "test of reasonableness.") </s> I say that one may, not that one must, read Senator Muskie's statement this way. But to read it differently would put the Agency in conflict with the test of reasonableness by threatening to impose massive costs far in excess of any benefit. For 30 years the EPA has read the statute and its history in this way. The EPA has thought that it would not be "reasonable to interpret Section 316(b) as requiring use of technology whose cost is wholly disproportionate to the environmental benefit to be gained." Inre Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), 1 E. A. D. 332, 340 (1977), remanded on other grounds, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (CA1 1978) (emphasis added); see also Inre Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., EPA Decision of the General Counsel, NPDES Permits, No. 63, p. 371 (July 29, 1977) (also applying a "wholly disproportionate" test); In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 1 E. A. D. 455 (1978) (same). "[T]his Court will normally accord particular deference to an agency interpretation of 'longstanding' duration." Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002). And for the last 30 years, the EPA has given the statute a permissive reading without suggesting that in doing so it was ignoring or thwarting the intent of the Congress that wrote the statute. </s> The EPA's reading of the statute would seem to permit it to describe environmental benefits in non-monetized terms and to evaluate both costs and benefits in accordance with its expert judgment and scientific knowledge. The Agency can thereby avoid lengthy formal cost-benefit proceedings and futile attempts at comprehensive monetization, see 69 Fed. Reg. 41661-41662; take account of Congress' technology-forcing objectives; and still prevent results that are absurd or unreasonable in light of extreme disparities between costs and benefits. This approach, in my view, rests upon a "reasonable interpretation" of the statute--legislative history included. Hence it is lawful. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Most of what the majority says is consistent with this view, and to that extent I agree with its opinion. II </s> The cases before us, however, present an additional problem. We here consider a rule that permits variances from national standards if a facility demonstrates that its costs would be "significantly greater than the benefits of complying." 40 CFR §125.94(a)(5)(ii) (2008). The words "significantly greater" differ from the words the EPA has traditionally used to describe its standard, namely, "wholly disproportionate." Perhaps the EPA does not mean to make much of that difference. But if it means the new words to set forth a new and different test, the EPA must adequately explain why it has changed its standard. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42-43 (1983); National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet, 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 524, n. 3 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting). I am not convinced the EPA has successfully explained the basis for the change. It has referred to the fact that existing facilities have less flexibility than new facilities with respect to installing new technologies, and it has pointed to special, energy-related impacts of regulation. 68 Fed. Reg. 13541 (2003) (proposed rule). But it has not explained why the traditional "wholly disproportionate" standard cannot do the job now, when the EPA has used that standard (for existing facilities and otherwise) with apparent success in the past. See, e.g., Central Hudson, supra. </s> Consequently, like the majority, I would remand these cases to the Court of Appeals. But unlike the majority I would permit that court to remand the cases to the EPA so that the EPA can either apply its traditional "wholly disproportionate" standard or provide an adequately reasoned explanation for the change. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote *Together with No. 07-589, PSEG Fossil LLC etal. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., etal., and No. 07-597, Utility Water Act Group v. Riverkeeper, Inc., etal., also on certiorari to the same court. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1The EPA and its Administrator appeared as respondents in support of petitioners. See Brief for Federal Parties as Respondents Supporting Petitioners. References to "respondents" throughout the opinion refer only to those parties challenging the EPA rules at issue in these cases. Footnote 2Closed-cycle cooling systems recirculate the water used to cool the facility, and consequently extract less water from the adjacent waterway, proportionately reducing impingement and entrainment. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 182, n.5 (CA2 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 41601, and n. 44 (2004). Footnote 3The EPA has also adopted Phase III rules for facilities not subject to the Phase I and Phase II regulations. 71 Fed. Reg. 35006 (2006). A challenge to those regulations is currently before the Fifth Circuit, where proceedings have been stayed pending disposition of these cases. See ConocoPhillips Co. v. EPA, No. 06-60662. Footnote 4The dissent finds it "puzzling" that we invoke this proposition (that a reasonable agency interpretation prevails) at the "outset," omitting the supposedly prior inquiry of "'whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.'" Post, at 6, n.5 (opinion of Stevens, J.) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S., at 842). But surely if Congress has directly spoken to an issue then any agency interpretation contradicting what Congress has said would be unreasonable. </s> What is truly "puzzling" is the dissent's accompanying charge that the Court's failure to conduct the Chevron step-one inquiry at the outset "reflects [its] reluctance to consider the possibility ... that Congress' silence may have meant to foreclose cost-benefit analysis." Post, at 6, n.5. Our discussion of that issue, infra, at 11, speaks for itself. Footnote 5Respondents concede that the term "available" is ambiguous, as it could mean either technologically feasible or economically feasible. But any ambiguity in the term "available" is largely irrelevant. Regardless of the criteria that render a technology "available," the EPA would still have to determine which available technology is the "best" one. And as discussed above, that determination may well involve consideration of the technology's relative costs and benefits. Footnote 6The statute does not contain a hyphen between the words "conventional" and "pollutant." "Conventional pollutant" is a statutory term, however, see 33 U.S.C. §1314(a)(4), and it is clear that in §1311(b)(2)(E) the adjective modifies "pollutant" rather than "control technology." The hyphen makes that clear. Footnote 7Dry cooling systems use air drafts to remove heat, and accordingly remove little or no water from surrounding water sources. See 66 Fed. Reg. 65282 (2001). Footnote 8Justice Breyer would remand for the additional reason of what he regards as the agency's inadequate explanation of the change in its criterion for variances--from a relationship of costs to benefits that is "'wholly disproportionate'" to one that is "'significantly greater.'" Post, at 7-8 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). That question can have no bearing upon whether the EPA can use cost-benefit analysis, which is the only question presented here. It seems to us, in any case, that the EPA's explanation was ample. It explained that the "wholly out of proportion" standard was inappropriate for the existing facilities subject to the Phase II rules because those facilities lack "the greater flexibility available to new facilities for selecting the location of their intakes and installing technologies at lower costs relative to the costs associated with retrofitting existing facilities," and because "economically impracticable impacts on energy prices, production costs, and energy production ... could occur if large numbers of Phase II existing facilities incurred costs that were more than 'significantly greater' than but not 'wholly out of proportion' to the costs in the EPA's record." 68 Fed. Reg. 13541 (2003). FOOTNOTESFootnote 1To produce energy, industrial powerplants withdraw billions of gallons of water daily from our Nation's waterways. Thermoelectric powerplants alone demand 39 percent of all freshwater withdrawn nationwide. See Dept. of Energy, Addressing the Critical Link Between Fossil Energy and Water 2 (Oct. 2005), http:// www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/coalpower/ewr/pubs/NETL_Water_Paper_Final_Oct.2005.pdf (all Internet materials as visited Mar. 18, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). The fish and shellfish are killed by "impingement" or "entrainment." Impingement occurs when aquatic organisms are trapped against the screens and grills of water intake structures. Entrainment occurs when these organisms are drawn into the intake structures. See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.3d 83, 89 (CA2 2007); 69 Fed. Reg. 41586 (2004). Footnote 2EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Proposed Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, p. D1-4 (EPA-821-R-02-001, Feb. 2002), http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits. Footnote 3EPA, Economic and Benefits Analysis for the Final Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule, p. D1-5 (EPA-821-R-04-005, Feb. 2004), http://www.epa.gov/waterscience/316b/phase2/econbenefits/final. htm. Footnote 4The two cross-referenced provisions, §§1311 and 1316, also establish "best technology" standards, the first applicable to existing point sources and the second to new facilities. The reference to these provisions in §316(b) merely requires any rule promulgated under those provisions, when applied to a point source with a water intake structure, to incorporate §316(b) standards. Footnote 5The majority announces at the outset that the EPA's reading of the BTA standard "governs if it is a reasonable interpretation of the statute--not necessarily the only possible interpretation, nor even the interpretation deemed most reasonable by the courts." Ante, at 7. This observation is puzzling in light of the commonly understood practice that, as a first step, we ask "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron, 467 U.S., at 842. Only later, if Congress' intent is not clear, do we consider the reasonableness of the agency's action. Id., at 843. Assuming ambiguity and moving to the second step reflects the Court's reluctance to consider the possibility, which it later laments is "more complex," ante, at 9, that Congress' silence may have meant to foreclose cost-benefit analysis. Footnote 6Congress later extended the deadline to March 31, 1989. Footnote 7Senator Muskie, the Senate sponsor of the legislation, described the cost-benefit analysis permitted under BPT as decidedly narrow, asserting that "[t]he balancing test between total cost and effluent reduction benefits is intended to limit the application of technology only where the additional degree of effluent reduction is wholly out of proportion to the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction for any class or category of sources." 1 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, p. 170 (1973) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.) Footnote 8Although the majority calls this "BATEA," the parties refer to the provision as "BAT," and for simplicity, so will I. Footnote 9The Court argues that, if silence in §316(b) signals the prohibition of cost-benefit analysis, it must also foreclose the consideration of all other potentially relevant discretionary factors in setting BTA standards. Ante, at 12. This all-or-nothing reasoning rests on the deeply flawed assumption that Congress treated cost-benefit analysis as just one among many factors upon which the EPA could potentially rely to establish BTA. Yet, as explained above, the structure and legislative history of the CWA demonstrate that Congress viewed cost-benefit analysis with special skepticism and controlled its use accordingly. The Court's assumption of equivalence is thus plainly incorrect. Properly read, Congress' silence in §316(b) forbids reliance on the cost-benefit tool but does not foreclose reliance on all other considerations, such as a determination whether a technology is so costly that it is not "available" for industry to adopt. Footnote 10In 1977, Congress established an additional technology-based standard, commonly referred to as "best conventional pollutant control technology," or "BCT," to govern conventional pollutants previously covered by the BAT standard. See 33 U.S.C. §1311(b)(2)(E). The BCT standard required the EPA to consider, among other factors, "the relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits derived." §1314(b)(4)(B). That Congress expressly authorized cost-benefit analysis in BCT further confirms that Congress treated cost-benefit analysis as exceptional and reserved for itself the authority to decide when it would be used in the Act. Footnote 11The Court attempts to cabin its holding by suggesting that a "rigorous form of cost-benefit analysis," such as the form "prescribed under the statute's former BPT standard," may not be permitted for setting BTA regulations. Ante, at 13. Thus the Court has effectively instructed the Agency that it can perform a cost-benefit analysis so long as it does not resemble the kind of cost-benefit analysis Congress elsewhere authorized in the CWA. The majority's suggested limit on the Agency's discretion can only be read as a concession that cost-benefit analysis, as typically performed, may be inconsistent with the BTA mandate. Footnote 12The "national performance standards" the EPA adopted were shaped by economic efficiency concerns at the expense of finding the technology that best minimizes adverse environmental impact. In its final rulemaking, the Agency declined to require industrial plants to adopt closed-cycle cooling technology, which by recirculating cooling water requires less water to be withdrawn and thus fewer aquatic organisms to be killed. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 182, n.5 (CA2 2004); 69 Fed. Reg. 41601, and n.44. This the Agency decided despite its acknowledgment that "closed-cycle, recirculating cooling systems ... can reduce mortality from impingement by up to 98 percent and entrainment by up to 98 percent." Id., at 41601. The EPA instead permitted individual plants to resort to a "suite" of options so long as the method used reduced impingement and entrainment by the more modest amount of 80 and 60 percent, respectively. See 40 CFR §125.94(b). The Agency also permitted individual plants to obtain a site-specific variance from the national performance standards if they could prove (1) that compliance costs would be "significantly greater than" those the Agency considered when establishing the standards, or (2) that compliance costs "would be significantly greater than the benefits of complying with the applicable performance standards," §125.94(a)(5). Footnote 13Thus, the Agency's past reliance on a "wholly disproportionate" standard, a mild variant of cost-benefit analysis, is irrelevant. See ante, at 14. Because "Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue," Chevron, 467 U.S., at 842, longstanding yet impermissible agency practice cannot ripen into permissible agency practice.

United States Supreme Court WAINWRIGHT v. TORNA(1982) No. 81-362 Argued: Decided: March 22, 1982 </s> Held: </s> The Federal District Court properly dismissed respondent state prisoner's habeas corpus petition asserting that he had been denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel because an application for certiorari - filed by his retained counsel in the Florida Supreme Court to review the Florida District Court of Appeal's affirmance of respondent's state conviction - had been dismissed as not having been timely filed. Respondent did not contest the District Court's finding that review by the Florida Supreme Court was discretionary. Since a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals, Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 , respondent could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to file a timely application. </s> Certiorari granted; 649 F.2d 290, reversed. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Respondent is in custody pursuant to several felony convictions that were affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida. Torna v. State, 358 So.2d 1109 (1978). The Florida Supreme Court dismissed an application for a writ of certiorari, on the ground that the application was not filed timely. 1 362 So.2d 1057 (1978). A petition for rehearing and clarification was later denied. App. to Pet. for Cert. A-15. </s> Respondent thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, contending that he had been denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel by the failure of his retained [455 U.S. 586, 587] counsel to file the application for certiorari timely. The District Court denied the petition on the ground that the failure to file a timely application for certiorari did not render counsel's actions "so grossly deficient as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair." Id., at A-22. In reaching this conclusion, the District Court noted that review by the Florida Supreme Court was discretionary; "[f]ailure of counsel to timely petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, therefore, only prevented [respondent] from applying for further discretionary review." Id., at A-28. The Court of Appeals reversed. 649 F.2d 290 (CA5 1981). 2 </s> In Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), this Court held that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals or applications for review in this Court. Respondent does not contest the finding of the District Court that he had no absolute right to appeal his convictions to the Florida Supreme Court. 3 Since respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, he [455 U.S. 586, 588] could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel by his retained counsel's failure to file the application timely. 4 The District Court was correct in dismissing the petition. </s> The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted. The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN would set the case for oral argument. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "It appearing to the Court that the notice was not timely filed, it is ordered that the cause is hereby dismissed sua sponte, subject to reinstatement if timeliness is established on proper motion filed within fifteen days from the date of this order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.120." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-13. </s> [Footnote 2 Citing its decision in Pressley v. Wainwright, 540 F.2d 818 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 987 (1977), the court first noted that "the failure of court-appointed counsel to file a timely notice of certiorari in the Florida Supreme Court has been held to constitute ineffective assistance." 649 F.2d, at 291. On the basis of the recent decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), the court then stated that "there is no distinction between court-appointed and privately retained counsel in the evaluation of a claim of ineffective assistance." 649 F.2d, at 292. Finally, the court quoted its recent decision in Perez v. Wainwright, 640 F.2d 596, 598 (1981), for the proposition that "`when a lawyer . . . does not perform his promise to his client that an appeal will be taken, fairness requires that the deceived defendant be granted an out-of-time appeal.'" 649 F.2d, at 292. On the basis of these statements, the court reversed "the district court's denial of the writ of habeas corpus," ibid., and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. </s> [Footnote 3 Like this Court, the Florida Supreme Court has a limited mandatory appellate jurisdiction. See Fla. Const., Art. V, 3. Respondent has never contended, however, that he had a right of review under that jurisdiction. Thus, we need not determine the extent of the right to counse in such a case. </s> [Footnote 4 Respondent was not denied due process of law by the fact that counsel deprived him of his right to petition the Florida Supreme Court for review. Such deprivation - even if implicating a due process interest - was caused by his counsel, and not by the State. Certainly, the actions of the Florida Supreme Court in dismissing an application for review that was not filed timely did not deprive respondent of due process of law. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. </s> The majority predicates its decision in this case on Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), which held that a criminal defendant does not have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals. The majority reasons that because respondent had no constitutional right to counsel, his lawyer's failure to file a timely appeal did not violate his right to effective assistance of counsel. In my view, however, Ross v. Moffitt was improperly decided. See id., at 619-621 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ.). I believe that a defendant does have a constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary state appeals. Particularly where a criminal conviction is challenged on constitutional grounds, permissive review in the highest state court may be the most meaningful review a conviction will receive. Moreover, where a defendant seeks discretionary review, the assistance of an attorney is vital. Because I disagree with the Court's position in Ross v. Moffitt, I disagree with its conclusion in this case also. [455 U.S. 586, 589] </s> Even if I believed that Ross v. Moffitt were correctly decided, however, I would dissent from the majority's conclusion that habeas corpus provides no recourse to a criminal defendant who has been denied his right to seek discretionary review because of his attorney's error. Although respondent's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel may not have been infringed, he was denied his right to due process. Respondent's counsel promised him that he would seek review in the Florida Supreme Court. Respondent reasonably relied on that promise. Counsel nonetheless failed to file a timely application. * As a result, respondent was deprived of his right to seek discretionary review by the State's highest court. As I suggested above, this loss is significant. I would hold that when a defendant can show that he reasonably relied on his attorney's promise to seek discretionary review, due process requires the State to consider his application, even when the application is untimely. To deny the right to seek discretionary review simply because of counsel's error is fundamentally unfair. Requiring the state courts to consider untimely applications when a defendant can show that he reasonably relied on his counsel will not impose a heavy burden. The State is not required to grant the application; it is simply barred from dismissing the application on the ground that it was not timely filed. [455 U.S. 586, 590] </s> The majority argues that even if deprivation of the right to petition the Florida Supreme Court for review implicates a due process interest, there was no state action here. It reasons that the deprivation of this right was caused by respondent's counsel - a private retained attorney - and not by the State. Ante, at 588, n. 4. In my view, however, there was sufficient state involvement to satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The majority's position is inconsistent with Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980). In that case, the Court rejected the respondent's assertion that the failings of retained counsel at a criminal trial could not provide a basis for federal habeas corpus relief, because his conduct does not involve state action. It held that a state criminal trial, a proceeding initiated and conducted by the State itself, is an action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. "When a State obtains a criminal conviction through such a trial, it is the State that unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty." Id., at 343. "[T]he State's conduct of a criminal trial itself implicates the State in the defendant's conviction." Id., at 344. </s> It is true that Cuyler v. Sullivan involved a challenge to the conduct of a private attorney during the trial, while this case involves a challenge to the post-trial conduct of a private attorney. However, post-trial proceedings are an integral part of the criminal process. In my view, the State is just as much implicated in those proceedings as in the trial itself. Here, for example, Florida was responsible for structuring the procedure by which criminal convictions are reviewed. In particular, it designed the rules governing the right to seek discretionary review, including the rule that applications are automatically rejected when filed out of time. Under the circumstances, I think it clear that the state-action requirement is satisfied. </s> [Footnote * Notice of the intent to apply for discretionary review was due in the office of the Clerk for the District Court of Appeal, Third District of Florida, on July 17, 1978. It was filed one day late, on July 18, 1978. According to respondent, a secretary in his attorney's office attempted to deliver the required papers on July 14, 1981. She became lost while traveling to the Clerk's office, and did not arrive until after it had closed. Because she did not realize that she could have placed the papers in a night depository box, she took them home and placed them in the mail. Record 29-30. To deny respondent the right to seek discretionary review, where he reasonably relied on his counsel's promise to apply for such review, and where counsel failed to comply with this promise only because of circumstances beyond his control, would be doubly unfair. </s> [455 U.S. 586, 591]

United States Supreme Court PUGACH v. DOLLINGER(1961) No. 111 Argued: January 16, 1961Decided: February 27, 1961 </s> A federal court may not enjoin the use in a criminal trial in a state court of evidence obtained by wire tapping in violation of 605 of the Federal Communications Act. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 ; Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 . </s> 277 F.2d 739, affirmed. </s> George J. Todaro argued the cause and filed a brief, and Frances Kahn filed an appearance, for petitioner. </s> Walter E. Dillon and Irving Anolik argued the cause for respondents. With them on the brief were Isidore Dollinger, respondent, pro se, and Alexander E. Soheer. </s> Briefs of amici curiae, urging affirmance, were filed by Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Paxton Blair, Solicitor General, and Jean M. Coon, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General of New York, and by Edward S. Silver and Aaron Nussbaum for the District Attorneys' Association of New York. </s> Emanuel Redfield filed a brief for the New York Civil Liberties Union et al., as amici curiae, urging reversal. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The judgment is affirmed on the authority of Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 , and Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 . </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN would also affirm but solely on the authority of Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 . [365 U.S. 458, 459] </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs, dissenting. </s> In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 , a pawnbroker was convicted as an accomplice in a robbery. Records of his telephone conversations, gotten by police eavesdropping, were admitted in evidence against him during his trial in the state court. He claimed that such evidence was inadmissible under 47 U.S.C. 605. 1 This Court rejected that claim without even stopping to see if indeed there had been a violation of the federal statute. The rationale of that rejection was that, "Where a state has carefully legislated so as not to render inadmissible evidence obtained and sought to be divulged in violation of the laws of the United States, this Court will not extend by implication the statute of the United States so as to invalidate the specific language of the state statute." Id., 202. </s> The later decision of this Court in Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 , swept away that rationale, and Schwartz v. Texas, supra, today stands alone as an aberration from the otherwise vigorous enforcement this Court has given to the congressional policy embodied in 47 U.S.C. 605. For in Benanti, in setting aside a federal conviction, we held that the proscription of wiretapping contained in 605 forbade wiretapping by an authorized executive officer of the State, acting under the explicit terms of a state statute and pursuant to a warrant issued [365 U.S. 458, 460] by the state judiciary. "[K]eeping in mind [the] comprehensive scheme of interstate regulation and the public policy underlying Section 605 as part of that scheme, we find that Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow state legislation which would contradict that section and that policy." Id., 105-106. It seems incongruous to me that this sweeping congressional purpose should now be held to make a detour around the precincts of a state court. This is especially true where, as here, officials have shown such an avid taste for violating the law. See Dash, Schwartz and Knowlton, The Eavesdroppers, pp. 68-69. In such circumstances, redress - other than by an exclusionary rule - against the criminal acts of those who bear the badge of the law is neither easy nor generous. Cf. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41 , 42-44 (dissenting opinion). </s> Yet today a majority of this Court summarily holds that Schwartz v. Texas, supra, is still the law, and petitioner is left only with the consoling knowledge that Congress meant to protect the privacy of his telephone conversations, 2 while the benefits of the congressional intendment are denied him. [365 U.S. 458, 461] </s> Petitioner is charged, in a New York state court, with the commission of several serious crimes. His complaint in the instant proceeding alleged that "on or about June 15th, 1959, and thereafter" agents of the District Attorney and of the New York police force tapped his telephone wires pursuant to a state court warrant and "obtained certain information." That information, and other evidence to which it led, was divulged to the grand jury, which indicted petitioner, and to the press. But more importantly there was the allegation that the "defendants intend to use the evidence obtained by use of the aforesaid illegal wire taps and the information obtained through the illegal use of the aforesaid wire taps upon the trial" which petitioner imminently faces. The prayer asked that the defendants be enjoined "from proceeding . . . upon the indictments . . . on any grounds in which they may use wire tapping evidence, or on any grounds or investigations resulting from or instituted as a result of the aforesaid illegal wire taps." </s> There is no doubt that, once the wire-tap evidence is put in during the impending trial, petitioner is without remedy for the prejudice it does him in that trial, either in the state courts, People v. Variano, 5 N. Y. 2d 391, 157 N. E. 2d 857, or, under Schwartz v. Texas, supra, in the federal courts. </s> In Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 , the petitioner was charged with a violation of the state gambling laws. He sought to enjoin the use, at his trial, of evidence obtained by a police invasion of his home, an invasion admittedly in violation of the command of the Fourth Amendment. Relief was denied in the exercise of equitable discretion, three factors being relied on. First, the petitioner, it was said, could show no irreparable injury, for, at worst, he would go to jail on the evidence sought to be suppressed. Second, it was supposed that [365 U.S. 458, 462] the federal court was being asked "to intervene piecemeal to try collateral issues." At 123. Third, and overriding the first two, was the traditional reluctance of a federal court to meddle in state court proceedings, and especially in state court criminal proceedings. </s> The strongest expression of that reluctance is found in the general prohibition of federal injunctions "to stay proceedings in a State court." 28 U.S.C. 2283. Although that provision bars an injunction operating on a party, after commencement of the state court proceedings, as well as an injunction directly against the state court, Harkrader v. Wadley, 172 U.S. 148 ; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 161 -162, it is not directly involved here. Here the thrust of the relief is only to enjoin the use of wire-tap evidence, not to enjoin the action itself. Hence there is no bar to maintaining the action. Cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 . Where, as here, the relief sought is the adjudication of collateral matters which cannot be adjudicated in the state proceedings under state law, there is no occasion to invoke the statute. "That provision is an historical mechanism (Act of March 2, 1793, 1 Stat. 334, 335) for achieving harmony in one phase of our complicated federalism by avoiding needless friction between two systems of courts having potential jurisdiction over the same subject-matter." Hale v. Bimco Trading Co., 306 U.S. 375, 378 . (Emphasis added.) Hence I do not reach the questions that would be raised if we had before us the alternative of enjoining the state action 3 or withholding all relief. [365 U.S. 458, 463] </s> Can the dangers of allowing this early resort to the federal court outweigh the wrong of subjecting petitioner to the risk of conviction and imprisonment on the strength of criminally obtained and criminally presented evidence? This is not a case where there is piecemeal resort from one court to another. This remedy is the only one which is available to protect a federal right. 4 It is not a case where an appeal is properly delayed, so that the asserted error may be seen in the context of the whole trial, as no review at all is available. For the same reason, this is no case for the exercise of equitable discretion. If the federal question is not now protected, it can never become the basis for relief. </s> The doctrine of equitable discretion properly involves no more than a choice among remedies, an orderly management of judicial procedures. Doubtless there are times when equity should leave parties to their remedy "at law," i. e., to their remedy in the ordinary course of the threatened proceeding. But once it is established [365 U.S. 458, 464] that the other proceeding offers no remedy, the rationale of equitable discretion disappears. It becomes no more than the legal language which clothes the denial of a right in the guise of a mere procedural decision. Unless and until Schwartz v. Texas, supra, is overruled, the exercise of equitable discretion to deny preliminary relief from the threatened use of wire-tap evidence is wholly unjustified. Unless and until Schwartz is overruled, the beneficent effect of 605 will be stultified by the admission of tainted evidence in state trials. The privacy of the individual, history assures us, can never be protected where its violation by state officers meets with reward rather than punishment. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 ". . . and no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person . . . ." See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 ; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 ; Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 ; Benanti v. United States, supra; cf. Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 ; Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 . </s> [Footnote 2 Schwartz v. Texas, supra, stands for no more than a refusal, as a matter of federal law, to void a conviction said to be based on wiretap evidence. The witness who divulges wire-tap information is no less guilty of a federal crime. See Schwartz v. Texas, supra, 201. Nor, after Benanti, does the fact that New York purported to authorize this police wire tap save it from illegality. See In re Telephone Communications, 9 Misc. 2d 121, 170 N. Y. S. 2d 84; Matter of Interception of Telephone Communications, 23 Misc. 2d 543, 198 N. Y. S. 2d 572. As I indicated in my dissent in Schwartz v. Texas, supra, 205, I am of the opinion that a wire tap is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, so that, in the absence of illegality under 605, I would have to consider if the New York wire-tap procedure meets the constitutional test of reasonableness. But under 605, all wire taps are forbidden. </s> [Footnote 3 28 U.S.C. 2283 provides for three classes of exception: (1) as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, (2) where necessary in aid of jurisdiction, and (3) to protect or effectuate its judgments. Cf. Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 . Injunction against the commencement of state court criminal proceedings has long been the first line of defense for federally secured rights. As respects federally secured civil rights see, e. g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 ; [365 U.S. 458, 463] Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 ; Hague v. C. I. O., 307 U.S. 496 ; cf. Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 . As respects federally secured economic rights see, e. g., Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 ; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445 ; Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 . </s> [Footnote 4 Judge Clark, dissenting in this case below, said: "In sum it is beyond dispute that there is a general, indeed universal, custom of federal law violation. Now this is a distressing situation, made not less so that in the eyes of many worthy citizens it is required by the asserted exigencies of successful law administration. But it is not an unusual situation. For actually it is a clash between federal and state governmental policies. As such it is a recurring struggle in our history and quite possibly a necessary one to a federal form of government. In the past we have found ways of meeting and solving the problem. Of course there are several forms of remedy; but the one to which there seems continual return when other remedies fail is the resort to the equity powers of the federal courts to enjoin repeated violations of the criminal law." 277 F.2d, at 748-749. </s> [365 U.S. 458, 465]

United States Supreme Court O'CONNOR v. ORTEGA(1987) No. 85-530 Argued: October 15, 1986Decided: March 31, 1987 </s> Respondent, a physician and psychiatrist, was an employee of a state hospital and had primary responsibility for training physicians in the psychiatric residency program. Hospital officials became concerned about possible improprieties in his management of the program, particularly with respect to his acquisition of a computer and charges against him concerning sexual harassment of female hospital employees and inappropriate disciplinary action against a resident. While he was on administrative leave pending investigation of the charges, hospital officials, allegedly in order to inventory and secure state property, searched his office and seized personal items from his desk and file cabinets that were used in administrative proceedings resulting in his discharge. No formal inventory of the property in the office was ever made, and all the other papers in the office were merely placed in boxes for storage. Respondent filed an action against petitioner hospital officials in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the search of his office violated the Fourth Amendment. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted judgment for petitioners, concluding that the search was proper because there was a need to secure state property in the office. Affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding the case, the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, and that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The court held that the record justified a grant of partial summary judgment for respondent on the issue of liability for the search, and it remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of damages. </s> Held: </s> The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. </s> 764 F.2d 703, reversed and remanded. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE POWELL, concluded that: </s> 1. Searches and seizures by government employers or supervisors of the private property of their employees are subject to Fourth Amendment restraints. An expectation of privacy in one's place of work is based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment. However, the operational realities of the workplace may make some public employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable [480 U.S. 709, 710] when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. Because the record does not reveal the extent to which hospital officials may have had work-related reasons to enter respondent's office, the Court of Appeals should have remanded the matter to the District Court for its further determination. However, a majority of this Court agrees with the determination of the Court of Appeals that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. Regardless of any expectation of privacy in the office itself, the undisputed evidence supports the conclusion that respondent had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets. Pp. 714-719. </s> 2. In determining the appropriate standard for a search conducted by a public employer in areas in which an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy, what is a reasonable search depends on the context within which the search takes place, and requires balancing the employee's legitimate expectation of privacy against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. Requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wishes to enter an employee's office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unreasonable. Moreover, requiring a probable cause standard for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. Their intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable. Pp. 719-726. </s> 3. In the procedural posture of this case, it cannot be determined whether the search of respondent's office, and the seizure of his personal belongings, satisfied the standard of reasonableness. Both courts below were in error because summary judgment was inappropriate. The parties were in dispute about the actual justification for the search, and the record was inadequate for a determination of the reasonableness of the search and seizure. On remand, the District Court must determine these matters. Pp. 726-729. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA concluded that the offices of government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter, and no special [480 U.S. 709, 711] circumstances were present here that would call for an exception to the ordinary rule. However, government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules - searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context - do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Because the conflicting and incomplete evidence in the present case could not conceivably support summary judgment that the search did not have such a validating purpose, the decision must be reversed and remanded. Pp. 731-732. </s> O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and POWELL, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 729. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 732. </s> Jeffrey T. Miller argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John K. Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Marvin Goldsmith, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey T. Miller and Teresa Tan, Deputy Attorneys General. </s> Joel I. Klein, by invitation of the Court, 475 U.S. 1006 , argued the cause and filed a brief as amicus curiae in support of the judgment below. Magno J. Ortega, pro se, filed a brief as respondent. * </s> [Footnote * Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, Alan I. Horowitz, Barbara L. Herwig, and John P. Schnitker filed a brief for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Peter W. Morgan, Jack Novik, Burt Neuborne, and Michael Simpson; and for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, by Richard Kirschner. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE POWELL join. </s> This suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 presents two issues concerning the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees. First, we must determine whether the respondent, a public [480 U.S. 709, 712] employee, had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets at his place of work. Second, we must address the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard for a search conducted by a public employer in areas in which a public employee is found to have a reasonable expectation of privacy. </s> I </s> Dr. Magno Ortega, a physician and psychiatrist, held the position of Chief of Professional Education at Napa State Hospital (Hospital) for 17 years, until his dismissal from that position in 1981. As Chief of Professional Education, Dr. Ortega had primary responsibility for training young physicians in psychiatric residency programs. </s> In July 1981, Hospital officials, including Dr. Dennis O'Connor, the Executive Director of the Hospital, became concerned about possible improprieties in Dr. Ortega's management of the residency program. In particular, the Hospital officials were concerned with Dr. Ortega's acquisition of an Apple II computer for use in the residency program. The officials thought that Dr. Ortega may have misled Dr. O'Connor into believing that the computer had been donated, when in fact the computer had been financed by the possibly coerced contributions of residents. Additionally, the Hospital officials were concerned with charges that Dr. Ortega had sexually harassed two female Hospital employees, and had taken inappropriate disciplinary action against a resident. </s> On July 30, 1981, Dr. O'Connor requested that Dr. Ortega take paid administrative leave during an investigation of these charges. At Dr. Ortega's request, Dr. O'Connor agreed to allow Dr. Ortega to take two weeks' vacation instead of administrative leave. Dr. Ortega, however, was requested to stay off Hospital grounds for the duration of the investigation. On August 14, 1981, Dr. O'Connor informed Dr. Ortega that the investigation had not yet been completed, and that he was being placed on paid administrative leave. Dr. Ortega remained on administrative leave until [480 U.S. 709, 713] the Hospital terminated his employment on September 22, 1981. </s> Dr. O'Connor selected several Hospital personnel to conduct the investigation, including an accountant, a physician, and a Hospital security officer. Richard Friday, the Hospital Administrator, led this "investigative team." At some point during the investigation, Mr. Friday made the decision to enter Dr. Ortega's office. The specific reason for the entry into Dr. Ortega's office is unclear from the record. The petitioners claim that the search was conducted to secure state property. Initially, petitioners contended that such a search was pursuant to a Hospital policy of conducting a routine inventory of state property in the office of a terminated employee. At the time of the search, however, the Hospital had not yet terminated Dr. Ortega's employment; Dr. Ortega was still on administrative leave. Apparently, there was no policy of inventorying the offices of those on administrative leave. Before the search had been initiated, however, petitioners had become aware that Dr. Ortega had taken the computer to his home. Dr. Ortega contends that the purpose of the search was to secure evidence for use against him in administrative disciplinary proceedings. </s> The resulting search of Dr. Ortega's office was quite thorough. The investigators entered the office a number of times and seized several items from Dr. Ortega's desk and file cabinets, including a Valentine's Day card, a photograph, and a book of poetry all sent to Dr. Ortega by a former resident physician. These items were later used in a proceeding before a hearing officer of the California State Personnel Board to impeach the credibility of the former resident, who testified on Dr. Ortega's behalf. The investigators also seized billing documentation of one of Dr. Ortega's private patients under the California Medicaid program. The investigators did not otherwise separate Dr. Ortega's property from state property because, as one investigator testified, "[t]rying to sort State from non-State, it was too much to do, so I gave it [480 U.S. 709, 714] up and boxed it up." App. 62. Thus, no formal inventory of the property in the office was ever made. Instead, all the papers in Dr. Ortega's office were merely placed in boxes, and put in storage for Dr. Ortega to retrieve. </s> Dr. Ortega commenced this action against petitioners in Federal District Court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the search of his office violated the Fourth Amendment. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court granted petitioners' motion for summary judgment. The District Court, relying on Chenkin v. Bellevue Hospital Center, New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 479 F. Supp. 207 (SDNY 1979), concluded that the search was proper because there was a need to secure state property in the office. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, 764 F.2d 703 (1985), concluding that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. While the Hospital had a procedure for office inventories, these inventories were reserved for employees who were departing or were terminated. The Court of Appeals also concluded - albeit without explanation - that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals held that the record justified a grant of partial summary judgment for Dr. Ortega on the issue of liability for an unlawful search, and it remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of damages. </s> We granted certiorari, 474 U.S. 1018 (1985), and now reverse and remand. </s> II </s> The strictures of the Fourth Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, have been applied to the conduct of governmental officials in various civil activities. New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 -335 (1985). Thus, we have held in the past that the Fourth Amendment governs the conduct of school officials, see ibid., building inspectors, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967), and Occupational Safety and Health [480 U.S. 709, 715] Act inspectors, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 -313 (1978). As we observed in T. L. O., "[b]ecause the individual's interest in privacy and personal security `suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,'. . . it would be `anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.'" 469 U.S., at 335 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, at 312-313 and Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 530). Searches and seizures by government employers or supervisors of the private property of their employees, therefore, are subject to the restraints of the Fourth Amendment. </s> The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." Our cases establish that Dr. Ortega's Fourth Amendment rights are implicated only if the conduct of the Hospital officials at issue in this case infringed "an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable." United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). We have no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Instead, "the Court has given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion." Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (citations omitted). </s> Because the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy, as well as the appropriate standard for a search, is understood to differ according to context, it is essential first to delineate the boundaries of the workplace context. The workplace includes those areas and items that are related to work and are generally within the employer's control. At a hospital, for [480 U.S. 709, 716] example, the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets, among other areas, are all part of the workplace. These areas remain part of the workplace context even if the employee has placed personal items in them, such as a photograph placed in a desk or a letter posted on an employee bulletin board. </s> Not everything that passes through the confines of the business address can be considered part of the workplace context, however. An employee may bring closed luggage to the office prior to leaving on a trip, or a handbag or briefcase each workday. While whatever expectation of privacy the employee has in the existence and the outward appearance of the luggage is affected by its presence in the workplace, the employee's expectation of privacy in the contents of the luggage is not affected in the same way. The appropriate standard for a workplace search does not necessarily apply to a piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase that happens to be within the employer's business address. </s> Within the workplace context, this Court has recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968). As with the expectation of privacy in one's home, such an expectation in one's place of work is "based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment." Oliver v. United States, supra, at 178, n. 8. Thus, in Mancusi v. DeForte, supra, the Court held that a union employee who shared an office with other union employees had a privacy interest in the office sufficient to challenge successfully the warrantless search of that office: </s> "It has long been settled that one has standing to object to a search of his office, as well as of his home. . . . [I]t seems clear that if DeForte had occupied a `private' office in the union headquarters, and union records had been seized from a desk or a filing cabinet in that office, he would have had standing. . . . In such a `private' office, [480 U.S. 709, 717] DeForte would have been entitled to expect that he would not be disturbed except by personal or business invitees, and that records would not be taken except with his permission or that of his union superiors." 392 U.S., at 369 . </s> Given the societal expectations of privacy in one's place of work expressed in both Oliver and Mancusi, we reject the contention made by the Solicitor General and petitioners that public employees can never have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work. Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer. The operational realities of the workplace, however, may make some employees' expectations of privacy unreasonable when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official. Public employees' expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation. Indeed, in Mancusi itself, the Court suggested that the union employee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy against his union supervisors. 392 U.S., at 369 . The employee's expectation of privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation. An office is seldom a private enclave free from entry by supervisors, other employees, and business and personal invitees. Instead, in many cases offices are continually entered by fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences, consultations, and other work-related visits. Simply put, it is the nature of government offices that others - such as fellow employees, supervisors, consensual visitors, and the general public - may have frequent access to an individual's office. We agree with JUSTICE SCALIA that "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer," [480 U.S. 709, 718] post, at 731, but some government offices may be so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection"). Given the great variety of work environments in the public sector, the question whether an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-case basis. </s> The Court of Appeals concluded that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, and five Members of this Court agree with that determination. See post, at 731-732 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); post, at 732 (BLACKMUN, J., joined by BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., dissenting). Because the record does not reveal the extent to which Hospital officials may have had work-related reasons to enter Dr. Ortega's office, we think the Court of Appeals should have remanded the matter to the District Court for its further determination. But regardless of any legitimate right of access the Hospital staff may have had to the office as such, we recognize that the undisputed evidence suggests that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets. The undisputed evidence discloses that Dr. Ortega did not share his desk or file cabinets with any other employees. Dr. Ortega had occupied the office for 17 years and he kept materials in his office, which included personal correspondence, medical files, correspondence from private patients unconnected to the Hospital, personal financial records, teaching aids and notes, and personal gifts and mementos. App. 14. The files on physicians in residency training were kept outside Dr. Ortega's office. Id., at 21. Indeed, the only items found by the investigators were apparently personal items because, with the exception of the items seized for use in the administrative hearings, all the papers and effects found in the office were simply placed in boxes and made available to Dr. Ortega. [480 U.S. 709, 719] Id., at 58, 62. Finally, we note that there was no evidence that the Hospital had established any reasonable regulation or policy discouraging employees such as Dr. Ortega from storing personal papers and effects in their desks or file cabinets, id., at 44, although the absence of such a policy does not create an expectation of privacy where it would not otherwise exist. </s> On the basis of this undisputed evidence, we accept the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file cabinets. See Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (CA3 1978); United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362 (CA3 1977); United States v. Blok, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 326, 188 F.2d 1019 (1951). </s> III </s> Having determined that Dr. Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office, the Court of Appeals simply concluded without discussion that the "search . . . was not a reasonable search under the fourth amendment." 764 F.2d, at 707. But as we have stated in T. L. O., "[t]o hold that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by [public employers] is only to begin the inquiry into the standards governing such searches. . . . [W]hat is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes place." New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S., at 337 . Thus, we must determine the appropriate standard of reasonableness applicable to the search. A determination of the standard of reasonableness applicable to a particular class of searches requires "balanc[ing] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 536 -537. In the case of searches conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy [480 U.S. 709, 720] against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient operation of the workplace. </s> "[I]t is settled . . . that `except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.'" Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S., at 370 (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 528-529). There are some circumstances, however, in which we have recognized that a warrant requirement is unsuitable. In particular, a warrant requirement is not appropriate when "the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, at 533. Or, as JUSTICE BLACKMUN stated in T. L. O., "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 469 U.S., at 351 (concurring in judgment). In Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978), for example, the Court explored the burdens a warrant requirement would impose on the Occupational Safety and Health Act regulatory scheme, and held that the warrant requirement was appropriate only after concluding that warrants would not "impose serious burdens on the inspection system or the courts, [would not] prevent inspections necessary to enforce the statute, or [would not] make them less effective." 436 U.S., at 316 . In New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, we concluded that the warrant requirement was not suitable to the school environment, because such a requirement would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. </s> There is surprisingly little case law on the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness for a public employer's work-related search of its employee's offices, desks, or file cabinets. Generally, however, the lower courts have held that any "work-related" search by an employer [480 U.S. 709, 721] satisfies the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement. See United States v. Nasser, 476 F.2d 1111, 1123 (CA7 1973) ("work-related" searches and seizures are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Collins, 349 F.2d 863, 868 (CA2 1965) (upholding search and seizure because conducted pursuant to "the power of the Government as defendant's employer, to supervise and investigate the performance of his duties as a Customs employee"). Others have suggested the use of a standard other than probable cause. See United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (CA9 1975) (work-related search of a locker tested under "reasonable cause" standard); United States v. Blok, supra, at 328, 188 F.2d, at 1021 ("No doubt a search of [a desk] without her consent would have been reasonable if made by some people in some circumstances. Her official superiors might reasonably have searched the desk for official property needed for official use"). The only cases to imply that a warrant should be required involve searches that are not work related, see Gillard v. Schmidt, supra, at 829, n. 1, or searches for evidence of criminal misconduct, see United States v. Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784 (SDNY 1972). </s> The legitimate privacy interests of public employees in the private objects they bring to the workplace may be substantial. Against these privacy interests, however, must be balanced the realities of the workplace, which strongly suggest that a warrant requirement would be unworkable. While police, and even administrative enforcement personnel, conduct searches for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for use in criminal or other enforcement proceedings, employers most frequently need to enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct. Employers and supervisors are focused primarily on the need to complete the government agency's work in a prompt and efficient manner. An employer may have need for correspondence, or a file or report available only in an employee's office while the employee is [480 U.S. 709, 722] away from the office. Or, as is alleged to have been the case here, employers may need to safeguard or identify state property or records in an office in connection with a pending investigation into suspected employee misfeasance. </s> In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement would conflict with "the common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983). </s> Whether probable cause is an inappropriate standard for public employer searches of their employees' offices presents a more difficult issue. For the most part, we have required that a search be based upon probable cause, but as we noted in New Jersey v. T. L. O., "[t]he fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable, and although `both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither is required.'" 469 U.S., at 340 (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring)). Thus, "[w]here a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause, we have not hesitated to [480 U.S. 709, 723] adopt such a standard." 469 U.S., at 341 . We have concluded, for example, that the appropriate standard for administrative searches is not probable cause in its traditional meaning. Instead, an administrative warrant can be obtained if there is a showing that reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an inspection are satisfied. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S., at 320 ; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S., at 538 . </s> As an initial matter, it is important to recognize the plethora of contexts in which employers will have an occasion to intrude to some extent on an employee's expectation of privacy. Because the parties in this case have alleged that the search was either a noninvestigatory work-related intrusion or an investigatory search for evidence of suspected work-related employee misfeasance, we undertake to determine the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness only for these two types of employer intrusions and leave for another day inquiry into other circumstances. </s> The governmental interest justifying work-related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper operation of the workplace. Government agencies provide myriad services to the public, and the work of these agencies would suffer if employers were required to have probable cause before they entered an employee's desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. Indeed, it is difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons. Similarly, the concept of probable cause has little meaning for a routine inventory conducted by public employers for the purpose of securing state property. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983). To ensure the efficient and proper operation of the agency, therefore, public employers must be given wide latitude to enter employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons. [480 U.S. 709, 724] </s> We come to a similar conclusion for searches conducted pursuant to an investigation of work-related employee misconduct. Even when employers conduct an investigation, they have an interest substantially different from "the normal need for law enforcement." New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the agency and the public interest can be severe. In contrast to law enforcement officials, therefore, public employers are not enforcers of the criminal law; instead, public employers have a direct and overriding interest in ensuring that the work of the agency is conducted in a proper and efficient manner. In our view, therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work, and ultimately to the public interest. See 469 U.S., at 353 ("The time required for a teacher to ask the questions or make the observations that are necessary to turn reasonable grounds into probable cause is time during which the teacher, and other students, are diverted from the essential task of education"). Additionally, while law enforcement officials are expected to "schoo[l] themselves in the niceties of probable cause," id., at 343, no such expectation is generally applicable to public employers, at least when the search is not used to gather evidence of a criminal offense. It is simply unrealistic to expect supervisors in most government agencies to learn the subtleties of [480 U.S. 709, 725] the probable cause standard. As JUSTICE BLACKMUN observed in T. L. O., "[a] teacher has neither the training nor the day-to-day experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer possesses, and is ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of probable cause." Id., at 353. We believe that this observation is an equally apt description of the public employer and supervisors at the Hospital, and we conclude that a reasonableness standard will permit regulation of the employer's conduct "according to the dictates of reason and common sense." Id., at 343. </s> Balanced against the substantial government interests in the efficient and proper operation of the workplace are the privacy interests of government employees in their place of work which, while not insubstantial, are far less than those found at home or in some other contexts. As with the building inspections in Camara, the employer intrusions at issue here "involve a relatively limited invasion" of employee privacy. 387 U.S., at 537 . Government offices are provided to employees for the sole purpose of facilitating the work of an agency. The employee may avoid exposing personal belongings at work by simply leaving them at home. </s> In sum, we conclude that the "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the . . . probable-cause requirement impracticable," 469 U.S., at 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment), for legitimate work-related, noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees. We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness [480 U.S. 709, 726] under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable: </s> "Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider `whether the . . . action was justified at its inception,' Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 20 ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted `was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,' ibid." New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 341. </s> Ordinarily, a search of an employee's office by a supervisor will be "justified at its inception" when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. Because petitioners had an "individualized suspicion" of misconduct by Dr. Ortega, we need not decide whether individualized suspicion is an essential element of the standard of reasonableness that we adopt today. See New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, at 342, n. 8. The search will be permissible in its scope when "the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of . . . the nature of the [misconduct]." 469 U.S., at 342 . </s> IV </s> In the procedural posture of this case, we do not attempt to determine whether the search of Dr. Ortega's office and the seizure of his personal belongings satisfy the standard of reasonableness we have articulated in this case. No evidentiary hearing was held in this case because the District Court acted on cross-motions for summary judgment, and granted petitioners summary judgment. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, concluded that the record in this case justified [480 U.S. 709, 727] granting partial summary judgment on liability to Dr. Ortega. </s> We believe that both the District Court and the Court of Appeals were in error because summary judgment was inappropriate. The parties were in dispute about the actual justification for the search, and the record was inadequate for a determination on motion for summary judgment of the reasonableness of the search and seizure. Petitioners have consistently attempted to justify the search and seizure as required to secure the state property in Dr. Ortega's office. Mr. Friday testified in a deposition that he had ordered members of the investigative team to "check Dr. Ortega's office out in order to separate the business files from any personal files in order to ascertain what was in his office." App. 50. He further testified that the search was initiated because he "wanted to make sure that we had our state property identified, and in order to provide Dr. Ortega with his property and get what we had out of there, in order to make sure our resident's files were protected, and that sort of stuff." Id., at 51. </s> In their motion for summary judgment in the District Court, petitioners alleged that this search to secure property was reasonable as "part of the established hospital policy to inventory property within offices of departing, terminated or separated employees." Record Doc. No. 24, p. 9. The District Court apparently accepted this characterization of the search because it applied Chenkin v. Bellevue Hospital Center, New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 479 F. Supp. 207 (SDNY 1979), a case involving a Fourth Amendment challenge to an inspection policy. At the time of the search, however, Dr. Ortega had not been terminated, but rather was still on administrative leave, and the record does not reflect whether the Hospital had a policy of inventorying the property of investigated employees. Respondent, moreover, has consistently rejected petitioners' characterization of the search as motivated by a need to secure state property. [480 U.S. 709, 728] Instead, Dr. Ortega has contended that the intrusion was an investigatory search whose purpose was simply to discover evidence that would be of use in administrative proceedings. He has pointed to the fact that no inventory was ever taken of the property in the office, and that seized evidence was eventually used in the administrative proceedings. Additionally, Dr. O'Connor stated in a deposition that one purpose of the search was "to look for contractural [sic] and other kinds of documents that might have been related to the issues" involved in the investigation. App. 38. </s> Under these circumstances, the District Court was in error in granting petitioners summary judgment. There was a dispute of fact about the character of the search, and the District Court acted under the erroneous assumption that the search was conducted pursuant to a Hospital policy. Moreover, no findings were made as to the scope of the search that was undertaken. </s> The Court of Appeals concluded that Dr. Ortega was entitled to partial summary judgment on liability. It noted that the Hospital had no policy of inventorying the property of employees on administrative leave, but it did not consider whether the search was otherwise reasonable. Under the standard of reasonableness articulated in this case, however, the absence of a Hospital policy did not necessarily make the search unlawful. A search to secure state property is valid as long as petitioners had a reasonable belief that there was government property in Dr. Ortega's office which needed to be secured, and the scope of the intrusion was itself reasonable in light of this justification. Indeed, petitioners have put forward evidence that they had such a reasonable belief; at the time of the search, petitioners knew that Dr. Ortega had removed the computer from the Hospital. The removal of the computer - together with the allegations of mismanagement of the residency program and sexual harassment - may have made the search reasonable at its inception under the standard we have put forth in this case. As with the [480 U.S. 709, 729] District Court order, therefore, the Court of Appeals conclusion that summary judgment was appropriate cannot stand. </s> On remand, therefore, the District Court must determine the justification for the search and seizure, and evaluate the reasonableness of both the inception of the search and its scope. * </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * We have no occasion in this case to reach the issue of the appropriate standard for the evaluation of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of the seizure of Dr. Ortega's personal items. Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals addressed this issue, and the amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of respondent did not discuss the legality of the seizure separate from that of the search. We also have no occasion in this case to address whether qualified immunity should protect petitioners from damages liability under 1983. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). The qualified immunity issue was not raised below and was not addressed by either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. Nor do we address the proper Fourth Amendment analysis for drug and alcohol testing of employees. Finally, we do not address the appropriate standard when an employee is being investigated for criminal misconduct or breaches of other nonwork-related statutory or regulatory standards. </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in the judgment. </s> Although I share the judgment that this case must be reversed and remanded, I disagree with the reason for the reversal given by the plurality opinion, and with the standard it prescribes for the Fourth Amendment inquiry. </s> To address the latter point first: The plurality opinion instructs the lower courts that existence of Fourth Amendment protection for a public employee's business office is to be assessed "on a case-by-case basis," in light of whether the office is "so open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable." Ante, at 718. No clue is provided as to how open "so open" must be; much less [480 U.S. 709, 730] is it suggested how police officers are to gather the facts necessary for this refined inquiry. As we observed in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984), "[t]his Court repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances." Even if I did not disagree with the plurality as to what result the proper legal standard should produce in the case before us, I would object to the formulation of a standard so devoid of content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field. </s> Whatever the plurality's standard means, however, it must be wrong if it leads to the conclusion on the present facts that if Hospital officials had extensive "work-related reasons to enter Dr. Ortega's office" no Fourth Amendment protection existed. Ante, at 718. It is privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment, not solitude. A man enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in his home, for example, even though his wife and children have the run of the place - and indeed, even though his landlord has the right to conduct unannounced inspections at any time. Similarly, in my view, one's personal office is constitutionally protected against warrantless intrusions by the police, even though employer and co-workers are not excluded. I think we decided as much many years ago. In Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), we held that a union employee had Fourth Amendment rights with regard to an office at union headquarters that he shared with two other employees, even though we acknowledged that those other employees, their personal or business guests, and (implicitly) "union higher-ups" could enter the office. Id., at 369. Just as the secretary working for a corporation in an office frequently entered by the corporation's other employees is protected against unreasonable searches of that office by the government, so also is the government secretary working in an office frequently entered by other government employees. There is no reason why this [480 U.S. 709, 731] determination that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists should be affected by the fact that the government, rather than a private entity, is the employer. Constitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer. </s> I cannot agree, moreover, with the plurality's view that the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy (and thus the existence of Fourth Amendment protection) changes "when an intrusion is by a supervisor rather than a law enforcement official." Ante, at 717. The identity of the searcher (police v. employer) is relevant not to whether Fourth Amendment protections apply, but only to whether the search of a protected area is reasonable. Pursuant to traditional analysis the former question must be answered on a more "global" basis. Where, for example, a fireman enters a private dwelling in response to an alarm, we do not ask whether the occupant has a reasonable expectation of privacy (and hence Fourth Amendment protection) vis-a-vis firemen, but rather whether - given the fact that the Fourth Amendment covers private dwellings - intrusion for the purpose of extinguishing a fire is reasonable. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978). A similar analysis is appropriate here. </s> I would hold, therefore, that the offices of government employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter. (The qualifier is necessary to cover such unusual situations as that in which the office is subject to unrestricted public access, so that it is "expose[d] to the public" and therefore "not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).) Since it is unquestioned that the office here was assigned to Dr. Ortega, and since no special circumstances are suggested that would call for an exception to the ordinary rule, I would [480 U.S. 709, 732] agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that Fourth Amendment protections applied. </s> The case turns, therefore, on whether the Fourth Amendment was violated - i. e., whether the governmental intrusion was reasonable. It is here that the government's status as employer, and the employment-related character of the search, become relevant. While as a general rule warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, we have recognized exceptions when "special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable . . . ." New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in judgment). Such "special needs" are present in the context of government employment. The government, like any other employer, needs frequent and convenient access to its desks, offices, and file cabinets for work-related purposes. I would hold that government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rules - searches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer context - do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Because the conflicting and incomplete evidence in the present case could not conceivably support summary judgment that the search did not have such a validating purpose, I agree with the plurality that the decision must be reversed and remanded. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN, JUSTICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> The facts of this case are simple and straightforward. Dr. Ortega had an expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets, which were the target of a search by petitioners that can be characterized only as investigatory in nature. Because there was no "special need," see New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (opinion concurring in judgment), to dispense with the warrant and probable-cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, I would evaluate the search by applying this traditional standard. Under that [480 U.S. 709, 733] standard, this search clearly violated Dr. Ortega's Fourth Amendment rights. </s> The problems in the plurality's opinion all arise from its failure or unwillingness to realize that the facts here are clear. The plurality, however, discovers what it feels is a factual dispute: the plurality is not certain whether the search was routine or investigatory. Accordingly, it concludes that a remand is the appropriate course of action. Despite the remand, the plurality assumes it must announce a standard concerning the reasonableness of a public employer's search of the workplace. Because the plurality treats the facts as in dispute, it formulates this standard at a distance from the situation presented by this case. </s> This does not seem to me to be the way to undertake Fourth Amendment analysis, especially in an area with which the Court is relatively unfamiliar. 1 Because this analysis, when conducted properly, is always fact specific to an extent, it is inappropriate that the plurality's formulation of a standard does not arise from a sustained consideration of a particular factual situation. 2 Moreover, given that any standard [480 U.S. 709, 734] ultimately rests on judgments about factual situations, it is apparent that the plurality has assumed the existence of hypothetical facts from which its standard follows. These "assumed" facts are weighted in favor of the public employer, 3 and, as a result, the standard that emerges makes reasonable almost any workplace search by a public employer. </s> I </s> It is necessary to review briefly the factual record in this case because of the plurality's assertion, ante, at 728, that [480 U.S. 709, 735] "[t]here was a dispute of fact about the character of the search." The plurality considers it to be either an inventory search to secure government property or an investigative search to gather evidence concerning Dr. Ortega's alleged misdeeds. Ante, at 727-728. It is difficult to comprehend how, on the facts of this case, the search in any way could be seen as one for inventory purposes. As the plurality concedes, the search could not have been made pursuant to the Hospital's policy of routinely inventorying state property in an office of a terminated employee, because at the time of the search Dr. Ortega was on administrative leave and had not been terminated. Ante, at 712-713. 4 Napa had no policy of inventorying the office of an employee placed on administrative leave. Ante, at 713. </s> The plurality, however, observes that the absence of the policy does not dispositively eliminate inventorying or securing state property as a possible purpose for conducting the search. Ante, at 728. As evidence suggesting such a purpose, the plurality points to petitioners' concern that Dr. Ortega may have removed from the Hospital's grounds a computer owned by the Hospital and to their desire to secure such items as files located in Dr. Ortega's office. See ante, at 727-728. </s> The record evidence demonstrates, however, that ensuring that the computer had not been removed from the Hospital was not a reason for the search. Mr. Friday, the leader of the "investigative team," stated that the alleged removal of the computer had nothing to do with the decision to enter Dr. Ortega's office. App. 59. Dr. O'Connor himself admitted that there was little connection between the entry and an attempt [480 U.S. 709, 736] by petitioners to ascertain the location of the computer. Id., at 39. The search had the computer as its focus only insofar as the team was investigating practices dealing with its acquisition. Id., at 32. </s> In deposition testimony, petitioners did suggest that the search was inventory in character insofar as they aimed to separate Dr. Ortega's personal property from Hospital property in the office. Id., at 38, 40, 50. Such a suggestion, however, is overwhelmingly contradicted by other remarks of petitioners and particularly by the character of the search itself. Dr. O'Connor spoke of the individuals involved in the search as "investigators," see id., at 37, and, even where he described the search as inventory in nature, he observed that it was aimed primarily at furthering investigative purposes. See, e. g., id., at 40 ("Basically what we were trying to do is to remove what was obviously State records or records that had to do with his program, his department, any of the materials that would be involved in running the residency program, around contracts, around the computer, around the areas that we were interested in investigating"). Moreover, as the plurality itself recognizes, ante, at 713-714, the "investigators" never made a formal inventory of what they found in Dr. Ortega's office. Rather, they rummaged through his belongings and seized highly personal items later used at a termination proceeding to impeach a witness favorable to him. Ibid. Furthermore, the search was conducted in the evening, App. 53, and it was undertaken only after the investigators had received legal advice, id., at 51. </s> The search in question stemmed neither from a Hospital policy nor from a practice of routine entrances into Dr. Ortega's office. It was plainly exceptional and investigatory in nature. Accordingly, there is no significant factual dispute in this case. </s> II </s> Before examining the plurality's standard of reasonableness for workplace searches, I should like to state both my [480 U.S. 709, 737] agreement and disagreement with the plurality's discussion of a public employee's expectation of privacy. What is most important, of course, is that in this case the plurality acknowledges that Dr. Ortega had an expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets, ante, at 719, and that, as the plurality concedes, ante, at 718, the majority of this Court holds that he had a similar expectation in his office. With respect to the plurality's general comments, I am in complete agreement with its observation that "[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer." Ante, at 717. Moreover, I would go along with the plurality's observation that, in certain situations, the "operational realities" of the workplace may remove some expectation of privacy on the part of the employee. Ibid. However, I am disturbed by the plurality's suggestion, see ante, at 717-718, that routine entries by visitors might completely remove this expectation. </s> First, this suggestion is contrary to the traditional protection that this Court has recognized the Fourth Amendment accords to offices. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 , n. 8 (1984) ("The Fourth Amendment's protection of offices and commercial buildings, in which there may be legitimate expectations of privacy, is also based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment"); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) ("What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile"). The common understanding of an office is that it is a place where a worker receives an occasional business-related visitor. Thus, when the office has received traditional Fourth Amendment protection in our cases, it has been with the understanding that such routine visits occur there. [480 U.S. 709, 738] </s> Moreover, as the plurality appears to recognize, see ante, at 717-718, the precise extent of an employee's expectation of privacy often turns on the nature of the search. This observation is in accordance with the principle that the Fourth Amendment may protect an individual's expectation of privacy in one context, even though this expectation may be unreasonable in another. See New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S., at 339 . See also Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329 (1979) (the opening of a retail store to the public does not mean that "it consents to wholesale searches and seizures that do not conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees"). As JUSTICE SCALIA observes, "[c]onstitutional protection against unreasonable searches by the government does not disappear merely because the government has the right to make reasonable intrusions in its capacity as employer." Ante, at 731. Thus, although an employee might well have no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to an occasional visit by a fellow employee, he would have such an expectation as to an afterhours search of his locked office by an investigative team seeking materials to be used against him at a termination proceeding. 5 </s> [480 U.S. 709, 739] </s> Finally and most importantly, the reality of work in modern time, whether done by public or private employees, reveals why a public employee's expectation of privacy in the workplace should be carefully safeguarded and not lightly set aside. It is, unfortunately, all too true that the workplace has become another home for most working Americans. Many employees spend the better part of their days and much of their evenings at work. See R. Kanter, Work and Family in the United States: A Critical Review and Agenda for Research and Policy 31-32 (1977); see also R. Bellah, R. Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swidler, & S. Tipton, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life 288-289 (1985) (a "less frantic concern for advancement and a reduction of working hours" would make it easier for both men and women to participate fully in working and family life). Consequently, an employee's private life must intersect with the workplace, for example, when the employee takes advantage of work or lunch breaks to make personal telephone calls, to attend to personal business, or to receive personal visitors in the office. As a result, the tidy distinctions (to which the plurality alludes, see ante, at 715-716) between the workplace and professional affairs, on the one hand, and personal possessions and private activities, on the other, do not exist in reality. 6 Not all of an employee's private [480 U.S. 709, 740] possessions will stay in his or her briefcase or handbag. Thus, the plurality's remark that the "employee may avoid exposing personal belongings at work by simply leaving them at home," ante, at 725, reveals on the part of the Members of the plurality a certain insensitivity to the "operational realities of the workplace," ante, at 717, they so value. 7 </s> [480 U.S. 709, 741] </s> Dr. Ortega clearly had an expectation of privacy in his office, desk, and file cabinets, particularly with respect to the type of investigatory search involved here. In my view, when examining the facts of other cases involving searches of the workplace, courts should be careful to determine this expectation also in relation to the search in question. </s> III </s> A </s> At the outset of its analysis, the plurality observes that an appropriate standard of reasonableness to be applied to a public employer's search of the employee's workplace is arrived at from "balancing" the privacy interests of the employee against the public employer's interests justifying the intrusion. Ante, at 719-720. Under traditional Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, however, courts abandon the warrant and probable-cause requirements, which constitute the standard of reasonableness for a government search that the Framers established, "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable . . . ." New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S., at 351 (opinion concurring in judgment); see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 721 -722, and n. 1 (1983) (opinion concurring in judgment). In sum, only when the practical realities of a particular situation suggest that a government official cannot obtain a warrant based upon probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a search would contribute, does the Court turn to a "balancing" test to formulate a standard of reasonableness for this context. </s> In New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, I faulted the Court for neglecting this "crucial step" in Fourth Amendment analysis. See 469 U.S., at 351 . I agreed, however, with the T. L. O. Court's standard because of my conclusion that this step, had [480 U.S. 709, 742] it been taken, would have revealed that the case presented a situation of "special need." Id., at 353. I recognized that discipline in this country's secondary schools was essential for the promotion of the overall goal of education, and that a teacher could not maintain this discipline if, every time a search was called for, the teacher would have to procure a warrant based on probable cause. Id., at 352-353. Accordingly, I observed: "The special need for an immediate response to behavior that threatens either the safety of schoolchildren and teachers or the educational process itself justifies the Court in excepting school searches from the warrant and probable-cause requirements, and in applying a standard determined by balancing the relevant interests." Id., at 353. </s> The plurality repeats here the T. L. O. Court's error in analysis. Although the plurality mentions the "special need" step, ante, at 720, it turns immediately to a balancing test to formulate its standard of reasonableness. This error is significant because, given the facts of this case, no "special need" exists here to justify dispensing with the warrant and probable-cause requirements. As observed above, the facts suggest that this was an investigatory search undertaken to obtain evidence of charges of mismanagement at a time when Dr. Ortega was on administrative leave and not permitted to enter the Hospital's grounds. There was no special practical need that might have justified dispensing with the warrant and probable-cause requirements. Without sacrificing their ultimate goal of maintaining an effective institution devoted to training and healing, to which the disciplining of Hospital employees contributed, petitioners could have taken any evidence of Dr. Ortega's alleged improprieties to a magistrate in order to obtain a warrant. </s> Furthermore, this seems to be exactly the kind of situation where a neutral magistrate's involvement would have been helpful in curtailing the infringement upon Dr. Ortega's privacy. See United States v. United States District Court, [480 U.S. 709, 743] 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) ("The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected speech"). Petitioners would have been forced to articulate their exact reasons for the search and to specify the items in Dr. Ortega's office they sought, which would have prevented the general rummaging through the doctor's office, desk, and file cabinets. Thus, because no "special need" in this case demanded that the traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements be dispensed with, petitioners' failure to conduct the search in accordance with the traditional standard of reasonableness should end the analysis, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be affirmed. </s> B </s> Even were I to accept the proposition that this case presents a situation of "special need" calling for an exception to the warrant and probable-cause standard, I believe that the plurality's balancing of the public employer's and the employee's respective interests to arrive at a different standard is seriously flawed. Once again, the plurality fails to focus on the facts. Instead, it arrives at its conclusion on the basis of "assumed" facts. First, sweeping with a broad brush, the plurality announces a rule that dispenses with the warrant requirement in every public employer's search of an employee's office, desk, or file cabinets because it "would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome." Ante, at 722. The plurality reasons that a government agency could not conduct its work in an efficient manner if an employer needed a warrant for every routine entry into an employee's office in search of a file or correspondence, or for every investigation of suspected employee misconduct. In addition, it argues that the warrant requirement, if imposed on an employer who would be unfamiliar with this procedure, would prove "unwieldy." Ibid. [480 U.S. 709, 744] </s> The danger in formulating a standard on the basis of "assumed" facts becomes very clear at this stage of the plurality's opinion. Whenever the Court has arrived at a standard of reasonableness other than the warrant and probable-cause requirements, it has first found, through analysis of a factual situation, that there is a nexus between this other standard, the employee's privacy interests, and the government purposes to be served by the search. Put another way, the Court adopts a new standard only when it is satisfied that there is no alternative in the particular circumstances. 8 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), the Court concluded that, as a practical matter, brief, on-the-spot stops of individuals by police officers need not be subject to a warrant. Still concerned, however, with the import of the warrant requirement, which provides the "neutral scrutiny of a judge," id., at 21, the Court weighed in detail the law enforcement and the suspect's interests in the circumstances of the protective search. The resulting standard constituted the equivalent of the warrant: judging the officer's behavior from a reasonable or objective standard, id., at 21, 27. In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), on the other hand, the Court declined to abandon the warrant as a standard in the case of a municipal health inspection in light of the interests of the target of the health investigation and those of the government in enforcing health standards. Id., at 532-533. [480 U.S. 709, 745] </s> A careful balancing with respect to the warrant requirement is absent from the plurality's opinion, an absence that is inevitable in light of the gulf between the plurality's analysis and any concrete factual setting. It is certainly correct that a public employer cannot be expected to obtain a warrant for every routine entry into an employee's workplace. 9 This situation, however, should not justify dispensing with a warrant in all searches by the employer. The warrant requirement is perfectly suited for many work-related searches, including the instant one. 10 Moreover, although the plurality abandons the warrant requirement, it does not explain what it will substitute or how the standard it adopts retains anything of the normal "neutral scrutiny of the judge." 11 In sum, the plurality's general result is preordained because, cut off from a particular factual setting, it cannot make the necessary distinctions among types of searches, or formulate an alternative to the warrant requirement that derives from a precise weighing of competing interests. [480 U.S. 709, 746] </s> When the plurality turns to the balancing that will produce an alternative to probable cause, it states that it is limiting its analysis to the two situations arguably presented by the facts of this case - the "noninvestigatory work-related intrusion" (i. e., inventory search) and the "investigatory search for evidence of suspected work-related employee misfeasance" (i. e., investigatory search). Ante, at 723. This limitation, however, is illusory. The plurality describes these searches in such a broad fashion that it is difficult to imagine a search that would not fit into one or the other of the categories. Moreover, it proposes the same standard, one taken from New Jersey v. T. L. O., for both inventory and investigatory searches. See ante, at 725-726. Therefore, in the context of remanding a case because the facts are unclear, the plurality is announcing a standard to apply to all public employer searches. </s> Moreover, the plurality also abandons any effort at careful balancing in arriving at its substitute for probable cause. Just as the elimination of the warrant requirement requires some nexus between its absence, the employee's privacy interests, and the government interests to be served by the search, so also does the formulation of a standard less than probable cause for a particular search demand a similar connection between these factors. See, e. g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975). The plurality's discussion of investigatory searches reveals no attempt to set forth the appropriate nexus. 12 It is certainly true, as the plurality observes, that a public employer has an interest in eliminating incompetence and work-related misconduct in order to enable the government agency to accomplish its tasks in an efficient manner. It is also conceivable that a public employee's privacy interests are somewhat limited in the workplace, although, as noted above, not to the extent suggested by the plurality. The plurality, however, fails to [480 U.S. 709, 747] explain why the balancing of these interests necessarily leads to the standard borrowed from New Jersey v. T. L. O., as opposed to other imaginable standards. Indeed, because the balancing is simply asserted rather than explicated, 13 the plurality never really justifies why probable cause, characterized by this Court as a "practical, nontechnical conception," Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949), would not protect adequately the public employer's interests in the situation presented by this case. See New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S., at 363 -364 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 14 </s> [480 U.S. 709, 748] </s> IV </s> I have reviewed at too great length the plurality's opinion because the question of public employers' searches of their employees' workplaces, like any relatively unexplored area of Fourth Amendment law, demands careful analysis. These searches appear in various factual settings, some of which courts are only now beginning to face, and present different problems. 15 Accordingly, I believe that the Court should examine closely the practical realities of a particular situation and the interests implicated there before replacing the traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements with some other standard of reasonableness derived from a balancing test. The Fourth Amendment demands no less. By ignoring the specific facts of this case, and by announcing in the abstract a standard as to the reasonableness of an employer's workplace searches, the plurality undermines not only the Fourth Amendment rights of public employees but also any further analysis of the constitutionality of public employer searches. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Although there has been some development on these issues in federal courts, see ante, at 720-721, this Court has not yet squarely faced them. </s> [Footnote 2 It is true that this Court has expressed concern about the workability of "`an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in differing factual circumstances.'" Ante, at 730 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment), quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984). Given, however, the number and types of workplace searches by public employers that can be imagined - ranging all the way from the employer's routine entry for retrieval of a file to a planned investigatory search into an employee's suspected criminal misdeeds - development of a jurisprudence in this area might well require a case-by-case approach. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 (1985) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("The only true rules governing search and seizure have been formulated and refined in the painstaking scrutiny of case-by-case adjudication"); New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U.S. 325, 366 -367 (1985) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would not think it necessary to develop a single standard to govern all school searches, any more than traditional Fourth Amendment law applies even the probable-cause standard [480 U.S. 709, 734] to all searches and seizures" (emphasis in original)). Under a case-by-case approach, a rule governing a particular type of workplace search, unlike the standard of the plurality here, should emerge from a concrete set of facts and possess the precision that only the exploration of "every aspect of a multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests" can produce. See United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961). The manner in which the plurality arrives at its standard, it seems to me, thus not only harms Dr. Ortega and other public employees, but also does a disservice to Fourth Amendment analysis. </s> [Footnote 3 It could be argued that the plurality removes its analysis from the facts of this case in order to arrive at a result unfavorable to public employees, whose position members of the plurality do not look upon with much sympathy. As Justice Cardozo long ago explained, judges are never free from the feelings of the times or those emerging from their own personal lives: </s> "I have spoken of the forces of which judges avowedly avail to shape the form and content of their judgments. Even these forces are seldom fully in consciousness. They lie so near the surface, however, that their existence and influence are not likely to be disclaimed. But the subject is not exhausted with the recognition of their power. Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge." B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 167 (1921). </s> It seems to me that whenever, as here, courts fail to concentrate on the facts of a case, these predilections inevitably surface, no longer held in check by the "discipline" of the facts, and shape, more than they ever should and even to an extent unknown to the judges themselves, any legal standard that is then articulated. This, I believe, is the central problem of the opinion of the plurality and, indeed, of the concurrence. </s> [Footnote 4 The plurality is correct in pointing out that the District Court erred in its conclusion that there was a Hospital policy that would have justified this search. Ante, at 728. This was not the only error on the District Court's part. That court also concluded that Dr. Ortega was notified of the search and could have participated in it, see App. 23, a conclusion at odds with the record, see id., at 24, 40. </s> [Footnote 5 This common-sense notion that public employees have some expectation of privacy in the workplace, particularly with respect to private documents or papers kept there, was exemplified by recent remarks of the Attorney General. In responding to questions concerning the possibility of a search and seizure of papers and offices of Government employees in connection with an investigation into allegedly illegal diversion of funds to Central American recipients, he is reported to have stated: "I'm not sure we would have any opportunity or any legal right to get into those personal papers. . . . There was certainly no evidence of any criminality that would have supported a search warrant at that time. . . . I don't think public employees' private documents belong to the Government." N. Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1986, p. All, col. 3. </s> Moreover, courts have recognized that a public employee has a legitimate expectation of privacy as to an employer's search and seizure at the workplace. See, e. g., Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (CA3 1978) (search of desk); United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1224 (CA9 1978) (monitoring conversations at office desk). But see Williams v. Collins, 728 F.2d 721, 728 (CA5 1984) (search of desk). In some cases, courts have decided that an employee had no such expectation with respect to a workplace search because an established regulation permitted the search. See United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362, 364-365 (CA3 1977) (describing cases); United States v. Donato, 269 F. Supp. 921 (ED Pa.), aff'd, 379 F.2d 288 (CA3 1967) (Government regulation notified employees that lockers in the United States Mint were not to be viewed by employees as private lockers). The question of such a search pursuant to regulations is not now before this Court. </s> [Footnote 6 Perhaps the greatest sign of the disappearance of the distinction between work and private life is the fact that women - the traditional representatives of the private sphere and family life - have entered the [480 U.S. 709, 740] work force in increasing numbers. See BNA Special Report, Work & Family: A Changing Dynamic, 1, 3, 13-15 (1986). It is therein noted: </s> "The myth of `separate worlds' - one of work and the other of family life - long harbored by employers, unions, and even workers themselves has been effectively laid to rest. Their inseparability is undeniable, particularly as two-earner families have become the norm where they once were the exception and as a distressing number of single parents are required to raise children on their own. The import of work-family conflicts - for the family, for the workplace, and, indeed, for the whole of society - will grow as these demographic and social transformations in the roles of men and women come to be more fully clarified and appreciated." Id., at 217 (remarks of Professor Phyllis Moen). </s> As a result of this disappearance, moreover, the employee must attempt to maintain the difficult balance between work and personal life. Id., at 227 (remarks of Barney Olmsted and Suzanne Smith). </s> [Footnote 7 I am also troubled by the plurality's implication that a public employee is entitled to a lesser degree of privacy in the workplace because the public agency, not the employee, owns much of what constitutes the workplace. This implication emerges in the distinction the plurality draws between the workplace "context," which includes "the hallways, cafeteria, offices, desks, and file cabinets," and an employee's "closed personal luggage, a handbag, or a briefcase." Ante, at 715-716. This Court, however, has made it clear that privacy interests protected by the Fourth Amendment do not turn on ownership of particular premises. See, e. g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) ("[T]he protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place"); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Fourth Amendment protects people and not simply "areas"). To be sure, the public employer's ownership of the premises is relevant in determining an employee's expectation of privacy, for often it is the main reason for the routine visits into an employee's office. The employee is assigned an office for work purposes; it is expected that the employee will receive work-related visitors and that the employer will maintain [480 U.S. 709, 741] the office. This fact of ownership, however, like the routine visits, does not abrogate the employee's expectation of privacy. </s> [Footnote 8 This part of the analysis is related to the "special need" step. Courts turn to the balancing test only when they conclude that the traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements are not a practical alternative. Through the balancing test, they then try to identify a standard of reasonableness, other than the traditional one, suitable for the circumstances. The warrant and probable-cause requirements, however, continue to serve as a model in the formulation of the new standard. It is conceivable, moreover, that a court, having initially decided that it is faced with a situation of "special need" that calls for balancing, may conclude after application of the balancing test that the traditional standard is a suitable one for the context after all. </s> [Footnote 9 In some workplace investigations, the particular goals of the government agency coupled with a need for special employee discipline may justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. See, e. g., Security and Law Enforcement Employees, Dist. Council 82, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Carey, 737 F.2d 187. 203-204 (CA2 1984) (government interest in maintaining security of a correctional facility justifies strip searches of correctional officers, in certain circumstances, in absence of a warrant). </s> [Footnote 10 While the warrant requirement might be "unwieldy" for public employers if it was required for every workplace search, the plurality has failed to explain why, on the facts of this case, obtaining a warrant would have been burdensome for petitioners, even if one assumes that they were unfamiliar with this requirement. In fact, the opposite seems true. Moreover, contrary to the plurality's suggestion, see ante, at 722, the warrant requirement is not limited to the criminal context. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 -531 (1967). </s> [Footnote 11 The plurality adopts a "standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances." Ante, at 725-726. It fails completely to suggest how this standard captures any of the protection of the traditional warrant requirement; indeed, the standard appears to be simply an alternative to probable cause. </s> [Footnote 12 The same holds true for the plurality's discussion of inventory searches. </s> [Footnote 13 The plurality's attempt at explication consists of little more than a series of assertions: that the probable-cause requirement "would impose intolerable burdens on public employers"; that the delay caused by such a requirement would result in "tangible and often irreparable damage" to a government agency; and that public employers cannot be expected "to learn the subtleties of the probable cause standard." See ante, at 724-725. Such assertions cannot pass for careful balancing on the facts of this case, given that the search was conducted during Dr. Ortega's administrative leave from the Hospital, with the advice of counsel, and by an investigating party that included a security officer. My observation that a particular Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness should be developed from a specific context bears repeating here. </s> [Footnote 14 Even if I believed that this case were an appropriate vehicle for development of a standard on public-employer searches, I would fault the plurality for its failure to give much substance to the standard it has borrowed almost verbatim from New Jersey v. T. L. O. See ante, at 714-715. The T. L. O. Court described in some detail the substance of its test, which was tailored to the circumstances of the case before it and thus is not directly transferable from the halls of a high school to the offices of government. In any event, were I to apply the rather stark standard of reasonableness announced by the plurality, I would conclude that petitioners here did not satisfy it. Assuming, without deciding, that petitioners had an individualized suspicion that Dr. Ortega was mismanaging the psychiatric residency program, I believe the scope of the search was not reasonably related to this concern. If petitioners were truly in search of evidence of respondent's mismanagement, it is difficult to understand why they looked through the personal belongings of Dr. Ortega, a search that resulted in the seizure of a Valentine's Day card, a photograph, and a book of poetry, which could have no conceivable relation to the claimed purpose of the search. Although, in [480 U.S. 709, 748] the plurality's view, the seizure of these items is not an issue in this case, see ante, at 729, n., I would think that this seizure is relevant to determining the reasonableness of the scope of the search. Accordingly, under the plurality's own standard, this search was unreasonable. </s> [Footnote 15 One example is the Fourth Amendment problem associated with drug and alcohol testing of employees. See, e. g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136, 1141-1143 (CA3) (administrative-search exception extended to warrantless breath and urine testing of jockeys, given the heavily regulated nature of the horse-racing industry), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 986 (1986); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380 (ED La. 1986) (wide-scale urinalysis of United States Customs Service employees without probable cause or reasonable suspicion struck down as violative of the Fourth Amendment). </s> [480 U.S. 709, 1]

United States Supreme Court PORTLAND GOLF CLUB v. COMMISSIONER(1990) No. 89-530 Argued: April 17, 1990Decided: June 21, 1990 </s> As a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates a private social club, petitioner's income derived from membership fees and other receipts from members is exempt from income tax. However, all other income is nonexempt "unrelated business taxable income," defined in 512(a)(3)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code as "the gross income (excluding any exempt function income), less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the gross income (excluding exempt function income)." Petitioner has nonexempt income from sales of food and drink to nonmembers, and from return on its investments. During its 1980 and 1981 tax years, petitioner offset net losses on nonmember sales against the earnings from its investments, and reported no unrelated business taxable income. In computing its losses, petitioner identified two categories of expenses incurred in nonmember sales: (1) variable (direct) expenses, such as the cost of food, which, in each year in question, were exceeded by gross income from nonmember sales; and (2) fixed (indirect) overhead expenses, which would have been incurred whether or not sales had been made to nonmembers. It determined what portions of fixed expenses were attributable to nonmember sales by employing an allocation formula known as the "gross-to-gross method," based on the ratio that nonmember sales bore to total sales. The total of these fixed expenses and variable costs exceeded petitioner's gross income from nonmember sales. On audit, the Commissioner determined that petitioner could deduct expenses associated with nonmember sales up to the amount of receipts from the sales themselves, but could not use losses from those activities to offset its investment income because it had failed to show that its nonmember sales were undertaken with an intent to profit. Petitioner sought redetermination, and the Tax Court ruled in petitioner's favor, concluding that petitioner had adequately demonstrated that it had a profit motive, since its gross receipts from nonmember sales consistently exceeded the variable costs associated with those activities. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Tax Court had applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that petitioner had demonstrated an intent to profit, because profit in this context meant the production of gains in excess of all direct and [497 U.S. 154, 155] indirect costs. The court remanded the case for a determination whether petitioner engaged in its nonmember activities with the required intent to profit from those activities. </s> Held: </s> Petitioner may use losses incurred in sales to nonmembers to investment income only if those sales were motivated by an intent to profit, which is to be determined by using the same allocation method as petitioner used to compute its actual profit or loss. Pp. 163-166. </s> (a) The statutory scheme for the taxation of social clubs was intended to achieve tax neutrality by ensuring that members are not subject to tax disadvantages as a consequence of their decision to pool their resources for the purchase of social or recreational services, but was not intended to provide clubs with a tax advantage. Pp. 160-163. </s> (b) By limiting deductions from unrelated business income to those expenses allowable as deductions under "this chapter," 512(a)(3)(A) limits such deductions to expenses allowable under Chapter 1 of the Code. Since only 162 of Chapter 1 serves as a basis for the deductions claimed here, and since a taxpayer's activities fall within 162's scope only if an intent, to profit is shown, see Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 , petitioner's nonmember sales must be motivated by an intent to profit. Dispensing with the profit-motive requirement in this case would run counter to the principle of tax neutrality underlying the statutory scheme. Pp. 163-166. </s> (c) The Commissioner correctly concluded that the same allocation method must be used in determining petitioner's intent to profit as in computing its actual profit or loss. It is an inherent contradiction to argue that the same fixed expenses that are attributable to nonmember sales in calculating actual losses can also be attributed to membership activities in determining whether petitioner acted with the requisite intent to profit. Having chosen to calculate its actual losses on the basis of the gross-to-gross formula, petitioner is foreclosed from attempting to demonstrate its intent to profit based on some other allocation method. Pp. 166-170. </s> (d) Petitioner has failed to show that it intended to earn gross income from nonmember sales in excess of its total costs where fixed expenses are allocated using the gross-to-gross method. P. 171. </s> 876 F.2d 897, affirmed. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and in which O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined except as to Parts III-B and IV. KENNEDY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ., joined, post, p. 171. [497 U.S. 154, 156] </s> Leonard J. Henzke, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Allen B. Bush. </s> Clifford M. Sloan argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant Attorney General Peterson, Deputy Solicitor General Wallace, Alan I. Horowitz, and Robert S. Pomerance. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case requires us to determine the circumstances under which a social club, in calculating its liability for federal income tax, may offset losses incurred in selling food and drink to nonmembers against the income realized from its investments. </s> I </s> Petitioner Portland Golf Club is a nonprofit Oregon corporation, most of whose income is exempt from federal income tax under 501(c)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(7). 1 Since 1914, petitioner has owned and operated a private golf and country club with a golf course, restaurant and bar, swimming pool, and tennis courts. The great part of petitioner's income is derived from membership dues and other receipts from the club's members; that income is exempt from tax. Portland Golf also has two sources of nonexempt "unrelated business taxable income": sales of food and drink to nonmembers, and return on its investments. 2 </s> [497 U.S. 154, 157] </s> The present controversy centers on Portland Golf's federal income tax liability for its fiscal years ended September 30, 1980, and September 30, 1981, respectively. Petitioner received investment income in the form of interest in the amount of $11,752 for fiscal 1980 and in the amount of $21,414 for fiscal 1981. App. 18. It sustained net losses of $28,433 for fiscal 1980 and $69,608 for fiscal 1981 on sales of food and drink to nonmembers. Petitioner offset these losses against the earnings from its investments, and therefore reported no unrelated business taxable income for the two tax years. In computing these losses, petitioner identified two different categories of expenses incurred in selling food and drink to nonmembers. First, petitioner incurred variable (or direct) expenses, such as the cost of food, which varied depending on the amount of food and beverages sold (and therefore would not have been incurred had no sales to nonmembers been made). For each year in question, petitioner's gross income from nonmember sales exceeded these variable costs. 3 Petitioner also included, as an unrelated business expense, a portion of the fixed (or indirect) overhead expenses of the club - expenses which would have been incurred whether or not petitioner had made sales to nonmembers. In determining what portions of its fixed expenses were attributable to nonmember sales, petitioner employed an allocation formula, described as the "gross-to-gross method," based on the ratio that nonmember sales bore to total sales. 4 When fixed [497 U.S. 154, 158] expenses, so calculated, were added to petitioner's variable costs, the total exceeded Portland Golf's gross income from nonmember sales. 5 </s> On audit, the Commissioner took the position that petitioner could deduct expenses associated with nonmember sales up to the amount of receipts from the sales themselves, but that it could not use losses from those activities to offset its investment income. The Commissioner based that conclusion on the belief that a profit motive was required if losses from these activities were to be used to offset income from other sources, and that Portland Golf had failed to show that its sales to nonmembers were undertaken with an intent to profit. 6 The Commissioner therefore determined deficiencies of $1,828 for 1980 and $3,470 for 1981; these deficiencies [497 U.S. 154, 159] reflected tax owed on petitioner's investment income. App. 48-51. </s> Portland Golf sought redetermination in the Tax Court. That court ruled in petitioner's favor. 55 TCM 212 (1988). The court assumed, without deciding, that losses incurred in the course of sales to nonmembers could be used to offset other nonexempt income only if the sales were undertaken with an intent to profit. The court, however, held that Portland Golf had adequately demonstrated a profit motive, since its gross receipts from sales to nonmembers consistently exceeded the variable costs associated with those activities. 7 The court therefore held that "petitioner is entitled to offset its unrelated business taxable income from interest by its loss from its nonmember food and beverage sales computed by allocating a portion of its fixed expenses to the nonmember food and beverage sales activity in a manner which respondent agrees is acceptable." Id., at 217, § 88,076 P-H Memo TC, at 413. </s> The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a. The Court of Appeals held that the Tax Court had applied an incorrect legal standard in determining that Portland Golf had demonstrated an intent to profit from sales to nonmembers. The appellate court relied on its decision in North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 750 (1989), where it had ruled that a social club "can properly deduct losses from a nonmember activity only if it undertakes that activity with the intent to profit, where profit means the production of gains in excess of all direct and indirect costs." Id., at 756. The same court in the [497 U.S. 154, 160] present case concluded: "Because Portland Golf Club could have reported gains in excess of direct and indirect costs, but did not do so, relying on a method of allocation stipulated to be reasonable by the Commissioner, we REMAND this case to the tax court for a determination of whether Portland Golf Club engaged in its nonmember activities with the intent required under North Ridge to deduct its losses from those activities." App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a-3a. 8 </s> Because of a perceived conflict with the decision of the Sixth Circuit in Cleveland Athletic Club, Inc. v. United States, 779 F.2d 1160 (1985), 9 and because of the importance of the issue, we granted certiorari. 493 U.S. 1041 (1990). </s> II </s> Virtually all tax-exempt business organizations are required to pay federal income tax on their "unrelated business taxable income." The law governing social clubs, however, is significantly different from that governing other tax-exempt entities. As to exempt organizations other than social clubs, the Code defines "unrelated business taxable income" as "the gross income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business (as defined in section 513) regularly carried on by it, less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the carrying on of [497 U.S. 154, 161] such trade or business." 26 U.S.C. 512(a)(1). 10 As to social clubs, however, "unrelated business taxable income" is defined as "the gross income (excluding any exempt function income), less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the gross income (excluding exempt function income)." 512(a)(3)(A). 11 The salient point is that 512(a)(1) (which applies to most exempt organizations) limits "unrelated business taxable income" to income derived from a "trade or business," while 512(a)(3)(A) (which applies to social clubs) contains no such limitation. Thus, a social club's investment income is subject to federal income tax, while the investment income of most other exempt organizations is not. </s> This distinction reflects the fact that a social club's exemption from federal income tax has a justification fundamentally different from that which underlies the grant of tax exemptions to other nonprofit entities. For most such organizations, exemption from federal income tax is intended to encourage the provision of services that are deemed socially beneficial. Taxes are levied on "unrelated business income" only in order to prevent tax-exempt organizations from gaining an unfair advantage over competing commercial enterprises. 12 See United States v. American College of Physicians, [497 U.S. 154, 162] 475 U.S. 834, 838 (1986) ("Congress perceived a need to restrain the unfair competition fostered by the tax laws"). Since Congress concluded that investors reaping tax-exempt income from passive sources would not be in competition with commercial businesses, it excluded from tax the investment income realized by exempt organizations. 13 </s> The exemption for social clubs rests on a totally different premise. Social clubs are exempted from tax not as a means of conferring tax advantages, but as a means of ensuring that the members are not subject to tax disadvantages as a consequence of their decision to pool their resources for the purchase of social or recreational services. The Senate Report accompanying the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 536, explained that that purpose does not justify a tax exemption for income derived from investments: </s> "Since the tax exemption for social clubs and other groups is designed to allow individuals to join together to provide recreational or social facilities or other benefits on a mutual basis, without tax consequences, the tax exemption operates properly only when the sources of income of the organization are limited to receipts from the membership. Under such circumstances, the individual is in substantially the same position as if he had spent his income on pleasure or recreation (or other benefits) without the intervening separate organization. However, where the organization receives income from sources outside the membership, such as income from investments . . . upon which no tax is paid, the membership receives a benefit not contemplated by the exemption, in that untaxed dollars can be used by the organization to provide pleasure or recreation (or other benefits) to its membership. . . . In such a case, the exemption is [497 U.S. 154, 163] no longer simply allowing individuals to join together for recreation or pleasure without tax consequences. Rather, it is bestowing a substantial additional advantage to the members of the club by allowing tax-free dollars to be used for their personal recreational or pleasure purposes. The extension of the exemption to such investment income is, therefore, a distortion of its purpose. S. Rep. No. 91-552, p. 71 (1969). </s> In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress extended the tax on "unrelated business income" to social clubs. As to these organizations, however, Congress defined "unrelated business taxable income" to include income derived from investments. Our review of the present case must therefore be informed by two central facts. First, Congress intended that the investment income of social clubs should be subject to federal tax, and indeed Congress devised a definition of "unrelated business taxable income" with that purpose in mind. Second, the statutory scheme for the taxation of social clubs was intended to achieve tax neutrality, not to provide these clubs a tax advantage: Even the exemption for income derived from members' payments was designed to ensure that members are not disadvantaged as compared with persons who pursue recreation through private purchases rather than through the medium of an organization. </s> III </s> Petitioner's principal argument is that it may deduct losses incurred through sales to nonmembers without demonstrating that these sales were motivated by an intent to profit. In the alternative, petitioner contends (and the Tax Court agreed) that, if the Code does impose a profit-motive requirement, then that requirement has been satisfied in this case. We address these arguments in turn. </s> A </s> We agree with the Commissioner and the Court of Appeals that petitioner may use losses incurred in sales to nonmembers [497 U.S. 154, 164] to offset investment income only if those sales were motivated by an intent to profit. The statute provides that, as to social clubs, "the term `unrelated business taxable income' means the gross income (excluding any exempt function income), less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the production of the gross income (excluding exempt function income)." 512(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added). As petitioner concedes, the italicized language limits deductions from unrelated business income to expenses allowable as deductions under Chapter 1 of the Code. See Brief for Petitioner 21-22. In our view, the deductions claimed in this case - expenses for food, payroll, and overhead in excess of gross receipts from nonmember sales - are allowable, if at all, only under 162 of the Code. See North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 750, 753 (CA9 1989); Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 838 (CA2 1986). 14 Section 162(a) provides a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Although the statute does not expressly require that a "trade or business" must be carried on with an intent to profit, this Court has ruled that a taxpayer's activities fall within the scope of 162 only if an intent to profit has been shown. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987) ("[T]o be engaged in a [ 162] trade or business, . . . the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit"). Thus, the losses that Portland Golf incurred in selling food and drink to nonmembers will constitute "deductions allowed by this chapter" only if the club's nonmember sales were performed with an intent to profit. 15 </s> [497 U.S. 154, 165] </s> We see no basis for dispensing with the profit-motive requirement in the present case. Indeed, such an exemption would be in considerable tension with the statutory scheme devised by Congress to govern the taxation of social clubs. Congress intended that the investment income of social clubs (unlike the investment income of most other exempt organizations) should be subject to the same tax consequences as the investment income of any other taxpayer. To allow such an offset for social clubs would run counter to the principle of tax neutrality which underlies the statutory scheme. </s> Petitioner concedes that "[g]enerally a profit motive is a necessary factor in determining whether an activity is a trade or business." Brief for Petitioner 23. Petitioner contends, however, that, by including receipts from sales to nonmembers within 512(a)(3)(A)'s definition of "unrelated business taxable income," the Code has defined nonmember sales as a "trade or business," and has thereby obviated the need for an inquiry into the taxpayer's intent to profit. We disagree. In our view, Congress' use of the term "unrelated business taxable income" to describe all receipts other than payments from the members hardly manifests an intent to define as a "trade or business" activities otherwise outside the scope of 162. Petitioner's reading would render superfluous the words "allowed by this chapter" in 512(a)(3)(A): if each taxable activity of a social club is "deemed" to be a trade or business, then all of the expenses "directly connected" with those activities would presumably be deductible. Moreover, Portland Golf's interpretation ignores Congress' general intent to [497 U.S. 154, 166] tax the income of social clubs according to the same principles applicable to other taxpayers. We therefore conclude that petitioner may offset losses incurred in sales to nonmembers against investment income only if its nonmember sales are motivated by an intent to profit. 16 </s> B </s> Losses from Portland Golf's sales to nonmembers may be used to offset investment income only if those activities were undertaken with a profit motive - that is, an intent to generate receipts in excess of costs. The parties and the other courts in this case, however, have taken divergent positions as to the range of expenses that qualify as costs of the nonexempt activity and are to be considered in determining whether petitioner acted with the requisite profit motive. In the view of the Tax Court, petitioner's profit motive was established by the fact that the club's receipts from nonmember [497 U.S. 154, 167] sales exceeded its variable costs. Since Portland Golf's fixed costs, by definition, have been incurred even in the absence of sales to nonmembers, the Tax Court concluded that these costs should be disregarded in determining petitioner's intent to profit. </s> The Commissioner has taken no firm position as to the precise manner in which Portland Golf's fixed costs are to be allocated between member and nonmember sales. Indeed, the Commissioner does not even insist that any portion of petitioner's fixed costs must be attributed to nonmember activities in determining intent to profit. 17 He does insist, however, that the same allocation method is to be used in determining petitioner's intent to profit as in computing its actual profit or loss. See Brief for Respondent 44-46. In the present case, the parties have stipulated that the gross-to-gross method provides a reasonable formula for allocating fixed costs, and Portland Golf has used that method in calculating the losses incurred in selling food and drink to nonmembers. The Commissioner contends that petitioner is therefore required to demonstrate an intent to earn gross receipts in excess of fixed and variable costs, with the allocable share of fixed costs being determined by the gross-to-gross method. </s> Although the Court of Appeals' opinion is not entirely clear on this point, see n. 8, supra, that court seems to have taken a middle ground. The Court of Appeals expressly rejected the Tax Court's assertion that profit motive could be established [497 U.S. 154, 168] by a showing that gross receipts exceeded variable costs; the court insisted that some portion of fixed costs must be considered in determining intent to profit. The court appeared, however, to leave open the possibility that Portland Golf could use the gross-to-gross method in calculating its actual losses while using some other allocation method to demonstrate that its sales to nonmembers were undertaken with a profit motive. 18 </s> We conclude that the Commissioner's position is the correct one. Portland Golf's argument rests, as the Commissioner puts it, on an "inherent contradiction." Brief for Respondent 44. Petitioner's calculation of actual losses rests on the claim that a portion of its fixed expenses is properly regarded as attributable to the production of income from nonmember sales. Given this assertion, we do not believe that these expenses can be ignored (or, more accurately, attributed to petitioner's exempt activities) in determining whether petitioner acted with the requisite intent to profit. Essentially the same criticism applies to the Court of Appeals' approach. That court required petitioner to include some portion of fixed expenses in demonstrating its intent to profit, but it left open the possibility that petitioner could employ an allocation method different from that used in calculating its actual losses. Under that approach, some of petitioner's fixed expenses could be attributed to exempt functions in determining intent to profit and to nonmember sales in establishing the club's actual loss. This, like the rationale of the Tax Court, seems to us to rest on an "inherent contradiction." </s> Petitioner's principal response is that 162 requires an intent to earn an economic profit, and that this is quite different from an intent to earn taxable income. Portland Golf emphasizes that numerous provisions of the Code establish [497 U.S. 154, 169] deductions and preferences which do not purport to mirror economic reality. Therefore, petitioner argues, taxpayers may frequently act with an intent to profit, even though the foreseeable (and, indeed, the intended) result of their efforts is that they suffer (or achieve) tax losses. Much of the Code, in petitioner's view, would be rendered a nullity if the mere fact of tax losses sufficed to show that a taxpayer lacked an intent to profit, thereby rendering the deductions unavailable. In Portland Golf's view, the parties have stipulated only that the gross-to-gross formula provides a reasonable method of determining what portion of fixed expenses is "directly connected" with the nonexempt activity for purposes of computing taxable income. That stipulation, Portland Golf contends, is irrelevant in determining the portion of fixed expenses that represents the actual economic cost of the activity in question. </s> We accept petitioner's contention that 162 requires only an intent to earn an economic profit. We acknowledge, moreover, that many Code provisions are designed to serve purposes (such as encouragement of certain types of investment) other than the accurate measurement of economic income. A taxpayer who takes advantage of deductions or preferences of that kind may establish an intent to profit even though he has no expectation of realizing taxable income. 19 The fixed expenses that Portland Golf seeks to allocate [497 U.S. 154, 170] to its nonmember sales, however, are deductions of a different kind. The Code does not state that fixed costs are allocable on a gross-to-gross basis irrespective of economic reality. Rather, petitioner's right to use the gross-to-gross method rests on the club's assertion that this allocation formula reasonably identifies those expenses that are "directly connected" to the nonmember sales, 512(a)(3)(A), and are "the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred" in selling food and drink to nonmembers, see 162(a). 20 Language such as this, it seems to us, reflects an attempt to measure economic income - not an effort to use the tax law to serve ancillary purposes. Having calculated its actual losses on the basis of the gross-to-gross formula, petitioner is therefore foreclosed from attempting to demonstrate its intent to profit by arguing that some other allocation method more accurately reflects economic reality. 21 </s> [497 U.S. 154, 171] </s> IV </s> We hold that any losses incurred as a result of petitioner's nonmember sales may be offset against its investment income only if the nonmember sales were undertaken with an intent to profit. We also conclude that, in demonstrating the requisite profit motive, Portland Golf must employ the same method of allocating fixed expenses as it uses in calculating its actual loss. Petitioner has failed to show that it intended to earn gross income from nonmember sales in excess of its total (fixed plus variable) costs, where fixed expenses are allocated using the gross-to-gross method. 22 The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 501(c)(7) grants an exemption from federal income tax to "[c]lubs organized for pleasure, recreation, and other nonprofitable purposes, substantially all of the activities of which are for such purposes and no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 511 of the Code provides that the "unrelated business taxable income" of an exempt organization shall be taxed at the ordinary corporate rate. The term "unrelated business taxable income," as applied to the income of a club such as petitioner, is defined in 512(a)(3)(A). That definition encompasses all sources of income except receipts from the club's members. </s> [Footnote 3 For 1980, gross receipts from nonmember sales in the bar and diningroom totalled $84,422, while variable expenses were $61,821. For 1981, gross receipts totalled $106,547, while variable expenses were $78,407. App. 85. </s> [Footnote 4 For example, if 10% of petitioner's gross receipts were derived from nonmember sales, 10% of petitioner's fixed costs would be allocated to the nonexempt activity. That method of allocation appears rather generous to Portland Golf. The club charges nonmembers higher prices for food and drink than members are charged, even though nonmembers' meals presumably cost no more to prepare and serve. It therefore seems likely that the gross-to-gross method overstates the percentage of fixed costs properly [497 U.S. 154, 158] attributable to nonmember sales. The parties, however, stipulated that this allocation method was reasonable. Id., at 17. </s> [Footnote 5 The following table shows petitioner's losses when fixed costs are allocated using the gross-to-gross method: </s> 1980 1981 </s> Gross income $ 84,422 $ 106,547 Variable expenses (61,821) (78,407) Allocated fixed expenses (51,034) (97,748) </s> Net loss ($ 28,433) ($ 69,608) </s> It is of interest to note that, if petitioner's fixed costs had been allocated using an alternative formula, known as the "square foot and hours of actual use" method, see id., at 29, its gross receipts exceeded the sum of variable and allocated fixed costs for both years: </s> 1980 1981 </s> Gross income $ 84,422 $ 106,547 Variable expenses (61,821) (78,407) Allocated fixed expenses (3,153) (4,666) </s> Net loss $ 19,448 $ 23,474 </s> [Footnote 6 The general rule under the Code is that losses incurred in a profit-seeking venture may be deducted from unrelated income; expenses of a not-for-profit activity may be offset against the income from that activity, but losses may not be applied against income from other sources. See 1 B. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts §§ 20.1.2, 22.5.4, pp. 20-6, 22-63 to 22-64 (2d ed. 1989). </s> [Footnote 7 The Tax Court stated that Portland Golf "did intend to make a profit, and did make a profit between the amount received from sales to nonmembers and the costs related to those sales which would not have been incurred absent those sales." 55 TCM at 216. The Tax Court, in articulating this standard for determining whether intent to profit had been shown, relied on its earlier reviewed decision in North Ridge Country Club v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 563 (1987). That decision subsequently was reversed. 877 F.2d 750 (CA9 1989). </s> [Footnote 8 The basis for the Court of Appeals' remand order is not entirely clear to us. It appears, however, that the court left open the possibility that petitioner could establish its intent to profit by using some other method of allocating fixed costs (such as the "actual use" method, see n. 5, supra), while continuing to use the gross-to-gross formula in computing actual losses. Both parties interpret the Court of Appeals' decision in this manner, and both express disapproval of that approach. See Brief for Respondent 47, n. 25 ("[T]his argument is untenable"); Brief for Petitioner 48 ("While the Ninth Circuit's formula is better than that of the Government, it is basically unprincipled"). Our disposition of the case makes unnecessary precise interpretation of the Court of Appeals' opinion. </s> [Footnote 9 See also Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833 (CA2 1986), Rev.Rul. 81-69, 1981-1 Cum.Bull. 351-352; A. Scialabba, The Unrelated Business Taxable Income of Social Clubs, 10 Campbell L.Rev. 249 (1988). </s> [Footnote 10 Section 513(a) defines "unrelated trade or business" as "any trade or business the conduct of which is not substantially related . . . to the exercise or performance by such organization of its charitable, educational, or other purpose or function constituting the basis for its exemption." </s> [Footnote 11 Section 512(a)(3)(B) defines "exempt function income" as "the gross income from dues, fees, charges, or similar amounts paid by members of the organization as consideration for providing such members or their dependents or guests goods, facilities, or services in furtherance of the purposes constituting the basis for the exemption of the organization to which such income is paid." </s> [Footnote 12 See S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 28 (1950) ("The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is directed is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of [these] organizations enables them to use their profits tax-free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only with the profits remaining after taxes"); H. R. Rep. [497 U.S. 154, 162] No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., 36 (1950). The tax on "unrelated business income" was added to the Code by the Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906. </s> [Footnote 13 See S. Rep. No. 2375, at 30-31; H. R. Rep. No. 2319, at 38. </s> [Footnote 14 Portland Golf appears to concede this point, too. See Brief for Petitioner 10 ("The parties agree that all of the expenses in issue . . . are the types of corporate expenses allowed as deductions by Code Section 162"). Petitioner does not identify any other Code provision which would serve as a basis for the deduction claimed in this case. </s> [Footnote 15 Section 183 of the Code permits a taxpayer to offset expenses incurred in a not-for-profit activity against income from that activity up to the amount of the income. Even before the enactment of 183, moreover, the [497 U.S. 154, 165] courts and the Commissioner had not required that revenues earned in activities showing a net loss be declared as taxable income. See 1 B. Bittker & Lokken, n. 6, supra, § 22.5.4, p. 22-63. Although 183 is inapplicable to a nonprofit corporation such as Portland Golf, the Commissioner has followed longstanding tax principles in permitting the deduction of expenses incurred in nonmember sales up to the amount of petitioner's receipts. See Brief for Respondent 33. At issue in this case is petitioner's right to offset losses from nonmember sales against income from unrelated investments. </s> [Footnote 16 The Code distinguishes a social club's "exempt function income" from its "unrelated business taxable income" by looking to the source of the payment: "[E]xempt function income" is limited to money received from the members. 512(a)(3)(B). However, a social club could easily organize events whose primary purpose was to benefit the membership, yet arrange for nonmembers to make modest contributions toward the cost of the event. Those contributions would constitute "unrelated business taxable income," but, if losses incurred in such activities could be used to offset investment income, it would be relatively easy for clubs to avoid taxation on their investments. </s> The general rule that losses incurred in a not-for-profit activity may not be used to offset unrelated income rests on the recognition that one who incurs expenses without an intent to profit presumably derives some intrinsic pleasure or benefit from the activity. The Code's limitation on deductibility (expenses may be deducted up to, but not above, the gross income produced by the activity) reflects the view that taxpayers should not be allowed to deduct what are, in essence, personal expenses simply because the activity in question generates some receipts. Just as an individual taxpayer may not offset personal expenses against income from other sources, a social club should not be allowed to deduct expenses incurred for the benefit of the membership from unrelated business income. </s> [Footnote 17 The parties stipulated that the gross-to-gross formula was a reasonable method of allocating fixed expenses. App. 17. In his brief to this Court, however, the Commissioner states: "There may be room to debate whether the fixed costs allocated by petitioner to its nonmember sales constitute true economic costs of that activity that ought to be treated as `directly connected' to the production of the nonmember sales income. It might be argued that only the variable costs are `directly connected with' the nonmember income, and therefore that only those variable costs should offset the gross receipts from the nonmember income." Brief for Respondent 45, n. 24. </s> [Footnote 18 See n. 8, supra. The Tax Court noted that petitioner would have shown a profit on sales to nonmembers in both 1980 and 1981 if fixed costs had been allocated under the "actual use" method. See 55 TCM at 212, 213 (1988), § 88,076 P-H Memo TC 412, 413. </s> [Footnote 19 The Tax Court consistently has held that the possibility of realizing tax benefits should be disregarded in determining whether an intent to earn an economic profit has been shown. (That is, the reduction in tax liability cannot itself be the "profit.") See, e.g, Gefen v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1471, 1490 (1986) ("A transaction has economic substance and will be recognized for tax purposes if the transaction offers a reasonable opportunity for economic profit, that is, profit exclusive of tax benefits"); Seaman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 564, 588 (1985) ("`[P]rofit' means economic profit, independent of tax savings"); Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210, 233 (1983) (same). Accord, Simon v. Commissioner, 830 F.2d 499, 500 (CA3 1987). Portland Golf does not dispute this principle. See Brief for Petitioner 39 ("The cases have uniformly held that taxable businesses, in order to deduct expenses in excess of income, need only show an `economic [497 U.S. 154, 170] profit' independent of tax savings, or `economic gain' independent of tax savings") (footnotes omitted). We therefore assume, without deciding, that potential reductions in tax liability are irrelevant to the determination whether a profit motive exists. </s> [Footnote 20 As stated earlier, 512(a)(3)(A) limits deductions from unrelated business taxable income to "deductions allowed by this chapter." In the present case, petitioner may offset losses from nonmember sales against investment income only if those losses are deductible under 162. That Code provision states: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." Thus, the expenses petitioner seeks to deduct will constitute "deductions allowed by this chapter" only if they are "the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred" in selling food and drink to nonmembers. </s> [Footnote 21 We do not hold that, for other cases, any particular method of allocating fixed expenses must be used by social clubs. We hold only that the allocation method used in determining actual profit or loss must also be used in determining whether the taxpayer acted with a profit motive. Petitioner here has stipulated, however, to the reasonableness of the gross-to-gross method, and has used that method in calculating its actual losses. We note that no other allocation method, used consistently, would have produced a result more favorable to petitioner. Had petitioner employed the actual use method, or ignored fixed costs entirely, it could have established [497 U.S. 154, 171] its intent to profit, but it would have realized a net gain from nonmember sales and its "unrelated business taxable income" would have been higher. </s> [Footnote 22 The fact that petitioner suffered actual losses in 1980 and 1981 does not, by itself, prove that Portland Golf lacked a profit motive. A taxpayer's intent to profit is not disproved simply because no profit is realized during a particular year. See Treas. Reg. 1.183-1(c)(1)(ii), 26 CFR 1.183-1(c)(1)(ii) (most activities presumed to be engaged in for profit if gross income exceeds costs in any 2 of 5 consecutive years); Treas. Reg. 1.183-2(b)(6), 26 CFR 1.183-2(b)(6) (1989) ("A series of losses during the initial or start-up stage of an activity may not necessarily be an indication that the activity is not engaged in for profit"). Petitioner could offset these losses against investment income if it could demonstrate that it intended to earn gross income in excess of total costs, with fixed expenses being allocated under the gross-to-gross formula. Portland Golf has not asserted, however, that it possessed such a motive. The club's reluctance to make that argument is understandable: in every year from 1975 through 1984, petitioner incurred losses from its sales to nonmembers when fixed costs are allocated on a gross-to-gross basis. 55 TCM, at 213, § 88,076 P-H Memo TC, at 413. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR and JUSTICE SCALIA join, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> The Tax Court found that Portland Golf Club's nonmember activity qualified as a trade or business under 162(a) of the [497 U.S. 154, 172] Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. 162(a), and it allowed the club to deduct expenses associated with the activity from its income. 55 TCM 212 (1988). § 88,076 P-H Memo TC. The Court of Appeals reversed because it found the club's profit motive unclear. App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a, judgt. order reported at 876 F.2d 897 (1989). Although the Tax Court had determined that the club intended the gross receipts from the nonmember activity to exceed the direct costs, the Court of Appeals held that 162(a) requires an intent to produce gains in excess of both direct and indirect costs. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to allow the Tax Court to reconsider the club's profit motive, taking account of the overhead and other fixed costs attributable to the nonmember activity. I agree with that decision, and so would affirm the Court of Appeals. </s> I join all but Parts III-B and IV of the Court's opinion. I otherwise concur only in the judgment, because the Court decides a significant issue that is unnecessary to our disposition of the case, and, in my view, decides it the wrong way. When the Court of Appeals instructed the Tax Court to consider the club's indirect costs, it did not specify how the club should allocate these costs between its member and nonmember activities. In particular, it left open the possibility that the club could use one allocation method to calculate its expenses under 162(a), while using some other allocation method to demonstrate its profit motivation. See ante, at 167-168. Although the Court purports to affirm the Court of Appeals, its opinion eliminates this possibility, and thus works a dramatic change in the remand order. The Court rules in Parts III-B and IV that, if the club uses the so-called gross-to-gross method to allocate its fixed costs when computing its expenses, it must use the same allocation method to prove its profit motivation. The Tax Court and Court of Appeals, in my view, should have had the opportunity to consider this issue in the first instance. Because the Court has [497 U.S. 154, 173] reached the question, however, I must state my disagreement with its conclusion. </s> A taxpayer's profit motive, in my view, cannot turn upon the particular accounting method by which it reports its ordinary and necessary expenses to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The Court cites no authority for its novel rule, and we cannot adopt it simply because we confront a hard case. Section 162(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. . . ." 26 U.S.C. 162(a). Although the section does not require a profit motivation by its express terms, we have inferred such a requirement because the words "trade or business," in their ordinary usage, contemplate activities undertaken to earn a profit. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 -28 (1987); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911). Yet I see no justification for making the profit motive requirement more demanding than necessary to distinguish trades and businesses from other activities pursued by taxpayers. See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, 197 (1963). Because an activity may be a trade or business even if the taxpayer intended to show losses on its income tax forms under a permissible accounting method, the Court endorses an improper conception of profit motivation. </s> A taxpayer often may choose from among different accounting methods when computing its ordinary and necessary expenses under 162(a). In this case, as stipulated by the IRS, the club could have allocated its fixed costs either by the gross-to-gross method or by the so-called actual-use method. Although the gross-to-gross method showed a net loss for the relevant tax years, the actual use method would have shown a net profit. See ante, at 158, n. 5. If profit motivation turns upon the allocation method employed by the club in filling out its tax forms, then the status of the nonmember activity as a trade or business may lie within the control of [497 U.S. 154, 174] the club's accountants. I find this interpretation of the words "trade or business" simply "to affront common understanding and to deny the facts of common experience." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 118 (1940). A taxpayer does not alter the nature of an enterprise by selecting one reasonable allocation method over another. </s> The Court's decision also departs from the traditional practice of the courts and the IRS. Rather than relying on strict consistency in accounting, the courts long have evaluated profit motivation according to a variety of factors that indicate whether the taxpayer acted in a manner characteristic of one engaged in a trade or business. See, e.g., Teitelbaum v. C.I.R., 294 F.2d 541, 545 (CA7 1961); Patterson v. United States, 459 F.2d 487, 493-494, (Ct.Cl. 1972); see Boyle, What is a Trade or Business?, 39 Tax Law. 737, 743-745 (1986); Lee, A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 Tax L. Review 347, 390-447 (1974). In a regulation based on a wide range of prior court decisions, the IRS itself has explained 162 and profit motivation as follows: </s> "Deductions are allowable under section 162 for expenses of carrying on activities which constitute a trade or business of the taxpayer and under section 212 for expenses incurred in connection with activities engaged in for the production or collection of income or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income. Except as provided in section 183 and [26 CFR] 1.183-1 [which authorize individuals and S-corporations to offset hobby losses], no deductions are allowable for expenses incurred in connection with activities which are not engaged in for profit. . . . The determination whether an activity is engaged in for profit is to be made by reference to objective standards, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances of each case. Although a reasonable expectation of profit is not required, the facts and circumstances [497 U.S. 154, 175] must indicate that the taxpayer entered into the activity, or continued the activity, with the objective of making a profit. 26 CFR 1.183-2(a) (1989). </s> To facilitate the application of this general standard, the IRS has supplied a list of nine factors, also based on a wide body of case law, for evaluating the taxpayer's profit motive. These factors include: (1) the manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity; (2) the expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors; (3) the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity; (4) the expectation that assets used in the activity may appreciate in value; (5) the success of the taxpayer in carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; (6) the taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are earned; (8) the financial status of the taxpayer; and (9) the elements of personal pleasure or recreation. See 1.183-2(b)(1)-(9). </s> The Court today limits this longstanding approach by pinning the profit motive requirement to the accounting method that a taxpayer uses to report its ordinary and necessary expenses under 162(a). Although the tax laws in general strive to reflect the true economic income of a taxpayer, the IRS at times allows taxpayers to use accounting methods that understate their income or overstate their expenses. In this case, as the Court itself acknowledges, the IRS stipulated that the club could use the gross-to-gross allocation method to calculate its expenses under 162(a) even though this method tends to exaggerate the percentage of fixed costs attributable to the club's nonmember sales. See ante, at 157-158, n. 4. Yet I see no basis for saying that, when the club took advantage of this unconditional stipulation, it committed itself to the legal position that the gross-to-gross method best reflects economic reality. Some inconsistency will exist if the club uses the gross-to-gross allocation method in computing the expenses while using some other reasonable accounting method to prove that it undertook the nonmember activity [497 U.S. 154, 176] as a trade or business. But the solution to this inconsistency lies in altering the stipulation in other cases, not in changing the longstanding interpretation of profit motivation. </s> The precise effect of the Court's holding with respect to the club remains unclear. The Court states only that the club may not offset its losses from nonmember sales against its investment income. But I do not understand how the Court can confine its ruling to investment income alone. If the club's nonmember activity does not qualify as a trade or business, then the club cannot use 162(a) to deduct any of the expenses associated with the nonmember activity, not even to the extent of gross receipts. Confronted with this difficulty at oral argument, respondent stated that, in the absence of statutory authority, the IRS has allowed an offset of expenses against gross receipts out of its own "generosity," a characteristic as rare as it is implausible. Tr. of Oral Arg. 42-43. The IRS, indeed, asserts the authority to disallow the offset in the future. See id., at 44. Cf. 26 U.S.C. 183 (authorizing individuals and S-corporations to offset hobby losses). This possibility further counsels against making the profit motive requirement more stringent than necessary to determine whether the club undertook the nonmember activity as a trade or business. For these reasons, I join the Court's opinion, with the exception of Parts III-B and IV, and concur in the judgment. </s> [497 U.S. 154, 177]

United States Supreme Court FEC v. NATIONAL CONSERVATIVE PAC(1985) No. 83-1032 Argued: November 28, 1984Decided: March 18, 1985 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 83-1122, Democratic Party of the United States et al. v. National Conservative Political Action Committee et al., also on appeal from the same court. </s> The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act) offers the Presidential candidates of major political parties the option of receiving public financing for their general election campaigns. If the candidate elects public financing, the Act, in 26 U.S.C. 9012(f), makes it a criminal offense for an independent "political committee" to expend more than $1,000 to further that candidate's election. Believing that 9012(f) would prohibit appellee independent political committees' intended substantial expenditures in support of President Reagan's reelection in 1984, appellant Democratic Party and appellant Democratic National Committee (Democrats) filed an action in Federal District Court against appellees, seeking a declaration that 9012(f) is constitutional. Appellant Federal Election Commission (FEC) brought a separate action against the same defendants seeking the same relief, and the two actions were consolidated. The District Court held that the Democrats had standing under 26 U.S.C. 9011(b)(1) - which authorizes the FEC, "the national committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President" to institute such actions "as may be appropriate to implement or con[s]true any provisions of [the Fund Act]" - to seek the requested declaratory relief, but that the Democrats and the FEC were not entitled to a declaration that 9012(f) is constitutional. The court then held 9012(f) unconstitutional on its face because it violated First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. </s> Held: </s> 1. The Democrats lack standing under 9011(b)(1). Pp. 484-489. </s> (a) Contrary to the Democrats' assertion that there is no need to resolve the issue of their standing, raised in the FEC's appeal, because the FEC clearly has standing and the legal issues and relief requested are the same in both actions, this Court will decide the issue. It is squarely presented in the Democrats' appeal from the District Court's [470 U.S. 480, 481] determination that 9011(b)(1) is unconstitutional, and if the District Court's decision that the Democrats have standing is allowed to stand, it could seriously interfere with the FEC's exclusive jurisdiction to determine how and when to enforce the Fund Act. Pp. 484-486. </s> (b) The plain language of 9011(b)(1) and 306(b)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) - which provides that the FEC "shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to" the Fund Act and confers on the FEC "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement" of the Act - clearly shows that the Democrats have no standing to bring a private action against another private party. The Democratic Party is clearly not included within those authorized by 9011(b)(1) to bring an action. And, while the Democratic National Committee is authorized to bring an action, the action must be "appropriate" to implement or construe the provision of the Fund Act at issue. Reading 306(b)(1) of the FECA and 26 U.S.C. 9010(a) - which authorizes the FEC to appear in and defend against any action filed under 9011 - together with 9011, "appropriate" actions by private parties are those that do not interfere with the FEC's responsibilities for administering and enforcing the Fund Act. Accordingly, private suits to construe or enforce the Act are inappropriate interference with those responsibilities. Pp. 486-489. </s> 2. Section 9012(f) violates the First Amendment. Pp. 490-501. </s> (a) The expenditures at issue are squarely prohibited by 9012(f). And, as producing speech at the core of the First Amendment and implicating the freedom of association, they are entitled to full protection under that Amendment. Pp. 490-496. </s> (b) Section 9012(f)'s limitation on independent expenditures by political committees is constitutionally infirm, absent any indication that such expenditures have a tendency to corrupt or to give the appearance of corruption. But even assuming that Congress could fairly conclude that large-scale political action committees have a sufficient tendency to corrupt, 9012(f) is a fatally overboard response to that evil. It is not limited to multimillion dollar war chests, but applies equally to informal discussion groups that solicit neighborhood contributions to publicize their views about a particular Presidential candidate. Pp. 496-500. </s> (c) Section 9012(f) cannot be upheld as a prophylactic measure deemed necessary by Congress. The groups and associations in question here, designed expressly to participate in political debate, are quite different from the traditional organizations organized for economic gain that may properly be prohibited from making contributions to political candidates. P. 500. </s> 578 F. Supp. 797, affirmed in part and reversed in part. [470 U.S. 480, 482] </s> REHNQUIST, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Part II of which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 501. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in Part I of which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 502. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 518. </s> Charles N. Steele argued the cause for appellant in No. 83-1032. With him on the briefs were Richard B. Bader, Miriam Aguiar, and Jonathan A. Bernstein. Steven B. Feirson argued the cause for appellants in No. 83-1122. With him on the briefs were John M. Coleman and Anthony S. Harrington. </s> Robert R. Sparks, Jr., argued the cause for appellees in both cases. With him on the brief was J. Curtis Herge.Fn </s> Fn [470 U.S. 480, 482] Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union by Philip A. Lacovara, Ronald A. Stern, Charles S. Sims, and Arthur B. Spitzer; for the Gulf & Great Plains Legal Foundation et al. by Wilkes C. Robinson; and for the National Congressional Club by Brice M. Clagett and John R. Bolton. </s> Roger M. Witten, William T. Lake, and Archibald Cox filed a brief for Common Cause as amicus curiae. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.[fn] </s> The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act (Fund Act), 26 U.S.C. 9001 et seq., offers the Presidential candidates of major political parties the option of receiving public financing for their general election campaigns. If a Presidential candidate elects public financing, 9012(f) makes it a criminal offense for independent "political committees," such as appellees National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) and Fund For A Conservative Majority (FCM), to expend more than $1,000 to further that candidate's election. A three-judge District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in companion lawsuits brought respectively by the Federal Election Commission (FEC) and by the Democratic Party of the United States and the Democratic National [470 U.S. 480, 483] Committee (DNC), held 9012(f) unconstitutional on its face because it violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. These plaintiffs challenge that determination on this appeal, and the FEC also appeals from that part of the judgment holding that the Democratic Party and the DNC have standing under 26 U.S.C. 9011(b)(1) to seek a declaratory judgment against appellees upholding the constitutionality of 9012(f). We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to the statutory appeal provision of 9011(b)(2), which provides for a direct appeal to this Court from three-judge district courts convened in proceedings under 9011(b)(1). 466 U.S. 935 (1984). We reverse the judgment of the District Court on the issue of the standing of the Democratic Party and the DNC, but affirm its judgment as to the constitutional validity of 9012(f). </s> The present litigation began in May 1983 when the Democratic Party, the DNC, and Edward Mezvinsky, Chairman of the Pennsylvania Democratic State Committee, in his individual capacity as a citizen eligible to vote for President of the United States 1 (collectively, the Democrats), filed suit against NCPAC and FCM (the PACs), who had announced their intention to spend large sums of money to help bring about the reelection of President Ronald Reagan in 1984. Their amended complaint sought a declaration that 9012(f), which they believed would prohibit the PACs' intended expenditures, was constitutional. The FEC intervened for the sole purpose of moving, along with the PACs, to dismiss the complaint for lack of standing. </s> In June 1983, the FEC brought a separate action against the same defendants seeking identical declaratory relief. It was referred to the same three-judge District Court, which consolidated the two cases for all purposes. The parties submitted 201 stipulations and three books of exhibits as [470 U.S. 480, 484] the factual record. After extensive briefing and oral argument, the court issued a comprehensive opinion, holding that the Democrats had standing under 9011(b)(1) and Art. III of the Constitution to seek the requested declaratory relief, but that the Democrats and the FEC were not entitled to a declaration that 9012(f) is constitutional. 578 F. Supp. 797 (1983). The court held that 9012(f) abridges First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, that it is substantially overbroad, and that it cannot permissibly be given a narrowing construction to cure the overbreadth. The court did not, however, declare 9012(f) unconstitutional because the PACs had not filed a counterclaim requesting such a declaration. </s> I </s> In their respective suits, the Democrats and the FEC relied upon 26 U.S.C. 9011(b) to confer standing on them and subject-matter jurisdiction on the three-judge District Court. Section 9011(b)(1) provides: </s> "The [FEC], the national committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President are authorized to institute such actions, including actions for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, as may be appropriate to implement or con[s]true any provisions of [the Fund Act]." </s> Section 9011(b)(2) confers subject-matter jurisdiction on the district courts of the United States, sitting in panels of three judges in accordance with 28 U.S.C. 2284, to hear proceedings instituted under 9011(b)(1). </s> We do not doubt, nor do any of the parties in these cases challenge, the standing of the FEC, which is specifically identified in 9011(b)(1), to bring a declaratory action to test the constitutionality of a provision of the Fund Act. We think such an action is "appropriate" within the meaning of that section because a favorable declaration would materially advance the FEC's ability to expedite its enforcement of the [470 U.S. 480, 485] Fund Act against political committees such as NCPAC and FCM. This is especially important because the relatively short duration of the then upcoming general election campaigns for President allowed little time in which to prosecute an enforcement action before it would become moot in whole or in part. We are fortified in our conclusion by 306(b)(1) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), as added, 88 Stat. 1281, and amended, 2 U.S.C. 437c(b)(1), which provides that the FEC "shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement" of the Fund Act. Article III standing exists by virtue of the facts that the FEC and the PACs have adverse interests, the PACs threatened, and now have made, substantial expenditures in apparent contravention of 26 U.S.C. 9012(f), and the declaratory relief the FEC requests would aid its enforcement efforts against the PACs and others similarly situated. </s> Despite the identity of the relief requested by the FEC and the Democrats, the FEC asks this Court to reverse the District Court's holding that the Democrats also have standing under 9011(b)(1). The Democrats maintain that there is no need to resolve this question because there is no doubt about the standing of the FEC and the legal issues and relief requested are the same in the two cases. See McCulloch v. Sociedad National de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963). The PACs have declined to renew or brief their jurisdictional challenge in this Court because in the present procedural posture they see the standing question as a "turf fight" in which they do not wish to participate. </s> Though McCulloch, supra, is authority on its somewhat different facts for finessing a decision as to questions of "jurisdiction" in one of two companion cases raising the same substantive issues, we decline to follow that course here. The statutory standing issue is squarely presented by the Democrats' appeal, and if the FEC is correct in its assertion as to lack of standing, the decision of the District Court could seriously interfere with the agency's exclusive jurisdiction to [470 U.S. 480, 486] determine how and when to enforce the Act. In the present cases, for example, there is no indication that the FEC would have filed a complaint against the PACs for a declaratory judgment if the Democrats had not done so first. The FEC might have chosen to focus its resources elsewhere or to pursue an enforcement action at a later date. The Democrats forced its hand; the subject of the litigation was so central to the FEC's function that it had no choice but to intervene once the action had been commenced. </s> The plain language of the Fund Act and the FECA suggests quite emphatically that the Democrats do not have standing to bring a private action against another private party. In addition to the FEC, 9011(b)(1) applies only to "the national committee of any political party" and to "individuals eligible to vote for President." Clearly the Democratic Party is not included; hence the District Court erred in permitting it to remain in the proceedings. The DNC is a national committee of a political party, and Edward Mezvinsky is an individual eligible to vote for President; therefore, they are authorized to bring actions under 9011(b)(1). But such actions must be "appropriate to implement or construe" the provision of the Fund Act at issue. The District Court's conclusion that the language of the statute "plainly" authorizes a private suit to seek construction of 9012(f) seems to us to ignore the word "appropriate." That word would be superfluous unless it restricts standing to suits which are "appropriate" in light of the statutory scheme for interpreting and enforcing the Act. </s> This scheme seems simple enough. Title 2 U.S.C. 437c(b) (1) provides that the FEC "shall administer, seek to obtain compliance with, and formulate policy with respect to" the Fund Act and confers on the FEC "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of" the Act. Title 26 U.S.C. 9010(a) authorizes the FEC "to appear in and defend against any action filed under section 9011." Reading these two provisions together with 9011, "appropriate" actions [470 U.S. 480, 487] by private parties are actions that do not interfere with the FEC's responsibilities for administering and enforcing the Act. Common sense indicates that only one body can intelligently formulate the policy necessary to administer an Act of this kind. The decision to sue third parties to construe or enforce the Act falls within these functions. Accordingly, private suits of this kind are inappropriate interference with the FEC's responsibilities. </s> Consistent with this statutory scheme an "appropriate" role for private parties under 9011(b)(1) would be to bring suits against the FEC to challenge its interpretations of various provisions of the Act. For example, the defendant PACs might have instituted an action challenging the FEC's interpretation of 9012(f) to cover the type of independent expenditures they planned to make. The specific authorization in the adjacent 9010(a) for the FEC to appear in and defend actions under 9011 implies that Congress contemplated that private suits pursuant to the latter section would be directed at the FEC. Lest one ask why the FEC is also given standing under 9011(b)(1), the obvious answer would be to give it the benefit of a three-judge district court and direct appeal to this a Court under 9011(b)(2), which procedures are not available in ordinary 437c(b)(1) enforcement actions. See 2 U.S.C. 437g(a)(6), (10). </s> This interpretation makes a good deal of sense. Suits to construe the Fund Act and to bring about implementation of the Act - presumably implementation by the FEC, which has exclusive authority to administer and enforce the Act - raise issues that are likely to be of great importance and in Congress' judgment justify a three-judge court, expedited review, and direct appeal to this Court. Ordinary enforcement actions to obtain compliance with the terms of the Act after they have been construed and implemented would not justify such extraordinary procedures. Moreover, it seems highly dubious that Congress intended every one of the millions of eligible voters in this country to have the power to [470 U.S. 480, 488] invoke expedited review by a three-judge district court with direct appeal to this Court in actions brought by them against other private parties. The DNC is obviously not just another private litigant, and it would undoubtedly be a worthy representative of collective interests which would justify expedited review had Congress so provided; but Congress simply did not draft the statute in a way that distinguishes the DNC from any individual voter. </s> Consistent with FEC's supervisory role, Congress provided an administrative complaint procedure in 2 U.S.C. 437g, through which the Democrats could have pursued their dispute with the PACs. The Democrats could have filed a complaint expressing their belief that "a violation [of the Fund Act] ha[d] occurred" based on the PACs' independent expenditures in the 1980 Presidential election. 437g(a)(1). If the FEC, "upon receiving a complaint . . . or on the basis of information ascertained in the normal course of carrying out its supervisory responsibilities, determines . . . that it has reason to believe that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a violation [of the Fund Act]," 437g(a)(2), it is obligated to investigate and, if it finds "probable cause to believe that any person has committed, or is about to commit, a violation," to pursue various corrective and enforcement steps, which can ultimately involve civil and criminal proceedings in district court. </s> If the FEC dismissed the complaint or failed to act on it in 120 days, the Democrats could petition the District Court for the District of Columbia under 437g(a)(8) for a declaration that the FEC had acted contrary to law and for an order directing the FEC to pursue the complaint. If, and only if, the FEC failed to obey such an order, could the Democrats bring a civil action directly against the PACs to remedy the violation charged in their complaint. </s> Alternatively, the DNC or an individual voter could sue the FEC under 26 U.S.C. 9011(b) to implement or construe the Act. This avenue, of course, is available to the [470 U.S. 480, 489] Democrats without first pursuing or exhausting the 437g administrative complaint procedure, see 9011(b)(2), but it would be worth pursuing only if the disagreement between the litigant and the FEC were over a matter of implementation or construction, and not routine enforcement. However, that is a judgment Congress made in establishing the statutory scheme. </s> We do not necessarily reject the District Court's conclusion that the legislative history of the successive amendments to 437c(b)(1) indicates an intention by the word "exclusive" to centralize in one agency the civil enforcement responsibilities previously fragmented among various governmental agencies. But nowhere is there any indication that Congress previously expressed any intention that anyone other than Government agencies have enforcement responsibilities. Section 9011(b) certainly is not a source of general private "enforcement" authority, as that word is conspicuously absent from 9011(b), which speaks only of suits to "implement or construe." 2 We also do not believe that an intention to create a so-called "maximum enforcement regime," calling for both Government and private enforcement, can be inferred from the fact that other congressional Acts, such as the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 1270, the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. 6305, and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7604, expressly adopt such an enforcement scheme. Nor may it be inferred from the fact that the related FECA has a different enforcement scheme than the Fund Act. Compare 2 U.S.C. 437d(e) and 26 U.S.C. 9011(b). Such speculative inferences do not carry the day in the face of the contrary language of the Fund Act. </s> In view of our conclusion that the Democrats lack standing under the statute, there is no need to reach the Art. III issue [470 U.S. 480, 490] decided by the District Court. Therefore, we turn to the merits of the FEC's appeal of its unsuccessful declaratory judgment action against the PACs. </s> II </s> NCPAC is a nonprofit, nonmembership corporation formed under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act in August 1975 and registered with the FEC as a political committee. Its primary purpose is to attempt to influence directly or indirectly the election or defeat of candidates for federal, state, and local offices by making contributions and by making its own expenditures. It is governed by a three-member board of directors which is elected annually by the existing board. The board's chairman and the other two members make all decisions concerning which candidates to support or oppose, the strategy and methods to employ, and the amounts of money to spend. Its contributors have no role in these decisions. It raises money by general and specific direct mail solicitations. It does not maintain separate accounts for the receipts from its general and specific solicitations, nor is it required by law to do so. </s> FCM is incorporated under the laws of Virginia and is registered with the FEC as a multicandidate political committee. In all material respects it is identical to NCPAC. </s> Both NCPAC and FCM are self-described ideological organizations with a conservative political philosophy. They solicited funds in support of President Reagan's 1980 campaign, and they spent money on such means as radio and television advertisements to encourage voters to elect him President. On the record before us, these expenditures were "independent" in that they were not made at the request of or in coordination with the official Reagan election campaign committee or any of its agents. Indeed, there are indications that the efforts of these organizations were at times viewed with disfavor by the official campaign as counterproductive to its chosen strategy. NCPAC and FCM expressed their intention to conduct similar activities in support of President [470 U.S. 480, 491] Reagan's reelection in 1984, and we may assume that they did so. </s> As noted above, both the Fund Act and FECA play a part in regulating Presidential campaigns. The Fund Act comes into play only if a candidate chooses to accept public funding of his general election campaign, and it covers only the period between the nominating convention and 30 days after the general election. In contrast, FECA applies to all Presidential campaigns, as well as other federal elections, regardless of whether publicly or privately funded. Important provisions of these Acts have already been reviewed by this Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). Generally, in that case we upheld as constitutional the limitations on contributions to candidates and struck down as unconstitutional limitations on independent expenditures. 3 </s> In these cases we consider provisions of the Fund Act that make it a criminal offense for political committees such as NCPAC and FCM to make independent expenditures in support of a candidate who has elected to accept public financing. Specifically, 9012(f) provides: </s> "(1) . . . it shall be unlawful for any political committee which is not an authorized committee with respect to the eligible candidates of a political party for President and Vice President in a presidential election knowingly and willfully to incur expenditures to further the election of such candidates, which would constitute qualified campaign expenses if incurred by an authorized committee of such candidates, in an aggregate amount exceeding $1,000." </s> The term "political committee" is defined to mean "any committee, association, or organization (whether or not incorporated) which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for [470 U.S. 480, 492] the purpose of influencing, or attempting to influence, the nomination or election of one or more individuals to Federal, State, or local elective public office." 26 U.S.C. 9002(9). The term "qualified campaign expense" simply means an otherwise lawful expense by a candidate or his authorized committee "to further his election" incurred during the period between the candidate's nomination and 30 days after election day. 9002(11), 9002(12). The term "eligible candidates" means those Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates who are qualified under the Act to receive public funding and have chosen to do so. 9002(4), 9003. Two of the more important qualifications are that a candidate and his authorized committees not incur campaign expenses in excess of his public funding and not accept contributions to defray campaign expenses. 9003(b), 9012(b). </s> There is no question that NCPAC and FCM are political committees and that President Reagan was a qualified candidate, and it seems plain enough that the PACs' expenditures fall within the term "qualified campaign expense." The PACs have argued in this Court, though apparently not below, that 9012(f) was not intended to cover truly independent expenditures such as theirs, but only coordinated expenditures. But "expenditures in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents," are considered "contributions" under the FECA, 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(7)(B)(i), and as such are already subject to FECA's $1,000 and $5,000 limitations in 441a(a)(1), (2). Also, as noted above, one of the requirements for public funding is the candidate's agreement not to accept such contributions. Under the PACs' construction, 9012(f) would be wholly superfluous, and we find no support for that construction in the legislative history. We conclude that the PACs' independent expenditures at issue in this case are squarely prohibited by 9012(f), and we proceed to consider whether that prohibition violates the First Amendment. [470 U.S. 480, 493] </s> There can be no doubt that the expenditures at issue in this case produce speech at the core of the First Amendment. We said in Buckley v. Valeo, supra, at 14: </s> "The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order `to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). . . . This no more than reflects our `profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)." </s> The PACs in this case, of course, are not lone pamphleteers or street corner orators in the Tom Paine mold; they spend substantial amounts of money in order to communicate their political ideas through sophisticated media advertisements. And of course the criminal sanction in question is applied to the expenditure of money to propagate political views, rather than to the propagation of those views unaccompanied by the expenditure of money. But for purposes of presenting political views in connection with a nationwide Presidential election, allowing the presentation of views while forbidding the expenditure of more than $1,000 to present them is much like allowing a speaker in a public hall to express his views while denying him the use of an amplifying system. The Court said in Buckley v. Valeo, supra: </s> "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression [470 U.S. 480, 494] by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, paper, and circulation costs. Speeches and rallies generally necessitate hiring a hall and publicizing the event. The electorate's increasing dependence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech." 424 U.S., at 19 . </s> We also reject the notion that the PACs' form of organization or method of solicitation diminishes their entitlement to First Amendment protection. The First Amendment freedom of association is squarely implicated in these cases. NCPAC and FCM are mechanisms by which large numbers of individuals of modest means can join together in organizations which serve to "amplif[y] the voice of their adherents." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 22 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 -296 (1981). It is significant that in 1979-1980 approximately 101,000 people contributed an average of $75 each to NCPAC and in 1980 approximately 100,000 people contributed an average of $25 each to FCM. </s> The FEC urges that these contributions do not constitute individual speech, but merely "speech by proxy," see California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (MARSHALL, J.) (plurality opinion), because the contributors do not control or decide upon the use of the funds by the PACs or the specific content of the PACs' advertisements and other speech. The plurality emphasized in that case, however, that nothing in the statutory provision in question "limits the amount [an unincorporated association] or any of its members may independently expend in order to advocate political views," but only the amount it may contribute to [470 U.S. 480, 495] a multicandidate political committee. Id., at 195. Unlike California Medical Assn., the present cases involve limitations on expenditures by PACs, not on the contributions they receive; and in any event these contributions are predominantly small and thus do not raise the same concerns as the sizable contributions involved in California Medical Assn. </s> Another reason the "proxy speech" approach is not useful in this case is that the contributors obviously like the message they are hearing from these organizations and want to add their voices to that message; otherwise they would not part with their money. To say that their collective action in pooling their resources to amplify their voices is not entitled to full First Amendment protection would subordinate the voices of those of modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able to buy expensive media ads with their own resources. </s> Our decision in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (NRWC), is not to the contrary. That case turned on the special treatment historically accorded corporations. In return for the special advantages that the State confers on the corporate form, individuals acting jointly through corporations forgo some of the rights they have as individuals. Id., at 209-210. We held in NRWC that a rather intricate provision of the FECA dealing with the prohibition of corporate campaign contributions to political candidates did not violate the First Amendment. The prohibition excepted corporate solicitation of contributions to a segregated fund established for the purpose of contributing to candidates, but in turn limited such solicitations to stockholders or members of a corporation without capital stock. We upheld this limitation on solicitation of contributions as applied to the National Right to Work Committee, a corporation without capital stock, in view of the well-established constitutional validity of legislative regulation of corporate contributions to candidates for public office. NRWC is consistent with this Court's earlier holding that a corporation's [470 U.S. 480, 496] expenditures to propagate its views on issues of general public interest are of a different constitutional stature than corporate contributions to candidates. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 -790 (1978). In Bellotti, of course, we did not reach, nor do we need to reach in these cases, the question whether a corporation can constitutionally be restricted in making independent expenditures to influence elections for public office. Id., at 788, n. 26. </s> Like the National Right to Work Committee, NCPAC and FCM are also formally incorporated; however, these are not "corporations" cases because 9012(f) applies not just to corporations but to any "committee, association, or organization (whether or not incorporated)" that accepts contributions or makes expenditures in connection with electoral campaigns. The terms of 9012(f)'s prohibition apply equally to an informal neighborhood group that solicits contributions and spends money on a Presidential election as to the wealthy and professionally managed PACs involved in these cases. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, supra, at 300 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring). </s> Having concluded that the PACs' expenditures are entitled to full First Amendment protection, we now look to see if there is a sufficiently strong governmental interest served by 9012(f)'s restriction on them and whether the section is narrowly tailored to the evil that may legitimately be regulated. The restriction involved here is not merely an effort by the Government to regulate the use of its own property, such as was involved in United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114 (1981), or the dismissal of a speaker from Government employment, such as was involved in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). It is a flat, across-the-board criminal sanction applicable to any "committee, association, or organization" which spends more than $1,000 on this particular type of political speech. </s> We held in Buckley and reaffirmed in Citizens Against Rent Control that preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government [470 U.S. 480, 497] interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances. In Buckley we struck down the FECA's limitation on individuals' independent expenditures because we found no tendency in such expenditures, uncoordinated with the candidate or his campaign, to corrupt or to give the appearance of corruption. For similar reasons, we also find 9012(f)'s limitation on independent expenditures by political committees to be constitutionally infirm. </s> Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for political favors. But here the conduct proscribed is not contributions to the candidate, but independent expenditures in support of the candidate. The amounts given to the PACs are over-whelmingly small contributions, well under the $1,000 limit on contributions upheld in Buckley; and the contributions are by definition not coordinated with the campaign of the candidate. The Court concluded in Buckley that there was a fundamental constitutional difference between money spent to advertise one's views independently of the candidate's campaign and money contributed to the candidate to be spent on his campaign. We said there: </s> "Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 424 U.S., at 47 . </s> We think the same conclusion must follow here. It is contended that, because the PACs may by the breadth of their organizations spend larger amounts than the individuals in [470 U.S. 480, 498] Buckley, the potential for corruption is greater. But precisely what the "corruption" may consist of we are never told with assurance. The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or reaffirm their own positions on issues in response to political messages paid for by the PACs can hardly be called corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is the presentation to the electorate of varying points of view. It is of course hypothetically possible here, as in the case of the independent expenditures forbidden in Buckley, that candidates may take notice of and reward those responsible for PAC expenditures by giving official favors to the latter in exchange for the supporting messages. But here, as in Buckley, the absence of prearrangement and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate. On this record, such an exchange of political favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical possibility and nothing more. </s> Even were we to determine that the large pooling of financial resources by NCPAC and FCM did pose a potential for corruption or the appearance of corruption, 9012(f) is a fatally overbroad response to that evil. It is not limited to multimillion dollar war chests; its terms apply equally to informal discussion groups that solicit neighborhood contributions to publicize their views about a particular Presidential candidate. </s> Several reasons suggest that we are not free to adopt a limiting construction that might isolate wealthy PACs, even if such a construction might save the statute. First, Congress plainly intended to prohibit just what 9012(f) prohibits - independent expenditures over $1,000 by all political committees, large and small. Even if it did not intend to cover small neighborhood groups, there is also no evidence in the statute or the legislative history that it would have looked [470 U.S. 480, 499] favorably upon a construction of the statute limiting 9012(f) only to very successful PACs. Secondly, we cannot distinguish in principle between a PAC that has solicited 1,000 $25 contributions and one that has solicited 100,000 $25 contributions. Finally, it has been suggested that 9012(f) could be narrowed by limiting its prohibition to political committees in which the contributors have no voice in the use to which the contributions are put. Again, there is no indication in the statute or the legislative history that Congress would be content with such a construction. More importantly, as observed by the District Court, such a construction is intolerably vague. At what point, for example, does a neighborhood group that solicits some outside contributions fall within 9012(f)? How active do the group members have to be in setting policy to satisfy the control test? Moreover, it is doubtful that the members of a large association in which each have a vote on policy have substantially more control in practice than the contributors to NCPAC and FCM: the latter will surely cease contributing when the message those organizations deliver ceases to please them. </s> In the District Court, the FEC attempted to show actual corruption or the appearance of corruption by offering evidence of high-level appointments in the Reagan administration of persons connected with the PACs and newspaper articles and polls purportedly showing a public perception of corruption. The District Court excluded most of the proffered evidence as irrelevant to the critical elements to be proved: corruption of candidates or public perception of corruption of candidates. A tendency to demonstrate distrust of PACs is not sufficient. We think the District Court's finding that "the evidence supporting an adjudicative finding of corruption or its appearance is evanescent," 587 F. Supp., at 830, was clearly within its discretion, and we will not disturb it here. If the matter offered by the FEC in the District Court be treated as addressed to what the District Court [470 U.S. 480, 500] referred to as "legislative facts," we nonetheless agree with the District Court that the evidence falls far short of being adequate for this purpose. </s> Finally, the FEC urges us to uphold 9012(f) as a prophylactic measure deemed necessary by Congress, which has far more expertise than the Judiciary in campaign finance and corrupting influences. In NRWC, 459 U.S., at 210 , we stated: </s> "While [2 U.S.C.] 441b restricts the solicitation of corporations and labor unions without great financial resources, as well as those more fortunately situated, we accept Congress' judgment that it is the potential for such influence that demands regulation. Nor will we second-guess a legislative determination as to the need for prophylactic measures where corruption is the evil feared." </s> Here, however, the groups and associations in question, designed expressly to participate in political debate, are quite different from the traditional corporations organized for economic gain. In NRWC we rightly concluded that Congress might include, along with labor unions and corporations traditionally prohibited from making contributions to political candidates, membership corporations, though contributions by the latter might not exhibit all of the evil that contributions by traditional economically organized corporations exhibit. But this proper deference to a congressional determination of the need for a prophylactic rule where the evil of potential corruption had long been recognized does not suffice to establish the validity of 9012(f), which indiscriminately lumps with corporations any "committee, association or organization." Indeed, the FEC in its briefs to this Court does not even make an effort to defend the statute under a construction limited in reach to corporations. </s> While in NRWC we held that the compelling governmental interest in preventing corruption supported the restriction [470 U.S. 480, 501] of the influence of political war chests funneled through the corporate form, in the present cases we do not believe that a similar finding is supportable: when the First Amendment is involved, our standard of review is "rigorous," Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 29 , and the effort to link either corruption or the appearance of corruption to independent expenditures by PACs, whether large or small, simply does not pass this standard of review. Even assuming that Congress could fairly conclude that large-scale PACs have a sufficient tendency to corrupt, the overbreadth of 9012(f) in these cases is so great that the section may not be upheld. We are not quibbling over fine-turning of prophylactic limitations, but are concerned about wholesale restriction of clearly protected conduct. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973). </s> The judgment of the District Court is affirmed as to the constitutionality of 9012(f), but is reversed on the issue of the Democrats' standing, with instructions to dismiss their complaint for lack of standing. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [fn] [470 U.S. 480, 482] JUSTICE BRENNAN joins only Part II of this opinion. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Mezvinsky did not pursue an appeal in this Court, though his name was inadvertently included in the notice of appeal filed by the Democratic Party and the DNC. </s> [Footnote 2 The Democrats implicitly conceded as much by amending their complaint to delete their initial request for injunctive relief. </s> [Footnote 3 In Buckley, THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE BLACKMUN would have struck down the limitations on contributions along with the limitations on independent expenditures. JUSTICE WHITE would have upheld both limitations. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> As I read it, the plain language of 26 U.S.C. 9011(b)(1) confers standing on the Democratic National Committee. The fact that the Federal Election Commission also has standing is not, in my opinion, a sufficient reason for concluding that it was not appropriate for DNC to commence this action regardless of whether or not the FEC elected to participate. This, however, is just my tentative opinion because it really is not necessary to decide the issue discussed in Part I of the Court's opinion in view of the fact that the disposition of the appeal in No. 83-1122 is controlled by our decision in No. 83-1032. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 16 (1963). </s> Accordingly, I join only Part II of the Court's opinion. [470 U.S. 480, 502] </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join as to Part I, dissenting. </s> I </s> Section 9011(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code authorizes the Federal Election Commission (FEC), "the national committee of any political party, and individuals eligible to vote for President" to institute actions "to implement or construe" the Fund Act. Relying on this provision, both the FEC and the Democratic National Committee (DNC) brought suit to enjoin expenditures by appellees that violated 9012(f). Despite the identity of the issues raised and the relief sought by the plaintiffs, the majority holds that only the FEC properly invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court because only its action is "appropriate." I disagree. </s> A </s> By its plain terms, 9011(b)(1) confers standing on the DNC. 1 The DNC's suit is an "actio[n] for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief," brought by "the national committee of [a] political party," in order "to implement or construe" a provision of the Fund Act. See 9011(b)(1). Therefore, the only possible reason for not allowing the suit is that, as the majority holds, it is inconsistent with the statute's limitation to "such actions . . . as may be appropriate." </s> The majority exalts the requirement of appropriateness by ignoring the term's context. Section 9011(b)(1) does not impose a free-floating requirement that any action brought thereunder meet some undefined standard of sound policy. Rather it merely refers to "such actions . . . as may be appropriate to implement or con[s]true" the Fund Act. The term "appropriate" limits the type of suit permissible to those aimed at implementing or construing the Act. Thus, the [470 U.S. 480, 503] named plaintiffs cannot bring just any action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief, but only those that would be "appropriate to implement or con[s]true" the Act. 2 The DNC's present suit satisfies that standard. The focus is the nature of the lawsuit, not the identity of the plaintiff. To read more into the term than this is to treat it as an invitation to unconstrained judicial policymaking. </s> By placing a greater burden on the term "appropriate" than it can bear, the majority reaches a result that also conflicts with the rest of the provision. Section 9011(b)(1) itself draws no distinction between the FEC and other plaintiffs. To the contrary, by listing them together it implies that they enjoy an equal capacity to bring suit. Indeed, the majority seems to agree. Acknowledging that a suit by the DNC might be "appropriate," it finds its hands tied by the statute's failure to distinguish between possible plaintiffs: "Congress simply did not draft the statute in a way that distinguishes the DNC from any individual voter." Ante, at 488. This statement is perplexing, for the statute does not distinguish either from the FEC - though the majority does so anyway. [470 U.S. 480, 504] It is not clear why the majority feels free to ignore the statutory language in order to separate the FEC from other plaintiffs, but obliged to adhere to it so as not to distinguish party committees from individual voters. </s> Rather than applying the statute's plain words, the majority examines the overall election law scheme to discover what it thinks Congress would consider "appropriate." But Congress does not usually operate by such complex hidden meanings, and if Congress had intended what the majority says it did, it chose the least helpful way of saying so. It is surprising to learn that while the FEC, a national committee, and an individual may each sue under the Act, the latter two may sue only the first. Surely if this is what Congress had intended, it would have chosen a more convenient way of saying it. 3 </s> The majority relies primarily on 2 U.S.C. 437c(b)(1), which grants the FEC "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of" the Act. When it adopted this provision, Congress did not change 9011, which had already been in existence for five years. Indeed, except for the 1974 substitution of the Commission for the Comptroller General, 9011 has never been amended, despite the frequent changes to the FECA and to other Fund Act provisions. By basing its argument on 437c(b)(1), the majority contends in effect that 9011 was repealed by implication. Absent a clear indication that such a repeal was intended, we should not infer [470 U.S. 480, 505] it. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 88 (1982); Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). </s> Here, all indications are to the contrary. When enacted, as part of the 1974 amendments to the FECA, 437c(b)(1) provided the Commission with "primary jurisdiction with respect to the civil enforcement of" that Act. S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1237, p. 22 (1974). There was no reference to the Fund Act at that time, or to the FEC's "exclusive" jurisdiction. Those were added in 1976. Pub. L. 94-283, 101(c)(2), 90 Stat. 476. Two points must be made about the 1976 Amendments. First, the reference to "exclusive" jurisdiction was designed to centralize all governmental enforcement authority in the FEC. See H. R. Rep. No. 94-917, pp. 3-4 (1976). 4 The majority does not deny this, but states that there is no indication that anyone other than the Government agencies ever had any enforcement authority. Ante, at 489. The indication that the majority overlooks is 9011(b)(1) itself. 5 </s> The second significant aspect of the 1976 Amendments is the addition of 2 U.S.C. 437d(e). That section provides: "Except as provided in section 437g(a)(8) of this title, the power of the Commission to initiate civil actions under subsection (a)(6) of this section shall be the exclusive civil remedy for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act." [470 U.S. 480, 506] "This Act" is specifically defined as the FECA. 431(19). See also H. R. Rep. No. 94-917, p. 61 (1976). The reference to "this Act" in 437d(e) is in marked contrast to the repeated references to "the provisions of this Act and chapter 95 and chapter 96 of title 26" (i. e., the Fund Act), also added in 1976, found throughout these provisions. See, e. g., 437d(a)(6), (8); 437f(c)(2); 437g(a)(1), (2), (5), (6). The conspicuous absence of any reference to the Fund Act in 437d(e) indicates that Congress intentionally made the FEC's litigating authority exclusive only as to the FECA. This section makes it quite clear that actions under 437g(a)(8) are the only permissible suits a private party may bring to implement or construe the FECA, but, by negative implication, it also suggests that private suits are not so limited under the Fund Act. </s> B </s> The majority places no reliance on the legislative history of 9011. Admittedly, little is to be found. But what there is suggests that the DNC has standing to bring this action. Section 9011 was part of the Revenue Act of 1971. Pub. L. 92-178, 801, 85 Stat. 570. It was in neither the House nor the Senate bill. In their joint explanatory statement, the conferees wrote that they had added "a provision to allow the Comptroller General or other interested parties to bring court actions in order to implement or construe the new provisions." S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-553, p. 58 (1971). This description provides no basis for distinguishing the Comptroller General (in the amended statute, the FEC) from the "other interested parties." Rather, it implies equal and independent authority to go to court. </s> The Conference Report goes on to note that "[b]ecause the provisions of this title will have a direct and immediate effect on the actions of individuals, organizations, and political parties . . . [who] must know" what candidates and parties will receive what funding, the bill provides for "expeditious disposition of legal proceedings brought with respect to these [470 U.S. 480, 507] provisions." Id., at 58-59. This desire for speedy determinations explains why Congress provided the private right of action today's holding eliminates. It also undermines the majority's conclusion that it is "appropriate" to require those other than the FEC to file a complaint with the FEC and wait for it to act, or not act, sue to compel it to do so, and only then, if the FEC ignores a court order, bring suit themselves. That is a prescription for delay. The conferees' concern for the expeditious resolution of suits brought by "other interested parties" indicates that they did not want to restrict implementation of the Fund Act to a Government agency. </s> C </s> "Appropriate" is not an ideal statutory term. But its vagueness should not be taken advantage of in order to read the provision in which it appears out of the United States Code. It is not an invitation to judicial legislation. A more restrained reading, consistent with congressional intent, the surrounding provisions, and, most important, the terms of the statute itself, is strongly indicated. </s> II </s> Section 9012(f) of the Internal Revenue Code limits to $1,000 the annual independent expenditures a PAC can make to further the election of a candidate receiving public funds. Because these expenditures "produce speech at the core of the First Amendment," ante, at 493, the majority concludes that they can only be regulated in order to avoid real or apparent corruption. Perceiving no such danger, since the money does not go directly to political candidates or their committees, it strikes down 9012(f). </s> My disagreements with this analysis, which continues this Court's dismemberment of congressional efforts to regulate campaign financing, are many. First, I continue to believe that Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), was wrongly decided. Congressional regulation of the amassing and spending [470 U.S. 480, 508] of money in political campaigns without doubt involves First Amendment concerns, but restrictions such as the one at issue here are supported by governmental interests - including, but not limited to, the need to avoid real or apparent corruption - sufficiently compelling to withstand scrutiny. Second, even were Buckley correct, I consider today's holding a mistaken application of that precedent. The provision challenged here more closely resembles the contribution limitations that were upheld in Buckley, and later cases, than the limitations on uncoordinated individual expenditures that were struck down. Finally, even if Buckley requires that in general PACs be allowed to make independent expenditures, I do not think that that proposition applies to 9012(f). As part of an integrated and complex system of public funding for Presidential campaigns, 9012(f) is supported by governmental interests that were absent in Buckley, which was premised on a system of private campaign financing. </s> A </s> In Buckley, I explained at some length why I am quite sure that regulations of campaign spending similar to that at issue here are constitutional. See 424 U.S., at 257 -266. I adhere to those views. The First Amendment protects the right to speak, not the right to spend, and limitations on the amount of money that can be spent are not the same as restrictions on speaking. I agree with the majority that the expenditures in this case "produce" core First Amendment speech. See ante, at 493. But that is precisely the point: they produce such speech; they are not speech itself. At least in these circumstances, I cannot accept the identification of speech with its antecedents. Such a house-that-Jack-built approach could equally be used to find a First Amendment right to a job or to a minimum wage to "produce" the money to "produce" the speech. </s> The burden on actual speech imposed by limitations on the spending of money is minimal and indirect. All rights of [470 U.S. 480, 509] direct political expression and advocacy are retained. Even under the campaign laws as originally enacted, everyone was free to spend as much as they chose to amplify their views on general political issues, just not specific candidates. The restrictions, to the extent they do affect speech, are viewpoint-neutral and indicate no hostility to the speech itself or its effects. 6 </s> If the elected Members of the Legislature, who are surely in the best position to know, conclude that large-scale expenditures are a significant threat to the integrity and fairness of the electoral process, we should not second-guess that judgment. FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 210 (1982). Like the expenditure limitations struck down in Buckley, 9012(f) serves to back up the limitations on direct campaign contributions, eliminate the danger of corruption, maintain public confidence in the integrity of federal elections, equalize the resources available to the candidates, and hold the overall amount of money devoted to political campaigning down to a reasonable level. I consider these purposes both legitimate and substantial, and more than sufficient to support the challenged provision's incidental and minor burden on actual speech. </s> In short, as I said in Buckley, 424 U.S., at 262 , I cannot accept the cynic's "money talks" as a proposition of constitutional law. Today's holding also rests on a second aspect of the Buckley holding with which I disagree, viz., its distinction between "independent" and "coordinated" expenditures. The Court was willing to accept that expenditures undertaken in consultation with a candidate or his committee should be viewed as contributions. Id., at 46. But it rejected Congress' judgment that independent expenditures were matters of equal concern, concluding that they did not [470 U.S. 480, 510] pose the danger of real or apparent corruption that supported limits on contributions. 7 The distinction is not tenable. "Independent" PAC expenditures function as contributions. Indeed, a significant portion of them no doubt would be direct contributions to campaigns had the FECA not limited such contributions to $5,000. See 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(2)(A). The growth of independent PAC spending has been a direct and openly acknowledged response to the contribution limits in the FECA. See, e. g., Brief for Appellees 3-4. In general, then, the reasons underlying limits on contributions equally underly limits on such "independent" expenditures. </s> The credulous acceptance of the formal distinction between coordinated and independent expenditures blinks political reality. That the PACs' expenditures are not formally "coordinated" is too slender a reed on which to distinguish them from actual contributions to the campaign. The candidate cannot help but know of the extensive efforts "independently" undertaken on his behalf. In this realm of possible tacit understandings and implied agreements, I see no reason [470 U.S. 480, 511] not to accept the congressional judgment that so-called independent expenditures must be closely regulated. 8 </s> The PACs do not operate in an anonymous vacuum. There are significant contacts between an organization like NCPAC and candidates for, and holders of, public office. In addition, personnel may move between the staffs of candidates or officeholders and those of PACs. See generally App. 30-40, Joint Stipulations of Fact Nos. 40-103. This is not to say that there has in the past been any improper coordination or political favors. We need not evaluate the accuracy of reports of such activities, or of the perception that large-scale independent PAC expenditures mean "the return of the big spenders whose money talks and whose gifts are not forgotten." See N. Y. Times, June 15, 1980, section 4, p. 20E, col. 1. It is enough to note that there is ample support for the congressional determination that the corrosive effects of large campaign contributions - not least among these a public perception of business as usual - are not eliminated solely because the "contribution" takes the form of an "independent expenditure." "Preserving the integrity of the electoral process [and] the individual citizen's confidence in government" "are interests of the highest importance." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 -789 (1978). </s> As in Buckley, I am convinced that it is pointless to limit the amount that can be contributed to a candidate or spent with his approval without also limiting the amounts that can be spent on his behalf. 9 In the Fund Act, Congress limited [470 U.S. 480, 512] contributions, direct or coordinated, to zero. It is nonsensical to allow the purposes of this limitation to be entirely defeated by allowing the sort of "independent" expenditures at issue here, and the First Amendment does not require us to do so. </s> B </s> Even if I accepted Buckley as binding precedent, I nonetheless would uphold 9012(f). Buckley distinguished "direct political expression," which could not be curtailed, from financial contributions, which could. 424 U.S., at 21 -22. Limitations on expenditures were considered direct restraints on the right to speak one's mind on public issues and to engage in advocacy protected by the First Amendment. Id., at 48. The majority views the challenged provision as being in that category. I disagree. </s> The majority never explicitly identifies whose First Amendment interests it believes it is protecting. However, its concern for rights of association and the effective political speech of those of modest means, ante, at 494-495, indicates that it is concerned with the interests of the PACs' contributors. But the "contributors" are exactly that - contributors, rather than speakers. Every reason the majority gives for treating 9012(f) as a restraint on speech relates to the effectiveness with which the donors can make their voices heard. In other [470 U.S. 480, 513] words, what the majority purports to protect is the right of the contributors to make contributions. </s> But the contributors are not engaging in speech; at least, they are not engaging in speech to any greater extent than are those who contribute directly to political campaigns. Buckley explicitly distinguished between, on the one hand, using one's own money to express one's views, and, on the other, giving money to someone else in the expectation that that person will use the money to express views with which one is in agreement. This case falls within the latter category. As the Buckley Court stated with regard to contributions to campaigns, "the transformation of contributions into political debate involves speech by someone other than the contributor." 424 U.S., at 21 . The majority does not explain the metamorphosis of donated dollars from money into speech by virtue of the identity of the donee. </s> It is true that regulating PACs may not advance the Government's interest in combating corruption as directly as limiting contributions to a candidate's campaign. See Buckley, 424 U.S., at 46 . But this concern relates to the governmental interest supporting the regulation, not to the nature of the conduct regulated. Even if spending money is to be considered speech, I fail to see how giving money to an independent organization to use as it wishes is also speech. I had thought the holding in Buckley was exactly the opposite. Certainly later cases would so indicate. See FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982); California Medical Assn. v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981). </s> The Court strikes down 9012(f) because it prevents PAC donors from effectively speaking by proxy. But appellees are not simply mouthpieces for their individual contributors. The PAC operates independently of its contributors. See App. 26, Joint Stipulation No. 13. Donations go into the committee's general accounts. See App. 28-29, Joint Stipulations Nos. 27-30. It can safely be assumed that each contributor does not fully support every one of the variety of [470 U.S. 480, 514] activities undertaken and candidates supported by the PAC to which he contributes. It is true, as the majority points out, that in general the contributors presumably like what they hear. However, "this sympathy of interests alone does not convert" the PACs' speech into that of its contributors. California Medical Assn. v. FEC, supra, at 196. 10 </s> Finally, the burden imposed by 9012(f) is slight. Exactly like the contributions limits upheld in Buckley, 9012(f) "does not in any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." 424 U.S., at 21 . And because it does not limit personal expenditures, it does not "reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political expression." Id., at 22. Accordingly, Buckley indicates that the decision below should be reversed. </s> C </s> These cases are in any event different enough from Buckley that that decision is not dispositive. The challenged provision is not part of the FECA, whose expenditure limitations were struck down in Buckley. Rather, it is part of the Fund Act, which was, to the extent it was before the Court, upheld. </s> The Fund Act provides major party candidates the option of accepting public financing, drawn from a fund composed of voluntary checkoffs from federal income tax payments, and forgoing all private contributions. In upholding this system [470 U.S. 480, 515] in Buckley, we accepted Congress' judgment that it would go far "to reduce the deleterious influence of large contributions on our political process, to facilitate communication by candidates with the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising." 424 U.S., at 91 . Indeed, we were of the view that the Fund Act "furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values" by using "public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral process." Id., at 92-93. </s> It is quite clear from the statutory scheme and the legislative history that the public financing alternative was to be comprehensive and exclusive - a total substitution for private financing. If the public funding merely supplements rather than supplants the private, its benefits are nil. Indeed, early proposals for public financing came to grief on exactly this problem. For example, Congress passed a public funding scheme in 1966, Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-809, 80 Stat. 1539, only to repeal it a year later. One of the reasons for abandoning that effort was, in the words of the sponsor of the repealing legislation, that it failed to limit the "raising and spending of private funds on behalf of presidential candidates or any other candidates" and would permit fundraising and spending to proceed as it had. 113 Cong. Rec. 8062-8063 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Gore). The same objection was voiced with regard to other proposals. See id., at 30772-30773; Political Campaign Financing Proposals, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 169, 364, 389-390 (1967) (statements of Sens. Williams and Cannon). It is precisely this defect that 9012(f) is designed to avoid. </s> Because it is an indispensable component of the public funding scheme, 9012(f) is supported by governmental interests absent in Buckley. Rather than forcing Congress to abandon public financing because it is unworkable without constitutionally prohibited restrictions on independent spending, I would hold that 9012(f) is permissible precisely [470 U.S. 480, 516] because it is a necessary, narrowly drawn 11 means to a constitutional end. The need to make public financing, with its attendant benefits, workable is a constitutionally sufficient additional justification for the burden on First Amendment rights. </s> The existence of the public financing scheme changes the picture in other ways as well. First, it heightens the danger of corruption discounted by the majority. If a candidate accepts public financing, private contributions are limited to zero. 26 U.S.C. 9003(b)(2), 9012(b). Where there are no contributions being made directly to the candidate or his committee, and no expenditures of private funds subject to his direct control, "independent" expenditures are thrown into much starker relief. If those are the only private expenditures, their independence is little assurance that they will not be noticed, appreciated, and, perhaps, repaid. </s> The majority argues that there is no danger here of direct political favors - the paradigmatic ambassadorship in exchange [470 U.S. 480, 517] for a large contribution. Accepting, arguendo, this assertion, I still do not share the majority's equanimity about the infusion of massive PAC expenditures into the political process. The candidate may be forced to please the spenders rather than the voters, and the two groups are not identical. The majority concedes that aggregations of wealth influence the candidate for political office. 12 It is exactly this influence that Congress sought to escape in providing for public financing of Presidential elections, and that supports the limitations it imposed. </s> The provision for exclusive public funding not only enhances the danger of real or perceived corruption posed by independent expenditures, it also gives more weight to the interest in holding down the overall cost of political campaigns. In Buckley, this concern was partly ignored and partly rejected as not achieved by the means chosen. See 424 U.S., at 25 -26, and n. 27, 48-49. Neither course is possible here. The Fund Act was a response not merely to "the influence of excessive private political contributions," but also to the "dangers of spiraling campaign expenditures." H. R. Rep. No. 93-1239, p. 13 (1974). I am unwilling to discount the latter concern, particularly in the context of a scheme where public financing is supposed to replace private financing and cap total expenditures. Certainly there can be no concern that communication will suffer for want of money spent on the campaigns. 13 Finally, in the context of the public [470 U.S. 480, 518] financing scheme, the apparent congressional desire that elections should be between equally well financed candidates and not turn on the amount of money spent for one or the other is all the more compelling, and the danger of funding disparities more serious. </s> D </s> By striking down one portion of an integrated and comprehensive statute, the Court has once again transformed a coherent regulatory scheme into a nonsensical, loophole-ridden patchwork. As THE CHIEF JUSTICE pointed out with regard to the similar outcome in Buckley, "[b]y dissecting the Act bit by bit, and casting off vital parts, the Court fails to recognize that the whole of this Act is greater than the sum of its parts." 424 U.S., at 235 . Without 9012(f), Presidential candidates enjoy extensive public financing while those who would otherwise have worked for or contributed to a campaign had there been no such funding will pursue the same ends through "independent" expenditures. The result is that the old system remains essentially intact, but that much more money is being spent. In overzealous protection of attenuated First Amendment values, the Court has once again managed to assure us the worst of both worlds. I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 I agree with the majority that, under the plain terms of 9011(b) (1), the Democratic Party has no cause of action. </s> [Footnote 2 Section 9011(b)(1) mirrors 2 U.S.C. 437h(a), which allows the same plaintiffs to "institute such actions in the appropriate district court of the United States, including actions for declaratory judgment, as may be appropriate to construe the constitutionality of any provision of" the FECA. That section provides for certification of the constitutional question to the en banc court of appeals, and expedited review in this Court. I would read the word "appropriate" in both provisions identically, that is, as referring to the sort of controversy as to which the court's jurisdiction may be invoked. </s> I also note that individuals are unquestionably able to invoke the rather drastic provisions for expedited review provided by 437h. See Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577 (1982); 120 Cong. Rec. 35140 (1974) (statement of Rep. Frenzel). In light of the clear intent behind 437h, I have less difficulty than does the majority in believing that Congress similarly "intended every one of the millions of eligible voters in this country to have the power to invoke expedited review by a three-judge district court with direct appeal to this Court in actions brought" under 9011(b)(1). See ante, at 487-488. </s> [Footnote 3 The majority points to 9010(a), which authorizes the FEC to "appear in and defend against any action filed under section 9011," as evidence that 9011 suits "would be directed at the FEC." Ante, at 487. At most, this provision indicates that 9011 suits could be directed against the Commission. In any event, the "defend against" language is fully explained by 9011(a), which authorizes suits by "any interested person" to review "[a]ny certification, determination, or other action by the Commission." It is likely that 9010(a) was designed merely to give the FEC authority to defend itself in these actions. Cf. 26 U.S.C. 9040(a). It is also worth noting that if Congress really intended that private parties be able to sue only the FEC, it essentially accomplished that purpose in 9011(a). </s> [Footnote 4 Prior to 1976, the FECA included criminal proscriptions, found in Title 18 of the United States Code, whose enforcement was left to the Attorney General. In addition, civil enforcement authority was granted to both the FEC and the Attorney General. "The result was that enforcement responsibility was fragmented, and the line between improper conduct remediable in civil proceedings and conduct punishable as a crime blurred." H. R. Rep. No. 94-917, p. 3 (1976). The 1976 Amendments were designed to centralize enforcement authority in the Commission. Id., at 3-4; S. Rep. No. 94-677, p. 7 (1976). </s> [Footnote 5 The majority states that 9011(b)(1) has nothing to do with "enforcement." Ante, at 489. If true, this assertion undermines the majority's reliance on 437c(b)(1) in the first place. That section grants the FEC "exclusive jurisdiction with respect to . . . civil enforcement"; it says nothing about "exclusive jurisdiction" to bring suits to implement or construe. </s> [Footnote 6 The situation might be different if the regulation significantly favored incumbents; for example, if Congress had imposed unreasonably low spending limits that placed a particular burden on challengers. There is no indication that is the case. </s> [Footnote 7 I note that the actual rationale of the Buckley Court was that "independent advocacy . . . does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions." 424 U.S., at 46 (emphasis added). The possibility was thus left open, and remains open, that unforeseen developments in the financing of campaigns might make the need for restrictions on "independent" expenditures more compelling. See also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 -790 (1978). The exponential growth in PAC expenditures, accompanied by an equivalent growth in public and congressional concern, suggests that independent expenditures may well prove to be more serious threats than they appeared in 1976. See generally Hearings on S. 85 et al. before the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (hereinafter 1983 Hearings); Contribution Limitations and Independent Expenditures, Hearings before the Task Force on Elections of the House Committee on House Administration, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 151-437 (1982). The time may come when the governmental interests in restricting such expenditures will be sufficiently compelling to satisfy not only Congress but a majority of this Court as well. </s> [Footnote 8 In opposing an early version of campaign spending legislation, Senator Gore objected to the bill because "expenditures would be outside the so-called restriction as long as the candidate had no `control' over the organization, and lack of `control' is very easy to manage." 113 Cong. Rec. 10201 (1967). See also 1983 Hearings, at 56 (statement of Sen. Bentsen). </s> [Footnote 9 In a discussion with which I entirely agree, the Senate Committee supported the 1974 limits on "independent expenditures" as follows: </s> "[S]uch controls are imperative if Congress is to enact meaningful limits on direct contributions. Otherwise, wealthy individuals limited to a $3,000 [470 U.S. 480, 512] direct contribution could also purchase one hundred thousand dollars' worth of advertisements for a favored candidate. Such a loophole would render direct contribution limits virtually meaningless. </s> "Admittedly, expenditures made directly by an individual to urge support of a candidate pose First Amendment issues more vividly than do financial contributions to a campaign fund. Nevertheless, to prohibit a $60,000 direct contribution to be used for a TV spot commercial but then to permit the would-be contributor to purchase the time himself, and place a commercial endorsing the candidate, would exalt constitutional form over substance. Your Committee does not believe the First Amendment requires such a wooden construction." S. Rep. No. 93-689, pp. 18-19 (1974). </s> [Footnote 10 It is unclear whether the majority views 9012(f) as an unconstitutional restriction on the First Amendment rights of appellees themselves. To the extent it does, I would have thought that such a conclusion was foreclosed by the Court's unanimous holding in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee, 459 U.S. 197 (1982). That decision cannot be explained away as merely a corporations case. Ante, at 495-496. The respondent in that case resembled appellees here far more closely than it resembled the traditional business corporation. In any event, the opinion referred broadly to "unions, corporations, and similar organizations," citing to a case involving a PAC, 459 U.S., at 210 -211, and its reasoning applies equally here. </s> [Footnote 11 Congress debated proposals to extend 9012(f) to other organized groups or even individuals. See H. R. Rep. No. 92-708, p. 58 (1971); 117 Cong. Rec. 42397-42402, 42626-42627 (1971). It rejected such proposals in part out of concern for the constitutionality of any more sweeping restriction. See id., at 42626. In light of Congress' careful balancing of First Amendment concerns against the integrity and effectiveness of public funding, I would be especially cautious before striking down its compromise. </s> Despite the restricted reach of 9012(f), the majority announces that it is overbroad. I do not think these are appropriate cases for the "strong medicine" of overbreadth analysis, which "has been employed by the Court sparingly and only as a last resort," Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973), and which assumes a chilling effect that, frankly, does not seem to be a problem here. In any event, the statute withstands scrutiny. It is carefully limited to those organizations, spending that amount of money, that Congress believed threatened the integrity of the electoral process. I fully share the majority's inability to "distinguish in principle between a PAC that has solicited 1,000 $25 contributions and one that has solicited 100,000 $25 contributions." Ante, at 499. But that is exactly why the statute is not overbroad. See Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 -802 (1984). </s> [Footnote 12 One Senator has stated with regard to congressional campaigning: </s> "[T]he current system of financing congressional elections . . . virtually forces Members of Congress to go around hat in hand, begging for money from Washington-based special interest groups, political action committees whose sole purpose for existing is to seek a quid pro quo. . . . We see the degrading spectacle of elected representatives completing detailed questionnaires on their positions on special interest issues, knowing that the monetary reward of PAC support depends on the correct answers." 1983 Hearings, at 49 (statement of Sen. Eagleton). </s> [Footnote 13 During the 1984 general election campaign, each major party candidate received $40.4 million in public funds, and each national committee was [470 U.S. 480, 518] permitted to spend another $6.9 million on its candidate's behalf. N. Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1984, p. A20, col. 1. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. </s> In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), this Court upheld congressional limitations on contributions to candidates for federal office but struck down limitations on independent expenditures made on behalf of such candidates. In upholding the former, the Court stated that "the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling." Id., at 29. In striking down [470 U.S. 480, 519] the latter, the Court noted that an expenditure limitation "fails to serve any substantial interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process," and that "it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression." Id., at 47-48. Relying on Buckley, the Court today strikes down a limitation on expenditures by "political committees." Although I joined the portion of the Buckley per curiam that distinguished contributions from independent expenditures for First Amendment purposes, I now believe that the distinction has no constitutional significance. </s> The contribution/expenditure distinction in Buckley was grounded on two factors. First, the Court reasoned that independent expenditures offer significantly less potential for abuse than contributions: </s> "Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and may indeed prove counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." Id., at 47. </s> Undoubtedly, when an individual interested in obtaining the proverbial ambassadorship had the option of either contributing directly to a candidate's campaign or doing so indirectly through independent expenditures, he gave money directly. It does not take great imagination, however, to see that, when the possibility for direct financial assistance is severely limited, as it is in light of Buckley's decision to uphold the contribution limitation, such an individual will find other ways to financially benefit the candidate's campaign. It simply belies reality to say that a campaign will not reward massive financial assistance provided in the only way that is legally available. And the possibility of such a reward provides a powerful incentive to channel an independent expenditure [470 U.S. 480, 520] into an area that a candidate will appreciate. Surely an eager supporter will be able to discern a candidate's needs and desires; similarly, a willing candidate will notice the supporter's efforts. To the extent that individuals are able to make independent expenditures as part of a quid pro quo, they succeed in undermining completely the first rationale for the distinction made in Buckley. </s> The second factor supporting the distinction between contributions and expenditures was the relative magnitude of the First Amendment interest at stake. The Court found that the constitutional interest implicated in the limitation on expenditures was the right to advocate the election or defeat of a particular candidate. This right, the Court reasoned, "is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation." Id., at 48. In contrast, the Court found that the limitation on contributions primarily implicated "the contributor's freedom of political association." Id., at 24-25. Although the Court acknowledged that this right was a "fundamental" one, id., at 25, it concluded that the expenditure ceiling imposed significantly more severe restrictions on political freedoms than the contribution limitation, id., at 23. </s> I disagree that the limitations on contributions and expenditures have significantly different impacts on First Amendment freedoms. First, the underlying rights at issue - freedom of speech and freedom of association - are both core First Amendment rights. Second, in both cases the regulation is of the same form: It concerns the amount of money that can be spent for political activity. Thus, I do not see how one interest can be deemed more compelling than the other. * </s> [470 U.S. 480, 521] </s> In summary, I am now unpersuaded by the distinction established in Buckley. I have come to believe that the limitations on independent expenditures challenged in that case and here are justified by the congressional interests in promoting "the reality and appearance of equal access to the political arena," id., at 287 (opinion of MARSHALL, J.), and in eliminating political corruption and the appearance of such corruption. Therefore, I dissent, substantially for the reasons expressed in Parts II-A, II-C, and II-D of JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, from the Court's decision today to strike down 9012(f)'s limitation on independent expenditures by "political committees." </s> Also, I join Part I of JUSTICE WHITE's dissent, which concerns the standing of the Democratic National Committee. </s> [Footnote * At the time Buckley was decided, three of the eight Members who heard that case agreed that contributions and expenditures should be treated in the same manner for First Amendment purposes. See 424 U.S., at 241 (opinion of BURGER, C. J.) ("For me contributions and expenditures are two sides of the same First Amendment coin"); id., at 261 [470 U.S. 480, 521] (opinion of WHITE, J.) ("For constitutional purposes it is difficult to see the difference between the two situations"); id., at 290 (opinion of BLACKMUN, J.) ("I am not persuaded that the Court makes, or indeed is able to make, a principled constitutional distinction between the contribution limitations, on the one hand, and the expenditure limitations, on the other, that are involved here"). </s> [470 U.S. 480, 522]

United States Supreme Court CLEVELAND BOARD OF EDUCATION v. LOUDERMILL(1985) No. 83-1362 Argued: December 3, 1984Decided: March 19, 1985 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 83-1363, Parma Board of Education v. Donnelly et al., and No. 83-6392, Loudermill v. Cleveland Board of Education et al., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> In No. 83-1362, petitioner Board of Education hired respondent Loudermill as a security guard. On his job application Loudermill stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Subsequently, upon discovering that he had in fact been convicted of grand larceny, the Board dismissed him for dishonesty in filling out the job application. He was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the dishonesty charge or to challenge the dismissal. Under Ohio law, Loudermill was a "classified civil servant," and by statute, as such an employee, could be terminated only for cause and was entitled to administrative review of the dismissal. He filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission, which, after hearings before a referee and the Commission, upheld the dismissal some nine months after the appeal had been filed. Although the Commission's decision was subject to review in the state courts, Loudermill instead filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging that the Ohio statute providing for administrative review was unconstitutional on its face because it provided no opportunity for a discharged employee to respond to charges against him prior to removal, thus depriving him of liberty and property without due process. It was also alleged that the statute was unconstitutional as applied because discharged employees were not given sufficiently prompt postremoval hearings. The District Court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted, holding that because the very statute that created the property right in continued employment also specified the procedures for discharge, and because those procedures were followed, Loudermill was, by definition, afforded all the process due; that the post-termination hearings also adequately protected Loudermill's property interest; and that in light of the Commission's crowded docket the delay in processing his appeal was constitutionally acceptable. In No. 83-1363, petitioner Board of Education fired respondent Donnelly from his job as a bus [470 U.S. 532, 533] mechanic because he had failed an eye examination. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission, which ordered him reinstated, but without backpay. He then filed a complaint in Federal District Court essentially identical to Loudermill's, and the court dismissed for failure to state a claim. On a consolidated appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded, holding that both respondents had been deprived of due process and that the compelling private interest in retaining employment, combined with the value of presenting evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added administrative burden of a pretermination hearing. But with regard to the alleged deprivation of liberty and Loudermill's 9-month wait for an administrative decision, the court affirmed the District Court, finding no constitutional violation. </s> Held: </s> All the process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with post-termination administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio statute; since respondents alleged that they had no chance to respond, the District Court erred in dismissing their complaints for failure to state a claim. Pp. 538-548. </s> (a) The Ohio statute plainly supports the conclusion that respondents possess property rights in continued employment. The Due Process Clause provides that the substantive rights of life, liberty, and property cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are distinct. "Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation. Pp. 538-541. </s> (b) The principle that under the Due Process Clause an individual must be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest, requires "some kind of hearing" prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. The need for some form of pretermination hearing is evident from a balancing of the competing interests at stake: the private interest in retaining employment, the governmental interests in expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination. Pp. 542-545. </s> (c) The pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge, but should be an initial check against mistaken decisions - essentially a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. The essential requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to respond. Pp. 545-546. </s> (d) The delay in Loudermill's administrative proceedings did not constitute a separate constitutional violation. The Due Process Clause [470 U.S. 532, 534] requires provision of a hearing "at a meaningful time," and here the delay stemmed in part from the thoroughness of the procedures. Pp. 546-547. </s> 721 F.2d 550, affirmed and remanded. </s> WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, in Parts I, II, III, and IV of which BRENNAN, J., joined, and in Part II of which MARSHALL, J., joined. MARSHALL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. 548. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 551. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 559. </s> James G. Wyman argued the cause for petitioners in Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363 and respondents in No. 83-6392. With him on the brief for petitioner in No. 83-1362 was Thomas C. Simiele. John F. Lewis and John T. Meredith filed a brief for petitioner in No. 83-1363. John D. Maddox and Stuart A. Freidman filed a brief for respondents Cleveland Civil Service Commission et al. in No. 83-6392. </s> Robert M. Fertel, by appointment of the Court, 468 U.S. 1203 , argued the cause and filed briefs for respondents in Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363 and petitioner in No. 83-6392.Fn </s> Fn [470 U.S. 532, 534] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal in Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363 were filed for the State of Ohio et al. by Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, Gene W. Holliker and Christine Manuelian, Assistant Attorneys General, Charles A. Graddick, Attorney General of Alabama, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, Tany S. Hong, Attorney General of Hawaii, Lindley E. Pearson, Attorney General of Indiana, Robert T. Stephen, Attorney General of Kansas, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, William A. Allain, Attorney General of Mississippi, Michael T. Greely, Attorney General of Montana, Brian McKay, Attorney General of Nevada, Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of New Hampshire, Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General of New Jersey, Robert WeFald, Attorney General of North Dakota, Michael Turpen, Attorney General of Oklahoma, David Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Mark V. Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, Bronson C. La Follette, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Archie G. McClintock, Attorney [470 U.S. 532, 535] General of Wyoming; and for the National School Boards Association by Gwendolyn H. Gregory and August W. Steinhilber. </s> Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance in Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363 were filed for the American Civil Liberties Union of Cleveland Foundation by Gordon J. Beggs, Edward R. Stege, Jr., and Charles S. Sims; for the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, by Richard Kirschner; and for the National Educational Association by Robert H. Chanin and Michael H. Gottesman. [470 U.S. 532, 535] </s> JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In these cases we consider what pretermination process must be accorded a public employee who can be discharged only for cause. </s> I </s> In 1979 the Cleveland Board of Education, petitioner in No. 83-1362, hired respondent James Loudermill as a security guard. On his job application, Loudermill stated that he had never been convicted of a felony. Eleven months later, as part of a routine examination of his employment records, the Board discovered that in fact Loudermill had been convicted of grand larceny in 1968. By letter dated November 3, 1980, the Board's Business Manager informed Loudermill that he had been dismissed because of his dishonesty in filling out the employment application. Loudermill was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the charge of dishonesty or to challenge his dismissal. On November 13, the Board adopted a resolution officially approving the discharge. </s> Under Ohio law, Loudermill was a "classified civil servant." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 124.11 (1984). Such employees can be terminated only for cause, and may obtain administrative review if discharged. 124.34. Pursuant to this provision, Loudermill filed an appeal with the Cleveland Civil Service Commission on November 12. The Commission appointed a referee, who held a hearing on January 29, 1981. Loudermill argued that he had thought that his 1968 larceny conviction was for a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The referee recommended reinstatement. On July 20, 1981, the [470 U.S. 532, 536] full Commission heard argument and orally announced that it would uphold the dismissal. Proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law followed on August 10, and Loudermill's attorneys were advised of the result by mail on August 21. </s> Although the Commission's decision was subject to judicial review in the state courts, Loudermill instead brought the present suit in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that 124.34 was unconstitutional on its face because it did not provide the employee an opportunity to respond to the charges against him prior to removal. As a result, discharged employees were deprived of liberty and property without due process. The complaint also alleged that the provision was unconstitutional as applied because discharged employees were not given sufficiently prompt postremoval hearings. </s> Before a responsive pleading was filed, the District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). It held that because the very statute that created the property right in continued employment also specified the procedures for discharge, and because those procedures were followed, Loudermill was, by definition, afforded all the process due. The post-termination hearing also adequately protected Loudermill's liberty interests. Finally, the District Court concluded that, in light of the Commission's crowded docket, the delay in processing Loudermill's administrative appeal was constitutionally acceptable. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1362, pp. A36-A42. </s> The other case before us arises on similar facts and followed a similar course. Respondent Richard Donnelly was a bus mechanic for the Parma Board of Education. In August 1977, Donnelly was fired because he had failed an eye examination. He was offered a chance to retake the examination but did not do so. Like Loudermill, Donnelly appealed to the Civil Service Commission. After a year of wrangling about the timeliness of his appeal, the Commission heard [470 U.S. 532, 537] the case. It ordered Donnelly reinstated, though without backpay. 1 In a complaint essentially identical to Loudermill's, Donnelly challenged the constitutionality of the dismissal procedures. The District Court dismissed for failure to state a claim, relying on its opinion in Loudermill. </s> The District Court denied a joint motion to alter or amend its judgment, 2 and the cases were consolidated for appeal. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part and remanded. 721 F.2d 550 (1983). After rejecting arguments that the actions were barred by failure to exhaust administrative remedies and by res judicata - arguments that are not renewed here - the Court of Appeals found that both respondents had been deprived of due process. It disagreed with the District Court's original rationale. Instead, it concluded that the compelling private interest in retaining employment, combined with the value of presenting evidence prior to dismissal, outweighed the added administrative burden of a pretermination hearing. Id., at 561-562. With regard to the alleged deprivation of liberty, and Loudermill's 9-month wait for an administrative decision, the court affirmed the District Court, finding no constitutional violation. Id., at 563-564. [470 U.S. 532, 538] </s> The dissenting judge argued that respondents' property interests were conditioned by the procedural limitations accompanying the grant thereof. He considered constitutional requirements satisfied because there was a reliable pretermination finding of "cause," coupled with a due process hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id., at 566. </s> Both employers petitioned for certiorari. Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363. In a cross-petition, Loudermill sought review of the rulings adverse to him. No. 83-6392. We granted all three petitions, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984), and now affirm in all respects. </s> II </s> Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property right in continued employment. 3 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 -578 (1972); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 425 (1901). If they did, the State could not deprive them of this property without due process. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11 -12 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 -574 (1975). </s> Property interests are not created by the Constitution, "they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law . . . ." Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 577. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 709 (1976). The Ohio statute plainly creates such an interest. Respondents were "classified civil service employees," Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 124.11 (1984), entitled to retain their positions "during good behavior and efficient service," who could not be dismissed "except . . . for . . . misfeasance, [470 U.S. 532, 539] malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office," 124.34. 4 The statute plainly supports the conclusion, reached by both lower courts, that respondents possessed property rights in continued employment. Indeed, this question does not seem to have been disputed below. 5 </s> The Parma Board argues, however, that the property right is defined by, and conditioned on, the legislature's choice of procedures for its deprivation. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1363, pp. 26-27. The Board stresses that in addition to specifying the grounds for termination, the statute sets out procedures by which termination may take place. 6 The [470 U.S. 532, 540] procedures were adhered to in these cases. According to petitioner, "[t]o require additional procedures would in effect expand the scope of the property interest itself." Id., at 27. See also Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 5-10. </s> This argument, which was accepted by the District Court, has its genesis in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Arnett involved a challenge by a former federal employee to the procedures by which he was dismissed. The plurality reasoned that where the legislation conferring the substantive right also sets out the procedural mechanism for enforcing that right, the two cannot be separated: </s> "The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee against removal without case in the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which Congress has designated for the determination of cause. </s> . . . . . </s> "[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet." Id., at 152-154. </s> This view garnered three votes in Arnett, but was specifically rejected by the other six Justices. See id., at 166-167 (POWELL, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J.,); id., at 177-178, 185 (WHITE, J.,); id., at 211 (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas and BRENNAN, JJ.). Since then, this theory has at times seemed to gather some additional support. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 355 -361 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 586 -587 (POWELL, J., joined [470 U.S. 532, 541] by BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting). More recently, however, the Court has clearly rejected it. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491 (1980), we pointed out that "minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action." This conclusion was reiterated in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982), where we reversed the lower court's holding that because the entitlement arose from a state statute, the legislature had the prerogative to define the procedures to be followed to protect that entitlement. </s> In light of these holdings, it is settled that the "bitter with the sweet" approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today. The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights - life, liberty, and property - cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards." Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part); see id., at 185 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). </s> In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, "the question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The answer to that question is not to be found in the Ohio statute. [470 U.S. 532, 542] </s> III </s> An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). We have described "the root requirement" of the Due Process Clause as being "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest." 7 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971). This principle requires "some kind of a hearing" prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 569 -570; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972). As we pointed out last Term, this rule has been settled for some time now. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 192 , n. 10 (1984); id., at 200-203 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even decisions finding no constitutional violation in termination procedures have relied on the existence of some pretermination opportunity to respond. For example, in Arnett six Justices found constitutional minima satisfied where the employee had access to the material upon which the charge was based and could respond orally and in writing and present rebuttal affidavits. See also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65 (1979) (no due process violation where horse trainer whose license was suspended "was given more than one opportunity to present his side of the story"). </s> The need for some form of pretermination hearing, recognized in these cases, is evident from a balancing of the competing interests at stake. These are the private interest in [470 U.S. 532, 543] retaining employment, the governmental interest in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens, and the risk of an erroneous termination. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). </s> First, the significance of the private interest in retaining employment cannot be gainsaid. We have frequently recognized the severity of depriving a person of the means of livelihood. See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 389 (1975); Bell v. Burson, supra, at 539; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969). While a fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which he left his previous job. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83 -84 (1973). </s> Second, some opportunity for the employee to present his side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching an accurate decision. Dismissals for cause will often involve factual disputes. Cf. Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 686 (1979). Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 583 -584; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 784 -786 (1973). 8 </s> [470 U.S. 532, 544] </s> The cases before us illustrate these considerations. Both respondents had plausible arguments to make that might have prevented their discharge. The fact that the Commission saw fit to reinstate Donnelly suggests that an error might have been avoided had he been provided an opportunity to make his case to the Board. As for Loudermill, given the Commission's ruling we cannot say that the discharge was mistaken. Nonetheless, in light of the referee's recommendation, neither can we say that a fully informed decisionmaker might not have exercised its discretion and decided not to dismiss him, notwithstanding its authority to do so. In any event, the termination involved arguable issues, 9 and the right to a hearing does not depend on a demonstration of certain success. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). </s> The governmental interest in immediate termination does not outweigh these interests. As we shall explain, affording the employee an opportunity to respond prior to termination would impose neither a significant administrative burden nor intolerable delays. Furthermore, the employer shares the employee's interest in avoiding disruption and erroneous decisions; and until the matter is settled, the employer would continue to receive the benefit of the employee's labors. It is preferable to keep a qualified employee on than to train a new one. A governmental employer also has an interest in keeping citizens usefully employed rather than taking the possibly erroneous and counterproductive step of forcing its employees onto the welfare rolls. Finally, in those situations where the employer perceives a significant hazard in [470 U.S. 532, 545] keeping the employee on the job, 10 it can avoid the problem by suspending with pay. </s> IV </s> The foregoing considerations indicate that the pretermination "hearing," though necessary, need not be elaborate. We have pointed out that "[t]he formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the subsequent proceedings." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S., at 378 . See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 -895 (1961). In general, "something less" than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S., at 343 . Under state law, respondents were later entitled to a full administrative hearing and judicial review. The only question is what steps were required before the termination took effect. </s> In only one case, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), has the Court required a full adversarial evidentiary hearing prior to adverse governmental action. However, as the Goldberg Court itself pointed out, see id., at 264, that case presented significantly different considerations than are present in the context of public employment. Here, the pretermination hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge. It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions - essentially, a determination of whether [470 U.S. 532, 546] there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S., at 540 . </s> The essential requirements of due process, and all that respondents seek or the Court of Appeals required, are notice and an opportunity to respond. The opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken is a fundamental due process requirement. See Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1281 (1975). The tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of the story. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S., at 170 -171 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., at 195-196 (opinion of WHITE, J.); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 581 . To require more than this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee. </s> V </s> Our holding rests in part on the provisions in Ohio law for a full post-termination hearing. In his cross-petition Loudermill asserts, as a separate constitutional violation, that his administrative proceedings took too long. 11 The Court of [470 U.S. 532, 547] Appeals held otherwise, and we agree. 12 The Due Process Clause requires provision of a hearing "at a meaningful time." E. g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). At some point, a delay in the post-termination hearing would become a constitutional violation. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S., at 66 . In the present case, however, the complaint merely recites the course of proceedings and concludes that the denial of a "speedy resolution" violated due process. App. 10. This reveals nothing about the delay except that it stemmed in part from the thoroughness of the procedures. A 9-month adjudication is not, of course, unconstitutionally lengthy per se. Yet Loudermill offers no indication that his wait was unreasonably prolonged other than the fact that it took nine months. The chronology of the proceedings set out in the complaint, coupled with the assertion that nine months is too long to wait, does not state a claim of a constitutional deprivation. 13 </s> VI </s> We conclude that all the process that is due is provided by a pretermination opportunity to respond, coupled with posttermination [470 U.S. 532, 548] administrative procedures as provided by the Ohio statute. Because respondents allege in their complaints that they had no chance to respond, the District Court erred in dismissing for failure to state a claim. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The statute authorizes the Commission to "affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing authority." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 124.34 (1984). Petitioner Parma Board of Education interprets this as authority to reinstate with or without backpay and views the Commission's decision as a compromise. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1363, p. 6, n. 3; Tr. of Oral. Arg. 14. The Court of Appeals, however, stated that the Commission lacked the power to award backpay. 721 F.2d 550, 554, n. 3 (1983). As the decision of the Commission is not in the record, we are unable to determine the reasoning behind it. </s> [Footnote 2 In denying the motion, the District Court no longer relied on the principle that the state legislature could define the necessary procedures in the course of creating the property right. Instead, it reached the same result under a balancing test based on JUSTICE POWELL's concurring opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 -169 (1974), and the Court's opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 83-1362, pp. A54-A57. </s> [Footnote 3 Of course, the Due Process Clause also protects interests of life and liberty. The Court of Appeals' finding of a constitutional violation was based solely on the deprivation of a property interest. We address below Loudermill's contention that he has been unconstitutionally deprived of liberty. See n. 13, infra. </s> [Footnote 4 The relevant portion of 124.34 provides that no classified civil servant may be removed except "for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections or the rules of the director of administrative services or the commission, or any other failure of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office." </s> [Footnote 5 The Cleveland Board of Education now asserts that Loudermill had no property right under state law because he obtained his employment by lying on the application. It argues that had Loudermill answered truthfully he would not have been hired. He therefore lacked a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the position. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1362, pp. 14-15. </s> For several reasons, we must reject this submission. First, it was not raised below. Second, it makes factual assumptions - that Loudermill lied, and that he would not have been hired had he not done so - that are inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint and inappropriate at this stage of the litigation, which has not proceeded past the initial pleadings stage. Finally, the argument relies on a retrospective fiction inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Loudermill was hired and did hold the security guard job. The Board cannot escape its constitutional obligations by rephrasing the basis for termination as a reason why Loudermill should not have been hired in the first place. </s> [Footnote 6 After providing for dismissal only for cause, see n. 4, supra, 124.34 states that the dismissed employee is to be provided with a copy of the order of removal giving the reasons therefor. Within 10 days of the filing of the order with the Director of Administrative Services, the employee may file a written appeal with the State Personnel Board of Review or the Commission. "In the event such an appeal is filed, the board or [470 U.S. 532, 540] commission shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a trial board to hear, such appeal within thirty days from and after its filing with the board or commission, and it may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing authority." Either side may obtain review of the Commission's decision in the State Court of Common Pleas. </s> [Footnote 7 There are, of course, some situations in which a postdeprivation hearing will satisfy due process requirements. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908). </s> [Footnote 8 This is not to say that where state conduct is entirely discretionary the Due Process Clause is brought into play. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976). Nor is it to say that a person can insist on a hearing in order to argue that the decisionmaker should be lenient and depart from legal requirements. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 (1977). The point is that where there is an entitlement, a prior hearing facilitates the consideration of whether a permissible course of action is also an appropriate one. This is one way in which providing "effective notice and informal hearing permitting the [employee] to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous action. At least the [employer] will be altered to the existence of disputes about facts and [470 U.S. 532, 544] arguments about cause and effect. . . . [H]is discretion will be more informed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S., at 583 -584. </s> [Footnote 9 Loudermill's dismissal turned not on the objective fact that he was an ex-felon or the inaccuracy of his statement to the contrary, but on the subjective question whether he had lied on his application form. His explanation for the false statement is plausible in light of the fact that he received only a suspended 6-month sentence and a fine on the grand larceny conviction. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. </s> [Footnote 10 In the cases before us, no such danger seems to have existed. The examination Donnelly failed was related to driving school buses, not repairing them. Id., at 39-40. As the Court of Appeals stated, "[n]o emergency was even conceivable with respect to Donnelly." 721 F.2d, at 562. As for Loudermill, petitioner states that "to find that we have a person who is an ex-felon as our security guard is very distressful to us." Tr. of Oral Arg. 19. But the termination was based on the presumed misrepresentation on the employment form, not on the felony conviction. In fact, Ohio law provides that an employee "shall not be disciplined for acts," including criminal convictions, occurring more than two years previously. See Ohio Admin. Code 124-3-04 (1979). Petitioner concedes that Loudermill's job performance was fully satisfactory. </s> [Footnote 11 Loudermill's hearing before the referee occurred two and one-half months after he filed his appeal. The Commission issued its written decision six and one-half months after that. Administrative proceedings in Donnelly's case, once it was determined that they could proceed at all, were swifter. A writ of mandamus requiring the Commission to hold a hearing was issued on May 9, 1978; the hearing took place on May 30; the order of reinstatement was issued on July 6. </s> Section 124.34 provides that a hearing is to be held within 30 days of the appeal, though the Ohio courts have ruled that the time limit is not mandatory. E. g., In re Bronkar, 53 Ohio Misc. 13, 17, 372 N. E. 2d 1345, 1347 (Com. Pl. 1977). The statute does not provide a time limit for the actual decision. </s> [Footnote 12 It might be argued that once we find a due process violation in the denial of a pretermination hearing we need not and should not consider whether the post-termination procedures were adequate. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 72 -74 (1979) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part). We conclude that it is appropriate to consider this issue, however, for three reasons. First, the allegation of a distinct due process violation in the administrative delay is not an alternative theory supporting the same relief, but a separate claim altogether. Second, it was decided by the court below and is raised in the cross-petition. Finally, the existence of post-termination procedures is relevant to the necessary scope of pretermination procedures. </s> [Footnote 13 The cross-petition also argues that Loudermill was unconstitutionally deprived of liberty because of the accusation of dishonesty that hung over his head during the administrative proceedings. As the Court of Appeals found, 721 F.2d, at 563, n. 18, the failure to allege that the reasons for the dismissal were published dooms this claim. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976). </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree wholeheartedly with the Court's express rejection of the theory of due process, urged upon us by the petitioner Boards of Education, that a public employee who may be discharged only for cause may be discharged by whatever procedures the legislature chooses. I therefore join Part II of the opinion for the Court. I also agree that, before discharge, the respondent employees were entitled to the opportunity to respond to the charges against them (which is all they requested), and that the failure to accord them that opportunity was a violation of their constitutional rights. Because the Court holds that the respondents were due all the process they requested, I concur in the judgment of the Court. </s> I write separately, however, to reaffirm my belief that public employees who may be discharged only for cause are entitled, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, to more than respondents sought in this case. I continue to believe that before the decision is made to terminate an employee's wages, the employee is entitled to an opportunity to test the strength of the evidence "by confronting and cross-examining adverse witnesses and by presenting witnesses on his own behalf, whenever there are substantial disputes in testimonial evidence," Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 214 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Because the Court suggests that even in this situation due process requires no more than notice and an opportunity to be heard before wages are cut off, I am not able to join the Court's opinion in its entirety. [470 U.S. 532, 549] </s> To my mind, the disruption caused by a loss of wages may be so devastating to an employee that, whenever there are substantial disputes about the evidence, additional predeprivation procedures are necessary to minimize the risk of an erroneous termination. That is, I place significantly greater weight than does the Court on the public employee's substantial interest in the accuracy of the pretermination proceeding. After wage termination, the employee often must wait months before his case is finally resolved, during which time he is without wages from his public employment. By limiting the procedures due prior to termination of wages, the Court accepts an impermissibly high risk that a wrongfully discharged employee will be subjected to this often lengthy wait for vindication, and to the attendant and often traumatic disruptions to his personal and economic life. </s> Considerable amounts of time may pass between the termination of wages and the decision in a post-termination evidentiary hearing - indeed, in this case nine months passed before Loudermill received a decision from his postdeprivation hearing. During this period the employee is left in limbo, deprived of his livelihood and of wages on which he may well depend for basic sustenance. In that time, his ability to secure another job might be hindered, either because of the nature of the charges against him, or because of the prospect that he will return to his prior public employment if permitted. Similarly, his access to unemployment benefits might seriously be constrained, because many States deny unemployment compensation to workers discharged for cause. * Absent an interim source of wages, the employee might be unable to meet his basic, fixed costs, such as food, rent or mortgage payments. He would be forced to spend his savings, if he had any, and to convert his possessions to [470 U.S. 532, 550] cash before becoming eligible for public assistance. Even in that instance </s> "[t]he substitution of a meager welfare grant for a regular paycheck may bring with it painful and irremediable personal as well as financial dislocations. A child's education may be interrupted, a family's home lost, a person's relationship with his friends and even his family may be irrevocably affected. The costs of being forced, even temporarily, onto the welfare rolls because of a wrongful discharge from tenured Government employment cannot be so easily discounted," id., at 221. </s> Moreover, it is in no respect certain that a prompt postdeprivation hearing will make the employee economically whole again, and the wrongfully discharged employee will almost inevitably suffer irreparable injury. Even if reinstatement is forthcoming, the same might not be true of backpay - as it was not to respondent Donnelly in this case - and the delay in receipt of wages would thereby be transformed into a permanent deprivation. Of perhaps equal concern, the personal trauma experienced during the long months in which the employee awaits decision, during which he suffers doubt, humiliation, and the loss of an opportunity to perform work, will never be recompensed, and indeed probably could not be with dollars alone. </s> That these disruptions might fall upon a justifiably discharged employee is unfortunate; that they might fall upon a wrongfully discharged employee is simply unacceptable. Yet in requiring only that the employee have an opportunity to respond before his wages are cut off, without affording him any meaningful chance to present a defense, the Court is willing to accept an impermissibly high risk of error with respect to a deprivation that is substantial. </s> Were there any guarantee that the postdeprivation hearing and ruling would occur promptly, such as within a few days of the termination of wages, then this minimal predeprivation [470 U.S. 532, 551] process might suffice. But there is no such guarantee. On a practical level, if the employer had to pay the employee until the end of the proceeding, the employer obviously would have an incentive to resolve the issue expeditiously. The employer loses this incentive if the only suffering as a result of the delay is borne by the wage earner, who eagerly awaits the decision on his livelihood. Nor has this Court grounded any guarantee of this kind in the Constitution. Indeed, this Court has in the past approved, at least implicitly, an average 10- or 11-month delay in the receipt of a decision on Social Security benefits, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 341 -342 (1976), and, in the case of respondent Loudermill, the Court gives a stamp of approval to a process that took nine months. The hardship inevitably increases as the days go by, but nevertheless the Court countenances such delay. The adequacy of the predeprivation and postdeprivation procedures are inevitably interwined, and only a constitutional guarantee that the latter will be immediate and complete might alleviate my concern about the possibility of a wrongful termination of wages. </s> The opinion for the Court does not confront this reality. I cannot and will not close my eyes today - as I could not 10 years ago - to the economic situation of great numbers of public employees, and to the potentially traumatic effect of a wrongful discharge on a working person. Given that so very much is at stake, I am unable to accept the Court's narrow view of the process due to a public employee before his wages are terminated, and before he begins the long wait for a public agency to issue a final decision in his case. </s> [Footnote * See U.S. Dept. of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws 425, 435 (1984); see also id., at 4-33 to 4-36 (table of state rules governing disqualification from benefits for discharge for misconduct). </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> Today the Court puts to rest any remaining debate over whether public employers must provide meaningful notice and hearing procedures before discharging an employee for [470 U.S. 532, 552] cause. As the Court convincingly demonstrates, the employee's right to fair notice and an opportunity to "present his side of the story" before discharge is not a matter of legislative grace, but of "constitutional guarantee." Ante, at 541, 546. This principle, reaffirmed by the Court today, has been clearly discernible in our "repeated pronouncements" for many years. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 203 (1984) (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). </s> Accordingly, I concur in Parts I-IV of the Court's opinion. I write separately to comment on two issues the Court does not resolve today, and to explain my dissent from the result in Part V of the Court's opinion. </s> I </s> First, the Court today does not prescribe the precise form of required pretermination procedures in cases where an employee disputes the facts proffered to support his discharge. The cases at hand involve, as the Court recognizes, employees who did not dispute the facts but had "plausible arguments to make that might have prevented their discharge." Ante, at 544. In such cases, notice and an "opportunity to present reasons," ante, at 546, are sufficient to protect the important interests at stake. </s> As the Court also correctly notes, other cases "will often involve factual disputes," ante, at 543, such as allegedly erroneous records or false accusations. As JUSTICE MARSHALL has previously noted and stresses again today, ante, at 548, where there exist not just plausible arguments to be made, but also "substantial disputes in testimonial evidence," due process may well require more than a simple opportunity to argue or deny. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 214 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). The Court acknowledges that what the Constitution requires prior to discharge, in general terms, is pretermination procedures sufficient to provide "an initial check against mistaken decisions - essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe [470 U.S. 532, 553] that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action." Ante, at 545-546 (emphasis added). When factual disputes are involved, therefore, an employee may deserve a fair opportunity before discharge to produce contrary records or testimony, or even to confront an accuser in front of the decisionmaker. Such an opportunity might not necessitate "elaborate" procedures, see ante, at 545, but the fact remains that in some cases only such an opportunity to challenge the source or produce contrary evidence will suffice to support a finding that there are "reasonable grounds" to believe accusations are "true." </s> Factual disputes are not involved in these cases, however, and the "very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961). I do not understand Part IV to foreclose the views expressed above or by JUSTICE MARSHALL, ante, p. 548, with respect to discharges based on disputed evidence or testimony. I therefore join Parts I-IV of the Court's opinion. </s> II </s> The second issue not resolved today is that of administrative delay. In holding that Loudermill's administrative proceedings did not take too long, the Court plainly does not state a flat rule that 9-month delays in deciding discharge appeals will pass constitutional scrutiny as a matter of course. To the contrary, the Court notes that a full post-termination hearing and decision must be provided at "a meaningful time" and that "[a]t some point, a delay in the post-termination hearing would become a constitutional violation." Ante, at 547. For example, in Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979), we disapproved as "constitutionally infirm" the shorter administrative delays that resulted under a statute that required "prompt" postsuspension hearings for suspended racehorse trainers with decision to follow within 30 days of the hearing. Id., at 61, 66. As JUSTICE MARSHALL demonstrates, when an employee's wages are terminated pending [470 U.S. 532, 554] administrative decision, "hardship inevitably increases as the days go by." Ante, at 551; see also Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 194 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The impact on the employee of being without a job pending a full hearing is likely to be considerable because `[m]ore than 75 percent of actions contested within employing agencies require longer to decide than the 60 days required by . . . regulations'") (citation omitted). In such cases the Constitution itself draws a line, as the Court declares, "at some point" beyond which the State may not continue a deprivation absent decision. 1 The holding in Part V is merely that, in this particular case, Loudermill failed to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action, and not that nine months can never exceed constitutional limits. </s> III </s> Recognizing the limited scope of the holding in Part V, I must still dissent from its result, because the record in this case is insufficiently developed to permit an informed judgment on the issue of overlong delay. Loudermill's complaint was dismissed without answer from the respondent Cleveland Civil Service Commission. Allegations at this early stage are to be liberally construed, and "[i]t is axiomatic that a complaint should not be dismissed unless `it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (citation omitted). Loudermill alleged that it took the Commission over two and one-half months simply to hold [470 U.S. 532, 555] a hearing in his case, over two months more to issue a non-binding interim decision, and more than three and one-half months after that to deliver a final decision. Complaint §§ 20, 21, App. 10. 2 The Commission provided no explanation for these significant gaps in the administrative process; we do not know if they were due to an overabundance of appeals, Loudermill's own foot-dragging, bad faith on the part of the Commission, or any other of a variety of reasons that might affect our analysis. We do know, however, that under Ohio law the Commission is obligated to hear appeals like Loudermill's "within thirty days." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 124.34 (1984). 3 Although this statutory limit has been [470 U.S. 532, 556] viewed only as "directory" by Ohio courts, those courts have also made it clear that when the limit is exceeded, "[t]he burden of proof [is] placed on the [Commission] to illustrate to the court that the failure to comply with the 30-day requirement . . . was reasonable." In re Bronkar, 53 Ohio Misc. 13, 17, 372 N. E. 2d 1345, 1347 (Com. Pl. 1977). I cannot conclude on this record that Loudermill could prove "no set of facts" that might have entitled him to relief after nine months of waiting. [470 U.S. 532, 557] </s> The Court previously has recognized that constitutional restraints on the timing, no less than the form, of a hearing and decision "will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved." Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975). The relevant interests have generally been recognized as threefold: "the importance of the private interest and the length or finality of the deprivation, the likelihood of governmental error, and the magnitude of the governmental interests involved." Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434 (1982) (citations omitted); accord, Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 -335 (1976); cf. United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983) (four-factor test for evaluating constitutionality of delay between time of property seizure and initiation of forfeiture action). "Little can be said on when a delay becomes presumptively improper, for the determination necessarily depends on the facts of the particular case." Id., at 565. </s> Thus the constitutional analysis of delay requires some development of the relevant factual context when a plaintiff alleges, as Loudermill has, that the administrative process has taken longer than some minimal amount of time. Indeed, all of our precedents that have considered administrative delays under the Due Process Clause, either explicitly or sub silentio, have been decided only after more complete proceedings in the District Courts. See, e. g., $8,850, supra; Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Mathews v. Eldridge, supra. 4 Yet in Part V, the Court summarily holds Loudermill's allegations [470 U.S. 532, 558] insufficient, without adverting to any considered balancing of interests. Disposal of Loudermill's complaint without examining the competing interests involved marks an unexplained departure from the careful multifaceted analysis of the facts we consistently have employed in the past. </s> I previously have stated my view that </s> "[t]o be meaningful, an opportunity for a full hearing and determination must be afforded at least at a time when the potentially irreparable and substantial harm caused by a suspension can still be avoided - i. e., either before or immediately after suspension." Barry v. Barchi, supra, at 74 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part). </s> Loudermill's allegations of months-long administrative delay, taken together with the facially divergent results regarding length of administrative delay found in Barchi as compared to Arnett, see n. 4, supra, are sufficient in my mind to require further factual development. In no other way can the third Mathews factor - "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement [in this case, a speedier hearing and decision] would entail," 424 U.S., at 335 - sensibly be evaluated in this case. 5 I therefore would remand the delay issue to the District Court for further evidentiary proceedings consistent with the Mathews approach. I respectfully dissent from the Court's contrary decision in Part V. </s> [Footnote 1 Post-termination administrative procedures designed to determine fully and accurately the correctness of discharge actions are to be encouraged. Multiple layers of administrative procedure, however, may not be created merely to smother a discharged employee with "thoroughness," effectively destroying his constitutionally protected interests by over-extension. Cf. ante, at 547 ("thoroughness" of procedures partially explains delay in this case). </s> [Footnote 2 The interim decision, issued by a hearing examiner, was in Loudermill's favor and recommended his reinstatement. But Loudermill was not reinstated nor were his wages even temporarily restored; in fact, there apparently exists no provision for such interim relief or restoration of backpay under Ohio's statutory scheme. See ante, at 537, n. 1; cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 196 (1974) (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (under federal civil service law, discharged employee's wages are only "provisionally cut off" pending appeal); id., at 146 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.) (under federal system, backpay is automatically refunded "if the [discharged] employee is reinstated on appeal"). See also N. Y. Civ. Serv. Law 75(3) (McKinney 1983) (suspension without pay pending determination of removal charges may not exceed 30 days). Moreover, the final decision of the Commission to reverse the hearing examiner apparently was arrived at without any additional evidentiary development; only further argument was had before the Commission. 721 F.2d 550, 553 (CA6 1983). These undisputed facts lead me at least to question the administrative value of, and justification for, the 9-month period it took to decide Loudermill's case. </s> [Footnote 3 A number of other States similarly have specified time limits for hearings and decisions on discharge appeals taken by tenured public employees, indicating legislative consensus that a month or two normally is sufficient time to resolve such actions. No state statutes permit administrative delays of the length alleged by Loudermill. See, e. g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 41-785(A), (C) (Supp. 1984-1985) (hearing within 30 days, decision within 30 days of hearing); Colo. Rev. Stat. 24-50-125 (4) (Supp. 1984) (hearing within 45 days, decision within 45 days of hearing); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 5-202(b) (Supp. 1984) (decision within 60 days of hearing); [470 U.S. 532, 556] Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 24 1/2, § 38b14 (1983) (hearing within 45 days); Ind. Code 4-15-2-35 (1982) (decision within 30 days of hearing); Iowa Code 19A.14 (1983) (hearing within 30 days); Kan Stat. Ann. 75-2949(f) (Supp. 1983) (hearing within 45 days); Ky. Rev. Stat. 18A.095(3) (1984) (hearing within 60 days of filing, decision within 90 days of filing); Maine Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 5, 753(5) (1979) (decision within 30 days of hearing); Md. Ann. Code, Art. 64A, 33(b)(2), (e) (Supp. 1984) (salary suspension hearing within 5 days and decision within 5 more days; discharge hearing within 90 days and decision within 45 days of hearing); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 31, 43 (Supp. 1984-1985) (hearing within 10 days, findings "forthwith," decision within 30 days of findings); Minn. Stat. 44.08 (1970) (hearing within 10 days, decision within 3 days of hearing); Nev. Rev. Stat. 284.390(2) (1983) (hearing within 20 days); N. J. Stat. Ann. 11:15-4, 11:15-6 (West 1976) (hearing within 30 days, decision within 15 days of hearing); Okla. Stat. Tit. 74, 841.13, 841.13A (Supp. 1984) (hearing within 35 days, decision within 15 days of hearing); R. I. Gen. Laws 36-4-40, 36-4-40.2, 36-4-41 (1984) (initial hearing within 14 days, interim decision within 20 days of hearing, appeal decision within 30 more days, final decision of Governor within 15 more days); S. C. Code 8-17-330, 8-17-340 (Supp. 1984) (interim decision within 45 days of filing, final decision within 20 days of hearing); Utah Code Ann. 67-19-25 (Supp. 1983) (interim decision within 5-20 days, final hearing within 30 days of filing final appeal, final decision within 40 days of hearing); Wash. Rev. Code 41.64.100 (1983) (final decision within 90 days of filing); Wis. Stat. 230.44(4)(f) (Supp. 1984-1985) (decision within 90 days of hearing); see also Ala. Code 36-26-27(b) (Supp. 1984) (hearing on citizen removal petitions within 20 days of service); D.C. Code 1-617.3(a)(1)(D) (1981) ("Career and Educational Services" employees "entitled" to decision within 45 days); Ga. Code Ann. 45-20-9(e)(1) (1982) (hearing officer's decision required within 30 days of hearing); Miss. Code Ann. 21-31-23 (Supp. 1984) (hearing required within 20 days of termination for "extraordinary circumstances"). </s> [Footnote 4 After giving careful consideration to well-developed factual contexts, the Court has reached results that might be viewed as inconsistent in the abstract. Compare Barchi, 443 U.S., at 66 (disapproving statute requiring decision within 30 days of hearing), with Arnett, 416 U.S., at 194 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (approving statutory scheme under which over 50 percent of discharge appeals "take more than three months"). Rather than inconsistency, however, these differing results demonstrate the impossibility of drawing firm lines and the importance of factual development in such cases. </s> [Footnote 5 In light of the complete absence of record evidence, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Court of Appeals below was forced to speculate that "[t]he delays in the instant cases in all likelihood were inadvertent." 721 F.2d, at 564, n. 19. Similarly, the Cleveland Board of Education and Civil Service Commission assert only that "[n]o authority is necessary to support the proposition" that administrative resolution of a case like Loudermill's in less than nine months is "almost impossible." Brief for Respondents in No. 83-6392, p. 8, n. 4. To the contrary, however, I believe our precedents clearly require demonstration of some "authority" in these circumstances. [470 U.S. 532, 559] </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting. </s> In Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), six Members of this Court agreed that a public employee could be dismissed for misconduct without a full hearing prior to termination. A plurality of Justices agreed that the employee was entitled to exactly what Congress gave him, and no more. THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice Stewart, and I said: </s> "Here appellee did have a statutory expectancy that he not be removed other than for `such cause as will promote the efficiency of [the] service.' But the very section of the statute which granted him that right, a right which had previously existed only by virtue of administrative regulation, expressly provided also for the procedure by which `cause' was to be determined, and expressly omitted the procedural guarantees which appellee insists are mandated by the Constitution. Only by bifurcating the very sentence of the Act of Congress which conferred upon appellee the right not to be removed save for cause could it be said that he had an expectancy of that substantive right without the procedural limitations which Congress attached to it. In the area of federal regulation of government employees, where in the absence of statutory limitation the governmental employer has had virtually uncontrolled latitude in decisions as to hiring and firing, Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 -897 (1961), we do not believe that a statutory enactment such as the Lloyd-La Follette Act may be parsed as discretely as appellee urges. Congress was obviously intent on according a measure of statutory job security to governmental employees which they had not previously enjoyed, but was likewise intent on excluding more elaborate procedural requirements which it felt would make the operation of the new scheme unnecessarily burdensome in practice. Where the focus of legislation was thus strongly on the procedural mechanism for enforcing the substantive [470 U.S. 532, 560] right which was simultaneously conferred, we decline to conclude that the substantive right may be viewed wholly apart from the procedure provided for its enforcement. The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which Congress has designated for the determination of cause." Id., at 151-152. </s> In these cases, the relevant Ohio statute provides in its first paragraph that </s> "[t]he tenure of every officer or employee in the classified service of the state and the counties, civil service townships, cities, city health districts, general health districts, and city school districts thereof, holding a position under this chapter of the Revised Code, shall be during good behavior and efficient service and no such officer or employee shall be reduced in pay or position, suspended, or removed, except . . . for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections or the rules of the director of administrative services or the commission, or any other failure of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 124.34 (1984). </s> The very next paragraph of this section of the Ohio Revised Code provides that in the event of suspension of more than three days or removal the appointing authority shall furnish the employee with the stated reasons for his removal. The next paragraph provides that within 10 days following the receipt of such a statement, the employee may appeal in writing to the State Personnel Board of Review or the Commission, such appeal shall be heard within 30 days from the time of its filing, and the Board may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing authority. [470 U.S. 532, 561] </s> Thus in one legislative breath Ohio has conferred upon civil service employees such as respondents in these cases a limited form of tenure during good behavior, and prescribed the procedures by which that tenure may be terminated. Here, as in Arnett, "[t]he employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which [the Ohio Legislature] has designated for the determination of cause." 416 U.S., at 152 (opinion of REHNQUIST, J.). We stated in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972): </s> "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law - rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." </s> We ought to recognize the totality of the State's definition of the property right in question, and not merely seize upon one of several paragraphs in a unitary statute to proclaim that in that paragraph the State has inexorably conferred upon a civil service employee something which it is powerless under the United States Constitution to qualify in the next paragraph of the statute. This practice ignores our duty under Roth to rely on state law as the source of property interests for purposes of applying the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While it does not impose a federal definition of property, the Court departs from the full breadth of the holding in Roth by its selective choice from among the sentences the Ohio Legislature chooses to use in establishing and qualifying a right. </s> Having concluded by this somewhat tortured reasoning that Ohio has created a property right in the respondents in these cases, the Court naturally proceeds to inquire what process is "due" before the respondents may be divested of [470 U.S. 532, 562] that right. This customary "balancing" inquiry conducted by the Court in these cases reaches a result that is quite unobjectionable, but it seems to me that it is devoid of any principles which will either instruct or endure. The balance is simply an ad hoc weighing which depends to a great extent upon how the Court subjectively views the underlying interests at stake. The results in previous cases and in these cases have been quite unpredictable. To paraphrase Justice Black, today's balancing act requires a "pretermination opportunity to respond" but there is nothing that indicates what tomorrow's will be. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 276 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting). The results from today's balance certainly do not jibe with the result in Goldberg or Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). * The lack of [470 U.S. 532, 563] any principled standards in this area means that these procedural due process cases will recur time and again. Every different set of facts will present a new issue on what process was due and when. One way to avoid this subjective and varying interpretation of the Due Process Clause in cases such as these is to hold that one who avails himself of government entitlements accepts the grant of tenure along with its inherent limitations. </s> Because I believe that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution does not support the conclusion that Ohio's effort to confer a limited form of tenure upon respondents resulted in the creation of a "property right" in their employment, I dissent. </s> [Footnote * Today the balancing test requires a pretermination opportunity to respond. In Goldberg we required a full-fledged trial-type hearing, and in Mathews we declined to require any pretermination process other than those required by the statute. At times this balancing process may look as if it were undertaken with a thumb on the scale, depending upon the result the Court desired. For example, in Mathews we minimized the importance of the benefit to the recipient, stating that after termination he could always go on welfare to survive. 424 U.S., at 340 -343; see also id., at 350 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). Today, however, the Court exalts the recipient's interest in retaining employment; not a word is said about going on welfare. Conversely, in Mathews we stressed the interests of the State, while today, in a footnote, the Court goes so far as to denigrate the State's interest in firing a school security guard who had lied about a prior felony conviction. Ante, at 545, n. 10. </s> Today the Court purports to describe the State's interest, ante, at 544-545, but does so in a way that is contrary to what petitioner Boards of Education have asserted in their briefs. The description of the State's interests looks more like a makeweight to support the Court's result. The decision whom to train and employ is strictly a decision for the State. The Court attempts to ameliorate its ruling by stating that a State may always suspend an employee with pay, in lieu of a predischarge hearing, if it determines that he poses a threat. Ibid. This does less than justice to the State's interest in its financial integrity and its interest in promptly terminating an employee who has violated the conditions of his tenure, and ignores Ohio's current practice of paying back wages to wrongfully discharged employees. </s> [470 U.S. 532, 564]

United States Supreme Court MILLER-EL v. DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION(2005) No. 03-9659 Argued: December 6, 2004Decided: June 13, 2005 </s> When Dallas County prosecutors used peremptory strikes against 10 of the 11 qualified black venire members during jury selection for petitioner Miller-El's capital murder trial, he objected, claiming that the strikes were based on race and could not be presumed legitimate since the District Attorney's Office had a history of excluding blacks from criminal juries. The trial court denied his request for a new jury, and his trial ended with a death sentence. While his appeal was pending, this Court decided, in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, that discrimination by a prosecutor in selecting a defendant's jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment. On remand, the trial court reviewed the voir dire record, heard prosecutor Macaluso's justifications for the strikes that were not explained during voir dire, and found no showing that prospective black jurors were struck because of their race. The State Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Subsequently, the Federal District Court denied Miller-El federal habeas relief, and the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability. This Court reversed, finding that the merits of Miller-El's Batson claim were, at least, debatable by jurists of reason. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322. The Fifth Circuit granted a certificate of appealability but rejected Miller-El's Batson claim on the merits. Held:Miller-El is entitled to prevail on his Batson claim and, thus, entitled to habeas relief. Pp.3-33. (a)"[T]his Court consistently and repeatedly has reaffirmed that racial discrimination by the State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause." Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44. The rub has been the practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary by nature and subject to a myriad of legitimate influences. The Batson Court held that a defendant can make out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection by "the totality of the relevant facts" about a prosecutor's conduct during the defendant's own trial. 476 U.S., at 94. Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation, id., at 97, and the trial court must determine if the defendant has shown "purposeful discrimination," id., at 98, in light of "all relevant circumstances," id., at 96-97. Since this case is on review of a denial of habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254, and since the Texas trial court's prior determination that the State's race-neutral explanations were true is a factual determination, Miller-El may obtain relief only by showing the trial court's conclusion to be "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," §2254(e)(1). Pp.3-6. </s> (b)The prosecutors used peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible black venire panelists, a disparity unlikely to have been produced by happenstance. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S, at 342. More powerful than the bare statistics are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white ones who were not. If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to a white panelist allowed to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. The details of two panel member comparisons bear out this Court's observation, id., at 343, that the prosecution's reason for exercising peremptory strikes against some black panel members appeared to apply equally to some white jurors. There are strong similarities and some differences between Billy Jean Fields, a black venireman who expressed unwavering support for the death penalty but was struck, and similarly situated nonblack jurors; but the differences seem far from significant, particularly when reading Fields's voir dire testimony in its entirety. Upon that reading, Fields should have been an ideal juror in the eyes of a prosecutor seeking a death sentence, and the prosecutors' explanations for the strike, that Fields would not vote for death if rehabilitation were possible, a mischaracterization of his testimony, cannot reasonably be accepted when there were nonblack veniremen expressing comparable views on rehabilitation who were not struck. The prosecution's reason that Fields's brother had prior convictions is not creditable in light of its failure to enquire about the matter. The prosecution's proffered reasons for striking Joe Warren, another black venireman, are comparably unlikely. The fact that the reason for striking him, that he thought death was an easy way out and defendants should be made to suffer more, also applied to nonblack panel members who were selected is evidence of pretext. The suggestion of pretext is not, moreover, mitigated by Macaluso's explanation that Warren was struck when the State could afford to be liberal in using its 10 remaining peremptory challenges. Were that the explanation for striking Warren and later accepting similar panel members, prosecutors would have struck white panel member Jenkins, who was examined and accepted before Warren despite her similar views. Macaluso's explanation also weakens any suggestion that the State's acceptance of Woods, the one black juror, shows that race was not in play. When he was selected as the eighth juror, the State had used 11 of its 15 peremptory challenges, 7 on black panel members; and the record shows that at least 3 of the remaining venire panel opposed capital punishment. Because the prosecutors had to exercise prudent restraint, the late-stage decision to accept a black panel member willing to impose the death penalty does not neutralize the early-stage decision to challenge a comparable venireman, Warren. The Fifth Circuit's substituted reason for the elimination, Warren's general ambivalence about the penalty, was erroneous as a matter of fact and law. As to fact, Macaluso said nothing about general ambivalence, and Warren's answer to several questions was that he could impose the death penalty. As for law, the Batson rule provides the prosecutor an opportunity to give the reason for striking a juror and requires the judge to assess the reason's plausibility in light of all of the evidence, but it does not does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis. Because a prosecutor is responsible for the reason he gave, the Fifth Circuit's substitution of a reason for excluding Warren does nothing to satisfy the prosecutors' burden of stating a racially neutral explanation for their own actions. Comparing Warren's strike with the treatment of panel members with similar views supports a conclusion that race was significant in determining who was challenged and who was not. Pp. 6-19. </s> (c)The prosecution's broader patterns of practice during jury selection also support the case for discrimination. Texas law permits either side to shuffle the cards bearing panel member names to rearrange the order in which they are questioned. Members seated in the back may escape voir dire, for those not questioned by the end of each week are dismissed. Here, the prosecution shuffled the cards when a number of black members were seated at the front of the panel at the beginning of the second week. The third week, they shuffled when the first four members were black, placing them in the back. After the defense reshuffled the cards, and the black members reappeared in the front, the court denied the prosecution's request for another shuffle. No racially neutral reason for the shuffling has ever been offered, and nothing stops the suspicion of discriminatory intent from rising to an inference. The contrasting voir dire questions posed respectively to black and nonblack panel members also indicate that the State was trying to avoid black jurors. Prosecutors gave a bland description of the death penalty to 94% of white venire panel members before asking about the individual's feelings on the subject, but used a script describing imposition of the death penalty in graphic terms for 53% of the black venire members. The argument that prosecutors used the graphic script to weed out ambivalent panel members simply does not fit the facts. Black venire members were more likely to receive that script regardless of their expressions of certainty or ambivalence about the death penalty, and the State's chosen explanation failed for four out of the eight black panel members who received it: two received it after clearly stating their opposition to the death penalty and two received it even though they unambiguously favored that penalty. The State's explanation misses the mark four out of five times with regard to the nonblacks who received the graphic description. Ambivalent black panel members were also more likely to receive the graphic script than nonblack ambivalent ones. The State's attempt at a race-neutral rationalization fails to explain what the prosecutors did. The explanation that the prosecutors' first object was to use the graphic script to make a case for excluding black panel members opposed to, or ambivalent about, the death penalty is more persuasive than the State's explanation, and the reasonable inference is that race was the major consideration when the prosecution chose to follow the graphic script. The same is true for another kind of disparate questioning. The prosecutors asked all black panel members opposed to, or ambivalent about, the death penalty how low a sentence they would consider imposing for murder without telling them that the State requires a 5-year minimum, but prosecutors did not put that question to most white panel members who had expressed similar views. The final body of evidence confirming the conclusion here is that the Dallas County District Attorney's Office had, for decades, followed a specific policy of systematically excluding blacks from juries. The Miller-El prosecutors' notes of the race of each panel member show that they took direction from a jury selection manual that included racial stereotypes. Pp.19-31. </s> (d)The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that Miller-El failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's no-discrimination finding was wrong is as unsupportable as the "dismissive and strained interpretation" of his evidence that this Court disapproved when deciding that he was entitled to a certificate of appealability, Miller-El, supra, at 344. Ten of the eleven black venire members were peremptorily struck. At least two of them were ostensibly acceptable to prosecutors seeking the death penalty. The prosecutors' chosen race-neutral reasons for the strikes do not hold up and are so far at odds with the evidence that pretext is the fair conclusion. The selection process was replete with evidence that prosecutors were selecting and rejecting potential jurors because of race. And the prosecutors took their cues from a manual on jury selection with an emphasis on race. It blinks reality to deny that the State struck Fields and Warren because they were black. The facts correlate to nothing as well as to race. The state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable as well as erroneous. Pp. 32-33. 361 F.3d 849, reversed and remanded. Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J., joined. </s> THOMAS JOE MILLER-EL, PETITIONER v. DOUGDRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OFCRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONALINSTITUTIONS DIVISION on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the fifth circuit [June 13, 2005] </s> Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Two years ago, we ordered that a certificate of appealability, under 28 U.S.C. §2253(c), be issued to habeas petitioner Miller-El, affording review of the District Court's rejection of the claim that prosecutors in his capital murder trial made peremptory strikes of potential jurors based on race. Today we find Miller-El entitled to prevail on that claim and order relief under §2254. I </s> In the course of robbing a Holiday Inn in Dallas, Texas in late 1985, Miller-El and his accomplices bound and gagged two hotel employees, whom Miller-El then shot, killing one and severely injuring the other. During jury selection in Miller-El's trial for capital murder, prosecutors used peremptory strikes against 10 qualified black venire members. Miller-El objected that the strikes were based on race and could not be presumed legitimate, given a history of excluding black members from criminal juries by the Dallas County District Attorney's Office. The trial court received evidence of the practice alleged but found no "systematic exclusion of blacks as a matter of policy" by that office, App. 882-883, and therefore no entitlement to relief under Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), the case then defining and marking the limits of relief from racially biased jury selection. The court denied Miller-El's request to pick a new jury, and the trial ended with his death sentence for capital murder. While an appeal was pending, this Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which replaced Swain's threshold requirement to prove systemic discrimination under a Fourteenth Amendment jury claim, with the rule that discrimination by the prosecutor in selecting the defendant's jury sufficed to establish the constitutional violation. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals then remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether Miller-El could show that prosecutors in his case peremptorily struck prospective black jurors because of race. Miller-El v. State, 748 S.W. 2d 459 (1988). </s> The trial court found no such demonstration. After reviewing the voir dire record of the explanations given for some of the challenged strikes, and after hearing one of the prosecutors, Paul Macaluso, give his justification for those previously unexplained, the trial court accepted the stated race-neutral reasons for the strikes, which the judge called "completely credible [and] sufficient" as the grounds for a finding of "no purposeful discrimination." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Upon Remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals in State v. Miller-El, No. 8668-NL (5th Crim. Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex., Jan. 13, 1989), pp.5-6, App. 928-929. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, stating it found "ample support" in the voir dire record for the race-neutral explanations offered by prosecutors for the peremptory strikes. Miller-El v. State, No. 69,677 (Sept. 16, 1992) (per curiam), p.2, App. 931. </s> Miller-El then sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. §2254, again pressing his Batson claim, among others not now before us. The District Court denied relief, Miller-El v. Johnson, Civil No. 3:96-CV-1992-H (ND Tex., June 5, 2000), App. 987, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit precluded appeal by denying a certificate of appealability, Miller-El v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 445 (2001). We granted certiorari to consider whether Miller-El was entitled to review on the Batson claim, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 534 U.S. 1122 (2002), and reversed the Court of Appeals. After examining the record of Miller-El's extensive evidence of purposeful discrimination by the Dallas County District Attorney's Office before and during his trial, we found an appeal was in order, since the merits of the Batson claim were, at the least, debatable by jurists of reason. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). After granting a certificate of appealability, the Fifth Circuit rejected Miller-El's Batson claim on the merits. 361 F.3d 849 (2004). We again granted certiorari, 542 U.S. 936 (2004), and again we reverse. II A </s> "It is well known that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the community, which sway the judgment of jurors, and which, therefore, operate in some cases to deny to persons of those classes the full enjoyment of that protection which others enjoy." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880); see also Batson v. Kentucky, supra, at 86. Defendants are harmed, of course, when racial discrimination in jury selection compromises the right of trial by impartial jury, Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, at 308, but racial minorities are harmed more generally, for prosecutors drawing racial lines in picking juries establish "state-sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice," J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994). Nor is the harm confined to minorities. When the government's choice of jurors is tainted with racial bias, that "overt wrong ... casts doubt over the obligation of the parties, the jury, and indeed the court to adhere to the law throughout the trial ...." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412 (1991). That is, the very integrity of the courts is jeopardized when a prosecutor's discrimination "invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality," id., at 412, and undermines public confidence in adjudication, Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 49 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, supra, at 87. So, "[f]or more than a century, this Court consistently and repeatedly has reaffirmed that racial discrimination by the State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection Clause." Georgia v. McCollum, supra, at 44; see Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, at 308, 310; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 596 (1935); Swain v. Alabama, supra, at 223-224; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, at 84; Powers v. Ohio, supra, at 404. </s> The rub has been the practical difficulty of ferreting out discrimination in selections discretionary by nature, and choices subject to myriad legitimate influences, whatever the race of the individuals on the panel from which jurors are selected. In Swain v. Alabama, we tackled the problem of "the quantum of proof necessary" to show purposeful discrimination, 380 U.S., at 205, with an eye to preserving each side's historical prerogative to make a peremptory strike or challenge, the very nature of which is traditionally "without a reason stated," id., at 220. The Swain Court tried to relate peremptory challenge to equal protection by presuming the legitimacy of prosecutors' strikes except in the face of a longstanding pattern of discrimination: when "in case after case, whatever the circumstances," no blacks served on juries, then "giving even the widest leeway to the operation of irrational but trial-related suspicions and antagonisms, it would appear that the purposes of the peremptory challenge [were] being perverted." Id., at 223-224. </s> Swain's demand to make out a continuity of discrimination over time, however, turned out to be difficult to the point of unworkable, and in Batson v. Kentucky, we recognized that this requirement to show an extended pattern imposed a "crippling burden of proof" that left prosecutors' use of peremptories "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny." 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)), and we accordingly held that a defendant could make out a prima facie case of discriminatory jury selection by "the totality of the relevant facts" about a prosecutor's conduct during the defendant's own trial. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S., at 94, 96. "Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging ... jurors" within an arguably targeted class. Id., at 97. Although there may be "any number of bases on which a prosecutor reasonably [might] believe that it is desirable to strike a juror who is not excusable for cause ..., the prosecutor must give a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challeng[e]." Id., at 98, n.20 (internal quotation marks omitted). "The trial court then will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination." Id., at 98. </s> Although the move from Swain to Batson left a defendant free to challenge the prosecution without having to cast Swain's wide net, the net was not entirely consigned to history, for Batson's individualized focus came with a weakness of its own owing to its very emphasis on the particular reasons a prosecutor might give. If any facially neutral reason sufficed to answer a Batson challenge, then Batson would not amount to much more than Swain. Some stated reasons are false, and although some false reasons are shown up within the four corners of a given case, sometimes a court may not be sure unless it looks beyond the case at hand. Hence Batson's explanation that a defendant may rely on "all relevant circumstances" to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination. 476 U.S., at 96-97. B </s> This case comes to us on review of a denial of habeas relief sought under 28 U.S.C. §2254, following the Texas trial court's prior determination of fact that the State's race-neutral explanations were true, see Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam); Batson v. Kentucky, supra, at 98, n. 21. </s> Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Miller-El may obtain relief only by showing the Texas conclusion to be "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2). Thus we presume the Texas court's factual findings to be sound unless Miller-El rebuts the "presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." §2254(e)(1). The standard is demanding but not insatiable; as we said the last time this case was here, "[d]eference does not by definition preclude relief." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S., at 340. III A </s> The numbers describing the prosecution's use of peremptories are remarkable. Out of 20 black members of the 108-person venire panel for Miller-El's trial, only 1 served. Although 9 were excused for cause or by agreement, 10 were peremptorily struck by the prosecution. Id., at 331. "The prosecutors used their peremptory strikes to exclude 91% of the eligible African-American venire members .... Happenstance is unlikely to produce this disparity." Id., at 342. More powerful than these bare statistics, however, are side-by-side comparisons of some black venire panelists who were struck and white panelists allowed to serve. If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson's third step. Cf. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (in employment discrimination cases, "[p]roof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive"). While we did not develop a comparative juror analysis last time, we did note that the prosecution's reasons for exercising peremptory strikes against some black panel members appeared equally on point as to some white jurors who served. Miller-El v. Cockrell, supra, at 343.1 The details of two panel member comparisons bear this out.2 </s> The prosecution used its second peremptory strike to exclude Billy Jean Fields, a black man who expressed unwavering support for the death penalty. On the questionnaire filled out by all panel members before individual examination on the stand, Fields said that he believed in capital punishment, Joint Lodging 14, and during questioning he disclosed his belief that the State acts on God's behalf when it imposes the death penalty. "Therefore, if the State exacts death, then that's what it should be." App. 174. He testified that he had no religious or philosophical reservations about the death penalty and that the death penalty deterred crime. Id., at 174-175. He twice averred, without apparent hesitation, that he could sit on Miller-El's jury and make a decision to impose this penalty. Id., at 176-177. </s> Although at one point in the questioning, Fields indicated that the possibility of rehabilitation might be relevant to the likelihood that a defendant would commit future acts of violence, id., at 183, he responded to ensuing questions by saying that although he believed anyone could be rehabilitated, this belief would not stand in the way of a decision to impose the death penalty: "[B]ased on what you [the prosecutor] said as far as the crime goes, there are only two things that could be rendered, death or life in prison. If for some reason the testimony didn't warrant death, then life imprisonment would give an individual an opportunity to rehabilitate. But, you know, you said that the jurors didn't have the opportunity to make a personal decision in the matter with reference to what I thought or felt, but it was just based on the questions according to the way the law has been handed down." Id., at 185 (alteration omitted). </s> Fields also noted on his questionnaire that his brother had a criminal history. Joint Lodging 13. During questioning, the prosecution went into this, too: "QCould you tell me a little bit about that? </s> "AHe was arrested and convicted on [a] number of occasions for possession of a controlled substance. </s> "QWas that here in Dallas? </s> "AYes. </s> "QWas he involved in any trials or anything like that? </s> "AI suppose of sorts. I don't really know too much about it. </s> "QWas he ever convicted? </s> "AYeah, he served time. </s> "QDo you feel that that would in any way interfere with your service on this jury at all? </s> "ANo." App. 190. </s> Fields was struck peremptorily by the prosecution, with prosecutor James Nelson offering a race-neutral reason: "[W]e ... have concern with reference to some of his statements as to the death penalty in that he said that he could only give death if he thought a person could not be rehabilitated and he later made the comment that any person could be rehabilitated if they find God or are introduced to God and the fact that we have a concern that his religious feelings may affect his jury service in this case." Id., at 197 (alteration omitted). </s> Thus, Nelson simply mischaracterized Fields's testimony. He represented that Fields said he would not vote for death if rehabilitation was possible, whereas Fields unequivocally stated that he could impose the death penalty regardless of the possibility of rehabilitation. Perhaps Nelson misunderstood, but unless he had an ulterior reason for keeping Fields off the jury we think he would have proceeded differently. In light of Fields's outspoken support for the death penalty, we expect the prosecutor would have cleared up any misunderstanding by asking further questions before getting to the point of exercising a strike. </s> If, indeed, Fields's thoughts on rehabilitation did make the prosecutor uneasy, he should have worried about a number of white panel members he accepted with no evident reservations. Sandra Hearn said that she believed in the death penalty "if a criminal cannot be rehabilitated and continues to commit the same type of crime." Id., at 429.3 Hearn went so far as to express doubt that at the penalty phase of a capital case she could conclude that a convicted murderer "would probably commit some criminal acts of violence in the future." Id., at 440. "People change," she said, making it hard to assess the risk of someone's future dangerousness. "[T]he evidence would have to be awful strong." Ibid. But the prosecution did not respond to Hearn the way it did to Fields, and without delving into her views about rehabilitation with any further question, it raised no objection to her serving on the jury. White panelist Mary Witt said she would take the possibility of rehabilitation into account in deciding at the penalty phase of the trial about a defendant's probability of future dangerousness, 6 Record of Voir Dire 2433 (hereinafter Record), but the prosecutors asked her no further question about her views on reformation, and they accepted her as a juror. Id., at 2464-2465.4 Latino venireman Fernando Gutierrez, who served on the jury, said that he would consider the death penalty for someone who could not be rehabilitated, App. 777, but the prosecutors did not question him further about this view. In sum, nonblack jurors whose remarks on rehabilitation could well have signaled a limit on their willingness to impose a death sentence were not questioned further and drew no objection, but the prosecution expressed apprehension about a black juror's belief in the possibility of reformation even though he repeatedly stated his approval of the death penalty and testified that he could impose it according to state legal standards even when the alternative sentence of life imprisonment would give a defendant (like everyone else in the world) the opportunity to reform.5 </s> The unlikelihood that his position on rehabilitation had anything to do with the peremptory strike of Fields is underscored by the prosecution's response after Miller-El's lawyer pointed out that the prosecutor had misrepresented Fields's responses on the subject. A moment earlier the prosecutor had finished his misdescription of Fields's views on potential rehabilitation with the words, "Those are our reasons for exercising our ... strike at this time." Id., at 197. When defense counsel called him on his misstatement, he neither defended what he said nor withdrew the strike. Id., at 198. Instead, he suddenly came up with Fields's brother's prior conviction as another reason for the strike. Id., at 199. </s> It would be difficult to credit the State's new explanation, which reeks of afterthought. While the Court of Appeals tried to bolster it with the observation that no seated juror was in Fields's position with respect to his brother, 361 F.3d, at 859-860, the court's readiness to accept the State's substitute reason ignores not only its pretextual timing but the other reasons rendering it implausible. Fields's testimony indicated he was not close to his brother, App. 190 ("I don't really know too much about it"), and the prosecution asked nothing further about the influence his brother's history might have had on Fields, as it probably would have done if the family history had actually mattered. See, e.g., Ex parte Travis, 776 So.2d 874, 881 (Ala. 2000) ("[T]he State's failure to engage in any meaningful voir dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination"). There is no good reason to doubt that the State's afterthought about Fields's brother was anything but makeweight. </s> The Court of Appeals's judgment on the Fields strike is unsupportable for the same reason the State's first explanation is itself unsupportable. The Appeals Court's description of Fields's voir dire testimony mentioned only his statements that everyone could be rehabilitated, failing to note that Fields affirmed that he could give the death penalty if the law and evidence called for it, regardless of the possibility of divine grace. The Court of Appeals made no mention of the fact that the prosecution mischaracterized Fields as saying he could not give death if rehabilitation were possible. 361 F.3d, at 856. </s> In sum, when we look for nonblack jurors similarly situated to Fields, we find strong similarities as well as some differences.6 But the differences seem far from significant, particularly when we read Fields's voir dire testimony in its entirety. Upon that reading, Fields should have been an ideal juror in the eyes of a prosecutor seeking a death sentence, and the prosecutors' explanations for the strike cannot reasonably be accepted. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S., at 339 (the credibilityof reasons given can be measured by "how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whetherthe proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy"). </s> The prosecution's proffered reasons for striking Joe Warren, another black venireman, are comparably unlikely. Warren gave this answer when he was asked what the death penalty accomplished: "I don't know. It's really hard to say because I know sometimes you feel that it might help to deter crime and then you feel that the person is not really suffering. You're taking the suffering away from him. So it's like I said, sometimes you have mixed feelings about whether or not this is punishment or, you know, you're relieving personal punishment." App. 205; 3 Record 1532. </s> The prosecution said nothing about these remarks when it struck Warren from the panel, but prosecutor Paul Macaluso referred to this answer as the first of his reasons when he testified at the later Batson hearing: "I thought [Warren's statements on voir dire] were inconsistent responses. At one point he says, you know, on a case-by-case basis and at another point he said, well, I think--I got the impression, at least, that he suggested that the death penalty was an easy way out, that they should be made to suffer more." App. 909. </s> On the face of it, the explanation is reasonable from the State's point of view, but its plausibility is severely undercut by the prosecution's failure to object to other panel members who expressed views much like Warren's. Kevin Duke, who served on the jury, said, "sometimes death would be better to me than--being in prison would be like dying every day and, if you were in prison for life with no hope of parole, I['d] just as soon have it over with than be in prison for the rest of your life." Id., at 372. Troy Woods, the one black panelist to serve as juror, said that capital punishment "is too easy. I think that's a quick relief.... I feel like [hard labor is] more of a punishment than putting them to sleep." Id., at 408. Sandra Jenkins, whom the State accepted (but who was then struck by the defense) testified that she thought "a harsher treatment is life imprisonment with no parole." Id., at 542. Leta Girard, accepted by the State (but also struck by the defense) gave her opinion that "living sometimes is a worse--is worse to me than dying would be." Id., at 624. The fact that Macaluso's reason also applied to these other panel members, most of them white, none of them struck, is evidence of pretext. </s> The suggestion of pretext is not, moreover, mitigated much by Macaluso's explanation that Warren was struck when the State had 10 peremptory challenges left and could afford to be liberal in using them. Id., at 908. If that were the explanation for striking Warren and later accepting panel members who thought death would be too easy, the prosecutors should have struck Sandra Jenkins, whom they examined and accepted before Warren. Indeed, the disparate treatment is the more remarkable for the fact that the prosecutors repeatedly questioned Warren on his capacity and willingness to impose a sentence of death and elicited statements of his ability to do so if the evidence supported that result and the answer to each special question was yes, id., at 202.2, 202.3, 205, 207, whereas the record before us discloses no attempt to determine whether Jenkins would be able to vote for death in spite of her view that it was easy on the convict, id., at 541-546. Yet the prosecutors accepted the white panel member Jenkins and struck the black venireman Warren. </s> Macaluso's explanation that the prosecutors grew more sparing with peremptory challenges as the jury selection wore on does, however, weaken any suggestion that the State's acceptance of Woods, the one black juror, shows that race was not in play. Woods was the eighth juror, qualified in the fifth week of jury selection. Joint Lodging 125. When the State accepted him, 11 of its 15 peremptory strikes were gone, 7 of them used to strike black panel members. Id., at 137. The juror questionnaires show that at least three members of the venire panel yet to be questioned on the stand were opposed to capital punishment, Janice Mackey, id., at 79; Paul Bailey, id., at 63; and Anna Keaton, id., at 55.7 With at least three remaining panel members highly undesirable to the State, the prosecutors had to exercise prudent restraint in using strikes. This late-stage decision to accept a black panel member willing to impose a death sentence does not, therefore, neutralize the early-stage decision to challenge a comparable venireman, Warren. In fact, if the prosecutors were going to accept any black juror to obscure the otherwise consistent pattern of opposition to seating one, the time to do so was getting late.8 </s> The Court of Appeals pretermitted these difficulties by stating that the prosecution's reason for striking Warren was a more general ambivalence about the penalty and his ability to impose it, 361 F.3d, at 856-857 (and the dissent presses that explanation here, post, at 14-17). But this rationalization was erroneous as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. </s> As to fact, Macaluso said nothing about any general ambivalence. He simply alluded to the possibility that Warren might think the death penalty too easy on some defendants, saying nothing about Warren's ability to impose the penalty when it appeared to be warranted.9 On the contrary, though Warren had indeed questioned the extent to which the death penalty served a purpose in society, App. 205, he explained his position in response to the very next question: it was not any qualm about imposing what society generally deems its harshest punishment, but his concern that the death penalty might not be severe enough, ibid. When Warren was asked whether he could impose the death penalty he said he thought he could; when told that answering yes to the special issue questions would be tantamount to voting for death he said he could give yes answers if the evidence supported them. Id., at 207.10 </s> As for law, the rule in Batson provides an opportunity to the prosecutor to give the reason for striking the juror, and it requires the judge to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it. 476 U.S., at 96-97; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S., at 339. It is true that peremptories are often the subjects of instinct, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S., at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring), and it can sometimes be hard to say what the reason is. But when illegitimate grounds like race are in issue, a prosecutor simply has got to state his reasons as best he can and stand or fall on the plausibility of the reasons he gives. A Batson challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis. If the stated reason does not hold up, its pretextual significance does not fade because a trial judge, or an appeals court, can imagine a reason that might not have been shown up as false. The Court of Appeals's and the dissent's substitution of a reason for eliminating Warren does nothing to satisfy the prosecutors' burden of stating a racially neutral explanation for their own actions. </s> The whole of the voir dire testimony subject to consideration casts the prosecution's reasons for striking Warren in an implausible light. Comparing his strike with the treatment of panel members who expressed similar views supports a conclusion that race was significant in determining who was challenged and who was not.11 B </s> The case for discrimination goes beyond these comparisons to include broader patterns of practice during the jury selection. The prosecution's shuffling of the venire panel, its enquiry into views on the death penalty, its questioning about minimum acceptable sentences: all indicate decisions probably based on race. Finally, the appearance of discrimination is confirmed by widely known evidence of the general policy of the Dallas County District Attorney's Office to exclude black venire members from juries at the time Miller-El's jury was selected. The first clue to the prosecutors' intentions, distinct from the peremptory challenges themselves, is their resort during voir dire to a procedure known in Texas as the jury shuffle. In the State's criminal practice, either side may literally reshuffle the cards bearing panel members' names, thus rearranging the order in which members of a venire panel are seated and reached for questioning.12 Once the order is established, the panel members seated at the back are likely to escape voir dire altogether, for those not questioned by the end of the week are dismissed. As we previously explained, "the prosecution's decision to seek a jury shuffle when a predominant number of African-Americans were seated in the front of the panel, along with its decision to delay a formal objection to the defense's shuffle until after the new racial composition was revealed, raise a suspicion that the State sought to exclude African-Americans from the jury. Our concerns are amplified by the fact that the state court also had before it, and apparently ignored, testimony demonstrating that the Dallas County District Attorney's Office had, by its own admission, used this process to manipulate the racial composition of the jury in the past." Miller-El v. Cockrell, supra, at 346. </s> In this case, the prosecution and then the defense shuffled the cards at the beginning of the first week of voir dire; the record does not reflect the changes in order. App. 113-114. At the beginning of the second week, when a number of black members were seated at the front of the panel, the prosecution shuffled.13 2 Record 836-837. At the beginning of the third week, the first four panel members were black. The prosecution shuffled, and these black panel members ended up at the back. Then the defense shuffled, and the black panel members again appeared at the front. The prosecution requested another shuffle, but the trial court refused. App. 124-132. Finally, the defense shuffled at the beginning of the fourth and fifth weeks of voir dire; the record does not reflect the panel's racial composition before or after those shuffles. Id., at 621-622; 9 Record 3585. </s> The State notes in its brief that there might be racially neutral reasons for shuffling the jury, Brief for Respondent 36-37, and we suppose there might be. But no racially neutral reason has ever been offered in this case, and nothing stops the suspicion of discriminatory intent from rising to an inference.14 </s> The next body of evidence that the State was trying to avoid black jurors is the contrasting voir dire questions posed respectively to black and nonblack panel members, on two different subjects. First, there were the prosecutors' statements preceding questions about a potential juror's thoughts on capital punishment. Some of these prefatory statements were cast in general terms, but some followed the so-called graphic script, describing the method of execution in rhetorical and clinical detail. It is intended, Miller-El contends, to prompt some expression of hesitation to consider the death penalty and thus to elicit plausibly neutral grounds for a peremptory strike of a potential juror subjected to it, if not a strike for cause. If the graphic script is given to a higher proportion of blacks than whites, this is evidence that prosecutors more often wanted blacks off the jury, absent some neutral and extenuating explanation. </s> As we pointed out last time, for 94% of white venire panel members, prosecutors gave a bland description of the death penalty before asking about the individual's feelings on the subject. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S., at 332. The abstract account went something like this: "I feel like it [is] only fair that we tell you our position in this case. The State of Texas ... is actively seeking the death penalty in this case for Thomas Joe Miller-El. We anticipate that we will be able to present to a jury the quantity and type of evidence necessary to convict him of capital murder and the quantity and type of evidence sufficient to allow a jury to answer these three questions over here in the affirmative. A yes answer to each of those questions results in an automatic death penalty from Judge McDowell." App. 564-565. </s> Only 6% of white venire panelists, but 53% of those who were black, heard a different description of the death penalty before being asked their feelings about it. This is an example of the graphic script: "I feel like you have a right to know right up front what our position is. Mr. Kinne, Mr. Macaluso and myself, representing the people of Dallas County and the state of Texas, are actively seeking the death penalty for Thomas Joe Miller-El.... </s> "We do that with the anticipation that, when the death penalty is assessed, at some point Mr. Thomas Joe Miller-El--the man sitting right down there--will be taken to Huntsville and will be put on death row and at some point taken to the death house and placed on a gurney and injected with a lethal substance until he is dead as a result of the proceedings that we have in this court on this case. So that's basically our position going into this thing." Id., at 572-573. </s> The State concedes that this disparate questioning did occur but argues that use of the graphic script turned not on a panelist's race but on expressed ambivalence about the death penalty in the preliminary questionnaire.15 Prosecutors were trying, the argument goes, to weed out noncommittal or uncertain jurors, not black jurors. And while some white venire members expressed opposition to the death penalty on their questionnaires, they were not read the graphic script because their feelings were already clear. The State says that giving the graphic script to these panel members would only have antagonized them. Brief for Respondent 27-32. </s> This argument, however, first advanced in dissent when the case was last here, Miller-El v. Cockrell, supra, at 364-368 (opinion of Thomas, J.), and later adopted by the State and the Court of Appeals, simply does not fit the facts. Looking at the answers on the questionnaires, and at voir dire testimony expressly discussing answers on the questionnaires,16 we find that black venire members were more likely than nonblacks to receive the graphic script regardless of their expressions of certainty or ambivalence about the death penalty, and the State's chosen explanation for the graphic script fails in the cases of four out of the eight black panel members who received it.17 Two of them, Janice Mackey and Anna Keaton, clearly stated opposition to the death penalty but they received the graphic script,18 while the black panel members Wayman Kennedy and Jeannette Butler were unambiguously in favor19 but got the graphic description anyway.20 The State's explanation does even worse in the instances of the five nonblacks who received the graphic script, missing the mark four times out of five: Vivian Sztybel and Filemon Zablan received it,21 although each was unambiguously in favor of the death penalty,22 while Dominick Desinise and Clara Evans unambiguously opposed it23 but were given the graphic version.24 </s> The State's purported rationale fails again if we look only to the treatment of ambivalent panel members, ambivalent black individuals having been more likely to receive the graphic description than ambivalent nonblacks. Three nonblack members of the venire indicated ambivalence to the death penalty on their questionnaires;25 only one of them, Fernando Gutierrez, received the graphic script.26 But of the four black panel mem-bers who expressed ambivalence,27 all got the graphic treatment.28 </s> The State's attempt at a race-neutral rationalization thus simply fails to explain what the prosecutors did. But if we posit instead that the prosecutors' first object was to use the graphic script to make a case for excluding black panel members opposed to or ambivalent about the death penalty, there is a much tighter fit of fact and explanation.29 Of the 10 nonblacks whose questionnaires expressed ambivalence or opposition,30 only 30% received the graphic treatment.31 But of the seven blacks who expressed ambivalence or opposition,32 86% heard the graphic script.33 As between the State's ambivalence explanation and Miller-El's racial one, race is much the better, and the reasonable inference is that race was the major consideration when the prosecution chose to follow the graphic script. </s> The same is true for another kind of disparate questioning, which might fairly be called trickery. The prosecutors asked members of the panel how low a sentence they would consider imposing for murder. Most potential jurors were first told that Texas law provided for a minimum term of five years, but some members of the panel were not, and if a panel member then insisted on a minimum above five years, the prosecutor would suppress his normal preference for tough jurors and claim cause to strike. Two Terms ago, we described how this disparate questioning was correlated with race: "Ninety-four percent of whites were informed of the statutory minimum sentence, compared [with] only twelve and a half percent of African-Americans. No explanation is proffered for the statistical disparity. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 361-362 (1939) ('"The fact that the testimony ... was not challenged by evidence appropriately direct, cannot be brushed aside." Had there been evidence obtainable to contradict and disprove the testimony offered by petitioner, it cannot be assumed that the State would have refrained from introducing it' (quoting Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 594-595 (1935))). Indeed, while petitioner's appeal was pending before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, that court found a Batson violation where this precise line of disparate questioning on mandatory minimums was employed by one of the same prosecutors who tried the instant case. Chambers v. State, 784 S.W. 2d 29, 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S., at 345. </s> The State concedes that the manipulative minimum punishment questioning was used to create cause to strike, Brief for Respondent 33, and n. 26, but now it offers the extenuation that prosecutors omitted the 5-year information not on the basis of race, but on stated opposition to the death penalty, or ambivalence about it, on the questionnaires and in the voir dire testimony. Id., at 34-35. On the State's identification of black panel members opposed or ambivalent, all were asked the trick question.34 But the State's rationale flatly fails to explain why most white panel members who expressed similar opposition or ambivalence were not subjected to it. It is entirely true, as the State argues, id., at 35, that prosecutors struck a number of nonblack members of the panel (as well as black members) for cause or by agreement before they reached the point in the standard voir dire sequence to question about minimum punishment. But this is no answer; 8 of the 11 nonblack individuals who voiced opposition or ambivalence were asked about the acceptable minimum only after being told what state law required.35 Hence, only 27% of nonblacks questioned on the subject who expressed these views were subjected to the trick question, as against 100% of black members. Once again, the implication of race in the prosecutors' choice of questioning cannot be explained away.36 </s> There is a final body of evidence that confirms this conclusion. We know that for decades leading up to the time this case was tried prosecutors in the Dallas County office had followed a specific policy of systematically excluding blacks from juries, as we explained the last time the case was here. "Although most of the witnesses [presented at the Swain hearing in 1986] denied the existence of a systematic policy to exclude African-Americans, others disagreed. A Dallas County district judge testified that, when he had served in the District Attorney's Office from the late-1950's to early-1960's, his superior warned him that he would be fired if he permitted any African-Americans to serve on a jury. Similarly, another Dallas County district judge and former assistant district attorney from 1976 to 1978 testified that he believed the office had a systematic policy of excluding African-Americans from juries. </s> "Of more importance, the defense presented evidence that the District Attorney's Office had adopted a formal policy to exclude minorities from jury service.... A manual entitled 'Jury Selection in a Criminal Case' [sometimes known as the Sparling Manual] was distributed to prosecutors. It contained an article authored by a former prosecutor (and later a judge) under the direction of his superiors in the District Attorney's Office, outlining the reasoning for excluding minorities from jury service. Although the manual was written in 1968, it remained in circulation until 1976, if not later, and was available at least to one of the prosecutors in Miller-El's trial." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S., at 334-335.37 </s> Prosecutors here "marked the race of each prospective juror on their juror cards." Id., at 347.38 The Court of Appeals concluded that Miller-El failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's finding of no discrimination was wrong, whether his evidence was viewed collectively or separately. 361 F.3d, at 862. We find this conclusion as unsupportable as the "dismissive and strained interpretation" of his evidence that we disapproved when we decided Miller-El was entitled to a certificate of appealability. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, supra, at 344. It is true, of course, that at some points the significance of Miller-El's evidence is open to judgment calls, but when this evidence on the issues raised is viewed cumulatively its direction is too powerful to conclude anything but discrimination. In the course of drawing a jury to try a black defendant, 10 of the 11 qualified black venire panel members were peremptorily struck. At least two of them, Fields and Warren, were ostensibly acceptable to prosecutors seeking a death verdict, and Fields was ideal. The prosecutors' chosen race-neutral reasons for the strikes do not hold up and are so far at odds with the evidence that pretext is the fair conclusion, indicating the very discrimination the explanations were meant to deny. </s> The strikes that drew these incredible explanations occurred in a selection process replete with evidence that the prosecutors were selecting and rejecting potential jurors because of race. At least two of the jury shuffles conducted by the State make no sense except as efforts to delay consideration of black jury panelists to the end of the week, when they might not even be reached. The State has in fact never offered any other explanation. Nor has the State denied that disparate lines of questioning were pursued: 53% of black panelists but only 3% of nonblacks were questioned with a graphic script meant to induce qualms about applying the death penalty (and thus explain a strike), and 100% of blacks but only 27% of nonblacks were subjected to a trick question about the minimum acceptable penalty for murder, meant to induce a disqualifying answer. The State's attempts to explain the prosecutors' questioning of particular witnesses on nonracial grounds fit the evidence less well than the racially discriminatory hypothesis. </s> If anything more is needed for an undeniable explanation of what was going on, history supplies it. The prosecutors took their cues from a 20-year old manual of tips on jury selection, as shown by their notes of the race of each potential juror. By the time a jury was chosen, the State had peremptorily challenged 12% of qualified nonblack panel members, but eliminated 91% of the black ones. </s> It blinks reality to deny that the State struck Fields and Warren, included in that 91%, because they were black. The strikes correlate with no fact as well as they correlate with race, and they occurred during a selection infected by shuffling and disparate questioning that race explains better than any race-neutral reason advanced by the State. The State's pretextual positions confirm Miller-El's claim, and the prosecutors' own notes proclaim that the Sparling Manual's emphasis on race was on their minds when they considered every potential juror. </s> The state court's conclusion that the prosecutors' strikes of Fields and Warren were not racially determined is shown up as wrong to a clear and convincing degree; the state court's conclusion was unreasonable as well as erroneous. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for entry of judgment for petitioner together with orders of appropriate relief. It is so ordered. </s> THOMAS JOE MILLER-EL, PETITIONER v. DOUGDRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OFCRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONALINSTITUTIONS DIVISION on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the fifth circuit [June 13, 2005] </s> Justice Breyer, concurring. </s> In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court adopted a burden-shifting rule designed to ferret out the unconstitutional use of race in jury selection. In his separate opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall predicted that the Court's rule would not achieve its goal. The only way to "end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process," he concluded, was to "eliminat[e] peremptory challenges entirely." Id., at 102-103 (concurring opinion). Today's case reinforces Justice Marshall's concerns. I </s> To begin with, this case illustrates the practical problems of proof that Justice Marshall described. As the Court's opinion makes clear, Miller-El marshaled extensive evidence of racial bias. But despite the strength of his claim, Miller-El's challenge has resulted in 17 years of largely unsuccessful and protracted litigation--including 8 different judicial proceedings and 8 different judicial opinions, and involving 23 judges, of whom 6 found the Batson standard violated and 16 the contrary. The complexity of this process reflects the difficulty of finding a legal test that will objectively measure the inherently subjective reasons that underlie use of a peremptory challenge. Batson seeks to square this circle by (1) requiring defendants to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, (2) asking prosecutors then to offer a race-neutral explanation for their use of the peremptory, and then (3) requiring defendants to prove that the neutral reason offered is pretextual. See ante, at 5. But Batson embodies defects intrinsic to the task. </s> At Batson's first step, litigants remain free to misuse peremptory challenges as long as the strikes fall below the prima facie threshold level. See 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam); see also id., at 766 ("'mustaches and the beards look suspicious'"). And most importantly, at step three, Batson asks judges to engage in the awkward, sometime hopeless, task of second-guessing a prosecutor's instinctive judgment--the underlying basis for which may be invisible even to the prosecutor exercising the challenge. See 476 U.S., at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (noting that the unconscious internalization of racial stereotypes may lead litigants more easily to conclude "that a prospective black juror is 'sullen,' or 'distant,'" even though that characterization would not have sprung to mind had the prospective juror been white); see also Page, Batson's Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 155, 161 (2005) ("'[s]ubtle forms of bias are automatic, unconscious, and unintentional'" and '"escape notice, even the notice of those enacting the bias'" (quoting Fiske, What's in a Category?: Responsibility, Intent, and the Avoidability of Bias Against Outgroups, in The Social Psychology of Good and Evil 127 (A. Miller ed. 2004))). In such circumstances, it may be impossible for trial courts to discern if a "'seat-of-the-pants'" peremptory challenge reflects a "'seat-of-the-pants'" racial stereotype. Batson, 476 U.S., at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting id., at 138 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). </s> Given the inevitably clumsy fit between any objectively measurable standard and the subjective decisionmaking at issue, I am not surprised to find studies and anecdotal reports suggesting that, despite Batson, the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges remains a problem. See, e.g., Baldus, Woodworth, Zuckerman, Weiner, & Broffitt, The Use of Peremptory Challenges in Capital Murder Trials: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 3 U.Pa. J. Const. L. 3, 52-53, 73, n.197 (2001) (in 317 capital trials in Philadelphia between 1981 and 1997, prosecutors struck 51% of black jurors and 26% of nonblack jurors; defense counsel struck 26% of black jurors and 54% of nonblack jurors; and race-based uses of prosecutorial peremptories declined by only 2% after Batson); Rose, The Peremptory Challenge Accused of Race or Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 Law and Human Behavior 695, 698-699 (1999) (in one North Carolina county, 71% of excused black jurors were removed by the prosecution; 81% of excused white jurors were removed by the defense); Tucker, In Moore's Trials, Excluded Jurors Fit Racial Pattern, Washington Post, Apr. 2, 2001, p.A1 (in D.C. murder case spanning four trials, prosecutors excused 41 blacks or other minorities and 6 whites; defense counsel struck 29 whites and 13 black venire members); Mize, A Legal Discrimination; Juries Are Not Supposed to be Picked on the Basis of Race and Sex, But It Happens All the Time, Washington Post, Oct. 8, 2000, p.B8 (authored by judge on the D.C. Superior Court); see also Melilli, Batson in Practice: What We Have Learned About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 Notre Dame L.Rev. 447, 462-464 (1996) (finding Batson challenges' success rates lower where peremptories were used to strike black, rather than white, potential jurors); Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying That Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L.Rev. 511, 583-589 (examining judicial decisions and concluding that few Batson challenges succeed); Note, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.: Is the Peremptory Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 Boston College L. Rev. 161, 189, and n.303 (1994) (same); Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire by Questionnaire and the "Blind" Peremptory Challenge, 29 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 981, 1006, nn.126-127, 1035 (1996) (reporting attorneys' views on the difficulty of proving Batson claims). II </s> Practical problems of proof to the side, peremptory challenges seem increasingly anomalous in our judicial system. On the one hand, the Court has widened and deepened Batson's basic constitutional rule. It has applied Batson's antidiscrimination test to the use of peremptories by criminal defendants, Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992), by private litigants in civil cases, Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991), and by prosecutors where the defendant and the excluded juror are of different races, Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). It has recognized that the Constitution protects not just defendants, but the jurors themselves. Id., at 409. And it has held that equal protection principles prohibit excusing jurors on account of gender. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). Some lower courts have extended Batson's rule to religious affiliation as well. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 352 F.3d 654, 668-669 (CA2 2003); State v. Hodge, 248 Conn. 207, 244-246, 726 A.2d 531, 553 (1999); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (CA7 1998) (suggesting same); see also Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115, 1117 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But see Casarez v. State, 913 S.W. 2d 468, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc) (declining to extend Batson to religious affiliation); State v. Davis, 504 N.W. 2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (same). On the other hand, the use of race- and gender-based stereotypes in the jury-selection process seems better organized and more systematized than ever before. See, e.g., Post, A Loaded Box of Stereotypes: Despite 'Batson,' Race, Gender Play Big Roles in Jury Selection., Nat. L.J., Apr. 25, 2005, pp.1, 18 (discussing common reliance on race and gender in jury selection). For example, one jury-selection guide counsels attorneys to perform a "demographic analysis" that assigns numerical points to characteristics such as age, occupation, and marital status--in addition to race as well as gender. See V. Starr & A. McCormick, Jury Selection 193-200 (3d ed. 2001). Thus, in a hypothetical dispute between a white landlord and an African-American tenant, the authors suggest awarding two points to an African-American venire member while subtracting one point from her white counterpart. Id., at 197-199. </s> For example, a bar journal article counsels lawyers to "rate" potential jurors "demographically (age, gender, marital status, etc.) and mark who would be under stereotypical circumstances [their] natural enemies and allies." Drake, The Art of Litigating: Deselecting Jurors Like the Pros, 34 Md. Bar J. 18, 22 (Mar.-Apr. 2001) (emphasis in original). </s> For example, materials from a legal convention, while noting that "nationality" is less important than "once was thought," and emphasizing that "the answers a prospective juror gives to questions are much more valuable," still point out that "[s]tereotypically" those of "Italian, French, and Spanish" origin "are thought to be pro-plaintiff as well as other minorities, such as Mexican and Jewish[;] [p]ersons of German, Scandinavian, Swedish, Finnish, Dutch, Nordic, British, Scottish, Oriental, and Russian origin are thought to be better for the defense"; African-Americans "have always been considered good for the plaintiff," and "[m]ore politically conservative minorities will be more likely to lean toward defendants." Blue, Mirroring, Proxemics, Nonverbal Communication and Other Psychological Tools, Advocacy Track--Psychology of Trial, Association of Trial Lawyers of America Annual Convention Reference Materials, 1 Ann. 2001 ATLA-CLE 153, available at WESTLAW, ATLA-CLE database (June 8, 2005). </s> For example, a trial consulting firm advertises a new jury-selection technology: "Whether you are trying a civil case or a criminal case, SmartJURY™ has likely determined the exact demographics (age, race, gender, education, occupation, marital status, number of children, religion, and income) of the type of jurors you should select and the type you should strike." SmartJURY Product Information, http://www.cts-america.com/smartjury_pi.asp (as visited June 8, 2005, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). </s> These examples reflect a professional effort to fulfill the lawyer's obligation to help his or her client. Cf. J.E.B., supra, at 148-149 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (observing that jurors' race and gender may inform their perspective). Nevertheless, the outcome in terms of jury selection is the same as it would be were the motive less benign. And as long as that is so, the law's antidiscrimination command and a peremptory jury-selection system that permits or encourages the use of stereotypes work at cross-purposes. </s> Finally, a jury system without peremptories is no longer unthinkable. Members of the legal profession have begun serious consideration of that possibility. See, e.g., Allen v. Florida, 596 So.2d 1083, 1088-1089 (Fla. App. 1992) (Hubbart, J., concurring); Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 369 (1992) (authored by Senior Judge on the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania); Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 809 (1997) (authored by a Colorado state-court judge); Altschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 153, 199-211 (1989); Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C.D. L. Rev. 1169, 1182-1183 (1995); Melilli, 71 Notre Dame L. Rev., at 502-503; Page, 85 B.U. L. Rev., at 245-246. And England, a common-law jurisdiction that has eliminated peremptory challenges, continues to administer fair trials based largely on random jury selection. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch.33, §118(1), 22 Halsbury's Statutes 357 (4th ed. 2003 reissue) (U.K.); see also 2 Jury Service in Victoria, Final Report, ch.5, p.165 (Dec. 1997) (1993 study of English barristers showed majority support for system without peremptory challenges). III </s> I recognize that peremptory challenges have a long historical pedigree. They may help to reassure a party of the fairness of the jury. But long ago, Blackstone recognized the peremptory challenge as an "arbitrary and capricious species of [a] challenge." 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 346 (1769). If used to express stereotypical judgments about race, gender, religion, or national origin, peremptory challenges betray the jury's democratic origins and undermine its representative function. See 1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 287 (H. Reeve transl. 1900) ("[T]he institution of the jury raises the people ... to the bench of judicial authority [and] invests [them] with the direction of society"); A. Amar, The Bill of Rights 94-96 (1998) (describing the Founders' vision of juries as venues for democratic participation); see also Stevens, Foreword, Symposium: The Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 907, 907-908 (2003) (citizens should not be denied the opportunity to serve as jurors unless an impartial judge states a reason for the denial, as with a strike for cause). The "scientific" use of peremptory challenges may also contribute to public cynicism about the fairness of the jury system and its role in American government. See, e.g., S. O'Connor, Juries: They May Be Broke, But We Can Fix Them, Chautauqua Institution Lecture, July 6, 1995. And, of course, the right to a jury free of discriminatory taint is constitutionally protected--the right to use peremptory challenges is not. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919); see also Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) (defendant's loss of a peremptory challenge does not violate his right to an impartial jury). Justice Goldberg, dissenting in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), wrote, "Were it necessary to make an absolute choice between the right of a defendant to have a jury chosen in conformity with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to challenge peremptorily, the Constitution compels a choice of the former." Id., at 244; see also Batson, 476 U.S., at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same); Edmonson, 500 U.S., at 630 (Kennedy, J.) ("[I]f race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a jury panel as fair, the price is too high to meet the standard of the Constitution"). This case suggests the need to confront that choice. In light of the considerations I have mentioned, I believe it necessary to reconsider Batson's test and the peremptory challenge system as a whole. With that qualification, I join the Court's opinion. </s> THOMAS JOE MILLER-EL, PETITIONER v. DOUGDRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OFCRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONALINSTITUTIONS DIVISION on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the fifth circuit [June 13, 2005] </s> Justice Thomas, with whom The Chief Justice and Justice Scalia join, dissenting. </s> In the early morning hours of November 16, 1985, petitioner Thomas Joe Miller-El and an accomplice, Kennard Flowers, robbed a Holiday Inn in Dallas, Texas. Miller-El and Flowers bound and gagged hotel employees Donald Hall and Doug Walker, and then laid them face down on the floor. When Flowers refused to shoot them, Miller-El shot each twice in the back, killing Walker and rendering Hall a paraplegic. Miller-El was convicted of capital murder by a jury composed of seven white females, two white males, a black male, a Filipino male, and a Hispanic male. </s> For nearly 20 years now, Miller-El has contended that prosecutors peremptorily struck potential jurors on the basis of race. In that time, seven state and six federal judges have reviewed the evidence and found no error. This Court concludes otherwise, because it relies on evidence never presented to the Texas state courts. That evidence does not, much less "clear[ly] and convincing[ly]," show that the State racially discriminated against potential jurors. 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). However, we ought not even to consider it: In deciding whether to grant Miller-El relief, we may look only to "the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." §2254(d)(2). The majority ignores that restriction on our review to grant Miller-El relief. I respectfully dissent. I </s> Miller-El requests federal habeas relief from a state-court judgment, and hence our review is controlled by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 110 Stat. 1214. Because Miller-El's claim of racial discrimination in jury selection was adjudicated on the merits in Texas state court, AEDPA directs that a writ of habeas corpus "shall not be granted" unless the state court's decision "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2) (emphasis added). To obtain habeas relief, then, Miller-El must show that, based on the evidence before the Texas state courts, the only reasonable conclusion was that prosecutors had racially discriminated against prospective jurors. He has not even come close to such a showing. The state courts held two hearings, but despite ample opportunity, Miller-El presented little evidence that discrimination occurred during jury selection. In view of the evidence actually presented to the Texas courts, their conclusion that the State did not discriminate was eminently reasonable. As a close look at the state-court proceedings reveals, the majority relies almost entirely on evidence that Miller-El has never presented to any Texas state court. A </s> Jury selection in Miller-El's trial took place over five weeks in February and March 1986. During the process, 19 of the 20 blacks on the 108-person venire panel were not seated on the jury: 3 were dismissed for cause, 6 were dismissed by the parties' agreement, and 10 were peremptorily struck by prosecutors. Miller-El objected to 8 of these 10 strikes, asserting that the prosecutors were discriminating against black veniremen. Each time, the prosecutors proffered a race-neutral, case-related reason for exercising the challenge, and the trial court permitted the venireman to be removed. The remaining black venireman, Troy Woods, served on the jury that convicted Miller-El. At the completion of voir dire, Miller-El moved to strike the jury under this Court's decision in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), which required Miller-El to prove "systematic exclusion of black persons through the use of peremptories over a period of time." Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 405 (1991). At the pretrial Swain hearing in March 1986, Miller-El presented three types of documentary evidence: the juror questionnaires of the 10 black veniremen struck by the State; excerpts from a series of newspaper articles on racial bias in jury selection; and a manual on jury selection in criminal cases authored by a former Dallas County prosecutor. The voir dire transcript was part of the official record. Miller-El, however, introduced none of the other 98 juror questionnaires, no juror cards, and no evidence related to jury shuffling. See ante, at 23-24, n.15. </s> Miller-El also presented nine witnesses, five of whom had spent time as prosecutors in the Dallas County District Attorney's (D. A.) Office and five of whom were current or former judges in Dallas County. Their testimony made three things clear. First, the D. A.'s Office had never officially sanctioned or promoted racial discrimination in jury selection, as several witnesses testified, including the county's Chief Public Defender as well as one of the first black prosecutors to serve in the D. A.'s Office. App. 842 (Baraka); id., at 846-848 (Tait); id., at 860 (Entz); id., at 864 (Kinkeade). Second, witnesses testified that, despite the absence of any official policy, individual prosecutors had almost certainly excluded blacks in particular cases. Id., at 830, 833 (Hampton); id., at 841-842 (Baraka); id., at 846-848 (Tait); id., at 863-864 (Kinkeade). Third and most important, no witness testified that the prosecutors in Miller-El's trial--Norman Kinne, Paul Macaluso, and Jim Nelson--had ever engaged in racially discriminatory jury selection. Id., at 843 (Baraka); id., at 859 (Entz); id., at 863 (Kinkeade). The trial court concluded that, although racial discrimination "may have been done by individual prosecutors in individual cases[,]" there was no evidence of "any systematic exclusion of blacks as a matter of policy by the District Attorney's office." Id., at 882-883. </s> Miller-El was then tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. While his appeal was pending, this Court decided Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Batson announced a new three-step process for evaluating claims that a prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike prospective jurors because of their race: "First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[; s]econd, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question[; and t]hird, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328-329 (2003) (Miller-El I). </s> The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals remanded Miller-El's case for a hearing to be held under Batson. B </s> At the Batson hearing in May 1988, before the same judge who had presided over his trial, Miller-El sought to establish that prosecutors at his trial had struck potential jurors on the basis of their race. To make his prima facie case, Miller-El reintroduced some of what he had presented two years earlier at the Swain hearing: the testimony of the nine witnesses, the 10 juror questionnaires, and the excerpted newspaper articles. App. 893-895. The court instructed the State to explain its strikes. Id., at 898-899. Of the 10 peremptory strikes at issue, prosecutors had already explained 8 at trial in response to Miller-El's objections. The State therefore called Paul Macaluso, one of the prosecutors who had conducted the voir dire, to testify regarding his reasons for striking veniremen Paul Bailey and Joe Warren. Macaluso testified that he had struck Bailey because Bailey seemed firmly opposed to the death penalty, even though Bailey tempered his stance during voir dire. Id., at 905-906. This was accurate. Bailey expressed forceful opposition to the death penalty when questioned by Macaluso. See, e.g., 11-(A) Record of Voir Dire 4110 (hereinafter Record) ("I don't believe in capital punishment. Like I said on [my juror questionnaire], I don't believe anyone has the right to take another person's life"); id., at 4112 (saying that he felt "[v]ery strongly" that the State should not impose the death penalty). Later, however, when questioned by defense counsel, Bailey said that he could impose the death penalty if the State proved the necessary aggravating circumstances. Id., at 4148-4150, 4152. When the trial court overruled the State's challenge for cause, the State exercised a peremptory challenge. Id., at 4168. </s> Macaluso next testified that he dismissed venireman Warren because Warren gave inconsistent answers regarding his ability to apply the death penalty and because Warren's brother had been recently convicted. App. 908-910. Macaluso conceded that Warren was not as clearly unfavorable to the State as Bailey. Id., at 911. Nevertheless, Macaluso struck Warren because it was early in the jury selection process and the State had plenty of remaining peremptories with which it could remove marginal jurors. Macaluso candidly stated that he might not have removed Warren if fewer peremptories had been available. Id., at 910. </s> After the State presented nonracial, case-related reasons for all its strikes, the focus shifted to Batson's third step: whether Miller-El had "carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination." Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam); Batson, supra, at 97-98. At this point, Miller-El stood on his Swain evidence. App. 921. That evidence bore on whether some Dallas County prosecutors had discriminated generally in past years; none of the evidence indicated that the prosecutors at Miller-El's trial--Kinne, Macaluso, and Nelson--had discriminated in the selection of Miller-El's jury. Moreover, none of this generalized evidence came close to demonstrating that the State's explanations were pretextual in Miller-El's particular trial. Miller-El did not even attempt to rebut the State's racially neutral reasons at the hearing. He presented no evidence and made no arguments. Id., at 919-922. </s> Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the trial judge was unreasonable in finding as a factual matter that the State did not discriminate against black veniremen. Ante, at 33. That is not so "in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2). From the scanty evidence presented to the trial court, "it is at least reasonable to conclude" that purposeful discrimination did not occur, "which means that the state court's determination to that effect must stand." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 11 (2002) (per curiam). II </s> Not even the majority is willing to argue that the evidence before the state court shows that the State discriminated against black veniremen. Instead, it bases its decision on juror questionnaires and juror cards that Miller-El's new attorneys unearthed during his federal habeas proceedings and that he never presented to the state courts.1 Ante, at 23-24, n. 15. Worse still, the majority marshals those documents in support of theories that Miller-El never argued to the state courts. AEDPA does not permit habeas petitioners to engage in this sort of sandbagging of state courts. A </s> The majority discusses four types of evidence: (1) the alleged similarity between black veniremen who were struck by the prosecution and white veniremen who were not; (2) the apparent disparate questioning of black and white veniremen with respect to their views on the death penalty and their ability to impose the minimum punishment; (3) the use of the "jury shuffle" by the prosecution; and (4) evidence of historical discrimination by the D.A.'s Office in the selection of juries. Only the last was ever put before the Texas courts--and it does not prove that any constitutional violation occurred at Miller-El's trial. The majority's discussion of the other types of evidence relies on documents like juror questionnaires and juror cards that were added to the record before the District Court. The majority's willingness to reach outside the state-court record and embrace evidence never presented to the Texas state courts is hard to fathom. AEDPA mandates that the reasonableness of a state court's factual findings be assessed "in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2), and also circumscribes the ability of federal habeas litigants to present evidence that they "failed to develop" before the state courts. §2254(e)(2); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 429-430 (2000). Miller-El did not argue disparate treatment or disparate questioning at the Batson hearing, so he had no reason to submit the juror questionnaires or cards to the trial court. However, Miller-El could have developed and presented all of that evidence at the Batson hearing.2 Consequently, he must satisfy §2254(e)(2)'s requirements to adduce the evidence in federal court--something he cannot do. Williams, supra, at 437 ("Federal courts sitting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceedings"). For instance, there is no doubt that Miller-El's supplemental material could have been "previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence." §2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). </s> Just last Term, we summarily reversed the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for doing what the Court does here: granting habeas relief on the basis of evidence not presented to the state court. See Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. ___, ___ (2004) (per curiam). We reaffirmed "that whether a state court's decision was unreasonable must be assessed in light of the record the court had before it." Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3); see also Miller-El I, 537 U.S., at 348 ("[P]etitioner must demonstrate that a state court's ... factual determination was 'objectively unreasonable' in light of the record before the court"). In an about-face, the majority now reverses the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for failing to grant habeas relief on the basis of evidence not before the state court. By crediting evidence that Miller-El never placed before the state courts, the majority flouts AEDPA's plain terms and encourages habeas applicants to attack state judgments collaterally with evidence never tested by the original triers of fact. B </s> The majority presents three arguments for ignoring AEDPA's requirement that the state-court decision be unreasonable "in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2). None is persuasive. 1 </s> First, without briefing or argument on the question, the majority hints that we may ignore AEDPA's limitation on the record under §2254(d)(2) because the parties have ignored it. Ante, at 23-24, n.15. The majority then quickly retreats and expressly does not decide the question. Ibid. But its retreat is as inexplicable as its advance: Unless §2254(d)(2) is waivable and the parties have waived it, the majority cannot consider evidence outside the state-court proceedings, as it concededly does. The majority's venture beyond the state-court record is indefensible. Even if §2254(d) is not jurisdictional, but see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 343-344 (1997) (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting), "it shares the most salient characteristic of jurisdictional statutes: Its commands are addressed to courts rather than to individuals," id., at 344. Section 2254(d) speaks directly to federal courts when it states that a habeas application by a state prisoner "shall not be granted" except under the specified conditions. (Emphasis added); ibid. (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting). The strictures of §2254(d) are not discretionary or waivable. Through AEDPA, Congress sought to ensure that federal courts would defer to the judgments of state courts, not the wishes of litigants. </s> Nevertheless, there is no need to decide whether §2254(d)(2) may be waived, for the State has not waived it. Contrary to the majority's assertions, ante, at 23-24, n.15, the State has argued that §2254(d)(2) bars our review of certain evidence not before the state trial court, Brief for Respondent 41-42, just as it did in its last appearance, see Brief for Respondent in Miller-El I, O. T. 2002, No. 01-7662, pp.28-29, 39. The majority is correct that the State has not argued §2254(d)(2) precludes consideration of the juror questionnaires and juror cards in particular, ante, at 23-24, n. 15, but the majority does not assert that the State may selectively invoke §2254(d)(2) to cherry-pick only favorable evidence that lies outside the state-court record. 2 </s> The majority next suggests that the supplemental material, particularly the juror questionnaires, might not expand on what the state trial court knew, since "the same judge presided over the voir dire, the Swain hearing, and the Batson hearing, and the jury questionnaires were subjects of reference at the voir dire." Ante, at 23-24, n.15. This is incorrect. At the Batson hearing, Miller-El introduced into evidence only the questionnaires of the 10 black veniremen peremptorily struck by the State. App. 893-895. The questionnaires of the other 98 veniremen--including many on which the majority relies--were never introduced into evidence or otherwise placed before the trial judge. Miller-El and the State had copies; the trial judge did not. Yet the majority insinuates that the questionnaires effectively were before the state court because they "were subjects of reference at the voir dire." Ante, at 23-24, n.15. That is extremely misleading on the facts of this case. Although counsel for Miller-El and the State questioned witnesses partially on the basis of their questionnaire responses, the lawyers' references to questionnaires were scattered and sporadic. Even the majority does not attempt to show that the specific questionnaire responses on which it relies were called to the trial court's attention. Clearly they were not called to the trial court's attention at the only time that mattered: the Batson hearing. </s> The majority's insinuation is doubly misleading when coupled with its insistence that "the transcript of voir dire ... was before the state courts." Ante, at 7-8, n.2. Miller-El's arguments gave the state court no reason to go leafing through the voir dire transcript. What is more, voir dire at Miller-El's trial lasted five weeks, and the transcript occupies 11 volumes numbering 4,662 pages. To think that two years after the fact a trial court should dredge up on its own initiative passing references to unseen questionnaires--references buried in a more than 4,600-page transcript no less--is unrealistic. That is why §2254(d)(2) demands that state courts be taken to task only on the basis of evidence "presented in the State court proceeding." The 98 questionnaires before the parties, unlike the 10 questionnaires that Miller-El entered into evidence, were not "presented" to the state court. </s> The majority also asserts that by considering the questionnaires, it is only attempting to help the State. After all, the State claims that any disparate questioning and treatment of black and white veniremen resulted from their questionnaires, not their respective races. As the majority sees it, if the questionnaires are not properly before us, then the State cannot substantiate its defense. </s> This is a startling repudiation of both Batson and AEDPA. A strong presumption of validity attaches to a trial court's factual finding at Batson's third step, Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991) (plurality opinion); id., at 372 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also Batson, 476 U.S., at 98, n. 21, and that presumption is doubly strong when the Batson finding is under collateral attack in habeas, Miller-El I, 537 U.S., at 340. Thus, it is Miller-El's burden to prove racial discrimination under Batson, and it is his burden to prove it by clear and convincing evidence under AEDPA. Without the questionnaires never submitted to the trial court, Miller-El comes nowhere near establishing that race motivated any disparate questioning or treatment, which is precisely why the majority must strain to include the questionnaires within the state-court record. </s> That Miller-El needs the juror questionnaires could not be clearer in light of how the Batson hearing unfolded. After offering racially neutral reasons for all of its strikes, the State could have remained silent--as Miller-El did. However, the State pointed out, among other things, that any disparate questioning of black and white veniremen was based on answers given on the juror questionnaires or during the voir dire process. App. 920-921. The State further noted that Miller-El had never alleged disparate treatment of black and white veniremen. Id., at 921. Because Miller-El did not dispute the State's assertions, there was no need for the State to enter the juror questionnaires into the record. There was nothing to argue about. Miller-El had presented only generalized evidence of historical discrimination by the D.A.'s Office, which no one believes was sufficient in itself to prove a Batson violation. That is why Miller-El, not the State, marshaled supplemental material during his federal habeas proceedings. Without that evidence, he cannot prove now what he never attempted to prove 17 years ago: that the State's justifications for its strikes were a pretext for discrimination. 3 </s> Finally, the majority suggests that the 2-year delay between the voir dire and the post-trial Batson hearing is reason for weakened deference. See ante, at 7, n.1. This is an argument not for setting aside §2254(d)(2)'s limit on the record, but for relaxing the level of deference due state courts' factual findings under §§2254(d)(2) and (e)(1). The presumption of correctness afforded factual findings on habeas review, however, does not depend on the manner in which the trial court reaches its factual findings, for reasons I have explained before. Miller-El I, supra, at 357-359 (dissenting opinion). The majority leaves those arguments unanswered. The majority's own argument is implausible on its face: "'[T]he usual risks of imprecision and distortion from the passage of time'" are far greater after 17 years than after 2. Ante, at 7, n. 1 (quoting Miller-El I, supra, at 343). The majority has it just backward. The passage of time, as AEDPA requires and as this Court has held, counsels in favor of more deference, not less. At least the trial court, unlike this Court, had the benefit of gauging the witnesses' and prosecutors' credibility at both the Swain and Batson hearings. Miller-El I, supra, at 339 ("Deference is necessary because a reviewing court, which analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire, is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations"); see also Hernandez, supra, at 364 (plurality opinion); Batson, supra, at 98, n. 21. III </s> Even taken on its own terms, Miller-El's cumulative evidence does not come remotely close to clearly and convincingly establishing that the state court's factual finding was unreasonable. I discuss in turn Miller-El's four types of evidence: (1) the alleged disparate treatment and (2) disparate questioning of black and white veniremen; (3) the prosecution's jury shuffles; and (4) historical discrimination by the D.A.'s Office in the selection of juries. Although each type of evidence "is open to judgment calls," ante, at 32, the majority finds that a succession of unpersuasive arguments amounts to a compelling case. In the end, the majority's opinion is its own best refutation: It strains to demonstrate what should instead be patently obvious. A </s> The majority devotes the bulk of its opinion to a side-by-side comparison of white panelists who were allowed to serve and two black panelists who were struck, Billy Jean Fields and Joe Warren. Ante, at 7-19. The majority argues that the prosecution's reasons for striking Fields and Warren apply equally to whites who were permitted to serve, and thus those reasons must have been pretextual. The voir dire transcript reveals that the majority is mistaken. It is worth noting at the outset, however, that Miller-El's and the Court's claims have always been a moving target. Of the 20 black veniremen at Miller-El's trial, 9 were struck for cause or by the parties' agreement, and 1 served on the jury. Miller-El claimed at the Batson hearing that all 10 remaining black veniremen were dismissed on account of race. That number dropped to 7 on appeal, and then again to 6 during his federal habeas proceedings. Of those 6 black veniremen, this Court once found debatable that the entire lot was struck based on race. Miller-El I, supra, at 343. However, 4 (Carrol Boggess, Roderick Bozeman, Wayman Kennedy, and Edwin Rand) were dismissed for reasons other than race, as the majority effectively concedes. Ante, at 19, n.11; Miller-El I, supra, at 351-354 (Scalia, J., concurring). </s> The majority now focuses exclusively on Fields and Warren. But Warren was obviously equivocal about the death penalty. In the end, the majority's case reduces to a single venireman, Fields, and its reading of a 20-year-old voir dire transcript that is ambiguous at best. This is the antithesis of clear and convincing evidence. 1 </s> From the outset of questioning, Warren did not specify when he would vote to impose the death penalty. When asked by prosecutor Paul Macaluso about his ability to impose the death penalty, Warren stated, "[T]here are some cases where I would agree, you know, and there are others that I don't." 3 Record 1526. Macaluso then explained at length the types of crimes that qualified as capital murder under Texas law, and asked whether Warren would be able to impose the death penalty for those types of heinous crimes. Id., at 1527-1530. Warren continued to hedge: "I would say it depends on the case and the circumstances involved at the time." Id., at 1530. He offered no sense of the circumstances that would lead him to conclude that the death penalty was an appropriate punishment. Macaluso then changed tack and asked whether Warren believed that the death penalty accomplished any social purpose. Id., at 1531-1532. Once again, Warren proved impossible to pin down: "Yes and no. Sometimes I think it does and sometimes I think it don't. Sometimes you have mixed feelings about things like that." Id., at 1532. Macaluso then focused on what the death penalty accomplished in those cases where Warren believed it useful. Ibid. Even then, Warren expressed no firm view: "I don't know. It's really hard to say because I know sometimes you feel that it might help to deter crime and then you feel that the person is not really suffering. You're taking the suffering away from him. So it's like I said, sometimes you have mixed feelings about whether or not this is punishment or, you know, you're relieving personal punishment." Ibid. </s> While Warren's ambivalence was driven by his uncertainty that the death penalty was severe enough, ante, at 17, that is beside the point. Throughout the examination, Warren gave no indication whether or when he would prefer the death penalty to other forms of punishment, specifically life imprisonment. 3 Record 1532-1533. To prosecutors seeking the death penalty, the reason for Warren's ambivalence was irrelevant. </s> At voir dire, there was no dispute that the prosecution struck Warren not for his race, but for his ambivalence on the death penalty. Miller-El's attorneys did not object to the State's strikes of Warren or Paul Bailey, though they objected to the removal of every other black venireman. Both Bailey and Warren shared the same characteristic: It was not clear, based on their questionnaires and voir dire testimony, that they could impose the death penalty. See supra, at 5. In fact, Bailey was so clearly struck for nonracial reasons that Miller-El has never objected to his removal at any stage in this case. </s> There also was no question at the Batson hearing why the prosecution struck Warren. Macaluso testified: "I thought [Warren's statements on voir dire] were inconsistent responses. At one point he says, you know, on a case-by-case basis and at another point he said, well, I think--I got the impression, at least, that he suggested that the death penalty was an easy way out, that they should be made to suffer more." App. 909. </s> In addition, Macaluso noted that Warren's brother recently had been convicted for a crime involving food stamps. Id., at 909-910. This suggested that Warren might be more sympathetic to defendants than other jurors. Macaluso was quite candid that Warren was not as obviously disfavorable to the State as Bailey, and Macaluso stated that he might not have exercised a peremptory against Warren later in jury selection. Id., at 910-911. But Macaluso used only his 6th of 15 peremptory challenges against Warren. </s> According to the majority, Macaluso testified that he struck Warren for his statement that the death penalty was "'an easy way out,'" ante, at 14 (quoting App. 909), and not for his ambivalence about the death penalty, ante, at 17. This grossly mischaracterizes the record. Macaluso specifically testified at the Batson hearing that he was troubled by the "inconsisten[cy]" of Warren's responses. App. 909 (emphasis added). Macaluso was speaking of Warren's ambivalence about the death penalty, a reason wholly unrelated to race. This was Macaluso's "stated reason," and Macaluso ought to "stand or fall on the plausibility" of this reason--not one concocted by the majority. Ante, at 18. </s> The majority points to four other panel members--Kevin Duke, Troy Woods, Sandra Jenkins, and Leta Girard--who supposedly expressed views much like Warren's, but who were not struck by the State. Ante, at 14-15. According to the majority, this is evidence of pretext. But the majority's premise is faulty. None of these veniremen was as difficult to pin down on the death penalty as Warren. For instance, Duke supported the death penalty. App. 373 ("I've always believed in having the death penalty. I think it serves a purpose"); ibid. ("I mean, it's a sad thing to see, to have to kill someone, but they shouldn't have done the things that they did. Sometimes they deserve to be killed"); id., at 394 ("If I feel that I can answer all three of these [special-issue] questions yes and I feel that he's done a crime worthy of the death penalty, yes, I will give the death penalty"). By contrast, Warren never expressed a firm view one way or the other. </s> Troy Woods, who was black and who served on the jury, was even more supportive of the death penalty than Duke. The majority suggests that prosecutors might have allowed Woods to serve on the jury because they were running low on peremptories or they wanted to obscure a pattern of discrimination. Ante, at 16. That such rank conjecture can serve as "clear and convincing evidence" is error in its own right, but it is also belied by the record. Woods said that capital punishment was "too quick" because defendants "don't feel the pain." App. 409. When asked what sort of punishment defendants ought to receive, Woods said that he would "[p]our some honey on them and stake them out over an ant bed." Ibid. He testified that he would mete out such sentences because if defendants "survive for a length of time, that would be enough punishment and . . . they wouldn't do it again." Id., at 410 (alteration omitted). Woods also testified that he was a lifelong believer in the death penalty, id., at 410-411; that he could impose death generally as a juror, id., at 413; and that he could impose death for murder during the course of a robbery, the specific crime of which Miller-El stood accused, ibid. It is beyond cavil why the State accepted Woods as a juror: He could impose the punishment sought by the State. </s> Nevertheless, even assuming that any of these veniremen expressed views similar to Warren's, Duke, Woods, and Girard were questioned much later in the jury selection process, when the State had fewer peremptories to spare. Only Sandra Jenkins was questioned early in the voir dire process, and thus only Jenkins was even arguably similarly situated to Warren. However, Jenkins and Warren were different in important respects. Jenkins expressed no doubt whatsoever about the death penalty. She testified that she had researched the death penalty in high school, and she said in response to questioning by both parties that she strongly believed in the death penalty's value as a deterrent to crime. 3 Record 1074-1075, 1103-1104. This alone explains why the State accepted Jenkins as a juror, while Miller-El struck her. In addition, Jenkins did not have a relative who had been convicted of a crime, but Warren did. At the Batson hearing, Macaluso testified that he struck Warren both for Warren's inconsistent responses regarding the death penalty and for his brother's conviction. Supra, at 5. </s> The majority thinks it can prove pretext by pointing to white veniremen who match only one of the State's proffered reasons for striking Warren. Ante, at 14-15. This defies logic. "'Similarly situated' does not mean matching any one of several reasons the prosecution gave for striking a potential juror--it means matching all of them." Miller-El I, 462 U.S. 669, 683 (1983) (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 discrimination occurs when an employee is treated "'"in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different"'" (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978))). Given limited peremptories, prosecutors often must focus on the potential jurors most likely to disfavor their case. By ignoring the totality of reasons that a prosecutor strikes any particular venireman, it is the majority that treats potential jurors as "products of a set of cookie cutters," ante, at 13, n.6--as if potential jurors who share only some among many traits must be treated the same to avoid a Batson violation. Of course jurors must not be "identical in all respects" to gauge pretext, ante, at 13, n.6, but to isolate race as a variable, the jurors must be comparable in all respects that the prosecutor proffers as important. This does not mean "that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror." Ibid. It means that a defendant cannot support a Batson claim by comparing veniremen of different races unless the veniremen are truly similar. 2 </s> The second black venireman on whom the majority relies is Billy Jean Fields. Fields expressed support for the death penalty, App. 174-175, but Fields also expressed views that called into question his ability to impose the death penalty. Fields was a deeply religious man, id., at 173-174, 192-194, and prosecutors feared that his religious convictions might make him reluctant to impose the death penalty. Those fears were confirmed by Fields' view that all people could be rehabilitated if introduced to God, a fear that had special force considering the special-issue questions necessary to impose the death penalty in Texas. One of those questions asked whether there was a probability that the defendant would engage in future violence that threatened society. When they reached this question, Macaluso and Fields had the following exchange: "[MACALUSO:] What does that word probability mean to you in that connotation? </s> "[FIELDS:] Well, it means is there a possibility that [a defendant] will continue to lead this type of life, will he be rehabilitated or does he intend to make this a life-long ambition. </s> "[MACALUSO:] Let me ask you, Mr. Fields, do you feel as though some people simply cannot be rehabilitated? </s> "[FIELDS:] No. </s> "[MACALUSO:] You think everyone can be rehabilitated? </s> "[FIELDS:] Yes." Id., at 183-184. </s> Thus, Fields indicated that the possibility of rehabilitation was ever-present and relevant to whether a defendant might commit future acts of violence. In light of that view, it is understandable that prosecutors doubted whether he could vote to impose the death penalty. </s> Fields did testify that he could impose the death penalty, even on a defendant who could be rehabilitated. Id., at 185. For the majority, this shows that the State's reason was pretextual. Ante, at 10. But of course Fields said that he could fairly consider the death penalty--if he had answered otherwise, he would have been challengeable for cause. The point is that Fields' earlier answers cast significant doubt on whether he could impose the death penalty. The very purpose of peremptory strikes is to allow parties to remove potential jurors whom they suspect, but cannot prove, may exhibit a particular bias. See Swain, 511 U.S. 127, 148 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Based on Fields' voir dire testimony, it was perfectly reasonable for prosecutors to suspect that Fields might be swayed by a penitent defendant's testimony.3 The prosecutors may have been worried for nothing about Fields' religious sentiments, but that does not mean they were instead worried about Fields' race. </s> As with Warren, the majority attempts to point to similarly situated nonblack veniremen who were not struck by the State, but its efforts again miss their mark for several reasons. First, the majority would do better to begin with white veniremen who were struck by the State. For instance, it skips over Penny Crowson, a white panelist who expressed a firm belief in the death penalty, but who also stated that she probably would not impose the death penalty if she believed there was a chance the defendant could be rehabilitated. Ante, at 12, n. 5; 3 Record 1211. The State struck Crowson, which demonstrates that it "was concerned about views on rehabilitation when the venireperson was not black." Ante, at 11, n.4. </s> Second, the nonblack veniremen to whom the majority points--Sandra Hearn, Mary Witt, and Fernando Gutierrez--were more favorable to the State than Fields for various reasons.4 For instance, Sandra Hearn was adamant about the value of the death penalty for callous crimes. App. 430, 451-452. Miller-El, of course, shot in cold blood two men who were lying before him bound and gagged. In addition, Hearn's father was a special agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and her job put her in daily contact with police officers for whom she expressed the utmost admiration. Id., at 445-446, 457-460. This is likely why the State accepted Hearn and Miller-El challenged her for cause. Id., at 447, 467. </s> In fact, on appeal Miller-El's counsel had this to say about Hearn: "If ever--if ever--there was a Venireperson that should have been excluded for cause from the Jury in this case, or any capital Murder Jury, it was Venirewoman HEARN. It is hoped that the Lord will save us from future jurors with her type of thinking and beliefs." Id., at 1015 (emphasis added and alteration omitted); see also id., at 1010. This same juror whom Miller-El's counsel once found so repugnant has been transformed by the majority's revisionist history into a defense-prone juror just as objectionable to the State as Fields. Ante, at 10-11. </s> Mary Witt did not even have the same views on rehabilitation as Fields: She testified to the commonplace view that some, but not all, people can be rehabilitated. 6 Record 2461. Moreover, Witt expressed strong support for the death penalty. Id., at 2414-2416, 2443-2444. She testified that the death penalty was appropriate for the crime of murder in the course of a robbery, id., at 2428, or for a convict who was released from prison and committed murder (Miller-El previously had twice spent time in prison for armed robberies), id., at 2462-2463. This is likely why the State accepted Witt and Miller-El struck her. Id., at 2464-2465. Finally, Fernando Gutierrez testified that he could impose the death penalty for brutal crimes. 11-(B) Record 4391-4392. In fact, the only issue during voir dire was whether Gutierrez could apply Texas' more lenient penalties, not its more severe ones. Id., at 4398-4399, 4413-4414, 4431. The court questioned Gutierrez at length, and ultimately he was accepted by both parties and seated on the jury. Id., at 4439-4449. </s> Third, Hearn, Witt, and Gutierrez were not similarly situated to Fields even apart from their views on the death penalty. Fields was dismissed not only for his pro-defense views on rehabilitation, but also because his brother had several drug convictions and had served time in prison. App. 190, 199. Hearn, Witt, and Gutierrez did not have relatives with significant criminal histories. Thus, there was an additional race-neutral reason to dismiss Fields that simply was not true of the other jurors. Surely the State did not need to expend peremptories on all veniremen who expressed some faith in rehabilitation to avoid violating Batson. </s> The majority dismisses as "makeweight" the State's justification as to Fields' brother, ante, at 13, but it is the majority's arguments that are contrived. The State questioned Fields during voir dire about his brother's drug offenses, where the offenses occurred, whether his brother had been tried, whether his brother had been convicted, and whether his brother's criminal history would affect Fields' ability to serve on the jury. App. 190. The State did not fail to engage in a "'meaningful voir dire examination,'" as the majority contends. Ante, at 12 (quoting Ex parte Travis, 776 So.2d 874, 881 (Ala. 2000)). </s> The majority also contends that the State's justification as to Fields' brother illustrates pretext, because the State first pointed to Fields' views on rehabilitation as the reason for its strike. Ante, at 12. The timing of the State's explanation was unexceptional. In context, the State discussed Fields' brother at essentially the same time it discussed Fields' religious views. The entire exchange between the State and counsel for Miller-El took place in a couple of minutes at most. App. 197-199. Thus, to call the State's second reason an "afterthought," ante, at 12, ignores what is obvious even from a cold record: that the State simply offered both of its reasons in quick succession. B </s> Miller-El's claims of disparate questioning also do not fit the facts. Miller-El argues, and the majority accepts, that the prosecution asked different questions at voir dire of black and nonblack veniremen on two subjects: (1) the manner of execution and (2) the minimum punishment allowed by state law. The last time this case was here, I refuted Miller-El's claim that the prosecutors' disparate questioning evinced racial bias, and explained why it did not even entitle him to a certificate of appealability. Miller-El I, 537 U.S., at 363-370 (dissenting opinion). This time, the majority has shifted gears, claiming that a different set of jurors demonstrates the State's racial bias. The majority's new claim is just as flawed as its last. The State questioned panelists differently when their questionnaire responses indicated ambivalence about the death penalty. Any racial disparity in questioning resulted from the reality that more nonblack veniremen favored the death penalty and were willing to impose it. 1 </s> While most veniremen were given a generic description of the death penalty at the outset of their voir dire examinations, some were questioned with a "graphic script" that detailed Texas' method of execution. Ante, at 22. According to Miller-El and the majority, prosecutors used the graphic script to create cause for removing black veniremen who were ambivalent about or opposed to the death penalty. Ante, at 27. This is incorrect. The jury questionnaires asked two questions directly relevant to the death penalty. Question 56 asked, "Do you believe in the death penalty?" It offered panelists the chance to circle "yes" or "no," and then asked them to "[p]lease explain your answer" in the provided space. E.g., Joint Lodging 6. Question 58 asked, "Do you have any moral, religious, or personal beliefs that would prevent you from returning a verdict which would ultimately result in the execution of another human being?" and offered panelists only the chance to circle "yes" or "no." Ibid. </s> According to the State, those veniremen who took a consistent stand on the death penalty--either for or against it--did not receive the graphic script. These prospective jurors either answered "no" to question 56 and "yes" to question 58 (meaning they did not believe in the death penalty and had qualms about imposing it), or answered "yes" to question 56 and "no" to question 58 (meaning they did believe in the death penalty and had no qualms about imposing it). Only those potential jurors who answered inconsistently, thereby indicating ambivalence about the death penalty, received the graphic script. </s> The questionnaires bear out this distinction. Fifteen blacks were questioned during voir dire. Only eight of them--or 53%--received the graphic script. All eight had given ambivalent questionnaire answers regarding their ability to impose the death penalty. There is no question that veniremen Baker, Bailey, Boggess, Woods, and Butler were ambivalent in their questionnaire answers. See ante, at 26, n. 27; 4 Record 1874-1875.5 The majority claims that Keaton, Kennedy, and Mackey were not ambivalent, ante, at 24-25, and nn.17, 19, but their questionnaire answers show otherwise. For instance, Keaton circled "no" for question 56, indicating she did not believe in the death penalty, and wrote, "It's not for me to punished [sic] anyone." Joint Lodging 55. However, she then circled "no" for question 58, indicating that she had no qualms about imposing the death penalty. Ibid. Likewise, Mackey indicated she did not believe in the death penalty and wrote "Thou Shall Not Kill" in the explanation space. Id., at 79. Mackey then said that she had no qualms, religious or otherwise, about imposing the death penalty, even though she had just quoted one of the Ten Commandments. Ibid. Keaton's and Mackey's answers cannot be reconciled, and the majority makes no attempt to do so. Ante, at 24-25, n.17. Kennedy wrote on his questionnaire that he would impose the death penalty "[o]nly in extreme cases, such as multiple murders." Joint Lodging 46. This left prosecutors uncertain about whether Kennedy could impose the death penalty on Miller-El, who had murdered only one person (though he had paralyzed another). </s> Of the seven blacks who did not receive the graphic script, six took a stand on the death penalty--either for or against it--in their questionnaires. There was no need to use the graphic script to clarify their positions. Veniremen Bozeman, Fields, Rand, and Warren all answered "yes" to question 56 (indicating that they believed in the death penalty) and "no" to question 58 (indicating that they had no qualms about imposing it).6 Id., at 6 (Bozeman); id., at 14 (Fields); id., at 30 (Rand); id., at 22 (Warren). Venireman Mosley was the opposite: He said that he was opposed to the death penalty, 7 Record 2656, 2681, and that he definitely could not impose it, id., at 2669-2670. The same appears true of venireman Smith, 2 id., at 927-928, who was so adamantly opposed to the death penalty throughout her voir dire that she was struck for cause. Id., at 1006. The only apparent exception is venireman Carter. She said that she believed in the death penalty, but wrote on the questionnaire, "Yes and no. It would depend on what the person had done." 4 id., at 1993. She then answered "'[y]es'" to question 58, indicating that she had some difficulties with imposing the death penalty. Ibid. Despite her ambivalence, Carter did not receive the full graphic script. Prosecutors told her only that Miller-El "[would] be executed by lethal injection at Huntsville." Id., at 1952. </s> Thus far, the State's explanation for its use of the graphic script fares far better than Miller-El's or the majority's. Questionnaire answers explain prosecutors' use of the graphic script with 14 out of the 15 blacks, or 93%. By contrast, race explains use of the script with only 8 out of 15 veniremen, or 53%. The majority's more nuanced explanation is likewise inferior to the State's. It hypothesizes that the script was used to remove only those black veniremen ambivalent about or opposed to the death penalty. Ante, at 27. But that explanation accounts for only 12 out of 15 veniremen, or 80%. The majority cannot explain why prosecutors did not use the script on Mosley and Smith, who were opposed to the death penalty, or Carter, who was ambivalent. Because the majority does not account for veniremen like Carter, and also mischaracterizes veniremen like Keaton, Kennedy, and Mackey, it arrives at different percentages. This is not clear and convincing evidence of racial bias. </s> The State's explanation also accounts for its treatment of the 12 nonblack veniremen (10 whites, 1 Hispanic, and 1 Filipino) on whom the majority relies. Granted, it is more difficult to draw conclusions about these nonblack veniremen. With the blacks, 11 of their 15 questionnaires are available; with the nonblacks, that number plummets to 3 of 12, because those veniremen were not discussed before the state court. See supra, at 6. Nevertheless, the questionnaires and voir dire permit some tentative conclusions. </s> First, of the five nonblacks who received the graphic script--Desinise, Evans, Gutierrez, Sztybel, and Zablan--four were ambivalent. On his questionnaire, Gutierrez answered both that he believed in the death penalty and that he had qualms about imposing it. Joint Lodging 231. Sztybel and Zablan averred that they believed in the death penalty and could impose it, but their written answers to question 56 made it unclear under what circumstances they could vote to impose the death penalty.7 Desinise is a closer call, but he was genuinely undecided about his ability to impose the death penalty, and the parties struck him by agreement. 3 Record 1505-1506, 1509, 1511, 1514. Of the five nonblacks who received the graphic script, Evans was the only one steadfastly opposed to the death penalty. 6 id., at 2588-2589, 2591, 2595. </s> Of the seven nonblacks who allegedly did not receive the graphic script, four were strongly opposed to the death penalty. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S., at 364-365 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Berk, Hinson, and Nelson were so opposed that they were struck for cause, and Holtz was struck by the State because he was opposed unless a policeman or fireman was murdered. Ibid. Administering the graphic script to these potential jurors would have been useless. "No trial lawyer would willingly antagonize a potential juror ardently opposed to the death penalty with an extreme portrait of its implementation." Id., at 364. </s> Of the remaining three nonblacks, the majority is correct that Moses was ambivalent in her questionnaire responses, 3 Record 1140-1141, 1177, although it is not certain that Vickery was, 4 id., at 1611. Neither received the graphic script. However, the final nonblack, Girard, confirms the State's explanation. It was not clear from Girard's questionnaire whether she was ambivalent.8 On the stand, prosecutor Nelson started off with the abstract script. 6 id., at 2520-2521. But it quickly became apparent that Girard was "just not real sure" about her ability to impose the death penalty, and she testified that she had not decided its value as a form of punishment. Id., at 2522-2523. At that point, Nelson gave her the graphic script--for no other reason than to discern her basic reaction. Id., at 2524-2525. Not only did it succeed--Girard testified that she did not want to serve on a capital jury, id., at 2529, 2531--but Miller-El's attorney also used the graphic script when he questioned Girard, id., at 2553. Miller-El's counsel was using the graphic script just as the State was: to discern a potential juror's true feelings, not to create cause for removing a venireman. After all, Girard's views were favorable to Miller-El. </s> In any event, again the State's explanation fares well. The State's explanation accounts for prosecutors' choice between the abstract and graphic scripts for 9 of 12 nonblack veniremen, or 75%. Moses and Vickery were likely ambivalent but did not receive the graphic script, while Evans was opposed to the death penalty but did receive it. However, the majority's theory accounts for the State's treatment of only 6 of 12 nonblacks, or 50%. The majority can explain why jurors like Moses and Vickery did not receive the graphic script, because it believes the State was using the graphic script primarily with blacks opposed to or ambivalent about the death penalty. Ante, at 27. But the majority cannot explain the State's use of the script with an opposed nonblack like Evans, or ambivalent nonblacks like Desinise, Girard, Gutierrez, Sztybel, and Zablan. </s> Finally, the majority cannot take refuge in any supposed disparity between use of the graphic script with ambivalent black and nonblack veniremen. Ante, at 26. The State gave the graphic script to 8 of 9 ambivalent blacks, or 88%, and 5 of 7 ambivalent nonblacks, or 71%. This is hardly much of a difference. However, when the majority lumps in veniremen opposed to the death penalty, ibid., the disparity increases. The State gave the graphic script to 8 of 11 ambivalent or opposed blacks, or 73%, and 6 of 12 ambivalent or opposed nonblacks, or 50%. But the reason for the increased disparity is not race: It is, as the State maintains, that veniremen who were opposed to the death penalty did not receive the graphic script. </s> In sum, the State can explain its treatment of 23 of 27 potential jurors, or 85%, while the majority can only account for the State's treatment of 18 of 27 potential jurors, or 67%. This is a far cry from clear and convincing evidence of racial bias. 2 </s> Miller-El also alleges that the State employed two different scripts on the basis of race when asking questions about imposition of the minimum sentence. This disparate-questioning argument is even more flawed than the last one. The evidence confirms that, as the State argues, prosecutors used different questioning on minimum sentences to create cause to strike veniremen who were ambivalent about or opposed to the death penalty. Brief for Respondent 33, and n. 26. Of the 15 blacks, 7 were given the minimum punishment script (MPS). All had expressed ambivalence about the death penalty, either in their questionnaires (Baker, Boggess, and Kennedy) or during voir dire (Bozeman, Fields, Rand, and Warren).9 Woods expressed ambivalence in his questionnaire, but his voir dire testimony made clear that he was a superb juror for the State. See supra, at 17-18. Thus, Woods did not receive the MPS. There was no reason to give the MPS to Butler, Carter, Mosley, or Smith, all of whom were dismissed for cause or by agreement of the parties. That leaves Bailey, Keaton, and Mackey, all of whom were so adamantly opposed to the death penalty during voir dire that the State attempted to remove them for cause. 11-(A) Record 4112, 4120, 4142 (Bailey); id., at 4316 (Keaton); 10 id., at 3950, 3953 (Mackey). Because the State believed that it already had grounds to strike these potential jurors, it did not need the MPS to disqualify them. However, even assuming that the State should have used the MPS on these 3 veniremen, the State's explanation still accounts for 7 of the 10 ambivalent blacks, or 70%. </s> The majority does not seriously contest any of this. Ante, at 28-29, and n. 34. Instead, it contends that the State used the MPS less often with nonblacks, which demonstrates that the MPS was a ruse to remove blacks. This is not true: The State used the MPS more often with ambivalent nonblacks who were not otherwise removable for cause or by agreement. </s> Of the nonblacks who reached the point in the voir dire sequence where the MPS was typically administered, the majority points to 11 whom it alleges were ambivalent and should have received the script. Ante, at 29, and n. 34. Three of these veniremen--Gibson, Gutierrez, and Holtz--were given the MPS, just like many of the blacks. Four of the remaining eight veniremen--Moses, Salsini, Vickery, and Witt--were favorable enough to the State that Miller-El peremptorily struck them.10 The State had no interest in disqualifying these jurors. Two of the remaining four veniremen--Hearn and Mazza--indicated that they could impose the death penalty, both on their questionnaires and during voir dire. The State likewise had no interest in disqualifying these jurors. Assuming that the State should have used the MPS on the two remaining veniremen, Crowson and Whaley, the State's explanation still accounts for 9 of the 11 ambivalent nonblacks, or 81%. Miller-El's evidence is not even minimally persuasive, much less clear and convincing. C </s> Miller-El's argument that prosecutors shuffled the jury to remove blacks is pure speculation. At the Batson hearing, Miller-El did not raise, nor was there any discussion of, the topic of jury shuffling as a racial tactic. The record shows only that the State shuffled the jury during the first three weeks of jury selection, while Miller-El shuffled the jury during each of the five weeks. This evidence no more proves that prosecutors sought to eliminate blacks from the jury, than it proves that Miller-El sought to eliminate whites even more often. Miller-El I, 537 U.S., at 360 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Miller-El notes that the State twice shuffled the jury (in the second and third weeks) when a number of blacks were seated at the front of the panel. Ante, at 21. According to the majority, this gives rise to an "inference" that prosecutors were discriminating. Ibid. But Miller-El should not be asking this Court to draw "inference[s]"; he should be asking it to examine clear and convincing proof. And the inference is not even a strong one. We do not know if the nonblacks near the front shared characteristics with the blacks near the front, providing race-neutral reasons for the shuffles. We also do not know the racial composition of the panel during the first week when the State shuffled, or during the fourth and fifth weeks when it did not. </s> More important, any number of characteristics other than race could have been apparent to prosecutors from a visual inspection of the jury panel. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W. 3d 547, 563-564 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Granted, we do not know whether prosecutors relied on racially neutral reasons, ante, at 21, but that is because Miller-El never asked at the Batson hearing. It is Miller-El's burden to prove racial discrimination, and the jury-shuffle evidence itself does not provide such proof. D </s> The majority's speculation would not be complete, however, without its discussion (block-quoted from Miller-El I) of the history of discrimination in the D. A.'s Office. This is nothing more than guilt by association that is unsupported by the record. Some of the witnesses at the Swain hearing did testify that individual prosecutors had discriminated. Ante, at 31. However, no one testified that the prosecutors in Miller-El's trial--Norman Kinne, Paul Macaluso, and Jim Nelson--had ever been among those to engage in racially discriminatory jury selection. Supra, at 4. The majority then tars prosecutors with a manual entitled Jury Selection in a Criminal Case (hereinafter Manual or Sparling Manual), authored by John Sparling, a former Dallas County prosecutor. There is no evidence, however, that Kinne, Macaluso, or Nelson had ever read the Manual--which was written in 1968, almost two decades before Miller-El's trial.11 The reason there is no evidence on the question is that Miller-El never asked. During the entire Batson hearing, there is no mention of the Sparling Manual. Miller-El never questioned Macaluso about it, and he never questioned Kinne or Nelson at all. The majority simply assumes that all Dallas County prosecutors were racist and remained that way through the mid-1980's. </s> Nor does the majority rely on the Manual for anything more than show. The Manual contains a single, admittedly stereotypical line on race: "Minority races almost always empathize with the Defendant." App. 102. Yet the Manual also tells prosecutors not to select "anyone who had a close friend or relative that was prosecuted by the State." Id., at 112. That was true of both Warren and Fields, and yet the majority cavalierly dismisses as "makeweight" the State's justification that Warren and Fields were struck because they were related to individuals convicted of crimes. Ante, at 12, 16, n.8. If the Manual is to be attributed to Kinne, Macaluso, and Nelson, then it ought to be attributed in its entirety. But if the majority did that, then it could not point to any black venireman who was even arguably dismissed on account of race. </s> Finally, the majority notes that prosecutors "'marked the race of each prospective juror on their juror cards.'" Ante, at 31 (quoting Miller-El I, supra, at 347). This suffers from the same problems as Miller-El's other evidence. Prosecutors did mark the juror cards with the jurors' race, sex, and juror number. We have no idea--and even the majority cannot bring itself to speculate--whether this was done merely for identification purposes or for some more nefarious reason. The reason we have no idea is that the juror cards were never introduced before the state courts, and thus prosecutors were never questioned about their use of them. *** Thomas Joe Miller-El's charges of racism have swayed the Court, and AEDPA's restrictions will not stand in its way. But Miller-El has not established, much less established by clear and convincing evidence, that prosecutors racially discriminated in the selection of his jury--and he certainly has not done so on the basis of the evidence presented to the Texas courts. On the basis of facts and law, rather than sentiments, Miller-El does not merit the writ. I respectfully dissent. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote 1While many of these explanations were offered contemporaneously, "the state trial court had no occasion to judge the credibility of these explanations at that time because our equal protection jurisprudence then, dictated by Swain, did not require it." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), hearing, but this was offered two years after trial and "was subject to the usual risks of imprecision and distortion from the passage of time." 537 U.S., at 343. Footnote 2 </s> The dissent contends that comparisons of black and nonblack venire panelists, along with Miller-El's arguments about the prosecution's disparate questioning of black and nonblack panelists and its use of jury shuffles, are not properly before this Court, not having been "put before the Texas courts." Post, at 7 (opinion of Thomas, J.). But the dissent conflates the difference between evidence that must be presented to the state courts to be considered by federal courts in habeas proceedings and theories about that evidence. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2) (state court factfinding must be assessed "in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding"); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 348 (2003) (habeas petitioner must show unreasonability "in light of the record before the [state] court"). There can be no question that the transcript of voir dire, recording the evidence on which Miller-El bases his arguments and on which we base our result, was before the state courts, nor does the dissent contend that Miller-El did not "fairly presen[t]" his Batson claim to the state courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). </s> Only as to the juror questionnaires and information cards is there question about what was before the state courts. Unlike the dissent, see post, at 9-10, we reach no decision about whether the limitation on evidence in §2254(d)(2) is waiveable. See infra, at 23-24, n.15. Footnote 3Hearn could give the death penalty for murder if the defendant had committed a prior offense of robbery, in which case she would judge "according to the situation," App. 430, and she thought the death penalty might be appropriate for offenses like "[e]xtreme child abuse," ibid. Footnote 4Witt ultimately did not serve because she was peremptorily struck by the defense. 6 Record 2465. The fact that Witt and other venire members discussed here were peremptorily struck by the defense is not relevant to our point. For each of them, the defense did not make a decision to exercise a peremptory until after the prosecution decided whether to accept or reject, so each was accepted by the prosecution before being ultimately struck by the defense. And the underlying question is not what the defense thought about these jurors but whether the State was concerned about views on rehabilitation when the venireperson was not black. </s> The dissent offers other reasons why these nonblack panel members who expressed views on rehabilitation similar to Fields's were otherwise more acceptable to the prosecution than he was. See post, at 21-24. In doing so, the dissent focuses on reasons the prosecution itself did not offer. See infra, at 19. Footnote 5Prosecutors did exercise peremptory strikes on Penny Crowson and Charlotte Whaley, who expressed views about rehabilitation similar to those of Witt and Gutierrez. App. 554, 715. Footnote 6The dissent contends that there are no white panelists similarly situated to Fields and to panel member Joe Warren because "'"[s]imilarly situated" does not mean matching any one of several reasons the prosecution gave for striking a potential juror--it means matching all of them.'" Post, at 19 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S., at 362-363 (Thomas, J., dissenting)). None of our cases announces a rule that no comparison is probative unless the situation of the individuals compared is identical in all respects, and there is no reason to accept one. Nothing in the combination of Fields's statements about rehabilitation and his brother's history discredits our grounds for inferring that these purported reasons were pretextual. A per se rule that a defendant cannot win a Batson claim unless there is an exactly identical white juror would leave Batson inoperable; potential jurors are not products of a set of cookie cutters. Footnote 7Each of them was black and each was peremptorily struck by the State after Woods's acceptance. It is unclear whether the prosecutors knew they were black prior to the voir dire questioning on the stand, though there is some indication that they did: prosecutors noted the race of each panelist on all of the juror cards, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S., at 347, even for those panelists who were never questioned individually because the week ended before it was their turn. Footnote 8Nor is pretextual indication mitigated by Macaluso's further reason that Warren had a brother-in-law convicted of a crime having to do with food stamps for which he had to make restitution. App. 910. Macaluso never questioned Warren about his errant relative at all; as with Fields's brother, the failure to ask undermines the persuasiveness of the claimed concern. And Warren's brother's criminal history was comparable to those of relatives of other panel members not struck by prosecutors. Cheryl Davis's husband had been convicted of theft and received seven years' probation. Id., at 695-696. Chatta Nix's brother was involved in white-collar fraud. Id., at 613-614. Noad Vickery's sister served time in a penitentiary several decades ago. Id., at 240-241. Footnote 9But even if Macaluso actually had explained that he exercised the strike because Warren was diffident about imposing death, it would have been hard to square that explanation with the prosecution's tolerance for a number of ambivalent white panel members. Juror Marie Mazza, for example, admitted some concern about what her associates might think of her if she sat on a jury that called for the death penalty. Id., at 354-355. Ronald Salsini, accepted by the prosecution but then struck by the defense, worried that if he gave the death penalty he might have a "problem" in the future with having done so. Id., at 593. Witt, another panel member accepted by the State but struck by the defense, said she did not know if she could give that sentence. 6 Record 2423. Footnote 10The Court of Appeals also found ambivalence in Warren's statement, when asked how he felt generally about the death penalty, that, "there are some cases where I would agree, you know, and there are others that I don't." App. 202.2 (quoted in 361 F.3d 849, 857 (CA5 2004)). But a look at Warren's next answers shows what he meant. The sorts of cases where he would impose it were those where "maybe things happen that could have been avoided," such as where there is a choice not to kill, but he would not impose it for killing "in self[-]defense sometimes." App. 202.2-202.3. Where the death penalty is sought for murder committed at the same time as another felony, Warren thought that it "depends on the case and the circumstances involved at the time." Id., at 204. None of these responses is exceptionable. A number of venire members not struck by the State, including some seated on the jury, offered some version of the uncontroversial, and responsible, view that imposition of the death penalty ought to depend on the circumstances. See Joint Lodging 176 (Marie Mazza, a seated juror); id., at 223 (Filemon Zablan, a seated juror); App. 548 (Colleen Moses, struck by the defense); id., at 618 (Mary Witt, struck by the defense); 11-(B) Record 4455-4456 (Max O'Dell, struck by the defense). Footnote 11There were other black members of the venire struck purportedly because of some ambivalence, about the death penalty or their capacity to impose it, who Miller-El argues must actually have been struck because of race, none of them having expressed any more ambivalence than white jurors Mazza and Hearn. We think these are closer calls, however. Edwin Rand said at points that he could impose the death penalty, but he also said "right now I say I can, but tomorrow I might not." App. 265 (alterations omitted). Wayman Kennedy testified that he could impose the death penalty, but on his questionnaire and voir dire, he was more specific, saying that he believed in the death penalty for mass murder. Id., at 317; Joint Lodging 46. (Arguably Fernando Gutierrez, accepted by the prosecution, expressed a similar view when he offered as an example of a defendant who merited the death penalty a "criminally insane" person who could not be rehabilitated. App. 777. But perhaps prosecutors took Gutierrez to mean this only as an example.) Roderick Bozeman stated that he thought he could vote for the death penalty but he didn't really know. Id., at 145. Finally, Carrol Boggess expressed uncertainty whether she could go through with giving the death penalty, id., at 298-299, although she later averred that she could, id., at 302-304. </s> We do not decide whether there were white jurors who expressed ambivalence just as much as these black members of the venire panel. There is no need to go into these instances, for the prosecutors' treatment of Fields and Warren supports stronger arguments that Batson was violated. Footnote 12The procedure is conducted under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 35.11 (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005). While that statute says that the court clerk is to conduct a shuffle on the request of either party, the transcripts in this case make clear that each side did its own shuffles. See, e.g., App. 124. Footnote 13Of the first 10 panel members before the prosecution shuffled, 4 were black. Of the second 10, 3 were black. Of the third 10, 2 were black, and only 1 black was among the last 10 panel members. 2 Record 837. Footnote 14The Court of Appeals declined to give much weight to the evidence of racially motivated jury shuffles because "Miller-El shuffled the jury five times and the prosecutors shuffled the jury only twice." 361 F.3d, at 855. But Miller-El's shuffles are flatly irrelevant to the question whether prosecutors' shuffles revealed a desire to exclude blacks. (The Appeals Court's statement was also inaccurate: the prosecution shuffled the jury three times.) Footnote 15So far as we can tell from the voluminous record before us, many of the juror questionnaires, along with juror information cards, were added to the habeas record after the filing of the petition in the District Court. See Supplemental Briefing on Batson/Swain Claim Based on Previously Unavailable Evidence, Record in No. 00-10784 (CA5), p. 2494. The State raised no objection to receipt of the supplemental material in the District Court or the Fifth Circuit, and in this Court the State has joined with Miller-El in proposing that we consider this material, by providing additional copies in a joint lodging (apparently as an alternative to a more costly printing as part of the joint appendix). Neither party has referred to the provision that the reasonableness of the state-court determination be judged by the evidence before the state court, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(2), and it is not clear to what extent the lodged material expands upon what the state judge knew; the same judge presided over the voir dire, the Swain hearing, and the Batson hearing, and the jury questionnaires were subjects of reference at the voir dire. The last time this case was here the State expressly relied on the questionnaires for one of its arguments, Brief for Respondent in Miller-El v. Cockrell, O.T. 2002, No. 01-7662, p.17, and although it objected to the Court's consideration of some other evidence not before the state courts, id., at 28-29, it did not object either to questionnaires or juror cards. This time around, the State again relies on the jury questionnaires for its argument that the prosecution's disparate questioning was not based on race. We have no occasion here to reach any question about waiver under §2254(d)(2). </s> It is worth noting that if we excluded the lodged material in this case, the State's arguments would fare even worse than they do. The panel members' cards and answers to the questionnaires were the only items of information that the prosecutors had about them, other than their appearances, before reaching the point of choosing whether to employ the graphic script; if we excluded consideration of the questionnaires, the State would be left with no basis even to argue extenuation of the extreme racial disparity in the use of the graphic script. Footnote 16We confine our analysis to these sources because the questionnaires and any testimony about their answers provided the only information available to prosecutors about venire members' views on the death penalty before they decided whether to use the graphic script. Footnote 17The dissent has conducted a similar statistical analysis that it contends supports the State's argument that the graphic script was used to expose the true feelings of jurors who professed ambivalence about the death penalty on their questionnaires. See post, at 24-31. A few examples suffice to show that the dissent's conclusions rest on characterizations of panel members' questionnaire responses that we consider implausible. In the dissent's analysis, for example, Keaton and Mackey were ambivalent, despite Keaton's questionnaire response that she did not believe in the death penalty and felt it was not for her to punish anyone, Joint Lodging 55, and Mackey's response that "[t]hou shall [n]ot kill," id., at 79. But we believe neither can be fairly characterized as someone who might turn out to be a juror acceptable to the State upon pointed questioning. The dissent also characterizes the questionnaires of Vivian Sztybel, Filemon Zablan, and Dominick Desinise as revealing ambivalence. But Sztybel's questionnaire stated that she believed in the death penalty "[i]f a person is found guilty of murder or other crime ... without a valid defense" because "[t]hey may continue to do this again and again." Id., at 184. She also reported that she had no moral, religious, or personal belief that would prevent her from imposing the death penalty. Ibid. Zablan stated on the questionnaire that he was able to impose the death penalty and that he supported it "[i]f it's the law and if the crime fits such punishment." Id., at 223. Desinise reported in voir dire that he had stated in the questionnaire his opposition to the death penalty. App. 573. Footnote 18App. 728 (Mackey); id., at 769 (Keaton). Footnote 19Kennedy said that he believed in the death penalty but would apply it only in an extreme case such as one involving multiple murders. Joint Lodging 46. There is no ambivalence in his questionnaire responses. Butler's questionnaire is not available, but she affirmed in voir dire that she had said on her questionnaire that she believed in the death penalty, that she had no moral, religious, or personal beliefs that would prevent her from imposing the death penalty, and that she had reported on her questionnaire that she "believe[d] in the death penalty only when a crime has been committed concerning a child such as beating to death or some form of harsh physical abuse and when an innocent victim's life is taken." 4 Record 1874; see also id., at 1906-1907. Footnote 20App. 579 (Butler); id., at 317 (Kennedy). Footnote 21Id., at 640-641 (Sztybel); id., at 748 (Zablan). Footnote 22Joint Lodging 184 (Sztybel); id., at 223 (Zablan). Footnote 23Neither questionnaire is available, but Desinise and Evans both confirmed on voir dire that on the questionnaire they stated their opposition to the death penalty. App. 573 (Desinise), id., at 626-628 (Evans). Footnote 24Id., at 573 (Desinise); id., at 626 (Evans). Footnote 25In answering the question whether she had moral, religious, or personal beliefs that might prevent her from giving the death penalty, Colleen Moses confirmed at voir dire that she said, "I don't know. It would depend." 3 Record 1141. Noad Vickery confirmed at voir dire that he reported on the questionnaire that he was not sure what he believed about the death penalty. 4 id., at 1611. Fernando Gutierrez reported on the questionnaire that he believed in the death penalty for some crimes but answered "yes" to the question whether he had moral, religious, or personal beliefs that might prevent him from imposing it. Joint Lodging 231. Footnote 26App. 775 (Gutierrez); id., at 547 (Moses); 4 Record 1569 (Vickery). Footnote 27These were Linda Baker, Joint Lodging 71; Paul Bailey, id., at 63; Carrol Boggess, id., at 38; and Troy Woods, id., at 207. Footnote 28App. 294 (Boggess); id., at 652-653 (Baker); id., at 405-406 (Woods), id., at 737 (Bailey). Footnote 29The dissent posits that prosecutors did not use the graphic script with panel members opposed to the death penalty because it would only have antagonized them. See post, at 29. No answer is offered to the question why a prosecutor would take care with the feelings of a panel member he would excuse for cause or strike yet would antagonize an ambivalent member whose feelings he wanted to smoke out, but who might turn out to be an acceptable juror. Footnote 30These were John Nelson, 2 Record 625; James Holtz, id., at 1022; Moses, 3 id., at 1141; Linda Berk, id., at 1445, 1450; Desinise, App. 573; Vickery, 4 Record 1610; Gene Hinson, App. 576; Girard, id., at 624; Evans, id., at 627-628; Gutierrez, Joint Lodging 231. Footnote 31These were Desinise, App. 573; Evans, id., at 626; and Gutierrez, id., at 775. Footnote 32These were Jerry Mosley, 7 Record 2658; Baker, id., at 71; Bailey, id., at 63; Keaton, id., at 55; Mackey, id., at 79; Boggess, id., at 38; and Woods, id., at 207. Footnote 33Only Mosley did not. App. 630. Footnote 34The State puts the number of black panel members who expressed opposition or ambivalence at seven, and each received the minimum punishment ruse. Bozeman, id., at 162; Fields, id., at 187-188; Warren, id., at 213-214; Rand, id., at 270; Boggess, id., at 306-307; Kennedy, id., at 327-328; and Baker, id., at 654. Woods, the State argues, had been revealed through questioning as a supporter of the death penalty, and accordingly he was told that five years was the statutory minimum. As explained supra, at 7-18, Fields and Warren were neither ambivalent nor opposed; on our analysis of black venire members opposed or ambivalent, all received the trick question, along with two proponents of capital punishment. Footnote 35Moses confirmed at voir dire that she reported on her questionnaire that she did not know the answer to Question 58, 3 Record 1141, although she did express support for the death penalty, App. 548. She was not subjected to the manipulative script. Id., at 547. Crowson said that if there was a chance at rehabilitation she probably would not go with death. Id., at 554. The prosecution used a peremptory strike against her but did not employ the manipulative minimum punishment script. 3 Record 1232. Vickery said he did not know how he felt about the death penalty, 4 id., at 1572, but was not subjected to the manipulative script, id., at 1582. Salsini thought he would have a problem in the future if he voted to impose a death sentence, App. 593, but he was not subjected to the script, id., at 595. Mazza was worried about what other people would think if she imposed the death penalty, id., at 354-355, but was not subjected to the script, id., at 356. Witt said she did not know if she could give the death penalty, 6 Record 2423, but was not subjected to the script, id., at 2439. Whaley thought that she could not give the death penalty without proof of premeditation, even though Texas law did not require it, 10 id., at 3750, but she was not subjected to the script, id., at 3768. Hearn said that the death penalty should be given only to those who could not be rehabilitated, App. 429, but she was not subjected to the script, id., at 441. The three nonblacks who expressed ambivalence or opposition and were subjected to the script were James Holtz, id., at 538; Margaret Gibson, id., at 514; and Fernando Gutierrez, 11-(B) Record 4397. Footnote 36The dissent reaches a different statistical result that supports the State's explanation. See post, at 31-33. There are two flaws in its calculations. First, it excises from its calculations panel members who were struck for cause or by agreement, on the theory that prosecutors knew they could be rid of those panel members without resorting to the minimum punishment ruse. See post, at 31-32. But the prosecution's calculation about whether to ask these manipulative questions occurred before prosecutors asked the trial court to strike panel members for cause and, frequently, before prosecutors and defense counsel would have reached agreement about removal. It is unlikely that prosecutors were so assured of being able to remove certain panel members for cause or by agreement that they would forgo the chance to create additional grounds for removal by employing the minimum-punishment ruse. Second, as with its analysis of the panelists receiving the graphic script, the dissent characterizes certain panel members in ways that in our judgment are unconvincing. For example, for purposes of the minimum-punishment analysis, the dissent considers Colleen Moses and Noad Vickery to be panelists so favorable to the prosecution that there was no need to resort to the minimum-punishment ruse, post, at 32, yet the dissent acknowledged Moses's and Vickery's ambivalent questionnaire responses in its discussion of the graphic script, post, at 29. Footnote 37The material omitted from the quotation includes an excerpt from a 1963 circular given to prosecutors in the District Attorney's Office, which the State points out was not in evidence in the state trial court. The Sparling Manual, however, was before the state court. Footnote 38The State claimed at oral argument that prosecutors could have been tracking jurors' races to be sure of avoiding a Batson violation. Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. Batson, of course, was decided the month after Miller-El was tried. FOOTNOTESFootnote 1The supplemental material appears in a joint lodging submitted by the parties. It includes the State's copies of questionnaires for 12 prospective jurors (11 of whom served at Miller-El's trial), and the State's juror cards for all 108 members of the venire panel. Footnote 2The juror questionnaires had been in Miller-El's possession since before the 1986 Swain hearing; Miller-El's attorneys used them during the voir dire. But because Miller-El did not argue disparate treatment or questioning at the Batson hearing, Miller-El's attorneys had no reason to submit the questionnaires to the trial court. The juror cards could have been requested at any point under the Texas Public Information Act. See Supplemental Briefing on Batson/Swain Claim Based on Previously Unavailable Evidence, Record in No. 00-10784 (CA5), p. 2494. Footnote 3The majority argues that prosecutors mischaracterized Fields' testimony when they struck him. Ante, at 10. This is partially true but wholly irrelevant. When Miller-El's counsel suggested that Fields' strike was related to race, prosecutor Jim Nelson responded: </s> "[W]e're certainly not exercising a preemptory strike on Mr. Fields because of his race in this case, but we do have concern with reference to some of his statements as to the death penalty in that he said that he could only give death if he thought a person could not be rehabilitated and he later made the comment that any person could be rehabilitated if they find God or are introduced to God and the fact that we have a concern that his religious feelings may affect his jury service in this case." App. 197 (alteration omitted). </s> Nelson partially misstated Fields' testimony. Fields had not said that he would give the death penalty only if a person was beyond rehabilitation, id., at 185, but he had said that any person could be rehabilitated if introduced to God, id., at 184. This is precisely why prosecutors were concerned that Fields' "religious feelings [might] affect his jury service." Id., at 197. Footnote 4In explaining why veniremen Hearn, Witt, and Gutierrez were more favorable to the State than Fields, the majority faults me for "focus[ing] on reasons the prosecution itself did not offer." Ante, at 11, n.4. The majority's complaint is hard to understand. The State accepted Hearn, Witt, and Gutierrez. Although it is apparent from the voir dire transcript why the State wanted to seat these veniremen on the jury, it was never required to "offer" its reasons for doing so. If the majority instead means that I focus on whether these veniremen opposed the death penalty and whether they had relatives with significant criminal histories, those are precisely the reasons offered by the State for its strike of Fields. Footnote 5The majority's own recitation of the voir dire transcript captures Butler's ambivalence. Ante, at 25, n.19. Butler said both that she had no qualms about imposing the death penalty, 4 Record 1906-1907, and that she would impose the death penalty "only when a crime has been committed concerning a child such as beating to death or some form of harsh physical abuse and when an innocent victim's life is taken," id., at 1874. Footnote 6The State's concerns with Fields and Warren stemmed not from their questionnaire responses, but from their subsequent voir dire testimony. Supra, at 15-16, 20-21. Footnote 7Joint Lodging 184 (Sztybel) ("If a person is found guilty of murder or other crime, which they have taken someone else's life, without a valid defense. They may continue to do this again and again. Even if they are sentenced to jail when they are released this could keep happening"); id., at 223 (Zablan) ("If it's the law and if the crime fits such punishment"). Footnote 8Girard did not answer question 56 about her belief in the death penalty, 6 Record 2522, but she indicated in answer to question 58 that her personal beliefs would not prevent her from imposing the death penalty, id., at 2555-2556. Footnote 9In making the decision whether to employ the MPS, prosecutors could rely on both the questionnaires and substantial voir dire testimony, because the minimum punishment questioning occurred much later in the voir dire than questioning about the death penalty. Miller-El I, 537 U.S. 322, 369 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Footnote 10Moses gave ambivalent answers on her questionnaire, as perhaps did Vickery. Supra, at 29. However, Moses and Vickery indicated during their voir dire testimony that they could impose the death penalty, 3 Record 1139-1141; 4 id., at 1576-1579, and thus they were not questioned on minimum sentences. But see ante, at 30, n. 36. Footnote 11Judge Larry Baraka, one of the first black prosecutors to serve in the D.A.'s Office, testified that, to the best of his recollection, the Manual was no longer used in 1977 when he attended the training course. App. 844.

United States Supreme Court CONCERNED CITIZENS v. PINE CREEK DISTRICT(1977) No. 76-667 Argued: Decided: February 22, 1977 </s> Where the District Court rejected all of appellants' challenges to the constitutionality of an Ohio statute establishing procedures for the organization and governance of conservancy districts (political subdivisions of the State invested with the power to carry out flood prevention and control measures), on the sole ground that such challenges were foreclosed by Orr v. Allen, 248 U.S. 35 , but none of the issues presented was raised or passed upon in Orr, the District Court's judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a full consideration of such issues. </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> Chapter 6101 of the Ohio Revised Code establishes procedures for the organization and governance of conservancy districts, political subdivisions of the State invested with the power to carry out flood prevention and control measures. The statute provides for the creation of a conservancy court each time that a petition is duly filed to propose the creation of a new district. It is the conservancy court's responsibility first to evaluate the desirability of establishing the proposed district and then, if it decides to create the district, to assume the ultimate responsibility for administering the district. A conservancy district may include territory from one or more counties, and the conservancy court is composed of one judge from the court of common pleas in each county having territory within the conservancy district. </s> In 1966 the Pine Creek Conservancy District was established in accordance with the procedures set forth in chapter [429 U.S. 651, 652] 6101. Appellants, who collectively are residents, property owners, and taxpayers in the Pine Creek District, brought the present action, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging, inter alia, that chapter 6101 is unconstitutional. </s> Appellants leveled three constitutional challenges against the statute in the District Court, and those claims have been renewed in the instant appeal. First, they argue that it violates due process for the conservancy courts to make the decision as to whether the conservancy districts that they will administer should be formed. Since the judges of the conservancy courts are entitled to special compensation for their work on those courts, appellants contend that they have a financial incentive to declare the proposed districts organized and that, therefore, persons objecting to the formation of a district are deprived of a hearing before an impartial judicial officer. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927). Second, appellants contend that the composition of the conservancy courts violates the one-man, one-vote principle of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), because the judges on those courts are selected without regard to the size of the population that they represent. Third, appellants argue that chapter 6101 permits the disenfranchisement of freeholders affected by the decision to create a conservancy district because the statute creates a presumption that a local political body, such as a township, represents the views of all persons within its jurisdiction whenever it supports a petition proposing the creation of a conservancy district. </s> A three-judge court rejected all of these claims on the single ground that they were foreclosed by Orr v. Allen, 248 U.S. 35 (1918), aff'g 245 F. 486 (WD Ohio 1917), a case in which we rejected a due process and equal protection attack on the statute challenged here. No. C-1-75-5 (WD Ohio, July 6, 1976). </s> None of the issues presented in this case was raised or [429 U.S. 651, 653] passed upon in Orr. The appellant in Orr presented four issues to this Court, none of which had anything to do with the issues presented here. The appellant argued that the challenged statute denied him judicial review, that it authorized an impairment of existing contracts, that it improperly conferred legislative powers on the judiciary, and that it authorized a taking without compensation. Our three-page memorandum opinion in Orr did not purport to go beyond the issues raised by the appellant in that case. By no stretch of the imagination can our decision in Orr be thought to have silently dealt with issues which arose and were decided in later cases such as Ward, Tumey, and Reynolds v. Sims. </s> Because the court below gave no independent consideration to the issues raised by appellants and relied exclusively on Orr, although that case considered none of the issues now presented, it is apparent that the merits of appellants' claims have never been fully considered by any federal court. Without offering any view as to the relative merit of appellants' contentions, it is fair to say that they are not insubstantial. We therefore reverse the decision below and remand for a full consideration of the issues presented by appellants. </s> So ordered. </s> THE CHIEF JUSTICE would note probable jurisdiction and give plenary consideration to this appeal. </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> The action the Court takes today in this appeal is unexplained and very likely inexplicable. The three-judge District Court heard the case and rendered a final decision on the merits. It concluded that our affirmance in Orr v. Allen, 248 U.S. 35 (1918), and principles of stare decisis, compelled rejection of the constitutional challenges. [429 U.S. 651, 654] </s> The opinion of the District Court sets forth every one of the challenges detailed by the Court today, and it is clear from its opinion that each of these claims was considered and rejected by it. On appeal here from such a decision, in the absence of relevant intervening circumstances, see, e. g., Guste v. Jackson, ante, p. 399; Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Weinberger v. Jobst, 419 U.S. 811 (1974), or procedural irregularities in the District Court's consideration of the case, e. g., Westby v. Doe, 420 U.S. 968 (1975), this Court ordinarily either affirms, modifies, or reverses the judgment of the District Court. But in this case it has chosen none of these courses. Disagreeing with the District Court as to the scope of Orr v. Allen, it remands for "full consideration" of claims based on cases decided since Orr, in the teeth of the obvious fact that the District Court did consider these claims and rejected them. 1 I agree with the Court that Orr does not afford an adequate basis for our affirming the District Court, although I am not nearly as certain that it was not an adequate basis for the District Court's decision. But even though the Members of this Court are agreed that Orr is not authority for rejecting appellants' claims based on Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), that amounts to nothing more than a disagreement with the reasoning of the District Court on the merits of the case. We should treat those claims here now, rather than "remanding" to the District Court as if we were editing a law student's first draft of a law review note. 2 </s> [429 U.S. 651, 655] </s> Believing as I do that we should reach and decide these claims, I shall state briefly my reasons for concluding that they are not sufficiently substantial to warrant setting the case for argument, and that the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. </s> Appellants raise three constitutional objections. Two of them are connected in the sense that they do not relate to the operation of the Pine Creek Conservancy District, but, rather, are objections solely to the formation of that district. 3 The first of these contentions is that persons objecting to the formation of a district are deprived of a hearing before an impartial judicial officer. 4 The second is that chapter [429 U.S. 651, 656] 6101 of the Ohio Revised Code permits disenfranchisement of freeholders to object to the formation of the district if the local political body supported the petition. </s> The district was formed in 1966, and these two objections were fully available to be raised at that time. This lawsuit was not filed until 1975. Absent some persuasive demonstration of a reason for such delay, I would view such a leisurely attack on the formation of a governmental body as barred by laches. "There must be conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, to call into action the powers of the court." McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161, 168 (1843). The appellants seek not merely a reapportionment of the voting population of the district, but a judicial declaration that its formation was a nullity. Surely an attack on the formation of an organ of government is one of the situations where "both the nature of the claim and the situation of the parties was such as to call for diligence." Benedict v. City of New York, 250 U.S. 321, 328 (1919). There has been no such diligence here, and neither the pleadings nor the proof intimates any excuse for the delay. </s> These two challenges, I believe, fare no better on the merits. The first, again, challenges the constitutionality, under Tumey v. Ohio, supra, of having court of common pleas judges decide whether the district should be formed, since, under 141.07 of the Ohio Revised Code Ann. ( [429 U.S. 651, 1975] Supp.), they will receive extra compensation if such district is formed. Neither Tumey nor Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972), has any direct bearing on the constitutionality of the Ohio procedure for forming a conservancy district. As Tumey and Ward made clear, those cases involved quintessentially judicial functions, see, e. g., Tumey, supra, at [429 U.S. 651, 657] 522. 5 Here, however, the determinations, although made by judges, are essentially legislative in nature. As Mr. Justice Holmes recognized, the determination of legislative facts does not necessarily implicate the same considerations as does the determination of adjudicative facts. Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915). Since I know of no constitutional objection to the formation of such districts through legislative or executive action - without giving opposing citizens a chance to air their objections, see Houck v. Little River Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 262 (1915) - I see no constitutional objection to the procedures followed here. Those procedures simply insured an additional check on the process of formation, already petitioned for by the town governments, and the fact that they may not have been before an "impartial" judicial officer offends no constitutional right of appellants. </s> The second "formation" challenge, as presented by appellants, raises the following issue: </s> "Section 6101.05, Ohio Revised Code, submits the first decision in the creation of a conservancy district to the freeholders, who must petition for its creation. This is the only step in the entire procedure which calls for any participation in support or opposition, by the residents or landowners, to the creation of the district or the execution of its projects. . . . Section 6101.05, Ohio Revised Code, provides that the petition may be signed by the governing body of any public corporation in the proposed district. When such a public corporation signs [429 U.S. 651, 658] the petition, all freeholders within it are conclusively presumed to favor creation of the district. In effect, all persons living in the three townships and one village which signed the petition who opposed the district were deprived of the right to oppose the district." Jurisdictional Statement 13-14. </s> This constitutional challenge is wholly insubstantial. I know of nothing, and appellants suggest nothing, which would even arguably make the issue one that freeholders were constitutionally entitled to vote on. Thus, had the statute simply allowed the governing bodies of the respective townships to form such a district, there is surely no constitutional objection simply because the populace did not vote, Houck v. Little River District, supra, at 262, 264. To the extent the claim here protests the "discrimination" against the freeholders in a town whose governing body signs the petition, in that they "were deprived of the right to oppose the district," it is simply wrong on the facts. There is no conclusive presumption, when the governing body signs a petition, that "all freeholders . . . favor creation of the district." Rather, opposing freeholders in such towns remain as free as opposing freeholders in towns where petitions are circulated, to appear before the conservancy court and "object to the organization and incorporation of said district . . . ." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 6101.08 ( [429 U.S. 651, 1975] Supp.). They are entitled to no more under the Constitution. </s> Appellants raise one other objection to the constitutionality of the statutory scheme, although not limited exclusively to the formation of the district. This is the claim that the selection of judges for the conservancy court violates the one-man, one-vote principle of Baker v. Carr, supra, and its progeny. But the one-man, one-vote decisions do not apply to the selection of judges, Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453 (MD La. 1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973). As the majority of the functions of the conservancy court are admittedly [429 U.S. 651, 659] judicial, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 6101.07, 6101.28, 6101.33 ( [429 U.S. 651, 1975] Supp.), the majority of such a one-man, one-vote challenge has already been squarely rejected by Wells. With respect to the remaining functions, essentially legislative or executive in nature, the scope of powers granted to a conservancy district itself are so narrowly confined as not to call into play the strict application of one-man, one-vote doctrines. Conservancy districts, established solely for flood prevention and control, do not exercise "general governmental powers," as that phrase was defined in Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968). Rather, flood control is a "special limited purpose," much like that found in Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973), and, likewise, "the popular election requirements enunciated by Reynolds [v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)] and succeeding cases are inapplicable . . . ." Id., at 730. In such a situation, where both counties have an interest, and there is no evidence of discrimination against any group, see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), such a selection process is permissible, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Water Dist., supra; cf. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). 6 As I am unable to conclude that the decision to have one judge for each affected county is "wholly irrelevant to achievement of the regulation's objectives," Kotch v. River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947), I would also reject this challenge and affirm the judgment of the District Court. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Appellants' reply brief before the District Court amply argues that Orr was not controlling because that case concerned other constitutional challenges. Thus, the District Court was aware of the arguments this Court now relies on for a remand. </s> [Footnote 2 The judgment order entered in the case states: "This matter came on for hearing by agreement of the parties upon the briefs of the parties on the issues of constitutionality of various sections of Chapter [429 U.S. 651, 655] 6101 of the Ohio Revised Code dealing with Conservancy Districts." The District Court thus did canvass the contentions going to the merits, and decided the issue, albeit on a ground not favored by the majority of this Court. But there can be no contention that appellants were precluded from entering relevant evidence into the record, or precluded from presenting a pertinent legal argument. Both parties, in essence, presented all they wished to on the constitutional issues to the District Court. Nor is there any hint that the factual record is in such a shape as to preclude determination of the issues by this Court. I am simply at a loss to explain this Court's curious remand. </s> [Footnote 3 None of the named plaintiffs allege in their complaint that they were residents at the time of the formation of the Conservancy District, although there are recitations in the body of the complaint that might indicate that at least some were residents at that time. Because of the failure to allege residency in 1966, their standing to raise such contentions is questionable. </s> [Footnote 4 Once the district is formed, the conservancy court has no incentive to decide a particular fact situation one way or another, as their pay remains the same in either case. The Jurisdictional Statement of appellants, however, suggests another, related attack: </s> "To receive payment of this per diem, of course, the treasury of the district must be full. The income of the district comes from assessments based on appraisals which the court must approve or disapprove . . . ." </s> Yet this challenge is to the remote impact on funding from full town coffers, raised and rejected in Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928). The payments are paid out of assessments, which are the responsibility, in [429 U.S. 651, 656] the first instance, of the board of directors of the district, not the conservancy court, see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 6101.45, 6101.48 ( [429 U.S. 651, 1975] Supp.). This issue surely raises no further challenge not worthy of a summary affirmance. </s> [Footnote 5 In Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973), where the proceeding was adjudicative in nature, but not criminal, we discussed whether the "pecuniary interest of the members . . . had sufficient substance to disqualify them . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Here, of course, the proceeding is more legislative than adjudicative, and is neither criminal nor stigmatizing. </s> [Footnote 6 We are told that the Pine Creek Conservancy District lies partially in Lawrence County and partially in Scioto County. We are told that the 1970 population was 56,868 and 76,951, respectively. We are also told that "[i]n neither instance is the entire county included in the district." We are not told, however, how much of either county is in the district, nor how many freeholders reside in either county. It would seem to follow that appellants fail in their burden of showing that "the voting power of the judges" has not been approximated "to the number of people they represent, or to the land or people within the district which they represent." </s> [429 U.S. 651, 1]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. SOTELO(1978) No. 76-1800 Argued: February 22, 1978Decided: May 22, 1978 </s> Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that "[a]ny person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" federal taxes who "willfully fails" to do so, shall be liable to a "penalty" equal to the amount of the taxes in question. Section 17a (1) (e) of the Bankruptcy Act makes nondischargeable in bankruptcy "taxes . . . which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others . . . but has not paid over." Respondents, husband and wife, were adjudicated bankrupt, as was a corporation in which he was the principal officer and majority stockholder. The bankruptcy court found respondent husband (hereafter respondent) personally liable to the Government under 6672 for his failure to pay over taxes withheld from employees of the corporation. Subsequently, in proceedings by the Government to collect from respondent on his 6672 liability, the bankruptcy judge, rejecting respondent's contention that such liability was a "penalty" and as such had been discharged, reasoned that although 6672 liability was denominated a "penalty," it was in substance a tax, and thus was nondischargeable under 17a (1), and more particularly 17a (1) (e). The District Court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. Though recognizing respondent's 6672 liability, the court held that 17a (1) (e) was inapplicable because it was not respondent himself but his corporation that was obligated to collect and withhold the taxes, and because in any event the money involved constituted a "penalty," whereas 17a (1) (e) renders only "taxes" nondischargeable. Held: Respondent's liability under 6672 is nondischargeable in bankruptcy under 17a (1) (e). Pp. 273-282. </s> (a) That respondent was found liable under 6672 necessarily means that he was "required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" the withholding taxes, and that he willfully failed to meet one or more of these obligations. P. 274. </s> (b) Since the taxes in question were "collected or withheld" from the corporation's employees and have not been "paid over" to the Government, respondent's 6672 liability was imposed not for his failure to collect taxes but for his failure to pay over taxes that he was required both to collect and to pay over, and therefore he "collected or withheld" the taxes within the meaning of 17a (1) (e). P. 275. [436 U.S. 268, 269] </s> (c) The "penalty" language of 6672 is not dispositive of the status of respondent's debt under 17a (1) (e), since the funds involved were unquestionably "taxes" at the time they were "collected or withheld from others," and it is this time period that 17a (1) (e), with its modification of "taxes" by the phrase "collected or withheld," treats as the relevant one. That the funds due are referred to as a "penalty" when the Government later seeks to recover them does not alter their essential character as taxes for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, at least where, as here, the 6672 liability is predicated on a failure to pay over, rather than a failure initially to collect, the taxes. P. 275. </s> (d) The legislative history of 17a (1) (e) indicates not only that Congress intended to make nondischargeable the withholding tax obligations of persons in respondent's situation, but also that it meant to ensure post-bankruptcy liability for such taxes in corporate bankruptcy situations (where a corporation's tax liabilities are rendered uncollectible because of its dissolution). Pp. 275-279. </s> (e) The overall policy of the Bankruptcy Act of giving a bankrupt a "fresh start" cannot override Congress' specific intent in 17a (1) (e) to make a liability like respondent's nondischargeable, especially since the contrary result would create an inequity between corporate officers and individual entrepreneurs. Pp. 279-281. </s> 551 F.2d 1090, reversed and remanded. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 282. </s> Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Ferguson, Crombie J. D. Garrett, and Wynette J. Hewett. </s> Bruce L. Balch argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case involves the interaction of sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the Bankruptcy Act. Respondent Onofre J. Sotelo was found personally liable to the Government [436 U.S. 268, 270] for his failure to pay over taxes withheld from employees of the corporation in which he was the principal officer. The question presented is whether this liability is dischargeable in bankruptcy. </s> I </s> In mid-1973, respondents Onofre J. and Naomi Sotelo were adjudicated bankrupts, as was their corporation, O. J. Sotelo & Sons Masonry, Inc. The individual bankruptcy proceedings of the two Sotelos were consolidated. In November 1973, the Internal Revenue Service filed against respondents' estate a claim in the amount of $40,751.16 "for internal revenue taxes" that had been collected from the corporation's employees but not paid over to the Government. Respondents were alleged to be personally liable for these taxes under Internal Revenue Code 6672, 26 U.S.C. 6672, as corporate officers who had a duty "to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" the taxes and who had "willfully fail[ed]" to make the requisite payments. 1 Respondents objected to the Government's claim, arguing that they should not be held personally liable for "taxes of the corporation." Memorandum Opinion of Bankruptcy Court (Nov. 29, 1974). </s> In upholding the Government's claim to the extent of $32,840.71, the bankruptcy court found that Onofre Sotelo [436 U.S. 268, 271] had formerly operated the masonry business as a sole proprietorship and that, since the formation of the corporation, he had been its president, director, majority stockholder, and chief executive officer. Naomi Sotelo, on the other hand, though named the corporation's secretary, "did not take an active part in the business." Id., at 1. The court concluded that Onofre Sotelo was personally liable to the Government under Internal Revenue Code 6672, since he "was charged with the duty and responsibility to see that the [withheld] taxes were paid." Memorandum Opinion, supra, at 3. 2 The record does not reflect any appeal of this ruling. </s> In October 1975 the Government, seeking to collect part of the money owed by Onofre Sotelo under 6672, served a notice of levy on respondents' trustee with regard to $10,000 that belonged to respondents and was not available for general distribution to creditors in bankruptcy. 3 Respondents objected to the levy, in part on the ground that the liability is described in 6672 itself as a "penalty" and as such had been discharged in bankruptcy. 4 The Government argued that, to [436 U.S. 268, 272] the contrary, the liability was for "taxes," which 17a (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 550, as amended, 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1) (1976 ed.), makes nondischargeable. The bankruptcy judge agreed with the Government, reasoning that, "[t]hough denominated a `penalty,' [the 6672 liability] is in substance a tax." 76-1 USTC § 9435, p. 84, 157 (SD Ill. 1976). The judge also noted, ibid., that subdivision (e) of Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) makes specifically nondischargeable "taxes . . . which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others . . . but has not paid over." 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1) (e) (1976 ed.). Respondents appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, which affirmed on the opinion of the bankruptcy court. </s> The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed. In re Sotelo, 551 F.2d 1090 (1977). It first noted that "Sotelo does not challenge his liability under 26 U.S.C. 6672 . . . [but] only argues that the liability should have been discharged by his personal bankruptcy petition." Id., at 1091. The court then held that the liability had been discharged, finding persuasive the fact that 6672 terms the liability a "penalty" and rejecting the Government's argument with respect to the specific language referring to withholding taxes in Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) (e). 551 F.2d, at 1092. 5 </s> [436 U.S. 268, 273] The court recognized that its ruling was in conflict with "an uncontroverted line of cases." Id., at 1091. 6 </s> We granted certiorari, 434 U.S. 816 (1977), and we now reverse. </s> II </s> Section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, 80 Stat. 270, provides in pertinent part: </s> "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, . . . except such as </s> "(1) are taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State . . . within three years preceding bankruptcy: Provided, however, That a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes . . . (e) which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or any State . . . but has not paid over . . . ." 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1976 ed.). </s> Relying on this statutory language, the Government presents what it views as two independent grounds for holding the 6672 liability of Onofre Sotelo (hereinafter respondent) to be nondischargeable. The Government's primary argument is based on the specific language relating to withholding in 17a (1) (e); alternatively, it argues that respondent's liability, although called a "penalty," IRC 6672, is in fact a "tax" as that term is used in 17a (1). 7 </s> [436 U.S. 268, 274] </s> Regardless of whether these two grounds are in fact independent, 8 17a (1) (e) leaves no doubt as to the nondischargeability of "taxes . . . which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or any State . . . but has not paid over." The Court of Appeals viewed this provision as inapplicable here for two reasons: first, because "it was not Sotelo himself, but his employer-corporation, that was obligated by law to collect and withhold the taxes"; and second, because in any event the money involved constituted a "penalty," whereas 17a (1) (e) "renders only `taxes' nondischargeable." 551 F.2d, at 1092. We believe that the first reason is inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' recognition of respondent's undisputed liability under Internal Revenue Code 6672, and that the second is inconsistent with the language of 17a (1) (e). </s> The fact that respondent was found liable under 6672 necessarily means that he was "required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" the withholding taxes, and that he willfully failed to meet one or more of these obligations. IRC 6672; see n. 1, supra. 9 Since the 6672 "require[ment]" of collection presumably derives from federal or state law, both of which are referred to in Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) (e), it is difficult to understand how the court below could have recognized respondent's 6672 liability, see supra, at 272, and nonetheless have concluded that he was not "obligated by law [436 U.S. 268, 275] to collect . . . the taxes," 551 F.2d, at 1092. It is undisputed here, moreover, that the taxes in question were "collected or withheld" from the corporation's employees and that the taxes, though collected, have not been "paid over" to the Government. It is therefore clear that the 6672 liability was not imposed for a failure on the part of respondent to collect taxes, but was rather imposed for his failure to pay over taxes that he was required both to collect and to pay over. Under these circumstances, the most natural reading of the statutory language leads to the conclusion that respondent "collected or withheld" the taxes within the meaning of Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) (e). </s> We also cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that the "penalty" language of Internal Revenue Code 6672 is dispositive of the status of respondent's debt under Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) (e). The funds here involved were unquestionably "taxes" at the time they were "collected or withheld from others." 17a (1) (e); see IRC 3102 (a), 3402 (a). It is this time period that 17a (1) (e), with its modification of "taxes" by the phrase "collected or withheld," treats as the relevant one. That the funds due are referred to as a "penalty" when the Government later seeks to recover them does not alter their essential character as taxes for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act, at least in a case in which, as here, the 6672 liability is predicated on a failure to pay over, rather than a failure initially to collect, the taxes. </s> III </s> The legislative history of Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) provides additional support for the view that respondent's liability should be held nondischargeable. A principal purpose of the legislation, enacted in 1966 after several years of congressional consideration, was to establish a three-year limitation on the taxes that would be nondischargeable in bankruptcy; under former law, there was no such temporal limitation. See H. R. Rep. No. 372, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-3 (1963) (hereafter [436 U.S. 268, 276] H. R. Rep. No. 372); S. Rep. No. 114, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1965) (hereafter S. Rep. No. 114). The new section ensured the discharge of most taxes "which became legally due and owing" more than three years preceding bankruptcy. With regard to unpaid withholding taxes, however, the three-year limitation was made inapplicable by the addition of the provision that is today 17a (1) (e). </s> This provision was added to the bill to respond to the Treasury Department's position that any discharge of liability for collected withholding taxes was undesirable. The Department's views were expressed in a letter to the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Stanley S. Surrey, who indicated that persons other than employer-bankrupts were included within the scope of the Department's </s> "concer[n] with the inequity of granting a taxpayer a discharge of his liability for payment of trust fund taxes which he has collected from his employees and the public in general. . . . The Department does not believe that it is equitable or administratively desirable to permit employers and other persons who have collected money from third parties to be relieved of their obligation to account for an[d] pay over such money to the Government . . . ." Quoted in H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 6 (emphasis added). </s> Treasury's position was further explained in a letter from the same Department official to the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee; the letter emphasized that it was "most undesirable to permit persons who are charged with the responsibility of paying over to the Federal Government moneys collected from third persons to be relieved of their obligations in bankruptcy when they have converted such moneys for their own use." Quoted in S. Rep. No. 114, p. 10. </s> In response to the Treasury Department's concern, the House Judiciary Committee added an amendment that [436 U.S. 268, 277] became 17a (1) (e). H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 1. According to the House Report, the amendment was specifically intended to meet "the objection of Treasury to the discharge of so-called trust fund taxes." Id., at 5. In agreeing to the House amendment, the Senate Committee noted that Treasury's "opposition" to the bill, to the extent it was based on the fact that responsible persons would have been "relieved of their obligations" for unpaid withholding taxes, was eliminated by the provision that became 17a (1) (e). S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 6, 10. </s> There is no reason to believe that Congress did not intend to meet Treasury's concerns in their entirety. While the Department may not have focused on the specific question presented here, it left no doubt as to its objection to the discharge of "persons . . . charged with the responsibility of paying over . . . moneys collected from third persons." Letter from Assistant Secretary Surrey to Chairman of Senate Judiciary Committee, supra. Respondent without question is such a person, a point essentially conceded here by virtue of the recognition of respondent's liability under Internal Revenue Code 6672, see supra, at 274-275, and n. 9. Because Congress specifically contemplated that those with withholding-tax-payment obligations would remain liable after bankruptcy for their "conver[sion]" of the tax funds to private use, S. Rep. No. 114, p. 10, 10 we must conclude that the liability here involved is not dischargeable in bankruptcy. [436 U.S. 268, 278] </s> Even without these indications of an intent to make nondischargeable the withholding tax obligations of persons in respondent's situation, moreover, Congress' perception of the consequences of corporate bankruptcy makes it most unlikely that the legislature intended 17a (1) (e) to apply only to the corporation's liability for unpaid withholding taxes. Both the Committee reports and the floor debates contain repeated references to the fact that a corporation "normally ceases to exist upon bankruptcy," H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 2; see S. Rep. No. 114, p. 2, thereby rendering "uncollectable" the corporation's tax liabilities, 112 Cong. Rec. 13818 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin). As one of the bill's principal sponsors observed, corporate dissolution has "the practical effect of discharging all debts including taxes," regardless of statutory declarations of nondischargeability. Id., at 13821 (remarks of Sen. Hruska). 11 In view of this congressional assumption, the interpretation of 17a (1) (e) adopted by the Court of Appeals is untenable, for the combination of corporate dissolution with the personal bankruptcies of those found liable under Internal Revenue Code 6672 would leave no person within the corporation obligated to the Government for unpaid withholding taxes. Such a result would be directly inconsistent with Congress' declarations that the amendment which became 17a (1) (e) met the Treasury Department's [436 U.S. 268, 279] concern about ensuring post-bankruptcy liability for these taxes. </s> IV </s> In light of this legislative history, little doubt remains as to the nondischargeability of respondent's liability under 17a (1) (e). The Court of Appeals did not consider this history, but instead relied on more general policy factors. The court observed that an "inequit[y]" could arise from holding an individual "liable for a tax owed by a corporation" in cases where, because "[t]he corporate liability . . . vastly exceed[s] the individual's present or future resources," his "entire future earnings could be confiscated to compensate for the corporate liability." Such a result, in the court's view, "would contravene the Bankruptcy Act's basic policy of settling a bankrupt's past debts and providing a fresh economic start." 551 F.2d, at 1092-1093. </s> However persuasive these considerations might be in a legislative forum, we as judges cannot override the specific policy judgments made by Congress in enacting the statutory provisions with which we are here concerned. The decision to hold an individual "liable for a tax owed by a corporation," even if there is a wide disparity between the corporation's liability and the individual's resources, was made when Internal Revenue Code 6672 was passed, since it is that section which imposes the liability without regard for the individual's ability to pay. 12 And while it is true that a finding of [436 U.S. 268, 280] nondischargeability prevents a bankrupt from getting an entirely "fresh start," this observation provides little assistance in construing a section expressly designed to make some debts nondischargeable. We are not here concerned with the entire Act's policy, but rather with what Congress intended in 17a (1) and its subdivision (e). The statutory language and legislative history discussed in Parts II and III, supra, demonstrate an intention to make a liability like respondent's nondischargeable. 13 </s> The Court of Appeals' approach, moreover, would have the effect of allowing a corporation and its officers to escape all liability for unpaid withholding taxes, see supra, at 278-279, [436 U.S. 268, 281] while leaving liable for such taxes after bankruptcy those individuals who do business in the sole proprietorship or partnership, rather than the corporate, form. 14 In passing 17a (1), however, Congress was expressly concerned about the fact that the operation of prior law was "unfairly discriminatory against the private individual or the unincorporated small businessman." H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 2; see S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 2-3. As discussed above, Congress recognized that a bankrupt corporation "dissolves and goes out of business," 112 Cong. Rec. 13817 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Ervin), thereby avoiding IRS tax claims; it was thought inequitable that a sole proprietor or other individual would remain liable after bankruptcy for the same type of claims. See generally sources cited at 278, and n. 11, supra. This inequity between a corporate officer and an individual entrepreneur, both of whom have a similar liability to the Government, frequently would turn on nothing more than whether the individual was "sophisticated" enough "to, in effect, incorporate himself." 112 Cong. Rec. 13817 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Ervin). 15 Were we to adopt the Court of Appeals' approach, we would be instituting precisely the kind of "arbitrary discrimination" that 17a (1) was designed to alleviate. 112 Cong. Rec. 13818 (1966) (statement of Sen. Ervin). 16 </s> [436 U.S. 268, 282] </s> In terms of statutory language and legislative history, then, the liability of respondent under Internal Revenue Code 6672 must be held nondischargeable under Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) (e). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, accordingly, </s> Reversed and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Internal Revenue Code 6672, 26 U.S.C. 6672, provides: </s> "Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over." </s> Section 6671 (b) of the Code makes clear that "[t]he term `person,' as used in [ 6672], includes an officer or employee of a corporation . . . who . . . is under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs." Section 6671 (a) states that the 6672 penalty "shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes." </s> [Footnote 2 Naomi Sotelo was found not to be liable, but the bankruptcy judge noted that this finding was "immaterial" in view of the merger of the estates. Memorandum Opinion of Bankruptcy Court 3 (Nov. 29, 1974). </s> [Footnote 3 This $10,000 was derived from the trustee's sale of real estate held by respondents as joint tenants, and would have been payable to one or both of respondents had it not been for the Government's claim. The trustee set aside the $10,000 as a "homestead exemption" for Onofre Sotelo only, apparently pursuant to Illinois law. Respondents argued below that the entire $10,000 belonged to Naomi Sotelo, who did not have any 6672 liability, see n. 2, supra. In response to this contention, the bankruptcy court stated: "[T]he law is clearly established in Illinois that where a husband and wife own property as joint tenants and reside together on the premises . . . the husband . . . alone is entitled to the Homestead Exemption." 76-1 USTC § 9435, p. 84,156 (SD Ill. 1976). The bankruptcy court upheld this Illinois rule against respondents' constitutional attack. Id., at 84,157-84,158. </s> [Footnote 4 Respondents' theory apparently was that the 6672 penalty is compensatory in nature. The Government does not here dispute that a [436 U.S. 268, 272] compensatory penalty is generally dischargeable. See Brief for United States 26-27, and n. 16. See generally Bankruptcy Act 57j, 11 U.S.C. 93 (j); 8 H. Remington, A Treatise on the Bankruptcy Law of the United States 3304 (6th ed. J. Henderson 1955). </s> [Footnote 5 Respondents raised their homestead exemption argument, see n. 3, supra, in the Court of Appeals, but that court believed that it did not have to reach the issue in view of its holding that the entire 6672 liability was dischargeable, 551 F.2d, at 1093 n. 3. The Government contends here that the issue should have been reached regardless of the dischargeability holding, because Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) makes a discharge irrelevant to the Government's right to proceed "against the exemption of the bankrupt allowed by law and duly set apart to him," 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1) (1976 ed.). Brief for United States 33-34, n. 23. In view of our holding that the 6672 liability is not dischargeable, we need not [436 U.S. 268, 273] address this contention. On remand, of course, the Court of Appeals may consider respondents' argument that some or all of the homestead exemption belongs to Naomi Sotelo. </s> [Footnote 6 In addition to several District Court cases, the Court of Appeals cited the conflicting holding of the Fifth Circuit in Murphy v. U.S. Internal Revenue Service, 533 F.2d 941 (1976). The Murphy decision was followed by the Fourth Circuit in Lackey v. United States, 538 F.2d 592 (1976). </s> [Footnote 7 The Government contends, and respondent does not disagree, that the three-year limitation in Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) would not bar any [436 U.S. 268, 274] part of the Government's claim in this case. Brief for United States 25-26, n. 15. </s> [Footnote 8 The specific language of Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) (e) is contained within a proviso that modifies the more general approach of 17a (1). Both the general language and the proviso are aimed at making "taxes" nondischargeable, and there is no reason to believe that any "taxes" made nondischargeable by the specific terms of 17a (1) (e) would not also be "taxes" as that word is used more generally in 17a (1). </s> [Footnote 9 As in the Court of Appeals, see supra, at 272, respondent does not here question his liability under Internal Revenue Code 6672. Brief for Respondents 4. </s> [Footnote 10 See also Marsh, Triumph or Tragedy? The Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1966, 42 Wash. L. Rev. 681, 694 (1967): </s> "It is a common phenomenon of business failure that even an `honest' businessman, in attempting to salvage a business which appears headed for insolvency, will frequently `borrow' money of other people without their consent if he can get his hands on it. The one fund which he is almost always able to lay his hands on is the taxes he has withheld and is currently withholding from his employees for the Government." </s> A recent statement to the same effect can be found in an opinion of the Comptroller General of the United States: "IRS considers delinquencies [436 U.S. 268, 278] in the payment of these employment taxes a serious problem. In 1976 [congressional] testimony . . ., IRS officials expressed concern that employers use withheld taxes as low interest loans from the Federal Government." Opinion B-137762 (May 3, 1977), reprinted in 9 CCH 1977 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. § 6614, p. 71, 438. </s> [Footnote 11 See also, e. g., 112 Cong. Rec. 13817 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id., at 13821 (letter to Senators from Sens. Ervin and Hruska); id., at 13822 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); letter from Under Secretary of Commerce Edward Gudeman, reprinted in S. Rep. No. 114, p. 12; memorandum from W. Randolph Montgomery, Chairman of the National Bankruptcy Conference, reprinted id., at 16; S. Rep. No. 1134, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1964); H. R. Rep. No. 735, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1959). </s> [Footnote 12 Rather than predicating liability on ability to pay, 6672 is based on the premise that liability should follow responsibility. See n. 13, infra. In a recent survey of IRS practices with regard to 6672, the Comptroller General of the United States wrote: </s> "IRS uses the 100-percent penalty only when all other means of securing the delinquent taxes have been exhausted. It is generally used against responsible officials of corporations that have gone out of business . . . . [I]t is IRS policy that the amount of the tax will be collected only once. After the tax liability is satisfied, no collection action is taken on the [436 U.S. 268, 280] remaining 100-percent penalties." Opinion B-137762, supra, n. 10, at 71,438. </s> [Footnote 13 Our dissenting Brethren appear uncomfortable with this legislative policy choice, expressing concern about "lifelong liability" being imposed on "a comptroller, accountant, or bookkeeper who reaped none of the fruits of entrepreneurial success." Post, at 290, 291. While we should not in any event be led by our sympathy to a result contrary to that intended by Congress, there is here little reason for concern. No corporate officer, regardless of title, can be held liable under Internal Revenue Code 672 unless his position was sufficiently important that he was "required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over" withholding taxes and unless he "willfully fail[ed]" to meet one or more of these obligations. In this case, for example, Onofre Sotelo, the chief executive officer exercising actual authority over the corporation's day-to-day affairs, was found liable under the section, while Naomi Sotelo was not, despite the fact that she held the position of corporate secretary. See supra, at 270-271, and n. 2. </s> The dissenting opinion as much as concedes, moreover, that there is no responsible corporate officer who can be said to reap "none of the fruits of entrepreneurial success," since all employees are dependent on the corporation for their "continued employment." Post, at 291 (emphasis added); see post, at 291-292, n. 3. The "continued employment" of a corporate officer is obviously a benefit of considerable significance to that officer and is generally dependent upon the success of the corporate enterprise. Hence an officer has a stake in "the fruits of entrepreneurial success" and, like a shareholder, may be tempted illegally to divert to the corporation those funds withheld from corporate employees for tax purposes. </s> [Footnote 14 Such individuals would be liable after bankruptcy for "taxes" which they, as employers, "collected or withheld from others . . . but [did] not pa[y] over." Bankruptcy Act 17a (1) (e), 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1) (e) (1976 ed.). </s> [Footnote 15 Indeed, respondent's business was operated as a sole proprietorship prior to September 1970. See supra, at 270-271; Memorandum Opinion of Bankruptcy Court, supra, n. 2, at 1. </s> [Footnote 16 The dissenting opinion recognizes, post, at 285 n. 1, Congress' unquestioned concern about eliminating corporations' "unfair" advantage over individual entrepreneurs. H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 2; S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 2-3. Elsewhere our Brother REHNQUIST appears to concede that Congress meant "to ameliorate the lot" of only "some bankrupts" when it passed the 1966 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act. Post, at 282; [436 U.S. 268, 282] see post, at 285. There is every indication that the 1966 amendment was not intended "to ameliorate the lot" of corporations and their principal officers, at least with regard to taxes collected from employees. And the dissenting opinion has not even attempted to explain how a Congress concerned about "discriminat[ion] against the private individual or the unincorporated small businessman," H. R. Rep. No. 372, p. 2; S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 2-3, could have thought it just to relieve corporate officers of 6672 liability in bankruptcy, as the dissent's approach would do, while leaving other owners of "small family business[es]," post, at 291 - those who happen to operate through noncorporate entities - subject to the same kind of liability. </s> MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> The Government undoubtedly needs the revenues it receives from taxes, but great as that need may be I cannot join the Court's thrice-twisted analysis of this particular statute to gratify it. The issue involved is the dischargeability in the corporate officer's bankruptcy proceedings of taxes which the corporation is obligated to collect and pay over to the Government. In order to conclude that the corporate officer remains liable for this corporate obligation the Court turns to an unlikely source indeed: a 1966 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, the only apparent purpose of which was to ameliorate the lot of at least some bankrupts, see infra, at 284-285, and n. 1. The Court then proceeds to slog its way to its illogical conclusion by reading a proviso obviously intended to limit dischargeability of the debts of a bankrupt so as to expand that category of debts. It then attempts to bolster this inexplicable interpretation by construing not the [436 U.S. 268, 283] legislation which Congress enacted but a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury not unnaturally opposing any expansion of the dischargeability in bankruptcy of tax-related liabilities. The net result of this perverse approach to an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act is to make nondischargeable a liability which might well have been dischargeable before Congress stepped in to alleviate some of the hardships resulting from the making of the debts of a bankrupt nondischargeable. In the background of this remarkable decision is 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code which imposes a "penalty" upon a "person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this title." 26 U.S.C. 6672. Perhaps recognizing that this provision not only does not support its conclusion but seriously undermines it, the Court not surprisingly attempts to keep this provision in the background, addressing it only obliquely in a footnote where it summarily concludes, again in a remarkable tour de force of linguistics and logic, that a penalty must mean the same thing as a tax. The underlying debt in this case is that of a third person to pay the tax liability of another. I would want far clearer language than can be found in this statute to reach the conclusion that this liability is not dischargeable in the bankruptcy proceedings of that third person. I therefore dissent. </s> As an initial matter, since 17a (1) (e) of the Bankruptcy Act is a proviso to 17a (1), I would have thought that respondent would have to fall within the terms of the latter before it is even appropriate to consider whether he falls within the terms of the former. That is, 17a first provides that a "discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts . . . ." 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1976 ed.). It then excepts in 17a (1) through 17a (8) eight different categories of debts which are not to be generally discharged, including "taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State [436 U.S. 268, 284] or any subdivision thereof within three years preceding bankruptcy." 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1) (1976 ed.). But this latter exception is itself in turn qualified in 17a (1) (e): "Provided, however, That a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes . . . (e) which the bankrupt has collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States or any State . . . but has not paid over . . . ." 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1) (e) (1976 ed.). Thus, the normal reading of 17a (1) should be to limit the nondischargeability of taxes to only those taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt within the three years preceding bankruptcy, and the subsections of 17a (1), including 17a (1) (e), are to be read as an exception to that limitation. That exception provides that certain of the taxes described in 17a (1) will not be discharged even if more than three years old; they will be nondischargeable without regard to time. Normal statutory construction would thus suggest that the first inquiry should be whether the liability in question is a tax legally due and owing by the bankrupt. Only if it is, would it become necessary to consider whether it is also a tax collected from others but not paid over. </s> That this is the correct reading of the statute is further buttressed by the legislative history. All the Committees which reported on the 1966 amendment to 17a stressed that its central purpose was to enable at least some bankrupts to more nearly achieve the fresh start promised by the Bankruptcy Act. The Senate Committee on Finance, for example, in discussing the purpose of the proposed amendment, agreed with the Committee on the Judiciary "that present law, by denying any discharge of taxes, presents a substantial deterrent to one fundamental policy of the Bankruptcy Act - effective rehabilitation of the bankrupt." S. Rep. No. 999, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (1966). The Senate Committee went on to suggest slightly different methods from those advanced by the Judiciary Committee to achieve this goal, but its Report, like the [436 U.S. 268, 285] others, leaves no doubt that the central purpose of the amendment was to make the Act more favorable to at least some bankrupts by limiting, with only a few specified exceptions, the nondischargeability of taxes to only those due for the prior three years. </s> This avowed legislative purpose only heightens the incongruity of the Court's interpretation. The statute's major purpose was to limit the nondischargeability of certain debts. And yet the Court holds today that the enactment of 17a (1) (e) of that statute results in a nondischargeable debt without regard to whether that debt would have been totally nondischargeable before the passage of 17a (1) (e) - that is, without the slightest attention to the question of whether it is a tax legally due and owing by the bankrupt within the meaning of 17a (1). Thus, by passing a statute with a basically beneficent purpose, Congress has, according to the Court, not only made nondischargeable a liability which could potentially run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars but may have worsened, rather than bettered, the lot of the bankrupt. 1 </s> Finally, even if the language and the history of this statute were less clear, I would hesitate to depart from our longstanding [436 U.S. 268, 286] tradition of reading the Bankruptcy Act with an eye to its fundamental purpose - the rehabilitation of bankrupts. This has always led the Court, at least until today, to construe narrowly any exceptions to the general discharge provisions. See, e. g., Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915). Admittedly 17a is not "a compassionate section for debtors," Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 361 (1964), but even it must be read consistently with the doctrine of Gleason, supra. And I simply cannot see anything in this case which justifies the Court in departing from this tradition by straining to read into the statute an exception to the dischargeability provisions that was not clearly there before this amendment was passed, when the very purpose of the amendment which the Court is now construing was intended to be benevolent, at least from the bankrupt's perspective. </s> Thus, the initial question which should have been addressed by the Court today is whether the amounts for which respondent is liable are "taxes legally due and owing by the bankrupt." If they are not, then the further question of whether they are nondischargeable in their entirety under 17a (1) (e) does not even arise. And I see nothing which persuades me that respondent's liability is a "tax" legally due and owing by him. Neither the Government nor the Court points to any section of the Internal Revenue Code which makes a corporate employee liable for the taxes which the corporate employer is required to withhold from the employees' paychecks. Sections 3102, 3402, or 3403 of the Internal Revenue Code certainly cannot be read to do this because by their unmistakable terms they impose a duty and liability only upon an "employer," which a corporate employee, regardless of his rank within the corporate heirarchy, clearly is not. </s> Neither can 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code serve the purpose. The liability imposed therein is specifically denominated a "penalty" and, absent any indication to the contrary, Congress is presumed to know the meaning of the words it uses, [436 U.S. 268, 287] especially in highly complex and intricate statutory schemes. Indeed, in another letter sent by Assistant Secretary of Treasury Surrey to the Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary when that Committee was considering what eventually became 17a (1), the following was specifically brought to the Committee's attention: </s> "It is further believed by the Department that this bill is intended to discharge not only taxes but also penalties and interest. However, the bill makes reference only to taxes. In this connection, it is pertinent to point out that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in the case of United States v. Mighell (C. A. 10th, 1959) 273 F.2d 682, held that the word `taxes' in section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. 35) does not include penalties and, by inference, interest. This apparent ambiguity could cause future litigation." H. R. Rep. No. 687, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1965). </s> And yet Congress did not modify 17a (1) to include penalties. (I normally would not accord such passing references any weight, but the contrary practice seems today de rigueur. Ante, at 276-277.) </s> The history of 6672 further bears out the notion that this always has been considered by Congress to be a "penalty," and not a "tax." For example, 1004 of the War Revenue Act of 1917, an early predecessor of 6672, provided that anyone who failed to make a return required by the Act or otherwise evaded any tax imposed by the Act or failed to collect and pay over any such tax was subject to "a penalty of double the tax evaded" in addition to other penalties, such as a $1,000 fine and imprisonment. 40 Stat. 325. Indeed, even today the subchapter heading under which 6672 is found is titled "Assessable Penalties." </s> Finally, the very existence of 6672 bears testimony to the fact that there is no other section of federal law which makes the employee charged with the duty of collecting withholding [436 U.S. 268, 288] taxes liable for those "taxes." If there were such a section, 6672 would be unnecessary. But it is the absence of such other provision which is dispositive of this case in my opinion. 2 </s> Instead of adopting the course which seems compelled by the structure and history of 17a (1), however, the Court has chosen today a very different course. It does give a passing nod to the question of whether one might have to satisfy 17a (1) before reaching 17a (1) (e), but then dismisses it in rather desultory fashion in a footnote, noting only that "there is no reason to believe that any `taxes' made nondischargeable by the specific terms of 17a (1) (e) would not also be `taxes' as that word is used more generally in 17a (1)." Ante, at 274 n. 8. The Court then goes on to interpret 17a (1) in light of its limiting provision, 17a (1) (e), instead of the other way around, a tour de force which compels admiration if not agreement. The critical, and indeed only, question for the Court then becomes whether respondent was "required" to collect and pay over the taxes. Finding that respondent was so required within the meaning of 6672 of [436 U.S. 268, 289] the IRC, the Court concludes he falls within the language of 17a (1) (e) and that is the end of the matter. </s> The justifications for engaging in this unorthodox method of statutory construction are supposedly threefold, but are, in my opinion, far from satisfactory. First, the Court asserts that respondent's liability is clearly encompassed within the plain terms of 17a (1) (e). But as indicated above such liability is encompassed within the terms of 17a (1) (e) only if we ignore both the structure and purpose of the statute and proceed directly to 17a (1) (e) without considering whether 17a (1) is first satisfied. </s> The Court next relies on certain concerns expressed by the Treasury Department in a letter from the Assistant Secretary to the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee. No doubt 17a (1) (e) was included partially in response to that letter. But there is certainly nothing contained in that or any other provision to indicate that in adding 17a (1) (e) Congress also intended to extend the concept of "taxes" in 17a (1) to include the 100% penalty imposed by 6672 or to encompass a corporate official's responsibility (presumably under the corporate charter and state law) to collect and pay over federal withholding taxes. The Court emphasizes the phrase "and other persons" in the letter and then observes that "[t]here is no reason to believe that Congress did not intend to meet Treasury's concerns in their entirety." Ante, at 277. But emphasizing that phrase to the exclusion of the rest of the letter and the language and structure of the statute places a weight upon that phrase which it cannot bear. Indeed, one could reach a much different conclusion by simply emphasizing other parts of the letter, such as the Department's </s> "concer[n] with the inequity of granting a taxpayer a discharge of his liability for payment of trust fund taxes which he has collected from his employees . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) H. R. Rep. No. 372, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1963). [436 U.S. 268, 290] </s> And even the Court recognizes that "the Department may not have focused on the specific question presented here . . . ." Ante, at 277. But most importantly, when interpreting the Bankruptcy Act in general, with its fundamental goal of rehabilitating bankrupts, and when interpreting this provision in particular, with its avowed purpose of furthering that basic goal of the Act, the Court is not entitled to make the presumption that it does. Rather, in the absence of a clear congressional expression to the contrary, there is every reason to believe that Congress did not intend to make nondischargeable in the employee's bankruptcy proceedings a tax which is legally due and owing not by the bankrupt employee, but by the employer. </s> Finally, the Court emphasizes the fact that corporations often dissolve upon bankruptcy, thus making all corporate debts dischargeable in fact if not in form. Ante, at 278. Thus, reasons the Court, it is "most unlikely that the legislature intended 17a (1) (e) to apply only to the corporation's liability for unpaid withholding taxes." Ibid. But clearly Congress, had it really intended to alleviate the problem to which the Court refers, could and hopefully would have used language more suited to the purpose. It is also incongruous to impute the intent to Congress to make this particular liability nondischargeable as to the employee because the corporation will dissolve upon bankruptcy and yet to make no other corporate liability nondischargeable as to the employee even though dissolution of the corporation is just as likely in those cases. Such a statutory scheme not only seems at odds with the basic notion of what a corporation is all about, i. e., limited liability, but it also imposes a potentially crushing liability on corporate officials - a liability that is nondischargeable in its entirety and virtually in perpetuity. I certainly would not impute such an intent to Congress without a much clearer statutory directive. </s> While the lifelong liability which the Court imposes today [436 U.S. 268, 291] falls on the shoulders of one who was the chief executive officer of a small family business, there is unfortunately nothing in the Court's reasoning which would prevent the same liability from surviving bankruptcy in the case of a comptroller, accountant, or bookkeeper who reaped none of the fruits of entrepreneurial success other than continued employment in the corporation, and in some cases possibly not even that, see n. 3, infra. So long as the Government in its zeal for the collection of the revenue may persuade a bankruptcy court that a corporate employee comes within the Court's Delphic construction of 26 U.S.C. 6672 and 11 U.S.C. 35 (a) (1) (e) (1976 ed.), such a person will be denied the "fresh start" which Congress clearly intended to enhance by the 1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. 3 Before the Government [436 U.S. 268, 292] may randomly sweep such persons into a net whereby they are denied a discharge, not of their own tax liability but of a penalty imposed upon them for failure to pay over taxes which had been withheld by another, I would at least insist on a statute which seemed to point in that direction, rather than in the opposite one. </s> [Footnote 1 The Court may well be correct in its observation that when Congress enacted these amendments it was "concerned about `discriminat[ion] against the private individual or the unincorporated small businessman,' H. R. Rep: No. 372, p. 2; S. Rep. No. 114, pp. 2-3," ante, at 282 n. 16. And this observation in turn may support the conclusion that Congress, with an eye to reducing this supposed discrimination, intended to ameliorate the lot of only those individuals who operate through noncorporate entities. But I find absolutely nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress also intended to reduce this supposed discrimination between those who operate through corporations and those who do not by affirmatively worsening the lot of the former. Thus, I still search the Court's opinion in vain for any justification for reading an amendment which was intended to limit the dischargeability of the debts of bankrupts, albeit only a limited class of bankrupts, so as to expand that category of debts with respect to another class of bankrupts. </s> [Footnote 2 There are lower court cases to the contrary. See cases cited ante, at 273 n. 6. This line of authority can be traced to Botta v. Scanlon, 314 F.2d 392 (CA2 1963), however, where the plaintiff sought an injunction against the Internal Revenue Service to restrain the collection of the penalty imposed under 6672. The court denied the injunction on the authority of the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides in pertinent part: "[N]o suit for the purpose of restraining the . . . collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court . . . ." 26 U.S.C. 7421 (a). The court held that this section applied to 6672 penalties as well as taxes because 6671 (a) of the Code provides: "[A]ny reference in this title to `tax' imposed by this title shall be deemed also to refer to the penalties . . . provided by this subchapter." 26 U.S.C. 6671 (a). But while there is clear statutory authority for treating a 6672 penalty as a tax for purposes of administering the Internal Revenue Code, there is no authority for treating such a penalty as a tax for purposes of the Bankruptcy Act. Indeed, the fact that Congress clearly recognized the need to specify that a penalty was a tax for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code strongly suggests that its failure to so specify with respect to the Bankruptcy Act was not an inadvertent omission. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court's lack of concern for the potentially crushing liability it imposes on bankrupts is nowhere more evident than at 280 n. 13, ante, where the Court notes that "[n]o corporate officer, regardless of title, can be held liable under Internal Revenue Code 6672 unless his position was sufficiently important that he was `required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over' withholding taxes and unless he `willfully fail[ed]' to meet one or more of these obligations." While I certainly do not dispute that observation, it does absolutely nothing to allay my fear that this liability can be imposed on a variety of salaried corporate employees who enjoy none of the fruits of entrepreneurial success other than their continued employment. The Federal Reporter is replete with cases in which just such individuals have been held liable under 6672. See, e. g., Adams v. United States, 504 F.2d 73 (CA7 1974) (the court held that an employee of a lending institution, who had been placed in charge of a corporation to which the institution had loaned money, could be liable under 6672 for failure to pay over withholding taxes collected from the corporation's employees, regardless of the fact that he held no stock or other interest in the corporation); Mueller v. Nixon, 470 F.2d 1348 (CA6 1972) (same); Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448 (CA9 1970) (employee of a bank, who had been made an officer of a company as a condition of a loan made to the company, could be liable under 6672 for failure to pay over withholding taxes collected from the company's employees). Indeed, it appears to be agreed by the Courts of Appeals that a person need not be a shareholder to be held accountable as a responsible person under 6672. See, [436 U.S. 268, 292] e. g., Anderson v. United States, 561 F.2d 162, 165 (CA8 1977); Hartman v. United States, 538 F.2d 1336, 1340 (CA8 1976); Haffa v. United States, 516 F.2d 931, 935-936 (CA7 1975). </s> [436 U.S. 268, 293]

United States Supreme Court ELDER v. HOLLOWAY(1994) No. 92-8579 Argued: January 10, 1994Decided: February 23, 1994 </s> Petitioner Elder was arrested without a warrant after respondents, Idaho police officers, surrounded his house and ordered him to come out. Alleging that the arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable seizure, Elder sued the officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers raised the defense of qualified immunity, which shields public officials from actions for damages unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The District Court found the law clear that, absent exigent circumstances, a warrant would have been required had the arrest occurred inside the house. The court found it unclear, however, whether a warrant was needed when officers surrounded a house and requested an individual to come out and surrender. Finding no controlling state or Ninth Circuit case law, the court granted summary judgment for respondents. On appeal, the Court of Appeals noticed Ninth Circuit precedent in point missed in the District Court. United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890, the Court of Appeals thought, might have alerted a reasonable officer to the constitutional implications of putting a suspect under arrest outside a surrounded house. The court held, however, that the Al-Azzawy decision could not be used to Elder's advantage. Although typing the qualified immunity inquiry a pure question of law, the court read this Court's decision in Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 , to require plaintiffs to present to the district court, as "legal facts," the cases showing that the right asserted was clearly established. Just as appellants forfeit facts not presented to the court of first instance, the Court of Appeals reasoned, so, in the peculiar context of civil rights qualified immunity litigation, a plaintiff may not benefit on appeal from a precedent Page II neither he nor the district court itself mentioned in the first instance. </s> Held: </s> Appellate review of qualified immunity dispositions must be conducted in light of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to or discovered by the district court. The rule declared by the Court of Appeals in this case does not aid the qualified immunity doctrine's central objective - to protect public officials from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability - because its operation is unpredictable in advance of the district court's adjudication. Nor does the rule further the interest in deterring public officials' unlawful actions and compensating victims of such conduct. Instead, it simply releases defendants because of shortages in counsels' or the court's legal research or briefing. The decision in Davis v. Scherer, supra, was misconstrued by the Court of Appeals. Davis did not concern what authorities a court may consider in determining qualified immunity. The Court held in Davis only this: to defeat qualified immunity, the federal right on which the claim for relief is based - rather than some other right - must be clearly established. Whether a federal right was clearly established at a particular time is a question of law, not "legal facts," and must be resolved de novo on appeal. A court of appeals reviewing a qualified immunity judgment should therefore use its full knowledge of its own and other relevant precedents. It is left to the Court of Appeals to consider, in light of all relevant authority, including Al-Azzawy, whether respondents are entitled to prevail on their qualified immunity defense. Pp. 4-6. </s> 975 F.2d 1388, reversed and remanded. </s> GINSBURG, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> [ ELDER v. HOLLOWAY, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the question whether an appellate court, reviewing a judgment according public officials qualified immunity from a damages suit charging violation of a federal right, must disregard relevant legal authority not presented to or considered by the court of first instance. We hold that appellate review of qualified immunity dispositions is to be conducted in light of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to or discovered by the district court. </s> I </s> In April, 1987, police officers in Idaho learned that Charles Elder was wanted by Florida authorities. They set out to arrest Elder, but did not obtain an Idaho arrest warrant. The officers planned to apprehend Elder at his workplace, in a public area where a warrant is not required. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 , n. 6 (1976). Finding that Elder had already left his jobsite, the officers surrounded the house in which he resided and ordered him to come out. Elder suffered epileptic seizures during the episode and an officer instructed him to crawl out of the house to avoid injury from falling. Elder, instead, walked through the </s> [ ELDER v. HOLLOWAY, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> doorway, immediately suffered another seizure, and fell on the concrete walk in front of the house. He sustained serious brain trauma and remains partially paralyzed. </s> II </s> Alleging that the warrantless arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable seizure, Elder sued the arresting officers for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields public officials like the respondents from damages actions unless their conduct was unreasonable in light of clearly established law. The District Court analyzed Elder's case in three steps. Had the arrest occurred inside the house, that court recognized, clear law would come into play: absent exigent circumstances, an arrest warrant would have been required. See 751 F.Supp. 858, 860 (Idaho 1990) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). If the same clear law governed Elder's arrest as it in fact transpired, the District Court said, then the matter of exigent circumstances would present a triable issue. 751 F.Supp., at 865. 1 But, the District Court concluded, it was not clear that the warrant requirement applied when officers surrounded a house and requested an individual inside to come out and surrender. For that scenario, the one presented here, the District Court "found no controlling Idaho or Ninth Circuit case law." Id., at 866. The District Court accordingly granted summary judgment for the officers on qualified immunity grounds. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (officials "are shielded from liability for civil damages </s> [ ELDER v. HOLLOWAY, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known"). </s> On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noticed precedent in point missed in the District Court: United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (CA9 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1144 (1986). Al-Azzawy, the Court of Appeals observed, involved a suspect seized outside his surrounded home. The Al-Azzawy decision, published over a year before Elder's arrest, "might have alerted a reasonable officer to the constitutional implications of putting a suspect under arrest after he had come outside his house pursuant to an order to exit." 975 F.2d 1388, 1391-1392 (CA9 1991). 2 Indeed, Al-Azzawy explicitly "reaffirmed the rule that "it is the location of the arrested person, and not the arresting agents, that determines whether an arrest occurs within a home.' [Al-Azzawy, supra, at 893] (quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 537 . . . (1982))." 975 F.2d, at 1391. </s> Elder could not benefit from the rule reaffirmed in Al-Azzawy, the Court of Appeals believed, because that precedent had been unearthed too late. For the conclusion that cases unmentioned in the District Court could not control on appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984), in particular, on this statement from Davis: "A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly </s> [ ELDER v. HOLLOWAY, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> established at the time of the conduct at issue." Id., at 197 (emphasis added). </s> Although typing the qualified immunity inquiry "a `pure question[] of law,'" 975 F.2d, at 1392 (quoting Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627-628 (CA9 1991)), the Court of Appeals read Davis to require plaintiffs to put into the district court record, as "legal facts," the cases showing that the right asserted was "clearly established." 975 F.2d, at 1394. Just as appellants forfeit facts not presented to the court of first instance, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, so, in the peculiar context of civil rights qualified immunity litigation, a plaintiff may not benefit on appeal from precedent neither he nor the district court itself mentioned in the first instance: "[T]he plaintiff's burden in responding to a request for judgment based on qualified immunity is to identify the universe of statutory or decisional law from which the [district] court can determine whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established." Id., at 1392. </s> III </s> The central purpose of affording public officials qualified immunity from suit is to protect them "from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, supra, at 806. The rule announced by the Ninth Circuit does not aid this objective because its operation is unpredictable in advance of the district court's adjudication. Nor does the rule further the interests on the other side of the balance: deterring public officials' unlawful actions and compensating victims of such conduct. Instead, it simply releases defendants because of shortages in counsels' or the court's legal research or briefing. 3 </s> [ ELDER v. HOLLOWAY, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> In thinking its rule compelled by this Court's instruction, the Ninth Circuit misconstrued Davis v. Scherer. The Court held in Davis that an official's clear violation of a state administrative regulation does not allow a 1983 plaintiff to overcome the official's qualified immunity. Only in this context is the Court's statement comprehensible: "A plaintiff who seeks damages for violation of constitutional or statutory rights may overcome the defendant official's qualified immunity only by showing that those rights were clearly established. . . ." Davis v. Scherer, supra, at 197 (emphasis added). Davis, in short, concerned not the authorities a court may consider in determining qualified immunity, but this entirely discrete question: Is qualified immunity defeated where a defendant violates any clearly established duty, including one under state law, or must the clearly established right be the federal right on which the claim for relief is based? The Court held the latter. 468 U.S., at 193 -196, and n. 14; see 984 F.2d 991, 995 (CA9 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc). </s> Whether an asserted federal right was clearly established at a particular time, so that a public official who allegedly violated the right has no qualified immunity from suit, presents a question of law, not one of "legal facts." See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S., at 818 . That question of law, like the generality of such questions, </s> [ ELDER v. HOLLOWAY, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> must be resolved de novo on appeal. See, e.g., Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988). A court engaging in review of a qualified immunity judgment should therefore use its "full knowledge of its own [and other relevant] precedents." See Davis, 468 U.S., at 192 , n. 9. </s> We leave it to the Court of Appeals to consider, in light of all relevant authority, including Al-Azzawy, whether the respondent officers are entitled to prevail on their qualified immunity defense. We express no opinion on that ultimate issue, nor do we consider whether the officers' alternate plea of exigent circumstances is tenable. </s> * * * </s> For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 According to depositions before the District Court, Elder had access to guns in the house, a consideration that might support an exigent circumstances plea. On the other hand, the police started to plan for the arrest five days before it occurred, a factor that might tug against a finding of exigency. </s> [Footnote 2 Elder's brief in the Court of Appeals did cite Al-Azzawy, albeit without elaboration. Brief for Appellant in No. 91-35146 (CA9), p. 9. There was cause for Elder's caution: the ultimate holding of Al-Azzawy was that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest. Cf. n. 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 3 The Ninth Circuit's rule could have a number of untoward </s> [ ELDER v. HOLLOWAY, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> effects. It could occasion appellate affirmation of incorrect legal results, see 984 F.2d 991, 998-999 (CA9 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh'g en banc), and it could place defense counsel in a trying situation. See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3(a) (1989 ed.) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly: . . . (3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel."). Page I

United States Supreme Court RYAN v. UNITED STATES(1964) No. 12 Argued: October 14, 1964Decided: November 23, 1964 </s> Government need not show probable cause for suspecting fraud in order to examine taxpayer's records for closed years. United States v. Powell, ante, p. 48, followed. P. 62. </s> 320 F.2d 500, affirmed. </s> William R. Bagby argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> Bruce J. Terris argued the cause for the United States. On the brief were Solicitor General Cox, Acting Assistant Attorney General Jones, Joseph M. Howard and Norman Sepenuk. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In August 1961, Internal Revenue Agent Whelan issued a summons to taxpayer Ryan ordering him to produce his books for the years 1942 through 1953 inclusive. Ryan appeared but refused to produce the records, claiming that because tax liability for those years was long since barred except for fraud, 1 the agent had no right to examine the records unless he could show grounds for suspecting fraud. </s> The Government then instituted an enforcement proceeding in a federal district court pursuant to 7402 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 2 The complaint alleged that on the basis of estimated net worth calculations [379 U.S. 61, 62] the agent strongly suspected fraud, and that examination of the records for the years in question was relevant and material in determining its existence. The taxpayer answered, putting the question of probable cause in issue, and, in addition, stating that he had not received the letter required by 7605 (b) informing him that the Secretary or his delegate had determined the examination to be necessary. 3 </s> At the hearing the District Judge clearly indicated his opinion that the Government need not show probable cause for suspecting fraud, and ordered Ryan to produce those records which he had available. Although the hearing confirmed Ryan's assertion that no "necessity letter" had been sent to him, the judge made no mention of this, probably because counsel did not press the point. </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed, 320 F.2d 500, on the theory that no full-scale showing of probable cause need be made. Except for the records relating to the year 1945, which appeared to have been once previously examined, the court ruled that no necessity letter was required by 7605 (b) because the Government had made no previous examination of those years. </s> We granted certiorari, 376 U.S. 904 , on the only issue raised by petitioner, whether the Government must show probable cause for its examination of the records. 4 On that issue we sustain the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons given in United States v. Powell, decided today, ante, p. 48. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART and MR. JUSTICE GOLDERG concur in the result, because they believe that through the [379 U.S. 61, 63] testimony of Internal Revenue Agent Whelan a sufficient showing was made that the Government was not proceeding capriciously in this case. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissents for the reasons given in his separate opinion in United States v. Powell, ante, p. 59. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 I. R. C., 6501. See United States v. Powell, decided today, ante, p. 48, at p. 49, note 2. </s> [Footnote 2 See id., at p. 52, note 10. </s> [Footnote 3 See id., at p. 52. </s> [Footnote 4 The propriety of the court's interpretation of the necessity letter requirement of 7605 (b) is, therefore, not before us. See Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40, 48 . </s> [379 U.S. 61, 64]

United States Supreme Court GRAVEL v. UNITED STATES(1972) No. 71-1017 Argued: Decided: June 29, 1972 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 71-1026, United States v. Gravel, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> A United States Senator read to a subcommittee from classified documents (the Pentagon Papers), which he then placed in the public record. The press reported that the Senator had arranged for private publication of the Papers. A grand jury investigating whether violations of federal law were implicated subpoenaed an aide to the Senator. The Senator, as an intervenor, moved to quash the subpoena, contending that it would violate the Speech or Debate Clause to compel the aide to testify. The District Court denied the motion but limited the questioning of the aide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial but modified the protective order, ruling that congressional aides and other persons may not be questioned regarding legislative acts and that, though the private publication was not constitutionally protected, a common-law privilege similar to the privilege of protecting executive officials from liability for libel, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , barred questioning the aide concerning such publication. Held: </s> 1. The Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member of Congress but also to his aide, insofar as the aide's conduct would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 ; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 ; and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 , distinguished. Pp. 613-622. </s> 2. The Speech or Debate Clause does not extend immunity to the Senator's aide from testifying before the grand jury about the alleged arrangement for private publication of the Pentagon Papers, as such publication had no connection with the legislative process. Pp. 622-627. </s> 3. The aide, similarly, had no nonconstitutional testimonial privilege from being questioned by the grand jury in connection with its inquiry into whether private publication of the Papers violated federal law. P. 627. [408 U.S. 606, 607] </s> 4. The Court of Appeals' protective order was overly broad in enjoining interrogation of the aide with respect to any act, "in the broadest sense," that he performed within the scope of his employment, since the aide's immunity extended only to legislative acts as to which the Senator would be immune. And the aide may be questioned by the grand jury about the source of classified documents in the Senator's possession, as long as the questioning implicates no legislative act. The order in other respects would suffice if it forbade questioning the aide or others about the conduct or motives of the Senator or his aides at the subcommittee meeting; communications between the Senator and his aides relating to that meeting or any legislative act of the Senator; or steps of the Senator or his aides preparatory for the meeting, if not relevant to third-party crimes. Pp. 627-629. </s> 455 F.2d 753, vacated and remanded. </s> WHITE, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 629. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 633. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 648. </s> Robert J. Reinstein and Charles L. Fishman argued the cause for petitioner in No. 71-1017 and for respondent in No. 71-1026. With them on the briefs were Harvey A. Silverglate and Alan M. Dershowitz. </s> Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the United States in both cases. With him on the briefs were Assistant Attorney General Mardian, Jerome M. Feit, Allan A. Tuttle, and Robert L. Keuch. </s> Sam J. Ervin, Jr., and William B. Saxbe argued the cause for the Senate of the United States as amicus curiae. With them on the brief were James O. Eastland, John O. Pastore, Herman E. Talmadge, Norris Cotton, Peter H. Dominick, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Philip B. Kurland, and Edward I. Rothschild. </s> Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Melvin L. Wulf and Sanford Jay Rosen for the American Civil Liberties [408 U.S. 606, 608] Union; by Frank B. Frederick and Henry Paul Monaghan for the Unitarian Universalist Association; and by Morton Stavis and Doris Peterson for Leonard S. Rodberg. </s> Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE WHITE, announced by MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN. </s> These cases arise out of the investigation by a federal grand jury into possible criminal conduct with respect to the release and publication of a classified Defense Department study entitled History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. This document, popularly known as the Pentagon Papers, bore a Defense security classification of Top Secret-Sensitive. The crimes being investigated included the retention of public property or records with intent to convert (18 U.S.C. 641), the gathering and transmitting of national defense information (18 U.S.C. 793), the concealment or removal of public records or documents (18 U.S.C. 2071), and conspiracy to commit such offenses and to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. 371). </s> Among the witnesses subpoenaed were Leonard S. Rodberg, an assistant to Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska and a resident fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, and Howard Webber, Director of M. I. T. Press. Senator Gravel, as intervenor, 1 filed motions to quash the [408 U.S. 606, 609] subpoenas and to require the Government to specify the particular questions to be addressed to Rodberg. 2 He asserted that requiring these witnesses to appear and testify would violate his privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, 6, cl. 1. </s> It appeared that on the night of June 29, 1971, Senator Gravel, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Committee, convened a meeting of the subcommittee and there read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers. He then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study in the public record. Rodberg had been added to the Senator's staff earlier in the day and assisted Gravel in preparing for and conducting the hearing. 3 Some weeks later there were press reports that Gravel had arranged for the papers to be published by Beacon [408 U.S. 606, 610] Press 4 and that members of Gravel's staff had talked with Webber as editor of M. I. T. Press. 5 </s> The District Court overruled the motions to quash and to specify questions but entered an order proscribing certain categories of questions. United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930 (Mass. 1971). The Government's contention that for purposes of applying the Speech or Debate Clause the courts were free to inquire into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting was rejected. 6 Because the Clause protected all legislative [408 U.S. 606, 611] acts, it was held to shield from inquiry anything the Senator did at the subcommittee meeting and "certain acts done in preparation therefore." Id., at 935. The Senator's privilege also prohibited "inquiry into things done by Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally." Id., at 937-938. 7 The trial court, however, held the private publication of the documents was not privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause. Id., at 936. 8 </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motions to quash but modified the protective order to reflect its own views of the scope of the congressional privilege. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (CA1 1972). Agreeing that Senator and aide were one for [408 U.S. 606, 612] the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause and that the Clause foreclosed inquiry of both Senator and aide with respect to legislative acts, the Court of Appeals also viewed the privilege as barring direct inquiry of the Senator or his aide, but not of third parties, as to the sources of the Senator's information used in performing legislative duties. 9 Although it did not consider private publication by the Senator or Beacon Press to be protected by the Constitution, the Court of Appeals apparently held that neither Senator nor aide could be questioned about it because of a common-law privilege akin to the judicially created immunity of executive officers from liability for libel contained in a news release issued in the course of their normal duties. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). This privilege, fashioned by the Court of Appeals, would not protect third parties from similar inquiries before the grand jury. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the protective order to be observed by prosecution and grand jury was: </s> "(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor, if the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's conduct at that meeting, about any communications with him or with [408 U.S. 606, 613] his aides regarding the activities of the Senator or his aides during the period of their employment, in preparation for and related to said meeting. </s> "(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions in the broadest sense, including observations and communications, oral or written, by or to him or coming to his attention while being interviewed for, or after having been engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were in the course of his employment." </s> The United States petitioned for certiorari challenging the ruling that aides and other persons may not be questioned with respect to legislative acts and that an aide to a Member of Congress has a common-law privilege not to testify before a grand jury with respect to private publication of materials introduced into a subcommittee record. Senator Gravel also petitioned for certiorari seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals insofar as it held private publication unprotected by the Speech or Debate Clause and asserting that the protective order of the Court of Appeals too narrowly protected against inquiries that a grand jury could direct to third parties. We granted both petitions. 405 U.S. 916 (1972). </s> I </s> Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first whether and to what extent Senator Gravel himself is exempt from process or inquiry by a grand jury investigating the commission of a crime. Our frame of reference is Art. I, 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution: </s> "The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United [408 U.S. 606, 614] States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." </s> The last sentence of the Clause provides Members of Congress with two distinct privileges. Except in cases of "Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace," the Clause shields Members from arrest while attending or traveling to and from a session of their House. History reveals, and prior cases so hold, that this part of the Clause exempts Members from arrest in civil cases only. "When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil suits were still common in America. It is only to such arrests that the provision applies." Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76, 83 (1934) (footnote omitted). "Since . . . the terms treason, felony and breach of the peace, as used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the operation of the privilege all criminal offenses, the conclusion results that the claim of privilege of exemption from arrest and sentence was without merit . . . ." Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 446 (1908). 10 Nor does freedom from arrest confer immunity on a Member from service of process as a defendant in civil matters, Long v. Ansell, supra, at [408 U.S. 606, 615] 82-83, or as a witness in a criminal case. "The constitution gives to every man, charged with an offense, the benefit of compulsory process, to secure the attendance of his witnesses. I do not know of any privilege to exempt members of congress from the service, or the obligations, of a subpoena, in such cases." United States v. Cooper, 4 Dall. 341 (1800) (Chase, J., sitting on Circuit). It is, therefore, sufficiently plain that the constitutional freedom from arrest does not exempt Members of Congress from the operation of the ordinary criminal laws, even though imprisonment may prevent or interfere with the performance of their duties as Members. Williamson v. United States, supra; cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906). Indeed, implicit in the narrow scope of the privilege of freedom from arrest is, as Jefferson noted, the judgment that legislators ought not to stand above the law they create but ought generally to be bound by it as are ordinary persons. T. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice, S. Doc. No. 92-1, p. 437 (1971). </s> In recognition, no doubt, of the force of this part of 6, Senator Gravel disavows any assertion of general immunity from the criminal law. But he points out that the last portion of 6 affords Members of Congress another vital privilege - they may not be questioned in any other place for any speech or debate in either House. The claim is not that while one part of 6 generally permits prosecutions for treason, felony, and breach of the peace, another part nevertheless broadly forbids them. Rather, his insistence is that the Speech or Debate Clause at the very least protects him from criminal or civil liability and from questioning elsewhere than in the Senate, with respect to the events occurring at the subcommittee hearing at which the Pentagon Papers were introduced into the public record. To us this claim is incontrovertible. [408 U.S. 606, 616] The Speech or Debate Clause was designed to assure a co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive Branch. It thus protects Members against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process. We have no doubt that Senator Gravel may not be made to answer - either in terms of questions or in terms of defending himself from prosecution - for the events that occurred at the subcommittee meeting. Our decision is made easier by the fact that the United States appears to have abandoned whatever position it took to the contrary in the lower courts. </s> Even so, the United States strongly urges that because the Speech or Debate Clause confers a privilege only upon "Senators and Representatives," Rodberg himself has no valid claim to constitutional immunity from grand jury inquiry. In our view, both courts below correctly rejected this position. We agree with the Court of Appeals that for the purpose of construing the privilege a Member and his aide are to be "treated as one," United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d, at 761; or, as the District Court put it: the "Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry into things done by Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally." United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp., at 937-938. Both courts recognized what the Senate of the United States urgently presses here: that it is literally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legislative process, with Congress almost constantly in session and matters of legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides and assistants; that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical to the [408 U.S. 606, 617] Members' performance that they must be treated as the latter's alter egos; and that if they are not so recognized, the central role of the Speech or Debate Clause - to prevent intimidation of legislators by the Executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary, United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966) - will inevitably be diminished and frustrated. </s> The Court has already embraced similar views in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), where, in immunizing the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization from liability for an alleged libel contained in a press release, the Court held that the executive privilege recognized in prior cases could not be restricted to those of cabinet rank. As stated by Mr. Justice Harlan, the "privilege is not a badge or emolument of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in the effective functioning of government. The complexities and magnitude of governmental activity have become so great that there must of necessity be a delegation and redelegation of authority as to many functions, and we cannot say that these functions become less important simply because they are exercised by officers of lower rank in the executive hierarchy." Id., at 572-573 (footnote omitted). </s> It is true that the Clause itself mentions only "Senators and Representatives," but prior cases have plainly not taken a liberalistic approach in applying the privilege. The Clause also speaks only of "Speech or Debate," but the Court's consistent approach has been that to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause to words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view. Committee reports, resolutions, and the act of voting are equally covered; "[i]n short, . . . things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881), quoted [408 U.S. 606, 618] with approval in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S., at 179 . Rather than giving the Clause a cramped construction, the Court has sought to implement its fundamental purpose of freeing the legislator from executive and judicial oversight that realistically threatens to control his conduct as a legislator. We have little doubt that we are neither exceeding our judicial powers nor mistakenly construing the Constitution by holding that the Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself. </s> Nor can we agree with the United States that our conclusion is foreclosed by Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where the speech or debate privilege was held unavailable to certain House and committee employees. Those cases do not hold that persons other than Members of Congress are beyond the protection of the Clause when they perform or aid in the performance of legislative acts. In Kilbourn, the Speech or Debate Clause protected House Members who had adopted a resolution authorizing Kilbourn's arrest; that act was clearly legislative in nature. But the resolution was subject to judicial review insofar as its execution impinged on a citizen's rights as it did there. That the House could with impunity order an unconstitutional arrest afforded no protection for those who made the arrest. The Court quoted with approval from Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (K. B. 1839): "`So if the speaker by authority of the House order an illegal act, though that authority shall exempt him from question, his order shall no more justify the person who executed it than King Charles's warrant for levying ship-money could justify his revenue [408 U.S. 606, 619] officer,'" 103 U.S., at 202 . 11 The Speech or Debate Clause could not be construed to immunize an illegal arrest even though directed by an immune legislative act. The Court was careful to point out that the Members themselves were not implicated in the actual arrest, id., at 200, and, significantly enough, reserved the question whether there might be circumstances in which "there may . . . be things done, in the one House or the other, of an extraordinary character, for which the members who take part in the act may be held legally responsible." 103 U.S., at 204 (emphasis added). </s> Dombrowski v. Eastland, supra, is little different in principle. The Speech or Debate Clause there protected a Senator, who was also a subcommittee chairman, but not the subcommittee counsel. The record contained no evidence of the Senator's involvement in any activity that could result in liability, 387 U.S., at 84 , whereas the committee counsel was charged with conspiring with state officials to carry out an illegal seizure of records that the committee sought for its own proceedings. Ibid. The committee counsel was deemed protected to [408 U.S. 606, 620] some extent by legislative privilege, but it did not shield him from answering as yet unproved charges of conspiring to violate the constitutional rights of private parties. Unlawful conduct of this kind the Speech or Debate Clause simply did not immunize. </s> Powell v. McCormack reasserted judicial power to determine the validity of legislative actions impinging on individual rights - there the illegal exclusion of a representative-elect - and to afford relief against House aides seeking to implement the invalid resolutions. The Members themselves were dismissed from the case because shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause both from liability for their illegal legislative act and from having to defend themselves with respect to it. As in Kilbourn, the Court did not reach the question "whether under the Speech or Debate Clause petitioners would be entitled to maintain this action solely against the members of Congress where no agents participated in the challenged action and no other remedy was available." 395 U.S., at 506 n. 26. </s> None of these three cases adopted the simple proposition that immunity was unavailable to congressional or committee employees because they were not Representatives or Senators; rather, immunity was unavailable because they engaged in illegal conduct that was not entitled to Speech or Debate Clause protection. The three cases reflect a decidedly jaundiced view towards extending the Clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional conduct beyond that essential to foreclose executive control of legislative speech or debate and associated matters such as voting and committee reports and proceedings. In Kilbourn, the Sergeant-at-Arms was executing a legislative order, the issuance of which fell within the Speech or Debate Clause; in Eastland, the committee counsel was gathering information for a hearing; and in Powell, the [408 U.S. 606, 621] Clerk and Doorkeeper were merely carrying out directions that were protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. In each case, protecting the rights of others may have to some extent frustrated a planned or completed legislative act; but relief could be afforded without proof of a legislative act or the motives or purposes underlying such an act. No threat to legislative independence was posed, and Speech or Debate Clause protection did not attach. </s> None of this, as we see it, involves distinguishing between a Senator and his personal aides with respect to legislative immunity. In Kilbourn-type situations, both aide and Member should be immune with respect to committee and House action leading to the illegal resolution. So, too, in Eastland, as in this litigation, senatorial aides should enjoy immunity for helping a Member conduct committee hearings. On the other hand, no prior case has held that Members of Congress would be immune if they executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy of a citizen. Neither they nor their aides should be immune from liability or questioning in such circumstances. Such acts are no more essential to legislating than the conduct held unprotected in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966). 12 </s> The United States fears the abuses that history reveals have occurred when legislators are invested with the power to relieve others from the operation of otherwise valid civil and criminal laws. But these abuses, it seems to us, are for the most part obviated if the privilege applicable to the aide is viewed, as it must be, as the [408 U.S. 606, 622] privilege of the Senator, and invocable only by the Senator or by the aide on the Senator's behalf, 13 and if in all events the privilege available to the aide is confined to those services that would be immune legislative conduct if performed by the Senator himself. This view places beyond the Speech or Debate Clause a variety of services characteristically performed by aides for Members of Congress, even though within the scope of their employment. It likewise provides no protection for criminal conduct threatening the security of the person or property of others, whether performed at the direction of the Senator in preparation for or in execution of a legislative act or done without his knowledge or direction. Neither does it immunize Senator or aide from testifying at trials or grand jury proceedings involving third-party crimes where the questions do not require testimony about or impugn a legislative act. Thus our refusal to distinguish between Senator and aide in applying the Speech or Debate Clause does not mean that Rodberg is for all purposes exempt from grand jury questioning. </s> II </s> We are convinced also that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that Senator Gravel's alleged arrangement with Beacon Press to publish the Pentagon Papers was not protected speech or debate within the meaning of Art. I, 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution. </s> Historically, the English legislative privilege was not viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise immune libel on the floor of the House. Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E., at 114, 112 Eng. Rep., at 1156, recognized that "[f]or speeches made in Parliament by a member to the prejudice of any other person, or hazardous [408 U.S. 606, 623] to the public peace, that member enjoys complete impunity." But it was clearly stated that "if the calumnious or inflammatory speeches should be reported and published, the law will attach responsibility on the publisher." 14 </s> [408 U.S. 606, 624] This was accepted in Kilbourn v. Thompson as a "sound statement of the legal effect of the Bill of Rights and of the parliamentary law of England" and as a reasonable basis for inferring "that the framers of the Constitution meant the same thing by the use of language borrowed from that source." 103 U.S., at 202 . </s> Prior cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause "broadly to effectuate its purposes," United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S., at 180 , and have included within its reach anything "generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S., at 204 ; United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S., at 179 . Thus, voting by Members and committee reports are protected; and we recognize today - as the Court has recognized before, Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S., at 204 ; Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S., 367, 377-378 (1951) - that a Member's conduct at legislative committee hearings, although subject to judicial review in various circumstances, as is legislation itself, may not be made the basis for a civil or criminal judgment against a Member because that conduct is within the "sphere of legitimate legislative activity." Id., at 376. 15 </s> But the Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative [408 U.S. 606, 625] sphere. That Senators generally perform certain acts in their official capacity as Senators does not necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members of Congress are constantly in touch with the Executive Branch of the Government and with administrative agencies - they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the administration of a federal statute - but such conduct, though generally done, is not protected legislative activity. United States v. Johnson decided at least this much. "No argument is made, nor do we think that it could be successfully contended, that the Speech or Debate Clause reaches conduct, such as was involved in the attempt to influence the Department of Justice, that is in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative process." 383 U.S., at 172 . Cf. Burton v. United States, 202 U.S., at 367 -368. </s> Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters, they must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House. As the Court of Appeals put it, the courts have extended the privilege to matters beyond pure speech or debate in either House, but "only when necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations." United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d, at 760. </s> Here, private publication by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate; nor does questioning as to private publication threaten the integrity or independence of the Senate by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence. The Senator [408 U.S. 606, 626] had conducted his hearings; the record and any report that was forthcoming were available both to his committee and the Senate. Insofar as we are advised, neither Congress nor the full committee ordered or authorized the publication. 16 We cannot but conclude that the Senator's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part and parcel of the legislative process. </s> There are additional considerations. Article I, 6, cl. 1, as we have emphasized, does not purport to confer a general exemption upon Members of Congress from liability or process in criminal cases. Quite the contrary is true. While the Speech or Debate Clause recognized speech, voting, and other legislative acts as exempt from liability that might otherwise attach, it does not privilege either Senator or aide to violate an otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for or implementing legislative acts. If republication of these classified papers would be a crime under an Act of Congress, it would not be entitled to immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause. It also appears that the grand jury was pursuing this very subject in the normal course of a valid investigation. The Speech or Debate Clause does not in our view extend immunity to Rodberg, as a Senator's aide, from testifying before the grand jury about the arrangement between Senator Gravel and Beacon Press or about his own participation, if any, in the [408 U.S. 606, 627] alleged transaction, so long as legislative acts of the Senator are not impugned. </s> III </s> Similar considerations lead us to disagree with the Court of Appeals insofar as it fashioned, tentatively at least, a nonconstitutional testimonial privilege protecting Rodberg from any questioning by the grand jury concerning the matter of republication of the Pentagon Papers. This privilege, thought to be similar to that protecting executive officials from liability for libel, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959), was considered advisable "[t]o the extent that a congressman has responsibility to inform his constituents . . . ." 455 F.2d, at 760. But we cannot carry a judicially fashioned privilege so far as to immunize criminal conduct proscribed by an Act of Congress or to frustrate the grand jury's inquiry into whether publication of these classified documents violated a federal criminal statute. The socalled executive privilege has never been applied to shield executive officers from prosecution for crime, the Court of Appeals was quite sure that third parties were neither immune from liability nor from testifying about the republication matter, and we perceive no basis for conferring a testimonial privilege on Rodberg as the Court of Appeals seemed to do. </s> IV </s> We must finally consider, in the light of the foregoing, whether the protective order entered by the Court of Appeals is an appropriate regulations of the pending grand jury proceedings. </s> Focusing first on paragraph two of the order, we think the injunction against interrogating Rodberg with respect to any act, "in the broadest sense," performed by him within the scope of his employment, overly restricts [408 U.S. 606, 628] the scope of grand jury inquiry. Rodberg's immunity, testimonial or otherwise, extends only to legislative acts as to which the Senator himself would be immune. The grand jury, therefore, if relevant to its investigation into the possible violations of the criminal law, and absent Fifth Amendment objections, may require from Rodberg answers to questions relating to his or the Senator's arrangements, if any, with respect to republication or with respect to third-party conduct under valid investigation by the grand jury, as long as the questions do not implicate legislative action of the Senator. Neither do we perceive any constitutional or other privilege that shields Rodberg, any more than any other witness, from grand jury questions relevant to tracing the source of obviously highly classified documents that came into the Senator's possession and are the basic subject matter of inquiry in this case, as long as no legislative act is implicated by the questions. 17 </s> Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege applies both to Senator and aide, it appears to us that paragraph one of the order, alone, would afford ample protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any witness, including Rodberg: (1) concerning the Senator's [408 U.S. 606, 629] conduct, or the conduct of his aides, at the June 29, 1971, meeting of the subcommittee; 18 (2) concerning the motives and purposes behind the Senator's conduct, or that of his aides, at that meeting; (3) concerning communications between the Senator and his aides during the term of their employment and related to said meeting or any other legislative act of the Senator; (4) except as it proves relevant to investigating possible third-party crime, concerning any act, in itself not criminal, performed by the Senator, or by his aides in the course of their employment, in preparation for the subcommittee hearing. We leave the final form of such an order to the Court of Appeals in the first instance, or, if that court prefers, to the District Court. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the cases are remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> So ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The District Court permitted Senator Gravel to intervene in the proceeding on Dr. Rodberg's motion to quash the subpoena ordering his appearance before the grand jury and accepted motions from Gravel to quash the subpoena and to specify the exact nature of the questions to be asked Rodberg. The Government contested Gravel's standing to appeal the trial court's disposition of these motions on the ground that, had the subpoena been directed to the Senator, he could not have appealed from a denial of a motion to quash without first refusing to comply with the subpoena and being held in contempt. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). The Court of [408 U.S. 606, 609] Appeals, United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 756-757 (CA1 1972), held that because the subpoena was directed to third parties, who could not be counted on to risk contempt to protect intervenor's rights, Gravel might be "powerless to avert the mischief of the order" if not permitted to appeal, citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918). The United States does not here challenge the propriety of the appeal. </s> [Footnote 2 Dr. Rodberg, who filed his own motion to quash the subpoena directing his appearance and testimony, appeared as amicus curiae both in the Court of Appeals and this Court. Technically, Rodberg states, he is a party to No. 71-1026, insofar as the Government appeals from the protective order entered by the District Court. However, since Gravel intervened, Rodberg does not press the point. Brief of Leonard S. Rodberg as Amicus Curiae 2 n. 2. </s> [Footnote 3 The District Court found "that `as personal assistant to movant [Gravel], Dr. Rodberg assisted movant in preparing for disclosure and subsequently disclosing to movant's colleagues and constituents, at a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds, the contents of the so-called "Pentagon Papers," which were critical of the Executive's conduct in the field of foreign relations.'" United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp. 930, 932 (Mass. 1971). </s> [Footnote 4 Beacon Press is a division of the Unitarian Universalist Association, which appeared here as amicus curiae in support of the position taken by Senator Gravel. </s> [Footnote 5 Gravel so alleged in his motion to intervene in the Webber matter and to quash the subpoena ordering Webber to appear and testify. App. 15-18. </s> [Footnote 6 The Government maintained that Congress does not enjoy unlimited power to conduct business and that judicial review has often been exercised to curb extra-legislative incursions by legislative committees, citing Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); Hentoff v. Ichord, 318 F. Supp. 1175 (DC 1970), at least where such incursions are unrelated to a legitimate legislative purpose. It was alleged that Gravel had "convened a special, unauthorized, and untimely meeting of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Works (at midnight on June 29, 1971), for the purpose of reading the documents and thereafter placed all unread portions in the subcommittee record, with Dr. Rodberg soliciting publication following the meeting." App. 9. The District Court rejected the contention: "Senator Gravel has suggested that the availability of funds for the construction and improvement of public buildings and grounds has been affected by the necessary costs of the war in Vietnam and that therefore the development and conduct of the war is properly within the concern of his subcommittee. The court rejects the Government's argument without detailed consideration of the merits of the Senator's position, on the basis of the general rule restricting judicial inquiry into matters of legislative purpose and operations." United States v. Doe, 332 F. Supp., at 935. Cases such as Watkins, supra, were distinguished on the ground that they concerned the power of Congress under the Constitution: "It has not been suggested [408 U.S. 606, 611] by the Government that the Subcommittee itself is unauthorized, nor that the war in Vietnam is an issue beyond the purview of congressional debate and action. Also, the individual rights at stake in these proceedings are not those of a witness before a congressional committee or of a subject of a committee's investigation, but only those of a congressman and member of his personal staff who claim `intimidation by the executive.'" 332 F. Supp., at 936. </s> [Footnote 7 The District Court thought that Rodberg could be questioned concerning his own conduct prior to joining the Senator's staff and concerning the activities of third parties with whom Rodberg and Gravel dealt. Id., at 934. </s> [Footnote 8 The protective order entered by the District Court provided as follows: </s> "(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971 nor about things done by the Senator in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting. </s> "(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions on June 29, 1971 after having been engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were taken at the Senator's direction either at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds or in preparation for and intimately related to said meeting." Id., at 938. </s> [Footnote 9 The Court of Appeals thought third parties could be questioned as to their own conduct regarding the Pentagon Papers, "including their dealing with intervenor or his aides." United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d at 761. The court found no merit in the claim that such parties should be shielded from questioning under the Speech or Debate Clause concerning their own wrongful acts, even if such questioning may bring the Senator's conduct into question. Id., at 758 n. 2. </s> [Footnote 10 Williamson, United States Congressman, had been found guilty of conspiring to commit subornation of perjury in connection with proceedings for the purchase of public land. He objected to the court's passing sentence upon him and particularly protested that any imprisonment would deprive him of his constitutional right to "go to, attend at and return from the ensuing session of Congress." Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 433 (1908). The Court rejected the contention that the Speech or Debate Clause freed legislators from accountability for criminal conduct. </s> [Footnote 11 In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 198 (1881), the Court noted a second example, used by Mr. Justice Coleridge in Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 225-226, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112, 1196-1197 (K. B. 1839): "`Let me suppose, by way of illustration, an extreme case; the House of Commons resolves that any one wearing a dress of a particular manufacture is guilty of a breach of privilege, and orders the arrest of such persons by the constable of the parish. An arrest is made and action brought, to which the order of the House is pleaded as a justification. . . . In such a case as the one supposed, the plaintiff's counsel would insist on the distinction between power and privilege; and no lawyer can seriously doubt that it exists: but the argument confounds them, and forbids us to enquire, in any particular case, whether it ranges under the one or the other. I can find no principle which sanctions this.'" </s> [Footnote 12 Senator Gravel is willing to assume that if he personally had "stolen" the Pentagon Papers, and that act were a crime, he could be prosecuted, as could aides or other assistants who participated in the theft. Consolidated Brief for Senator Gravel 93. </s> [Footnote 13 It follows that an aide's claim of privilege can be repudiated and thus waived by the Senator. </s> [Footnote 14 Stockdale extensively reviewed the precedents and their interplay with the privilege so forcefully recognized in the Bill of Rights of 1689: "That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament." 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2. From these cases, including Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273, 105 Eng. Rep. 102 (K. B. 1813); Rex v. Wright, 8 T. R. 293, 101 Eng. Rep. 1396 (K. B. 1799); Rex v. Abingdon, 1 Esp. 226, 170 Eng. Rep. 337 (N. P. 1794); Rex v. Williams, 2 Show. K. B. 471, 89 Eng. Rep. 1048 (1686), it is apparent that to the extent English precedent is relevant to the Speech or Debate Clause there is little, if any, support for Senator Gravel's position with respect to republication. Parliament reacted to Stockdale v. Hansard by adopting the Parliamentary Papers Act of 1840, 3 & 4 Vict., c. 9, which stayed proceedings in all cases where it could be shown that publication was by order of a House of Parliament and was a bona fide report, printed and circulated without malice. See generally C. Wittke, The History of English Parliamentary Privilege (1921). </s> Gravel urges that Stockdale v. Hansard was later repudiated in Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73 (1868), which held a proprietor immune from civil libel for an accurate republication of a debate in the House of Lords. But the immunity established in Wason was not founded on parliamentary privilege, id., at 84, but upon analogy to the privilege for reporting judicial proceedings. Id., at 87-90. The Wason court stated its "unhesitating and unqualified adhesion" to the "masterly judgments" rendered in Stockdale and characterized the question before it as whether republication, quite apart from any assertion of parliamentary privilege, was "in itself privileged and lawful." Id., at 86-87. That the privileges for nonmalicious republication of parliamentary and judicial proceedings - later established as qualified - were construed as coextensive in all respects, id., at 95, further underscores the inappositeness of reading Wason as based upon parliamentary privilege that, like the Speech or Debate Clause, is absolute. Much later Holdsworth was to comment that at the time of Wason the distinction between absolute and qualified privilege had not been worked out and that the "part played by [408 U.S. 606, 624] malice in the tort and crime of defamation" probably helped retard recognition of a qualified privilege. 8 W. Holdsworth, History of English Law 377 (1926). </s> [Footnote 15 The Court in Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 -377 (1951), was equally clear that "legislative activity" is not all-encompassing, nor may its limits be established by the Legislative Branch: "Legislatures may not of course acquire power by an unwarranted extension of privilege. The House of Commons' claim of power to establish the limits of its privilege has been little more than a pretense since Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 3 id. 320. This Court has not hesitated to sustain the rights of private individuals when it found Congress was acting outside its legislative role. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 ; Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 ; compare McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 ." </s> [Footnote 16 The sole constitutional claim asserted here is based on the Speech or Debate Clause. We need not address issues that may arise when Congress or either House, as distinguished from a single Member, orders the publication and/or public distribution of committee hearings, reports, or other materials. Of course, Art. I, 5, cl. 3, requires that each House "keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy . . . ." This Clause has not been the subject of extensive judicial examination. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 -671 (1892); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892). </s> [Footnote 17 The Court of Appeals held that the Speech or Debate Clause protects aides as well as Senators and that while third parties may be questioned about the source of a Senator's information, neither aide nor Senator need answer such inquiries. The Government's position is that the aide has no protection under the Speech or Debate Clause and may be questioned even about legislative acts. A contrary ruling, the Government fears, would invite great abuse. On the other hand, Gravel contends that the Court of Appeals insufficiently protected the Senator both with respect to the matter of republication and with respect to the scope of inquiry permitted the grand jury in questioning third-party witnesses with whom the Senator and his aides dealt. Hence, we are of the view that both the question of the aide's immunity and the question of the extent of that immunity are properly before us in this case. And surely we are not bound by the Government's view of the scope of the privilege. </s> [Footnote 18 Having established that neither the Senator nor Rodberg is subject to liability for what occurred at the subcommittee hearing, we perceive no basis for inquiry of either Rodberg or third parties on this subject. If it proves material to establish for the record the fact of publication at the subcommittee hearing, which seems undisputed, the public record of the hearing would appear sufficient for this purpose. We do not intend to imply, however, that in no grand jury investigations or criminal trials of third parties may third-party witnesses be interrogated about legislative acts of Members of Congress. As for inquiry of Rodberg about third-party crimes, we are quite sure that the District Court has ample power to keep the grand jury proceedings within proper bounds and to foreclose improvident harassment and fishing expeditions into the affairs of a Member of Congress that are no proper concern of the grand jury or the Executive Branch. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting in part. </s> The Court today holds that the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect a Congressman from being forced to testify before a grand jury about sources of information [408 U.S. 606, 630] used in preparation for legislative acts. This critical question was not embraced in the petitions for certiorari. It was not dealt with in the written briefs. It was addressed only tangentially during the oral arguments. Yet it is a question with profound implications for the effective functioning of the legislative process. I cannot join in the Court's summary resolution of so vitally important a constitutional issue. </s> In preparing for legislative hearings, debates, and roll calls, a member of Congress obviously needs the broadest possible range of information. Valuable information may often come from sources in the Executive Branch or from citizens in private life. And informants such as these may be willing to relate information to a Congressman only in confidence, fearing that disclosure of their identities might cause loss of their jobs or harassment by their colleagues or employers. In fact, I should suppose it to be self-evident that many such informants would insist upon an assurance of confidentiality before revealing their information. Thus, the acquisition of knowledge through a promise of nondisclosure of its source will often be a necessary concomitant of effective legislative conduct, if the members of Congress are properly to perform their constitutional duty. </s> The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized the importance of the information-gathering process in the performance of the legislative function. It held that the Speech or Debate Clause bars all grand jury questioning of a member of Congress regarding the sources of his information. The Court of Appeals reasoned that to allow a "grand jury to question a senator about his sources would chill both the vigor with which legislators seek facts, and the willingness of potential sources to supply them." United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 758-759. The Government did not seek review of this ruling, but rather sought certiorari on the question whether the [408 U.S. 606, 631] Speech or Debate Clause bars a grand jury from questioning congressional aides about privileged actions of Senators or Representatives. 1 </s> The Court, however, today decides, sua sponte, that a Member of Congress may, despite the Speech or Debate Clause, be compelled to testify before a grand jury concerning the sources of information used by him in the performance of his legislative duties, if such an inquiry "proves relevant to investigating possible third-party crime." Ante, at 629 (emphasis supplied). 2 In my view, this ruling is highly dubious in view of the basic purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause - "to prevent intimidation [of Congressmen] by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 . </s> Under the Court's ruling, a Congressman may be subpoenaed by a vindictive Executive to testify about informants who have not committed crimes and who have no knowledge of crime. Such compulsion can occur, because the judiciary has traditionally imposed virtually no limitations on the grand jury's broad investigatory powers; grand jury investigations are not limited in scope [408 U.S. 606, 632] to specific criminal acts, and standards of materiality and relevance are greatly relaxed. 3 But even if the Executive had reason to believe that a Member of Congress had knowledge of a specific probable violation of law, it is by no means clear to me that the Executive's interest in the administration of justice must always override the public interest in having an informed Congress. Why should we not, given the tension between two competing interests, each of constitutional dimensions, balance the claims of the Speech or Debate Clause against the claims of the grand jury in the particularized contexts of specific cases? And why are not the Houses of Congress the proper institutions in most situations to impose sanctions upon a Representative or Senator who withholds information about crime acquired in the course of his legislative duties? 4 </s> [408 U.S. 606, 633] </s> I am not prepared to accept the Court's rigid conclusion that the Executive may always compel a legislator to testify before a grand jury about sources of information used in preparing for legislative acts. For that reason, I dissent from that part of the Court's opinion that so inflexibly and summarily decides this vital question. </s> [Footnote 1 As stated in its petition for certiorari, the Government asked us to consider: </s> "Whether Article 1, Section 6, of the Constitution providing that `. . . for any Speech or Debate in either House,' the Senators and Representatives `shall not be questioned in any other Place' bars a grand jury from questioning aides of members of Congress and other persons about matters that may touch on activities of a member of Congress which are protected `Speech or Debate.'" </s> The Government also asked us to consider: </s> "Whether an aide of a member of Congress has a common law privilege not to testify before a grand jury concerning private republication of material which his Senator-employer had introduced into the record of a Senate subcommittee." </s> We granted certiorari on both questions. 405 U.S. 916 . </s> [Footnote 2 See also ante, at 622, 628. </s> [Footnote 3 See, e. g., Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 ; Hendricks v. United States, 223 U.S. 178 ; United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 . See generally Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 ; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 . </s> [Footnote 4 During oral argument, the Solicitor General virtually conceded, in the course of arguing that aides should not enjoy the same testimonial privilege as Congressmen, that a Senator could not be called before the grand jury to testify about the sources of his information: </s> "Q. Mr. Solicitor, am I correct that you wouldn't be able to question the Senator as to where he got the papers from? </s> "A. Oh, Mr. Justice, we are not able to question the Senator about anything insofar as it relates to speech or debate. </s> "Q. Well, this was related, you agree, to speech and debate? </s> "A. I am not contending to the contrary. . . ." Tr. of Oral Arg., Apr. 20, 1972, pp. 27-28. </s> The following exchange also took place: </s> "Q. You can't ask a Senator where you got the material you used in your speech. </s> "A. Yes, Mr. Justice. </s> "Q. You can't. </s> "A. Yes." Id., at 29. </s> At another point in the oral argument, the Solicitor General said [408 U.S. 606, 633] that even when a Senator or Representative has knowledge of crime as a result of legislative acts "[t]hey can't even be required to respond to questions with respect to their speeches and debates. That is a great and historic privilege which ought to be maintained which I fully support but which does not extend to any other persons than Senators and Representatives." Id., at 32. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> I would construe the Speech or Debate Clause 1 to insulate Senator Gravel and his aides from inquiry concerning the Pentagon Papers, and Beacon Press from inquiry concerning publication of them, for that publication was but another way of informing the public as to what had gone on in the privacy of the Executive Branch concerning the conception and pursuit of the so-called "war" in Vietnam. Alternatively, I would hold that Beacon Press is protected by the First Amendment from prosecution or investigations for publishing or undertaking to publish the Pentagon Papers. </s> Gravel, Senator from Alaska, was Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds. He convened a meeting of the Subcommittee and read to it a summary of the so-called Pentagon Papers. He then introduced "the entire Papers, allegedly some 47 volumes and said to contain seven million words, as an [408 U.S. 606, 634] exhibit." 455 F.2d 753, 756. Thereafter, he supplied a copy of the papers to the Beacon Press, a Boston publishing house, on the understanding that it would publish the papers without profit to the Senator. A grand jury was investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers and subpoenaed one Rodberg, an aide to Senator Gravel, to testify. Rodberg moved to quash the subpoena; and on the same day the Senator moved to intervene. Intervention was granted and in due course the Court of Appeals entered the following order which is now before us for review: </s> "(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor, if the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's conduct at that meeting, about any communications with him or with his aides regarding the activities of the Senator or his aides during the period of their employment, in preparation for and related to said meeting. </s> "(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions in the broadest sense, including observations and communications, oral or written, by or to him or coming to his attention while being interviewed for, or after having been engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were in the course of his employment." </s> I </s> Both the introduction of the Pentagon Papers by Senator Gravel into the record before his Subcommittee and his efforts to publish them were clearly covered by [408 U.S. 606, 635] the Speech or Debate Clause, as construed in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 : </s> "It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken in debate. The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body by its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and to the act of voting, whether it is done vocally or by passing between the tellers. In short, to things generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it." 2 </s> One of the things normally done by a Member "in relation to the business before it" is the introduction of documents or other exhibits in the record the committee or subcommittee is making. The introduction of a document into a record of the Committee or subcommittee by its Chairman certainly puts it in the public domain. Whether a particular document is relevant to the inquiry of the committee may be questioned by the Senate in the exercise of its power to prescribe rules for the governance and discipline of wayward members. But there is only one instance, as I see it, where supervisory power over that issue is vested in the courts, and that is where a witness before a committee is prosecuted for contempt and he makes the defense that the question he refused to answer was not germane to the legislative inquiry or within its permissible range. See Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 ; Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, at 190. </s> In all other situations, however, the judiciary's view of the motives or germaneness of a Senator's conduct [408 U.S. 606, 636] before a committee is irrelevant. For, "[t]he claim of an unworthy purpose does not destroy the privilege." Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 . If there is an abuse, there is a remedy; but it is legislative, not judicial. </s> As to Senator Gravel's efforts to publish the Subcommittee record's contents, wide dissemination of this material as an educational service is as much a part of the Speech or Debate Clause philosophy as mailing under a frank a Senator's or a Congressman's speech across the Nation. As mentioned earlier, "[i]t is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. . . . The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function." W. Wilson, Congressional Government 303 (1885), quoted with approval in Tenney v. Brandhove, supra, at 377 n. 6. "From the earliest times in its history, the Congress has assiduously performed an 'informing function,'" Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n. 33. "Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political questions so that their constituents can be fully informed by them." Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 136 . </s> We said in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 , that the Speech or Debate Clause established a "legislative privilege" that protected a member of Congress against prosecution "by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary" in order, as Mr. Justice Harlan put it, to ensure "the independence of the legislature." That hostility emanates from every stage of the present proceedings. It emphasizes the need to construe the Speech or Debate Clause generously, not niggardly. If republication of a Senator's speech in a newspaper carries the privilege, as it doubtless does, then republication of the exhibits introduced [408 U.S. 606, 637] at a hearing before Congress must also do so. That means that republication by Beacon Press is within the ambit of the Speech or Debate Clause and that the confidences of the Senator in arranging it are not subject to inquiry "in any other Place" than the Congress. </s> It is said that though the Senator is immune from questioning as to what he said and did in preparation for the committee hearing and in conducting it, his aides may be questioned in his stead. Such easy circumvention of the Speech or Debate Clause would indeed make it a mockery. The aides and agents such as Beacon Press must be taken as surrogates for the Senator and the confidences of the job that they enjoy are his confidences that the Speech or Debate Clause embraces. </s> II </s> The secrecy of documents in the Executive Department has been a bone of contention between it and Congress from the beginning. 3 Most discussions have [408 U.S. 606, 638] centered on the scope of the executive privilege in stamping documents as "secret," "top secret," "confidential," and so on, thus withholding them from the eyes of Congress and the press. The practice has reached large proportions, it being estimated that </s> (1) Over 30,000 people in the Executive Branch have the power to wield the classification stamp. 4 </s> (2) The Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Atomic Energy Commission have over 20 million classified documents in their files. </s> (3) Congress appropriates approximately $15 billion annually without most of its members or the public or the press knowing for what purposes the money is to be used. 5 </s> The problem looms large as one of separation of [408 U.S. 606, 639] powers. Woodrow Wilson wrote about it in terms of the "informing function" of Congress: 6 </s> "It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. The argument is not only that discussed and interrogated administration is the only pure and efficient administration, but, more than that, that the only really self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates its administration. The talk on the part of Congress which we sometimes justly condemn is the profitless squabble of words over frivolous bills or selfish party issues. It would be hard to conceive of there being too much talk about the practical concerns and processes of government. Such talk it is which, when earnestly and purposefully conducted, clears the public mind and shapes the demands of public opinion." </s> Classification of documents is a concern of the Congress. It is, however, no concern of the courts, as I see it, how a [408 U.S. 606, 640] document is stamped in an Executive Department or whether a committee of Congress can obtain the use of it. The federal courts do not sit as an ombudsman refereeing the disputes between the other two branches. The federal courts do become vitally involved whenever their power is sought to be invoked either to protect the press against censorship as in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 , or to protect the press against punishment for publishing "secret" documents or to protect an individual against his disclosure of their contents for any of the purposes of the First Amendment. </s> Forcing the press to become the Government's co-conspirator in maintaining state secrets is at war with the objectives of the First Amendment. That guarantee was designed in part to ensure a meaningful version of self-government by immersing the people in a "steady, robust, unimpeded, and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which are continuously subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-examination." Branzburg v. Hayes, post, at 715 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 ; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 ; Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (BRENNAN, J., concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 . As I have said, in dissent, elsewhere, e. g., Branzburg, supra; Kleindienst v. Mandel, post, at 771, that Amendment is aimed at protecting not only speakers and writers but also listeners and readers. The essence of our form of governing was at the heart of Mr. Justice Black's reminder in the Pentagon Papers case that "[t]he press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people." 403 U.S., at 717 (concurring opinion). Similarly, Senator Sam Ervin has observed: "When the people do not know what their government is doing, those who govern are not accountable for their actions - and accountability is basic to the democratic system. By using devices of secrecy, the government [408 U.S. 606, 641] attains the power to `manage' the news and through it to manipulate public opinion." 7 Ramsey Clark as Attorney General expressed a similar sentiment: "If government is to be truly of, by, and for the people, the people must know in detail the activities of government. Nothing so diminishes democracy as secrecy." 8 And see Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245; Press Freedoms Under Pressure: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Government and the Press 109-117 (1972) (background paper by Fred Graham on access to news); M. Johnson, The Government Secrecy Controversy 39-41 (1967). </s> Jefferson in a letter to Madison, dated December 20, 1787, posed the question "whether peace is best preserved by giving energy to the government, or information to the people," and then answered, "This last is the most certain, and the most legitimate engine of government." 6 Writings of Thomas Jefferson 392 (Memorial ed. 1903). </s> Madison at the time of the Whiskey Rebellion spoke in the House against a resolution of censure against the groups stirring up the turmoil against that rebellion. </s> "`If we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people.'" Brant, The Madison Heritage, 35 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 882, 900. </s> Yet, as has been revealed by such exposes as the Pentagon Papers, the My Lai massacres, the Gulf of Tonkin "incident," and the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Government usually suppresses damaging news but highlights [408 U.S. 606, 642] favorable news. In this filtering process the secrecy stamp is the officials' tool of suppression and it has been used to withhold information which in "99 1/2%" of the cases would present no danger to national security. 9 To refuse to publish "classified" reports would at times relegate a publisher to distributing only the press releases of Government or remaining silent; if he printed only the press releases or "leaks" he would become an arm of officialdom, not its critic. Rather, in my view, when a publisher obtains a classified document he should be free to print it without fear of retribution, unless it contains material directly bearing on future, sensitive planning of the Government. 10 By that test Beacon Press could with [408 U.S. 606, 643] impunity reproduce the Pentagon Papers inasmuch as their content "is all history, not future events. None of it is more recent than 1968." New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S., at 722 n. 3 (concurring opinion). </s> The late Mr. Justice Harlan in the Pentagon Papers case said that in that situation the courts had only two restricted functions to perform: first, to ascertain whether the subject matter of the dispute lies within the proper compass of the President's constitutional power; and second, to insist that the head of the Executive Department concerned - whether State or Defense - determine if disclosure of the subject matter "would irreparably impair the national security." Beyond those two inquiries, he concluded, the judiciary may not go. Id., at 757-758 (dissenting opinion). </s> My view is quite different. When the press stands before the court as a suspected criminal, it is the duty of the court to disregard what the prosecution claims is the executive privilege and to acquit the press or overturn the ruling or judgment against it, if the First Amendment and the assertion of the executive privilege conflict. For the executive privilege - nowhere made explicit in the Constitution - is necessarily subordinate to the express commands of the Constitution. </s> United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 , involved the question whether a proclamation issued by the President, pursuant to a Joint Resolution of the [408 U.S. 606, 644] Congress, was adequate to sustain an indictment. The Court, in holding that it was, discussed at length the power of the President. The Court said that the power of the President in the field of international relations does not require as a basis an Act of Congress; but it added that his power "like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." Id., at 320. </s> When the Executive Branch launches a criminal prosecution against the press, it must do so only under an Act of Congress. Yet Congress has no authority to place the press under the restraints of the executive privilege without "abridging" the press within the meaning of the First Amendment. </s> In related and analogous situations, federal courts have subordinated the executive privilege to the requirements of a fair trial. </s> Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the trial of Aaron Burr ruled "[t]hat the president of the United States may be subpoenaed, and examined as a witness, and required to produce any paper in his possession, is not controverted." United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807). Yet he "may have sufficient motives for declining to produce a particular paper, and those motives may be such as to restrain the court from enforcing its production." Ibid. A letter to the President, he said, "may relate to public concerns" and not be "forced into public view." Id., at 192. But where the paper was shown "to be essential to the justice of the case," ibid., "the paper [should] be produced, or the cause be continued." Ibid. </s> Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 , is in that tradition. It was a criminal prosecution for perjury, the telling evidence against the accused being the testimony of Government investigators. The defense asked for contemporary notes made by agents at the time. Refusal [408 U.S. 606, 645] was based on their confidential character. We held that to be reversible error. 11 </s> "We hold that the criminal action must be dismissed when the Government, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce, for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements or reports in its possession of government witnesses touching the subject matter of their testimony at the trial. Accord, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 -61. The burden is the Government's, not to be shifted to the trial judge, to decide whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is greater than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of state secrets and other confidential information in the Government's possession." Id., at 672. </s> Congress enacted the so-called Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500, regulating the use of Government documents in criminal prosecutions. We sustained that Act. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 258 . Under the Act a defendant "on trial in a federal criminal prosecution is entitled, for impeachment purposes, to relevant and [408 U.S. 606, 646] competent statements of a government witness in possession of the Government touching the events or activities as to which the witness has testified at the trial. . . . The command of the statute is thus designed to further the fair and just administration of criminal justice, a goal of which the judiciary is the special guardian." Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92 . And see Clancy v. United States, 365 U.S. 312 . </s> The prosecution often dislikes to make public the identity of the informer on whose information its case rests. But his identity must be disclosed where his testimony is material to the trial. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 . In other words, the desire for Government secrecy does not override the demands for a fair trial. And see Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251, 254 . The constitutional demands for a fair trial, implicit in the concept of due process, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 , override the Government's desire for secrecy, whether the identity of an informer or the executive privilege be involved. And see Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 . </s> The requirements of the First Amendment are not of lesser magnitude. They override any claim to executive privilege. As stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., supra, the class of executive privilege "like every other governmental power, must be exercised in sub-ordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution." 299 U.S., at 320 . </s> III </s> Aside from the question of the extent to which publishers can be penalized for printing classified documents, surely the First Amendment protects against all inquiry into the dissemination of information which, although once classified, has become part of the public domain. </s> To summon Beacon Press through its officials before the grand jury and to inquire into why it did what it did [408 U.S. 606, 647] and its publication plans is "abridging" the freedom of the press contrary to the command of the First Amendment. In light of the fact that these documents were part of the official Senate record, 12 Beacon Press has violated no valid law, and the grand jury's scrutiny of it reduces to "[e]xposure purely for the sake of exposure." Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S., at 82 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). As in United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 , where a legislative committee inquired of a publisher of political tracts as to its customers' identities, "[i]f the present inquiry were sanctioned, the press would be subjected to harassment that in practical effect might be as serious as censorship." Id., at 57 (concurring opinion). Under our Constitution the Government has no surveillance over the press. That includes, as we held in New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 , the prohibition against prior restraints. Yet criminal punishment for or investigations of what the press publishes, though a different species of abridgment, is nonetheless within the ban of the First Amendment. </s> The story of the Pentagon Papers is a chronicle of suppression of vital decisions to protect the reputations and political hides of men who worked an amazingly successful scheme of deception on the American people. They were successful not because they were astute but because the press had become a frightened, regimented, submissive instrument, fattening on favors from those in power and forgetting the great tradition of reporting. To allow the press further to be cowed by grand [408 U.S. 606, 648] jury inquiries and prosecution is to carry the concept of "abridging" the press to frightening proportions. </s> What would be permissible if Beacon Press "stole" the Pentagon Papers is irrelevant to today's decision. What Beacon Press plans to publish is matter introduced into a public record by a Senator acting under the full protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. 13 In light of the command of the First Amendment we have no choice but to rule that here government, not the press, is lawless. </s> I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals except as to Beacon Press, in which case I would reverse. </s> [Footnote 1 The Speech or Debate Clause included in Art. I, 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides as respects Senators and Representatives that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place." </s> [Footnote 2 And see United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 172 , 177; and Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 . </s> [Footnote 3 See Developments In The Law - The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1207-1215 (1972); Note, The Right of Government Employees to Furnish Information to Congress: Statutory and Constitutional Aspects, 57 Va. L. Rev. 885-887 (1971); Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 1044 (1965); Schwartz, Executive Privilege and Congressional Investigatory Power, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 3 (1959); Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the Executive, Hearing on S. 1125 before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). There is no express statutory authority for the classification procedure used currently by the bureaucracies, although it has been claimed that Congress has recognized it in such measures as the exemptions from the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. 552 (b) and the espionage laws, 18 U.S.C. 792-799. Rather, the classification regime has been implemented through a series of executive orders [408 U.S. 606, 638] described in Developments In The Law, supra, at 1192-1198. It has also been claimed that several sections of Art. II (such as the designation of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy) confer upon the Executive an inherent power to classify documents. See Report of the Commission on Government Security, S. Doc. No. 64, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 158 (1957). </s> [Footnote 4 Hearings on S. 1125, supra, n. 3, at 517-518. One estimate of the number of officials who can classify documents is even higher. In the Department of Defense alone, 803 persons have the authority to classify documents Top Secret; 7,687 have permission to stamp them Secret, and 31,048 have the authorization to denominate papers Confidential. United States Government Information Policies and Practices - The Pentagon Papers, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 599 (statement of David Cooke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense). </s> [Footnote 5 Senator Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, recently testified that his committee had been so unsuccessful in obtaining accurate information about the Vietnam war from the Executive Branch that it was required to hire its own investigators and send them to Southeast Asia. Hearings on S. 1125, supra, n. 3, at 206. </s> [Footnote 6 Congressional Government 303-304 (1885). </s> [Footnote 7 Secrecy in a Free Society, 213 Nation 454, 456 (1971). </s> [Footnote 8 Attorney General's Memorandum on the Public Information Section of the Administrative Procedure Act, 20 Ad. L. Rev. 263, 264 (1967). </s> [Footnote 9 United States Government Information Policies and Practices - The Pentagon Papers, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 97; Cong. Horton, The Public's Right to Know, 77 Case & Comm. 3, 5 (1972). We are told that the military has withheld as confidential a large selection of photographs showing atrocities against Vietnamese civilians wrought by both Communist and United States forces. Even a training manual devoted to the history of the Bolshevik revolution was dubbed secret by the military. Hearings, supra, pt. 3, at 966, 967 (testimony of former classification officer). And ordinary newspaper clippings of criticism aimed at the military have been routinely marked secret. Id., pt. 1, at 100. Former Justice and former Ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Goldberg has stated: "I have read and prepared countless thousands of classified documents. In my experience, 75 percent of these documents should never have been classified in the first place; another 15 percent quickly outlived the need for secrecy; and only about 10 percent genuinely required restricted access over any significant period of time." Id., pt. 1, at 12. </s> [Footnote 10 Moreover, I would not even permit a conviction for the publication of documents related to future and sensitive planning where the jury was permitted, as it was in United States v. Drummond, 354 F.2d 132, 152 (CA2), to consider the fact that the documents had been classified by the Executive Branch pursuant to its present over-broad system which, in my view, unnecessarily sweeps too much [408 U.S. 606, 643] nonsensitive information into the locked files of the bureaucracies. In general, however, I agree that there may be situations and occasions in which the right to know must yield to other compelling and overriding interests. As Professor Henkin has observed, many deliberations in Government are kept confidential, such as the proceedings of grand juries or our own Conferences, despite the fact that the breadth of public knowledge is thereby diminished. Henkin, The Right To Know And The Duty To Withhold: The Case Of The Pentagon Papers, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 271, 274-275 (1971). </s> [Footnote 11 In Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 , we took a like course in requiring the prosecution to disclose to the defense records of unlawful electronic surveillance: </s> "It may be that the prospect of disclosure will compel the Government to dismiss some prosecutions in deference to national security or third-party interests. But this is a choice the Government concededly faces with respect to material which it has obtained illegally and which it admits, or which a judge would find, is arguably relevant to the evidence offered against the defendant." Id., at 184. </s> A different rule obtains in civil suits where the government is not the moving party but is a defendant and has specified the terms on which it may be sued. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 12 . </s> [Footnote 12 Republication of what has filled the Congressional Record is commonplace. Newspapers, television, and radio use its contents constantly. I see no difference between republication of a paragraph and republication of material amounting to a book. Once a document or a series of documents is in the record of the Senate or House or one of its committees it is in the public domain. </s> [Footnote 13 It is conceded that all of the material which Beacon Press has undertaken to publish was introduced into the Subcommittee record and that this record is open to the public. See Brief for United States 3. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, join, dissenting. </s> The facts of this litigation, which are detailed by the Court, and the objections to overclassification of documents by the Executive, detailed by my Brother DOUGLAS, need not be repeated here. My concern is with the narrow scope accorded the Speech or Debate Clause by today's decision. I fully agree with the Court that a Congressman's immunity under the Clause must also be extended to his aides if it is to be at all effective. The complexities and press of congressional business make it impossible for a Member to function without the close cooperation of his legislative assistants. Their role as his agents in the performance of official duties requires that they share his immunity for those acts. The scope of that immunity, however, is as important as the persons to whom it extends. In my view, today's decision so restricts the privilege of speech or debate as to endanger the continued performance of legislative tasks that are vital to the workings of our democratic system. [408 U.S. 606, 649] </s> I </s> In holding that Senator Gravel's alleged arrangement with Beacon Press to publish the Pentagon Papers is not shielded from extra-senatorial inquiry by the Speech or Debate Clause, the Court adopts what for me is a far too narrow view of the legislative function. The Court seems to assume that words spoken in debate or written in congressional reports are protected by the Clause, so that if Senator Gravel had recited part of the Pentagon Papers on the Senate floor or copied them into a Senate report, those acts could not be questioned "in any other Place." Yet because he sought a wider audience, to publicize information deemed relevant to matters pending before his own committee, the Senator suddenly loses his immunity and is exposed to grand jury investigation and possible prosecution for the republication. The explanation for this anomalous result is the Court's belief that "Speech or Debate" encompasses only acts necessary to the internal deliberations of Congress concerning proposed legislation. "Here," according to the Court, "private publication by Senator Gravel through the cooperation of Beacon Press was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate." Ante, at 625. Therefore, "the Senator's arrangements with Beacon Press were not part and parcel of the legislative process." Id., at 626. </s> Thus, the Court excludes from the sphere of protected legislative activity a function that I had supposed lay at the heart of our democratic system. I speak, of course, of the legislator's duty to inform the public about matters affecting the administration of government. That this "informing function" falls into the class of things "generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it," Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881), was explicitly acknowledged by the Court in Watkins [408 U.S. 606, 650] v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). In speaking of the "power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government," the Court noted that "[f]rom the earliest times in its history, the Congress has assiduously performed an `informing function' of this nature." Id., at 200 n. 33. </s> We need look no further than Congress itself to find evidence supporting the Court's observation in Watkins. Congress has provided financial support for communications between its Members and the public, including the franking privilege for letters, telephone and telegraph allowances, stationery allotments, and favorable prices on reprints from the Congressional Record. Congressional hearings, moreover, are not confined to gathering information for internal distribution, but are often widely publicized, sometimes televised, as a means of alerting the electorate to matters of public import and concern. The list is virtually endless, but a small sampling of contemporaneous hearings of this kind would certainly include the Kefauver hearings on organized crime, the 1966 hearings on automobile safety, and the numerous hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the origins and conduct of the war in Vietnam. In short, there can be little doubt that informing the electorate is a thing "generally done" by the Members of Congress "in relation to the business before it." </s> The informing function has been cited by numerous students of American politics, both within and without the Government, as among the most important responsibilities of legislative office. Woodrow Wilson, for example, emphasized its role in preserving the separation of powers by ensuring that the administration of public policy by the Executive is understood by the legislature and electorate: </s> "It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into every affair of government [408 U.S. 606, 651] and to talk much about what it sees. It is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom and will of its constituents. Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government, the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion, the country must remain in embarrassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct." Congressional Government 303 (1885). </s> Others have viewed the give-and-take of such communication as an important means of educating both the legislator and his constituents: </s> "With the decline of Congress as an original source of legislation, this function of keeping the government in touch with public opinion and of keeping public opinion in touch with the conduct of the government becomes increasingly important. Congress no longer governs the country; the Administration in all its ramifications actually governs. But Congress serves as a forum through which public opinion can be expressed, general policy discussed, and the conduct of governmental affairs exposed and criticized." The Reorganization of Congress, A Report of the Committee on Congress of the American Political Science Association 14 (1945). </s> Though I fully share these and related views on the educational values served by the informing function, there is yet another, and perhaps more fundamental, interest at stake. It requires no citation of authority to state that public concern over current issues - the war, race relations, governmental invasions of privacy - [408 U.S. 606, 652] has transformed itself in recent years into what many believe is a crisis of confidence, in our system of government and its capacity to meet the needs and reflect the wants of the American people. Communication between Congress and the electorate tends to alleviate that doubt by exposing and clarifying the workings of the political system, the policies underlying new laws and the role of the Executive in their administration. To the extent that the informing function succeeds in fostering public faith in the responsiveness of Government, it is not only an "ordinary" task of the legislator but one that is essential to the continued vitality of our democratic institutions. </s> Unlike the Court, therefore, I think that the activities of Congressmen in communicating with the public are legislative acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. I agree with the Court that not every task performed by a legislator is privileged; intervention before Executive departments is one that is not. But the informing function carries a far more persuasive claim to the protections of the Clause. It has been recognized by this Court as something "generally done" by Congressmen, the Congress itself has established special concessions designed to lower the cost of such communication, and, most important, the function furthers several well-recognized goals of representative government. To say in the face of these facts that the informing function is not privileged merely because it is not necessary to the internal deliberations of Congress is to give the Speech or Debate Clause an artificial and narrow reading unsupported by reason. </s> Nor can it be supported by history. There is substantial evidence that the Framers intended the Speech or Debate Clause to cover all communications from a Congressman to his constituents. Thomas Jefferson clearly expressed that view of legislative privilege in a [408 U.S. 606, 653] case involving Samuel Cabell, Congressman from Virginia. In 1797 a federal grand jury in Virginia investigated the conduct of several Congressmen, including Cabell, in sending newsletters to constituents critical of the administration's policy in the war with France. The grand jury found that the Congressmen had endeavored "at a time of real public danger, to disseminate unfounded calumnies against the happy government of the United States, and thereby to separate the people therefrom; and to increase or produce a foreign influence, ruinous to the peace, happiness, and independence of these United States." Jefferson immediately drafted a long essay signed by himself and several citizens of Cabell's district, condemning the grand jury investigation as a blatant violation of the congressional privilege. Revised and joined by James Madison, the protest was forwarded to the Virginia House of Delegates. It reads in part as follows: </s> "[T]hat in order to give to the will of the people the influence it ought to have, and the information which may enable them to exercise it usefully, it was a part of the common law, adopted as the law of this land, that their representatives, in the discharge of their functions, should be free from the cognizance or coercion of the co-ordinate branches, Judiciary and Executive; and that their communications with their constituents should of right, as of duty also, be free, full, and unawed by any: that so necessary has this intercourse been deemed in the country from which they derive principally their descent and laws, that the correspondence between the representative and constituent is privileged there to pass free of expense through the channel of the public post, and that the proceedings of the legislature have been known to be arrested and suspended at times until the Representatives [408 U.S. 606, 654] could go home to their several counties and confer with their constituents. </s> . . . . . </s> "That when circumstances required that the ancient confederation of this with the sister States, for the government of their common concerns, should be improved into a more regular and effective form of general government, the same representative principle was preserved in the new legislature, one branch of which was to be chosen directly by the citizens of each State, and the laws and principles remained unaltered which privileged the representative functions, whether to be exercised in the State or General Government, against the cognizance and notice of the co-ordinate branches, Executive and Judiciary; and for its safe and convenient exercise, the inter-communication of the representative and constituent has been sanctioned and provided for through the channel of the public post, at the public expense. </s> . . . . . </s> "That the grand jury is a part of the Judiciary, not permanent indeed, but in office, pro hac vice and responsible as other judges are for their actings and doings while in office: that for the Judiciary to interpose in the legislative department between the constituent and his representative, to control them in the exercise of their functions or duties towards each other, to overawe the free correspondence which exists and ought to exist between them, to dictate what communications may pass between them, and to punish all others, to put the representative into jeopardy of criminal prosecution, of vexation, expense, and punishment before the Judiciary, if his communications, public or private, do not exactly square with their ideas of fact or right, or with their designs of wrong, is to put the legislative department [408 U.S. 606, 655] under the feet of the Judiciary, is to leave us, indeed, the shadow, but to take away the substance of representation, which requires essentially that the representative be as free as his constituents would be, that the same interchange of sentiment be lawful between him and them as would be lawful among themselves were they in the personal transaction of their own business; is to do away the influence of the people over the proceedings of their representatives by excluding from their knowledge, by the terror of punishment, all but such information or misinformation as may suit their own views; and is the more vitally dangerous when it is considered that grand jurors are selected by officers nominated and holding their places at the will of the Executive . . .; and finally, is to give to the Judiciary, and through them to the Executive, a complete preponderance over the legislature rendering ineffectual that wise and cautious distribution of powers made by the constitution between the three branches, and subordinating to the other two that branch which most immediately depends on the people themselves, and is responsible to them at short periods." 8 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 322-327 (Ford ed. 1904). </s> Jefferson's protest is perhaps the most significant and certainly the most cogent analysis of the privileged nature of communication between Congressman and public. Its comments on the history, purpose, and scope of the Clause leave no room for the notion that the Executive or Judiciary can in any way question the contents of that dialogue. Nor was Jefferson alone among the Framers in that view. Aside from Madison, who joined in the protest, James Wilson took the position that a member of Congress "should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and . . . should be protected from [408 U.S. 606, 656] the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence." 1 Works of James Wilson 421 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). Wilson, a member of the Committee responsible for drafting the Speech or Debate Clause, stated in plainest terms his belief in the duty of Congressmen to inform the people about proceedings in the Congress: </s> "That the conduct and proceedings of representatives should be as open as possible to the inspection of those whom they represent, seems to be, in republican government, a maxim, of whose truth or importance the smallest doubt cannot be entertained. That, by a necessary consequence, every measure, which will facilitate or secure this open communication of the exercise of delegated power, should be adopted and patronised by the constitution and laws of every free state, seems to be another maxim, which is the unavoidable result of the former." Id., at 422. </s> Wilson's statements, like those of Jefferson and Madison, reflect a deep conviction of the Framers, that self-government can succeed only when the people are informed by their representatives, without interference by the Executive or Judiciary, concerning the conduct of their agents in government. That conviction is no less valid today than it was at the time of our founding. I would honor the clear intent of the Framers and extend to the informing function the protections embodied in the Speech or Debate Clause. </s> The Court, however, offers not a shred of evidence concerning the Framers' intent, but relies instead on the English view of legislative privilege to support its interpretation of the Clause. Like the Court itself, ante, at 623-624, n. 14, I have some doubt concerning the relevance of English authority to this case, particularly authority post-dating the adoption of our Constitution. But [408 U.S. 606, 657] in any event it is plain that the Court has misread the history on which it relies. The Speech or Debate Clause of the English Bill of Rights was at least in part the product of a struggle between Parliament and Crown over the very type of activity involved in this litigation. During the reign of Charles II, the House of Commons received a number of reports about an alleged plot between the Crown and the King of France to restore Catholicism as the established religion of England. The most famous of these reports, Dangerfield's Narrative, was entered into the Commons Journal and then republished by order of the Speaker of the House, Sir William Williams, with the consent of Commons. In 1686, after James II came to the throne, informations charging libel were filed against Williams in King's Bench. Despite the arguments of his attorney, Sir Robert Atkyns, that the publication was necessary to the "counselling" and "enquiring" functions of Parliament, Williams' plea of privilege was rejected and he was fined 10,000. Shortly after Williams' conviction James II was sent into exile, and a committee was appointed by the House of Commons to report upon "such things as are absolutely necessary for securing the Laws and Liberties of the Nation." 9 Debates of the House of Commons, coll. by A. Grey, 1763, p. 37. In reporting to the House, the chairman of the committee stated that the provision for freedom of speech and debate was included "for the sake of one . . . Sir William Williams, who was punished out of Parliament for what he had done in Parliament." Id., at 81. Following consultation with the House of Lords, that provision was included as part of the English Bill of Rights, and the judgment against Williams was declared by Commons "illegal and subversive of the freedom of parliament." 1 W. Townsend, Memoirs of the House of Commons 414 (2d ed. 1844). </s> Although the origins of the Speech or Debate Clause in [408 U.S. 606, 658] England can thus be traced to a case involving republication, the Court, citing Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1, 112 Eng. Rep. 1112 (K. B. 1839), says that "English legislative privilege was not viewed as protecting republication of an otherwise immune libel on the floor of the House." Ante, at 622. That conclusion reflects an erroneous reading of precedent. Stockdale did state that "if the calumnious or inflammatory speeches should be reported and published, the law will attach responsibility on the publisher." Id., at 114, 112 Eng. Rep., at 1156. But Stockdale concerned only the publisher's liability, not that of a member of Parliament; thus, it has little bearing on the instant case. Furthermore, contrary to the Court's assertion, ante, at 623-624, n. 14, even the narrow result of Stockdale was repudiated 30 years later in Wason v. Walter, L. R. 4 Q. B. 73 (1868), for reasons strikingly similar to those expressed by Jefferson in his protest. 1 In [408 U.S. 606, 659] my view, therefore, the English precedent, if relevant at all, supports Senator Gravel's position here. </s> Thus, from the standpoint of function or history, it is plain that Senator Gravel's dissemination of material, [408 U.S. 606, 660] placed by him in the record of a congressional hearing, is itself legislative activity protected by the privilege of speech or debate. Whether or not that privilege protects the publisher from prosecution or the Senator from senatorial discipline, it certainly shields the Senator from any grand jury inquiry about his part in the publication. As we held in United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966), neither a Congressman, nor his aides, nor third parties may be made to testify concerning privileged acts or their motives. That immunity, which protects legislators "from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty," Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377 (1951), is the essence of the Clause, designed not for the legislators'"private indulgence but for the public good." Id., at 377. </s> That privilege, moreover, may not be defeated merely because a court finds that the publication was irregular or the material irrelevant to legislative business. Legislative immunity secures "to every member exemption from prosecution, for every thing said or done by him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office . . . whether the exercise was regular according to the rules of the house, or irregular and against their rules." Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808). Thus, if the republication of this committee record was unauthorized or even prohibited by the Senate rules, it [408 U.S. 606, 661] is up to the Senate, not the Executive or Judiciary, to fashion the appropriate sanction to discipline Senator Gravel. </s> Similarly, the Government cannot strip Senator Gravel of the immunity by asserting that his conduct "did not relate to any pending Congressional business." Brief for United States 41. The Senator has stated that his hearing on the Pentagon Papers had a direct bearing on the work of his Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds, because of the effect of the Vietnam war on the domestic economy and the lack of sufficient federal funds to provide adequate public facilities. If in fact the Senator is wrong in this contention, and his conduct at the hearing exceeded the subcommittee's jurisdiction, then again it is the Senate that must call him to task. This Court has permitted congressional witnesses to defend their refusal to answer questions on the ground of nongermaneness. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). Here, however, it is the Executive that seeks the aid of the judiciary, not to protect individual rights, but to extend its power of inquiry and interrogation into the privileged domain of the legislature. In my view the Court should refuse to turn the freedom of speech or debate on the Government's notions of legislative propriety and relevance. We would weaken the very structure of our constitutional system by becoming a partner in this assault on the separation of powers. </s> Whether the Speech or Debate Clause extends to the informing function is an issue whose importance goes beyond the fate of a single Senator or Congressman. What is at stake is the right of an elected representative to inform, and the public to be informed, about matters relating directly to the workings of our Government. The dialogue between Congress and people has been recognized, from the days of our founding, as one of the necessary elements of a representative system. [408 U.S. 606, 662] We should not retreat from that view merely because, in the course of that dialogue, information may be revealed that is embarrassing to the other branches of government or violates their notions of necessary secrecy. A Member of Congress who exceeds the bounds of propriety in performing this official task may be called to answer by the other Members of his chamber. We do violence to the fundamental concepts of privilege, however, when we subject that same conduct to judicial scrutiny at the instance of the Executive. 2 The threat of "prosecution by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary," United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S., at 179 , that the Clause was designed to avoid, can only lead to timidity in the performance of this vital function. The Nation as a whole benefits from the congressional investigation and exposure of official corruption and deceit. It likewise suffers when that exposure is replaced by muted criticism, carefully hushed behind congressional walls. </s> II </s> Equally troubling in today's decision is the Court's refusal to bar grand jury inquiry into the source of documents received by the Senator and placed by him in the hearing record. The receipt of materials for use in a congressional hearing is an integral part of the preparation for that legislative act. In United States v. Johnson, supra, the Court acknowledged the privileged nature of such preparatory steps, holding that they, like the act itself and its motives, must be shielded from scrutiny by the Executive and Judiciary. That holding merely recognized the obvious - that speeches, [408 U.S. 606, 663] hearings, and the casting of votes require study and planning in advance. It would accomplish little toward the goal of legislative freedom to exempt an official act from intimidating scrutiny, if other conduct leading up to the act and intimately related to it could be deterred by a similar threat. The reasoning that guided that Court in Johnson is no less persuasive today, and I see no basis, nor does the Court offer any, for departing from it here. I would hold that Senator Gravel's receipt of the Pentagon Papers, including the name of the person from whom he received them, may not be the subject of inquiry by the grand jury. </s> I would go further, however, and also exclude from grand jury inquiry any knowledge that the Senator or his aides might have concerning how the source himself first came to possess the Papers. This immunity, it seems to me, is essential to the performance of the informing function. Corrupt and deceitful officers of government do not often post for public examination the evidence of their own misdeeds. That evidence must be ferreted out, and often is, by fellow employees and subordinates. Their willingness to reveal that information and spark congressional inquiry may well depend on assurances from their contact in Congress that their identities and means of obtaining the evidence will be held in strictest confidence. To permit the grand jury to frustrate that expectation through an inquiry of the Congressman and his aides can only dampen the flow of information to the Congress and thus to the American people. There is a similar risk, of course, when the Member's own House requires him to break the confidence. But the danger, it seems to me, is far less if the Member's colleagues, and not an "unfriendly executive" or "hostile judiciary," are charged with evaluating the propriety of his conduct. In any event, assuming that a Congressman can be required to reveal the [408 U.S. 606, 664] sources of his information and the methods used to obtain that information, that power of inquiry, as required by the Clause, is that of the Congressman's House, and of that House only. </s> I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 In Wason the proprietor of the London Times was sued for printing an account of a libelous debate in the House of Lords. The court agreed with Stockdale that the House did not have final authority to determine the scope of its privileges and thus could not confer immunity on any publisher merely by ordering a document printed and then declaring it privileged. Indeed, the Wason court gave its "unhesitating and unqualified adhesion" to Stockdale on that point. Id., at 86. The only issue for the court, therefore, was whether the publication "is, independently of such order or assertion of privilege, in itself privileged and lawful." Id., at 87. On that issue the court severely criticized the reasoning of earlier cases, including Stockdale, stating that two of the Justices in that case had expressed a "very shortsighted view of the subject." Id., at 91. The court held that so long as the republication was accurate and in good faith, it could not be the basis of a libel action; and the member himself was privileged to publish his speech "for the information of his constituents." Id., at 95. Relying, not on the Parliamentary Papers Act of 1840, which was enacted in response to Stockdale, but on the analogy to judicial reports and the need for an informed public, the court stated: </s> "It seems to us impossible to doubt that it is of paramount public and national importance that the proceedings of the houses of parliament [408 U.S. 606, 659] shall be communicated to the public, who have the deepest interest in knowing what passes within their walls, seeing that on what is there said and done, the welfare of the community depends. Where would be our confidence in the government of the country or in the legislature by which our laws are framed, and to whose charge the great interests of the country are committed, - where would be our attachment to the constitution under which we live, - if the proceedings of the great council of the realm were shrouded in secrecy and concealed from the knowledge of the nation? How could the communications between the representatives of the people and their constituents, which are so essential to the working of the representative system, be usefully carried on, if the constituencies were kept in ignorance of what their representatives are doing? What would become of the right of petitioning on all measures pending in parliament, the undoubted right of the subject, if the people are to be kept in ignorance of what is passing in either house? Can any man bring himself to doubt that the publicity given in modern times to what passes in parliament is essential to the maintenance of the relations subsisting between the government, the legislature, and the country at large?" Id., at 89. </s> The fact that the debate was published in violation of a standing order of Parliament was held to be irrelevant. "Independently of the orders of the houses, there is nothing unlawful in publishing reports of parliamentary proceedings. . . . [A]ny publication of its debates made in contravention of its orders would be a matter between the house and the publisher." Id., at 95. </s> Whether Wason was based on parliamentary privilege or on an analogy to the publication of judicial proceedings is unimportant. What is important to the instant litigation is that Wason firmly rejected any implication in Stockdale that the informing function was not among the legislative activities that a member of Parliament was privileged to perform. Indeed, that same conclusion was reached by Sir Gilbert Campion, a noted scholar, in his memorandum to the House of Commons' Select Committee on the Official Secrets Acts. After reviewing the republication cases through Wason, the memorandum concluded: </s> "If . . . a member circulated among his constituents a speech made [408 U.S. 606, 660] by him in Parliament in which he had disclosed information [otherwise subject to the Official Secrets Acts], it might be held on the analogy of the principles which have been said to apply to prosecutions for libel that he could not be proceeded against for disclosing it to his constituents, unless, of course, the speech had been made in a secret session. Even if the suggested analogy is not admitted, it would be repugnant to common sense to hold that though the original disclosure in the House was protected by parliamentary privilege, the circulation of the speech among the member's constituents was not." Minutes of Evidence Taken before the Select Committee on the Official Secrets Acts 29 (1939). </s> [Footnote 2 Different considerations may apply, of course, where the republication is attacked, not by the Executive, but by private persons seeking judicial redress for an alleged invasion of their constitutional rights. </s> [408 U.S. 606, 665]

United States Supreme Court SCHWEIKER v. HOGAN(1982) No. 81-213 Argued: March 24, 1982Decided: June 21, 1982 </s> Section 1903(f) of the Social Security Act provides that federal reimbursement to States electing to provide Medicaid benefits to the "medically needy" is available only if the income of those persons, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, is less than 133 1/3% of the state Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC) payment level. Section 1903(f) specifically excepts from this rule the "categorically needy" - those receiving Supplemental Security Income (SSI) because of lack of income to meet their basic needs. As applied in Massachusetts, 1903(f) results in a distribution of Medicaid benefits to recipients of SSI that is more generous than the distribution of such benefits to persons who are self-supporting. Appellees, each of whom (or his spouse) receives Social Security benefits in an amount that renders him ineligible for either SSI benefits or state supplementary payments, filed suit in Federal District Court, alleging that 1903(f), as applied in Massachusetts, violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. Appellees asserted that, since 133 1/3% of the Massachusetts AFDC payment level is for them lower than the SSI payment level, they are ineligible for Medicaid until their income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, is less than that of SSI payment recipients, and that because of the Social Security benefits which they receive, appellees thus have less income available for nonmedical expenses than individuals who - possibly because they never worked and receive no Social Security benefits - are dependent upon public assistance for support. The District Court entered judgment for appellees. </s> Held: </s> 1. There is no merit to appellees' contention that the Social Security Act itself compels the conclusion that, if Medicaid services are provided to the "medically needy," those persons may not be forced to incur medical expenses that would reduce their remaining income below the applicable public assistance standard. The legislative history of the Medicaid provisions of the Act does not justify a departure from the literal and clear language of 1903(f). Nor does 1903(f)'s literal language conflict with any other provision of the Act. Moreover, adherence to that section's [457 U.S. 569, 570] language is consistent with its interpretation by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Thus, the discrimination challenged in this case is required by the Social Security Act. Pp. 584-588. </s> 2. As applied in Massachusetts, 1903(f) does not violate constitutional principles of equal treatment. While powerful equities support appellees' claim of unfair treatment insofar as they receive less medical assistance and have less income remaining for their nonmedical needs than do SSI recipients, a belief that an Act of Congress may be inequitable or unwise is an insufficient basis on which to conclude that it is unconstitutional. The optional character of the congressional scheme - whereby participating States must provide Medicaid benefits to the categorically needy but may elect not to provide any benefits at all to the medically needy - does not itself violate constitutional principles of equality. Since a State may deny all benefits to the medically needy - while providing benefits to the categorically needy and rendering some persons who are on public assistance better off than others who are not - it may narrow the gap between the two classes by providing partial benefits to the medically needy, even though certain members of that class may remain in a position less fortunate than those on public assistance. The fact that Massachusetts has provided Medicaid benefits to the medically needy does not force it to make immediate medical need the sole standard in its entire Medicaid program. Pp. 588-593. </s> 501 F. Supp. 1129, reversed and remanded. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> George W. Jones argued the cause pro hac vice for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Deputy Solicitor General Geller, William Kanter, Bruce G. Forrest, Lynne K. Zusman, and Robert P. Jaye. </s> William H. Simon, by appointment of the Court, 454 U.S. 1051 , argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Mark Coven, Gill Deford, and Gary Bellow. * </s> [Footnote * Francis X. Bellotti, Attorney General of Massachusetts, and Mitchell J. Sikora, Jr., and Paul W. Johnson, Assistant Attorneys General, filed a brief for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts as amicus curiae urging reversal. </s> Bruce K. Miller and Dennis Caraher filed a brief for the Massachusetts Association of Older Americans as amicus curiae urging affirmance. [457 U.S. 569, 571] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> At issue in this case are the meaning and validity of 1903(f) of the Social Security Act, 81 Stat. 898, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396b(f). As applied in Massachusetts, that provision results in a distribution of Medicaid benefits to recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) - a class of aged, blind, or disabled persons who lack sufficient income to meet their basic needs - that is more generous than the distribution of such benefits to persons who are self-supporting. Appellees are members of the latter class. Because they must incur medical expenses - for which they are never reimbursed - before they become eligible for Medicaid, they have less income available for their nonmedical needs than the recipients of SSI. The District Court concluded that this discrimination was irrational and held that 1903(f) was unconstitutional. Hogan v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 1129 (Mass. 1980). We disagree and reverse. </s> The statutory provisions governing the Medicaid program are complex. See 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). We first consider the history of the specific provisions at issue in this case, then relate the circumstances that gave rise to the present controversy, and finally address the two legal issues that are presented. </s> I </s> Section 1903(f) of the Social Security Act (Act) was enacted in 1968. To understand the present controversy, however, it is necessary to consider amendments to the Act made in 1965, 1967, and 1972. </s> A </s> The Medicaid program was established in 1965 in Title XIX of the Act "for the purpose of providing federal financial assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain costs of medical treatment for needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 . Section 1902(a)(10) of the Act, [457 U.S. 569, 572] 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10), sets forth the basic scope of the program, which has not changed significantly from its enactment in 1965. See 79 Stat. 345. Participating States are required to provide Medicaid coverage to certain individuals - now described as the "categorically needy"; at their option States also may provide coverage (and receive partial federal reimbursement) to other individuals - described as the "medically needy." See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 . 1 These classes are defined by reference to other federal assistance programs. </s> In 1965, federal assistance programs existed for the aged, the blind, the disabled, and families with dependent children. 2 At that time, each of these programs was administered by the States, which established both the "standard of need" and the "level of benefits." See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 ; Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 . 3 In establishing the Medicaid program, Congress required participating States to provide medical assistance to individuals who received cash payments under one of these assistance programs. 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a) (10)(A). The House Report explained: "These people are the most needy in the country and it is appropriate for [457 U.S. 569, 573] medical care costs to be met, first, for these people." 4 They are the "categorically needy." </s> Congress also provided that a participating State could offer Medicaid benefits to individuals who fell within one of the categories for which federal assistance was available but whose income made them ineligible for aid under those programs. These individuals were deemed "less needy" 5 and could receive assistance only if their income and resources were insufficient "to meet the costs of necessary medical or remedial care and services." 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(C). In 1965, no limit was placed on the extent to which federal reimbursement was available for optional coverage that States elected to provide to these persons who might become "medically needy." 6 </s> [457 U.S. 569, 574] </s> Since States established the income limits for the categorical assistance programs, they also established the income limits for the "categorically needy" under the Medicaid program. In addition, participating States established the eligibility standards for the optional coverage provided to the "medically needy." In 1902(a)(17) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a (a)(17), however, Congress set forth certain requirements governing state standards for determining eligibility. In particular, Congress required States to "provide for flexibility in the application of such standards with respect to income by taking into account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law." 79 Stat. 346; see 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(17). 7 </s> [457 U.S. 569, 575] </s> Most States promptly elected to participate in the Medicaid program. 8 Many of these States also chose to provide Medicaid coverage to the "medically needy." Within a year, Congress recognized that it was fiscally improvident to rely exclusively on the States to set income limits for both aspects [457 U.S. 569, 576] of the Medicaid program. See H. R. Rep. No. 2224, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (1966). It cautioned States "to avoid unrealistic levels of income and resources for title XIX eligibility purposes." Id., at 3. </s> B </s> In 1967, Congress placed a limit on federal participation in the Medicaid program. Representative Mills introduced a bill, sponsored by the Johnson administration, that would have made significant changes in both the Medicaid program and the categorical assistance programs. H. R. 5710, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Under 220 of H. R. 5710, a State participating in the Medicaid program would have been entitled to receive federal financial assistance for providing Medicaid benefits only to those persons whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than 150% of the highest of the State's categorical assistance standards of need. 9 Section 202 of the bill would have required States to revise annually the standards of need under each of the categorical assistance programs to reflect changes in the costs of living and, in some circumstances, to pay 100% of the standard of need established under the programs. In support of this provision, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare explained that "33 States provide less support for needy children [under the AFDC program] than the standards the States themselves have set as necessary to meet basic human needs." 10 </s> [457 U.S. 569, 577] </s> After extensive consideration, the House Ways and Means Committee reported out a substantially revised bill. H. R. 12080, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Committee Report described its primary proposed limitation on federal participation: </s> "Your committee is proposing . . . that Federal sharing will not be available for families whose income exceeds 133 1/3 percent of the highest amount ordinarily paid to a family of the same size (without any income and resources) in the form of money payments under the AFDC program. (AFDC income limits are, generally speaking, the lowest that are used in the categorical assistance programs)." 1967 House Report, at 119. </s> As noted, see n. 10, supra, the amount of benefits paid in many States was less than the qualifying standard of need. 11 The Committee Report explained the reasons for the move to limit federal participation in the Medicaid program. After noting that a few States had provided benefits beyond that anticipated by Congress, it stated: </s> "Your committee expected that the State plans submitted under title XIX would afford better medical care and services to persons unable to pay for adequate care. [457 U.S. 569, 578] It neither expected nor intended that such care would supplant health insurance presently carried or presently provided under collective bargaining agreements for individuals and families in or close to an average income range. Your committee is also concerned that the operation of some State plans may greatly reduce the incentives for persons aged 65 or over to participate in the supplementary medical insurance program [Medicare] of title XVIII of the Social Security Act, which was also established by the Social Security Amendments of 1965. The provisions of the bill are directed toward eliminating, insofar as Federal sharing is concerned, these clearly unintended and, in your committee's judgment, undesirable actual and potential effects of the legislation." Id., at 118. </s> In States that paid less than 75% of the AFDC standard of need, the House provision would have provided Medicaid benefits only to persons whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than the AFDC standard of need. 12 </s> The Committee proposal was severely criticized on the House floor. 13 It nevertheless was passed by the House and [457 U.S. 569, 579] sent to the Senate. 14 The Senate returned a substantially different bill and the matter was referred to conference. 15 </s> The Conference Committee adopted the House 133 1/3% [457 U.S. 569, 580] AFDC payment standard. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1030, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 63 (1967). It added, however, an express exception for the categorically needy. Ibid. Opposition to the Conference proposal was voiced in both the House and the Senate. 16 The 133 1/3% AFDC payment standard nevertheless was approved by Congress and enacted into law as 1903(f) of the Social Security Act. See 81 Stat. 898, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396b(f). 17 </s> [457 U.S. 569, 581] </s> C </s> In 1972, Congress replaced three of the four state-administered categorical assistance programs with a new federal program entitled Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSI), 42 U.S.C. 1381 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). 18 The SSI program establishes a federally [457 U.S. 569, 582] guaranteed minimum income for the aged, blind, and disabled. See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 223 . Under the program, however, the States may (and in some cases must) raise that minimum standard and supplement the benefits provided by the Federal Government. See 42 U.S.C. 1382e (1976 ed. and Supp. IV). Moreover, if supplemental payments are made to persons who would be eligible for SSI benefits except for the amount of their income, the State also may provide Medicaid benefits to those persons. See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(C)(ii). 19 </s> II </s> The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has chosen to participate in the Medicaid program and to provide benefits - to the extent that federal financial assistance is available - to the "medically needy." The State also has elected to make supplementary payments to individuals who are eligible for SSI benefits or who would be eligible except for their income. Finally, the State has chosen to provide Medicaid benefits to those persons who receive supplemental payments. In Massachusetts, 133 1/3% of the appropriate state AFDC [457 U.S. 569, 583] payment amount is less in some cases than the combined federal SSI and state supplementary payment level. 20 </s> Appellees filed this suit in 1980 in federal court, contending that 1903(f) of the Act - as applied in Massachusetts - violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment. 21 Each of the appellees is either aged, blind, or disabled, but they are not categorically needy. For each appellee or his spouse was employed at one time and paid "Social Security" taxes. Each appellee (or his spouse) currently receives Social Security benefits (Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance, 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. IV)) in an amount that renders him ineligible for either SSI benefits or state supplementary payments. Appellees challenged the fact that, since 133 1/3% of the Massachusetts AFDC payment level is for them lower than the SSI payment level, they are ineligible for Medicaid until their income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, is less than that of SSI payment recipients. By reason of the Social Security benefits that they receive, appellees thus have less income available for nonmedical expenses than individuals who - possibly because they never worked and receive no Social Security benefits - are dependent upon public assistance for support. 22 </s> [457 U.S. 569, 584] </s> The District Court granted appellees' motion for partial summary judgment. 23 It ruled that the Massachusetts Medicaid program was unconstitutional insofar as it forced Social Security recipients to incur medical expenses that reduced their remaining income to an amount below SSI payment levels. The court later declared explicitly that 1903(f) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396b(f), is unconstitutional as applied in Massachusetts. App. to Juris. Statement 25a. We noted probable jurisdiction. 454 U.S. 891 . </s> III </s> In this Court, for the first time, appellees contend that the Social Security Act itself compels the conclusion that, if Medicaid services are provided to the "medically needy," those persons may not be forced to incur medical expenses that [457 U.S. 569, 585] would reduce their remaining income below the applicable public assistance standard. Although appellees did not advance this argument in the District Court, they are not precluded from asserting it as a basis on which to affirm that court's judgment. 24 "Where a party raises both statutory and constitutional arguments in support of a judgment, ordinarily we first address the statutory argument in order to avoid unnecessary resolution of the constitutional issue." Blum v. Bacon, ante, at 137. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S., at 306 -307. </s> Appellees contend that a "fundamental Congressional purpose in the creation of the medically needy feature of Title XIX was to achieve equity between public assistance recipients and others similarly situated." Brief for Appellees 12. In support of this contention, appellees cite the requirement first imposed in 1965 that States "include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for all groups) for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan . . .," 79 Stat. 346 (emphasis added), as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(17), and note the statements in the legislative history that a State could not require an individual to use, for medical expenses, income "which would bring the individual below the test of eligibility under the State plan." See n. 7, supra. </s> Moreover, appellees contend that this "comparability requirement" was not changed by the enactment of 1903(f) in 1968. Appellees argue that the separate bills passed in both the House and the Senate would have affected both the categorically and the medically needy. 25 Only when the Conference [457 U.S. 569, 586] Committee accepted the House provision and added an exception for the categorically needy, appellees argue, did the 1968 modification potentially change the comparability requirement between the two groups. Appellees assert that such a change was not intended; rather, they argue that the exception for the categorically needy was added only to ensure that they would not be adversely affected by 1903(f). Appellees assert that the medically needy were not similarly excepted from the 133 1/3% rule in those States in which that figure was less than the applicable standard of need because, in 1967, those States did not have medically needy programs. </s> Thus, appellees urge that we construe 1903(f) to require the medically needy to incur medical expenses until their income is 133 1/3% of the AFDC payment amount or - to maintain comparability - 100% of the combined SSI-state supplementary payment level if that figure is higher. Appellees argue that the legislative history of the 1965 and 1967 Amendments to the Social Security Act justifies a departure from the literal language of 1903(f) and the Secretary's interpretation of that provision. </s> We cannot agree. Congress explicitly stated in 1903(f) that federal reimbursement for benefits provided to the medically needy was available only if the income of those persons, after the deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than 133 1/3% of the state AFDC payment level. In specifically excepting the categorically needy from this rule, Congress recognized that this amount could be lower than categorical assistance eligibility levels. There is no basis in either the statute or the legislative history for appellees' argument that Congress implicitly "assumed" that those States in which 133 1/3% of the AFDC payment level was less than the applicable standard of need simply would not provide assistance to the medically needy. Even if this were [457 U.S. 569, 587] true in 1967, the Medicaid program then was less than two years old; Congress was aware that many States were in the process of adopting Medicaid programs. 26 To assume that Congress was unaware that 1903(f) - which applied only to the medically needy - could operate in those States - which Congress knew existed - in which 133 1/3% of the AFDC payment amount was less than the applicable standard of need is to demean the intelligence of the Congress. We are not prepared to interpret a statute on the basis of an unsupported assumption that Congress had little idea of what it was doing. 27 </s> The literal and clear language of 1903(f) does not conflict with any other provision of the Act. In both 1902(a)(10) and 1902(a)(17), see 79 Stat. 345-346, Congress required comparability among the various "categories" for which federal assistance was available, but these provisions did not require that the medically needy be treated comparably to the categorically needy in all respects. See n. 6, supra. 28 Indeed, [457 U.S. 569, 588] such a broad comparability requirement would be inconsistent with the fact that Congress provided in 1965 that the medically needy could be excluded entirely from the Medicaid program. Moreover, 1903(f) is not inconsistent with the congressional intent, see n. 7, supra, that medical expenses be considered in determining, where appropriate, an individual's eligibility for Medicaid. In 1903(f) Congress determined that federal assistance would not be available for payments made to individuals whose income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was greater than 133 1/3% of applicable state AFDC payments. Congress determined that, so long as an individual retained that level of income to meet basic needs, he need not receive reimbursement for medical expenses. That income level might appear unreasonably low, but it is the level that Congress chose. We find no inconsistency between 1903(f) and 1902(a)(17). </s> In sum, we see no reason to ignore the literal language of 1903(f). Moreover, this analysis is consistent with the Secretary's interpretation of that statutory provision. "We have often noted that the interpretation of an agency charged with the administration of a statute is entitled to substantial deference." Blum v. Bacon, ante, at 141. We hold that the discrimination challenged in this case is required by the Social Security Act. </s> IV </s> Appellees also contend - and the District Court held - that 1903(f), as applied in Massachusetts, irrationally discriminates between the categorically and the medically needy. 29 </s> [457 U.S. 569, 589] The unfairness of the statute stems from the fact that appellees receive less medical assistance, and have less income remaining for their nonmedical needs, than do SSI recipients. The unfairness is accentuated by the fact that the disfavored class consists largely of persons who worked and paid taxes to provide for their retirement while the favored class includes persons who may never have done so. Powerful equities unquestionably support the appellees' claim of unfair treatment. </s> A belief that an Act of Congress may be inequitable or unwise is of course an insufficient basis on which to conclude that it is unconstitutional. Moreover, the validity of a broad legislative classification is not properly judged by focusing solely on the portion of the disfavored class that is affected most harshly by its terms. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 . In this case, Congress has differentiated between the categorically needy - a class of aged, blind, disabled, or dependent persons who have very little income - and other persons with similar characteristics who are self-supporting. Members of the former class are automatically entitled to Medicaid; members of the latter class are not eligible unless a State elects to provide benefits to the medically needy and unless their income, after consideration of medical expenses, is below state standards of eligibility. 30 </s> According to the congressional scheme, then, the medically needy may be excluded entirely from the Medicaid program. Before considering the constitutional constraints that may exist if a State chooses to provide benefits to that class, it is appropriate to confront the more basic question whether the [457 U.S. 569, 590] optional character of the program for the medically needy is itself constitutionally permissible. </s> In establishing public assistance programs, Congress often has determined that the Federal Government cannot finance a program that provides meaningful benefits in equal measure to everyone. Both federal and state funds available for such assistance are limited. In structuring the Medicaid program, Congress chose to direct those limited funds to persons who were most impoverished and who - because of their physical characteristics - were often least able to overcome the effects of poverty. The legislative history of the 1965 Amendments makes clear that this group was not chosen for administrative convenience. "These people are the most needy in the country and it is appropriate for medical care costs to be met, first, for these people." 31 A decision to allocate medical assistance benefits only to the poor does not itself violate constitutional principles of equality; in terms of their ability to provide for essential medical services, the wealthy and the poor are not similarly situated and need not be treated the same. It is rational to distribute public assistance benefits on the basis of the income and resources available to potential recipients. </s> In choosing to require coverage only for the categorically needy, Congress permitted States to exclude from the program many persons who - by reason of large medical expenses - often were just as much in need of medical assistance as the categorically needy. Yet Congress found these persons "less needy." 1965 House Report, at 66. By reason of the greater income available to them, as a class these persons generally are better able to provide for their medical needs. In the legislative history of the 1967 Amendments, see supra, at 577-580, and n. 14, Congress noted that these persons often are able to prepare for future medical expenses [457 U.S. 569, 591] through private insurance or through participation in the Medicare program. </s> In Fullington v. Shea, 404 U.S. 963 , this Court affirmed a decision of a three-judge District Court holding that it was constitutional for the State of Colorado to provide benefits to the categorically needy but not to the medically needy. We decided Fullington summarily. It is clear that a decision to allocate scarce assistance benefits on the basis of an assumption that persons with greater incomes generally are better able to prepare for future medical needs is not inconsistent with constitutional principles of equal treatment. In other words, it is rational to define need on the basis of income, even though some persons with greater income - who have been unable or unwilling to save enough of their earnings to prepare for future medical needs - may actually be in greater need of assistance than those with less gross income. Although some "medically needy" persons have less income available for nonmedical expenses than those who receive categorical assistance, the broad legislative classification does not involve the type of arbitrariness that is constitutionally offensive. 32 </s> Appellees do not challenge the decision in Fullington. They do not contend that it is irrational to deny benefits entirely to the medically needy. Thus, they do not challenge the line drawn by Congress to separate the class that receives favored treatment from the class that does not. Appellees attack only the manner in which one of the separate [457 U.S. 569, 592] classes is affected by the program. They argue that if medical benefits are made available to a class of persons who are not categorically needy, it is constitutionally impermissible to deny them benefits if their income, after the deduction of incurred medical expenses, is lower than that of an individual who receives public assistance. </s> In view of the unchallenged decision in Fullington, appellees' constitutional argument is self-defeating. The injury that they regard as inconsistent with constitutional principles of equal treatment could be avoided by denying them all Medicaid benefits, thus placing them in a worse position financially than they are in now. No interest in "equality" could be furthered by such a result. If a State may deny all benefits to the medically needy - while providing benefits to the categorically needy and rendering some persons who are on public assistance better off than others who are not - a State surely may narrow the gap between the two classes by providing partial benefits to the medically needy, even though certain members of that class may remain in a position less fortunate than those on public assistance. </s> The validity of the distinction between the categorically needy and the medically needy is not undermined by 1903(f), because the impact of that provision falls entirely on persons who are not within the categorically needy class. See n. 30, supra. The function of the 133 1/3% AFDC payment rule is to place a limit on the availability of reimbursement for potential members of the "medically needy" class. That rule prevents some persons (although not the appellees) from qualifying as medically needy; it also determines the extent to which the medically needy are reimbursed for their medical expenses. Yet appellees do not challenge the fact that, among persons who do not receive public assistance, some are treated differently from others. In other words, they do not complain of any discrimination within the class (all persons who are not categorically needy) [457 U.S. 569, 593] in which the rule performs its entire function. 33 Nor do they argue that Congress chose an eligibility level that is unrelated to ability to provide for medical needs. </s> The fact that Massachusetts, unlike the State of Colorado in Fullington, has provided Medicaid benefits to the medically needy - and in doing so has defined eligibility for persons who are not categorically needy on the basis of incurred medical expenses - does not force it to make immediate medical need the sole standard in its entire Medicaid program. Massachusetts in essence has determined that those individuals whose gross income is greater than public assistance levels are ineligible for Medicaid, unless medical expenses in any computation period reduce available income to 133 1/3% of the state AFDC payment level. By adding the qualifying clause, which the State of Colorado did not, Massachusetts did not offend any constitutional interest in equality. Accordingly, without endorsing the wisdom of the particular standard that Congress selected - a matter that is not for us to consider - we conclude that it violates no constitutional command. The judgment of the District Court is reversed. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 But see n. 18, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 These programs were entitled: Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq. (1970 ed.); Aid to the Blind, 1201 et seq.; Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 1351 et seq.; and Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 601 et seq. See also 42 U.S.C. 1381-1385 (1970 ed.). These programs are of course fundamentally different from Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI or Social Security), 42 U.S.C. 401 et seq. </s> [Footnote 3 In many States, the "level of benefits" did not raise an individual's income to the "standard of need." The standard of need determined eligibility for some benefits; often the benefits provided, however, were merely a fraction of the difference between the individual's income and the defined standard of need. See Jefferson v. Hackney. The standards of need also typically varied from program to program. </s> [Footnote 4 H. R. Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 66 (1965) (1965 House Report). </s> [Footnote 5 Ibid. See also S. Rep. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 77 (1965) (1965 Senate Report). </s> [Footnote 6 The 1965 Act contained certain requirements governing the comparative treatment of different beneficiaries under the Act. It provided that the medical assistance afforded to an individual who qualified under any categorical assistance program could not be different from that afforded to an individual who qualified under any other program. 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i). In other words, the amount, duration, and scope of medical assistance provided to an individual who qualified to receive assistance for the aged could not be different from the amount, duration, and scope of benefits provided to an individual who qualified to receive assistance for the blind. "This will assure comparable treatment for all of the needy under the federally aided categories of assistance and will eliminate some of the unevenness which has been apparent in the treatment of the medical needs of various groups of the needy." 1965 House Report, at 66. See also 1965 Senate Report, at 77. </s> A similar "comparability" requirement among the aged, blind, disabled, and dependent applied to the optional distribution of benefits to the "medically needy." If a State elected to provide benefits to one group, it was obligated to provide benefits to the others, and "the determination of financial eligibility must be on a basis that is comparable as among the people who, except for their income and resources, would be recipients of money [457 U.S. 569, 574] for maintenance under the other public assistance programs." 1965 House Report, at 67; see also 1965 Senate Report, at 77. 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i). In addition, the benefits provided to each categorical group of the medically needy were required to be equal in amount, duration, and scope. 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(C)(ii). </s> In its provision for "comparability among the various categorical groups of needy people," 1965 House Report, at 67, the Act required comparability in the criteria used to determine eligibility for each group. 79 Stat. 346, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(17). See also 1965 House Report, at 67; 1965 Senate Report, at 77 ("Although States may set a limitation on income and resources which individuals may hold and be eligible for aid, they must do so by maintaining a comparability among the various categorical groups of needy people"). Finally, the Act provided that the assistance provided to the "medically needy" could not be greater in amount, duration, or scope than the assistance provided to the "categorically needy." 79 Stat. 345, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(B)(ii). "This was included in order to make sure that the most needy in a State receive no less comprehensive care than those who are not as needy." 1965 House Report, at 67; see also 1965 Senate Report, at 77. </s> [Footnote 7 In its discussion of this portion of the statute, the 1965 House Report, at 68, explains: </s> "The bill also contains a provision designed to correct one of the weaknesses identified in the medical assistance for the aged program. Under [457 U.S. 569, 575] the current provisions of Federal law, some States have enacted programs which contain a cutoff point on income which determines the financial eligibility of the individual. Thus, an individual with an income just under the specified limit may qualify for all of the aid provided under the State plan. Individuals, however, whose income exceeds the limitation adopted by the State are found ineligible for the medical assistance provided under the State plan even though the excess of the individual's income may be small when compared with the cost of the medical care needed. In order that all States shall be flexible in the consideration of an individual's income, your committee bill requires that the States standards for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance shall take into account, except to the extent prescribed by the Secretary, the cost - whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise - incurred for medical care or any other type of remedial care recognized under State law. Thus, before an individual is found ineligible for all or part of the cost of his medical needs, the State must be sure that the income of the individual has been measured in terms of both the State's allowance for basic maintenance needs and the cost of the medical care he requires." </s> See also 1965 Senate Report, at 78-79. To this extent, the House Report mirrors the statutory language. In further describing this provision, however, the 1965 House Report, at 68, immediately continues: </s> "The State may require the use of all the excess income of the individual toward his medical expenses, or some proportion of that amount. In no event, however, with respect to either this provision or that described below with reference to the use of deductibles for certain items of medical service, may a State require the use of income or resources which would bring the individual below the test of eligibility under the State plan. If the test of eligibility should be $2,000 a year, an individual with income in excess of that amount shall not be required to use his income to the extent he has remaining less than $2,000. This action would reduce the individual below the level determined by the State as necessary for his maintenance." </s> See also 1965 Senate Report, at 79. This additional comment has no direct foundation in the statutory language of 1902(a)(17). See 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a) (17). </s> [Footnote 8 See H. R. Rep. No. 544, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 117 (1967) (1967 House Report). </s> [Footnote 9 This provision, of course, would have had no effect on the "categorically needy," since their income was necessarily less than 150% of the highest categorical assistance standard of need. </s> [Footnote 10 President's Proposals for Revision in the Social Security System: Hearings on H. R. 5710 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 118 (1967). In January 1965, there were 21 States that paid less than 75% of the standard of need established for a family of four under the State's AFDC program. Id., at 119. </s> [Footnote 11 The proposed bill also provided another limit on federal participation. It included a provision that set "a figure of 133 1/3 percent of the average per capita income of a State as the upper limit on Federal sharing when applied to a family of four under the title XIX program." 1967 House Report, at 119. It is noteworthy that these proposals were not an insignificant part of what was - admittedly - a complex bill. In setting forth at the outset the "principal purposes of the bill," the House Report provides: </s> "Fifth, to modify the program of medical assistance to establish certain limits on Federal participation in the program and to add flexibility in administration, the bill would - </s> "(a) Impose a limitation on Federal matching at an income level related to payments for families receiving aid to families with dependent children or to the per capita income of the State, if lower." Id., at 5. </s> [Footnote 12 If the House bill applied to both the categorically needy and the medically needy, it could have resulted in the denial of Medicaid benefits to certain categorically needy individuals who - although eligible for assistance under the State's standard of need - had an income that was higher than 133 1/3% of the amount the State actually paid to a qualifying individual with no income. The House bill did not, however, alter 1902(a)(10) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10), which required participating States to provide Medicaid benefits to all of the categorically needy. </s> [Footnote 13 See 113 Cong. Rec. 23065 (1967) (remarks of Rep. King); id., at 23077 (remarks of Rep. Burke); id., at 23082 (remarks of Rep. Vanik); id., at 23084 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id., at 23087 (remarks of Rep. Halpern); id., at 23093 (remarks of Rep. Ryan); id., at 23104 (remarks of Rep. Bingham); id., at 23125 (remarks of Rep. Boland); id., at 23128 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier). In particular, see id., at 23131 (remarks of Rep. [457 U.S. 569, 579] Farbstein); id., at 23083 (remarks of Rep. Gilbert); id., at 23092 (remarks of Rep. Burton). </s> [Footnote 14 Representative Mills defended the bill against criticism that its treatment of those with income above the categorical assistance limit was unfair. He noted that it was "only because of what we walked into with this program that the committee has seen fit to put limits on it," id., at 23093, and added: "I do not think it is fair to tax people through the general funds of the Treasury to pay for the medical costs of those who undoubtedly have the means to buy insurance and to defray their own medical costs." Ibid. See also id., at 23061-23062 (remarks of Rep. Byrnes); id., at 23084-23085 (remarks of Rep. Hanley); id., at 23090 (remarks of Rep. Stratton); id., at 23090, 23091 (remarks of Rep. McCarthy); id., at 23105 (remarks of Rep. Taft); id., at 22783 (remarks of Rep. Quillen). </s> [Footnote 15 In hearings before the Senate Finance Committee, an HEW official recommended that the administration's proposal be adopted. He criticized the House bill and noted that, in States such as Indiana and Texas, 133% of the AFDC payment amount was less than the AFDC standard of need. Social Security Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H. R. 12080 before the Senate Committee on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 280 (1967). He pointed out that such a standard could result in exclusion of some of the categorically needy, which he suggested probably had not been intended. Ibid. Senator Robert Kennedy also criticized the House proposal, noting that medically needy individuals would not be eligible for Medicaid in some States until their income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was less than the standards of need established for the categorically needy. Id., at 784. </s> The Finance Committee subsequently proposed a bill that provided participating States with federal assistance for Medicaid expenditures made on behalf of any person whose income after the deduction of medical expenses was less than 150% of the OAA standard, which generally was the highest of the cash assistance standards. See S. Rep. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 177 (1967). The Senate bill also introduced a new formula for computing the amount of federal reimbursement under the Medicaid program that was designed to reduce federal matching funds for payments to the medically needy. Id., at 176-177. </s> The proposals encountered resistance on the Senate floor. Senator Javits, speaking in support of an amendment offered by Senator Kuchel that [457 U.S. 569, 580] would have substituted the proposals of the administration, criticized the Finance Committee bill on the ground that it discriminated against the medically needy. See 113 Cong. Rec. 33168, 33169 (1967). In response, Senator Long acknowledged that the bill discriminated against the medically needy, but explained that it "encourages the State to concentrate its medical assistance for those who are most in need, those who qualify for public welfare assistance." Id., at 33169, 33171. The Senate rejected the Kuchel amendment and adopted the Finance Committee bill. </s> [Footnote 16 See id., at 36380 (remarks of Rep. Burton); id., at 36381 (remarks of Rep. Gilbert); id., at 36385 (remarks of Rep. Reid); id., at 36387 (remarks of Rep. Ryan); id., at 36389 (remarks of Rep. Farbstein). In the Senate, Robert Kennedy complained that in Mississippi the 133 1/3% limitation amounted to an income level, after medical expenses had been incurred, of $80 per month for a family of four. Id., at 36784. Senator Mondale quoted the testimony in the Senate Hearings, see n. 15, supra, that in some States the 133 1/3% AFDC payment amount was less than the standard of need established under even the AFDC program. 113 Cong. Rec. 36819 (1967). </s> [Footnote 17 Title 42 U.S.C. 1396b(f) provides: </s> "(f) Limitation on Federal participation in medical assistance </s> "(1)(A) Except as provided in paragraph (4), payment under the preceding provisions of this section shall not be made with respect to any amount expended as medical assistance in a calendar quarter, in any State, for any member of a family the annual income of which exceeds the applicable income limitation determined under this paragraph. </s> "(B)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii) of this subparagraph, the applicable income limitation with respect to any family is the amount determined, in accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, to be equivalent to 133 1/3 percent of the highest amount which would ordinarily be paid to a family of the same size without any income or resources, in the form of money payments, under the plan of the State approved under Part A of subchapter IV of this chapter. </s> . . . . . </s> "(2) In computing a family's income for purposes of paragraph (1), there shall be excluded any costs (whether in the form of insurance premiums or otherwise) incurred by such family for medical care or for any other type of remedial care recognized under State law. </s> "(4) The limitations on payment imposed by the preceding provisions of this subsection shall not apply with respect to any amount expended by a State as medical assistance for any individual - </s> "(A) who is receiving aid or assistance under any plan of the State approved under subchapter I, X, XIV or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, or with respect to whom supplemental security income benefits are being paid under subchapter XVI of this chapter, or </s> "(B) who is not receiving such aid or assistance, and with respect to whom such benefits are not being paid, but (i) is eligible to receive such aid or assistance, or to have such benefits paid with respect to him, or (ii) would be eligible to receive such aid or assistance, or to have such benefits paid with respect to him if he were not in a medical institution, or </s> "(C) with respect to whom there is being paid, or who is eligible, or would be eligible if he were not in a medical institution, to have paid with respect to him, a State supplementary payment and is eligible for medical assistance equal in amount, duration, and scope to the medical assistance made available to individuals described in section 1396a(a)(10) (A) of this title, but only if the income of such individual (as determined under section 1382a of this title, but without regard to subsection (b) thereof) does not exceed 300 percent of the supplemental security income benefit rate established by section 1382(b)(1) of this title, </s> at the time of the provision of the medical assistance giving rise to such expenditure." </s> [Footnote 18 The SSI program is funded and administered by the Federal Government. As its name indicates, it replaced the categorical assistance programs for the aged, the blind, and the disabled. The AFDC program continues to be administered by the States and is only partially funded by the Federal Government. </s> In some States the number of individuals eligible for SSI was significantly greater than the number of persons who had been eligible under the [457 U.S. 569, 582] state-administered categorical assistance programs. See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 38 . Since recipients of categorical welfare assistance are also entitled to Medicaid benefits, the expansion of general welfare accomplished by the SSI program increased Medicaid obligations for some States. To guarantee that States would not, for that reason, withdraw from the Medicaid program, Congress offered what has become known as the " 209(b) option." Under it, States may elect to provide Medicaid assistance only to those individuals who would have been eligible under the state Medicaid plan in effect on January 1, 1972. See id., at 38-39. Thus, in some States, Medicaid is not automatically available for all of the "categorically needy." Massachusetts is not a 209(b) State. </s> [Footnote 19 There is a limit on federal participation in this aspect of the program. A State is entitled to federal financial assistance for providing Medicaid benefits to a state supplementary payment recipient only if his gross income is less than 300% of the applicable SSI income limitation. See 42 U.S.C. 1396b(f)(4)(C); n. 17, supra. </s> [Footnote 20 There is no statutory requirement that state AFDC payment amounts be comparable to state supplemental benefits. </s> [Footnote 21 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 . Appellees also contended that certain state statutory provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 22 Appellees alleged that federal and state provisions require an individual to apply for and to accept all Social Security benefits for which he is eligible as a condition of application for SSI and Medicaid benefits. See 42 U.S.C. 1382(e)(2). </s> Appellees' grievances are best illustrated by the situation of appellee Hunter. The District Court found that Hunter had worked for 41 years and had paid Social Security taxes during that period. As a result, he received at the time of trial $534 per month in Social Security benefits, $20 of which apparently was disregarded in computing eligibility for SSI and state supplementary payments. As a result of his income, Hunter was [457 U.S. 569, 584] ineligible for either SSI or state supplemental payments; the "standard of need" under those programs was $513 per month. If he had qualified, he of course would also have been eligible for Medicaid. Since the applicable AFDC payment amount in Massachusetts was $300, Hunter was ineligible for Medicaid until his income, after deduction of incurred medical expenses, was no higher than $400. Hunter regularly incurred over $200 each month in medical expenses; thus, by reason of his Social Security benefits, he had less income available for nonmedical needs ($400 per month) than he would have had on public assistance ($513 per month). In his case, a Social Security payment of $1 less each month ($534 less $20 less $1) would apparently have rendered him fully eligible for Medicaid. See Hogan v. Harris, 501 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (Mass. 1980). In other words, if his gross income were reduced by $1, he would receive over $100 in additional medical benefits and have that additional amount of income available for nonmedical needs. </s> [Footnote 23 The District Court certified a class "consisting of all (i) present and future Social Security recipients; (ii) who reside or will reside in Massachusetts; (iii) who are or will be disabled or 65 years old or older; (iv) who are or will be ineligible because of the amount of their incomes for Massachusetts Supplemental Security Income payments; and (v) who have or will have, as determined in accordance with the applicable Massachusetts Medicaid regulations, medical expenses not subject to payment by a third party which exceed the difference between their countable incomes under the Massachusetts Medicaid regulations and the applicable Massachusetts Supplemental Security Income standard." App. to Juris. Statement 23a-24a. </s> [Footnote 24 "It is well accepted . . . that without filing a cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the record in support of the judgment below." Blum v. Bacon, ante, at 137, n. 5. The statutory argument raised by the appellees, although not presented in the District Court, may be decided on the basis of the record developed in that court. </s> [Footnote 25 See n. 12, supra. Since the limitation in the Senate bill was set at 150% of the OAA assistance standard, by definition it would not likely have [457 U.S. 569, 586] affected the categorically needy. In any event, appellees contend that both bills were consistent with a comparability requirement. </s> [Footnote 26 See 1967 House Report, at 117-118. </s> [Footnote 27 Moreover, appellees' "congressional ignorance" argument rests on another unsupportable premise. Appellees assume that the House bill - which they admit was vigorously debated - had a "comparable" effect on the categorically and the medically needy. That bill, however, did not propose an amendment to 1902(a)(10) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396a (a)(10), which required that Medicaid coverage be provided to all the categorically needy. It is much more likely - in light of 1902(a) (10) - that the House assumed that its proposed limits on federal participation in the Medicaid program would affect only the medically needy. See Hearings on H. R. 12080, supra n. 15, at 280 (describing the possibility that the House bill would affect the categorically needy as a "drafting error"). This assumption was made explicit by the Conference Committee, which chose the House standard but added - with little discussion - a direct exception for the categorically needy. </s> [Footnote 28 Relying on 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) and 1396a(a)(17), courts have concluded that certain treatment of the medically needy must be comparable to that afforded to the categorically needy. See Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 (CA2 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 909 ; Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869 (CA4 1979); Greklek v. Toia, 565 F.2d 1259 (CA2 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Blum v. Toomey, 436 U.S. 962 ; Aitchison [457 U.S. 569, 588] v. Berger, 404 F. Supp. 1137 (SDNY 1975), aff'd 538 F.2d 307 (CA2 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 890 . Whatever the scope of the requirement of comparability between the categorically and the medically needy, it is clear that the Act does not require the income of medically needy persons - after the deduction of incurred medical expenses - to be at least comparable to that of the categorically needy. </s> [Footnote 29 The discriminatory impact challenged in this case arises solely from the fact that Massachusetts has chosen to supplement SSI payments to an extent that exceeds 133 1/3% of state AFDC payment levels. It is not [457 U.S. 569, 589] disputed that 133 1/3% of the Massachusetts AFDC payment level is higher than federal SSI benefit levels. See 45 Fed. Reg. 31782 (1980); 46 Fed. Reg. 27076 (1981). </s> [Footnote 30 Although the arguments in this case have focused on two classes, in fact there are three: (1) the categorically needy; and (2) all others, (a) some of whom have medical expenses that reduce their remaining income to a level that qualifies them as medically needy, and (b) some of whom are neither categorically needy nor medically needy. </s> [Footnote 31 1965 House Report, at 66. </s> [Footnote 32 See Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238 ("This Court has granted a `strong presumption of constitutionality' to legislation conferring monetary benefits, Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S., at 185 , because it believes that Congress should have discretion in deciding how to expend necessarily limited resources"). The fact that the recipient of a governmental benefit - such as an indigent defendant who is represented by a public defender - may in some cases be better off after receiving the benefit than a wealthier person who did not qualify to receive it does not undermine the validity of the basis for determining eligibility. </s> [Footnote 33 The fact that the amount of benefits payable to persons within the medically needy class is determined on the basis of income remaining after medical expenses have been incurred does not impeach the rationality of defining the basic distinction between the categorically needy and all others on the basis of income before medical expenses are considered. </s> [457 U.S. 569, 594]

United States Supreme Court CLEARY v. BOLGER(1963) No. 57 Argued: Decided: January 14, 1963 </s> While a state criminal prosecution and a state administrative proceeding for revocation of his license were pending against respondent, he brought this suit in a Federal District Court to enjoin a state officer and certain federal officers from testifying in either proceeding about incriminating statements elicited from respondent while he was being illegally detained and interrogated by the federal officers. The state officer had been present during part of the interrogation but had not participated therein. Finding that the incriminating statements had been procured by the federal officers in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), the Court granted the injunction against them and the state officer. Only the state officer sought review in this Court. Held: The injunction against the state officer was improvidently granted. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 , followed. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 , distinguished. Pp. 392-401. </s> 293 F.2d 368, reversed. </s> Irving Malchman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was William P. Sirignano. </s> Joseph Aronstein, by appointment of the Court, post, p. 805, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> John T. Casey and Benj. J. Jacobson filed a brief for the New York State District Attorneys Association, as amicus curiae. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case draws in question the propriety of the issuance of a federal injunction restraining petitioner, a state officer, from giving evidence in a pending state criminal prosecution and a state administrative proceeding. </s> The facts, as found by the two lower courts, are as follows. About 8:30 one Saturday morning in September [371 U.S. 392, 393] 1959 federal Customs officers observed respondent, a hiring agent and longshoreman licensed by the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, enter a deserted pier, carry out a cardboard carton, and place it in a car parked at the pier entrance. The officers, who were concerned about the recent frequency of thefts, particularly of liquor, in the New York waterfront area, followed respondent's car for a short distance and then ordered him to stop. A search of the automobile revealed that the cardboard carton contained only empty soda bottles, but that the glove compartment contained a number of spark plugs and windshield wipers, some of which were stamped "Made in England." Respondent was asked whether he had obtained any liquor from the piers, and he admitted that he had six or eight bottles at home which he had purchased from members of ships' crews who in turn, he said, had bought them from ships' stores. </s> The agents then took respondent into custody; he was brought to the Customs office, denied permission to use the telephone, and questioned until shortly before 11 a.m. During this period he signed a document consenting to a search of his home by the Customs officers, who had told him that the consent form was unnecessary since they already had enough information to warrant a search but that he might as well sign it to save them trouble. He had at first refused to sign such a consent without consulting a lawyer. The agents then drove respondent to his home in New Jersey and without a search warrant, gave it a thorough search, which uncovered some 75 bottles of liquor, a Stenorette tape recording machine made in West Germany, and various other items of apparent foreign origin such as perfumes, linens, costume jewelry, etc. These articles, thought to have been illegally acquired, were brought back to Customs headquarters in New York, where, starting about 4 p. m., respondent was again questioned. [371 U.S. 392, 394] </s> By this time the Waterfront Commission, a of-state agency of New York and New Jersey 1 which worked in close cooperation with the Customs Service in matters of law enforcement on the waterfront, had been informed of respondent's arrest, and two Commission detectives were present when the interrogation resumed. Petitioner Cleary was one of these detectives. After respondent had revealed that he maintained a tool room in the basement of an apartment house in New York, petitioner and a Customs officer accompanied respondent to this tool room, but nothing suspicious was discovered and they returned to Customs headquarters at 5:45 p. m. </s> After he had been told that he did not have to make a statement, respondent was sworn and interrogated by Customs officers in the presence of a Customs Service reporter, who recorded the questions and answers verbatim. Petitioner was present and could have participated in the questioning though he did not do so. 2 Respondent admitted that with the exception of a few items that he had purchased from crew members most of the articles seized at his home had been taken by him from piers where he worked. He also said that he had taken the Stenorette tape recorder from a lighter moored at one of the piers. At 7:30 p. m. respondent was released. </s> No charges were lodged against respondent by the federal authorities. But a month later he was arrested by the New York City police on a charge of grand larceny for the theft of the Stenorette tape recorder, and shortly thereafter the Waterfront Commission temporarily suspended his licenses as hiring agent and longshoreman. The criminal charge was subsequently reduced to petit [371 U.S. 392, 395] larceny and scheduled for trial in the Court of Special Sessions of New York City. A hearing looking to the revocation of respondent's licenses was deferred by the Waterfront Commission pending the outcome of the criminal case. </s> After the petit larceny charge had been set for trial, respondent instituted the present action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking to enjoin the federal Customs officers and petitioner from using in evidence any of the seized property or his incriminating statement, and from testifying with respect thereto, in the state criminal trial or Waterfront Commission proceeding. He also sought return of the seized property. 3 The basis for the action was the claim that the seized property and the incriminating statement were the products of illegal conduct on the part of the federal officers. </s> The District Court granted such relief, limited however, to the property seized at respondent's home, to the incriminatory statement made following his arrest, and to testimony respecting these matters. 4 It held that the search and seizure at respondent's home violated Rule 41 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 in that it had [371 U.S. 392, 396] been made without a search warrant, and that his incriminating statement had been procured in violation of Rule 5 (a) of those Rules, 6 in that respondent had not been taken before a United States Commissioner within a reasonable time after his arrest, and was also "the result . . . of the illegal search and seizure." In consequence of these illegalities an injunction against the federal officers was thought to follow. An injunction against petitioner was deemed necessary to make the injunction against the federal officials effective. 189 F. Supp. 237. The Court of Appeals affirmed by a divided vote. 293 F.2d 368. Since the use of federal equity power in the premises presented important questions touching upon federal-state relationships in the realm of state criminal prosecutions, we brought the case here. 368 U.S. 984 . </s> Accepting for present purposes the holdings of the two lower courts with respect to the conduct and enjoinability of the federal officers, we nevertheless conclude that the injunction against this petitioner was improvidently issued. 7 </s> [371 U.S. 392, 397] </s> Courts of equity traditionally have refused, except in rare instances, to enjoin criminal prosecutions. This principle "is impressively reinforced when not merely the relations between coordinate courts but between coordinate political authorities are in issue." Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 . It has been manifested in numerous decisions of this Court involving a State's enforcement of its criminal law. E. g., Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 ; Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 ; Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 . The considerations that have prompted denial of federal injunctive relief affecting state prosecutions were epitomized in the Stefanelli case, in which this Court refused to sanction an injunction against state officials to prevent them from using in a state criminal trial evidence seized by state police in alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment: </s> "[W]e would expose every State criminal prosecution to insupportable disruption. Every question of procedural due process of law - with its far-flung and undefined range - would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by resort to the federal forum, with review if need be to this Court, to determine the issue. Asserted unconstitutionality in the impaneling and selection of the grand and petit juries, in the failure to appoint counsel, in the admission of a confession, in the creation of an unfair trial atmosphere, in the misconduct of the trial court - all would provide ready opportunities, which conscientious counsel might be bound to employ, to subvert the orderly effective prosecution of local crime in local courts. To suggest these difficulties is to recognize their solution." 342 U.S., at 123 -124. [371 U.S. 392, 398] </s> The two courts below recognized the validity of these considerations but thought that injunctive relief was nonetheless required by Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 . In that case the accused had been indicted in a federal court and had moved for an order under Rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure suppressing the use in evidence of certain narcotics seized under a search warrant invalid on its face. The District Court granted the motion. Despite the order, however, one of the federal officers who had secured the search warrant caused the accused to be rearrested and charged in a state court, with possession of the same narcotics in violation of a state statute, and threatened to make the State's case by his testimony based on the evidence seized under the illegal federal warrant. The accused then moved in the Federal District Court to enjoin the federal agent from testifying in the state proceeding. This Court, invoking its "supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies" (id., at 216-217), reversed the denial of an injunction and directed that the requested relief be granted in order to prevent frustration of the Federal Rules under which suppression had been ordered. 8 Both lower courts in the present case evidently took Rea to mean that federal officers transgressing the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure may always be enjoined from utilizing their ill-gotten gains in a state criminal prosecution against the victim or from directly or indirectly passing them along to state authorities for such use. 9 </s> We need not, however, determine in this instance the correctness of the lower courts' broad reading of the Rea [371 U.S. 392, 399] case, cf. Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 , on the basis of which the federal officers here were enjoined. 10 For in any event Rea does not support the injunction against this petitioner, a state official. The Court in Rea was at special pains to point out that the federal courts were not there "asked to enjoin state officials nor in any way to interfere with state agencies in enforcement of state law," 350 U.S., at 216 , and further that "[n]o injunction is sought against a state official," id., at 217. The opinion is barren of any suggestion that any inroads on Stefanelli were intended. </s> It is no answer to say, as the Court of Appeals did, that this petitioner "is not being enjoined in his capacity as a state official, but as a witness invited to observe illegal activity by federal agents," 293 F.2d, at 369. For it is abundantly clear that the petitioner was present at these occurrences precisely and only because of his official connection with the Waterfront Commission. The District Court expressly found that it was "[t]he Waterfront Commission," not petitioner, which "had been informed of [respondent] Bolger's detention," 189 F. Supp., at 244, and that petitioner "was present at the questioning [of Bolger] as a representative of the Waterfront Commission," id., at 255. </s> Nor can the injunctive relief against this petitioner find justification in the rationale that it was required in order to make the injunction against the federal officers effective. Such relief as to him must stand on its own bottom. We need not decide whether petitioner's status as a state official might be ignored had it been shown that he had misconducted himself in this affair, that he had been utilized by the federal officials as a means of shielding [371 U.S. 392, 400] their own alleged illegal conduct or that he had receive the evidence in direct violation of a federal court order. Here the District Court found that petitioner was not a factor in the federal investigation 11 and that his presence there was simply "the result of the commendable cooperation between the Customs Service and the Commission who were both concerned with law enforcement on the waterfront." 189 F. Supp., at 255. 12 On this record the upshot of the matter is that, insofar as this state official is concerned, nothing in Rea justifies disregard of the teachings of Stefanelli. Nor is the vitality of the principles on which the latter case rested sapped by this Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , which had refused to extend to the States the exclusionary rule of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 . For in denying the injunctive relief there sought Stefanelli expressly laid to one side any possible impact of Wolf. 342 U.S., at 119 -120. </s> The withholding of injunctive relief against this state official does not deprive respondent of the opportunity for federal correction of any denial of federal constitutional rights in the state proceedings. To the extent that such rights have been violated, cf., e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, [371 U.S. 392, 401] supra, he may raise the objection in the state courts and then seek review in this Court of an adverse determination by the New York Court of Appeals. To permit such claims to be litigated collaterally, as is sought here, would in effect frustrate the deep-seated federal policy against piecemeal review. </s> To the extent that respondent's claims involve infractions merely of the Federal Criminal Rules, we need not decide whether an adverse state determination upon such claims would be reversible here. Cf., e. g., Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 . For in any event we do not think that an injunction against this state official is justified in the circumstances of this case. Assuming that such relief was properly granted here as to the federal officials in the exercise of federal-court supervisory power over them, we consider that a supplementing injunction should not issue against a state official, at least where, as here, there is no evidence of a purpose to avoid federal requirements and the information has not been acquired by the state official in violation of a federal court order. Such direct intrusion in state processes does not comport with proper federalstate relationships. </s> We conclude that the injunction as to this petitioner should not have been granted, and that the judgment of the Court of Appeals must accordingly be </s> Reversed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 . </s> [Footnote 2 The other Waterfront Commission detective, Machry, had apparently left the scene at an earlier stage. He was not joined as a defendant in the present action. </s> [Footnote 3 Respondent also instituted a second federal action against the Waterfront Commission and its members, seeking to enjoin the use of the same evidence in the license-revocation proceeding. That suit was dismissed by the District Court and is not involved here. </s> [Footnote 4 The District Court held that respondent's arrest and the search of his automobile by the federal agents were not illegal, and also denied return of any of the property seized at respondent's home on the premise that it was contraband. Neither of those determinations is before us. </s> [Footnote 5 Rule 41 (a): "Authority to Issue Warrant. A search warrant authorized by this rule may be issued by a judge of the United States or of a state, commonwealth or territorial court of record or by a United States commissioner within the district wherein the property sought is located." </s> [Footnote 6 Rule 5 (a): "Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States. When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner or other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith." See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 . </s> [Footnote 7 It should be noted that respondent did not allege in his complaint that the matter in controversy exceeded the sum or value of $10,000, or that diversity of citizenship existed. See 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1332. Nor did he allege that the District Court had jurisdiction to enjoin petitioner incidental to its supervisory power over federal law enforcement agencies, cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 217 , or that 28 U.S.C. 1343 conferred jurisdiction. But, in view of our determination that equitable power should not have been exercised with respect to this petitioner, it is not necessary to resolve the questions [371 U.S. 392, 397] whether the complaint stated a cause of action as to him or whether federal jurisdiction existed or was adequately invoked. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 . </s> [Footnote 8 Rule 41 (e) provides that the material suppressed "shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial." </s> [Footnote 9 The Court of Appeals was also disposed to think that the propriety of the District Court's injunction was not affected by this Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , which came down after this case had left the District Court. </s> [Footnote 10 None of the federal officers involved in this action has sought review in this Court. And for reasons stated in this opinion there is otherwise no need for determining the propriety of the injunction as to them in order to dispose of the case before us. </s> [Footnote 11 "In the case at bar the wrongful activities were all those of federal officers and were conducted or directed by them. All that was done during the period of unlawful detention, and particularly the taking of the incriminating statement from Bolger, was being done on behalf of the United States. Cleary was merely a witness to them." 189 F. Supp., at 256. </s> [Footnote 12 We attach no significance to the District Court's remark that petitioner's "presence might have been an additional inducement to Bolger to answer questions more freely" (189 F. Supp., at 255) because Bolger, when originally picked up by the federal officers, had exhibited concern about the possible effect of his transgressions on his longshoreman's license. The record is barren of any evidence indicating that petitioner was brought into the situation for the purpose of intimidating Bolger or that he in fact did so. </s> MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG, concurring in the result. </s> I concur in the result. I cannot, however, join the Court's opinion, because I do not find it necessary in the present circumstances to pass upon the question whether Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 , may ever support an injunction against a state official who has received evidence illegally obtained by federal officers even though "there is no evidence of a purpose to avoid federal requirements [371 U.S. 392, 402] and the information has not been acquired by the state official in violation of a federal court order." For me consideration of that question is obviated by the commendably broad reading which the New York Court of Appeals has given this Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 . 1 Because I strongly adhere to the principle, stated with clarity in Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 , that the considerations governing whether a federal equity court should exercise its power here "touch perhaps the most sensitive source of friction between States and Nation, namely, the active intrusion of the federal courts in the administration of the criminal law for the prosecution of crimes solely within the power of the States," I would avoid granting of injunctive relief in cases such as this where, because there is a substantial likelihood that the state courts will exclude the evidence at issue, such relief is not essential to vindication of an overriding federal policy governing conduct of federal officers. The virtual certainty of exclusion in the New York criminal proceedings and the likelihood of exclusion in the state administrative proceedings satisfy me that denial of the injunction here will not encourage federal officers to engage in illegal conduct. Thus, deterrence of such illegality the consideration which in substantial part underlay the decision in Rea, is not a determining factor here and there is no need to grant injunctive relief to effectuate that policy. </s> In stating my position I rely on the New York Court of Appeals' announced view that it regards Mapp as extending to the "fruit of the poisonous tree," a holding arrived at on facts similar to those involved here. People v. Rodriguez, 11 N. Y. 2d 279, 286, 183 N. E. 2d 651, 653-654 [371 U.S. 392, 403] (1962). It therefore appears that New York will exclude all the evidence here in question in the pending criminal proceedings. With reference to the Waterfront Commission hearing, I am well aware that the New York Court of Appeals has as yet taken no position on the applicability of Mapp in civil and administrative proceedings, 2 and that, indeed, the effect of the Fourth Amendment in civil cases in the federal courts is not totally settled. 3 However, in view of the encouragingly constructive approach of the New York courts to application of the Mapp decision, and of the "quasi-criminal" character of the pending Waterfront Commission proceedings, I nevertheless take the view, based upon Stefanelli, that the orderly way to proceed in this case is for New York to pass upon respondent's claims first. </s> The Court's opinion states that "To the extent that respondent's claims involve infractions merely of the Federal Criminal Rules, we need not decide whether an adverse state determination upon such claims would be reversible here." I, like the Court, do not reach this issue, but I so conclude because of my stated belief that New York will, under Mapp, likely exclude all the evidence in question here, a possibility which for me because of my firm belief in the principles of Stefanelli v. Minard, supra, is sufficient to make the granting of injunctive relief here an unwise exercise of federal power. Whether it would be similarly excludible in such state proceedings were respondent's claims premised solely upon federal officers' [371 U.S. 392, 404] misbehavior in contravention of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a question which this Court has not decided. 4 There is a strong interest, which many decisions of this Court reflect, e. g., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 ; Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , in ensuring compliance by federal officers with rules having the force of federal law, designed to safeguard the rights of citizens charged with criminal acts. Whether the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution compels state courts to enforce that interest by excluding evidence obtained by federal officers in violation of the Federal Criminal Rules, including reverse "silver platter" situations wherein illegally procured evidence has been handed over to state officers, will warrant serious consideration in an appropriate case. We need not and therefore do not decide that question here. </s> [Footnote 1 See, e. g., People v. Loria, 10 N. Y. 2d 368, 179 N. E. 2d 478 (1961); People v. O'Neill, 11 N. Y. 2d 148, 182 N. E. 2d 95 (1962); People v. Rodriguez, 11 N. Y. 2d 279, 183 N. E. 2d 651 (1962). </s> [Footnote 2 Compare Bloodgood v. Lynch, 293 N. Y. 308, 56 N. E. 2d 718 (1944), with Sackler, v. Sackler, 16 App. Div. 2d 423, 229 N. Y. S. 2d 61 (2d Dept. 1962). </s> [Footnote 3 Compare Rogers v. United States, 97 F.2d 691 (C. A. 1st Cir. 1938), United States v. Butler, 156 F.2d 897 (C. A. 10th Cir. 1946), and United States v. Physic, 175 F.2d 338 (C. A. 2d Cir. 1949), with United States v. One 1956 Ford Tudor Sedan, 253 F.2d 725 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1958). </s> [Footnote 4 Nothing in Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55 , which did not involve activities of federal officers in violation of the Federal Criminal Rules, decides that question. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs, dissenting. </s> I would agree with the judgment of the Court if we had here nothing but a question concerning the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. That question can now be raised in the state prosecution as a result of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 . My difficulties stem from a flagrant violation by federal officers of Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the threatened use of the fruits of that violation by a state official in state cases. If the Court, as is strongly suggested, makes unreviewable here any adverse state determination on that claim, the only opportunity to correct the abuse of federal authority is here and now. [371 U.S. 392, 405] </s> Federal customs agents suspected that thefts of liquor were occurring on the New York waterfront. Two agents stopped respondent Bolger on suspicion of theft at about 8 a. m. on Saturday, September 12, 1959. Their search of Bolger's car produced only a couple of windshield wipers and six spark plugs stamped "made in England," items that easily could have been purchased in New York. But, in response to the agents' questioning, Bolger admitted that he had at his home several bottles of liquor purchased from seamen. On the basis of this information the agents arrested Bolger at 9 a. m. Instead of taking him before a Commissioner as required by Rule 5 (a), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure they took him to headquarters for further questioning. There, after refusing his request to consult a lawyer and by employing trickery, the agents got Bolger to consent to a search of his home. The ensuing search, conducted at about 11 a. m., produced several items tending to incriminate Bolger. Upon returning to headquarters further questioning produced damaging statements from him. Petitioner Cleary, an investigator for the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, was present at this later questioning at the invitation of the federal agents. Though he did not participate in this questioning he was free to do so. </s> No federal prosecution was ever brought against Bolger. New York, however instituted both a criminal prosecution and an administrative proceeding to revoke his license as a hiring agent. Bolger brought suit in the Federal District Court to enjoin the federal agents and Cleary from producing any of the material seized from him or testifying as to any of his statements in either of the state proceedings. </s> The District Court granted the relief requested with respect to all statements obtained after 11 a. m., at which time a Federal Commissioner was in his office a few blocks [371 U.S. 392, 406] from headquarters, and also all evidence obtained at Bolger's home. It held that the statements obtained both prior to and after the search were in violation of Rule 5 (a), and that the search and seizure violated both the Fourth Amendment and Rule 41 (a). 189 F. Supp. 237. The District Court relied on Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 , insofar as the federal agents were concerned; and it added that if the remedy did not extend to Cleary, whom it characterized as a "human recorder," federal agents would be free to flout the strictures imposed on them by Rea and the Federal Rules. The District Court concluded, "Cleary will be restrained not in his capacity as a state official but because he participated as a witness in the unlawful acts of the federal officers acting on behalf of the United States." 189 F. Supp., at 256. </s> Only Cleary appealed; and the Court of Appeals affirmed on the authority of Rea v. United States, supra. 293 F.2d 368. It said that the only difference between this case and Rea "is the time at which the federal officials attempt to make the results of their lawbreaking available to the state." Id., at 369. </s> I think the Court of Appeals was correct in saying that "the Rea case [is] ample authority for holding that the order appealed from is not barred by 28 U.S.C. 2283 as an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court." Id., at 370. The proceedings themselves are not enjoined. Enjoining a state agent from offering as a witness unlawfully obtained evidence has no different effect on the "proceedings in a state court" than enjoining a federal officer. To be sure, in Rea there had been an earlier suppression order in a federal prosecution; and so it is now said that the injunction against testifying was necessary to protect or effectuate that suppression order. That answer proves too much, for it would enable federal agents themselves to violate the Federal Rules and, without fear of a federal [371 U.S. 392, 407] injunction, produce all their illegally obtained evidence in a state prosecution. </s> A state agent should be enjoined from producing, as a witness in a state court proceeding, evidence he acquired solely as a result of federal agents' violation of the Federal Rules. </s> Such an injunction should issue lest federal agents accomplish illegal results by boosting Oliver Twists through windows built too narrow by those Rules for their own ingress. * It is no answer to say that the state agent was merely a nonparticipating observer, or that Oliver Twist was an innocent child. The result produced, viz., the Oliver Twist method of obtaining evidence in violation of the Federal Rules, is illegal and should not go unchecked. </s> "Free and open cooperation between state and federal law enforcement officers is to be commended and encouraged. Yet that kind of cooperation is hardly promoted by a rule that implicitly invites federal officers . . . [to violate the provisions of the Federal Rules]. If, on the other hand, it is understood that the fruit of . . . unlawful . . . [conduct] by . . . [federal] agents will be inadmissible in a . . . [state] trial, there can be no inducement to subterfuge and evasion with respect to federalstate cooperation in criminal investigation" - to paraphrase an earlier opinion in a related area. See Elkins v. [371 U.S. 392, 408] United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 -222. Unless a federal court can enjoin a state agent under the facts of this case, the provisions of the Federal Rules will be subverted and an unhealthy form of state-federal cooperation will be encouraged. </s> What is involved is not an attempt by a federal court to interject itself into a state criminal prosecution to protect a defendant's federal rights against state infringement, as was the case in Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 , and Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 . In both of those cases the unlawfully obtained evidence had been obtained by state police. Here the evidence was obtained by federal agents in violation of the Federal Rules. It therefore involves no entrenchment on principles of federalism to hold that a Federal District Court may enjoin the production of such evidence in a state proceeding, regardless of who seeks to introduce it. The federal courts, rather than the state courts, have the responsibility of assuring that federal law-enforcement officers adhere to the procedures prescribed by the Federal Rules. This responsibility cannot be met if the federal courts' power can be thwarted by federal employment of a state Oliver Twist. </s> [Footnote * "It was a little lattice window, about five feet and a half above the ground: at the back of the house: which belonged to a scullery, or small brewing-place, at the end of the passage. The aperture was so small, that the inmates had probably not thought it worth while to defend it more securely; but it was large enough to admit a boy of Oliver's size, nevertheless. A very brief exercise of Mr. Sikes's art, sufficed to overcome the fastening of the lattice; and it soon stood wide open also." Dickens, The Adventures of Oliver Twist (N. Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell & Co.), p. 184. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE concurs, dissenting. </s> I join in the dissenting opinion of my Brother DOUGLAS and add a few words in support of his conclusion. </s> I. </s> The Court concedes arguendo that it was proper to enjoin the federal officers from testifying in state proceedings against respondent as to the fruits of their violations of Rules 5 and 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. But having made this concession - compelled, I should think, by Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. [371 U.S. 392, 409] 214 1 - the Court then excludes petitioner from the injunction: "injunctive relief against this petitioner [cannot] find justification in the rationale that it was required in order to make the injunction against the federal officers effective. Such relief as to him must stand on its own bottom." The Court finds no "bottom," because petitioner did not himself violate the Federal Rules or otherwise misconduct himself. This reasoning, I submit, cannot withstand scrutiny. </s> In so refusing incidental relief against petitioner, surely the Court flouts settled principles of equity. Equity does not do justice by halves; its remedies are flexible. "A writ of injunction may be said to be a process capable of more modifications than any other in the law; it is so malleable that it may be moulded to suit the various circumstances and occasions presented to a court of equity. It is an instrument in its hands capable of various applications for the purposes of dispensing complete justice between the parties." Tucker v. Carpenter, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14217 (Cir. Ct. D. Ark. 1841); see I Joyce, Injunctions (1909). 2; 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (5th ed., Symons, 1941), 114. 2 "Complete justice" has not been [371 U.S. 392, 410] done if the fruits of the violations of federal law by federal officers may nevertheless be used against respondent in state proceedings by a state officer who witnessed, indeed abetted, those violations. </s> The vacation of the injunction against the state officer on the ground that he himself was not a wrongdoer wholly misconceives the nature of equitable relief. Such relief is not punitive but remedial, and it is measured not by the defendant's transgressions but by the plaintiff's needs. Thus, to protect a trade secret, equity will enjoin third persons to whom the secret has been divulged if they have notice of the breach of trust. See, e. g., Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Carter Products, Inc., 230 F.2d 855, 864-865 (C. A. 4th Cir. 1956). Such third persons are not themselves malefactors, any more than this state officer is; they are enjoined in order to give the victim of the wrong effective protection. The respondent herein is entitled to effective protection against the federal officers' violations of federal law, which comprehends ancillary relief against petitioner qua witness to the unlawful conduct. Though innocent of the federal officers' misconduct, the state officer may not avail himself of its fruits to the harm of respondent. I repeat: the Court errs in asserting that the injunction against the state officer must stand on its own bottom; such a supplemental decree is fully justified, in accordance with the conventional principles of equity, by the issuance of an injunction against the federal officers. [371 U.S. 392, 411] </s> The incidental nature of the relief granted against the state officer should dispel any fear that such relief threatens impairment of the harmonious workings of federalism. To be sure, it was part of the state officer's official duties to cooperate fully with federal officers. But it was no part of his duty to abet and facilitate federal officers' unlawful conduct. To enjoin him as a witness to such conduct does no more than forbid him to profit from it. In overruling the "silver platter" doctrine a few Terms ago, we anchored our holding in the disruptive effect upon the federal system of allowing the introduction into federal courts of evidence unlawfully seized by state officers. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 221 . Surely the converse situation is no less productive of needless conflict. In truth, to enjoin the introduction into state courts of evidence unlawfully seized by federal officers is to promote, not retard, a healthy federalism. </s> In invoking the bogey of federal disruption of state criminal processes, the Court relies heavily on Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 , where it was held to be improper to enjoin the introduction in a state criminal trial of evidence seized by state officers in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. But Stefanelli is manifestly inapt. That decision was compelled by Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 , where the Court, while confirming that the Fourth Amendment had been absorbed into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, nevertheless left the States free to devise appropriate remedies for violations of this constitutional protection. To have authorized the Federal District Courts to order the exclusion in state criminal trials of evidence unlawfully obtained by state officials would have sanctioned accomplishing indirectly what Wolf forbade directly. But Wolf has been overruled in this particular, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , and the accommodation of Wolf which required the decision in Stefanelli is no longer a concern. [371 U.S. 392, 412] </s> Moreover, the instant petitioner is not sought to be enjoined as a state officer whose misconduct ought to be remedied by the State, as was the case in Stefanelli, but as a witness to the misconduct of federal officers. The Federal Rules are not directed at state officers, nor was this state officer found to have engaged in conduct violative of them. Responsibility for enforcing the Federal Rules lies precisely with the federal courts, whereas under the regime of Wolf responsibility for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment's right of privacy lay exclusively with the state court. Indeed, it is in light of the difference between violations of the Federal Rules and violations of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Stefanelli and Rea decisions emerge as perfectly consistent; and it is significant that the author of the Court's opinion in Stefanelli joined the Court's opinion in Rea. </s> It is also worth observing that Congress has taken pains to specify the conditions under which a federal court shall withhold injunctive relief in respect of a pending state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. 2283. The Court nowhere mentions this provision, surely because its total inapplicability to the case at hand is plain: an injunction against this state officer would not stay the state proceedings against respondent but only preclude the use of certain evidence in them. Since Congress in 2283 set out specific conditions for withholding federal equity relief, and these conditions have not been met in the case at bar, I submit that we are obligated to allow such relief to be granted in conformity with the accepted usages of equity procedure. </s> II. </s> With all respect I cannot share the view of my Brother GOLDBERG that relief should be denied here because the probable exclusion of the challenged evidence, in whole or part, by the New York courts would sufficiently serve to deter lawless conduct by federal officers. My view is [371 U.S. 392, 413] that equitable actions grounded in violations of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should be governed by the accepted principles of equity. Among them is the principle that an adequate remedy at law bars equitable relief. This principle seems to me to be applicable even where the remedy is given by the state courts, so long as the source of the remedy is federal law. See Henrietta Mills v. Rutherford County, 281 U.S. 121, 126 -127. I further believe that one who has an adequate remedy by way of appeal, as well as one who has a more conventional adequate remedy at law, is thereby disbarred from equitable relief. 1 Joyce, supra, 29. But for a remedy to be adequate, it must have more than a merely theoretical availability. If "a court of law can do as complete justice to the matter in controversy . . . as could be done by a court of equity, equity will not interfere . . . . But in order that the general principle may apply, the sufficiency and completeness of the legal remedy must be certain; if it is doubtful, equity may take cognizance." 1 Pomeroy, supra, 176. How certain, complete, and sufficient is the remedy by way of appeal in the instant case? My Brother GOLDBERG concedes uncertainty as to whether the New York courts, though they have generously interpreted Mapp v. Ohio, supra, will exclude all the challenged evidence involved in this case, or whether Mapp or any other decision of this Court compels such exclusion. Nor is it certain that a State is obliged to exclude evidence which is the product of violations of the Federal Rules - no decision of this Court has yet so held and Rea was premised on a contrary assumption, see 350 U.S., at 217 ; Wilson v. Schnettler, supra, at 391 (dissenting opinion) - and finally, while petitioner herein was enjoined from testifying in the state administrative proceeding against respondent, as well as in the criminal proceeding, it has not yet been settled whether Mapp applies to administrative proceedings. [371 U.S. 392, 414] </s> Thus, to remit respondent to his remedy by appeal in the state courts is to set him adrift on a sea of legal uncertainties, and very possibly to deprive him, in the end, of any remedy whatever. Since respondent's remedy by law is uncertain, conventional equity principles require that the injunction issue against this state officer, premised not on constitutional grounds but on violations of the Federal Rules by federal officers. 3 </s> [Footnote 1 In Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 , I joined the dissenting opinion of my Brother DOUGLAS because I thought (and still do) that the Court was making dangerous inroads upon the Rea decision. Happily, the Court in the instant case makes no suggestion that the authority of Rea has been impaired by Wilson. At all events Wilson is distinguishable from the case at bar, for here there was no failure to allege a violation of federal law and a lack of an adequate remedy at law. </s> [Footnote 2 "The governing motive of equity in the administration of its remedial system is to grant full relief, and to adjust in the one suit the rights and duties of all the parties, which really grow out of or are connected with the subject-matter of that suit . . . . Its fundamental principle concerning parties is, that all persons in whose favor or against whom there might be a recovery, however partial, and also all persons who are so interested, although indirectly, in the subject-matter [371 U.S. 392, 410] and the relief granted, that their rights or duties might be affected by the decree, although no substantial recovery can be obtained either for or against them, shall be made parties to the suit . . . . The primary object is, that all persons sufficiently interested may be before the court, so that the relief may be properly adjusted among those entitled, the liabilities properly apportioned, and the incidental or consequential claims or interests of all may be fixed, and all may be bound in respect thereto by the single decree." 1 Pomeroy, supra. </s> [Footnote 3 The Court's intimation, in note 7 of the opinion, of doubt as to the existence of federal jurisdiction in the instant case seems to me totally unwarranted. The Court was unanimous in Rea as to the existence of federal jurisdiction; the only dispute was as to the propriety of exercising it. See 350 U.S., at 219 (dissenting opinion). To predicate federal jurisdiction in the instant case, we need not decide whether the Federal Rules are civil rights statutes within the intent of 28 U.S.C. 1343 (4), nor need we resort to any other jurisdictional statute. For the federal courts have the inherent authority to issue orders to protect their processes, here, as in Rea, governed by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See 350 U.S., at 217 ; Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556, 558 . </s> [371 U.S. 392, 415]

United States Supreme Court HECKLER v. COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES(1984) No. 83-56 Argued: February 27, 1984Decided: May 21, 1984 </s> Under the Medicare program, providers of health care services are reimbursed for the reasonable cost of services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries and are required to submit annual cost reports which are audited to determine actual costs. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary) may reopen any reimbursement determination within a 3-year period and make appropriate adjustments. Respondent non-profit corporation (hereafter respondent), pursuant to its contract to provide home health care services under the Medicare program, received reimbursement through a fiscal intermediary, Travelers Insurance Cos. (Travelers). Respondent also received a federal grant under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), which authorized the use of federal funds to provide training and job opportunities for economically disadvantaged persons. This made it possible for respondent to take on additional personnel and to expand its home health care services. A regulation to prevent double reimbursement of providers' costs indicated that grants received by a provider to pay special operating costs must be subtracted from the reasonable costs for which the provider may be reimbursed under the Medicare program. Respondent asked Travelers whether the salaries of its CETA-funded employees who provided services to Medicare patients were reimbursable as reasonable costs under Medicare, and was orally advised by Travelers' Medicare manager that the CETA funds were "seed money" as defined in the Provider Reimbursement Manual to mean "[g]rants designated for the development of new health care agencies or for expansion of services of established agencies," and that therefore, even though the CETA employees' salaries constituted specific operating costs paid by a federal grant, they were reimbursable under the Medicare program. Relying on this advice, respondent included costs for which it was receiving CETA reimbursement in its cost reports for fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977, and received reimbursement for those sums. Eventually, however, Travelers, as it should have done previously, referred respondent's inquiry to the Department of Health and Human Services, and was formally advised that the CETA funds were not "seed money" and thus had [467 U.S. 51, 52] to be subtracted from respondent's Medicare reimbursement. Travelers then reopened respondent's cost reports for the years in question and recomputed the reimbursable costs, determining that respondent had been overpaid $71,480. When Travelers demanded repayment of this amount, respondent filed suit in Federal District Court, but, after it had obtained temporary injunctive relief, the parties stipulated that the suit would be stayed pending administrative review. Thereafter, while rejecting the position that CETA funds were "seed money," the Provider Reimbursement Review Board found that the Secretary's right to recoup the 1975 overpayment was barred because Travelers had not given respondent a written notice of reopening within the 3-year limitation period, and accordingly reduced the amount in dispute. Respondent then filed another suit in the District Court seeking review of this determination. Consolidating the two suits, the court ruled in the Secretary's favor, rejecting respondent's claim that the Secretary ought to be estopped to deny that the CETA funds were "seed money" because of the representations of the Secretary's agent, Travelers. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Government may be estopped by the "affirmative misconduct" of its agents and that Travelers' erroneous advice, coupled with its failure to refer the question to the Secretary, constituted such misconduct. </s> Held: </s> The Government is not estopped from recovering the funds in question from respondent, since respondent has not demonstrated that the traditional elements of an estoppel are present with respect to either its change in position or its reliance on Travelers' advice. Pp. 59-66. </s> (a) The consequences of the Government's misconduct were not entirely adverse, since respondent did receive an immediate benefit as a result of the double reimbursement. Its detriment is the inability to retain money that it should never have received in the first place. Thus, this is not a case in which respondent has lost any legal right or suffered any adverse change in its status. Respondent cannot claim any right to expand its services to levels greater than those it would have provided had the error never occurred. Curtailment of operation does not justify an estoppel when the expansion of respondent's operation was achieved through unlawful access to federal funds. Respondent cannot raise an estoppel without proving that it would be significantly worse off than if it had never obtained the CETA funds in question. Pp. 61-63. </s> (b) The regulations governing the cost reimbursement provisions of Medicare should and did put respondent on ample notice of the care with which its cost reports must be prepared, and the care which would be taken to review them within the relevant 3-year period. Yet respondent prepared those reports on the basis of an oral policy judgment by an official who, it should have known, was not in the business of making [467 U.S. 51, 53] policy. That is not the kind of reasonable reliance that would even give rise to an estoppel against a private party and therefore cannot estop the Government. Pp. 63-66. </s> 698 F.2d 615, reversed and remanded. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BURGER, C. J., joined, post, p. 66. </s> Deputy Solicitor General Geller argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General McGrath, Carolyn F. Corwin, William Kanter, and Richard A. Olderman. </s> Raymond G. Hasley argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Brian W. Ashbaugh. * </s> [Footnote * Jack N. Goodman filed a brief for the National Association for Home Care et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Under what is recognized for present purposes as an incorrect interpretation of rather complex federal regulations, during 1975, 1976, and 1977 respondent received and expended $71,480 in federal funds to provide health care services to Medicare beneficiaries to which it was not entitled. The question presented is whether the Government is estopped from recovering those funds because respondent relied on the express authorization of a responsible Government agent in making the expenditures. </s> I </s> Under the Medicare program, Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 79 Stat. 291, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 1395-1395vv, providers of health care services are reimbursed for the reasonable cost of services rendered to Medicare beneficiaries as determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Secretary). 1395x(v)(1)(A). Providers receive interim payments at least monthly covering the cost of services [467 U.S. 51, 54] they have rendered. 1395g(a). Congress recognized, however, that these interim payments would not always correctly reflect the amount of reimbursable costs, and accordingly instructed the Secretary to develop mechanisms for making appropriate retroactive adjustments when reimbursement is found to be inadequate or excessive. 1395x(v)(1)(A)(ii). 1 Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Secretary requires providers to submit annual cost reports which are then audited to determine actual costs. 42 CFR 405.454, 405.1803 (1982). The Secretary may reopen any reimbursement determination within a 3-year period and make appropriate adjustments. 405.1885. </s> The Act also permits a provider to elect to receive reimbursement through a "fiscal intermediary." 42 U.S.C. 1395h; 42 CFR 421.103 (1982). If the intermediary the provider has nominated meets the Secretary's requirements, the Secretary then enters into an agreement with the intermediary to have it perform those administrative responsibilities she assigns it. 421.5, 421.110. These duties include receipt, disbursement, and accounting for funds used in making Medicare payments, auditing the records of providers in order to ensure payments have been proper, resolving disputes over cost reimbursement, reviewing and reconsidering payments to providers, and recovering overpayments to providers. 421.100(b), (c), (e), (f), 421.120(e). The fiscal intermediary must also "serve as a center for, and communicate to providers, any information or instructions furnished to it by the Secretary, and serve as a channel of communication from providers to the Secretary." 42 U.S.C. 1395h(a)(2)(A). </s> Respondent Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc. (hereafter respondent), is a nonprofit corporation. In 1966 it entered into a contract with petitioner's predecessor, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, to provide home health care services to individuals eligible [467 U.S. 51, 55] for benefits under Part A of the Medicare program, 42 U.S.C. 1395c to 1395i-2. Under the contract, respondent received reimbursement through a fiscal intermediary, the Travelers Insurance Cos. (Travelers). </s> In 1973 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), 87 Stat. 839, codified, as amended, at 29 U.S.C. 801 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V), and repealed, Pub. L. 97-300, 96 Stat. 1357, authorizing the use of federal funds to provide training and job opportunities for economically disadvantaged persons. In 1975 respondent began participating in the program, which reimbursed it for the salaries and fringe benefits paid to certain of its employees. CETA funds made it possible for respondent to take on additional personnel and to provide additional home health care services. </s> To prevent what would be in effect double reimbursement of providers' costs, one of the regulations concerning reasonable costs reimbursable under the Medicare program indicates that grants received by a provider in order to pay specific operating costs must be subtracted from the reasonable costs for which the provider may receive reimbursement. 2 </s> [467 U.S. 51, 56] After obtaining a CETA grant, respondent's administrator contacted Travelers to ask whether the salaries of its CETA-funded employees who provided services to patients eligible for Medicare benefits were reimbursable as reasonable costs under Medicare. Travelers' Medicare manager orally advised respondent that the CETA funds were "seed money" within the meaning of 612.2 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual, which is defined as "[g]rants designated for the development of new health care agencies or for expansion of services of established agencies," 3 and therefore, even though the CETA employees' salaries constituted specific operating costs paid by a federal grant, they were reimbursable under the Medicare program. </s> Relying on Travelers' advice, respondent included costs for which it was receiving CETA reimbursement in its cost reports, and received reimbursement for those sums amounting [467 U.S. 51, 57] to $7,694, $32,460, and $31,326 in fiscal 1975, 1976, and 1977, respectively. 4 On several occasions during this period, respondent requested and received from Travelers oral verification of the propriety of this treatment. 5 With these additional funds, respondent expanded its annual number of home health care visits from approximately 4,000 in 1974 to over 81,000 in the next three years. Its annual budget increased during that period from about $200,000 to about $900,000. </s> It is undisputed that correct administrative practice required Travelers to refer respondent's inquiry to the Department of Health and Human Services for a definitive answer. However, Travelers did not do this until August 7, 1977, when a written request for instructions was finally submitted to the Philadelphia office of the Department's Bureau of Health Insurance. Travelers was then formally advised that the CETA funds were not "seed money" and therefore had to be subtracted from respondent's Medicare reimbursement. On October 7, 1977, Travelers formally notified respondent of this determination. Travelers then reopened respondent's cost reports for the preceding three years and recomputed respondent's reimbursable costs, determining that respondent had been overpaid a total of $71,480. </s> In May 1978 Travelers made a formal demand for repayment of the disputed amount. Respondent filed suit and obtained temporary injunctive relief against the Secretary and Travelers; in November 1979, the parties entered into a [467 U.S. 51, 58] stipulation providing that the Secretary would postpone any attempts at recoupment and that the civil action would be stayed pending the outcome of administrative review. </s> Thereafter, the Secretary's Provider Reimbursement Review Board (PRRB) conducted a hearing and issued a written opinion rejecting the position that CETA funds were "seed money." The PRRB found, however, that the Secretary's right to recoup the 1975 overpayment was barred because Travelers had not given respondent a written notice of reopening within the 3-year limitations period; 6 thus, the amount in dispute was reduced to approximately $63,800. On April 10, 1980, respondent filed a complaint in the District Court seeking review of the administrative determination. The District Court consolidated that case with the equitable action that had been filed about two years earlier. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court ruled in favor of the Secretary, accepting the PRRB's view of the Secretary's regulations and rejecting respondent's claim that the Secretary ought to be estopped to deny that the CETA grants were "seed money" because of the representations of her agent, Travelers. The District Court held that it was unreasonable for respondent to believe it could be in effect twice reimbursed for a given expense. 7 </s> The Court of Appeals reversed, reaching only the estoppel question. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc. v. Califano, 698 F.2d 615 (CA3 1983). It held that the Government may be estopped by the "affirmative misconduct" of its agents and that Travelers' erroneous advice coupled with its failure to refer the question to the Secretary constituted such misconduct. It rejected as "clearly erroneous" [467 U.S. 51, 59] the District Court's finding that it was unreasonable for respondent to rely on Travelers' advice, concluding instead that respondent acted reasonably because the relevant regulation had no clear meaning and respondent had no source other than Travelers to which it could turn for advice. </s> II </s> Estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked to avoid injustice in particular cases. While a hallmark of the doctrine is its flexible application, certain principles are tolerably clear: </s> "If one person makes a definite misrepresentation of fact to another person having reason to believe that the other will rely upon it and the other in reasonable reliance upon it does an act . . . the first person is not entitled </s> . . . . . </s> "(b) to regain property or its value that the other acquired by the act, if the other in reliance upon the misrepresentation and before discovery of the truth has so changed his position that it would be unjust to deprive him of that which he thus acquired." Restatement (Second) of Torts 894(1) (1979). 8 </s> Thus, the party claiming the estoppel must have relied on its adversary's conduct "in such a manner as to change his position for the worse," 9 and that reliance must have been reasonable in that the party claiming the estoppel did not know nor should it have known that its adversary's conduct was misleading. 10 See Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120, 124 -125 (1935). [467 U.S. 51, 60] </s> When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined. It is for this reason that it is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant. 11 Petitioner urges us to expand this principle into a flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against the Government. We have left the issue open in the past, 12 and do so again today. Though the arguments the Government advances for the rule are substantial, we are hesitant, when it is unnecessary to decide this case, to say that there are no cases in which the public interest in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from [467 U.S. 51, 61] estoppel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their dealings with their Government. 13 But however heavy the burden might be when an estoppel is asserted against the Government, the private party surely cannot prevail without at least demonstrating that the traditional elements of an estoppel are present. We are unpersuaded that that has been done in this case with respect to either respondent's change in position or its reliance on Travelers' advice. </s> III </s> To analyze the nature of a private party's detrimental change in position, we must identify the manner in which reliance on the Government's misconduct has caused the private citizen to change his position for the worse. In this case the consequences of the Government's misconduct were not entirely adverse. Respondent did receive an immediate benefit as a result of the double reimbursement. Its detriment is the inability to retain money that it should never have received in the first place. Thus, this is not a case in which the respondent has lost any legal right, either vested or contingent, [467 U.S. 51, 62] or suffered any adverse change in its status. 14 When a private party is deprived of something to which it was entitled of right, it has surely suffered a detrimental change in its position. Here respondent lost no rights but merely was induced to do something which could be corrected at a later time. 15 </s> There is no doubt that respondent will be adversely affected by the Government's recoupment of the funds that it has already spent. It will surely have to curtail its operations and may even be forced to seek relief from its debts through bankruptcy. However, there is no finding as to the extent of the likely curtailment in the volume of services provided by respondent, much less that respondent will reduce its activities below the level that obtained when it was first advised that the double reimbursement was proper. Respondent may need an extended period of repayment or other modifications in the recoupment process if it is to continue to operate, but questions concerning the Government's method of enforcing collection are not before us. The question is whether the Government has entirely forfeited its right to the money. </s> A for-profit corporation could hardly base an estoppel on the fact that the Government wrongfully allowed it the interest-free use of taxpayers' money for a period of two or three years, enabling it to expand its operation. 16 No more can respondent claim any right to expand its services to levels greater than those it would have provided had the error never occurred. Curtailment of operation does not justify an estoppel when - by respondent's own account - the expansion [467 U.S. 51, 63] of its operation was achieved through unlawful access to governmental funds. And even if there will be a reduction below the service provided by respondent prior to its receipt of CETA funds, the record does not foreclose the possibility that the aggregate advantages to the community stemming from respondent's use of the money have more than offset the actual hardship associated with now being required to restore these funds. Respondent cannot raise an estoppel without proving that it will be significantly worse off than if it had never obtained the CETA funds in question. </s> IV </s> Justice Holmes wrote: "Men must turn square corners when they deal with the Government." Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920). This observation has its greatest force when a private party seeks to spend the Government's money. Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous regard for the requirements of law; respondent could expect no less than to be held to the most demanding standards in its quest for public funds. This is consistent with the general rule that those who deal with the Government are expected to know the law and may not rely on the conduct of Government agents contrary to law. 17 </s> [467 U.S. 51, 64] </s> As a participant in the Medicare program, respondent had a duty to familiarize itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement. Since it also had elected to receive reimbursement through Travelers, it also was acquainted with the nature of and limitations on the role of a fiscal intermediary. When the question arose concerning respondent's CETA funds, respondent's own action in consulting Travelers demonstrates the necessity for it to have obtained an interpretation of the applicable regulations; respondent indisputably knew that this was a doubtful question not clearly covered by existing policy statements. The fact that Travelers' advice was erroneous is, in itself, insufficient to raise an estoppel, 18 as is the fact that the Secretary had not anticipated this problem and made a clear resolution available to respondent. 19 There is simply no requirement that the Government anticipate every problem that may arise in the administration of a complex program such as Medicare; neither can it be expected to ensure that every bit of informal advice given by its agents in the course of such a program will be sufficiently reliable to justify expenditure of sums of money as substantial as those spent by respondent. 20 Nor was the advice given under circumstances that should have induced respondent's reliance. As a recipient of public funds well acquainted with the role of a fiscal intermediary, respondent knew Travelers only acted as a conduit; it could not resolve policy questions. The relevant statute, regulations, and Reimbursement Manual, with which respondent should have [467 U.S. 51, 65] been and was acquainted, made that perfectly clear. 21 Yet respondent made no attempt to have the question resolved by the Secretary; it was satisfied with the policy judgment of a mere conduit. 22 </s> The appropriateness of respondent's reliance is further undermined because the advice it received from Travelers was oral. It is not merely the possibility of fraud that undermines our confidence in the reliability of official action that is not confirmed or evidenced by a written instrument. Written advice, like a written judicial opinion, requires its author to reflect about the nature of the advice that is given to the citizen, and subjects that advice to the possibility of review, criticism, and reexamination. The necessity for ensuring that governmental agents stay within the lawful scope of their authority, and that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous exactitude, argues strongly for the conclusion that an estoppel cannot be erected on the basis of the oral advice that underlay respondent's cost reports. That is especially true when a complex program such as Medicare is involved, in which the need for written records is manifest. </s> In sum, the regulations governing the cost reimbursement provisions of Medicare should and did put respondent on [467 U.S. 51, 66] ample notice of the care with which its cost reports must be prepared, and the care which would be taken to review them within the relevant 3-year period. Yet respondent prepared those reports on the basis of an oral policy judgment by an official who, it should have known, was not in the business of making policy. That is not the kind of reasonable reliance that would even give rise to an estoppel against a private party. It therefore cannot estop the Government. </s> Thus, assuming estoppel can ever be appropriately applied against the Government, it cannot be said that the detriment respondent faces is so severe or has been imposed in such an unfair way that petitioner ought to be estopped from enforcing the law in this case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Congress also authorized petitioner to adjust interim payments on account of previous overpayments or underpayments. 1395g(a). </s> [Footnote 2 "(a) Principle. Unrestricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments should not be deducted from operating costs in computing reimbursable cost. Grants, gifts, or endowment income designated by a donor for paying specific operating costs should be deducted from the particular operating cost or group of costs. </s> "(b) Definitions - (1) Unrestricted grants, gifts, income from endowment. Unrestricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments are funds, cash or otherwise, given to a provider without restriction by the donor as to their use. </s> "(2) Designated or restricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments. Designated or restricted grants, gifts, and income from endowments are funds, cash or otherwise, which must be used only for the specific purpose designated by the donor. This does not refer to unrestricted grants, gifts, or income from endowments which have been restricted for a specific purpose by the provider. </s> "(c) Application. (1) Unrestricted funds, cash or otherwise, are generally the property of the provider to be used in any manner its management [467 U.S. 51, 56] deems appropriate and should not be deducted from operating costs. It would be inequitable to require providers to use the unrestricted funds to reduce the payments for care. The use of these funds is generally a means of recovering costs which are not otherwise recoverable. </s> "(2) Donor-restricted funds which are designated for paying certain hospital operating expenses should apply and serve to reduce these costs or group of costs and benefit all patients who use services covered by the donation. If such costs are not reduced, the provider would secure reimbursement for the same expense twice; it would be reimbursed through the donor-restricted contributions as well as from patients and third-party payers including the title XVIII health insurance program." 42 CFR 405.423 (1982) (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 3 "Seed Money Grants. - Grants designated for the development of new health care agencies or for expansion of services of established agencies are generally referred to as `seed money' grants. `Seed money' grants are not deducted from costs in computing allowable costs. These grants are usually made to cover specific operating costs or group[s] of costs for services for a stated period of time. During this time, the provider will develop sufficient patient caseloads to enable continued self-sustaining operation with funds received from Medicare reimbursement as well as from funds received from other patients or other third-party payers." Medicare Provider Reimbursement Manual, HIM-15, Pt. I, 612.2 (Aug. 1968), reproduced in 1 CCH, Medicare & Medicaid Guide § 5461 (1983). </s> [Footnote 4 Presumably because CETA program participants provided services to some individuals not eligible for Medicare benefits, the aggregate amount of CETA reimbursements was substantially larger than the portion for which Medicare reimbursement was claimed. The total amount of reimbursement respondent received in CETA funds was $16,555, $53,952, and $81,118 in 1975, 1976, and 1977, respectively. </s> [Footnote 5 From its review of the record the Court of Appeals concluded that respondent had consulted Travelers and was advised that the CETA grants qualified as "seed money" on five separate occasions. However, the District Court made no finding as to the number of times that this advice was requested and received. </s> [Footnote 6 The Board also found that the required written notice for 1976 had not been served on respondent, but noted that the Secretary still had time to comply with the notice requirement for that year. A timely notice for 1976 was thereafter served on respondent. </s> [Footnote 7 The District Court also held that Travelers was not independently liable to respondent for its incorrect advice. </s> [Footnote 8 See also Restatement (Second) of Agency 8B (1958). </s> [Footnote 9 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence 805, p. 192 (S. Symons ed. 1941); see also id., 812. </s> [Footnote 10 "The truth concerning these material facts must be unknown to the other party claiming the benefit of the estoppel, not only at the time of the conduct which amounts to a representation or concealment, but also at the time when that conduct is acted upon by him. If, at the time when he [467 U.S. 51, 60] acted, such party had knowledge of the truth, or had the means by which with reasonable diligence he could acquire the knowledge so that it would be negligence on his part to remain ignorant by not using those means, he cannot claim to have been misled by relying upon the representation or concealment." Id., 810, at 219 (footnote omitted). </s> [Footnote 11 See, e. g., INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5, 8 (1973) (per curiam); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 (1947). </s> [Footnote 12 See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982) (per curiam); Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981) (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 315 (1961). In fact, at least two of our cases seem to rest on the premise that when the Government acts in misleading ways, it may not enforce the law if to do so would harm a private party as a result of governmental deception. See United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 670 -675 (1973) (criminal defendant may assert as a defense that the Government led him to believe that its conduct was legal); Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951) (applicant cannot be deemed to waive right to citizenship on the basis of a form he signed when he was misled as to the effect signing would have on his rights). See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178 -180 (1979); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Branson v. Wirth, 17 Wall. 32, 42 (1873). This principle also underlies the doctrine that an administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so would unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807 -808 (1973) (plurality opinion); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947). </s> [Footnote 13 See generally St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Our Government should not by picayunish haggling over the scope of its promise, permit one of its arms to do that which, by any fair construction, the Government has given its word that no arm will do. It is no less good morals and good law that the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people than that the people should turn square corners in dealing with their government"); Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S., at 387 -388 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("It is very well to say that those who deal with the Government should turn square corners. But there is no reason why the square corners should constitute a one-way street"); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53, 57 (CA9 1970) ("To say to these appellants, `The joke is on you. You shouldn't have trusted us,' is hardly worthy of our great government"); Menges v. Dentler, 33 Pa. 495, 500 (1859) ("Men naturally trust in their government, and ought to do so, and they ought not to suffer for it"). See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 -155 (1972). </s> [Footnote 14 This case is, therefore, plainly distinguishable from Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951), in which the petitioner "was led to believe that he would not thereby lose his rights to citizenship." Id., at 46. </s> [Footnote 15 See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S., at 789 (per curiam). </s> [Footnote 16 See United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S. 60, 70 (1940); Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S. 575 (1921); Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S. 279, 291 (1902); Hart v. United States, 95 U.S. 316 (1877). See also Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957). </s> [Footnote 17 "Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays within the bounds of his authority. The scope of this authority may be explicitly defined by Congress or be limited by delegated legislation, properly exercised through the rule-making power. And this is so even though, as here, the agent himself may have been unaware of the limitations upon his authority." Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S., at 384 . </s> See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 39 -40 (1947); United States v. Stewart, 311 U.S., at 70 ; United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31 -32 (1940); Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120, 123 -124 (1935); Utah v. United States, 284 U.S. 534, 545 -546 (1932); Jeems Bayou Fishing & Hunting Club v. United States, 260 U.S. 561, 564 </s> [467 U.S. 51, 64] (1923); Sutton v. United States, 256 U.S., at 579 ; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 409 (1917); Pine River Logging Co. v. United States, 186 U.S., at 291 ; Hart v. United States, 95 U.S., at 318 -319; Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269, 274 (1869); Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 366 (1813). </s> [Footnote 18 See Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S., at 789 -790 (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314 -315 (1961). </s> [Footnote 19 See INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam). </s> [Footnote 20 See generally Schweiker v. Hansen, supra. </s> [Footnote 21 Under the law of agency, a principal may be bound by the acts of an agent only if that agent acted with actual or apparent authority. Restatement (Second) of Agency 145, 159 (1958). Travelers had neither with respect to the interpretation of the regulations in question. See also id., 141, Comment b (principal may be estopped to deny lack of actual or apparent authority only when it negligently leads third parties to believe authority exists). </s> [Footnote 22 The Court of Appeals believed that respondent did all it could have done since it was unable to deal with the Secretary directly. However, that belief, even if accurate, would not make respondent's reliance on Travelers' policy judgment any more reasonable. Moreover, given the role of Travelers as a conduit for information, it is far from clear that had respondent specifically requested that Travelers pass on its question to the Department, Travelers would not have been under a duty to do so. Even if there were no such duty, there is nothing in the record to indicate that Travelers would have been unwilling to honor such a request. </s> JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, concurring in the judgment. </s> I entirely agree with the Court that there was no estoppel in favor of respondent by reason of the Government's conduct in this case, because even a private party under like circumstances would not have been estopped. I write separately because I think the Court's treatment of our decided cases in this area gives an inaccurate and misleading impression of what those cases have had to say as to the circumstances, if any, under which the Government may be estopped to enforce the laws. </s> Sixty-seven years ago, in Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917), private parties argued that they had acquired rights in federal lands, contrary to the law, because Government employees had acquiesced in their exercise of those rights. In that case the Court laid down the general principle governing claims of estoppel on behalf of private individuals against the Government: [467 U.S. 51, 67] </s> "As a general rule, laches or neglect of duty on the part of officers of the Government is no defense to a suit by it to enforce a public right or protect a public interest. [Citations omitted.] And, if it be assumed that the rule is subject to exceptions, we find nothing in the cases in hand which fairly can be said to take them out of it as heretofore understood and applied in this court. A suit by the United States to enforce and maintain its policy respecting lands which it holds in trust for all the people stands upon a different plane in this and some other respects from the ordinary private suit to regain the title to real property or to remove a cloud from it. [Citation omitted.]" Id., at 409. </s> Since then we have applied that principle in a case where a private party relied on the misrepresentation of a Government agency as to the coverage of a crop insurance policy, a misrepresentation which the Court agreed would have estopped a private insurance carrier. Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 383 -386 (1947). We have applied it in a case where a private party relied on a misrepresentation by a Government employee as to Social Security eligibility, a misrepresentation which resulted in the applicant's losing 12 months of Social Security benefits. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (per curiam). And we have applied it on at least three occasions to claims of estoppel in connection with the enforcement of the immigration laws and the denial of citizenship because of the conduct of immigration officials. INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14 (1982) (per curiam); INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973) (per curiam); Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 314 -315 (1961). In none of these cases have we ever held the Government to be estopped by the representations or conduct of its agents. In INS v. Hibi, supra, at 8, we noted that it is still an open question whether, in some future case, "affirmative misconduct" on the part of the Government might be grounds for an estoppel. See Montana v. Kennedy, supra, at 314-315. [467 U.S. 51, 68] </s> I agree with the Court that there is no need to decide in this case whether there are circumstances under which the Government may be estopped, but I think that the Court's treatment of that question, ante, at 60-61, gives an impression of hospitality towards claims of estoppel against the Government which our decided cases simply do not warrant. In footnote 12, ante, at 60, the Court intimates that two of our decisions have allowed the Government to be estopped: United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973), and Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41 (1951). But these cases are not traditional equitable estoppel cases. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp. was a criminal prosecution, and we held that "to the extent that [Government regulations] deprived [the defendant] of fair warning as to what conduct the Government intended to make criminal, we think there can be no doubt that traditional notions of fairness inherent in our system of criminal justice prevent the Government from proceeding with the prosecution." 411 U.S., at 674 . And the Court's rather cryptic opinion in Moser, holding that an alien who declined to serve in the Armed Forces was not barred from United States citizenship pursuant to a federal statute, expressly rejected any doctrine of estoppel, and rested on the absence of a knowing and intentional waiver of the right to citizenship. 341 U.S., at 47 . </s> We do not write on a clean slate in this field, and our cases have left open the possibility of estoppel against the Government only in a rather narrow possible range of circumstances. Because I think the Court's opinion, in its efforts to phrase new statements of the circumstances under which the Government may be estopped, casts doubt on these decided cases, I concur only in the judgment. </s> [467 U.S. 51, 69]

United States Supreme Court PICKELSIMER v. WAINWRIGHT(1963) No. 16 Argued: Decided: October 14, 1963 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 36, Misc., Mihelcich v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 54, Misc., Cowan v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 55, Misc., Dumond v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 60, Misc., Sharp v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 62, Misc., Baker v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 70, Misc., Heard v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 71, Misc., Campbell v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; No. 86, Misc., Mitchell v. Wainwright, Corrections Director; and No. 87, Misc., Kitchens v. Wainwright, Corrections Director, all on petitions for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida. </s> Certiorari granted; judgments vacated; and cases remanded for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 . </s> Petitioners pro se. </s> Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and A. G. Spicola, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in No. 16, Misc., No. 60, Misc., and No. 70, Misc. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and George R. Georgieff, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in No. 36, Misc., No. 54, Misc., and No. 87, Misc. Richard W. Ervin, Attorney General of Florida, and James G. Mahorner, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in No. 55, Misc., No. 62, Misc., No. 71, Misc., and No. 86, Misc. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petitions for writs of certiorari are granted. The [375 U.S. 2, 3] judgments are vacated and the cases are remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 . </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting. </s> I am unable to agree with the Court's summary disposition of these 10 Florida cases, and believe that the federal question which they present in common is deserving of full-dress consideration. That question is whether the denial of an indigent defendant's right to court-appointed counsel in a state criminal trial as established last Term in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 , invalidates his pre-Gideon conviction. </s> When this Court is constrained to change well-established constitutional rules governing state criminal proceedings, as has been done here and in other recent cases, see, e. g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 , it seems to me that the question whether the States are constitutionally required to apply the new rule retrospectively, which may well require the reopening of cases long since finally adjudicated in accordance with then applicable decisions of this Court, is one that should be decided only after informed and deliberate consideration. Surely no general answer is to be found in "the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Nor do I believe that the circumstance that Gideon was decided in the context of a state collateral proceeding rather than upon direct review, as were the new constitutional doctrines enunciated in Mapp and Ker, forecloses consideration of the retroactivity issue in this instance. 1 </s> [375 U.S. 2, 4] </s> In the current swift pace of constitutional change, the time has come for the Court to deal definitively with this important and far-reaching subject. 2 Without intimating any view as to how the question should be decided in these cases, I would set one or more of them for argument. 3 </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Court's opinion in Gideon contains no discussion of this issue. Similarly, in cases decided last Term in which we summarily vacated [375 U.S. 2, 4] the judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Gideon, e. g., Bryant v. Wainwright, 374 U.S. 492 , the question of retroactivity was not treated in the dispositions. </s> [Footnote 2 Such cases as Eskridge v. Washington State Prison Board, 357 U.S. 214 , and Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420 , hardly constitute precedents for a rule of general application. </s> [Footnote 3 In all but two of these cases, the State suggests that the judgments can be supported on an adequate independent state ground, even though the Florida Supreme Court denied relief without hearing or explanatory opinion, and despite the apparent concession in Nos. 36 and 87 that the state court did face the federal question and rule adversely to the petitioners. It is abundantly clear that each of the state grounds suggested is either plainly unavailing or so tenuous that it would be disrespectful of the Florida Supreme Court to regard it as the basis of that court's judgment. Cf. Klinger v. Missouri, 13 Wall. 257; Adams v. Russell, 229 U.S. 353, 358 -359; Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 478 -479. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the federal question is properly before this Court in all of the cases. </s> [375 U.S. 2, 5]

United States Supreme Court OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL(1994) No. 93-70 Argued: January 18, 1994Decided: April 4, 1994 </s> [Footnote * Page I Together with No. 93-108, Columbia Resource Co. v. Environmental Quality Commission of the State of Oregon, also on certiorari to the same court. </s> Oregon imposes a $2.50 per ton surcharge on the in-state disposal of solid waste generated in other States and an $0.85 per ton fee on the disposal of waste generated within Oregon. Petitioners sought review of the out-of-state surcharge in the State Court of Appeals, challenging the administrative rule establishing the surcharge and its enabling statutes under, inter alia, the Commerce Clause. The court upheld the statutes and rule, and the State Supreme Court affirmed. Despite the Oregon statutes' explicit reference to out-of-state waste's geographical location, the court reasoned, the surcharge's express nexus to actual costs incurred by state and local government rendered it a facially constitutional "compensatory fee." </s> Held: </s> Oregon's surcharge is facially invalid under the negative Commerce Clause. Pp. 5-16. </s> (a) The first step in analyzing a law under the negative Commerce Clause is to determine whether it discriminates against, or regulates evenhandedly with only incidental effects on, interstate commerce. If the restriction is discriminatory - i.e., favors in-state economic interests over their out-of-state counterparts - it is virtually per se invalid. By contrast, nondiscriminatory regulations are valid unless the burden imposed on interstate commerce is "clearly Page II excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 . Oregon's surcharge is obviously discriminatory on its face. It subjects waste from other States to a fee almost three times greater than the charge imposed on in-state waste, and the statutory determinant for whether the fee applies is whether or not the waste was generated out of state. The alleged compensatory aim of the surcharge has no bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. ___, ___. Pp. 5-7. </s> (b) Because the surcharge is discriminatory, the virtually per se rule of invalidity - not the Pike balancing test - provides the proper legal standard for these cases. Thus, the surcharge must be invalidated unless respondents can show that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. Neither of respondents' justifications passes strict scrutiny. For the surcharge to be justified as a "compensatory tax" necessary to make shippers of out-of-state waste pay their "fair share" of disposal costs, it must be the rough equivalent of an identifiable and substantially similar surcharge on intrastate commerce. However, respondents have failed to identify a specific charge on intrastate commerce equal to or exceeding the surcharge; the $0.85 per ton fee on in-state waste is only about one-third of the challenged surcharge. Even assuming that various other means of general taxation, such as state income taxes, could serve as a roughly equivalent intrastate burden, respondents' argument fails because the levies are not imposed on substantially equivalent events: Taxes on earning income and utilizing Oregon landfills are entirely different kinds of taxes. Nor can the surcharge be justified by respondents' argument that Oregon has a valid interest in spreading the costs of the disposal of Oregon waste, but not out-of-state waste, to all Oregonians. Because Oregon's scheme necessarily results in shippers of out-of-state waste bearing the full costs of disposal with shippers of Oregon waste bearing less than the full cost, it necessarily incorporates an illegitimate protectionist objective. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. ___, ___. Recharacterizing the surcharge as "resource protectionism" - discouraging the importation of out-of-state waste in order to conserve more landfill space for in-state waste - hardly advances respondents' cause. A State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to its natural resources. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 . Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 , distinguished. Pp. 7-15. </s> 316 Ore. 99, 849 P.2d 500, reversed and remanded. Page III </s> THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., joined. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN, J., joined. </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Two Terms ago, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. ___ (1992), we held that the negative Commerce Clause prohibited Alabama from imposing a higher fee on the disposal in Alabama landfills of hazardous waste from other States than on the disposal of identical waste from Alabama. In reaching that conclusion, however, we left open the possibility that such a differential surcharge might be valid if based on the costs of disposing of waste from other States. Id., at ___, n. 9 (slip op., at 10, n.9). Today, we must decide whether Oregon's purportedly cost-based surcharge on the in-state disposal of solid waste generated in other States violates the Commerce Clause. </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> I </s> Like other States, Oregon comprehensively regulates the disposal of solid wastes within its borders. 1 Respondent Oregon Department of Environmental Quality oversees the State's regulatory scheme by developing and executing plans for the management, reduction, and recycling of solid wastes. To fund these and related activities, Oregon levies a wide range of fees on landfill operators. See, e. g., Ore. Rev. Stat. 459.235(3), 459.310 (1991). In 1989, the Oregon Legislature imposed an additional fee, called a "surcharge," on "every person who disposes of solid waste generated out-of-state in a disposal site or regional disposal site." 459.297(1) (effective Jan. 1, 1991). The amount of that surcharge was left to respondent Environmental Quality Commission (Commission) to determine through rulemaking, but the legislature did require that the resulting surcharge "be based on the costs to the State of Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state which are not otherwise paid for" under specified statutes. 459.298. At the conclusion of the rulemaking process, the Commission set the surcharge on out-of-state waste at $2.25 per ton. Ore. Admin. Rule 340-97-120(7) (Sept. 1993). </s> In conjunction with the out-of-state surcharge, the legislature imposed a fee on the in-state disposal of </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> waste generated within Oregon. See Ore.Rev.Stat. 459A.110(1), (5) (1991). The in-state fee, capped by statute at $0.85 per ton (originally $0.50 per ton), is considerably lower than the fee imposed on waste from other States. 459A.110(5) and 459A.115. Subsequently, the legislature conditionally extended the $0.85 per ton fee to out-of-state waste, in addition to the $2.25 per ton surcharge, 459A.110(6), with the proviso that if the surcharge survived judicial challenge, the $0.85 per ton fee would again be limited to in-state waste. 1991 Ore.Laws, ch. 385, 91-92. 2 </s> The anticipated court challenge was not long in coming. Petitioners, Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. (Oregon Waste) and Columbia Resource Company (CRC), joined by Gilliam County, Oregon, sought expedited review of the out-of-state surcharge in the Oregon Court of Appeals. Oregon Waste owns and operates a solid waste landfill in Gilliam County, at which it accepts for final disposal solid waste generated in Oregon and in other States. CRC, pursuant to a 20-year contract with Clark County, in neighboring Washington State, transports solid waste via barge from Clark County to a landfill in Morrow County, Oregon. Petitioners challenged the administrative rule establishing the out-of-state surcharge and its enabling statutes under both state law and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The Oregon Court of Appeals upheld the statutes and rule. Gilliam County v. Department of </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> Environmental Quality, 114 Ore.App. 369, 837 P.2d 965 (1992). </s> The State Supreme Court affirmed. Gilliam County v. Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon, 316 Ore. 99, 849 P.2d 500 (1993). As to the Commerce Clause, the court recognized that the Oregon surcharge resembled the Alabama fee invalidated in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. ___ (1992), in that both prescribed higher fees for the disposal of waste from other States. Nevertheless, the court viewed the similarity as superficial only. Despite the explicit reference in 459.297(1) to out-of-state waste's geographic origin, the court reasoned, the Oregon surcharge is not facially discriminatory "[b]ecause of [its] express nexus to actual costs incurred [by state and local government]." 316 Ore., at 112, 849 P.2d, at 508. That nexus distinguished Chemical Waste, supra, by rendering the surcharge a "compensatory fee," which the court viewed as "prima facie reasonable," that is to say, facially constitutional. Ibid. The court read our case law as invalidating compensatory fees only if they are "`manifestly disproportionate to the services rendered.'" Ibid. (quoting Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 599 (1939)). Because Oregon law restricts the scope of judicial review in expedited proceedings to deciding the facial legality of administrative rules and the statutes underlying them, Ore.Rev.Stat. 183.400 (1991), the Oregon court deemed itself precluded from deciding the factual question whether the surcharge on out-of-state waste was disproportionate. 316 Ore., at 112, 849 P.2d, at 508. </s> We granted certiorari, 509 U.S. ___ (1993), because the decision below conflicted with a recent decision of </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 3 We now reverse. </s> II </s> The Commerce Clause provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the several States." Art. I, 8, cl. 3. Though phrased as a grant of regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has long been understood to have a "negative" aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce. See, e. g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 15); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876). The Framers granted Congress plenary authority over interstate commerce in "the conviction that, in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of Confederation." Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 -326 (1979). See generally The Federalist No. 42 (J. Madison). "This principle that our economic unit is the Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the economy, . . . has as its corollary that the states are not separable economic units. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 -538 (1949). </s> Consistent with these principles, we have held that the first step in analyzing any law subject to judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause is to determine whether it "regulates evenhandedly with only `incidental' effects on interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce." Hughes, supra, at 336. See also Chemical Waste, 504 U.S., at ___ (slip </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> op., at 5). As we use the term here, "discrimination" simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. If a restriction on commerce is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid. 504 U.S., at ___, n. 6 (slip op., at 9, n. 6). See also Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). By contrast, nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless "the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). </s> In Chemical Waste, we easily found Alabama's surcharge on hazardous waste from other States to be facially discriminatory because it imposed a higher fee on the disposal of out-of-state waste than on the disposal of identical in-state waste. 504 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 6). We deem it equally obvious here that Oregon's $2.25 per ton surcharge is discriminatory on its face. The surcharge subjects waste from other States to a fee almost three times greater than the $0.85 per ton charge imposed on solid in-state waste. The statutory determinant for which fee applies to any particular shipment of solid waste to an Oregon landfill is whether or not the waste was "generated out-of-state." Ore.Rev.Stat. 459.297(1) (1991). It is well established, however, that a law is discriminatory if it "`tax[es] a transaction or incident more heavily when it crosses state lines than when it occurs entirely within the State.'" Chemical Waste, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 642 (1984)). See also American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 286 (1987). 4 </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> Respondents argue, and the Oregon Supreme Court held, that the statutory nexus between the surcharge and "the [otherwise uncompensated] costs to the State of Oregon and its political subdivisions of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state," Ore.Rev.Stat. 459.298 (1991), necessarily precludes a finding that the surcharge is discriminatory. We find respondents' narrow focus on Oregon's compensatory aim to be foreclosed by our precedents. As we reiterated in Chemical Waste, the purpose of, or justification for, a law has no bearing on whether it is facially discriminatory. See 504 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 5-6). See also Philadelphia, supra, at 626. Consequently, even if the surcharge merely recoups the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste in Oregon, the fact remains that the differential charge favors shippers of Oregon waste over their counterparts handling waste generated in other States. In making that geographic distinction, the surcharge patently discriminates against interstate commerce. </s> III </s> Because the Oregon surcharge is discriminatory, the virtually per se rule of invalidity provides the proper legal standard here, not the Pike balancing test. As a result, the surcharge must be invalidated unless respondents can "sho[w] that it advances a legitimate local </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives." New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). See also Chemical Waste, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7-9). Our cases require that justifications for discriminatory restrictions on commerce pass the "strictest scrutiny." Hughes, supra, at 337. The State's burden of justification is so heavy that "facial discrimination by itself may be a fatal defect." Ibid. See also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 -407 (1984); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 759 -760 (1981). </s> At the outset, we note two justifications that respondents have not presented. No claim has been made that the disposal of waste from other States imposes higher costs on Oregon and its political subdivisions than the disposal of in-state waste. 5 Also, respondents have not offered any safety or health reason unique to nonhazardous waste from other States for discouraging the flow of such waste into Oregon. Cf. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding ban on importation of out-of-state baitfish into Maine because such baitfish were subject to parasites completely foreign to Maine baitfish). Consequently, respondents must come forward with other legitimate reasons to subject waste from </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> other States to a higher charge than is levied against waste from Oregon. </s> Respondents offer two such reasons, each of which we address below. </s> A </s> Respondents' principal defense of the higher surcharge on out-of-state waste is that it is a "compensatory tax" necessary to make shippers of such waste pay their "fair share" of the costs imposed on Oregon by the disposal of their waste in the State. In Chemical Waste, we noted the possibility that such an argument might justify a discriminatory surcharge or tax on out-of-state waste. See 504 U.S., at ___, n. 9 (slip op., at 10, n. 9). In making that observation, we implicitly recognized the settled principle that interstate commerce may be made to "`pay its way.'" Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 281 (1977). See also Maryland, supra, at 754. "It was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of state tax burden[s]." Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938). See also Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937). Nevertheless, one of the central purposes of the Clause was to prevent States from "exacting more than a just share" from interstate commerce. Dept. of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 748 (1978) (emphasis added). See also Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 462 (1959). </s> At least since our decision in Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148 (1868), these principles have found expression in the "compensatory" or "complementary" tax doctrine. Though our cases sometimes discuss the concept of the compensatory tax as if it were a doctrine unto itself, it is merely a specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local purpose that </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means. See Chemical Waste, supra, at ___, n. 9 (slip op., at 10, n. 9) (referring to the compensatory tax doctrine as a "justif[ication]" for a facially discriminatory tax). Under that doctrine, a facially discriminatory tax that imposes on interstate commerce the rough equivalent of an identifiable and "substantially similar" tax on intrastate commerce does not offend the negative Commerce Clause. Maryland, supra, at 758-759. See also Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 242 -243 (1987); Armco, 467 U.S., at 643 . </s> To justify a charge on interstate commerce as a compensatory tax, a State must, as a threshold matter, "identif[y] . . . the [intrastate tax] burden for which the State is attempting to compensate." Maryland, supra, at 758. Once that burden has been identified, the tax on interstate commerce must be shown roughly to approximate - but not exceed - the amount of the tax on intrastate commerce. See, e.g., Alaska v. Arctic Maid, 366 U.S. 199, 204 -205 (1961). Finally, the events on which the interstate and intrastate taxes are imposed must be "substantially equivalent"; that is, they must be sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive "prox[ies]" for each other. Armco, supra, at 643. As Justice Cardozo explained for the Court in Henneford, under a truly compensatory tax scheme, "the stranger from afar is subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within the gates. The one pays upon one activity or incident, and the other upon another, but the sum is the same when the reckoning is closed. 300 U.S., at 584 . 6 </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> Although it is often no mean feat to determine whether a challenged tax is a compensatory tax, we have little difficulty concluding that the Oregon surcharge is not such a tax. Oregon does not impose a specific charge of at least $2.25 per ton on shippers of waste generated in Oregon, for which the out-of-state surcharge might be considered compensatory. In fact, the only analogous charge on the disposal of Oregon waste is $0.85 per ton, approximately one-third of the amount imposed on waste from other States. See Ore.Rev.Stat. 459A.110(5), 459A.115 (1991). Respondents' failure to identify a specific charge on intrastate commerce equal to or exceeding the surcharge is fatal to their claim. See Maryland, 451 U.S., at 758 . </s> Respondents argue that, despite the absence of a specific $2.25 per ton charge on in-state waste, intrastate commerce does pay its share of the costs underlying the surcharge through general taxation. 7 Whether </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> or not that is true is difficult to determine, as "[general] tax payments are received for the general purposes of the [government], and are, upon proper receipt, lost in the general revenues." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 128 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Even assuming, however, that various other means of general taxation, such as income taxes, could serve as an identifiable intrastate burden roughly equivalent to the out-of-state surcharge, respondents' compensatory tax argument fails because the in-state and out-of-state levies are not imposed on substantially equivalent events. </s> The prototypical example of substantially equivalent taxable events is the sale and use of articles of trade. See Henneford, supra. In fact, use taxes on products purchased out of state are the only taxes we have upheld in recent memory under the compensatory tax doctrine. See ibid. Typifying our recent reluctance to recognize new categories of compensatory taxes is Armco, where we held that manufacturing and wholesaling are not substantially equivalent events. 467 U.S., at 643 . In our view, earning income and disposing of waste at Oregon landfills are even less equivalent than manufacturing and wholesaling. Indeed, the very fact that in-state shippers of out-of-state waste, such as Oregon Waste, are charged the out-of-state surcharge even though they pay Oregon income taxes refutes respondents' argument that the respective taxable events are substantially equivalent. See ibid. We conclude that, far from being substantially equivalent, taxes on earning income and utilizing Oregon landfills are "entirely different kind[s] of tax[es]." Washington v. United States, 460 U.S. 536, 546 , n. 11 (1983). We are no more inclined here than we were in Scheiner to "plunge . . . into the morass of weighing comparative </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 13] </s> tax burdens" by comparing taxes on dissimilar events. 483 U.S., at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). 8 </s> B </s> Respondents' final argument is that Oregon has an interest in spreading the costs of the in-state disposal of Oregon waste to all Oregonians. That is, because all citizens of Oregon benefit from the proper in-state disposal of waste from Oregon, respondents claim it is only proper for Oregon to require them to bear more of the costs of disposing of such waste in the State through a higher general tax burden. At the same time, however, Oregon citizens should not be required to bear the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste, respondents claim. The necessary result of that limited cost-shifting is to require shippers of out-of-state waste to bear the full costs of in-state disposal, but to permit shippers of Oregon waste to bear less than the full cost. </s> We fail to perceive any distinction between respondents' contention and a claim that the State has an interest in reducing the costs of handling in-state waste. Our cases condemn as illegitimate, however, any governmental interest that is not "unrelated to economic protectionism," Wyoming, 502 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 16), and regulating interstate commerce in such a way as to give those who handle domestic articles of commerce a cost advantage over their competitors handling similar </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 14] </s> items produced elsewhere constitutes such protectionism. See New Energy, 486 U.S., at 275 . 9 To give controlling effect to respondents' characterization of Oregon's tax scheme as seemingly benign cost-spreading would require us to overlook the fact that the scheme necessarily incorporates a protectionist objective as well. Cf. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984) (rejecting Hawaii's attempt to justify a discriminatory tax exemption for local liquor producers as conferring a benefit on them, as opposed to burdening out-of-state liquor producers). </s> Respondents counter that if Oregon is engaged in any form of protectionism, it is "resource protectionism," not economic protectionism. It is true that by discouraging the flow of out-of-state waste into Oregon landfills, the higher surcharge on waste from other States conserves more space in those landfills for waste generated in Oregon. Recharacterizing the surcharge as resource protectionism hardly advances respondents' cause, however. Even assuming that landfill space is a "natural resource," "a State may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over consumers in other States to natural resources located within its borders." Philadelphia, 437 U.S., at 627 . As we held more than </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 15] </s> a century ago, "if the State, under the guise of exerting its police powers, should [impose a burden] . . . applicable solely to articles [of commerce] . . . produced or manufactured in other States, the courts would find no difficulty in holding such legislation to be in conflict with the Constitution of the United States." Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 443 (1880). </s> Our decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), is not to the contrary. There we held that a State may grant a "limited preference" for its citizens in the utilization of ground water. Id., at 956. That holding was premised on several different factors tied to the simple fact of life that "water, unlike other natural resources, is essential for human survival." Id., at 952. Sporhase therefore provides no support for respondents' position that States may erect a financial barrier to the flow of waste from other States into Oregon landfills. See Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S., at ___, and n. 6 (slip op., at 10-11, and n. 6). However serious the shortage in landfill space may be, post, at 1, "[n]o State may attempt to isolate itself from a problem common to the several States by raising barriers to the free flow of interstate trade." Chemical Waste, 504 U.S., at ___, and ___, n. 9. (slip op., at 4, and 10, n.9) </s> IV </s> We recognize that the States have broad discretion to configure their systems of taxation as they deem appropriate. See, e. g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 622 -623 (1981); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 -337 (1977). All we intimate here is that their discretion in this regard, as in all others, is bounded by any relevant limitations of the Federal Constitution, in this case the negative Commerce Clause. Because respondents have offered no legitimate reason to subject waste generated in other States to a discriminatory surcharge approximately </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 16] </s> three times as high as that imposed on waste generated in Oregon, the surcharge is facially invalid under the negative Commerce Clause. Accordingly, the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court is reversed, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Oregon defines "solid wastes" as "all putrescible and nonputrescible wastes, including but not limited to garbage, rubbish, refuse, ashes, waste paper and cardboard; sewage sludge, septic tank and cesspool pumpings or other sludge; commercial, industrial, demolition and construction wastes; discarded or abandoned vehicles or parts thereof; discarded home and industrial appliances; manure, vegetable or animal solid and semisolid wastes, dead animals, infectious waste . . . and other wastes." Ore.Rev.Stat. 459.005(27) (1991). Hazardous wastes are not considered solid wastes. 459.005(27)(a). </s> [Footnote 2 As a result, shippers of out-of-state solid waste currently are being charged $3.10 per ton to dispose of such waste in Oregon landfills, as compared to the $0.85 per ton fee charged to dispose of Oregon waste in those same landfills. We refer hereinafter only to the $2.25 surcharge, because the $0.85 per ton fee, which will be refunded to shippers of out-of-state waste if the surcharge is upheld, 1991 Ore.Laws, ch. 385, 92, is not challenged here. </s> [Footnote 3 Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. ___ (1993). </s> [Footnote 4 The dissent argues that the $2.25 per ton surcharge is so minimal in amount that it cannot be considered discriminatory, even though the surcharge expressly applies only to waste generated in </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> other States. Post, at 9. The dissent does not attempt to reconcile that novel understanding of discrimination with our precedents, which clearly establish that the degree of a differential burden or charge on interstate commerce "measures only the extent of the discrimination" and "is of no relevance to the determination whether a State has discriminated against interstate commerce." Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (slip op., at 17). See also, e.g., Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760 (1981) ("We need not know how unequal [a] [t]ax is before concluding that it . . . discriminates"). </s> [Footnote 5 In fact, the Commission fixed the $2.25 per ton cost of disposing of solid waste in Oregon landfills without reference to the origin of the waste, 3 Record 665-690, and Oregon's economic consultant recognized that the per ton costs are the same for both in-state and out-of-state waste. Id., at 731-732, 744. Of course, if out-of-state waste did impose higher costs on Oregon than in-state waste, Oregon could recover the increased cost through a differential charge on out-of-state waste, for then there would be a "reason, apart from its origin, why solid waste coming from outside the [State] should be treated differently." Fort Gratiot Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. ___ (1992) (slip op., at 7). Cf. Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399 (1948). </s> [Footnote 6 The Oregon Supreme Court, though terming the out-of-state surcharge a "compensatory fee," relied for its legal standard on our "user fee" cases. See 316 Ore. 99, 112, 849 P.2d 500, 508 (1993) (citing, for example, Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 11] </s> Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707 (1972), and Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939)). The compensatory tax cases cited in the text, rather than the user fee cases, are controlling here, as the latter apply only to "charge[s] imposed by the State for the use of state-owned or state-provided transportation or other facilities and services." Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981). Because it is undisputed that, as in Chemical Waste, the landfills in question are owned by private entities, including Oregon Waste, the out-of-state surcharge is plainly not a user fee. Nevertheless, even if the surcharge could somehow be viewed as a user fee, it could not be sustained as such, given that it discriminates against interstate commerce. See Evansville, supra, at 717; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434 (1880). Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 12) (a user fee is valid only to the extent it "does not discriminate against interstate commerce"). </s> [Footnote 7 We would note that respondents, like the dissent, post, at 5, ignore the fact that shippers of waste from other States in all likelihood pay income taxes in other States, a portion of which might well be used to pay for waste reduction activities in those </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 12] </s> States. </s> [Footnote 8 Furthermore, permitting discriminatory taxes on interstate commerce to compensate for charges purportedly included in general forms of intrastate taxation "would allow a state to tax interstate commerce more heavily than in-state commerce anytime the entities involved in interstate commerce happened to use facilities supported by general state tax funds." Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d, at 1284. We decline respondents' invitation to open such an expansive loophole in our carefully confined compensatory tax jurisprudence. </s> [Footnote 9 We recognize that "[t]he Commerce Clause does not prohibit all state action designed to give its residents an advantage in the marketplace, but only action of that description in connection with the State's regulation of interstate commerce." New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). Cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 877 , n. 6 (1985). Here, as in New Energy, we confront a patently discriminatory law that is plainly connected to the regulation of interstate commerce. We therefore have no occasion to decide whether Oregon could validly accomplish its limited cost-spreading through the "market participant" doctrine, Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 806 -810 (1976), or other means unrelated to any regulation of interstate commerce. </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 1] </s> CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN joins, dissenting. </s> Landfill space evaporates as solid waste accumulates. State and local governments expend financial and political capital to develop trash control systems that are efficient, lawful, and protective of the environment. The State of Oregon responsibly attempted to address its solid waste disposal problem through enactment of a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the management, disposal, reduction, and recycling of solid waste. For this Oregon should be applauded. The regulatory scheme included a fee charged on out-of-state solid waste. The Oregon Legislature directed the Commission to determine the appropriate surcharge "based on the costs . . . of disposing of solid waste generated out-of-state." Ore.Rev.Stat. 459.298 (1991). The </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 2] </s> Commission arrived at a surcharge of $2.25 per ton, compared to the $0.85 per ton charged on in-state solid waste. Ore. Admin. Rule 340-97-110(3) (1993). 1 The surcharge works out to an increase of about $0.14 per week for the typical out-of-state solid waste producer. 2 Brief for Respondent 26-27, n. 16. This seems a small price to pay for the right to deposit your "garbage, rubbish, refuse . . .; sewage sludge, septic tank and cesspool pumpings or other sludge; . . . manure, . . . dead animals, [and] infectious waste" on your neighbors. Ore.Rev.Stat. 459.005(27) (1991). </s> Nearly 20 years ago, we held that a State cannot ban all out-of-state waste disposal in protecting themselves from hazardous or noxious materials brought across the State's borders. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Two Terms ago, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. ___ (1992), in striking down the State of Alabama's $72 per ton fee on the disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste, the Court left open the possibility that such a fee could be valid if based on the costs of disposing of waste from other States. Id., at ___, n. 9 (slip op., at 10, n. 9). Once again, however, as in Philadelphia and Chemical Waste </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 3] </s> Management, the Court further cranks the dormant Commerce Clause ratchet against the States by striking down such cost-based fees, and, by so doing, ties the hands of the States in addressing the vexing national problem of solid waste disposal. I dissent. </s> Americans generated nearly 196 million tons of municipal solid waste in 1990, an increase from 128 million tons in 1975. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Characterization of Municipal Solid Waste in the United States: 1992 Update, p. ES-3. Under current projections, Americans will produce 222 million tons of garbage in the year 2000. Ibid. Generating solid waste has never been a problem. Finding environmentally safe disposal sites has. By 1991, it was estimated that 45 percent of all solid waste landfills in the Nation had reached capacity. 56 Fed.Reg. 50980 (1991). Nevertheless, the Court stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that a clean and healthy environment, unthreatened by the improper disposal of solid waste, is the commodity really at issue in cases such as this, see, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, supra, at ___ (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting), and Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dept. of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. ___, ___ (1992) (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissenting). </s> Notwithstanding the identified shortage of landfill space in the Nation, the Court notes that it has "little difficulty," ante, at 11, concluding that the Oregon surcharge does not operate as a compensatory tax, designed to offset the loss of available landfill space in the State caused by the influx of out-of-state waste. The Court reaches this nonchalant conclusion because the State has failed "to identify a specific charge on intrastate commerce equal to or exceeding the surcharge." Ibid. (emphasis added). The Court's myopic focus on "differential fees" ignores the fact that in-state producers of solid waste support the Oregon regulatory program through state income taxes and by paying, </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 4] </s> indirectly, the numerous fees imposed on landfill operators and the dumping fee on in-state waste. Ore.Rev.Stat. 459.005 et seq. (1991). </s> We confirmed in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982), that a State may enact a comprehensive regulatory system to address an environmental problem or a threat to natural resources within the confines of the Commerce Clause. In the context of threatened ground water depletion, we stated that "[o]bviously, a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State." Id., at 955-956. The same point could be made about a "clean and safe environment" in these cases: where a State imposes restrictions on the ability of its own citizens to dispose of solid waste in an effort to promote a "clean and safe environment," it is not discriminating against interstate commerce by preventing the uncontrolled transfer of out-of-state solid waste into the State. </s> The availability of safe landfill disposal sites in Oregon did not occur by chance. Through its regulatory scheme, the State of Oregon inspects landfill sites, monitors waste streams, promotes recycling, and imposes an $0.85 per ton disposal fee on in-state waste, Ore.Rev.Stat. 459.005 et seq. (1991), all in an effort to curb the threat that its residents will harm the environment and create health and safety problems through excessive and unmonitored solid waste disposal. Depletion of a clean and safe environment will follow if Oregon must accept out-of-state waste at its landfills without a sharing of the disposal costs. The Commerce Clause does not require a State to abide this outcome where the "natural resource has some indicia of a good publicly produced and owned in which a State may favor its own citizens in times of shortage." Sporhase, supra, at 957. A shortage of available landfill space is upon us, 56 </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 5] </s> Fed.Reg. 50980 (1991), and with it comes the accompanying health and safety hazards flowing from the improper disposal of solid wastes. We have long acknowledged a distinction between economic protectionism and health and safety regulation promulgated by Oregon. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949). </s> Far from neutralizing the economic situation for Oregon producers and out-of-state producers, the Court's analysis turns the Commerce Clause on its head. Oregon's neighbors will operate under a competitive advantage against their Oregon counterparts, as they can now produce solid waste with reckless abandon and avoid paying concomitant state taxes to develop new landfills and clean up retired landfill sites. While I understand that solid waste is an article of commerce, Philadelphia, 437 U.S., at 622 -623, it is not a commodity sold in the marketplace; rather it is disposed of at a cost to the State. Petitioners do not buy garbage to put in their landfills; solid waste producers pay petitioners to take their waste. Oregon solid waste producers do not compete with out-of-state businesses in the sale of solid waste. Thus, the fees do not alter the price of a product that is competing with other products for common purchasers. If anything, striking down the fees works to the disadvantage of Oregon businesses. They alone will have to pay the "nondisposal" fees associated with solid waste: landfill siting, landfill clean-up, insurance to cover environmental accidents, and transportation improvement costs associated with out-of-state waste being shipped into the State. While we once recognized that "`the collection and disposal of solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local agencies,'" id., at 621, n. 4, quoting 42 U.S.C. 6901(a)(4) (1976 ed.), the Court today leaves States with only two options: become a dumper and ship as much waste as possible to a less </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 6] </s> populated State, or become a dumpee, and stoically accept waste from more densely populated States. </s> The Court asserts that the State has not offered "any safety or health reasons" for discouraging the flow of solid waste into Oregon. Ante, at 8. I disagree. The availability of environmentally sound landfill space and the proper disposal of solid waste strike me as justifiable "safety or health" rationales for the fee. As far back as the turn of the century, the Court recognized that control over the collection and disposal of solid waste was a legitimate, nonarbitrary exercise of police powers to protect health and safety. See, e.g., California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306 (1905) (holding that exclusive privilege to one company to dispose of the garbage in the city and county of San Francisco was not void as taking the property of householders for public use without compensation); and Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325 (1905) (holding that property rights of individuals must be subordinated to the general good and if the owner of garbage suffers any loss by its destruction he is compensated therefor in the common benefit secured by the regulation requiring that all garbage be destroyed). </s> In exercising its legitimate police powers in regulating solid waste disposal, Oregon is not "needlessly obstruct[ing] interstate trade or attempt[ing] to place itself in a position of economic isolation." Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding Maine's ban on the importation of live baitfish on the ground that it serves the legitimate governmental interest in protecting Maine's indigenous fish population from parasites prevalent in out-of-state baitfish). Quite to the contrary, Oregon accepts out-of-state waste as part of its comprehensive solid waste regulatory program and it "retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources." </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 7] </s> Ibid. Moreover, Congress also has recognized taxes as an effective method of discouraging consumption of natural resources in other contexts. Cf. 26 U.S.C. 4681, 4682 (1988 ed., Supp. IV) (tax on ozone-depleting chemicals); 26 U.S.C. 4064 (1988 ed. and Supp. IV) (gas guzzler excise tax). Nothing should change the analysis when the natural resource - landfill space - was created or regulated by the State in the first place. </s> In its sweeping ruling, the Court makes no distinction between publicly and privately owned landfills. It rejects the argument that our "user fee" cases apply in this context, since the landfills owned by the petitioners are private and our user fee analysis applies only to "charge[s] imposed by the State for the use of a state-owned or state-provided transportation or other facilities and services." Ante, at 10-11, n. 6, quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 621 (1981). Rather than stopping there, however, the majority goes on to note that even if the Oregon surcharge could be viewed as a user fee, "it could not be sustained as such, given that it discriminates against interstate commerce." Ante, at 10-11, n. 6, quoting Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S. 707, 717 (1972). There is no need to make this dubious assertion. We specifically left unanswered the question whether a state or local government could regulate disposal of out-of-state solid waste at landfills owned by the government in Philadelphia, supra. at 627, n. 6. </s> We will undoubtedly be faced with this question directly in the future as roughly 80 percent of landfills receiving municipal solid waste in the United States are state or locally owned. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Subtitle D Study: Phase 1 Report, table 4-2, p. 4-7 (Oct. 1986). We noted in South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984), "if a State is </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 8] </s> acting as a market participant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities." See also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. ___, ___ (1992). Similarly, if the State owned and operated a park or recreational facility, it would be allowed to charge differential fees for in-state and out-of-state users of the resource. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (upholding Montana's higher nonresident elk hunting license fees to compensate the State for conservation expenditures from taxes which only residents pay). More recently we upheld such differential fees under a reasonableness standard in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 501 U.S. ___ (1994), despite the fact that the fees were not precisely tied to the costs of the services provided at the publicly owned airport. We relied on our Commerce Clause analysis from Evansville, supra. We stated in Evansville: </s> "At least so long as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege for use, . . . and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred, it will pass constitutional muster, even though some other formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the state facilities by individual users." Id., at 716-717. </s> I think that the $2.25 per ton fee that Oregon imposes on out-of-state waste works out to a similar "fair approximation" of the privilege to use its landfills. Even the Court concedes that our precedents do not demand anything beyond "substantia[l] equivalen[cy]" between the fees charged on in-state and out-of-state waste. Ante, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted). The $0.14 per week fee imposed on out-of-state waste producers qualifies as "substantially equivalent" under </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 9] </s> the reasonableness standard of Northwest Airlines and Evansville. </s> The Court begrudgingly concedes that interstate commerce may be made to "pay its way," ante, at 9, yet finds Oregon's nominal surcharge to exact more than a "just share" from interstate commerce. Ibid. It escapes me how an additional $0.14 per week cost for the average solid waste producer constitutes anything but the type of "incidental effects on interstate commerce" endorsed by the majority. Id., at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted). Evenhanded regulations imposing such incidental effects on interstate commerce must be upheld unless "the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). If the majority finds $0.14 per week beyond the pale, one is left to wonder what the Court possibly could have contemplated when it stated: </s> "[I]n the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it." Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977), quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945). </s> Surely $0.14 per week falls within even the most crabbed definition of "affect" or "regulate." Today the majority has rendered this "residuum of power" a nullity. </s> The State of Oregon is not prohibiting the export of solid waste from neighboring States; it is only asking that those neighbors pay their fair share for the use of Oregon landfill sites. I see nothing in the Commerce Clause that compels less densely populated States to </s> [ OREGON WASTE SYSTEMS v. ENVIRONMENTAL, ___ U.S. ___ (1994) </s> , 10] </s> serve as the low-cost dumping grounds for their neighbors, suffering the attendant risks that solid waste landfills present. The Court, deciding otherwise, further limits the dwindling options available to States as they contend with the environmental, health, safety, and political challenges posed by the problem of solid waste disposal in modern society. </s> For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The surcharge is composed of the following identified costs: $0.58 - statewide activities for reducing environmental risks and improving solid waste management; $0.66 - reimbursements to the state for tax credits and other public subsidies; $0.05 - solid waste reduction activities related to the review and certification of waste reduction and recycling plans; $0.72 - increased environmental liability; $0.20 - lost disposal capacity; $0.03 - publicly supported infrastructure; and $0.01 - nuisance impacts from transportation. Pet. for Cert. in No. 93-108, p. 4. </s> [Footnote 2 The $2.25 per ton fee imposed on out-of-state waste exceeds the $0.85 per ton fee imposed on in-state waste by $1.40 per ton. One ton equals 2,000 pounds. Assuming that the hypothetical nonresident generates 200 pounds of garbage per month (1/10 of a ton), the nonresident's garbage bill would increase by $0.14 per month. Page I

United States Supreme Court BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE.(1995) No. 94-859 Argued: April 17, 1995Decided: June 29, 1995 </s> As relevant here, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act) makes it unlawful for any person to "take" endangered or threatened species, 9(a)(1)(B), and defines "take" to mean to "harass, harm, pursue," "wound," or "kill," 3(19). In 50 CFR 17.3, petitioner Secretary of the Interior further defines "harm" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." Respondents, persons and entities dependent on the forest products industries and others, challenged this regulation on its face, claiming that Congress did not intend the word "take" to include habitat modification. The District Court granted petitioners summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals ultimately reversed. Invoking the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction, which holds that a word is known by the company it keeps, the court concluded that "harm," like the other words in the definition of "take," should be read as applying only to the perpetrator's direct application of force against the animal taken. </s> Held: </s> The Secretary reasonably construed Congress' intent when he defined "harm" to include habitat modification. Pp. 7-21. </s> (a) The Act provides three reasons for preferring the Secretary's interpretation. First, the ordinary meaning of "harm" naturally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to members of an endangered or threatened species. Unless "harm" encompasses indirect as well as direct injuries, the word has no meaning that does not duplicate that of other words that 3 uses to define "take." Second, the ESA's broad purpose of providing comprehensive protection for endangered and threatened species Page II supports the reasonableness of the Secretary's definition. Respondents advance strong arguments that activities causing minimal or unforseeable harm will not violate the Act as construed in the regulation, but their facial challenge would require that the Secretary's understanding of harm be invalidated in every circumstance. Third, the fact that Congress in 1982 authorized the Secretary to issue permits for takings that 9(a)(1)(B) would otherwise prohibit, "if such taking is incidental to, and not for the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity," 10(a)(1)(B), strongly suggests that Congress understood 9 to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. No one could seriously request an "incidental" take permit to avert 9 liability for direct, deliberate action against a member of an endangered or threatened species. Pp. 7-13. </s> (b) The Court of Appeals made three errors in finding that "harm" must refer to a direct application of force because the words around it do. First, the court's premise was flawed. Several of the words accompanying "harm" in 3's definition of "take" refer to actions or effects that do not require direct applications of force. Second, to the extent that it read an intent or purpose requirement into the definition of "take," it ignored 9's express provision that a "knowing" action is enough to violate the Act. Third, the court employed noscitur a sociis to give "harm" essentially the same function as other words in the definition, thereby denying it independent meaning. Pp. 13-14. </s> (c) The Act's inclusion of land acquisition authority, 5, and a directive to federal agencies to avoid destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat, 7, does not alter the conclusion reached in this case. Respondents' argument that the Government lacks any incentive to purchase land under 5 when it can simply prohibit takings under 9 ignores the practical considerations that purchasing habitat lands may be less expensive than pursuing criminal or civil penalties and that 5 allows for protection of habitat before any endangered animal has been harmed, whereas 9 cannot be enforced until a killing or injury has occurred. Section 7's directive applies only to the Federal Government, whereas 9 applies to "any person." Pp. 14-15. </s> (d) The conclusion reached here gains further support from the statute's legislative history. Pp. 16-20. </s> 17 F.3d 1463, reversed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed a concurring opinion. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined. </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 87 Stat. 884, 16 U.S.C. 1531 (1988 ed. and Supp. V) (ESA or Act), contains a variety of protections designed to save from extinction species that the Secretary of the Interior designates as endangered or threatened. Section 9 of the Act makes it unlawful for any person to "take" any endangered or threatened species. The Secretary has promulgated a regulation that defines the statute's prohibition on takings to include "significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife." This case presents the question whether the Secretary exceeded his authority under the Act by promulgating that regulation. </s> I </s> Section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act provides the following protection for endangered species: 1 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 2] </s> "Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533 of this title it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to - </s> . . . . . </s> "(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United States[.]" 16 U.S.C. 1538(a)(1). </s> Section 3(19) of the Act defines the statutory term "take": </s> "The term `take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 16 U.S.C. 1532(19). </s> The Act does not further define the terms it uses to define "take." The Interior Department regulations that implement the statute, however, define the statutory term "harm": </s> "Harm in the definition of `take' in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 CFR 17.3 (1994). </s> This regulation has been in place since 1975. 2 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 3] </s> A limitation on the 9 "take" prohibition appears in 10(a)(1)(B) of the Act, which Congress added by amendment in 1982. That section authorizes the Secretary to grant a permit for any taking otherwise prohibited by 9(a)(1)(B) "if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(1)(B). </s> In addition to the prohibition on takings, the Act provides several other protections for endangered species. Section 4, 16 U.S.C. 1533, commands the Secretary to identify species of fish or wildlife that are in danger of extinction and to publish from time to time lists of all species he determines to be endangered or threatened. Section 5, 16 U.S.C. 1534, authorizes the Secretary, in cooperation with the States, see 16 U.S.C. 1535, to acquire land to aid in preserving such species. Section 7 requires federal agencies to ensure that none of their activities, including the granting of licenses and permits, will jeopardize the continued existence of endangered species "or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be critical." 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2). </s> Respondents in this action are small landowners, logging companies, and families dependent on the forest products industries in the Pacific Northwest and in the Southeast, and organizations that represent their interests. They brought this declaratory judgment action against petitioners, the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the statutory validity of the Secretary's regulation defining "harm," particularly the inclusion of habitat modification and degradation in the definition. 3 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 4] </s> Respondents challenged the regulation on its face. Their complaint alleged that application of the "harm" regulation to the red-cockaded woodpecker, an endangered species, 4 and the northern spotted owl, a threatened species, 5 had injured them economically. App. 17-23. </s> Respondents advanced three arguments to support their submission that Congress did not intend the word "take" in 9 to include habitat modification, as the Secretary's "harm" regulation provides. First, they correctly noted that language in the Senate's original version of the ESA would have defined "take" to include "destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the] habitat or range" of fish or wildlife, 6 but the Senate deleted that language from the bill before enacting it. Second, respondents argued that Congress intended the Act's express authorization for the Federal Government to buy private land in order to prevent habitat degradation in 5 to be the exclusive check against habitat modification on private property. Third, because the Senate added the term "harm" to the definition of "take" in a floor </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 5] </s> amendment without debate, respondents argued that the court should not interpret the term so expansively as to include habitat modification. </s> The District Court considered and rejected each of respondents' arguments, finding "that Congress intended an expansive interpretation of the word `take,' an interpretation that encompasses habitat modification." 806 F. Supp. 279, 285 (1992). The court noted that in 1982, when Congress was aware of a judicial decision that had applied the Secretary's regulation, see Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (CA9 1981) (Palila I), it amended the Act without using The opportunity to change the definition of "take." 806 F. Supp., at 284. The court stated that, even had it found the ESA "`silent or ambiguous'" as to the authority for the Secretary's definition of "harm," it would nevertheless have upheld the regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statute. Id., at 285 (quoting Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). The District Court therefore entered summary judgment for petitioners and dismissed respondents' complaint. </s> A divided panel of the Court of Appeals initially affirmed the judgment of the District Court. 1 F.3d 1 (CADC 1993). After granting a petition for rehearing, however, the panel reversed. 17 F.3d 1463 (CADC 1994). Although acknowledging that "[t]he potential breadth of the word `harm' is indisputable," id., at 1464, the majority concluded that the immediate statutory context in which "harm" appeared counseled against a broad reading; like the other words in the definition of "take," the word "harm" should be read as applying only to "the perpetrator's direct application of force against the animal taken . . . . The forbidden acts fit, in ordinary language, the basic model `A hit B.'" Id., at 1465. The majority based its reasoning on a canon of statutory construction called noscitur a sociis, which </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 6] </s> holds that a word is known by the company it keeps. See Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 708-709 (1878). </s> The majority claimed support for its construction from a decision of the Ninth Circuit that narrowly construed the word "harass" in the Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. 1372(a)(2)(A), see United States v. Hayashi, 5 F.3d 1278, 1282 (1993); from the legislative history of the ESA; 7 from its view that Congress must not have intended the purportedly broad curtailment of private property rights that the Secretary's interpretation permitted; and from the ESA's land acquisition provision in 5 and restriction on federal agencies' activities regarding habitat in 7, both of which the court saw as evidence that Congress had not intended the 9 "take" prohibition to reach habitat modification. Most prominently, the court performed a lengthy analysis of the 1982 amendment to 10 that provided for "incidental take permits" and concluded that the amendment did not change the meaning of the term "take" as defined in the 1973 statute. 8 </s> Chief Judge Mikva, who had announced the panel's original decision, dissented. See 17 F.3d, at 1473. In his view, a proper application of Chevron indicated that the Secretary had reasonably defined "harm," because respondents had failed to show that Congress unambiguously manifested its intent to exclude habitat modification from the ambit of "take." Chief Judge Mikva found the majority's reliance on noscitur a sociis inappropriate </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 7] </s> in light of the statutory language and unnecessary in light of the strong support in the legislative history for the Secretary's interpretation. He did not find the 1982 "incidental take permit" amendment alone sufficient to vindicate the Secretary's definition of "harm," but he believed the amendment provided additional support for that definition because it reflected Congress' view in 1982 that the definition was reasonable. </s> The Court of Appeals' decision created a square conflict with a 1988 decision of the Ninth Circuit that had upheld the Secretary's definition of "harm." See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (1988) (Palila II). The Court of Appeals neither cited nor distinguished Palila II, despite the stark contrast between the Ninth Circuit's holding and its own. We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 513 U.S. ___ (1995). Our consideration of the text and structure of the Act, its legislative history, and the significance of the 1982 amendment persuades us that the Court of Appeals' judgment should be reversed. </s> II </s> Because this case was decided on motions for summary judgment, we may appropriately make certain factual assumptions in order to frame the legal issue. First, we assume respondents have no desire to harm either the red-cockaded woodpecker or the spotted owl; they merely wish to continue logging activities that would be entirely proper if not prohibited by the ESA. On the other hand, we must assume arguendo that those activities will have the effect, even though unintended, of detrimentally changing the natural habitat of both listed species and that, as a consequence, members of those species will be killed or injured. Under respondents' view of the law, the Secretary's only means of forestalling that grave </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 8] </s> result - even when the actor knows it is certain to occur 9 - is to use his 5 authority to purchase the lands on which the survival of the species depends. The Secretary, on the other hand, submits that the 9 prohibition on takings, which Congress defined to include "harm," places on respondents a duty to avoid harm that habitat alteration will cause the birds unless respondents first obtain a permit pursuant to 10. </s> The text of the Act provides three reasons for concluding that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable. First, an ordinary understanding of the word "harm" </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 9] </s> supports it. The dictionary definition of the verb form of "harm" is "to cause hurt or damage to: injure." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1034 (1966). In the context of the ESA, that definition naturally encompasses habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to members of an endangered or threatened species. </s> Respondents argue that the Secretary should have limited the purview of "harm" to direct applications of force against protected species, but the dictionary definition does not include the word "directly" or suggest in any way that only direct or willful action that leads to injury constitutes "harm." 10 Moreover, unless the statutory term "harm" encompasses indirect as well as direct injuries, the word has no meaning that does not duplicate the meaning of other words that 3 uses to define "take." A reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage supports the reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretation. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 , and n. 11 (1988). 11 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 10] </s> Second, the broad purpose of the ESA supports the Secretary's decision to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid. In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), we described the Act as "the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation." Id., at 180. Whereas predecessor statutes enacted in 1966 and 1969 had not contained any sweeping prohibition against the taking of endangered species except on federal lands, see id., at 175, the 1973 Act applied to all land in the United States and to the Nation's territorial seas. As stated in 2 of the Act, among its central purposes is "to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved . . . ." 16 U.S.C. 1531(b). </s> In Hill, we construed 7 as precluding the completion of the Tellico Dam because of its predicted impact on the survival of the snail darter. See 437 U.S., at 193 . Both our holding and the language in our opinion stressed the importance of the statutory policy. "The plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute," we recognized, "was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 11] </s> not only in the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute." Id., at 184. Although the 9 "take" prohibition was not at issue in Hill, we took note of that prohibition, placing particular emphasis on the Secretary's inclusion of habitat modification in his definition of "harm." 12 In light of that provision for habitat protection, we could "not understand how TVA intends to operate Tellico Dam without `harming' the snail darter." Id., at 184, n. 30. Congress' intent to provide comprehensive protection for endangered and threatened species supports the permissibility of the Secretary's "harm" regulation. </s> Respondents advance strong arguments that activities that cause minimal or unforeseeable harm will not violate the Act as construed in the "harm" regulation. Respondents, however, present a facial challenge to the regulation. Cf. Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. ___, ___, n. 6 (1995) (slip op., at 11); INS v. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 188 (1991). Thus, they ask us to invalidate the Secretary's understanding of "harm" in every circumstance, even when an actor knows that an activity, such as draining a pond, would actually result in the extinction of a listed species by destroying its habitat. Given Congress' clear expression of the ESA's broad purpose to protect endangered and threatened wildlife, the Secretary's definition of "harm" is reasonable. 13 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 12] </s> Third, the fact that Congress in 1982 authorized the Secretary to issue permits for takings that 9(a)(1)(B) would otherwise prohibit, "if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity," 16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(1)(B), strongly suggests that Congress understood 9(a)(1)(B) to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings. Cf. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 274 -275 (1974). The permit process requires the applicant to prepare a "conservation plan" that specifies how he intends to "minimize and mitigate" the "impact" of his activity on endangered and threatened species, 16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(2)(A), making clear that Congress had in mind foreseeable rather than merely accidental effects on listed species. 14 No one could seriously request an "incidental" take permit to avert 9 liability for direct, deliberate action against a member of an endangered or threatened species, but respondents would read "harm" </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 13] </s> so narrowly that the permit procedure would have little more than that absurd purpose. "When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial effect." Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 10). Congress' addition of the 10 permit provision supports the Secretary's conclusion that activities not intended to harm an endangered species, such as habitat modification, may constitute unlawful takings under the ESA unless the Secretary permits them. </s> The Court of Appeals made three errors in asserting that "harm" must refer to a direct application of force because the words around it do. 15 First, the court's premise was flawed. Several of the words that accompany "harm" in the 3 definition of "take," especially "harass," "pursue," "wound," and "kill," refer to actions or effects that do not require direct applications of force. Second, to the extent the court read a requirement of intent or purpose into the words used to define "take," it ignored 9's express provision that a "knowing" action is enough to violate the Act. Third, the court employed noscitur a sociis to give "harm" essentially the same </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 14] </s> function as other words in the definition, thereby denying it independent meaning. The canon, to the contrary, counsels that a word "gathers meaning from the words around it." Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). The statutory context of "harm" suggests that Congress meant that term to serve a particular function in the ESA, consistent with but distinct from the functions of the other verbs used to define "take." The Secretary's interpretation of "harm" to include indirectly injuring endangered animals through habitat modification permissibly interprets "harm" to have "a character of its own not to be submerged by its association." Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923). 16 </s> Nor does the Act's inclusion of the 5 land acquisition authority and the 7 directive to federal agencies to avoid destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat alter our conclusion. Respondents' argument that the Government lacks any incentive to purchase land under 5 when it can simply prohibit takings under 9 ignores the practical considerations that attend enforcement of the ESA. Purchasing habitat lands may well cost the Government less in many circumstances than pursuing civil or criminal penalties. In addition, </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 15] </s> the 5 procedure allows for protection of habitat before the seller's activity has harmed any endangered animal, whereas the Government cannot enforce the 9 prohibition until an animal has actually been killed or injured. The Secretary may also find the 5 authority useful for preventing modification of land that is not yet but may in the future become habitat for an endangered or threatened species. The 7 directive applies only to the Federal Government, whereas the 9 prohibition applies to "any person." Section 7 imposes a broad, affirmative duty to avoid adverse habitat modifications that 9 does not replicate, and 7 does not limit its admonition to habitat modification that "actually kills or injures wildlife." Conversely, 7 contains limitations that 9 does not, applying only to actions "likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species," 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2), and to modifications of habitat that has been designated "critical" pursuant to 4, 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(2). 17 Any overlap that 5 or 7 may have with 9 in particular cases is unexceptional, see, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 24 , and n. 2 (1983), and simply reflects the broad purpose of the Act set out in 2 and acknowledged in TVA v. Hill. </s> We need not decide whether the statutory definition of "take" compels the Secretary's interpretation of "harm," because our conclusions that Congress did not unambiguously manifest its intent to adopt respondents' view and that the Secretary's interpretation is reasonable suffice to decide this case. See generally Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 16] </s> (1984). The latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable interpretation. See Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 373 (1986). 18 </s> III </s> Our conclusion that the Secretary's definition of "harm" rests on a permissible construction of the ESA gains further support from the legislative history of the statute. The Committee Reports accompanying the bills that became the ESA do not specifically discuss the meaning of "harm," but they make clear that Congress intended "take" to apply broadly to cover indirect as well as purposeful actions. The Senate Report stressed that </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 17] </s> "`[t]ake' is defined . . . in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can `take' or attempt to `take' any fish or wildlife." S. Rep. No. 93-307, p. 7 (1973). The House Report stated that "the broadest possible terms" were used to define restrictions on takings. H. R. Rep. No. 93-412, p. 15 (1973). The House Report underscored the breadth of the "take" definition by noting that it included "harassment, whether intentional or not." Id., at 11 (emphasis added). The Report explained that the definition "would allow, for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the activities of birdwatchers where the effect of those activities might disturb the birds and make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their young." Ibid. These comments, ignored in the dissent's welcome but selective foray into legislative history, see post, at 14-16, support the Secretary's interpretation that the term "take" in 9 reached far more than the deliberate actions of hunters and trappers. </s> Two endangered species bills, S. 1592 and S. 1983, were introduced in the Senate and referred to the Commerce Committee. Neither bill included the word "harm" in its definition of "take," although the definitions otherwise closely resembled the one that appeared in the bill as ultimately enacted. See Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 before the Subcommittee on Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 7, 27 (1973) (hereinafter Hearings). Senator Tunney, the floor manager of the bill in the Senate, subsequently introduced a floor amendment that added "harm" to the definition, noting that this and accompanying amendments would "help to achieve the purposes of the bill." 119 Cong. Rec. 25683 (July 24, 1973). Respondents argue that the lack of debate about the amendment that added "harm" counsels in favor of a narrow interpretation. We disagree. An obviously broad word that the Senate went out of its way to add </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 18] </s> to an important statutory definition is precisely the sort of provision that deserves a respectful reading. </s> The definition of "take" that originally appeared in S. 1983 differed from the definition as ultimately enacted in one other significant respect: It included "the destruction, modification, or curtailment of [the] habitat or range" of fish and wildlife. Hearings, at 27. Respondents make much of the fact that the Commerce Committee removed this phrase from the "take" definition before S. 1983 went to the floor. See 119 Cong. Rec. 25663 (1973). We do not find that fact especially significant. The legislative materials contain no indication why the habitat protection provision was deleted. That provision differed greatly from the regulation at issue today. Most notably, the habitat protection in S. 1983 would have applied far more broadly than the regulation does because it made adverse habitat modification a categorical violation of the "take" prohibition, unbounded by the regulation's limitation to habitat modifications that actually kill or injure wildlife. The S. 1983 language also failed to qualify "modification" with the regulation's limiting adjective "significant." We do not believe the Senate's unelaborated disavowal of the provision in S. 1983 undermines the reasonableness of the more moderate habitat protection in the Secretary's "harm" regulation. 19 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 19] </s> The history of the 1982 amendment that gave the Secretary authority to grant permits for "incidental" takings provides further support for his reading of the Act. The House Report expressly states that "[b]y use of the word `incidental' the Committee intends to cover situations in which it is known that a taking will occur if the other activity is engaged in but such taking is </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 20] </s> incidental to, and not the purpose of, the activity." H. R. Rep. No. 97-567, p. 31 (1982). This reference to the foreseeability of incidental takings undermines respondents' argument that the 1982 amendment covered only accidental killings of endangered and threatened animals that might occur in the course of hunting or trapping other animals. Indeed, Congress had habitat modification directly in mind: both the Senate Report and the House Conference Report identified as the model for the permit process a cooperative state-federal response to a case in California where a development project threatened incidental harm to a species of endangered butterfly by modification of its habitat. See S. Rep. No. 97-418, p. 10 (1982); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, pp. 30-32 (1982). Thus, Congress in 1982 focused squarely on the aspect of the "harm" regulation at issue in this litigation. Congress' implementation of a permit program is consistent with the Secretary's interpretation of the term "harm." </s> IV </s> When it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary. See 16 U.S.C. 1533, 1540(f). The task of defining and listing endangered and threatened species requires an expertise and attention to detail that exceeds the normal province of Congress. Fashioning appropriate standards for issuing permits under 10 for takings that would otherwise violate 9 necessarily requires the exercise of broad discretion. The proper interpretation of a term such as "harm" involves a complex policy choice. When Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, we are especially reluctant to substitute our views of wise policy for his. See Chevron, 467 U.S., at 865 -866. In this case, that reluctance accords with our conclusion, based on the text, structure, and legislative history of the ESA, that the Secretary reasonably </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 21] </s> construed the intent of Congress when he defined "harm" to include "significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife." </s> In the elaboration and enforcement of the ESA, the Secretary and all persons who must comply with the law will confront difficult questions of proximity and degree; for, as all recognize, the Act encompasses a vast range of economic and social enterprises and endeavors. These questions must be addressed in the usual course of the law, through case-by-case resolution and adjudication. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Act defines the term "endangered species" to mean "any species which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range other than a species of the Class Insecta determined by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose protection </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 2] </s> under the provisions of this chapter would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to man." 16 U.S.C. 1532(6). </s> [Footnote 2 The Secretary, through the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service, originally promulgated the regulation in 1975 and amended it in 1981 to emphasize that actual death or injury of a protected animal is necessary for a violation. See 40 Fed. Reg. 44412, 44416 (1975); 46 Fed. Reg. 54748, 54750 (1981). </s> [Footnote 3 Respondents also argued in the District Court that the Secretary's </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 4] </s> definition of "harm" is unconstitutionally void for vagueness, but they do not press that argument here. </s> [Footnote 4 The woodpecker was listed as an endangered species in 1970 pursuant to the statutory predecessor of the ESA. See 50 CFR 17.11(h) (1994), issued pursuant to the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, 83 Stat. 275. </s> [Footnote 5 See 55 Fed. Reg. 26114 (1990). Another regulation promulgated by the Secretary extends to threatened species, defined in the ESA as "any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range," 16 U.S.C. 1532(20), some but not all of the protections endangered species enjoy. See 50 CFR 17.31(a) (1994). In the District Court respondents unsuccessfully challenged that regulation's extension of 9 to threatened species, but they do not press the challenge here. </s> [Footnote 6 Senate 1983, reprinted in Hearings on S. 1592 and S. 1983 before the Subcommittee on Environment of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 27 (1973). </s> [Footnote 7 Judge Sentelle filed a partial concurrence in which he declined to join the portions of the court's opinion that relied on legislative history. See 17 F.3d 1463, 1472 (CADC 1994). </s> [Footnote 8 The 1982 amendment had formed the basis on which the author of the majority's opinion on rehearing originally voted to affirm the judgment of the District Court. Compare 1 F.3d 1, 11 (CADC 1993) (Williams, J., concurring in part), with 17 F.3d, at 1467-1472. </s> [Footnote 9 As discussed above, the Secretary's definition of "harm" is limited to "act[s] which actually kil[l] or injur[e] wildlife." 50 CFR 17.3 (1994). In addition, in order to be subject to the Act's criminal penalties or the more severe of its civil penalties, one must "knowingly violat[e]" the Act or its implementing regulations. 16 U.S.C. 1540(a)(1),(b)(1). Congress added "knowingly" in place of "willfully" in 1978 to make "criminal violations of the act a general rather than a specific intent crime." H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804, p. 26 (1978). The Act does authorize up to a $500 civil fine for "[a]ny person who otherwise violates" the Act or its implementing regulations. 16 U.S.C. 1540(a) (1). That provision is potentially sweeping, but it would be so with or without the Secretary's "harm" regulation, making it unhelpful in assessing the reasonableness of the regulation. We have imputed scienter requirements to criminal statutes that impose sanctions without expressly requiring scienter, see, e.g., Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. ___ (1994), but the proper case in which we might consider whether to do so in the 9 provision for a $500 civil penalty would be a challenge to enforcement of that provision itself, not a challenge to a regulation that merely defines a statutory term. We do not agree with the dissent that the regulation covers results that are not "even foreseeable . . . no matter how long the chain of causality between modification and injury." Post, at 2. Respondents have suggested no reason why either the "knowingly violates" or the "otherwise violates" provision of the statute - or the "harm" regulation itself - should not be read to incorporate ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability. In any event, neither respondents nor their amici have suggested that the Secretary employs the "otherwise violates" provision with any frequency. </s> [Footnote 10 Respondents and the dissent emphasize what they portray as the "established meaning" of "take" in the sense of a "wildlife take," a meaning respondents argue extends only to "the effort to exercise dominion over some creature, and the concrete effect of [sic] that creature." Brief for Respondents 19; see post, at 4-5. This limitation ill serves the statutory text, which forbids not taking "some creature" but "tak[ing] any [endangered] species" - a formidable task for even the most rapacious feudal lord. More importantly, Congress explicitly defined the operative term "take" in the ESA, no matter how much the dissent wishes otherwise, see post, at 4-7, 11-12, thereby obviating the need for us to probe its meaning as we must probe the meaning of the undefined subsidiary term "harm." Finally, Congress' definition of "take" includes several words - most obviously "harass," "pursue," and "wound," in addition to "harm" itself - that fit respondents' and the dissent's definition of "take" no better than does "significant habitat modification or degradation." </s> [Footnote 11 In contrast, if the statutory term "harm" encompasses such </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 10] </s> indirect means of killing and injuring wildlife as habitat modification, the other terms listed in 3 - "harass," "pursue," "hunt," "shoot," "wound," "kill," "trap," "capture," and "collect" - generally retain independent meanings. Most of those terms refer to deliberate actions more frequently than does "harm," and they therefore do not duplicate the sense of indirect causation that "harm" adds to the statute. In addition, most of the other words in the definition describe either actions from which habitat modification does not usually result (e.g., "pursue," "harass") or effects to which activities that modify habitat do not usually lead (e.g., "trap," "collect"). To the extent the Secretary's definition of "harm" may have applications that overlap with other words in the definition, that overlap reflects the broad purpose of the Act. See infra, at 9-11. </s> [Footnote 12 We stated: "The Secretary of the Interior has defined the term `harm' to mean `an act or omission which actually injures or kills wildlife, including acts which annoy it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt essential behavioral patterns, which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding or sheltering; significant environmental modification or degradation which has such effects is included within the meaning of "harm."'" TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 -185, n. 30 (1978) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). </s> [Footnote 13 The dissent incorrectly asserts that the Secretary's regulation (1) "dispenses with the foreseeability of harm" and (2) "fail[s] to require </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 12] </s> injury to particular animals," post, at 19. As to the first assertion, the regulation merely implements the statute, and it is therefore subject to the statute's "knowingly violates" language, see 16 U.S.C. 1540(a)(1),(b)(1), and ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability. See n. 9, supra. Nothing in the regulation purports to weaken those requirements. To the contrary, the word "actually" in the regulation should be construed to limit the liability about which the dissent appears most concerned, liability under the statute's "otherwise violates" provision. See n. 9, supra; post, at 8-9, 19-20. The Secretary did not need to include "actually" to connote "but for" causation, which the other words in the definition obviously require. As to the dissent's second assertion, every term in the regulation's definition of "harm" is subservient to the phrase "an act which actually kills or injures wildlife." </s> [Footnote 14 The dissent acknowledges the legislative history's clear indication that the drafters of the 1982 amendment had habitat modification in mind, see post, at 18, but argues that the text of the amendment requires a contrary conclusion. This argument overlooks the statute's requirement of a "conservation plan," which must describe an alternative to a known, but undesired, habitat modification. </s> [Footnote 15 The dissent makes no effort to defend the Court of Appeals' reading of the statutory definition as requiring a direct application of force. Instead, it tries to impose on 9 a limitation of liability to "affirmative conduct intentionally directed against a particular animal or animals." Post, at 7. Under the dissent's interpretation of the Act, a developer could drain a pond, knowing that the act would extinguish an endangered species of turtles, without even proposing a conservation plan or applying for a permit under 9(a)(1)(B); unless the developer was motivated by a desire "to get at a turtle," post, at 8, no statutory taking could occur. Because such conduct would not constitute a taking at common law, the dissent would shield it from 9 liability, even though the words "kill" and "harm" in the statutory definition could apply to such deliberate conduct. We cannot accept that limitation. In any event, our reasons for rejecting the Court of Appeals' interpretation apply as well to the dissent's novel construction. </s> [Footnote 16 Respondents' reliance on United States v. Hayashi, 22 F.3d 859 (CA9 1993) is also misplaced. Hayashi construed the term "harass," part of the definition of "take" in the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. 1361 et seq., as requiring a "direct intrusion" on wildlife to support a criminal prosecution. 22 F.3d, at 864. Hayashi dealt with a challenge to a single application of a statute whose "take" definition includes neither "harm" nor several of the other words that appear in the ESA definition. Moreover, Hayashi was decided by a panel of the Ninth Circuit, the same court that had previously upheld the regulation at issue here in Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (1988) (Palila II). Neither the Hayashi majority nor the dissent saw any need to distinguish or even to cite Palila II. </s> [Footnote 17 Congress recognized that 7 and 9 are not coextensive as to federal agencies when, in the wake of our decision in Hill in 1978, it added 7(o), 16 U.S.C. 1536(o), to the Act. That section provides that any federal project subject to exemption from 7, 16 U.S.C. 1536(h), will also be exempt from 9. </s> [Footnote 18 Respondents also argue that the rule of lenity should foreclose any deference to the Secretary's interpretation of the ESA because the statute includes criminal penalties. The rule of lenity is premised on two ideas: first, "`a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed'"; second, "legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity." United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 -350 (1971) (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 282 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)). We have applied the rule of lenity in a case raising a narrow question concerning the application of a statute that contains criminal sanctions to a specific factual dispute - whether pistols with short barrels and attachable shoulder stocks are short-barreled rifles - where no regulation was present. See United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 517 -518, and n. 9 (1992). We have never suggested that the rule of lenity should provide the standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal enforcement. Even if there exist regulations whose interpretations of statutory criminal penalties provide such inadequate notice of potential liability as to offend the rule of lenity, the "harm" regulation, which has existed for two decades and gives a fair warning of its consequences, cannot be one of them. </s> [Footnote 19 Respondents place heavy reliance for their argument that Congress intended the 5 land acquisition provision and not 9 to be the ESA's remedy for habitat modification on a floor statement by Senator Tunney: </s> "Many species have been inadvertently exterminated by a negligent destruction of their habitat. Their habitats have been cut in size, polluted, or otherwise altered so that they are unsuitable environments for natural populations of fish and wildlife. Under this bill, we can take steps to make amends for our negligent encroachment. The Secretary would be empowered to use the land acquisition authority granted to him in certain existing legislation to </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 19] </s> acquire land for the use of the endangered species programs. . . . Through these land acquisition provisions, we will be able to conserve habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further destruction. </s> "Although most endangered species are threatened primarily by the destruction of their natural habitats, a significant portion of these animals are subject to predation by man for commercial, sport, consumption, or other purposes. The provisions in S. 1983 would prohibit the commerce in or the importation, exportation, or taking of endangered species . . . ." 119 Cong. Rec. 25669 (1973). </s> Similarly, respondents emphasize a floor statement by Representative Sullivan, the House floor manager for the ESA: </s> "For the most part, the principal threat to animals stems from destruction of their habitat. . . . H. R. 37 will meet this problem by providing funds for acquisition of critical habitat . . . . It will also enable the Department of Agriculture to cooperate with willing landowners who desire to assist in the protection of endangered species, but who are understandably unwilling to do so at excessive cost to themselves. </s> "Another hazard to endangered species arises from those who would capture or kill them for pleasure or profit. There is no way that Congress can make it less pleasurable for a person to take an animal, but we can certainly make it less profitable for them to do so." Id., at 30162. </s> Each of these statements merely explained features of the bills that Congress eventually enacted in 5 of the ESA and went on to discuss elements enacted in 9. Neither statement even suggested that 5 would be the Act's exclusive remedy for habitat modification by private landowners or that habitat modification by private landowners stood outside the ambit of 9. Respondents' suggestion that these statements identified 5 as the ESA's only response to habitat modification contradicts their emphasis elsewhere on the habitat protections in 7. See supra, at 14. </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring. </s> My agreement with the Court is founded on two understandings. First, the challenged regulation is limited to significant habitat modification that causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to identifiable protected animals. Second, even setting aside difficult questions of scienter, the regulation's application is limited by ordinary principles of proximate causation, which introduce notions of foreseeability. These limitations, in my view, call into question Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (CA9 1988) (Palila II), and with it, many of the applications derided by the dissent. Because there is no need to strike a regulation on a facial challenge out of concern that it is susceptible of erroneous application, however, and because there are many habitat-related circumstances in which the regulation might validly apply, I join the opinion of the Court. </s> In my view, the regulation is limited by its terms to actions that actually kill or injure individual animals. JUSTICE SCALIA disagrees, arguing that the harm regulation "encompasses injury inflicted, not only upon </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 2] </s> individual animals, but upon populations of the protected species." Post, at 4-5. At one level, I could not reasonably quarrel with this observation; death to an individual animal always reduces the size of the population in which it lives, and in that sense, "injures" that population. But by its insight, the dissent means something else. Building upon the regulation's use of the word "breeding," JUSTICE SCALIA suggests that the regulation facially bars significant habitat modification that actually kills or injures hypothetical animals (or, perhaps more aptly, causes potential additions to the population not to come into being). Because "[i]mpairment of breeding does not `injure' living creatures," JUSTICE SCALIA reasons, the regulation must contemplate application to "a population of animals which would otherwise have maintained or increased its numbers." Post, at 5, 22. </s> I disagree. As an initial matter, I do not find it as easy as JUSTICE SCALIA does to dismiss the notion that significant impairment of breeding injures living creatures. To raze the last remaining ground on which the piping plover currently breeds, thereby making it impossible for any piping plovers to reproduce, would obviously injure the population (causing the species' extinction in a generation). But by completely preventing breeding, it would also injure the individual living bird, in the same way that sterilizing the creature injures the individual living bird. To "injure" is, among other things, "to impair." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 623 (1983). One need not subscribe to theories of "psychic harm," cf. post, at 22, n. 5, to recognize that to make it impossible for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most essential physical functions and to render that animal, and its genetic material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is actual injury. </s> In any event, even if impairing an animal's ability to </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 3] </s> breed were not, in and of itself, an injury to that animal, interference with breeding can cause an animal to suffer other, perhaps more obvious, kinds of injury. The regulation has clear application, for example, to significant habitat modification that kills or physically injures animals which, because they are in a vulnerable breeding state, do not or cannot flee or defend themselves, or to environmental pollutants that cause an animal to suffer physical complications during gestation. Breeding, feeding, and sheltering are what animals do. If significant habitat modification, by interfering with these essential behaviors, actually kills or injures an animal protected by the Act, it causes "harm" within the meaning of the regulation. In contrast to JUSTICE SCALIA, I do not read the regulation's "breeding" reference to vitiate or somehow to qualify the clear actual death or injury requirement, or to suggest that the regulation contemplates extension to nonexistent animals. </s> There is no inconsistency, I should add, between this interpretation and the commentary that accompanied the amendment of the regulation to include the actual death or injury requirement. See 46 Fed. Reg. 54748 (1981). Quite the contrary. It is true, as JUSTICE SCALIA observes, post, at 5, that the Fish and Wildlife Service states at one point that "harm" is not limited to "direct physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife species," see 46 Fed. Reg. 54748 (1981). But one could just as easily emphasize the word "direct" in this sentence as the word "individual." * Elsewhere in the </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 4] </s> commentary, the Service makes clear that "section 9's threshold does focus on individual members of a protected species." Id., at 54749. Moreover, the Service says that the regulation has no application to speculative harm, explaining that its insertion of the word "actually" was intended "to bulwark the need for proven injury to a species due to a party's actions." Ibid.; see also ibid. (approving language that "Harm covers actions . . . which actually (as opposed to potentially), cause injury"). That a protected animal could have eaten the leaves of a fallen tree or could, perhaps, have fruitfully multiplied in its branches is not sufficient under the regulation. Instead, as the commentary reflects, the regulation requires demonstrable effect (i.e., actual injury or death) on actual, individual members of the protected species. </s> By the dissent's reckoning, the regulation at issue here, in conjunction with 16 U.S.C. 1540(1), imposes liability for any habitat-modifying conduct that ultimately results in the death of a protected animal, "regardless of whether that result is intended or even foreseeable, and no matter how long the chain of causality between modification and injury." Post, at 3-4; see also post, at 10. Even if 1540(1) does create a strict liability regime (a question we need not decide at this juncture), I see no indication that Congress, in enacting that section, intended to dispense with ordinary principles of proximate causation. Strict liability means liability without regard to fault; it does not normally mean liability for </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 5] </s> every consequence, however remote, of one's conduct. See generally W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton, & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 559-560 (5th ed. 1984) (describing "practical necessity for the restriction of liability within some reasonable bounds" in the strict liability context). I would not lightly assume that Congress, in enacting a strict liability statute that is silent on the causation question, has dispensed with this well-entrenched principle. In the absence of congressional abrogation of traditional principles of causation, then, private parties should be held liable under 1540(1) only if their habitat-modifying actions proximately cause death or injury to protected animals. Cf. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807-808 (CA9 1992) (in enacting the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, which provides for strict liability for damages that are the result of discharges, Congress did not intend to abrogate common-law principles of proximate cause to reach "remote and derivative" consequences); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044, and n. 17 (CA2 1985) (noting that "[t]raditional tort law has often imposed strict liability while recognizing a causation defense," but that, in enacting CERCLA, Congress "specifically rejected including a causation requirement"). The regulation, of course, does not contradict the presumption or notion that ordinary principles of causation apply here. Indeed, by use of the word "actually," the regulation clearly rejects speculative or conjectural effects, and thus itself invokes principles of proximate causation. </s> Proximate causation is not a concept susceptible of precise definition. See Keeton, supra, at 280-281. It is easy enough, of course, to identify the extremes. The farmer whose fertilizer is lifted by tornado from tilled fields and deposited miles away in a wildlife refuge cannot, by any stretch of the term, be considered the proximate cause of death or injury to protected species </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 6] </s> occasioned thereby. At the same time, the landowner who drains a pond on his property, killing endangered fish in the process, would likely satisfy any formulation of the principle. We have recently said that proximate causation "normally eliminates the bizarre," Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 9), and have noted its "functionally equivalent" alternative characterizations in terms of foreseeability, see Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 475 (1877) ("natural and probable consequence"), and duty, see Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928). Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 13). Proximate causation depends to a great extent on considerations of the fairness of imposing liability for remote consequences. The task of determining whether proximate causation exists in the limitless fact patterns sure to arise is best left to lower courts. But I note, at the least, that proximate cause principles inject a foreseeability element into the statute, and hence, the regulation, that would appear to alleviate some of the problems noted by the dissent. See, e. g., post, at 8 (describing "a farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes oxygen and thereby [injures] protected fish"). </s> In my view, then, the "harm" regulation applies where significant habitat modification, by impairing essential behaviors, proximately (foreseeably) causes actual death or injury to identifiable animals that are protected under the Endangered Species Act. Pursuant to my interpretation, Palila II - under which the Court of Appeals held that a state agency committed a "taking" by permitting feral sheep to eat mamane-naio seedlings that, when full-grown, might have fed and sheltered endangered palila - was wrongly decided according to the regulation's own terms. Destruction of the seedlings did not proximately </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 7] </s> cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds; it merely prevented the regeneration of forest land not currently inhabited by actual birds. </s> This case, of course, comes to us as a facial challenge. We are charged with deciding whether the regulation on its face exceeds the agency's statutory mandate. I have identified at least one application of the regulation (Palila II) that is, in my view, inconsistent with the regulation's own limitations. That misapplication does not, however, call into question the validity of the regulation itself. One can doubtless imagine questionable applications of the regulation that test the limits of the agency's authority. However, it seems to me clear that the regulation does not on its terms exceed the agency's mandate, and that the regulation has innumerable valid habitat-related applications. Congress may, of course, see fit to revisit this issue. And nothing the Court says today prevents the agency itself from narrowing the scope of its regulation at a later date. </s> With this understanding, I join the Court's opinion. </s> [Footnote * JUSTICE SCALIA suggests that, if the word "direct" merits emphasis in this sentence, then the sentence should be read as an effort to negate principles of proximate causation. See post, at 22, n. 5. As this case itself demonstrates, however, the word "direct" is susceptible of many meanings. The Court of Appeals, for example, used "direct" to suggest an element of purposefulness. See Sweet </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 5] </s> Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463, 1465 (CADC 1994). So, occasionally, does the dissent. See post, at 7 (describing "affirmative acts . . . which are directed immediately and intentionally against a particular animal") (emphasis added). It is not hard to imagine conduct that, while "indirect" (i.e., nonpurposeful), proximately causes actual death or injury to individual protected animals, cf. post, at 20; indeed, principles of proximate cause routinely apply in the negligence and strict liability contexts. </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 1] </s> JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE THOMAS join, dissenting. </s> I think it unmistakably clear that the legislation at issue here (1) forbade the hunting and killing of endangered animals, and (2) provided federal lands and federal funds for the acquisition of private lands, to preserve the habitat of endangered animals. The Court's holding that the hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of financial ruin - not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land conscripted to national zoological use. I respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> The Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. (1988 ed. and Supp. V) (Act), provides that "it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take any [protected] species within the United States." 1538(a)(1)(B). The term "take" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." 1532(19) (emphasis </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 2] </s> added). The challenged regulation defines "harm" thus: </s> "`Harm' in the definition of `take' in the Act means an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 50 CFR 17.3 (1994). </s> In my view petitioners must lose - the regulation must fall - even under the test of Chevron U.S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), so I shall assume that the Court is correct to apply Chevron. See ante, at 15-16, and n. 18. </s> The regulation has three features which, for reasons I shall discuss at length below, do not comport with the statute. First, it interprets the statute to prohibit habitat modification that is no more than the cause-in-fact of death or injury to wildlife. Any "significant habitat modification" that in fact produces that result by "impairing essential behavioral patterns" is made unlawful, regardless of whether that result is intended or even foreseeable, and no matter how long the chain of causality between modification and injury. See, e.g., Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources (Palila II), 852 F.2d 1106, 1108-1109 (CA9 1988) (sheep grazing constituted "taking" of palila birds, since although sheep do not destroy full-grown mamane trees, they do destroy mamane seedlings, which will not grow to full-grown trees, on which the palila feeds and nests). See also Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking under the Endangered Species Act, 10 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 155, 190 (1995) (regulation requires only causation-in-fact). </s> Second, the regulation does not require an "act": the Secretary's officially stated position is that an omission will do. The previous version of the regulation made </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 3] </s> this explicit. See 40 Fed. Reg. 44412, 44416 (1975) ("`Harm' in the definition of `take' in the Act means an act or omission which actually kills or injures wildlife . . ."). When the regulation was modified in 1981 the phrase "or omission" was taken out, but only because (as the final publication of the rule advised) "the [Fish and Wildlife] Service feels that `act' is inclusive of either commissions or omissions which would be prohibited by section [1538(a)(1)(B)]." 46 Fed. Reg. 54748, 54750 (1981). In its brief here the Government agrees that the regulation covers omissions, see Brief for Petitioners 47 (although it argues that "[a]n `omission' constitutes an `act' . . . only if there is a legal duty to act"), ibid. </s> The third and most important unlawful feature of the regulation is that it encompasses injury inflicted, not only upon individual animals, but upon populations of the protected species. "Injury" in the regulation includes "significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding," 50 CFR 17.3 (1994) (emphasis added). Impairment of breeding does not "injure" living creatures; it prevents them from propagating, thus "injuring" a population of animals which would otherwise have maintained or increased its numbers. What the face of the regulation shows, the Secretary's official pronouncements confirm. The Final Redefinition of "Harm" accompanying publication of the regulation said that "harm" is not limited to "direct physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife species," 46 Fed. Reg. 54748 (1981), and refers to "injury to a population," id., at 54749 (emphasis added). See also Palila II, 852 F.2d, at 1108; Davison, supra, at 190, and n. 177, 195; M. Bean, The Evolution of National Wildlife Law 344 (1983). 1 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 4] </s> None of these three features of the regulation can be found in the statutory provisions supposed to authorize it. The term "harm" in 1532(19) has no legal force of its own. An indictment or civil complaint that charged the defendant with "harming" an animal protected under the Act would be dismissed as defective, for the only operative term in the statute is to "take." If "take" were not elsewhere defined in the Act, none could dispute what it means, for the term is as old as the law itself. To "take," when applied to wild animals, means to reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human control. See, e.g., 11 Oxford English Dictionary (1933) ("Take . . . To catch, capture (a wild beast, bird, fish, etc.)"); Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (2d ed. 1949) (take defined as "to catch or capture by trapping, snaring, etc., or as prey"); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523 (1896) ("[A]ll the animals which can be taken upon the earth, in the sea, or in the air, that is to say, wild animals, belong to those who take them") (quoting the Digest of Justinian); 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 411 (1766) ("Every man . . . has an equal right of pursuing and taking to his own use all such creatures as are ferae naturae"). This is just the sense in which "take" is used elsewhere in federal legislation and treaty. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. 703 (1988 ed., Supp. V) (no person may "pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, [or] attempt to take, capture, or kill" any migratory bird); Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, Art. I, 27 U.S. T. 3918, 3921, T. I. A. S. No. 8409 (defining "taking" as "hunting, killing and capturing"). And that meaning fits neatly with the rest of 1538(a)(1), which makes it unlawful not only to take protected species, but also to import or export them ( 1538(a)(1)(A)); to possess, sell, deliver, carry, transport, or ship any taken species ( 1538(a)(1)(D)); and to transport, sell, or offer to sell them in interstate or </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 5] </s> foreign commerce ( 1538(a)(1)(E), (F). The taking prohibition, in other words, is only part of the regulatory plan of 1538(a)(1), which covers all the stages of the process by which protected wildlife is reduced to man's dominion and made the object of profit. It is obvious that "take" in this sense - a term of art deeply embedded in the statutory and common law concerning wildlife - describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly and intentionally (not indirectly and by accident) to particular animals (not populations of animals). </s> The Act's definition of "take" does expand the word slightly (and not unusually), so as to make clear that it includes not just a completed taking, but the process of taking, and all of the acts that are customarily identified with or accompany that process ("to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect"); and so as to include attempts. 1532(19). The tempting fallacy - which the Court commits with abandon, see ante, at 9, n. 10 - is to assume that once defined, "take" loses any significance, and it is only the definition that matters. The Court treats the statute as though Congress had directly enacted the 1532(19) definition as a self-executing prohibition, and had not enacted 1538(a)(1)(B) at all. But 1538(a)(1)(B) is there, and if the terms contained in the definitional section are susceptible of two readings, one of which comports with the standard meaning of "take" as used in application to wildlife, and one of which does not, an agency regulation that adopts the latter reading is necessarily unreasonable, for it reads the defined term "take" - the only operative term - out of the statute altogether. 2 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 6] </s> That is what has occurred here. The verb "harm" has a range of meaning: "to cause injury" at its broadest, "to do hurt or damage" in a narrower and more direct sense. See, e.g., 1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) ("Harm, v.t. To hurt; to injure; to damage; to impair soundness of body, either animal or vegetable") (emphasis added); American College Dictionary 551 (1970) ("harm . . . n. injury; damage; hurt: to do him bodily harm"). In fact the more directed sense of "harm" is a somewhat more common and preferred usage; "harm has in it a little of the idea of specially focused hurt or injury, as if a personal injury has been anticipated and intended." J. Opdycke, Mark My Words: A Guide to Modern Usage and Expression 330 (1949). See also American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1981) ("Injure has the widest range. . . . Harm and hurt refer principally to what causes physical or mental distress to living things"). To define "harm" as an act or omission that, however remotely, "actually kills or injures" a population of wildlife through habitat modification, is to choose a meaning that makes nonsense of the word that "harm" defines - requiring us to accept that a farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that makes silt run into a nearby river which depletes oxygen and thereby "impairs [the] breeding" of protected fish, has "taken" or "attempted to take" the fish. It should take the strongest evidence to make us believe that Congress has defined a term in a manner repugnant to its ordinary and traditional sense. </s> Here the evidence shows the opposite. "Harm" is </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 7] </s> merely one of 10 prohibitory words in 1532(19), and the other 9 fit the ordinary meaning of "take" perfectly. To "harass, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect" are all affirmative acts (the provision itself describes them as "conduct," see 1532(19)) which are directed immediately and intentionally against a particular animal - not acts or omissions that indirectly and accidentally cause injury to a population of animals. The Court points out that several of the words ("harass," "pursue," "wound," and "kill") "refer to actions or effects that do not require direct applications of force." Ante, at 13 (emphasis added). That is true enough, but force is not the point. Even "taking" activities in the narrowest sense, activities traditionally engaged in by hunters and trappers, do not all consist of direct applications of force; pursuit and harassment are part of the business of "taking" the prey even before it has been touched. What the nine other words in 1532(19) have in common - and share with the narrower meaning of "harm" described above, but not with the Secretary's ruthless dilation of the word - is the sense of affirmative conduct intentionally directed against a particular animal or animals. </s> I am not the first to notice this fact, or to draw the conclusion that it compels. In 1981 the Solicitor of the Fish and Wildlife Service delivered a legal opinion on 1532(19) that is in complete agreement with my reading: </s> "The Act's definition of `take' contains a list of actions that illustrate the intended scope of the term . . . . With the possible exception of `harm,' these terms all represent forms of conduct that are directed against and likely to injure or kill individual wildlife. Under the principle of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, . . . the term `harm' should be interpreted to include only those actions that are directed against, and likely to injure or kill, </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 8] </s> individual wildlife." Memorandum of April 17, 1981, reprinted in 46 Fed. Reg. 29490, 29491 (emphasis in original). </s> I would call it noscitur a sociis, but the principle is much the same: the fact that "several items in a list share an attribute counsels in favor of interpreting the other items as possessing that attribute as well," Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 3). The Court contends that the canon cannot be applied to deprive a word of all its "independent meaning," ante, at 14. That proposition is questionable to begin with, especially as applied to long lawyers' listings such as this. If it were true, we ought to give the word "trap" in the definition its rare meaning of "to clothe" (whence "trappings") - since otherwise it adds nothing to the word "capture." See Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 120 (1990) (SCALIA, J., dissenting). In any event, the Court's contention that "harm" in the narrow sense adds nothing to the other words underestimates the ingenuity of our own species in a way that Congress did not. To feed an animal poison, to spray it with mace, to chop down the very tree in which it is nesting, or even to destroy its entire habitat in order to take it (as by draining a pond to get at a turtle), might neither wound nor kill, but would directly and intentionally harm. </s> The penalty provisions of the Act counsel this interpretation as well. Any person who "knowingly" violates 1538(a)(1)(B) is subject to criminal penalties under 1540(b)(1) and civil penalties under 1540(a)(1); moreover, under the latter section, any person "who otherwise violates" the taking prohibition (i.e., violates it unknowingly) may be assessed a civil penalty of $500 for each violation, with the stricture that "[e]ach such violation shall be a separate offense." This last provision should be clear warning that the regulation is in error, for when combined with the regulation it produces a result </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 9] </s> that no legislature could reasonably be thought to have intended: A large number of routine private activities - farming, for example, ranching, roadbuilding, construction and logging - are subjected to strict-liability penalties when they fortuitously injure protected wildlife, no matter how remote the chain of causation and no matter how difficult to foresee (or to disprove) the "injury" may be (e.g., an "impairment" of breeding). The Court says that "[the strict-liability provision] is potentially sweeping, but it would be so with or without the Secretary's `harm' regulation." Ante, at 8, n. 9. That is not correct. Without the regulation, the routine "habitat modifying" activities that people conduct to make a daily living would not carry exposure to strict penalties; only acts directed at animals, like those described by the other words in 1532(19), would risk liability. </s> The Court says that "[to] read a requirement of intent or purpose into the words used to define `take' . . . ignore[s] [ 1540's] express provision that a `knowing' action is enough to violate the Act." Ante, at 13. This presumably means that because the reading of 1532(19) advanced here ascribes an element of purposeful injury to the prohibited acts, it makes superfluous (or inexplicable) the more severe penalties provided for a "knowing" violation. That conclusion does not follow, for it is quite possible to take protected wildlife purposefully without doing so knowingly. A requirement that a violation be "knowing" means that the defendant must "know the facts that make his conduct illegal," Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 6). The hunter who shoots an elk in the mistaken belief that it is a mule deer has not knowingly violated 1538(a)(1)(B) - not because he does not know that elk are legally protected (that would be knowledge of the law, which is not a requirement, see ante, at 8, n. 9), but because he does not know what sort of animal he is shooting. The hunter has nonetheless committed a </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 10] </s> purposeful taking of protected wildlife, and would therefore be subject to the (lower) strict-liability penalties for the violation. </s> So far I have discussed only the immediate statutory text bearing on the regulation. But the definition of "take" in 1532(19) applies "[f]or the purposes of this chapter," that is, it governs the meaning of the word as used everywhere in the Act. Thus, the Secretary's interpretation of "harm" is wrong if it does not fit with the use of "take" throughout the Act. And it does not. In 1540(e)(4)(B), for example, Congress provided for the forfeiture of "[a]ll guns, traps, nets, and other equipment . . . used to aid the taking, possessing, selling, [etc.]" of protected animals. This listing plainly relates to "taking" in the ordinary sense. If environmental modification were part (and necessarily a major part) of taking, as the Secretary maintains, one would have expected the list to include "plows, bulldozers, and back-hoes." As another example, 1539(e)(1) exempts "the taking of any endangered species" by Alaskan Indians and Eskimos "if such taking is primarily for subsistence purposes"; and provides that "[n]on-edible byproducts of species taken pursuant to this section may be sold . . . when made into authentic native articles of handicrafts and clothing." Surely these provisions apply to taking only in the ordinary sense, and are meaningless as applied to species injured by environmental modification. The Act is full of like examples. See, e.g., 1538(a)(1)(D) (prohibiting possession, sale, and transport of "species taken in violation" of the Act). "[I]f the Act is to be interpreted as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme, one in which the operative words have a consistent meaning throughout," Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. ___, ___ (1995) (slip op., at 6), the regulation must fall. </s> The broader structure of the Act confirms the unreasonableness of the regulation. Section 1536 provides: </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 11] </s> "Each Federal agency shall . . . insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Secretary . . . to be critical." 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) (emphasis added). </s> The Act defines "critical habitat" as habitat that is "essential to the conservation of the species," 1532(5)(A)(i), (A)(ii), with "conservation" in turn defined as the use of methods necessary to bring listed species "to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." 1532(3). </s> These provisions have a double significance. Even if 1536(a)(2) and 1538(a)(1)(B) were totally independent prohibitions - the former applying only to federal agencies and their licensees, the latter only to private parties - Congress's explicit prohibition of habitat modification in the one section would bar the inference of an implicit prohibition of habitat modification in the other section. "[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another . . ., it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 7-8) (internal quotation marks omitted). And that presumption against implicit prohibition would be even stronger where the one section which uses the language carefully defines and limits its application. That is to say, it would be passing strange for Congress carefully to define "critical habitat" as used in 1536(a)(2), but leave it to the Secretary to evaluate, willy-nilly, impermissible "habitat modification" (under the guise of "harm") in 1538(a)(1)(B). </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 12] </s> In fact, however, 1536(a)(2) and 1538(a)(1)(B) do not operate in separate realms; federal agencies are subject to both, because the "person[s]" forbidden to take protected species under 1538 include agencies and departments of the Federal Government. See 1532(13). This means that the "harm" regulation also contradicts another principle of interpretation: that statutes should be read so far as possible to give independent effect to all their provisions. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. ___, ___ (slip op., at 6-8). By defining "harm" in the definition of "take" in 1538(a)(1)(B) to include significant habitat modification that injures populations of wildlife, the regulation makes the habitat-modification restriction in 1536(a)(2) almost wholly superfluous. As "critical habitat" is habitat "essential to the conservation of the species," adverse modification of "critical" habitat by a federal agency would also constitute habitat modification that injures a population of wildlife. </s> Petitioners try to salvage some independent scope for 1536(a)(2) by the following contortion: because the definition of critical habitat includes not only "the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species [that are] essential to the conservation of the species," 1532(5)(A)(i), but also "specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it is listed [as a protected species] . . . [that are] essential to the conservation of the species," 1532A(5)(ii), there may be some agency modifications of critical habitat which do not injure a population of wildlife. See Brief for Petitioners 41, and n. 27. This is dubious to begin with. A principal way to injure wildlife under the Secretary's own regulation is to "significantly impai[r] . . . breeding," 50 CFR 17.3 (1994). To prevent the natural increase of a species by adverse modification of habitat suitable for expansion assuredly impairs breeding. But even if true, the argument only narrows the scope of the superfluity, </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 13] </s> leaving as so many wasted words the 1532(a)(5)(i) definition of critical habitat to include currently occupied habitat essential to the species' conservation. If the Secretary's definition of "harm" under 1538(a)(1)(B) is to be upheld, we must believe that Congress enacted 1536(a)(2) solely because in its absence federal agencies would be able to modify habitat in currently unoccupied areas. It is more rational to believe that the Secretary's expansion of 1538(a)(1)(B) carves out the heart of one of the central provisions of the Act. </s> II </s> The Court makes four other arguments. First, "the broad purpose of the [Act] supports the Secretary's decision to extend protection against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the statute to avoid." Ante, at 10. I thought we had renounced the vice of "simplistically . . . assum[ing] that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law." Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) (emphasis in original). Deduction from the "broad purpose" of a statute begs the question if it is used to decide by what means (and hence to what length) Congress pursued that purpose; to get the right answer to that question there is no substitute for the hard job (or in this case, the quite simple one) of reading the whole text. "The Act must do everything necessary to achieve its broad purpose" is the slogan of the enthusiast, not the analytical tool of the arbiter. 3 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 14] </s> Second, the Court maintains that the legislative history of the 1973 Act supports the Secretary's definition. See ante, at 16-18. Even if legislative history were a legitimate and reliable tool of interpretation (which I shall assume in order to rebut the Court's claim); and even if it could appropriately be resorted to when the enacted text is as clear as this, but see Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 9-10); here it shows quite the opposite of what the Court says. I shall not pause to discuss the Court's reliance on such statements in the Committee Reports as "`[t]ake' is defined . . . in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can `take' or attempt to `take' any fish or wildlife.'" S. Rep. No. 93-307, p. 7 (1973) (quoted ante, at 17). This sort of empty flourish - to the effect that "this statute means what it means all the way" - counts for little even when enacted into the law itself. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. ___, ___ (1993) (slip op., at 13-14). </s> Much of the Court's discussion of legislative history is devoted to two items: first, the Senate floor manager's introduction of an amendment that added the word "harm" to the definition of "take," with the observation that (along with other amendments) it would "help to achieve the purposes of the bill"; second, the relevant Committee's removal from the definition of a provision stating that "take" includes "the destruction, modification or curtailment of [the] habitat or range" of fish and wildlife. See ante, at 17-18. The Court inflates the first and belittles the second, even though the second is on its face far more pertinent. But this elaborate inference from various pre-enactment actions and </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 15] </s> inactions is quite unnecessary, since we have direct evidence of what those who brought the legislation to the floor thought it meant - evidence as solid as any ever to be found in legislative history, but which the Court banishes to a footnote. See ante, at 18-19, n. 19. </s> Both the Senate and House floor managers of the bill explained it in terms which leave no doubt that the problem of habitat destruction on private lands was to be solved principally by the land acquisition program of 1534, while 1538 solved a different problem altogether - the problem of takings. Senator Tunney stated: </s> "Through [the] land acquisition provisions, we will be able to conserve habitats necessary to protect fish and wildlife from further destruction. </s> "Although most endangered species are threatened primarily by the destruction of their natural habitats, a significant portion of these animals are subject to predation by man for commercial, sport, consumption, or other purposes. The provisions of [the bill] would prohibit the commerce in or the importation, exportation, or taking of endangered species . . . ." 119 Cong. Rec. 25669 (1973) (emphasis added). </s> The House floor manager, Representative Sullivan, put the same thought in this way: </s> "[T]he principal threat to animals stems from destruction of their habitat. . . . [The bill] will meet this problem by providing funds for acquisition of critical habitat. . . . It will also enable the Department of Agriculture to cooperate with willing landowners who desire to assist in the protection of endangered species, but who are understandably unwilling to do so at excessive cost to themselves. Another hazard to endangered species arises from those who would capture or kill them for pleasure or profit. There is no way that Congress can make it </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 16] </s> less pleasurable for a person to take an animal, but we can certainly make it less profitable for them to do so." Id., at 30162 (emphasis added). </s> Habitat modification and takings, in other words, were viewed as different problems, addressed by different provisions of the Act. The Court really has no explanation for these statements. All it can say is that "[n]either statement even suggested that [the habitat acquisition funding provision in 1534] would be the Act's exclusive remedy for habitat modification by private landowners or that habitat modification by private landowners stood outside the ambit of [ 1538]." Ante, at 18-19, n. 19. That is to say, the statements are not as bad as they might have been. Little in life is. They are, however, quite bad enough to destroy the Court's legislative-history case, since they display the clear understanding (1) that habitat modification is separate from "taking," and (2) that habitat destruction on private lands is to be remedied by public acquisition, and not by making particular unlucky landowners incur "excessive cost to themselves." The Court points out triumphantly that they do not display the understanding (3) that the land acquisition program is "the [Act's] only response to habitat modification." Ibid. Of course not, since that is not so (all public lands are subject to habitat-modification restrictions); but (1) and (2) are quite enough to exclude the Court's interpretation. They identify the land acquisition program as the Act's only response to habitat modification by private landowners, and thus do not in the least "contradic[t]," ibid., the fact that 1536 prohibits habitat modification by federal agencies. </s> Third, the Court seeks support from a provision which was added to the Act in 1982, the year after the Secretary promulgated the current regulation. The provision states: </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 17] </s> "[T]he Secretary may permit, under such terms and conditions as he shall prescribe - </s> . . . . . </s> "any taking otherwise prohibited by section 1538(a)(1)(B) . . . if such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful activity." 16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(1)(B). </s> This provision does not, of course, implicate our doctrine that reenactment of a statutory provision ratifies an extant judicial or administrative interpretation, for neither the taking prohibition in 1538(a)(1)(B) nor the definition in 1532(19) was reenacted. See Central Bank of Denver, N. A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. ___, ___ (1994) (slip op., at 21). The Court claims, however, that the provision "strongly suggests that Congress understood [ 1538(a)(1)(B)] to prohibit indirect as well as deliberate takings." Ante, at 12. That would be a valid inference if habitat modification were the only substantial "otherwise lawful activity" that might incidentally and nonpurposefully cause a prohibited "taking." Of course it is not. This provision applies to the many otherwise lawful takings that incidentally take a protected species - as when fishing for unprotected salmon also takes an endangered species of salmon, see Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative v. Brown, 38 F.3d 1058, 1067 (CA9 1994). Congress has referred to such "incidental takings" in other statutes as well - for example, a statute referring to "the incidental taking of . . . sea turtles in the course of . . . harvesting [shrimp]" and to the "rate of incidental taking of sea turtles by United States vessels in the course of such harvesting," 103 Stat. 1038 609(b)(2), note following 16 U.S.C. 1537 (1988 ed., Supp. V); and a statute referring to "the incidental taking of marine mammals in the course of commercial fishing operations," 108 Stat. 546, 118(a). The Court shows </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 18] </s> that it misunderstands the question when it says that "[n]o one could seriously request an `incidental' take permit to avert . . . liability for direct, deliberate action against a member of an endangered or threatened species." Ante, at 12-13 (emphasis added). That is not an incidental take at all. 4 </s> This is enough to show, in my view, that the 1982 permit provision does not support the regulation. I must acknowledge that the Senate Committee Report on this provision, and the House Conference Committee Report, clearly contemplate that it will enable the Secretary to permit environmental modification. See S. Rep. No. 97-418, p. 10 (1982); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 97-835, pp. 30-32 (1982). But the text of the amendment cannot possibly bear that asserted meaning, when placed within the context of an Act that must be interpreted (as we have seen) not to prohibit private environmental modification. The neutral language of the amendment cannot possibly alter that interpretation, nor can its legislative history be summoned forth to contradict, rather than clarify, what is in its totality an unambiguous statutory text. See Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. ___ (1994). There is little fear, of course, that giving no effect to the relevant portions of the Committee Reports will frustrate the real-life expectations of a majority of the Members of Congress. If they read and relied on such tedious detail on such an obscure point (it was not, after all, presented as a revision of the statute's prohibitory scope, but as a discretionary-waiver provision) the Republic would be in grave peril. </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 19] </s> Fourth and lastly, the Court seeks to avoid the evident shortcomings of the regulation on the ground that the respondents are challenging it on its face rather than as applied. See ante, at 11; see also ante, at 1 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). The Court seems to say that even if the regulation dispenses with the foreseeability of harm that it acknowledges the statute to require, that does not matter because this is a facial challenge: so long as habitat modification that would foreseeably cause harm is prohibited by the statute, the regulation must be sustained. Presumably it would apply the same reasoning to all the other defects of the regulation: the regulation's failure to require injury to particular animals survives the present challenge, because at least some environmental modifications kill particular animals. This evisceration of the facial challenge is unprecedented. It is one thing to say that a facial challenge to a regulation that omits statutory element x must be rejected if there is any set of facts on which the statute does not require x. It is something quite different - and unlike any doctrine of "facial challenge" I have ever encountered - to say that the challenge must be rejected if the regulation could be applied to a state of facts in which element x happens to be present. On this analysis, the only regulation susceptible to facial attack is one that not only is invalid in all its applications, but also does not sweep up any person who could have been held liable under a proper application of the statute. That is not the law. Suppose a statute that prohibits "premeditated killing of a human being," and an implementing regulation that prohibits "killing a human being." A facial challenge to the regulation would not be rejected on the ground that, after all, it could be applied to a killing that happened to be premeditated. It could not be applied to such a killing, because it does not require the factfinder to find premeditation, as the statute requires. In other words, </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 20] </s> to simplify its task the Court today confuses lawful application of the challenged regulation with lawful application of a different regulation, i.e., one requiring the various elements of liability that this regulation omits. </s> III </s> In response to the points made in this dissent, the Court's opinion stresses two points, neither of which is supported by the regulation, and so cannot validly be used to uphold it. First, the Court and the concurrence suggest that the regulation should be read to contain a requirement of proximate causation or foreseeability, principally because the statute does - and "[n]othing in the regulation purports to weaken those requirements [of the statute]." See ante, at 8, n. 9; 11-12, n. 13; see also ante, at 4-6 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). I quite agree that the statute contains such a limitation, because the verbs of purpose in 1538(a)(1)(B) denote action directed at animals. But the Court has rejected that reading. The critical premise on which it has upheld the regulation is that, despite the weight of the other words in 1538(a)(1)(B), "the statutory term `harm' encompasses indirect as well as direct injuries," ante, at 9. See also ante, at 9-10, n. 11 (describing "the sense of indirect causation that `harm' adds to the statute"); ante, at 14 (stating that the Secretary permissibly interprets "`harm'" to include "indirectly injuring endangered animals"). Consequently, unless there is some strange category of causation that is indirect and yet also proximate, the Court has already rejected its own basis for finding a proximate-cause limitation in the regulation. In fact "proximate" causation simply means "direct" causation. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1103 (5th ed. 1979) (defining "[p]roximate" as "Immediate; nearest; direct") (emphasis added); Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language 1995 (2d ed. 1949) </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 21] </s> ("proximate cause. A cause which directly, or with no mediate agency, produces an effect") (emphasis added). The only other reason given for finding a proximate-cause limitation in the regulation is that "by use of the word `actually,' the regulation clearly rejects speculative or conjectural effects, and thus itself invokes principles of proximate causation." Ante, at 5 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring); see also ante, at 11-12, n. 13 (majority opinion). Non sequitur, of course. That the injury must be "actual" as opposed to "potential" simply says nothing at all about the length or foreseeability of the causal chain between the habitat modification and the "actual" injury. It is thus true and irrelevant that "the Secretary did not need to include `actually' to connote `but for' causation," ante, at 11-12, n. 13; "actually" defines the requisite injury, not the requisite causality. </s> The regulation says (it is worth repeating) that "harm" means (1) an act which (2) actually kills or injures wildlife. If that does not dispense with a proximate-cause requirement, I do not know what language would. And changing the regulation by judicial invention, even to achieve compliance with the statute, is not permissible. Perhaps the agency itself would prefer to achieve compliance in some other fashion. We defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes precisely in order that agencies, rather than courts, may exercise policymaking discretion in the interstices of statutes. See Chevron, 467 U.S., at 843 -845. Just as courts may not exercise an agency's power to adjudicate, and so may not affirm an agency order on discretionary grounds the agency has not advanced, see SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), so also this Court may not exercise the Secretary's power to regulate, and so may not uphold a regulation by adding to it even the most reasonable of elements it does not contain. </s> The second point the Court stresses in its response seems to me a belated mending of its hold. It apparently </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 22] </s> concedes that the statute requires injury to particular animals rather than merely to populations of animals. See ante, at 11-12, n. 13; id., at 7, 9 (referring to killing or injuring "members of [listed] species" (emphasis added)). The Court then rejects my contention that the regulation ignores this requirement, since, it says, "every term in the regulation's definition of `harm' is subservient to the phrase `an act which actually kills or injures wildlife.'" Id., at 11-12, n. 13. As I have pointed out, see supra, at 3, this reading is incompatible with the regulation's specification of impairment of "breeding" as one of the modes of "kill[ing] or injur[ing] wildlife." 5 </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 23] </s> But since the Court is reading the regulation and the statute incorrectly in other respects, it may as well introduce this novelty as well - law a la carte. As I understand the regulation that the Court has created and held consistent with the statute that it has also created, habitat modification can constitute a "taking," but only if it results in the killing or harming of individual animals, and only if that consequence is the direct result of the modification. This means that the destruction of privately owned habitat that is essential, not for the feeding or nesting, but for the breeding, of butterflies, would not violate the Act, since it would not harm or kill any living butterfly. I, too, think it would not violate the Act - not for the utterly unsupported reason that habitat modifications fall outside the regulation if they happen not to kill or injure a living animal, but for the textual reason that only action directed at living animals constitutes a "take." </s> * * * </s> The Endangered Species Act is a carefully considered piece of legislation that forbids all persons to hunt or harm endangered animals, but places upon the public at large, rather than upon fortuitously accountable individual landowners, the cost of preserving the habitat of endangered species. There is neither textual support </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 24] </s> for, nor even evidence of congressional consideration of, the radically different disposition contained in the regulation that the Court sustains. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The Court and JUSTICE O'CONNOR deny that the regulation has the first or the third of these features. I respond to their arguments in Part III, infra. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court suggests halfheartedly that "take" cannot refer to the taking of particular animals, because 1538(a)(1)(B) prohibits "tak[ing] any [endangered] species." Ante, at 9, n. 10. The suggestion is halfhearted because that reading obviously contradicts the statutory intent. </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 6] </s> It would mean no violation in the intentional shooting of a single bald eagle - or, for that matter, the intentional shooting of 1,000 bald eagles out of the extant 1,001. The phrasing of 1538(a)(1)(B), as the Court recognizes elsewhere, see, e.g., ante, at 7, is shorthand for "take any member of [an endangered] species." </s> [Footnote 3 This portion of the Court's opinion, see ante, at 11, n. 12, discusses and quotes a footnote in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 -185, n. 30 (1978), in which we described the then-current version of the Secretary's regulation, and said that the habitat modification undertaken by the federal agency in the case would have violated the regulation. Even if we had said that the Secretary's regulation was authorized by 1538, that would have been utter dictum, for the only provision at issue was 1536. See 437 U.S., at 193 . But in </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 14] </s> fact we simply opined on the effect of the regulation while assuming its validity, just as courts always do with provisions of law whose validity is not at issue. </s> [Footnote 4 The statutory requirement of a "conservation plan" is as consistent with this construction as with the Court's. See ante, at 12, and n. 14. The commercial fisherman who is in danger of incidentally sweeping up protected fish in his nets can quite reasonably be required to "minimize and mitigate" the "impact" of his activity. 16 U.S.C. 1539(a)(2)(A). </s> [Footnote 5 JUSTICE O'CONNOR supposes that an "impairment of breeding" intrinsically injures an animal because "[t]o make it impossible for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most essential physical functions and to render that animal, and its genetic material, biologically obsolete." Ante, at 2 (concurring opinion). This imaginative construction does achieve the result of extending "impairment of breeding" to individual animals; but only at the expense of also expanding "injury" to include elements beyond physical harm to individual animals. For surely the only harm to the individual animal from impairment of that "essential function" is not the failure of issue (which harms only the issue), but the psychic harm of perceiving that it will leave this world with no issue (assuming, of course, that the animal in question, perhaps an endangered species of slug, is capable of such painful sentiments). If it includes that psychic harm, then why not the psychic harm of not being able to frolic about - so that the draining of a pond used for an endangered animal's recreation, but in no way essential to its survival, would be prohibited by the Act? That the concurrence is driven to such a dubious redoubt is an argument for, not against, the proposition that "injury" in the regulation includes injury to populations of animals. Even more so with the concurrence's alternative explanation: that "impairment of breeding" refers to nothing more than concrete injuries inflicted by the habitat modification on the animal who does the breeding, such as "physical complications [suffered] during gestation," ante, at 3. Quite obviously, if "impairment of breeding" meant such physical harm to an individual animal, it would not have had to be mentioned. </s> The concurrence entangles itself in a dilemma while attempting to explain the Secretary's commentary to the harm regulation, which stated </s> [ BABBITT v. SWEET HOME CHAP., COMS. FOR ORE., ___ U.S. ___ (1995) </s> , 23] </s> that "harm" is not limited to "direct physical injury to an individual member of the wildlife species," 46 Fed. Reg. 54748 (1981). The concurrence denies that this means that the regulation does not require injury to particular animals, because "one could just as easily emphasize the word `direct' in this sentence as the word `individual.'" Ante, at 3. One could; but if the concurrence does, it thereby refutes its separate attempt to exclude indirect causation from the regulation's coverage, see ante, at 4-6. The regulation, after emerging from the concurrence's analysis, has acquired both a proximate-cause limitation and a particular-animals limitation - precisely the one meaning that the Secretary's quoted declaration will not allow, whichever part of it is emphasized. Page I

United States Supreme Court KIMMELMAN v. MORRISON(1986) No. 84-1661 Argued: March 5, 1986Decided: June 26, 1986 </s> At respondent's bench trial in a New Jersey court resulting in his conviction of rape, a police officer testified that a few hours after the rape she accompanied the victim to respondent's apartment where the rape had occurred; that he was not there but another tenant let them into respondent's apartment; and that the officer seized a sheet from respondent's bed. At such point in the testimony, respondent's counsel sought to suppress introduction of the sheet and any testimony about it on the ground that the officer had seized it without a search warrant in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but the judge ruled that counsel's suppression motion was late under the applicable New Jersey Court Rule. The judge rejected counsel's attempt to justify his omission on the grounds that he had not heard of the seizure until the day before, when the trial began; that it was the State's obligation to inform him of its case, even though he made no pretrial request for discovery, which would have revealed the search and seizure; and that he had not expected to go to trial because he had been told that the victim did not wish to proceed. Respondent retained new counsel after the trial and, on appeal, alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at the trial and error in the trial court's refusal to entertain the suppression motion during the trial. The appellate court rejected the claims and affirmed respondent's conviction. Thereafter respondent unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief from the trial judge on the same grounds. He then obtained habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court, which held, inter alia, that he had established his ineffective-assistance claim. The Court of Appeals concluded that Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 - which held that federal courts should withhold habeas review where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim - should not be extended to bar federal habeas consideration of Sixth Amendment claims based on counsel's alleged failure competently to litigate Fourth Amendment claims. Reviewing the District Court's determination of ineffective assistance under the test established by the intervening decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 - which held that, to establish ineffective assistance, the defendant must prove both incompetence of counsel and prejudice - the Court of Appeals determined that [477 U.S. 365, 366] respondent's trial counsel had been "grossly ineffective," but vacated and remanded for the District Court to consider whether, under the standards set forth in Strickland, respondent had been prejudiced by his attorney's incompetence. </s> Held: </s> 1. The restriction on federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims announced in Stone v. Powell, supra, does not extend to Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims which are founded primarily on incompetent representation with respect to a Fourth Amendment issue. Federal courts may grant habeas relief in appropriate cases, regardless of the nature of the underlying attorney error. Pp. 373-383. </s> (a) Respondent's Sixth Amendment claim is not in fact a Fourth Amendment claim directly controlled by Stone, as petitioners assert. The two claims are distinct, both in nature and in the requisite elements of proof. Pp. 374-375. </s> (b) Nor are the rationale and purposes of Stone fully applicable to a Sixth Amendment claim that is based principally on defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently. Stone held that the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations provided by the exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right, but instead is predominately a judicially created structural remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect; the rule has minimal utility in the context of federal collateral proceedings. Here, respondent sought direct federal habeas protection of his fundamental personal right to effective assistance of counsel, and collateral review is frequently the only means through which an accused can effectuate that right. Moreover, there is no merit to the contention that a defendant should not be allowed to vindicate through federal habeas review his right to effective assistance of counsel where counsel's primary error is failure to make a timely request for the exclusion of illegally seized evidence that is often the most probative information bearing on the defendant's guilt or innocence. The right to counsel is not conditioned upon actual innocence. Pp. 375-380. </s> (c) Petitioners' prediction that every Fourth Amendment claim that fails in state court will be fully litigated in federal habeas proceedings in Sixth Amendment guise, and that, as a result, many state-court judgments will be disturbed, is incorrect because it ignores the rigorous standard which Strickland v. Washington, supra, erects for ineffective-assistance claims. Although a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is necessary to the success of a Sixth Amendment claim like respondent's, a good Fourth Amendment claim alone will not earn a prisoner federal habeas relief. Only those habeas petitioners who can prove under Strickland that they have been denied a fair trial [477 U.S. 365, 367] by the gross incompetence of their attorneys are entitled to the writ and to retrial without the challenged evidence. Pp. 380-382. </s> 2. Respondent satisfied the incompetence prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland, and the Court of Appeals did not err in remanding the case to the District Court for a determination of prejudice under Strickland's standard. Pp. 383-391. </s> (a) While the failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel, the record clearly reveals that respondent's attorney failed to file a timely suppression motion, not due to trial strategy considerations, but because he was unaware of the search, and of the State's intention to introduce the bedsheet into evidence, due to his failure to conduct any pretrial discovery. Such failure here was not, as required under Strickland, reasonable and in accord with prevailing professional norms. Pp. 383-387. </s> (b) With respect to the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, there is no merit to petitioners' contention that a statement made by the trial judge at a post-trial hearing on respondent's motion for bail pending appeal constituted a finding that even if the bedsheet had been excluded, he would have found respondent guilty, and that such finding was a subsidiary finding of historical fact that respondent was not prejudiced by his attorney's incompetence, entitled under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) to a presumption of correctness in federal habeas proceedings. The record here is not sufficiently complete to enable this Court to apply Strickland's prejudice prong directly to the facts of the case, and the remand to the District Court for redetermination of prejudice was proper. Pp. 387-391. </s> 752 F.2d 918, affirmed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which BURGER, C. J., and REHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 391. </s> Allan J. Nodes argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Irwin I. Kimmelman, Attorney General of New Jersey, and Catherine A. Foddai, Mildred Vallerini Spiller, and Arlene R. Weiss, Deputy Attorneys General. </s> William E. Staehle, by appointment of the Court 474 U.S. 917 , argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. * </s> [Footnote * Leon Friedman, Charles S. Sims, and Burt Neuborne filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance. [477 U.S. 365, 368] </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question we address in this case is whether the restrictions on federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims announced in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), should be extended to Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel where the principal allegation and manifestation of inadequate representation is counsel's failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. </s> I </s> Respondent, Neil Morrison, was convicted by the State of New Jersey of raping a 15-year-old-girl. The case presented by the State at respondent's bench trial consisted of scientific evidence and of the testimony of the victim, her mother, and the police officers who handled the victim's complaint. </s> The victim testified that Morrison, who was her employer, had taken her to his apartment, where he forced her onto his bed and raped her. Upon returning home, the girl related the incident to her mother, who, after first summoning Morrison and asking for his account of events, phoned the police. The police came to the victim's home and transported her to the hospital, where she was examined and tested for indicia of a sexual assault. </s> The State also called as a witness Detective Dolores Most, one of the officers who investigated the rape complaint. Most testified that she accompanied the victim to Morrison's apartment building a few hours after the rape. Morrison was not at home, but another tenant in the building let them into respondent's one-room apartment. While there, Most stated, she seized a sheet from respondent's bed. </s> At this point in the testimony respondent's counsel objected to the introduction of the sheet and to any testimony concerning it on the ground that Most had seized it without a search warrant. New Jersey Court Rules, however, require [477 U.S. 365, 369] that suppression motions be made within 30 days of indictment unless the time is enlarged by the trial court for good cause. N. J. Ct. Rule 3:5-7. Because the 30-day deadline had long since expired, the trial judge ruled that counsel's motion was late. Defense counsel explained to the court that he had not heard of the seizure until the day before, when trial began, and that his client could not have known of it because the police had not left a receipt for the sheet. The prosecutor responded that defense counsel, who had been on the case from the beginning, had never asked for any discovery. Had trial counsel done so, the prosecutor observed, police reports would have revealed the search and seizure. The prosecutor stated further that one month before trial he had sent defense counsel a copy of the laboratory report concerning the tests conducted on stains and hairs found on the sheets. </s> Asked repeatedly by the trial court why he had not conducted any discovery, respondent's attorney asserted that it was the State's obligation to inform him of its case against his client, even though he made no request for discovery. The judge rejected this assertion and stated: "I hate to say it, but I have to say it, that you were remiss. I think this evidence was there and available to you for examination and inquiry." 2 Tr. 114. Defense counsel then attempted to justify his omission on the ground that he had not expected to go to trial because he had been told that the victim did not wish to proceed. The judge rejected this justification also, reminding counsel that once an indictment is handed down, the decision to go through with the complaint no longer belongs to the victim, and that it requires a court order to dismiss an indictment. Id., at 115. While the judge agreed that defense counsel had "br[ought] about a very valid basis . . . for suppression . . . if the motion had been brought and timely made," he refused "to entertain a motion to suppress in the middle of the trial." Id., at 110. [477 U.S. 365, 370] </s> The State then called a number of expert witnesses who had conducted laboratory tests on the stains and hairs found on the sheet, on a stain found on the victim's underpants, and on blood and hair samples provided by the victim and respondent. This testimony established that the bedsheet had been stained with semen from a man with type O blood, that the stains on the victim's underwear similarly exhibited semen from a man with type O blood, that the defendant had type O blood, that vaginal tests performed on the girl at the hospital demonstrated the presence of sperm, and that hairs recovered from the sheet were morphologically similar to head hair of both Morrison and the victim. Defense counsel aggressively cross-examined all of the expert witnesses. </s> The defense called four friends and acquaintances of the defendant and the defendant himself in an attempt to establish a different version of the facts. The defense theory was that the girl and her mother fabricated the rape in order to punish respondent for being delinquent with the girl's wages. According to Morrison, the girl and her mother had not intended to go through with the prosecution, but ultimately they found it impossible to extricate themselves from their lies. Morrison admitted that he had taken the girl to his apartment, but denied having had intercourse with her. He claimed that his sexual activity with other women accounted for the stains on his sheet, and that a hair from the girl's head was on his sheet because she had seated herself on his bed. Defense counsel also implied that the girl's underwear and vaginal secretions tested positive for semen and sperm because she probably had recently engaged in relations with the father of her baby. Counsel did not, however, call the girl's boyfriend to testify or have him tested for blood type, an omission upon which the prosecution commented in closing argument. </s> The trial judge, in rendering his verdict, noted: "As in most cases nothing is cut and dry. There are discrepancies in the State's case, there are discrepancies in the defense as [477 U.S. 365, 371] it's presented." 6 Tr. 86. After pointing out some of the more troublesome inconsistencies in the testimony of several of the witnesses, the judge declared his conclusion that the State had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. </s> After trial, respondent dismissed his attorney and retained new counsel for his appeal. On appeal, respondent alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and error in the trial court's refusal to entertain the suppression motion during trial. The appeals court announced summarily that it found no merit in either claim and affirmed respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court of New Jersey subsequently denied respondent's petition for discretionary review. Respondent then sought postconviction relief in the New Jersey Superior Court, from the same judge who had tried his case. There Morrison presented the identical issues he had raised on direct appeal. The court denied relief on the ground that it was bound by the appellate court's resolution of those issues against respondent. </s> Respondent then sought a writ of habeas corpus in Federal District Court, again raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and erroneous admission of illegally seized evidence. The District Court ruled that because respondent did not allege that the State had denied him an opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim fully and fairly, direct consideration of this claim on federal habeas review was barred by Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 579 F. Supp. 796 (NJ 1984). The District Court did find respondent's ineffective-assistance claim meritorious. </s> Because the District Court rendered its decision before this Court announced the standards to be applied to claims of constitutionally deficient representation in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the District Court relied on Third Circuit precedent for guidance, particularly United States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659 (1982), and Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (1970). Like Strickland, these cases required a two-pronged inquiry into counsel's competence and [477 U.S. 365, 372] into the prejudicial effect of counsel's unprofessional errors. With respect to trial counsel's competence, the District Court used as its standard the "`customary skill and knowledge which normally prevails at the time and place.'" 579 F. Supp., at 802 (quoting Moore, supra, at 736). Noting that this standard "`entails a careful inquiry into the particular circumstances surrounding each case,'" 579 F. Supp., at 802 (quoting Baynes, supra, at 665), the court concluded: </s> "[C]ounsel failed to conduct any meaningful pretrial discovery, and thus was totally unaware that certain damaging evidence might have been the appropriate subject for a suppression motion. Counsel seems to have acted on the misapprehension that the State was obligated to turn over anything that the defense might be interested in examining. Little else was offered by way of excuse by [Morrison's] lawyer in the face of repeated criticism by the state trial judge, except for counsel's rather remarkable attempt to justify his conduct by noting that up until trial he had been told that the victim `didn't want to go ahead with this case.' . . . Based on the unmitigated negligence of petitioner's trial counsel in failing to conduct any discovery, combined with the likelihood of success of a suppression motion had it been timely made, we find that petitioner was deprived of effective representation." 579 F. Supp., at 802-803. </s> The District Court then determined that, measured by the harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard prescribed by Baynes, supra, respondent had been prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness and issued a conditional writ of habeas corpus ordering Morrison's release unless New Jersey should retry him. </s> Although the District Court did not address the relevance of Stone, supra, to respondent's Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the Court of Appeals did. Relying on both the language of Stone and the different natures of Fourth and Sixth Amendment claims, the Court of [477 U.S. 365, 373] Appeals concluded that Stone should not be extended to bar federal habeas consideration of Sixth Amendment claims based on counsel's alleged failure competently to litigate Fourth Amendment claims. 752 F.2d 918 (1985). Because Strickland had recently been decided by this Court, the Court of Appeals reviewed the District Court's determination of ineffective assistance under Strickland's test. The Court of Appeals determined that respondent's trial counsel had been "grossly ineffective," 752 F.2d, at 922, but vacated and remanded for the District Court to consider whether, under the standards set forth in Strickland, supra, respondent had been prejudiced by his attorney's incompetence. </s> Petitioners, the Attorney General of New Jersey and the Superintendent of Rahway State Prison, petitioned for certiorari. We granted their petition, 474 U.S. 815 (1985), and now affirm. </s> II </s> Petitioners urge that the Sixth Amendment veil be lifted from respondent's habeas petition to reveal what petitioners argue it really is - an attempt to litigate his defaulted Fourth Amendment claim. They argue that because respondent's claim is in fact, if not in form, a Fourth Amendment one, Stone directly controls here. Alternatively, petitioners maintain that even if Morrison's Sixth Amendment claim may legitimately be considered distinct from his defaulted Fourth Amendment claim, the rationale and purposes of Stone, are fully applicable to ineffective-assistance claims where the principal allegation of inadequate representation is counsel's failure to file a timely motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Stone, they argue, will be emasculated unless we extend its bar against federal habeas review to this sort of Sixth Amendment claim. Finally, petitioners maintain that consideration of defaulted Fourth Amendment claims in Sixth Amendment federal collateral proceedings would violate principles of comity and [477 U.S. 365, 374] federalism and would seriously interfere with the State's interest in the finality of its criminal convictions. 1 </s> A </s> We do not share petitioners' perception of the identity between respondent's Fourth and Sixth Amendment claims. While defense counsel's failure to make a timely suppression motion is the primary manifestation of incompetence and source of prejudice advanced by respondent, the two claims are nonetheless distinct, both in nature and in the requisite elements of proof. </s> Although it is frequently invoked in criminal trials, the Fourth Amendment is not a trial right; the protection it affords against governmental intrusion into one's home and affairs pertains to all citizens. The gravamen of a Fourth Amendment claim is that the complainant's legitimate expectation of privacy has been violated by an illegal search or seizure. See, e. g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In order to prevail, the complainant need prove only that the search or seizure was illegal and that it violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in the item or place at issue. See, e. g., Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980). </s> The right to counsel is a fundamental right of criminal defendants; it assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of our adversary process. E. g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). The essence of an ineffective-assistance claim is that counsel's unprofessional errors so upset the adversarial balance between defense and prosecution that the trial was rendered unfair and the verdict rendered suspect. See, e. g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 686 ; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , [477 U.S. 365, 375] 655-657 (1984). In order to prevail, the defendant must show both that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, Strickland, 466 U.S., at 688 , and that there exists a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id., at 694. Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Thus, while respondent's defaulted Fourth Amendment claim is one element of proof of his Sixth Amendment claim, the two claims have separate identities and reflect different constitutional values. </s> B </s> We also disagree with petitioners' contention that the reasoning and purposes of Stone are fully applicable to a Sixth Amendment claim which is based principally on defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently. </s> At issue in Stone was the proper scope of federal collateral protection of criminal defendants' right to have evidence, seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, excluded at trial in state court. In determining that federal courts should withhold habeas review where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Court found it crucial that the remedy for Fourth Amendment violations provided by the exclusionary rule "is not a personal constitutional right." 428 U.S., at 486 ; see also id., at 495, n. 37. The Court expressed the understanding that the rule "is not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure," id., at 486; instead, the Court explained, the exclusionary rule is predominately a "`judicially created'" structural remedy [477 U.S. 365, 376] "`designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.'" Ibid. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)). </s> The Court further noted that "[a]s in the case of any remedial device, `the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served,'" 428 U.S., at 486 -487 (quoting Calandra, supra, at 348), and that the rule has not been extended to situations such as grand jury proceedings, 428 U.S., at 486 -487, (citing Calandra, supra), and impeachment of a defendant who testifies broadly in his own behalf, 428 U.S., at 488 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)), where the rule's costs would outweigh its utility as a deterrent to police misconduct. Applying this "pragmatic analysis," 428 U.S., at 488 , to the question whether prisoners who have been afforded a full and fair opportunity in state court to invoke the exclusionary rule may raise their Fourth Amendment claims on federal habeas review, the Court determined that they may not. While accepting that the exclusionary rule's deterrent effect outweighs its costs when enforced at trial and on direct appeal, the Court found any "additional contribution . . . of the consideration of search-and-seizure claims . . . on collateral review," id., at 493, to be too small in relation to the costs to justify federal habeas review. Id., at 492-495. </s> In Stone the Court also made clear that its "decision . . . [was] not concerned with the scope of the habeas corpus statute as authority for litigating constitutional claims generally." Id., at 495, n. 37 (emphasis in original). Rather, the Court simply "reaffirm[ed] that the exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy rather than a personal constitutional right . . . and . . . emphasiz[ed] the minimal utility of the rule" in the context of federal collateral proceedings. Ibid. See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560 (1979) ("In Stone v. Powell . . . the Court carefully limited the reach of its opinion . . . to cases involving the judicially created exclusionary [477 U.S. 365, 377] rule, which had minimal utility when applied in a habeas corpus proceeding"); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979) (declining to extend Stone to claims by state prisoners that, in violation of the constitutional standard set forth in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the evidence in support of their convictions was not sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). </s> In contrast to the habeas petitioner in Stone, who sought merely to avail himself of the exclusionary rule, Morrison seeks direct federal habeas protection of his personal right to effective assistance of counsel. </s> The right of an accused to counsel is beyond question a fundamental right. See, e. g., Gideon, 372 U.S., at 344 ("The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours"). Without counsel the right to a fair trial itself would be of little consequence, see, e. g., Cronic, supra, at 653; United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 -308 (1973); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 -32 (1972); Gideon, supra, at 343-345; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 -463 (1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 -69 (1932), for it is through counsel that the accused secures his other rights. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 168 -170 (1985); Cronic, supra, at 653; see also, Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956) ("Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have"). The constitutional guarantee of counsel, however, "cannot be satisfied by mere formal appointment," Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). "An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." Strickland, supra, at 685. In other words, the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 395 -396 (1985); Strickland, supra, at [477 U.S. 365, 378] 686; Cronic, 466 U.S., at 654 ; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 , n. 14 (1970). 2 </s> Because collateral review will frequently be the only means through which an accused can effectuate the right to counsel, restricting the litigation of some Sixth Amendment claims to trial and direct review would seriously interfere with an accused's right to effective representation. A layman will ordinarily be unable to recognize counsel's errors and to evaluate counsel's professional performance, cf. Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 69; consequently a criminal defendant will rarely know that he has not been represented competently until after trial or appeal, usually when he consults another lawyer about his case. Indeed, an accused will often not realize that he has a meritorious ineffectiveness claim until he begins collateral review proceedings, particularly if he retained trial counsel on direct appeal. Were we to extend Stone and hold that criminal defendants may not raise ineffective-assistance claims that are based primarily on incompetent handling of Fourth Amendment issues on federal habeas, we would deny most defendants whose trial attorneys performed incompetently in this regard the opportunity to vindicate their right to effective trial counsel. We would deny all defendants whose appellate counsel performed inadequately with respect to Fourth Amendment issues the opportunity to protect their right to effective appellate counsel. See Evitts, supra. Thus, we cannot say, as the Court was able to say in Stone, that restriction of federal habeas review would not severely interfere with the protection of the constitutional right asserted by the habeas petitioner. 3 </s> [477 U.S. 365, 379] </s> Furthermore, while the Court may be free, under its analysis in Stone, to refuse for reasons of prudence and comity 4 to burden the State with the costs of the exclusionary rule in contexts where the Court believes the price of the rule to exceed its utility, the Constitution constrains our ability to allocate as we see fit the costs of ineffective assistance. The Sixth Amendment mandates that the State bear the risk of constitutionally deficient assistance of counsel. See Murray v. Carrier, post, at 488 (where a "procedural default is the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Sixth Amendment itself requires that responsibility for the default be imputed to the State"); Cuyler, supra, at 344 ("The right to counsel prevents the States from conducting trials at which persons who face incarceration must defend themselves without adequate legal assistance"); see also Evitts, supra, at 396 ("The constitutional mandate is addressed to the action of the State"). </s> We also reject the suggestion that criminal defendants should not be allowed to vindicate through federal habeas review their right to effective assistance of counsel where counsel's primary error is failure to make a timely request for the exclusion of illegally seized evidence - evidence which is "typically reliable and often the most probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Stone, 428 U.S., at 490 . While we have recognized that the "`premise of our adversary system of criminal justice . . . that partisan advocacy . . . will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go [477 U.S. 365, 380] free,'" Evitts, 469 U.S., at 394 , quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975), underlies and gives meaning to the right to effective assistance, Cronic, supra, at 655-656, we have never intimated that the right to counsel is conditioned upon actual innocence. The constitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty alike. Consequently, we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt. 5 Furthermore, petitioners do not suggest that an ineffective-assistance claim asserted on direct review would fail for want of actual prejudice whenever counsel's primary error is failure to make a meritorious objection to the admission of reliable evidence the exclusion of which might have affected the outcome of the proceeding. We decline to hold that the scope of the right to effective assistance of counsel is altered in this manner simply because the right is asserted on federal habeas review rather than on direct review. </s> C </s> Stone's restriction on federal habeas review, petitioners warn, will be stripped of all practical effect unless we extend it to Sixth Amendment claims based principally on defense counsel's incompetent handling of Fourth Amendment issues. Petitioners predict that every Fourth Amendment claim that fails or is defaulted in state court will be fully litigated in federal habeas proceedings in Sixth Amendment guise and that, as a result, many state-court judgments will be disturbed. [477 U.S. 365, 381] </s> They seem to believe that a prisoner need only allege ineffective assistance, and if he has an underlying, meritorious Fourth Amendment claim, the writ will issue and the State will be obligated to retry him without the challenged evidence. Because it ignores the rigorous standard which Strickland erected for ineffective-assistance claims, petitioners' forecast is simply incorrect. </s> In order to establish ineffective representation, the defendant must prove both incompetence and prejudice. 6 </s> 466 U.S., at 688 . There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the "wide range of professional assistance," id., at 689; the defendant bears the burden of proving that counsel's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy. Id., at 688-689. The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances, and the standard of review is highly deferential. Id., at 689. The defendant shows that he was prejudiced by his attorney's ineffectiveness by demonstrating that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id., at 694. See also, id., at 695 (Where a defendant challenges his conviction, he must show that there exists "a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt"). And, in determining the existence vel non of prejudice, the court "must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." Ibid. [477 U.S. 365, 382] </s> As is obvious, Strickland's standard, although by no means insurmountable, is highly demanding. More importantly, it differs significantly from the elements of proof applicable to a straightforward Fourth Amendment claim. Although a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is necessary to the success of a Sixth Amendment claim like respondent's, a good Fourth Amendment claim alone will not earn a prisoner federal habeas relief. Only those habeas petitioners who can prove under Strickland that they have been denied a fair trial by the gross incompetence of their attorneys will be granted the writ and will be entitled to retrial without the challenged evidence. 7 </s> D </s> In summary, we reject petitioners' argument that Stone's restriction on federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment [477 U.S. 365, 383] claims should be extended to Sixth Amendment ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims which are founded primarily on incompetent representation with respect to a Fourth Amendment issue. Where a State obtains a criminal conviction in a trial in which the accused is deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, the "State . . . unconstitutionally deprives the defendant of his liberty." Cuyler, 446 U.S., at 343 . The defendant is thus "in custody in violation of the Constitution," 28 U.S.C. 2254(a), and federal courts have habeas jurisdiction over his claim. We hold that federal courts may grant habeas relief in appropriate cases, regardless of the nature of the underlying attorney error. </s> III </s> Petitioners also argue that respondent has not satisfied either the performance or the prejudice prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland. We address each component of that test in turn. </s> A </s> With respect to the performance component of the Strickland test, petitioners contend that Morrison has not overcome the strong presumption of attorney competence established by Strickland. While acknowledging that this Court has said that a single, serious error may support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Brief for Petitioners 33, n. 16 (citing Cronic, 466 U.S., at 657 , n. 20), 8 petitioners argue that the mere failure to file a timely suppression motion alone does not constitute a per se Sixth Amendment violation. They maintain that the record "amply reflects that trial counsel crafted a sound trial strategy" and that, "[v]iewed in its entirety, counsel's pretrial investigation, [477 U.S. 365, 384] preparation and trial performance were professionally reasonable." Brief for Petitioners 33 (footnotes and citations omitted). While we agree with petitioners' view that the failure to file a suppression motion does not constitute per se ineffective assistance of counsel, we disagree with petitioners' assessment of counsel's performance. </s> In Strickland we explained that "access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the `ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution' to which they are entitled." 466 U.S., at 685 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 , 276 (1942)). "Counsel . . . has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process." 466 U.S., at 688 . Counsel's competence, however, is presumed, id., at 689, and the defendant must rebut this presumption by proving that his attorney's representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and that the challenged action was not sound strategy. Id., at 688-689. The reasonableness of counsel's performance is to be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the alleged error and in light of all the circumstances. Id., at 689. In making the competency determination, the court "should keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case." Id., at 690. Because that testing process generally will not function properly unless defense counsel has done some investigation into the prosecution's case and into various defense strategies, we noted that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Id., at 691. But, we observed, "a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Ibid. [477 U.S. 365, 385] </s> The trial record in this case clearly reveals that Morrison's attorney failed to file a timely suppression motion, not due to strategic considerations, but because, until the first day of trial, he was unaware of the search and of the State's intention to introduce the bedsheet into evidence. Counsel was unapprised of the search and seizure because he had conducted no pretrial discovery. Counsel's failure to request discovery, again, was not based on "strategy," but on counsel's mistaken beliefs that the State was obliged to take the initiative and turn over all of its inculpatory evidence to the defense and that the victim's preferences would determine whether the State proceeded to trial after an indictment had been returned. </s> Viewing counsel's failure to conduct any discovery from his perspective at the time he decided to forgo that stage of pretrial preparation and applying a "heavy measure of deference," ibid., to his judgment, we find counsel's decision unreasonable, that is, contrary to prevailing professional norms. The justifications Morrison's attorney offered for his omission betray a startling ignorance of the law - or a weak attempt to shift blame for inadequate preparation. "[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Ibid. Respondent's lawyer neither investigated, nor made a reasonable decision not to investigate, the State's case through discovery. Such a complete lack of pretrial preparation puts at risk both the defendant's right to an "`ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution,'" id., at 685 (quoting Adams, supra, at 275), and the reliability of the adversarial testing process. See 466 U.S., at 688 . </s> Petitioners attempt to minimize the seriousness of counsel's errors by asserting that the State's case turned far more on the credibility of witnesses than on the bedsheet and related testimony. Consequently, they urge, defense counsel's vigorous cross-examination, attempts to discredit witnesses, and effort to establish a different version of the facts [477 U.S. 365, 386] lift counsel's performance back into the realm of professional acceptability. </s> Strickland requires a reviewing court to "determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id., at 690. It will generally be appropriate for a reviewing court to assess counsel's overall performance throughout the case in order to determine whether the "identified acts or omissions" overcome the presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. Since "[t]here are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case," id., at 689, unless consideration is given to counsel's overall performance, before and at trial, it will be "all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable." Ibid. </s> In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Id., at 691. Under these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the soundness of the conclusion both courts reached - that counsel's performance fell below the level of reasonable professional assistance in the respects alleged. </s> Moreover, petitioners' analysis is flawed, however, by their use of hindsight to evaluate the relative importance of various components of the State's case. See, id., at 689 ("A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, [477 U.S. 365, 387] and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time"). At the time Morrison's lawyer decided not to request any discovery, he did not - and, because he did not ask, could not - know what the State's case would be. While the relative importance of witness credibility vis-a-vis the bedsheet and related expert testimony is pertinent to the determination whether respondent was prejudiced by his attorney's incompetence, it sheds no light on the reasonableness of counsel's decision not to request any discovery. We therefore agree with the District Court and the Court of Appeals that the assistance rendered respondent by his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient. </s> B </s> 1 </s> Petitioners also argue that respondent suffered no prejudice from his attorney's failure to make a timely suppression motion and that the Third Circuit erred in remanding the case to the District Court for a determination of prejudice under Strickland's standard. The essence of petitioners' argument is that, at a post-trial hearing on respondent's motion for bail pending appeal, the same judge who presided at respondent's trial made a finding of historical fact, which is entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). If that finding were presumed correct, petitioners contend that it would be dispositive of the prejudice issue - that is, no court could find that there exists "a reasonable probability that, absent [Morrison's attorney's] errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt." Strickland, 466 U.S., at 695 . Thus, petitioners conclude, no ground for a remand exists. </s> In New Jersey, bail after conviction is appropriate where a substantial issue for review exists and where the defendant poses no threat to the community. N. J. Ct. Rule 2:9-4. At Morrison's bail hearing, the public defender representing him informed the judge that because he had not read the trial [477 U.S. 365, 388] transcript and was not doing the appeal, he was not entirely sure on what grounds Morrison would appeal. Tr. of Motion for Bail Pending Appeal 7. He did, however, argue that the trial court had committed two legal errors that could present substantial issues for appellate review. Specifically, counsel contended that the court erred in refusing to entertain the midtrial motion to suppress the sheet and that respondent may have been prejudiced by the court's awareness of another pending indictment. </s> With respect to the court's decision to admit the sheet, Morrison's attorney presented what is most accurately characterized as an abuse-of-discretion argument. He suggested that because trial counsel had been surprised by the introduction of the sheet, the court should have waived the pretrial filing requirement for suppression motions and should have permitted the midtrial motion. Id., at 5. The judge responded to this argument by noting: </s> "The matter of the sheet and the tests that resulted therefrom obviously were important, they were not the most important phases of this case by any means. </s> "Obviously, the most important phases of the case were direct testimony from the victim herself as well as from testimony of witnesses, police, medical examinations, and testimony from the defense, testimony by the defendant. The sheet was just one small phase in this whole case. I do not think that it is such a substantial issue for review by the Appellate Division which would cause or be likely to cause a reversal." Id., at 11. </s> Petitioners direct our attention to the court's statement that "[t]he sheet was just one small phase in this whole case." Ibid. While acknowledging this Court's explanation in Strickland that both the performance and the prejudice components of the ineffectiveness test are mixed questions of fact and law and that therefore a state court's ultimate conclusions regarding competence and prejudice are not findings of fact binding on the federal court to the extent stated by [477 U.S. 365, 389] 2254(d), see Strickland, 466 U.S., at 698 , petitioners maintain that this statement constitutes a subsidiary finding of historical fact, entitled to 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness. See ibid. Further, petitioners construe the judge's remark to be a finding that even if the sheet had been excluded, he would have found respondent guilty. So construed and accorded the presumption of correctness, this finding of fact, they argue, prevents a federal court from determining that Morrison was prejudiced by his attorney's incompetence. </s> We do not agree with petitioners that the statement made by the judge at respondent's bail hearing constitutes a finding of fact which is subject to 2254(d) deference in this case. Section 2254(d)(1) provides that "a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction . . . shall be presumed to be correct" unless "the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hearing." 9 The issue respondent places before the federal habeas courts is substantially different from the issue he presented to the judge in the bail hearing. The question before the federal courts is whether a reasonable probability exists that the trial judge would have had a reasonable doubt concerning respondent's guilt if the sheet and related testimony had been excluded. By contrast, the state court was called upon simply to decide whether the argument that the court had abused its discretion in refusing to entertain respondent's suppression motion midtrial raised a substantial issue for appeal on which Morrison was likely to succeed. </s> Not only was the judge not asked to answer the question presently before the federal courts, he did not answer it. He stated only that while the sheet was an important aspect of [477 U.S. 365, 390] the case, it was not the most important aspect. We do not find his remark tantamount to a declaration that he would have found respondent guilty even if the sheet and related expert testimony had not been admitted. If, after saying what he did, the judge had been asked whether he would have had a reasonable doubt concerning Morrison's guilt had the sheet and related testimony been excluded, he could well have answered affirmatively without contradicting his earlier comment. Although the sheet may not have been as important as other components of the State's case, it may have tipped the balance. We simply do not know. </s> Because it cannot fairly be said that the "merits of the factual dispute," 2254(d)(1), regarding the existence of prejudice were resolved in the bail hearing, we conclude that the statements of the judge regarding the relative importance of the sheet are not findings of fact subject to 2254(d) deference. 10 </s> 2 </s> Respondent also criticizes the Court of Appeals' decision to remand for redetermination of prejudice. He argues that the record is sufficiently complete to enable this Court to apply Strickland's prejudice prong directly to the facts of his case and urges that we do so. </s> We decline respondent's invitation. While the existing record proved adequate for our application of Strickland's competency standard, it is incomplete with respect to prejudice. No evidentiary hearing has ever been held on the merits of respondent's Fourth Amendment claim. Because the State has not conceded the illegality of the search and seizure, Tr. of Oral Arg. 11-12, it is entitled to an opportunity to establish that Officer Most's search came within one of the exceptions we have recognized to the Fourth Amendment's [477 U.S. 365, 391] prohibition against warrantless searches. Even if not, respondent may be unable to show that absent the evidence concerning the bedsheet there is a reasonable probability that the trial judge would have had a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. If respondent could not make this showing, a matter on which we express no view, there would of course be no need to hold an evidentiary hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Petitioners also argue that because respondent's Fourth Amendment claim was procedurally defaulted by his trial lawyer's failure to file a timely suppression motion, any Sixth Amendment claim based on this failure is similarly defaulted. We disagree. Respondent's Sixth Amendment claim is distinct from his Fourth Amendment claim and has never been defaulted. </s> [Footnote 2 As we held only last Term, the right to effective assistance of counsel is not confined to trial, but extends also to the first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). </s> [Footnote 3 Moreover, the restriction on federal habeas relief established by Stone v. Powell was predicated on the existence at trial and on direct review of "an opportunity for full and fair litigation" of the constitutional claim [477 U.S. 365, 379] advanced by the habeas petitioner. 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). In general, no comparable, meaningful opportunity exists for the full and fair litigation of a habeas petitioner's ineffective-assistance claims at trial and on direct review. </s> [Footnote 4 The Court made clear in Stone that it rested its holding on prudential, rather than jurisdictional, grounds. Id., at 495, n. 37 ("Our decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over . . . [a Fourth Amendment] claim, but only that the application of the [exclusionary] rule is limited"). </s> [Footnote 5 As we observed in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the layman defendant "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him." Id., at 69 (emphasis added). We noted: "If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 6 We refer here only to cases in which the defendant alleges "actual" ineffective assistance rather than the few contexts where ineffective assistance is "presumed," such as where counsel is either totally absent or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding, see, e. g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 , n. 25 (1984); Strickland, 466 U.S., at 692 , and where counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest. Ibid.; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 -350 (1980). </s> [Footnote 7 We have no reason to believe that defense attorneys will "sandbag" - that is, consciously default or poorly litigate their clients' Fourth Amendment claims in state court in the hope of gaining more favorable review of these claims in Sixth Amendment federal habeas proceedings. First, it is virtually inconceivable that an attorney would deliberately invite the judgment that his performance was constitutionally deficient in order to win federal collateral review for his client. Second, counsel's client has little, if anything, to gain and everything to lose through such a strategy. It should be remembered that the only incompetently litigated and defaulted Fourth Amendment claims that could lead to a reversal of the defendant's conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds are potentially outcome-determinative claims. No reasonable lawyer would forgo competent litigation of meritorious, possibly decisive claims on the remote chance that his deliberate dereliction might ultimately result in federal habeas review. Furthermore, when an attorney chooses to default a Fourth Amendment claim, he also loses the opportunity to obtain direct review under the harmless-error standard of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), which requires the State to prove that the defendant was not prejudiced by the error. By defaulting, counsel shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, absent his attorney's incompetence, he would not have been convicted. Cf. Comment, Effective Assistance of Counsel: The Sixth Amendment and the Fair Trial Guarantee, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1380, 1428, n. 223 (1983). </s> [Footnote 8 See also Smith v. Murray, post, at 535; Murray v. Carrier, post, at 488. </s> [Footnote 9 Subsections (2)-(8) of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) establish other exceptions to the general rule that determinations made by a state court after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue are entitled to a presumption of correctness. </s> [Footnote 10 We do not mean to suggest that the comment made by the judge at the bail hearing has absolutely no relevance to the prejudice inquiry; we hold only that his remark is not a finding of fact subject to 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in the judgment. </s> I agree that Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), does not bar consideration of respondent's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on federal habeas corpus. That conclusion flows logically from Stone and from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The more difficult question is whether the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence can ever constitute "prejudice" under Strickland. There is a strong argument that it cannot. But that argument has neither been raised by the parties nor discussed by the various courts involved in this case. Consequently, the proper course is to reject petitioners' Stone v. Powell argument and go no further. Though the Court appears to take this course, it employs unnecessarily broad language that may suggest that we have considered and resolved the broader Strickland issue in this case. E. g., ante, at 379-380. I write separately because that suggestion is mistaken, and also to express my view of the relationship between Stone and the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. </s> I </s> Respondent's ineffective-assistance claim is uncomplicated. Respondent argues that his trial counsel incompetently failed to conduct any pretrial discovery. Had counsel conducted discovery, he would have known that the police had seized a [477 U.S. 365, 392] bedsheet from respondent's apartment without a warrant. The bedsheet contained hair samples matching hair of both respondent and the rape victim. The sheet also contained semen stains matching those found in the victim's underpants. The State introduced the bedsheet and accompanying expert analysis at trial, and the trial judge denied respondent's belated motion to suppress on the ground that it was untimely. Respondent contends that the sheet would have been excluded on Fourth Amendment grounds had the suppression motion been timely filed. Thus, respondent argues, counsel's failure to conduct discovery led to the admission of evidence that was both damning and excludable. </s> Petitioners, the Attorney General of New Jersey and the Superintendent of Rahway State Prison, argue that because this claim depends on a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the claim cannot be heard by a federal court on habeas corpus. Petitioners' argument rests on Stone v. Powell, supra, in which we held that Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus as long as the State provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate those claims in state court. </s> The Court properly rejects petitioners' argument. Stone's holding derives from two propositions, neither of which applies to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, we reasoned in Stone that the exclusionary rule does not exist to remedy any wrong committed against the defendant, but rather to deter violations of the Fourth Amendment by law enforcement personnel. 428 U.S., at 486 -489. Second, we concluded that collateral review of Fourth Amendment claims would add little to the exclusionary rule's deterrent value, but would entail significant costs to federal-state relations and particularly to the public interest in convicting and punishing the guilty. Id., at 493-495. </s> Ineffective-assistance claims stand on a different footing. As Strickland makes clear, the right to effective assistance of counsel is personal to the defendant, and is explicitly tied to [477 U.S. 365, 393] the defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial - a trial in which the determination of guilt or innocence is "just" and "reliable." Strickland, supra, at 685-686, 696. See also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) ("[T]he right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial"). A criminal defendant who obtains relief under Strickland does not receive a windfall; on the contrary, reversal of such a defendant's conviction is necessary to ensure a fair and just result. Strickland, supra, at 685-687. For this reason, Strickland explicitly stated that "[t]he principles governing ineffectiveness claims should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new trial." 466 U.S., at 697 . Strickland thus leaves no room for an argument that Stone indirectly bars some ineffective-assistance claims in federal habeas corpus proceedings. </s> Nor is it possible to conclude that, since the only claimed prejudice is the admission of the illegally seized bedsheet, respondent's claim actually is a Fourth Amendment claim barred by Stone directly. As Strickland teaches, the right to effective assistance of counsel ensures that defendants have a fair opportunity to contest the charges against them. A defendant has a valid ineffective-assistance claim whenever he has been denied that opportunity, regardless of the law on which counsel's error is based. It follows that respondent's claim must be judged as a Sixth Amendment claim, according to the standards set forth in Strickland, and not as a Fourth Amendment claim governed by Stone. 1 </s> [477 U.S. 365, 394] </s> II </s> Applying Strickland, respondent must show both that his counsel fell below basic standards of competence and that he was sufficiently prejudiced by the resulting errors. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 687 . Petitioners contend that trial counsel's errors were not egregious enough to satisfy Strickland's performance prong. In addition, they argue that the trial judge's comments at a bail hearing constitute a factual finding that those errors were not prejudicial. The Court correctly finds that both arguments are mistaken. This holding disposes of the only claims petitioners make with respect to the legal standards for ineffective-assistance claims. </s> There is a far more serious argument that petitioners do not make, and that no court in this case has addressed. Respondent's sole claim of prejudice stems from the admission of evidence that is concededly reliable although arguably inadmissible under Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and its progeny. The parties and the courts below have assumed that if the evidence in question was in fact inadmissible, and if there is a "reasonable probability" that its use at trial affected the verdict, Strickland's prejudice prong is satisfied. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 695 . In my view, that assumption is not justified. In Strickland we emphasized that ineffective-assistance claims were designed to protect defendants against fundamental unfairness. "The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results." Id., at 685. See also id., at 686 ("The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a [477 U.S. 365, 395] just result"). Accordingly, we cautioned that the "reasonable probability" test should not be applied too mechanically: </s> "A number of practical considerations are important for the application of the standards we have outlined. Most important, in adjudicating a claim of actual ineffectiveness of counsel, a court should keep in mind that the principles we have stated do not establish mechanical rules. Although those principles should guide the process of decision, the ultimate focus of inquiry must be on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding whose result is being challenged. In every case the court should be concerned with whether, despite the strong presumption of reliability, the result of the particular proceeding is unreliable because of a breakdown in the adversarial process that our system counts on to produce just results." Id., at 696 (emphasis added). </s> This reasoning strongly suggests that only errors that call into question the basic justice of the defendant's conviction suffice to establish prejudice under Strickland. The question, in sum, must be whether the particular harm suffered by the defendant due to counsel's incompetence rendered the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. See id., at 687 (prejudice "requires [a] showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable"). 2 </s> [477 U.S. 365, 396] </s> As many of our cases indicate, the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence does not lead to an unjust or fundamentally unfair verdict. We have held repeatedly that such evidence ordinarily is excluded only for deterrence reasons that have no relation to the fairness of the defendant's trial. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 486 -488; United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Indeed, it has long been clear that exclusion of illegally seized but wholly reliable evidence renders verdicts less fair and just, because it "deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the guilty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 490 . See also id., at 540 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (noting that often "the only consequence" of exclusion "is that unimpeachable and probative evidence is kept from the trier of fact and the truth-finding function of proceedings is substantially impaired or a trial totally aborted"). Thus, the harm suffered by respondent in this case is not the denial of a fair and reliable adjudication of his guilt, but rather the absence of a windfall. 3 Because the fundamental fairness of the trial is not affected, our reasoning in Strickland strongly suggests that such harm does not amount to prejudicial ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. </s> Common sense reinforces this conclusion. As we emphasized only last Term, and as the Court recognizes again today, ante, at 379-380, "`[t]he very premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free.'" Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 394 (1985) (emphasis added), quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). The right [477 U.S. 365, 397] to effective assistance of counsel flows logically from this premise. But it would shake that right loose from its constitutional moorings to hold that the Sixth Amendment protects criminal defendants against errors that merely deny those defendants a windfall. In this case, for example, the bedsheet may have provided critical evidence of respondent's guilt, evidence whose relevance and reliability cannot seriously be questioned. The admission of the bedsheet thus harmed respondent only in the sense that it helped the factfinder make a well-informed determination of respondent's guilt or innocence. In my view, nothing in Strickland compels us to conclude that such an "injury" establishes prejudice for purposes of respondent's ineffective assistance claim. </s> I nevertheless do not vote to reverse the Court of Appeals, because neither the parties nor the courts below have considered the question I raise here. Nor do the questions presented in the petition for certiorari encompass this aspect of Strickland's application. 4 I raise the issue only because the Court's rhetoric might mistakenly be read to answer a question that has not been asked. E. g., ante, at 380 ("[W]e decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt"). Courts and litigants should not be deceived by such pronouncements. Notwithstanding its broad language, the Court explicitly recognizes that the general applicability of Strickland in this context has not been discussed by the parties, ante, at 380, and limits itself to holding that the right to effective assistance of counsel is equally enforceable on direct [477 U.S. 365, 398] appeal and on federal collateral review. Ante, at 382-383. Thus, the question whether Strickland prejudice encompasses the admission of reliable but illegally obtained evidence remains an open one that can be considered on remand in this case. </s> Because I agree that Stone v. Powell does not govern this case, I concur in the judgment. I leave the application of Strickland's prejudice prong to claims such as this one to another day. </s> [Footnote 1 For the same reason, petitioners' argument that respondent's claim is barred by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), lacks merit. The gist of this argument is that respondent failed timely to raise his Fourth Amendment claim on direct appeal, and thereby forfeited the right to rely on any Fourth Amendment violation on collateral review. The argument ignores the fact that respondent's claim is not that evidence was admitted at trial in violation of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule, but rather that his counsel's failure to so argue, together with counsel's failure [477 U.S. 365, 394] to conduct pretrial discovery, deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The two claims are distinct. </s> [Footnote 2 Cf. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, we held that prejudice may be presumed in some kinds of extreme circumstances, as when counsel is given no time to prepare a defense. See id., at 660-661 (discussing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)). In such circumstances, the defendant is in effect deprived of counsel altogether, and thereby deprived of any meaningful opportunity to subject the State's evidence to adversarial testing. Prejudice is presumed for the same reason as it is presumed under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 , n. 8 (1967) (recognizing that denial of counsel at trial could never be harmless error). </s> [Footnote 3 See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. Pa. L. Rev. 378, 389 (1964) ("Granted that so many criminals must go free as will deter the constables from blundering, pursuance of this policy of liberation beyond the confines of necessity inflicts gratuitous harm on the public interest"), quoted in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S., at 487 , n. 24. </s> [Footnote 4 The questions presented ask (1) "[w]hether Stone v. Powell bars a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on habeas corpus" where the basis for the claim is a failure to make a Fourth Amendment suppression motion at trial; (2) whether such a claim is barred by Wainwright v. Sykes where the Fourth Amendment issue was not preserved at trial; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals gave sufficient weight to certain supposed factual findings of the state trial judge. Pet. for Cert. i. </s> [477 U.S. 365, 399]

United States Supreme Court KENTUCKY DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS v. THOMPSON(1989) No. 87-1815 Argued: January 18, 1989Decided: May 15, 1989 </s> Following the District Court's issuance of a consent decree settling a class action brought by Kentucky penal inmates under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Commonwealth promulgated "Corrections Policies and Procedures," which, inter alia, contain a nonexhaustive list of prison visitors who "may be excluded," including those who "would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution's security or interfere with [its] orderly operation." The Kentucky State Reformatory at La Grange subsequently issued its own "Procedures Memorandum," which, in addition to including language virtually identical to that of the state regulations, sets forth procedures under which a visitor "may" be refused admittance and have his or her visitation privileges suspended by reformatory officials. After the reformatory refused to admit several visitors and denied them future visits without providing them a hearing, the representatives of an inmate class filed a motion with the District Court, claiming, among other things, that the suspensions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court agreed and directed that minimal due process procedures be developed. The Court of Appeals affirmed and remanded, concluding, inter alia, that the language of the relevant prison policies created a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. </s> Held: </s> The Kentucky regulations do not give state inmates a liberty interest in receiving visitors that is entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause. Pp. 459-465. </s> (a) In order to create a protected liberty interest in the prison context, state regulations must use "explicitly mandatory language" in connection with the establishment of "specific substantive predicates" to limit official discretion, and thereby require that a particular outcome be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 . Pp. 459-463. </s> (b) Although the regulations at issue do provide certain "substantive predicates" to guide prison decisionmakers in determining whether to allow visitation, the regulations lack the requisite relevant mandatory language, since visitors "may," but need not, be excluded whether they fall within or without one of the listed categories of excludable visitors. [490 U.S. 454, 455] Thus, the regulations are not worded in such a way that an inmate could reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the listed conditions or reasonably expect to enforce the regulations against prison officials should that visit not be allowed. Pp. 463-465. </s> 833 F.2d 614, reversed. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. KENNEDY, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 465. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 465. </s> Barbara Willett Jones argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs was Leslie Patterson Vose. </s> Joseph S. Elder II argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. * </s> [Footnote * A brief of amici curiae urging reversal was filed for the State of Tennessee et al. by W. J. Michael Cody, Attorney General of Tennessee, and Michael W. Catalano, Deputy Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Don Siegelman of Alabama, Grace Berg Schaible of Alaska, Robert K. Corbin of Arizona, John Steven Clark of Arkansas, Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut, Robert Butterworth of Florida, Jim Jones of Idaho, Neil F. Hartigan of Illinois, Linley E. Pearson of Indiana, Thomas J. Miller of Iowa, Robert T. Stephan of Kansas, William J. Guste, Jr., of Louisiana, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., of Maryland, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Hubert H. Humphrey III of Minnesota, Michael C. Moore of Mississippi, William L. Webster of Missouri, Brian McKay of Nevada, W. Cary Edwards of New Jersey, Hal Stratton of New Mexico, Lacy H. Thornburg of North Carolina, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., of Ohio, Robert Henry of Oklahoma, LeRoy S. Zimmerman of Pennsylvania, Travis Medlock of South Carolina, Robert A. Tellinghuisen of South Dakota, Jim Mattox of Texas, David L. Wilkinson of Utah, Kenneth O. Eikenberry of Washington, Don J. Hanaway of Wisconsin, and Joseph B. Meyer of Wyoming. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In this case we consider whether Kentucky prison regulations give state inmates, for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment, a liberty interest in receiving certain visitors. [490 U.S. 454, 456] </s> I </s> In September 1976, Kentucky inmates brought a federal class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 challenging conditions of confinement in the Kentucky State Penitentiary at Eddyville. Other cases, one of them relating to the Kentucky State Reformatory at La Grange, were consolidated with the one concerning the penitentiary. The litigation was settled by a consent decree dated 28 May 1980, and supplemented 22 July 1980, containing provisions governing a broad range of prison conditions. App. 2-44, 45-55. See Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp. 21, 27-50 (WD Ky. 1981); see also Kendrick v. Bland, 740 F.2d 432 (CA6 1984). Of sole relevance here, the consent decree provides: "The Bureau of Corrections encourages and agrees to maintain visitation at least at the current level, with minimal restrictions," and to "continue [its] open visiting policy." See 541 F. Supp., at 37. </s> The Commonwealth in 1981 issued "Corrections Policies and Procedures" governing general prison visitation, including a nonexhaustive list of visitors who may be excluded. 1 Four years later, the reformatory issued its own more detailed [490 U.S. 454, 457] "Procedures Memorandum" on the subject of "Visiting Regulations." The memorandum begins with a Statement of Policy and Purpose: "Although administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow visits, it is the policy of the Kentucky State Reformatory to respect the right of inmates to have visits in the spirit of the Court decisions and the Consent Decree, while insuring the safety and security of the institution." App. 106. The memorandum then goes on to state that a visitor may be denied entry if his or her presence would constitute a "clear and probable danger to the safety and security of the institution or would interfere with the orderly operation of the institution." § K(1)(a), App. 133. A nonexhaustive list of nine specific reasons for excluding visitors is set forth. 2 The memorandum also states that the [490 U.S. 454, 458] decision whether to exclude a visitor rests with the duty officer, who is to be consulted by any staff member who "feels a visitor should not be allowed admittance." § K(3), App. 134. </s> This particular litigation was prompted in large part by two incidents when applicants were denied the opportunity to visit an inmate at the reformatory. The mother of one inmate was denied visitation for six months because she brought to the reformatory a person who had been barred for smuggling contraband. Another inmate's mother and woman friend were denied visitation for a limited time when the inmate was found with contraband after a visit by the two women. In both instances the visitation privileges were suspended without a hearing. The inmates were not prevented from receiving other visitors. </s> The representatives of the Kendrick-inmate class filed a motion with the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky (the court which had issued the consent decree), claiming that the suspension of visitation privileges without a hearing in these two instances violated the decree and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [490 U.S. 454, 459] By a memorandum dated June 26, 1986, the District Court found that the prison policies did not violate the decree, App. 147, but concluded that the language of the decree was "mandatory in character," id., at 148, and that, under the standards articulated by this Court in Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), respondents "possess a liberty interest in open visitation." The District Court directed petitioners to develop "minimal due process procedures," including "an informal, nonadversary review in which a prisoner receives notice of and reasons for" any decision to exclude a visitor, as well as an opportunity to respond. App. 148. A formal order was issued accordingly. Id., at 149. </s> The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed and remanded the case. 833 F.2d 614 (1987). Relying not only on the consent decree but also on the regulations and stated policies, the court held that the relevant language was sufficiently mandatory to create a liberty interest. The Court of Appeals found that the relevant prison policies "placed `substantive limitations on official discretion.'" Id., at 618-619, quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983). The court also found that the language of the consent decree, that "[d]efendants shall continue their open visiting policy" (emphasis supplied by Court of Appeals), see Kendrick v. Bland, 541 F. Supp., at 37, coupled with a provision from the policy statement that "[a]n inmate is allowed three (3) separate visits . . . per week" (emphasis added by Court of Appeals), Reformatory Procedures § B(3), App. 108, satisfied the requirement of "mandatory language" articulated by our prior cases. See 833 F.2d, at 618. </s> Because this case appeared to raise important issues relevant to general prison administration, we granted certiorari. 487 U.S. 1217 (1988). </s> II </s> The Fourteenth Amendment reads in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without [490 U.S. 454, 460] due process of law," and protects "the individual against arbitrary action of government," Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). We examine procedural due process questions in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State, Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 472 . The types of interests that constitute "liberty" and "property" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes are not unlimited; the interest must rise to more than "an abstract need or desire," Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S., at 577 , and must be based on more than "a unilateral hope," Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 465 (1981). Rather, an individual claiming a protected interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Protected liberty interests "may arise from two sources - the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the States." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 466 . </s> Respondents do not argue - nor can it seriously be contended, in light of our prior cases - that an inmate's interest in unfettered visitation is guaranteed directly by the Due Process Clause. We have rejected the notion that "any change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner involved is sufficient to invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause." (Emphasis in original.) Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). This is not to say that a valid conviction extinguishes every direct due process protection; "consequences visited on the prisoner that are qualitatively different from the punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of crime" may invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause even in the absence of a state-created right. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980) (transfer to mental hospital). However, "[a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement [490 U.S. 454, 461] to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight." Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). The denial of prison access to a particular visitor "is well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence," Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 468 , and therefore is not independently protected by the Due Process Clause. </s> We have held, however, that state law may create enforceable liberty interests in the prison setting. We have found, for example, that certain regulations granted inmates a protected interest in parole, Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (1987); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), in good-time credits, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S., at 556 -572, in freedom from involuntary transfer to a mental hospital, Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S., at 487 -494, and in freedom from more restrictive forms of confinement within the prison, Hewitt v. Helms, supra. In contrast, we have found that certain state statutes and regulations did not create a protected liberty interest in transfer to another prison. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S., at 225 (intrastate transfer); Olim v. Wakinekona, supra (interstate transfer). The fact that certain state-created liberty interests have been found to be entitled to due process protection, while others have not, is not the result of this Court's judgment as to what interests are more significant than others; rather, our method of inquiry in these cases always has been to examine closely the language of the relevant statutes and regulations. 3 </s> [490 U.S. 454, 462] </s> Stated simply, "a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S., at 249 . A State may do this in a number of ways. Neither the drafting of regulations nor their interpretation can be reduced to an exact science. Our past decisions suggest, however, that the most common manner in which a State creates a liberty interest is by establishing "substantive predicates" to govern official decision-making, Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 472 , and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met. </s> Most of our procedural due process cases in the prison context have turned on the presence or absence of language creating "substantive predicates" to guide discretion. For example, the failure of a Connecticut statute governing commutation of sentences to provide "particularized standards or criteria [to] guide the State's decisionmakers," Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S., at 467 (BRENNAN, J., concurring), defeated an inmate's claim that the State had created a liberty interest. Id., at 465 (majority opinion). See also Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S., at 249 -250 (interstate prison transfer left to "completely unfettered" discretion of administrator); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S., at 228 (intrastate prison transfer at discretion of officials); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S., at 243 (same). In other instances, we have found that prison regulations or statutes do provide decisionmaking criteria which serve to limit discretion. See, e. g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 472 (administrative segregation not proper absent particular substantive predicates); Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S., at 381 (parole granted unless certain standards met, even though the decision is "`necessarily subjective . . . and predictive'"). [490 U.S. 454, 463] </s> We have also articulated a requirement, implicit in our earlier decisions, that the regulations contain "explicitly mandatory language," i. e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations' substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow, in order to create a liberty interest. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 471 -472. The regulations at issue in Hewitt mandated that certain procedures be followed, and "that administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates." Id., at 472. In Board of Pardons v. Allen, supra, the relevant statute "use[d] mandatory language (`shall') to `creat[e] a presumption that parole release will be granted' when the designated findings are made," 482 U.S., at 377 -378, quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S., at 12 . See also id., at 11 (statute providing that board "shall order" release unless one of four specified conditions is found). In sum, the use of "explicitly mandatory language," in connection with the establishment of "specified substantive predicates" to limit discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty interest. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S., at 472 . </s> III </s> The regulations and procedures at issue in this case do provide certain "substantive predicates" to guide the decisionmaker. See nn. 1 and 2, supra. The state procedures provide that a visitor "may be excluded" when, inter alia, officials find reasonable grounds to believe that the "visitor's presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution's security or interfere with [its] orderly operation." See n. 1, supra. Among the more specific reasons listed for denying visitation are the visitor's connection to the inmate's criminal behavior, the visitor's past disruptive behavior or refusal to submit to a search or show proper identification, and the visitor's being under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Ibid. The reformatory procedures are nearly identical, and include a prohibition on a [490 U.S. 454, 464] visit from a former reformatory inmate, without the prior approval of the warden. See n. 2, supra. These regulations and procedures contain standards to be applied by a staff member in determining whether to refer a situation to the duty officer for resolution, and require the staff member to notify the duty officer if the staff member feels that a visitor should not be allowed admittance. Ibid. The same "substantive predicates" undoubtedly are intended to guide the duty officer's discretion in making the ultimate decision. </s> The regulations at issue here, however, lack the requisite relevant mandatory language. They stop short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates are met. 4 The Reformatory Procedures Memorandum begins with the caveat that "administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow visits," and goes on to note that "it is the policy" of the reformatory "to respect the right of inmates to have visits." App. 106. This language is not mandatory. Visitors may be excluded if they fall within one of the described categories, see n. 1, supra, but they need not be. Nor need visitors fall within one of the described categories in order to be excluded. The [490 U.S. 454, 465] overall effect of the regulations is not such that an inmate can reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the listed conditions. Or, to state it differently, the regulations are not worded in such a way that an inmate could reasonably expect to enforce them against the prison officials. 5 </s> Because the regulations at issue here do not establish a liberty interest entitled to the protections of the Due Process Clause, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The relevant provision states: "Certain visitors who are either a threat to the security or order of the institution or nonconducive to the successful re-entry of the inmate to the community may be excluded. These are, but not restricted to: "A. The visitor's presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable danger to the institution's security or interfere with the orderly operation of the institution. "B. The visitor has a past record of disruptive conduct. "C. The visitor is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. "D. The visitor refuses to submit to search, if requested to do so, or show proper identification. "E. The visitor is directly related to the inmate's criminal behavior. "F. The visitor is currently on probation or parole and does not have special written permission from both his or her Probation or Parole Officer and the institutional Superintendent." Commonwealth of Kentucky Corrections Policies and Procedures 403.06 (issued Aug. 28, 1981, effective Sept. 28, 1981); App. 101-102. </s> [Footnote 2 The memorandum reads in relevant part: "K. Visitor Refused Admittance "1. A visitor may be denied a visit at any time if one or more of the following exists or there are reasonable grounds to believe that: "a. The visitor's presence in the institution would constitute a clear and probable danger to the safety and security of the institution or would interfere with the orderly operation of the institution, including, but not limited to: "(1) The visitor has a past record of disruptive conduct. "(2) The visitor is under the influence of alcohol or drugs. "(3) The visitor refuses to submit to search or show proper identification upon request. "(4) The visitor is directly related to the inmate's criminal behavior. "(5) The visit will be detrimental to the inmate's rehabilitation. "(6) The visitor is a former resident currently on parole who does not have the approval of his Parole Officer or the Warden. "(7) The visitor is a former resident who has left by maximum expiration of sentence and does not have the prior approval of the Warden. "(8) The visitor has previously violated institutional visiting policies. "(9) Former employees of the Kentucky State Reformatory will not be allowed to visit inmates unless they have authorization from the Warden prior to the time of the visit. "2. A master log will be kept at the Visiting Desk of all visitors who have been denied a visit for any of the reasons listed above. A visitor who is denied a visit will not be allowed to visit an inmate for up to six (6) months following the incident. Persons who bring dangerous drugs or contraband into the institution may be denied visits indefinitely, until permission is granted by the Warden. The Duty Officer has the responsibility of denying a visit for the above reasons. "a. The master log will be furnished to all institutions and updated as required. "3. Any time a staff member feels a visitor should not be allowed admittance for any of the reasons above, the Shift Supervisor and the Duty Officer shall be notified. The final decision will be with the Duty Officer. All decisions will be documented. If it is felt that the individual presents a serious threat of danger to himself or others the Kentucky State Police will be advised of the situation so they may make a decision on whether their intervention is needed." Kentucky State Reformatory Procedures Memorandum, No. KSR 16-00-01 (issued and effective Sept. 30, 1985); App. 132-134. </s> [Footnote 3 Petitioners and their amici urge us to adopt a rule that prison regulations, regardless of the mandatory character of their language or the extent to which they limit official discretion, "do not create an entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause when they do not affect the duration or release from confinement, or the very nature of confinement." See Brief for Petitioners 10. They argue that this bright line would allow prison officials to issue guidelines to prison staff to govern minor decisions, without thereby transforming the details of prison life into "liberty interests" [490 U.S. 454, 462] with accompanying procedural rights. Inasmuch as a "bright line" of this kind is not necessary for a ruling in favor of petitioners, we refrain from considering it at this time. We express no view on the proposal and leave its resolution for another day. </s> [Footnote 4 It should be obvious that the mandatory language requirement is not an invitation to courts to search regulations for any imperative that might be found. The search is for relevant mandatory language that expressly requires the decisionmaker to apply certain substantive predicates in determining whether an inmate may be deprived of the particular interest in question. Thus, one of the examples of mandatory language relied upon by the Court of Appeals is unavailing, that is, the statement that an inmate "is allowed three (3) separate visits in the Visiting Building per week." App. 108. This directive says nothing about whether any particular visitor must be admitted, and thus has no direct relevance to the decision whether to exclude a particular visitor, which is what is at issue here. Another example of irrelevant mandatory language is the following: "A visitor who is denied a visit will not be allowed to visit an inmate for up to six (6) months following the incident." (Emphasis added.) See n. 2, supra. This language refers only to the penalty to be imposed once an individual is found to be unfit to visit, and has no role to play in guiding prison officials' discretion in deciding whether to exclude a visitor in the first instance. </s> [Footnote 5 The language of the consent decree, that "[d]efendants shall continue their open visiting policy," is mandatory only to the extent that it prevents the State from making its regulations more restrictive than they were at the time the decree was entered. Obviously, the promise to leave unchanged a discretionary policy does not transform that policy into a mandatory one. The District Court found that the regulations enacted after the decree was signed were no more restrictive than those already in place. App. 147. For this reason, we need make no judgment as to whether a consent decree can create a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue was not briefed or argued by the parties or discussed below and is not necessary to our decision. </s> JUSTICE KENNEDY, concurring. </s> I concur fully in the opinion and judgment of the Court. I write separately to note that this case involves a denial of prison access to particular visitors, not a general ban on all prison visitation. Nothing in the Court's opinion forecloses the claim that a prison regulation permanently forbidding all visits to some or all prisoners implicates the protections of the Due Process Clause in a way that the precise and individualized restrictions at issue here do not. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. </s> As a result of today's decision, correctional authorities at the Kentucky State Reformatory are free to deny prisoners visits from parents, spouses, children, clergy members, and [490 U.S. 454, 466] close friends for any reason whatsoever, or for no reason at all. Prisoners will not even be entitled to learn the reason, if any, why a visitor has been turned away. In my view, the exercise of such unbridled governmental power over the basic human need to see family members and friends strikes at the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Recognizing a liberty interest in this case would not create a right to "unfettered visitation," ante, at 460, but would merely afford prisoners rudimentary procedural safeguards against retaliatory or arbitrary denials of visits. Because the majority refuses to take this small step, I dissent. </s> I </s> The majority begins its analysis by conceding, as it must under our precedents, that prisoners do not shed their constitutional rights at the prison gate, but instead retain a residuum of constitutionally protected liberty independent of any state laws or regulations. See ante, at 459-461. 1 In the balance of its opinion, however, the majority proceeds to prove the emptiness of this initial gesture. In concluding that prison visits implicate no retained liberty interest, the majority applies the following oft-cited test: "`As long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight.'" Ante, at 460-461, quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). On its face, the "within the sentence" test knows few rivals for vagueness and pliability, not the least because a typical [490 U.S. 454, 467] prison sentence says little more than that the defendant must spend a specified period of time behind bars. As applied, this test offers prisoners scant more protection, for the Justices employing it have rarely scrutinized the actual conditions of confinement faced by the prisoners in the correctional institutions at issue. Under this approach, therefore, "a prisoner crosses into limbo when he enters into penal confinement." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 482 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). In theory he retains some minimal interest in liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but in practice this interest crystallizes only on those infrequent occasions when a majority of the Court happens to say so. 2 </s> I have previously stated that, when prison authorities alter a prisoner's conditions of confinement, the relevant question should be whether the prisoner has suffered "a sufficiently `grievous loss' to trigger the protection of due process." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 252 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), quoting Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The answer depends not only on the nature and gravity of the change, but also on whether the prisoner has been singled out arbitrarily for disparate treatment. "For an essential attribute of the liberty protected by the Constitution is the right to the same kind of treatment as the State provides to other similarly situated persons. A convicted felon, though he is properly placed in a disfavored class, retains this essential right." Hewitt, supra, at 485-486 (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also Olim, supra, at 252 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Put another way, the retained liberty interest protected by the Constitution encompasses the right to be free from arbitrary [490 U.S. 454, 468] governmental action affecting significant personal interests. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 -572, n. 19 (1974). </s> Prison visits have long been recognized as critically important to inmates as well as to the communities to which the inmates ultimately will return. 3 Without visits, a prisoner "may be entirely cut off from his only contacts with the outside world." Olim, supra, at 253 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). Confinement without visitation </s> "brings alienation and the longer the confinement the greater the alienation. There is little, if any, disagreement that the opportunity to be visited by friends and relatives is more beneficial to the confined person than any other form of communication. </s> "Ample visitation rights are also important for the family and friends of the confined person. . . . Preservation of the family unit is important to the reintegration of the confined person and decreases the possibility of recidivism upon release. . . . [V]isitation has demonstrated positive effects on a confined person's ability to adjust to life while confined as well as his ability to adjust to life upon release . . . ." National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Model Sentencing and Corrections Act 4-115, Comment (1979) (hereinafter NCCUSL) (citations omitted). 4 </s> [490 U.S. 454, 469] </s> Consistent with this view, numerous governmental and private organizations which deal closely with correctional institutions have promulgated standards designed "to maximize visiting opportunities for inmates." U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails, Standard 12.12 (1980). 5 Although the details vary, the standards uniformly provide that visitors should not be barred except for good cause shown. Kentucky itself, in its statewide Corrections Policies and Procedures (Commonwealth Procedures), recognizes that visits permit reformatory inmates such as Kenneth Bobbitt and Kevin Black "to maintain morale and contact with the community," and thus "are important to the inmate and his success within the community upon release." App. 98. </s> The majority intimates that the actions taken against prisoners Bobbitt and Black were based on good cause, see ante, at 458, but the very essence of these prisoners' factual allegations is that no such cause existed. Id., at 57-58, 61, 66-68, 70-71. If Bobbitt and Black are correct, they may well have suffered a "grievous loss" by being singled out arbitrarily for unjustifiably harsh treatment. No evidence whatsoever indicates that visitors to the reformatory have ever been [490 U.S. 454, 470] barred for any reason except those enumerated as legitimate in the Commonwealth Procedures and the institution-specific Reformatory Procedures Memorandum (Reformatory Memorandum). See ante, at 456-458, nn. 1, 2. It is nowhere suggested, furthermore, that these prisoners' sentences contemplated denials of visits for nonenumerated reasons, or that such denials are "`well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated'" in the reformatory. Ante, at 461, quoting Hewitt, 459 U.S., at 468 . Under the majority's disposition, neither prisoner will ever have a right to contest the prison authorities' account. One need hardly be cynical about prison administrators to recognize that the distinct possibility of retaliatory or otherwise groundless deprivations of visits calls for a modicum of procedural protections to guard against such behavior. </s> II </s> Even if I believed that visit denials did not implicate a prisoner's retained liberty interest, I would nonetheless find that a liberty interest has been "created" by the Commonwealth's visitation regulations and policies. 6 As the majority notes, "`a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.'" Ante, at 462, quoting Olim, 461 U.S., at 249 . I fully agree with the majority that "[t]he regulations and procedures at issue in this case do provide certain `substantive predicates' to guide the decisionmaker." Ante, at 463. But I cannot agree that Kentucky's prison regulations do not create a liberty interest because they "lack the requisite relevant mandatory language." Ante, at 464. [490 U.S. 454, 471] </s> As an initial matter, I fail to see why mandatory language always is an essential element of a state-created liberty interest. Once it is clear that a State has imposed substantive criteria in statutes or regulations to guide or limit official discretion, there is no reason to assume - as the majority does - that officials applying the statutes or regulations are likely to ignore the criteria if there is not some undefined quantity of the words "shall" or "must." Drafters of statutes or regulations do not ordinarily view the criteria they establish as mere surplusage. Absent concrete evidence that state officials routinely ignore substantive criteria set forth in statutes or regulations (and there is no such evidence here), it is only proper to assume that the criteria are regularly employed in practice, thereby creating legitimate expectations worthy of protection by the Due Process Clause. Common sense suggests that expectations stem from practice as well as from the language of statutes or regulations. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S., at 489 (approving lower courts' reliance on "objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law and official Penal Complex practice"). 7 This point escapes the majority, which apparently harbors the "unrealistic [belief] that variations such as the use of `may' rather than `shall' could negate the expectations derived from experience with a [prison] system and . . . enumerated criteria . . . ." Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 29 -30, n. 9 (1979) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). [490 U.S. 454, 472] </s> Even if I thought it proper to rely on the presence or absence of mandatory language, I would still disagree with the majority's determination that the regulations here lack such language. 8 The majority relies primarily on a statement in the Reformatory Memorandum that "administrative staff reserves the right to allow or disallow visits." It is important, however, to put this "caveat," ante, at 464, in proper context. The Reformatory Memorandum's section on visitation occupies 33 pages of the joint appendix. The caveat appears just once in a general, introductory paragraph which also includes the statement that "it is the policy of the Kentucky State Reformatory to respect the right of inmates to have visits." App. 106 (emphasis added). Over the next 20 pages, the Reformatory Memorandum lays out in great detail the mandatory "procedures to be enforced in regard to all types of visits." Ibid. (emphasis added). 9 It states, for [490 U.S. 454, 473] example, that "[v]isits will be conducted seven (7) days a week," id., at 107 (emphasis added); that "[a]n inmate is allowed three (3) separate visits . . . per week," id., at 108 (emphasis added); that "[t]here will be no visit list maintained which specifies who may visit an inmate," ibid. (emphasis added); that "[a]n inmate is allowed to have . . . three (3) adult visitors . . . per visit," id., at 108-109 (emphasis added); that visits "will be one and one-half hours," id., at 109 (emphasis added); and that "[e]ach inmate will be allowed one (1) outdoor visit per week," id., at 125 (emphasis added). </s> Only then does the Reformatory Memorandum enumerate the very specific reasons for which a visitor may be excluded. Id., at 132-134, quoted ante, at 457-458, n. 2. The duty officer does not have unfettered discretion with respect to visitors. Rather, he "has the responsibility of denying a visit for the above [enumerated] reasons." App. 134 (emphasis added). When a visit is denied, the reasons "will be documented." Ibid. (emphasis added). Presumably this means that the duty officer must keep a record of which of "the above reasons" caused him to exclude the visitor. The Reformatory Memorandum also expressly references the American Correctional Association's visitation standards, which provide that "visits may be limited only by the institution's schedule, space, and personnel constraints, or when there are substantial reasons to justify such limitations." American Correctional Association, Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standard 2-4381 (2d ed. 1981) (emphasis added), cited at App. 106. Nothing in these standards even remotely contemplates the arbitrary exclusion of visitors. </s> When these mandatory commands are read in conjunction with the detailed rules set forth in the Commonwealth Procedures, 10 it is inconceivable that prisoners in the reformatory [490 U.S. 454, 474] would not "reasonably form an objective expectation that a visit would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the listed conditions." Ante, at 465. The majority inexplicably ignores nearly all of these commands, despite claiming to have considered the "overall effect of the regulations," ibid., and despite the Commonwealth's striking concession that the regulations "repeatedly use `will', `shall', and similar directive or mandatory language" in an effort "to advise inmates and potential visitors what is expected." Brief for Petitioners 13, 30 (emphasis added); see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-6 ("[O]ur procedures are very limiting in the discretion of the officials"). 11 In light of these mandatory commands, the caveat, as well as any other language that could be taken to suggest that visitors need not "fall within one of the described categories in order to be excluded," ante, at 464, amount to nothing more than mere boilerplate. The Court should reject the view that "state laws which impose substantive limitations and elaborate procedural requirements on official conduct create no liberty interest solely because there remains the possibility that an official will act in an arbitrary manner at the end of the process." Olim, 461 U.S., at 258 -259 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting) (discussing holding in Hewitt); see also 461 U.S., at 259 , n. 13 (discussing similar [490 U.S. 454, 475] holding in Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979); cf. Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 8 (CA1 1987). </s> Finally, the majority's reliance on the fact that both the Commonwealth Procedures and the Reformatory Memorandum provide that a visitor "may" be excluded if he falls within one of the enumerated categories, ante, at 464, is misplaced. The word "may" in this context simply means that prison authorities possess the discretion to allow visits from persons who fall within one of the enumerated categories. Surely this possibility cannot defeat a prisoner's legitimate expectation that visitors will be denied only when they fall within one of those categories. In Hewitt, regulations regarding administrative segregation were deemed to have created a liberty interest even though they stated that a prisoner "may" be placed in segregation on the occurrence of specified substantive predicates. See 459 U.S., at 470 , n. 6. Likewise, in Vitek, a prisoner had a state-created liberty interest in not being transferred to a mental hospital even though the applicable state statute provided that the director of correctional services "may" transfer a prisoner to such a hospital after certain medical findings are made. See 445 U.S., at 483 , n. 1. If the use of the word "may" could not defeat a liberty interest in Hewitt or Vitek, I fail to see how it could do so here. </s> III </s> The prisoners in this case do not seek a right to unfettered visitation. All they ask is that the Court recognize that visitation is sufficiently important to warrant procedural protections to ensure that visitors are not arbitrarily denied. The protections need not be extensive, but simply commensurate with the special "needs and exigencies of the institutional environment." Wolff, 418 U.S., at 555 . In making the threshold determination that the denial of visits can never implicate a prisoner's liberty interest, the majority thus establishes that when visitors are turned away, no process, not [490 U.S. 454, 476] even notice, is constitutionally due. I cannot accept such a parsimonious reading of the Due Process Clause, and therefore dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 "[I]f the inmate's protected liberty interests are no greater than the State chooses to allow, he is really little more than the slave described in the 19th century cases. I think it clear that even the inmate retains an unalienable interest in liberty - at the very minimum the right to be treated with dignity - which the Constitution may never ignore." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 233 (1976) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). </s> [Footnote 2 The majority's refusal to take seriously the prisoners' retained liberty claim is demonstrated by its unwillingness to acknowledge this claim when, at the very outset of its opinion, it frames the issue in this case as one solely involving state-created rights. See ante, at 455. </s> [Footnote 3 Cf. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Restrict Access to Prisons: An Historical Re-Examination, 18 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 409, 413-415 (1983) (describing widespread visitation practices in early English and American prisons). </s> [Footnote 4 See also, e. g., National Sheriffs' Association, Inmates' Legal Rights 67 (rev. ed. 1987) (hereinafter NSA) (visits "with family, friends and others [are] important if the inmate is to retain his ties to the community and his knowledge of what the free society is like"); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Federal Standards for Prisons and Jails, Standard 12.12, Discussion (1980) (hereinafter DOJ) ("Visiting is an important element in maintaining inmates' contact with outside society"); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 23-6.2, Commentary (2d ed. 1980) (hereinafter ABA) ("Because almost all inmates ultimately will be returned to the community at the expiration of their [490 U.S. 454, 469] terms, it is important to preserve, wherever possible, family and community ties"); National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Corrections, Standard 2.17, Commentary (1973) (hereinafter NAC) ("Strained ties with family and friends increase the difficulty of making the eventual transition back to the community. The critical value for offenders of a program of visiting with relatives and friends long has been recognized"); cf. Thornburgh v. Abbott, ante, at 407 ("Access [to prisons] is essential . . . to families and friends of prisoners who seek to sustain relationships with them . . ."); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 825 (1974) (noting prison director's determination that personal visits "aid in the rehabilitation of the inmate while not compromising the other legitimate objectives of the corrections system"). </s> [Footnote 5 See also, e. g., NSA, at 67; DOJ, Standards 12.12-12.15; NCCUSL, 4-114, 4-118; ABA, Standard 23-6.2; American Correctional Assn., Standards for Adult Correctional Institutions, Standards 2-4380 to 2-4386 (2d ed. 1981); NAC, Standard 2.17. </s> [Footnote 6 Although the Court's past decisions establish that a liberty interest may be "created" by state regulations and policies, I have taken a somewhat different view of the relationship between such regulations and policies and the Due Process Clause. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 255 , n. 6 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 488 (1983) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) ("Prison regulations `provide evidentiary support for the conclusion that the [adverse action taken against a prisoner] affects a constitutionally protected interest in liberty,' but they `do not create that interest'") (emphasis in Hewitt). </s> [Footnote 7 See also, e. g., Dace v. Mickelson, 816 F.2d 1277, 1279 (CA8 1987) (en banc) (a prisoner's "expectancy" is based on "a review of a state rule, regulation, or practice"); Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416, 1422 (CA11 1985) ("The court must examine the . . . practices of the prison officials in administering the program to determine whether [it] . . . place[s] a restriction on the prison official's discretion . . ."); Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865, 876 (CA5 Unit B 1981) ("[T]he interaction between written regulations and actual practices often produces results not apparent by a mere examination of the regulations"); cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) ("[T]here may be an unwritten `common law' in a particular university that certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure"). </s> [Footnote 8 The majority does not state clearly whether its rationale applies solely to prisoners in the reformatory, or to prisoners in all of the Commonwealth's correctional institutions. I read the majority opinion as limited to prisoners in the reformatory for several reasons. First, although the majority points to language both in the statewide Commonwealth Procedures and the institution-specific Reformatory Memorandum in first determining that there are sufficient substantive predicates cabining official discretion, ante, at 463-464, the majority relies exclusively on statements in the Reformatory Memorandum in finding insufficient mandatory language to create a liberty interest. Ante, at 464-465. Second, Bobbitt and Black - the only prisoners subject to visitation denials in this case - were both incarcerated in the reformatory at the time of the incidents giving rise to this litigation. Third, the Reformatory Memorandum is the only institution-specific set of rules before the Court. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. It is quite possible that other correctional facilities in the Commonwealth have promulgated rules which create a liberty interest even under the majority's linguistic approach. As the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted below, "it is unclear from the record what set of regulations governs visits in other parts of the Kentucky System." 833 F.2d 614, 619 (1987). </s> [Footnote 9 These procedures pertain to such matters as the days, lengths, times, and places for visits; the dress code for prisoners and visitors; the scope of permissible searches of prisoners and visitors; the type of contact permitted between prisoners and visitors; and the special rules for night visits [490 U.S. 454, 473] and outdoor visits, as well as for legal, clergy, and hospital visits. App. 106-132. </s> [Footnote 10 Although the Commonwealth Procedures are somewhat less elaborate - because the individual correctional institutions are charged with [490 U.S. 454, 474] supplementing these statewide rules with ones designed to fit their own institutions - there is no shortage of mandatory language. Visits "are to be promoted and facilitated by each institution." id., at 98 (emphasis added); "[a]t a minimum," weekend and holiday visiting "shall [be] permi[tted]," id., at 99 (emphasis added); the individual institutions "must allow each inmate the opportunity to visit a minimum of eight hours per month," ibid. (emphasis added); and "[u]nder normal conditions, any [regular visitor] can visit unless visits could reasonably create a threat to the security and order of the institution," id., at 100 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 11 It is no answer to say that most of the mandatory commands are irrelevant because the decision "to exclude a particular visitor" is the only issue in this case. Ante, at 464, n. 4. After today's decision, there are no constraints whatsoever on the reformatory's ability to exclude all of an inmate's visitors simply by invoking its unreviewable discretion whenever a person seeks to visit the inmate. </s> [490 U.S. 454, 477]

United States Supreme Court VOLKSWAGENWERK AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT v. SCHLUNK(1988) No. 86-1052 Argued: March 21, 1988Decided: June 15, 1988 </s> After his parents were killed in an automobile accident, respondent filed a wrongful death action in an Illinois court, alleging that defects in the automobile designed and sold by Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VWoA), in which the parents were driving, caused or contributed to their deaths. When VWoA's answer denied that it had designed or assembled the vehicle, respondent amended his complaint to add as a defendant petitioner here (VWAG), a German corporation which is the sole owner of VWoA. Respondent attempted to serve the amended complaint on VWAG by serving VWoA as VWAG's agent. Filing a special and limited appearance, VWAG moved to quash the service on the grounds that it could be served only in accordance with the Hague Service Convention, and that respondent had not complied with the Convention's requirements. The court denied the motion, reasoning that VWoA and VWAG are so closely related that VWoA is VWAG's agent for service of process as a matter of law, notwithstanding VWAG's failure or refusal to appoint VWoA formally as an agent. The court concluded that, because service was accomplished in this country, the Convention did not apply. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, ruling that the Illinois long-arm statute authorized substituted service on VWoA, and that such service did not violate the Convention. </s> Held: </s> The Hague Service Convention does not apply when process is served on a foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary which, under state law, is the foreign corporation's involuntary agent for service. Pp. 698-708. </s> (a) The service of process in this case is not covered by Article 1 of the Convention, which provides that the Convention "shall apply . . . where there is occasion to transmit a judicial . . . document for service abroad." "Service" means a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action. Since the Convention does not itself prescribe a standard for determining the legal sufficiency of the delivery, the internal law of the forum state controls. Thus, where, as here, the forum state's law does not define the applicable method of serving process as requiring the transmittal of [486 U.S. 694, 695] documents abroad, the Convention does not apply. This interpretation is consistent with the negotiating history and the general purposes of the Convention. One purpose of the Convention is to provide means to facilitate service of process abroad. The Convention implements this purpose by requiring each state to establish a central authority to assist in the service of process, and nothing in the present decision interferes with that requirement. Another purpose of the Convention is to assure foreign defendants adequate notice. The present decision does not necessarily advance this purpose, because it makes application of the Convention depend on the forum's internal law; however, it is unlikely that any country will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit judicial documents for service abroad. Furthermore, this decision does not prevent voluntary compliance with the Convention even when the forum's internal law does not so require, and such compliance can be advantageous. Pp. 698-706. </s> (b) VWAG's contention that service upon it was not complete until VWoA transmitted the complaint to it in Germany, and that this transmission "for service abroad" rendered the Convention applicable to the case under Article 1, is without merit. Where, as here, service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause without an official transmission of documents abroad, the inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications. Pp. 706-708. </s> 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 503 N. E. 2d 1045, affirmed. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which MARSHALL and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 708. </s> Herbert Rubin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Stephen M. Shapiro, Kenneth S. Geller, Michael Hoenig, and James K. Toohey. </s> Jack Samuel Ring argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Judith E. Fors. </s> Jeffrey P. Minear argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Merrill, Deputy Assistant [486 U.S. 694, 696] Attorney General Spears, David Epstein, and Abraham D. Sofaer. * </s> [Footnote * Peter Heidenberger filed a brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as amicus curiae urging reversal. Leonard M. Ring filed a brief for the Trial Lawyers of America as amicus curiae urging affirmance. Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association by William J. Harte; and for the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States, Inc., by Jay M. Smyser, William H. Crabtree, and Edward P. Good. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case involves an attempt to serve process on a foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary which, under state law, is the foreign corporation's involuntary agent for service of process. We must decide whether such service is compatible with the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965 (Hague Service Convention), 1969. 20 U.S. T. 361, T. I. A. S. No. 6638. </s> I </s> The parents of respondent Herwig Schlunk were killed in an automobile accident in 1983. Schlunk filed a wrongful death action on their behalf in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. Schlunk alleged that Volkswagen of America, Inc. (VWoA), had designed and sold the automobile that his parents were driving, and that defects in the automobile caused or contributed to their deaths. Schlunk also alleged that the driver of the other automobile involved in the collision was negligent; Schlunk has since obtained a default judgment against that person, who is no longer a party to this lawsuit. Schlunk successfully served his complaint on VWoA, and VWoA filed an answer denying that it had designed or assembled the automobile in question. Schlunk then amended the complaint to add as a defendant Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft (VWAG), which is the petitioner [486 U.S. 694, 697] here. VWAG, a corporation established under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany, has its place of business in that country. VWoA is a wholly owned subsidiary of VWAG. Schlunk attempted to serve his amended complaint on VWAG by serving VWoA as VWAG's agent. </s> VWAG filed a special and limited appearance for the purpose of quashing service. VWAG asserted that it could be served only in accordance with the Hague Service Convention, and that Schlunk had not complied with the Convention's requirements. The Circuit Court denied VWAG's motion. It first observed that VWoA is registered to do business in Illinois and has a registered agent for receipt of process in Illinois. The court then reasoned that VWoA and VWAG are so closely related that VWoA is VWAG's agent for service of process as a matter of law, notwithstanding VWAG's failure or refusal to appoint VWoA formally as an agent. The court relied on the facts that VWoA is a wholly owned subsidiary of VWAG, that a majority of the members of the board of directors of VWoA are members of the board of VWAG, and that VWoA is by contract the exclusive importer and distributor of VWAG products sold in the United States. The court concluded that, because service was accomplished within the United States, the Hague Service Convention did not apply. </s> The Circuit Court certified two questions to the Appellate Court of Illinois. For reasons similar to those given by the Circuit Court, the Appellate Court determined that VWoA is VWAG's agent for service of process under Illinois law, and that the service of process in this case did not violate the Hague Service Convention. 145 Ill. App. 3d 594, 503 N. E. 2d 1045 (1986). After the Supreme Court of Illinois denied VWAG leave to appeal, 112 Ill. 2d 595 (1986), VWAG petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Appellate Court's interpretation of the Hague Service Convention. We granted certiorari to address this issue, 484 U.S. 895 (1987), which has given rise to disagreement among the lower [486 U.S. 694, 698] courts. Compare Ex parte Volkswagenwerk A. G., 443 So.2d 880, 881 (Ala. 1983) (holding that the Hague Service Convention does not apply if a foreign national is served properly through its agent in this country); Zisman v. Sieger, 106 F. R. D. 194, 199-200 (ND Ill. 1985) (same); Lamb v. Volkswagenwerk A. G., 104 F. R. D. 95, 97 (SD Fla. 1985) (same); McHugh v. International Components Corp., 118 Misc. 2d 489, 491-492, 461 N. Y. S. 2d 166, 167-168 (1983) (same), with Cippolla v. Picard Porsche Audi, Inc., 496 A. 2d 130, 131-132 (R. I. 1985) (holding that the Hague Service Convention is the exclusive means of serving a foreign corporation); Wingert v. Volkswagenwerk A. G., Civ. Action Nos. 3:86-2994-16 and 3:86-2995-16 (S. C. î May 19, 1987), slip op., at 3-4 (same). </s> II </s> The Hague Service Convention is a multilateral treaty that was formulated in 1964 by the Tenth Session of the Hague Conference of Private International Law. The Convention revised parts of the Hague Conventions on Civil Procedure of 1905 and 1954. The revision was intended to provide a simpler way to serve process abroad, to assure that defendants sued in foreign jurisdictions would receive actual and timely notice of suit, and to facilitate proof of service abroad. 3 1964 Conference de la Haye de Droit International Prive, Actes et Documents de la Dixieme Session (Notification) 75-77, 363 (1965) (3 Actes et Documents); 1 B. Ristau, International Judicial Assistance (Civil and Commercial) 4-1 (1984 and 1 Supp. 1986) (1 Ristau). Representatives of all 23 countries that were members of the Conference approved the Convention without reservation. Thirty-two countries, including the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, have ratified or acceded to the Convention. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 2, n. 2 (filed Sep. 12, 1987). </s> The primary innovation of the Convention is that it requires each state to establish a central authority to receive requests for service of documents from other countries. 20 [486 U.S. 694, 699] U.S. T. 362, T. I. A. S. 6638, Art. 2. Once a central authority receives a request in the proper form, it must serve the documents by a method prescribed by the internal law of the receiving state or by a method designated by the requester and compatible with that law. Art. 5. The central authority must then provide a certificate of service that conforms to a specified model. Art. 6. A state also may consent to methods of service within its boundaries other than a request to its central authority. Arts. 8-11, 19. The remaining provisions of the Convention that are relevant here limit the circumstances in which a default judgment may be entered against a defendant who had to be served abroad and did not appear, and provide some means for relief from such a judgment. Arts. 15, 16. </s> Article 1 defines the scope of the Convention, which is the subject of controversy in this case. It says: "The present Convention shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad." 20 U.S. T., at 362. The equally authentic French version says, "La presente Convention est applicable, en matiere civile ou commerciale, dans tous les cas ou un acte judiciaire ou extrajudiciaire doit etre transmis a l'etranger pour y etre signifie ou notifie." Ibid. This language is mandatory, as we acknowledged last Term in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 , n. 15 (1987). By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art. VI, the Convention pre-empts inconsistent methods of service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies. Schlunk does not purport to have served his complaint on VWAG in accordance with the Convention. Therefore, if service of process in this case falls within Article 1 of the Convention, the trial court should have granted VWAG's motion to quash. </s> When interpreting a treaty, we "begin `with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used.'" [486 U.S. 694, 700] Societe Nationale, supra, at 534 (quoting Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985)). Other general rules of construction may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages. "`Treaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.'" Air France v. Saks, supra, at 396 (quoting Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431 -432 (1943)). </s> The Convention does not specify the circumstances in which there is "occasion to transmit" a complaint "for service abroad." But at least the term "service of process" has a well-established technical meaning. Service of process refers to a formal delivery of documents that is legally sufficient to charge the defendant with notice of a pending action. 1 Ristau 4-5(2), p. 123 (interpreting the Convention); Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (5th ed. 1979); see 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 1063, p. 225 (2d ed. 1987). The legal sufficiency of a formal delivery of documents must be measured against some standard. The Convention does not prescribe a standard, so we almost necessarily must refer to the internal law of the forum state. If the internal law of the forum state defines the applicable method of serving process as requiring the transmittal of documents abroad, then the Hague Service Convention applies. </s> The negotiating history supports our view that Article 1 refers to service of process in the technical sense. The committee that prepared the preliminary draft deliberately used a form of the term "notification" (formal notice), instead of the more neutral term "remise" (delivery), when it drafted Article 1. 3 Actes et Documents, at 78-79. Then, in the course of the debates, the negotiators made the language even more exact. The preliminary draft of Article 1 said that the present Convention shall apply in all cases in which there are grounds to transmit or to give formal notice of [486 U.S. 694, 701] a judicial or extrajudicial document in a civil or commercial matter to a person staying abroad. Id., at 65 ("La presente Convention est applicable dans tous les cas ou il y a lieu de transmettre ou de notifier un acte judiciaire ou extrajudiciaire en matiere civile ou commerciale a une personne se trouvant a l'etranger") (emphasis added). To be more precise, the delegates decided to add a form of the juridical term "signification" (service), which has a narrower meaning than "notification" in some countries, such as France, and the identical meaning in others, such as the United States. Id., at 152-153, 155, 159, 366. The delegates also criticized the language of the preliminary draft because it suggested that the Convention could apply to transmissions abroad that do not culminate in service. Id., at 165-167. The final text of Article 1, supra, eliminates this possibility and applies only to documents transmitted for service abroad. The final report (Rapport Explicatif) confirms that the Convention does not use more general terms, such as delivery or transmission, to define its scope because it applies only when there is both transmission of a document from the requesting state to the receiving state, and service upon the person for whom it is intended. Id., at 366. </s> The negotiating history of the Convention also indicates that whether there is service abroad must be determined by reference to the law of the forum state. The preliminary draft said that the Convention would apply "where there are grounds" to transmit a judicial document to a person staying abroad. The committee that prepared the preliminary draft realized that this implied that the forum's internal law would govern whether service implicated the Convention. Id., at 80-81. The reporter expressed regret about this solution because it would decrease the obligatory force of the Convention. Id., at 81. Nevertheless, the delegates did not change the meaning of Article 1 in this respect. </s> The Yugoslavian delegate offered a proposal to amend Article 1 to make explicit that service abroad is defined according [486 U.S. 694, 702] to the law of the state that is requesting service of process. Id., at 167. The delegate from the Netherlands supported him. Ibid. The German delegate approved of the proposal in principle, although he thought it would require a corresponding reference to the significance of the law of the state receiving the service of process, and that this full explanation would be too complicated. Id., at 168. The President opined that there was a choice to be made between the phrase used by the preliminary draft, "where grounds exist," and the Yugoslavian proposal to modify it with the phrase, "according to the law of the requesting state." Ibid. This prompted the Yugoslavian delegate to declare that the difference was immaterial, because the phrase "where grounds exist" necessarily refers to the law of the forum. Ibid. The French delegate added that, in his view, the law of the forum in turn is equivalent to the law of the requesting state. Id., at 169. At that point, the President recommended entrusting the problem to the drafting committee. </s> The drafting committee then composed the version of Article 1 that ultimately was adopted, which says that the Convention applies "where there is occasion" to transmit a judicial document for service abroad. Id., at 211. After this revision, the reporter again explained that one must leave to the requesting state the task of defining when a document must be served abroad; that this solution was a consequence of the unavailability of an objective test; and that while it decreases the obligatory force of the Convention, it does provide clarity. Id., at 254. The inference we draw from this history is that the Yugoslavian proposal was rejected because it was superfluous, not because it was inaccurate, and that "service abroad" has the same meaning in the final version of the Convention as it had in the preliminary draft. </s> VWAG protests that it is inconsistent with the purpose of the Convention to interpret it as applying only when the internal law of the forum requires service abroad. One of the two stated objectives of the Convention is "to create [486 U.S. 694, 703] appropriate means to ensure that judicial and extrajudicial documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time." 20 U.S. T., at 362. The Convention cannot assure adequate notice, VWAG argues, if the forum's internal law determines whether it applies. VWAG warns that countries could circumvent the Convention by defining methods of service of process that do not require transmission of documents abroad. Indeed, VWAG contends that one such method of service already exists and that it troubled the Conference: notification au parquet. </s> Notification au parquet permits service of process on a foreign defendant by the deposit of documents with a designated local official. Although the official generally is supposed to transmit the documents abroad to the defendant, the statute of limitations begins to run from the time that the official receives the documents, and there allegedly is no sanction for failure to transmit them. 3 Actes et Documents, at 167-169; S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1967) (statement of Philip Amram, member of the United States delegation); 1 Ristau 4-33, p. 172. At the time of the 10th Conference, France, the Netherlands, Greece, Belgium, and Italy utilized some type of notification au parquet. 3 Actes et Documents, at 75. </s> There is no question but that the Conference wanted to eliminate notification au parquet. Id., at 75-77. It included in the Convention two provisions that address the problem. Article 15 says that a judgment may not be entered unless a foreign defendant received adequate and timely notice of the lawsuit. Article 16 provides means whereby a defendant who did not receive such notice may seek relief from a judgment that has become final. 20 U.S. T., at 364-365. Like Article 1, however, Articles 15 and 16 apply only when documents must be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service. 3 Actes et Documents, at 168-169. VWAG argues that, if this determination is made [486 U.S. 694, 704] according to the internal law of the forum state, the Convention will fail to eliminate variants of notification au parquet that do not expressly require transmittal of documents to foreign defendants. Yet such methods of service of process are the least likely to provide a defendant with actual notice. </s> The parties make conflicting representations about whether foreign laws authorizing notification au parquet command the transmittal of documents for service abroad within the meaning of the Convention. The final report is itself somewhat equivocal. It says that, although the strict language of Article 1 might raise a question as to whether the Convention regulates notification au parquet, the understanding of the drafting Commission, based on the debates, is that the Convention would apply. Id., at 367. Although this statement might affect our decision as to whether the Convention applies to notification au parquet, an issue we do not resolve today, there is no comparable evidence in the negotiating history that the Convention was meant to apply to substituted service on a subsidiary like VWoA, which clearly does not require service abroad under the forum's internal law. Hence neither the language of the Convention nor the negotiating history contradicts our interpretation of the Convention, according to which the internal law of the forum is presumed to determine whether there is occasion for service abroad. </s> Nor are we persuaded that the general purposes of the Convention require a different conclusion. One important objective of the Convention is to provide means to facilitate service of process abroad. Thus the first stated purpose of the Convention is "to create" appropriate means for service abroad, and the second stated purpose is "to improve the organisation of mutual judicial assistance for that purpose by simplifying and expediting the procedure." 20 U.S. T., at 362. By requiring each state to establish a central authority to assist in the service of process, the Convention implements this enabling function. Nothing in our decision today interferes with this requirement. [486 U.S. 694, 705] </s> VWAG correctly maintains that the Convention also aims to ensure that there will be adequate notice in cases in which there is occasion to serve process abroad. Thus compliance with the Convention is mandatory in all cases to which it applies, see supra, 700-701, and Articles 15 and 16 provide an indirect sanction against those who ignore it, see 3 Actes et Documents, at 92, 363. Our interpretation of the Convention does not necessarily advance this particular objective, inasmuch as it makes recourse to the Convention's means of service dependent on the forum's internal law. But we do not think that this country, or any other country, will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit judicial documents for service abroad. For example, there has been no question in this country of excepting foreign nationals from the protection of our Due Process Clause. Under that Clause, foreign nationals are assured of either personal service, which typically will require service abroad and trigger the Convention, or substituted service that provides "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). * </s> [486 U.S. 694, 706] </s> Furthermore, nothing that we say today prevents compliance with the Convention even when the internal law of the forum does not so require. The Convention provides simple and certain means by which to serve process on a foreign national. Those who eschew its procedures risk discovering that the forum's internal law required transmittal of documents for service abroad, and that the Convention therefore provided the exclusive means of valid service. In addition, parties that comply with the Convention ultimately may find it easier to enforce their judgments abroad. See Westin, Enforcing Foreign Commercial Judgments and Arbitral Awards in the United States, West Germany, and England, Law & Policy Int'l Bus. 325, 340-341 (1987). For these reasons, we anticipate that parties may resort to the Convention voluntarily, even in cases that fall outside the scope of its mandatory application. </s> III </s> In this case, the Illinois long-arm statute authorized Schlunk to serve VWAG by substituted service on VWoA, without sending documents to Germany. See Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 110, § 2-209(a)(1) (1985). VWAG has not petitioned for review of the Illinois Appellate Court's holding that service was proper as a matter of Illinois law. VWAG contends, however, that service on VWAG was not complete until VWoA transmitted the complaint to VWAG in Germany. According to VWAG, [486 U.S. 694, 707] this transmission constituted service abroad under the Hague Service Convention. </s> VWAG explains that, as a practical matter, VWoA was certain to transmit the complaint to Germany to notify VWAG of the litigation. Indeed, as a legal matter, the Due Process Clause requires every method of service to provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., supra, at 314. VWAG argues that, because of this notice requirement, every case involving service on a foreign national will present an "occasion to transmit a judicial . . . document for service abroad" within the meaning of Article 1. Tr. of Oral Arg. 8. VWAG emphasizes that in this case, the Appellate Court upheld service only after determining that "the relationship between VWAG and VWoA is so close that it is certain that VWAG `was fully apprised of the pendency of the action' by delivery of the summons to VWoA." 145 Ill. App. 3d, at 606, 503 N. E. 2d, at 1053 (quoting Maunder v. DeHavilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 102 Ill. 2d 342, 353, 466 N. E. 2d 217, 223, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984)). </s> We reject this argument. Where service on a domestic agent is valid and complete under both state law and the Due Process Clause, our inquiry ends and the Convention has no further implications. Whatever internal, private communications take place between the agent and a foreign principal are beyond the concerns of this case. The only transmittal to which the Convention applies is a transmittal abroad that is required as a necessary part of service. And, contrary to VWAG's assertion, the Due Process Clause does not require an official transmittal of documents abroad every time there is service on a foreign national. Applying this analysis, we conclude that this case does not present an occasion to transmit a judicial document for service abroad within the meaning [486 U.S. 694, 708] of Article 1. Therefore the Hague Service Convention does not apply, and service was proper. The judgment of the Appellate Court is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote î ERRATA: "S. C." should be "D. S. C." </s> [Footnote * The concurrence believes that our interpretation does not adequately guarantee timely notice, which it denominates the "primary" purpose of the Convention, albeit without authority. Post, at 711. The concurrence instead proposes to impute a substantive standard to the words, "service abroad." Post, at 708. Evidently, a method of service would not be deemed to be "service abroad" within the meaning of Article 1 unless it provides notice to the recipient "in due time." Post, at 712, 714. This due process notion cannot be squared with the plain meaning of the words, "service abroad." The contours of the concurrence's substantive standard are not defined, and we note that it would create some uncertainty even on the facts of this case. If the substantive standard tracks the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is not self-evident that substituted service on a subsidiary is sufficient with respect to the parent. In [486 U.S. 694, 706] the only cases in which it has considered the question, this Court held that the activities of a subsidiary are not necessarily enough to render a parent subject to a court's jurisdiction, for service of process or otherwise. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336 -337 (1925); Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 88 (1933); see 18A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Law of Private Corporations 8773 pp. 250-254 (rev. ed. 1988). Although the particular relationship between VWAG and VWoA might have made substituted service valid in this case, a question that we do not decide, the factbound character of the necessary inquiry makes us doubt whether the standard suggested by the concurrence would in fact be "remarkably easy" to apply, see post, at 715. </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL and JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in the judgment. </s> We acknowledged last Term, and the Court reiterates today, ante, at 699, that the terms of the Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 1969. 20 U.S. T. 361, T. I. A. S. No. 6638, are "mandatory," not "optional" with respect to any transmission that Article 1 covers. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 534 , and n. 15 (1987). Even so, the Court holds, and I agree, that a litigant may, consistent with the Convention, serve process on a foreign corporation by serving its wholly owned domestic subsidiary, because such process is not "service abroad" within the meaning of Article 1. The Court reaches that conclusion, however, by depriving the Convention of any mandatory effect, for in the Court's view the "forum's internal law" defines conclusively whether a particular process is "service abroad," which is covered by the Convention, or domestic service, which is not. Ante, at 704. I do not join the Court's opinion because I find it implausible that the Convention's framers intended to leave each contracting nation, and each of the 50 States within our Nation, free to decide for itself under what circumstances, if any, the Convention would control. Rather, in my view, the words "service abroad," read in light of the negotiating history, embody a substantive standard that limits a forum's latitude to deem service complete domestically. </s> The first of two objectives enumerated in the Convention's preamble is "to create appropriate means to ensure that judicial . . . documents to be served abroad shall be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time . . . ." 20 U.S. T., at 362. See also ante, at 702-703. Until the Convention [486 U.S. 694, 709] was implemented, the contracting nations followed widely divergent practices for serving judicial documents across international borders, some of which did not ensure any notice, much less timely notice, and therefore often produced unfair default judgments. See generally International Co-Operation in Litigation: Europe (H. Smit ed. 1965); 3 1965 Conference de la Haye de Droit International Prive, Actes et Documents de la Dixieme Session (Notification) 11-12 (1965) (hereinafter 3 Actes et Documents). Particularly controversial was a procedure, common among civil-law countries, called "notification au parquet," which permitted delivery of process to a local official who was then ordinarily supposed to transmit the document abroad through diplomatic or other channels. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 11-12, 14-16 (1967) (S. Exec. Rep. No. 6); S. Doc. C, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 5-6, 21 (1967) (S. Exec. Doc. C). Typically, service was deemed complete upon delivery of the document to the official whether or not the official succeeded in transmitting it to the defendant and whether or not the defendant otherwise received notice of the pending lawsuit. 1 </s> [486 U.S. 694, 710] </s> The United States delegation to the Convention objected to notification au parquet as inconsistent with "the requirements of `due process of law' under the Federal Constitution." 3 Actes et Documents 128 (citations omitted). The head of the delegation has derided its "`[i]njustice, extravagance, [and] absurdity . . . .'" Amram 651 (citation omitted). In its classic formulation, he observed, notification au parquet "`totally sacrificed all rights of the defense in favor of the plaintiff.'" Id., at 652, n. 9 (citation omitted). The Convention's official reporter noted similar "`spirited criticisms of the system' . . . which we wish to see eliminated." 3 Actes et Documents 76 (translated). </s> In response to this and other concerns, the Convention prescribes the exclusive means for service of process emanating from one contracting nation and culminating in another. As the Court observes, the Convention applies only when the document is to be "transmit[ted] . . . for service abroad"; it covers not every transmission of judicial documents abroad, but only those transmissions abroad that constitute formal "service." See ante, at 700. It is common ground that the Convention governs when the procedure prescribed by the internal law of the forum nation or state provides that service is not complete until the document is transmitted abroad. That is not to say, however, as does the Court, that the forum nation may designate any type of service "domestic" and thereby avoid application of the Convention. </s> Admittedly, as the Court points out, ibid., the Convention's language does not prescribe a precise standard to distinguish between "domestic" service and "service abroad." But the Court's solution leaves contracting nations free to ignore its terms entirely, converting its command into exhortation. Under the Court's analysis, for example, a forum nation could prescribe direct mail service to any foreigner and deem service effective upon deposit in the mailbox, or could arbitrarily designate a domestic agent for any foreign defendant and deem service complete upon receipt domestically by [486 U.S. 694, 711] the agent even though there is little likelihood that service would ever reach the defendant. In fact, so far as I can tell, the Court's interpretation permits any contracting nation to revive notification au parquet so long as the nation's internal law deems service complete domestically, but cf. ante, at 704, even though, as the Court concedes, "such methods of service are the least likely to provide a defendant with actual notice," and even though "[t]here is no question but that the Conference wanted to eliminate notification au parquet," ante, at 703 (citation omitted). </s> The Court adheres to this interpretation, which (in the Court's words) "does not necessarily advance" the primary purpose that the Convention itself announces, ante, at 705, notwithstanding its duty to read the Convention "with a view to effecting the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting." Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331 -332 (1912). See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 -294 (1933); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 57 (1903). Even assuming any quantum of evidence from the negotiating history would suffice to support an interpretation so fundamentally at odds with the Convention's primary purpose, the evidence the Court amasses in support of its reading - two interim comments by the reporter on initial drafts of the Convention suggesting that the forum's internal law would dictate whether a particular form of service implicates the Convention - falls far short. See ante, at 701-702. </s> In the first place, the reporter's comments were by no means uncontroversial. One participant, for example, directly challenged the "report['s] allusion . . . to the danger that the court hearing the proceeding could decide that there were no grounds for service," and observed that "[n]ow, the preamble of [the] draft specifies the objective of the convention, which is to ensure the service of writs to persons in foreign countries in order to guarantee that these persons will have knowledge of them." 3 Actes et Documents 165 (United Kingdom delegate) (translation) (emphasis added). [486 U.S. 694, 712] In fact, the delegates considered a version of Article 1 explicitly prescribing that the Convention's scope would be defined "`according to the law of the petitioning state,'" id., at 167 (quoting proposal of Yugoslavian delegate) (translation), but rejected the proposal at least in part "because it would allow [domestic] law to determine the cases in which transmission is not obligatory." Ibid. (Italian delegate) (translation). </s> If the delegates did not resolve their differences upon tabling the proposal, they apparently did by the time the official reporter issued his Rapport Explicatif. This final report, which presumably supersedes all interim comments, stresses "the opinion of the Third Commission [that] the Convention was `obligatory,'" making no reference to internal law. 3 Actes et Documents 366 (translation). By way of example, the Rapport acknowledges that a literal reading of the Convention might raise doubts as to the Convention's coverage of notification au parquet, yet announces the understanding of the drafting commission that the Convention would prohibit such service. 2 Thus, reading Article 1 "`in the liberal spirit in which it is intended[,]'" to address "`the hardship and injustice, which [the Convention] seeks to relieve,'" id., at 367 (citation omitted), the Rapport interprets the Convention to impose a substantive standard proscribing notification au parquet whether the forum nation deems the service "domestic" or "abroad." That substantive standard is captured in the Rapport's admonition that </s> "`[a]ll of the transmission channels (prescribed by the convention) must have as a consequence the fact that the act reach the addressee in due time. That is a requirement [486 U.S. 694, 713] of justice, which assumes its full importance when the act to be transmitted is an act instituting proceedings.'" Ibid. (translation) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). </s> The Court belittles the Rapport's significance by presuming that the reporter assumed, as a matter of the internal law of the various nations then permitting notification au parquet, that such service always required transmission abroad, and therefore would always have been deemed "service abroad." See ante, at 703-704. But the above-cited passage purports to interpret the Convention, not to survey the various forms of notification au parquet then prevalent, and does not so much as hint at the possibility that notification au parquet might continue if the domestic law of a forum nation were to deem it "domestic." Moreover, the assumption that the Court imputes to the Rapport is inaccurate; as noted above, notification au parquet was typically deemed complete upon delivery to the local official. See supra, at 709, and n. 1. Any requirement of transmission abroad was no more essential to formal service than is the informal arrangement by which a domestic subsidiary might transmit documents served on it as an agent for its foreign parent. See, e. g., 3 Actes et Documents 169. Thus, if the Court entertains the possibility that the Convention bans notification au parquet under all circumstances, ante, at 704, it can only be because (notwithstanding the Court's stated analysis) the Convention, read in light of its negotiating history, sets some substantive limit on the forum state's latitude to deem such service "domestic." </s> Significantly, our own negotiating delegation, whose contemporaneous views are "entitled to great weight," Societe Nationale, 482 U.S., at 536 , n. 19, took seriously the Rapport's conclusion that the Convention is more than just precatory. The delegation's report applauded the Convention as "mak[ing] substantial changes in the practices of many of the civil law countries, moving their practices in the direction of the U.S. approach to international judicial assistance and our [486 U.S. 694, 714] concepts of due process in the service of process." S. Exec. Doc. C, at 20 (emphasis added). The delegation's chief negotiator emphasized that "the convention sets up the minimum standards of international judicial assistance which each country which ratifies the convention must offer to all others who ratify." S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, at 13 (statement by Philip W. Amram) (emphasis in original). Then-Secretary of State Rusk reiterated the same point, 3 as did the State Department's Deputy Legal Advisor, 4 and President Johnson. 5 The repeated references to "due process" were not, of course, intended to suggest that every contracting nation submitted itself to the intricacies of our constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, they were shorthand formulations of the requirement, common to both due process and the Convention, that process directed on a party abroad should be designed so that the documents "reach the addressee in due time," 3 Actes et Documents 367 (translation). </s> The negotiating history and the uniform interpretation announced by our own negotiators confirm that the Convention limits a forum's ability to deem service "domestic," thereby avoiding the Convention's terms. Admittedly, the Convention does not precisely define the contours. But that imprecision does not absolve us of our responsibility to apply the Convention mandatorily, any more than imprecision permits us to discard the words "due process of law," U.S. Const., Amdt. 14, 1. And however difficult it might be in some circumstances to discern the Convention's precise limits, it is [486 U.S. 694, 715] remarkably easy to conclude that the Convention does not prohibit the type of service at issue here. Service on a wholly owned, closely controlled subsidiary is reasonably calculated to reach the parent "in due time" as the Convention requires. See, e. g., 9 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Law of Private Corporations 4412, p. 400 (rev. ed. 1985). That is, in fact, what our own Due Process Clause requires, see Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 -315 (1950), and since long before the Convention's implementation our law has permitted such service, see, e. g., Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444 -445 (1952); Latimer v. S/A Industrias Reunidas F. Matarazzo, 175 F.2d 184, 185 (CA2 1949) (L. Hand, J.). This is significant because our own negotiators made clear to the Senate their understanding that the Convention would require no major changes in federal or state service-of-process rules. 6 Thus, it is unsurprising that nothing in the negotiating history suggests that the contracting nations were dissatisfied with the practice at issue here, of which they were surely aware, much less that they intended to abolish it like they intended to abolish notification au parquet. And since notice served on a wholly owned domestic subsidiary is infinitely more likely to reach the foreign parent's attention than was notice served au parquet (or by any other procedure that the negotiators singled out for criticism) there is no reason to interpret the Convention to bar it. [486 U.S. 694, 716] </s> My difference with the Court does not affect the outcome of this case, and, given that any process emanating from our courts must comply with due process, it may have little practical consequence in future cases that come before us. But cf. S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, at 15 (statement by Philip W. Amram suggesting that Convention may require "a minor change in the practice of some of our States in long-arm and automobile accident cases" where "service on the appropriate official need be accompanied only by a minimum effort to notify the defendant"). Our Constitution does not, however, bind other nations haling our citizens into their courts. Our citizens rely instead primarily on the forum nation's compliance with the Convention, which the Senate believed would "provide increased protection (due process) for American Citizens who are involved in litigation abroad." Id., at 3. And while other nations are not bound by the Court's pronouncement that the Convention lacks obligatory force, after today's decision their courts will surely sympathize little with any United States national pleading that a judgment violates the Convention because (notwithstanding any local characterization) service was "abroad." </s> It is perhaps heartening to "think that [no] countr[y] will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the Convention in cases in which it would be appropriate to transmit judicial documents for service abroad," ante, at 705, although from the defendant's perspective "circumvention" (which, according to the Court, entails no more than exercising a prerogative not to be bound) is equally painful whether deliberate or not. The fact remains, however, that had we been content to rely on foreign notions of fair play and substantial justice, we would have found it unnecessary, in the first place, to participate in a Convention "to ensure that judicial . . . documents to be served abroad [would] be brought to the notice of the addressee in sufficient time," 20 U.S. T., at 362. </s> [Footnote 1 The head of the United States delegation to the Convention described notification au parquet as follows: "This is a system which permits the entry of judgments in personam by default against a nonresident defendant without requiring adequate notice. There is also no real right to move to open the default judgment or to appeal, because the time to move to open judgment or to appeal will generally have expired before the defendant finds out about the judgment. "Under this system of service, the process-server simply delivers a copy of the writ to a public official's office. The time for answer begins to run immediately. Some effort is supposed to be made through the Foreign Office and through diplomatic channels to give the defendant notice, but failure to do this has no effect on the validity of the service. . . . "There are no . . . limitations and protections [comparable to due process or personal jurisdiction] under the notification au parquet system. Here jurisdiction lies merely if the plaintiff is a local national; nothing more is needed." S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, at 11-12 (statement by Philip W. Amram). See also S. Exec. Doc. C, at 5 (letter of submittal from Secretary of State Rusk); Amram, The Revolutionary Change in Service of Process Abroad in French Civil Procedure, 2 Int'l Law. 650, 650-651 (1968) (Amram). </s> [Footnote 2 3 Actes et Documents 367 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted): "However, when confronted with the strict letter of the provision, one can always ask the question of knowing whether or not, when a State permits the service or notification of a person in a foreign country to be made [au parquet], the convention is applicable. "THE AUTHENTIC INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMISSION AS IT EMERGES FROM THE DISCUSSIONS, IS IN THE SENSE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION." </s> [Footnote 3 See S. Exec. Doc. C, at 8 ("[T]he convention . . . requires . . . major changes, in the direction of modern and efficient procedures, in the present practices of many other" nations) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 4 See S. Exec. Rep No. 6, at 7 ("It is to our great advantage to obtain binding commitments from other governments that they will adhere to [the] principles" embodied in due process) (statement by Richard D. Kearney) (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 5 See S. Exec. Doc. C, at 1 ("[T]he convention makes important changes in the practices of many civil law countries, moving those practices in the direction of our generous system of international judicial assistance and our concept of due process in the service of documents"). </s> [Footnote 6 In words reiterated by Secretary of State Rusk, the delegation observed that "[i]n its broadest aspects the convention makes no basic changes in U.S. practices." S. Exec. Doc. C, at 20. See also id., at 8 ("The most significant aspect of the convention is the fact that it requires so little change in the present procedures in the United States") (letter of submittal of Secretary of State Rusk). The delegation's head likewise repeatedly observed that the Convention "leaves our common-law due-process principles unaffected and unchanged." S. Exec. Rep. No. 6, at 11. See also id., at 9 ("By our internal law . . . we already give to foreign litigants all that this convention would require us to provide"); id., at 16 (Convention "requires no changes in our law of judicial assistance"). </s> [486 U.S. 694, 717]

United States Supreme Court ALLEGHENY COUNTY v. MASHUDA CO.(1959) No. 347 Argued: April 2, 1959Decided: June 8, 1959 </s> 1. A federal district court may not abstain from exercising its properly invoked diversity jurisdiction in a state eminent domain case in which the exercise of that jurisdiction would not entail the possibility of a premature and perhaps unnecessary decision of a serious federal constitutional question, would not create the hazard of unsettling some delicate balance in the area of federal-state relationships, and would not even require the District Court to guess at the resolution of uncertain and difficult issues of state law. Pp. 186-198. </s> 2. While a proceeding to assess damages for the condemnation of land for an airport was pending in a Pennsylvania state court, the landowners, properly invoking jurisdiction on the ground of diversity of citizenship, sued in a Federal District Court for a judgment of ouster, on the ground that the taking was for private use and therefore contrary to state law. There was no federal constitutional question involved; the state law on the point was clear and well settled; the case turned on the purely factual question whether the taking was for private rather than public use; and under state procedure the issue of the validity of the taking could be litigated in a separate suit. However, the District Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it should not interfere with the administration of the affairs of a political subdivision acting under color of state law in a condemnation proceeding. Held: No exceptional circumstances justifying abstention appear in this case, and the District Court should have adjudicated the claim. Pp. 186-198. </s> (a) The doctrine of abstention, under which a district court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a district court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. P. 188. </s> (b) Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest. Pp. 188-189. [360 U.S. 185, 186] </s> (c) An order to the parties to repair to the state court in this case would not entail the possibility of mooting a federal constitutional issue or changing its posture. P. 189. </s> (d) Adjudication of the issues in this case by the District Court would present no hazard of disrupting federal-state relations, since the District Court would be acting toward the pending state condemnation proceeding in the same manner as would a state court. Pp. 189-191. </s> (e) The fact that this case concerns the exercise of a State's power of eminent domain did not justify the District Court in abstaining from exercising its jurisdiction. Pp. 191-196. </s> (f) This case illustrates the unnecessary delay and expense that results from refusal of the District Court to exercise its properly invoked jurisdiction. Pp. 196-197. </s> (g) Refusal to exercise jurisdiction could not be justified on the ground that the state court had assumed jurisdiction over the res, since the pending state proceeding was simply an in personam suit to determine the amount the State should pay for the property. P. 197. </s> (h) A decision by the District Court holding that the taking was invalid would not be barred by 28 U.S.C. 2283, which provides that a federal court may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or effectuate its judgments, since respondents do not seek an injunction in this case. Pp. 197-198. </s> 256 F.2d 241, affirmed. </s> Philip Baskin argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were Maurice Louik and Francis A. Barry. </s> Harold R. Schmidt argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Don Rose and John L. Laubach, Jr. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This case presents the question whether a District Court may abstain from exercising its properly invoked diversity [360 U.S. 185, 187] jurisdiction in a state eminent domain case in which the exercise of that jurisdiction would not entail the possibility of a premature and perhaps unnecessary decision of a serious federal constitutional question, would not create the hazard of unsettling some delicate balance in the area of federal-state relationships, and would not even require the District Court to guess at the resolution of uncertain and difficult issues of state law. We hold that in such circumstances a District Court cannot refuse to discharge the responsibility, imposed by Congress under 28 U.S.C. 1332 and 1441, to render prompt justice in cases where its diversity jurisdiction has been properly invoked. </s> The Board of County Commissioners of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, invoked the applicable eminent domain statutes of the State to appropriate certain property of respondents, citizens of Wisconsin, for the alleged purpose of improving and enlarging the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The Board adopted the required resolution of taking, and thereafter petitioned the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County for appointment of a Board of Viewers to assess damages for the taking. A Board of Viewers was convened and awarded the respondents $52,644 in compensation for their property. Both parties appealed this award to the Common Pleas Court pursuant to the state procedure, and that proceeding is now pending. Subsequent to the time when the County obtained possession respondents learned that their property had been leased to Martin W. Wise, Inc., allegedly for its private business use. The applicable Pennsylvania substantive law is clear: "It is settled law in Pennsylvania that private property cannot be taken for a private use under the power of eminent domain." Philadelphia Clay Co. v. York Clay Co., 241 Pa. 305, 308, 88 A. 487; see also Winger v. Aires, 371 Pa. 242, 89 A. 2d 521; Lance's Appeal, 55 Pa. 16. [360 U.S. 185, 188] </s> On the basis of this settled law respondents brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, alleging that "at the time of the taking the only definite plan and purpose of the County with regard to said land was that the same would be leased to defendant Martin W. Wise, Inc. for the benefit of the said lessee and for no public use," and seeking a judgment of ouster against the County and Martin W. Wise, Inc., damages, and, in the alternative, an injunction restraining the County from proceeding further in the pending state court damage proceeding. 1 The District Court, although recognizing that its diversity jurisdiction had been properly invoked, dismissed the suit on the ground that it "should not interfere with the administration of the affairs of a political subdivision acting under color of State law in a condemnation proceeding." 154 F. Supp. 628, 629. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a challenge to the validity of a taking such as respondents make in this case may, and perhaps must, be brought in an independent suit different from the Board of Viewers proceeding to assess damages, and that such an independent suit based on diversity of citizenship could therefore be maintained in the District Court. 256 F.2d 241. We granted certiorari because of the important question presented as to whether the District Court had discretion to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case. 358 U.S. 872 . </s> The doctrine of abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be justified under this doctrine only [360 U.S. 185, 189] in the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest. Since no exceptional circumstances justifying abstention appear in this case we think that the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the District Court should have adjudicated the respondents' claim. </s> This Court has sanctioned a federal court's postponement of the exercise of its jurisdiction in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law. See, e. g., City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 ; Government Employees Organizing Comm. v. Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 ; Leiter Minerals, Inc., v. United States, 352 U.S. 220 ; Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 ; Shipman v. DuPre, 339 U.S. 321 ; Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po, 336 U.S. 368 ; American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 ; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 ; Spector Motor Service, Inc., v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 ; Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, Inc., 316 U.S. 168 ; Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 . But there are no federal constitutional questions raised in this case. </s> This Court has also upheld an abstention on grounds of comity with the States when the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal court would disrupt a state administrative process, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 ; Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 , interfere with the collection of state taxes, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 392 ; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 , or otherwise create needless friction by unnecessarily enjoining state officials from executing domestic policies, Alabama Public Service Comm'n v. Southern R. Co., 341 U.S. 341 ; Hawks v. Hamill, 288 U.S. 52 . But adjudication of the issues in this case by the District Court would [360 U.S. 185, 190] present no hazard of disrupting federal-state relations. The respondents did not ask the District Court to apply paramount federal law to prohibit state officials from carrying out state domestic policies, nor do they seek the obvious irritant to state-federal relations of an injunction against state officials. The only question for decision is the purely factual question whether the County expropriated the respondents' land for private rather than for public use. The District Court would simply be acting as would a court of the State in applying to the facts of this case the settled state policy that a County may not take a private citizen's land under the State's power of eminent domain except for public use. </s> It is true that a decision by the District Court returning the land to respondents on the ground that the taking was invalid would interfere with the proceeding to assess damages now pending in the state court in the sense that the damage proceeding would be mooted since the County would no longer have the land. But this interference, if properly called interference at all, cannot justify abstention since exactly the same suit to contest the validity of the taking could be brought in a state court different from the one in which the damage proceeding is now pending. It is perfectly clear under Pennsylvania law that the respondents could have challenged the validity of the taking, on the ground that it was not for public purposes, in a suit brought in a Court of Common Pleas independent of the damage proceedings pending on appeal from the Board of Viewers. The Court of Appeals' opinion instructs us as to the state procedure which would have applied if respondents had chosen the state forum: "These [Pennsylvania] authorities establish the propriety, if not the necessity, of testing the validity of a condemnation in a proceeding in the Pennsylvania courts independent of that in which compensation is awarded." 256 F.2d, at 243. Again the Court of Appeals stated: [360 U.S. 185, 191] "the question involved before the federal court need not, and perhaps cannot, be raised in the pending state action . . . ." Ibid. We, of course, usually accept state law as found by the Court of Appeals, see Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 ; The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 596 , and we have no hesitancy in doing so here where there is no indication that its conclusion as to the state law is not correct. 2 The issues of validity and damage are triable separately not because federal jurisdiction has been invoked, but because they are triable separately under the Pennsylvania law. Respondents, it bears repetition, could have brought this very suit in a state court different from the one in which the damage proceeding is pending and an adjudication of that validity suit by the state court would have the same effect on the pending damage proceeding as will the federal court adjudication. Instead of bringing such a suit in the state court, respondents exercised their right under 28 U.S.C. 1332 to institute the equivalent suit in the District Court based on diversity of citizenship. Certainly considerations of comity are satisfied if the District Court acts toward the pending state damage proceeding in the same manner as would a state court. </s> It is suggested, however, that abstention is justified on grounds of avoiding the hazard of friction in federal-state relations any time a District Court is called on to adjudicate a case involving the State's power of eminent domain, even though, as in this case, the District Court would simply be applying state law in the same manner as would a state court. But the fact that a case concerns [360 U.S. 185, 192] a State's power of eminent domain no more justifies abstention than the fact that it involves any other issue related to sovereignty. Surely eminent domain is no more mystically involved with "sovereign prerogative" than a State's power to regulate fishing in its waters, Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 , its power to regulate intrastate trucking rates, Public Utilities Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 , a city's power to issue certain bonds without a referendum, Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 , its power to license motor vehicles, Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 , and a host of other governmental activities carried on by the States and their subdivisions which have been brought into question in the Federal District Courts despite suggestions that those courts should have stayed their hand pending prior state court determination of state law. </s> Furthermore, the federal courts have been adjudicating cases involving issues of state eminent domain law for many years, without any suggestion that there was entailed a hazard of friction in federal-state relations. A host of cases, many in this Court, have approved the decision by a federal court of precisely the same kind of state eminent domain question which the District Court was asked to decide in this case. This Court approved such a decision as early as 1878, 3 in Boom Co. v. Patterson, [360 U.S. 185, 193] 98 U.S. 403 . There the petitioner, a private corporation authorized to utilize the State's power of eminent domain, moved in a state court to condemn respondent's land. Both parties appealed from an award by Commissioners, as provided by the relevant state statute, to a state court for a trial de novo. At this point, respondent removed the case to a federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. This Court, while recognizing that eminent domain is "an exercise by the State of its sovereign right . . . and with its exercise the United States . . . has no right to interfere . . .," held that the removal was proper and that the federal court correctly adjudicated the issues involved. The Court concluded: "But notwithstanding the right is one that appertains to sovereignty, when the sovereign power attaches conditions to its exercise, the inquiry whether the conditions have been observed is a proper matter for judicial cognizance. If that inquiry take the form of a proceeding before the courts between parties, . . . there is a controversy which is subject to the ordinary incidents of a civil suit, and its determination derogates in no respect from the sovereignty of the State." 98 U.S., at 406 . This rationale was subsequently applied by this Court to uphold adjudication of state eminent domain proceedings involving suits between diverse parties in the federal courts even though the procedures available would not be the same as those provided [360 U.S. 185, 194] by the state practice, Searl v. School District No. 2, 124 U.S. 197 , and even though the case involved the power of the condemning authority to take the property, Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 17 -23. </s> It is now settled practice for Federal District Courts to decide state condemnation proceedings in proper cases despite challenges to the power of the condemning authority to take the property. This Court has approved of the practice many times. East Tennessee, Va. & Ga. R. Co. v. Southern Telegraph Co., 112 U.S. 306 ; Clinton v. Missouri P. R. Co., 122 U.S. 469 ; Upshur County v. Rich, 135 U.S. 467, 475 -477 (dictum); Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 151 U.S. 673, 683 (dictum); Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 ; Mason City and Fort Dodge R. Co. v. Boynton, 204 U.S. 570 ; Commissioners of Lafayette County v. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co., 257 U.S. 547 (dictum); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439 . Cf. Risty v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 270 U.S. 378 . Trial of state eminent domain cases has become a common practice in the federal courts. 4 Indeed, Rule 71A of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, [360 U.S. 185, 195] adopted by the Court in 1951, provides a detailed procedure for use in eminent domain cases in the Federal District Courts and specifically provides, in subsection (k), "The practice as herein prescribed governs in actions involving the exercise of the power of eminent domain under the law of a state, provided that if the state law makes provision for trial of any issue by jury, or for trial of the issue of compensation by jury or commission or both, that provision shall be followed." This Rule makes perfectly clear, as do the Notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules pertaining to it, 5 that this Court, when it adopted the Rule, intended that state eminent domain cases, including those which raised questions of authority to take land, would be tried in the Federal District Courts if jurisdiction was properly invoked. This was confirmed by this Court's opinion in Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 . Although holding that the respondent could not remove a state condemnation case to the Federal District Court on diversity grounds because he was the plaintiff in the state proceeding, the Court clearly recognized that the defendant in such a proceeding could remove in accordance with 1441 and obtain a federal adjudication of the issues involved. </s> There is no suggestion that the state eminent domain proceedings tried in the federal courts, both before and after promulgation of the Rule 71A procedures, have resulted in misapplication of state law, inconvenience, or friction with the States. Rule 71A was adopted only after a thorough investigation of eminent domain practice in the federal courts, 6 and its provision for trying state [360 U.S. 185, 196] eminent domain cases in the District Courts necessarily reflects a conclusion that this practice is unobjectionable. </s> Aside from the complete absence of any possibility that a District Court adjudication in this case would necessitate decision of a federal constitutional issue or conflict with state policy, the state law that the District Court was asked to apply is clear and certain. All that was necessary for the District Court to dispose of this case was to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the respondents' property was taken for the private use of Martin W. Wise, Inc. The propriety of a federal adjudication in this case follows a fortiori from the established principle that Federal District Courts should apply settled state law without abstaining from the exercise of jurisdiction even though this course would require decision of difficult federal constitutional questions. Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 357 U.S. 77 ; Public Utilities Comm'n of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 ; Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 . </s> The undesirability of a refusal to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of exceptional circumstances which clearly justify an abstention is demonstrated by the facts of this case. Respondents have consumed considerable time and expense in pursuing their claim that their property has been unlawfully taken. To order them out of the federal court would accomplish nothing except to require still another lawsuit, with added delay and expense for all parties. This would be a particular hardship for the respondents, who, besides incurring the added expense, would also suffer a further prolonged unlawful denial of the possession of their property if ultimately they prevail against the County and its lessee. It exacts a severe penalty from citizens for their attempt to exercise rights of access to the federal courts granted them by Congress to deny them "that promptness of decision [360 U.S. 185, 197] which in all judicial actions is one of the elements of justice." Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 513 . </s> Two other contentions raised by the County can be disposed of quickly. The County argues that the Board of Viewers has established jurisdiction over the land in question and thus the rule applies that when one court has assumed jurisdiction over a res, no other court will undertake to enter a judgment which might be incompatible with the disposition ultimately to be made by the first court. The short answer to this contention is that the Board of Viewers under Pennsylvania law does not have in rem jurisdiction over property. This is apparent from the fact that an independent proceeding lies to question the validity of the taking of property which is the subject of a Board of Viewers' proceeding. The "damage" proceeding is simply an in personam suit to determine what the State must pay for property it appropriates; it does not require or contemplate control of the res by the Board of Viewers. </s> The County also urges that a decision by the District Court holding the taking to be invalid would be barred by 28 U.S.C. 2283. That section provides: </s> "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." </s> The County's theory is that a holding that the taking was invalid and an order reconveying the land to respondents would be res judicata on the parties in the Board of Viewers' proceedings. Since the County would no longer have the land, that proceeding to determine the compensation due for the taking of the land would be mooted. But it has been firmly established under the language of [360 U.S. 185, 198] 2283, which has, in substance, been in force since first enacted in 5 of the Act of March 2, 1793, 7 that a federal suit is not barred merely because a holding in the case might be res judicata on the same parties litigating the same issue in a state court and thereby moot the state proceeding. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 , settled the governing principle. In that case diversity jurisdiction had been invoked to adjudicate an alleged breach of contract. The defendant in the federal court proceeding had initiated a suit in a state court to adjudicate the same issue. The Court of Appeals ruled that the Federal District Court should have issued a requested injunction to stay the state court proceedings. This Court held that a statute similar to present 2283 barred the injunction, but that the District Court could adjudicate the breach of contract issue even though its holding would be decisive of the state case. The Court stated that "the rule . . . has become generally established that where the action first brought is in personam and seeks only a personal judgment, another action for the same cause in another jurisdiction is not precluded." 260 U.S., at 230 . Congress in enacting 2283 expressed no intention to modify this firmly established principle. Thus there is no reason to expand the plain wording of 2283 which bars only injunctions designed to stay state court proceedings. The respondents' suit in the District Court was for a judgment of ouster. They abandoned the claim for an injunction against the state court and against the County. It follows that 2283 would not bar the relief requested in the District Court. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The prayer for injunctive relief was expressly abandoned in oral argument before this Court. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court of Appeals' conclusion as to the Pennsylvania law is amply supported by Pennsylvania authorities. E. g., Spann v. Joint Boards of School Directors, 381 Pa. 338, 113 A. 2d 281; Pioneer Coal Co. v. Cherrytree & D. R. Co., 272 Pa. 43, 116 A. 45; Philadelphia Clay Co. v. York Clay Co., 241 Pa. 305, 88 A. 487. See also 14 Standard Pa. Practice, c. 71, 230, 231, 233, 235. </s> [Footnote 3 The basis for federal court adjudication of state eminent domain proceedings was established even before this. In Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67; Union Bank v. Jolly's Adm'rs, 18 How. 503; and Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, this Court held that the federal courts would decide diversity cases even though they involved issues, such as the validity of a will, which were peculiarly within the State's competence to regulate. The principles were clearly settled in Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S. 10 . That case concerned a suit "to annul [a will] . . . as a muniment of title, and to limit the operation of the decree admitting it to probate." 92 U.S., at 20 . The case, originally brought in a state court, was removed to a federal court on the basis of diversity [360 U.S. 185, 193] of citizenship. This Court upheld the removal on the ground that, although the State had authority to establish the substantive law relevant to the validity of wills and the procedure by which wills were to be contested, if, under the scheme developed by the State, a controversy arose between citizens of different States, the federal courts would adjudicate that controversy. These principles were further articulated in Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529 . This Court has often upheld federal court determinations of state law concerning wills, e. g., Ellis v. Davis, 109 U.S. 485 ; Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73 , even when the State itself claimed the decedent's property by escheat, McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 . </s> [Footnote 4 E. g., Wabash R. Co. v. Duncan, 170 F.2d 38; Franzen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 278 F. 370; In re Bensel, 206 F. 369; Broadmoor Land Co. v. Curr, 142 F. 421; South Dakota Cent. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co., 141 F. 578; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. 10 Parcels of Real Estate Located in Madison County, Iowa, 159 F. Supp. 140; Williams Live Stock Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 285 F. 795; Deepwater R. Co. v. Western Pocahontas Coal & Lumber Co., 152 F. 824; Union Terminal R. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 119 F. 209; Kirby v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 106 F. 551; Sugar Creek, P. B. & P. C. R. Co. v. McKell, 75 F. 34; Kansas City & T. R. Co. v. Interstate Lumber Co., 37 F. 3; Mineral Range R. Co. v. Detroit & Lake Superior Copper Co., 25 F. 515; City of Chicago v. Hutchinson, 15 F. 129. Cf. Kaw Valley Drainage District v. Metropolitan Water Co., 186 F. 315; Fishblatt v. Atlantic City, 174 F. 196; Adams v. City of Woburn, 174 F. 192; Kansas City v. Hennegan, 152 F. 249. See also 7 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) 71A.11; 6 Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed.) 27.8 2.. </s> [Footnote 5 Note to Subdivision (k), Notes to Rule 71A of Advisory Committee on Rules, printed at 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 71A (1958 Pocket Part). </s> [Footnote 6 See Notes to Rule 71A of Advisory Committee on Rules, note 8, supra; see also 7 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) 71A.120; 64 Yale L. J. 600. </s> [Footnote 7 The language of 28 U.S.C. 2283 has been retained substantially unchanged from its original form in 5 of the Act of March 2, 1793, 1 Stat. 334-335. For a discussion of its origin and history, see Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 . [360 U.S. 185, 199] </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN join, dissenting. </s> The Court says that under the peculiar facts of this case the trial judge has abused his discretion in abstaining from trying the issue involved here, which is presently pending in a previously filed state case between the same parties. I see nothing in the facts that reveals any clear abuse of discretion. In fact, the disruption of the State's processes by the refusal of the Court in the circumstances of this case to permit the application of modern businesslike procedures in the administration of the federal diversity jurisdiction requires my dissent. </s> Allegheny County, a subdivision of the State of Pennsylvania, took action under its state law to acquire property owned by respondents which was allegedly necessary for the enlargement of its Greater Pittsburgh Airport. The respondents made no effort to remove that action to the federal court. If that had been done, the entire case would have been subject to trial in the federal court. Instead, however, the respondents appeared in the state case and contested the issue of damages for the taking, but raised no objection whatever to its validity. Both parties appealed from an award of $52,644 in damages and demanded a trial de novo in the State's Court of Common Pleas. The County thereupon entered upon the property and began its improvement. A year later respondents filed this suit in the federal court attacking the validity of the County's taking in the state suit. 1 </s> [360 U.S. 185, 200] The Court requires the County to litigate that sole issue in the federal court while the state court holds in abeyance the original case involving the taking as well as the damages therefor. </s> Thus the state suit is split; the validity of the taking being involved in the federal court as well as the state proceeding, while the amount of damages remains for the state court alone. Admittedly the federal court cannot obtain jurisdiction over the latter. As a result, the County now has two lawsuits on its hands, one, involving half of its state case, will be tried in the federal court, while the remainder pends in the state court. If it finally prevails in the federal court, after two or three more years of delay incident to trial and appeal, still it must go back to its state case and try the issue of damages. If the County loses in the federal court, it must nevertheless go back to the state court and start all over again with a new action or an amendment of the old one. This is true because the plans, as shown in the record, indicate clearly that the County will be obliged to take respondents' property because it is situated adjacent to the old entrance to the airport and would be necessary for the proposed enlargement. The latter course would inevitably lead to greater damages, as well as additional years of delay, all of which would be occasioned by the action today. </s> The Court describes this needless merry-go-round of technical procedures as preventing "added expense [and] . . . further prolonged unlawful denial of the possession of their [respondents'] property. . . ." Obviously just the opposite is true. The respondents, by not removing the case to the federal court, but rather by waiting a year before filing the present suit, have now delayed the [360 U.S. 185, 201] County for over three years, 2 and bid fair to extend that period for at least two more under the ruling of this Court. On the other hand, if the Court required respondents to proceed in the state suit, all of the issues between the parties would be settled in the one suit, even if respondents persisted - as the Court holds is their right - in filing a separate suit in the state court over the validity of the taking. That suit could easily be consolidated with the original case, and the validity of the taking as well as the damages therefor could be settled at one trial. This, of course, cannot be done when one of the cases is in the federal court and the other in the state. This points up the fallacy of the Court's conclusion that "considerations of comity are satisfied if the [Federal] District Court acts toward the pending state damage proceeding in the same manner as would a state court." It is, indeed, a poor way to administer justice, especially where a subdivision of the State is involved. </s> In short, I say that under the peculiar facts of this case the "exceptional circumstances" of which the majority speaks are present. An "order to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest," namely, the orderly and businesslike administration of justice, as well as the comity due Pennsylvania's courts. </s> As to the latter consideration, the Court bottoms its decision to make the County split its case between the two jurisdictions on the proposition that respondents "abandoned the claim for an injunction against the state [360 U.S. 185, 202] court and against the County." But the reality of the situation is that the state court, which has already abstained for three years at the urging of respondents may now decide that it should proceed to hear and determine both the issues of validity and damages which are and have been pending in the state case. If it did so, there would result an unseemly race between the forums and a head-on collision between the state and federal courts. The latter would be moving by way of ejectment and the former by way of condemnation over the same property and involving the same parties. Still, since, as the majority says, "the plain wording of 2283 . . . bars . . . injunctions," this unseemly spectacle could not be stopped and would result in "needless friction with state policies." Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941). In view of these circumstances, peculiar to this case, there is nothing here to show that the trial court clearly abused its discretion and I would therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial judge. </s> [Footnote 1 The grounds are obviously frivolous. Respondents urge that the County's leasing to its contractor of a strip 75' x 150' out of the 8 acres condemned amounts to an abandonment of its taking for "public use." The record shows that the lease was made in order to permit the contractor to use this small strip for storage and [360 U.S. 185, 200] concentration of supplies of the contractor in the performance of his duties under the contract with the County for the improvement and enlargement of the Greater Pittsburgh Airport. </s> [Footnote 2 The record does not reveal whether the County has proceeded with its improvements or not. If it has not, the respondents' action in filing this suit, and which the Court approves, has delayed a much-needed improvement for over three years. If it has proceeded to complete the improvement, the County has still been delayed in obtaining final title to the property for all these years, all because of this frivolous action of the respondents. </s> [360 U.S. 185, 203]

United States Supreme Court ALLIED TUBE & CONDUIT CORP. v. INDIAN HEAD, INC.(1988) No. 87-157 Argued: February 24, 1988Decided: June 13, 1988 </s> The National Fire Protection Association - a private organization that includes members representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized medicine, firefighters, and government - sets and publishes product standards and codes related to fire protection. Its National Electrical Code (Code), which establishes requirements for the design and installation of electrical wiring systems, is routinely adopted into law by a substantial number of state and local governments, and is widely adopted as setting acceptable standards by private product-certification laboratories, insurance underwriters, and electrical inspectors, contractors, and distributors. Throughout the relevant period, the Code permitted the use of electrical conduit made of steel. Respondent, a manufacturer of plastic conduit, initiated a proposal before the Association to extend Code approval to plastic conduit as well. The proposal was approved by one of the Association's professional panels, and thus could be adopted into the Code by a simple majority of the members attending the Association's 1980 annual meeting. Before the meeting was held, petitioner, the Nation's largest producer of steel conduit, members of the steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and independent sales agents collectively agreed to exclude respondent's product from the 1981 Code by packing the annual meeting with new Association members whose only function was to vote against respondent's proposal. After the proposal was defeated at the meeting and an appeal to the Association's Board of Directors was denied, respondent brought suit in Federal District Court, alleging that petitioner and others had unreasonably restrained trade in the electrical conduit market in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act. The jury found petitioner liable, but the court granted a judgment n.o.v. for petitioner, reasoning that it was entitled to antitrust immunity under the doctrine of Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 . The Court of Appeals reversed. </s> Held: </s> Noerr antitrust immunity does not apply to petitioner. Pp. 499-510. </s> (a) The scope of Noerr protection depends on the source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue. Where a restraint is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, [486 U.S. 492, 493] those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint. In this case, the relevant context is the standard-setting process of a private association without official authority that includes members having horizontal and vertical business relations and economic incentives to restrain competition. Such an association cannot be treated as a "quasi-legislative" body simply because legislatures routinely adopt its Code, and thus petitioner does not enjoy the immunity afforded those who merely urge the government to restrain trade. Pp. 499-502. </s> (b) Nor does Noerr immunity apply to petitioner on the theory that the exclusion of plastic conduit from the Code, and the effect that exclusion had of its own force in the marketplace, were incidental to a valid effort to influence governmental action. Although, because a large number of governments routinely adopt the Code into law, efforts to influence the Association's standard-setting process are arguably the most effective means of influencing legislation regulating electrical conduit, and although Noerr immunity is not limited to "direct" petitioning of government officials, the Noerr doctrine does not immunize every concerted activity that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action. There is no merit to the argument that, regardless of the Association's nonlegislative status, petitioner's efforts to influence the Association must be given the same wide berth accorded legislative lobbying or efforts to influence legislative action in the political arena. Pp. 502-504. </s> (c) Unlike the publicity campaign to influence legislation in Noerr, petitioner's activity did not take place in the open political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of decisionmaking, but took place within the confines of a private standard-setting process. The validity of petitioner's efforts to influence the Code is not established, without more, by petitioner's literal compliance with the Association's rules, for the hope of the Code's procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining competition. An association cannot validate the anticompetitive activities of its members simply by adopting rules that fail to provide such safeguards. At least where, as here, an economically interested party exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force in the marketplace. Pp. 505-510. </s> 817 F.2d 938, affirmed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., [486 U.S. 492, 494] joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'CONNOR, J., joined, post, p. 511. </s> Marvin E. Frankel argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Robert M. Heller, Arthur B. Kramer, and Debora K. Grobman. </s> Fredric W. Yerman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael Malina, Randolph S. Sherman, and Richard A. De Sevo. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Illinois by Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, and Robert E. Davy, Jr., Assistant Attorney General; and for the Western Fire Chiefs Association et al. by William J. Meeske and Alexander D. Thomson. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the United States et al. by Solicitor General Fried, Assistant Attorney General Rule, Deputy Solicitor General Cohen, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Starling, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Robert B. Nicholson, John J. Powers III, Marion L. Jetton, Robert D. Paul, and Ernest J. Isenstadt; and for the State of Alaska et al. by Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York, O. Peter Sherwood, Solicitor General, and Lloyd E. Constantine, Susan Beth Farmer, Elizabeth M. O'Neill, and George W. Sampson, Assistant Attorneys General, Grace Berg Schaible, Attorney General of Alaska, Richard D. Monkmon, Assistant Attorney General, Robert K. Corbin, Attorney General of Arizona, John Steven Clark, Attorney General of Arkansas, Jeffrey A. Bell, Deputy Attorney General, John Van de Kamp, Attorney General of California, Andrea Ordin, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Thomas P. Dove, Deputy Attorney General, Duane Woodard, Attorney General of Colorado, Thomas P. McMahon, First Assistant Attorney General, Joseph I. Lieberman, Attorney General of Connecticut, Robert M. Langer, Assistant Attorney General, Warren Price III, Attorney General of Hawaii, Robert A. Marks, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, John Perkins, Deputy Attorney General, James E. Tierney, Attorney General, of Maine, Stephen L. Wessler, Assistant Attorney General, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland, Michael F. Brockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Robert C. Ard, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Hubert H. Humphrey III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Cary Edwards, Attorney General of New Jersey, Laurel A. Price, Deputy Attorney General, Lacy H. Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, Richard H. Carlton, Assistant Attorney General, Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General of Ohio, Dave [486 U.S. 492, 495] Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon, LeRoy S. Zimmerman, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Eugene F. Wayne, Chief Deputy Attorney General, James E. O'Neil, Attorney General of Rhode Island, Roger A. Tellinghuisen, Attorney General of South Dakota, Jim Mattox, Attorney General of Texas, Mary F. Keller, Executive Assistant Attorney General, John J. White, Assistant Attorney General, David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General of Utah, Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Attorney General of Washington, John R. Ellis, Deputy Attorney General, Tina Kondo, Assistant Attorney General, Charles G. Brown, Attorney General of West Virginia, Mark D. Kindt, Deputy Attorney General, Donald J. Hanaway, Attorney General of Wisconsin, and Kevin J. O'Connor, Assistant Attorney General. [486 U.S. 492, 495] </s> JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Petitioner contends that its efforts to affect the product standard-setting process of a private association are immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr doctrine primarily because the association's standards are widely adopted into law by state and local governments. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (Noerr). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Noerr immunity did not apply. We affirm. </s> I </s> The National Fire Protection Association (Association) is a private, voluntary organization with more than 31,500 individual and group members representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized medicine, firefighters, and government. The Association, among other things, publishes product standards and codes related to fire protection through a process known as "consensus standard making." One of the codes it publishes is the National Electrical Code (Code), which establishes product and performance requirements for the design and installation of electrical wiring systems. Revised every three years, the Code is the most influential electrical code in the nation. A substantial number of state and local governments routinely adopt the Code into law with little or no change; private certification laboratories, such as Underwriters Laboratories, normally will not list and label [486 U.S. 492, 496] an electrical product that does not meet Code standards; many underwriters will refuse to insure structures that are not built in conformity with the Code; and many electrical inspectors, contractors, and distributors will not use a product that falls outside the Code. </s> Among the electrical products covered by the Code is electrical conduit, the hollow tubing used as a raceway to carry electrical wires through the walls and floors of buildings. Throughout the relevant period, the Code permitted using electrical conduit made of steel, and almost all conduit sold was in fact steel conduit. Starting in 1980, respondent began to offer plastic conduit made of polyvinyl chloride. Respondent claims its plastic conduit offers significant competitive advantages over steel conduit, including pliability, lower installed cost, and lower susceptibility to short circuiting. In 1980, however, there was also a scientific basis for concern that, during fires in high-rise buildings, polyvinyl chloride conduit might burn and emit toxic fumes. </s> Respondent initiated a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride conduit as an approved type of electrical conduit in the 1981 edition of the Code. Following approval by one of the Association's professional panels, this proposal was scheduled for consideration at the 1980 annual meeting, where it could be adopted or rejected by a simple majority of the members present. Alarmed that, if approved, respondent's product might pose a competitive threat to steel conduit, petitioner, the Nation's largest producer of steel conduit, met to plan strategy with, among others, members of the steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and its independent sales agents. They collectively agreed to exclude respondent's product from the 1981 Code by packing the upcoming annual meeting with new Association members whose only function would be to vote against the polyvinyl chloride proposal. </s> Combined, the steel interests recruited 230 persons to join the Association and to attend the annual meeting to [486 U.S. 492, 497] vote against the proposal. Petitioner alone recruited 155 persons - including employees, executives, sales agents, the agents' employees, employees from two divisions that did not sell electrical products, and the wife of a national sales director. Petitioner and the other steel interests also paid over $100,000 for the membership, registration, and attendance expenses of these voters. At the annual meeting, the steel group voters were instructed where to sit and how and when to vote by group leaders who used walkie-talkies and hand signals to facilitate communication. Few of the steel group voters had any of the technical documentation necessary to follow the meeting. None of them spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the proposal to approve polyvinyl chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with their solid vote in opposition, the proposal was rejected and returned to committee by a vote of 394 to 390. Respondent appealed the membership's vote to the Association's Board of Directors, but the Board denied the appeal on the ground that, although the Association's rules had been circumvented, they had not been violated. 1 </s> In October 1981, respondent brought this suit in Federal District Court, alleging that petitioner and others had unreasonably restrained trade in the electrical conduit market in violation of 1 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1. A bifurcated jury trial began in March 1985. Petitioner conceded that it had conspired with the other steel interests to exclude respondent's product from the Code and that it had a pecuniary interest to do so. The jury, instructed under the rule of reason that respondent carried the burden of showing that the anticompetitive effects of petitioner's actions outweighed any procompetitive benefits of standard [486 U.S. 492, 498] setting, found petitioner liable. In answers to special interrogatories, the jury found that petitioner did not violate any rules of the Association and acted, at least in part, based on a genuine belief that plastic conduit was unsafe, but that petitioner nonetheless did "subvert" the consensus standardmaking process of the Association. App. 23-24. The jury also made special findings that petitioner's actions had an adverse impact on competition, were not the least restrictive means of expressing petitioner's opposition to the use of polyvinyl chloride conduit in the marketplace, and unreasonably restrained trade in violation of the antitrust laws. The jury then awarded respondent damages, to be trebled, of $3.8 million for lost profits resulting from the effect that excluding polyvinyl chloride conduit from the 1981 Code had of its own force in the marketplace. No damages were awarded for injuries stemming from the adoption of the 1981 Code by governmental entities. 2 </s> The District Court then granted a judgment n.o.v. for petitioner, reasoning that Noerr immunity applied because the Association was "akin to a legislature" and because petitioner, "by the use of methods consistent with acceptable standards of political action, genuinely intended to influence the [Association] with respect to the National Electrical Code, and to thereby influence the various state and local legislative bodies which adopt the [Code]." App. to Pet. for [486 U.S. 492, 499] Cert. 28a, 30a. The Court of Appeals reversed, rejecting both the argument that the Association should be treated as a "quasi-legislative" body because legislatures routinely adopt the Code and the argument that efforts to influence the Code were immune under Noerr as indirect attempts to influence state and local governments. 817 F.2d 938 (1987). We granted certiorari to address important issues regarding the application of Noerr immunity to private standard-setting associations. 3 </s> 484 U.S. 814 (1987). </s> II </s> Concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning government officials are protected from antitrust liability under the doctrine established by Noerr; Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 -672 (1965); and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The scope of this protection depends, however, on the source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue. "[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action," those urging the governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the anticompetitive restraint. Noerr, 365 U.S., at 136 ; see also Pennington, supra, at 671. In addition, where, independent of any government action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from private action, the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is "incidental" to a valid effort to influence governmental action. Noerr, supra, at 143. The validity of such efforts, and thus the applicability of Noerr immunity, varies with the context and nature of the activity. A publicity campaign directed at the general public, seeking legislation or executive action, enjoys antitrust immunity even when the campaign employs unethical [486 U.S. 492, 500] and deceptive methods. Noerr, supra, at 140-141. But in less political arenas, unethical and deceptive practices can constitute abuses of administrative or judicial processes that may result in antitrust violations. 4 California Motor Transport, supra, at 512-513. </s> In this case, the restraint of trade on which liability was predicated was the Association's exclusion of respondent's product from the Code, and no damages were imposed for the incorporation of that Code by any government. The relevant context is thus the standard-setting process of a private association. Typically, private standard-setting associations, like the Association in this case, include members having horizontal and vertical business relations. See generally 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law § 1477, p. 343 (1986) (trade and standard-setting associations routinely treated as continuing conspiracies of their members). There is no doubt that the members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious potential for anticompetitive harm. 5 See American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982). Agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products. Accordingly, private standard-setting associations have traditionally been objects of antitrust scrutiny. See, e. g., ibid.; Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam). See also FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, [486 U.S. 492, 501] 476 U.S. 447 (1986). When, however, private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of objective expert judgments and through procedures that prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in stifling product competition, cf. Hydrolevel, supra, at 570-573 (noting absence of "meaningful safeguards"), those private standards can have significant procompetitive advantages. It is this potential for procompetitive benefits that has led most lower courts to apply rule-of-reason analysis to product standard-setting by private associations. 6 </s> Given this context, petitioner does not enjoy the immunity accorded those who merely urge the government to restrain trade. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Association cannot be treated as a "quasi-legislative" body simply because legislatures routinely adopt the Code the Association publishes. 817 F.2d, at 943-944. Whatever de facto authority the Association enjoys, no official authority has been conferred on it by any government, and the decisionmaking body of the Association is composed, at least in part, of persons with economic incentives to restrain trade. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 -708 (1962). See also id., at 706-707; Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 -792 (1975). "We may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that [a government] acts in the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to be acting primarily on his or its own behalf." Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 45 (1985). The dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental action and those resulting from private action [486 U.S. 492, 502] may not always be obvious. 7 But where, as here, the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the public and without official authority, many of whom have personal financial interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty concluding that the restraint has resulted from private action. </s> Noerr immunity might still apply, however, if, as petitioner argues, the exclusion of polyvinyl chloride conduit from the Code, and the effect that exclusion had of its own force in the marketplace, were incidental to a valid effort to influence governmental action. Petitioner notes that the lion's share of the anticompetitive effect in this case came from the predictable adoption of the Code into law by a large number of state and local governments. See 817 F.2d, at 939, n. 1. Indeed, petitioner argues that, because state and local governments rely so heavily on the Code and lack the resources or technical expertise to second-guess it, efforts to influence the Association's standard-setting process are the most effective means of influencing legislation regulating electrical conduit. This claim to Noerr immunity has some force. The effort to influence governmental action in this case certainly cannot be characterized as a sham given the actual adoption of the 1981 Code into a number of statutes and local ordinances. Nor can we quarrel with petitioner's contention that, given the widespread adoption of the Code into [486 U.S. 492, 503] law, any effect the 1981 Code had in the marketplace of its own force was, in the main, incidental to petitioner's genuine effort to influence governmental action. 8 And, as petitioner persuasively argues, the claim of Noerr immunity cannot be dismissed on the ground that the conduct at issue involved no "direct" petitioning of government officials, for Noerr itself immunized a form of "indirect" petitioning. See Noerr (immunizing a publicity campaign directed at the general public on the ground that it was part of an effort to influence legislative and executive action). </s> Nonetheless, the validity of petitioner's actions remains an issue. We cannot agree with petitioner's absolutist position that the Noerr doctrine immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence governmental action. If all such conduct were immunized then, for example, competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price agreements as long as they wished to propose that price as an appropriate level for governmental ratemaking or price supports. But see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456 -463 (1945). Horizontal conspiracies or boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from the government would be immunized on the ground that they are genuinely intended to influence the government to agree to the conspirators' terms. But see Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942). Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal output restrictions on the ground that they are intended to dramatize the plight of their industry and spur legislative action. Immunity might even be [486 U.S. 492, 504] claimed for anticompetitive mergers on the theory that they give the merging corporations added political clout. Nor is it necessarily dispositive that packing the Association's meeting may have been the most effective means of securing government action, for one could imagine situations where the most effective means of influencing government officials is bribery, and we have never suggested that that kind of attempt to influence the government merits protection. We thus conclude that the Noerr immunity of anticompetitive activity intended to influence the government depends not only on its impact, but also on the context and nature of the activity. </s> Here petitioner's actions took place within the context of the standard-setting process of a private association. Having concluded that the Association is not a "quasi-legislative" body, we reject petitioner's argument that any efforts to influence the Association must be treated as efforts to influence a "quasi-legislature" and given the same wide berth accorded legislative lobbying. That rounding up supporters is an acceptable and constitutionally protected method of influencing elections does not mean that rounding up economically interested persons to set private standards must also be protected. Nor do we agree with petitioner's contention that, regardless of the Association's nonlegislative status, the effort to influence the Code should receive the same wide latitude given ethically dubious efforts to influence legislative action in the political arena, see Noerr, 365 U.S., at 140 -141, simply because the ultimate aim of the effort to influence the private standard-setting process was (principally) legislative action. The ultimate aim is not dispositive. A misrepresentation to a court would not necessarily be entitled to the same antitrust immunity allowed deceptive practices in the political arena simply because the odds were very good that the court's decision would be codified - nor for that matter would misrepresentations made under oath at a legislative committee hearing in the hopes of spurring legislative action. [486 U.S. 492, 505] </s> What distinguishes this case from Noerr and its progeny is that the context and nature of petitioner's activity make it the type of commercial activity that has traditionally had its validity determined by the antitrust laws themselves. True, in Noerr we immunized conduct that could be characterized as a conspiracy among railroads to destroy business relations between truckers and their customers. Noerr, supra, at 142. But we noted there: </s> "There are no specific findings that the railroads attempted directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers. Moreover, all the evidence in the record, both oral and documentary, deals with the railroads' efforts to influence the passage and enforcement of laws. Circulars, speeches, newspaper articles, editorials, magazine articles, memoranda and all other documents discuss in one way or another the railroads' charges that heavy trucks injure the roads, violate the laws and create traffic hazards, and urge that truckers should be forced to pay a fair share of the costs of rebuilding the roads, that they should be compelled to obey the laws, and that limits should be placed upon the weight of the loads they are permitted to carry." 365 U.S., at 142 -143. </s> In light of those findings, we characterized the railroads' activity as a classic "attempt . . . to influence legislation by a campaign of publicity," an "inevitable" and "incidental" effect of which was "the infliction of some direct injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed." Id., at 143. The essential character of such a publicity campaign was, we concluded, political, and could not be segregated from the activity's impact on business. Rather, the plaintiff's cause of action simply embraced the inherent possibility in such political fights "that one group or the other will get hurt by the arguments that are made." Id., at 144. As a political activity, special factors counseled against regulating the publicity campaign under the antitrust laws: [486 U.S. 492, 506] </s> "Insofar as [the Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and, as we have already pointed out, a publicity campaign to influence governmental action falls clearly into the category of political activity. The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the political arena. Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution in legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of political activities, a caution which has been reflected in the decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. All of this caution would go for naught if we permitted an extension of the Sherman Act to regulate activities of that nature simply because those activities have a commercial impact and involve conduct that can be termed unethical." Id., at 140-141 (footnote omitted). </s> In Noerr, then, the political context and nature of the activity precluded inquiry into its antitrust validity. 9 </s> Here the context and nature of the activity do not counsel against inquiry into its validity. Unlike the publicity campaign in Noerr, the activity at issue here did not take place in the open political arena, where partisanship is the hallmark of decisionmaking, but within the confines of a private standard-setting process. The validity of conduct within that process has long been defined and circumscribed by the antitrust laws without regard to whether the private standards are likely to be adopted into law. See supra, at 500. Indeed, because private standard-setting by associations comprising firms with horizontal and vertical business relations is permitted at all under the antitrust laws only on the [486 U.S. 492, 507] understanding that it will be conducted in a nonpartisan manner offering procompetitive benefits, see ibid., the standards of conduct in this context are, at least in some respects, more rigorous than the standards of conduct prevailing in the partisan political arena or in the adversarial process of adjudication. The activity at issue here thus cannot, as in Noerr, be characterized as an activity that has traditionally been regulated with extreme caution, see Noerr, 365 U.S., at 141 , or as an activity that "bear[s] little if any resemblance to the combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act," id., at 136. And petitioner did not confine itself to efforts to persuade an independent decisionmaker, cf. id., at 138, 139 (describing the immunized conduct as "mere solicitation"); rather, it organized and orchestrated the actual exercise of the Association's decisionmaking authority in setting a standard. Nor can the setting of the Association's Code be characterized as merely an exercise of the power of persuasion, for it in part involves the exercise of market power. The Association's members, after all, include consumers, distributors, and manufacturers of electrical conduit, and any agreement to exclude polyvinyl chloride conduit from the Code is in part an implicit agreement not to trade in that type of electrical conduit. Cf. id., at 136. Although one could reason backwards from the legislative impact of the Code to the conclusion that the conduct at issue here is "political," we think that, given the context and nature of the conduct, it can more aptly be characterized as commercial activity with a political impact. Just as the antitrust laws should not regulate political activities "simply because those activities have a commercial impact," id., at 141, so the antitrust laws should not necessarily immunize what are in essence commercial activities simply because they have a political impact. 10 </s> [486 U.S. 492, 508] </s> NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), is not to the contrary. In that case we held that the First Amendment protected the nonviolent elements of a boycott of white merchants organized by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and designed to make white government and business leaders comply with a list of demands for equality and racial justice. Although the boycotters intended to inflict economic injury on the merchants, the boycott was not motivated by any desire to lessen competition or to reap economic benefits but by the aim of vindicating rights of equality and freedom lying at the heart of the Constitution, and the boycotters were consumers who did not stand to profit financially from a lessening of competition in the boycotted market. Id., at 914-915. Here, in contrast, [486 U.S. 492, 509] petitioner was at least partially motivated by the desire to lessen competition, and, because of petitioner's line of business, stood to reap substantial economic benefits from making it difficult for respondent to compete. 11 </s> Thus in this case the context and nature of petitioner's efforts to influence the Code persuade us that the validity of those efforts must, despite their political impact, be evaluated under the standards of conduct set forth by the antitrust laws that govern the private standard-setting process. The antitrust validity of these efforts is not established, without more, by petitioner's literal compliance with the rules of the Association, for the hope of procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic interests in restraining competition. An association cannot validate the anticompetitive activities of its members simply by adopting rules that fail to provide such safeguards. 12 The issue of immunity in this case thus collapses into the issue of antitrust liability. Although we do not here set forth the rules of antitrust liability governing the private standard-setting process, we hold that at least where, as here, an economically interested party exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market participants, that [486 U.S. 492, 510] party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force in the marketplace. </s> This conclusion does not deprive state and local governments of input and information from interested individuals or organizations or leave petitioner without ample means to petition those governments. Cf. Noerr, 365 U.S., at 137 -138. See also California Motor Transport, 404 U.S., at 510 . Petitioner, and others concerned about the safety or competitive threat of polyvinyl chloride conduit, can, with full antitrust immunity, engage in concerted efforts to influence those governments through direct lobbying, publicity campaigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression. To the extent state and local governments are more difficult to persuade through these other avenues, that no doubt reflects their preference for and confidence in the nonpartisan consensus process that petitioner has undermined. Petitioner remains free to take advantage of the forum provided by the standard-setting process by presenting and vigorously arguing accurate scientific evidence before a nonpartisan private standard-setting body. 13 And petitioner can avoid the strictures of the private standard-setting process by attempting to influence legislatures through other forums. [486 U.S. 492, 511] What petitioner may not do (without exposing itself to possible antitrust liability for direct injuries) is bias the process by, as in this case, stacking the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their economic interest in restraining competition. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Respondent also sought a tentative interim amendment to the Code, but that was denied on the ground that there was not sufficient exigency to merit an interim amendment. The Association subsequently approved use of polyvinyl chloride conduit for buildings of less than three stories in the 1984 Code, and for all buildings in the 1987 Code. </s> [Footnote 2 Although the District Court was of the view that at trial respondent relied solely on the theory that its injury "flowed from legislative action," App. to Pet. for Cert. 31a, the Court of Appeals determined that respondent was awarded damages only on the theory "that the stigma of not obtaining [Code] approval of its products and [petitioner's] `marketing' of that stigma caused independent marketplace harm to [respondent] in those jurisdictions permitting use of [polyvinyl chloride] conduit, as well as those which later adopted the 1984 [Code], which permitted use of [polyvinyl chloride] conduit in buildings less than three stories high. [Respondent] did not seek redress for any injury arising from the adoption of the [Code] by the various governments." 817 F.2d 938, 941, n. 3 (1987) (emphasis added). We decide the case as it was framed by the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 3 We also granted certiorari on the issue whether, if not immune under Noerr, petitioner's conduct violated the Sherman Act, but we now vacate our grant of that issue as improvident. </s> [Footnote 4 Of course, in whatever forum, private action that is not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action is a mere sham that cannot be deemed a valid effort to influence government action. Noerr, 365 U.S., at 144 ; California Motor Transport, 404 U.S., at 511 . </s> [Footnote 5 "Product standardization might impair competition in several ways. . . . [It] might deprive some consumers of a desired product, eliminate quality competition, exclude rival producers, or facilitate oligopolistic pricing by easing rivals' ability to monitor each other's prices." 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law § 1503, p. 373 (1986). </s> [Footnote 6 See 2 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation 61.013., 61.03, 61.04, pp. 61-6 to 61-7, 61-18 to 61-29 (1981) (collecting cases). Concerted efforts to enforce (rather than just agree upon) private product standards face more rigorous antitrust scrutiny. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659 -660 (1961) (per curiam). See also Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941). </s> [Footnote 7 See, e. g., California Motor Transport, supra, at 513 (stating in dicta that "[c]onspiracy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor" or "bribery of a public purchasing agent" may violate the antitrust laws); Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 671 , and n. 4 (1965) (holding that immunity applied but noting that the trade restraint at issue "was the act of a public official who is not claimed to be a co-conspirator" and contrasting Continental Ore); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 -708 (1962); 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, Antitrust Law § 206 (1978) (discussing the extent to which Noerr immunity should apply to commercial transactions involving the government). See also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 -792 (1975); Continental Ore, supra, at 706-707. </s> [Footnote 8 The effect, independent of government action, that the 1981 Code had in the marketplace may to some extent have been exacerbated by petitioner's efforts to "market" the stigma respondent's product suffered by being excluded from the Code. See 817 F.2d, at 941, n. 3. Given our disposition infra, we need not decide whether, or to what extent, these "marketing" efforts alter the incidental status of the resulting anticompetitive harm. See generally Noerr, 365 U.S., at 142 (noting that in that case there were. "no specific findings that the railroads attempted directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers"). </s> [Footnote 9 Similarly in California Motor Transport any antitrust review of the validity of the activity at issue was limited and structured by the fact that there the antitrust defendants were "us[ing] the channels and procedures of state and federal agencies and courts." 404 U.S., at 511 ; see also id., at 512-513. </s> [Footnote 10 It is admittedly difficult to draw the precise lines separating anticompetitive political activity that is immunized despite its commercial impact from anticompetitive commercial activity that is unprotected despite [486 U.S. 492, 508] its political impact, and this is itself a case close to the line. For that reason we caution that our decision today depends on the context and nature of the activity. Although criticizing the uncertainty of such a particularized inquiry, post, at 513, the dissent does not dispute that the types of activity we describe supra, at 503-504, could not be immune under Noerr and fails to offer an intelligible alternative for distinguishing those nonimmune activities from the activity at issue in this case. Rather, the dissent states without elaboration that the sham exception "is enough to guard against flagrant abuse," post, at 516, apparently embracing the conclusion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that the sham exception covers the activity of a defendant who "genuinely seeks to achieve his governmental result, but does so through improper means." Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 827 F.2d 458, 465, n. 5 (1987) (emphasis in original). Such a use of the word "sham" distorts its meaning and bears little relation to the sham exception Noerr described to cover activity that was not genuinely intended to influence governmental action. 365 U.S., at 144 . See also P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 203.1a, pp. 13-14 (Supp. 1987). More importantly, the Ninth Circuit's approach renders "sham" no more than a label courts could apply to activity they deem unworthy of antitrust immunity (probably based on unarticulated consideration of the nature and context of the activity), thus providing a certain superficial certainty but no real "intelligible guidance" to courts or litigants. Post, at 513. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the very activity the dissent deems protected was an unprotected "sham." 827 F.2d, at 465. </s> [Footnote 11 Although the absence of such anticompetitive motives and incentives is relevant to determining whether petitioner's restraint of trade is protected under Claiborne Hardware, we do not suggest that the absence of anticompetitive purpose is necessary for Noerr immunity. As the dissent points out, in Noerr itself the major purpose of the activity at issue was anticompetitive. Post, at 512-513. Our statement that the "ultimate aim" of petitioner "is not dispositive," supra, at 504, stands only for the proposition that, at least outside the political context, the mere fact that an anticompetitive activity is also intended to influence governmental action is not alone sufficient to render that activity immune from antitrust liability. </s> [Footnote 12 Even petitioner's counsel concedes, for example, that Noerr would not apply if the Association had a rule giving the steel conduit manufacturers a veto over changes in the Code. Tr. of Oral Arg. 41-42. </s> [Footnote 13 The dissent mistakenly asserts that we today hold that Noerr immunity does not apply to mere efforts to persuade others to exclude a competitor's product from a private code. See post, at 514-516. Our holding is expressly limited to cases where an "economically interested party exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market participants." Supra, at 509 (emphasis added); see also supra, at 506-507 (relying in part on the distinction between activity involving the exercise of decisionmaking authority and market power and activity involving mere attempts to persuade an independent decisionmaker). Cf. Noerr, 365 U.S., at 136 . The dissent also mistakenly asserts that this description encompasses all private standard-setting associations. See post, at 515. In fact, many such associations are composed of members with expertise but no economic interest in suppressing competition. See, e. g., Sessions, supra, at 461, and n. 2. </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE O'CONNOR joins, dissenting. </s> Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), held that the Sherman Act should not be construed to forbid joint efforts by railway companies seeking legislation that would disadvantage the trucking industry. These efforts for the most part involved a public relations campaign rather than direct lobbying of the lawmakers and were held not subject to antitrust challenge because of the fundamental importance of maintaining the free flow of information to the government and the right of the people to seek legislative relief, directly or indirectly. Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972), applied the rule to efforts to seek executive action and to administrative and adjudicative proceedings. </s> The Court now refuses to apply the rule of these cases to the participants in those private organizations, such as the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), that regularly propound and publish health and safety standards for a variety of products and industries and then present these codes to state and local authorities for the purpose of having them enacted into law. The NFPA and those participating in the code-writing process will now be subject to antitrust liability if their efforts have anticompetitive effects and do not withstand scrutiny under the rule of reason. Believing that this result is a misapplication of the Noerr decision and an improvident construction of the Sherman Act, I respectfully dissent. [486 U.S. 492, 512] </s> This case presents an even stronger argument for immunity than did Noerr itself. That decision turned on whether the design or purpose of the conduct was to obtain or influence the passage or enforcement of laws. The Court concedes that petitioner's actions in this case constituted a "genuine effort to influence governmental action," ante, at 503, and that this was its "ultimate aim," ante, at 504. In Noerr, the publicity campaign was dispersed widely among the public in a broad but necessary diluted attempt to move public opinion in hopes that government officials would take note and respond accordingly. The campaign apparently had some influence on the passage of tax laws and other legislation favorable to the railroads in New Jersey, New York, and Ohio, and procured the Governor's veto of a bill that had been passed in Pennsylvania. See 365 U.S., at 130 ; see also 155 F. Supp. 768, 777-801 (ED Pa. 1957). Here, the NFPA actually drafted proposed legislation in the form of the National Electrical Code (NEC) and presented it countrywide. Not only were petitioner's efforts in this case designed to influence the passage of state laws, but there was also a much greater likelihood that they would be successful than was the case in Noerr. This is germane because it establishes a much greater likelihood that the "purpose" and "design" of petitioner's actions in this case was the "solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws," 365 U.S., at 138 . </s> Rather than directly confronting the severe damage that today's decision does to the Noerr doctrine, the majority asserts that the "ultimate aim" of petitioner's efforts "is not dispositive." Ante, at 504. That statement cannot be reconciled with the statements quoted earlier from Noerr, where it was held that even if one of the major purposes, or even the sole purpose, of the publicity campaign was "to destroy the truckers as competitors," 365 U.S., at 138 , those actions were immunized from antitrust liability because ultimately they were "directed toward obtaining governmental action," [486 U.S. 492, 513] id., at 140. The majority later doubles back on this statement, and suggests that it is important in this case that "petitioner was at least partially motivated by the desire to lessen competition, and . . . stood to reap substantial economic benefits from making it difficult for respondent to compete." Ante, at 509. It need hardly be said that all of this was also true in Noerr. Nobody condones fraud, bribery, or misrepresentation in any form, and other state and federal laws ensure that such conduct is punishable. But the point here is that conduct otherwise punishable under the antitrust laws either becomes immune from the operation of those laws when it is part of a larger design to influence the passage and enforcement of laws, or it does not. No workable boundaries to the Noerr doctrine are established by declaring, and then repeating at every turn, that everything depends on "the context and nature of" the activity, ante, at 504, 505, 506, 509, if we are unable to offer any further guidance about what this vague reference is supposed to mean, especially when the result here is so clearly wrong as long as Noerr itself is reputed to remain good law. One unfortunate consequence of today's decision, therefore, is that district courts and courts of appeals will be obliged to puzzle over claims raised under the doctrine without any intelligible guidance about when and why to apply it. </s> If there were no private code-writing organizations, and state legislatures themselves held the necessary hearing and wrote codes from scratch, then business concerns like Allied, together with their friends, could jointly testify with impunity about the safety of various products, even though they had anticompetitive motives in doing so. This much the majority concedes, as it does that the major purpose of the code-writing organizations is to influence legislative action. These days it is almost a foregone conclusion that the vast majority of the States will adopt these codes with little or no change. It is untenable to consider the code-writing process by such organizations as the NFPA as too far removed [486 U.S. 492, 514] from the legislative process to warrant application of the doctrine announced in Noerr and faithfully applied in other cases. This was the view of Judge Sneed and his colleagues on the Ninth Circuit in Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 827 F.2d 458 (1987), and the reasons they gave for applying Noerr in this context are much more persuasive than anything to the contrary the majority now has to offer. </s> The Court's decision is unfortunate for another reason. There are now over 400 private organizations preparing and publishing an enormous variety of codes and standards. State and local governments necessarily, and as a matter of course, turn to these proposed codes in the process of legislating to further the health and safety of their citizens. The code that is at issue in this case, for example, was adopted verbatim by 25 States and the District of Columbia; 19 others adopted it with only minor changes. It is the most widely disseminated and adopted model code in the world today. There is no doubt that the work of these private organizations contributes enormously to the public interest and that participation in their work by those who have the technical competence and experience to do so should not be discouraged. </s> The Court's decision today will surely do just that. It must inevitably be the case that codes such as the NEC will set standards that some products cannot satisfy and hence in the name of health and safety will reduce or prevent competition, as was the case here. Yet, putative competitors of the producer of such products will now think twice before urging in the course of the code-making process that those products not be approved; for if they are successful (or even if they are not), they may well become antitrust defendants facing treble-damages liability unless they can prove to a court and a jury that they had no evil motives but were merely "presenting and vigorously arguing accurate scientific evidence before a nonpartisan private standard-setting body," ante, at 510 (though with the knowing and inevitable result of eliminating competition). In this case, for example, even [486 U.S. 492, 515] if Allied had not resorted to the tactics it employed, but had done no more than successfully argue in good faith the hazards of using respondent's products, it would have inflicted the same damage on respondent and would have risked facing the same antitrust suit, with a jury ultimately deciding the health and safety implications of the products at issue. </s> The Court's suggestion that its decision will not affect the ability of these organizations to assist state and local governments is surely wrong. The Court's holding is "that at least where, as here, an economically interested party exercises decisionmaking authority in formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust liability flowing from the effects the standard has of its own force in the marketplace." Ante, at 509-510. This description encompasses the structure and work of all such organizations as we now know them. The Court is saying, in effect, that where a private organization sets standards, the participants can be sued under the antitrust laws for any effects those standards have in the marketplace other than those flowing from their adoption into law. But the standards will have some effect in the marketplace even where they are also adopted into law, through publicity and other means, thus exposing the participants to liability. Henceforth, therefore, any private organization offers such standards at its peril, and without any of the breathing room enjoyed by other participants in the political process. </s> The alternative apparently envisioned by the Court is that an organization can gain the protection of the Noerr doctrine as long as nobody with any economic interest in the product is permitted to "exercis[e] decisionmaking authority" (i. e., vote) on its recommendations as to particular product standards. Insisting that organizations like the NFPA conduct themselves like courts of law will have perverse effects. Legislatures are willing to rely on such organizations precisely because their standards are being set by those who [486 U.S. 492, 516] possess an expert understanding of the products and their uses, which are primarily if not entirely those who design, manufacture, sell, and distribute them. Sanitizing such bodies by discouraging the active participation of those with economic interests in the subject matter undermines their utility. </s> I fear that exposing organizations like the NFPA to antitrust liability will impair their usefulness by inhibiting frank and open discussion of the health and safety characteristics of new or old products that will be affected by their codes. The Court focuses on the tactics of petitioner that are thought to have subverted the entire process. But it is not suggested that if there are abuses, they are anything more than occasional happenings. The Court does speculate about the terrible practices that applying Noerr in this context could lead us to condone in future cases, ante, at 503-504, but these are no more than fantasies, since nothing of the sort occurred in the wake of Noerr itself. It seems to me that today's decision is therefore an unfortunate case of overkill. </s> Of course, the Noerr immunity is not unlimited and by its terms is unavailable where the alleged efforts to influence legislation are nothing but a sham. As the Ninth Circuit held, this limitation is enough to guard against flagrant abuse. In any event, occasional abuse is insufficient ground to render the entire process less useful and reliable. I would reverse the judgment below and remand for further proceedings. </s> [486 U.S. 492, 517]

United States Supreme Court MOSELEY et al., dba VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET v. V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC., et al.(2003) No. 01-1015 Argued: November 12, 2002Decided: March 4, 2003 </s> An army colonel sent a copy of an advertisement for petitioners' retail store, "Victor's Secret," to respondents, affiliated corporations that own the VICTORIA'S SECRET trademarks, because he saw it as an attempt to use a reputable trademark to promote unwholesome, tawdry merchandise. Respondents asked petitioners to discontinue using the name, but petitioners responded by changing the store's name to "Victor's Little Secret." Respondents then filed suit, alleging, inter alia, "the dilution of famous marks" under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA). This 1995 amendment to the Trademark Act of 1946 describes the factors that determine whether a mark is "distinctive and famous," 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1), and defines "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services," §1127. To support their claims that petitioners' conduct was likely to "blur and erode" their trademark's distinctiveness and "tarnish" its reputation, respondents presented an affidavit from a marketing expert who explained the value of respondents' mark but expressed no opinion concerning the impact of petitioners' use of "Victor's Little Secret" on that value. The District Court granted respondents summary judgment on the FTDA claim, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that respondents' mark was "distinctive" and that the evidence established "dilution" even though no actual harm had been proved. It also rejected the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the FTDA "requires proof that (1) a defendant has [used] a junior mark sufficiently similar to the famous mark to evoke in ... consumers a mental association of the two that (2) has caused (3) actual economic harm to the famous mark's economic value by lessening its former selling power as an advertising agent for its goods or services," Ringling-Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v. Utah Div. of Travel Development, 170 F. 3d 449, 461. Held: 1.The FTDA requires proof of actual dilution. Pp.9-16. </s> (a)Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers. The approximately 25 state trademark dilution laws predating the FTDA refer both to injury to business reputation (tarnishment) and to dilution of the distinctive quality of a trademark or trade name (blurring). The FTDA's legislative history mentions that the statute's purpose is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the mark's distinctiveness or tarnish or disparage it, even absent a likelihood of confusion. Pp.9-13. </s> (b)Respondents' mark is unquestionably valuable, and petitioners have not challenged the conclusion that it is "famous." Nor do they contend that protection is confined to identical uses of famous marks or that the statute should be construed more narrowly in a case such as this. They do contend, however, that the statute requires proof of actual harm, rather than mere "likelihood" of harm. The contrast between the state statutes and the federal statute sheds light on this precise question. The former repeatedly refer to a "likelihood" of harm, rather than a completed harm, but the FTDA provides relief if another's commercial use of a mark or trade name "causes dilution of the [mark's] distinctive quality," §1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, it unambiguously requires an actual dilution showing. This conclusion is confirmed by the FTDA's "dilution" definition itself, §1127. That does not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or profits, must also be proved. This Court disagrees with the Fourth Circuit's Ringling Bros. decision to the extent it suggests otherwise, but agrees with that court's conclusion that, at least where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution. Such association will not necessarily reduce the famous mark's capacity to identify its owner's goods, the FTDA's dilution requirement. Pp.13-15. </s> 2.The evidence in this case is insufficient to support summary judgment on the dilution count. There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the VICTORIA'S SECRET mark's capacity to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria's Secret stores or advertised in its catalogs. The officer who saw the ad directed his offense entirely at petitioners, not respondents. And respondents' expert said nothing about the impact of petitioners' name on the strength of respondents' mark. Any difficulties of proof that may be entailed in demonstrating actual dilution are not an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation. Pp.15-16. 259 F.3d 464, reversed and remanded. Stevens, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I, II, and IV, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Part III, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ, joined. Kennedy J., filed a concurring opinion. </s> VICTOR MOSELEY and CATHY MOSELEY, dbaVICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET, PETITIONERS v.V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC., etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the sixth circuit [March 4, 2003] </s> Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.** </s> In 1995 Congress amended §43 of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §1125, to provide a remedy for the "dilution of famous marks." 109 Stat. 985-986. That amendment, known as the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), describes the factors that determine whether a mark is "distinctive and famous," and defines the term "dilution" as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services."1 The question we granted certiorari to decide is whether objective proof of actual injury to the economic value of a famous mark (as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from a subjective "likelihood of dilution" standard) is a requisite for relief under the FTDA. I </s> Petitioners, Victor and Cathy Moseley, own and operate a retail store named "Victor's Little Secret" in a strip mall in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. They have no employees. Respondents are affiliated corporations that own the VICTORIA'S SECRET trademark, and operate over 750 Victoria's Secret stores, two of which are in Louisville, Kentucky, a short drive from Elizabethtown. In 1998 they spent over $55 million advertising "the VICTORIA'S SECRET brand--one of moderately priced, high quality, attractively designed lingerie sold in a store setting designed to look like a wom[a]n's bedroom." App. 167, 170. They distribute 400 million copies of the Victoria's Secret catalog each year, including 39,000 in Elizabethtown. In 1998 their sales exceeded $1.5 billion. </s> In the February 12, 1998, edition of a weekly publication distributed to residents of the military installation at Fort Knox, Kentucky, petitioners advertised the "GRAND OPENING Just in time for Valentine's Day!" of their store "VICTOR'S SECRET" in nearby Elizabethtown. The ad featured "Intimate Lingerie for every woman"; "Romantic Lighting"; "Lycra Dresses"; "Pagers"; and "Adult Novelties/Gifts." Id., at 209. An army colonel, who saw the ad and was offended by what he perceived to be an attempt to use a reputable company's trademark to promote the sale of "unwholesome, tawdry merchandise," sent a copy to respondents. Id., at 210. Their counsel then wrote to petitioners stating that their choice of the name "Victor's Secret" for a store selling lingerie was likely to cause confusion with the well-known victoria's secret mark and, in addition, was likely to "dilute the distinctiveness" of the mark. Id., at 190-191. They requested the immediate discontinuance of the use of the name "and any variations thereof." Ibid. In response, petitioners changed the name of their store to "Victor's Little Secret." Because that change did not satisfy respondents,2 they promptly filed this action in Federal District Court. </s> The complaint contained four separate claims: (1) for trademark infringement alleging that petitioners' use of their trade name was "likely to cause confusion and/or mistake in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1114(1)"; (2) for unfair competition alleging misrepresentation in violation of §1125(a); (3) for "federal dilution" in violation of the FTDA; and (4) for trademark infringement and unfair competition in violation of the common law of Kentucky. Id., at 15, 20-23. In the dilution count, the complaint alleged that petitioners' conduct was "likely to blur and erode the distinctiveness" and "tarnish the reputation" of the VICTORIA'S SECRET trademark. Ibid. </s> After discovery the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The record contained uncontradicted affidavits and deposition testimony describing the vast size of respondents' business, the value of the VICTORIA'S SECRET name, and descriptions of the items sold in the respective parties' stores. Respondents sell a "complete line of lingerie" and related items, each of which bears a VICTORIA'S SECRET label or tag.3 Petitioners sell a wide variety of items, including adult videos, "adult novelties," and lingerie.4 Victor Moseley stated in an affidavit that women's lingerie represented only about five per cent of their sales. Id., at 131. In support of their motion for summary judgment, respondents submitted an affidavit by an expert in marketing who explained "the enormous value" of respondents' mark. Id., at 195-205. Neither he, nor any other witness, expressed any opinion concerning the impact, if any, of petitioners' use of the name "Victor's Little Secret" on that value. </s> Finding that the record contained no evidence of actual confusion between the parties' marks, the District Court concluded that "no likelihood of confusion exists as a matter of law" and entered summary judgment for petitioners on the infringement and unfair competition claims. Civ. Action No. 3:98CV-395-S (WD Ky., Feb. 9, 2000), App. to Pet. for Cert. 28a, 37a. With respect to the FTDA claim, however, the court ruled for respondents. </s> Noting that petitioners did not challenge Victoria Secret's claim that its mark is "famous," the only question it had to decide was whether petitioners' use of their mark diluted the quality of respondents' mark. Reasoning from the premise that dilution "corrodes" a trademark either by "'blurring its product identification or by damaging positive associations that have attached to it,'" the court first found the two marks to be sufficiently similar to cause dilution, and then found "that Defendants' mark dilutes Plaintiffs' mark because of its tarnishing effect upon the Victoria's Secret mark." Id., at 38a-39a (quoting Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 811 F. 2d 960, 965 (CA6 1987)). It therefore enjoined petitioners "from using the mark 'Victor's Little Secret' on the basis that it causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the Victoria's Secret mark." App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a-39a. The court did not, however, find that any "blurring" had occurred. Ibid. </s> The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 259 F.3d 464 (2001). In a case decided shortly after the entry of the District Court's judgment in this case, the Sixth Circuit had adopted the standards for determining dilution under the FDTA that were enunciated by the Second Circuit in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (1999). See Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562 (CA6 2000). In order to apply those standards, it was necessary to discuss two issues that the District Court had not specifically addressed--whether respondents' mark is "distinctive,"5 and whether relief could be granted before dilution has actually occurred.6 With respect to the first issue, the court rejected the argument that Victoria's Secret could not be distinctive because "secret" is an ordinary word used by hundreds of lingerie concerns. The court concluded that the entire mark was "arbitrary and fanciful" and therefore deserving of a high level of trademark protection. 259 F.3d, at 470.7 On the second issue, the court relied on a distinction suggested by this sentence in the House Report: "Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark." H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, p. 1030 (1995). This statement, coupled with the difficulty of proving actual harm, lent support to the court's ultimate conclusion that the evidence in this case sufficiently established "dilution." 259 F.3d, at 475-477. In sum, the Court of Appeals held: "While no consumer is likely to go to the Moseleys' store expecting to find Victoria's Secret's famed Miracle Bra, consumers who hear the name 'Victor's Little Secret' are likely automatically to think of the more famous store and link it to the Moseleys' adult-toy, gag gift, and lingerie shop. This, then, is a classic instance of dilution by tarnishing (associating the Victoria's Secret name with sex toys and lewd coffee mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a single, unauthorized establishment). Given this conclusion, it follows that Victoria's Secret would prevail in a dilution analysis, even without an exhaustive consideration of all ten of the Nabisco factors." Id., at 477.8 </s> In reaching that conclusion the Court of Appeals expressly rejected the holding of the Fourth Circuit in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Development, 170 F.3d 449 (1999). In that case, which involved a claim that Utah's use on its license plates of the phrase "greatest snow on earth" was causing dilution of the "greatest show on earth," the court had concluded "that to establish dilution of a famous mark under the federal Act requires proof that (1) a defendant has made use of a junior mark sufficiently similar to the famous mark to evoke in a relevant universe of consumers a mental association of the two that (2) has caused (3) actual economic harm to the famous mark's economic value by lessening its former selling power as an advertising agent for its goods or services." Id., at 461 (emphasis added). Because other Circuits have also expressed differing views about the "actual harm" issue, we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 535 U.S. 985 (2002). II </s> Traditional trademark infringement law is a part of the broader law of unfair competition, see Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916), that has its sources in English common law, and was largely codified in the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). See B. Pattishall, D. Hilliard, & J. Welch, Trademarks and Unfair Competition 2 (4th ed. 2000) ("The United States took the [trademark and unfair competition] law of England as its own"). That law broadly prohibits uses of trademarks, trade names, and trade dress that are likely to cause confusion about the source of a product or service. See 15 U.S.C. §§1114, 1125(a)(1)(A). Infringement law protects consumers from being misled by the use of infringing marks and also protects producers from unfair practices by an "imitating competitor." Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-164 (1995). Because respondents did not appeal the District Court's adverse judgement on counts 1, 2, and 4 of their complaint, we decide the case on the assumption that the Moseleys' use of the name "Victor's Little Secret" neither confused any consumers or potential consumers, nor was likely to do so. Moreover, the disposition of those counts also makes it appropriate to decide the case on the assumption that there was no significant competition between the adversaries in this case. Neither the absence of any likelihood of confusion nor the absence of competition, however, provides a defense to the statutory dilution claim alleged in count 3 of the complaint. </s> Unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers. The seminal discussion of dilution is found in Frank Schechter's 1927 law review article concluding "that the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only rational basis for its protection." Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 Harv. L.Rev. 813, 831. Schechter supported his conclusion by referring to a German case protecting the owner of the well-known trademark "Odol" for mouthwash from use on various noncompeting steel products.9 That case, and indeed the principal focus of the Schechter article, involved an established arbitrary mark that had been "added to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary" and an infringement that made use of the identical mark. Id., at 829.10 </s> Some 20 years later Massachusetts enacted the first state statute protecting trademarks from dilution. It provided: "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark infringement or unfair competition notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of confusion as to the source of goods or services." 1947 Mass. Acts, p. 300, ch. 307. </s> Notably, that statute, unlike the "Odol" case, prohibited both the likelihood of "injury to business reputation" and "dilution." It thus expressly applied to both "tarnishment" and "blurring." At least 25 States passed similar laws in the decades before the FTDA was enacted in 1995. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition §25, Statutory Note (1995). III </s> In 1988, when Congress adopted amendments to the Lanham Act, it gave consideration to an antidilution provision. During the hearings on the 1988 amendments, objections to that provision based on a concern that it might have applied to expression protected by the First Amendment were voiced and the provision was deleted from the amendments. H.R. Rep. No. 100-1028 (1988). The bill, H.R. 1295, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., that was introduced in the House in 1995, and ultimately enacted as the FTDA, included two exceptions designed to avoid those concerns: a provision allowing "fair use" of a registered mark in comparative advertising or promotion, and the provision that noncommercial use of a mark shall not constitute dilution. See 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(4). On July 19, 1995, the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee held a 1-day hearing on H.R. 1295. No opposition to the bill was voiced at the hearing and, with one minor amendment that extended protection to unregistered as well as registered marks, the subcommittee endorsed the bill and it passed the House unanimously. The committee's report stated that the "purpose of H.R. 1295 is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion." H.R. Rep. No. 104-374, p.1029 (1995). As examples of dilution, it stated that "the use of DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable under this legislation." Id., at 1030. In the Senate an identical bill, S. 1513, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., was introduced on December 29, 1995, and passed on the same day by voice vote without any hearings. In his explanation of the bill, Senator Hatch also stated that it was intended "to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it," and referred to the Dupont Shoes, Buick aspirin, and Kodak piano examples, as well as to the Schechter law review article. 141 Cong. Rec. 38559-38561 (1995). IV </s> The Victoria's Secret mark is unquestionably valuable and petitioners have not challenged the conclusion that it qualifies as a "famous mark" within the meaning of the statute. Moreover, as we understand their submission, petitioners do not contend that the statutory protection is confined to identical uses of famous marks, or that the statute should be construed more narrowly in a case such as this. Even if the legislative history might lend some support to such a contention, it surely is not compelled by the statutory text. The District Court's decision in this case rested on the conclusion that the name of petitioners' store "tarnished" the reputation of respondents' mark, and the Court of Appeals relied on both "tarnishment" and "blurring" to support its affirmance. Petitioners have not disputed the relevance of tarnishment, Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7, presumably because that concept was prominent in litigation brought under state antidilution statutes and because it was mentioned in the legislative history. Whether it is actually embraced by the statutory text, however, is another matter. Indeed, the contrast between the state statutes, which expressly refer to both "injury to business reputation" and to "dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trademark," and the federal statute which refers only to the latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA. See Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. Pitt. L.Rev. 789, 812-813, and n. 132 (1997). </s> The contrast between the state statutes and the federal statute, however, sheds light on the precise question that we must decide. For those state statutes, like several provisions in the federal Lanham Act, repeatedly refer to a "likelihood" of harm, rather than to a completed harm. The relevant text of the FTDA, quoted in full in note 1, supra, provides that "the owner of a famous mark" is entitled to injunctive relief against another person's commercial use of a mark or trade name if that use "causes dilution of the distinctive quality" of the famous mark. 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). This text unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of dilution. </s> This conclusion is fortified by the definition of the term "dilution" itself. That definition provides: "The term 'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of-- </s> "(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or </s> "(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." §1127. </s> The contrast between the initial reference to an actual "lessening of the capacity" of the mark, and the later reference to a "likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception" in the second caveat confirms the conclusion that actual dilution must be established. </s> Of course, that does not mean that the consequences of dilution, such as an actual loss of sales or profits, must also be proved. To the extent that language in the Fourth Circuit's opinion in the Ringling Bros. case suggests otherwise, see 170 F.3d, at 460-465, we disagree. We do agree, however, with that court's conclusion that, at least where the marks at issue are not identical, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution. As the facts of that case demonstrate, such mental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory requirement for dilution under the FTDA. For even though Utah drivers may be reminded of the circus when they see a license plate referring to the "greatest snow on earth," it by no means follows that they will associate "the greatest show on earth" with skiing or snow sports, or associate it less strongly or exclusively with the circus. "Blurring" is not a necessary consequence of mental association. (Nor, for that matter, is "tarnishing.") </s> The record in this case establishes that an army officer who saw the advertisement of the opening of a store named "Victor's Secret" did make the mental association with "Victoria's Secret," but it also shows that he did not therefore form any different impression of the store that his wife and daughter had patronized. There is a complete absence of evidence of any lessening of the capacity of the Victoria's Secret mark to identify and distinguish goods or services sold in Victoria's Secret stores or advertised in its catalogs. The officer was offended by the ad, but it did not change his conception of Victoria's Secret. His offense was directed entirely at petitioners, not at respondents. Moreover, the expert retained by respondents had nothing to say about the impact of petitioners' name on the strength of respondents' mark. </s> Noting that consumer surveys and other means of demonstrating actual dilution are expensive and often unreliable, respondents and their amici argue that evidence of an actual "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services," §1127, may be difficult to obtain. It may well be, however, that direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proven through circumstantial evidence--the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical. Whatever difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are not an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation. The evidence in the present record is not sufficient to support the summary judgment on the dilution count. The judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. </s> VICTOR MOSELEY and CATHY MOSELEY, dbaVICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET, PETITIONERS v.V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC., etal. on writ of certiorari to the united states court ofappeals for the sixth circuit [March 4, 2003] </s> Justice Kennedy, concurring. </s> As of this date, few courts have reviewed the statute we are considering, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(c), and I agree with the Court that the evidentiary showing required by the statute can be clarified on remand. The conclusion that the VICTORIA'S SECRET mark is a famous mark has not been challenged throughout the litigation, ante, at 6, 13, and seems not to be in question. The remaining issue is what factors are to be considered to establish dilution. </s> For this inquiry, considerable attention should be given, in my view, to the word "capacity" in the statutory phrase that defines dilution as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services." 15 U.S.C. §1127. When a competing mark is first adopted, there will be circumstances when the case can turn on the probable consequences its commercial use will have for the famous mark. In this respect, the word "capacity" imports into the dilution inquiry both the present and the potential power of the famous mark to identify and distinguish goods, and in some cases the fact that this power will be diminished could suffice to show dilution. Capacity is defined as "the power or ability to hold, receive, or accommodate." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 330 (1961); see also Webster's New International Dictionary 396 (2d ed. 1949) ("Power of receiving, containing, or absorbing"); 2 Oxford English Dictionary 857 (2d ed. 1989) ("Ability to receive or contain; holding power"); American Heritage Dictionary 275 (4th ed. 2000) ("The ability to receive, hold, or absorb"). If a mark will erode or lessen the power of the famous mark to give customers the assurance of quality and the full satisfaction they have in knowing they have purchased goods bearing the famous mark, the elements of dilution may be established. </s> Diminishment of the famous mark's capacity can be shown by the probable consequences flowing from use or adoption of the competing mark. This analysis is confirmed by the statutory authorization to obtain injunctive relief. 15 U.S.C. §1125(c)(2). The essential role of injunctive relief is to "prevent future wrong, although no right has yet been violated." Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928). Equity principles encourage those who are injured to assert their rights promptly. A holder of a famous mark threatened with diminishment of the mark's capacity to serve its purpose should not be forced to wait until the damage is done and the distinctiveness of the mark has been eroded. </s> In this case, the District Court found that petitioners' trademark had tarnished the VICTORIA'S SECRET mark. App. to Pet. for Cert. 38a-39a. The Court of Appeals affirmed this conclusion and also found dilution by blurring. 259 F. 3d 464, 477 (CA6 2001). The Court's opinion does not foreclose injunctive relief if respondents on remand present sufficient evidence of either blurring or tarnishment. </s> With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court. </s> FOOTNOTESFootnote **Justice Scalia joins all but Part III of this opinion. Footnote 1The FTDA provides: "SEC. 3. REMEDIES FOR DILUTION OF FAMOUS MARKS. </s> "(a) Remedies.--Section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: </s> "'(c)(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in this subsection. In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but not limited to-- </s> "'(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; </s> "'(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which the mark is used; </s> "'(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; </s> "'(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; </s> "'(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; </s> "'(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought; </s> "'(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and </s> "'(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. </s> "'(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief unless the person against whom the injunction is sought willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution of the famous mark. If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 35(a) and 36, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of equity. </s> "'(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with respect to that mark, that is brought by another person under the common law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement. </s> "'(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section: </s> "'(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous mark. </s> "'(B) Noncommercial use of a mark. </s> "'(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.' </s> "(b) Conforming Amendment.--The heading for title VIII of the Trademark Act of 1946 is amended by striking 'AND FALSE DESCRIPTIONS' and inserting ', FALSE DESCRIPTIONS, AND DILUTION.' </s> "SEC. 4. DEFINITION. </s> "Section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1127) is amended by inserting after the paragraph defining when a mark shall be deemed to be 'abandoned' the following: </s> "'The term "dilution" means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of-- </s> "'(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or </s> "'(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.'" 109 Stat. 985-986. Footnote 2After being advised of a proposal to change the store name to "VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRETS," respondents' counsel requested detailed information about the store in order to consider whether that change "would be acceptable." App. 13-14. Respondents filed suit two months after this request. Footnote 3Respondents described their business as follows: "Victoria's Secret stores sell a complete line of lingerie, women's undergarments and nightwear, robes, caftans and kimonos, slippers, sachets, lingerie bags, hanging bags, candles, soaps, cosmetic brushes, atomizers, bath products and fragrances." Id., at 168. Footnote 4In answer to an interrogatory, petitioners stated that they "sell novelty action clocks, patches, temporary tattoos, stuffed animals, coffee mugs, leather biker wallets, zippo lighters, diet formula, diet supplements, jigsaw puzzles, whyss, handcufs [sic], hosiery bubble machines, greeting cards, calendars, incense burners, car air fresheners, sunglasses, ball caps, jewelry, candles, lava lamps, blacklights, fiber optic lights, rock and roll prints, lingerie, pagers, candy, adult video tapes, adult novelties, t-shirts, etc." Id., at 87. Footnote 5"It is quite clear that the statute intends distinctiveness, in addition to fame, as an essential element. The operative language defining the tort requires that 'the [junior] person's ... use ... caus[e] dilution of the distinctive quality of the [senior] mark.' 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). There can be no dilution of a mark's distinctive quality unless the mark is distinctive." Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (CA2 1999). Footnote 6The Second Circuit explained why it did not believe "actual dilu-tion" need be proved: </s> "Relying on a recent decision by the Fourth Circuit, Nabisco also asserts that proof of dilution under the FTDA requires proof of an 'actual, consummated harm.' Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Dev., 170 F. 3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999). We reject the argument because we disagree with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the statute. </s> "It is not clear which of two positions the Fourth Circuit adopted by its requirement of proof of 'actual dilution.' Id. The narrower position would be that courts may not infer dilution from 'contextual factors (degree of mark and product similarity, etc.),' but must instead rely on evidence of 'actual loss of revenues' or the 'skillfully constructed consumer survey.' Id. at 457, 464-65. This strikes us as an arbitrary and unwarranted limitation on the methods of proof." Nabisco, 191 F.3d, at 223. Footnote 7"In this case, for example, although the word 'secret' may provoke some intrinsic association with prurient interests, it is not automatically linked in the ordinary human experience with lingerie. 'Secret' is not particularly descriptive of bras and hosiery. Nor is there anything about the combination of the possessive 'Victoria's' and 'secret' that automatically conjures thought of women's underwear-except, of course, in the context of plaintiff's line of products. Hence, we conclude that the 'Victoria's Secret' mark ranks with those that are 'arbitrary and fanciful' and is therefore deserving of a high level of trademark protection. Although the district court applied a slightly different test from the one now established in this circuit, the court would undoubtedly have reached the same result under the Nabisco test. Certainly, we cannot say that the court erred in finding that the preliminary factors of a dilution claim had been met by Victoria's Secret." 259 F.3d, at 470-471. Footnote 8The court had previously noted that the "Second Circuit has developed a list of ten factors used to determine if dilution has, in fact, occurred, while describing them as a 'nonexclusive list' to 'develop gradually over time' and with the particular facts of each case. Those factors are: distinctiveness; similarity of the marks; 'proximity of the products and the likelihood of bridging the gap;' 'interrelationship among the distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the junior mark, and the proximity of the products;' 'shared consumers and geographic limitations;' 'sophistication of consumers;' actual confusion; 'adjectival or referential quality of the junior use;' 'harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user;' and the 'effect of [the] senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark." Id., at 476 (quoting Nabisco, 191 F. 3d, at 217-222). Footnote 9The German court "held that the use of the mark, 'Odol' even on non-competing goods was 'gegen die guten Sitten,' pointing out that, when the public hears or reads the word 'Odol,' it thinks of the complainant's mouth wash, and that an article designated with the name 'Odol' leads the public to assume that it is of good quality. Consequently, concludes the court, complainant has 'the utmost interest in seeing that its mark is not diluted [verwä ;ssert]: it would lose in selling power if everyone used it as the designation of his goods.'" 40 Harv. L.Rev., at 831-832. Footnote 10Schecter discussed this distinction at length: "The rule that arbitrary, coined or fanciful marks or names should be given a much broader degree of protection than symbols, words or phrases in common use would appear to be entirely sound. Such trademarks or tradenames as 'Blue Ribbon,' used, with or without registration, for all kinds of commodities or services, more than sixty times; 'Simplex' more than sixty times; 'Star,' as far back as 1898, nearly four hundred times; 'Anchor,' already registered over one hundred fifty times in 1898; 'Bull Dog,' over one hundred times by 1923; 'Gold Medal,' sixty-five times; '3-in-1' and '2-in-1,' seventy-nine times; 'Nox-all,' fifty times; 'Universal,' over thirty times; 'Lily White' over twenty times;--all these marks and names have, at this late date, very little distinctiveness in the public mind, and in most cases suggest merit, prominence or other qualities of goods or services in general, rather than the fact that the product or service, in connection with which the mark or name is used, emanates from a particular source. On the other hand, 'Rolls-Royce,' 'Aunt Jemima's,' 'Kodak,' 'Mazda,' 'Corona,' 'Nujol,' and 'Blue Goose,' are coined, arbitrary or fanciful words or phrases that have been added to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary by their owners, and have, from the very beginning, been associated in the public mind with a particular product, not with a variety of products, and have created in the public consciousness an impression or symbol of the excellence of the particular product in question." Id., at 828-829.

United States Supreme Court CAMPBELL PAINTING CORP. v. REID(1968) No. 673 Argued: April 30, 1968Decided: June 10, 1968 </s> The Public Authorities Law of New York requires all contracts awarded by a public authority for work or services to provide that upon refusal of "a person" to testify before a grand jury, to answer relevant questions, or to waive immunity against subsequent prosecution, such person and any corporation of which he is an officer or director shall be disqualified for five years from contracting with any public authority and any existing contracts may be canceled by the authority without penalty or damages. Appellant corporation's president, who was also a director and stockholder, executed three painting contracts, on behalf of appellant, with the New York City Housing Authority. When appellant learned of an impending investigation of bid rigging, the president resigned and divested himself of his stock. He remained in appellant's employ as an "estimator." He was later subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury and refused to sign a waiver of immunity. Appellant was notified that the contracts were canceled and that it and the president were disqualified for five years. The New York Court of Appeals denied relief to appellant, holding the disqualification valid and the statute constitutional. The court also rejected appellant's claim that it should not have been disqualified because its president resigned as president and director before being called to testify. Held: </s> 1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is "a personal one, applying only to natural individuals," and since appellant corporation cannot avail itself of the privilege it cannot take advantage of the claimed invalidity of a penalty imposed for refusal of an individual, its president, to waive the privilege. Pp. 288-289. </s> 2. There is no reason to disturb the finding of the Court of Appeals that the resignation of the president was solely for the purpose of avoiding disqualification, and the conclusion of that court that the purported resignation should be disregarded for purposes of this case. P. 289. </s> 20 N. Y. 2d 370, 229 N. E. 2d 602, affirmed. [392 U.S. 286, 287] </s> Albert A. Blinder argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Theodore M. Ruzow and Stephen Hochhauser. </s> Paul W. Hessel argued the cause for appellee New York City Housing Authority. With him on the brief were Harry Levy and I. Stanley Stein. Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General of New York, argued the cause for appellee Attorney General of New York. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, pro se, and Brenda Soloff, Assistant Attorney General. </s> MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Public Authorities Law of New York, 2601, provides that a clause must be inserted in all contracts awarded by a public authority of the State for work or services to provide that upon refusal of "a person" to testify before a grand jury, to answer any relevant question, or to waive immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, such person and any firm or corporation of which he is a member, officer, or director shall be disqualified for five years from contracting with any public authority, and any existing contracts may be canceled by the public authority without incurring any penalty or damages. 1 </s> During 1964, appellant, a closely held family corporation, entered into three painting contracts with appellee New York City Housing Authority. Each of these contained the standard disqualification clause. The contracts were executed by appellant's president, George Campbell, Jr., who was also a director and stockholder of the corporation. </s> Early in 1965, appellant became aware that the District Attorney of New York County was conducting an [392 U.S. 286, 288] investigation before a grand jury of alleged bid rigging on public contracts, including those of appellant. Thereafter, George Campbell, Jr., resigned as appellant's president and director and divested himself of his stock. He remained in appellant's employ as an "estimator." </s> A few weeks thereafter, Campbell was subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury. He refused to sign the waiver of immunity. In due course, the Public Housing Authority notified appellant that, pursuant to the provision in its contracts, the contracts were terminated and Campbell and the corporation were disqualified from doing business with the Authority for five years. </s> After proceedings in the lower courts of New York, the New York Court of Appeals denied relief to appellant. It held that the disqualification was valid and that 2601 of the Public Authorities Law is constitutional, citing Gardner v. Broderick, 20 N. Y. 2d 227, 229 N. E. 2d 184 (1967) (reversed this day, ante, p. 273). The Court of Appeals also rejected appellant's claim that it should not have been disqualified because Campbell resigned as president and director before he was called to testify. 2 We noted probable jurisdiction. 390 U.S. 918 (1968). </s> We do not consider the constitutionality of 2601 of New York's Public Authorities Law or the validity or effect of the contract provisions incorporating that section. Appellant's claim is that these provisions operated unconstitutionally to require its president, Mr. Campbell, to waive the benefits of his privilege against self-incrimination. But appellant cannot avail itself of this point, assuming its validity. It has long been settled in federal jurisprudence that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is "essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals." It "cannot be utilized by [392 U.S. 286, 289] or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation." United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 , 699 (1944); see also Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151 (1923); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 622 (1911); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 -385 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 -75 (1906). If a corporation cannot avail itself of the privilege against self-incrimination, it cannot take advantage of the claimed invalidity of a penalty imposed for refusal of an individual, its president, to waive the privilege. Since the privilege is not available to it, appellant, a corporation, cannot invoke the privilege to challenge the constitutionality of 2601 of the Public Authorities Law. A fortiori, it cannot assail the validity of the provision in the contracts into which it entered, incorporating the substance of that section. </s> As to appellant's claim that its due process rights were denied by the imposition of the penalty despite Mr. Campbell's purported resignation from managerial positions, we do not reach the abstract legal question that is urged upon us. We see no reason to disturb the finding of the New York Court of Appeals that "the resignation was tendered and accepted solely for the purpose of avoiding the statutory disqualification," and the conclusion of that court that the purported resignation should be disregarded for purposes of this case. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Section 2602 provides for disqualification on the same basis without reference to any contractual clause. </s> [Footnote 2 The Court of Appeals noted that 2603 of the Public Authorities Act vests the State Supreme Court with jurisdiction, for stated reasons, to remove the disqualification. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs, dissenting. </s> Appellant corporation has been disqualified as a contractor with the State of New York because its president, George Campbell, Jr., who was also a director and an owner of 10% of its stock, invoked the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment when summoned before the grand jury. All other officers, directors, [392 U.S. 286, 290] and the controlling stockholders of this closely held corporation appeared and indicated a willingness to sign waivers of immunity and to testify. The president, who invoked the Self-Incrimination Clause, resigned as officer and director and agreed to sell his 10% stock interest, though so far as appears the contract of sale has not been consummated. 1 </s> In the old days when a culprit, unpopular person, or suspect was punished by a bill of attainder, the penalty imposed often reached not only his own property, but also interests of his family. 2 When the present law blacklists this family corporation, it has a like impact. </s> I fail to see how any penalty - direct or collateral - can be imposed on anyone for invoking a constitutional guarantee. A corporation, to be sure, is not a beneficiary of the Self-Incrimination Clause, in the sense that it may invoke it. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 . Yet placing this family corporation on the blacklist and [392 U.S. 286, 291] disqualifying it from doing business with the State of New York is one way of reaching the economic interest of the recalcitrant president. 3 If, as I felt in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 , placing the penalty of disbarment on a lawyer for invoking the Self-Incrimination Clause is unconstitutional, so is placing a monetary penalty on a businessman for doing the same. 4 Reducing the value of appellant corporation by putting it on the State's blacklist is a penalty which every stockholder suffers. If New York provided that where a businessman invokes the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment [392 U.S. 286, 292] he shall forfeit, say, $10,000, the law would plainly be unconstitutional as exacting a penalty for asserting a constitutional privilege. What New York could not do directly, it may not do indirectly. Yet penalizing this man's family corporation for his assertion of immunity has precisely that effect. </s> The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Art. VI, cl. 2) gives the Fifth Amendment, now applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth, controlling authority over New York's law. </s> [Footnote 1 One of the directors of the corporation testified before appellee New York City Housing Authority that no consideration was paid for the stock at the time of transfer, and that there was as yet no formal or informal agreement as to payment for the stock. </s> Moreover, the pleadings reveal that George Campbell, Jr., was at all times relevant here a 10% residuary legatee under the estate of his late father. That estate contained 50% of the stock of appellant corporation. Thus, George Campbell, Jr., possessed a substantial additional interest in the corporation which would likely be affected by any increase or decrease in the value of the stock. </s> [Footnote 2 E. g., Delaware Laws 1778, c. 29b; New Jersey, Act of Dec. 11, 1778, N. J. Rev. Laws 40 (Paterson ed. 1800). Compare North Carolina Laws, Session of April 14, 1778, c. 5, calling for confiscation of the estates of certain persons "inimical to the United States," but specifically providing that members of their families should be allowed that portion of the estate forfeited which they might have enjoyed had the owner died intestate. See also Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin's N.C. Rep. 42 (1787). And see Comment, The Supreme Court's Bill of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 212, 214, 216 (1966). </s> [Footnote 3 Damage to shareholders which results indirectly from damage done to the corporation can, of course, be rectified through suit by the corporation itself or by a stockholder's derivative action. E. g., Paulson v. Margolis, 234 App. Div. 496, 255 N. Y. S. 568 (Sup. Ct. 1932). See generally Ballantine, Corporations 333-339 (1946); 13 Fletcher Cyclopedia, Corporations 5908-5911 (1961). There is no indication in the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals that that remedy is inappropriate on the facts of this case. </s> [Footnote 4 The fact that appellant may petition the New York courts for discretionary relief under 2603 of the New York Public Authorities Law does not cure the defect. For appellant's claim is that its disqualification was improper, and that it was penalized pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. Its remedy cannot be limited by 2603, which was construed by the New York Court of Appeals below to grant the state courts discretion to afford relief from a proper disqualification when the application of the statute would cause an unnecessary hardship. Indeed, 2603 by its terms does not even involve a review of the basis for the disqualification, but provides that any disqualified corporation may apply to the New York Supreme Court to discontinue the disqualification: </s> "Such application shall be in the form of a petition setting forth grounds, including that the cooperation by petitioner with the grand jury at the time of the refusal was such, and the amount and degree of control and financial interest, if any, in the petitioning firm, partnership or corporation by the member, partner, officer or director who refused to waive immunity is such that it will not be in the public interest to cancel or terminate petitioner's contracts or to continue the disqualification . . . ." </s> [392 U.S. 286, 293]

United States Supreme Court CURTIS v. LOETHER(1974) No. 72-1035 Argued: Decided: February 20, 1974 </s> The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution entitles either party to demand a jury trial in an action for damages in the federal courts under 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, which authorizes private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to redress violations of the Act's fair housing provisions. Pp. 191-198. </s> 467 F.2d 1110, affirmed. </s> MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. </s> Jack Greenberg argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Michael Davidson, Sylvia Drew, Eric Schnapper, Patricia D. McMahon, Seymour Pikofsky, and Charles L. Black, Jr. </s> Robert D. Scott argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief was Edward A. Dudek. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed by Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Pottinger, and Frank E. Schwelb for the United States, and by Norman C. Amaker for the National Committee against Discrimination in Housing. </s> MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Section 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 88, 42 U.S.C. 3612, authorizes private plaintiffs to bring civil actions to redress violations of Title VIII, the fair housing provisions of the Act, and provides that "[t]he court may grant as relief, as it deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order, and may award to the plaintiff [415 U.S. 189, 190] actual damages and not more than $1,000 punitive damages, together with court costs and reasonable attorney fees . . . ." The question presented in this case is whether the Civil Rights Act or the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial upon demand by one of the parties in an action for damages and injunctive relief under this section. </s> Petitioner, a Negro woman, brought this action under 812, claiming that respondents, who are white, had refused to rent an apartment to her because of her race, in violation of 804 (a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 3604 (a). In her complaint she sought only injunctive relief and punitive damages; a claim for compensatory damages was later added. 1 After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court granted preliminary injunctive relief, enjoining the respondents from renting the apartment in question to anyone else pending the trial on the merits. This injunction was dissolved some five months later with the petitioner's consent, after she had finally obtained other housing, and the case went to trial on the issues of actual and punitive damages. </s> Respondents made a timely demand for jury trial in their answer. The District Court, however, held that [415 U.S. 189, 191] jury trial was neither authorized by Title VIII nor required by the Seventh Amendment and denied the jury request. Rogers v. Loether, 312 F. Supp. 1008 (ED Wis. 1970). After trial on the merits, the District Judge found that respondents had in fact discriminated against petitioner on account of her race. Although he found no actual damages, see n. 1, supra, he awarded $250 in punitive damages, denying petitioner's request for attorney's fees and court costs. </s> The Court of Appeals reversed on the jury trial issue. Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110 (CA7 1972). After an extended analysis, the court concluded essentially that the Seventh Amendment gave respondents the right to a jury trial in this action, and therefore interpreted the statute to authorize jury trials so as to eliminate any question of its constitutionality. In view of the importance of the jury trial issue in the administration and enforcement of Title VIII and the diversity of views in the lower courts on the question, 2 we granted certiorari, 412 U.S. 937 (1973). 3 We affirm. </s> The legislative history on the jury trial question is sparse, and what little is available is ambiguous. There seems to be some indication that supporters of Title VIII were concerned that the possibility of racial prejudice on juries might reduce the effectiveness of civil [415 U.S. 189, 192] rights damages actions. 4 On the other hand, one bit of testimony during committee hearings indicates an awareness that jury trials would have to be afforded in damages actions under Title VIII. 5 Both petitioner and respondents have presented plausible arguments from the wording and construction of 812. We see no point to giving extended consideration to these arguments, however, for we think it is clear that the Seventh Amendment entitles either party to demand a jury trial in an action for damages in the federal courts under 812. 6 </s> The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." [415 U.S. 189, 193] Although the thrust of the Amendment was to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in 1791, it has long been settled that the right extends beyond the common-law forms of action recognized at that time. Mr. Justice Story established the basic principle in 1830: </s> "The phrase `common law,' found in this clause, is used in contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence . . . . By common law, [the Framers of the Amendment] meant . . . not merely suits, which the common law recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were administered . . . . In a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever might be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights." Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 446-447 (1830) (emphasis in original). </s> Petitioner nevertheless argues that the Amendment is inapplicable to new causes of action created by congressional enactment. As the Court of Appeals observed, however, we have considered the applicability of the constitutional right to jury trial in actions enforcing statutory rights "as a matter too obvious to be doubted." 467 F.2d, at 1114. Although the Court has apparently never discussed the issue at any length, we have often found the Seventh Amendment applicable to causes of action based on statutes. See, e. g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477 (1962) (trademark laws); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 115 (1909) (immigration laws); cf. Fleitmann v. Welsbach Street Lighting Co., 240 U.S. 27 (1916) (antitrust laws), and the [415 U.S. 189, 194] discussion of Fleitmann in Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 535 -536 (1970). 7 Whatever doubt may have existed should now be dispelled. The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law. </s> NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), relied on by petitioner, lends no support to her statutory-rights argument. The Court there upheld the award of backpay without jury trial in an NLRB unfair labor practice proceeding, rejecting a Seventh Amendment claim on the ground that the case involved a "statutory proceeding" and "not a suit at common law or in the nature of such a suit." Id., at 48. Jones & Laughlin merely stands for the proposition that the Seventh Amendment is generally inapplicable in administrative proceedings, where jury trials would be incompatible with the whole concept of administrative adjudication 8 and would substantially interfere with the NLRB's role in the statutory scheme. Katchen [415 U.S. 189, 195] v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966), also relied upon by petitioner, is to like effect. There the Court upheld, over a Seventh Amendment challenge, the Bankruptcy Act's grant of summary jurisdiction to the bankruptcy court over the trustee's action to compel a claimant to surrender a voidable preference; the Court recognized that a bankruptcy court has been traditionally viewed as a court of equity, and that jury trials would "dismember" the statutory scheme of the Bankruptcy Act. Id., at 339. See also Guthrie National Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528 (1899). These cases uphold congressional power to entrust enforcement of statutory rights to an administrative process or specialized court of equity free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment. But when Congress provides for enforcement of statutory rights in an ordinary civil action in the district courts, where there is obviously no functional justification for denying the jury trial right, a jury trial must be available if the action involves rights and remedies of the sort typically enforced in an action at law. 9 </s> We think it is clear that a damages action under 812 is an action to enforce "legal rights" within the meaning of our Seventh Amendment decisions. See, e. g., Ross v. Bernhard, supra, at 533, 542; Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, supra, at 476-477. A damages action under the statute sounds basically in tort - the statute merely defines a new legal duty, and authorizes the courts to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendant's wrongful breach. As the Court of Appeals noted, this cause of action is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law. 10 </s> [415 U.S. 189, 196] More important, the relief sought here - actual and punitive damages - is the traditional form of relief offered in the courts of law. 11 </s> We need not, and do not, go so far as to say that any award of monetary relief must necessarily be "legal" relief. See, e. g., Mitchell v. DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960); Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946). 12 A comparison of Title VIII with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, where the courts of appeals have held that jury trial is not required in an action for reinstatement and backpay, 13 is [415 U.S. 189, 197] instructive, although we of course express no view on the jury trial issue in that context. In Title VII cases the courts of appeals have characterized backpay as an integral part of an equitable remedy, a form of restitution. But the statutory language on which this characterization is based - </s> "[T]he court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay . . ., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate," 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (g) (1970 ed., Supp. II) - </s> contrasts sharply with 812's simple authorization of an action for actual and punitive damages. In Title VII cases, also, the courts have relied on the fact that the decision whether to award backpay is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. There is no comparable discretion here: if a plaintiff proves unlawful discrimination and actual damages, he is entitled to judgment for that amount. Nor is there any sense in which the award here can be viewed as requiring the defendant to disgorge funds wrongfully withheld from the plaintiff. Whatever may be the merit of the "equitable" characterization in Title VII cases, there is surely no basis for characterizing the award of compensatory and punitive damages here as equitable relief. 14 </s> [415 U.S. 189, 198] </s> We are not oblivious to the force of petitioner's policy arguments. Jury trials may delay to some extent the disposition of Title VIII damages actions. But Title VIII actions seeking only equitable relief will be unaffected, and preliminary injunctive relief remains available without a jury trial even in damages actions. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S., at 479 n. 20. Moreover, the statutory requirement of expedition of 812 actions, 42 U.S.C. 3614, applies equally to jury and non-jury trials. We recognize, too, the possibility that jury prejudice may deprive a victim of discrimination of the verdict to which he or she is entitled. Of course, the trial judge's power to direct a verdict, to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or to grant a new trial provides substantial protection against this risk, and respondents' suggestion that jury trials will expose a broader segment of the populace to the example of the federal civil rights laws in operation has some force. More fundamentally, however, these considerations are insufficient to overcome the clear command of the Seventh Amendment. 15 The decision of the Court of Appeals must be </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Although the lower courts treated the action as one for compensatory and punitive damages, petitioner has emphasized in this Court that her complaint sought only punitive damages. It is apparent, however, that petitioner later sought to recover actual damages as well. The District Court's pretrial order indicates the judge's understanding, following a pretrial conference with counsel, that the question of actual damages would be one of the issues to be tried. App. 18a. Petitioner in fact attempted to prove actual damages, App. 45a, but her testimony was excluded for failure to comply with a pretrial discovery order. The District Judge later dismissed the claim of actual damages for failure of proof. In these circumstances, it is irrelevant that the pleadings were never formally amended. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 15 (b), 16. </s> [Footnote 2 The Seventh Circuit here was the first court of appeals to consider this issue, but the reported decisions of the district courts are evenly divided on the question. In addition to the District Court in this case, the court in Cauley v. Smith, 347 F. Supp. 114 (ED Va. 1972), held that jury trial was not required in an action under 812. Kastner v. Brackett, 326 F. Supp. 1151 (Nev. 1971), and Kelly v. Armbrust, 351 F. Supp. 869 (N. D. 1972), held that jury trial was required. </s> [Footnote 3 Petitioner married while the case was pending before the Court, and her motion to change the caption of the case accordingly was granted. 414 U.S. 1140 (1974). </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding Civil Rights before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 16, p. 1183 (1966). </s> [Footnote 5 See Hearings on S. 3296 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 1178 (1966). </s> [Footnote 6 We recognize, of course, the "cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided." United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971), and cases there cited. In this case, however, the necessity for jury trial is so clearly settled by our prior Seventh Amendment decisions that it would be futile to spend time on the statutory issue, particularly since our result is not to invalidate the Civil Rights Act but only to direct that a certain form of procedure be employed in federal court actions under 812. </s> Moreover, the Seventh Amendment issue in this case is in a very real sense the narrower ground of decision. Section 812 (a) expressly authorizes actions to be brought "in appropriate State or local courts of general jurisdiction," as well as in the federal courts. The Court has not held that the right to jury trial in civil cases is an element of due process applicable to state courts through the Fourteenth Amendment. Since we rest our decision on Seventh Amendment rather than statutory grounds, we express no view as to whether jury trials must be afforded in 812 actions in the state courts. </s> [Footnote 7 See also Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 401 -402 (1946) (Emergency Price Control Act); Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) (Safety Appliance Act). The Courts of Appeals have similarly rejected the notion that the Seventh Amendment has no application to causes of action created by statute. See, e. g., International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 197 (CA5), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968); Simmons v. Avisco, Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1018 (CA4 1965); Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (CA2 1946), as well as the decision of the Seventh Circuit in this case, 467 F.2d, at 1113-1116. See generally Developments in the Law - Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1109, 1266 (1971). </s> [Footnote 8 "[T]he concept of expertise on which the administrative agency rests is not consistent with the use by it of a jury as fact finder." L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 90 (1965). </s> [Footnote 9 See Rogers v. Loether, 467 F.2d 1110, 1115-1116 (CA7 1972); Developments in the Law, supra, n. 7, at 1267-1268. </s> [Footnote 10 For example, the Court of Appeals recognized that Title VIII could be viewed as an extension of the common-law duty of innkeepers not to refuse temporary lodging to a traveler without justification, [415 U.S. 189, 196] a duty enforceable in a damages action triable to a jury, to those who rent apartments on a long-term basis. See 467 F.2d, at 1117. An action to redress racial discrimination may also be likened to an action for defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress. Indeed, the contours of the latter tort are still developing, and it has been suggested that "under the logic of the common law development of a law of insult and indignity, racial discrimination might be treated as a dignitary tort." C. Gregory & H. Kalven, Cases and Materials on Torts 961 (2d ed. 1969). </s> [Footnote 11 The procedural history of this case generated some question in the courts below as to whether the action should be viewed as one for damages and injunctive relief, or as one for damages alone, for purposes of analyzing the jury trial issue. The Court of Appeals concluded that the right to jury trial was properly tested by the relief sought in the complaint and not by the claims remaining at the time of trial. 467 F.2d, at 1118-1119. We need express no view on this question. If the action is properly viewed as one for damages only, our conclusion that this is a legal claim obviously requires a jury trial on demand. And if this legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on the legal claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact. The right cannot be abridged by characterizing the legal claim as "incidental" to the equitable relief sought. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 470 -473 (1962). </s> [Footnote 12 See also Swofford v. B&W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406, 414 (CA5 1964). </s> [Footnote 13 Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (CA5 1969); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (CA4), cert. dismissed under Rule 60, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); cf. McFerren [415 U.S. 189, 197] v. County Board of Education, 455 F.2d 199, 202-204 (CA6 1972); Harkless v. Sweeny Independent School District, 427 F.2d 319, 324 (CA5 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Smith v. Hampton Training School, 360 F.2d 577, 581 n. 8 (CA4 1966) (en banc); see generally Developments in the Law, supra, n. 7, at 1265-1266. </s> [Footnote 14 See Comment, The Seventh Amendment and Civil Rights Statutes: History Adrift in a Maelstrom, 68 Nw. U. L. Rev. 503, 524-527 (1973). </s> [Footnote 15 Although petitioner has emphasized that the policies underlying the Fair Housing Act are derived from the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, she expressly "does not maintain that these constitutional considerations could prevent a jury trial if a jury were otherwise required by the Seventh Amendment." Brief for Petitioner 7. Moreover, although the legislative history of Title VIII with respect to jury trials is ambiguous, there is surely no indication that Congress intended to override the requirements of the Seventh Amendment if it mandates that jury trials be provided in 812 damage actions. We therefore have no occasion to consider in this case any question of the scope of congressional power to enforce 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> [415 U.S. 189, 199]

United States Supreme Court TAYLOR v. McELROY(1959) No. 504 Argued: Decided: June 29, 1959 </s> Petitioner, a lathe operator and tool and die maker at a plant which manufactured aircraft for the Government, lost his job because of revocation of his security clearance in proceedings similar to those involved in Greene v. McElroy, ante, p. 474. After this Court had granted certiorari to review a judgment sustaining that action, his security clearance was restored and the Solicitor General assured this Court that petitioner now stands in precisely the same position as all others who have been granted clearance, that the evidence in petitioner's file will not be used against him in the future, and that the findings against petitioner have been expunged. Held: The cause is moot; and the judgment of the District Court is vacated and the cause is remanded to that Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint as moot. Pp. 709-711. </s> Judgment vacated and cause remanded. </s> Joseph L. Rauh, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John Silard, Eugene Gressman, Harold A. Cranefield, Daniel H. Pollitt and Richard Lipsitz. </s> Solicitor General Rankin argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Doub, Samuel D. Slade and Bernard Cedarbaum. </s> J. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. Harris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This is a companion case to Greene v. McElroy, ante, p. 474, decided today, and concerns an industrial worker who was denied clearance to classified defense information [360 U.S. 709, 710] and consequently discharged from his employment as a lathe operator and tool and die maker at a plant which manufactured aircraft for the Government. </s> Prior to 1956, petitioner had a Confidential clearance. In that year, he was denied Secret clearance and his Confidential clearance was suspended. He demanded and was accorded a hearing similar to the one afforded petitioner in Greene v. McElroy, supra. The Hearing Board concluded that petitioner's access to classified defense information was "not clearly consistent with the interests of national security." Later, he was afforded another hearing with similar results. Petitioner then filed an action asking for a declaration that he was entitled to a hearing at which he could confront the informants whose statements were used against him, a declaration that the denial of clearance violated his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and an injunction restraining respondents from enforcing the decision denying clearance. Respondents prevailed on a motion for summary judgment and, on December 15, 1958, we granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals before argument was had in that court because of the pendency here of Greene v. McElroy, supra. 358 U.S. 918 . </s> On December 31, 1958, the Department of Defense notified all interested parties, including petitioner, his counsel, and his ex-employer, that the Secretary of Defense had determined "that the granting of clearance to Mr. Charles Allen Taylor for access to Secret defense information is in the national interest." On January 9, 1959, respondents filed a suggestion of mootness. We postponed consideration of that question to the hearing of the case on the merits. 359 U.S. 901 . </s> At the oral argument in this case, the Solicitor General made the following representations: </s> 1. The Secretary of Defense in determining that petitioner was eligible for clearance to obtain access to [360 U.S. 709, 711] information classified "Secret" did not intend by his reference to "the national interest" to differentiate between petitioner's status and that of other employees whose eligibility for clearance has been found to be "clearly consistent with the interests of national security." * </s> 2. The findings of the various Hearing Boards which passed on petitioner's fitness for clearance have been expunged from all records and no longer have any vitality or effect. </s> 3. Petitioner was afforded clearance on December 31, 1958, after having been denied clearance for over two years, because of a change in applicable Department of Defense regulations. </s> 4. Pursuant to existing Department of Defense procedures, the evidence in petitioner's file will not be used again as a basis for revoking petitioner's clearance. </s> 5. Petitioner is eligible under applicable regulations for compensation for wages lost during the time he was unemployed due to the clearance revocation and denial. </s> In view of the fact that petitioner has received clearance, the ultimate relief which he demanded, and in view of the representations of the Solicitor General to the effect that petitioner stands in precisely the same position as all others who have been granted clearance, that the evidence in petitioner's file will not be used against him in the future, and that the findings against petitioner have been expunged, this case is moot. </s> The judgment of the District Court is vacated and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the complaint as moot. </s> It is so ordered. </s> [Footnote * The respondents have filed a letter in this Court from the General Counsel of the Department of Defense which makes an identical representation. </s> [360 U.S. 709, 712]

United States Supreme Court CITY OF MESQUITE v. ALADDIN'S CASTLE, INC.(1982) No. 80-1577 Argued: November 10, 1981Decided: February 23, 1982 </s> Section 6 of appellant Texas city's licensing ordinance governing coin-operated amusement establishments directs the Chief of Police to consider whether a license applicant has any "connections with criminal elements." After receiving recommendations from the Chief of Police, the Chief Building Inspector, and the City Planner, the City Manager decides whether to grant a license. If he denies the license, the applicant may appeal to the City Council. If the City Manager denied the application because of the Chief of Police's adverse recommendation as to the applicant's character, the applicant must show to the City Council that he or it is of good character. Section 5 of the ordinance prohibits a licensee from allowing children under 17 years of age to operate amusement devices unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian. After appellant had been ordered in Texas state-court proceedings to issue appellee amusement center operator a license (its license application having been initially denied under the predecessor to 6), and after appellant had repealed appellee's exemption from the predecessor to 5, appellee brought suit in Federal District Court, praying for an injunction against enforcement of the ordinance. The District Court held that 6 was unconstitutionally vague, but upheld 5. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to 6, basing its holding solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but reversed as to 5, basing its holding on the Texas Constitution as well as on the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> Held: </s> 1. The fact that the phrase "connections with criminal elements" was eliminated from the ordinance while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals does not render the case moot. A defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. Here, appellant's repeal of the objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting the same provision if the District Court's judgment were vacated. Pp. 288-289. </s> 2. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that 6 is unconstitutionally vague. It is clear from the procedure to be followed when an application for a license is denied by the City Manager based on the Chief of Police's recommendation, that the phrase "connections with criminal [455 U.S. 283, 284] elements" is not the standard for approval or disapproval of the application. Rather, the applicant's possible connection with criminal elements is merely a subject that 6 directs the Chief of Police to investigate before he makes a recommendation to the City Manager. The Federal Constitution does not preclude a city from giving vague or ambiguous directions to officials who are authorized to make investigations and recommendations. Pp. 289-291. </s> 3. Because Congress has limited this Court's jurisdiction to review questions of state law and because there is ambiguity in the Court of Appeals' holding as to 5, a remand for clarification of that holding is necessary. This Court will not decide the federal constitutional question connected with 5, where (a) the relevant language of the Texas constitutional provisions is different from, and arguably significantly broader than, the language of the corresponding federal provisions; (b) it is unclear whether this Court would apply as a matter of federal law the same standard applied as a matter of state law by the Court of Appeals in reviewing 5; and (c) it is this Court's policy to avoid unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional questions, there being no need for decision of the federal issue here if Texas law provides independent support for the Court of Appeals' judgment. Pp. 291-295. 630 F.2d 1029, reversed in part and remanded. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., post, p. 296, and POWELL, J., post, p. 297, filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> Elland Archer argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant. </s> Philip W. Tone argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Louis P. Bickel, Thomas L. Case, Don R. Sampen, and Christopher L. Varner. * </s> [Footnote * Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Lawrence Gunnels, James A. Klenk, and Rufus King for the Amusement Device Manufacturers Association; and by Philip F. Herrick for the Amusement and Music Operators Association, Inc. Robert H. Bork and David E. Springer filed a brief for Atari, Inc., as amicus curiae. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declared unconstitutional two sections of a licensing ordinance [455 U.S. 283, 285] governing coin-operated amusement establishments in the city of Mesquite, Texas. 1 Section 6 of Ordinance 1353, which directs the Chief of Police to consider whether a license applicant has any "connections with criminal elements," 2 was [455 U.S. 283, 286] held to be unconstitutionally vague. Section 5, which prohibits a licensee from allowing children under 17 years of age to operate the amusement devices unless accompanied by a parent or legal guardian, 3 was held to be without a rational basis. The first holding rests solely on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court of Appeals stated that its second holding rested on two provisions of the Texas Constitution as well as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Because Congress has limited our jurisdiction to review questions of state law, and because there is ambiguity in the Court of Appeals' second holding, we conclude that a remand for clarification of that holding is necessary. There is, however, no impediment to our review of the first holding. </s> On April 5, 1976, to accommodate the proposal of Aladdin's Castle, Inc. (Aladdin), to open an amusement center in a shopping mall, the city exempted from the prohibition against operation of amusement devices by unattended children certain amusement centers, the features of which were defined in terms of Aladdin's rules, as long as children under the age of seven were accompanied by an adult. 4 Thereafter, Aladdin entered into a long-term lease and made other arrangements to open a center in the mall. In August, however, [455 U.S. 283, 287] its application for a license was refused because the Chief of Police had concluded that Aladdin's parent corporation was connected with criminal elements. Aladdin then brought suit in a Texas state court and obtained an injunction requiring the city to issue it a license forthwith. The Texas court found that neither Aladdin nor its parent corporation had any connection with criminal elements and that the vagueness in the ordinance contravened both the Texas and the Federal Constitutions. 5 </s> On February 7, 1977, less than a month after the city had complied with the state-court injunction by issuing the license to Aladdin, the city adopted a new ordinance repealing Aladdin's exemption, thereby reinstating the 17-year age requirement, and defining the term "connections with criminal elements" in some detail. 6 Aladdin then commenced this action [455 U.S. 283, 288] in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, praying for an injunction against enforcement of the new ordinance. After a trial, the District Court held that the language "connections with criminal elements," even as defined, was unconstitutionally vague, but the District Court upheld the age restriction in the ordinance. 7 As already noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed the former holding and reversed the latter. </s> Invoking our appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1254(2), the city now asks us to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. After we noted probable jurisdiction, 451 U.S. 981 , Aladdin advised us that the ordinance reviewed by the Court of Appeals had been further amended in December 1977 by eliminating the phrase "connections with criminal elements." The age restriction, however, was retained. 8 </s> I </s> A question of mootness is raised by the revision of the ordinance that became effective while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals. When that court decided that the term "connections with criminal elements" was unconstitutionally vague, that language was no longer a part of the ordinance. Arguably, if the court had been fully advised, it would have regarded the vagueness issue as moot. 9 It is clear to us, however, that it was under no duty to do so. [455 U.S. 283, 289] </s> It is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. Such abandonment is an important factor bearing on the question whether a court should exercise its power to enjoin the defendant from renewing the practice, but that is a matter relating to the exercise rather than the existence of judicial power. 10 In this case the city's repeal of the objectionable language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision if the District Court's judgment were vacated. 11 The city followed that course with respect to the age restriction, which was first reduced for Aladdin from 17 to 7 and then, in obvious response to the state court's judgment, the exemption was eliminated. There is no certainty that a similar course would not be pursued if its most recent amendment were effective to defeat federal jurisdiction. We therefore must confront the merits of the vagueness holding. </s> "It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (emphasis [455 U.S. 283, 290] added). 12 We may assume that the definition of "connections with criminal elements" in the city's ordinance is so vague that a defendant could not be convicted of the offense of having such a connection; we may even assume, without deciding, that such a standard is also too vague to support the denial of an application for a license to operate an amusement center. These assumptions are not sufficient, however, to support a holding that this ordinance is invalid. </s> After receiving recommendations from the Chief of Police, the Chief Building Inspector, and the City Planner, the City Manager decides whether to approve the application for a license; if he disapproves, he must note his reasons in writing. The applicant may appeal to the City Council. If the City Manager disapproved the application because of the Chief of Police's adverse recommendation as to the applicant's character, then the applicant must show to the City Council that "he or it is of good character as a law abiding citizen," which is defined in the ordinance to "mean substantially that standard employed by the Supreme Court of the State of Texas in the [455 U.S. 283, 291] licensing of attorneys as set forth in [the Texas statutes]." 9 of Ordinance 1353, App. to Juris. Statement 13. An applicant may further appeal to the state district court. It is clear from this summary 13 that the phrase "connections with criminal elements," as used in this ordinance, is not the standard for approval or disapproval of the application. </s> The applicant's possible connection with criminal elements is merely a subject that the ordinance directs the Chief of Police to investigate before he makes a recommendation to the City Manager either to grant or to deny a pending application. The Federal Constitution does not preclude a city from giving vague or ambiguous directions to officials who are authorized to make investigations and recommendations. There would be no constitutional objection to an ordinance that merely required an administrative official to review "all relevant information" or "to make such investigation as he deems appropriate" before formulating a recommendation. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was therefore incorrect insofar as it held that the directive to the Chief of Police is unconstitutionally vague. </s> II </s> The Court of Appeals stated that its conclusion that the age requirement in the ordinance is invalid rested on its interpretation of the Texas Constitution as well as the Federal Constitution: </s> "We hold that the seventeen year old age requirement violates both the United States and Texas constitutional guarantees of due process of law, and that the application of this age requirement to coin-operated amusement centers violates the federal and Texas constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law." 630 F.2d 1029, 1038-1039 (1980) (footnotes omitted). [455 U.S. 283, 292] </s> In the omitted footnotes the court quoted two provisions of the Texas Constitution that are similar, but by no means identical, to parts of the Federal Constitution. 14 </s> Because our jurisdiction of this appeal is based on 28 U.S.C. 1254(2), we are precluded from reviewing the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Texas Constitution. For the federal statute provides: </s> "Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: </s> . . . . . </s> "(2) By appeal by a party relying on a State statute held by a court of appeals to be invalid as repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, but such appeal shall preclude review by writ of certiorari at the instance of such appellant, and the review on appeal shall be restricted to the Federal questions presented . . . ." </s> If the Texas Constitution provides an independent ground for the Court of Appeals' judgment, our possible disagreement with its exposition of federal law would not provide a sufficient basis for reversing its judgment. If that be so, we should simply dismiss the appeal insofar as the city seeks review of the invalidation of the age requirement. Cf. United States v. Hastings, 296 U.S. 188, 193 . 15 </s> The city contends, however, that the Court of Appeals did not place independent reliance on Texas law but merely [455 U.S. 283, 293] treated the Texas constitutional protections as congruent with the corresponding federal provisions. 16 Under this reading of the Court of Appeals' opinion, our correction of any federal error automatically would result in a revision of the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Texas Constitution. Instead of providing independent support for the judgment below, the Texas law, as understood by the Court of Appeals, would be dependent on our reading of federal law. Although the city's contention derives support from the Court of Appeals' greater reliance on federal precedents than on Texas cases, we nevertheless decline, for the reasons that follow, to decide the federal constitutional question now. </s> It is first noteworthy that the language of the Texas constitutional provision is different from, and arguably significantly broader than, the language of the corresponding federal provisions. As a number of recent State Supreme Court decisions demonstrate, a state court is entirely free to read its own State's constitution more broadly than this Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee. See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489 (1977), and cases cited therein. Because learned members of the Texas Bar sit on the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and because that court confronts questions of Texas law in the regular course of its judicial business, that court is in a better position than are we to recognize any special nuances of state law. The fact that the Court of Appeals cited only four Texas cases is an insufficient [455 U.S. 283, 294] basis for concluding that it did not make an independent analysis of Texas law. </s> Second, it is important to take note of the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the Texas "requirement of legislative rationality." That interpretation seems to adopt a standard requiring that a legislative classification rests "`"upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation . . . ."'" 630 F.2d, at 1039. 17 This formulation is derived from this Court's opinion in F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 . But it is unclear whether this Court would apply the Royster Guano standard to the present case. See United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 ; Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 . Therefore, it is surely not evident that the Texas standard and the federal standard are congruent. </s> Finally, and of greater importance, is this Court's policy of avoiding the unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional questions. As we recently have noted, see Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105 , this self-imposed limitation on the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction has an importance to the institution that transcends the significance of particular controversies. No reason for hasty decision of the constitutional question presented by this case has been advanced. If Texas law provides independent support [455 U.S. 283, 295] for the Court of Appeals' judgment, there is no need for decision of the federal issue. 18 On the other hand, if the city is correct in suggesting that the Court of Appeals' interpretation of state law is dependent on its federal analysis, that court can so advise us and we can then discharge our responsibilities free of concern that we may be unnecessarily reaching out to decide a novel constitutional question. 19 </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 630 F.2d 1029 (1980). </s> [Footnote 2 Section 6 of Ordinance 1353 of the Code of the city of Mesquite provided in pertinent part: "Any person desiring to obtain a license for a coin-operated amusement establishment shall apply to the City Secretary by original and five (5) copies, one of which shall be routed to the City Manager, Chief of Police, Chief Building Inspector and City Planner, for review. "Upon approval by each of the parties and payment of the license fee, the City Secretary shall issue a license for such establishment, which shall be valid for one (1) year and shall be non-transferable. "The Chief of Police shall make his recommendation based upon his investigation of the applicant's character and conduct as a law abiding person and shall consider past operations, if any, convictions of felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude and connections with criminal elements, taking into consideration the attraction by such establishments of those of tender years. "The Chief Building Inspector and City Planner shall determine compliance with applicable building and zoning ordinances of the City. "When the City Manager has received the recommendations from the Chief of Police, Chief Building Inspector and City Planner, he shall review such application together with such recommendations as may be furnished and shall approve such application or disapprove same with written notation of his reasons for disapproval. "Upon disapproval, the applicant may make such corrections as noted and request approval, request withdrawal and refund of license fee, or give notice of appeal from the City Manager's decision. "In the event of appeal from the City Manager's decision the applicant shall give written notice of his intention to appeal within ten (10) days of notice of the City Manager's decision. Such appeal shall be heard by the City Council within thirty (30) days from date of such notice unless a later date is agreed upon by applicant. "Upon appeal to the City Council of the City Manager's decision based upon an adverse recommendation by the Chief of Police as to applicant's character, the applicant shall have the same burden as prescribed in Article 305, V. A. C. S. to show to the Council that he or it is of good character as a law abiding citizen to such extent that a license should be issued. [455 U.S. 283, 286] "Upon hearing the Council may reverse the decision of the City Manager in whole or in part or may affirm such decision. "An applicant may appeal such decision to the District Court within thirty (30) days but such appeal shall be upon the substantial evidence rule. "For violation of any of the requirements of this ordinance the City Manager may upon three (3) days notice of Licensee revoke the license granted hereunder. The same rights of appeal shall exist upon revocation as upon disapproval of the original application." App. to Juris. Statement 9-10. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 5 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any owner, operator or displayer of coin-operated amusement machines to allow any person under the age of seventeen (17) years to play or operate a coin-operated amusement machine unless such minor is accompanied by a parent or legal guardian." Id., at 8. </s> [Footnote 4 See Ordinance 1310. </s> [Footnote 5 The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, 559 S. W. 2d 92 (1977), and the Texas Supreme Court refused an application for a writ of error, 570 S. W. 2d 377 (1978), finding no reversible error in the conclusion that the denial of the license was not supported by substantial evidence, but declining to reach the vagueness question. </s> [Footnote 6 Section 9 of Ordinance 1353 defined terms used in 6 of the ordinance (quoted in n. 2, supra), which had been reenacted without change. Section 9 provided in pertinent part: "Connection With Criminal Elements is defined as that state of affairs wherein an applicant, or an officer of, principal stockholder of, person having a substantial interest in or management responsibility for, a corporation or other organization wherein such organization is the applicant, directly or as parent, subsidiary or affiliate, has such association, acquaintance, or business association with parties having been convicted of a felony or crime involving moral turpitude or are otherwise involved in unlawful activities, whether convicted or not, to the extent that the fencing of stolen merchandise or illegally obtained funds, the procuring of prostitutes, the transfer or sale of narcotics or illegal substances is made more feasible or likely or the protection of those of tender years from such unwholesome influences are rendered more difficult. "A determination by the United States Department of Justice that a party is a member of the `mafia' or `Cosa Nostro' family or that such party is engaged in or affiliated with a nationwide crime organization, whether [455 U.S. 283, 288] formally or informally, shall be prima facia evidence, so far as the issuance of a license hereunder, that such person has `connections with criminal elements' and constitute, within the meaning of this ordinance, `criminal elements'." App. to Juris. Statement 12-13. </s> [Footnote 7 434 F. Supp. 473 (1977), aff'd in part, rev'd and remanded in part, 630 F.2d 1029 (1980). </s> [Footnote 8 See Ordinance 1410, App. to Brief for Appellee A1-A11. </s> [Footnote 9 If it becomes apparent that a case has become moot while an appeal is pending, the judgment below normally is vacated with directions to dismiss the complaint. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 . </s> [Footnote 10 "The test for mootness in cases such as this is a stringent one. Mere voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not moot a case; if it did, the courts would be compelled to leave `[t]he defendant . . . free to return to his old ways.' United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953); see, e. g., United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assn., 166 U.S. 290 (1897). A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. . . . Of course it is still open to appellees to show, on remand, that the likelihood of further violations is sufficiently remote to make injunctive relief unnecessary. [345 U.S.] at 633-636. This is a matter for the trial judge. But this case is not technically moot, an appeal has been properly taken, and we have no choice but to decide it." United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Assn., 393 U.S. 199, 203 -204. </s> [Footnote 11 Indeed, the city has announced just such an intention. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18-20. </s> [Footnote 12 The Court of Appeals summarized the relevant authorities as follows: "A law is void for vagueness if persons `of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application . . . .' Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572 n. 8, quoting Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 . See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960). The offense to due process lies in both the nature and consequences of vagueness. First, vague laws do not give individuals fair notice of the conduct proscribed. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 . Accord Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 & n. 3. Second, vague laws do not limit the exercise of discretion by law enforcement officials; thus they engender the possiblity of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108-09 & n. 4; Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. at 168-70. Third, vague laws defeat the intrinsic promise of, and frustrate the essence of, a constitutional regime. We remain `a government of laws, and not of men,' Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 163, only so long as our laws remain clear." 630 F.2d, at 1037 (citations abbreviated). </s> [Footnote 13 The ordinance is quoted in pertinent part in n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 14 Article 1, 19, of the Texas Constitution provides: "No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land." Article 1, 3, of the Texas Constitution provides in pertinent part: "All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . . ." </s> [Footnote 15 "Review of a judgment which we cannot disturb, because it rests adequately upon a basis not subject to our examination, would be an anomaly." </s> [Footnote 16 If this contention is correct, we may review the Court of Appeals' interpretation of federal law. Cf. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568 ; Mental Hygiene Dept. v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, 198 ; Missouri ex rel. Southern R. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 5 ; Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 554 -555; State Tax Comm'n v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511, 514 . </s> [Footnote 17 In a section of its opinion entitled "Rational Basis," the Court of Appeals twice set forth a rational-basis test. See 630 F.2d, at 1039. In the first paragraph, the court stated that "[t]he test requires that legislative action be rationally related to the accomplishment of a legitimate state purpose," and cited both federal and state decisions in support of that formulation. In the second paragraph, the court stated that "[t]he test requires that legislation constitute a means that is `reasonable, not arbitrary and rests "upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation . . .,"'" quoting from a decision of the Texas Supreme Court, Texas Woman's University v. Chayklintaste, 530 S. W. 2d 927, 928 (1975), which in turn quoted from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 . A number of this Court's decisions were cited as in accord with this formulation. Although we cannot be sure, we might reasonably infer that the second formulation of the test represents the Court of Appeals' interpretation of Texas law. </s> [Footnote 18 Our dissenting Brethren suggest that our "view allows federal courts overruling state statutes to avoid appellate review here simply by adding citations to state cases when applying federal law," post, at 300 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We are unwilling to assume that any federal judge would discharge his judicial responsibilities in that fashion. In any event, in this case we merely hold that the Court of Appeals must explain the basis for its conclusion, if there be one, that the state ground is adequate and independent of the federal ground. </s> [Footnote 19 Cf. Mental Hygiene Dept. v. Kirchner, supra, at 196-197 (footnotes omitted): "The California Supreme Court did not state whether its holding was based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or the equivalent provisions of the California Constitution, or both. While we might speculate from the choice of words used in the opinion, and the authorities cited by the court, which provision was the basis for the judgment of the state court, we are unable to say with any degree of certainty that the judgment of the California Supreme Court was not based on an adequate and independent nonfederal ground. This Court is always wary of assuming jurisdiction of a case from a state court unless it is plain that a federal question is necessarily presented, and the party seeking review here must show that we have jurisdiction of the case. Were we to assume that the federal question was the basis for the decision below, it is clear that the California Supreme Court, either on remand or in another case presenting the same issues, could inform us that its opinion was in fact based, at least in part, on the California Constitution, thus leaving the result untouched by whatever conclusions this Court might have reached on the merits of the federal question. For reasons that follow we conclude that further clarifying proceedings in the California Supreme Court are called for under the principles stated in Minnesota v. National Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551 ." [455 U.S. 283, 296] </s> JUSTICE WHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I concur in the Court's holding that Mesquite's ordinance directing the Chief of Police to consider whether a license applicant has any "connections with criminal elements" is not void for vagueness. * </s> Like JUSTICE POWELL, however, I dissent from the Court's remand of the challenge to the age requirements in 5 of the Mesquite ordinance. The sentiment to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions is wise, but there is no reason in this case to suspect that the Fifth Circuit's standard for evaluating appellee's due process and equal protection claims under the Texas Constitution differed in any respect from federal constitutional standards. I agree with JUSTICE POWELL that "the inclusion of three cursory state-law citations in a full discussion of federal law by a federal court is neither a reference to nor an adoption of an independent state ground." Post, at 299-300 (concurring in part and dissenting in part). </s> I refrain from joining JUSTICE POWELL's detailed discussion in support of this position only because I would prefer not to engage in debate over the present health of "the Royster [455 U.S. 283, 297] Guano standard." As I understand it, and as expressed in the opinion of the Court, ante, at 292 and 294, the rationale for inquiring into the presence of independent and adequate state grounds is to avoid an unnecessary "abstract opinion," United States v. Hastings, 296 U.S. 188, 193 (1935), and to refrain from "unnecessary adjudication of federal constitutional questions." Ante, at 294. This is the sole justification for remanding the case to the Court of Appeals. To justify that disposition, however, the Court finds it necessary to speculate as to whether a formulation of the rational-basis test initially stated in F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920), and reiterated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), remains good law in light of more recent decisions. Ante, at 294. JUSTICE POWELL, in response, declares that "[t]his Court has never rejected either Royster Guano or Reed v. Reed." Post, at 301, n. 6. </s> I fear that we have lost sight of the fact that our reason for pursuing this inquiry is to avoid rendering advisory opinions on federal constitutional law. It is ironic that in seeking to skirt a relatively narrow issue of whether the Mesquite age requirement is constitutional, an issue decided by the Court of Appeals and fully briefed, the Court has instead entered into highly abstract, totally advisory, speculation as to the continuing validity of one of our earlier statements on a matter of no small constitutional importance. If it is necessary to interpret a case twice removed and totally unrelated to the matter before us in order to justify a remand to the Court of Appeals, I would think it clear that no independent nonfederal basis for the decision is present. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 652 (1979). </s> [Footnote * I agree that this issue has not been mooted by the city's revision of the ordinance. This conclusion is not inconsistent with our recent disposition of Princeton University v. Schmid, ante, p. 100 (per curiam). In that case, Princeton University's regulations governing solicitation and similar activity on University property were held invalid by the New Jersey Supreme Court. While the case was pending before the New Jersey court, Princeton substantially amended the contested regulations. On appeal to this Court, we held that the validity of the old regulations had become a moot issue. Unlike the city of Mesquite, Princeton gave no indication that it desired to return to the original regulatory scheme and would do so absent a judicial barrier. In this case, as noted in the Court's opinion, Mesquite "has announced just such an intention." Ante, at 289, n. 11. Because the test of whether the cessation of allegedly illegal action moots a case requires that we evaluate the likelihood that the challenged action will recur, County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), it is on this basis that our disposition of the two cases is consistent. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I concur in the Court's holding that Mesquite Ordinance 1353, 6, is not void for vagueness. I dissent, however, from the Court's remand of the challenge to 5. [455 U.S. 283, 298] </s> I </s> The jurisdictional basis for the Court's review of this case is 28 U.S.C. 1254(2), which provides for mandatory Supreme Court review of federal appellate decisions overturning state statutes on federal constitutional grounds. Rather than exercising this jurisdiction, the Court remands the case to the Court of Appeals to clarify whether its decision is based on Texas law. In the past, the Court has not automatically required clarification when the record reveals that the lower court's decisional basis is federal law. In this case, the opinion of the Court of Appeals contains no analysis of state law independent of its clear application of federal law. In my view there is no justification for a remand. </s> The city of Mesquite, Tex., adopted an ordinance stating that owners of coin-operated pinball machines should not allow their operation by youths under the age of 17 years. In the decision below, the Court of Appeals held that this ordinance violated equal protection and due process as well as First Amendment rights of free speech and association. The court's opinion referred to the Texas Constitution's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, 1 and quoted the relevant Texas constitutional provisions in the margin. 2 The court then, at some length, applied the Fourteenth Amendment's rational-relationship test to the Mesquite ordinance, citing, quoting, and discussing a total of 18 federal cases in this analysis. In the two initial paragraphs defining the [455 U.S. 283, 299] broad principles applied in that analysis, the court cited two Texas cases and quoted briefly from another. 630 F.2d 1029, 1035 (CA5 1980). </s> These Texas cases do not suggest an adequate and independent state ground for overruling the Mesquite ordinance. In the quoted case, the Texas court was describing federal, not Texas, law. Texas Woman's University v. Chayklintaste, 530 S. W. 2d 927, 928 (Tex. 1975) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)). Of the two other Texas cases cited, one involves an unsuccessful challenge to a zoning ordinance, and in it the Supreme Court of Texas applied the rule that a challenger to a zoning ordinance bears a heavy burden of showing that the exercise of police power is not lawful. City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S. W. 2d 773, 778-779 (1972). This case actually supports the validity of the Mesquite ordinance under Texas law. </s> In the other case, Falfurrias Creamery Co. v. City of Laredo, 276 S. W. 2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955), the State had established an inspection program for dairies. One municipality then passed an ordinance under which milk could be sold within its borders only if inspected by a local inspector. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals concluded that this requirement was arbitrary, since the local inspector could easily determine whether other inspectors were "[making] inspect[ions] in accordance with the standard ordinance contemplated by the State law." Id., at 355. This single case dealing with a dairy-inspection requirement designed to favor local dairies cannot be the basis for a serious allegation that Texas law would not allow Mesquite to exercise its police power by keeping youths out of pinball parlors. </s> On the basis of an inference as weak as that afforded by Falfurrias Creamery, I would not remand to any court, state or federal. But even if the cited case law provided some support for appellee's challenge, the inclusion of three cursory state-law citations in a full discussion of federal law by a federal [455 U.S. 283, 300] court is neither a reference to nor an adoption of an independent state ground. The Court's view allows federal courts overruling state statutes to avoid appellate review here simply by adding citations to state cases when applying federal law. </s> Nor is the Court's rigid approach today required by earlier decisions. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252, 256 -258 (1957), for example, California argued that the California Supreme Court's order dismissing the petitioner's prayer for relief was based on an independent and adequate state ground: the requirements of a state procedural rule. The Court nevertheless proceeded to the merits of the federal question without remanding for clarification of the dismissal order's basis. This Court found the proffered sources of the alleged state procedural rule unconvincing and "conclu[ded] that the constitutional issues are before us and we must consider them." Id., at 258 (footnote omitted). 3 </s> [455 U.S. 283, 301] </s> II </s> The Court gives three reasons for remanding. First, it observes that the language of the State Constitution, quoted in n. 2, supra, differs from that in the Federal Constitution and Texas may afford broader protection to individual rights than does the Federal Government. The relevant question is not, however, whether state law could be, or even is, different from federal law, but whether the Court of Appeals decided the case before it on state or federal grounds. In deciding this question, the citation of only three 4 state cases is not, of course, determinative. Here, however, the Court of Appeals failed to discuss, explain, describe, or even state Texas law despite extensive discussion of federal law and cases. </s> The Court's second point is at least imaginative. It focuses on one sentence from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S., at 76 , quoted in the Texas case of Texas Woman's University v. Chayklintaste, 530 S. W. 2d, at 928, ante, at 294, and n. 17. That sentence reiterated a formulation of rational-basis analysis that was stated in F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920). The Court today then implies that "the Royster Guano standard" may no longer be good law, citing United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980). 5 From this implication, 6 the Court further [455 U.S. 283, 302] infers that "the Texas standard and the federal standard" may not be congruent. The best answer to this speculative syllogism is found in the discussion of rational-basis analysis by the Court of Appeals. In an Appendix hereto I include the three paragraphs of the opinion that discuss the rational-relationship standard of review. It will be noted that nine United States Supreme Court cases were cited. Although three Texas cases were cited also, there is not the slightest indication that the Court of Appeals was distinguishing between federal and state law. Moreover, in the subsequent pages applying rational-relationship review, the court did not cite or discuss a single Texas case or any aspect of Texas law, though 11 federal cases were cited and discussed. 630 F.2d, at 1039-1040 (not included in Appendix). </s> Finally, the Court relies on our traditional reluctance to decide a constitutional question unnecessarily. But we noted jurisdiction to consider the validity of the Mesquite ordinance, and this question is squarely presented. As a general matter, the Court should avoid unnecessary remands; this is particularly true when the Court's mandatory jurisdiction has been invoked under 1254(2). Neither the Court of Appeals nor appellee has presented any substantial reason for thinking that the Mesquite ordinance is invalid under Texas law independently of federal law that clearly was the basis for the decision below. In these circumstances, we have a duty to decide the substantive questions presented. [455 U.S. 283, 303] </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF JUSTICE POWELL * </s> "1. Rational Basis </s> "Assuming that the rational basis test is the appropriate standard of review, we conclude that no such rationality supports ordinance No. 1353. The test requires that legislative action be rationally related to the accomplishment of a legitimate state purpose. First, the challenged legislation must have a legitimate public purpose based on promotion of the public welfare, health or safety. See, e. g., Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 -10 . . . (1966); Falfurrias Creamery Co. v. City of Laredo, 276 S. W. 2d 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Second, the act taken must bear a rational relation to the end it seeks to further. See e. g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 505-507 . . . (WHITE, J., concurring); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 . . . (1957); City of University Park v. Benners, 485 S. W. 2d 773, 778-79 (Tex. 1972), appeal dismissed 411 U.S. 901 . . . (1973). </s> "The requirement of legislative rationality in the service of legitimate purposes protects individuals and their liberties from official arbitrariness or unthinking prejudice. As one commentator noted, irrationality at least means `patently useless in the service of any goal apart from whim or favoritism.' Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review? 13 Creighton Law Review 487, 499 (1979). The test requires that legislation constitute a means that is `reasonable, not arbitrary and rests "upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation . . ."' Texas Woman's University v. Chayklintaste, 530 S. W. 2d 927, 928 (Tex. [455 U.S. 283, 304] 1979), citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 . . . (1971). Accord, United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 . . . (1973); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 . . . (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 . . . (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 . . . (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 . . . (1972). </s> "Examination of ordinance No. 1353 reveals two stated purposes. First, the ordinance seeks to prevent truancy. Second, it seeks to keep minors from being exposed to people `who would promote gambling, sale of narcotics and other unlawful activities.' We conclude that the seventeen year old age requirement in no way rationally furthers these interests in regulating the associational activity of Mesquite's young citizens, even making the assumption that both of these goals are legitimate." 630 F.2d, at 1039. </s> 1 </s> [455 U.S. 283, 298] 630 F.2d 1029, 1038-1039 (CA5 1980): "We hold that the seventeen year old age requirement violates both the United States and Texas constitutional guarantees of due process of law, and that the application of this age requirement to coin-operated amusement centers violates the federal and Texas constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the law" (footnotes omitted). </s> [Footnote 2 Tex. Const., Art. I, 3 ("All free men, when they form a social compact, have equal rights . . .") and 19 ("No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land"). </s> [Footnote 3 See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (reaching federal issues when interpretation of State Constitution depends on federal law); Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 507 , n. 2 (1958) (After looking at record and opinion below, Court concludes that State Supreme Court's dismissal appears to be based on federal ground); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945) (The only cited sources for an independent state ground are considered insubstantial by the Court; Court proceeds to merits of federal issue); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 69 (1928) (Given that State Constitution has no Equal Protection Clause, Court concludes that federal law must have been determinative). In Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945), the lower court dismissed complaints with no indication of whether the dismissal was based on state or federal law. The Court continued the cases pending clarification of the lower court's decisional basis. In announcing this outcome, the Court stated that it would not review a judgment of a state court "until the fact that [the decision] does not [rest on an adequate and independent state ground] appears of record." Id., at 128. Pitcairn did not, however, adopt the rigid rule the Court apparently adopts today. The Court continued to be willing to look at available record evidence (none was available in Pitcairn) to determine whether the decision below was based on an adequate [455 U.S. 283, 301] and independent state ground. See Cicenia v. Lagay, supra; Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957). </s> [Footnote 4 The Court reports that the Court of Appeals cited four Texas cases, but one case was cited as procedural history in the dispute between these parties, not as relevant to any question of Texas law. See 630 F.2d, at 1034, n. 8. </s> [Footnote 5 Fritz was decided on December 9, 1980; as the Court of Appeals had decided this case on November 17, 1980, it could not have been influenced by Fritz. </s> [Footnote 6 This Court has never rejected either Royster Guano or Reed v. Reed. As stated in Fritz, "[t]he most arrogant legal scholar would not claim that all [Supreme Court] cases appl[y] a uniform or consistent test under equal [455 U.S. 283, 302] protection principles." 449 U.S., at 177 , n. 10. In view of the example we have set, there is no reason to perceive inferences of divergent federal-and state-court views because of the failure of the Court of Appeals or Texas courts to use entirely consistent terminology. Moreover, after its generalizations as to rational-basis analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit went on to say that even if "the challenged ordinance had a rational basis . . . we would nevertheless be compelled to strike it down" as an infringement of the fundamental right of association. 630 F.2d, at 1041. No less than 29 federal cases were cited for this conclusion. No Texas case was cited. Id., at 1041-1044. </s> [Footnote * This includes the entire discussion of the rational-basis standard of review by the Court of Appeals. 630 F.2d, at 1039. It is this portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion that the Court today relies on for saying that "it is surely not evident that the Texas standard and the federal standard are congruent." Ante, at 294. See supra, at 301-302, and n. 6. </s> [455 U.S. 283, 305]

United States Supreme Court WILLIAMS v. UNITED STATES(1982) No. 80-2116 Argued: April 20, 1982Decided: June 29, 1982 </s> Title 18 U.S.C. 1014 makes it a crime to "knowingly mak[e] any false statement or report," or "willfully overvalu[e] any land, property or security," for the purpose of influencing the action of described financial institutions (including federally insured banks) "upon any application, advance, . . . commitment, or loan." Petitioner engaged in a series of transactions seemingly amounting to a case of "check kiting" between his accounts in federally insured banks, first drawing a check far in excess of his account balance in one bank and depositing it in his account in the other, and then reversing the process between his accounts. Petitioner was convicted in Federal District Court of violating 1014, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. </s> Held: </s> Petitioner's conduct in depositing "bad checks" in federally insured banks is not proscribed by 1014. Pp. 284-290. </s> (a) Petitioner's actions did not involve the making of a "false statement." Technically speaking, a check is not a factual assertion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as "true" or "false." Similarly, petitioner's conduct cannot be regarded as "overvalu[ing]" property or a security. In a literal sense, the face amounts of the checks were their "values." To interpret 1014 as meaning that a drawer of a check has made a "false" statement whenever he has insufficient funds in his account at the moment the check is presented would "sligh[t] the wording of the statute" United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 , and would render a wide range of unremarkable conduct violative of federal law. When 1014 was enacted, federal action was not necessary to interdict the deposit of bad checks, for fraudulent checking activities already were addressed in comprehensive fashion by state law. Pp. 284-287. </s> (b) The legislative history does not support the proposition that 1014 was designed to have general application to the passing of worthless checks, and does not demand that the statute be read as applicable to anything other than representations made in connection with conventional loan or related transactions. A narrow interpretation of 1014 is consistent with the usual approach of lenity in the construction of criminal statutes. Pp. 288-290. </s> 639 F.2d 1311, reversed and remanded. [458 U.S. 279, 280] </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which POWELL, REHNQUIST, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 291. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and BRENNAN and WHITE, JJ., joined, post, p. 292. </s> Nickolas P. Chilivis argued the cause and filed briefs for petitioner. </s> Richard G. Wilkins argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant Attorney General Jensen, Deputy Solicitor General Shapiro, William C. Bryson, Douglas S. Wood, and Janis H. Kockritz. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In this case we must decide whether the deposit of a "bad check" in a federally insured bank is proscribed by 18 U.S.C. 1014. </s> I </s> In 1975, petitioner William Archie Williams purchased a controlling interest in the Pelican State Bank in Pelican, La., and appointed himself president. The bank's deposits were insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. </s> Among the services the bank provided its customers at the time of petitioner's purchase was access to a "dummy account," used to cover checks drawn by depositors who had insufficient funds in their individual accounts. Any such check was processed through the dummy account and paid from the bank's general assets. The check was then held until the customer covered it by a deposit to his own account, at which time the held check was posted to the customer's account and the dummy account was credited accordingly. As president of the bank, petitioner enjoyed virtually unlimited use of the dummy account, and by May 2, 1978, his personal overdrafts amounted to $58,055.44, approximately half the total then covered by the account. </s> On May 8, 1978, federal and state examiners arrived at the Pelican Bank to conduct an audit. That same day, petitioner [458 U.S. 279, 281] embarked on a series of transactions that seemingly amounted to a case of "check kiting." 1 He began by opening a checking account with a deposit of $4,649.97 at the federally insured Winn State Bank and Trust Company in Winnfield, La. The next day, petitioner drew a check on his new Winn account for $58,500 - a sum far in excess of the amount actually on deposit at the Winn Bank - and deposited it in his Pelican account. Pelican credited his account with the face value of the check, at the same time deducting from petitioner's account the $58,055.44 total of his checks that previously had been cleared through the dummy account. At the close of business on May 9, then, petitioner had a balance of $452.89 at the Pelican Bank. </s> On May 10, petitioner wrote a $60,000 check on his Pelican account - again, a sum far in excess of the account balance - and deposited it in his Winn account. The Winn Bank immediately credited the $60,000 to petitioner's account there, and Pelican cleared the check through its dummy account when it was presented for payment on May 11. The Winn Bank routinely [458 U.S. 279, 282] paid petitioner's May 9 check for $58,500 when it cleared on May 12. </s> Petitioner next attempted to balance his Pelican account by depositing a $65,000 check drawn on his account at yet another institution, the Sabine State Bank in Many, La. Unfortunately, the balance in petitioner's Sabine account at the time was only $1,204.81. The Sabine Bank therefore refused payment when Pelican presented the check on May 17. On May 23, petitioner settled his Pelican account by depositing at the Pelican Bank a $65,000 money order obtained with the proceeds from a real estate mortgage loan. </s> The bank examiners, meanwhile, had been following petitioner's activities with considerable interest. Their scrutiny ultimately led to petitioner's indictment, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. 1014. 2 That provision makes it a crime to </s> "knowingly mak[e] any false statement or report, or willfully overvalu[e] any land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [certain enumerated financial institutions, among them banks whose deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation], upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan . . . ." </s> The first of the counts under 1014 was directed at the May 9, 1978, check drawn on the Winn Bank, and charged that petitioner "did knowingly and willfully overvalue . . . a security, that is a check . . . for the purpose of influencing the Pelican State Bank, . . . a bank the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, upon an advance of money and extension of credit." The other [458 U.S. 279, 283] 1014 count used virtually identical language to indict petitioner for depositing in his Winn account the May 10 check drawn on the Pelican Bank. App. 3-4. 3 </s> At petitioner's trial the court charged the jury that "[a] check is a security for purposes of Section 1014." The court then explained that "[t]he Government charges that Mr. Williams was involved in check-kiting - a scheme whereby false credit is obtained by the exchange and passing of worthless checks between two or more banks." Id., at 36. To convict petitioner, the court continued, the jury had to find as to each count that "the defendant . . . did knowingly and willfully make a false statement of a material fact," that the statement "influence[d] the decision of the [bank] officers or employees," and that "the defendant made the false statement with fraudulent intent to influence the [bank] to extend credit to the defendant." Id., at 37-38. "The crucial question in check-kiting," the court concluded, "is whether the defendant intended to write checks which he could not reasonably expect to cover and thereby defraud the bank, or whether he was genuinely involved in the process of depositing funds and then making legitimate withdrawals against them." Id., at 38. The jury convicted petitioner on both counts, and he was sentenced to six months' incarceration on the second 1014 count. For the first 1014 count he was placed on five years' probation, to begin upon his release from confinement. App. 39. 4 </s> [458 U.S. 279, 284] </s> Among other things, petitioner argued on appeal that the indictment did not state a violation of 1014. The Court of Appeals rejected this contention, however, concluding that petitioner's actions "constitute classic incidents of check kiting." 639 F.2d 1311, 1319 (CA5 1981). In line with its earlier decision in United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), the court found such action proscribed by the statute. </s> We granted certiorari, limited to Questions 3 and 4 presented by the petition, in order to resolve a conflict concerning the reach of 1014. 5 </s> 454 U.S. 1030 and 1096 (1981). </s> II </s> To obtain a conviction under 1014, the Government must establish two propositions: it must demonstrate (1) that the defendant made a "false statement or report," or "willfully overvalue[d] any land, property or security," and (2) that he did so "for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [a described financial institution] upon any application, advance, . . . commitment, or loan." We conclude that petitioner's convictions under 1014 cannot stand, because the Government has failed to meet the first of these burdens. </s> A </s> Although petitioner deposited several checks that were not supported by sufficient funds, that course of conduct did not involve the making of a "false statement," for a simple reason: technically speaking, a check is not a factual assertion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as "true" or "false." Petitioner's bank checks served only to direct the drawee banks to pay the face amounts to the bearer, while committing petitioner to make good the obligations if the banks dishonored the drafts. Each check did not, in terms, [458 U.S. 279, 285] make any representation as to the state of petitioner's bank balance. As defined in the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 U. L. A. 17 (1977), a check is simply "a draft drawn on a bank and payable on demand," 3-104(2)(b), which "contain[s] an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money," 3-104(1)(b). As such, "[t]he drawer engages that upon dishonor of the draft and any necessary notice of dishonor or protest he will pay the amount of the draft to the holder." 3-413(2), 2 U. L. A. 424 (1977). The Code also makes clear, however, that "[a] check or other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrument until he accepts it." 3-409(1), 2 U. L. A. 408 (1977). Louisiana, the site of petitioner's unfortunate banking career, embraces verbatim each of these definitions. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 10:3-104, 10:3-409, 10:3-413 (West Supp. 1982). 6 </s> For similar reasons, we conclude that petitioner's actions cannot be regarded as "overvalu[ing]" property or a security. Even assuming that petitioner's checks were property or a security as defined by 1014, the value legally placed upon them was the value of petitioner's obligation; as defined by Louisiana law, that is the only meaning actually attributable to a bank check. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 10:3-409(1), 10:3-413(2) (West Supp. 1982). In a literal sense, then, the face amounts of the checks were their "values." </s> The foregoing description of bank checks is concededly a technical one, and the Government therefore argues with some force that a drawer is generally understood to represent that he "currently has funds on deposit sufficient to cover the face value of the check." Brief for United States 19. See United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d, at 1218. If the [458 U.S. 279, 286] drawer has insufficient funds in his account at the moment the check is presented, the Government continues, he effectively has made a "false statement" to the recipient. While this broader reading of 1014 is plausible, we are not persuaded that it is the preferable or intended one. It "slights the wording of the statute," United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 399 (1973), for, as we have noted, a check is literally not a "statement" at all. In any event, whatever the general understanding of a check's function, "false statement" is not a term that, in common usage, is often applied to characterize "bad checks." And, when interpreting a criminal statute that does not explicitly reach the conduct in question, we are reluctant to base an expansive reading on inferences drawn from subjective and variable "understandings." 7 </s> Equally as important, the Government's interpretation of 1014 would make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable conduct a violation of federal law. While the Court of Appeals addressed itself only to check kiting, its ruling has wider implications: it means that any check, knowingly supported by insufficient funds, deposited in a federally insured bank could give rise to criminal liability, whether or not the drawer had an intent to defraud. Under the Court of Appeals' approach, the violation of 1014 is not the scheme to pass a number of bad checks; it is the presentation of one false statement - that is, one check that at the moment of deposit is not supported by sufficient funds - to a federally insured [458 U.S. 279, 287] bank. The United States acknowledged as much at oral argument. Tr. of Oral Arg. 40. Indeed, each individual count of the indictment in this case stated only that petitioner knowingly had deposited a single check that was supported by insufficient funds, not that he had engaged in an extended scheme to obtain credit fraudulently. 8 </s> Yet, if Congress really set out to enact a national bad check law in 1014, it did so with a peculiar choice of language and in an unusually backhanded manner. Federal action was not necessary to interdict the deposit of bad checks, for, as Congress surely knew, fraudulent checking activities already were addressed in comprehensive fashion by state law. See Comment, Insufficient Funds Checks in the Criminal Area: Elements, Issues, and Proposals, 38 Mo. L. Rev. 432 (1973). Absent support in the legislative history for the proposition that 1014 was "designed to have general application to the passing of worthless checks," United States v. Krown, 675 F.2d 46, 50 (CA2 1982), we are not prepared to hold petitioner's conduct proscribed by that particular statute. 9 </s> [458 U.S. 279, 288] </s> B </s> In the 1948 codification of Title 18 of the United States Code, 62 Stat. 683, 1014 reduced 13 existing statutes, which criminalized fraudulent practices directed at a variety of financial and credit institutions, to a single section. See 18 U.S.C. 1014, Historical and Revision Notes. Of the originally enumerated institutions, 10 only two - the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, see 15 U.S.C. 616(a) (1946 ed.), and the Federal Reserve Banks, see 12 U.S.C. 596 (1946 ed.) - performed duties other than the making of farm and home loans, and neither of those two organizations accepted checks for deposit from private customers. See United States v. Sabatino, 485 F.2d 540, 548 (CA2 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); United States v. Edwards, 455 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (MD Pa. 1978). It is evident, then, that bad checks were not among the "false statements" or "overvalued property" originally addressed by the statute. While Congress has added and subtracted certain institutions to and from the list covered by 1014 over the intervening years, no changes have been made in the type of transactions proscribed by the provision. </s> The legislative history does not demand a broader reading of the statute. The amendments adding institutions to 1014's list attracted little attention in Congress and were dealt with summarily; at no point was it suggested that the statute should be applicable to anything other than representations [458 U.S. 279, 289] made in connection with conventional loan or related transactions. In 1964, for example, when Congress, by Pub. L. 88-353, 5, 78 Stat. 269, added Federal Credit Unions to the statutory list, 1014 was described as barring "false statements or willful overvaluations in connection with applications, loans, and the like." S. Rep. No. 1078, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1964). Thus, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency declared that 1014 "is designed primarily to apply to borrowers from Federal agencies or federally chartered organizations." 11 Id., at 4. Similarly, the first of two 1970 amendments, which added state-chartered credit unions to the statutory list, Pub. L. 91-468, 7, 84 Stat. 1017, was characterized simply as "relating to false statements in loan and credit applications." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1457, p. 21 (1970). </s> A second 1970 amendment, Pub. L. 91-609, 915, 84 Stat. 1815, added banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Home Loan Banks, and institutions insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, for the first time listing institutions that engaged in commercial checking. 12 But there was no contemporaneous congressional recognition of the substantial expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction that would attend the proscription of bad checks. To the contrary, the Reports accompanying the amendment stated simply that the addition "would describe more explicitly the institutions which are covered by 18 U.S.C. 1014, which provides penalties for making false statements or reports in connection with loans or other similar [458 U.S. 279, 290] transactions." H. R. Rep. No. 91-1556, p. 35 (1970). See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1784, p. 66 (1970). Congressional debate was directed only at the addition of federally insured savings and loan institutions, which was said to "mak[e] it a Federal crime to submit false data to an insured savings and loan on the true value of a property on which a mortgage is to be granted." 116 Cong. Rec. 42633 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Sullivan). </s> Given this background - a statute that is not unambiguous in its terms and that if applied here would render a wide range of conduct violative of federal law, a legislative history that fails to evidence congressional awareness of the statute's claimed scope, and a subject matter that traditionally has been regulated by state law - we believe that a narrow interpretation of 1014 would be consistent with our usual approach to the construction of criminal statutes. The Court has emphasized that "`when choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.'" United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971), quoting United States v. Universal C. I. T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221 -222 (1952). 13 To be sure, the rule of lenity does not give courts license to disregard otherwise applicable enactments. But in a case such as this one, where both readings of 1014 are plausible, "it would require statutory language much more explicit than that before us here to lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to put the Federal Government in the business of policing the" deposit of bad checks. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S., at 411 . </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 As the Government explains, a check-kiting scheme typically works as follows: "The check kiter opens an account at Bank A with a nominal deposit. He then writes a check on that account for a large sum, such as $50,000. The check kiter then opens an account at Bank B and deposits the $50,000 check from Bank A in that account. At the time of deposit, the check is not supported by sufficient funds in the account at Bank A. However, Bank B, unaware of this fact, gives the check kiter immediate credit on his account at Bank B. During the several-day period that the check on Bank A is being processed for collection from that bank, the check kiter writes a $50,000 check on his account at Bank B and deposits it into his account at Bank A. At the time of the deposit of that check, Bank A gives the check kiter immediate credit on his account there, and on the basis of that grant of credit pays the original $50,000 check when it is presented for collection. "By repeating this scheme, or some variation of it, the check kiter can use the $50,000 credit originally given by Bank B as an interest-free loan for an extended period of time. In effect, the check kiter can take advantage of the several-day period required for the transmittal, processing, and payment of checks from accounts in different banks . . . ." Brief for United States 12-13. </s> [Footnote 2 Petitioner also was charged with - and thereafter convicted of - one count of misapplying bank funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 656. The validity of that conviction, which was affirmed on appeal, is not before us. </s> [Footnote 3 Neither of the 1014 counts of the indictment expressly charged petitioner with making a "false statement." The first count, however, did allege that he "presented said check for deposit at Pelican State Bank . . . and represented and caused to be represented to said bank that said check was of a value equal to the face amount of the check, when in truth and fact, as the [petitioner] then well knew, there were no sufficient funds in the account of W. A. Williams at the Winn State Bank and Trust Company, to cover said check." App. 3. Similar language was employed in the second 1014 count. Id., at 4. </s> [Footnote 4 The sentence of probation also applied to petitioner's conviction for misapplication of bank funds. See n. 2, supra. </s> [Footnote 5 See United States v. Sher, 657 F.2d 28 (CA3 1981), cert. pending, No. 81-1047 (holding that 1014 does not proscribe check kiting). Cf. United States v. Krown, 675 F.2d 46, 50 (CA2 1982) (noting the conflict). </s> [Footnote 6 Unlike many state statutes that do proscribe conduct such as that engaged in by petitioner, the federal scheme obviously does not in terms reach the deposit of checks that are supported by insufficient funds. See Comment, Insufficient Funds Checks in the Criminal Area: Elements, Issues, and Proposals, 38 Mo. L. Rev. 432 (1973). </s> [Footnote 7 That is particularly true where, as here, it is not immediately clear what "common understanding" would recognize as the implied representation of the act of depositing one's own check. The United States suggests that one who deposits a check represents that he "currently has funds on deposit sufficient to cover the face value." Brief for United States 19. But it would be equally plausible to suggest that many people understand a check to represent that the drawer will have sufficient funds deposited in his account by the time the check clears, or that the drawer will make good the face value of the draft if it is dishonored by the bank. We therefore find "common understanding" a particularly fragile foundation upon which to base an interpretation of 1014. </s> [Footnote 8 JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissent does not fully respond to this point. That opinion, like the Government's brief, emphasizes that petitioner's "conduct was wrongful," post, at 293, and deals only with 1014's application to check kiting. See also post, at 294, 295, 299, 300, and 301. Indeed, the dissent seems to suggest that that statute would not reach the conduct of a defendant who "wrote a check on an account containing insufficient funds with the good-faith intention to deposit in that account an amount that would cover the check before it cleared in the normal course of business." Post, at 292. Accepting JUSTICE MARSHALL's theory, however, would bring such conduct within the literal language of the statute, for a "false statement" would have been submitted with the hope of inducing a bank to "advance" funds. While the dissent attempts to avoid this by suggesting that there would be no violation of 1014 absent an intent "to defraud," post, at 301, n. 4, the language of the statute imposes no such intent requirement. And as we emphasize above, we believe that the wording of 1014 would be a peculiar choice of terms if Congress wished to proscribe such conduct. </s> [Footnote 9 JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissent rests entirely on the proposition that petitioner's conduct falls within the "plain language" of 1014. Post, at 293. See also post, at 301, 302, and 305-306. In our view, that literally is not [458 U.S. 279, 288] true. And even if one looks to the "common understanding" so emphasized by JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, at 296-298, the statute is at best ambiguous, for we doubt that the public typically describes bad checks as "false statements." </s> [Footnote 10 These included the Farmers' Home Corporation, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Banks, the Farm Credit Administration, Federal Credit Banks, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation, the National Agricultural Credit Corporation, Federal Home Loan Banks, the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and related institutions. See 7 U.S.C. 1026(a), 1514(a) (1946 ed.); 12 U.S.C. 596, 981, 1122, 1123, 1138d(a), 1248, 1312, 1313, 1441(a), 1467(a) (1946 ed.); 15 U.S.C. 616(a) (1946 ed.). </s> [Footnote 11 The Committee added ambiguously that the statute "is not, however, limited by its terms to borrowers and would seem also to apply to others, including for example, officers and employees of the agencies and institutions named." S. Rep. No. 1078, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1964). </s> [Footnote 12 Also added to the list in 1970 were the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation themselves, as well as the Administrator of the National Credit Union Administration. Pub. L. 91-609, 915, 84 Stat. 1815. </s> [Footnote 13 We therefore find it somewhat surprising that JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion takes us to task for noting the applicability of the rule of lenity to the interpretation of what we believe to be an ambiguous statute. [458 U.S. 279, 291] </s> JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. </s> The majority reverses petitioner's conviction under 18 U.S.C. 1014 on the grounds that the Government has not shown that he made a "false statement or report" or "willfully overvalue[d] any land, property or security." Ante, at 284. According to the majority, a check is not a statement; it is merely an order to the drawee bank to pay the face amount to the payee and a promise to pay the amount of the check upon notice of dishonor. Ante, at 284-285. Like JUSTICE MARSHALL, I do not disagree with the majority that under the Uniform Commercial Code a check constitutes an order to the drawee bank and a promise to pay upon notice of dishonor. However, the fact that the Uniform Commercial Code describes a check in this manner does not mean that a check does not carry with it other representations, for the Code does not purport to contain an all-inclusive definition of a check. </s> It defies common sense and everyday practice to maintain, as the majority does, that a check carries with it no representation as to the drawer's account balance. No bank would give a customer immediate credit for a check drawn on another bank or reduce a check to cash if it did not believe that the check would be paid in the normal course of collection. It could be argued that petitioner did not make a false statement with respect to the May 10 check drawn on the Pelican Bank because he knew the bank would pay the check through its dummy account. However, petitioner does not contend that he had any such arrangement with the Winn Bank, and thus the May 9 check for $58,500 drawn on the Winn Bank, when his balance was $4,649.97, can fairly be said to constitute a false statement. In any event, a properly instructed jury surely found that Williams had made false representations with respect to each of the checks that were the subject of this indictment. </s> If the majority really means what it says in Part II-A of its opinion - that the Government failed to show that petitioner [458 U.S. 279, 292] made a false statement or overvalued property or security - it is unnecessary to explore the legislative history of 1014 or to apply the rule of lenity. On the other hand, if the majority reverses the Court of Appeals because it cannot conceive that Congress intended 1014 to reach the conduct at issue because the area has long been regulated by state law, it is not necessary to employ the fiction that a check does not entail a representation that it will be paid in the normal course of business by the drawee bank. Because the majority opinion appears to me to rest on that fiction, I respectfully dissent. I also join JUSTICE MARSHALL's dissenting opinion. </s> JUSTICE MARSHALL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE BRENNAN, and JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting. </s> The majority, after developing an overly technical "definition" of the meaning of a check - a definition which will come as quite a surprise to banks and businesses that accept checks in exchange for goods, services, or cash on the representation that the drawer has sufficient funds to cover the check - concludes that the question whether petitioner Williams' check-kiting scheme is covered by 18 U.S.C. 1014 is ambiguous. The majority then applies its version of the rule of lenity, and decides that Williams cannot be convicted for violating this statute. Because I believe that the majority misapplies the rule of lenity, and because Williams' conduct is clearly prohibited by the statute, I respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> Before addressing the application of 1014 to Williams' conduct, I think that it is helpful to set forth clearly what is not involved here. This is not a case in which a defendant, through careless bookkeeping, wrote checks on accounts with insufficient funds. Nor is this a case in which a defendant wrote a check on an account containing insufficient funds with the good-faith intention to deposit in that account an amount that would cover the check before it cleared in the normal course of business. Rather, this case clearly involves [458 U.S. 279, 293] fraudulent conduct. Petitioner Williams engaged in an intentional check-kiting scheme. He misled the first bank into honoring his worthless, or virtually worthless, check and extending him immediate credit. This extension of credit enabled him to "play the float" and cover that check by misleading another bank into extending him credit on an equally worthless check. In effect, Williams was able to obtain interest-free extensions of credit. Williams, who was a bank president, does not, nor can he, make any credible argument that he was unaware that his conduct was wrongful. With this in mind, I turn to the question whether Williams' conduct constitutes a violation of 18 U.S.C. 1014. </s> Section 1014 is a comprehensive statute designed to protect the assets of federally insured lending institutions. The Government establishes a violation of this statute by proving that the defendant "knowingly [made] any false statement or . . . willfully overvalue[d] any . . . property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [any federally insured bank] upon any . . . advance, . . . commitment, or loan." 18 U.S.C. 1014 (emphasis added). Just last Term, we reiterated that "[i]n determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a `clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'" United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (quoting Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)). In my view, the plain language of 1014 covers the check-kiting scheme practiced by Williams, and nothing in the legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress intended to exclude this type of scheme from the coverage of the statute. </s> A </s> The language of 1014 is sweeping. It embraces numerous entities in which the Federal Government has a financial interest. It proscribes, in the disjunctive, a wide variety of [458 U.S. 279, 294] deceptive schemes that might impair the financial stability of these institutions. Cf. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 774 (1979) (disjunctive prohibitions intended to "cover additional kinds of illegalities - not to narrow the reach of the prior sections"). The statute refers broadly to "any false statement or report," and to overvaluations of "any" property or security. The list of transactions to which the statute applies is equally expansive - it covers "any application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan, or any change or extension of any of the same, by renewal, deferment of action or otherwise, or the acceptance, release, or substitution of security therefor." 18 U.S.C. 1014. </s> The broad statutory language clearly evinces its legislative purpose - Congress hoped to protect federally insured institutions from losses stemming from false statements or misrepresentations that mislead the institutions into making financial commitments, advances, or loans. The statute was intended to be broad enough "to maintain the vitality of the FDIC insurance program . . . and `to cover all undertakings which might subject the FDIC insured bank to risk of loss.'" United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 838 (CA3) (quoting United States v. Stoddart, 574 F.2d 1050, 1053 (CA10 1978)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981). This broad language does not lend itself to the restrictive interpretation endorsed by the Court today. Cf. United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978). </s> Nothing on the face of 1014 "suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage" to a particular kind of transaction. United States v. Culbert, supra, at 373. Check kiting, which threatens the assets of federally insured banks in precisely the same way as a misrepresentation in a loan application, should not be excluded from the reach of the statute simply because the terms of the statute and its legislative history do not specifically identify check kiting by name or precise description. This method of statutory construction was [458 U.S. 279, 295] rejected recently in Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 592 (1980): </s> "[I]t would be a strange canon of statutory construction that would require Congress to state in committee reports or elsewhere in its deliberations that which is obvious on the face of a statute. In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court cannot, in the manner of Sherlock Holmes, pursue the theory of the dog that did not bark." </s> Unfortunately, in my view, the Court's approach to interpreting 1014 comes dangerously close to the method we rejected in Harrison. Unless one accepts the Court's overly restrictive and technical "definition" of a check, check-kiting schemes clearly fall within the broad language of that statute. </s> B </s> As the majority recognizes, a violation of 1014 is established when the Government proves two elements: that the defendant either made a "false statement or report," or "willfully overvalue[d] any . . . property or security;" and that the defendant did so "for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [a federally insured institution] upon any application, advance, . . . commitment, or loan." After recognizing this, however, the majority's analysis jumps the track. The majority concludes that when a drawer presents a kited check to a bank with the knowledge that he does not have sufficient funds, and with the intent not to cover that check with anything other than another virtually worthless kited check, he has not made "any false statement or report," or "willfully overvalue[d] any . . . property or security" within the meaning of the statute. In my view, neither of these conclusions withstands analysis. </s> (1) </s> The basis for the Court's conclusion that Williams did not make a "false statement or report" is concededly technical [458 U.S. 279, 296] and "simple": "a check is not a factual assertion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as `true' or `false.'" Ante, at 284. This argument proves too much: it would apply equally to material omissions or failures to disclose in connection with loan applications. However, the Courts of Appeals have held that the failure to disclose material information needed to avoid deception in connection with loan transactions covered by 1014 constitutes a "false statement or report," and thus violates the statute. See, e. g., United States v. Greene, 578 F.2d 648, 657 (CA5 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1133 (1979). I assume that the majority would not disagree with this analysis, which is based on established contract principles. I am at a loss as to why the majority does not apply the same analysis to the transactions at issue in this case. </s> The majority's description of a check as an "`unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money,'" ante, at 285 (quoting the Uniform Commercial Code 3-104(1)(b), 2 U. L. A. 17 (1977)), is unexceptionable as a conclusory description of "black-letter" law. However, this oversimplified description fails to look behind the bare technical definition of a check. Moreover, this description is not at all inconsistent with the necessary implications that a check carries. "In giving a check, the drawer impliedly represents that he has on deposit with the drawee banks funds equivalent to the face amount of the check." F. Whitney, The Law of Modern Commercial Practices 341 (2d ed. 1965). 1 Despite the majority's [458 U.S. 279, 297] equivocation on this point, those who write or accept checks in exchange for goods, services, or cash undoubtedly understand that this implicit representation has been made. 2 </s> [458 U.S. 279, 298] A check is accepted with the expectation that it will be paid in the normal course of collection. A banker who knew that the drawer did not have funds on deposit would not credit the check to the drawer's account or reduce it to cash. Regardless of any contractual breach also involved in check kiting, a person who writes a series of checks knowing that there are no funds to cover them has made intentional false representations within the reach of 1014. </s> Any other view, including that endorsed by the Court today, would interfere with the manner in which a major portion of commercial transactions are conducted in our society today. Williams was charged with, and the jury convicted him of, making a false representation (or, more precisely, a material omission) when he presented his check to the bank with the knowledge that he did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, and with the further intent not to cover that check before it cleared with anything other than another worthless kited check. See n. 2, supra. Therefore, his conviction under 1014 should stand. </s> (2) </s> In addition to violating 1014 by intentionally making a false statement to a federally insured bank for the purpose of obtaining credit, Williams also violated the statute for a separate and independent reason. Although Williams presented to the bank for immediate credit a check which on its face represented an amount exceeding $50,000, he well knew that in fact the check was virtually worthless. In so doing, he "willfully overvalue[d] . . . property or security" for the purpose of obtaining credit. 3 The Court's rejection of the Government's [458 U.S. 279, 299] argument with respect to this issue is startling in both its brevity and its concededly technical and "literal" interpretation of the legal value of a check which completely ignores the meaning attributed to checks in the real world. </s> The very essence of a check-kiting scheme is the successful overvaluation of a security or property which misleads a bank into issuing immediate credit on the assumption that the security or property is in fact valued at the amount represented on its face. A check-kiting scheme is successful only when the bank to which the check is presented assumes that the check is supported by adequate funds in the account upon which it is drawn, and that the face amount of the check is in fact its value. See supra, at 296-298; United States v. Payne, 602 F.2d 1215, 1217-1218 (CA5 1979). If the bank does not accept the valuation on the face of the check, and instead either inquires into the status of the account on which the check is drawn or waits until the check clears before paying the face amount of the check, the scheme will collapse. Of course, it would be more prudent for a bank to take such precautions just as it would be prudent for banks to inquire carefully into the accuracy of all representations made concerning the value of collateral pledged as security for conventional loans. However, this more prudent course is not always practicable. Moreover, the bank may not believe that such precautions are necessary where, as here, the person presenting the check is the president of another bank presumed to know the illegality, and the drastic adverse consequences [458 U.S. 279, 300] to a bank, of a check-kiting scheme. In any event, a bank's failure to take all possible precautions does not bar prosecution under 1014, which places the burden of avoiding false representations, at the risk of criminal prosecution, upon the person who seeks the funds of the federally insured bank. Section 1014 forbids a person seeking such funds to make "any" false statement or to "willfully overvalue" any security or property to obtain use of the bank's funds. A kited check is "willfully overvalued" within the meaning of the statute, just as worthless securities presented as collateral for a loan are "willfully overvalued." See United States v. Calandrella, 605 F.2d 236 (CA6), cert. denied sub nom. Kaye v. United States, 444 U.S. 991 (1979). </s> (3) </s> The Court does not question that the second element of a 1014 violation - that Williams presented his kited check for the purpose of influencing the bank to extend him credit in the form of a loan or an advance - is satisfied in this case. Clearly, Williams' conduct was directed at misleading a bank into extending immediate credit. Indeed, the whole purpose of Williams' kiting scheme was to obtain an immediate extension of credit by depositing a check purportedly supported by adequate funds. The banks that extended funds on the basis of Williams' worthless, and not yet collected, checks made an "advance," a "loan," and a "commitment" within the ordinary meaning of these terms. See, e. g., United States v. Payne, supra, at 1218 (check kiting has effect of inducing a credit, a loan, or an advance); United States v. Street, 529 F.2d 226, 229 (CA6 1976) (check kiting is the obtaining of "forced credit"); J. White & R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 558 (2d ed. 1980); F. Whitney, supra n. 1, 310, pp. 451-452. </s> If a worthless check is submitted to a bank for reasons other than to obtain an extension of credit, the conduct simply is not check kiting in the ordinary sense of the term, and [458 U.S. 279, 301] would not fall within the prohibition of 1014. 4 However, if a properly instructed jury concludes that a worthless check was submitted in order to obtain immediate credit from a bank, there is no reason to regard the conduct as falling outside the reach of 1014. The jury that convicted Williams was so instructed, see n. 2, supra, and found that Williams' conduct constituted a "false representation" designed to influence the banks into extending him immediate credit. </s> C </s> The unambiguous language of 1014 clearly proscribes conduct commonly referred to as check kiting. This language should be given effect in the absence of clear indications in the legislative history that Congress did not intend to proscribe this conduct. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S., at 580 . There are no such indications in the legislative history. To the contrary, the legislative history makes clear that the statute was not limited to borrowers or to loan applications. See S. Rep. No. 1078, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 4 (1964); H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1784, p. 66 (1970). </s> The Court finds no indication that Congress intended to exclude check-kiting schemes from the scope of the statute. The Court's brief review of the legislative history to 1014 does suggest that the primary purpose of the statute is to prohibit misrepresentations in connection with conventional loan applications. However, neither this fact, nor the fact that most convictions under the statute involve such transactions, compels the Court to ignore the broad language and [458 U.S. 279, 302] purposes of the statute by interpreting it to cover only these transactions. In the past, we have consistently rejected the argument that a criminal statute must be given its narrowest meaning by limiting its scope to effectuate only its primary purpose. See, e. g., United States v. Turkette, supra; United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768 (1979); United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122 (1975). </s> II </s> In light of the broad protection Congress intended to accord federally insured institutions against fraudulent or deceptive conduct intended to mislead these institutions into extending credit and the broad, unrestricted statutory language embodied in 1014, I marvel at the Court's method of interpreting this statute. Indeed, today's decision is utterly incompatible with a number of prior decisions of this Court in which we addressed similar arguments raised by persons convicted under broad federal statutes. See, e. g., United States v. Turkette, supra; Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424 (1981); United States v. Naftalin, supra; United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371 (1978). In these decisions, we have consistently looked first to the statutory language to determine the scope and purpose of the statute. If it were evident from the face of the statute that the statute was written broadly in order to prohibit certain kinds of conduct which entail specific risks or dangers deemed by the legislators to be sufficiently unacceptable to warrant criminal sanction, we do not frustrate this purpose by distorting either the statutory language employed or the conduct of the accused in the name of the "rule of lenity." See, e. g., United States v. Turkette, supra; Rubin v. United States, supra. </s> In contrast with this established approach, the majority today interprets 1014 without acknowledging the broad statutory language chosen by Congress. This error is compounded by the Court's failure to address the fact that this broad language was intended to proscribe, in generic and disjunctive [458 U.S. 279, 303] terms, precisely the type of conduct of which Williams was found guilty - intentionally misleading the bank into extending him credit - and to protect federally insured institutions from precisely the risk of loss to which Williams' conduct subjected them. Ignoring these factors, the majority begins its analysis by employing an oversimplified, concededly technical and literal interpretation of the "legal definition" of a check. In then observes that Congress never explicitly stated that it intended the statute to cover check-kiting schemes. It concludes that in the absence of such an express statement, the rule of lenity requires that the statute not cover these schemes. </s> The majority's approach to the question of statutory construction is a prime example of what this Court has time and again said the rule of lenity does not entail: </s> "The canon in favor of strict construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. It does not require magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it a meaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language. As was said in United States v. Gaskin, 320 U.S. 527, 530 , the canon `does not require distortion or nullification of the evident meaning and purpose of the legislation.' Nor does it demand that a statute be given the `narrowest meaning'; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers." United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 -26 (1948) (quoted in United States v. Turkette, supra, at 588, n. 10, and United States v. Moore, supra, at 145). </s> If the broad language and evident purpose of the statute had been given effect, there would have been no need to parse the legislative history for affirmative evidence that Congress "demand[ed] a broader reading of the statute." Ante, at 288. Holding that 1014 reaches check kiting does [458 U.S. 279, 304] not produce an absurd result, render the statute internally contradictory, or diverge from legislative policy. To the contrary, Congress' policy, manifest in 1014 and elsewhere throughout Title 18 of the United States Code, is that federal criminal sanctions are necessary to provide federally insured banking institutions with comprehensive protection against practices that cause risk of loss. The Court's construction of 1014, on the other hand, results in a large loophole in the protection afforded these institutions by limiting the statute's application to formal loan transactions. After today's decision, a bank's protection against false statements intended to influence credit transactions depends not upon whether a misrepresentation was made in connection with a loan, advance, or commitment, but rather upon whether a court concluded that the transaction was "traditional" or that Congress specified that transaction by name in a committee report. </s> It is worth observing that in this case, none of the general justifications for applying the rule of lenity are present. In Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974), this Court explained that the rule of lenity "is rooted in the concern of the law for individual rights, and in the belief that fair warning should be accorded as to what conduct is criminal and punishable by deprivation of liberty or property." There is no question that Williams, a bank president, knew that his check-kiting scheme was wrongful. The majority's attempt to buttress its decision by arguing that check kiting has traditionally been regulated by the States, and that federal enforcement might interfere with this regulation, is completely unjustified. 5 The Federal Government, which provides [458 U.S. 279, 305] deposit insurance, has a paramount interest in safeguarding the financial integrity of federally insured banking institutions. The Courts of Appeals have been virtually unanimous in holding that check kiting is subject to federal prosecution under the mail and wire fraud statutes, see, e. g., United States v. Giordano, 489 F.2d 327 (CA2 1973); United States v. Constant, 501 F.2d 1284 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 910 (1975), and the majority apparently does not question these decisions. Therefore, a check-kiting prosecution under 1014, which by its terms applies only to federally insured institutions, results in no new inroad upon state criminal jurisdiction. </s> Under the version of the rule of lenity adopted today, conduct which falls within the literal terms of a broad statute, which proscribes in disjunctive and generic terms the type of conduct at issue, and which is designed to protect against the very risk created by such conduct, escapes the reach of the statute unless Congress specifies that conduct by name in the statute or describes it in detail in the statute's legislative history. [458 U.S. 279, 306] In order to find Williams' conduct outside the scope of 1014, the majority ignores the function of a check in today's society. The rule of lenity has never been interpreted to require this kind of result. I am at a loss to explain why the Court adopts this approach today and consequently turns the rule of lenity on its head. Accordingly, I dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 The Court's facile conclusion that Williams made no false statement or misrepresentation when he presented his check to a bank for immediate credit, knowing that the check was not supported by sufficient funds and that he was not going to cover the check before it cleared with anything other than another kited check, is contrary to the theory underlying most prosecutions under state bad check laws. These laws are not based upon the defendant's breach of a contractual promise that he will pay a sum certain upon demand, but upon the fact that in knowingly presenting a bad check the defendant has committed fraud and misrepresentation and can be punished for committing a crime. Brief for United States 20; Brief for [458 U.S. 279, 297] Petitioner 28-29, and n. 17. See also F. Whitney, The Law of Modern Commercial Practices 341 (2d ed. 1965). The Court attempts to avoid the obvious problem this fact presents to its method of statutory interpretation by stating that the federal statute does not apply "in terms" to check kiting, while some state laws do. See ante, at 285, n. 6. This reasoning is circular. The reason why 1014 does not "in terms" reach a check-kiting scheme, while certain state laws do, is because the Court ipse dixit totally discredits the theory upon which the state laws are premised and refuses to read the terms of the statute in the only manner that is consistent with this theory. </s> [Footnote 2 The manner in which the Court manufactures "confusion" over the common understanding of a check is difficult to comprehend. See ante, at 286, n. 7. Most of it is totally irrelevant because each of the majority's "common understandings" of the meaning of a check are entirely consistent with prosecuting a check-kiting scheme under 1014. The majority suggests that the "common understanding" of a check is only that sufficient funds will be present by the time the check clears or that the drawer will make good the payment of the face amount of the check if the bank refuses payment. Even if the majority is correct, prosecuting a check-kiting scheme under 1014 would be justified because the jury found that Williams had intentionally acted inconsistently with each of these understandings. The jury was specifically instructed that it could not convict unless it found that Williams "made the false statement with fraudulent intent to influence the [bank] to extend [him] credit." App. 37. The judge added that a statement is "false" if it "relates to a material fact and is untrue and is then known to be untrue by the person making it." Id., at 38. The judge further instructed the jury that "[t]he crucial question in check-kiting is whether the defendant intended to write checks which he could not reasonably expect to cover and thereby defraud the bank, or whether he was genuinely involved in the process of depositing funds and then making legitimate withdrawals against them. Hence, proof that the checks were eventually paid might well be pertinent to defendant's initial intent, that is, whether he intended to deceive the bank." Ibid. Therefore, the jury was clearly instructed to acquit Williams if he had shared with the Court even its most lenient and unrealistic interpretation of the implied representation made when one presents a check. The jury had to find that Williams had given the bank the kited check with the express intent not to actually cover the check, but only to receive this extension of credit for as long as the check-kiting scheme continued. </s> [Footnote 3 Section 1014 applies to the willful overvaluation of "any . . . property, or security." Again, this element of the statute is cast in broad rather than restrictive terms. Congress plainly intended to proscribe the willful overvaluation of anything of value given to a lending institution. There is no suggestion that the broad generic terms "any . . . property or security" [458 U.S. 279, 299] were meant to exclude items such as checks presented to obtain a temporary extension of credit. There is no reason to interpret this language to exclude checks. A check is plainly a form of property under even the majority's most restrictive definition - it is a demand to a drawee to pay a sum certain of money, which is backed by a promise of the drawer to make payment in the event of default. Furthermore, as evidenced by other provisions of Title 18, including the general definitional section, 18 U.S.C. 8, a check is a type of "security." See, e. g., 18 U.S.C. 2311. </s> [Footnote 4 The Court's fears that holding a check-kiting scheme to be covered by 1014 would entail broad implications, see ante, at 286-287, are misguided. If there was no intent on the part of the check kiter to defraud the bank into extending credit, there would be no 1014 violation. The fact that the Government brought separate counts for each check in the check-kiting scheme does not alter the fact that it was essential to conviction under the jury instructions for the jury to find that petitioner was involved in a check-kiting scheme intentionally designed to defraud the banks. </s> [Footnote 5 In Title 18, Congress has provided comprehensive criminal sanctions to protect federally insured institutions. See, e. g., 18 U.S.C. 212, 213 (loans or gratuities offered to bank examiners by bank officials; acceptance of same by examiners); 18 U.S.C. 493 (forging, counterfeiting, or [458 U.S. 279, 305] passing bonds and obligations); 18 U.S.C. 656 (theft from banks by bank examiners); 18 U.S.C. 709 (1976 ed. and Supp. IV) (false advertising that bank deposits are insured by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). Congress has sought to protect fully the integrity of the federal insurance program, and the protection against check kiting afforded by 1014 is consistent with this scheme. See, e. g., United States v. Bush, 599 F.2d 72, 75 (CA5 1979); United States v. Pinto, 646 F.2d 833, 838 (CA3), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 816 (1981); United States v. Stoddart, 574 F.2d 1050, 1053 (CA10 1978). Construing 1014 to cover check kiting does not displace the authority of the States. Rather, it complements state law enforcement in an area where the federal interest is substantial. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 586 , n. 9 (1981) (interpreting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute) ("[T]he States remain free to exercise their police powers to the fullest constitutional extent in defining and prosecuting crimes within their respective jurisdictions. That some of those crimes may also constitute [violations of federal law], is no restriction on the separate administration of criminal justice by the States"). </s> [458 U.S. 279, 307]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. HOWARD P. FOLEY CO.(1946) No. 50 Argued: October 25, 1946Decided: November 25, 1946 </s> [329 U.S. 64, 65] Mr.A. Devitt Vaneck, of Washington, D.C., for petitioner. Mr. Alexander Heron, of Washington, D.C., for respondent. </s> Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. The Court of Claims rendered a judgment for the respondent and against the Government for an asserted breach of a construction contract. Ct.Cl., 63 F.Supp. 209, 215. We granted the Government's petition for certiorari which alleged that the Court of Claims' decision was in direct conflict with Crook v. United States, 270 U.S. 4 , 46 S.Ct. 184 and United States v. Rice, 317 U.S. 61 , 63 S.Ct. 120. We hold that the Government's contention is correct. The respondent, an electrical contractor, agreed for a fixed fee to supply the materials for and install a field lighting system at the National Airport, Gravelly Point, Virg nia, then under construction. The agreement was embodied in a standard form Government contract. Respondent promised to complete the job within 120 days after notice to proceed. In fact the job was not finished until 277 days after notice was given. The delay came [329 U.S. 64, 66] about in this way. The site of the airport was being built up from under water by a fast but then unique method of hydraulic dredging. As portions of the earth base for the runways and taxiways settled, they were to be paved and the shoulders 'rough-graded.' As segments of this work were finished, respondent was to move in, wire them, and install the lighting fixtures. The dredging took longer than Government engineers had anticipated, because some of the dredged soil, proving to be too unstable for runways and taxiways, had to be replaced. This in turn delayed completion of the runway sections and until each was finished the lighting equipment for each segment could not be installed. The 157 days delay resulted from the consequently long and irregular intervals between the times when these segments were made available to respondent to do its job. But for these delays, respondent apparently could have finished its work in 120 days. The Court of Claims considered that the Government breached its contract by failing to make the runways available in time for respondent to do its work within 120 days. The judgment against the Government was for certain overhead and administrative expenses which respondent incurred during the consequent period of delay. 1 </s> In no single word, clause, or sentence in the contract does the Government expressly covenant to make the runways available to respondent at any particular time. Cf. United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 733 , 734 S., 64 S.Ct. 820, 822. It is suggested that the obligation of respondent to complete the job in 120 days can be inverted into a promise by the Government not to cause performance to be delayed beyond that time by its negligence. But even if this provision stand- [329 U.S. 64, 67] ing alone could be stretched to mean that the Government obligated itself to exercise the highest degree of diligence and the utmost good faith in efforts to make the runways promptly available, the facts of this case would show no breach of such an undertaking. For the Court of Claims found that the Government's representatives did this work 'with great, if not unusual, diligence,' and that 'no fault is or can be attributed to them.' Consequently, the Government cannot be held liable unless the contract can be interpreted to imply an unqualified warranty to make the runways promptly available. We can find no such warranty if we are to be consistent with our Crook and Rice decisions, supra. The pertinent provisions in the instant contract are, in every respect here material, substantially the same as those which were held in the former cases to impose no obligation on the Government to pay damages for delay. Here, as in the former cases, there are several contract provisions which showed that the parties not only anticipated that the Government might not finish its work as originally planned, but also provided in advance to protect the contractor from the consequences of such governmental delay, should it occur. The contract reserved a governmental right to make changes in the work which might cause interruption and delay, required respondent to coordinate his work with the other work being done on the site, and clearly contemplated that he would take up his work on the runway sections as they were intermittently completed and paved. Article 9 of the contract entitled 'Delays-Damages,' set out a procedure to govern both parties in case of respondent's delay in completion, whether such delay was caused by respondent, the Govern ent, or other causes. If delay were caused by respondent, the Government could terminate the contract, take over the work, and hold respondent and its sureties liable. Or, in the alternative, the Govern- [329 U.S. 64, 68] ment could collect liquidated damages. If, on the other hand, delay were due to 'acts of the government' or other specified events, including 'unforeseeable causes,' procedure was outlined for extending the time in which respondent was required to complete its contract, and relieving him from the penalties of contract termination or liquidated damages. In the Crook and Rice cases we held that the Government could not be held liable for delay in making its work available to contractors unless the terms of the contract imposed such liability. Those contracts, practically identical with the one here, were held to impose none. See also United States v. Blair, supra. The distinction which the Court of Claims found between this and the prior cases is not in point. It seems to be this: In the Crook and Rice cases the Government had a prime and a subcontractor; the Government reserved a right to make changes by which the prime contractor must thereafter be governed; the Government exercised this right; these changes made it impossible for the prime contractor and ultimately the subcontractor to do their work in time; since the Government had reserved the right against the prime contractor to make these changes, and the subcontractor knew this, the Government was not contractually responsible for the delay. Therefore it is suggested that the subcontractor in the Rice and Crook cases could know in advance that the performance time was 'provisional' whereas here the contractor had reason to believe that it was certain. But in this case there is ample indication both in the extrinsic facts and in the contract terms that changes and delays were anticipated and remedies therefor provided. The contractor here only lacked the one additional indication that changes were anticipated which he could have read from the prime contract had there been a prime contract and if a prime contract had been available for his to read. If this be a distinction, it is a distinction [329 U.S. 64, 69] with no significant difference. This contract, like the others, shows that changes and delays were anticipated and provided for. The question on which all these cases turn is, did the Government obligate itself to pay damages to a contractor solely because of delay in making the work available? We hold again that it did not for the reasons elaborated in the Crook and Rice decisions. REVERSED. Mr. Justice REED, Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, and Mr. Justice JACKSON dissent. It is admitted that the Government had given the contractor 'notice to proceed' which in our opinion had the legal consequences set forth in the opinion of the court below whose judgment we would affirm. </s> Footnotes </s> [Footnote 1 The damages awarded were for the wages respondent paid supervisory employees who stood by during the delay intervals, and for certain expenses of respondent incurred on account of these employees for unemployment and similar taxes.

United States Supreme Court OSMAN v. DOUDS(1950) No. 12 Argued: Decided: June 5, 1950 </s> Section 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. 159 (h), pertaining to "non-Communist" affidavits, is valid under the Federal Constitution. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 . Pp. 846-847. </s> Affirmed. </s> In a suit brought by the appellants to enjoin the appellee from enforcing the provisions of 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 61 Stat. 146, 29 U.S.C. 159 (h), a three-judge District Court dismissed the complaint on the merits. On direct appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 848. </s> Victor Rabinowitz and Samuel A. Neuberger for appellants. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> This case was heretofore held for, and presents the same issues involved in, American Communications Association v. Douds, and United Steelworkers of America v. Labor Board, decided May 8, 1950, 339 U.S. 382 . In these cases the Court upheld the constitutionality of 9 (h) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 146, 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III) 141, 159 (h), which provides: </s> "No investigation shall be made by the [National Labor Relations] Board of any question affecting [339 U.S. 846, 847] commerce concerning the representation of employees, raised by a labor organization under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under subsection (e) (1) of this section shall be entertained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization under subsection (b) of section 160 of this title, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods." </s> With regard to that part of the section which is concerned with membership in, or affiliation with, the Communist Party, the Court holds the requirement to be constitutional. MR. JUSTICE BLACK dissents for reasons stated in his dissent in American Communications Association v. Douds, supra. </s> With regard to the constitutionality of other relevant parts of the section, the Court is equally divided. MR. JUSTICE MINTON joins in the views expressed by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, who was joined by MR. JUSTICE REED and MR. JUSTICE BURTON in the cases above cited. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON adhere to their opinions in those cases. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins the dissenting opinions of MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON insofar as they hold unconstitutional the [339 U.S. 846, 848] portion of the oath dealing with beliefs, and being of the view that provisions of the oath are not separable votes to reverse. He therefore does not find it necessary to reach the question of the constitutionality of the other part of the oath. The judgment of the District Court is therefore </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. </s> [339 U.S. 846, 1]

United States Supreme Court WILKINSON v. UNITED STATES(1961) No. 37 Argued: November 17, 1960Decided: February 27, 1961 </s> Summoned to testify before a Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities, which was investigating Communist infiltration into basic industries in the South and Communist Party propaganda activities in the South, petitioner refused to answer a question as to whether he was then a member of the Communist Party. He did not claim his privilege against self-incrimination but contended that the Subcommittee was without lawful authority to interrogate him and that its questioning violated his rights under the First Amendment. For refusing to answer, he was convicted of a violation of 2 U.S.C. 192, which makes it a misdemeanor for any person summoned as a witness by either House of Congress or a committee thereof to refuse to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry. Held: Petitioner's conviction is sustained. Pp. 400-415. </s> 1. The Committee's investigation of Communist infiltration into basic industries in the South and Communist propaganda activities in the South was clearly authorized by Congress. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 . Pp. 407-409. </s> 2. On this record, it cannot be said that, in questioning petitioner, the Subcommittee was not pursuing a valid legislative purpose. Pp. 409-413. </s> (a) Petitioner's contention that the Subcommittee's sole reason for interrogating him was to subject him to public censure, harassment and exposure because of his opposition to the existence of the Un-American Activities Committee is not supported by the record. Pp. 411-412. </s> (b) It is not for this Court to speculate as to the motives that may have prompted the decision of individual members of the Subcommittee to summon petitioner, since their motives alone would not vitiate an investigation that was serving a legislative purpose. P. 412. </s> (c) Petitioner was not summoned to appear as a result of an indiscriminate dragnet procedure, lacking in probable cause for belief that he possessed information which might be helpful to the [365 U.S. 399, 400] Subcommittee, since the Subcommittee had reason to believe when it summoned him that he was an active Communist leader engaged primarily in propaganda activities. Pp. 412-413. </s> 3. The question whether petitioner was then a member of the Communist Party was pertinent to a subject under inquiry. P. 413. </s> 4. Petitioner was clearly apprised of the pertinency of the question when he was directed to answer it. P. 413. </s> 5. The Subcommittee's interrogation of petitioner did not violate his rights under the First Amendment. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 . Pp. 413-415. </s> (a) It was not unlawful for the Committee to investigate petitioner's conduct, even though he may have been engaged, at the moment, in public criticism of the Committee and attempting to influence public opinion in favor of abolishing it. P. 414. </s> (b) The Subcommittee's legitimate legislative interest was not the activity in which petitioner might have been engaged at the time, but in the manipulation and infiltration of activities and organizations by persons advocating the overthrow of the Government. Pp. 414-415. </s> 272 F.2d 783, affirmed. </s> Rowland Watts argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Nanette Dembitz. </s> Kevin T. Maroney argued the cause for the United States. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley, Bruce J. Terris, Lee B. Anderson and George B. Searls. </s> David Scribner, Ben Margolis and William B. Murrish filed a brief for the National Lawyers Guild, as amicus curiae, urging reversal. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The petitioner was convicted for having unlawfully refused to answer a question pertinent to a matter under inquiry before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities at a hearing in Atlanta, [365 U.S. 399, 401] Georgia, on July 30, 1958. 1 His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, which held that our decision in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 , was "controlling." 272 F.2d 783. We granted certiorari, 362 U.S. 926 , to consider the petitioner's claim that the Court of Appeals had misconceived the meaning of the Barenblatt decision. For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the Court of Appeals was correct, and that its judgment must be affirmed. </s> I. </s> The following circumstances were established by uncontroverted evidence at the petitioner's trial: </s> The Committee on Un-American Activities is a standing committee of the House of Representatives, elected at the commencement of each Congress. 2 The Committee, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to investigate "(i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation [365 U.S. 399, 402] thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." 3 </s> In the spring of 1958 the Committee passed a resolution providing for a subcommittee hearing to be held in Atlanta, Georgia, "relating to the following subjects and having the legislative purposes indicated: </s> "1. The extent, character and objects of Communist colonization and infiltration in the textile and other basic industries located in the South, and Communist Party propaganda activities in the South, the legislative purpose being: </s> "(a) To obtain additional information for use by the Committee in its consideration of Section 16 of H. R. 9352, relating to the proposed amendment of Section 4 of the Communist Control Act of 1954, prescribing a penalty for knowingly and wilfully becoming or remaining a member of the Communist Party with knowledge of the purposes or objectives thereof; and </s> "(b) To obtain additional information, adding to the Committee's overall knowledge on the subject so that Congress may be kept informed and thus prepared to enact remedial legislation in the National Defense, and for internal security, when and if the exigencies of the situation require it. </s> "2. Entry and dissemination within the United States of foreign Communist Party propaganda, the legislative purpose being to determine the necessity for, and advisability of, amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act designed more effectively to counteract the Communist schemes and devices now used in avoiding the prohibitions of the Act. [365 U.S. 399, 403] </s> "3. Any other matter within the jurisdiction of the Committee which it, or any subcommittee thereof, appointed to conduct this hearing, may designate." </s> The subcommittee which was appointed pursuant to this resolution convened in Atlanta on July 29, 1958. At the opening of the proceedings on that day, the Chairman of the Committee orally summarized the purposes of the hearings. The petitioner was present and heard the Chairman's statement. </s> The first witness to appear was Amando Penha, who testified that he had been a member of the Communist Party from 1950 to 1958, having joined the Party at the request of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He stated that he had served as a member of the National Textile Commission of the Party, which, he said, was set up to control and supervise the infiltration and colonization of the textile industry, particularly in the South. He described the "colonizer" system, which, he said, involves sending hard-core Party members into plants in jobs where they have close contact with rank-and-file workers. Penha described in some detail his trips throughout the South in compliance with the instructions of the National Textile Commission, and identified a number of individuals as "colonizers." Another witness, a Deputy Collector of Customs, described the influx of Communist propaganda sent from abroad into the United States and particularly into the South. Several other witnesses were then interrogated, some as to their activities as alleged Communist colonizers, others as to their connection with certain allegedly Communist-controlled publications. A number of these witnesses declined to answer most of the questions put to them. </s> On the following day the first witness before the subcommittee was Carl Braden. Although interrogated at length he declined to answer questions relating to alleged [365 U.S. 399, 404] Communist activity. 4 The next witness was the petitioner. After being sworn and stating his name he declined to give his residence address, stating that, "As a matter of conscience and personal responsibility, I refuse to answer any questions of this committee." When asked his occupation, he made the same response. He was then asked the question which was to become the subject of the present indictment and conviction: "Mr. Wilkinson, are you now a member of the Communist Party?" He declined to answer the question, giving the same response as before. </s> The Committee's Staff Director then addressed the petitioner at length, in explanation "of the reasons, the pertinency, and the relevancy of that question and certain other questions which I propose to propound to you." 5 </s> [365 U.S. 399, 405] </s> In response the petitioner stated "I am refusing to answer any questions of this committee." He was then directed by the Subcommittee Chairman to answer the question as to his Communist Party membership. This time he responded as follows: </s> "I challenge, in the most fundamental sense, the legality of the House Committee on Un-American [365 U.S. 399, 406] Activities. It is my opinion that this committee stands in direct violation by its mandate and by its practices of the first amendment to the United States Constitution. It is my belief that Congress had no authority to establish this committee in the first instance, nor to instruct it with the mandate which it has. </s> "I have the utmost respect for the broad powers which the Congress of the United States must have to carry on its investigations for legislative purposes. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that, broad as these powers may be, the Congress cannot investigate into an area where it cannot legislate, and this committee tends, by its mandate and by its practices, to investigate into precisely those areas of free speech, religion, peaceful association and assembly, and the press, wherein it cannot legislate and therefore it cannot investigate." </s> The hearing continued. The Staff Director read part of the record of an earlier hearing in California, where a witness had testified to knowing the petitioner as a Communist. The petitioner was then asked whether this testimony was true. He refused to answer this and several further questions addressed to him. There was introduced into the record a reproduction of the petitioner's [365 U.S. 399, 407] registration at an Atlanta hotel a week earlier, in which he had indicated that his business firm association was the "Emergency Civil Liberties Committee." </s> The subsequent indictment and conviction of the petitioner were based upon his refusal, in the foregoing context, to answer the single question "Are you now a member of the Communist Party?" </s> II. </s> The judgment affirming the petitioner's conviction is attacked here from several different directions. It is contended that the subcommittee was without authority to interrogate him, because its purpose in doing so was to investigate public opposition to the Committee itself and to harass and expose him. It is argued that the petitioner was wrongly convicted because the question which he refused to answer was not pertinent to a question under inquiry by the subcommittee, so that a basic element of the statutory offense was lacking. It is said that in any event the pertinency of the question was not made clear to the petitioner at the time he was directed to answer it, so that he was denied due process. Finally, it is urged that the action of the subcommittee in subpoenaing and questioning him violated his rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution. </s> In considering these contentions the starting point must be to determine the subject matter of the subcommittee's inquiry. House Rule XI, which confers investigative authority upon the Committee and its subcommittees, is quoted above. Because of the breadth and generality of its language, Rule XI cannot be said to state with adequate precision the subject under inquiry by a subcommittee at any given hearing. This the Court had occasion to point out in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 . See also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 116 117. But, as the Watkins opinion recognized, Rule XI [365 U.S. 399, 408] is only one of several possible points of reference. The Court in that case said that "[t]he authorizing resolution, the remarks of the chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature of the proceedings themselves" might reveal the subject under inquiry. 354 U.S., at 209 . Here, as in Barenblatt, other sources do supply the requisite concreteness. </s> The resolution authorizing the subcommittee hearing in Atlanta was explicit. It clearly set forth three concrete areas of investigation: Communist infiltration into basic industry in the South, Communist Party propaganda in the South, and foreign Communist Party propaganda in the United States. 6 The pattern of interrogation of the witnesses who appeared on the first day of the hearing confirms that the subcommittee was pursuing those three subjects of investigation. The Staff Director's statement to the petitioner explicitly referred to the second of the three subjects - Communist Party propaganda in the South. We think that the record thus clearly establishes that the subcommittee at the time of the petitioner's interrogation was pursuing at least two related and specific subjects of investigation: Communist infiltration into basic southern industry, and Communist Party propaganda activities in that area of the country. </s> If these, then, were the two subjects of the subcommittee's inquiry, the questions that must be answered in considering the petitioner's contentions are several. First, was the subcommittee's investigation of these subjects, through interrogation of the petitioner, authorized [365 U.S. 399, 409] by Congress? Second, was the subcommittee pursuing a valid legislative purpose? Third, was the question asked the petitioner pertinent to the subject matter of the investigation? Fourth, was the contemporaneously apprised of the pertinency of the question? Fifth, did the subcommittee's interrogation violate his First Amendment rights of free association and free speech? </s> The question of basic congressional authorization was clearly decided in Barenblatt v. United States, supra. There we said, after reviewing the genesis and subsequent history of Rule XI, that "[I]t can hardly be seriously argued that the investigation of Communist activities generally, and the attendant use of compulsory process, was beyond the purview of the Committee's intended authority under Rule XI." 360 U.S., at 120 -121. The subjects under inquiry here surely fall within "the investigation of Communist activities generally." </s> The petitioner argues, however, that the subcommittee was inspired to interrogate him by reason of his opposition to the existence of the Un-American Activities Committee itself, and that its purpose was unauthorized harassment and exposure. He points to the Chairman's opening statement which mentioned activity against the Committee, to the fact that he was subpoenaed to appear before the subcommittee soon after he arrived in Atlanta to stir up opposition to the Committee's activities, and to the statement of the Staff Director indicating the subcommittee's awareness of his efforts to develop a "hostile sentiment" to the Committee and to "bring pressure upon the United States Congress to preclude these particular hearings." </s> But, just as in Barenblatt, supra, we could find nothing in Rule XI to exclude the filed of education from the Committee's compulsory authority, we can find nothing to indicate that it was the intent of Congress to immunize [365 U.S. 399, 410] from interrogation all those (and there are many) who are opposed to the existence of the Un-American Activities Committee. </s> Nor can we say on this record that the subcommittee was not pursuing a valid legislative purpose. The Committee resolution authorizing the Atlanta hearing, quoted above, expressly referred to two legislative proposals, an amendment to 4 of the Communist Control Act of 1954 and amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938. A number of other sources also indicate the presence of a legislative purpose. The Chairman's statement at the opening of the hearings contained a lengthy discussion of legislation. 7 The Staff Director's statement to the petitioner also discussed legislation which the Committee had under consideration. 8 All these sources indicate the existence of a legislative purpose. And the determination that purposes of the kind referred to are unassailably valid was a cornerstone of our decision in Barenblatt, [365 U.S. 399, 411] supra: "That Congress has wide power to legislate in the field of Communist activity in this Country, and to conduct appropriate investigations in aid thereof, is hardly debatable. The existence of such power has never been questioned by this Court, and it is sufficient to say, without particularization, that Congress has enacted or considered in this field a wide range of legislative measures, not a few of which have stemmed from recommendations of the very Committee whose actions have been drawn in question here. In the last analysis this power rests on the right of self-preservation. . . ." 360 U.S., at 127 -128. </s> The petitioner's contention that, while the hearing generally may have been pursuant to a valid legislative purpose, the sole reason for interrogating him was to expose him to public censure because of his activities against the Committee is not persuasive. It is true that the Staff Director's statement reveals the subcommittee's awareness of the petitioner's opposition to the hearings and indicates that the petitioner was not summoned to appear until after he had arrived in Atlanta as the representative of a group carrying on a public campaign to abolish the House Committee. These circumstances, however, do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the subcommittee's intent was personal persecution of the petitioner. As we have noted, a prime purpose of the hearings was to investigate Communist propaganda activities in the South. It therefore was entirely logical for the subcommittee to subpoena the petitioner after he had arrived at the site of the hearings, had registered as a member of a group which the subcommittee believed to be Communist dominated, and had conducted a public campaign against the subcommittee. The fact that the petitioner might not have been summoned to appear had he not come to Atlanta illustrates the very point, for in that event he might not have been thought to have been [365 U.S. 399, 412] connected with a subject under inquiry - Communist Party propaganda activities in that area of the country. </s> Moreover, it is not for us to speculate as to the motivations that may have prompted the decision of individual members of the subcommittee to summon the petitioner. As was said in Watkins, supra, "a solution to our problem is not to be found in testing the motives of committee members for this purpose. Such is not our function. Their motives alone would not vitiate an investigation which had been instituted by a House of Congress if that assembly's legislative purpose is being served." 354 U.S., at 200 . See also Barenblatt, supra, 360 U.S., at 132 . </s> It is to be emphasized that the petitioner was not summoned to appear as the result of an indiscriminate dragnet procedure, lacking in probable cause for belief that he possessed information which might be helpful to the subcommittee. As was made clear by the testimony of the Committee's Staff Director at the trial, the subcommittee had reason to believe at the time it summoned the petitioner that he was an active Communist leader engaged primarily in propaganda activities. 9 This is borne out [365 U.S. 399, 413] by the record of the subcommittee hearings, including the content of the Staff Director's statement to the petitioner and evidence that at a prior hearing the petitioner had been identified as a Communist Party member. </s> The petitioner's claim that the question he refused to answer was not pertinent to a subject under inquiry merits no extended discussion. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a preliminary question more pertinent to the topics under investigation than whether petitioner was in fact a member of the Communist Party. As was said in Barenblatt, "petitioner refused to answer questions as to his own Communist Party affiliations, whose pertinency of course was clear beyond doubt." 360 U.S., at 125 . The contention that the pertinency of the question was not made clear to the petitioner at the time he was directed to answer it is equally without foundation. After the Staff Director gave a detailed explanation of the question's pertinency, the petitioner said nothing to indicate that he entertained any doubt on this score. 10 </s> We come finally to the claim that the subcommittee's interrogation of the petitioner violated his rights under the First Amendment. The basic issues which this contention raises were thoroughly canvassed by us in Barenblatt. [365 U.S. 399, 414] Substantially all that was said there is equally applicable here, and it would serve no purpose to enlarge this opinion with a paraphrased repetition of what was in that opinion thoughtfully considered and carefully expressed. See 360 U.S., at 125 -134. </s> It is sought to differentiate this case upon the basis that "the activities in which petitioner was believed to be participating consisted of public criticism of the Committee and attempts to influence public opinion to petition Congress for redress - to abolish the Committee." But we cannot say that, simply because the petitioner at the moment may have been engaged in lawful conduct, his Communist activities in connection therewith could not be investigated. The subcommittee had reasonable ground to suppose that the petitioner was an active Communist Party member, and that as such he possessed information that would substantially aid it in its legislative investigation. As the Barenblatt opinion makes clear, it is the nature of the Communist activity involved, whether the momentary conduct is legitimate or illegitimate politically, that establishes the Government's overbalancing interest. "To suggest that because the Communist Party may also sponsor peaceable political reforms the constitutional issues before us should now be judged as if that Party were just an ordinary political party from the standpoint of national security, is to ask this Court to blind itself to world affairs which have determined the whole course of our national policy since the close of World War II. . . ." 360 U.S., at 128 -129. </s> The subcommittee's legitimate legislative interest was not the activity in which the petitioner might have happened at the time to be engaged, but in the manipulation and infiltration of activities and organizations by persons advocating overthrow of the Government. "The strict requirements of a prosecution under the Smith Act . . . [365 U.S. 399, 415] are not the measure of the permissible scope of a congressional investigation into `overthrow,' for of necessity the investigatory process must proceed step by step." 360 U.S., at 130 . </s> We conclude that the First Amendment claims pressed here are indistinguishable from those considered in Barenblatt, and that upon the reasoning and the authority of that case they cannot prevail. </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The applicable statute is 2 U.S.C. 192. It provides: "Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than twelve months." 2 U.S.C. 192. </s> [Footnote 2 Rule X of the Standing Rules of the House of Representatives, as amended by the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, c. 753, 121, 60 Stat. 812, 822, 823. </s> [Footnote 3 Rule XI of the Standing Rules (60 Stat. 823, 828). These Standing Rules were specifically adopted by the House, at the beginning of the 85th Congress in 1957 (H. Res. No. 5, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.). </s> [Footnote 4 See Braden v. United States, post, p. 431. </s> [Footnote 5 "Now, sir, I should like to make an explanation to you of the reasons, the pertinency, and the relevancy of that question and certain other questions which I propose to propound to you; and I do so for the purpose of laying a foundation upon which I will then request the chairman of this subcommittee to order and direct you to answer those questions. </s> "The Committee on Un-American Activities has two major responsibilities which it is undertaking to perform here in Atlanta. </s> "Responsibility number 1, is to maintain a continuing surveillance over the administration and operation of a number of our internal security laws. In order to discharge that responsibility the Committee on Un-American Activities must undertake to keep abreast of techniques of Communists' operations in the United States and Communist activities in the United States. In order to know about Communist activities and Communist techniques, we have got to know who the Communists are and what they are doing. </s> "Responsibility number 2, is to develop factual information which will assist the Committee on Un-American Activities in appraising legislative proposals before the committee. </s> "There are pending before the committee a number of legislative proposals which undertake to more adequately cope with the Communist Party and the Communist conspiratorial operations in the United States. H. R. 9937 is one of those. Other proposals are [365 U.S. 399, 405] pending before the committee not in legislative form yet, but in the form of suggestions that there be an outright outlawry of the Communist Party; secondly, that there be registrations required of certain activities of Communists; third, that there be certain amendments to the Foreign Agents Registration Act because this Congress of the United States has found repeatedly that the Communist Party and Communists in the United States are only instrumentalities of a Kremlin-controlled world Communist apparatus. Similar proposals are pending before this committee. </s> "Now with reference to pertinency of this question to your own factual situation, may I say that it is the information of this committee that you now are a hard-core member of the Communist Party; that you were designated by the Communist Party for the purpose of creating and manipulating certain organizations, including the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, the affiliate organizations of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, including a particular committee in California and a particular committee in Chicago, a committee - the name of which is along the line of the committee for cultural freedom, or something of that kind. I don't have the name before me at the instant. </s> "It is the information of the committee or the suggestion of the committee that in anticipation of the hearings here in Atlanta, Georgia, you were sent to this area by the Communist Party for the purpose of developing a hostile sentiment to this committee and to its work for the purpose of undertaking to bring pressure upon the United States Congress to preclude these particular hearings. Indeed it is the fact that you were not even subpenaed for these particular hearings until we learned that you were in town for that very purpose and that you were not subpenaed to appear before this committee until you had actually registered in the hotel here in Atlanta. </s> "Now, sir, if you will tell this committee whether or not, while you are under oath, you are now a Communist, we intend to pursue that area of inquiry and undertake to solicit from you information respecting [365 U.S. 399, 406] your activities as a Communist on behalf of the Communist Party, which is tied up directly with the Kremlin; your activities from the standpoint of propaganda; your activities from the standpoint of undertaking to destroy the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Committee on Un-American Activities, because indeed this committee issued a report entitled `Operation Abolition,' in which we told something, the information we then possessed, respecting the efforts of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, of which you are the guiding light, to destroy the F. B. I. and discredit the director of the F. B. I. and to undertake to hamstring the work of this Committee on Un-American Activities." </s> [Footnote 6 By contrast, the authorizing resolution that was before the Court in Watkins incorporated by reference the full breadth and generality of Rule XI itself. That resolution simply empowered the Committee Chairman to appoint subcommittees "for the purpose of performing any and all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do." See 354 U.S., at 211 , n. 50. </s> [Footnote 7 ". . . [T]he Committee on Un-American Activities is continuously in the process of accumulating factual information respecting Communists, the Communist Party, and Communist activities which will enable the committee and the Congress to appraise the administration and operation of the Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, the Communist Control Act of 1954, and numerous provisions of the Criminal Code relating to espionage, sabotage, and subversion. In addition, the committee has before it numerous proposals to strengthen our legislative weapons designed to protect the internal security of this Nation. </s> "In the course of the last few years, as a result of hearings and investigations, this committee has made over 80 separate recommendations for legislative action. Legislation has been passed by the Congress embracing 35 of the committee recommendations and 26 separate proposals are currently pending in the Congress on subjects covered by other committee recommendations. Moreover, in the course of the last few years numerous recommendations made by the committee for administrative action have been adopted by the executive agencies of the Government." </s> [Footnote 8 See note 5, supra. </s> [Footnote 9 The trial testimony on this score was as follows: "In essence the information of which the committee was possessed was that Mr. Wilkinson was a member of the communist party, that he had been identified by a creditable witness under oath before the committee a short time or within a year or so prior to the Atlanta hearings, identified as a Communist. It was also the information of the committee that Mr. Wilkinson had been designated by the Communist hierarchy in the nation to spearhead or to lead the infiltration into the South of a group known as the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee which itself had been cited by the Internal Security Subcommittee as a communist operation or a communist front. It was the information of the committee that Mr. Wilkinson's assignments, including setting up rallies and meetings over the country for the purpose of engendering sentiment against the Federal Bureau of Investigation, against the security program of the government, [365 U.S. 399, 413] and against the Committee on Un-American Activities and its activities. Mr. Wilkinson had in the course of the relatively recent past prior to his appearance in Atlanta been sent into Atlanta by the communist operation for the purpose of conducting communist activities in the South and more specifically in the Atlanta area. What I'm telling you now is only a general summary, you understand." </s> [Footnote 10 Since both the pertinency of the question and the fact that its pertinency was brought home to the petitioner are so indisputably clear, we need not consider the Government's contention that the record does not show that the petitioner ever did or said anything that could be understood as an objection upon grounds of lack of pertinency. See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214 -215; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 124 . </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concur, dissenting. </s> In July 1958 the House Un-American Activities Committee announced its intention to conduct a series of hearings in Atlanta, Georgia, ostensibly to obtain information in aid of the legislative function of the House of Representatives. 1 Petitioner, a long-time opponent of the Committee, 2 decided to go to Atlanta for the purpose of lending his support to those who were fighting against the hearings. He arrived in Atlanta and registered in a hotel there on July 23 as a representative of the Emergency [365 U.S. 399, 416] Civil Liberties Committee, a New York organization which was working for the abolition of the Un-American Activities Committee. Within an hour of his registration, petitioner was served with a subpoena requiring his appearance before the Committee. When he appeared in response to this subpoena, petitioner was told that he had been subpoenaed because the Committee was informed that "you were sent to this area by the Communist Party for the purpose of developing a hostile sentiment to this committee and to its work for the purpose of undertaking to bring pressure upon the United States Congress to preclude these particular hearings." 3 A number of questions were then put to petitioner, all of which related to his personal beliefs and associations, but petitioner refused to answer any of these questions on the ground that they violated his rights under the First Amendment. For this, he was convicted under 2 U.S.C. 192 and sentenced to jail for 12 months. </s> On these facts, which are undisputed in the record, the majority upholds petitioner's conviction as "indistinguishable" from that upheld in Barenblatt v. United States. 4 On this point, I find myself only partially in disagreement with the majority. I think this case could and should be distinguished from Barenblatt on the ground urged by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS - that the resolution authorizing the Un-American Activities Committee does not authorize that Committee to interrogate a person for criticizing it. I therefore join in the dissent filed by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS on that ground. On the other hand, I must agree with the majority that so far as petitioner's constitutional claims are concerned, Barenblatt is "indistinguishable." [365 U.S. 399, 417] Unlike the majority, however, I regard this recognition of the unlimited sweep of the decision in the Barenblatt case a compelling reason, not to reaffirm that case, but to overrule it. </s> In my view, the majority by its decision today places the stamp of constitutional approval upon a practice as clearly inconsistent with the Constitution, and indeed with every ideal of individual freedom for which this country has so long stood, as any that has ever come before this Court. For, like MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, I think it clear that this case involves nothing more nor less than an attempt by the Un-American Activities Committee to use the contempt power of the House of Representatives as a weapon against those who dare to criticize it. The majority does not and, in reason, could not deny this for the conclusion is all but inescapable for anyone who will take the time to read the record. 5 They say instead that it makes no difference whether the Committee was harassing petitioner solely by reason of his opposition to it or not because "it is not for us to speculate as to the motivations that may have prompted the decision of individual members of the subcommittee to summon the petitioner." The clear thrust of this sweeping abdication of judicial power is that the Committee may continue to harass its opponents with absolute impunity so long as the "protections" of Barenblatt are observed. Since this is to be the rule under which the Committee will be permitted to operate, I think it necessary in the interest of fairness to those who may in the future wish to exercise their constitutional right to criticize the Committee [365 U.S. 399, 418] that the true nature of those "protections" be clearly set forth. </s> The first such "protection" relates to the question of whom the Committee may call before it. Is there any limitation upon the power of the Committee to subpoena and compel testimony from anyone who attacks it? On this point, the majority, relying upon the fact that at a previous hearing the Committee was told by a paid informant that petitioner was a Communist and upon statements by the Committee's counsel to the effect that the Committee had information that petitioner had been sent to Atlanta by the Communist Party, says simply: "It is to be emphasized that the petitioner was not summoned to appear as the result of an indiscriminate dragnet procedure, lacking in probable cause for belief that he possessed information which might be helpful to the subcommittee." Significantly, the majority does not say just how much its "emphasis" on this point is worth, if anything. Thus, for all that appears in the majority opinion, there is no assurance that the Committee will be required to produce any information at all as a prerequisite to the exercise of its subpoena and contempt powers. Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that such a requirement will be imposed, it then becomes relevant to inquire as to just how much this requirement will mean in terms of genuine protection for those who in good faith wish to criticize the Committee. </s> That inquiry is, to my mind, satisfactorily settled by a look at the facts of this case. So far as appears from this record, the only information the Committee had with regard to petitioner was the testimony of an informant at a previous Committee hearing. The only evidence to the effect that petitioner was in fact a member of the Communist Party that emerges from that testimony is a flat conclusory statement by the informant that it was [365 U.S. 399, 419] so. 6 No testimony as to particular happenings upon which such a conclusion could rationally be based was given at that hearing. When this fact is considered in conjunction with the fact that petitioner was not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the informant 7 or the protection of the statute permitting inspection of statements given to the F. B. I. by informants, 8 it seems obvious to me that such testimony is almost totally worthless for the purpose of establishing probable cause. For all we know, the informant may have had no basis at all for her conclusion and, indeed, the possibility of perjury cannot, in view of its frequent recurrence in these sorts of cases, 9 be entirely discounted. Thus, in my view, the "protection" afforded by a requirement of some sort of probable cause, even if imposed, is almost totally worthless. In the atmosphere existing in this country today, the charge that someone is a Communist is so common that hardly anyone active in public life escapes it. Every member of this Court has, on one occasion or another, [365 U.S. 399, 420] been so designated. And a vast majority of the members of the other two branches of Government have fared no better. If the mere fact that someone has been called a Communist is to be permitted to satisfy a requirement of probable cause, I think it plain that such a requirement is wholly without value. To impose it would only give apparent respectability to a practice which is inherently in conflict with our concepts of justice and due process. </s> The other such "protection" afforded to critics of the Un-American Activities Committee under these decisions is included in the majority's so-called balancing test. Under that test, we are told, this Court will permit only those abridgments of personal beliefs and associations by Committee inquiry that the Court believes so important in terms of the need of the Committee for information that such need outweighs the First Amendment rights of the witness and the public. 10 For my part, I need look no further than this very case to see how little protection this high-sounding slogan really affords. For in this case the majority is holding that the interest of the Committee in the information sought outweighs that of the witness and the public in free discussion while, at the same time, it disclaims any power to determine whether the Committee is in fact interested in the information at all. The truth of the matter is that the balancing test, at least as applied to date, means that the Committee may engage in any inquiry a majority of this Court happens to think could possibly be for a legitimate purpose whether that "purpose" be the true reason for the inquiry or not. And [365 U.S. 399, 421] under the tests of legitimacy that are used in this area, any first-year law school student worth his salt could construct a rationalization to justify almost any question put to any witness at any time. </s> Thus, in my view, the conclusion is inescapable that the only real limitation upon the Committee's power to harass its opponents is the Committee's own self-restraint, a characteristic which probably has not been predominant in the Committee's work over the past few years. The result of all this is that from now on anyone who takes a public position contrary to that being urged by the House Un-American Activities Committee should realize that he runs the risk of being subpoenaed to appear at a hearing in some far off place, of being questioned with regard to every minute detail of his past life, of being asked to repeat all the gossip he may have heard about any of his friends and acquaintances, of being accused by the Committee of membership in the Communist Party, of being held up to the public as a subversive and a traitor, of being jailed for contempt if he refuses to cooperate with the Committee in its probe of his mind and associations, and of being branded by his neighbors, employer and erstwhile friends as a menace to society regardless of the outcome of that hearing. With such a powerful weapon in its hands, it seems quite likely that the Committee will weather all criticism, even though justifiable, that may be directed toward it. For there are not many people in our society who will have the courage to speak out against such a formidable opponent. But cf. Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388 . If the present trend continues, this already small number will necessarily dwindle as their ranks are thinned by the jails. Government by consent will disappear to be replaced by government by intimidation because some people are afraid that this country cannot survive unless Congress has the power to set aside the freedoms of the First Amendment at will. [365 U.S. 399, 422] </s> I can only reiterate my firm conviction that these people are tragically wrong. This country was not built by men who were afraid and it cannot be preserved by such men. 11 Our Constitution, in unequivocal terms, gives the right to each of us to say what we think without fear of the power of the Government. That principle has served us so well for so long that I cannot believe it necessary to allow any governmental group to reject it in order to preserve its own existence. Least of all do I believe that such a privilege should be accorded the House Un-American Activities Committee. For I believe that true Americanism is to be protected, not by committees that persecute unorthodox minorities, but by strict adherence to basic principles of freedom that are responsible for this Nation's greatness. Those principles are embodied for all who care to see in our Bill of Rights. They were put there for the specific purpose of preventing just the sort of governmental suppression of criticism that the majority upholds here. Their ineffectiveness to that end stems, not from any lack of precision in the statement of the principles, but from the refusal of the majority to apply those principles as precisely stated. For the principles of the First Amendment are stated in precise and mandatory terms and unless they are applied in those terms, the [365 U.S. 399, 423] freedoms of religion, speech, press, assembly and petition will have no effective protection. Where these freedoms are left to depend upon a balance to be struck by this Court in each particular case, liberty cannot survive. For under such a rule, there are no constitutional rights that cannot be "balanced" away. </s> [Footnote 1 In my dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 153 -166, I set out the evidence from the Committee's own reports which indicates the Committee's real purpose in conducting this kind of hearing. </s> [Footnote 2 During the past several years, the petitioner appears to have been associated with at least three different organizations that had as their primary aim the abolition of the Un-American Activities Committee. In addition to his association with the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, which is shown by this record, petitioner seems to have been associated with similar organizations in Los Angeles and Chicago. At least he was accused of such associations when he was called before a previous hearing of the Committee in 1956. See Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., at Los Angeles, California, December 5-8, 1956, entitled "Communist Political Subversion, Part I," pp. 6747-6753. </s> [Footnote 3 Significantly, the petitioner was never told, nor does the record disclose for our consideration here, either the source or the nature of the alleged information referred to. </s> [Footnote 4 360 U.S. 109 . </s> [Footnote 5 I agree with the majority that, in a sense, "[t]hese circumstances, however, do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the subcommittee's intent was personal persecution of the petitioner" (emphasis supplied), but I am satisfied that the evidence, though not absolutely conclusive, is overwhelming. </s> [Footnote 6 The "evidence" relied upon by the Committee is contained in the following colloquy between the informant, a Mrs. Schneider, and the Committee counsel, a Mr. Arens: </s> "Mr. Arens. Was it [the Citizens Committee To Preserve American Freedoms] Communist-controlled? </s> "Mrs. Schneider. Yes. </s> "Mrs. Arens. Who was the ringleader in that organization? </s> "Mrs. Schneider. I didn't work in that organization, and I don't know who the ringleader was. My contact on that occasion was with Frank Wilkinson, I believe. </s> "Mr. Arens. Did you know him as a Communist? </s> "Mrs. Schneider. Yes." Hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit., supra, n. 2, at 6730. </s> [Footnote 7 This, of course, is the established practice in hearings before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. </s> [Footnote 8 18 U.S.C. 3500. </s> [Footnote 9 See, e. g., Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 351 U.S. 115 ; Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 . </s> [Footnote 10 The test is stated by the majority in its opinion in Barenblatt in the following terms: "Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown." 360 U.S., at 126 . Cf. American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 ; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 . </s> [Footnote 11 Mr. Justice Brandeis made this very point in his concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, where he said: "Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty." 274 U.S. 357, 375 . Mr. Justice Brandeis doubtless had in mind, and indeed made specific reference to, the famous words in Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural address: "If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it." </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACK concur, dissenting. </s> When petitioner was summoned before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities in Atlanta, Georgia, the Staff Director for the Committee made the following statement to him: </s> "It is the information of the committee or the suggestion of the committee that in anticipation of the hearings here in Atlanta, Georgia, you were sent to this area by the Communist Party for the purpose of developing a hostile sentiment to this committee and to its work for the purpose of undertaking to bring pressure upon the United States Congress to preclude these particular hearings. Indeed it is the fact that you were not even subpenaed for these particular hearings until we learned that you were in town for that very purpose and that you were not subpenaed to appear before this committee until you had actually registered in the hotel here in Atlanta. </s> "Now, sir, if you will tell this committee whether or not, while you are under oath, you are now a Communist, we intend to pursue that area of inquiry and undertake to solicit from you information respecting your activities as a Communist on behalf of the Communist Party, which is tied up directly with the Kremlin; your activities from the standpoint of propaganda; your activities from the standpoint of undertaking to destroy the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Committee on Un-American Activities, [365 U.S. 399, 424] because indeed this committee issued a report entitled `Operation Abolition,' in which we told something, the information we then possessed, respecting the efforts of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee, of which you are the guiding light, to destroy the F. B. I. and discredit the director of the F. B. I. and to undertake to hamstring the work of this Committee on Un-American Activities. </s> "So if you will answer that principal question, I intend to pursue the other questions with you to solicit information which would be of interest - which will be of vital necessity, indeed - to this committee in undertaking to develop legislation to protect the United States of America under whose flag you, sir, have protection. </s> "Now please answer the question: Are you now a member of the Communist Party?" </s> Petitioner answered, "I am refusing to answer any questions of this committee." </s> After a further explanation he was directed to answer. He replied: </s> "I have the utmost respect for the broad powers which the Congress of the United States must have to carry on its investigations for legislative purposes. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that, broad as these powers may be, the Congress cannot investigate into an area where it cannot legislate, and this committee tends, by its mandate and by its practices, to investigate into precisely those areas of free speech, religion, peaceful association and assembly, and the press, wherein it cannot legislate and therefore it cannot investigate." 1 </s> [365 U.S. 399, 425] </s> The Committee 2 is authorized by the Resolution governing it to make investigations of "the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States." </s> If it is "un-American" to criticize, impeach, and berate the Committee and to seek to have it abolished, then the Committee acted within the scope of its authority in asking the questions. But we take a dangerous leap when we reach the conclusion that criticism of the Committee was within the scope of the Resolution. </s> Criticism of government finds sanctuary in several portions of the First Amendment. It is part of the right [365 U.S. 399, 426] of free speech. It embraces freedom of the press. Can editors be summoned before the Committee and be made to account for their editorials denouncing the Committee, its tactics, its practices, its policies? If petitioner can be questioned concerning his opposition to the Committee, then I see no reason why editors are immune. The list of editors will be long as is evident from the editorial protests against the Committee's activities, 3 including its recent film, Operation Abolition. 4 </s> [365 U.S. 399, 427] </s> The First Amendment rights involved here are more than freedom of speech and press. Bringing people together in peaceable assemblies is in the same category. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 . "The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental." Id., at 364. The right to petition "for a redress of grievances" is also part of the First Amendment; it too is fundamental to "the very idea of a government, republican in form." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 . Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the Court in the De Jonge case involving communist activities no more nor less lawful than those charged here, said: </s> "The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that government [365 U.S. 399, 428] may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government." De Jonge v. Oregon, supra, at 365. </s> These are reasons why I would construe the Resolution narrowly so as to exclude criticism of the Committee. We have customarily done just that, insisting that if "an inquiry of dubious limits" is to be found in an Act or Resolution, Congress should unequivocally authorize it. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 ; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 ; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 . </s> The indictment charged only the failure to answer the one question, "Are you now a member of the Communist Party?" That question in other contexts might well have been appropriate. We have here, however, an investigation whose central aim was finding out what criticism a citizen was making of the Government. That was the gist of the case presented to the jury. 5 </s> [365 U.S. 399, 429] </s> We cannot allow this man to go to prison for 12 months unless we hold that an investigation of those who criticize the Un-American Activities Committee was both authorized and constitutional. I cannot read the Resolution as authorizing that kind of investigation without assuming that the Congress intended to flout the First Amendment. </s> [Footnote 1 The Washington Post on January 4, 1961, made a similar criticism of the House Committee on Un-American Activities: </s> "The Committee often functions as a kind of public pillory to punish men by publicity for offenses which the Constitution forbids [365 U.S. 399, 425] Congress to make punishable by law. It `exposes' men who express opinions or indulge in associations of which the Committee disapproves, carelessly calling them - or allowing witnesses under the cloak of congressional immunity to call them - Communists or Communist-sympathizers or Communist dupes. </s> "The Committee, as a consequence of this conduct, sometimes operates as a serious restraint on freedom of expression and freedom of association. It makes Americans fearful of uttering opinions for which they may be called to account by the Committee and fearful of joining organizations which the Committee may consider subversive." </s> [Footnote 2 The ultimate mandate of the parent Committee at the time of the subcommittee hearing was to be found in paragraph 17 (b), Rule XI, Rules of the House of Representatives, H. Res. 5, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 60 Stat. 828. It provides: "The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent, character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation." The record in this case also contains the mandate of the subcommittee (see note 5, infra), but the terms of the parent Committee's mandate are of course controlling. Of the purposes of the Committee, only the investigation of "un-American propaganda" activities seems even arguably to authorize the questions asked and the inquiry pursued in this case. </s> [Footnote 3 See note 1, supra. </s> [Footnote 4 The Washington Post said editorially on December 28, 1960: </s> "In his letters printed elsewhere in this newspaper today, Rep. Francis Walter asserts that the film Operation Abolition `contains absolutely no distortions' and that the staff member who had admitted it contained such defects `had not himself used the word "distortions."' In a television show over KCOP-TV, Los Angeles, a teaching assistant at the University of California referred to distortions in the film. William Wheeler, an investigator for the House Un-American Activities Committee, taking part in the program asked, `What are you trying to prove by this?' The following exchange then took place: </s> "Mr. White: That the film has inaccuracies and distortions. </s> "Mr. Wheeler: I've admitted that. </s> "Mr. White: You've admitted that? </s> "Mr. Wheeler: Certainly. </s> "Mr. Walter offers some carefully selected quotes from the San </s> Francisco press to refute this newspaper's assertion that the San Francisco police `reacted with altogether needless ferocity.' Like the film Operation Abolition itself, he omits all the material showing the other side of the picture. For instance, San Francisco Chronicle reporter George Draper wrote: </s> "`I did not see any of the kids actually fighting with the police. Their resistance was more passive. They would simply go limp and be manhandled out of the building. . . . I saw one slightly built lad being carried by two husky officers. One held the boy's shirt, the other had him by the feet. He was struggling, but he was no match for the two bigger men. Then from nowhere appeared a third officer. He ran up to the slender boy firmly held by the other two officers and clubbed him three times on the head. You could hear the hollow smack of the club striking. The boy went limp and was carried out.' [365 U.S. 399, 427] "Nor does Mr. Walter mention the report of another eyewitness, Mel Wax, a special correspondent of the New York Post. </s> "`Never, in 20 years as a reporter, have I seen such brutality. . . . San Francisco police hurled women down the staircase, spines bumping on each marble stair.' </s> "To Mr. Walter, it is an admitted but `decidedly minor' distortion in the film that Harry Bridges was represented as being on the scene just before the rioting broke out when, in point of fact, he did not arrive until after it was all over. `Honest' this error may have been; but it was more than unfortunate. For it contributed considerably to the deceptive and distorted message of the film that the student demonstration was inspired and led by Communists. </s> "Communists may have tried to claim the credit which Mr. Walter accords them. Unquestionably the affair got out of hand, and no one condones the rowdiness that ensued. But the truth is that the demonstration was inspired by distaste for the Un-American Activities Committee. And it was led by students who intended nothing more than an orderly protest - an inalienable political right in the United States." </s> [Footnote 5 At the trial committee counsel was cross-examined as follows: </s> "Q. Mr. Arens, you stated before the committee that Mr. Wilkinson had come to Atlanta to stir up hostility to the committee, that he was doing everything he could to prevent these hearings from being held in Atlanta? </s> "A. Yes, sir. </s> "Q. And that you did not subpoena him until you discovered that he had arrived here for that purpose? </s> "A. That's correct, sir. </s> "Q. Now, you state that within the three general categories under which the committee was holding hearings here of colonization in the textile industry, entry and dissemination of foreign propaganda and Communist party propaganda activity in the South, you are stating that Mr. Wilkinson stirring up hostility to the House Committee on Un-American Activities comes within the category of Communist party propaganda activity which justified the House Committee to subpoena him and question him, is that correct? I just want to understand your position. </s> "A. Yes, in general I agree with you, yes." </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting. </s> For the reasons stated in my Brother DOUGLAS' dissenting opinion in Braden v. United States, post, p. 446, which I joined, I believe that the Committee failed to lay an adequate foundation at the hearing for questions which, it was claimed, concerned the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment. </s> I also dissent because on these facts the inference is inescapable that the dominant purpose of these questions was not to gather information in aid of law making or law evaluation but rather to harass the petitioner and expose him for the sake of exposure. A scant 19 months before the hearing in question petitioner was summoned before this very Committee and refused to answer questions on substantially the same grounds as those he claimed in this instance. Nor did his conduct in the interim afford any basis for a hope that he might have repented, an inference which, by contrast, was possible in Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147, 151 , cited by the Government. For petitioner continued to proclaim his hostility to the Committee and his belief that it had no power to probe areas of free expression. He was not even called to testify at these hearings in Atlanta until the Committee learned that he was to be present in Atlanta to express his opposition to the Committee's work, as, of course, he had a right to do. In fact, the Committee's Staff Director came perilously close to admitting, on cross-examination by petitioner's counsel, that petitioner was called to the [365 U.S. 399, 430] stand only because of his opposition to the Committee's activities. </s> It is particularly important that congressional committees confine themselves to the function of gathering information when their investigation begins to touch the realm of speech and opinion. On this record, I cannot help concluding that the Committee had no reasonable prospect that petitioner would answer its questions, and accordingly that the Committee's purpose could not have been the legitimate one of fact gathering. I am forced to the view that the questions asked of petitioner were therefore not within the Committee's power. Cf. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 166 (dissenting opinion); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 82 (dissenting opinion). I would reverse. </s> [365 U.S. 399, 431]

United States Supreme Court LEVINE v. UNITED STATES(1960) No. 164 Argued: March 22, 1960Decided: May 23, 1960 </s> Subpoenaed to testify before a federal grand jury, petitioner refused, on grounds of possible self-incrimination, to answer questions relevant to the grand jury's inquiry. The grand jury sought the aid of the district judge, who heard arguments on the subject, ruled that petitioner would be accorded immunity as extensive as the privilege he had asserted, and ordered him to answer the questions. After returning to the grand jury room, petitioner persisted in his refusal, and he was again brought before the district judge, who addressed the same questions to him in the presence of the grand jury, explicitly directed him to answer them, and, upon his refusal to do so, adjudged him guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year. During these proceedings, everyone was excluded from the courtroom except petitioner, his counsel, the grand jury, government counsel, the judge and the court reporter; but no objection to the exclusion of the general public was made at any stage of the proceedings. Held: In the circumstances of this case, exclusion of the public from the courtroom when petitioner was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced did not invalidate his conviction. Pp. 611-620. </s> (a) A proceeding for criminal contempt under Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is not a "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment, which explicitly guarantees the right to a "public trial" only for "criminal prosecutions." P. 616. </s> (b) It was not error for the judge to clear the courtroom initially when the grand jury appeared before him for the second time seeking his assistance in compelling petitioner to testify; and, in light of the presence of petitioner's counsel and his failure to object to the continued exclusion of the public, failure of the judge to reopen the courtroom to the general public on his own motion before adjudging petitioner in contempt and sentencing him did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Pp. 616-620. </s> 267 F.2d 335, affirmed. [362 U.S. 610, 611] </s> Myron L. Shapiro argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was J. Bertram Wegman. </s> Philip R. Monahan argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Rankin, Assistant Attorney General Wilkey and Robert S. Erdahl. </s> MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> This is a prosecution for contempt arising from petitioner's refusal to answer a series of questions propounded to him by a federal grand jury. In every respect but one, this case is a replica of Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 , and as to all common issues it is controlled by that case. In Brown, however, we expressly declined to decide the effect of claimed "secrecy" upon proceedings culminating in the petitioner's sentencing for contempt, "because the record does not show this to be the fact." 359 U.S., at 51 , n. 11. Here, it appears that the contemptuous conduct, the adjudication of guilt, and the imposition of sentence all took place after the public had been excluded from the courtroom, in what began and was continued as "a Grand Jury proceeding." The effect of this continuing exclusion in the circumstances of the case is the sole question presented. </s> On the morning of April 18, 1957, pursuant to a subpoena, petitioner appeared as a witness before a federal grand jury in the Southern District of New York engaged in investigating violations of the Interstate Commerce Act. He was asked six questions relevant to the grand jury's investigation. After consultation with his attorney, who was in an anteroom, he refused to answer them on the ground that they might tend to incriminate him. He persisted in this refusal after having been directed to answer by the foreman of the grand jury and advised by [362 U.S. 610, 612] government counsel that applicable statutes gave him complete immunity from prosecution concerning any matter as to which he might testify. See 49 U.S.C. 305 (d). </s> Later that day the grand jury, government counsel, petitioner and his attorney appeared before Judge Levet, sitting in the District Court for the Southern District of New York, the grand jury having sought "the aid and assistance of the Court, in a direction to a witness, Morry Levine, who has this morning appeared before the Grand Jury and declined to answer certain questions that have been put to him." The record of the morning's proceedings before the grand jury was read. After argument by counsel, the judge ruled that the adequate immunity conferred by statute deprived petitioner of the right to refuse to answer the questions put to him. Petitioner was ordered to appear before the grand jury on April 22, and was directed by the court then to answer the questions. </s> On the morning of April 22 petitioner appeared before the grand jury. The questions were again put to him and he again refused to answer. Once again the grand jury, government counsel, petitioner and his counsel went before Judge Levet, for "the assistance of the Court in regard to the witness Morry Levine." At this time the record shows the following: </s> "The Court: Will those who have no other business in the courtroom please leave now? I have a Grand Jury proceeding. </s> "The Clerk: The Marshal will clear the court room. </s> "(Court room cleared by the Marshals.)" </s> Petitioner, his counsel, the grand jury, government counsel and the court reporter remained. Petitioner objected to further participation by the court in the process of [362 U.S. 610, 613] compelling his testimony, except according to the procedures prescribed by Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That provision, which relates to contempts generally, excluding those "committed in the actual presence of the court" as to which the judge certifies "that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt." provides in effect for a conventional trial. In petitioner's view the court was compelled to regard his contempt, if any, as having already been committed out of the presence of the court, through petitioner's disobedience before the grand jury that morning of the court's order of April 18. </s> The judge, however, did not treat petitioner's renewed refusal to answer the grand jury's questions as a definitive contempt. He chose to proceed just as he had two weeks earlier in the case of Brown, reviewed here as Brown v. United States, supra, 359 U.S. 41 . The morning's grand jury proceedings, showing petitioner's refusals to answer, were read, and petitioner was ordered by the judge to take the stand. The court indicated it was proceeding as "[t]he Court and the Grand Jury" "in accordance with Rule 42 (a)," which relates to the procedure in cases of contempt "committed in the actual presence of the court." Over objection, the court then put to petitioner the six questions which he had refused to answer when propounded by the grand jury. Petitioner again refused to answer these questions on the claim of the privilege against self-incrimination. In answer to a question by the court he stated that he would continue to refuse on that ground should the grand jury again put the questions to him. Government counsel asked that petitioner be adjudged in contempt "committed in the physical presence of the Judge." The court asked for reasons "why I should not so adjudicate this witness in contempt." Petitioner's counsel made three [362 U.S. 610, 614] points: (1) that the procedures had not been in accordance with "the requirements of due process"; (2) that the procedures had not followed the requirements of Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; and (3) that, on the merits of the charge, the statutory immunity was not sufficiently extensive to deprive petitioner of his privilege not to answer. No reference was made to the exclusion of the general public from the proceedings. Petitioner was adjudicated in contempt and, after submission by counsel of views regarding sentence, one year's imprisonment was imposed. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, 267 F.2d 335, and we granted certiorari, 361 U.S. 860 , limiting our grant to the question left open in Brown v. United States, namely, whether the "secrecy" of the proceedings offended either the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution or the public-trial requirement of the Sixth Amendment. </s> The course of proceeding followed by the District Court in this case for compelling petitioner's testimony was the one approved in Brown. Specifically, it was established by that case that, after petitioner had disobeyed the court's direction to answer the grand jury's questions before that body, it was proper for the court, upon application of the grand jury, (1) to disregard any contempt committed outside its presence; (2) to put the questions directly to petitioner in the court's presence as well as in the presence of the grand jury; and (3) to punish summarily under Rule 42 (a) as a contempt committed "in the actual presence of the court" petitioner's refusal thereupon to answer. </s> It was surely not error for the judge initially to have cleared the courtroom on April 22 when the grand jury appeared before him for the second time seeking his "assistance . . . in regard to the witness Morry Levine." [362 U.S. 610, 615] The secrecy of grand jury proceedings is enjoined by statute (see 18 U.S.C. 1508, and Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6 (d) and (e)), and a necessary initial step in the proceedings was to read the record of the morning's grand jury proceedings. The precise question involved in this case, therefore, is whether it was error, once the courtroom had been properly, indeed necessarily, cleared, for petitioner's contempt, summary conviction and sentencing to occur without inviting the general public back into the courtroom. </s> From the very beginning of this Nation and throughout its history the power to convict for criminal contempt has been deemed an essential and inherent aspect of the very existence of our courts. The First Congress, out of whose 95 members 20, among them some of the most distinguished lawyers, had been members of the Philadelphia Convention, explicitly conferred the power of contempt upon the federal courts. Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 83. That power was recognized by this Court as early as 1812, in a striking way. United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34. As zealous a guardian of the procedural safeguards of the Bill of Rights as the first Mr. Justice Harlan, in sustaining the power summarily to punish contempts committed in the face of the court, described the power in this way: "the offender may, in . . . [the court's] discretion, be instantly apprehended and immediately imprisoned, without trial or issue, and without other proof than its actual knowledge of what occurred; . . . such power, although arbitrary in its nature and liable to abuse, is absolutely essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge of their functions." Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888). It is a particular exercise of this power of summary punishment of contempt committed in the court's presence which is at issue in this case. This Court has not been wanting in [362 U.S. 610, 616] effective alertness to check abusive exercises of that power by federal judges. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 ; Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 . It would, however, be throwing the baby out with the bath to find it necessary, in the name of the Constitution, to strangle a power "absolutely essential" for the functioning of an independent judiciary, which is the ultimate reliance of citizens in safeguarding rights guaranteed by the Constitution. </s> Procedural safeguards for criminal contempts do not derive from the Sixth Amendment. Criminal contempt proceedings are not within "all criminal prosecutions" to which that Amendment applies. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 306 -310; Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 -535; Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 . But while the right to a "public trial" is explicitly guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment only for "criminal prosecutions," that provision is a reflection of the notion, deeply rooted in the common law, that "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 , at 14. Accordingly, due process demands appropriate regard for the requirements of a public proceeding in cases of criminal contempt, see In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 , as it does for all adjudications through the exercise of the judicial power, barring narrowly limited categories of exceptions such as may be required by the exigencies of war, see Amendment to Rule 46 of the Admiralty Rules, June 8, 1942, 316 U.S. 717 , revoked May 6, 1946, 328 U.S. 882 , or for the protection of children, see 18 U.S.C. 5033. </s> Inasmuch as the petitioner's claim thus derives from the Due Process Clause and not from one of the explicitly defined procedural safeguards of the Constitution, decision must turn on the particular circumstances of the case, and not upon a question-begging because abstract and [362 U.S. 610, 617] absolute right to a "public trial." Cf. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 -117. The narrow question is whether, in light of the facts that the grand jury, petitioner and his counsel were present throughout and that petitioner never specifically made objection to the continuing so-called "secrecy" of the proceedings or requested that the judge open the courtroom, he was denied due process because the general public remained excluded from the courtroom. </s> The grand jury is an arm of the court and its in camera proceedings constitute "a judicial inquiry." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 ,66. "The Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process. It must initiate prosecution for the most important federal crimes. It does so under general instructions from the court to which it is attached and to which, from time to time, it reports its findings." Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 . Unlike an ordinary judicial inquiry, where publicity is the rule, grand jury proceedings are secret. In the ordinary course, therefore, contempt of the court committed through a refusal to answer questions put before the grand jury does not occur in a public proceeding. Publicity fully satisfying the requirements of due process is achieved in such a case when a public trial upon notice is held on the charge of contempt under Rule 42 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. </s> Brown v. United States, supra, established that a grand jury as an arm of the court has available to it another course to vindicate its authority over a lawlessly recalcitrant witness. Appeal may be made to the court under whose aegis the grand jury sits to have the witness ordered to answer the grand jury's inquires in the judge's physical presence, so that the court's persuasive exertion to induce obedience, and its power summarily to commit for contempt should its authority be ignored, may be brought [362 U.S. 610, 618] to bear upon him. Since such a summary adjudication of contempt occurs in the midst of a grand jury proceeding, a clash may arise between the interest, sanctioned by history and statute, in preserving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, and the interest, deriving from the Due Process Clause, in preserving the public nature of court proceedings. </s> In the present case grand jury secrecy freely gave way insofar as petitioner's counsel was present and was permitted to be fully active in behalf of his client throughout the proceedings before Judge Levet. Petitioner had ample notice of the court's intention to put the grand jury's questions directly to him, and to proceed against him summarily should he persist in his refusal to answer. Had petitioner requested, and the court denied his wish, that the courtroom be opened to the public before the final stage of these proceedings we would have a different case. Petitioner had no right to have the general public present while the grand jury's questions were being read. However, after the record of the morning's grand jury proceedings had been read, and the six questions put to petitioner with a direction that he answer them in the court's presence, there was no further cause for enforcing secrecy in the sense of excluding the general public. Having refused to answer each question in turn, and having resolved not to answer at all, petitioner then might well have insisted that, as summary punishment was to be imposed, the courtroom be opened so that the act of contempt, that is, his definitive refusal to comply with the court's direction to answer the previously propounded questions, and the consequent adjudication and sentence might occur in public. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 534 -536. To repeat, such a claim evidently was not in petitioner's thought, and no request to open the courtroom was made at any stage of the proceedings. [362 U.S. 610, 619] </s> The continuing exclusion of the public in this case is not to be deemed contrary to the requirements of the Due Process Clause without a request having been made to the trial judge to open the courtroom at the final stage of the proceeding, thereby giving notice of the claim now made and affording the judge an opportunity to avoid reliance on it. This was not a case of the kind of secrecy that deprived petitioner of effective legal assistance and rendered irrelevant his failure to insist upon the claim he now makes. Counsel was present throughout, and it is not claimed that he was not fully aware of the exclusion of the general public. The proceedings properly began out of the public's presence and one stage of them flowed naturally into the next. There was no obvious point at which, in light of the presence of counsel, it can be said that the onus was imperatively upon the trial judge to interrupt the course of proceedings upon his own motion and establish a conventional public trial. We cannot view petitioner's untenable general objection to the nature of the proceedings by invoking Rule 42 (b) as constituting appropriate notice of an objection to the exclusion of the general public in the circumstances of this proceeding under Rule 42 (a). </s> This case is wholly unlike In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 . This is not a case where it is or could be charged that the judge deliberately enforced secrecy in order to be free of the safeguards of the public's scrutiny; nor is it urged that publicity would in the slightest have affected the conduct of the proceedings or their result. Nor are we dealing with a situation where prejudice, attributable to secrecy, is found to be sufficiently impressive to render irrelevant failure to make a timely objection at proceedings like these. This is obviously not such a case. Due regard generally for the public nature of the judicial process does not require disregard of the solid demands of the fair [362 U.S. 610, 620] administration of justice in favor of a party who, at the appropriate time and acting under advice of counsel, saw no disregard of a right, but raises an abstract claim only as an afterthought on appeal. </s> Affirmed. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS join, dissenting. </s> The Court here upholds the petitioner's conviction and imprisonment for contempt of court in refusing to answer grand jury questions, although admitting that "the contemptuous conduct, the adjudication of guilt, and the imposition of sentence all took place after the public had been excluded from the courtroom, in what began and was continued as `a Grand Jury proceeding.'" Stated not quite so euphemistically the Court is simply saying that this petitioner was summarily convicted and sentenced to a one-year prison term after a "trial" from which the public was excluded - a governmental trial technique that liberty-loving people have with great reason feared and hated in all ages. </s> This Court condemned such secret "trials" 12 years ago in the case of In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 . There Oliver had been convicted by a Michigan state court and sentenced to jail for 60 days on a charge of contempt based on his refusal to answer questions propounded by a one-man grand jury. Since the public had been excluded from Oliver's "trial" we were squarely faced with this precise question: "Can an accused be tried and convicted for contempt of court in grand jury secrecy?" Id., at 265-266. Our answer was an emphatic "No," although MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER and MR. JUSTICE JACKSON dissented. We held that Michigan had denied Oliver due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment by convicting him of contempt in a trial from which the [362 U.S. 610, 621] public was excluded. In the course of our decision we said this: </s> "Counsel have not cited and we have been unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such secret criminal trial in England since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641, and whether that court ever convicted people secretly is in dispute. Summary trials for alleged misconduct called contempt of court have not been regarded as an exception to this universal rule against secret trials, unless some other Michigan one-man grand jury case may represent such an exception." Id., 266. </s> It seems apparent, therefore, that the Court in upholding petitioner's sentence for contempt here is not only repudiating our Oliver decision in whole or in part but is at the same time approving a secret trial procedure which apologists for the Star Chamber have always been careful to deny even that unlimited and unlamented court ever used. The Court holds that petitioner's secret trial here violated neither the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor the Sixth Amendment's guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . ." Certainly the one-year prison sentence for criminal contempt here, like the three-year criminal contempt sentence in Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 , has all the earmarks and the consequences of a plain, ordinary criminal prosecution. Id., 193 (dissenting opinion). </s> In the Green case I asked for a reappraisal of the whole doctrine of summary contempt trials. I repeat that "I cannot help but believe that this arbitrary power [362 U.S. 610, 622] to punish by summary process, as now used, is utterly irreconcilable with first principles underlying our Constitution and the system of government it created . . . ." Green v. United States, supra, at 208. This case illustrates once more the dangers of such trials and the fact that it is nothing but a fiction to say that by labeling a prosecution as one for "contempt" it is changed from that which it actually is - a criminal prosecution for criminal punishment - a procedure which is being used more and more each year as a substitute for trials with Bill of Rights safeguards. The length to which the Court is going in this case - depriving petitioner of the specific public trial safeguard of the Sixth Amendment and holding that he has no more than whatever measure of protection the Court chooses to give him under its flexible interpretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment - is shown by its express declaration that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a public trial for those charged with a crime provides no protection at all if the crime charged is labeled "contempt." And the Court cites no case holding that the public trial provision of that Amendment does not apply to criminal contempt proceedings. </s> I wholly reject the idea that the presence of any power so awesome and arbitrary as "criminal contempt" has grown to be, as nourished by courts, is essential to preserve the independence of the judiciary and I am constrained to say that such a plea of necessity has a strange sound when voiced by our independent judiciary dedicated to fair trials in accordance with ancient safeguards. It is pertinent here to repeat the statement of one of our great lawyers, Edward Livingston, who said: "`Not one of the oppressive prerogatives of which the crown has been successively stripped, in England, but was in its day, defended on the plea of necessity. Not one of the attempts to destroy them, but was deemed a hazardous [362 U.S. 610, 623] innovation.'" Green v. United States, supra, at 214 (dissenting opinion). </s> In the closing part of its opinion the Court indicates that its decision rests to some extent upon a failure of petitioner to make the proper kind of objection to the secrecy of his trial. His objection is referred to as "an abstract claim [raised] only as an afterthought on appeal." The Court thinks that the trial judge was not given "an opportunity to avoid reliance on [the claim now made]." The record shows, however, that on the two occasions petitioner was brought before the court, he requested a trial according to due process, notice and specification of the charges against him, an opportunity to prepare his defenses, an adjournment to obtain compulsory process and subpoena witnesses as well as, in general, proceedings under Rule 42 (b), which undoubtedly calls for a public trial. Petitioner's objection seems sufficient to me to raise the extremely important point of his constitutional right to a public trial. </s> Despite the Court's decision that petitioner's repeated claims for constitutional procedures were not enough to raise the constitutionality of his secret "trial," there is an intimation in the Court's opinion that maybe at some future time, in some future contempt conviction, the Court would frown upon exclusion of the public from some part of a contempt trial such as this. Here it is said, however, "The proceedings properly began out of the public's presence and one stage of them flowed naturally into the next. There was no obvious point at which, in light of the presence of counsel, it can be said that the onus was imperatively upon the trial judge to interrupt the course of proceedings upon his own motion and establish a conventional public trial." The theory of the Court here seems to be that since grand jury hearings in the grand jury room are secret, the grand jury's proceedings in court against allegedly recalcitrant witnesses may [362 U.S. 610, 624] also be in secret. But surely this cannot be. The grand jury has to report to the judge to invoke his assistance and it did so in this case, bringing Levine along. The grand jury then preferred charges against him to the court. To say that grand jury secrecy extends into the courtroom is wholly to ignore the difference between secrecy of grand jury deliberations and votes, and secrecy of a trial for contempt. Not only are the grand jury deliberations supposed to be free from the intrusions of others, but the idea of a grand jury is one of an independent body, which even the judge shall not be allowed to interfere with or control. See, e. g., Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 . The grand jury did not enter the courtroom to deliberate or to vote; it went there and took the petitioner there in order to ask the court to compel him to testify under penalty of contempt. At that moment the grand jury deliberations were temporarily ended and a court proceeding against petitioner began. It was then that there arose petitioner's constitutional right to be free from secret procedures gravely jeopardizing his liberty or property. 1 The judge has no more right or power under the law to intrude on the secret deliberations of a grand jury than anyone else. Grand juries, as this Court has said, "`. . . are not appointed for the prosecutor or for the court; they are appointed for the government and for the people . . . .'" Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61 . See also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 . When the grand jury came into the courtroom with the petitioner it was to get immediate action against the petitioner under its charges, which the Court now holds the judge was entitled to try summarily and secretly without further notice. This was the kind of trial from which [362 U.S. 610, 625] the public should not be excluded if we are to follow constitutional commands. In fact, I believe, as I said in Green v. United States, supra, that at the very least a man whose liberty may be taken away for a period of months or years as punishment, is entitled to a full-fledged, constitutional, Bill of Rights trial. 2 </s> The Court seems to conclude its holding by invoking the doctrine of error without injury. In my judgment it is scant respect for the constitutional command that trials be had in public to look at the circumstances of the trial and conviction of a man tried in secret and approve the trial on the ground that "anyhow he wasn't hurt." I think every man is hurt when any defendant in America is convicted and sent to the penitentiary after a secret "trial" which is condemned by the Constitution's requirement of public trials as well as its command that all trials be conducted according to due process of law. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 I omit the word "life" from the usual phrase "life, liberty or property" because the courts have not yet said that their vast power to punish for contempt extends to taking the life of the convicted defendant. </s> [Footnote 2 It is to be borne in mind that petitioner is not to be put in jail with the keys in his pocket, so that he would be released immediately upon complying with the court's valid order, see Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 55 (dissenting opinion), but is being punished by a year's imprisonment for a past and completed offense. See, id., 53 (dissenting opinion); Green v. United States, supra, at 197 (dissenting opinion). </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting. </s> The Court's opinion makes it plain that the petitioner was adjudicated guilty of criminal contempt through a proceeding from which the public was excluded. And the whole Court is agreed that, whether petitioner's right is founded on the Fifth or the Sixth Amendment, he possessed a right, guaranteed by the Constitution, that this adjudication of his guilt of crime be made in public. </s> But the Court concludes that despite this, the petitioner is not entitled to our judgment of reversal because [362 U.S. 610, 626] he did not object in precise enough terms to this infringement of his constitutional rights. Its ruling is, I submit, a radical departure from the principles which have prevailed, and should continue to prevail, in this Court respecting the waiver of a criminal defendant's constitutional procedural rights. The key to the matter has been the defendant's consent - his "express, intelligent consent." Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277 . The special interest of the public in the publicity of adjudications of guilt of crime has been repeatedly pointed out judicially, see United States, v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 924; Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 395-396; Neal v. State, 86 Okla. Crim. 283, 289, 192 P.2d 294, 297, and this has led some to argue that even the defendant's express consent should not suffice to permit proceedings to be had in secret. Kirstowsky v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 2d 745, 300 P.2d 163; United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 N. Y. 71, 93, 123 N. E. 2d 777, 788 (dissenting opinion). But though the defendant's power to waive the constitutional protection be assumed, this consideration underscores how imperative is the requirement that the waiver of publicity be a meaningful one, based on real consent - be part of the "defendant's own conduct of his defense." Id., at 81, 123 N. E. 2d, at 780 (majority opinion). The waiver must be one based on the defendant's conclusion that "in his particular situation his interests will be better served by foregoing the privilege than by exercising it." United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723. </s> This requirement could not by the greatest stretch of the imagination be said to have been met here. Here petitioner's counsel by no means consented to the proceedings, but repeatedly made the most fundamental objections to the procedure whereby his client was being adjudicated guilty of crime, based on the Criminal Rules and on the very provision of the Constitution which the [362 U.S. 610, 627] Court today finds applicable. If the objection had been sustained, and the procedure contended for adopted, the error now laid bare would not have been committed. Whether the objection was well taken on its own grounds is irrelevant, since it is consent that must be found. The question is not whether the trial court was apprised of its error in the talismanic language the Court now finds in retrospect to have been essential. There are, to be sure, trial errors as to which specific objection is required of counsel. But where fundamental constitutional guarantees are omitted, the question is rather whether consent to proceed without the constitutional protection can be found. It is patent here that it cannot. Of course, this principle is hardly to be altered by the Court's transparent semantic device of phrasing the constitutional right of this defendant as one that did not come into existence until he made explicit request that he have its benefits. * The judgment should be reversed. </s> [Footnote * Apparently through the same device the Court has avoided the settled rule of the federal courts that a showing of prejudice is not necessary for reversal of a conviction not had in public proceedings. Davis v. United States, 247 F. 394, 398-399 (C. A. 8th Cir.); Tanksley v. United States, 145 F.2d 58, 59 (C. A. 9th Cir.); United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 921 (C. A. 3d Cir.). See People v. Jelke, 308 N. Y. 56, 67-68, 123 N. E. 2d 769, 775. </s> [362 U.S. 610, 628]

United States Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. BISCEGLIA(1975) No. 73-1245 Argued: Decided: February 19, 1975 </s> The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) held to have authority under 7601 and 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to issue a "John Doe" summons to a bank or other depository to discover the identity of a person who has had bank transactions suggesting the possibility of liability for unpaid taxes, in this instance a summons to respondent bank officer during an investigation to identify the person or persons who deposited 400 deteriorated $100 bills with the bank within the space of a few weeks. Pp. 148-151. </s> (a) That the summons was styled in a fictitious name is not a sufficient ground for denying enforcement. Pp. 148-149. </s> (b) The language of 7601 permitting the IRS to investigate and inquire after "all persons . . . who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax . . ." and of 7602 authorizing the summoning of "any person" for the taking of testimony and examination of books and witnesses that may be relevant for "ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determining the liability of any person . . . or collecting any such liability . . .," is inconsistent with an interpretation that would limit the issuance of summonses to investigations which have already focused upon a particular return, a particular named person, or a particular potential tax liability, and moreover such a reading of the summons power of the IRS ignores the agency's legitimate interest in large or unusual financial transactions, especially those involving cash. Pp. 149-150. </s> 486 F.2d 706, reversed and remanded. </s> BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 151. STEWART, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS, J., joined, post, p. 152. </s> Stuart A. Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Bork, Assistant [420 U.S. 141, 142] Attorney General Crampton, and Deputy Solicitor General Wallace. </s> William A. Watson argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. * </s> [Footnote * The American Bankers Assn. filed a brief as amicus curiae urging affirmance. </s> MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether the Internal Revenue Service has statutory authority to issue a "John Doe" summons to a bank or other depository to discover the identity of a person who has had bank transactions suggesting the possibility of liability for unpaid taxes. </s> I </s> On November 6 and 16, 1970, the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro, Ky., made two separate deposits with the Cincinnati Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, each of which included $20,000 in $100 bills. The evidence is undisputed that the $100 bills were "paper thin" and showed signs of severe disintegration which could have been caused by a long period of storage under abnormal conditions. As a result the bills were no longer suitable for circulation and they were destroyed by the Federal Reserve in accord with established procedures. Also in accord with regular Federal Reserve procedures, the Cincinnati Branch reported these facts to the Internal Revenue Service. </s> It is not disputed that a deposit of such a large amount of high denomination currency was out of the ordinary for the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro; for example, in the 11 months preceding the two $20,000 deposits in $100 bills, the Federal Reserve had received only 218 $100 bills from that bank. This fact, together with the [420 U.S. 141, 143] uniformly unusual state of deterioration of the $40,000 in $100 bills, caused the Internal Revenue Service to suspect that the transactions relating to those deposits may not have been reported for tax purposes. An agent was therefore assigned to investigate the matter. </s> After interviewing some of the bank's employees, none of whom could provide him with information regarding the two $20,000 deposits, the agent issued a "John Doe" summons directed to respondent, an executive vice president of the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro. The summons called for production of "[t]hose books and records which will provide information as to the person(s) or firm(s) which deposited, redeemed or otherwise gave to the Commercial Bank $100 bills U.S. Currency which the Commercial Bank sent in two shipments of (200) two hundred each $100 bills to the Cincinnati Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank on or about November 6, 1970 and November 16, 1970." This, of course, was simply the initial step in an investigation which might lead to nothing or might have revealed that there had been a failure to report money on which federal estate, gift, or income taxes were due. 1 Respondent, however, refused to comply with the summons even though he has not seriously argued that compliance would be unduly burdensome. </s> In due course, proceedings were commenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of [420 U.S. 141, 144] Kentucky to enforce the summons. That court narrowed its scope to require production only of deposit slips showing cash deposits in the amount of $20,000 and deposit slips showing cash deposits of $5,000 or more which involved $100 bills, and restricted it to the period between October 16, 1970, and November 16, 1970. Respondent was ordered to comply with the summons as modified. </s> The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. 7602, pursuant to which the summons had been issued, "presupposes that the [Internal Revenue Service] has already identified the person in whom it is interested as a taxpayer before proceeding." 486 F.2d 706, 710. We disagree, and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> II </s> The statutory framework for this case consists of 7601 and 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which provide: </s> "Section 7601. Canvass of districts for taxable persons and objects. </s> "(a) General rule. </s> "The Secretary or his delegate shall, to the extent he deems it practicable, cause officers or employees of the Treasury Department to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed. </s> "Section 7602. Examination of books and witnesses. </s> "For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been [420 U.S. 141, 145] made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax . . . or collecting any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized - </s> "(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant or material to such inquiry; </s> "(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data, and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry; and </s> "(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such inquiry." </s> We begin examination of these sections against the familiar background that our tax structure is based on a system of self-reporting. There is legal compulsion, to be sure, but basically the Government depends upon the good faith and integrity of each potential taxpayer to disclose honestly all information relevant to tax liability. Nonetheless, it would be naive to ignore the reality that some persons attempt to outwit the system, and tax evaders are not readily identifiable. Thus, 7601 gives the Internal Revenue Service a broad mandate to investigate and audit "persons who may be liable" for taxes and 7602 provides the power to "examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant . . . [and to summon] any person having possession [420 U.S. 141, 146] . . . of books of account . . . relevant or material to such inquiry." Of necessity, the investigative authority so provided is not limited to situations in which there is probable cause, in the traditional sense, to believe that a violation of the tax laws exists. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964). The purpose of the statutes is not to accuse, but to inquire. Although such investigations unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy, they are essential to our self-reporting system, and the alternatives could well involve far less agreeable invasions of house, business, and records. </s> We recognize that the authority vested in tax collectors may be abused, as all power is subject to abuse. However, the solution is not to restrict that authority so as to undermine the efficacy of the federal tax system, which seeks to assure that taxpayers pay what Congress has mandated and to prevent dishonest persons from escaping taxation thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpayers. Substantial protection is afforded by the provision that an Internal Revenue Service summons can be enforced only by the courts. 26 U.S.C. 7604 (b); Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964). Once a summons is challenged it must be scrutinized by a court to determine whether it seeks information relevant to a legitimate investigative purpose and is not meant "to harass the taxpayer or to put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation." United States v. Powell, supra, at 58. The cases show that the federal courts have taken seriously their obligation to apply this standard to fit particular situations, either by refusing enforcement or narrowing the scope of the summons. See, e. g., United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (CA8 1973); United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 755 (CA4 1973); United States v. Pritchard, 438 F.2d 969 (CA5 1971); United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust [420 U.S. 141, 147] Co., 385 F.2d 129 (CA3 1967). Indeed, the District Judge in this case viewed the demands of the summons as too broad and carefully narrowed them. </s> Finally, we note that the power to summon and inquire in cases such as the instant one is not unprecedented. For example, had respondent been brought before a grand jury under identical circumstances there can be little doubt that he would have been required to testify and produce records or be held in contempt. In Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919), petitioners were summoned to appear before a grand jury. They refused to testify on the ground that the investigation exceeded the authority of the court and grand jury, despite the fact that it was not directed at them. Their subsequent contempt convictions were affirmed by this Court: </s> "[The witness] is not entitled to set limits to the investigation that the grand jury may conduct . . . It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime. As has been said before, the identity of the offender, and the precise nature of the offense, if there be one, normally are developed at the conclusion of the grand jury's labors, not at the beginning." Id., at 282. </s> The holding of Blair is not insignificant for our resolution of this case. In United States v. Powell, supra, Mr. Justice Harlan reviewed this Court's cases dealing with the subpoena power of federal enforcement agencies, and observed: </s> "[T]he Federal Trade Commission . . . `has a power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, [420 U.S. 141, 148] which is not derived from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.' While the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue derives from a different body of statutes, we do not think the analogies to other agency situations are without force when the scope of the Commissioner's power is called in question." 379 U.S., at 57 , quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 -643 (1950). </s> III </s> Against this background, we turn to the question whether the summons issued to respondent, as modified by the District Court, was authorized by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 2 Of course, the mere fact that the summons was styled "In the matter of the tax liability of John Doe" is not sufficient ground for denying enforcement. The use of such fictitious names is common in indictments, see, e. g., Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533 (CA8 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 692 (1941), and other types of compulsory process. Indeed, the Courts of Appeals have regularly enforced Internal Revenue Service summonses which did not name a specific taxpayer who was under investigation. E. g., United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413 (CA5 1973); United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272, 279 (CA7 1973); Tillotson v. [420 U.S. 141, 149] Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (CA7), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964). Respondent undertakes to distinguish these cases on the ground that they involved situations in which either a taxpayer was identified or a tax liability was known to exist as to an unidentified taxpayer. However, while they serve to suggest the almost infinite variety of factual situations in which a "John Doe" summons may be necessary, it does not follow that these cases define the limits of the Internal Revenue Service's power to inquire concerning tax liability. </s> The first question is whether the words of the statute require the restrictive reading given them by the Court of Appeals. Section 7601 permits the Internal Revenue Service to investigate and inquire after "all persons . . . who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax . . . ." To aid in this investigative function, 7602 authorizes the summoning of "any . . . person" for the taking of testimony and examination of books which may be relevant for "ascertaining the correctness of any return, . . . determining the liability of any person . . . or collecting any such liability . . . ." Plainly, this language is inconsistent with an interpretation that would limit the issuance of summonses to investigations which have already focused upon a particular return, a particular named person, or a particular potential tax liability. </s> Moreover, such a reading of the Internal Revenue Service's summons power ignores the fact that it has a legitimate interest in large or unusual financial transactions, especially those involving cash. The reasons for that interest are too numerous and too obvious to catalog. Indeed, Congress has recently determined that information regarding transactions with foreign financial institutions and transactions which involve large amounts of money is so likely to be useful to persons responsible for enforcing the tax laws that it must be reported by banks. [420 U.S. 141, 150] See generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26 -40 (1974). </s> It would seem elementary that no meaningful investigation of such events could be conducted if the identity of the persons involved must first be ascertained, and that is not always an easy task. Fiduciaries and other agents are understandably reluctant to disclose information regarding their principals, as respondent was in this case. Moreover, if criminal activity is afoot the persons involved may well have used aliases or taken other measures to cover their tracks. Thus, if the Internal Revenue Service is unable to issue a summons to determine the identity of such persons, the broad inquiry authorized by 7601 will be frustrated in this class of cases. Settled principles of statutory interpretation require that we avoid such a result absent unambiguous directions from Congress. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 288 (1957); United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U.S. 534, 542 -544 (1940). No such congressional purpose is discernible in this case. </s> We hold that the Internal Revenue Service was acting within its statutory authority in issuing a summons to respondent for the purpose of identifying the person or persons who deposited 400 decrepit $100 bills with the Commercial Bank of Middlesboro within the space of a few weeks. Further investigation may well reveal that such person or persons have a perfectly innocent explanation for the transactions. It is not unknown for taxpayers to hide large amounts of currency in odd places out of a fear of banks. But on this record the deposits were extraordinary, and no meaningful inquiry can be made until respondent complies with the summons as modified by the District Court. </s> We do not mean to suggest by this holding that respondent's fears that the 7602 summons power could be used to conduct "fishing expeditions" into the private affairs [420 U.S. 141, 151] of bank depositors are trivial. However, as we have observed in a similar context: </s> "`That the power may be abused, is no ground for denying its existence. It is a limited power, and should be kept within its proper bounds; and, when these are exceeded, a jurisdictional question is presented which is cognizable in the courts.'" McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 166 (1927), quoting People ex rel. McDonald v. Keeler, 99 N. Y. 463, 482 (1885). </s> So here, Congress has provided protection from arbitrary or capricious action by placing the federal courts between the Government and the person summoned. The District Court in this case conscientiously discharged its duty to see that a legitimate investigation was being conducted and that the summons was no broader than necessary to achieve its purpose. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to it with directions to affirm the order of the District Court. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 The Internal Revenue Service agent testified: </s> "Q. What possible tax effect could this have on the taxpayer if he is determined? </s> "A. Well, it could be anything from nothing at all, a simple explanation, or it could be that this is money that has been secreted away for a period of time as a means of avoiding the tax. </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. Then you really have not reached first base yet, is that correct? </s> "A. That's correct." </s> [Footnote 2 Respondent also argues that, even if the summons issued in this case was authorized by statute, it violates the Fourth Amendment. This contention was not passed upon by the Court of Appeals. In any event, as narrowed by the District Court the summons is at least as specific as the reporting requirements which were upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge by banks in California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 63 -70 (1974). </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL joins, concurring. </s> I join the Court's opinion and its judgment, and add this word only to emphasize the narrowness of the issue at stake here. We decide today that the Internal Revenue Service has statutory authority to issue a summons to a bank in order to ascertain the identity of a person whose transactions with that bank strongly suggest liability for unpaid taxes. Under the circumstances here, there was an overwhelming probability, if not a certitude, that one individual or entity was responsible for the deposits. The uniformly deteriorated condition of the currency and the amount, combined with other unusual [420 U.S. 141, 152] aspects, gave the Service good reason, and, indeed, the duty to investigate. The Service's suspicion as to possible liability was more than plausible. * The summons was closely scrutinized and appropriately narrowed in scope by the United States District Court. </s> The summons, in short, was issued pursuant to a genuine investigation. The Service was not engaged in researching some general problem; its mission was not exploratory. The distinction between an investigative and a more general exploratory purpose has been stressed appropriately by federal courts, see, e. g., United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 488 F.2d 953, 958 (CA5 1974), pet. for cert. pending, No. 73-1827; United States v. Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318 (Conn. 1974), and that distinction is important to our decision here. </s> We need not decide in this case whether the Service has statutory authority to issue a "John Doe" summons where neither a particular taxpayer nor an ascertainable group of taxpayers is under investigation. At most, we hold that the Service is not always required to state a taxpayer's name in order to obtain enforcement of its summons, and that under the circumstances of this case it is definitely not required to do so. We do not decide that a "John Doe" summons is always enforceable where the name of an individual is lacking and the Service's purpose is other than investigative. </s> Upon this understanding, I join the Court's opinion. </s> [Footnote * The Service may not have reached "first base," see ante, at 143 n. 1, but it had been at bat before, and it knew both the game and the ball park well. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins, dissenting. </s> The Court today says that it "recogniz[es] that the authority vested in tax collectors may be abused," ante, [420 U.S. 141, 153] at 146, but it is nonetheless unable to find any statutory limitation upon that authority. The only "protection" from abuse that Congress has provided, it says, is "placing the federal courts between the Government and the person summoned," ante, at 151. But that, of course, is no protection at all, unless the federal courts are provided with a measurable standard when asked to enforce a summons. I agree with the Court of Appeals that Congress has provided such a standard, and that the standard was not met in this case. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the opinion and judgment of the Court. </s> Congress has carefully restricted the summons power to certain rather precisely delineated purposes: </s> "ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability." 26 U.S.C. 7602. </s> This provision speaks in the singular - referring to "the correctness of any return" and to "the liability of any person." The delineated purposes are jointly denominated an "inquiry" concerning "the person liable for tax or required to perform the act," and the summons is designed to facilitate the "[e]xamination of books and witnesses" which "may be relevant or material to such inquiry." 26 U.S.C. 7602 (1), (2), and (3). This language indicates unmistakably that the summons power is a tool for the investigation of particular taxpayers. </s> By contrast, the general duties of the IRS are vastly broader than its summons authority. For instance, 7601 mandates a "[c]anvass of districts for taxable persons and objects." Unlike 7602, the canvassing provision [420 U.S. 141, 154] speaks broadly and in the plural, instructing Treasury Department officials. </s> "to proceed, from time to time, through each internal revenue district and inquire after and concerning all persons therein who may be liable to pay any internal revenue tax, and all persons owning or having the care and management of any objects with respect to which any tax is imposed." (Emphasis added.) </s> Virtually all "persons" or "objects" in this country "may," of course, have federal tax problems. Every day the economy generates thousands of sales, loans, gifts, purchases, leases, deposits, mergers, wills, and the like which - because of their size or complexity - suggest the possibility of tax problems for somebody. Our economy is "tax relevant" in almost every detail. Accordingly, if a summons could issue for any material conceivably relevant to "taxation" - that is, relevant to the general duties of the IRS - the Service could use the summons power as a broad research device. The Service could use that power methodically to force disclosure of whole categories of transactions and closely monitor the operations of myriad segments of the economy on the theory that the information thereby accumulated might facilitate the assessment and collection of some kind of a federal tax from somebody. Cf. United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 488 F.2d 953. And the Court's opinion today seems to authorize exactly that. </s> But Congress has provided otherwise. The Congress has recognized that information concerning certain classes of transactions is of peculiar importance to the sound administration of the tax system, but the legislative solution has not been the conferral of a limitless summons power. Instead, various special-purpose statutes have been written to require the reporting or disclosure of particular kinds of transactions. E. g., 26 U.S.C. 6049, [420 U.S. 141, 155] 6051-6053, 31 U.S.C. 1081-1083, 1101, and 1121-1122, and 31 U.S.C. 1141-1143 (1970 ed., Supp. III). Meanwhile, the scope of the summons power itself has been kept narrow. Congress has never made that power coextensive with the Service's broad and general canvassing duties set out in 7601. Instead, the summons power has always been restricted to the particular purposes of individual investigation, delineated in 7602. 1 </s> Thus, a financial or economic transaction is not subject to disclosure through summons merely because it is large or unusual or generally "tax relevant" - but only when the summoned information is reasonably pertinent to an ongoing investigation of somebody's tax status. This restriction checks possible abuses of the summons power in two rather obvious ways. First, it guards against an [420 U.S. 141, 156] overbroad summons by allowing the enforcing court to prune away those demands which are not relevant to the particular, ongoing investigation. See, e. g., First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d 532, 533-535. Second, the restriction altogether prohibits a summons which is wholly unconnected with such an investigation. </s> The Court today completely obliterates the historic distinction between the general duties of the IRS, summarized in 7601, and the limited purposes for which a summons may issue, specified in 7602. Relying heavily on 7601, and noting that the IRS "has a legitimate interest in large or unusual financial transactions, especially those involving cash," ante, at 149, the Court approves enforcement of a summons having no investigative predicate. The sole premise for this summons was the Service's theory that the deposit of old wornout $100 bills was a sufficiently unusual and interesting transaction to justify compulsory disclosure of the identities of all the large-amount depositors at the respondent's bank over a one-month period. 2 That the summons was not incident to an ongoing, particularized investigation, but was merely a shot in the dark to see if one might be warranted, was freely conceded by the IRS agent who served the summons. 3 </s> [420 U.S. 141, 157] </s> The Court's opinion thus approves a breathtaking expansion of the summons power: There are obviously thousands of transactions occurring daily throughout the country which, on their face, suggest the possibility of tax complications for the unknown parties involved. These transactions will now be subject to forced disclosure at the whim of any IRS agent, so long only as he is acting in "good faith." Ante, at 146. </s> This is a sharp and dangerous detour from the settled course of precedent. The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case has been explicitly accepted as sound by the Courts of Appeals of two other Circuits. See United States v. Berkowitz, 488 F.2d 1235, 1236 (CA3), and United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 488 F.2d 953, 960 (CA5), cert. pending, No. 73-1827. No federal court has disagreed with it. </s> The federal courts have always scrutinized with particular care any IRS summons directed to a "third party," i. e., to a party other than the taxpayer under investigation. See, e. g., United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., supra, at 963; Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 211-212; United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 523. When, as here, the third-party summons does not identify the party under investigation, a presumption naturally arises that the summons is not genuinely investigative but merely exploratory - a device for general research or for the hit-or-miss monitoring of "unusual" transactions. Unless this presumption is rebutted by the Service, the courts have denied enforcement. </s> Thus, the IRS was not permitted to summon from a bank the names and addresses of all beneficiaries of certain [420 U.S. 141, 158] types of trust arrangements merely on the theory that these arrangements were unusual in form or size. Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596. Nor could the Service force a company to disclose the identity of whole classes of its oil land lessees merely on the theory that oil lessees commonly have tax problems. United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., supra. See also McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F.2d 838; First Nat. Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d, at 533-535; Teamsters v. United States, 240 F.2d 387, 390. </s> On the other hand, enforcement has been granted where the Service has been able to demonstrate that the John Doe summons was issued incident to an ongoing and particularized investigation. Thus, enforcement was granted of summonses seeking to identify the clients of those tax-return-preparation firms which prior investigation had shown to be less than honest or accurate in the preparation of sample returns. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749; United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272; United States v. Berkowitz, supra; United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413. Similarly, enforcement was granted of summonses directed to an attorney, and his bank, seeking to identify the client for whom the attorney had mailed to the IRS a large, anonymous check, purporting to satisfy an outstanding tax deficiency of the client. Tillotson v. Boughner 333 F.2d 515; Schulze v. Rayunec, 350 F.2d 666. Like the prior investigative work in the tax-return-preparer cases, the receipt of the mysterious check established the predicate of a particularized investigation which was necessary, under 7602, to the enforcement of a summons. In each case, the Service had already proceeded to the point where the unknown individual's tax liability had become a reasonable possibility, rather than a matter of sheer speculation. </s> Today's decision shatters this long line of precedent. [420 U.S. 141, 159] For this summons, there was absolutely no investigative predicate. The sole indication of this John Doe's tax liability was the unusual character of the deposit transaction itself. Any private economic transaction is now fair game for forced disclosure, if any IRS agent happens in good faith to want it disclosed. This new rule simply disregards the language of 7602 and the body of established case law construing it. </s> The Court's attempt to justify this extraordinary departure from established law is hardly persuasive. The Court first notes that a witness may not refuse testimony to a grand jury merely because the grand jury has not yet specified the "identity of the offender," ante, at 147, quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 . This is true but irrelevant. The IRS is not a grand jury. It is a creature not of the Constitution but of legislation and is thus peculiarly subject to legislative constraints. See In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 346 (Black, J., dissenting). It is true that the Court drew an analogy between an IRS summons and a grand jury subpoena in United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 , but this was merely to emphasize that an IRS summons does not require the support of "probable cause" to suspect tax fraud when the summons is issued incident to an ongoing, individualized investigation of an identified party. A major premise of Powell was that an extrastatutory "probable cause" requirement was unnecessary in view of the "legitimate purpose" requirements already specified in 7602, 379 U.S., at 56 -57. </s> The Court next suggests that this expansion of the summons power is innocuous, at least on the facts of this case, because the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 4 itself compels [420 U.S. 141, 160] banks to disclose the identity of certain cash depositors. Ante, at 149-150. Aside from the fact that the summons at issue here forces disclosure of some deposits not covered by the Act and its attendant regulations, 5 the argument has a more basic flaw. If the summons authority of 7602 allows preinvestigative inquiry into any large or unusual bank deposit, the 1970 Act was largely redundant. The IRS could have saved Congress months of hearings and debates by simply directing 7602 summonses on a regular basis to the Nation's banks, demanding the identities of their large cash depositors. In California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 , we gave extended consideration to the complex constitutional issues raised by the 1970 Act; some of those issues - e. g., whether and to what extent bank depositors have Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment rights to the secrecy of their domestic deposits - were left unresolved by the Court's opinion, 416 U.S., at 67 -75. If the disclosure requirements in the 1970 Act were already encompassed within the Service's summons power, one must wonder why the Court labored so long and carefully in Shultz. </s> Finally, the Court suggests that respect for the plain language of 7602 would "undermine the efficacy of the federal tax system, which seeks to assure that taxpayers pay what Congress has mandated and prevents dishonest persons from escaping taxation and thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpayers." Ante, at 146. But the federal courts have applied the strictures of 7602, and its predecessors, for many decades without occasioning these [420 U.S. 141, 161] dire effects. If such a danger exists, Congress can deal with it. But until Congress changes the provision of 7602, it is our duty to apply the statute as it is written. </s> I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> [Footnote 1 The canvassing duties and the summons power have always been found in separate and distinct statutory provisions. The spatial proximity of the two contemporary provisions is utterly without legal significance. 26 U.S.C. 7806 (b). The general mandate to canvass and inquire, now found in 7601, is derived from 3172 of the Revised Statutes of 1874. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 523 -524. The summons power, however, has different historical roots. Section 7602, enacted in 1954, was meant to consolidate and carry forward several prior statutes, with "no material change from existing law." H. R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess, A436; S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 617. The relevant prior statutes were 3614 and 3615 (a)-(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. See Table II of the 1954 Code, 68A Stat. 969. Section 3614 granted the summons power to the Commissioner "for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return or for the purpose of making a return where none has been made." Sections 3615 (a)-(c) granted the summons power to "collectors" and provided that a "summons may be issued" whenever "any person" refuses to make a return or makes a false or fraudulent return. Thus, like the present 7602, these earlier provisions clearly limited use of the summons power to the investigation of particular taxpayers. </s> [Footnote 2 The summons here used a scattershot technique to learn the identity of the unknown depositor. Rather than merely asking bank officials who the depositor was, the IRS required production of all deposit slips exceeding specified amounts that had been filled out during the period when the suspect deposits were, presumably, made. Thus, enforcement of the summons, even as redrafted by the District Court, will doubtlessly apprise the IRS of the identities of many bank depositors other than the one who submitted the old and wornout $100 bills. </s> [Footnote 3 He testified at the enforcement hearing: </s> "Q. What possible tax effect could this have on the taxpayer if he is determined? </s> "A. Well, it could be anything from nothing at all, a simple explanation, [420 U.S. 141, 157] or it could be that this is money that has been secreted away for a period of time as a means of avoiding the tax. </s> . . . . . </s> "Q. Then you really have not reached first base yet, is that correct? </s> "A. That's correct." </s> [Footnote 4 Pub. L. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 12 U.S.C. 1730d, 1829b, 1951-1959, and 31 U.S.C. 1051-1062, 1081-1083, 1101-1105, 1121-1122. See California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 . </s> [Footnote 5 As limited by the District Court, the summons calls for production of deposit slips showing cash deposits in the amount of $20,000 and deposit slips showing cash deposits of $5,000 or more involving $100 bills, for deposits made between October 16 and November 16, 1970. Current regulations under the Bank Secrecy Act require reporting only with respect to cash transactions exceeding $10,000. 31 CFR 103.22 (1974). </s> [420 U.S. 141, 162]

United States Supreme Court SMITH v. BENNETT(1961) No. 174 Argued: March 28, 1961Decided: April 17, 1961 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 177, Marshall v. Bennett, Warden, also on certiorari to the same Court. </s> Iowa statutes that require an indigent prisoner of the State to pay a filing fee before his application for a writ of habeas corpus ($4) or the allowance of his appeal ($3) in such proceedings will be docketed in a state court deny him the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 . Pp. 708-714. </s> Judgments vacated and causes remanded. </s> Luther L. Hill, Jr., acting under appointment by the Court, 363 U.S. 834, 838 , argued the causes and filed a brief for petitioners in both cases. </s> Evan Hultman, Attorney General of Iowa, argued the causes and filed a brief for respondent in both cases. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The issue in these habeas corpus cases concerns the validity, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, of the requirement of Iowa law that necessitates the payment of statutory filing fees 1 by an indigent prisoner of the State before an application for a writ of habeas corpus or the allowance of an appeal in such proceedings will be docketed. As we noted in Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 256 (1959), "[t]he State's [365 U.S. 708, 709] commendable frankness in [these] . . . case[s] has simplified the issues." In its brief, the State conceded that "indigent convicted criminals are unable to file a petition for habeas corpus in Iowa." We hold that to interpose any financial consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws. </s> In No. 174, Neal Merle Smith v. John E. Bennett, Warden, the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to serve 10 years in the state penitentiary for the offense of breaking and entering. In due course he was released on parole. After a short period, however, this was revoked for violation of its conditions. Petitioner was arrested and was thereafter returned to the penitentiary for completion of his sentence. He then forwarded to the Clerk of the District Court of Lee County, Iowa, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with accompanying motion to proceed in forma pauperis and an affidavit of poverty. In the petition he raised constitutional questions as to the validity of the warrant of arrest under which he was taken into custody and returned to the penitentiary. The Clerk refused to docket the petition without payment of the $4 filing fee. Petitioner then filed a motion in the Iowa Supreme Court for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, together with a pauper's oath, which the court denied without opinion. On appeal to this Court, we dismissed the appeal but treated the papers as a petition for certiorari, which was granted, limited to the above question, 363 U.S. 834 . </s> In No. 177, Richard W. Marshall v. John E. Bennett, Warden, the petitioner, who was represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to an information charging the offense of breaking and entering and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment at the Iowa State Penitentiary. A year later he forwarded to the Clerk of the District Court of [365 U.S. 708, 710] Lee County, Iowa, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was detained "contrary to the provisions of the 14th Amendment, 1" because the information to which he pleaded guilty was "fatal on its face" in that "it does not charge Petitioner with `intent'" and further because his "plea thereon was obtained by coercion and duress." Accompanying the petition was a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a pauper's affidavit. Thereafter, in an unreported written order, the court refused to docket the petition without the payment of the statutory filing fee but, nevertheless, examined the petition and found it "would have to be denied if properly presented to the Court." Petitioner forwarded appeal papers to the Supreme Court of Iowa but that application was also denied. Petitioner's motion for leave to proceed here in forma pauperis was granted, as was his petition for certiorari, which was limited to the question posed in the opening paragraph, supra. 363 U.S. 838 . </s> In Burns v. Ohio, supra, we decided that a State could not "constitutionally require . . . an indigent defendant in a criminal case [to] pay a filing fee before permitting him to file a motion for leave to appeal in one of its courts." At p. 253. That decision was predicated upon our earlier holding in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), that an indigent criminal defendant was entitled to a transcript of the record of his trial, or an adequate substitute therefor, where needed to effectively prosecute an appeal from his conviction. The gist of these cases is that because "[t]here is no rational basis for assuming that indigents' motions for leave to appeal will be less meritorious than those of other defendants," Burns v. Ohio, supra, at 257-258, "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has," Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 19, and consequently that "[t]he imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate [365 U.S. 708, 711] review for indigent criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice Under Law." Burns v. Ohio, supra, at 258. Iowa had long anticipated the rule announced in these cases, i. e., indigent defendants may appeal from criminal convictions without prior payment of filing fees, Iowa Code 789.20 (enacted in 1917), and transcripts are provided by the county to be used in such appeals, Iowa Code 792.8 (enacted in 1878). As the State points out, those cases "were concerned with the rights of a convicted criminal seeking to make a direct attack upon his conviction by appeal . . . ." Habeas corpus, on the other hand, is not an attack on the conviction but on the validity of the detention and is, therefore, a collateral proceeding. The State, however, admits that the Great Writ "is an available post-conviction civil remedy in . . . Iowa" and concedes that a prisoner's inability to pay the $4 fee would render it unavailable to him. The question is therefore clearly posed: Since Iowa does make the writ available to prisoners who have the $4 fee, may it constitutionally preclude its use by those who do not? </s> The State insists that it may do so for three reasons. First, habeas corpus is a civil action brought by a prisoner to obtain his personal liberty, a civil right, and if it must be made available to indigents free of fees in protection of that right then it must be made available in like manner to all indigents in the protection of every civil right. Second, habeas corpus is a statutory right, Iowa Code 663.5, and the legislature may constitutionally extend or limit its application. Finally, a habeas corpus action may be brought in the United States District Court because Iowa's fee requirement fulfills the demand of 28 U.S.C. 2254, that "the existence of circumstances rendering such [state corrective] process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner" be present. [365 U.S. 708, 712] </s> While habeas corpus may, of course, be found to be a civil action for procedural purposes, Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U.S. 556 (1883), it does not follow that its availability in testing the State's right to detain an indigent prisoner may be subject to the payment of a filing fee. The State admits that each petitioner here is an indigent and that its requirement as to the $4 fee payment has effectively denied them the use of the writ. While $4 is, as the State says, an "extremely nominal" sum, if one does not have it and is unable to get it the fee might as well be $400 - which the State emphasizes it is not. In Iowa, the writ is a post-conviction remedy available to all prisoners who have $4. We shall not quibble as to whether in this context it be called a civil or criminal action for, as Selden has said, it is "the highest remedy in law, for any man that is imprisoned." 3 Howell's State Trials 95 (1628). The availability of a procedure to regain liberty lost through criminal process cannot be made contingent upon a choice of labels. Ever since the Magna Charta, man's greatest right - personal liberty - has been guaranteed, and the procedures of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 2 gave to every Englishman a prompt and effective remedy for testing the legality of his imprisonment. Considered by the Founders as the highest safeguard of liberty, it was written into the Constitution of the United States that its "privilege . . . shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." Art. I, 9. Its principle is imbedded in the fundamental law of 47 of our States. It has long been available in the federal courts to indigent prisoners of both the State and Federal Governments to test the validity of their detention. Over the centuries it has been the common law world's "freedom writ" by whose orderly [365 U.S. 708, 713] processes the production of a prisoner in court may be required and the legality of the grounds for his incarceration inquired into, failing which the prisoner is set free. We repeat what has been so truly said of the federal writ: "there is no higher duty than to maintain it unimpaired," Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939), and unsuspended, save only in the cases specified in our Constitution. When an equivalent right is granted by a State, financial hurdles must not be permitted to condition its exercise. </s> To require the State to docket applications for the post-conviction remedy of habeas corpus by indigent prisoners without the fee payment does not necessarily mean that all habeas corpus or other actions involving civil rights must be on the same footing. Only those involving indigent convicted prisoners are involved here and we pass only upon them. </s> The Attorney General of Iowa also argues that indigent prisoners in the State's custody may seek "vindication of federal rights alleged to have been denied by the state" in the federal courts. But even though this be true - an additional point not involved or passed upon here - it would ill-behoove this great State, whose devotion to the equality of rights is indelibly stamped upon its history, to say to its indigent prisoners seeking to redress what they believe to be the State's wrongs: "Go to the federal court." Moreover, the state remedy may offer review of questions not involving federal rights and therefore not raisable in federal habeas corpus. </s> Because Iowa has established such a procedure, we need consider neither the issue raised by petitioners that the State is constitutionally required to offer some type of post-conviction remedy for the vindication of federal rights, nor the State's converse claim that the remedy is a matter of legislative grace. However, the operation of the statutes under attack has, perhaps inadvertently, [365 U.S. 708, 714] made it available only to those persons who can pay the necessary filing fees. This is what it cannot do. </s> Throughout the centuries the Great Writ has been the shield of personal freedom insuring liberty to persons illegally detained. Respecting the State's grant of a right to test their detention, the Fourteenth Amendment weighs the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its hand extends as far to each. In failing to extend the privilege of the Great Writ to its indigent prisoners, Iowa denies them equal protection of the laws. The judgments of the Supreme Court of Iowa are vacated and each cause is remanded to that court for further action consistent with this opinion. </s> Vacated and remanded. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 Iowa Code Ann. (Cum. Supp. 1960) 606.15 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he clerk of the district court shall charge and collect . . . [f]or filing any petition . . . and docketing the same, four dollars." Section 685.3 states in relevant part that "[t]he clerk [of the Supreme Court] shall collect . . . [u]pon filing each appeal, three dollars." </s> [Footnote 2 31 Car. II, c. 2. </s> [365 U.S. 708, 715]

United States Supreme Court OREGON v. MITCHELL(1970) No. 43 Argued: October 19, 1970Decided: December 21, 1970 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 44, Orig., Texas v. Mitchell, Attorney General, No. 46, Orig., United States v. Arizona, and No. 47, Orig., United States v. Idaho, also on bills of complaint. </s> These original actions involve the constitutionality of three provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 which (1) lower the minimum age of voters in both state and federal elections from 21 to 18, (2) bar the use of literacy tests (and similar voting eligibility requirements) for a five-year period in state and federal elections in any area where such tests are not already proscribed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and (3) forbid States from disqualifying voters in presidential and vice-presidential elections for failure to meet state residency requirements and provide uniform national rules for absentee voting in such elections. Held: (1) The 18-year-old minimum-age requirement of the Voting Rights Act Amendments is valid for national elections. (2) That requirement is not valid for state and local elections. (3) The literacy test provision is valid. (4) The residency and absentee balloting provisions are valid. Pp. 117-296. </s> Relief granted in part and denied in part. </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK concluded that: </s> 1. Congress has the authority to permit 18-year-old citizens to vote in national elections, under Art. I, 4, Art. II, 1, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, of the Constitution since those provisions fully empower Congress to make or alter regulations in national elections, to supervise such elections, and to set the qualifications for voters therein. Pp. 117, 119-124. </s> 2. But under Art I, 2, the States have the power to set qualifications to vote in state and local elections, and the whole Constitution reserves that power to the States except as it has been curtailed by specific constitutional amendments. No amendment (including the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the other Civil War Amendments) authorizes Congress' attempt to lower the voting age in state and local elections. Pp. 118, 124-131. [400 U.S. 112, 113] </s> 3. The literacy test ban is constitutional under the Enforcement Clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, in view of the evidence of racial discrimination that Congress found in various parts of the Nation: racial discrimination resulting from literacy tests, the educational inequality stemming from the "separate but equal" rule, and other racially discriminatory practices. Pp. 118, 131-134. </s> 4. The provisions forbidding States from disqualifying voters in national elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors because they have not met state residency requirements and establishing absentee balloting rules are valid under Congress' broad powers to regulate federal elections and maintain a national government. * Pp. 118, 134. </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS concluded that: * </s> 1. The authority of Congress to fix at 18 the minimum age for the civil right of voting in national elections derives from the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the power to "enforce" granted by 5 of that Amendment. Congress had an adequate basis for concluding that 18-year-olds are mature enough to vote and that to deprive them of the franchise would be a denial of equal protection. Pp. 135-144. </s> 3. The bar against a State's denying the right to vote in any federal, state, or local election because of a literacy test is sustainable as appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, Congress having concluded that such tests have been used to discriminate against the voting rights of minority groups and that the tests are not necessary to ensure that voters be well informed. Pp. 144-147. </s> 4. The right to vote in national elections is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship and the congressional judgment to ban durational residency requirements in presidential and vice-presidential elections is a manifestly permissible means of enforcing that privilege and immunity under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 147-150. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN concluded that: * </s> 2. The Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see [400 U.S. 112, 114] fit and neither that Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution authorizes Congress to set voter qualifications in state or local elections. Pp. 154-213. </s> 3. The literacy requirement can be deemed an appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment since Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application. Pp. 216-217. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concluded that: ** </s> 1. Congress has the power to forbid the disenfranchisement in national elections of persons over the age of 18 because of their age, in order to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There was ample evidence to support Congress' conclusion that the exclusion of citizens 18 to 21 years of age from the franchise is unnecessary to promote any legitimate interest the States may have in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. Pp. 239-281. </s> 3. The congressional determination that a nationwide ban on literacy tests was necessary to prevent racial discrimination in voting is amply supported by the legislative record, and the proscription of literacy tests is well within the power of Congress granted by 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 231-236. </s> 4. There is adequate constitutional basis for the residency provisions of the Act in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as there is ample justification for the congressional findings that durational residence requirements abridge the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests. Pp. 236-239. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concluded that: ** </s> 2. Congress has no power to confer the right to vote in state or local elections on citizens from the ages of 18 to 21 since under the Constitution only the States have the power to set voting qualifications. Pp. 293-296. </s> 3. The literacy test ban is constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. Pp. 282-284. </s> 4. The residency provisions of the Act are constitutional because Congress, while it does not have general authority to establish qualifications for voting in congressional or presidential elections, [400 U.S. 112, 115] does have the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to protect the privileges of United States citizenship, including the freedom to travel and to change one's residence. Pp. 285-292. </s> BLACK, J., delivered an opinion announcing the judgments of the Court and expressing his own view of the cases. DOUGLAS, J., filed a separate opinion, post, p. 135. HARLAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 152. BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ., filed an opinion dissenting from the judgments in part and concurring in the judgments in part, post, p. 229. STEWART, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p. 281. </s> Lee Johnson, Attorney General of Oregon, argued the cause for plaintiff in No. 43, Orig. With him on the briefs were Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Deputy Attorney General, Jacob B. Tanzer, Solicitor General, and Al J. Laue and Thomas H. Denney, Assistant Attorneys General. Charles Alan Wright argued the cause for plaintiff in No. 44, Orig. With him on the brief were Crawford C. Martin, Attorney General of Texas, Nola White, First Assistant Attorney General, Alfred Walker, Executive Assistant Attorney General, and J. C. Davis, W. O. Shultz II, and John Reeves, Assistant Attorneys General. </s> Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for defendant in Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., and for the United States in Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig. With him on the briefs were Attorney General Mitchell, pro se, Assistant Attorney General Leonard, Peter L. Strauss, and Samuel Huntington. </s> Gary K. Nelson, Attorney General of Arizona, and John M. McGowan II, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in No. 46, Orig. Robert M. Robson, Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for defendant in No. 47, Orig. With him on the brief was Richard H. Greener, Assistant Attorney General. [400 U.S. 112, 116] </s> Brief of amicus curiae in all cases was filed by A. F. Summer, Attorney General, Delos Burks, First Assistant Attorney General, William A. Allain, Assistant Attorney General, and Charles B. Henley for the State of Mississippi. Briefs of amici curiae in Nos. 43, Orig., 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., were filed by Melvin L. Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union, and by John R. Cosgrove for Citizens for Lowering the Voting Age et al. Brief of amicus curiae in Nos. 43, Orig., and 46, Orig., was filed by William A. Dobrovir, Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., David Rubin, Stephen I. Schlossberg, John A. Fillion, Nathaniel R. Jones, Clarence Mitchell, and J. Francis Pohlhaus for the Youth Franchise Coalition et al. Briefs of amici curiae in No. 43, Orig., were filed by Joseph A. Califano, Jr., and Clifford L. Alexander for the Democratic National Committee, and by Messrs. Jones, Mitchell, and Pohlhaus for the Department of Armed Services and Veterans Affairs of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. Brief of amicus curiae for the State of Indiana in support of plaintiff in No. 44, Orig., was filed by Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Richard C. Johnson, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and William F. Thompson, Assistant Attorney General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States, as follows: Joe Purcell of Arkansas, Robert M. Robson of Idaho, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, Clarence A. H. Meyer of Nebraska, Warren B. Rudman of New Hampshire, Robert Morgan of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, Paul W. Brown of Ohio, Gordon Mydland of South Dakota, Vernon B. Romney of Utah, Slade Gorton of Washington, Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., of West Virginia, and James E. Barrett of Wyoming. Brief of amicus curiae in No. 47, Orig., was filed by Andrew P. Miller, Attorney General, and Anthony F. Troy and Walter A. McFarlane, Assistant Attorneys General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia. [400 U.S. 112, 117] </s> MR. JUSTICE BLACK, announcing the judgments of the Court in an opinion expressing his own view of the cases. </s> In these suits certain States resist compliance with the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, because they believe that the Act takes away from them powers reserved to the States by the Constitution to control their own elections. 1 By its terms the Act does three things. First: It lowers the minimum age of voters in both state and federal elections from 21 to 18. Second: Based upon a finding by Congress that literacy tests have been used to discriminate against voters on account of their color, the Act enforces the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by barring the use of such tests in all elections, state and national, for a five-year period. Third: The Act forbids States from disqualifying voters in national elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors because they have not met state residency requirements. </s> For the reasons set out in Part I of this opinion, I believe Congress can fix the age of voters in national elections, such as congressional, senatorial, vice-presidential [400 U.S. 112, 118] and presidential elections, but cannot set the voting age in state and local elections. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL join me in concluding that Congress can enfranchise 18-year-old citizens in national elections, but dissent from the judgment that Congress cannot extend the franchise to 18-year-old citizens in state and local elections. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers THE CHIEF JUSTICE, HARLAN, STEWART, and BLACKMUN join me in concluding that Congress cannot interfere with the age for voters set by the States for state and local elections. They, however, dissent from the judgment that Congress can control voter qualifications in federal elections. In summary, it is the judgment of the Court that the 18-year-old vote provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 are constitutional and enforceable insofar as they pertain to federal elections and unconstitutional and unenforceable insofar as they pertain to state and local elections. </s> For the reasons set out in Part II of this opinion, I believe that Congress, in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, can prohibit the use of literacy tests or other devices used to discriminate against voters on account of their race in both state and federal elections. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, all of my Brethren join me in this judgment. Therefore the literacy-test provisions of the Act are upheld. </s> For the reasons set out in Part III of this opinion, I believe Congress can set residency requirements and provide for absentee balloting in elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors. For reasons expressed in separate opinions, my Brothers THE CHIEF JUSTICE, DOUGLAS, BRENNAN, STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN concur in this judgment. My Brother [400 U.S. 112, 119] HARLAN, for the reasons stated in his separate opinion, considers that the residency provisions of the statute are unconstitutional. Therefore the residency and absentee balloting provisions of the Act are upheld. </s> Let judgments be entered accordingly. </s> I </s> The Framers of our Constitution provided in Art. I, 2, that members of the House of Representatives should be elected by the people and that the voters for Representatives should have "the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Senators were originally to be elected by the state legislatures, but under the Seventeenth Amendment Senators are also elected by the people, and voters for Senators have the same qualifications as voters for Representatives. In the very beginning the responsibility of the States for setting the qualifications of voters in congressional elections was made subject to the power of Congress to make or alter such regulations if it deemed it advisable to do so. 2 This was done in Art. I, 4, of the Constitution which provides: </s> "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be [400 U.S. 112, 120] prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." (Emphasis supplied.) </s> Moreover, the power of Congress to make election regulations in national elections is augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), where the Court upheld congressional power to regulate party primaries, Mr. Justice Stone speaking [400 U.S. 112, 121] for the Court construed the interrelation of these clauses of the Constitution, stating: </s> "While, in a loose sense, the right to vote for representatives in Congress is sometimes spoken of as a right derived from the states . . . this statement is true only in the sense that the states are authorized by the Constitution, to legislate on the subject as provided by 2 of Art. I, to the extent that Congress has not restricted state action by the exercise of its powers to regulate elections under 4 and its more general power under Article I, 8, clause 18 of the Constitution `to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.'" 313 U.S. at 315. </s> See also Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900). </s> The breadth of power granted to Congress to make or alter election regulations in national elections, including the qualifications of voters, is demonstrated by the fact that the Framers of the Constitution and the state legislatures which ratified it intended to grant to Congress the power to lay out or alter the boundaries of the congressional districts. In the ratifying conventions speakers "argued that the power given Congress in Art. I, 4, was meant to be used to vindicate the people's right to equality of representation in the House," Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 16 (1964), and that Congress would "`most probably . . . lay the state off into districts.'" And in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), no Justice of this Court doubted Congress' power to rearrange the congressional districts according to population; the fight in that case revolved about the judicial power to compel redistricting. [400 U.S. 112, 122] </s> Surely no voter qualification was more important to the Framers than the geographical qualification embodied in the concept of congressional districts. The Framers expected Congress to use this power to eradicate "rotten boroughs," 3 and Congress has in fact used its power to prevent States from electing all Congressmen at large. 4 There can be no doubt that the power to alter congressional district lines is vastly more significant in its effect than the power to permit 18-year-old citizens to go to the polls and vote in all federal elections. </s> Any doubt about the powers of Congress to regulate congressional elections, including the age and other qualifications of the voters, should be dispelled by the opinion of this Court in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). There, Chief Justice Hughes writing for a unanimous Court discussed the scope of congressional power under 4 at some length. He said: </s> "The subject matter is the `times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives.' It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved. . . . </s> "This view is confirmed by the second clause of Article I, section 4, which provides that `the Congress [400 U.S. 112, 123] may at any time by law make or alter such regulations,' with the single exception stated. The phrase `such regulations' plainly refers to regulations of the same general character that the legislature of the State is authorized to prescribe with respect to congressional elections. In exercising this power, the Congress may supplement these state regulations or may substitute its own. . . . It `has a general supervisory power over the whole subject.'" Id., at 366-367. </s> In short, the Constitution allotted to the States the power to make laws regarding national elections, but provided that if Congress became dissatisfied with the state laws, Congress could alter them. 5 A newly created national government could hardly have been expected to survive without the ultimate power to rule itself and to fill its offices under its own laws. The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 now before this Court [400 U.S. 112, 124] evidence dissatisfaction of Congress with the voting age set by many of the States for national elections. I would hold, as have a long line of decisions in this Court, that Congress has ultimate supervisory power over congressional elections. 6 Similarly, it is the prerogative of Congress to oversee the conduct of presidential and vice-presidential elections and to set the qualifications for voters for electors for those offices. It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elections than it has over congressional elections. 7 </s> On the other hand, the Constitution was also intended to preserve to the States the power that even the Colonies had to establish and maintain their own separate and independent governments, except insofar as the Constitution itself commands otherwise. My Brother HARLAN has persuasively demonstrated that the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, [400 U.S. 112, 125] as provided in the Tenth Amendment, 8 the power to regulate elections. My major disagreement with my Brother HARLAN is that, while I agree as to the States' power to regulate the elections of their own officials, I believe, contrary to his view, that Congress has the final authority over federal elections. No function is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and their governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices and the nature of their own machinery for filling local public offices. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904); Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (1875). Moreover, Art. I, 2, 9 is a clear indication that the Framers intended the States to determine the qualifications of their own voters for state offices, because those qualifications were adopted for federal offices unless Congress directs otherwise under Art. I, 4. It is a plain fact of history that the Framers never imagined that the national Congress would set the qualifications for voters in every election from President to local constable or village alderman. It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited extent that the people through constitutional amendments have specifically narrowed the powers of the States. Amendments Fourteen, Fifteen, Nineteen, and Twenty-four, each of which has assumed that the States had general supervisory power [400 U.S. 112, 126] over state elections, are examples of express limitations on the power of the States to govern themselves. And the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to destroy the States' power to govern themselves, making the Nineteenth and Twenty-fourth Amendments superfluous. My Brother BRENNAN's opinion, if carried to its logical conclusion, would, under the guise of insuring equal protection, blot out all state power, leaving the 50 States as little more than impotent figureheads. In interpreting what the Fourteenth Amendment means, the Equal Protection Clause should not be stretched to nullify the States' powers over elections which they had before the Constitution was adopted and which they have retained throughout our history. </s> Of course, the original design of the Founding Fathers was altered by the Civil War Amendments and various other amendments to the Constitution. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments have expressly authorized Congress to "enforce" the limited prohibitions of those amendments by "appropriate legislation." The Solicitor General contends in these cases that Congress can set the age qualifications for voters in state elections under its power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> Above all else, the framers of the Civil War Amendments intended to deny to the States the power to discriminate against persons on account of their race. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 71-72 (1873). While this Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in some instances protects against discriminations [400 U.S. 112, 127] other than those on account of race, 10 see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970); see also Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), and cases cited therein, it cannot be successfully argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to strip the States of their power, carefully preserved in the original Constitution, to govern themselves. The Fourteenth Amendment was surely not intended to make every discrimination between groups of people a constitutional denial of equal protection. Nor was the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to permit Congress to prohibit every discrimination between groups of people. On the other hand, the Civil War Amendments were unquestionably designed to condemn and forbid every distinction, however trifling, on account of race. </s> To fulfill their goal of ending racial discrimination and to prevent direct or indirect state legislative encroachment on the rights guaranteed by the amendments, the Framers gave Congress power to enforce each of the Civil War Amendments. These enforcement powers are broad. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), the Court held that 2 of the Thirteenth [400 U.S. 112, 128] Amendment "clothed `Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.'" In construing 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has stated: </s> "It is not said the judicial power of the general government shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and immunities guaranteed. It is not said that branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions. It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880). (Emphasis added in part.) </s> And in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (BLACK, J., dissenting on other grounds), the Court upheld the literacy test ban of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, under Congress' Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power. </s> As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited. Specifically, there are at least three limitations upon Congress' power to enforce the guarantees of the Civil War Amendments. First, Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions of the Constitution. Second, the power granted to Congress was not intended to strip the States of their power to govern themselves or to convert our national government of enumerated powers into a central government of unrestrained authority over every inch of the whole Nation. Third, Congress may only "enforce" the provisions of the amendments and may do so only by "appropriate legislation." Congress has no power under the enforcement sections to undercut the amendments' guarantees of personal equality and freedom from discrimination, see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n. [400 U.S. 112, 129] 10 (1966), or to undermine those protections of the Bill of Rights which we have held the Fourteenth Amendment made applicable to the States. 11 </s> Of course, we have upheld congressional legislation under the Enforcement Clauses in some cases where Congress has interfered with state regulation of the local electoral process. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, the Court upheld a statute which outlawed New York's requirement of literacy in English as a prerequisite to voting as this requirement was applied to Puerto Ricans with certain educational qualifications. The New York statute overridden by Congress applied to all elections. And in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra (BLACK, J., dissenting on other grounds), the Court upheld the literacy test ban of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. That Act proscribed the use of the literacy test in all elections in certain areas. But division of power between state and national governments, like every provision of the Constitution, was expressly qualified by the Civil War Amendments' ban on racial discrimination. Where Congress attempts to remedy racial discrimination under its enforcement powers, its authority is enhanced by the avowed intention of the framers of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (BLACK, J., dissenting). [400 U.S. 112, 130] </s> In enacting the 18-year-old vote provisions of the Act now before the Court. Congress made no legislative findings that the 21-year-old vote requirement was used by the States to disenfranchise voters on account of race. I seriously doubt that such a finding, if made, could be supported by substantial evidence. Since Congress has attempted to invade an area preserved to the States by the Constitution without a foundation for enforcing the Civil War Amendments' ban on racial discrimination, I would hold that Congress has exceeded its powers in attempting to lower the voting age in state and local elections. On the other hand, where Congress legislates in a domain not exclusively reserved by the Constitution to the States, its enforcement power need not be tied so closely to the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race. </s> To invalidate part of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, however, does not mean that the entire Act must fall or that the constitutional part of the 18-year-old vote provision cannot be given effect. In passing the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Congress recognized that the limits of its power under the Enforcement Clauses were largely undetermined, and therefore included a broad severability provision: </s> "If any provision of this Act or the application of any provision thereof to any person or circumstance is judicially determined to be invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such determination." 84 Stat. 318. </s> In this case, it is the judgment of the Court that Title III, lowering the voting age to 18, is invalid as applied to voters in state and local elections. It is also the judgment of the Court that Title III is valid with respect to national elections. We would fail to follow the [400 U.S. 112, 131] express will of Congress in interpreting its own statute if we refused to sever these two distinct aspects of Title III. Moreover, it is a longstanding canon of statutory construction that legislative enactments are to be enforced to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Constitution, particularly where the valid portion of the statute does not depend upon the invalid part. See, e. g., Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Marsh v. Buck, 313 U.S. 406 (1941). Here, of course, the enforcement of the 18-year-old vote in national elections is in no way dependent upon its enforcement in state and local elections. </s> II </s> In Title I of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 Congress extended the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which ban the use of literacy tests in certain States upon the finding of certain conditions by the United States Attorney General. The Court upheld the provisions of the 1965 Act over my partial dissent in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, and Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969). The constitutionality of Title I is not raised by any of the parties to these suits. 12 </s> In Title II of the Amendments Congress prohibited until August 6, 1975, the use of any test or device resembling a literacy test in any national, state, or local election [400 U.S. 112, 132] in any area of the United States where such test is not already proscribed by the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The State of Arizona maintains that Title II cannot be enforced to the extent that it is inconsistent with Arizona's literacy test requirement, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-101.A.4, 16-101.A.5 (1956). I would hold that the literacy test ban of the 1970 Amendments is constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment and that it supersedes Arizona's conflicting statutes under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. </s> In enacting the literacy test ban of Title II Congress had before it a long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race. Congress could have found that as late as the summer of 1968, the percentage registration of nonwhite voters in seven Southern States was substantially below the percentage registration of white voters. 13 Moreover, Congress had before it striking evidence to show that the provisions of the 1965 Act had had in the span of four years a remarkable impact on minority group voter registration. 14 Congress also had evidence to show that voter registration in areas with large Spanish-American populations was consistently below the state and national averages. In Arizona, for example, only two counties out of eight with Spanish surname populations in excess of 15% showed a voter registration equal to the state-wide average. 15 Arizona also has a serious problem of deficient voter registration among Indians. Congressional [400 U.S. 112, 133] concern over the use of a literacy test to disfranchise Puerto Ricans in New York State is already a matter of record in this Court. Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra. And as to the Nation as a whole, Congress had before it statistics which demonstrate that voter registration and voter participation are consistently greater in States without literacy tests. 16 </s> Congress also had before it this country's history of discriminatory educational opportunities in both the North and the South. The children who were denied an equivalent education by the "separate but equal" rule of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), are now old enough to vote. There is substantial, if not overwhelming, evidence from which Congress could have concluded that it is a denial of equal protection to condition the political participation of children educated in a dual school system upon their educational achievement. Moreover, the history of this legislation suggests that concern with educational inequality was perhaps uppermost in the minds of the congressmen who sponsored the Act. The hearings are filled with references to educational inequality. Faced with this and other evidence that literacy tests reduce voter participation in a discriminatory manner not only in the South but throughout the Nation, Congress was supported by substantial evidence in concluding that a nationwide ban on literacy tests was appropriate to enforce the Civil War amendments. </s> Finally, there is yet another reason for upholding the literacy test provisions of this Act. In imposing a nationwide ban on literacy tests, Congress has recognized a national problem for what it is - a serious national dilemma that touches every corner of our land. [400 U.S. 112, 134] In this legislation Congress has recognized that discrimination on account of color and racial origin is not confined to the South, but exists in various parts of the country. Congress has decided that the way to solve the problems of racial discrimination is to deal with nationwide discrimination with nationwide legislation. Compare South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, and Gaston County v. United States, supra. </s> III </s> In Title II of the Voting Rights Act Amendments Congress also provided that in presidential and vice-presidential elections, no voter could be denied his right to cast a ballot because he had not lived in the jurisdiction long enough to meet its residency requirements. Furthermore, Congress provided uniform national rules for absentee voting in presidential and vice-presidential elections. In enacting these regulations Congress was attempting to insure a fully effective voice to all citizens in national elections. What I said in Part I of this opinion applies with equal force here. Acting under its broad authority to create and maintain a national government, Congress unquestionably has power under the Constitution to regulate federal elections. The Framers of our Constitution were vitally concerned with setting up a national government that could survive. Essential to the survival and to the growth of our national government is its power to fill its elective offices and to insure that the officials who fill those offices are as responsive as possible to the will of the people whom they represent. </s> IV </s> Our judgments today give the Federal Government the power the Framers conferred upon it, that is, the final control of the elections of its own officers. Our judgments also save for the States the power to control state and [400 U.S. 112, 135] local elections which the Constitution originally reserved to them and which no subsequent amendment has taken from them. 17 The generalities of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were not designed or adopted to render the States impotent to set voter qualifications in elections for their own local officials and agents in the absence of some specific constitutional limitations. </s> [Footnote * [NOTE: A numbered category that is used for MR. JUSTICE BLACK's opinion is not repeated below where the opinion being headnoted does not concur or concur in the result with respect to the point involved in that category.] </s> [Footnote ** See note, supra, at 113. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., Oregon and Texas, respectively, invoke the original jurisdiction of this Court to sue the United States Attorney General seeking an injunction against the enforcement of Title III (18-year-old vote) of the Act. In No. 46, Orig., the United States invokes our original jurisdiction seeking to enjoin Arizona from enforcing its laws to the extent that they conflict with the Act, and directing the officials of Arizona to comply with the provisions of Title II (nationwide literacy test ban), 201, 84 Stat. 315, and Title III (18-year-old vote), 301, 302, 84 Stat. 318, of the Act. In No. 47, Orig., the United States invokes our original jurisdiction seeking to enjoin Idaho from enforcing its laws to the extent that they conflict with Title II (abolition of residency requirements in presidential and vice-presidential elections), 202, 84 Stat. 316, and Title III (18-year-old vote) of the Act. No question has been raised concerning the standing of the parties or the jurisdiction of this Court. </s> [Footnote 2 Article I, 4, was a compromise between those delegates to the Constitutional Convention who wanted the States to have final authority over the election of all state and federal officers and those who wanted Congress to make laws governing national elections, 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 280-292 (1st ed. 1833). The contemporary interpretation of this compromise reveals that those who favored national authority over national elections prevailed. Six States included in their resolutions of ratification the recommendation that a constitutional amendment be adopted to curtail the power of the Federal Government to regulate national elections. Such an amendment was never adopted. A majority of the delegates to the Massachusetts ratifying convention [400 U.S. 112, 120] must have assumed that Art. I, 4, gave very broad powers to Congress. Otherwise that convention would not have recommended an amendment providing: "That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them by the 4th section of the 1st article, but in cases where a state shall neglect or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal representation in Congress, agreeably to the Constitution." 2 J. Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 177 (1876). The speech of Mr. Cabot, one delegate to the Massachusetts convention, who argued that Art. I, 4, was "to be as highly prized as any in the Constitution," expressed a view of the breadth of that section which must have been shared by most of his colleagues: "[I]f the state legislatures are suffered to regulate conclusively the elections of the democratic branch, they may . . . finally annihilate that control of the general government, which the people ought always to have . . . ." Id., at 26. And Cabot was supported by Mr. Parsons, who added: "They might make an unequal and partial division of the states into districts for the election of representatives, or they might even disqualify one third of the electors. Without these powers in Congress, the people can have no remedy; but the 4th section provides a remedy, a controlling power in a legislature, composed of senators and representatives of twelve states, without the influence of our commotions and factions, who will hear impartially, and preserve and restore to the people their equal and sacred rights of election." Id., at 27. </s> [Footnote 3 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 14 -16 (1964). </s> [Footnote 4 See, e. g., Act of Aug. 8, 1911, 37 Stat. 13. </s> [Footnote 5 My Brother STEWART has cited the debates of the Constitutional Convention to show that Ellsworth, Mason, Madison, and Franklin successfully opposed granting Congress the power to regulate federal elections, including the qualifications of voters, in the original Constitution. I read the history of our Constitution differently. Mr. Madison, for example, explained Art. I, 4, to the Virginia ratifying convention as follows: "[I]t was thought that the regulation of time, place, and manner, of electing the representatives, should be uniform throughout the continent. Some States might regulate the elections on the principles of equality, and others might regulate them otherwise. This diversity would be obviously unjust. . . . Should the people of any state by any means be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the general government." 3 J. Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 367 (1876). And Mr. Mason, who was supposedly successful in opposing a broad grant of power to Congress to regulate federal elections, still found it necessary to support an unsuccessful Virginia proposal to curb the power of Congress under Art. I, 4. Id., at 403. </s> [Footnote 6 See, e. g., Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). </s> [Footnote 7 With reference to the selection of the President and Vice President, Art. II, 1, provides: "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress . . . ." But this Court in Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), upheld the power of Congress to regulate certain aspects of elections for presidential and vice-presidential electors, specifically rejecting a construction of Art. II, 1, that would have curtailed the power of Congress to regulate such elections. Finally, and most important, inherent in the very concept of a supreme national government with national officers is a residual power in Congress to insure that those officers represent their national constituency as responsively as possible. This power arises from the nature of our constitutional system of government and from the Necessary and Proper Clause. </s> [Footnote 8 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const., Amdt. X. </s> [Footnote 9 "The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." </s> [Footnote 10 My Brother BRENNAN relies upon Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); and Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). These typical equal protection cases in which I joined are not relevant or material to our decision in the cases before us. The establishment of voter age qualifications is a matter of legislative judgment which cannot be properly decided under the Equal Protection Clause. The crucial question here is not who is denied equal protection, but, rather, which political body, state or federal, is empowered to fix the minimum age of voters. The Framers intended the States to make the voting age decision in all elections with the provision that Congress could override state judgments concerning the qualifications of voters in federal elections. </s> [Footnote 11 See: the First Amendment, e. g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); the Fourth Amendment, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); the Fifth Amendment, Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); the Sixth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); and the Eighth Amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). </s> [Footnote 12 Yuma County, Arizona, is presently subject to the literacy-test ban of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pursuant to a determination of the Attorney General under 4 (a) of the 1965 Act. I do not understand Arizona to contest the application of the 1965 Act or its extension to that county. Arizona "does not question" Congress' authority to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments "when Congress possesses a `special legislative competence'"; and cites South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), with approval. Answer and Brief for Arizona, No. 46, Orig., O. T. 1970. </s> [Footnote 13 Hearings on H. R. 4249, H. R. 5538, and Similar Proposals before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. 3, p. 14 (1969). </s> [Footnote 14 Id., at 93. </s> [Footnote 15 Hearings on S. 818, S. 2456, S. 2507, and Title IV of S. 2029 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 406 (1969-1970). </s> [Footnote 16 Id., at 401. </s> [Footnote 17 That these views are not novel is demonstrated by Mr. Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, vol. 2, pp. 284-285 (1st ed. 1833): "There is, too, in the nature of such a provision [Art. I, 4], something incongruous, if not absurd. What would be said of a clause introduced into the national constitution to regulate the state elections of the members of the state legislatures? It would be deemed a most unwarrantable transfer of power, indicating a premeditated design to destroy the state governments. It would be deemed so flagrant a violation of principle, as to require no comment. It would be said, and justly, that the state governments ought to possess the power of self-existence and self-organization, independent of the pleasure of the national government. Why does not the same reasoning apply to the national government? What reason is there to suppose, that the state governments will be more true to the Union, than the national government will be to the state governments?" (Emphasis added.) (Footnote omitted.) </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS. </s> I dissent from the judgments of the Court insofar as they declare 302 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 Stat. 318, unconstitutional as applied to state elections and concur in the judgments as they affect federal elections, but for different reasons. I rely on the Equal Protection Clause and on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> I </s> The grant of the franchise to 18-year-olds by Congress is in my view valid across the board. [400 U.S. 112, 136] </s> I suppose that in 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified giving women the right to vote, it was assumed by most constitutional experts that there was no relief by way of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, the Court held in the 1874 Term that a State could constitutionally restrict the franchise to men. While the Fourteenth Amendment was relied upon, the thrust of the opinion was directed at the Privileges and Immunities Clause with a subsidiary reference to the Due Process Clause. It was much later, indeed not until the 1961 Term - nearly a century after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted - that discrimination against voters on grounds other than race was struck down. </s> The first case in which this Court struck down a statute under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 , decided in the 1879 Term. 1 In the 1961 Term we squarely held that the manner of apportionment of members of a state legislature raised a justiciable question under the Equal Protection Clause, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 . That case was followed by numerous others, e. g.: that one person could not be given twice or 10 times the voting power of another person in a statewide election merely because he lived in a rural area or [400 U.S. 112, 137] in the smallest rural county; 2 that the principle of equality applied to both House of a bicameral legislature; 3 that political parties receive protection under the Equal Protection Clause just as voters do. 4 </s> The reapportionment cases, however, are not quite in point here, though they are the target of my Brother HARLAN'S dissent. His painstaking review of the history of the Equal Protection Clause leads him to conclude that "political" rights are not protected though "civil" rights are protected. The problem of what questions are "political" has been a recurring issue in this Court from the beginning, and we recently reviewed them all in Baker v. Carr, supra, and in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 . Baker v. Carr was a reapportionment case and Powell v. McCormack involved the exclusion from the House of Representatives of a Congressman. The issue of "political" question versus "justiciable" question was argued pro and con in those cases; and my Brother HARLAN stated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 330 et seq., and on related occasions (Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 382 ; Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 20 ; Reynolds v. [400 U.S. 112, 138] Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 ) his views on the constitutional dimensions of the "political" question in the setting of the reapportionment problem. </s> Those cases involved the question whether legislatures must be so structured as to reflect with approximate equality the voice of every voter. The ultimate question was whether, absent a proper apportionment by the legislature, a federal court could itself make an apportionment. That kind of problem raised issues irrelevant here. Reapportionment, as our experience shows, presented a tangle of partisan politics in which geography, economics, urban life, rural constituencies, and numerous other nonlegal factors play varying roles. The competency of courts to deal with them was challenged. Yet we held the issues were justiciable. None of those so-called "political" questions are involved here. </s> This case, so far as equal protection is concerned, is no whit different from a controversy over a state law that disqualifies women from certain types of employment, Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 , or that imposes a heavier punishment on one class of offender than on another whose crime is not intrinsically different. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 . The right to vote is, of course, different in one respect from the other rights in the economic, social, or political field which, as indicated in the Appendix to this opinion, are under the Equal Protection Clause. The right to vote is a civil right deeply embedded in the Constitution. Article I, 2, provides that the House is composed of members "chosen . . . by the People" and the electors "shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." The Seventeenth Amendment states that Senators shall be "elected by the people." The Fifteenth Amendment speaks of the "right of citizens of the United States to vote" - not only in federal [400 U.S. 112, 139] but in state elections. The Court in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 , stated: </s> "This new constitutional right was mainly designed for citizens of African descent. The principle, however, that the protection of the exercise of this right is within the power of Congress, is as necessary to the right of other citizens to vote as to the colored citizen, and to the right to vote in general as to the right to be protected against discrimination." </s> It was in that tradition that we said in Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at 555, "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government." </s> This "right to choose, secured by the Constitution," United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 , is a civil right of the highest order. Voting concerns "political" matters; but the right is not "political" in the constitutional sense. Interference with it has given rise to a long and consistent line of decisions by the Court; and the claim has always been upheld as justiciable. 5 Whatever distinction may have been made, following the Civil War, between "civil" and "political" rights, has passed into history. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 , we stated: "Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do change." That statement is in harmony with my view of the Fourteenth Amendment, as expressed by my Brother BRENNAN: "We must therefore conclude that its framers understood their Amendment to be a broadly worded injunction capable of being interpreted [400 U.S. 112, 140] by future generations in accordance with the vision and needs of those generations." Post, at 278. Hence the history of the Fourteenth Amendment tendered by my Brother HARLAN is irrelevant to the present problem. </s> Since the right is civil and not "political," it is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which in turn, by 5 of that Amendment, can be "enforced" by Congress. </s> In Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 , we held that Texas could not bar a person, otherwise qualified, from voting merely because he was a member of the armed services. Occupation, we held, when used to bar a person from voting, was that invidious discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause condemns. In Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 , we held that a State could not deny the vote to residents of a federal enclave when it treated them as residents for many other purposes. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S., at 666 , we held a State could not in harmony with the Equal Protection Clause keep a person from voting in state elections because of "the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee." In Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 , we held that a person could not be barred from voting in school board elections merely because he was a bachelor. So far as the Equal Protection Clause was concerned, we said that the line between those qualified to vote and those not qualified turns on whether those excluded have "a distinct and direct interest in the school meeting decisions." Id., at 632. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 , we held that a state law which gave only "property taxpayers" the right to vote on the issuance of revenue bonds of a municipal utility system violated equal protection as "the benefits and burdens of the bond issue fall indiscriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner alike." Id., at 705. And only on June 23, 1970, we held in Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 , that [400 U.S. 112, 141] it violates equal protection to restrict those who may vote on general obligation bonds to real property taxpayers. We looked to see if there was any "compelling state interest" in the voting restrictions. We held that "nonproperty owners" are not "substantially less interested in the issuance of these securities than are property owners," id., at 212, and that presumptively "when all citizens are affected in important ways by a governmental decision subject to a referendum, the Constitution does not permit weighted voting or the exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the franchise." 6 Id., at 209. And as recently as November 9, 1970, we summarily affirmed a district court decision (310 F. Supp. 1172) on the basis of Kolodziejski. Parish School Board of St. Charles v. Stewart, post, p. 884, where Louisiana gave a vote on municipal bond issues only to "property taxpayers." </s> The powers granted Congress by 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to "enforce" the Equal Protection Clause are "the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 18." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 . As we stated in that case, "Correctly viewed, 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 651. </s> Congress might well conclude that a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 was needed in the interest of equal protection. The Act itself brands the denial of [400 U.S. 112, 142] the franchise to 18-year-olds as "a particularly unfair treatment of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed" on them. 301 (a) (1), Voting Rights Act, 84 Stat. 318. The fact that only males are drafted while the vote extends to females as well is not relevant, for the female component of these families or prospective families is also caught up in war and hit hard by it. Congress might well believe that men and women alike should share the fateful decision. </s> It is said, why draw the line at 18? Why not 17? Congress can draw lines and I see no reason why it cannot conclude that 18-year-olds have that degree of maturity which entitles them to the franchise. They are "generally considered by American law to be mature enough to contract, to marry, to drive an automobile, to own a gun, and to be responsible for criminal behavior as an adult." 7 Moreover, we are advised that under state laws, mandatory school attendance does not, as a matter of practice, extend beyond the age of 18. On any of these items the States, of course, have leeway to raise or lower the age requirements. But voting is "a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society," Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 -562. Where "fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 . There we were speaking of state restrictions on those rights. Here we are dealing with the right of Congress to "enforce" the principles of equality enshrined in the Fourteenth Amendment. The right to "enforce" granted by 5 of that Amendment is, as noted, parallel with the Necessary and Proper Clause whose reach Chief Justice Marshall described in McCulloch v. [400 U.S. 112, 143] Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." </s> Equality of voting by all who are deemed mature enough to vote is certainly consistent "with the letter and spirit of the constitution." Much is made of the fact that Art. I, 4, of the Constitution 8 gave Congress only the power to regulate the "Manner of holding Elections," not the power to fix qualifications for voting in elections. But the Civil War Amendments - the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth - made vast inroads on the power of the States. Equal protection became a standard for state action and Congress was given authority to "enforce" it. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 647 . The manner of enforcement involves discretion; but that discretion is largely entrusted to the Congress, not to the courts. If racial discrimination were the only concern of the Equal Protection Clause, then across-the-board voting regulations set by the States would be of no concern to Congress. But it is much too late in history to make that claim, as the cases listed in the Appendix to this opinion show. Moreover, election inequalities created by state laws and based on factors other than race may violate the Equal Protection Clause, as we have held over and over again. The reach of 5 to "enforce" equal protection by eliminating election inequalities would seem quite broad. Certainly there is [400 U.S. 112, 144] not a word of limitation in 5 which would restrict its applicability to matters of race alone. And if, as stated in McCulloch v. Maryland, the measure of the power of Congress is whether the remedy is consistent "with the letter and spirit of the constitution," we should have no difficulty here. We said in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 : "The conception of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing - one person, one vote." </s> It is a reasoned judgment that those who have such a large "stake" in modern elections as 18-year-olds, whether in times of war or peace, should have political equality. As was made plain in the dissent in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 566 (whose reasoning was approved in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 ), the Equal Protection Clause does service to protect the right to vote in federal as well as in state elections. </s> I would sustain the choice which Congress has made. </s> II </s> I likewise find the objections that Arizona and Idaho make to the literacy and residence requirements of the 1970 Act to be insubstantial. </s> Literacy. We held in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 , that a State could apply a literacy test in selecting qualified voters provided the test is not "discriminatory" and does not contravene "any restriction that Congress, acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, has imposed." Id., at 51. The question in these cases is whether Congress has the power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to bar literacy tests in all federal, state, or local elections. </s> Section 201 bars a State from denying the right to vote in any federal, state, or local election because of "any [400 U.S. 112, 145] test or device" which is defined, inter alia, to include literacy. 9 We traveled most of the distance needed to sustain this Act in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , where we upheld the constitutionality of an earlier Act which prohibited the application of English literacy tests to persons educated in Puerto Rico. The power of Congress in 5 to "enforce" the Equal Protection Clause was sufficiently broad, we held, to enable it to abolish voting requirements which might pass muster under the Equal Protection Clause, absent an Act of Congress. Id., at 648-651. </s> The question, we said, was whether the Act of Congress was "appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause": </s> "It was well within congressional authority to say that this need of the Puerto Rican minority for the vote warranted federal intrusion upon any state interests served by the English literacy requirement. It was for Congress, as the branch that made this judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations - the risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in governmental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state restriction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and the nature and significance of the state interests that would be affected by the nullification of the English literacy requirement as applied to residents who have successfully completed [400 U.S. 112, 146] the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school. It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did." Id., at 653. </s> We also held that the Act might be sustained as an attack on the English language test as a device to discriminate. Id., at 654. And we went on to say that Congress might have concluded that "as a means of furthering the intelligent exercise of the franchise, an ability to read or understand Spanish is as effective as ability to read English for those to whom Spanish-language newspapers and Spanish-language radio and television programs are available to inform them of election issues and governmental affairs." Id., at 655. </s> We took a further step toward sustaining the present type of law in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 . That decision involved a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which suspended the use of any "test or device," including literacy, as a prerequisite to registration in a State which was found by the Attorney General and the Director of the Census to have used it in any election on November 1, 1964, and in which less than 50% of the residents of voting age were registered or had voted. 10 Gaston County, North Carolina, was so classified and its literacy test was thereupon suspended. In a suit to remove the ban we sustained it. We noted that Congress had concluded that "the County deprived its black residents of equal educational opportunities, which in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test." Id., at 291. Congress, it was argued, should have employed a formula based on educational disparities between the races or one based on [400 U.S. 112, 147] literacy rates. Id., at 292. But the choice of appropriate remedies is for Congress and the range of available ones is wide. It was not a defect in the formula that some literate Negroes would be turned out by Negro schools. </s> "It is only reasonable to infer that among black children compelled to endure a segregated and inferior education, fewer will achieve any given degree of literacy than will their better-educated white contemporaries. And on the Government's showing, it was certainly proper to infer that Gaston County's inferior Negro schools provided many of its Negro residents with a subliterate education, and gave many others little inducement to enter or remain in school." Id., at 295-296. </s> By like reasoning Congress in the present legislation need not make findings as to the incidence of literacy. It can rely on the fact that most States do not have literacy tests; that the tests have been used at times as a discriminatory weapon against some minorities, not only Negroes but Americans of Mexican ancestry, and American Indians; that radio and television have made it possible for a person to be well informed even though he may not be able to read and write. We know from the legislative history that these and other desiderata influenced Congress in the choice it made in the present legislation; and we certainly cannot say that the means used were inappropriate. </s> Residence. The residency requirements of 202 relate only to elections for President and Vice President. Section 202 abolishes durational residency 11 and provides [400 U.S. 112, 148] for absentee voting provided that registration may be required 30 days prior to the election. The effect of 202 is to reduce all state durational residency requirements to 30 days. </s> In presidential elections no parochial interests of the State, county, or city are involved. Congress found that a durational residency requirement "in some instances has the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens the right to vote." 202 (a) (4). It found in 202 (a) (3) that a durational residency requirement denies citizens their privileges and immunities. 12 </s> The Seventeenth Amendment states that Senators shall be "elected by the people." Article I, 2, provides [400 U.S. 112, 149] that the House shall be chosen "by the People of the several States." The right to vote for national officers is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 ; In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 534 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 ; Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 . 13 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 150] </s> The Fourteenth Amendment provides that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Durational residency laws of the States had such effect, says Congress. The "choice of means" to protect such a privilege presents "a question primarily addressed to the judgment of Congress." Burroughs v. United States, supra, at 547. The relevance of the means which Congress adopts to the condition sought to be remedied, the degree of their necessity, and the extent of their efficacy are all matters for Congress. Id., at 548. </s> The judgment which Congress has made respecting the ban of durational residency in presidential elections is plainly a permissible one in its efforts under 5 to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF DOUGLAS, J. </s> Cases which have struck down state statutes under the Equal Protection Clause other than statutes which discriminate on the basis of race. </s> STATUTES WHICH DISCRIMINATED AGAINST CERTAIN BUSINESSES </s> Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 ; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U.S. 56 (railroad must pay attorney fees if it loses suit, but other businesses need not). Kentucky Finance Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exchange, 262 U.S. 544 ; Power Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 (burdens placed upon out-of-state corporations in litigation). </s> STATUTES WHICH FAVORED CERTAIN BUSINESSES </s> Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (exemption from state antitrust law for agricultural goods); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553 (act exempting certain motor vehicles from insurance requirements); Mayflower [400 U.S. 112, 151] Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (act allowing certain milk dealers to sell at lower than the regulated price); Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (statute permitting mutual, but not stock, insurance companies to act through salaried representatives), and Morey v. Dowd, 354 U.S. 457 (American Express exempted from licensing requirements applied to "currency exchanges"). </s> TAXING STATUTES STRUCK DOWN </s> Concordia Ins. Co. v. Illinois, 292 U.S. 535 ; Iowa-Des Moines Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 ; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board, 284 U.S. 23 ; Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 389 ; Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 ; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 ; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 ; Sioux City Bridge v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 ; F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 ; and Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400 . </s> TREATMENT OF CONVICTED CRIMINALS </s> Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (statute requiring unsuccessful criminal appellants who were in jail to pay cost of trial transcript); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (statute denying convict a sanity hearing before a jury prior to civil commitment); and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (sterilization of some convicts). </s> INDIGENTS </s> Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (Rule of Criminal Procedure which did not provide counsel for appeal to indigents); and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (denial of welfare benefits based on residency requirement). </s> LEGITIMACY </s> Glona v. American Guarantee Co., 391 U.S. 73 (mother denied right to sue for wrongful death of illegitimate [400 U.S. 112, 152] child); and Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (illegitimate children denied recovery for wrongful death of mother). </s> ALIENS </s> Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (statute limiting the number of aliens that could be employed to 20%); and Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (denial of fishing rights to aliens ineligible for citizenship). </s> [Footnote 1 Strauder was tried for murder. He had sought removal to federal courts on the ground that "by virtue of the laws of the State of West Virginia no colored man was eligible to be a member of the grand jury or to serve on a petite jury in the State." Id., at 304. He was convicted of murder and the West Virginia Supreme Court affirmed. This Court held the West Virginia statute limiting jury duty to whites only unconstitutional: "We do not say that within the limits from which it is not excluded by the amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifications of its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations. . . . [The aim of the Fourteenth Amendment] was against discrimination because of race or color." 100 U.S., at 310 . </s> [Footnote 2 Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 ; Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 ; Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 ; Kilgarlin v. Hill, 386 U.S. 120 ; Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 ; Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 ; Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 . </s> [Footnote 3 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 ; WMCA v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633 ; Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695 . </s> [Footnote 4 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 . We also held in federal elections that the command of Art. I, 2, of the Constitution that representatives be chosen "by the People of the several States" means that "as nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's," Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 -8, and that that meant "vote-diluting discrimination" could not be accomplished "through the device of districts containing widely varied numbers of inhabitants." Id., at 8; Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 ; Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526 ; Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 . </s> [Footnote 5 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 ; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 ; Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 ; United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 ; Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 ; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 ; United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 . </s> [Footnote 6 We noted that general obligation bonds may be satisfied not from real property taxes but from revenues from other local taxes paid by nonowners of property as well as those who own realty. Moreover, we noted that property taxes paid initially by property owners are often passed on to tenants or customers. 399 U.S., at 209 -211. </s> [Footnote 7 Engdahl, Constitutionality of the Voting Age Statute, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1970). </s> [Footnote 8 Article I, 4, provides: "1. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators. "2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day." </s> [Footnote 9 Section 201 (b) defines "test or device" as "any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class." 84 Stat. 315. </s> [Footnote 10 The constitutionality of that procedure has been sustained in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 . </s> [Footnote 11 This Court upheld durational residency requirements as applied in presidential and vice-presidential elections absent an Act of Congress. See Drueding v. Devlin, 234 F. Supp. 721 (Md. 1964), aff'd, 380 U.S. 125 . Subsequently we vacated as moot a case presenting the same question. Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45 . The district courts have been faced with the issue of durational residency requirements as they would be applied to congressional elections. Two have concluded the requirement is constitutional. Howe v. Brown, 319 F. Supp. 862 (ND Ohio 1970); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (Ariz. 1970). Additionally, one other court has refused a preliminary injunction in a case presenting the issue. Piliavin v. Hoel, 320 F. Supp. 66 (WD Wis. 1970). Some district courts, however, believe that Drueding cannot stand (absent an Act of Congress) after Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 ; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 ; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 , and Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 . Accordingly they have held durational residency requirements for congressional elections (and by implication presidential elections) violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (Mass. 1970); Blumstein v. Ellington, ___ F. Supp. ___ (MD Tenn. 1970); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (MD Ala. 1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (ED Va. 1970). In none of these cases was an Act of Congress involved. </s> [Footnote 12 Article IV, 2, of the Constitution provides: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." The Fourteenth Amendment provides in 1 that: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." </s> [Footnote 13 The cases relied on by my Brother HARLAN, post, at 214, are not to the contrary. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 , states: "The right to become a candidate for state office, like the right to vote for the election of state officers . . . is a right or privilege of state citizenship." (Emphasis added.) Arguably Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, is to the contrary, but to the extent its dicta indicated otherwise, it was limited in Ex parte Yarbrough. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 , overruled by Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 , involved a poll tax applied in both federal and state elections; it erroneously cited Yarbrough for the proposition voting is not a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 , involved durational residency requirements, but expressly reserved the question of their application to presidential and vice-presidential elections. Our holdings concerning privileges and immunities of national citizenship were analyzed less than five years ago by my Brother HARLAN. After referring to Ex parte Yarbrough, and United States v. Classic, he stated that those cases "are essentially concerned with the vindication of important relationships with the Federal Government - voting in federal elections, involvement in federal law enforcement, communicating with the Federal Government." United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 772 (separate opinion) (emphasis added). Contrary to the suggestion of my Brother HARLAN, post, at 213, we need not rely on the power of Congress to declare the meaning of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This court had determined that voting for national officers is a privilege and immunity of national citizenship. No congressional declaration was necessary. Congressional power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is, as stated, buttressed by congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Thus even if the durational residency requirements do not violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Congress can determine that it is necessary and proper to abolish them in national elections to effectuate and further the purpose of 1 as it has been declared by this Court. </s> MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> From the standpoint of this Court's decisions during an era of judicial constitutional revision in the field of the suffrage, ushered in eight years ago by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), I would find it difficult not to sustain all three aspects of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, here challenged. From the standpoint of the bedrock of the constitutional structure of this Nation, these cases bring us to a crossroad that is marked with a formidable "Stop" sign. That sign compels us to pause before we allow those decisions to carry us to the point of sanctioning Congress' decision to alter state-determined voter qualifications by simple legislation, and to consider whether sound doctrine does not in truth require us to hold that one or more of the changes which Congress has thus sought to make can be accomplished only by constitutional amendment. </s> The four cases require determination of the validity of the Voting Rights Act Amendments in three respects. In Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., Oregon and Texas have sought to enjoin the enforcement of 302 of the Act as applied to lower the voting age in those States from 21 to 18. 1 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 153] </s> In Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., the United States seeks a declaration of the validity of the Act and an injunction requiring Arizona and Idaho to conform their laws to it. The Act would lower the voting age in each State from 21 to 18. It would suspend until August 6, 1975, the Arizona literacy test, which requires that applicants for registration be able to read the United States Constitution in English and write their names. It would require Idaho to make several changes in its laws governing residency, registration, and absentee voting in presidential elections. Among the more substantial changes, Idaho's present 60-day state residency requirement will in effect be lowered to 30-days; its 30-day county residency requirement for intrastate migrants will be abolished; Idaho will have to permit voting by citizens of other States formerly domiciled in Idaho who emigrated too recently to register in their new homes; and it must permit absentee registration and voting by persons who have lived in Idaho for less than six months. The relevant provisions of the Act and of the constitutions and laws of the four States are set out in an Appendix to this opinion. </s> Each of the States contests the power of Congress to enact the provisions of the Act involved in its suit. 2 The Government places primary reliance on the power of Congress under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the provisions of that Amendment by appropriate [400 U.S. 112, 154] legislation. For reasons to follow, I am of the opinion that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit and therefore that it does not authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, in either state or federal elections. I find no other source of congressional power to lower the voting age as fixed by state laws, or to alter state laws on residency, registration, and absentee voting, with respect to either state or federal elections. The suspension of Arizona's literacy requirement, however, can be deemed an appropriate means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment, and I would sustain it on that basis. </s> I </s> It is fitting to begin with a quotation from one of the leading members of the 39th Congress, which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the States in 1866: </s> "Every Constitution embodies the principles of its framers. It is a transcript of their minds. If its meaning in any place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem to have no fixed signification, we cannot err if we turn to the framers; and their authority increases in proportion to the evidence which they have left on the question." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 677 (1866) (Sen. Sumner). </s> Believing this view to be undoubtedly sound, I turn to the circumstances in which the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted for enlightenment on the intended reach of its provisions. This, for me, necessary undertaking has unavoidably led to an opinion of more than ordinary length. Except for those who are willing to close their eyes to constitutional history in making constitutional interpretations or who read such history with a preconceived determination to attain a particular constitutional [400 U.S. 112, 155] goal, I think that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear beyond any reasonable doubt that no part of the legislation now under review can be upheld as a legitimate exercise of congressional power under that Amendment. </s> A. Historical Setting 3 </s> The point of departure for considering the purpose and effect of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to the suffrage should be, I thin, the pre-existing provisions of the Constitution. Article I, 2, provided that in determining the number of Representatives to which a State was entitled, only three-fifths of the slave population should be counted. 4 The section also provided that the qualifications of voters for such Representatives should be the same as those established by the States for electors of the most numerous branch of their respective legislatures. Article I, 4, provided that, subject to congressional veto, the States might prescribe the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Representatives. Article II, 1, provided that the States might direct the manner of choosing electors for President and Vice President, except that Congress might fix a uniform time for the choice. 5 Nothing in the original [400 U.S. 112, 156] Constitution controlled the way States might allocate their political power except for the guarantee of a Republican Form of Government, which appears in Art. IV, 4. 6 No relevant changes in the constitutional structure were made until after the Civil War. </s> At the close of that war, there were some four million freed slaves in the South, none of whom were permitted to vote. The white population of the Confederacy had been overwhelmingly sympathetic with the rebellion. Since there was only a comparative handful of persons in these States who were neither former slaves nor Confederate sympathizers, the place where the political power should be lodged was a most vexing question. In a series of proclamations in the summer of 1865, President Andrew Johnson had laid the groundwork for the States to be controlled by the white populations which had held power before the war, eliminating only the leading rebels and those unwilling to sign a loyalty oath. 7 The Radicals, on the other hand, were ardently in favor of Negro suffrage as essential to prevent resurgent rebellion, requisite to protect the freedmen, and necessary to ensure continued Radical control of the government. This ardor cooled as it ran into northern racial prejudice. At that time, only six States - Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York - permitted Negroes to vote, and New York imposed special property and residency requirements on Negro voters. 8 In referenda late that year, enfranchising proposals [400 U.S. 112, 157] were roundly beaten in Connecticut, Wisconsin, Minnesota, the Territory of Colorado, and the District of Columbia. Gillette, supra, n. 3, at 25-26. Such popular rebuffs led the Radicals to pull in their horns and hope for a protracted process of reconstruction during which the North could be educated to the advisability of Negro suffrage, at least for the South. In the meantime, of course, it would be essential to bar southern representation in Congress lest a combination of southerners and Democrats obtain control of the government and frustrate Radical goals. </s> The problem of congressional representation was acute. With the freeing of the slaves, the Three-Fifths Compromise ceased to have any effect. While predictions of the precise effect of the change varied with the person doing the calculating, the consensus was that the South would be entitled to at least 15 new members of Congress, and, of course, a like number of new presidential electors. The Radicals had other rallying cries which they kept before the public in the summer of 1865, but one author gives this description of the mood as Congress convened: 9 </s> "Of all the movements influencing the Fourteenth Amendment which developed prior to the first session of the Thirty-ninth Congress, that for Negro suffrage was the most outstanding. The volume of private and public comment indicates that it was viewed as an issue of prime importance. The cry for a changed basis of representation was, in reality, subsidiary to this, and was meant by Radicals to secure in another way what Negro suffrage might accomplish for them: removal of the danger of Democratic dominance as a consequence of Southern restoration. The danger of possible repudiation of the national obligations, and assumption of the rebel [400 U.S. 112, 158] debt, was invariably presented to show the need for Negro suffrage or a new basis of representation. Sentiment for disqualification of ex-Confederates, though a natural growth, well suited such purposes. The movement to guarantee civil rights, sponsored originally by the more conservative Republicans, received emphasis from Radicals only when state elections indicated that suffrage would not serve as a party platform." </s> When Congress met, the Radicals, led by Thaddeus Stevens, were successful in obtaining agreement for a Joint Committee on Reconstruction, composed of 15 members, to "inquire into the condition of the States which formed the so-called confederate States of America, and report whether they, or any of them, are entitled to be represented in either House of Congress . . . ." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 30, 46 (1865) (hereafter Globe). </s> All papers relating to representation of the Southern States were to be referred to the Committee of Fifteen without debate. The result, which many had not foreseen, was to assert congressional control over Reconstruction and at the same time to put the congressional power in the hands of a largely Radical secret committee. </s> The Joint Committee began work with the beginning of 1866, and in due course reported a joint resolution, H. R. 51, to amend the Constitution. The proposal would have based representation and direct taxes on population, with a proviso that </s> "whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation." Globe 351. </s> The result, if the Southern States did not provide for Negro suffrage, would be a decrease in southern representation [400 U.S. 112, 159] in Congress and the electoral college by some 24 seats from their pre-war position instead of an increase of 15. The House, although somewhat balky, approved the measure after lengthy debate. Globe 538. The Senate proved more intractable. An odd combination of Democrats, moderate Republicans, and extreme Radicals combined to defeat the measure, with the Radicals basing their opposition largely on the fear that the proviso would be read to authorize racial voter qualifications and thus prevent Congress from enfranchising the freedmen under powers assertedly granted by other clauses of the Constitution. See, e. g., Globe 673-687 (Sen. Sumner). </s> At about this same time the Civil Rights Bill and the Second Freedmen's Bureau Bill were being debated. Both bills provided a list of rights secured, not including voting. 10 Senator Trumbull, who reported the Civil Rights Bill on behalf of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated: "I do not want to bring up the question of negro suffrage in the bill." Globe 606. His House counterpart exhibited the same reluctance. Globe 1162 (Cong. Wilson of Iowa). Despite considerable uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the measures, both ultimately passed. In the midst of the Senate debates on the basis of representation, President Johnson vetoed the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, primarily on constitutional grounds. This veto, which was narrowly sustained, was followed shortly by the President's bitter attack on Radical Reconstruction in his Washington's Birthday speech. These two actions, which were followed a month later by the veto of the Civil Rights Bill, removed any lingering hopes among the Radicals that Johnson would support them in a thoroughgoing plan of reconstruction. By the same token they increased the Radicals' need for an [400 U.S. 112, 160] articulated plan of their own to be put before the country in the upcoming elections as an alternative to the course the President was taking. </s> The second major product of the Reconstruction Committee, before the resolution which became the Fourteenth Amendment, was a proposal to add an equal rights provision to the Constitution. This measure, H. R. 63, which foreshadowed 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, read as follows: </s> "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property." Globe 1034. </s> It was reported by Congressman Bingham of Ohio, who later opposed the Civil Rights Bill because he believed it unconstitutional. Globe 1292-1293. The amendment immediately ran into serious opposition in the House and the subject was dropped. 11 </s> Such was the background of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress, at loggerheads with the President over Reconstruction, had not come up with a plan of its own after six months of deliberations; both friends and foes prodded it to develop an alternative. The Reconstruction Committee had been unable to produce anything which could even get through Congress, much less obtain the adherence of three-fourths of the States. The Radicals, committed to Negro suffrage, were confronted with widespread public opposition to that goal and the necessity for a reconstruction plan that could do service as a party platform in the elections that fall. The language [400 U.S. 112, 161] of the Fourteenth Amendment must be read with awareness that it was designed in response to this situation. </s> B. The Language of the Amendment and Reconstruction Measures </s> Sections 1 and 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment as originally reported read as follows: 12 </s> "SEC. 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. </s> "SEC. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But whenever, [400 U.S. 112, 162] in any State, the elective franchise shall be denied to any portion of its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age, or in any way abridged except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation in such State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age." Globe 2286. </s> In the historical context, no one could have understood this language as anything other than an abandonment of the principle of Negro suffrage, for which the Radicals had been so eager. By the same token, the language could hardly have been understood as affecting the provisions of the Constitution placing voting qualifications in the hands of the States. Section 1 must have been seen as little more than a constitutionalization of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, concededly one of the primary goals of that portion of the Amendment. 13 </s> While these conclusions may, I think, be confidently asserted, it is not so easy to explain just how contemporary observers would have construed the three clauses of 1 to reach this result. 14 No doubt in the case of [400 U.S. 112, 163] many congressmen it simply never occurred to them that the States' longstanding plenary control over voter qualifications would be affected without explicit language to that effect. And since no speaker during the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment pursued the contention that 1 would be construed to include the franchise, those who took the opposite view rarely explained how they arrived at their conclusions. </s> In attempting to unravel what was seldom articulated, the appropriate starting point is the fact that the framers of the Amendment expected the most significant portion of 1 to be the clause prohibiting state laws "which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." These privileges were no doubt understood to include the ones set out in the first section of the Civil Rights Act. To be prohibited by law from enjoying these rights would hardly be consistent with full membership in a civil society. </s> The same is not necessarily true with respect to prohibitions on participation in the political process. Many members of Congress accepted the jurisprudence of the day, in which the rights of man fell into three categories: natural, civil, and political. The privileges of citizens, being "civil" rights, were distinct from the rights arising from governmental organization, which were political in character. 15 Others no doubt relied on [400 U.S. 112, 164] the experience under the similar language of Art. IV, 2, which had never been held to guarantee the right to vote. The remarks of Senator Howard of Michigan, who as spokesman for the Joint Committee explained in greater detail than most why the Amendment did not reach the suffrage, contain something of each view. See Globe 2766, quoted infra, at 187; nn. 56 and 57, infra; cf. Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898) (dictum). </s> Since the Privileges and Immunities Clause was expected to be the primary source of substantive protection, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses were relegated to a secondary role, as the debates and other contemporary materials make clear. 16 Those clauses, which appear on their face to correspond with the latter portion of 1 of the Civil Rights Act, see n. 13, supra, and to be primarily concerned with person and property, would not have been expected to enfranchise the freedmen if the Privileges and Immunities Clause did not. </s> Other members of Congress no doubt saw 2 of the proposed Amendment as the Committee's resolution of the related problems of suffrage and representation. Since that section did not provide for enfranchisement, but simply reduced representation for disfranchisement, any doubts about the effect of the broad language of 1 were removed. Congressman Bingham, who was primarily responsible for the language of 1, [400 U.S. 112, 165] stated this view. Globe 2542, quoted infra, at 185. Finally, characterization of the Amendment by such figures as Stevens and Bingham in the House and Howard in the Senate, not contested by the Democrats except in passing remarks, was no doubt simply accepted by many members of Congress; they, repeating it, gave further force to the interpretation, with the result that, as will appear below, not one speaker in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment unambiguously stated that it would affect state voter qualifications, and only three, all opponents of the measure, can fairly be characterized as raising the possibility. 17 Further evidence of this original understanding can be found in later events. </s> The 39th Congress, which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, also enacted the first Reconstruction Act, c. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867). This Act required, as a condition precedent to readmission of the Southern States, that they adopt constitutions providing that the elective franchise should be enjoyed by all male citizens over the age of 21 who had been residents for more than one year and were not disfranchised for treason or common-law felony; even so, no State would be readmitted until a legislature elected under the new Constitution had ratified the proposed Fourteenth Amendment and that Amendment had become part of the Constitution. </s> The next development came when the ratification drive in the North stalled. After a year had passed during which only one Northern State had ratified the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, Arkansas was readmitted to the Union by the Act of June 22, 1868, 15 [400 U.S. 112, 166] Stat. 72. This readmission was based on the "fundamental condition" that the state constitution should not be amended to restrict the franchise, except with reference to residency requirements. Three days later the Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73, held out a promise of similar treatment to North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida if they would ratify the Fourteenth Amendment. By happy coincidence, the assent of those six States was just sufficient to complete the ratification process. It can hardly be suggested, therefore, that the "fundamental condition" was exacted from them as a measure of caution lest the Fourteenth Amendment fail of ratification. </s> The 40th Congress, not content with enfranchisement in the South, proposed the Fifteenth Amendment to extend the suffrage to northern Negroes. See Gillette, supra, n. 3, at 46. This fact alone is evidence that they did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to have accomplished such a result. Less well known is the fact that the 40th Congress considered and very nearly adopted a proposed amendment which would have expressly prohibited not only discriminatory voter qualifications but discriminatory qualifications for office as well. Each House passed such a measure by the required two-thirds margin. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1318, 1428 (1869). A conference committee, composed of Senators Stewart and Conkling and Representatives Boutwell, Bingham, and Logan, struck out the officeholding provision, id., at 1563, 1593, and with Inauguration Day only a week away, both Houses accepted the conference report. Id., at 1564, 1641. See generally Gillette 58-77. While the reasons for these actions are unclear, it is unlikely that they were provoked by the idea that the Fourteenth Amendment covered the field; such a rationale seemingly would have made the enfranchising provision itself unnecessary. [400 U.S. 112, 167] </s> The 41st Congress readmitted the remaining three States of the Confederacy. The admitting act in each case recited good-faith ratification of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and imposed the fundamental conditions that the States should not restrict the elective franchise 18 and "[t]hat it shall never be lawful for the said State to deprive any citizen of the United States, on account of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude, of the right to hold office under the constitution and laws of said State." Act of Jan. 26, 1870, c. 10, 16 Stat. 62, 63 (Virginia); Act of Feb. 23, 1870, c. 19, 16 Stat. 67, 68 (Mississippi); Act of Mar. 30, 1870, c. 39, 16 Stat. 80, 81 (Texas). </s> These materials demonstrate not only that 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is susceptible of an interpretation that it does not reach suffrage qualifications, but that this is the interpretation given by the immediately succeeding Congresses. Such an interpretation is the most reasonable reading of the section in view of the background against which it was proposed and adopted, particularly the doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act, the prejudice in the North against any recognition of the principle of Negro suffrage, and the basic constitutional structure of leaving suffrage qualifications with the States. 19 If any further clarification were [400 U.S. 112, 168] needed, one would have thought it provided by the second section of the same Amendment, which specifically contemplated that the right to vote would be denied or abridged by the States on racial or other grounds. As a unanimous Court once asked, "Why this, if it was not in the power of the [state] legislature to deny the right of suffrage to some male inhabitants?" Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 174 (1875). </s> The Government suggests that the list of protected qualifications in 2 is "no more than descriptive of voting laws as they then stood." Brief for the United States, Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., 75. This is wholly inaccurate. Aside from racial restrictions, all States had residency requirements and many had literacy, property, or taxation qualifications. On the other hand, several of the Western States permitted aliens to vote if they had satisfied certain residency requirements and had declared [400 U.S. 112, 169] their intention to become citizens. 20 It hardly seems necessary to observe that the politicians who framed the Fourteenth Amendment were familiar with the makeup of the electorate. In any event, the congressional debates contain such proof in ample measure. 21 </s> Assuming, then, that 2 represents a deliberate selection of the voting qualifications to be penalized, what is the point of it? The Government notes that "it was intended - although it has never been used - to provide a remedy against exclusion of the newly freed slaves from the vote." Brief for the Defendant, Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., 20. Undoubtedly this was the primary purpose. But the framers of the Amendment, with their attention thus focused on racial voting qualifications, could hardly have been unaware of 1. If they understood that section to forbid such qualifications, the simple means of penalizing this conduct would have been to impose a reduction of representation for voting discrimination in violation of 1. Their adoption instead of the awkward phrasing of 2 is therefore significant. </s> To be sure, one might argue that 2 is simply a rhetorical flourish, and that the qualifications listed there are merely the ones which the framers deemed to be consistent with the alleged prohibition of 1. This argument is not only unreasonable on its face and untenable in light of the historical record; it is fatal to the validity of the reduction of the voting age in 302 of the Act before us. </s> The only sensible explanation of 2, therefore, is that the racial voter qualifications it was designed to penalize [400 U.S. 112, 170] were understood to be permitted by 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Amendment was a halfway measure, adopted to deprive the South of representation until it should enfranchise the freedmen, but to have no practical effect in the North. It was politically acceptable precisely because of its regional consequences and its avoidance of an explicit recognition of the principle of Negro suffrage. As my Brother BLACK states: "[I]t cannot be successfully argued that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to strip the States of their power, carefully preserved in the original Constitution, to govern themselves." Ante, at 127. The detailed historical materials make this unmistakably clear. </s> C. The Joint Committee </s> The first place to look for the understanding of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment is the Journal of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction. 22 The exact sequence of the actions of this Committee presumably had little or no effect on the members of Congress who were not on the Committee, for the Committee attempted to keep its deliberations secret, 23 and the Journal itself was lost for nearly 20 years. 24 Nevertheless the Journal, although only a record of proposals and votes, illustrates the thoughts of those leading figures of Congress who were members and participated in the drafting of the Amendment. </s> Two features emerge from such a review with startling clarity. First, the Committee regularly rejected explicitly [400 U.S. 112, 171] enfranchising proposals in favor of plans which would postpone enfranchisement, leave it to congressional discretion, or abandon it altogether. Second, the abandonment of Negro suffrage as a goal exactly corresponded with the adoption of provisions to reduce representation for discriminatory restrictions on the ballot. </s> This correspondence was present from the start. Five plans were proposed to deal with representation. One would have prohibited racial qualifications for voters and based representation on the whole number of citizens in the State; the other four proposals contained no enfranchising provision but in various ways would have reduced representation for States where the vote was racially restricted. Kendrick 41-44. A subcommittee reduced the five proposals to two, one prohibiting discrimination and the other reducing representation where it was present. On Stevens' motion the latter alternative was accepted by a vote of 11 to 3, Kendrick 51; with minor changes it was subsequently reported as H. R. 51. </s> The subcommittee also proposed that whichever provision on the basis of representation was adopted, the Congress should be empowered to legislate to secure all citizens "the same political rights and privileges" and also "equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." Kendrick 51. After the Committee reported H. R. 51, it turned to consideration of this proposal. At a meeting attended by only 10 members, a motion to strike out the clause authorizing Congress to legislate for equal political rights and privileges lost by a vote of six to four. Kendrick 57. At a subsequent meeting, however, Bingham had the subcommittee proposal replaced with another which did not mention political rights and privileges, but was otherwise quite similar. Kendrick 61; see the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE [400 U.S. 112, 172] MARSHALL, post, at 258-259, for the text of the two provisions. The Committee reported the substitute as H. R. 63. In the House so much concern was expressed over the centralization of power the amendment would work - a few said it would even authorize Congress to regulate the suffrage - that the matter was dropped. Post, at 260. </s> The Fourteenth Amendment had as its most direct antecedent a proposal drafted by Robert Dale Owen, who was not a member of Congress, and presented to the Joint Committee by Stevens. 25 Originally the plan provided for mandatory enfranchisement in 1876 and for reduction of representation until that date. Kendrick 82-84. However, Stevens was pressured by various congressional delegations who wanted nothing to do with Negro suffrage, even at a remove of 10 years. 26 He therefore successfully moved to strike out the enfranchising provision and correspondingly to abolish the 10-year limitation on reduction of representation for racial discrimination. The motion carried by a vote of 12 to 2. Kendrick 101. </s> Bingham was then successful in replacing 1 of Owen's proposal, which read: </s> "No discrimination shall be made by any State, or by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" </s> with the following now-familiar language: </s> "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive [400 U.S. 112, 173] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Kendrick 106. </s> The summary style of the Journal leaves unclear the reasons for the change. However, Bingham himself had rather consistently voted against proposals for direct and immediate enfranchisement, 27 and on the face of things it seems unlikely that the other members of the Joint Committee understood his provision to be an enfranchising proposal. 28 That they did not so understand is [400 U.S. 112, 174] demonstrated by the speeches in the debates on the floor. 29 </s> Before I examine those debates, a word of explanation is in order. For obvious reasons, the discussions of voter qualifications in the 39th Congress and among the public were cast primarily in terms of racial disqualifications. This does not detract from their utility as guides to interpretation. When an individual speaker said that the Amendment would not result in the enfranchisement of Negroes, he must have taken one of two views: either the Amendment did not reach voter qualifications at all; or it set standards limiting state restrictions on the ballot, but those standards did not prohibit racial discrimination. I have already set out some of the reasons which lead me to conclude that the former interpretation is correct, and that it is the understanding [400 U.S. 112, 175] shared by the framers of the Amendment, as well as by almost all of the opponents. The mere statement of the latter position appears to me to be a complete refutation of it. Even on its wholly unsupportable assumptions (1) that certain framers of the Amendment contemplated that the privileges and immunities of citizens included the vote, (2) that they intended to permit state laws to abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens whenever it was rational to do so, and (3) that they agreed on the rationality of prohibiting the freed slaves from voting, this remarkable theory still fails to explain why they understood the Amendment to permit racial voting qualifications in the free States of the North. </s> D. In Congress </s> On May 8, 1866, Thaddeus Stevens led off debate on H. R. 127, the Joint Resolution proposing the Fourteenth Amendment. After explaining the delay of the Joint Committee in coming up with a plan of reconstruction, he apologized for his proposal in advance: </s> "This proposition is not all that the committee desired. It falls far short of my wishes, but it fulfills my hopes. I believe it is all that can be obtained in the present state of public opinion. Not only Congress but the several States are to be consulted. Upon a careful survey of the whole ground, we did not believe that nineteen of the loyal States could be induced to ratify any proposition more stringent than this." Globe 2459. </s> In the climate of the times, Stevens could hardly have been understood as referring to anything other than the failure of the measure to make some provision for the enfranchisement of the freedmen. However, lest any mistake be made, he recounted the history of the Committee's prior effort in the field of representation and suffrage, [400 U.S. 112, 176] H. R. 51, which "would surely have secured the enfranchisement of every citizen at no distant period." That measure was dead, "slaughtered by a puerile and pedantic criticism," and "unless this (less efficient, I admit) shall pass, its death has postponed the protection of the colored race perhaps for ages." Ibid. </s> With this explanation made, Stevens turned to a section-by-section study of the proposed resolution. The results to be achieved by 1, as he saw it, would be equal punishment for crime, equal entitlement to the benefits of "[w]hatever law protects the white man," equal means of redress, and equal competence to testify. Ibid. If he thought the section provided equal access to the polls, despite his immediately preceding apology for the fact that it did not, his failure to mention that application is remarkable. 30 </s> Turning then to 2, Stevens again discussed racial qualification for voting. He explained the section as follows: </s> "If any State shall exclude any of her adult male citizens from the elective franchise, or abridge that right, she shall forfeit her right to representation in the same proportion. The effect of this provision will be either to compel the States to grant universal suffrage or so to shear them of their power as to keep them forever in a hopeless minority in the national Government, both legislative and executive." Ibid. </s> Stevens recognized that it might take several years for the coercive effect of the Amendment to result in Negro suffrage, but since this would give time for education and enlightenment of the freedmen, "That short delay would [400 U.S. 112, 177] not be injurious." Ibid. He did not indicate that he believed it would be unconstitutional. He admitted that 2 was not so good as the proposal which had been defeated in the Senate, for that, by reducing representation by all the members of a race if any one was discriminated against, would have hastened full enfranchisement. Section 2 allowed proportional credit. "But it is a short step forward. The large stride which we in vain proposed is dead . . . ." Globe 2460. </s> I have dealt at length with Stevens' remarks because of his prominent position in the House and in the Joint Committee. The remaining remarks, except for Bingham's summation, can be treated in more summary fashion. Of the supporters of the Amendment, Garfield of Ohio, 31 Kelley of Pennsylvania, 32 Boutwell of Massachusetts (a member of the Joint Committee), 33 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 178] Eliot of Massachusetts, 34 Beaman of Michigan, 35 and Farnsworth of Illinois, 36 expressed their regret that the Amendment did not prohibit restrictions on the franchise. As the quotations set out in the margin indicate, the absence of such a prohibition was generally attributed to prejudice in the Congress, in the States, or both, to such an extent that an enfranchising amendment could not pass. This corresponds with the first part of Stevens' introductory speech. [400 U.S. 112, 179] </s> Other supporters of the Amendment obviously based their remarks on their understanding that it did not affect state laws imposing discriminatory voting qualifications, but did not indicate that the omission was a drawback in their view. In this group were Thayer of Pennsylvania, 37 Broomall of Pennsylvania, 38 Raymond of New York, 39 McKee of Kentucky, 40 Miller of Pennsylvania, 41 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 180] Banks of Massachusetts, 42 and Eckley of Ohio. 43 </s> The remaining members of the House who supported the Fourteenth Amendment either did not speak at all or did not address themselves to the suffrage issue in any very clear terms. Those in the latter group who gave speeches on the proposed Amendment included [400 U.S. 112, 181] Spalding of Ohio, 44 Longyear of Michigan, 45 and Shellabarger of Ohio. 46 The remaining Republican members of the Joint Committee - Washburne of Illinois, Morrill of Vermont, Conkling of New York, and Blow of Missouri - did not participate in the debates over the Amendment. </s> In the opposition to the Amendment were only the handful of Democrats. Even they, with one seeming exception, did not assert that the Amendment was applicable to suffrage, although they would have been expected to do so if they thought such a reading plausible. Finck of Ohio and Shanklin of Kentucky did not even [400 U.S. 112, 182] mention Negro suffrage in their attacks on the Amendment, although Finck discussed the reasons why the Southern States could not be expected to ratify it, Globe 2460-2462, and Shanklin characterized the Amendment as "tyrannical and oppressive." Globe 2501. Eldridge of Wisconsin 47 and Randall of Pennsylvania 48 affirmatively indicated their understanding that with the Amendment the Radicals had at least temporarily abandoned their crusade for Negro suffrage, as did Finck when the measure returned from the Senate with amendments. 49 </s> The other two Democrats to participate in the three days of debate on H. R. 127, Boyer of Pennsylvania and Rogers of New Jersey, have been a source of great comfort to those who set out to prove that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive on this issue. Each, in the course of a lengthy speech, included a sentence which, taken out of context, can be read to indicate a fear that 1 might prohibit racial restrictions on the ballot. Boyer said, "The first section embodies the principles of the civil rights bill, and is intended to secure ultimately, and to some extent indirectly, [400 U.S. 112, 183] the political equality of the negro race." Globe 2467. Rogers, commenting on the uncertain scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, observed: "The right to vote is a privilege." Globe 2538. </s> While these two statements are perhaps innocuous enough to be left alone, it is noteworthy that each speaker had earlier in the session delivered a tirade against the principle of Negro suffrage; 50 if either seriously believed that the Fourteenth Amendment might enfranchise the freedmen, he was unusually calm about the fact. That they did not seriously interpret the Amendment in this way is indicated as well by other portions of their speeches. 51 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 184] </s> Two other opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment, Phelps of Maryland and Niblack of Indiana, made statements which have been adduced to show that there was no consensus on the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment to suffrage laws. Phelps voiced his sentiments on May 5, three days before the beginning of debate. 52 In the course of a speech urging a soft policy on reconstruction, he expressed the fear that the Amendment would authorize Congress to define the privileges of citizens to include the suffrage - or indeed that it might have that effect proprio vigore. Globe 2398. Phelps did not repeat this sentiment after he was contradicted by speaker after speaker during the debates proper; indeed, he did not take part in the debates at all, but simply voted against the Amendment, along with most of his Democratic colleagues. Globe 2545. 53 </s> As for Niblack, on the first day of debate he made the following remarks: </s> "I give notice that I will offer the following amendment if I shall have the opportunity: [400 U.S. 112, 185] </s> "`Add to the fifth section as follows: </s> "`Provided, That nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to authorize Congress to regulate or control the elective franchise within any State, or to abridge or restrict the power of any State to regulate or control the same within its own jurisdiction, except as in the third section hereof prescribed.'" Globe 2465. </s> Like Phelps, Niblack found it unnecessary to participate in the debates. He was not heard from again until the vote on the call for the previous question. As Garfield ascertained at the time, the only opportunity to amend H. R. 127 would arise if the demand was voted down. Niblack voted to sustain it. Globe 2545. </s> Debate in the House was substantially concluded by Bingham, the man primarily responsible for the language of 1. Without equivocation, he stated: </s> "The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States. </s> "The second section excludes the conclusion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law; save, indeed, with this exception, that as the right in the people of each State to a republican government and to choose their Representatives in Congress is of the guarantees of the Constitution, by this amendment a remedy might be given directly for a case supposed by Madison, where treason might change a State government from a republican to a despotic government, and thereby deny suffrage to the people." Globe 2542. </s> Stevens then arose briefly in rebuttal. He attacked Bingham for saying in another portion of his speech that the disqualification provisions of 3 were unenforceable. He did not contradict - or even refer to - Bingham's [400 U.S. 112, 186] interpretation of 1 and 2. Globe 2544. The vote was taken and the resolution passed immediately thereafter. Globe 2545. </s> To say that Stevens did not contradict Bingham is to minimize the force of the record. Not once, during the three days of debate, did any supporter of the Amendment criticize or correct any of the Republicans or Democrats who observed that the Amendment left the ballot "exclusively under the control of the States." Globe 2542 (Bingham). This fact is tacitly admitted even by those who find the debates "inconclusive." The only contrary authority they can find in the debates is the pale remarks of the four Democrats already discussed. 54 </s> In the Senate, which did not have a gag rule, matters proceeded at a more leisurely pace. The introductory speech would normally have been given by Senator Fessenden of Maine, the Chairman of the Joint Committee on behalf of the Senate, but he was still weak with illness and unable to deliver a lengthy speech. The duty of presenting the views of the Joint Committee therefore devolved on Senator Howard of Michigan. 55 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 187] </s> Howard minced no words. He stated that </s> "the first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these classes the right of voting. The right of suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the Constitution. It is merely the creature of law. It has always been regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a depotism [sic]. Globe 2766. </s> "The second section leaves the right to regulate the elective franchise still with the States, and does not meddle with that right." Ibid. Howard stated that while he personally would have preferred to see the freedmen enfranchised, the Committee was confronted with the necessity of proposing an amendment which could be ratified. </s> "The committee were of opinion that the States are not yet prepared to sanction so fundamental a change as would be the concession of the right of suffrage to the colored race. We may as well state it plainly and fairly, so that there shall be no misunderstanding on the subject. It was our opinion that three fourths of the States of this Union could not be induced to vote to grant the right of suffrage, even in any degree or under any restriction, to the colored race." Ibid. </s> Howard's forthright attempt to prevent misunderstanding was completely successful insofar as the Senate was concerned; at least, no one has yet discovered a remark during the Senate debates on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment which indicates any contrary impression. 56 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 188] For some, however, time has muddied the clarity with which he spoke. 57 </s> The Senate, like the House, made frequent reference to the fact that the proposed amendment would not result in the enfranchisement of the freedmen. The supporters [400 U.S. 112, 189] who expressed their regret at the fact were Wade of Ohio, 58 Poland of Vermont, 59 Stewart of Nevada, 60 Howe of Wisconsin, 61 Henderson of Missouri, 62 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 190] and Yates of Illinois. 63 The remarks of Senator Sherman of Ohio, whose support for the amendment was lukewarm, see Globe 2986, seem to have been based on the common interpretation. 64 </s> Doolittle of Wisconsin, whose support for the President resulted in his virtually being read out of the Republican Party, proposed to base representation on adult male voters. Globe 2942. In a discussion with Senator Grimes of Iowa, a member of the Joint Committee, about the desirability of this change, Doolittle defended himself by pointing out that: "Your amendment proposes to [400 U.S. 112, 191] allow the States to say who shall vote." Globe 2943. Grimes did not respond. Among the Democrats, no different view was expressed. Those whose remarks are informative are Hendricks of Indiana, 65 Cowan of Pennsylvania, 66 Davis of Kentucky, 67 and Johnson of Maryland. 68 </s> Senator Howard, who had opened debate, made the last remarks in favor of the Amendment. He said: </s> "We know very well that the States retain the power, which they have always possessed, of regulating the right of suffrage in the States. It is the theory of the Constitution itself. That right has never been taken from them; no endeavor has ever been made to take it from them; and the theory of this whole amendment is, to leave the power of regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of the States, and not to assume to regulate [400 U.S. 112, 192] it by any clause of the Constitution of the United States." Globe 3039. </s> Shortly thereafter the Amendment was approved. Globe 3041-3042. </s> In the House, there was a brief discussion of the Senate amendments and the measure generally, chiefly by the Democrats. Stevens then concluded the debate as he had begun it, expressing his regret that the Amendment would not enfranchise the freedmen. 69 The House accepted the Senate changes and sent the measure to the States. Globe 3149. </s> E. Collateral Evidence of Congressional Intent </s> It has been suggested that despite this evidence of congressional understanding, which seems to me overwhelming, the history is nonetheless inconclusive. Primary reliance is placed on debates over H. R. 51, the Joint Committee's first effort in the field of the basis of representation. In these debates, some of the more extreme Radicals, typified by Senator Sumner of Massachusetts, suggested that Congress had power to interfere with state voter qualifications at least to the extent of enfranchising the freedmen. This power was said to exist in a variety of constitutional provisions, including Art. I, 2, Art. I, 4, the war power, the power over territories, the guarantee of a republican form of government, and 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. Those who held this view expressed concern lest the Committee's proposal be read to authorize the States to discriminate on racial grounds and stated that they could not vote for the measure if such was the correct construction. They were sometimes comforted by supporters [400 U.S. 112, 193] of the committee proposal, who assured them that there would be no such effect. From these statements, and the fact that some of those who took the extreme view ultimately did vote for the proposed Fourteenth Amendment, it is sought to construct a counter-argument: if H. R. 51, properly interpreted, would not have precluded congressional exercise of power otherwise existing under the constitutional provisions referred to, then 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, does not preclude the exercise of congressional power under 1 and 5 of that Amendment. </s> This argument, however, is even logically fallacious, and quite understandably none of the opinions filed today place much reliance on it. I do not maintain that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment took away with one hand what they had given with the other, but simply that the Amendment must be construed as a whole, and that for the reasons already given, supra, at 167-170, the inclusion of 2 demonstrates that the framers never intended to confer the power which my Brethren seek to find in 1 and 5. Bingham, for one, distinguished between these two positions. When it was suggested in the debates over H. R. 51 that the proviso would remove pre-existing congressional power over voting qualifications, Bingham made the response quoted by my colleagues. Globe 431-432; see post, at 276-277. When it was observed during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment that 2 demonstrated that the Amendment did not reach state control over voting qualifications, Bingham was the one making the observation. Globe 2542, quoted supra, at 185. As Bingham seems to have recognized, the sort of argument he made in connection with H. R. 51 is beside the point with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment. </s> In any event, even disregarding its analytical difficulties, the argument is based on blatant factual shortcomings. All but one of the speakers on whose statements [400 U.S. 112, 194] primary reliance is placed stated, either during the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment or subsequently, that the Amendment did not enfranchise the freedmen. 70 </s> Finally, some of those determined to sustain the legislation now before us rely on speeches made between two and three years after Congress had sent the proposed Amendment to the States. Boutwell and Stevens in the House, and Sumner in the Senate, argued that the Fifteenth [400 U.S. 112, 195] Amendment or enfranchising legislation was unnecessary because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited racial discrimination in voter qualifications. Each had earlier expressed the opposite position. 71 Their subsequent attempts to achieve by assertion what they had not had the votes to achieve by constitutional processes can hardly be entitled to weight. </s> F. Ratification </s> State materials relating to the ratification process are not very revealing. For the most part only gubernatorial messages and committee reports have survived. 72 So far as my examination of these materials reveals, while the opponents of the Amendment were divided [400 U.S. 112, 196] and sometimes equivocal on whether it might be construed to require enfranchisement, 73 the supporters of the Amendment in the States approached the congressional proponents in the unanimity of their interpretation. I have discovered only one brief passage in support of the Amendment which appears to be based on the assumption that it would result in enfranchisement. 74 These remarks, in the message of the Governor of Illinois, had to compete in the minds of the legislators with the viewpoint of the Chicago Tribune. This Radical journal repeatedly criticized the Amendment's lack of an enfranchising provision, and at one time it even expressed the hope that the South would refuse to ratify the Amendment so that the North would turn to enfranchisement of the freedmen as the only means of reconstruction. June 25, 1866, quoted in James 177. In all the other States I have examined, where the materials are sufficiently full for the understanding of a supporter of the Amendment to appear, his understanding [400 U.S. 112, 197] has been that enfranchisement would not result. 75 </s> The scanty official materials can be supplemented by other sources. There was a congressional election in the fall of the year the Fourteenth Amendment went to the States. The Radicals ran on the Amendment as their reconstruction program, attempting to force voters to choose between their plan and that of President Johnson. From the campaign speeches and from newspaper reactions, we can get some further idea of the understanding of the States. </s> The tone of the campaign was set by the formal report of the Joint Committee, which Fessenden openly stated he had composed as a partisan document. James 147. Indeed, it was not even submitted to Congress until the day the Senate approved the measure, and then only in manuscript form. Globe 3038. On the delicate issue of Negro suffrage, the report read as follows: 76 </s> "Doubts were entertained whether Congress had power, even under the amended Constitution, to prescribe the qualifications of voters in a State, or could act directly on the subject. It was doubtful, in the opinion of your committee, whether the States would consent to surrender a power they had always exercised, and to which they were attached. As the best if not the only method of surmounting the difficulty, and as eminently just and proper in itself, your committee came to the conclusion that political power should be possessed in all the States exactly in proportion as the right of suffrage should be granted, without distinction of color or race. [400 U.S. 112, 198] This it was thought would leave the whole question with the people of each State, holding out to all the advantage of increased political power as an inducement to allow all to participate in its exercise. Such a provision would be in its nature gentle and persuasive, and would lead, it was hoped, at no distant day, to an equal participation of all, without distinction, in all the rights and privileges of citizenship, thus affording a full and adequate protection to all classes of citizens, since all would have, through the ballot-box, the power of self-protection. </s> "Holding these views, your committee prepared an amendment to the Constitution to carry out this idea, and submitted the same to Congress. Unfortunately, as we think, it did not receive the necessary constitutional support in the Senate, and therefore could not be proposed for adoption by the States. The principle involved in that amendment is, however, believed to be sound, and your committee have again proposed it in another form, hoping that it may receive the approbation of Congress." </s> Newspapers expressed the same view of the reach of the Amendment. Even while deliberations were underway, predictions that Congress would come up with a plan involving enfranchisement of the freedmen had gradually ceased. James 91. When the Amendment was released to the press, Andrew Johnson was reported as seeing in it a "practical abandonment of the negro suffrage issue." Cincinnati Daily Commercial, April 30, 1866, quoted in James 117. The New York Herald had reported editorially that the Amendment reflected an abandonment of the Radical push for Negro suffrage and acceptance of Johnson's position that control over suffrage rested exclusively with the States. May 1, 1866, reported in James 119. The Nation, a Radical organ, [400 U.S. 112, 199] attributed the absence of any provision on Negro suffrage to "sheer want of confidence in the public." 2 Nation 545 (May 1, 1866), quoted in James 120. The Chicago Tribune, another Radical organ, complained that 1 was objectionable as "surplusage," May 5, 1866, quoted in James 123, and later in the same month criticized the measure for "postponing, and not settling" the matter of equal political rights for Negroes. May 31, 1866, quoted in James 146. As deliberations continued, the reporting went on in the same vein. The New York Times reported that with elections approaching, "No one now talks or dreams of forcing Negro suffrage upon the Southern States." June 6, 1866. The Cincinnati Daily Commercial and the Boston Daily Journal for June 7, 1866, commented on the Radicals' abandonment of Negro suffrage. James 145. </s> Much the same picture emerges from the campaign speeches. Although an occasional Democrat expressed the fear that the Amendment would or might result in political equality, 77 the supporters of the Amendment denied such effects without exception that I have discovered. Among the leading congressional figures who stated in campaign speeches that the Amendment did not prohibit racial voting qualifications were Senators Howe, Lane, Sherman, Sumner, and Trumbull, and Congressmen Bingham, Delano, Schenck, and Stevens. See James 159-168, 173, 178; Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 70-78 (1949). </s> As was pointed out above, all but a handful of Northern States prohibited blacks from voting at all, [400 U.S. 112, 200] and opposition to a change was intense. Between 1865 and 1869 referenda on the issue rejected impartial Negro suffrage in Colorado Territory, Connecticut, Wisconsin, Minnesota (twice), the District of Columbia, Nebraska Territory, Kansas, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, and New York. Only Iowa and Minnesota accepted it, and that on the day Grant was elected to the Presidency. 78 It is inconceivable that those States, in that climate, could have ratified the Amendment with the expectation that it would require them to permit their black citizens to vote. </s> Small wonder, then, that in early 1869 substantially the same group of men who three years earlier had proposed the Fourteenth Amendment felt it necessary to make further modifications in the Constitution if state suffrage laws were to be controlled even to the minimal degree of prohibiting qualifications which on their face discriminated on the basis of race. If the consequences for our federal system were not so serious, the contention that the history is "inconclusive" would be undeserving of attention. And, with all respect, the transparent failure of attempts to cast doubt on the original understanding is simply further evidence of the force of the historical record. </s> II </s> The history of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to suffrage qualifications is remarkably free of the problems which bedevil most attempts to find a reliable guide to present decision in the pages of the past. Instead, there is virtually unanimous agreement, clearly and repeatedly expressed, that 1 of the Amendment did not reach discriminatory voter qualifications. In this rather remarkable situation, the issue of the bearing of the historical understanding on constitutional interpretation squarely arises. [400 U.S. 112, 201] </s> I must confess to complete astonishment at the position of some of my Brethren that the history of the Fourteenth Amendment has become irrelevant. Ante, at 139-140. In the six years since I first set out much of this history, 79 I have seen no justification for such a result which appears to me at all adequate. With matters in this posture, I need do no more by way of justifying my reliance on these materials than sketch the familiar outlines of our constitutional system. </s> When the Constitution with its original Amendments came into being, the States delegated some of their sovereign powers to the Federal Government, surrendered other powers, and expressly retained all powers not delegated or surrendered. Amdt. X. The power to set state voting qualifications was neither surrendered nor delegated, except to the extent that the guarantee of a republican form of government 80 may be thought to require a certain minimum distribution of political power. The power to set qualifications for voters for national office, created by the Constitution, was expressly committed to the States by Art. I, 2, and Art. II, 1. 81 By Art. V, States may be deprived of their retained powers only with the concurrence of two-thirds of each House of Congress and three-fourths of the States. No one asserts that the power to set voting qualifications was taken from the States or subjected to federal control by any Amendment before the Fourteenth. The historical evidence makes it plain that the Congress and the States proposing and ratifying that Amendment affirmatively understood that they were not limiting state power over voting qualifications. The [400 U.S. 112, 202] existence of the power therefore survived the amending process, and, except as it has been limited by the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments, it still exists today. 82 Indeed, the very fact that constitutional amendments were deemed necessary to bring about federal abolition of state restrictions on voting by reason of race (Amdt. XV), sex (Amdt. XIX), and, even with respect to federal elections, the failure to pay state poll taxes (Amdt. XXIV), is itself forceful evidence of the common understanding in 1869, 1919, and 1962, respectively, that the Fourteenth Amendment did not empower Congress to legislate in these respects. </s> It must be recognized, of course, that the amending process is not the only way in which constitutional understanding alters with time. The judiciary has long been entrusted with the task of applying the Constitution in changing circumstances, and as conditions change the Constitution in a sense changes as well. But when the Court gives the language of the Constitution an [400 U.S. 112, 203] unforeseen application, it does so, whether explicitly or implicitly, in the name of some underlying purpose of the Framers. 83 This is necessarily so; the federal judiciary, which by express constitutional provision is appointed for life, and therefore cannot be held responsible by the electorate, has no inherent general authority to establish the norms for the rest of society. It is limited to elaboration and application of the precepts ordained in the Constitution by the political representatives of the people. When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political process to which the amending power was committed, and it has violated the constitutional structure which it is its highest duty to protect. 84 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 204] </s> As the Court is not justified in substituting its own views of wise policy for the commands of the Constitution, still less is it justified in allowing Congress to disregard those commands as the Court understands them. Although Congress' expression of the view that it does have power to alter state suffrage qualifications is entitled to the most respectful consideration by the judiciary, coming as it does from a coordinate branch of government, 85 this cannot displace the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether Congress has exceeded its powers. The reason for this goes beyond Marshall's assertion that: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 86 It inheres in the structure of the [400 U.S. 112, 205] constitutional system itself. Congress is subject to none of the institutional restraints imposed on judicial decisionmaking; it is controlled only by the political process. In Article V, the Framers expressed the view that the political restraints on Congress alone were an insufficient control over the process of constitution making. The concurrence of two-thirds of each House and of three-fourths of the States was needed for the political check to be adequate. To allow a simple majority of Congress to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is therefore fundamentally out of keeping with the constitutional structure. Nor is that structure adequately protected by a requirement that the judiciary be able to perceive a basis for the congressional interpretation, the only restriction laid down in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). </s> It is suggested that the proper basis for the doctrine enunciated in Morgan lies in the relative factfinding competence of Court, Congress, and state legislatures. Post, at 246-249. In this view, as I understand it, since Congress is at least as well qualified as a state legislature to determine factual issues, and far better qualified than this Court, where a dispute is basically factual in nature the congressional finding of fact should control, subject only to review by this Court for reasonableness. </s> In the first place, this argument has little or no force as applied to the issue whether the Fourteenth Amendment covers voter qualifications. Indeed, I do not understand the adherents of Morgan to maintain the contrary. [400 U.S. 112, 206] But even on the assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment does place a limit on the sorts of voter qualifications which a State may adopt, I still do not see any real force in the reasoning. </s> When my Brothers refer to "complex factual questions," post, at 248, they call to mind disputes about primary, objective facts dealing with such issues as the number of persons between the ages of 18 and 21, the extent of their education, and so forth. The briefs of the four States in these cases take no issue with respect to any of the facts of this nature presented to Congress and relied on by my Brothers DOUGLAS, ante, at 141-143, and BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, post, at 243-246, 279-280. Except for one or two matters of dubious relevance, these facts are not subject to rational dispute. The disagreement in these cases revolves around the evaluation of this largely uncontested factual material. 87 On the assumption that maturity and experience are relevant to intelligent and responsible exercise of the elective franchise, are the immaturity and inexperience of the average 18-, 19-, or 20-year-old sufficiently serious to justify denying such a person a direct voice in decisions affecting his or her life? Whether or not this judgment is characterized as "factual," it calls for striking a balance between incommensurate interests. Where the balance is to be struck depends ultimately on the values and the perspective of the decisionmaker. It is a matter as to which men of good will can and do reasonably differ. </s> I fully agree that judgments of the sort involved here are beyond the institutional competence and constitutional [400 U.S. 112, 207] authority of the judiciary. See, e. g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 -330 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 634 -641 (1969) (STEWART, J., dissenting). They are pre-eminently matters for legislative discretion, with judicial review, if it exists at all, narrowly limited. But the same reasons which in my view would require the judiciary to sustain a reasonable state resolution of the issue also require Congress to abstain from entering the picture. </s> Judicial deference is based, not on relative factfinding competence, but on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide. Establishment of voting qualifications is a matter for state legislatures. Assuming any authority at all, only when the Court can say with some confidence that the legislature has demonstrably erred in adjusting the competing interests is it justified in striking down the legislative judgment. This order of things is more efficient and more congenial to our system and, in my judgment, much more likely to achieve satisfactory results than one in which the Court has a free hand to replace state legislative judgments with its own. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). </s> The same considerations apply, and with almost equal force, to Congress' displacement of state decisions with its own ideas of wise policy. The sole distinction between Congress and the Court in this regard is that Congress, being an elective body, presumptively has popular authority for the value judgment it makes. But since the state legislature has a like authority, this distinction between Congress and the judiciary falls short of justifying a congressional veto on the state judgment. The perspectives and values of national legislators on the issue of voting qualifications are likely to differ from those of state legislators, but I see no reason [400 U.S. 112, 208] a priori to prefer those of the national figures, whose collective decision, applying nationwide, is necessarily less able to take account of peculiar local conditions. Whether one agrees with this judgment or not, it is the one expressed by the Framers in leaving voter qualifications to the States. The Supremacy Clause does not, as my colleagues seem to argue, represent a judgment that federal decisions are superior to those of the States whenever the two may differ. </s> To be sure, my colleagues do not expressly say that Congress or this Court is empowered by the Constitution to substitute its own judgment for those of the States. However, before sustaining a state judgment they require a "clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest." 88 Post, at 238; see post, at 247 n. 30. I should think that if the state interest were truly "compelling" and "substantial," and a clear showing could be made that the voter qualification was "necessary" to its preservation, no reasonable person would think the qualification undesirable. Equivalently, if my colleagues or a majority of Congress deem a given voting qualification undesirable as a matter of policy, they must consider that the state interests involved are not "compelling" or "substantial" or that they can be adequately protected in other ways. It follows that my colleagues must be prepared to hold invalid as a matter [400 U.S. 112, 209] of federal constitutional law all state voting qualifications which they deem unwise, as well as all such qualifications which Congress reasonably deems unwise. For this reason, I find their argument subject to the same objection as if it explicitly acknowledged such a conclusion. </s> It seems to me that the notion of deference to congressional interpretation of the Constitution, which the Court promulgated in Morgan, is directly related to this higher standard of constitutionality which the Court intimated in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), and brought to fruition in Kramer. When the scope of federal review of state determinations became so broad as to be judicially unmanageable, it was natural for the Court to seek assistance from the national legislature. If the federal role were restricted to its traditional and appropriate scope, review for the sort of "plain error" which is variously described as "arbitrary and capricious," "irrational," or "invidious," there would be no call for the Court to defer to a congressional judgment on this score that it did not find convincing. Whether a state judgment has so exceeded the bounds of reason as to authorize federal intervention is not a matter as to which the political process is intrinsically likely to produce a sounder or more acceptable result. It is a matter of the delicate adjustment of the federal system. In this area, to rely on Congress would make that body a judge in its own cause. The role of final arbiter belongs to this Court. </s> III </s> Since I cannot agree that the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress, or the federal judiciary, to control voter qualifications. I turn to other asserted sources of congressional power. My Brother BLACK would find that such power exists with respect to federal elections by [400 U.S. 112, 210] virtue of Art. I, 4, and seemingly other considerations that he finds implicit in federal authority. </s> The constitutional provisions controlling the regulation of congressional elections are the following: </s> Art. I, 2: "the Electors [for Representatives] in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." </s> Art. I, 4: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators." </s> Amdt. XVII: "The electors [for Senators] in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures." </s> It is difficult to see how words could be clearer in stating what Congress can control and what it cannot control. Surely nothing in these provisions lends itself to the view that voting qualifications in federal elections are to be set by Congress. The reason for the scheme is not hard to find. In the Constitutional Convention, Madison expressed the view that: "The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution." 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. 249-250 (1911). He explained further in The Federalist No. 52, p. 326 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961): </s> "To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the [400 U.S. 112, 211] States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the federal Constitution." </s> See also Federalist No. 60, p. 371 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (Hamilton), quoted in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE STEWART, post, at 290, which is to the same effect. </s> As to presidential elections, the Constitution provides: </s> "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . ." Art. II, 1, cl. 2. </s> "The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States." Art. II, 1, cl. 4. </s> Even the power to control the "Manner" of holding elections, given with respect to congressional elections by Art. I, 4, is absent with respect to the selection of presidential electors. 89 And, of course, the fact that it was deemed necessary to provide separately for congressional [400 U.S. 112, 212] power to regulate the time of choosing presidential electors and the President himself demonstrates that the power over "Times, Places and Manner" given by Art. I, 4, does not refer to presidential elections, but only to the elections for Congressmen. Any shadow of a justification for congressional power with respect to congressional elections therefore disappears utterly in presidential elections. </s> IV </s> With these major contentions resolved, it is convenient to consider the three sections of the Act individually to determine whether they can be supported by any other basis of congressional power. </s> A. Voting Age </s> The only constitutional basis advanced in support of the lowering of the voting age is the power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause, a power found in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons already given, it cannot be said that the statutory provision is valid as declaratory of the meaning of that clause. Its validity therefore must rest on congressional power to lower the voting age as a means of preventing invidious discrimination that is within the purview of that clause. </s> The history of the Fourteenth Amendment may well foreclose the possibility that 5 empowers Congress to enfranchise a class of citizens so that they may protect themselves against discrimination forbidden by the first section, but it is unnecessary for me to explore that question. For I think it fair to say that the suggestion that members of the age group between 18 and 21 are threatened with unconstitutional discrimination, or that any hypothetical discrimination is likely to be affected by lowering the voting age, is little short of fanciful. I see no justification for stretching to find any such possibility [400 U.S. 112, 213] when all the evidence indicates that Congress - led on by recent decisions of this Court - thought simply that 18-year-olds were fairly entitled to the vote and that Congress could give it to them by legislation. 90 </s> I therefore conclude, for these and other reasons given in this opinion, that in 302 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 Congress exceeded its delegated powers. </s> B. Residency </s> For reasons already stated, neither the power to regulate voting qualifications in presidential elections, asserted by my Brother BLACK, nor the power to declare the meaning of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, relied on by my Brother DOUGLAS, can support 202 of the Act. It would also be frivolous to contend that requiring States to allow new arrivals to vote in presidential elections is an appropriate means of preventing local discrimination against them in other respects, or of forestalling violations of the Fifteenth Amendment. The remaining grounds relied on are the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, 2, 91 and the right to travel across state lines. </s> While the right of qualified electors to cast their ballots and to have their votes counted was held to be a privilege of citizenship in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884), and United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), these decisions were careful to observe that it [400 U.S. 112, 214] remained with the States to determine the class of qualified voters. It was federal law, acting on this state-defined class, which turned the right to vote into a privilege of national citizenship. As the Court has consistently held, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses do not react on the mere status of citizenship to enfranchise any citizen whom an otherwise valid state law does not allow to vote. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 170-175 (1875); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937); cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 6 -7 (1944). Minors, felons, insane persons, and persons who have not satisfied residency requirements are among those citizens who are not allowed to vote in most States. 92 The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV of the Constitution is a direct descendent of Art. IV of the Articles of Confederation: </s> "The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States . . . ." </s> It is inconceivable that these words when used in the Articles could have been understood to abolish state durational residency requirements. 93 There is not a [400 U.S. 112, 215] vestige of evidence that any further extent was envisioned for them when they were carried over into the Constitution. And, as I have shown, when they were substantially repeated in 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment it was affirmatively understood that they did not include the right to vote. The Privileges and Immunities Clause is therefore unavailing to sustain any portion of 202. </s> The right to travel across state lines, see United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 -758 (1966), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969), is likewise insufficient to require Idaho to conform its laws to the requirements of 202. MR. JUSTICE STEWART justifies 202 solely on the power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 1 which he deems the basis for the right to travel. Post, at 285-287. I find it impossible to square the position that 5 authorizes Congress to abolish state voting qualifications based on residency with the position that it does not authorize Congress to abolish such qualifications based on race. Since the historical record compels me to accept the latter position, I must reject the former. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL do not anchor the right of interstate travel to any specific constitutional provision. Post, at 237-238. Past decisions to which they refer have relied on the two Privileges and Immunities Clauses, just discussed, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 630 n. 8; id., at 663-671 (dissenting opinion). The Fifth Amendment is wholly inapplicable to state laws; and surely the Commerce Clause cannot be seriously relied on to sustain the Act here challenged. With no specific clause of the Constitution [400 U.S. 112, 216] empowering Congress to enact 202, I fail to see how that nebulous judicial construct, the right to travel, can do so. </s> C. Literacy </s> The remaining provision of the Voting Rights Act Amendments involved in these cases is the five-year suspension of Arizona's requirement that registrants be able to read the Constitution in English and to write their names. Although the issue is not free from difficulty, I am of the opinion that this provision can be sustained as a valid means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amendment. </s> Despite the lack of evidence of specific instances of discriminatory application or effect, Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation, and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application, either conscious or unconscious. 94 This danger of violation of 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment was sufficient to authorize the exercise of congressional power under 2. </s> Whether to engage in a more particularized inquiry into the extent and effects of discrimination, either as a condition precedent or as a condition subsequent to suspension of literacy tests, was a choice for Congress to make. 95 The fact that the suspension is only for five years will require Congress to re-evaluate at the close of that period. While a less sweeping approach [400 U.S. 112, 217] in this delicate area might well have been appropriate, the choice which Congress made was within the range of the reasonable. 96 I therefore agree that 201 of the Act is a valid exercise of congressional power to the extent it is involved in this case. I express no view about its validity as applied to suspend tests such as educational qualifications, which do not lend themselves so readily to discriminatory application or effect. </s> For the reasons expressed in this opinion, I would grant the relief requested in Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig. I would dismiss the complaint in No. 47, Orig., for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. In No. 46, Orig., I would grant declaratory relief with respect to the validity of 201 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments as applied to Arizona's current literacy test; I would deny relief in all other respects, with leave to reapply to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona for injunctive relief in the event it proves necessary, which I am confident it will not. </s> V </s> In conclusion I add the following. The consideration that has troubled me most in deciding that the 18-year-old and residency provisions of this legislation should be held unconstitutional is whether I ought to regard the doctrine of stare decisis as preventing me from arriving at that result. For as I indicated at the outset of this opinion, were I to continue to consider myself constricted by recent past decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches [400 U.S. 112, 218] state electoral processes, I would, particularly perforce of the decisions cited in n. 84, supra, be led to cast my vote with those of my Brethren who are of the opinion that the lowering of the voting age and the abolition of state residency requirements in presidential elections are within the ordinary legislative power of Congress. </s> After much reflection I have reached the conclusion that I ought not to allow stare decisis to stand in the way of casting my vote in accordance with what I am deeply convinced the Constitution demands. In the annals of this Court few developments in the march of events have so imperatively called upon us to take a fresh hard look at past decisions, which could well be mustered in support of such developments, as do the legislative lowering of the voting age and, albeit to a lesser extent, the elimination of state residential requirements in presidential elections. Concluding, as I have, that such decisions cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny, I think it my duty to depart from them, rather than to lend my support to perpetuating their constitutional error in the name of stare decisis. </s> In taking this position, I feel fortified by the evident malaise among the members of the Court with those decisions. Despite them, a majority of the Court holds that this congressional attempt to lower the voting age by simple legislation is unconstitutional, insofar as it relates to state elections. Despite them, four members of the Court take the same view of this legislation with respect to federal elections as well; and the fifth member of the Court who considers the legislation constitutionally infirm as regards state elections relies not at all on any of those decisions in reaching the opposite conclusion in federal elections. And of the eight members of the Court who vote to uphold the residential provision of the statute, [400 U.S. 112, 219] only four appear to rely upon any of those decisions in reaching that result. </s> In these circumstances I am satisfied that I am free to decide these cases unshackled by a line of decisions which I have felt from the start entailed a basic departure from sound constitutional principle. </s> APPENDIX TO OPINION OF HARLAN, J. </s> VOTING RIGHTS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, PUB. L. 91-285, 84 STAT. 314 </s> TITLE II - SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS </s> APPLICATION OF PROHIBITION TO OTHER STATES </s> SEC. 201. (a) Prior to August 6, 1975, no citizen shall be denied, because of his failure to comply with any test or device, the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election conducted in any State or political subdivision of a State as to which the provisions of section 4 (a) of this Act are not in effect by reason of determinations made under section 4 (b) of this Act. </s> (b) As used in this section, the term "test or device" means any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class. </s> RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING </s> SEC. 202. (a) The Congress hereby finds that the imposition and application of the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and the lack of sufficient [400 U.S. 112, 220] opportunities for absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections - </s> (1) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to vote for their President and Vice President; </s> (2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement across State lines; </s> (3) denies or abridges the privileges and immunities guaranteed to the citizens of each State under article IV, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution; </s> (4) in some instances has the impermissible purpose or effect of denying citizens the right to vote for such officers because of the way they may vote; </s> (5) has the effect of denying to citizens the equality of civil rights, and due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment; and </s> (6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential elections. </s> (b) Upon the basis of these findings, Congress declares that in order to secure and protect the above-stated rights of citizens under the Constitution, to enable citizens to better obtain the enjoyment of such rights, and to enforce the guarantees of the fourteenth amendment, it is necessary (1) to completely abolish the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for President and Vice President, and (2) to establish nationwide, uniform standards relative to absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections. </s> (c) No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any election for President and Vice President shall be denied the right to vote for electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of the failure of such citizen to comply with any durational residency [400 U.S. 112, 221] requirement of such State or political subdivision; nor shall any citizen of the United States be denied the right to vote for electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of the failure of such citizen to be physically present in such State or political subdivision at the time of such election, if such citizen shall have complied with the requirements prescribed by the law of such State or political subdivision providing for the casting of absentee ballots in such election. </s> (d) For the purposes of this section, each State shall provide by law for the registration or other means of qualification of all duly qualified residents of such State who apply, not later than thirty days immediately prior to any presidential election, for registration or qualification to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice President or for President and Vice President in such election; and each State shall provide by law for the casting of absentee ballots for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, by all duly qualified residents of such State who may be absent from their election district or unit in such State on the day such election is held and who have applied therefore not later than seven days immediately prior to such election and have returned such ballots to the appropriate election official of such State not later than the time of closing of the polls in such State on the day of such election. </s> (e) If any citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political subdivision in any election for President and Vice President has begun residence in such State or political subdivision after the thirtieth day next preceding such election and, for that reason, does not satisfy the registration requirements of such State or political subdivision he shall be allowed to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice [400 U.S. 112, 222] President, or for President and Vice President, in such election, (1) in person in the State or political subdivision in which he resided immediately prior to his removal if he had satisfied, as of the date of his change of residence, the requirements to vote in that State or political subdivision, or (2) by absentee ballot in the State or political subdivision in which he resided immediately prior to his removal if he satisfies, but for his nonresident status and the reason for his absence, the requirements for absentee voting in that State or political subdivision. </s> (f) No citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote by absentee ballot in any State or political subdivision in any election for President and Vice President shall be denied the right to vote for the choice of electors for President and Vice President, or for President and Vice President, in such election because of any requirement of registration that does not include a provision for absentee registration. </s> (g) Nothing in this section shall prevent any State or political subdivision from adopting less restrictive voting practices than those that are prescribed herein. </s> SEPARABILITY </s> SEC. 205. If any provision of this Act or the application of any provision thereof to any person or circumstance is judicially determined to be invalid, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected by such determination. </s> TITLE III - REDUCING VOTING AGE TO EIGHTEEN IN FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL ELECTIONS </s> DECLARATION AND FINDINGS </s> SEC. 301. (a) The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and application of the requirement that a [400 U.S. 112, 223] citizen be twenty-one years of age as a precondition to voting in any primary or in any election - </s> (1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional rights of citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote - a particularly unfair treatment of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed upon such citizens; </s> (2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution; and </s> (3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest. </s> (b) In order to secure the constitutional rights set forth in subsection (a), the Congress declares that it is necessary to prohibit the denial of the right to vote to citizens of the United States eighteen years of age or over. </s> PROHIBITION </s> SEC. 302. Except as required by the Constitution, no citizen of the United States who is otherwise qualified to vote in any State or political subdivision in any primary or in any election shall be denied the right to vote in any such primary or election on account of age if such citizen is eighteen years of age or older. </s> EFFECTIVE DATE </s> SEC. 305. The provisions of title III shall take effect with respect to any primary or election held on or after January 1, 1971. </s> ARIZONA CONSTITUTION </s> Art. 7, 2. No person shall be entitled to vote at any general election, or for any office that now is, or hereafter may be, elective by the people, or upon any question [400 U.S. 112, 224] which may be submitted to a vote of the people, unless such person be a citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one years or over, and shall have resided in the State one year immediately preceding such election, provided that qualifications for voters at a general election for the purpose of electing presidential electors shall be as prescribed by law. The word "citizen" shall include persons of the male and female sex. </s> ARIZONA REVISED STATUTES ANNOTATED </s> 16-101. Qualifications of elector </s> A. Every resident of the state is qualified to become an elector and may register to vote at all elections authorized by law if he: </s> 1. Is a citizen of the United States. </s> 2. Will be twenty-one years or more of age prior to the regular general election next following his registration. </s> 3. Will have been a resident of the state one year and of the county in which he claims the right to vote thirty days next preceding the election. </s> 4. Is able to read the constitution of the United States in the English language in a manner showing that he is neither prompted nor reciting from memory, unless prevented from so doing by physical disability. </s> 5. Is able to write his name, unless prevented from so doing by physical disability. </s> B. At an election held between the date of registration and the next regular general election, the elector is eligible to vote if at the date of the intervening election he is twenty-one years of age and has been a resident of the state one year and the county thirty days. </s> C. A person convicted of treason or a felony, unless restored to civil rights, or an idiot, insane person or person under guardianship is not qualified to register. As amended, Laws 1970, c. 151, 1. [400 U.S. 112, 225] </s> 16-107. Closing of registrations </s> A. No elector shall be registered to vote between five o'clock p. m. of the day which is two months preceding the date of the next primary election and seven o'clock p. m. of the day of the primary election. </s> B. No elector shall be registered to vote between five o'clock p. m. of the eighth Monday preceding a general election and seven o'clock p. m. of the day thereof. As amended, Laws 1958, c. 48, 1; Laws 1970, c. 151, 5. </s> IDAHO CONSTITUTION </s> Art. 6, 2. Qualifications of electors. - Except as in this article otherwise provided, every male or female citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state or territory for six months, and in the country where he or she offers to vote, thirty days next preceding the day of election, if registered as provided by law, is a qualified elector; provided however, that every citizen of the United States, twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state for sixty days next preceding the day of election, if registered as required by law, is a qualified elector for the sole purpose of voting for presidential electors; and until otherwise provided by the legislature, women who have the qualifications prescribed in this article may continue to hold such school offices and vote at such school elections as provided by the laws of Idaho territory. </s> IDAHO CODE </s> Sec. 34-401. Qualifications of voters. - Every person over the age of twenty-one (21) years, possessing the qualifications following, shall be entitled to vote at all elections: He shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have resided in this state six (6) months immediately preceding the election at which he offers to vote, [400 U.S. 112, 226] and in the county thirty (30) days: provided, that no person shall be permitted to vote at any county seat election who has not resided in the county six (6) months, and in the precinct ninety (90) days, where he offers to vote; nor shall any person be permitted to vote at any election for the division of the county, or striking off from any county any part thereof, who has not the qualifications provided for in section 3, article 18, of the constitution; nor shall any person be denied the right to vote at any school district election, nor to hold any school district office on account of sex. </s> 34-408. Eligibility of new residents to vote. - Each citizen of the United States who, immediately prior to his removal to this state, was a citizen of another state and who has been a resident of this state for sixty (60) days next preceding the day of election but for less than the six (6) month period of required residence for voting prior to a presidential election, is entitled to vote for presidential and vice-presidential electors at that election, but for no other offices, if </s> (1) he otherwise possesses the substantive qualifications to vote in this state, except the requirement of residence and registration, and </s> (2) he complies with the provisions of this act. </s> 34-409. Application for presidential ballot by new residents. - A person desiring to qualify under this act in order to vote for presidential and vice-presidential electors shall be considered as registered within the meaning of this act if on or before ten (10) days prior to the date of the general election, he shall make an application in the form of an affidavit executed in duplicate in the presence of the county auditor, substantially as follows . . . . </s> 34-413. Voting by new residents. - (1) The applicant, upon receiving the ballot for presidential and vice-presidential electors shall mark forthwith the ballot in the [400 U.S. 112, 227] presence of the county auditor, but in a manner that the official cannot know how the ballot is marked. He shall then fold the ballot in the county auditor's presence so as to conceal the markings, and deposit and seal it in an envelope furnished by the county auditor. </s> 34-1101. Absent voting authorized. - Any qualified elector of the state of Idaho who is absent or expects to be absent from the election precinct in which he resides on the day of holding any election under any of the laws of this state in which an official ballot is required, or who is within the election precinct and is, or will be, unable, because of physical disability, or because of blindness, to go to the voting place, and if registration is required for such election, who is duly registered therefor, may vote at any such election, as hereinafter provided. </s> 34-1105. Return of ballot. - On marking such ballot or ballots such absent or disabled or blind elector shall refold same as theretofore folded and shall inclose the same in said official envelope and seal said envelope securely and mail by registered or certified mail or deliver it in person to the officer who issued same; provided, that an absentee ballot must be received by the issuing officer by 12:00 o'clock noon on the day of the election before such ballot may be counted. Said ballot or ballots shall be so marked, folded and sealed by said voter in private and secretly. Provided, that whenever the disability or blindness makes it necessary that the voter shall be assisted in marking his ballot, such voter may have the assistance of any person of his choice in marking his ballot. </s> OREGON CONSTITUTION </s> Art. II, 2. Qualifications of electors. (1) Every citizen of the United States is entitled to vote in all elections not otherwise provided for by this Constitution if such citizen: </s> (a) Is 21 years of age or older . . . . [400 U.S. 112, 228] </s> TEXAS CONSTITUTION </s> Art. 6, 1. Classes of persons not allowed to vote </s> Section 1. The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this State, to wit: </s> First: Persons under twenty-one (21) years of age. </s> Second: Idiots and lunatics. </s> Third: All paupers supported by any county. </s> Fourth: All persons convicted of any felony, subject to such exceptions as the Legislature may make. </s> 2. Qualified elector; registration; absentee voting </s> Sec. 2. Every person subject to none of the foregoing disqualifications who shall have attained the age of twenty-one (21) years and who shall be a citizen of the United States and who shall have resided in this State one (1) year next preceding an election and the last six (6) months within the district or county in which such person offers to vote, shall be deemed a qualified elector; provided, however, that before offering to vote at an election a voter shall have registered annually, but such requirement for registration shall not be considered a qualification of an elector within the meaning of the term "qualified elector" as used in any other Article of this Constitution in respect to any matter except qualification and eligibility to vote at an election. Any legislation enacted in anticipation of the adoption of this Amendment shall not be invalid because of its anticipatory nature. The Legislature may authorize absentee voting. And this provision of the Constitution shall be self-enacting without the necessity of further legislation. </s> TEXAS ELECTION CODE </s> Article 5.01. Classes of persons not qualified to vote </s> The following classes of persons shall not be allowed to vote in this state: </s> 1. Persons under twenty-one years of age. </s> 2. Idiots and lunatics. [400 U.S. 112, 229] </s> 3. All paupers supported by the county. </s> 4. All persons convicted of any felony except those restored to full citizenship and right of suffrage or pardoned. </s> Art. 5.02. Qualification and requirements for voting </s> Every person subject to none of the foregoing disqualifications who shall have attained the age of twenty-one years and who shall be a citizen of the United States and who shall have resided in this state one year next preceding an election and the last six months within the district or county in which such person offers to vote, and who shall have registered as a voter, shall be deemed a qualified elector. No person shall be permitted to vote unless he has registered in accordance with the provisions of this code. The provisions of this section, as modified by Sections 35 and 39 of this code, shall apply to all elections, including general, special, and primary elections, whether held by the state, by a county, municipality, or other political subdivision of the state, or by a political party. </s> [Footnote 1 The Attorney General of the United States, a citizen of New York, is named as defendant. The jurisdictional basis alleged is Art. III, 2, which gives this Court original jurisdiction over controversies [400 U.S. 112, 153] between a State and a citizen of another State. We held a similar suit justiciable and otherwise within our original jurisdiction in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). The parties have not asked us to re-examine the validity of that ruling, and since the Court has not undertaken to do so, I am content to sustain jurisdiction on the authority of that decision. </s> [Footnote 2 In response to inquiries from the Attorney General, Arizona, Oregon, and Texas indicated willingness to abide by 202 of the Act, governing residency, registration, and absentee voting in presidential elections and to conform conflicting state laws. </s> [Footnote 3 The account in the text is largely drawn from J. James, The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment (1956) (hereafter James), and to some extent from W. Gillette, The Right To Vote: Politics and the Passage of the Fifteenth Amendment (1969) (hereafter Gillette), and B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction (1914) (hereafter Kendrick), as well. </s> [Footnote 4 "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." </s> [Footnote 5 See infra, at 209-212, for the text of these provisions, and for discussion of the contention that they empower Congress to set qualifications of voters in federal elections. </s> [Footnote 6 "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government." </s> [Footnote 7 E. g., Proclamation of May 29, 1865, 13 Stat. 760 (North Carolina). </s> [Footnote 8 The texts of the state constitutions are most readily available in F. Thorpe, The Federal and State Constitutions (1909). The qualifications imposed by the various States three years later, when the Fifteenth Amendment was proposed, are presented in tabular form in Hearings on the Voting Rights Bill, S. 1564, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 128-129 (1965). </s> [Footnote 9 James 33. </s> [Footnote 10 See Globe 209 (Freedmen's Bureau Bill); Globe 211 (Civil Rights Bill). </s> [Footnote 11 While formally further consideration was postponed until a date in April, six weeks off, Globe 1095, it was generally understood that "April means indefinitely." 2 Nation 289 (Mar. 1. 1866), quoted in James 87. </s> [Footnote 12 The only change made in 1 was the addition of the Citizenship Clause by the Senate. Globe 3041. The primary change made in 2 was to condition reduction of representation on denial or abridgment of the right to vote in certain named elections, rather than to speak generally of denial or abridgment of "the elective franchise." Ibid. That section now reads: "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." </s> [Footnote 13 Section 1 of that Act provided in part that "all persons . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding." Act of Apr. 9, 1866, 1, 14 Stat. 27. </s> [Footnote 14 In this connection, Professor Fairman's admonition of 20 years ago is even more forceful than it was when he wrote: "We know so much more about the constitutional law of the Fourteenth Amendment than the men who adopted it that we should [400 U.S. 112, 163] remind ourselves not to be surprised to find them vague where we want them to prove sharp. Eighty years of adjudication has taught us distinctions and subtleties where the men of 1866 did not even perceive the need for analysis." Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 9 (1949). </s> [Footnote 15 See, e. g., Globe 599 (Sen. Trumbull); Globe 1117 (Cong. Wilson of Iowa, quoting Kent's Commentaries and Bouvier's Law Dictionary); Globe 1152 (Cong. Thayer). There were some, however, who considered the distinction either nonexistent or too uncertain to be [400 U.S. 112, 164] a basis for legislation. E. g., Globe 477 (Sen. Saulsbury); Globe 1157 (Cong. Thornton); Globe 1292-1293 (Cong. Bingham). It hardly seems necessary to point out that the jurisprudential concept of "political" as opposed to "civil" or "natural" rights bears no relation to that class of nonjusticiable issues perhaps inappropriately known as "political questions." See the opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, ante, at 137-140. </s> [Footnote 16 See generally Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5 (1949), especially at 8-9. </s> [Footnote 17 The remarks of these three Democrats, Niblack, Boyer, and Rogers, are discussed infra, at 182-185. Also discussed there are the remarks of a fourth Democratic Representative, Phelps, which were delivered before the start of debate on the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. </s> [Footnote 18 While this provision might seem useless in light of the Fifteenth Amendment, it was doubtless intended to prohibit the imposition of property or literacy qualifications which, even though fairly applied, would have the effect of disfranchising most of the Negroes. The Radicals had sought to prohibit such qualifications in the Fifteenth Amendment, but were unsuccessful. See Gillette 53, 56-62, 69-72, 76. </s> [Footnote 19 While the history indicates that the supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been surprised at the suggestion that the Amendment brought qualifications for state office under federal supervision, officeholding was not the focus of attention during the consideration of the Amendment. Moreover, state [400 U.S. 112, 168] power to set voter qualifications, unlike state power to set qualifications for office, is explicitly recognized not only in the original Constitution but in 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment itself. Whether these distinctions are sufficient to justify testing state qualifications for office by the Fourteenth Amendment is a matter not presented by these cases. Where the state action has a racial basis, see Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964), I am not prepared to assume that the Fifteenth Amendment provides no protection. Despite the statement in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, post, at 252, I would find it surprising if a State could undercut the right to vote by taking steps to ensure that all candidates are unpalatable to voters of a certain race. Although an explicit provision on officeholding was deleted from the proposed Fifteenth Amendment at the eleventh hour, the idea that the right to vote without more implies the right to be voted for was specifically referred to by supporters of the Fifteenth Amendment in both Houses of Congress. See Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1425-1426 (1869) (Cong. Boutwell); id., at 1426 (Cong. Butler); id., at 1629 (Sen. Sawyer). </s> [Footnote 20 Hearings, supra, n. 8, at 128-129. </s> [Footnote 21 See, e. g., Globe 141-142 (Cong. Blaine); Globe 2766-2767 (Sen. Howard); Globe 2769-2770 (Sens. Wade and Wilson); Globe 3033 (Sen. Henderson). </s> [Footnote 22 The Journal is reprinted in Kendrick, supra, n. 3, at 37-129. </s> [Footnote 23 The attempts were not altogether successful. See James 108-109. </s> [Footnote 24 See generally Kendrick 18-22. For reasons to be developed below, infra, at 197, the report of the Joint Committee, H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866), is less useful as an indication of the understanding of the Committee and the Congress than as an indication of the understanding of the ratifying States. </s> [Footnote 25 Owen's account of the Fourteenth Amendment is given in Political Results from the Varioloid, 35 Atlantic Monthly 660 (June 1875). </s> [Footnote 26 See James 109-112; Gillette 24; Owen, supra, n. 25, at 666. </s> [Footnote 27 See the votes on Steven's motion to select the alternative which reduced representation rather than that which prohibited racial restrictions on the ballot, Kendrick 52; Boutwell's motion to condition readmission of Tennessee on that State's agreement not to discriminate in its voter qualifications, Kendrick 70; Stevens' motion to strike out the provision of the Owen plan enfranchising Negroes after 1876, Kendrick 101; and the motion to condition readmission of Tennessee and Arkansas on their having provided impartial male suffrage, as well as on conforming their laws and constitutions to the requirements of the proposed amendment (which included Bingham's provision when this motion was made), Kendrick 109. Bingham was not, however, wholly opposed to Negro suffrage. As chairman of the subcommittee, he reported the equal-rights provision which would have empowered Congress to provide for equal political rights and privileges, Kendrick 56, although he was the one who subsequently had that replaced with the first equal-rights provision reported to Congress. Kendrick 61. As already noted, the substitute contained substantially identical language, but omitted reference to political rights and privileges. Bingham also voted for Owen's plan, which would have enfranchised Negroes in 1876, when it was first presented. Kendrick 85. In February 1867 he moved to condition readmission of the Southern States on impartial male suffrage as well as on the States' ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment and conforming their laws thereto. Kendrick 123. </s> [Footnote 28 While any guess as to the motives of Bingham and the other members of the committee is sheer speculation, it is not necessarily true that they believed they were replacing specific language with [400 U.S. 112, 174] general. The author of the original plan, for one, seems to have taken the opposite view. He gave the following characterization of 1 some years later: "A declaration who is a citizen: unnecessary, if we had given suffrage to the negro; since there could be no possible doubt that an elector, native-born, is a citizen of the United States. Also a specification of the particular civil rights to be assured: out of place, I think, in a constitutional amendment, though necessary and proper in a civil rights bill." Owen, supra, n. 25, at 666 (emphasis added). </s> [Footnote 29 The proceedings of the Joint Committee are examined in greater detail in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL. Post, at 257-263. I agree with their apparent conclusion that the Journal sheds little light on the contemporary construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. One is left to do what he can with the two facts noted at the outset of this section: that of the plans considered by the Joint Committee, all provided either for reduction of representation or for enfranchisement while none provided for both at the same time; and that the Committee consistently rejected provisions to enfranchise the freedmen, with the conceivable exception of a plan which was defeated in the House largely because of the scope of the powers it transferred from the States to the Federal Government. </s> [Footnote 30 Unless, of course, one adopts a "conspiracy theory" of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus far no one has (quite) done so in this context. </s> [Footnote 31 "I regret more than I shall be able to tell this House that we have not found the situation [sic] of affairs in this country such, and the public virtue such that we might come out on the plain, unanswerable proposition that every adult intelligent citizen of the United States, unconvicted of crime, shall enjoy the right of suffrage." Globe 2462. </s> [Footnote 32 "I shall, Mr. Speaker, vote for this amendment; not because I approve it. Could I have controlled the report of the committee of fifteen, it would have proposed to give the right of suffrage to every loyal man in the country." Globe 2469. "So far as I am individually concerned, I object to the amendment as a whole, because it does not go far enough and propose to at once enfranchise every loyal man in the country." Ibid. </s> [Footnote 33 "The proposition in the matter of suffrage falls short of what I desire, but so far as it goes it tends to the equalization of the inequality at present existing; and while I demand and shall continue to demand the franchise for all loyal male citizens of this country - and I cannot but admit the possibility that ultimately those eleven States may be restored to representative power without the right of franchise being conferred upon the colored people - I should feel myself doubly humiliated and disgraced, and criminal even, if I hesitated to do what I can for a proposition which equalizes representation." Globe 2508. </s> [Footnote 34 "The second section, Mr. Speaker, is, in my judgment, as nearly correct as it can be without being fully, in full measure, right. But one thing is right, and that is secured by the amendment. Manifestly no State should have its basis of national representation enlarged by reason of a portion of citizens within its borders to which the elective franchise is denied. If political power shall be lost because of such denial, not imposed because of participation in rebellion or other crime, it is to be hoped that political interests may work in the line of justice, and that the end will be the impartial enfranchisement of all citizens not disqualified by crime. Whether that end shall be attained or not, this will be secured: that the measure of political power of any State shall be determined by that portion of its citizens which can speak and act at the polls, and shall not be enlarged because of the residence within the State of portions of its citizens denied the right of franchise. So much for the second section of the amendment. It is not all that I wish and would demand; but odious inequalities are removed by it and representation will be equalized, and the political rights of all citizens will under its operation be, as we believe, ultimately recognized and admitted." Globe 2511. </s> [Footnote 35 "I did hope to see the rights of the freedom completely established . . . . I did hope . . . that we should have the manhood and magnanimity to declare that men who have wielded the sword in defense of their country are fit to be intrusted with the ballot. But I am convinced that my expectations, hitherto fondly cherished, are doomed to some disappointment." Globe 2537. </s> [Footnote 36 "This is a step in the right direction; and although I should prefer to see incorporated into the Constitution a guarantee of universal suffrage, as we cannot get the required two thirds for that, I cordially support this proposition as the next best." Globe 2540. </s> [Footnote 37 [If the freed slaves had been added] to the thinking, voting men of the southern States, it would be just and proper that that addition should be represented in this body. But we all know that such is not the case. In those States themselves the late slaves do not enter into the basis of local representation. . . . "Would it not be a most unprecedented thing that when this population are not permitted where they reside to enter into the basis of representation in their own State, we should receive it as an element of representation here . . . ." Globe 2464. </s> [Footnote 38 "The second proposition is, in short, to limit the representation of the several States as those States themselves shall limit suffrage. . . . ". . . And why not? If the negroes of the South are not to be counted as a political element in the government of the South in the States, why should they be counted as a political element in the government of the country in the Union? If they are not to be counted as against the southern people themselves, why should they be counted as against us?" Globe 2498. </s> [Footnote 39 H. R. 51 "deprived [the southern States] of all inducement for [the] gradual admission [of the freemen] to the right of suffrage, inasmuch as it exacted universal suffrage as the only condition upon which they should be counted in the basis of representation at all. . . . I voted against a proposition which seemed to me so unjust and so injurious, not only to the whites of the southern States, but to the colored race itself. Well, sir, that amendment was rejected in the Senate, and the proposition, as embodied in the committee's report, comes before us in a very different form. It is now proposed to base representation upon suffrage, upon the number of voters, instead of upon the aggregate population in every State of the Union. And as I believe that to be essentially just, and likely to remedy the unequal representation of which complaint is so justly made, I shall give it my vote." Globe 2502. Later, in discussion of 3, which at that time would have [400 U.S. 112, 180] disfranchised certain rebels in federal elections, Raymond remarked that the effect would be to allow "one fifth, one eighth, or one tenth, as the case may be, of the people of these southern States to elect members from those States, to hold seats upon this floor." Ibid. It is obvious that the possibility of Negroes' voting in these elections did not cross his mind. </s> [Footnote 40 "But this House is not prepared to enfranchise all men; the nation, perhaps, is not prepared for it to-day; the colored race are not prepared for it, probably, and I am sure the rebels are unfit for it; and as Congress has not the moral courage to vote for it, then put in this provision which cuts off the traitor from all political power in the nation, and then we have secured to the loyal men that control which they so richly deserve." Globe 2505. </s> [Footnote 41 "This amendment will settle the complication in regard to suffrage and representation, leaving each State to regulate that for itself, so that it will be for it to decide whether or not it shall have a representation for all its male citizens not less than twenty-one years of age." Globe 2510. </s> [Footnote 42 "I have no doubt that the Government of the United States has full power to extend the elective franchise to the colored population of the insurgent States. I mean authority; I said power. I have no doubt that the Government of the United States has authority to do this under the Constitution; but I do not think they have the power. The distinction I make between authority and power is this: we have, in the nature of our Government, the right to do it; but the public opinion of the country is such at this precise moment as to make it impossible we should do it. It was therefore most wise on the part of the committee on reconstruction to waive this matter in deference to public opinion." Globe 2532. </s> [Footnote 43 "If South Carolina persists in withholding the ballot from the colored man, then let her take the alternative we offer, of confining her to the white basis of representation . . . ." Globe 2535. </s> [Footnote 44 Spalding's speeches are given at Globe 2509-2510. His only remarks addressed to 1 and 2 read: "As to the first measure proposed, a person may read it five hundred years hence without gathering from it any idea that this rebellion ever existed. The same may be said of the second proposition, for it only proposes that, the bondsmen being made free, the apportionment of Representatives in Congress shall be based upon the whole number of persons who exercise the elective franchise, instead of the population." Globe 2509. A month later, in the debate over the Amendment when it had returned from the Senate, Spalding expressed his views more clearly: "I say, as an individual, that I would more cheerfully give my vote if that provision allowed all men of proper age whom we have made free to join in the exercise of the right of suffrage in this country. But if I cannot obtain all that I wish, I will go heartily to secure all we can obtain." Globe 3146. </s> [Footnote 45 Longyear's speech is published at Globe 2536-2537. He did not in terms address himself to any section except the third. However, it is not difficult to read his statement that the proposals of the Joint Committee disappointed "the expectations of the people" and his personal hopes as having reference to the absence of any provision on suffrage. </s> [Footnote 46 Shellabarger spoke only briefly, and this in connection with the disfranchising section. In the course of his remarks he expressed the view that congressional power to regulate voter qualifications in federal elections was granted by Art. I, 4. Globe 2512. </s> [Footnote 47 "Why is it that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. STEVENS] gives up universal suffrage? Why is it that he and other gentlemen give up universal confiscation? Why is it that other gentlemen give up universal butchery of that people? It is a compromise of what they call principle for the purpose of saving their party in the next fall election." Globe 2506. </s> [Footnote 48 "Gentlemen here admit that they desire [federal control over suffrage], but that the weak kneed of their party are not equal to the issue. Your purpose is the same, and but for that timidity you would now ingraft negro suffrage upon our Constitution and force it on the entire people of this Union." Globe 2530. </s> [Footnote 49 "While this [second] section admits the right of the States thus to exclude negroes from voting, it says to them, if you do so exclude them they shall also be excluded from all representation; and you shall suffer the penalty by loss of representation." Globe 3145. </s> [Footnote 50 Boyer's speech was made in opposition to a proposal to enfranchise Negroes in the District of Columbia. He then thought Negro suffrage a "monstrous proposition," Globe 176, which was incompatible with "the broad general principle that this is, and of right ought to be, a white man's Government." Globe 175. One of Rogers' harangues on the subject came in connection with the same bill. There he spoke of "the monstrous doctrine of political equality of the negro race with the white at the ballot-box," Globe 198, and launched into an attack remarkable for its vitriol. </s> [Footnote 51 Boyer viewed 3, which at that time would have prohibited voluntary participants in the rebellion from voting in federal elections, as "the most objectionable of all the parts," Globe 2467, as it would disfranchise nine-tenths of the voting population of the South for more than four years. The second section he found objectionable as designed "to reduce the number of southern representatives in Congress and in the Electoral College; and also to operate as a standing inducement to negro suffrage." Globe 2467. These remarks indicate no awareness that the first section would increase the number of voters in the Southern States and also render any "inducement" to Negro suffrage unnecessary. Rogers later in his speech asserted: "The committee dare not submit the broad proposition to the people of the United States of negro suffrage. They dare not to-day pass the negro suffrage bill which passed this House in the Senate of the United States because, as I have heard one honorable and leading man on the Republican side of the House say, it would [400 U.S. 112, 184] sink into oblivion the party that would advocate before the American people the equal right of the negro with the white man to suffrage." Globe 2538. When H. R. 127 was returned by the Senate with amendments, Rogers addressed the House and stated that when the records of the Joint Committee were made public, it would be revealed that the Committee at first agreed to recommend universal Negro suffrage, but reconsidered because of the force of public opinion. Globe App. 230. Rogers was himself a member of the Joint Committee, and he presumably was referring to the acceptance and then rejection of Owen's plan for enfranchisement in 1876. </s> [Footnote 52 The Amendment, however, had been released to the press on April 28. James 115. </s> [Footnote 53 It is not amiss to point out that whatever force Phelps' and Rogers' interpretations may have in the face of the contrary authority, even they foresaw no danger from the Equal Protection Clause as a source of federal power over the suffrage. </s> [Footnote 54 Like my colleagues, post, at 264, I find it difficult to understand what Bingham meant when he said that "the exercise of the elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of the Republic, is exclusively under the control of the States." Globe 2542. However, I do not find this mysterious sentence to mean that the exercise of the elective franchise is exclusively under the control of the States and Congress, nor do I find it to dilute the force of his explicit statements quoted above that 1 did not reach the right to vote. The general statements by Bingham and Stevens to the effect that the Amendment was designed to achieve equality before the law, or would be effectuated by legislation in part, likewise do not weaken the force of the statements specifically addressed to the suffrage question quoted above. </s> [Footnote 55 Fessenden, however, was present in the Senate and participated in the discussion. See Globe 2763, 2769, 2770. He was therefore in a position to correct any gross misinterpretation of his views or of those of the Committee. </s> [Footnote 56 My colleagues, post,at 264, point to Howard's reference to Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (CCED Pa. 1825), in order to "gather some intimation of what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary" on the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 1. Globe 2765. As the text indicates, Howard rejected Justice Washington's lengthy dictum insofar as it said that the protected privileges and immunities included "the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised." No other Senator quoted or referred to this portion of Washington's opinion during the debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. Corfield, which held that New Jersey could constitutionally restrict access to her oyster beds to her own residents, was the leading authority on privileges and immunities in the mind of the 39th Congress, but it was not the only one. Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535 (Md. 1797) (Samuel Chase, J.), and Abbot v. Bayley, 6 Pick. 89 (Mass. 1827) (Parker, C. J.), were also cited. See Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 12-15 (1949). Both specifically stated that the privileges and immunities protected by Art. IV, 2, did not include the right of suffrage or the right to hold office. </s> [Footnote 57 Howard was a very clear-spoken man. When it was suggested, during the debates over the Fifteenth Amendment, that the freedmen were entitled to the ballot by virtue of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, he recalled his role in the framing of that Amendment and said: "I feel constrained to say here now that this is the first time it ever occurred to me that the right to vote was to be derived from the fourteenth article. I think such a construction cannot be maintained." Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess., 1003 (1869). He then referred to the debates, 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact that "[n]obody ever supposed that the right of voting or of holding office was guaranteed by that second section of the fourth article of the old Constitution" to bolster his construction of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Ibid. </s> [Footnote 58 "I think our friends, the colored people of the South, should not be excluded from the right of voting, and they shall not be if my vote and the votes of a sufficient number who agree with me in Congress shall be able to carry it. I do not agree in this particular with the Senator from Michigan [Mr. Howard]. He yields to the provision in the committee's resolution on the subject reluctantly, because he does not believe three fourths of the States can be got to ratify that proposition which is right and just in itself. My own opinion is that if you go down to the very foundation of justice, so far from weakening yourself with the people, you will strengthen yourself immensely by it; but I know that it is not the opinion of many here, and I suppose we must accommodate ourselves to the will of majorities, and if we cannot do all we would, do all we can. I propose for myself to contend for all I can get in the right direction, and finally to go with those who will give us anything that is beneficial." Globe 2769. </s> [Footnote 59 "I should be much better satisfied if the right of suffrage had been given at once to the more intelligent of ["the colored people of the South"] and such as had served in our Army. . . . Believing that this amendment probably goes as far in favor of suffrage to the negro as is practicable to accomplish now, and hoping it may in the end accomplish all I desire in this respect, I shall vote for its adoption, although I should be glad to go further." Globe 2963-2964. </s> [Footnote 60 "It declares that all men are entitled to life, liberty, and property, and imposes upon the Government the duty of discharging these solemn obligations, but fails to adopt the easy and direct means for the attainment of the results proposed. It refuses the aid of four million people in maintaining the Government of the people. . . . [But] it furnishes a conclusive argument in favor of universal amnesty and impartial suffrage. . . . The utter impossibility of a final solution of the difficulties by the means proposed will cause the North to clamor for suffrage." Globe 2964. </s> [Footnote 61 "I am sorry to have to put that clause [ 2] into our Constitution, as I am sorry for the necessity which calls upon us to put the preceding clause into the Constitution. I wish there was no community and no State in the United States that was not [400 U.S. 112, 190] prepared to say with my friend from Nevada [Mr. Stewart] that all men may be represented in the Congress of the United States and shall be represented and shall choose their own representatives. That is the better doctrine; that is the true doctrine. I would much prefer, myself, to unite with the people of the United States in saying that hereafter no man shall be excluded from the right to vote, than to unite with them in saying that hereafter some men may be excluded from the right of representation." Globe App. 219. </s> [Footnote 62 Henderson, who had offered a direct enfranchising provision as an alternative to the Committee's first effort in the field of representation, see Globe App. 115, stated that he now recognized that "the country is not yet prepared" to share political power with Negroes, and he supported the Committee plan. Globe 3035. </s> [Footnote 63 "[A]lthough we do not obtain suffrage now, it is not far off, because the grasping desire of the South for office, that old desire to rule and reign over this Government and control its destinies, will at a very early day hasten the enfranchisement of the loyal blacks." Globe 3038. </s> [Footnote 64 "There is no reason why the white citizens of South Carolina should vote the political power of a class of people whom they say are entirely unfit to vote for themselves. If there is any portion of the people of this country who are unfit to vote for themselves, their neighbors ought not to vote for them." Globe 2986. There was no indication that Sherman considered South Carolina's disqualification on racial grounds any more improper than Massachusetts' limitations of the franchise to men, which he mentioned in the next breath. </s> [Footnote 65 "If you think the negro ought to have the right of voting; if you are in favor of it, and intend it shall be given, why do you not in plain words confer it upon them? It is much fairer than to seek it by indirection, and the people will distinctly understand you when you propose such a change of the Constitution." Globe 2939. </s> [Footnote 66 "What is to be the operation of this amendment? Just this: your whip is held over Pennsylvania, and you say to her that she must either allow her negroes to vote or have one member of Congress less." Globe 2987. </s> [Footnote 67 "[The second section's] true meaning was intended to be difficult to be reached, but when understood it is a measure which shrinks from the responsibility of openly forcing negro suffrage upon the late slave States, but attempts by a great penalty to coerce them to accept it." Globe App. 240. </s> [Footnote 68 "It says that each of the southern States, and, of course, each other State in the Union, has a right to regulate for itself the franchise, and that consequently, as far as the Government of the United States is concerned, if the black man is not permitted the right to the franchise, it will be a wrong (if a wrong) which the Government of the United States will be impotent to redress." Globe 3027. Johnson was the only Democratic Senator on the Joint Committee. </s> [Footnote 69 "With [the rebel States'] enlarged basis of representation, and exclusion of the loyal men of color from the ballot-box, I see no hope of safety unless in the prescription of proper enabling acts, which shall do justice to the freedmen and enjoin enfranchisement as a condition-precedent." Globe 3148. </s> [Footnote 70 Kelly: see Globe 2469, quoted at n. 32, supra. Farnsworth: see Globe 2540, quoted at n. 36, supra. Eliot: see Globe 2511, quoted at n. 34, supra. Higby: see Globe 3978 (debate over readmission of Tennessee despite all-white electorate). Bingham: see Globe 2542, quoted supra, at 185; see also Globe 3979 (debate over readmission of Tennessee). Stevens: see Globe 2459-2460, quoted supra, at 175-177; Globe 3148, quoted at n. 69, supra. Raymond: see Globe 2502, quoted at n. 39 supra. Ashley: see Globe 2882. Summer: see n. 71, infra. Fessenden: see H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., XIII-XIV (1866), quoted infra, at 197-198. Yates: see Globe 3038, quoted at n. 63, supra. Stewart: see Globe 2964, quoted at n. 60, supra. Wade: see Globe 2769, quoted at n. 58, supra. The exception is Senator Wilson of Massachusetts, who did not address himself to this issue. However, he participated in the debates, see Globe 2770, 2986-2987, and was therefore in a position to express disagreement with the interpretation uniformly offered in the Senate. Secondary reliance is placed on Shellabarger, Cook, Boutwell, Julian, and Lawrence of Ohio. These Representatives, with the exception of Boutwell, see n. 33, supra, did not participate significantly in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment. The substance of their earlier remarks is that Congress had some power, usually by way of the Guarantee Clause, see n. 6, supra, to oversee state voter qualifications. Shellabarger also relied on Art. I, 4, see n. 46, supra; infra, at 210; Julian relied on the Thirteenth Amendment; and Boutwell looked to the Declaration of Independence. The relevance of these views to the scope of 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is not apparent. </s> [Footnote 71 Stevens: see Globe 2459-2460, quoted supra, at 175-177; Globe 3148, quoted at n. 69, supra; James 163 (campaign speech in fall of 1866). Boutwell: see Globe 2508, quoted at n. 33, supra; Globe 3976 (debate over readmission of Tennessee). Sumner did not actually participate in the debates on H. R. 127. However, after the caucus of Republican Senators had agreed on the form of the Amendment, Sumner gave notice that he intended to move to amend the bill accompanying the proposed Amendment. This bill, S. 292, provided that any Confederate State might be readmitted to representation in Congress once the proposed Amendment had become part of the Constitution and the particular State should have ratified it and modified its constitution and laws in conformity therewith. The bill is reprinted in H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., V-VI, and in Kendrick 117-119. Summer's amendment would have provided that a State might be readmitted when it should have ratified the Fourteenth Amendment and modified its constitution and laws in conformity therewith "and shall have further provided that there shall be no denial of the elective franchise to citizens of the United States because of race or color, and that all persons shall be equal before the law." Globe 2869 (emphasis added). Sumner also referred to Negro suffrage as unfinished business in speeches that fall. James 173, 178. </s> [Footnote 72 For citations to the state materials, see Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 Stan. L. Rev. 5, 84-132 (1949). </s> [Footnote 73 Fear that the Amendment would reach voting was expressed in Brevier Legis. Rep. [Indiana] 45-46, 80, 88-89 (1867); Tenn. H. R. J. 38 (Extra Sess. 1866); Fla. S. J. 102 (1866); N.C. S. J. 96-97 (1866-1867); S. C. H. R. J. 34 (1866); and Tex. S. J. 422-423 (1866). The last four States rejected the proposed Amendment. Opponents of the Amendment stated or assumed that it would not reach voting qualifications in Ark. H. R. J. 288-289 (1866); Fla. S. J. 8-9 (1866); Report of the Joint Committee on Federal Relations, Md. H. R. Doc. MM, p. 15 (Mar. 18, 1867); Mass. H. R. Doc. No. 149, pp. 7-9, 16-17 (1867); and Wis. S. J. 102-103 (1867). Fla. H. R. J. 76-78 (1866); Ind. H. R. J. 102-103 (1867); and N. H. S. J. 71-72 (1866) are equivocal. </s> [Footnote 74 "Are not all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction, rightfully citizens of the United States and of each State, and justly entitled to all the political and civil rights citizenship confers? and should any State possess the power to divest them of these great rights except for treason or other infamous crime?" Ill. H. R. J. 40 (1867). </s> [Footnote 75 Ind. H. R. J. 47-48 (1867); Kan. S. J. 45 (1867); Maine S. J. 23 (1867); Mass. H. R. Doc. No. 149, pp. 25-26 (1867); Nev. S. J. App. 9 (1867); Vt. S. J. 28 (1866); W. Va. S. J. 19 (1867); Wis. Assembly J. 33 (1867). </s> [Footnote 76 H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., XIII-XIV (1866). </s> [Footnote 77 I have found references to only two such speeches, one by Senator Hendricks and the other by one George M. Morgan, a candidate for Congress in Ohio. Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Aug. 9, 1866, p. 1, col. 4, quoted in Fairman, supra, n. 14, at 72; Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Aug. 23, 1866, p. 2, col. 3, quoted in Fairman, supra, at 75. </s> [Footnote 78 See Gillette, supra, n. 3, at 25-27. </s> [Footnote 79 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589 (1964) (dissenting opinion). </s> [Footnote 80 Art. IV, 4. See n. 6, supra, for the text. </s> [Footnote 81 The contention that Congress has power to override state judgments as to qualifications for voting in federal elections is discussed infra, at 209-212. </s> [Footnote 82 Amdt. XV: "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. "Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Amdt. XIX: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex. "Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." Amdt. XXIV: "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax. "Sec. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." </s> [Footnote 83 See, e. g., Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966): "Our conclusion, like that in Reynolds v. Sims, [377 U.S. 533 (1964),] is founded not on what we think governmental policy should be, but on what the Equal Protection Clause requires." </s> [Footnote 84 Most of the cases in which this Court has used the Equal Protection Clause to strike down state voter qualifications have been decided since 1965. Eight such cases have been decided by opinion. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). Other cases have been summarily disposed of. In none of these cases did the Court advert to the argument based on the historical understanding. Before 1965, although this Court had occasionally entertained on the merits challenges to state voter qualifications under the Equal Protection Clause, only two cases had sustained the challenges. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927), held that a Texas statute limiting participation in the Democratic Party primary to whites violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932), held that Texas did not avoid the reach of the Herndon [400 U.S. 112, 204] decision by transferring to the party's executive committee the power to set qualifications for participation in the primary. In neither of the Nixon cases was the history of the Fourteenth Amendment suggested to the Court. Both cases were argued on the assumption that racial prohibitions on voting in state general elections would violate the Fourteenth as well as the Fifteenth Amendment. This potential line of decisions proved abortive when United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), laid the groundwork for holding that participation in party primaries was included within the "right . . . to vote" protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 614 n. 72 (1964) (dissenting opinion). The Nixon opinions were not relied on by the Court in the subsequent white-primary cases, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), and they were not even referred to in the recent cases on voter qualifications cited above. </s> [Footnote 85 In this particular instance the other two branches of the Government have in fact expressed conflicting views as to the validity of Title III of the Act, the voting-age provision. See H. R. Doc. No. 91-326 (1970). </s> [Footnote 86 In fact, however, I do not understand how the doctrine of deference to rational constitutional interpretation by Congress, espoused by the majority in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), is consistent with this statement of Chief Justice Marshall or [400 U.S. 112, 205] with our reaffirmation of it in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958): "[Marbury] declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system." </s> [Footnote 87 Contrast Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935), relied on by my colleagues. In that case the crucial factual issue, on which the record was silent, was whether casualty insurance companies not incorporated in Indiana "generally keep their funds and maintain their business offices, and their agencies for the settlement of claims, outside the state." 294 U.S., at 585 . </s> [Footnote 88 It might well be asked why this standard is not equally applicable to the congressional expansion of the franchise before us. Lowering of voter qualifications dilutes the voting power of those who could meet the higher standard, and it has been held that "the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (footnote omitted). Interference with state control over qualifications for voting in presidential elections in order to encourage interstate migration appears particularly vulnerable to analysis in terms of compelling federal interests. </s> [Footnote 89 Although MR. JUSTICE BLACK rests his decision in part on the assumption that the selection of presidential electors is a "federal" election, the Court held in In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890), and repeated in Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 224 -225 (1952), that presidential electors act by authority of the States and are not federal officials. </s> [Footnote 90 At the time these suits were filed only two of the 50 States, Georgia and Kentucky, allowed 18-year-olds to vote, and only two other States, Hawaii and Alaska, set the voting age below 21. In subsequent referenda, voters in 10 States declined to lower the voting age; five States lowered the voting age to 19 or 20; and Alaska lowered the age from 19 to 18. See the Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1970, p. A13, col. 5. </s> [Footnote 91 "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." </s> [Footnote 92 At the time the Constitution was adopted, additional restrictions based on payment of taxes and ownership of property, as well as creed and sex, were imposed, making the proposition even clearer. </s> [Footnote 93 See Art. II: "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." </s> [Footnote 94 The legislative history of the Voting Rights Act Amendments contain sufficient evidence to this effect, if any be needed. </s> [Footnote 95 Cf. 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438, which suspended literacy tests only in areas falling within a coverage formula and allowed reinstatement of the tests upon judicial determination that during the preceding five years no tests had been used with discriminatory purpose or effect. 42 U.S.C. 1973b (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), amended by Pub. L. No. 91-285 3, 84 Stat. 315. </s> [Footnote 96 I assume that reasonableness is the applicable standard, notwithstanding the fact that the instant legislation is challenged on the ground that it improperly dilutes the votes of literate Arizona citizens. But see Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); n. 88, supra. </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL dissent from the judgments insofar as they declare 302 unconstitutional as applied to state and local elections, and concur in the judgments in all other respects, for the following reasons. </s> These cases draw into question the power and judgment of Congress in enacting Titles II and III of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 314. The State of Arizona challenges the power of Congress to impose a nationwide ban, until August 6, 1975, on the use of literacy and certain other tests to limit the franchise in any election. The State of Idaho takes issue with the asserted congressional power to find that the imposition of a durational residence requirement to deny the right to vote in elections for President and Vice President imposes a burden upon the right of free interstate [400 U.S. 112, 230] migration that is not necessary to further a compelling state interest. 1 Finally, the States of Oregon, Texas, Arizona, and Idaho would have us strike down as unreasonable and beyond congressional power the findings, embodied in 301 (a) of the Amendments, that denying the vote to otherwise qualified persons 18 to 21 years of age, while granting it to those 21 years of age and older, violates the Equal Protection Clause and is, in any event, not reasonably related to any compelling state interest. 2 In Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., Oregon and Texas have invoked our original jurisdiction under Art. III, 2, of the Constitution to restrain the Attorney General of the United States, a citizen of New York, from enforcing the 18-year-old voting provisions of the Amendments. [400 U.S. 112, 231] South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966). In Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig., the United States seeks orders enjoining Arizona from enforcing age and literacy limitations on the franchise, 3 and enjoining Idaho from enforcing age, residence, and absentee voting limitations, 4 insofar as those limitations are inconsistent with the 1970 Amendments. Original jurisdiction, again, is founded upon Art. III, 2, of the Constitution. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 22 (1947). Since, in our view, congressional power to enact the challenged Amendments is found in the enforcement clauses of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and since we may easily perceive a rational basis for the congressional judgments underlying each of them, we would deny relief in Nos. 43, Orig., and 44, Orig., and issue the requested orders in Nos. 46, Orig., and 47, Orig. </s> I </s> The Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438, 42 U.S.C. 1973 et seq. (1964 ed., Supp. V), proscribed the use of any "test or device," 5 including literacy tests, in States [400 U.S. 112, 232] or their political subdivisions that fell within a coverage formula set forth in 4 (b) of the 1965 Act. 42 U.S.C. 1973b (a), (b) (1964 ed., Supp. V). Although we had previously concluded that literacy tests, fairly administered, violate neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment, Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), we nevertheless upheld their selective proscription by Congress. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Canvassing the "voluminous" legislative history of the 1965 Act, we found ample basis for a legislative conclusion that such a proscription was necessary to combat the "insidious and pervasive evil" of racial discrimination with regard to voting. Id., at 308-315. Accordingly, we held the proscription to be well within the power of Congress granted by 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id., at 327-334. Three years later, in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969), we sustained application of the ban on literacy tests to a county where there was no evidence that the test itself was discriminatory or that - at least since 1962 6 - it had been administered in a discriminatory manner. Notwithstanding this fact, we noted that the record did contain substantial evidence that in years past, "Gaston County [had] systematically deprived its black citizens of the educational opportunities it granted to its white citizens." Id., at 297. Since this "in turn deprived them of an equal chance to pass the literacy test," id., at 291, even impartial administration of an impartial test would inevitably result in just the discrimination that Congress [400 U.S. 112, 233] and the Fifteenth Amendment had sought to proscribe. Id., at 296-297; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 308 , 333-334. </s> No challenge is made in the present cases either to the 1965 Act or to the five-year extension of its ban on "tests or devices" embodied in Title I of the 1970 Amendments. Arizona does, however, challenge 201 of the Amendments, which extends (until August 6, 1975) the 1965 Act's selective ban on the use of "tests or devices" to all States and political subdivisions in which it is not already in force by virtue of the 1965 Act. In substance, Arizona argues that it is and has been providing education of equal quality for all its citizens; that its literacy test is both fair and fairly administered; and that there is no evidence in the legislative record upon which Congress could have relied to reach a contrary conclusion. It urges that to the extent that any citizens of Arizona have been denied the right to vote because of illiteracy resulting from discriminatory governmental practices, the unlawful discrimination has been by governments other than the State of Arizona or its political subdivisions. Arizona, it suggests, should not have its laws overridden to cure discrimination on the part of governmental bodies elsewhere in the country. </s> We need not question Arizona's assertions as to the nondiscriminatory character, past and present, of its educational system. Congressional power to remedy the evils resulting from state-sponsored racial discrimination does not end when the subject of that discrimination removes himself from the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred. "The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in range. It was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 , [400 U.S. 112, 234] 523 (1935); see Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 -176 (1941). In upholding the suspension of literacy tests as applied to Gaston County under the 1965 Act, we could see "no legal significance" in the possibility that adult residents of the county might have received their education "in other counties or States also maintaining segregated and unequal school systems." Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S., at 293 n. 9. 7 </s> The legislative history of the 1970 Amendments contains substantial information upon which Congress could have based a finding that the use of literacy tests in Arizona and in other States where their use was not proscribed by the 1965 Act has the effect of denying the vote to racial minorities whose illiteracy is the consequence of a previous, governmentally sponsored denial of equal educational opportunity. The Attorney General of Arizona told the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights that many older Indians in the State were "never privileged to attend a formal school." 8 Extensive testimony before both Houses indicated that racial minorities have long received inferior educational opportunities throughout the United States. 9 And interstate [400 U.S. 112, 235] migration of such persons, particularly of Negroes from the Southern States, has long been a matter of common knowledge. 10 </s> Moreover, Congress was given testimony explicitly relating the denial of educational opportunity to inability to pass literacy tests in States not covered by the formula contained in the 1965 Act. The United States Commission on Civil Rights reported a survey of the Northern and Western States which concluded that literacy tests have a negative impact upon voter registration which "falls most heavily on blacks and persons of Spanish surname." 11 With regard specifically to Arizona, the Chairman of the Navajo Tribal Council testified that a greater percentage of Navajos are registered in New Mexico, which has no literacy test, than in Arizona. 12 </s> In short, there is no question but that Congress could legitimately have concluded that the use of literacy tests anywhere within the United States has the inevitable effect of denying the vote to members of racial minorities whose inability to pass such tests is the direct consequence of previous governmental discrimination in education. Almost five years ago, we found in 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment an ample grant of legislative power for Congress to decree a selective proscription of such tests in certain portions of the country. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 327 -334. We have since held that power ample to cover the proscription of fair literacy tests, fairly administered, which [400 U.S. 112, 236] nevertheless operate to disenfranchise racial minorities because of previous governmental discrimination against them in education. Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S., at 287 , 289-293. Five years of experience with the 1965 Act persuaded Congress that a nationwide ban on literacy and other potentially discriminatory tests was necessary to prevent racial discrimination in voting throughout the country. That conclusion is amply supported in the legislative record and 201 of the 1970 Amendments is accordingly well within the scope of congressional power. </s> II </s> Section 202 of the 1970 Amendments abolishes all durational state residence requirements restricting the right to vote in presidential elections. In their place, Congress has undertaken to prescribe a uniform nationwide system of registration and absentee voting designed to allow all otherwise qualified persons to vote in such elections regardless of the length of time they have lived in a particular jurisdiction. 13 The States are required to keep open their registration rolls for presidential elections until 30 days preceding the election. 202 (d). Persons who have changed their residence within 30 days of the election are, if otherwise qualified, entitled to vote either in person or by absentee ballot in the State of their previous residence, 202 (e), and the States are compelled to permit the casting of absentee ballots by all properly qualified persons who have made application not less than seven days prior to the election, and returned the ballot to the appropriate officials not later than the closing of polls on election day. 202 (b), (d). Provision must also be made by the States to allow absentee registration. 202 (f). [400 U.S. 112, 237] </s> Idaho challenges the power of Congress to enact such legislation insofar as it conflicts with Idaho's statutory and constitutional provisions regarding durational residence requirements for voting; regarding absentee voting; and regarding absentee registration. 14 The State's argument in brief is that the Constitution has left to the States the power to set qualifications for voters in both state and federal elections, subject only to certain explicit limitations such as, for example, those imposed by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments. Admitting that unreasonable residence requirements may not withstand judicial scrutiny, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), Idaho urges that its 60-day residence requirement is necessary for protection against fraud, and for administrative purposes. In consequence, 202 of the 1970 Amendments is said to be of no weight against these compelling state interests. </s> Whether or not the Constitution vests Congress with particular power to set qualifications for voting in strictly federal elections, 15 we believe there is an adequate constitutional basis for 202 in 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. For more than a century, this Court has recognized the constitutional right of all citizens to unhindered interstate travel and settlement. Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C. J.); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 43-44 (1868); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 -758 (1966); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 -631, 634 (1969). From whatever constitutional provision this right may be said to flow, 16 both its existence [400 U.S. 112, 238] and its fundamental importance to our Federal Union have long been established beyond question. </s> By definition, the imposition of a durational residence requirement operates to penalize those persons, and only those persons, who have exercised their constitutional right of interstate migration. Of course, governmental action that has the incidental effect of burdening the exercise of a constitutional right is not ipso facto unconstitutional. But in such a case, governmental action may withstand constitutional scrutiny only upon a clear showing that the burden imposed is necessary to protect a compelling and substantial governmental interest. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 634 ; United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 -583 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 -409 (1963). And once it be determined that a burden has been placed upon a constitutional right, the onus of demonstrating that no less intrusive means will adequately protect compelling state interests is upon the party seeking to justify the burden. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 -526 (1958). </s> In the present case, Congress has explicitly found both that the imposition of durational residence requirements abridges the right of free interstate migration and that such requirements are not reasonably related to any compelling state interests. 1970 Amendments, 202 (a) (2), (6). The latter finding was made with full cognizance of the possibility of fraud and administrative difficulty. Senator Goldwater, testifying at Senate hearings on the bill, pointed out that 40 States presently allow registration until 30 days or less prior to the election. 17 Idaho itself allows registration by those desiring to vote as new residents in presidential elections within 10 days of balloting. Idaho Code 34-409 (1963). And Idaho's assertion of the administrative unfeasibility [400 U.S. 112, 239] of maintaining separate registration lists for fully qualified voters and for those qualified only for presidential balloting is difficult to credit in light of the fact that the Idaho Constitution, Art. 6, 2, itself sets separate qualifications for voting in general and in presidential elections. The provisions for absentee voting, as Senator Goldwater pointed out on the floor of the Senate, were likewise "drawn from the proven practice of the States themselves." 18 Thirty-seven States allow application within a week of the election, and 40 permit the marked ballot to be returned no election day. 19 Finally, Idaho has provided no evidence beyond the mere assertion that the scheme of 202 is inadequate to protect against fraud. But the only kind of fraud asserted is the possibility of dual voting, and Idaho has provided no explanation why the 30-day period between the closing of new registrations and the date of election would not provide, in light of modern communications, adequate time to insure against such frauds. Accordingly, we find ample justification for the congressional conclusion that 202 is a reasonable means for eliminating an unnecessary burden on the right of interstate migration. United States v. Guest, supra. </s> III </s> The final question presented by these cases is the propriety of Title III of the 1970 Amendments, which [400 U.S. 112, 240] forbids the States from disenfranchising persons over the age of 18 because of their age. Congress was of the view that this prohibition, embodied in 302 of the Amendments, was necessary among other reasons in order to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 301 (a) (2), (b). The States involved in the present litigation question the assertion of congressional power to make that judgment. </s> It is important at the outset to recognize what is not involved in these cases. We are not faced with an assertion of congressional power to regulate any and all aspects of state and federal elections, or even to make general rules for the determination of voter qualifications. Nor are we faced with the assertion that Congress is possessed of plenary power to set minimum ages for voting throughout the States. Every State in the Union has conceded by statute that citizens 21 years of age and over are capable of intelligent and responsible exercise of the right to vote. The single, narrow question presented by these cases is whether Congress was empowered to conclude, as it did, that citizens 18 to 21 years of age are not substantially less able. </s> We believe there is serious question whether a statute granting the franchise to citizens 21 and over while denying it to those between the ages of 18 and 21 could, in any event, withstand present scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. Regardless of the answer to this question, however, it is clear to us that proper regard for the special function of Congress in making determinations of legislative fact compels this Court to respect those determinations unless they are contradicted by evidence far stronger than anything that has been adduced in these cases. We would uphold 302 as a valid exercise of congressional power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. [400 U.S. 112, 241] </s> A </s> All parties to these cases are agreed that the States are given power, under the Constitution, to determine the qualifications for voting in state elections. Art. I, 2; Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965). But it is now settled that exercise of this power, like all other exercises of state power, is subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Carrington v. Rash, supra; Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). Although it once was thought that equal protection required only that a given legislative classification, once made, be evenly applied, see Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 -72 (1887), for more than 70 years we have consistently held that the classifications embodied in a state statute must also meet the requirements of equal protection. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897); see McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 189 -191 (1964), and cases cited. </s> The right to vote has long been recognized as a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968). "Any unjustified discrimination in determining who may participate in political affairs . . . undermines the legitimacy of representative government." Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 626 . Consequently, when exclusions from the franchise are challenged as violating the Equal Protection Clause, judicial scrutiny is not confined to the question whether the exclusion may reasonably be thought to further a permissible interest of the State. [400 U.S. 112, 242] Cf. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583 -584 (1935). "A more exacting standard obtains." Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 633 . In such cases, "the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id., at 627; Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 704 (1969). </s> In the present cases, the States justify exclusion of 18- to 21-year-olds from the voting rolls solely on the basis of the States' interests in promoting intelligent and responsible exercise of the franchise. 20 There is no reason to question the legitimacy and importance of these interests. But standards of intelligence and responsibility, however defined, may permissibly be applied only to the means whereby a prospective voter determines how to exercise his choice, and not to the actual choice itself. Were it otherwise, such standards could all too easily serve as mere epithets designed to cloak the exclusion of a class of voters simply because of the way they might vote. Cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 422 -423. Such a state purpose is, of course, constitutionally impressible. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S., at 94 . We must, therefore, examine with particular care the asserted connection between age limitations and the admittedly laudable state purpose to further intelligent and responsible voting. </s> We do not lack a starting point for this inquiry. Although the question has never been squarely presented, we have in the past indicated that age is a factor not necessarily irrelevant to qualifications for voting. Lassiter [400 U.S. 112, 243] v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S., at 51 ; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 625 -626. But recognition that age is not in all circumstances a "capricious or irrelevant factor," Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S., at 668 , does not insure the validity of the particular limitation involved here. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 425 -426. Every State in the Union has concluded for itself that citizens 21 years of age and over are capable of responsible and intelligent voting. Accepting this judgment, there remains the question whether citizens 18 to 21 years of age may fairly be said to be less able. </s> State practice itself in other areas casts doubt upon any such proposition. Each of the 50 States has provided special mechanisms for dealing with persons who are deemed insufficiently mature and intelligent to understand, and to conform their behavior to, the criminal laws of the State. 21 Forty-nine of the States have concluded that, in this regard, 18-year-olds are invariably to be dealt with according to precisely the same standards prescribed for their elders. 22 This at the very least is evidence of a nearly unanimous legislative judgment on the part of the States themselves that differences in maturity and intelligence between 18-year-olds and persons 21 years of age and over are too trivial to warrant specialized treatment for any of the former class in the critically important matter of criminal responsibility. 23 Similarly, [400 U.S. 112, 244] every State permits 18-year-olds to marry, and 39 States do not require parental consent for such persons of one or both sexes. 24 State statutory practice in other areas follows along these lines, albeit not as consistently. 25 </s> Uniform state practice in the field of education points the same way. No State in the Union requires attendance at school beyond the age of 18. Of course, many 18-year-olds continue their education to 21 and beyond. But no 18-year-old who does not do so will be disenfranchised thereby once he reaches the age of 21. 26 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 245] Whether or not a State could in any circumstances condition exercise of the franchise upon educational achievements beyond the level reached by 18-year-olds today, there is no question but that no State purports to do so. Accordingly, that 18-year-olds as a class may be less educated than some of their elders 27 cannot justify restriction of the franchise, for the States themselves have determined that this incremental education is irrelevant to voting qualifications. And finally, we have been cited to no material whatsoever that would support the proposition that intelligence, as opposed to educational attainment, increases between the ages of 18 and 21. </s> One final point remains. No State seeking to uphold its denial of the franchise to 18-year-olds has adduced anything beyond the mere difference in age. We have already indicated that the relevance of this difference is contradicted by nearly uniform state practice in other areas. But perhaps more important is the uniform experience of those States - Georgia since 1943, and Kentucky since 1955 - that have permitted 18-year-olds to vote. 28 We have not been directed to a word of testimony or other evidence that would indicate either that 18-year-olds in those States have voted any less intelligently and responsibly than their elders, or that there is any reasonable ground for belief that 18-year-olds in other States are less able than those in Georgia and Kentucky. On the other hand, every person who spoke to the issue in either the House or Senate was agreed that 18-year-olds [400 U.S. 112, 246] in both States were at least as interested, able, and responsible in voting as were their elders. 29 </s> In short, we are faced with an admitted restriction upon the franchise, supported only by bare assertions and long practice, in the face of strong indications that the States themselves do not credit the factual propositions upon which the restriction is asserted to rest. But there is no reason for us to decide whether, in a proper case, we would be compelled to hold this restriction a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. For as our decisions have long made clear, the question we face today is not one of judicial power under the Equal Protection Clause. The question is the scope of congressional power under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To that question we now turn. </s> B </s> As we have often indicated, questions of constitutional power frequently turn in the last analysis on questions of fact. This is particularly the case when an assertion of state power is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For although equal protection requires that all persons "under like circumstances and conditions" be treated alike, Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S., at 71 , such a formulation merely raises, but does not answer the question whether a legislative classification has resulted in different treatment of persons who are in fact "under like circumstances and conditions." </s> Legislatures, as well as courts, are bound by the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 -20 (1958). When a state legislative classification is subjected to judicial challenge as violating the Equal Protection Clause, it comes before the [400 U.S. 112, 247] courts cloaked by the presumption that the legislature has, as it should, acted within constitutional limitations. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots, 330 U.S. 552, 556 , 563-564 (1947); see Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 627 -628. Accordingly, "[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S., at 584 . </s> But, as we have consistently held, this limitation on judicial review of state legislative classifications is a limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth Amendment itself, but from the nature of judicial review. It is simply a "salutary principle of judicial decision," Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, supra, at 584, one of the "self-imposed restraints intended to protect [the Court] and the state against irresponsible exercise of [the Court's] unappealable power." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282 (1947). The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination [400 U.S. 112, 248] of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication. Courts, therefore, will overturn a legislative determination of a factual question only if the legislature's finding is so clearly wrong that it may be characterized as "arbitrary," "irrational," or "unreasonable." Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 94 -95 (1961); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 -154 (1938); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S., at 583 -584. </s> Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, however, have no application to Congress. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Should Congress, pursuant to that power, undertake an investigation in order to determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative discrimination actually exists, it need not stop once it determines that some reasonable men could believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers Congress to make its own determination on the matter. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 -656 (1966). It should hardly be necessary to add that if the asserted factual basis necessary to support a given state discrimination does not exist, 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vests Congress with power to remove the discrimination by appropriate means. Id., at 656-657; Fay v. New York, 332 U.S., at 282 -283; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 -348 (1880). </s> The scope of our review in such matters has been established by a long line of consistent decisions. "It is not for the courts to re-examine the validity of these legislative findings and reject them." Communist Party v. Control Board, 367 U.S., at 94 . "[W]here we find that the legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory [400 U.S. 112, 249] scheme necessary . . . our investigation is at an end." Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 303-304 (1964); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S., at 653 ; see Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 529 (1954). 31 </s> This scheme is consistent with our prior decisions in related areas. The core of dispute over the constitutionality of Title III of the 1970 Amendments is a conflict between state and federal legislative determinations of the factual issues upon which depends decision of a federal constitutional question - the legitimacy, under the Equal Protection Clause, of state discrimination against persons between the ages of 18 and 21. Our cases have repeatedly emphasized that, when state and federal claims come into conflict, the primacy of federal power requires that the federal finding of fact control. See England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 -417 (1964); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 311 -312 (1963); Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 406-407 (1872); cf. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941). The Supremacy Clause requires an identical result when the conflict is one of legislative, not judicial, findings. </s> Finally, it is no answer to say that Title III intrudes upon a domain reserved to the States - the power to set qualifications for voting. It is no longer open to question that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to this, as to any other, exercise of state power. Kramer v. [400 U.S. 112, 250] Union School District, supra, and cases cited. As we said in answer to a similar contention almost a century ago, "the Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional interference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth Amendment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single class of cases; but within its limits it is complete." Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S., at 347 -348. </s> C </s> Our Brother HARLAN has set out in some detail the historical evidence that persuades him that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment did not believe that the Equal Protection Clause, either through judicial action or through congressional enforcement under 5 of the Amendment, could operate to enfranchise Negroes in States that denied them the vote. Ante, at 154-200. From this he has concluded "that the Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit and therefore that it does not authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, in either state or federal elections." Ante, at 154. This conclusion, if accepted, would seem to require as a corollary that although States may not, under the Fifteenth Amendment, discriminate against Negro voters, they are free so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned to discriminate against Negro or unpopular candidates in any way they desire. Not surprisingly, our Brother HARLAN'S thesis is explicitly disavowed by all the States party to the present litigation, 32 and has been presented to us only in the briefs amici [400 U.S. 112, 251] curiae of Virginia and, perhaps, Mississippi. 33 We could not accept this thesis even if it were supported by historical evidence far stronger than anything adduced here today. But in our view, our Brother HARLAN'S historical analysis is flawed by his ascription of 20th-century meanings to the words of 19th-century legislators. In consequence, his analysis imposes an artificial simplicity upon a complex era, and presents, as universal, beliefs that were held by merely one of several groups competing for political power. We can accept neither his judicial conclusion nor his historical premise that the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment left it within the power of the States to deny the vote to Negro citizens. </s> It is clear that the language of the Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids a State to "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," applies on its face to all assertions of state power, however made. More than 40 years ago, this Court faced for the first time the question whether a State could deny Negroes the right to vote in primary elections. Writing for a unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Holmes observed tartly that "[w]e find it unnecessary to consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seems to us hard to imagine a more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth." Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540 -541 (1927); see Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 83 , 87-89 (1932) (Cardozo, J.); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964); cf. Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 35 -36 (1907). If the broad language of the Equal Protection Clause were to be read as nevertheless allowing the States to deny equal political rights to any citizens they see fit to exclude from the political process, [400 U.S. 112, 252] far more is involved than merely shifting the doctrinal basis of such cases as Nixon v. Herndon from the Fourteenth to the Fifteenth Amendment. For the Fifteenth Amendment applies only to voting, not to the holding of public office; in consequence, our Brother HARLAN'S view would appear to leave the States free to encourage citizens to cast their votes solely on the basis of race (a practice found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment in Anderson v. Martin, supra), or even presumably to deny Negro citizens the right to run for office at all. 34 We cannot believe that the Equal Protection Clause would permit such discrimination. </s> In any event, it seems to us, the historical record will not bear the weight our Brother HARLAN has placed upon it. His examination of the historical background of the Fourteenth Amendment leads him to conclude that it is "clear beyond any reasonable doubt that no part of the legislation now under review can be upheld as a legitimate exercise of congressional power under that Amendment," ante, at 155, because the Amendment was not intended "to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit." Ante, at 154. Our own reading of the historical background, on the other hand, results in a somewhat imperfect picture of an era of constitutional confusion, confusion that the Amendment did little to resolve. As the leading constitutional historian of the Civil War has observed, constitutional law was characterized during the war years by "a noticeable lack of legal precision" and by "[a] tendency toward irregularity . . . in legislation, and in legal interpretation." J. Randall, Constitutional Problems under Lincoln [400 U.S. 112, 253] 515-516 (rev. ed. 1951). Nor would the postwar period of Reconstruction be substantially different. </s> For several decades prior to the Civil War, constitutional interpretation had been a pressing concern of the Nation's leading statesmen and lawyers, whose attention focused especially on the nature of the relationship of the States to the Federal Government. The onset of the Civil War served only to raise new problems upon which the original Constitution offered, at best, only peripheral guidance. The greatest problem of all, perhaps, was the character of the civil conflict - whether it was to be treated as a rebellion, as a war with a belligerent state, or as some combination of the two. Another issue concerned the scope of federal power to emancipate the slaves; even President Lincoln doubted whether his Emancipation Proclamation would be operative when the war had ended and his special war powers had expired. This particular issue was resolved by the Thirteenth Amendment, but that Amendment only raised new issues, for some men doubted the validity of even a constitutional change upon such a fundamental matter as slavery, particularly while the status of the eleven Confederate States remained unsettled. See id., at 12-24, 59-73, 342-404. </s> The end of the war did not bring an end to difficult constitutional questions. Two perplexing problems remained. The one was the relation of the former Confederate States to the Federal Government; the other was the relation of the former slaves to the white citizens of the Nation. Both were intimately related to the politics of the day, an understanding of which is essential since the Fourteenth Amendment was presented to the Nation as the Republican Party's solution for these problems. See J. James, The Framing of the Fourteenth Amendment 169-173 (1956) (hereafter James). [400 U.S. 112, 254] </s> The starting point must be the key fact that, as of 1860, the Republicans were very much the Nation's minority party. Lincoln had won the Presidency that year with less than 40% of the popular vote, while the Republicans had secured control of Congress only when southern Democrats had left Washington following the secession of their States. The compromise in the original Constitution, by which only three-fifths of the slaves in Southern States were computed in determining representation in the House of Representatives and votes in the electoral college also was a matter of critical importance in 1865; with slavery abolished, southern and hence Democratic power in the House and in the electoral college would increase. The Republicans had calculated this matter rather carefully; as the Chicago Tribune had demonstrated as early as the summer of 1865, the increased southern delegation would need only 29 readily obtainable Democratic votes from the North in order to dominate the House. See James 21-23. But Republicans had no intention of permitting such a Democratic resurgence to occur; in their view, as one Republican Senator observed, Republicans would be "faithless" to their "trust," if they allowed "men who have thus proven themselves faithless" to recover "the very political power which they have hitherto used for the destruction of this Government." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (hereafter Globe) 2918 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Willey). Whether one looks upon such sentiments as a grasp for partisan political power or as an idealistic determination that the gains of the Civil War not be surrendered, the central fact remains that Republicans found it essential to bar or at least to delay the return of all-white southern delegations to Congress. </s> Temporarily, they proposed to do so by refusing to seat Congressmen from the seceded States. They usually justified their refusal on constitutional grounds, [400 U.S. 112, 255] presenting a variety of theories as to how the former Confederate States had forfeited their rights by secession. See generally E. McKitrick, Andrew Johnson and Reconstruction 93-119 (1960). But exclusion of southern representatives could not be a permanent solution; a better solution seemed to be to elect at least some Republican representatives from the South by enfranchising the only class that could be expected to vote Republican in large numbers - the freedmen. </s> According to the census of 1860, Negroes had constituted some 4,200,000 of the total population of 12,200,000 in the 15 slave States. In two States - Mississippi and South Carolina - Negroes were a substantial majority of the population, while in several other States the population was at least 40% Negro. Thus, Negro suffrage would probably result in a number of Negro and presumably Republican representatives from the South. The difficulty was with the means of bringing Negro suffrage about. Some, including Chief Justice Chase, looked back toward the Emancipation Proclamation and contended that Negro suffrage could be achieved, at least in the South, by means of a presidential proclamation. See James 5-7; 1 W. Fleming, Documentary History of Reconstruction 142 (1906). Others thought congressional legislation the appropriate vehicle for granting the suffrage, see James 13, 52-53; Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Supreme Court Review 33, 49-51, while still others argued for a constitutional amendment. See Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Sept. 19, 1865, in James 11-12 (reporting speech of Cong. Bingham). Disagreement over means, however, was but a minor obstacle in the path of equal suffrage; racial prejudice in the North was a far more significant one. Only five New England States and New York permitted any Negroes to vote [400 U.S. 112, 256] as of 1866, see Van Alstyne, supra, at 70, and extension of the suffrage was rejected by voters in 17 of 19 popular referenda held on the subject between 1865 and 1868. Moreover, Republicans suffered some severe election set-backs in 1867 on account of their support of Negro suffrage. See W. Gillette, The Right to Vote 25-27, 32-38 (1969). </s> Meeting in the winter and spring of 1866 and facing elections in the fall of the same year, the Republicans in Congress thus faced a difficult dilemma: they desperately needed Negro suffrage in order to prevent total Democratic resurgence in the South, yet they feared that by pressing for suffrage they might create a reaction among northern white voters that would lead to massive Democratic electoral gains in the North. Their task was thus to frame a policy that would prevent total southern Democratic resurgence and that simultaneously would serve as a platform upon which Republicans could go before their northern constituents in the fall. What ultimately emerged as the policy and political platform of the Republican Party was the Fourteenth Amendment. 35 </s> As finally adopted, relevant portions of the Fourteenth Amendment read as follows: </s> Sec. 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." [400 U.S. 112, 257] </s> Sec. 2. "Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers . . . . But when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." </s> Sec. 5. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." </s> The key provision on the suffrage question was, of course, 2, which was to have the effect of reducing the representation of any State which did not permit Negroes to vote. Section 1 also began, however, as a provision aimed at securing equality of "political rights and privileges" - a fact hardly surprising in view of Republican concern with the question. In their earliest versions in the Joint Congressional Committee on Reconstruction, which framed the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 and 2 read as follows: </s> "[Sec. 1.] Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States, in every State, the same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 51 (1914) (hereafter Kendrick). </s> "[Sec. 2.] Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which [400 U.S. 112, 258] may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers of persons, deducting therefrom all of any race or color, whose members or any of them are denied any of the civil or political rights or privileges." Id., at 43. </s> The question that must now be pursued is whether 1 of the Amendment ever lost its original connection with the suffrage question. </s> It became evident at an early date that the Joint Committee did not wish to make congressional power over the suffrage more explicit than did the language of the original version of the future 1. Six days after that section had been proposed by a subcommittee, the full committee refused to adopt an amendment offered by Senator Howard to make the section refer expressly to "political and elective rights and privileges," id., at 55 (emphasis added), and refused as well to substitute for the language: </s> "Congress shall have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all citizens of the United States in each State the same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." </s> the following language offered by Congressman Boutwell: </s> "Congress shall have power to abolish any distinction in the exercise of the elective franchise in any State, which by law, regulation or usage may exist therein." Id., at 54-55. </s> The committee did agree, however, to return the proposal to a special subcommittee, chaired by Congressman John A. Bingham, which at the next meeting of the full committee reported back the following language: </s> "Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure all [400 U.S. 112, 259] persons in every state full protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property; and to all citizens of the United States in any State the same immunities and also equal political rights and privileges." Id., at 56. </s> This language, it seems clear, did not change the meaning of the section as originally proposed, but the next change in language, proposed several days later by Bingham, arguably did. Bingham moved the following substitute: </s> "The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states (Art. 4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment)." Id., at 61. </s> This substitute was accepted by a committee vote of 7-6. </s> No record of the committee's debates has been preserved, and thus one can only guess whether Bingham's substitute was intended to change the meaning of the original proposal. The breakdown of the committee vote suggests, however, that no change in meaning was intended. The substitute was supported by men of all political views, ranging from Senator Howard and Congressman Boutwell, radicals who had earlier sought to make the section's coverage of suffrage explicit, to Congressman Rogers, a Democrat. Similarly, among the six voting against the substitute were a radical, Stevens; a moderate, Fessenden; and a Democrat, Grider. Id., at 61. Thus, while one might continue to argue that Bingham meant his substitute to do away with congressional power to legislate for the preservation of equal rights of suffrage, one can, with at least equal plausibility, [400 U.S. 112, 260] contend that Bingham sought to do no more than substitute for his earlier specific language more general language which had already appeared elsewhere in the Constitution. 36 </s> Bingham's proposed amendment to the Constitution, as modified, was next submitted to the House of Representatives, where Republicans joined Democrats in attacking it. Republican Representative Hale of New York, for example, thought the amendment "in effect a provision under which all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting the individual citizen, may be overridden," Globe 1063, while Representative Davis, also a New York Republican, thought it would give Congress power to establish "perfect political equality between the colored and the white race of the South." Id., at 1085. Meanwhile, the New York Times, edited by conservative Republican Congressman Henry J. Raymond, wondered if the proposed Amendment was "simply a preliminary to the enactment of negro suffrage." Feb. 19, 1866. Even the Amendment's supporters recognized that it would confer extensive power upon the Federal Government; Representative Kelley, a Pennsylvania radical, who supported the Amendment, concluded, after a lengthy discussion of the right of suffrage, that "the proposed amendment . . . [was] intended to secure it." Globe 1063. Its proponents, however, could not secure the necessary support for the Amendment in the House and thus were compelled to postpone the matter until a later date, when they failed to bring it again to the floor. Kendrick 215. </s> Meanwhile, the Joint Committee had returned to work and had begun to consider the direct antecedent of the Fourteenth Amendment, a proposal by Robert Dale [400 U.S. 112, 261] Owen which Representative Stevens had placed before the committee. Its relevant provisions were as follows: </s> "Section 1. No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. </s> "Sec. 2. From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. </s> "Sec. 3. Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-six, no class of persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage discrimination shall be made by any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation. </s> . . . . . </s> "Sec. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id., at 83-84. </s> Congressman Bingham had not, however, given up on his own favorite proposal, and he immediately moved to add the following new section to the Amendment: </s> "Sec. 5. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id., at 87. </s> His motion was adopted on a 10-to-2 party-line vote, but its adoption was only the beginning of some intricate and inexplicable maneuvering. Four days later, Senator [400 U.S. 112, 262] Williams, an Oregon radical, moved to delete Bingham's section, and his motion was carried by a vote of 7 to 5, with radicals Howard and Boutwell and Democrats Grider and Johnson voting for the motion and Stevens, Bingham, and Democrat Rogers voting against. Bingham then moved to submit his proposal as a separate amendment, but he was supported by only the three Democrats on the committee. The committee then agreed to submit the Owen proposal to Congress with only slight modifications, but postponed the submission until after one further meeting to be held three days hence. Id., at 98-100. </s> At this meeting, the proposed Fourteenth Amendment was substantially rewritten. First, the committee, by a vote of 12 to 2, deleted 2, which had barred States from making racial discriminations in the enjoyment of the right of suffrage after 1876, and conformed 3, so as to insure that it would remain in effect after 1876. After making numerous other changes, the committee then concluded its deliberations by replacing Owen's ban in 1 on discrimination "as to civil rights" with Bingham's now familiar language. Here the vote was 10 to 3, with the majority again containing a full spectrum of political views. Id., at 100-106. The reasons for the rewriting are not entirely clear. The only known explanation was given by Owen in 1875, when he wrote an article recalling a contemporary conversation with Stevens. Stevens had reportedly explained that the committee's original decisions had "got noised abroad," and that, as a result, several state delegations had held caucuses which decided that the explicit references to "negro suffrage, in any shape, ought to be excluded from the platform . . . ." Quoted in id., at 302. Thus, the provision for suffrage after 1876 had to be eliminated, but Stevens did not explain why Bingham's version of 1 was then substituted [400 U.S. 112, 263] for Owen's version. Perhaps the changes in 1 of the Amendment were thought by the committee to be mere linguistic improvements which did not substantially modify Owen's meaning and which did not extend its coverage to political as distinguished from civil rights. But, at the very least the committee must have realized that it was substituting for Owen's rather specific language Bingham's far more elastic language - language that, as one scholar has noted, is far more "capable of growth" and "receptive to `latitudinarian' construction." Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 61, 63 (1955). It is, moreover, at least equally plausible that the committee meant to substitute for Owen's narrow provision dealing solely with civil rights a broader provision that had originated and been understood only two months earlier as protecting equality in the right of suffrage as well as equality of civil rights. </s> The purpose of 1 in relation to the suffrage emerges out of the debates on the floor of Congress with an equal obscurity. In the search for meaning one must begin, of course, with the statements of leading men in Congress, such as Bingham and Howard. Bingham, for one, stated without apparent equivocation that "[t]he amendment does not give . . . the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States." Globe 2542. Similarly, Senator Howard, after noting that the Amendment would accord to Negroes the same protection in their fundamental rights as the law gave to whites, explicitly cautioned that "the first section of the proposed amendment does not give to either of these classes the right of voting." Globe 2766. 37 But such statements are not [400 U.S. 112, 264] as unambiguous as they initially appear to be. Thus, Howard, with that "lack of legal precision" typical of the period, stated that the right of suffrage was not one of the privileges and immunities protected by the Constitution, Globe 2766, immediately after he had read into the record an excerpt from the case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (CCED Pa. 1825), an excerpt which listed the elective franchise as among the privileges and immunities. Globe 2765. Bingham was equally ambiguous, for he too thought that the elective franchise was a constitutionally protected privilege and immunity. Globe 2542. Indeed, at one point in the debates, Bingham made what is for us a completely incongruous statement: </s> "To be sure we all agree, and the great body of the people of this country agree, and the committee thus far in reporting measures of reconstruction agree, that the exercise of the elective franchise, though it be one of the privileges of a citizen of the Republic, is exclusively under the control of the States." Globe 2542. </s> Bingham seemed to say in one breath first, that the franchise was a constitutionally protected privilege in support of which Congress under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could legislate and then, in the next breath, that the franchise was exclusively under the control of the States. </s> Bingham's words make little sense to modern ears; yet, when they were uttered, his words must have made some sense, at least to Bingham and probably to many of his listeners. The search for their meaning probably [400 U.S. 112, 265] ought to begin with Art. IV, 2 - the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the original Constitution. In the minds of members of the 39th Congress, the leading case to construe that clause was Corfield v. Coryell, supra, which had listed among a citizen's privileges and immunities "the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exercised." 6 F. Cas., at 552. Here again is the same apparent ambiguity that later occurred in Bingham's thought - that the franchise is a federally protected right, but only to the extent it is regulated and established by state law. The ambiguity was, however, only apparent and not real, for the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the original Constitution served a peculiar function; it did not create absolute rights but only placed a noncitizen of a State "upon a perfect equality with its own citizens" as to those fundamental rights already created by state law. Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 407 (1857). Accord, id., at 584 (dissenting opinion). The Privileges and Immunities Clause, that is, was a sort of equal protection clause adopted for the benefit of out-of-state citizens; 38 it required, for example, that if a State gave its own citizens a right to enter into a lawful business, it could not arbitrarily deny the same right to out-of-state citizens solely because they came from out of State. See Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871). Thus, what Bingham may have meant in indicating that the franchise was included within the scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment while remaining entirely under the control of the States was that, although the States would be free in general to confer the franchise upon whomever they chose, Congress would have power [400 U.S. 112, 266] to bar them from racial or other arbitrary discriminations in making their choices. In short, the Privileges and Immunities Clause might for Bingham have meant the same as the Equal Protection Clause; as he later explained in a campaign speech, 1 was nothing but "a simple, strong, plain declaration that equal laws and equal and exact justice shall hereafter be secured within every State of this Union . . . ." Cincinnati Daily Commercial, Aug. 27, 1866, quoted in James 160. </s> One way, then, to reconcile the seemingly incongruous statements of Bingham is to read him as understanding that, while the Fourteenth Amendment did not take from the States nor grant to Congress plenary power to regulate the suffrage, it did give Congress power to invalidate discriminatory state legislation. In his words, the Amendment took "from no State any right which hitherto pertained to the several States of the Union, but it impose[d] a limitation upon the States to correct their abuses of power." Ibid. Others had a similar understanding. Thus, for Charles Summer, "Equality of political rights . . . [did] not involve necessarily what is sometimes called the `regulation' of the suffrage by the National Government, although this would be best . . . [but] simply require[d] the abolition of any discrimination among citizens, inconsistent with Equal Rights." C. Summer, Are We a Nation? 34 (1867). Or, as Stevens explained in presenting the Amendment to the House, it merely allowed "Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all." Globe 2459 (emphasis in original). Clearest of all, perhaps was Thomas M. Cooley in the 1871 edition of his Constitutional Limitations, where he wrote: </s> "This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power in the general government for [400 U.S. 112, 267] any purpose of police government within the States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall `abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,' or `deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,' or `deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws'; and Congress is empowered to pass all laws necessary to render such unconstitutional State legislation ineffectual." T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 294 (2d ed. 1871). </s> There is also other evidence that at least some members of Congress and of the electorate believed that 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress power to invalidate discriminatory state regulations of the suffrage. Thus, Congressman Rogers, a Democrat who had served on the Joint Committee, agreed with Bingham and Howard that "[t]he right to vote is a privilege," Globe 2538, while Congressman Boyer, another Democrat, feared that 1 was "intended to secure ultimately, and to some extent indirectly, the political equality of the negro race." Globe 2467. A third Democrat, Congressman Niblack, thought the section sufficiently ambiguous to warn that he might, although in fact he never did, offer the following addition to it: </s> "Provided, That nothing contained in this article shall be so construed as to authorize Congress to regulate or control the elective franchise within any State, or to abridge or restrict the power of any State to regulate or control the same within its own jurisdiction, except as in the third section hereof prescribed." Globe 2465. </s> Republicans also alluded on occasion to their belief that the Amendment might give Congress power to prevent discrimination in regard to the suffrage. Radical [400 U.S. 112, 268] Senator Stewart, for example, while unhappy that the Amendment did not directly confer suffrage, nevertheless could "support this plan" because it did "not preclude Congress from adopting other means by a two-thirds vote, 39 when experience shall have demonstrated, as it certainly will, the necessity for a change of policy. In fact it furnishes a conclusive argument in favor of universal amnesty and impartial suffrage." Globe 2964. Likewise, the more conservative Congressman Raymond of New York supported the first section because he thought Congress should have the power to legislate on behalf of equal rights "in courts and elsewhere," Globe 2513, after the radical Congressman Wilson of Iowa had informed him that, "if we give a reasonable construction to the term `elsewhere,' we may include in that the jury-box and the ballot-box." Globe 2505. Congressman Stevens, meanwhile, was informing Congress that "if this amendment prevails you must legislate to carry out many parts of it," Globe 2544, and was looking forward to "further legislation; in enabling acts or other provisions," Globe 3148, while even the Joint Committee submitted the Amendment to the Nation "in the hope that its imperfections may be cured, and its deficiencies supplied, by legislative wisdom . . . ." Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., xxi (1866). Nor did the radical Republican press disagree; as the Lansing State Republican argued in its editorial columns, even "[i]f impartial suffrage, the real vital question of the whole struggle . . . [was] postponed through the mulish obstinacy of Andrew Johnson," "freedom" would "triumph by the adoption of the proposed [400 U.S. 112, 269] amendment," which would be followed by "equal rights to all . . . ." July 11, 1866. And, of course, once the Amendment had been ratified, Republicans in Congress began to make speeches in favor of legislation which would implement the Amendment by guaranteeing equal suffrage. See, e. g., Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966-1967 (1868) (remarks of Cong. Stevens); 3d Sess., 1008 (1869) (remarks of Sen. Sumner). </s> Of course, few of the above statements taken from congressional debates, campaign speeches, and the press were made with such clarity and precision that we can know with certainty that its framers intended the Fourteenth Amendment to function as we think they did. But clarity and precision are not to be expected in an age when men are confronting new problems for which old concepts do not provide ready solutions. As we have seen, the 1860's were such an age, and the men who formulated the Fourteenth Amendment were facing an especially perplexing problem - that of creating federal mechanisms to insure the fairness of state action without in the process destroying the reserved powers of the States. It would, indeed, be surprising if the men who first faced this difficult problem were possessed of such foresight that they could debate its solution with complete clarity and consistency and with uniformity of views. There is, in short, every reason to believe that different men reconciled in different and often imprecise ways the Fourteenth Amendment's broad guarantee of equal rights and the statements of some of its framers that it did not give Congress power to legislate upon the suffrage. </s> Some men, for example, might have reconciled the broad guarantee and the narrow language by concluding that Negroes were not yet ready to exercise the franchise and hence that a State would not act arbitrarily [400 U.S. 112, 270] in denying it to them while granting it to whites. As the debates make clear, proponents of the Amendment did not understand the Equal Protection Clause to forbid States to distinguish among persons where justification for distinctions appeared. See, e. g., Globe 1064 (Congressman Stevens). At the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the overwhelming majority of Negro residents of the United States were former slaves living in the Southern States. Most of them were illiterate and uneducated. Except for those few who had been kidnaped by slave traders after reaching adulthood, they had no prior experience with the responsibilities of citizenship. Given this state of affairs, it would hardly be surprising if some of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment felt that the Equal Protection Clause would not forbid the States from classifying Negroes as a group to be denied the right to vote. Equal protection has never been thought to require identical treatment of all persons in all respects. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S., at 583 -584, and cases cited. It requires only that the State provide adequate justification for treating one group differently from another. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Entirely aside from any concepts of racial inequality that may have been held by some members of Congress at that time, it seems clear that many members had serious reservations about the ability of the majority of Negroes, after centuries of slavery, to cast an intelligent and responsible vote. See, for example, the debates over a proposal to enfranchise Negroes in the District of Columbia in Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess., 2140-2141, 2239-2243, 2248 (1864). Of course, we would not now hold that even the situation existing in 1866 would justify wholesale exclusion of Negroes from the franchise: our decisions have consistently held that a particular group may not be denied the right to vote merely [400 U.S. 112, 271] because many, or even most, of its members could properly be excluded. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S., at 93 -96; Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 632 -633; Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S., at 424 -426; cf. Tussman & TenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 351-352 (1949). But mere administrative convenience was once thought to be sufficient justification for an overly broad legislative classification, so long at least as the resultant discrimination could be justified as to a majority of the class affected. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 218 -222 (1923); cf. Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). Rejection of this approach has been the result of a judicial development that could hardly have been known to the framers of the Amendment. Cf. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 114 -115 (1966). </s> Of course, many Americans in the 1860's rejected imputations that Negroes were unready for the franchise and thus concluded that distinctions between the races in regard to the franchise would constitute denials of equal protection. Congressman Stevens, for one, had no doubt that to allow a State to deny the franchise to Negroes would be to allow it "to discriminate among the same class." Globe 2460. And Negroes, of course, indignantly rejected such imputations, arguing that "[w]e are not all so illiterate as you suppose" and that "even if we were, our instincts have proved better than that `educated class,' whose `little learning' prompted them to attempt the impossible thing of destroying this great Republic . . . ." Letter to the Editor, New York Times, Nov. 4, 1866. </s> Among the men who refused to regard Negroes as ill prepared for the exercise of the franchise, there may have been some who did not understand the subtle distinctions of constitutional lawyers such as Bingham and who thus [400 U.S. 112, 272] accepted at face value assurances that the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress no power over the suffrage. As a result, at least three identifiable groups may have existed within the Republican majorities that enacted and ratified the Amendment - those who thought that Congress would have power to insure to Negroes the same right to suffrage as the States gave to whites, those who thought that Congress would not have such power since Negroes and whites constituted distinct and dissimilar classes for voting purposes, and those who thought Congress would possess no power at all over the suffrage. Perhaps all three such groups did not exist in 1866 in Congress and in the Nation at large, but surely the evidence is not clear "beyond any reasonable doubt" that the only existent group was the last one, consisting of men who, despite the broad language of 1 and the hints by speakers of its applicability to the suffrage, simply assumed without developing any analytical framework in support of their assumption that the section would not be so applied. </s> The evidence, in sum, plausibly suggests that the men who framed the Fourteenth Amendment possessed differing views as to the limits of its applicability but that they papered over their differences because those differences were not always fully apparent and because they could not foresee with precision how their amendment would operate in the future. Moreover, political considerations militated against clarification of issues and in favor of compromise. Much of the North, as already noted, opposed Negro suffrage, and many Republicans in Congress had to seek re-election from constituencies where racial prejudice remained rampant. Republicans in the forthcoming elections thus found it convenient to speak differently before different constituencies; as the Republican state chairman of Ohio wrote, in northern counties of the State "some of our Speakers have openly [400 U.S. 112, 273] advocated impartial suffrage, while in other places it was thought necessary, not only to repudiate it but to oppose it." Letter from B. R. Cowan to S. P. Chase, Oct. 12, 1866, quoted in James 168. Similarly, Senator Wilson of Massachusetts, when accused shortly after the 1866 elections of misrepresenting the issues of the campaign in Delaware by saying nothing of Negro suffrage, replied that since he had been "in a State where not much progress had been made, I acted somewhat on the scriptural principle of giving `milk to babes.'" Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., 42. Apparently Congressman Ashley of Ohio acted upon similar principles, for when he was asked after the House had initially approved the Amendment whether Congress had "power to confer the right of suffrage upon negroes in the States," he responded, </s> "Well, sir, I do not intend to put myself on record against the right of Congress to do that. I am not prepared now to argue the point with my colleague; but I will say to him that when the time comes for the American Congress to take action on the question, I will be ready to speak. I will not say now whether I would vote for or against such a proposition." Globe 2882. </s> Thus, precise legal analysis and clarity of thought were both intellectually difficult and politically unwise. What Republicans needed, in the words of Wendell Phillips, the former abolitionist leader, was "a party trick to tide over the elections and save time," after which they could "float back into Congress, able to pass an act that shall give the ballot to the negro and initiate an amendment to the Constitution which shall secure it to him." Speech of Wendell Phillips, July 4, 1866, quoted in A. Harris, A Review of the Political Conflict in America 437 (1876). Similarly, the New York Times, edited by Congressman Henry J. Raymond, a conservative Republican who [400 U.S. 112, 274] ultimately would support the Amendment, observed that "all the excitement that had been raised about constitutional amendments . . . has been simply dust thrown in the eyes of the public to cover the approach to the grand fundamental, indispensable principle of universal negro suffrage . . . ." April 27, 1866, quoted in Harris, supra, at 433. </s> Not surprisingly, the product of such political needs was an Amendment which contemporaries saw was vague and imprecise. Democratic Senator Hendricks, for example, protested that he had "not heard any Senator accurately define, what are the rights and immunities of citizenship," Globe 3039, while Congressman Boyer, another Democrat, found the first section "objectionable also in its phraseology, being open to ambiguity and admitting of conflicting constructions." Globe 2467. Republicans, too, were aware of the Amendment's vagueness. Thus, when he presented the Amendment to the Senate, Senator Howard noted that "[i]t would be a curious question to solve what are the privileges and immunities of citizens" and proposed not to consider the question at length, since "[i]t would be a somewhat barren discussion." Instead, like the pre-Civil War Supreme Court, 40 he "very modestly declined to go into a definition of them, leaving questions arising under the clause to be discussed and adjudicated when they should happen practically to arise." Globe 2765. </s> Thus, the historical evidence does not point to a single, clear-cut conclusion that contemporaries viewed the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment as an explicit abandonment of the radical goal of equal suffrage for Negroes. Rather the evidence suggests an alternative hypothesis: that the Amendment was framed by men who possessed differing views on the great question of the [400 U.S. 112, 275] suffrage and who, partly in order to formulate some program of government and partly out of political expediency, papered over their differences with the broad, elastic language of 1 and left to future interpreters of their Amendment the task of resolving in accordance with future vision and future needs the issues that they left unresolved. Such a hypothesis strikes us as far more consistent with the turbulent character of the times than one resting upon a belief that the broad language of the Equal Protection Clause contained a hidden limitation upon its operation that would prevent it from applying to state action regulating rights that could be characterized as "political." 41 </s> Nor is such a hypothesis inconsistent with the subsequent enactment of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments. Those who submitted the Fifteenth Amendment to the States for ratification could well have desired that any prohibition against racial discrimination in voting stand upon a firmer foundation than mere legislative action capable of repeal 42 or the vagaries of judicial decision. 43 Or they could merely have concluded that, whatever might be the case with other rights, the right to vote was too important to allow disenfranchisement of any person for no better reason [400 U.S. 112, 276] than that others of the same race might not be qualified. At least some of the supporters of the Nineteenth Amendment believed that sex discrimination in voting was itself proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection. 57 Cong. Rec. 3053 (1919). And finally, the Twenty-fourth Amendment was not proposed to the States until this Court had held, in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), 44 that state laws requiring payment of a poll tax as a pre-requisite to voting did not ipso facto violate the Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, we see no reason that the mere enactment of these amendments can be thought to imply that their proponents believed the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to state allocations of political power. At a dubious best, these amendments may be read as implying that their proponents felt particular state allocations of power a proper exercise of power under the Equal Protection Clause. </s> Nor do we find persuasive our Brother HARLAN'S argument that 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended as an exclusive remedy for state restrictions on the franchise, and that therefore any such restrictions are permissible under 1. As Congressman Bingham emphatically told the House, when the same argument was made by Congressman Bromwell, </s> "there has not been such a construction, in my opinion, of a law which imposes only a penalty, for centuries, if ever, in any country where the common law obtains. The construction insisted upon by the gentleman amounts to this, that a law which inflicts a penalty or works a forfeiture for doing an act, by implication authorizes the act to be done for doing which the penalty is inflicted. There [400 U.S. 112, 277] cannot be such a construction of the proviso. It is a penalty. It says in terms that if any of the States of the United States shall disobey the Constitution . . . as a penalty such State shall lose political power in this House . . . . </s> . . . . . </s> "You place upon your statute-book a law punishing the crime of murder with death. You do not thereby, by implication, say that anybody may, of right, commit murder. You but pass a penal law. You do not prohibit murder in the Constitution; you guaranty life in the Constitution. You do not prohibit the abuse of power by the majority in the Constitution in express terms, but you guaranty the equal right of all free male citizens of full age to elect Representatives; and by the proviso you inflict a penalty upon a State which denies or abridges that right on account of race or color. In doing that we are not to be told that we confer a power to override the express guarantees of the Constitution. We propose the penalty in aid of the guarantee, not in avoidance of it." Globe 431-432. </s> See Van Alstyne, supra, at 48-68. </s> It may be conceivable that 2 was intended to be the sole remedy available when a State deprived its citizens of their right to vote, but it is at least equally plausible that congressional legislation pursuant to 1 and 5 was thought by the framers of the Amendment to be another potential remedy. Section 2, in such a scheme, is hardly superfluous: it was of critical importance in assuring that, should the Southern States deny the franchise to Negroes, the Congress called upon to remedy that discrimination would not be controlled by the beneficiaries of discrimination themselves. And it could, of course, have been expected to provide at least a limited remedy [400 U.S. 112, 278] in the event that both Congress and the courts took no action under 1. Neither logic nor historical evidence compellingly suggests that 2 was intended to be more than a remedy supplementary, and in some conceivable circumstances indispensable, to other congressional and judicial remedies available under 1 and 5. See generally Van Alstyne, supra. </s> The historical record left by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it is a product of differing and conflicting political pressures and conceptions of federalism, is thus too vague and imprecise to provide us with sure guidance in deciding the pending cases. We must therefore conclude that its framers understood their Amendment to be a broadly worded injunction capable of being interpreted by future generations in accordance with the vision and needs of those generations. We would be remiss in our duty if, in an attempt to find certainty amidst uncertainty, we were to misread the historical record and cease to interpret the Amendment as this Court has always interpreted it. </s> D </s> There remains only the question whether Congress could rationally have concluded that denial of the franchise to citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 was unnecessary to promote any legitimate interests of the States in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. There is no need to set out the legislative history of Title III at any great length here. 45 Proposals to lower the voting age to 18 had been before Congress at several times since 1942. 46 The Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional [400 U.S. 112, 279] Amendments conducted extensive hearings on the matter in 1968 and again in 1970, 47 and the question was discussed at some length on the floor of both the House and the Senate. </s> Congress was aware, of course, of the facts and state practices already discussed. 48 It was aware of the opinion of many historians that choice of the age of 21 as the age of maturity was an outgrowth of medieval requirements of time for military training and development of a physique adequate to bear heavy armor. 49 It knew that whereas only six percent of 18-year-olds in 1900 had completed high school, 81 percent have done so today. 50 Congress was aware that 18-year-olds today make up a not insubstantial proportion of the adult work force; 51 and it was entitled to draw upon its experience in supervising the federal establishment to determine the competence and responsibility with which 18-year-olds perform their assigned tasks. As Congress recognized, its judgment that 18-year-olds are capable of voting is consistent with its practice of entrusting them with the heavy responsibilities of military service. See 301 (a) (1) of the Amendments. 52 Finally, Congress was presented [400 U.S. 112, 280] with evidence that the age of social and biological maturity in modern society has been consistently decreasing. Dr. Margaret Mead, an anthropologist, testified that in the past century, the "age of physical maturity has been dropping and has dropped over 3 years." 53 Many Senators and Representatives, including several involved in national campaigns, testified from personal experience that 18-year-olds of today appeared at least as mature and intelligent as 21-year-olds in the Congressmen's youth. 54 </s> Finally, and perhaps most important, Congress had before it information on the experience of two States, Georgia and Kentucky, which have allowed 18-year-olds to vote since 1943 and 1955, respectively. Every elected Representative from those States who spoke to the issue agreed that, as Senator Talmadge stated, "young people [in these States] have made the sophisticated decisions and have assumed the mature responsibilities of voting. Their performance has exceeded the greatest hopes and expectations." 55 </s> In sum, Congress had ample evidence upon which it could have based the conclusion that exclusion of citizens 18 to 21 years of age from the franchise is wholly unnecessary to promote any legitimate interest the States may have in assuring intelligent and responsible voting. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S., at 653 -656. If discrimination is unnecessary to promote any legitimate state interest, it is plainly unconstitutional [400 U.S. 112, 281] under the Equal Protection Clause, and Congress has ample power to forbid it under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We would uphold 302 of the 1970 Amendments as a legitimate exercise of congressional power. </s> [Footnote 1 Section 202 (a) of the Amendments embodies a congressional finding that "the imposition and application of the durational residency requirement as a precondition to voting for the offices of President and Vice President, and the lack of sufficient opportunities for absentee registration and absentee balloting in presidential elections - . . . . . "(2) denies or abridges the inherent constitutional right of citizens to enjoy their free movement across State lines; . . . . . "(6) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest in the conduct of presidential elections." </s> [Footnote 2 Section 301 (a) of the Amendments provides: "The Congress finds and declares that the imposition and application of the requirement that a citizen be twenty-one years of age as a precondition to voting in any primary or in any election - "(1) denies and abridges the inherent constitutional rights of citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age to vote - a particularly unfair treatment of such citizens in view of the national defense responsibilities imposed upon such citizens; "(2) has the effect of denying to citizens eighteen years of age but not yet twenty-one years of age the due process and equal protection of the laws that are guaranteed to them under the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution; and "(3) does not bear a reasonable relationship to any compelling State interest." </s> [Footnote 3 Arizona Constitution, Art. 7, 2, limits the franchise to those 21 years of age and older. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-101 (Supp. 1970) requires voters to be able to read the Federal Constitution (in English), and to write their names. </s> [Footnote 4 Idaho Constitution, Art. 6, 2, requires all voters to be 21 years of age or older, and requires 60 days' residence within the State as a precondition to voting in presidential elections. Idaho Code 34-408 (1963) further requires that 60-day residents have been citizens of another State prior to their removal to Idaho. Provisions for absentee balloting are contained in id., 34-1101 to 34-1125. </s> [Footnote 5 Section 4 (c) of the 1965 Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973b (c) (1964 ed., Supp. V), defines a "test or device" as "any requirement that a person as a prerequisite for voting or registration for voting (1) demonstrate the ability to read, write, understand, or interpret any matter, (2) demonstrate any educational achievement or his knowledge of any particular subject, (3) possess good moral character, or (4) prove his qualifications by the voucher of registered voters or members of any other class." </s> [Footnote 6 Gaston County was a suit by the county under 4 (a) of the 1965 Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973b (a) (1964 ed., Supp. V), to reinstate the county's literacy test. The county would have been entitled to do so upon demonstration that, for the preceding five years, no "test or device" had been there used for the purpose or with the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. </s> [Footnote 7 We there reserved only the question of the application of the 1965 Act to suspend literacy tests "in the face of racially disparate educational or literacy achievements for which a government bore no responsibility." 395 U.S., at 293 n. 8 (emphasis supplied). </s> [Footnote 8 Hearings on Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st and 2d Sess., 675 (1969-1970) (hereafter Senate Hearings). Schooling of Indians has for some time been the responsibility of the Federal Government. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Commission, 380 U.S. 685, 690 -691 (1965). </s> [Footnote 9 E. g., Senate Hearings 185-187; Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Extension before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 3, pp. 55-57, 223-225 (1969) (hereafter House Hearings). </s> [Footnote 10 For example, 1960 census data indicate that from 1955 to 1960, 4,388 blacks moved from Southern States to Arizona, 74,804 to California, and 74,821 to New York. Table 100 in 1 1960 Census of Population, pts. 4, 6, and 34. </s> [Footnote 11 Senate Hearings 399; see id., at 400-407. </s> [Footnote 12 Senate Hearings 678. Tribal Chairman Nakai viewed Arizona's literacy test as the primary cause of this disparity. </s> [Footnote 13 The States are permitted, should they desire, to adopt practices less restrictive than those prescribed by the 1970 Amendments. 202 (g). </s> [Footnote 14 See n. 4, supra. </s> [Footnote 15 See the opinion of MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, ante, at 148-150. </s> [Footnote 16 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S., at 630 and n. 8; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S., at 757 -758. </s> [Footnote 17 Senate Hearings 282. </s> [Footnote 18 116 Cong. Rec. 6991. </s> [Footnote 19 Ibid. Idaho Code 34-1101, 34-1102, 34-1103 appear to allow application to be made at any time. Id., 34-1121 allows application up to five days before the election for persons in United States service. The ballot may be returned any time prior to noon on election day, id., 34-1105 (Supp. 1969). Finally, effective January 1, 1971, applications may be made up to 5 p. m. the day before the election. Id., 34-1002 (Supp. 1970). In such circumstances, the argument of administrative impossibility from the viewpoint of Idaho seems almost chimerical. </s> [Footnote 20 Idaho, in addition, claims that its interest in setting qualifications for voters in its own elections serves, without more, as a compelling state interest sufficient to justify the challenged exclusion. But there is no state interest in the mere exercise of power; the power must be exercised for some reason. The only reason asserted by Idaho for the exercise of its power is that already mentioned - promotion of intelligent and responsible voting. </s> [Footnote 21 116 Cong. Rec. 6970 (Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service survey). </s> [Footnote 22 Ibid. </s> [Footnote 23 Nor does the California statute, Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code 602 (1966), necessarily evidence a contrary conclusion. California permits its juvenile court to waive jurisdiction of persons over the age of 16 to the regular criminal courts, and state practice appears to be that very few if any felony defendants over the age of 18 are ever tried as juveniles. R. Boches & J. Goldfarb, California Juvenile Court Practice 35-36 (1968). This may well indicate that the California [400 U.S. 112, 244] statute reflects merely a legislative conclusion that the slight burden of waiver hearings is outweighed by the possibility, however slight, that a very few individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 might in fact be more appropriately treated as juveniles. </s> [Footnote 24 116 Cong. Rec. 6970. </s> [Footnote 25 For example, in California any woman 18 years old may marry without parental consent, and any man of that age may marry with the consent of one parent. Cal. Civ. Code 4101 (1970). Any married person who has attained the age of 18 is treated in precisely the same way as all persons of the age of 21 and over with regard to all provisions of the Civil Code, Probate Code, and Code of Civil Procedure, as well as for the purposes of making contracts or entering into any agreement regarding property or his estate. Cal. Civ. Code 25 (Supp. 1970). The State Labor Department treats males of the age of 18 and over as adults. Cal. Labor Code 1172, 3077 (1955). Persons of the age of 18 and over may serve civil process in the State. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 410 (Supp. 1970). </s> [Footnote 26 Some States, of course, do attempt to condition exercise of the franchise upon the ability to pass a literacy test. Presumably some 18-year-old illiterates will be literate at 21. But in light of the fact that 81 percent of the disenfranchised class are high school graduates, it would seem that the number of 18-year-old illiterates who are literate three years later is vanishingly small. See Hearings on S. J. Res. 147 and Others before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 133 (1970) (Sen. Goldwater). Of course, for reasons that apply as well to 18-year-olds as to others, we have today upheld a nationwide suspension of all literacy tests. Ante, at 118. But in any event, that some 18-year-olds may be illiterate is hardly sufficient reason for disenfranchising the entire class. See Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 632 -633. </s> [Footnote 27 Eighteen-year-olds as a class are better educated than some of their elders. The median number of school years completed by 18- and 19-year-olds two years ago was 12.2; it was 8.8 for persons 65 to 74. Bureau of the Census, Educational Attainment, table 1 (Current Population Reports, Series P-20, No. 182) (1969). </s> [Footnote 28 Hawaii and Alaska have, since their admission to the Union in 1959, allowed the vote to 19-year-olds (Alaska) and 20-year-olds (Hawaii). </s> [Footnote 29 See, e. g., 116 Cong. Rec. 6433-6434 (Sen. Cook), 6929-6930 (Sens. Talmadge and Ervin); Senate Hearings 343 (Gov. Maddox). </s> [Footnote 30 The state of facts necessary to justify a legislative discrimination will of course vary with the nature of the discrimination involved. When we have been faced with statutes involving nothing more than state regulation of business practices, we have often found mere administrative convenience sufficient to justify the discrimination. E. g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 , 488-489 (1955). But when a discrimination has the effect of denying or inhibiting the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights, we have required that it be not merely convenient, but necessary. Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S., at 627 ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S., at 96 ; see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 582 -583 (1968). And we have required as well that it be necessary to promote not merely a constitutionally permissible state interest, but a state interest of substantial importance. Kramer v. Union School District, supra; Carrington v. Rash, supra; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 -490 (1960); see United States v. O'Brien, supra. </s> [Footnote 31 As we emphasized in Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, " 5 does not grant Congress power to . . . enact `statutes so as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of this Court.'" 384 U.S., at 651 n. 10. As indicated above, a decision of this Court striking down a state statute expresses, among other things, our conclusion that the legislative findings upon which the statute is based are so far wrong as to be unreasonable. Unless Congress were to unearth new evidence in its investigation, its identical findings on the identical issue would be no more reasonable than those of the state legislature. </s> [Footnote 32 Brief for the State of Oregon 10-13; Brief for the State of Texas 10-12; Brief for the State of Arizona 19; Brief for the State of Idaho 22, 28-30. </s> [Footnote 33 Brief amicus curiae for the Commonwealth of Virginia 13-22; see Brief amicus curiae for the State of Mississippi 7-11. </s> [Footnote 34 Indeed, since the First Amendment is applicable to the States only through the Fourteenth, our Brother HARLAN'S view would appear to allow a State to exclude any unpopular group from the political process solely upon the basis of its political opinions. </s> [Footnote 35 Republicans explicitly looked upon the Fourteenth Amendment as a political platform. See 2 F. Fessenden, Life and Public Services of William Pitt Fessenden 62 (1907); B. Kendrick, The Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 302 (1914). See also infra, at 262. </s> [Footnote 36 The language appears earlier in Art. IV, 2. </s> [Footnote 37 As the statements of Bingham and Howard in the text indicate, the framers of the Amendment were not always clear whether they understood it merely as a grant of power to Congress or whether they thought, in addition, that it would confer power upon the [400 U.S. 112, 264] courts, which the courts would use to achieve equality of rights. Since 5 is clear in its grant of power to Congress and we have consistently held that the Amendment grants power to the courts, this issue is of academic interest only. </s> [Footnote 38 According to Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869), the Privileges and Immunities Clause in Art. 4, 2, secured to citizens "in other States the equal protection of their laws." </s> [Footnote 39 Senator Stewart's statement regarding the two-thirds requirement appears to refer to 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires such a majority for legislation granting amnesty to former Confederate leaders. </s> [Footnote 40 This Court had taken such an approach in Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591 (1856). </s> [Footnote 41 Ironically, the same distinction between "political" and other rights was drawn by this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 -546 (1896). But the Court there concluded, directly contrary to our Brother HARLAN'S position, that the Fourteenth Amendment applied to "political" rights and to those rights only. </s> [Footnote 42 As Thaddeus Stevens had pointed out in urging passage of the Fourteenth Amendment despite the fact that, he felt, some of its guarantees could be enforced by mere legislative enactment, "a law is repealable by a majority." Globe 2459. </s> [Footnote 43 Radical disenchantment with decisions of this Court had led, prior to the Fifteenth Amendment, to the Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44, withdrawing our appellate jurisdiction over certain habeas corpus cases. See Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 508, 514-515 (1869). </s> [Footnote 44 Breedlove has been overruled by Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). </s> [Footnote 45 For a full collection of the relevant materials, see Note, Legislative History of Title III of the Voting Rights Act of 1970, 8 Harv. J. Legis. 123 (1970). </s> [Footnote 46 See 88 Cong. Rec. 8312, 8316 (1942). </s> [Footnote 47 Hearings on S. J. Res. 8, 14, and 78 before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Hearings on S. J. Res. 147 and Others before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (hereafter 1970 Hearings). </s> [Footnote 48 Supra, at 242-246. </s> [Footnote 49 See 116 Cong. Rec. 6955; James, The Age of Majority, 4 Am. J. Legal Hist. 22 (1960); Report of the Committee on the Age of Majority Presented to the English Parliament 21 (1967). </s> [Footnote 50 116 Cong. Rec. 6435. </s> [Footnote 51 16 Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings, table A-3 (June 1970). </s> [Footnote 52 See also Senate Hearings 323 (Sen. Kennedy), 116 Cong. Rec. 5950-5951 (Sen. Mansfield); 6433 (Sen. Cook). See generally Note, supra, n. 45, at 134-148. </s> [Footnote 53 1970 Hearings at 223. Dr. W. Walter Menninger, a psychiatrist, and Dr. S. I. Hayakawa agreed. Id., at 23, 36. </s> [Footnote 54 E. g., 116 Cong. Rec. 5950-5951 (Sen. Mansfield); 6433-6434 (Sen. Cook); 6434-6437 (Sen. Goldwater); 6929-6930 (Sen. Talmadge, joined by Sen. Ervin); 6950-6951 (Sen. Tydings). </s> [Footnote 55 116 Cong. Rec. 6929. </s> MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> In these cases we deal with the constitutional validity of three provisions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970. Congress undertook in these provisions: (a) to abolish for a five-year period all literacy tests and similar voting eligibility requirements imposed by any State in the Union ( 201); (b) to remove the restrictions imposed by state durational residency requirements upon voters in presidential elections ( 202); and (c) to reduce the voting age to a minimum of 18 years for all voters in all elections throughout the Nation ( 302). The Court today upholds 201's nationwide literacy test ban and 202's elimination of state durational residency restrictions in presidential elections. Section 302's extension of the franchise to 18-year-old voters is (by virtue of the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BLACK announcing the judgments of the Court) upheld as applied to federal elections. I agree with the Court in sustaining the congressional ban on state literacy tests, for substantially the same reasons relied upon by MR. JUSTICE BLACK. I also agree that the action of Congress in removing the restrictions of state residency requirements in presidential elections is constitutionally valid, but I base this judgment upon grounds quite different from those relied upon by MR. JUSTICE BLACK. And, finally, I disagree with the Court's conclusion that Congress could constitutionally reduce the voting [400 U.S. 112, 282] age to 18 for federal elections, since I am convinced that Congress was wholly without constitutional power to alter - for the purpose of any elections - the voting age qualifications now determined by the several States. </s> Before turning to a discussion of my views, it seems appropriate to state that we are not called upon in these cases to evaluate or appraise the wisdom of abolishing literacy tests, of altering state residency requirements, or of reducing the voting age to 18. Whatever we may think as citizens, our single duty as judges is to determine whether the legislation before us was within the constitutional power of Congress to enact. I find it necessary to state so elementary a proposition only because certain of the separate opinions filed today contain many pages devoted to a demonstration of how beneficent are the goals of this legislation, particularly the extension of the electoral franchise to young men and women of 18. A casual reader could easily get the impression that what we are being asked in these cases is whether or not we think allowing people 18 years old to vote is a good idea. Nothing could be wider of the mark. My Brothers to the contrary, there is no question here as to the "judgment" of Congress; there are questions only of Congress' constitutional power. </s> I </s> I concur in Part II of MR. JUSTICE BLACK'S opinion, which holds that the literacy test ban of 201 of the 1970 Amendments is constitutional under the Enforcement Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment. Our decisions establish that the Fifteenth Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination. It hits onerous procedural requirements which effectively handicap exercise of the franchise by the colored race although the abstract right to vote may remain unrestricted as to race." Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 ; [400 U.S. 112, 283] cf. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 . Because literacy and illiteracy are seemingly neutral with respect to race, creed, color, and sex, we upheld a literacy requirement against a claim that it was invalid on its face under the Fifteenth Amendment. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S. 45 . But in Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 , we made it clear that Congress has ample authority under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment to determine that literacy requirements work unfairly against Negroes in practice because they handicap those Negroes who have been deprived of the educational opportunities available to white citizens. We construed the 1965 Voting Rights Act in light of the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee which said, "[T]he educational differences between whites and Negroes in the areas to be covered by the prohibitions - differences which are reflected in the record before the committee - would mean that equal application of the tests would abridge 15th amendment rights." S. Rep. No. 162, pt. 3, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 16. See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 -315. </s> Congress has now undertaken to extend the ban on literacy tests to the whole Nation. I see no constitutional impediment to its doing so. Nationwide application reduces the danger that federal intervention will be perceived as unreasonable discrimination against particular States or particular regions of the country. This in turn increases the likelihood of voluntary compliance with the letter and spirit of federal law. Nationwide application facilitates the free movement of citizens from one State to another, since it eliminates the prospect that a change in residence will mean the loss of a federally protected right. Nationwide application avoids the often difficult task of drawing a line between those States where a problem is pressing enough to warrant federal intervention and those where it is not. Such a [400 U.S. 112, 284] line may well appear discriminatory to those who think themselves on the wrong side of it. Moreover the application of the line to particular States can entail a substantial burden on administrative and judicial machinery and a diversion of enforcement resources. Finally, nationwide application may be reasonably thought appropriate when Congress acts against an evil such as racial discrimination which in varying degrees manifests itself in every part of the country. A remedy for racial discrimination which applies in all the States underlines an awareness that the problem is a national one and reflects a national commitment to its solution. </s> Because the justification for extending the ban on literacy tests to the entire Nation need not turn on whether literacy tests unfairly discriminate against Negroes in every State in the Union, Congress was not required to make state-by-state findings concerning either the equality of educational opportunity or actual impact of literacy requirements on the Negro citizen's access to the ballot box. In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint with a much broader brush than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding individual cases and controversies upon individual records. Cf. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, supra. The findings that Congress made when it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 would have supported a nationwide ban on literacy tests. Instead, at that time "Congress chose to limit its attention to the geographic areas where immediate action seemed necessary." South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 328 . Experience gained under the 1965 Act has now led Congress to conclude that it should go the whole distance. This approach to the problem is a rational one; consequently it is within the constitutional power of Congress under 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. [400 U.S. 112, 285] </s> II </s> Section 202 added by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 is a comprehensive provision aimed at insuring that a citizen will not be deprived of the opportunity to vote for the offices of President and Vice President because of a change of residence. Those who take up a new residence more than 30 days before a presidential election are guaranteed the right to register and vote in the State to which they have moved notwithstanding any durational residency requirement imposed by state law, provided, of course, that they are otherwise qualified to vote. Those who take up a new residence less than 30 days before a presidential election are guaranteed the right to vote, either in person or by absentee ballot, in the State from which they have moved, provided that they satisfied, as of the date of their change of residence, the requirements to vote in that State. </s> A </s> Congress, in my view, has the power under the Constitution to eradicate political and civil disabilities that arise by operation of state law following a change in residence from one State to another. Freedom to travel from State to State - freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union - is a privilege of United States citizenship. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 ; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 -760; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 ; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or [400 U.S. 112, 286] immunities of citizens of the United States . . . ." In discussing the privileges of citizens of the United States within the meaning of 1, Mr. Justice Miller wrote for the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases: </s> "One of these privileges is conferred by the very article under consideration. It is that a citizen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State." 16 Wall. 36, 80. </s> Although 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers on Congress the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article," this Court has sustained the power of Congress to protect and facilitate the exercise of privileges of United States citizenship without reference to 5. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S., at 757 -760; United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 ; Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 . These cases and others establish that Congress brings to the protection and facilitation of the exercise of privileges of United States citizenship all of its power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Consequently, as against the reserved power of the States, it is enough that the end to which Congress has acted be one legitimately within its power and that there be a rational basis for the measures chosen to achieve that end. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 421. </s> In the light of these considerations, 202 presents no difficulty. Congress could rationally conclude that the imposition of durational residency requirements unreasonably burdens and sanctions the privilege of taking up residence in another State. The objective of 202 is clearly a legitimate one. Federal action is required if the privilege to change residence is not to be undercut by parochial local sanctions. No State could undertake [400 U.S. 112, 287] to guarantee this privilege to its citizens. At most a single State could take steps to resolve that its own laws would not unreasonably discriminate against the newly arrived resident. Even this resolve might not remain firm in the face of discriminations perceived as unfair against those of its own citizens who moved to other States. Thus, the problem could not be wholly solved by a single State, or even by several States, since every State of new residence and every State of prior residence would have a necessary role to play. In the absence of a unanimous interstate compact, the problem could only be solved by Congress. Quite clearly, then, Congress has acted to protect a constitutional privilege that finds its protection in the Federal Government and is national in character. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall., at 79. </s> B </s> But even though general constitutional power clearly exists, Congress may not overstep the letter or spirit of any constitutional restriction in the exercise of that power. For example, Congress clearly has power to regulate interstate commerce, but it may not, in the exercise of that power, impinge upon the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. I have concluded that, while 202 applies only to presidential elections, nothing in the Constitution prevents Congress from protecting those who have moved from one State to another from disenfranchisement in any federal election, whether congressional or presidential. </s> The Constitution withholds from Congress any general authority to change by legislation the qualifications for voters in federal elections. The meaning of the applicable constitutional provisions is perfectly plain. Article I, 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment prescribe the qualifications for voters in elections to choose Senators and Representatives: they "shall have the Qualifications [400 U.S. 112, 288] requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." The Constitution thus adopts as the federal standard the standard which each State has chosen for itself. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 663 ; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 64 . Accordingly, a state law that purported to establish distinct qualifications for congressional elections would be invalid as repugnant to Art. I, 2, and the Seventeenth Amendment. By the same token, it cannot be gainsaid that federal legislation that had no objective other than to alter the qualifications to vote in congressional elections would be invalid for the same reasons. What the Constitution has fixed may not be changed except by constitutional amendment. </s> Contrary to the submission of my Brother BLACK, Art. I, 4, does not create in the Federal Legislature the power to alter the constitutionally established qualifications to vote in congressional elections. That section provides that the legislatures in each State shall prescribe the "Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives," but reserves in Congress the power to "make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of causing Senators." The "manner" of holding elections can hardly be read to mean the qualifications for voters, when it is remembered that 2 of the same Art. I explicitly speaks of the "qualifications" for voters in elections to choose Representatives. It is plain, in short, that when the Framers meant qualifications they said "qualifications." That word does not appear in Art. I, 4. Moreover, 4 does not give Congress the power to do anything that a State might not have done, and, as pointed out above, no State may establish distinct qualifications for congressional elections. The States, of course, are free to pass such laws as are necessary to assure fair elections. Congressional power under 4 is equally broad with respect to congressional [400 U.S. 112, 289] elections. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 . But the States are not free to prescribe qualifications for voters in federal elections which differ from those prescribed for the most numerous branch of the state legislature. And the power of Congress to do so cannot, therefore, be found in Art. I, 4. </s> This view is confirmed by extrinsic evidence of the intent of the Framers of the Constitution. An early draft of the Constitution provided that the States should fix the qualifications of voters in congressional elections subject to the proviso that these qualifications might "at any Time be altered and superseded by the Legislature of the United States." 1 The records of the Committee on Detail show that it was decided to strike the provision granting to Congress the authority to set voting qualifications and to add in its stead a clause making the qualifications "the same from Time to Time as those of the Electors, in the several States, of the most numerous Branch of their own Legislatures." 2 The proposed draft reported by the Committee on Detail to the Convention included the following: </s> "The qualifications of the electors shall be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures." Art. IV, 1. </s> "The times and places and manner of holding the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at any time, be altered by the Legislature of the United States." 3 Art. VI, 1. [400 U.S. 112, 290] </s> On August 7, Gouverneur Morris moved to strike the last clause of the proposed Art. IV, 1, and either to provide a freehold limitation on suffrage or to add a clause permitting Congress to alter the electoral qualifications. 4 This motion was opposed by Oliver Ellsworth, George Mason, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin. Ellsworth protested that the proposal favored aristocracy. If the legislature could alter qualifications, it could disqualify a great proportion of the electorate. 5 Mason voiced a similar objection. "A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature." 6 To the same effect Madison said: </s> "The right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature." 7 </s> The proposed motion was defeated by a seven-to-one vote, 8 and no substantive change in Art. I, 2, was proposed or made thereafter. </s> Thus, Alexander Hamilton accurately reported the intent of the Convention when he wrote in The Federalist No. 60 that the authority of the national government "would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature [i. e., Congress]." (Emphasis in original.) </s> Different provisions of the Constitution govern the selection of the President and the Vice President. Article [400 U.S. 112, 291] II and the Twelfth Amendment provide for election by electors. Article II specifies that each State shall appoint electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct." Because the Constitution does not require the popular election of members of the electoral college, it does not specify the qualifications that voters must have when the selection of electors is by popular election. This is left to the States in the exercise of their power to "direct" the manner of choosing presidential electors. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 . When electors are chosen by popular election, the Federal Government has the power to assure that such elections are orderly and free from corruption. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 . But in Burroughs the Court noted of the Act under review: "Neither in purpose nor in effect does it interfere with the power of a state to appoint electors or the manner in which their appointment shall be made." 290 U.S., at 544 . The Court quoted with approval the following passage from Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 : "[T]he importance to the general government of having the actual election - the voting for those members - free from force and fraud is not diminished by the circumstance that the qualification of the voter is determined by the law of the State where he votes." 290 U.S., at 546 . And in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 , the Court was careful to point out that it is the "right of qualified voters within a state to cast their ballots and have them counted" which is a privilege of United States citizenship amenable to congressional protection. Id., at 315 (emphasis added). See also Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (No. 3230) (CCED Pa.). </s> The issue, then, is whether, despite the intentional withholding from the Federal Government of a general authority to establish qualifications to vote in either congressional or presidential elections, there exists [400 U.S. 112, 292] congressional power to do so when Congress acts with the objective of protecting a citizen's privilege to move his residence from one State to another. Although the matter is not entirely free from doubt, I am persuaded that the constitutional provisions discussed above are not sufficient to prevent Congress from protecting a person who exercises his constitutional right to enter and abide in any State in the Union from losing his opportunity to vote, when Congress may protect the right of interstate travel from other less fundamental disabilities. The power of the States with regard to the franchise is subject to the power of the Federal Government to vindicate the unconditional personal rights secured to the citizen by the Federal Constitution. Williams v. Rhodes, supra; cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, supra. The power that Congress has exercised in enacting 202 is not a general power to prescribe qualifications for voters in either federal or state elections. It is confined to federal action against a particular problem clearly within the purview of congressional authority. Finally, the power to facilitate the citizen's exercise of his constitutional privilege to change residence is one that cannot be left for exercise by the individual States without seriously diminishing the level of protection available. As I have sought to show above, federal action is required if this privilege is to be effectively maintained. We should strive to avoid an interpretation of the Constitution that would withhold from Congress the power to legislate for the protection of those constitutional rights that the States are unable effectively to secure. For all these reasons, I conclude that it was within the power of Congress to enact 202. 9 </s> [400 U.S. 112, 293] </s> III </s> Section 302 added by the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 undertakes to enfranchise in all federal, state, and local elections those citizens 18 years of age or older who are now denied the right to vote by state law because they have not reached the age of 21. Although it was found necessary to amend the Constitution in order to confer a federal right to vote upon Negroes 10 and upon females, 11 the Government asserts that a federal right to vote can be conferred upon people between 18 and 21 years of age simply by this Act of Congress. Our decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 , it is said, established the power of Congress, under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, to nullify state laws requiring voters to be 21 years of age or older if Congress could rationally have concluded that such laws are not supported by a "compelling state interest." </s> In my view, neither the Morgan case, nor any other case upon which the Government relies, establishes such congressional power, even assuming that all those cases 12 were rightly decided. MR. JUSTICE BLACK is surely [400 U.S. 112, 294] correct when he writes, "It is a plain fact of history that the Framers never imagined that the national Congress would set the qualifications for voters in every election from President to local constable or village alderman. It is obvious that the whole Constitution reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections, except to the limited extent that the people through constitutional amendments have specifically narrowed the powers of the States." Ante, at 125. For the reasons that I have set out in Part II of this opinion, it is equally plain to me that the Constitution just as completely withholds from Congress the power to alter by legislation qualifications for voters in federal elections, in view of the explicit provisions of Article I, Article II, and the Seventeenth Amendment. </s> To be sure, recent decisions have established that state action regulating suffrage is not immune from the impact of the Equal Protection Clause. 13 But we have been careful in those decisions to note the undoubted power of a State to establish a qualification for voting based on age. See, e. g., Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 625 ; Lassiter v. Northampton Election Board, 360 U.S., at 51 . Indeed, none of the opinions filed today suggest that the States have anything but a constitutionally unimpeachable interest in establishing some age qualification as such. Yet to test the power to establish an age qualification by the "compelling interest" standard is really to deny a State any choice at all, because no State could demonstrate a "compelling interest" in drawing the line with respect to age at one point rather than another. Obviously, the power to establish an age qualification must carry with it the power to choose [400 U.S. 112, 295] 21 as a reasonable voting age, as the vast majority of the States have done. 14 </s> Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, does not hold that Congress has the power to determine what are and what are not "compelling state interests" for equal protection purposes. In Morgan the Court considered the power of Congress to enact a statute whose principal effect was to enfranchise Puerto Ricans who had moved to New York after receiving their education in Spanish-language Puerto Rican schools and who were denied the right to vote in New York because they were unable to read or write English. The Court upheld the statute on two grounds: that Congress could conclude that enhancing the political power of the Puerto Rican community by conferring the right to vote was an appropriate means of remedying discriminatory treatment in public services; and that Congress could conclude that the New York statute was tainted by the impermissible purpose of denying the right to vote to Puerto Ricans, [400 U.S. 112, 296] an undoubted invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Both of these decisional grounds were farreaching. The Court's opinion made clear that Congress could impose on the States a remedy for the denial of equal protection that elaborated upon the direct command of the Constitution, and that it could override state laws on the ground that they were in fact used as instruments of invidious discrimination even though a court in an individual lawsuit might not have reached that factual conclusion. Cf. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 . </s> But it is necessary to go much further to sustain 302. The state laws that it invalidates do not invidiously discriminate against any discrete and insular minority. Unlike the statute considered in Morgan, 302 is valid only if Congress has the power not only to provide the means of eradicating situations that amount to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, but also to determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of the clause, and what state interests are "compelling." I concurred in MR. JUSTICE HARLAN'S dissent in Morgan. That case, as I now read it, gave congressional power under 5 the furthest possible legitimate reach. Yet to sustain the constitutionality of 302 would require an enormous extension of that decision's rationale. I cannot but conclude that 302 was beyond the constitutional power of Congress to enact. </s> [Footnote 1 2 M. Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 153 (1911). </s> [Footnote 2 Id., at 164. </s> [Footnote 3 Id., at 178-179. </s> [Footnote 4 Id., at 201, 207. </s> [Footnote 5 Id., at 201. </s> [Footnote 6 Id., at 202. </s> [Footnote 7 Id., at 203. </s> [Footnote 8 Id., at 206. </s> [Footnote 9 Whether a particular State's durational residency requirement for voters may violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment presents questions that are for me quite different from those attending the constitutionality of 202. See Howe v. Brown, [400 U.S. 112, 293] 319 F. Supp. 862 (ND Ohio 1970); Cocanower v. Marston, 318 F. Supp. 402 (Ariz. 1970); Burg v. Canniffe, 315 F. Supp. 380 (Mass. 1970); Blumstein v. Ellington, ___ F. Supp. ___ (MD Tenn. 1970); Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (MD Ala. 1970); Bufford v. Holton, 319 F. Supp. 843 (ED Va. 1970); Lester v. Board of Elections, 319 F. Supp. 505 (DC 1970). </s> [Footnote 10 U.S. Const., Amdt. XV. </s> [Footnote 11 U.S. Const., Amdt. XIX; see also Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162. </s> [Footnote 12 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970). </s> [Footnote 13 See, e. g., cases cited supra, n. 12. </s> [Footnote 14 If the Government is correct in its submission that a particular age requirement must meet the "compelling interest" standard, then, of course, a substantial question would exist whether a 21-year-old voter qualification is constitutional even in the absence of congressional action, as my Brothers point out. Ante, at 241-246. Yet it is inconceivable to me that this Court would ever hold that the denial of the vote to those between the ages of 18 and 21 constitutes such an invidious discrimination as to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The establishment of an age qualification is not state action aimed at any discrete and insular minority. Cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4. Moreover, so long as a State does not set the voting age higher than 21, the reasonableness of its choice is confirmed by the very Fourteenth Amendment upon which the Government relies. Section 2 of that Amendment provides for sanctions when the right to vote "is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States . . . ." (Emphasis added.) </s> [400 U.S. 112, 297]

United States Supreme Court EVANSVILLE AIRPORT v. DELTA AIRLINES(1972) No. 70-99 Argued: Decided: April 19, 1972 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 70-212, Northeast Airlines, Inc., et al. v. New Hampshire Aeronautics Commission et al., on appeal from the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, argued February 24, 1972. </s> In No. 70-99 respondents challenged a "use and service charge" of $1 "for each passenger enplaning any commercial aircraft operated from the Dress Memorial Airport" in Evansville, Indiana. The funds were to be used for the improvement and maintenance of the airport. The Indiana Supreme Court, upholding the lower court, held the charge to be an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, 8, of the Constitution. In No. 70-212 a New Hampshire statute levied a service charge of $1 for each passenger enplaning a scheduled commercial airliner weighing 12,500 pounds or more, and a 50 charge for each passenger enplaning a scheduled aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds. Fifty percent of the funds were allocated to the State's aeronautical fund, with the balance going to the municipalities or airport authorities owning the public landing areas. The New Hampshire Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the statute. Held: The charges imposed in these cases are constitutional. Pp. 711-722. </s> (a) A charge designed to make the user of state-provided facilities pay a reasonable fee for their construction and maintenance may constitutionally be imposed on interstate and intrastate users alike. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, distinguished. Pp. 711-717. </s> (b) The charges, applicable to both interstate and intrastate flights, do not discriminate against interstate commerce and travel. P. 717. </s> (c) Although not all users of the airport facilities are subject to the fees, and there are distinctions among different classes of passengers and aircraft, the charges reflect a fair, albeit imperfect, [405 U.S. 707, 708] approximation of the use of the facilities by those for whose benefit they are imposed, and the exemptions are not wholly unreasonable. Pp. 717-719. </s> (d) The airlines have not shown the charges to be excessive in relation to the costs incurred by the taxing authorities in constructing and maintaining airports with public funds. New Hampshire's decision to reimburse local expenditures through unrestricted revenues is not a matter of concern to the airlines. Pp. 719-720. </s> (e) The charges do not conflict with any federal policies furthering uniform national regulation of air transportation. Pp. 720-721. </s> (f) There is no suggestion here that the charges do not advance the constitutionally permissible objective of having interstate commerce bear a fair share of airport costs. P. 722. </s> No. 70-99, ___ Ind. ___, 265 N. E. 2d 27, reversed: No. 70-212, 111 N. H. 5, 273 A. 2d 676, affirmed. </s> BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 722. POWELL, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases. </s> Howard P. Trockman argued the cause for petitioners in No. 70-99. With him on the briefs was James F. Flynn. John K. Mallory, Jr., argued the cause for respondents in No. 70-99 and for appellants in No. 70-212. With him on the brief in No. 70-99 were Fred P. Bamberger, J. Eugene Marans, and Jeffrey R. Kinney. With him on the brief in No. 70-212 were Joseph A. Millimet and Mr. Marans. W. Michael Dunn, Assistant Attorney General of New Hampshire, argued the cause for appellees in No. 70-212. With him on the brief was Warren B. Rudman, Attorney General. </s> Donald G. Alexander filed a brief for the National League of Cities as amicus curiae urging reversal in No. 70-99. [405 U.S. 707, 709] </s> MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The question is whether a charge by a State or municipality of $1 per commercial airline passenger to help defray the costs of airport construction and maintenance violates the Federal Constitution. Our answer is that, as imposed in these two cases, the charge does not violate the Federal Constitution. </s> No. 70-99. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority District was created by the Indiana Legislature to operate Dress Memorial Airport in Evansville, Indiana. Under its authority to enact ordinances adopting rates and charges to be collected from users of the airport facilities and services, the Airport Authority enacted Ordinance No. 33 establishing "a use and service charge of One Dollar ($1.00) for each passenger enplaning any commercial aircraft operated from the Dress Memorial Airport." The commercial airlines are required to collect and remit the charge, less 6% allowed to cover the airlines' administrative costs in doing so. The moneys collected are held by the Airport Authority "in a separate fund for the purpose of defraying the present and future costs incurred by said Airport Authority in the construction, improvement, equipment, and maintenance of said Airport and its facilities for the continued use and future enjoyment by all users thereof." </s> Respondents challenged the constitutionality of the charge in an action filed in the Superior Court of Vanderburgh County, Indiana. The court held that the charge constituted an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce in violation of Art. I, 8, of the Federal Constitution and permanently enjoined enforcement of the ordinance. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed, ___ Ind. ___, 265 N. E. 2d 27 (1970). We granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 820 (1971). We reverse. [405 U.S. 707, 710] </s> No. 70-212. Chapter 391 of the 1969 Laws of New Hampshire, amending N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 422:3, 422:43, 422:45, requires every interstate and intrastate "common carrier of passengers for hire by aircraft on a regular schedule" that uses any of New Hampshire's five publicly owned and operated airports to "pay a service charge of one dollar with respect to each passenger emplaning 1 upon its aircraft with a gross weight of 12,500 pounds or more, or a service charge of fifty cents with respect to each passenger emplaning upon its aircraft with a gross weight of less than 12,500 pounds." Fifty percent of the moneys collected are allocated to the State's aeronautical fund and 50% "to the municipalities or the airport authorities owning the public landing areas at which the fees . . . were imposed." The airlines are authorized to pass on the charge to the passenger. 2 </s> [405 U.S. 707, 711] </s> Appellants brought this action in the Superior Court of Merrimack Country, New Hampshire, and challenged the constitutionality of the charge as to scheduled commercial flights on the grounds of repugnancy to the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the provisions of the Federal Constitution protecting the right to travel. The Superior Court, without decision, transferred the action to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, and that court sustained the constitutionality of the statute. 111 N. H. 5, 273 A. 2d 676 (1971). We noted probable jurisdiction, 404 U.S. 819 (1971). 3 We affirm. </s> We begin our analysis with consideration of the contention of the commercial airlines in both cases that the charge is constitutionally invalid under the Court's decision in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868). There the Court invalidated a Nevada statute that levied a "tax of one dollar upon every person leaving the State by any railroad, stage coach, or other vehicle engaged or employed in the business of transporting passengers for hire." The Court approached the problem as one of whether levy of "any tax of that character," whatever its amount, impermissibly burdened the constitutionally protected right of citizens to travel. In holding that it did, the Court reasoned: </s> "[I]f the State can tax a railroad passenger one dollar, it can tax him one thousand dollars. If one State [405 U.S. 707, 712] can do this, so can every other State. And thus one or more States covering the only practicable routes of travel from the east to the west, or from the north to the south, may totally prevent or seriously burden all transportation of passengers from one part of the country to the other." Id., at 46. 4 </s> The Nevada charge, however, was not limited, as are the Indiana and New Hampshire charges before us, to travelers asked to bear a fair share of the costs of providing public facilities that further travel. The Nevada tax applied to passengers traveling interstate by privately owned transportation, such as railroads. Thus the tax was charged without regard to whether Nevada provided any facilities for the passengers required to pay the tax. Cases decided since Crandall have distinguished it on that ground and have sustained taxes "designed to make [interstate] commerce bear a fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946). 5 For example, in Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915), a District of Columbia resident was convicted of driving in Maryland without paying a fee charged to help defray the costs of road construction and repair. He challenged his conviction on the ground that the fee burdened interstate commerce in violation of the rights of citizens to travel into and through the State. The Court rejected that argument, holding that: </s> "[W]here a State at its own expense furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in commerce, [405 U.S. 707, 713] interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation therefor. The amount of the charges and the method of collection are primarily for determination by the State itself; and so long as they are reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair and practical standard they constitute no burden on interstate commerce. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 699 ; Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 548 , 549; Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 329 , 330; Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 405 ; and authorities cited. The action of the State must be treated as correct unless the contrary is made to appear. In the instant case there is no evidence concerning the value of the facilities supplied by the State, the cost of maintaining them, or the fairness of the methods adopted for collecting the charges imposed; and we cannot say from a mere inspection of the statute that its provisions are arbitrary or unreasonable." Id., at 624. </s> The Court expressly distinguished Crandall, saying: </s> "There is no solid foundation for the claim that the statute directly interferes with the rights of citizens of the United States to pass through the State, and is consequently bad according to the doctrine announced in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. In that case a direct tax was laid upon the passenger for the privilege of leaving the State; while here the statute at most attempts to regulate the operation of dangerous machines on the highways and to charge for the use of valuable facilities." Ibid. 6 </s> [405 U.S. 707, 714] </s> We therefore regard it as settled that a charge designed only to make the user of state-provided facilities pay a reasonable fee to help defray the costs of their construction and maintenance may constitutionally be imposed on interstate and domestic users alike. The principle that burdens on the right to travel are constitutional only if shown to be necessary to promote a compelling state interest has no application in this context. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). The facility provided at public expense aids rather than hinders the right to travel. A permissible charge to help defray the cost of the facility is therefore not a burden in the constitutional sense. </s> The Indiana and New Hampshire Supreme Courts differed in appraising their respective charges in terms of whether the charge was for the use of facilities in aid of travel provided by the public. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the Evansville charge "is not reasonably related to the use of the facilities which benefit from the tax . . . ." ___ Ind., at ___, 265 N. E. 2d, at 31. The New Hampshire Supreme Court, on the other hand, held that the New Hampshire charge was a "fee for the use of facilities furnished by the public" that did not "exceed reasonable compensation for the use provided." 111 N. H., at 9, 273 A. 2d, at 678, 679. </s> In addressing the question, we do not think it particularly important whether the charge is imposed on the passenger himself, to be collected by the airline, or on the airline, to be passed on to the passenger if it chooses. In either case, it is the act of enplanement and the consequent use of runways and other airport facilities that give rise to the obligation. Our inquiry [405 U.S. 707, 715] is whether the use of airport facilities occasioned by enplanement is a permissible incident on which to levy these fees, regardless of whether the airline or its passengers bear the formal responsibility for their payment. </s> Our decisions concerning highway tolls are instructive. They establish that the States are empowered to develop "uniform, fair and practical" standards for this type of fee. While the Court has invalidated as wholly unrelated to road use a toll based on the carrier's seating capacity, Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931); Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 (1928), and the amount of gasoline over 20 gallons in the carrier's gas tank, McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176 (1940), we have sustained numerous tolls based on a variety of measures of actual use, including: horsepower, Hendrick v. Maryland, supra; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); number and capacity of vehicles, Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 (1927); mileage within the State, Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 (1928); gross-ton mileage, Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352 (1932); carrying capacity, Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933); and manufacturer's rated capacity and weight of trailers, Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Comm'n, 306 U.S. 72 (1939). </s> We have also held that a State may impose a flat fee for the privilege of using its roads, without regard to the actual use by particular vehicles, so long as the fee is not excessive. Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935); Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S. 407 (1936); Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S. 495 (1947). And in Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950), the Court sustained a Maryland highway toll of "2% upon the fair market value [405 U.S. 707, 716] of motor vehicles used in interstate commerce." That toll was supplemental to a standard mileage charge imposed by the State, so that "the total charge as among carriers [did] vary substantially with the mileage traveled." Id., at 546. It was there argued, however, that the correlation between tax and use was not precise enough to sustain the toll as a valid user charge. Noting that the tax "should be judged by its result, not its formula, and must stand unless proven to be unreasonable in amount for the privilege granted," id., at 545, the Court rejected the argument: </s> "Complete fairness would require that a state tax formula vary with every factor affecting appropriate compensation for road use. These factors, like those relevant in considering the constitutionality of other state taxes, are so countless that we must be content with `rough approximation rather than precision.' Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422 -423. Each additional factor adds to administrative burdens of enforcement, which fall alike on taxpayers and government. We have recognized that such burdens may be sufficient to justify states in ignoring even such a key factor as mileage, although the result may be a tax which on its face appears to bear with unequal weight upon different carriers. Aero Transit Co. v. Georgia Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285, 289 . Upon this type of reasoning rests our general rule that taxes like that of Maryland here are valid unless the amount is shown to be in excess of fair compensation for the privilege of using state roads." Id., at 546-547. </s> Thus, while state or local tolls must reflect a "uniform, fair and practical standard" relating to public expenditures, it is the amount of the tax, not its formula, that is of central concern. At least so long as the toll is based on some fair approximation of use or privilege [405 U.S. 707, 717] for use, as was that before us in Capitol Greyhound, and is neither discriminatory against interstate commerce nor excessive in comparison with the governmental benefit conferred, it will pass constitutional muster, even though some other formula might reflect more exactly the relative use of the state facilities by individual users. </s> The Indiana and New Hampshire charges meet those standards. First, neither fee discriminates against interstate commerce and travel. While the vast majority of passengers who board flights at the airports involved are traveling interstate, both interstate and intrastate flights are subject to the same charges. Furthermore, there is no showing of any inherent difference between these two classes of flights, such that the application of the same fee to both would amount to discrimination against one or the other. See Nippert v. Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946). </s> Second, these charges reflect a fair, if imperfect, approximation of the use of facilities for whose benefit they are imposed. We recognize that in imposing a fee on the boarding of commercial flights, both the Indiana and New Hampshire measures exempt in whole or part a majority of the actual number of persons who use facilities of the airports involved. Their number includes certain classes of passengers, such as active members of the military and temporary layovers, 7 deplaning commercial passengers, 8 and passengers on noncommercial flights, 9 nonscheduled commercial flights, 10 and commercial [405 U.S. 707, 718] flights on light aircraft. 11 Also exempt are nonpassenger users, such as persons delivering or receiving air-freight shipments, meeting or seeing off passengers, dining at airport restaurants, and working for employers located on airport grounds. Nevertheless, these exceptions are not wholly unreasonable. Certainly passengers as a class may be distinguished from other airport users, if only because the boarding of flights requires the use of runways and navigational facilities not occasioned by nonflight activities. Furthermore, business users, like shops, restaurants, and private parking concessions, do contribute to airport upkeep through rent, a cost that is passed on in part at least to their patrons. And since the visitor who merely sees off or meets a passenger confers a benefit on the passenger himself, his use of the terminal may reasonably be considered to be included in the passenger's fee. </s> The measures before us also reflect rational distinctions among different classes of passengers and aircraft. Commercial air traffic requires more elaborate navigation and terminal facilities, as well as longer and more costly runway systems, than do flights by smaller private planes. 12 Commercial aviation, therefore, may be made [405 U.S. 707, 719] to bear a larger share of the cost of facilities built primarily to meet its special needs, whether that additional charge is levied on a per-flight basis in the form of higher takeoff and landing fees, or as a toll per passenger-use in the form of a boarding fee. In short, distinctions based on aircraft weight or commercial versus private use do not render these charges wholly irrational as a measure of the relative use of the facilities for whose benefit they are levied. Nor does the fact that they are levied on the enplanement of commercial flights, but not deplanement. It is not unreasonable to presume that passengers enplaning at an airport also deplane at the same airport approximately the same number of times. The parties in No. 70-99, for example, have stipulated that the number of passengers enplaning and deplaning at Dress Memorial Airport in 1967 was virtually the same. Thus, a fee levied only on the boarding of commercial aircraft can reasonably be supposed to cover a charge on use by passengers when they deplane. 13 </s> Third, the airlines have not shown these fees to be excessive in relation to costs incurred by the taxing authorities. The record in No. 70-99 shows that in [405 U.S. 707, 720] 1965 the Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority paid bond retirement costs of $166,000 for capital improvements at Dress Memorial Airport, but recovered only $9,700 of these costs in the form of airport revenue. The airport's revenues covered only $63,000 of the Authority's $184,000 bond costs in 1966, $87,000 of $182,000 in 1967, and $65,000 of $178,000 in 1968. The respondents in No. 70-99 have advanced no evidence that a $1 boarding fee, if permitted to go into effect, would do more than meet these past, as well as current, deficits. Appellants in No. 70-212 have likewise failed to offer proof of excessiveness. </s> This omission in No. 70-212 suffices to dispose of the final attack by appellants in that case on the New Hampshire statute. Appellants argue that the statute "on its face belies any legislative intent to impose an exaction based solely on use" because only 50% of its revenue is allocated to the state aeronautical fund while "the remaining fifty per cent is allocated to the municipalities or airport authorities owning the landing areas at which the fees were imposed in the form of unrestricted general revenues." Brief 51-52. Yet so long as the funds received by local authorities under the statute are not shown to exceed their airport costs, it is immaterial whether those funds are expressly earmarked for airport use. The State's choice to reimburse local expenditures through unrestricted rather than restricted revenues is not a matter of concern to these appellants. See Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S., at 557 ; Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U.S., at 412 ; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of Railroad Comm'rs, 332 U.S., at 502 -505. </s> We conclude, therefore, that the provisions before us impose valid charges on the use of airport facilities constructed and maintained with public funds. Furthermore, we do not think that they conflict with any federal policies furthering uniform national regulation [405 U.S. 707, 721] of air transportation. No federal statute or specific congressional action or declaration evidences a congressional purpose to deny or pre-empt state and local power to levy charges designed to help defray the costs of airport construction and maintenance. A contrary purpose is evident in the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 219, 49 U.S.C. 1701 et seq. That Act provides that as "a condition precedent to his approval of an airport development project," the Secretary of Transportation must determine that </s> "the airport operator or owner will maintain a fee and rental structure for the facilities and services being provided the airport users which will make the airport as self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing at that particular airport, taking into account such factors as the volume of traffic and economy of collection." 49 U.S.C. 1718 (8). </s> The commercial airlines argue in these cases that a proliferation of these charges in airports over the country will eventually follow in the wake of a decision sustaining the validity of the Indiana and New Hampshire fees, and that this is itself sufficient reason to adjudge the charges repugnant to the Commerce Clause. "If such levies were imposed by each airport along a traveller's route, the total effect on the cost of air transportation could be prohibitive, the competitive structure of air carriers could be affected, and air transportation, compared to other forms of transportation, could be seriously impaired." Brief for Appellants in No. 70-212, p. 44. The argument relies on Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959). There the Court invalidated an Illinois statute requiring that trucks and trailers using Illinois highways be equipped at the state line with a contour mudguard of specified design. [405 U.S. 707, 722] The lower courts had found that the contour mudguard possessed no advantages in terms of safety over the conventional flap permitted in all other States and indeed created safety hazards. But there is no suggestion that the Indiana and New Hampshire charges do not in fact advance the constitutionally permissible objective of having interstate commerce bear a fair share of the costs to the States of airports constructed and maintained for the purpose of aiding interstate air travel. In that circumstance, "[a]t least until Congress chooses to enact a nation-wide rule, the power will not be denied to the State[s]." Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S., at 253 ; see also Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 -776 (1945). </s> The judgment in No. 70-99 is reversed; the judgment in No. 70-212 is affirmed. </s> It is so ordered. </s> MR. JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of these cases. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 "Emplane" is a variant of "enplane." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 743 (1961). </s> [Footnote 2 Before the enactment of Chapter 391, N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 422:43 levied a $1 service charge for each passenger boarding a scheduled airline at an airport receiving development funds from a certain state bond issue authorized in 1957. Section 422:44 imposed a similar fee for nonscheduled commercial planes. No fee was imposed for any noncommercial aircraft or for commercial aircraft weighing less than 12,500 pounds. All of the fees collected were to be used to pay off the 1957 bond issue, and the charge was to cease once repayment was completed. N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 422:45. </s> Chapter 391 broadened the applicability of the fee for scheduled airlines to all airports that had received state or local public funds since 1959, and as to these airlines eliminated the provisions terminating the fee upon repayment of the 1957 bond issue. The Act also imposed the 50 service charge for boarding of small aircraft (under 12,500 pounds) operated by scheduled airlines, but retained the small-plane exemption for nonscheduled airlines. </s> Chapter 140 of the New Hampshire Laws of 1971, enacted after the State Supreme Court decision involved here, expanded the charge imposed on nonscheduled airlines by including all airports receiving state or local funds after 1959. The legislature did not [405 U.S. 707, 711] eliminate the bond-repayment cut-off, as it had for scheduled airlines, nor did it apply the 50 fee to light aircraft operated by nonscheduled airlines. </s> [Footnote 3 Courts in Montana and New Jersey have invalidated airport fees similar to those involved here. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Joint City-County Airport Bd., 154 Mont. 352, 463 P.2d 470 (1970); Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Sills, 110 N. J. Super. 54, 264 A. 2d 268 (1970). In addition, several legislative proposals for similar taxes have been abandoned on the basis of opinions by state or local officials arguing their invalidity. </s> [Footnote 4 Concurring Justices invalidated the tax as repugnant to the Commerce Clause. 6 Wall., at 49. </s> [Footnote 5 The State's jurisdiction to tax is, however, limited by the due process requirement that the "taxing power exerted by the state [bear] fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state." Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). </s> [Footnote 6 This distinction has been drawn in other cases. For example, in striking down a state tax construed as falling "upon the privilege of carrying on a business that was exclusively interstate in character," Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 , [405 U.S. 707, 714] 609 (1951) (emphasis in original), the Court expressly distinguished it from a tax "levied as compensation for the use of highways." Id., at 607. </s> [Footnote 7 Active members of the military and temporary layovers are not subject to the Indiana tax. The New Hampshire statute on its face does not distinguish these classes of passengers. </s> [Footnote 8 Deplaning passengers are not subject to either tax. </s> [Footnote 9 Private aviators are not subject to either tax. </s> [Footnote 10 New Hampshire imposes a fee of $1 for nonscheduled flights on aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds, but no fee for nonscheduled flights on lighter planes; the $1 fee lapses upon repayment [405 U.S. 707, 718] of a bond issue authorized in 1957. See n. 2, supra. The Indiana ordinance on its face does not distinguish between scheduled and nonscheduled commercial flights. </s> [Footnote 11 New Hampshire imposes a 50 fee for commercial flights on light aircraft if scheduled, and no fee if unscheduled. The Indiana ordinance on its face does not distinguish light from heavy aircraft. </s> [Footnote 12 The parties in No. 70-99, for example, have stipulated that "[m]ost of the facilities constituting the Terminal Building at Dress Memorial Airport would not be essential for the operation of a noncommercial airport except for the required use thereof by persons traveling on commercial airlines," that "runway lengths, approach areas, taxiways and ramp areas of said Dress Memorial Airport would not be so extensive except for the requirement that the same be sufficiently extensive in order to accommodate commercial airline [405 U.S. 707, 719] carriers and their passengers," and that "Dress Memorial Airport operates and maintains an instrument lighting system and an approach lighting system for use by commercial airlines, both of which are costly to maintain and operate and would not be necessary in connection with use by private, noncommercial aircraft." App. 54, 55. </s> [Footnote 13 Because they do reflect a rational measure of relative use, these exceptions and exemptions are also consistent with the requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, that "in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have `some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.' Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93 ; Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37 ; Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 ." Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966). </s> MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, dissenting. </s> These cases are governed by Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, which must be overruled if we are to sustain the instant taxes. </s> One case involves an Indiana tax of $1 on every enplaning commercial airline passenger at the Evansville Airport. The other involves a New Hampshire $1 tax on every passenger enplaning a scheduled commercial aircraft with a gross weight of 12,500 pounds or more and a 50 tax on every passenger enplaning such aircraft with a gross weight of less than 12,500 pounds. </s> The carriers are made responsible for paying, accounting for, and remitting the fee to the local authority. </s> Crandall v. Nevada, decided before the Fourteenth Amendment, struck down a state law which levied a [405 U.S. 707, 723] $1 tax on every person leaving the State by rail, stage coach, or other common carrier. Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the Court, said the citizen had rights which the tax abridged: </s> "He has a right to free access to its sea-ports, through which all the operations of foreign trade and commerce are conducted, to the sub-treasuries, the land offices, the revenue offices, and the courts of justice in the several States, and this right is in its nature independent of the will of any State over whose soil he must pass in the exercise of it." Id., at 44. </s> And he quoted with approval from the dissenting opinion in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492: </s> "`For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed we are one people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States, and as members of the same community must have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States. And a tax imposed by a State, for entering its territories or harbors, is inconsistent with the rights which belong to citizens of other States as members of the Union, and with the objects which that Union was intended to attain. Such a power in the States could produce nothing but discord and mutual irritation, and they very clearly do not possess it.'" 6 Wall., at 48-49. </s> Usually the right to travel has been founded on the Commerce Clause. 1 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 -759. Some, including myself, have thought the right to travel was a privilege and immunity of national [405 U.S. 707, 724] citizenship. 2 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). Whatever the source, the right exists. 3 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 ; [405 U.S. 707, 725] Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 -106; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 237 -238 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 -631; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S., at 757 -758. </s> Heretofore, we have held that a tax imposed on a carrier but measured by the number of passengers is no different from a direct exaction upon the passengers themselves, whether or not the carrier is authorized to collect the tax from the passengers. Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U.S. 34, 46 ; State Freight Tax Case, 15 Wall. 232, 281. To be sure, getting onto a plane is an intrastate act. But a tax imposed on a local activity that is related to interstate commerce is valid only if the local activity is not such an integral part of interstate commerce that it cannot be realistically separated from it. 4 Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. [405 U.S. 707, 726] Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166 . In that case the tax struck down was the tax on gas that had been processed for interstate use - and a tax "on the exit of the gas from the State." Id., at 167. We held that that exit was "a part of interstate commerce itself." Id., at 168. </s> The same is true here, for the step of the passenger enplaning the aircraft is but an instant away from and an inseparable part of an interstate flight. </s> Of course interstate commerce can be made to pay its fair share of the cost of the local government whose protection it enjoys. But though a local resident can be made to pay taxes to support his community, he cannot be required to pay a fee for making a speech or exercising any other First Amendment right. Like prohibitions obtain when licensing is exacted for exercising constitutional rights. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 -452; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 540 -541; Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 542 . Heretofore we have treated the right to participate in interstate commerce in precisely the same way on the theory that the "power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 . I adhere to that view; federal constitutional rights should neither be "chilled" nor "suffocated." </s> Are we now to assume that Calvert and Murdock are no longer the law? </s> I would affirm the Indiana judgment and reverse New Hampshire's. </s> [Footnote 1 Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 251 ; Philadelphia & Southern S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 339 ; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 443 -444 (Stone, J., dissenting); Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 480 -481. </s> [Footnote 2 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 285 (STEWART, J., concurring and dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 250 , 255 (separate opinion of DOUGLAS, J.), 293-294, n. 10 (Goldberg, J., concurring); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 12 (DOUGLAS, J., dissenting); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 -127; Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring), 181 (Jackson, J., concurring); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 337 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 97 ; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566 ; United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 ; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S., at 429 -430; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79. </s> [Footnote 3 Only the other day in Dunn v. Blumstein, ante, p. 330, we held a durational residence requirement that was a prerequisite to voting invalid because it "directly impinges on the exercise of a . . . fundamental personal right, the right to travel." And we cited a host of "right to travel" cases including United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 ; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, 492 (Taney, C. J., dissenting); Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 180; Edwards v. California, supra; Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S., at 126 ; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 -631, 634; Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S., at 237 (separate opinion of BRENNAN, WHITE, and MARSHALL, JJ.), 285-286 (STEWART, J., concurring and dissenting). </s> In answer to the argument that actual deterrence of travel need not be shown we said: "It is irrelevant whether disenfranchisement or denial of welfare is the more potent deterrent to travel. Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare actually deterred travel. Nor have other `right to travel' cases in this Court always relied on the presence of actual deterrence. In Shapiro we explicitly stated that the compelling state interest test would be triggered by `any classification which served to penalize the exercise of that right [to travel] . . . .' [394 U.S.], at 634 (emphasis added); see id., at 638 n. 21. While noting the frank legislative purpose to deter migration by the poor, and speculating that `an indigent who desires to migrate . . . will doubtless hesitate if he knows that he must risk' the loss of benefits, id., at 628-629, the majority found no need to dispute the `evidence that few welfare recipients have in fact been deterred [from moving] by residence [405 U.S. 707, 725] requirements.' Id., at 650 (Warren, C. J., dissenting); see also id., at 671-672 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, none of the litigants had themselves been deterred." Ante, at 339-340. </s> [Footnote 4 In Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 , for example, we considered a tax imposed by the State of Kentucky upon the use, within its borders, of gasoline by interstate carriers. We determined that such a tax was a direct burden on an instrumentality of interstate commerce and therefore struck it down. We said: </s> "The tax is exacted as the price of the privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It reasonably cannot be distinguished from a tax for using a locomotive or a car employed in such commerce. A tax laid upon the use of the ferry boat, would present an exact parallel. And is not the fuel consumed in propelling the boat an instrumentality of commerce no less than the boat itself? A tax, which falls directly upon the use of one of the means by which commerce is carried on, directly burdens that commerce. If a tax cannot be laid by a state upon the interstate transportation of the subjects of commerce, as this Court definitely has held, it is little more than repetition to say that such a tax cannot be laid upon the use of a medium by which such transportation is effected. `All restraints by exactions in the form of taxes [405 U.S. 707, 726] upon such transportation, or upon acts necessary to its completion, are so many invasions of the exclusive power of Congress to regulate that portion of commerce between the States.'" Id., at 252. </s> [405 U.S. 707, 727]

United States Supreme Court BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY v. PEABODY COAL CO. et al.(2003) No. 01-705 Argued: October 8, 2002Decided: January 15, 2003 </s> Under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act or Act), the Commissioner of Social Security "shall, before October 1, 1993," assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits under the Act to an extant operating company--a "signatory operator"--or a related entity, which shall then be responsible for funding the beneficiary's benefits, 26 U.S.C. §9706(a). Assignment to a signatory operator binds the operator to pay an annual premium to the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund (Combined Fund), which administers the benefits. The premium has up to three components, a health benefit premium, a death benefit premium, and a premium for retirees who are not assigned to a particular operator, but whose benefits are paid from the Combined Fund as if they were assigned. An important object of the Coal Act was providing stable funding for the health benefits of such "orphan retirees." Although signatory operators will only be required to pay an unassigned beneficiaries premium if funding from the United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Plan (UMWA Pension Plan) and the Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation Fund (AML Fund) runs out, each signatory operator's unassigned beneficiaries premium is based on the number of its assigned beneficiaries, such that the signatory with the most assigned retirees would be required to cover the greatest share of the benefits payable to unassigned beneficiaries. In two separate actions before different District Courts, respondent companies challenged initial assignments made to them after the October 1, 1993, deadline, claiming that the date set a time limit on the Commissioner's assignment power, so that a beneficiary not assigned on that date must be left unassigned for life. If the challenged assignments are void, the corresponding benefits must be financed by transfers from the UMWA Pension Plan, the AML Fund, and, if necessary, unassigned beneficiaries premiums paid by signatory operators to whom timely assignments were made. The companies obtained summary judgments, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. </s> Held:Initial assignments made after October 1, 1993, are valid despite their untimeliness. Pp.7-22. </s> (a)The companies' contention that the Commissioner's failure is "jurisdictional," so that affected beneficiaries may never be assigned and their former employers may go scot free, is as unsupportable as it is counterintuitive. Pp.7-21. </s> (1)This Court has rejected an argument comparable to the companies' position that couching the duty in terms of the mandatory "shall" together with a specific deadline leaves the Commissioner with no authority to make an initial assignment on or after October 1, 1993. In Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, the Court found that the Secretary of Labor's 120-day deadline to issue a final determination on a complaint of federal grant fund misuse was meant to spur him to action, not limit the scope of his authority, so that his untimely action was valid. Nor, since Brock, has this Court ever construed a provision that the Government "shall" act within a specified time, without more, as a jurisdictional limit precluding action later. If a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, federal courts will not ordinarily impose their own coercive sanction. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63. Hence the oddity of a claim at this date that late official action should shift financial burdens from otherwise responsible private purses to the public fisc, let alone siphon money from funds set aside for a different public purpose, like the AML Fund for land reclamation. The point would be the same even if Brock were the only case on the subject. The Coal Act was passed six years after Brock, when Congress was presumably aware that the Court does not readily infer congressional intent to limit an agency's power to finish a mandatory job merely from a specification to act by a certain time. Nothing more limiting than "shall" is to be found in the Coal Act: no express language supports the companies, while structure, purpose, and legislative history go against them. Structural clues support the Commissioner in the Act's other instances of combining "shall" with a specific date that could not possibly be read to prohibit action outside the statutory period. See §§9705(a)(1), 9702(a)(1), 9704(h). In each of these instances, a conclusion is based on plausibility grounds: had Congress meant to set a counterintuitive limit on authority to act, it would have said more than it did, and would surely not have couched its intent in language Brock had already held to lack any clear jurisdictional significance. Pp.7-12. </s> (2)The result of appealing to plausibility is not affected by either of the other textual features that the companies argue indicate inability to assign beneficiaries after October 1, 1993. Pp.12-21. </s> (i)The provision for unassigned beneficiary status, §9704(d), cannot be characterized as the specification of a "consequence" for failure to assign a beneficiary to an operator or related person. It speaks not in terms of the Commissioner's failure to assign beneficiaries but simply of "beneficiaries who are not assigned." The most obvious reason for such unassigned status is a former employer's disappearance. This is not to say that a failure of timely assignment does not also leave a beneficiary "unassigned." It simply means that unassigned status has no significance peculiar to failure of timely assignment. In addition, to the extent that unassigned status is a consequence of mere untimeliness, the most obvious reason for specifying that consequence is not a supposed desire for finality but a default rule telling the Social Security Administration what funding source to use in the absence of any other. It is unrealistic to think that Congress understood unassigned status as an enduring consequence of uncompleted work, for nothing indicates that it foresaw that some beneficiaries matchable with operators still in business might not be assigned by the deadline. In the one instance where Congress clearly weighed finality on October 1, 1993, against accuracy of initial assignments, accuracy won, see §§9704(d), (f); and the companies' attempts to limit this apparent preference for accuracy fail. Pp.13-19. </s> (ii)The provision that an operator's contribution for the benefit of the unassigned shall be calculated based on "assignments as of October 1, 1993," §9704(f)(1), does not mean that an assigned operator's percentage of potential liability for the benefit of the unassigned is fixed according to the assignments made at that date. "[A]s of" need not mean, as the companies contend, "as assignments actually stand" on that date, but can mean assignments as they shall be on that date, assuming the Commissioner complies with Congress's command. Since there is no "plain" reading, there is nothing left of this "as of" argument except its stress that the applicable percentage can be modified only in accordance with exceptions for initial error or an assignee operator's demise. And the enunciation of two exceptions does not imply the exclusion of a third when there is no reason to think that Congress considered such an exclusion and there is good reason to conclude that Congress did not foresee a failure to make timely assignments. Pp.19-21. </s> (b)The Coal Act was designed to allocate the greatest number of beneficiaries to a prior responsible operator. The way to reach this objective is to read the statutory date as a spur to prompt action, not as a bar to tardy completion of the business of ensuring that benefits are funded, as much as possible, by those principally responsible. Pp.21-22. </s> 14 Fed. Appx. 393 (first judgment) and 424 (second judgment), reversed. </s> Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which O'Connor and Thomas, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. </s> JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIALSECURITY, PETITIONER </s> 01-705v. </s> PEABODY COAL COMPANY etal. </s> JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIALSECURITY, PETITIONER v. BELLAIRECORPORATION etal. </s> MICHAEL H. HOLLAND, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 01-715v. </s> BELLAIRE CORPORATION etal. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit </s> [January 15, 2003] </s> Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> The Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act or Act) includes the present 26 U.S.C. §9706(a), providing generally that the Commissioner of Social Security "shall, before October 1, 1993," assign each coal industry retiree eligible for benefits to an extant operating company or a "related" entity, which shall then be responsible for funding the assigned beneficiary's benefits. The question is whether an initial assignment made after that date is valid despite its untimeliness. We hold that it is. </s> I </s> We have spoken about portions of the Coal Act in two recent cases, Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002), and Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998), the first of which sketches the Act's history, 534 U.S., at 442-447. Here, it is enough to recall that in its current form the Act requires the Commissioner to assign, where possible, every coal industry retiree to a "signatory operator," defined as a signatory of a coal wage agreement specified in §9701(b)(1). §§9701(c)(1), 9706(a). An assignment should turn on a retiree's employment history with a particular operator, §9706(a), unless an appropriate signatory is no longer in business, in which case the proper assignee is a "related person" of that operator, defined in terms of corporate associations and relationships not in issue here, §9701(c)(2).1 The Act recognizes that some retirees will be "unassigned." §9704(d). </s> Assignment to a signatory operator binds the operator to pay an annual premium to the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund, established under the Act to administer benefits. §9702. The premium has up to three components, starting with a "health benefit premium," computed by multiplying the number of assigned retirees by the year's "per beneficiary" premium, set by the Commissioner and based on the Combined Fund's health benefit expenses for the prior year, adjusted for changes in the Consumer Price Index. §9704(b). The second element is a "death benefit premium" for projected benefits to the retirees' survivors, the premium being the operator's share of "the amount, actuarially determined, which the Combined Fund will be required to pay during the plan year for death benefits coverage." §9704(c). </s> A possible third constituent of the premium is for retirees who are not assigned to a particular operator, whose health and death benefits are nonetheless paid from the Combined Fund as if they were assigned beneficiaries. Before passage of the Coal Act, many operators withdrew from coal wage agreements, shifting the costs of paying for their retirees' benefits to the remaining signatories, Sigmon Coal Co., supra, at 444, and an important object of the Coal Act was providing stable funding for the health benefits of these "orphan retirees," House Committee on Ways and Means, Development and Implementation of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 1 (Comm. Print 1995) (hereinafter Coal Act Implementation). See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, §19142, 106 Stat. 3037 (intent to "stabilize plan funding" and "provide for the continuation of a privately financed self-sufficient program"). </s> Before signatory operators may be compelled to contribute for the benefit of unassigned beneficiaries, however, funding from two other sources must run out. The United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Plan (UMWA Pension Plan) was required to make three substantial payments to the Combined Fund for this purpose on February 1, 1993, October 1, 1993, and October 1, 1994. §9705(a)(1). The Act also calls for yearly payments to the Combined Fund from the Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation Fund (AML Fund), established for reclamation and restoration of land and water resources degraded by coal mining. 30 U.S.C. §1231(c). Annual transfers from this AML Fund are limited to the greater of $70 million and the annual interest earned by the fund, and are subject to an aggregate limit equal to the amount of interest earned on the AML Fund between September 30, 1992, and October 1, 1995. §§1232(h)(2), (3)(B). </s> So far, these transfers from the UMWA Pension Plan and the AML Fund have covered the benefits of all unassigned beneficiaries. If they fall short, however, the third source comes into play (and the third element of an operator's Combined Fund premium becomes actual): all assignee operators (that is, operators with assigned retirees) will have to pay an "unassigned beneficiaries premium," being their applicable percentage portion of the amount needed to pay annual benefits for the unassigned. An operator's "applicable percentage" is defined as "the percentage determined by dividing the number of eligible beneficiaries assigned under section 9706 to such operator by the total number of eligible beneficiaries assigned under section 9706 to all such operators (determined on the basis of assignments as of October 1, 1993)." 26 U.S.C. §9704(f)(1). The signatory with the most assigned retirees thus would cover the greatest share of the benefits payable to the unassigned (as well as their spouses and certain dependants).2 </s> II </s> Although §9706 provides that the Commissioner "shall" complete all assignments before October 1, 1993, the Commissioner did not, and she now estimates that some 10,000 beneficiaries were first assigned to signatory operators after the statutory date. The parties disagree on the reason the Commissioner failed to meet the deadline, but that dispute need not be resolved here.3 </s> After October 1, 1993, the Commissioner assigned 330 beneficiaries to respondents Peabody Coal Company and Eastern Associated Coal Corp., and a total of 270 beneficiaries to respondents Bellaire Corporation, NACCO Industries, Inc., and The North American Coal Corporation. These companies challenged the assignments in two separate actions before different District Courts, claiming that the statutory date sets a time limit on the Commissioner's power to assign, so that a beneficiary not assigned on October 1, 1993 (and the beneficiary's eligible dependants) must be left unassigned for life. If the respondent companies are right, the challenged assignments are void and the corresponding benefits must be financed not by them, but by the transfers from the UMWA Pension Plan and the AML Fund and, if necessary, by unassigned beneficiary premiums paid by other signatory operators to whom timely assignments were made. </s> The Commissioner denied that Congress intended the Commissioner's tardiness in assignments to impose a permanent charge on the public AML Fund, otherwise earmarked for reclamation, or to raise the threat of permanently heavier financial burdens on companies that happened to get assignments before October1,1993. The Commissioner argued that Congress primarily intended coal operators to pay for their own retirees. The trustees of the Combined Fund intervened in one of the cases and took the Commissioner's view that initial assignments made after September30,1993, are valid.4 </s> The companies obtained summary judgments in each case, on the authority of Dixie Fuel Co. v. Commissioner of Social Security, 171 F.3d 1052 (CA6 1999), which went against the Commissioner on the issue here. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in two opinions likewise following Dixie Fuel--Peabody Coal Co. v. Massanari, 14 Fed. Appx. 393 (2001), and Bellaire Corp. v. Massanari, 14 Fed. Appx. 424 (2001)-- but conflicting with the Fourth Circuit's holding in Holland v. Pardee Coal Co., 269 F.3d 424 (2001). We granted certiorari to resolve the conflict,5 534 U.S. 1112 (2002), and now reverse. </s> III </s> It misses the point simply to argue that the October 1, 1993, date was "mandatory," "imperative," or a "deadline," as of course it was, however unrealistic the mandate may have been. The Commissioner had no discretion to choose to leave assignments until after the prescribed date, and the assignments in issue here represent a default on a statutory duty, though it may well be a wholly blameless one. But the failure to act on schedule merely raises the real question, which is what the consequence of tardiness should be. The respondent companies call the failure "jurisdictional," such that the affected beneficiaries (like truly orphan beneficiaries) may never be assigned, but instead must be permanent wards of the UMWA Pension Plan, the AML Fund, and, potentially, of coal operators without prior relationship to these beneficiaries. The companies, in other words, say that as to tardily assigned beneficiaries who were, perhaps, formerly their own employees, they go scot free. We think the claim is as unsupportable as it is counterintuitive. </s> A </s> First there is the companies' position that couching the duty in terms of the mandatory "shall" together with a specific deadline leaves the Commissioner with no authority to make an initial assignment on or after October 1, 1993. We rejected a comparable argument in Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986), dealing with the power of the Secretary of Labor to audit a grant recipient under a provision that he "`shall' issue a final determination ... within 120 days" of receiving a complaint alleging misuse of federal grant funds. Id., at 255. Like the Court of Appeals here, the Ninth Circuit in Brock thought the mandate and deadline together implied that Congress "had intended to prevent the Secretary from acting" after the statutory period, id., at 257. We, on the contrary, expressed reluctance "to conclude that every failure of an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency action, especially when important public rights are at stake," id., at 260, and reversed. As in this litigation, the Secretary's responsibility in Brock was "substantial," the "ability to complete it within 120 days [was] subject to factors beyond [the Secretary's] control," and "the Secretary's delay, under respondent's theory, would prejudice the rights of the taxpaying public." Id., at 261. We accordingly read the 120-day provision as meant "to spur the Secretary to action, not to limit the scope of his authority," so that untimely action was still valid. Id., at 265. </s> Nor, since Brock, have we ever construed a provision that the Government "shall" act within a specified time, without more, as a jurisdictional limit precluding action later. Thus, a provision that a detention hearing "`shall be held immediately upon the [detainee's] first appearance before the judicial officer'" did not bar detention after a tardy hearing, United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711, 714 (1990) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)), and a mandate that the Secretary of Health and Human Services "`shall report'" within a certain time did "not mean that [the] official lacked power to act beyond it," Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 459, n.3 (1998). </s> We have summed up this way: "if a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction." United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993).6 </s> Hence the oddity at this date of a claim that late official action should shift financial burdens from otherwise responsible private purses to the public fisc, let alone siphon money from funds set aside expressly for a different public purpose, like the AML Fund for land reclamation. The point would be the same, however, even if Brock were the only case on the subject. The Coal Act was adopted six years after Brock came down, when Congress was presumably aware that we do not readily infer congressional intent to limit an agency's power to get a mandatory job done merely from a specification to act by a certain time. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 495 (1997).7 The Brock example consequently has to mean that a statute directing official action needs more than a mandatory "shall" before the grant of power can sensibly be read to expire when the job is supposed to be done. Nothing so limiting, however, is to be found in the Coal Act: no express language supports the companies, while structure, purpose, and legislative history go against them. </s> Structural clues support the Commissioner in the Coal Act's other instances of combining the word "shall" with a specific date that could not possibly be read to prohibit action outside the statutory period. Congress, for example, provided that the UMWA Pension Plan "shall transfer to the Combined Fund" installments of $70 million on February 1, 1993, on October 1, 1993, and on October 1, 1994. §9705(a)(1). It could not be that a failure to make a transfer on one of those precise dates, for whatever reason, would have left the UMWA Pension Plan with no authority to make the payment; October 1, 1994, was not even a business day. Or consider the Act's mandatory provisions that the trustees of the Combined Fund "shall" be designated no later than 60 days from the enactment date, §9702(a)(1), and that the designated trustees "shall, not later than 60 days after the enactment date," give the Commissioner certain information about benefits, §9704(h). No one could seriously argue that the entire scheme would have been nullified if appointments had been left to the 61st day, or that trustees (whose appointments could properly have been left to the 60th day) were powerless to divulge information to the SSA after the 60-day period had expired.8 </s> In each of these instances, we draw a conclusion on grounds of plausibility: if Congress had meant to set a counterintuitive limit on authority to act, it would have said more than it did, and would surely not have couched its intent in language Brock had already held to lack any clear jurisdictional significance. The same may be said here. </s> B </s> Nor do we think the result of appealing to plausibility is affected by either of two other textual features that the companies take as indicating inability to assign beneficiaries after the statutory date: the provision for unassigned beneficiary status itself, and the provision that an operator's contribution for the benefit of the unassigned shall be calculated "on the basis of assignments as of October1,1993." §§9704(f)(1), (2). </s> 1 </s> The companies characterize the provision for unassigned beneficiaries as the specification of a "consequence" for failure to assign a beneficiary to an operator or related person. Cf. Brock, 476 U.S., at 259. Specifying this consequence of failure, they say, shows that the failure must be governed by the consequence provided, not corrected by a tardy assignment corresponding to one that should have been made earlier. The specified consequence, in other words, reflects a legislative preference for finality over accurate initial assignments and creates a right on the part of the companies to rely permanently on the state of affairs as they were on October 1, 1993. We think this line of reasoning is unsound at every step. </s> To begin with, whatever might be inferable from the fact that a specific provision addressed the failure to make a timely assignment, the part of the Act referring to "unassigned" beneficiaries is not any such provision. The Act speaks of the beneficiaries not in terms of the Commissioner's failure to assign them in time, but simply as "beneficiaries who are not assigned." §9704(d). The most obvious reason for beneficiaries' being unassigned, in fact, is the disappearance of a beneficiary's former employer, leaving no signatory operator for assignment under §9706(a). This is not to say that failure of timely assignment does not also leave a beneficiary "unassigned" under the Act. It simply means that unassigned status has no significance peculiar to failure of timely assignment. </s> Second, to the extent that "unassigned" status is a consequence of mere untimeliness, there would be a far more obvious reason for specifying that consequence than a supposed desire for finality.9 On its face, the provision for a beneficiary left out through tardiness functions simply as a default rule to provide coverage under the new regime required to be in place by October 1, 1993; there had to be some source of funding for every beneficiary by then, and provisions for the "unassigned" employees tell the SSA what the source will be in the absence of any other. But we do not read a provision apparently made for want of something better as an absolute command to forgo something better for all time. </s> In fact, it is unrealistic to think that Congress understood unassigned status as an enduring "consequence" of uncompleted work, for nothing indicates that Congress even foresaw that some beneficiaries matchable with operators still in business might not be assigned before October1,1993. As the companies themselves point out, the Commissioner led Congress to believe as late as 1995 that all possible assignments had been made on time, see n.3, supra, and such little legislative history as there is on the point tends to show that Congress assumed that any assignments that could be made at all (say, to an operator still in business) would be made on time. On October 8, 1992, on the heels of the Conference Committee Report on the Act and just before the vote in the Senate adopting the Act, Senator Wallop gave a detailed explanation of the Coal Act's provisions for unassigned beneficiaries, which assumed that the "unassigned" would be true orphans: </s> "As a practical matter, not all beneficiaries can be assigned to a specific last signatory operator, related person or assigned operator for payment purposes. This is because in some instances, none of those persons remain in business, even as defined to include non-mining related businesses. Thus, provisions are made for unassigned beneficiary premiums." 138 Cong. Rec. 34003 (1992). </s> The Senator's report says that the transfer to the Combined Fund from the UMWA Pension Plan and AML Fund would be made because "unassigned beneficiaries were not employed by the assigned operators at the time of their retirement .... [I]f no operator remains in business under the formulations described above, that retiree becomes an unassigned beneficiary.... [The Coal Act's] purpose is to assure that any beneficiary, once assigned, remains the responsibility of a particular operator, and that the number of unassigned beneficiaries is kept to an absolute minimum." Ibid.10 It seems not to have crossed Congress's mind that the category of the "unassigned" would include beneficiaries, let alone a lot of beneficiaries, who could be connected with an operator, albeit late. Providing a consequence of default was apparently just happenstance.11 </s> Congress plainly did, however, weigh finality on October 1, 1993, against accuracy of initial assignments in one circumstance, and accuracy won. Section 9704(d) speaks of "beneficiaries who are not assigned ... for [any] plan year," suggesting that assignment status may change from year to year. One way it may change is by correcting an erroneous assignment. Under the Act, an operator getting notice of an assignment has 30 days to request information regarding the basis of the assignment and then 30 days from receipt of that information to ask for reconsideration. §§9706(f)(1)-(2). If the Commissioner finds error, the Combined Fund trustees will fix it by reducing premiums and refunding any overpayments. §9706(f)(3)(A)(i); see also §9706(f)(3)(A)(ii). Nothing is said about finality on October 1, 1993, and no time limit whatever is imposed on the Commissioner's authority to reassign. The companies concede, as they must, that the statute permits reassignment after October 1, 1993. </s> The companies do, however, try to limit the apparent preference for accuracy by arguing that one feature of this provision for reconsideration in §9706(f) implicitly supports them; this specific and isolated exception to an otherwise unequivocal bar to assignments after the statutory date suggests, they say, that the bar is otherwise absolute. Again, we think no such conclusion follows. </s> First, the argument is circular; it assumes that the availability of the §9706(f) reconsideration process with no time limit is an exception to a bar on all assignment activity imposed by the October 1, 1993, time limit of §9706(a). But the question, after all, is whether the October 1, 1993, mandate is in fact a bar. Section 9706(f) does not say it is, and nothing in that provision suggests it was enacted as an exception to the October 1, 1993, date. It has no language about operating notwithstanding the date specified in §9706(a); on the contrary, it states that reassignment will be made "under subsection (a)," §9706(f)(3)(A)(ii). But if the authority to reassign is contained in §9706(a), then §9706(f) is reasonably read not as lifting a jurisdictional time bar but simply as specifying a procedure for an aggrieved operator to follow in requesting the Commissioner to exercise the assignment power contained in §9706(a) all along. In the combined operation of the two subsections, there is thus no implication that the Commissioner is powerless to make an initial assignment to an operator after the specified date; any suggestion goes the other way. </s> Second, there is no reason to read the provision in §9706(f) for correction of erroneous assignments as implying that the Commissioner should not employ her §9706(a) authority to make a tardy initial assignment in a situation like this. We do not read the enumeration of one case to exclude another unless it is fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility and meant to say no to it. United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 836 (2001). As we have held repeatedly, the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply to every statutory listing or grouping; it has force only when the items expressed are members of an "associated group or series," justifying the inference that items not mentioned were excluded by deliberate choice, not inadvertence. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S 55, 65 (2002). We explained this point as recently as last Term's unanimous opinion in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002): </s> "Just as statutory language suggesting exclusiveness is missing, so is that essential extrastatutory ingredient of an expression-exclusion demonstration, the series of terms from which an omission bespeaks a negative implication. The canon depends on identifying a series of two or more terms or things that should be understood to go hand in hand, which [is] abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded. E. Crawford, Construction of Statutes 337 (1940) (expressio unius "`properly applies only when in the natural association of ideas in the mind of the reader that which is expressed is so set over by way of strong contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast enforces the affirmative inference'" (quoting State ex rel. Curtis v. De Corps, 134 Ohio St. 295, 299, 16 N.E. 2d 459, 462 (1938))); United States v. Vonn, supra." </s> As in Echazabal, respondents here fail to show any reason that Congress would have considered reassignments after appeal "to go hand in hand" with tardy initial assignments. Since Congress apparently never thought that initial assignments would be late, see supra, at 14-16, the better inference is that what we face here is nothing more than a case unprovided for.12 </s> 2 </s> The remaining textual argument for the companies' side rests on the definition of an operator's "applicable percentage" of the overall obligation of all assignee operators (or related persons) to fund benefits for the unassigned. Under §9704(f)(1), it is defined as the percentage of the operator's own assigned beneficiaries among all assigned beneficiaries "determined on the basis of assignments as of October 1, 1993" (parenthesis omitted). The companies argue that the specification "as of" October1,1993, means that an assigned operator's percentage of potential liability for the benefit of the unassigned is fixed according to the assignments made at that date, subject only to specific exceptions set out in §9704(f)(2), requiring a change in the percentage when erroneously assigned retirees are reassigned or assignee operators go out of business. The companies contend that their position rests on plain meaning: "as of" the date means "as assignments actually stand" on the date. Yet the words "as of," as used in the statute, can be read another way: since Congress required that all possible assignments be complete on October 1, 1993, see §9706(a), it is equally fair to read assignments "as of" that date to mean "assignments as they shall be on that date, assuming the Commissioner complies with our command." The companies' reading is hospitable to early finality of assignments, while the alternative favors completeness and accuracy before finality prevails. </s> Once it is seen that there is no "plain" reading, however, there is nothing left of the "as of" argument except its stress that the applicable percentage can be modified only in accordance with the two exceptions recognizing changes for initial error or the demise of an assignee operator. The answer to this point, of course, has already been given. The enunciation of two exceptions does not imply an exclusion of a third unless there is reason to think the third was at least considered, whereas there is good reason to conclude that when Congress adopted the language in question it did not foresee a failure to make timely assignments. See supra, at 17-19. The phrase "as of" cannot be read to govern a situation that Congress clearly did not contemplate,13 nor does it require the absolute finality of assignments urged by the companies. </s> IV </s> This much is certain: the Coal Act rests on Congress's stated finding that it was necessary to "identify persons most responsible for plan liabilities," and on its express desire to "provide for the continuation of a privately financed self-sufficient program for the delivery of health care benefits," Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, §19142, 106 Stat. 3037.14 In the words of Senator Wallop's report delivered shortly before enactment, the statute is "designed to allocate the greatest number of beneficiaries in the Plans to a prior responsible operator. For this reason, definitions are intended by the drafters to be given broad interpretation to accomplish this goal." 138 Cong. Rec. 34001 (1992).15 To accept the companies' argument that the specified date for action is jurisdictional would be to read the Act so as to allocate not the greatest, but the least, number of beneficiaries to a responsible operator. The way to reach the congressional objective, however, is to read the statutory date as a spur to prompt action, not as a bar to tardy completion of the business of ensuring that benefits are funded, as much as possible, by those identified by Congress as principally responsible. </s> The judgments of the Court of Appeals in both cases are accordingly </s> Reversed. </s> JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIALSECURITY, PETITIONER </s> 01-705v. </s> PEABODY COAL COMPANY etal. </s> JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIALSECURITY, PETITIONER v. BELLAIRECORPORATION etal. </s> MICHAEL H. HOLLAND, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 01-715v. </s> BELLAIRE CORPORATION etal. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit </s> [January 15, 2003] </s> Justice Scalia, with whom Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas join, dissenting. </s> The Court's holding today confers upon the Commissioner of Social Security an unexpiring power to assign retired coal miners to signatory operators under 26 U.S.C. §9706(a). In my view, this disposition is irreconcilable with the text and structure of the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act or Act), and finds no support in our precedents. I respectfully dissent. </s> I </s> The respondents contend that the Commissioner im- </s> properly assigned them responsibility for 600 coal miners under §9706(a). Section 9706(a) provides, in pertinent part: </s> "[T]he Commissioner of Social Security shall, before October 1, 1993, assign each coal industry retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator which (or any related person with respect to which) remains in business in the following order: </s> "(1) First, to the signatory operator which-- </s> "(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent coal wage agreement, and </s> "(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry retiree in the coal industry for at least 2 years. </s> "(2) Second, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1), to the signatory operator which-- </s> "(A) was a signatory to the 1978 coal wage agreement or any subsequent coal wage agreement, and </s> "(B) was the most recent signatory operator to employ the coal industry retiree in the coal industry. </s> "(3) Third, if the retiree is not assigned under paragraph (1) or (2), to the signatory operator which employed the coal industry retiree in the coal industry for a longer period of time than any other signatory operator prior to the effective date of the 1978 coal wage agreement." </s> The Commissioner failed to complete the task of assigning each eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator before October 1, 1993. As a result, many eligible beneficiaries were "unassigned," and their benefits were financed, for a time, by the United Mine Workers of America 1950 Pension Plan (UMWA Pension Plan) and the Abandoned Mine Land Reclamation Fund. See §§9705(a)(3)(B), 9705(b)(2). </s> The Commissioner blames her failure to meet the statutory deadline on the "magnitude of the task" and the lack of appropriated funds. Brief for Petitioners Trustees of the UMWA Combined Benefit Fund 15. It should not be thought, however, that these cases are about letting the Commissioner complete a little unfinished business that barely missed the deadline. They concern some 600 post-October 1, 1993, assignments to these respondents, the vast majority of which were made between 1995 and 1997, years after the statutory deadline had passed. App. 98-121. Respondents contend that these assignments are unlawful, and unless Congress has conferred upon the Commissioner the power that she claims--an unexpiring authority to assign eligible beneficiaries to signatory operators--the respondents must prevail. Section 9706(a) of the Coal Act does not provide such an expansive power, and the other provisions of the Act confirm this. </s> II </s> It is well established that an agency's power to regulate private entities must be grounded in a statutory grant of authority from Congress. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital, 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986). This principle has special importance with respect to the extraordinary power the Commissioner asserts here: to compel coal companies to pay miners (and their families) health benefits that they never contracted to pay. We have held that the Commissioner's use of this power under §9706(a), even when exercised before October 1, 1993, violates the Constitution to the extent it imposes severe retroactive liability on certain coal companies. See Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). When an agency exercises a power that so tests constitutional limits, we have all the more obligation to assure that it is rooted in the text of a statute. </s> The Court holds that the Commissioner retains the power to act after October 1, 1993, because Congress did not "`specify a consequence for noncompliance'" with the statutory deadline. Ante, at 8. This makes no sense. When a power is conferred for a limited time, the automatic consequence of the expiration of that time is the expiration of the power. If a landowner authorizes someone to cut Christmas trees "before December 15," there is no doubt what happens when December 15 passes: The authority to cut terminates. And the situation is not changed when the authorization is combined with a mandate--as when the landowner enters a contract which says that the other party "shall cut all Christmas trees on the property before December 15." Even if time were not of the essence of that contract (as it is of the essence of §9706(a), for reasons I shall discuss in Part III, infra) no one would think that the contractor had continuing authority--not just for a few more days or weeks--but perpetually, to harvest trees.1 </s> The Court points out, ante, at 10-11, that three other provisions of the Coal Act combine the word "shall" with a statutory deadline that in its view is extendible: </s> (1) Section 9705(a)(1)(A) states that the UMWA Pension Plan "shall transfer to the Combined Fund . . . $70,000,000 on February 1, 1993"; </s> (2) §9704(h) says the trustees for the Combined Fund "shall, not later than 60 days" after the enactment date, furnish certain information regarding benefits to the Commissioner; and </s> (3) §9702(a)(1) provides that certain individuals described in §9702(b)(1) "shall designate" the trustees for the Combined Fund "not later than 60 days . . . after the enactment date." </s> I agree that the actions mandated by the first two of these deadlines can be taken after the deadlines have expired (though perhaps not forever after, which is what the Court claims for the deadline of §9706(a)). The reason that is so, however, does not at all apply to §9706(a). In those provisions, the power to do what is mandated does not stem from the mere implication of the mandate itself. The private entities involved have the power to do what is prescribed, quite apart from the statutory command that they do it by a certain date: The UMWA Pension Plan has the power to transfer funds,2 and the trustees of the Combined Fund have the power to provide the specified information, whether the statute commands that they do so or not. The only question is whether the late exercise of an unquestionably authorized act will produce the consequences that the statute says will follow from a timely exercise of that act. It is as though, to pursue the tree-harvesting analogy, a contract provided that the landowner will harvest and deliver trees by December 15; even after December 15 passes, he can surely harvest and deliver trees, and the only issue is whether the December 15 date is so central to the contract that late delivery does not have the contractual consequence of requiring the other side's counterperformance. The Commissioner of Social Security, by contrast, being not a private entity but a creature of Congress, has no authority to assign beneficiaries to operators except insofar as such authority is implicit in the mandate; but the mandate (and hence the implicit authority) expired on October 1, 1993. </s> The last of these three provisions does confer a power that is not otherwise available to the private entities involved: the power to appoint initial trustees to the board of the Combined Fund. I do not, however, think it as clear as the Court does--indeed, I think it quite debatable--whether that power survives the deadline. If it be thought utterly essential that all the trustees be in place, it seems to me just as reasonable to interpret the provision for appointment of successor trustees (§9702(b)(2)) to include the power to fill vacancies arising from initial failure to appoint, as to interpret the initial appointment power to extend beyond its specified termination date. The provision surely does not establish the Court's proposition that time-limited mandates include continuing authority. </s> III </s> None of the cases on which the Court relies is even remotely in point. In Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986), the agency action in question was authorized by an explicit statutory grant of authority, separate and apart from the provision that contained the time-limited mandate. Title 29 U.S.C. §816(d)(1) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (now repealed), gave the Secretary of Labor "authority to . .. order such sanctions or corrective actions as are appropriate." Another provision of the statute, former §816(b), required the Secretary, when investigating a complaint that a recipient is misusing funds, to "make the final determination . . . regarding the truth of the allegation . . . not later than 120 days after receiving the complaint." We held that the Secretary's failure to meet the 120-day deadline did not prevent him from ordering repayment of misspent funds. Respondent had not, we said, shown anything that caused the Secretary to "lose its power to act," 476 U.S., at 260 (emphasis added). Here, by contrast, the Commissioner never had power to act apart from the mandate, which expired after October 1, 1993. </s> In United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993), federal statutes authorized the Government to bring a forfeiture action within a 5-year limitation period. 21 U.S.C. §881(a)(7); 19 U.S.C. §1621. We held that that power was not revoked by the Government's failure to comply with some of the separate "internal timing requirements" set forth in §§1602-1604. Because those provisions failed to specify a consequence for noncompliance, we refused to "impose [our] own coercive sanction" of terminating the Government's authority to bring a forfeiture action. James Daniel Good, supra, at 63. The authorization separate from the defaulted obligation was not affected. There is no authorization separate from the defaulted obligation here. </s> In United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990), the statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. §3142(e), gave courts power to order pretrial detention "after a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f) of this section." One of those provisions was that the hearing "shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial officer . . . ." §3142(f). The court had failed to hold a hearing immediately upon the respondent's first appearance, yet we held that the authority to order pretrial detention was unaffected. As we explained: "It is conceivable that some combination of procedural irregularities could render a detention hearing so flawed that it would not constitute `a hearing pursuant to the provisions of subsection (f)' for purposes of §3142(e)," 495 U.S., at 717 (emphasis added), but the mere failure to comply with the first-appearance requirement did not alone have that effect. Once again, the case holds that an authorization separate from the defaulted obligation is not affected; and there is no authorization separate from the defaulted obligation here. </s> The contrast between these cases and the present ones demonstrates why the Court's extended discussion of whether Congress specified consequences for the Commissioner's failure to comply with the October 1 deadline, ante, at 12-14, is quite beside the point. A specification of termination of authority may be needed where there is a separate authorization to be canceled; it is utterly superfluous where the only authorization is contained in the time-limited mandate that has expired. </s> IV </s> That the Commissioner lacks authority to assign eligible beneficiaries after the statutory deadline is confirmed by other provisions of the Coal Act that are otherwise rendered incoherent. </s> A </s> The calculation of "death benefit premiums" and "unassigned beneficiaries premiums" owed by coal operators is based on an assigned operator's "applicable percentage," which is defined in §9704(f) as "the percentage determined by dividing the number of eligible beneficiaries assigned under section 9706 to such operator by the total number of eligible beneficiaries assigned under section 9706 to all such operators (determined on the basis of assignments as of October 1, 1993)." (Emphasis added.) The statute specifies only two circumstances in which adjustments may be made to an assigned operator's "applicable percentage": (1) when changes to the assignments "as of October 1, 1993," result from the appeals process set out in §9706(f), see §9704(f)(2)(A); and (2) when an assigned operator goes out of business, see §9704(f)(2)(B). No provision allows adjustments to account for post-October 1, 1993, initial assignments. This is perfectly consistent with the view that the §9706(a) power to assign does not extend beyond October 1, 1993; it is incompatible with the Court's holding to the contrary. </s> The Court's response to this structural dilemma is nothing short of astonishing. The Court concludes that the applicable percentage based on assignments as of October 1, 1993, may be adjusted to account for the subsequent initial assignments, notwithstanding the statutory command that the applicable percentage be determined "on the basis of assignments as of October 1, 1993," and notwithstanding the statute's provision of two, and only two, exceptions to this command that do not include post-October 1, 1993, initial assignments. "The enunciation of two exceptions," the Court says, "does not imply an exclusion of a third unless there is reason to think the third was at least considered." Ante, at 20. Here, "[s]ince Congress apparently never thought that initial assignments would be late, . . .the better inference is that what we face . . . is nothing more than a case unprovided for." Id., at 18-19 (referred to id., at 20). This is an unheard-of limitation upon the accepted principle of construction inclusio unius, exclusio alterius. See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 86 (1994); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). It is also an absurd limitation, since it means that the more unimaginable an unlisted item is, the more likely it is not to be excluded. Does this new maxim mean, for example, that exceptions to the hearsay rule beyond those set forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence must be recognized if it is unlikely that Congress (or perhaps the Rules committee) "considered" those unnamed exceptions? Our cases do not support such a proposition. See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994); United States v. Salerno, 505 U.S. 317 (1992).3 There is no more reason to make a "case unprovided for" exception to the clear import of an exclusive listing than there is to make such an exception to any other clear textual disposition. In a way, therefore, the Court's treatment of this issue has ample precedent--in those many wrongly decided cases that replace what the legislature said, with what courts thinks the legislature would have said (i.e., in the judges' estimation should have said) if it had only "considered" unanticipated consequences of what it did say (of which the courts disapprove). In any event, the relevant question here is not whether §9704(f)(2) excludes other grounds for adjustments to the applicable percentage, but rather whether anything in the statute affirmatively authorizes them. The answer to that question is no--an answer that should not surprise the Court, given its acknowledgment that Congress "did not foresee a failure to make timely assignments." Ante, at 20. </s> B </s> Post-October 1, 1993, initial assignments can also not be reconciled with the Coal Act's provisions regarding appointments to the board of trustees. Section 9702(b)(1)(B) establishes for the Combined Fund a board of seven members, one of whom is to be "designated by the three employers . . . who have been assigned the greatest number of eligible beneficiaries under section 9706." The Act provides for an "initial trustee" to fill this position pending completion of the assignment process, but §9702(b)(3)(B) permits this initial trustee to serve only "until November 1, 1993." It is evident, therefore, that the "three employers . . . who have been assigned the greatest number of eligible beneficiaries under section 9706" must be known by November 1, 1993. It is simply inconceivable that the three appointing employers were to be unknown (and the post left unfilled) until the Commissioner completes an open-ended assignment process--whenever that might be; or that the designated trustee is constantly to change, as the identity of the "three employers . . . who have been assigned the greatest number of eligible beneficiaries under section 9706" constantly changes. </s> V </s> At bottom, the Court's reading of the Coal Act--its confident filling in of provisions to cover "cases not provided for"--rests upon its perception that the statute's overriding goal is accuracy in assignments. That is a foundation of sand. The Coal Act is demonstrably not a scheme that requires, or even attempts to require, a perfect match between each beneficiary and the coal operator most responsible for that beneficiary's health care. It provides, at best, rough justice; seemingly unfair and inequitable provisions abound. </s> When, for example, an operator goes out of business, §9704(f)(2)(B) provides that beneficiaries previously assigned to that operator must go into the unassigned pool for purposes of calculating the "applicable percentage." It makes no provision for them to be reassigned to another operator, even if another operator might qualify under §§9706(a)(1)-(3). That is hardly compatible with a scheme that is keen on "accuracy of assignments," and that envisions perpetual assignment authority in the Commissioner. </s> To account for the existence of §9704(f)(2)(B), the Court retreats to the more nuanced position that the Coal Act prefers accuracy over finality only "in the first assignment," ante, at 19, n.12. Why it should have this strange preference for perfection in virgin assignments is a mystery. One might understand insisting upon as perfect a match-up as possible up to October 1, 1993, and then prohibiting future changes, both by way of initial assignment or otherwise; that would assure an initial system that is as near perfect as possible, but abstain from future adjustments that upset expectations and render sales of companies more difficult. But what is the conceivable reason for insistence upon perfection in initial assignments, whether made before the deadline or afterward?4 As it is, however, the Act does not insist upon accuracy in initial assignments, not even in those made before the deadline. For each assigned beneficiary, only one signatory operator is held responsible for health benefits, even if that miner had worked for other signatory operators that should in perfect fairness share the responsibility. </s> The reality is that the Coal Act reflects a compromise between the goals of perfection in assignments and finality. It provides some accuracy in initial assignments along with some repose to signatory operators, who are given full notice of their obligations by October 1, 1993, and can plan their business accordingly without the surprise of new (and retroactive) liabilities imposed by the Commissioner. It is naive for the Court to rely on guesses as to what Congress would have wanted in legislation as complicated as this, the culmination of a long, drawn-out legislative battle in which, as we put it in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 461 (2002), "highly interested parties attempt[ed] to pull the provisions in different directions." The best way to be faithful to the resulting compromise is to follow the statute's text, as I have done above--not to impute to Congress one statutory objective favored by the majority of this Court at the expense of other, equally plausible, statutory objectives. </s> * * * </s> I think it clear from the text of §9706(a) and other provisions of the Coal Act that the Commissioner lacks authority to assign eligible beneficiaries to signatory operators on or after October 1, 1993. I respectfully dissent from the Court's judgment to the contrary. </s> JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIALSECURITY, PETITIONER </s> 01-705v. </s> PEABODY COAL COMPANY etal. </s> JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIALSECURITY, PETITIONER v. BELLAIRECORPORATION etal. </s> MICHAEL H. HOLLAND, etal., PETITIONERS </s> 01-715v. </s> BELLAIRE CORPORATION etal. </s> on writs of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit </s> [January 15, 2003] </s> Justice Thomas, dissenting. </s> I fully agree with Justice Scalia's analysis in these cases and, accordingly, join his opinion. I write separately, however, to reiterate a seemingly obvious rule: Unless Congress explicitly states otherwise, "we construe a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning." FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). Thus, absent a congressional directive to the contrary, "shall" must be construed as a mandatory command, see American Heritage Dictionary 1598 (4th ed. 2000) (defining "shall" as (1)a. "Something that will take place or exist in the future .... b. Something, such as an order, promise, requirement, or obligation: You shall leave now. He shall answer for his misdeeds. The penalty shall not exceed two years in prison"). If Congress desires for this Court to give "shall" a nonmandatory meaning, it must say so explicitly by specifying the consequences for noncompliance or explicitly defining the term "shall" to mean something other than a mandatory directive. Indeed, Congress is perfectly free to signify the hortatory nature of its wishes by choosing among a wide array of words that do, in fact, carry such meaning; "should," "preferably," and "if possible" readily come to mind. </s> Given the foregoing, I disagree with Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986), and its progeny, to the extent they are taken, perhaps erroneously, see ante, at 6-7 (Scalia, J., dissenting), to suggest that (1) "shall" is not mandatory and that (2) a failure to specify a consequence for noncompliance preserves the power to act in the face of such noncompliance, even where, as here, the grant of authority to act is coterminous with the mandatory command. I fail to see any reason for eviscerating the clear meaning of "shall," other than the impermissible goal of saving Congress from its own choices in the name of achieving better policy. But Article III does not vest judges with the authority to rectify those congressional decisions that we view as imprudent. </s> I also note that, under the Court's current interpretive approach, there is no penalty at all for failing to comply with a duty if Congress does not specify consequences for noncompliance. The result is most irrational: If Congress indicates a lesser penalty for noncompliance (i.e., less than a loss of power to act), we will administer it; but if there is no lesser penalty and "shall" stands on its own, we will let government officials shirk their duty with impunity. </s> Rather than depriving the term "shall" of its ordinary meaning, I would apply the term as a mandatory directive to the Secretary. The conclusion then is obvious: The Secretary has no power to make initial assignments after October 1, 1993. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote * </s> Together with Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security v. Bellaire Corp. etal. (see this Court's Rule 12.4), and No. 01-715, Holland etal. v. Bellaire Corp. etal., also on certiorari to the same court. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> The Coal Act's definition of "related persons" was the subject of our opinion last Term in Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002). For simplicity, we will not refer to related persons separately in the balance of this opinion. </s> Footnote 2 </s> According to a 1995 congressional Report, the total premium for a single beneficiary was $2,349.38 for the 1995 fiscal year. This figure includes only the health and death benefit premiums, since no unassigned beneficiaries premium has yet been charged. Coal Act Implementation 32-33. The 2002 per-beneficiary premium was approximately $2,725. General Accounting Office Report No. 02-243, Retired Coal Miners' Health Benefit Funds: Financial Challenges Continue 8 (Apr. 2002). </s> Footnote 3 </s> The Commissioner's proffered reason for the delay is that the Social Security Administration (SSA) was not permitted to expend appropriated funds to commence work on assignments until July 13, 1993, when Congress enacted the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-50, 107 Stat. 254. The Commissioner also states that the task of researching employment records for approximately 80,000 coal industry workers in order to determine the appropriate signatory operators was monumental and could not have been completed by October 1, 1993, without additional resources. The respondent companies counter that the Acting Commissioner assured Congress less than a month before the statutory date that SSA would meet its "statutory responsibility" to complete the assignments on time. Hearing on Provisions Relating to the Health Benefits of Retired Coal Miners before the House Ways and Means Committee, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1993) (hereinafter 1993 Coal Act Hearing), Ser. No. 103-59, p. 26 (Comm. Print 1994) (statement of Acting Commissioner Thompson). The same representative informed Congress in 1995 that SSA had "completed the process of making the initial assignment decisions by October 1, 1993, as required by law." Hearing on the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 23 (1995), Ser. No. 104-67, p.23 (1997) (statement of Principal Deputy Commissioner Thompson). </s> Footnote 4 </s> The General Accounting Office estimated in 2000 that invalidation of assignments made after September 30, 1993, could require the Combined Fund to refund $57 million in premium payments. Letter of Gloria L. Jarmon to Hon. William V. Roth, Jr., Senate Committee on Finance, 2 (Aug. 15, 2000), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ai00267r.pdf (as visited Jan. 9, 2003) (available in Clerk of Court's case file). </s> Footnote 5 </s> After the grant of certiorari, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit came down on the side of the Fourth Circuit. See Shenango Inc. v. Apfel, 307 F.3d 174 (2002). </s> Footnote 6 </s> No one could disagree with Justice Scalia that "[w]hen a power is conferred for a limited time, the automatic consequence of the expiration of that time is the expiration of the power," post, at 4 (dissenting opinion), but his assumption that the Commissioner's power to assign retirees was "conferred for a limited time" assumes away the very question to be decided. Justice Scalia's dissent is an elaboration on this circularity, forever returning as it must to his postulate that §9706(a) constitutes a "time-limited mandate" that "expired" on the statutory date. Post, at 6-7. </s> Justice Scalia's closest approach to a nonconclusory justification for his position is the assertion of an entirely formal interpretive rule that a date figuring in the same statutory subsection as the creation of a mandatory obligation ipso facto negates any power of tardy performance. Post, at 5-7. Justice Scalia cites no authority for his formalism, which is contradicted by United States v. Montalvo-Murillo, 495 U.S. 711 (1990), where a single statutory subsection provided that a judicial officer "shall hold a hearing" and that "[t]he hearing shall be held immediately upon the person's first appearance before the judicial officer." Id., at 714 (quoting 18 U.S.C. §3142(f)). Conversely, Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253 (1986), United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43 (1993), and Regions Hospital v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448 (1998), ascribed no significance to the formal placement of the time limitation. One can only ask why a statute providing that "The obligor shall perform its duty before October 1, 1993," should be thought to differ fundamentally from one providing that "(i) The obligor shall perform its duty. (ii) The obligor's duty shall be performed before October 1, 1993." The accepted fact is that some time limits are jurisdictional even though expressed in a separate statutory section from jurisdictional grants, see, e. g., 28 U.S.C. §1291 (providing that the courts of appeals "shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States"); §2107 (providing that notice of appeal in civil cases must be filed "within thirty days after the entry of such judgment"); Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Ill., 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (stating that the limitation in §2107 is "`mandatory and jurisdictional'" (citation omitted)), while others are not, even when incorporated into the jurisdictional provision, see, e. g., Montalvo-Murillo, supra. Formalistic rules do not account for the difference, which is explained by contextual and historical indications of what Congress meant to accomplish. Here that intent is revealed in several obvious ways: in rules that define an operator's liability in terms of employment history, see §9706(a), in appellate rights to test the appropriateness of an initial assignment, see infra, at 16-17, and in the expressed understanding that the companies that got the benefit of a worker's labor should pay for the worker's benefits, see infra, at 14-16. What else, after all, would anyone naturally expect? As opposed to the sensible indications that the initial assignment deadline was not meant to be jurisdictional, Justice Scalia's new formal rule would thwart the statute's object and relieve the respondent companies of all responsibility, which other, less lucky operators might be required to shoulder. There undoubtedly was much political compromise in the development of the Coal Act, but politics does not justify turning the process of initial assignment into a game of chance. </s> Footnote 7 </s> The respondent companies attempt to distinguish Brock because we noted in that case that an aggrieved party could sue under the Administrative Procedure Act to "`compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,'" 476 U.S., at 260, n.7 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §706(1)). The companies assert that no such remedy would have applied to the Commissioner's duty under §9706(a). Whether or not this is the case, the companies do not argue that they were aggrieved by the failure to assign retirees by the statutory date. On the contrary, they temporarily avoided payment of premium amounts for which they would indisputably have been liable had the assignments been timely made. It therefore does not appear that there was a need to provide operators "with any remedy at all--much less the drastic remedy respondent[s] see[k] in this case--for the [Commissioner's] failure to meet the [October 1, 1993] deadline." 476 U.S., at 260, n.7. </s> Footnote 8 </s> Justice Scalia concedes that his theory should not extend so far as to limit the UMWA Pension Plan's duty to transfer funds to the Combined Fund to the particular dates in §9705(a)(1). Justice Scalia attempts to avoid such an outcome by assuming, without basis, that the "UMWA Pension Plan has the power to transfer funds" to the Combined Fund in the absence of the authorization in §9705(a)(1). Post, at 5 (dissenting opinion). Justice Scalia's confidence is misplaced. Prior to the Coal Act's enactment, the Vice Chairman of the Secretary of Labor's Coal Commission testified before Congress that legislative authorization was needed for such a transfer to occur: "One of the things that concerned the Commission was, first of all, our understanding of the present state of law under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Under that Act it is not within the power of any of the participants or signatories to transfer a pension surplus to a benefit fund. That is one of the reasons for the recommendation that a transfer be authorized." Hearing before the Subcommittee on Medicare and Long-Term Care of the Senate Committee on Finance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., 13 (1991) (statement of Coal Commission Vice Chairman Perritt). It appears, then, that §9705(a)(1) provides both the UMWA Pension Plan's power to act and a time limit, which according to Justice Scalia would render action on any other date ultra vires, a result that even the dissent does not embrace. </s> Justice Scalia thinks it "debatable" that the power to appoint initial trustees survives the deadline in §9702(a)(1). Post, at 7. In order to avoid the embarrassment of concluding that tardiness would remove all authority to appoint the initial trustees, which would render the Act a dead letter, he suggests that an initial trustee could be appointed under §9702(b)(2), even though that provision applies only to appointment of a "successor trustee" to be made "in the same manner as the trustee being succeeded," whereas an initial trustee does not "succeed" anyone. The extreme implausibility of Justice Scalia's suggested reading of §9702(b)(2) points up the unreasonableness of placing a jurisdictional gloss on the §9706(a) time limitation. It is impossible to believe that Congress meant its Herculean effort to resolve the coal industry benefit crisis to come to absolutely nothing if trustees were designated late. </s> There is a basic lesson to be learned from Justice Scalia's contortions to avoid the untoward results flowing from his formalistic theory that time limits on mandatory official action are always jurisdictional when they occur in an authorizing provision. The lesson is that something is very wrong with the theory. </s> Footnote 9 </s> Many "consequences," of course, are intended to induce an obligated person to take untimely action rather than bar that action altogether. Section 9704(i)(1)(C), for example, denies certain tax deductions to operators who fail to make contributions during specified periods, and §9707(a) provides a penalty for operators who fail to pay premiums on time. The first consequence is eliminated when the operator takes action that is necessarily untimely, and the second penalty ceases to run when the premiums are paid, albeit out of time. </s> Footnote 10 </s> Postenactment statements, though entitled to less weight, are to the same effect. At a hearing before the House Committee of Ways and Means on September 9, 1993, one member asked whether SSA had established procedures "to assure that beneficiaries are not improperly designated as unassigned." The Acting Commissioner of Social Security responded that employee training "emphasized that the intent of the Coal Act was to assign miners to mine operators if at all possible." 1993 Coal Act Hearing 46 (statements of Rep. Johnson and Acting Commissioner Thompson). The record of the hearing also contains a statement by the committee chairman that the Act required operators to "pay for their own retirees, and to assume a proportionate share of the liability for true `orphans'--retirees whose companies are no longer in existence and cannot pay for the benefits." Id., at 85. At no point did any witness suggest that the unassigned beneficiary system was intended for miners who could be assigned but were not assigned before October 1, 1993, or that such miners would remain unassigned in perpetuity in order to protect the status quo on that date. </s> Footnote 11 </s> The respondent companies cite a postenactment statement by Representative Johnson that Congress had an obligation to "make sure that companies ... have time to figure out their liability and prepare to deal with it." Id., at 42. The Representative's comment did not purport to interpret the Coal Act as adopted, however, but was made in discussing whether "there should be some resolution passed" to give coal operators more time to prepare for their Coal Act obligations. Ibid. </s> One statement in Senator Wallop's preenactment report, which the companies do not cite, indicates an understanding that assignments would be fixed after October 1, 1993. See 138 Cong. Rec. 34003 (1992) ("[T]he percentage of the unassigned beneficiary premiums allocable to each assigned operator on October 1, 1993 will remain fixed in future years"). As discussed, however, there is no indication that Congress foresaw that the Commissioner would be unable to complete assignments by the statutory date. A general statement made on the assumption that all assignments that could ever be made would be made before October 1, 1993, does not show a legislative preference for finality over accuracy now that that assumption has proven incorrect. </s> Footnote 12 </s> There is, of course, no "`case unprovided for' exception" to the expressio unius canon, post, at 11 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is merely that the canon does not tell us that a case was provided for by negative implication unless an item unmentioned would normally be associated with items listed. </s> The companies emphasize that §9704(f)(2)(B) requires that beneficiaries whose operator goes out of business must be treated as unassigned and cannot be reassigned. Even assuming that a provision that goes to the definition of "applicable percentage" and does not directly implicate assignments has the effect the companies suggest, the most that could be said is that Congress wished to identify the first, most responsible operator for a given retiree, and not to follow that with a second assignment to a less responsible operator if the initial assigned operator left the business. This interest does not indicate an object of date-specific finality over accuracy in the first assignment; on the contrary, it opts for finality only once an accurate initial assignment has been made. In the absence of a more exact explanation for this arrangement, we suppose the explanation is good political horse trading. But provisions that by their terms govern after the initial assignment is made tell us nothing about the period in which an initial assignment may be made. In fact, the permissibility under §9706(f) of postappeal reassignment after October 1, 1993, makes plain that Congress was not "insisting upon as perfect a match-up as possible up to October 1, 1993, and then prohibiting future changes, both by way of initial assignment or otherwise," post, at 13 (Scalia, J., dissenting), as Justice Scalia himself agrees. On the contrary, the reassignment provision indicates that a system of accuracy "in initial assignments, whether made before the deadline or afterward," is precisely what the Act envisions. Ibid. Here, as throughout this opinion, "accuracy" refers not to an elusive system of "perfect fairness," ibid., but to assignments by the Commissioner following the scheme set out in §§9706(a)(1)-(3). </s> Footnote 13 </s> The same may be said of the provision for an initial trustee to serve until November 1, 1993, §9702(b)(3)(B), contrary to Justice Scalia's view. Post, at 11-12 (dissenting opinion). </s> Footnote 14 </s> Under the respondent companies' view, if the transfers from the AML Fund prove insufficient to cover the benefits of all unassigned beneficiaries, an operator that received no assignments prior to October 1, 1993, would not have to contribute a penny to the unassigned beneficiary pool--solely due to the Commissioner's fortuitous failure to make all assignments by the statutory deadline. At the same time, operators that received full assignments prior to October 1, 1993, would be forced to cover more than their fair share of unassigned beneficiaries' premiums. </s> Although Justice Scalia sees the Act as rife with "seemingly unfair and inequitable provisions," post, at 12 (dissenting opinion), even his view is no reason to assume that Congress meant contested provisions to be construed in the most unfair and inequitable manner possible. In any event, Justice Scalia's citation of §9704(f)(2)(B) does not help his position. It provides a clear statutory solution to a problem Congress anticipated: the end of an assigned operator's business. Had Congress propounded a response to the issue now before us as clear as §9704(f)(2)(B), there would doubtless have been no split in the Courts of Appeals and no cases for us to review. Given the absence of an express provision, the statute's goals are best served by treating operators the way Congress intended them to be treated, that is, by allowing the Commissioner to identify the operators most responsible. </s> Footnote 15 </s> A Congressional Research Service report dated shortly before the enactment likewise states that the Act envisioned that "[w]herever possible, responsibility for individual beneficiaries would be assigned ... to a previous employer still in business." Coal Industry: Use of Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund Monies for UMWA "Orphan Retiree" Health Benefits (Sept. 10, 1992), reprinted in 138 Cong. Rec., at 34005. </s> FOOTNOTES Footnote 1 </s> This interpretation of §9706(a) does not "assum[e] away the very question to be decided," as the Court accuses, ante, at 8, n.6. It is no assumption at all, but rather the consequence of the proposition that the scope of an agency's power is determined by the text of the statutory grant of authority. Because §9706(a)'s power to "assign . . . eligible beneficiar[ies]" is prefaced by the phrase "before October 1, 1993," the statutory date is intertwined with the grant of authority; it is part of the very definition of the Commissioner's power. If the statute provided that the Commissioner "shall, on or after October 1, 1993," assign each eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator, it would surely be beyond dispute that pre-October 1, 1993, assignments were ineffective. No different conclusion should obtain here, where the temporal scope of the Commissioner's authority is likewise defined according to a clear and unambiguous date. If this is (as the Court charges) "formalism," ante, at 8-9, n.6, it is only because language is a matter of form. Here the form that Congress chose presumptively represents the political compromise that Congress arrived at. </s> Footnote 2 </s> Private entities, unlike administrative agencies, do not need authorization from Congress in order to act--they have the power to take all action within the scope of their charter, unless and until the law forbids it. The Court suggests that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) may actually forbid the UMWA Pension Plan from transferring its pension surplus to the benefit fund. Ante, at 11, n.8. But if this is true, that does not convert §9705(a)(1) into a power-conferring statutory provision in the mold of §9706(a). It instead means that the UMWA Pension Plan is subject to contradictory statutory mandates, and the relevant question becomes whether, and to what extent, §9705(a)(1) implicitly repealed the provisions of ERISA as applied to the UMWA Pension Plan. Resolving that question would be no small task, given our disinclination to find implied repeals, see Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974), and I will not speculate on it. Instead, I am content to go along with the Court's assumption that nothing in §9705(a)(1), or in the rest of the Coal Act, prevents the UMWA Pension Plan from transferring money to the Combined Fund after the statutory deadline, and to emphasize that nothing in this concession lends support to the Court's interpretation of §9706(a). </s> Footnote 3 </s> The most enduring consequence of today's opinion may well be its gutting of the ancient canon of construction. It speaks volumes about the dearth of precedent for the Court's position that the principal case it relies upon, ante, at 18, is Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 (2002). The express language of the statute interpreted in that case demonstrated that the single enumerated example of a "qualification standard" was illustrative rather than exhaustive: "The term `qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose any direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." 42 U.S.C. §12113(b) (emphasis added). Little wonder that the Court did not find in that text "an omission [that] bespeaks a negative implication," 536 U.S., at 81. And of course the opinion said nothing about the requirement (central to the Court's analysis today) that it be "fair to suppose that Congress considered the unnamed possibility," ante, at 18. </s> Footnote 4 </s> The Court points to §9706(f)'s review process in support of its view that the Coal Act envisions "accuracy `in inital assignments, whether made before the deadline or afterward.'" Ante, at 19, n.12 (emphasis deleted). In fact it shows the opposite--reflecting the statute's trade-offs between the competing objectives of accuracy in assignments and finality. Sections 9706(f)(1) and (f)(2) provide time limits for coal operators to request reconsideration by the Commissioner; errors discovered after these time limits have passed are forever closed from correction. (Unless, of course, the Court chooses, in the interest of accuracy in assignments, to ignore those time limits, just as it has ignored the time limit of §9706(a).)

United States Supreme Court EVOLA v. UNITED STATES(1963) No. 194 Argued: Decided: October 21, 1963 </s> [Footnote * Together with No. 195, Santora v. United States; No. 196, Genovese v. United States; No. 197, Gigante v. United States; No. 79, Misc., DiPalermo v. United States; No. 80, Misc., DiPalermo v. United States; No. 115, Misc., Mazzie v. United States; No. 149, Misc., Polizzano et al. v. United States, and No. 224, Misc., Barcellona v. United States, also on petitions for writs of certiorari to the same Court. </s> Certiorari granted; judgments vacated; and cases remanded. </s> Reported below: 315 F.2d 186. </s> Maurice Edelbaum for petitioner in No. 194. Herbert S. Siegal for petitioner in No. 195. Edward Bennett Williams and Wilfred L. Davis for petitioner in No. 196. Wilfred L. Davis for petitioner in No. 197. Allen S. Stim for petitioners in No. 149, Misc. Robert S. Carlson for petitioner in No. 224, Misc. Petitioners pro se in Misc. Nos. 79, 80 and 115. </s> Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg and Richard W. Schmude for the United States. </s> PER CURIAM. </s> The petitions for writs of certiorari in Nos. 194, 195, 196 and 197, and the motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, as well as the petitions for certiorari in No. 79, Misc., No. 80, Misc., No. 115, Misc., No. 149, Misc., and No. 224, Misc., are granted. </s> The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is vacated and the cases are remanded to that [375 U.S. 32, 33] court for reconsideration in light of Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 , and for such further consideration as may be appropriate. </s> MR. JUSTICE CLARK, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, concurring in part and dissenting in part. </s> I realize, of course, that in remanding these cases the Court neither decides that Campbell governs nor implies how the Court of Appeals should decide them. Nevertheless, I would grant the petitions for certiorari and set these cases for argument, since it is my feeling that it is futile to remand "for reconsideration in light of Campbell v. United States, 373 U.S. 487 ." </s> Although these cases were decided prior to Campbell, the Court of Appeals' disposition has support in the record and is worthy of argument. * All the evidence before the District Court was documentary and the Court of Appeals was therefore correct in making factual determinations on the basis of such evidence. </s> [Footnote * I deem plenary consideration here preferable to this remand because the delineation of the limits of the Jencks Act has been peculiarly the province of this Court. The remand will merely delay a final decision which could be made on the record now before the Court and the identical record will no doubt return here no matter what determination is made by the Court of Appeals. While the Government accepts the District Court's finding that the Shaw notes should have been produced under 18 U.S.C. 3500, this does not relieve the courts of the obligation to examine independently the error confessed. Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 , and Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257 . </s> [375 U.S. 32, 34]

United States Supreme Court BURGER v. KEMP(1987) No. 86-5375 Argued: March 30, 1987Decided: June 26, 1987 </s> A Georgia trial court jury found petitioner guilty of murder and sentenced him to death. Both petitioner and a coindictee (Thomas Stevens) gave full confessions to the crime, and Stevens was tried later in a separate trial. The Georgia Supreme Court, after ordering a second sentencing hearing for petitioner which resulted in reimposition of the death sentence, affirmed the sentence. Throughout the state-court proceedings, petitioner was represented by appointed counsel, Alvin Leaphart, who was an experienced and well-respected local attorney. After exhausting state collateral remedies, petitioner (represented by a different attorney) sought habeas corpus relief in Federal District Court on the ground that Leaphart's representation was constitutionally inadequate, particularly because of a conflict of interest since Leaphart's law partner was appointed to represent Stevens at his trial, and Leaphart had assisted in that representation. At each trial, the defendant's strategy was to emphasize the coindictee's culpability in order to avoid the death penalty. Petitioner also based his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective representation on Leaphart's failure to present any mitigating circumstances at the state-court sentencing hearings and on his allegedly inadequate investigation of the possibility of doing so. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court rejected the Sixth Amendment claim, and the Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed. </s> Held: </s> 1. There is no merit to petitioner's ineffective-assistance claim based on Leaphart's alleged conflict of interest. Even assuming that law partners are to be considered as one attorney in determining such a claim, requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. Any overlap of counsel did not so infect Leaphart's representation as to constitute an active representation of competing interests. Nor was an actual conflict established by the fact that Leaphart, who prepared the appellate briefs for both petitioner and Stevens, did not make a "lesser culpability" argument in petitioner's brief on his second appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court. That decision had a sound strategic basis and, as found by both the federal courts below, was not attributable to the fact that his partner was Stevens' [483 U.S. 776, 777] lawyer, or to the further fact that he assisted his partner in Stevens' representation. Moreover, the record did not support petitioner's contention that, because of the asserted actual conflict of interest, Leaphart did not negotiate a plea bargain for a life sentence (the prosecutor, in fact, having refused to bargain) or take advantage of petitioner's lesser culpability when compared to Stevens'. Pp. 783-788. </s> 2. Nor did petitioner receive ineffective assistance because of Leaphart's failure to develop and present any mitigating evidence at either of the two state-court sentencing hearings. The evidence that might have been presented would have disclosed that petitioner had an exceptionally unhappy and unstable childhood. Based on interviews with petitioner, his mother, and others, Leaphart decided that petitioner's interest would not be served by presenting such evidence. His decision was supported by reasonable professional judgment, and thus met the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 . Pp. 788-795. </s> 785 F.2d 890, affirmed. </s> STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE, O'CONNOR, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, and in Part II of which POWELL, J., joined, post, p. 796. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, J., joined, post, p. 817. </s> Joseph M. Nursey argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Millard C. Farmer. </s> William B. Hill, Jr., Senior Assistant Attorney General of Georgia, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Marion O. Gordon, First Assistant Attorney General, and Susan v. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General. </s> JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> A jury in the Superior Court of Wayne County, Georgia, found petitioner Christopher Burger guilty of murder and sentenced him to death on January 25, 1978. In this habeas corpus proceeding, he contends that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer labored under a conflict of interest and failed to make an adequate investigation of the possibly mitigating circumstances [483 U.S. 776, 778] of his offense. After a full evidentiary hearing, the District Court rejected the claim. We are persuaded, as was the Court of Appeals, that the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed. </s> I </s> The sordid story of the crime involves four soldiers in the United States Army who were stationed at Fort Stewart, Georgia, on September 4, 1977. On that evening, petitioner and his coindictee, Thomas Stevens, both privates, were drinking at a club on the post. They talked on the telephone with Private James Botsford, who had just arrived at the Savannah Airport, and agreed to pick him up and bring him back to the base. They stole a butcher knife and a sharpening tool from the mess hall and called a cab that was being driven by Roger Honeycutt, a soldier who worked part-time for a taxi company. On the way to the airport, petitioner held the knife and Stevens held the sharpening tool against Honeycutt. They forced him to stop the automobile, robbed him of $16, and placed him in the backseat. Petitioner took over the driving. Stevens then ordered Honeycutt to undress, threw each article of his clothing out of the car window after searching it, blindfolded him, and tied his hands behind his back. As petitioner drove, Stevens climbed into the backseat with Honeycutt, where he compelled Honeycutt to commit oral sodomy on him and anally sodomized him. After stopping the car a second time, petitioner and Stevens placed their victim, nude, blindfolded, and hands tied behind his back, in the trunk of the cab. They then proceeded to pick up Botsford at the airport. During the ride back to Fort Stewart, they told Botsford that they had stolen the cab and confirmed their story by conversing with Honeycutt in the trunk. In exchange for Botsford's promise not to notify the authorities, they promised that they would not harm Honeycutt after leaving Botsford at the base. </s> Ultimately, however, petitioner and Stevens drove to a pond in Wayne County where they had gone swimming in the past. They removed the cab's citizen-band radio and, while [483 U.S. 776, 779] Stevens was hiding the radio in the bushes, petitioner opened the trunk and asked Honeycutt if he was all right. He answered affirmatively. Petitioner then closed the trunk, started the automobile, and put it in gear, getting out before it entered the water. Honeycutt drowned. </s> A week later Botsford contacted the authorities, and the military police arrested petitioner and Stevens. The two men made complete confessions. Petitioner also took the military police to the pond and identified the point where Honeycutt's body could be found. Petitioner's confession and Private Botsford's testimony were the primary evidence used at Burger's trial. That evidence was consistent with the defense thesis that Stevens, rather than petitioner, was primarily responsible for the plan to kidnap the cabdriver, the physical abuse of the victim, and the decision to kill him. Stevens was 20 years old at the time of the killing. Petitioner was 17; 1 a psychologist testified that he had an IQ of 82 and functioned at the level of a 12-year-old child. </s> II </s> Alvin Leaphart was appointed to represent petitioner about a week after his arrest. Leaphart had been practicing law in Wayne County for about 14 years, had served as the [483 U.S. 776, 780] county's attorney for most of that time, and had served on the Board of Governors of the State Bar Association. About 15 percent of his practice was in criminal law, and he had tried about a dozen capital cases. It is apparent that he was a well-respected lawyer, thoroughly familiar with practice and sentencing juries in the local community. He represented petitioner during the proceedings that resulted in his conviction and sentence, during an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court which resulted in a vacation of the death penalty, during a second sentencing hearing, and also during a second appeal which resulted in affirmance of petitioner's capital sentence in 1980. Burger v. State, 242 Ga. 28, 247 S. E. 2d 834 (1978); Burger v. State, 245 Ga. 458, 265 S. E. 2d 796, cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988 (1980). Leaphart was paid approximately $9,000 for his services. </s> After exhausting his state collateral remedies, petitioner (then represented by a different attorney) filed a habeas corpus proceeding in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. He advanced several claims, including a charge that Leaphart's representation had been constitutionally inadequate. The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and emphatically rejected that claim, 2 but concluded that the trial court's instructions to the jury [483 U.S. 776, 781] permitted it to base its sentencing decision on an invalid aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, the District Court vacated petitioner's death sentence. Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772 (1981). </s> The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and reinstated the death penalty. Burger v. Zant, 718 F.2d 979 (CA11 1983). On the issue of Leaphart's competence, it adopted the District Court's opinion as its own over the dissent of Judge Johnson. The dissent found that Leaphart had a conflict of interest because his partner Robert Smith 3 had been appointed to represent Stevens in his later, separate trial for the murder of Honeycutt, and Leaphart had assisted in that representation. He had interviewed Stevens and assisted his partner during Stevens' trial. Moreover, the two partners shared their legal research and discussed the cases with one another. Judge Johnson was persuaded that the conflict created actual prejudice to petitioner's interest for two reasons. First, each of the two defendants sought to emphasize the culpability of the other in order to avoid the death penalty. Second, Leaphart failed to negotiate a plea bargain in which petitioner's testimony against Stevens might be traded for a life sentence. Judge Johnson was also persuaded that Leaphart's performance was defective because he did not conduct an adequate investigation of possible mitigating circumstances and did not have a valid strategic explanation for his failure to offer any mitigating evidence at either the first or the second sentencing hearing. </s> After the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, we decided Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). We granted Burger's petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of "the effectiveness of counsel's assistance at petitioner's second sentencing hearing" in light of that decision. Burger v. Zant, [483 U.S. 776, 782] 467 U.S. 1212, 1213 (1984). The Court of Appeals in turn remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to extend or revise its findings, and if appropriate, its conclusions on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Burger v. Zant, 741 F.2d 1274 (CA11 1984). The District Court wrote a more extensive opinion on that issue and again concluded that there was no merit to petitioner's claim. Once again, the Court of Appeals affirmed on the basis of the District Court's opinion, over the dissent of Judge Johnson. Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930 (CA11 1985) (per curiam). 4 We granted the petition for certiorari, vacated, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985), on the question whether the jury instruction impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the issue of intent. Burger v. Kemp, 474 U.S. 806 (1985). The Court of Appeals assumed the trial court's charge on intent unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof, but found the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 785 F.2d 890 (1986) (per curiam). We granted certiorari, 479 U.S. 929 (1986), and now affirm. We first consider counsel's alleged conflict of interest argument and then his failure to offer mitigating evidence. 5 </s> [483 U.S. 776, 783] </s> III </s> There is certainly much substance to petitioner's argument that the appointment of two partners to represent coindictees in their respective trails creates a possible conflict of interest that could prejudice either or both clients. Moreover, the risk of prejudice is increased when the two lawyers cooperate with one another in the planning and conduct of trial strategy, as Leaphart and his partner did. Assuming without deciding that two law partners are considered as one attorney, it is settled that "[r]equiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482 (1978). We have never held that the possibility of prejudice that "inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation" justifies the adoption of an inflexible rule that would presume prejudice in all such cases. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). Instead, we presume prejudice "only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" Strickland, 466 U.S., at 692 (citation omitted). See also Cuyler, 446 U.S., at 348 , 350. </s> As an initial matter, we agree with the District Court that the overlap of counsel, if any, did not so infect Leaphart's representation as to constitute an active representation of competing interests. Particularly in smaller communities where the supply of qualified lawyers willing to accept the demanding and unrewarding work of representing capital prisoners is extremely limited, the defendants may actually benefit from the joint efforts of two partners who supplement [483 U.S. 776, 784] one another in their preparation. In many cases a "`common defense . . . gives strength against a common attack.'" Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S., at 482 -483 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 92 (1942) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.)). Moreover, we generally presume that the lawyer is fully conscious of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his or her client. Trial courts appropriately and "necessarily rely in large measure upon the good faith and good judgment of defense counsel." Cuyler, 446 U.S., at 347 . In addition, petitioner and Stevens were tried in separate proceedings; as we noted in Cuyler, the provision of separate murder trials for the three coindictees "significantly reduced the potential for a divergence in their interests." Ibid. </s> In an effort to identify an actual conflict of interest, petitioner points out that Leaphart prepared the briefs for both him and Stevens on their second appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, and that Leaphart did not make a "lesser culpability" argument in his appellate brief on behalf of petitioner even though he had relied on petitioner's lesser culpability as a trial defense. Given the fact that it was petitioner who actually killed Honeycutt immediately after opening the trunk to ask if he was all right, and the further fact that the Georgia Supreme Court expressed the opinion that petitioner's actions were "outrageously and wantonly vile and inhuman under any reasonable standard of human conduct," Burger v. State, 245 Ga., at 461-462, 265 S. E. 2d, at 800, the decision to forgo this issue had a sound strategic basis. As we reaffirmed in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986), the "process of `winnowing out weaker claims on appeal and focusing on' those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of incompetence, is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 -752 (1983)." </s> In addition, determining that there was an actual conflict of interest requires the attribution of Leaphart's motivation for not making the "lesser culpability" argument to the fact [483 U.S. 776, 785] that his partner was Stevens' lawyer, or to the further fact that he assisted his partner in that representation. The District Court obviously credited his testimony to the contrary, see 513 F. Supp., at 795; 753 F.2d, at 941, and its findings were twice sustained by the Court of Appeals. It would thus be most inappropriate, and factually unsupportable, for this Court to speculate that the drafting of a brief on appeal was tainted by a lawyer's improper motivation. Our duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case. Nevertheless, when the lower courts have found that a lawyer has performed his or her solemn duties in such a case at or above the lower boundary of professional competence, both respect for the bar and deference to the shared conclusion of two reviewing courts prevent us from substituting speculation for their considered opinions. The district judge, who presumably is familiar with the legal talents and character of the lawyers who practice at the local bar and who saw and heard the witness testify, is in a far better position than we are to evaluate a charge of this kind, and the regional courts of appeals are in a far better position than we are to conduct appellate review of these heavily fact-based rulings. </s> We also conclude that the asserted actual conflict of interest, even if it had been established, did not harm his lawyer's advocacy. Petitioner argues that the joint representation adversely affected the quality of the counsel he received in two ways: Leaphart did not negotiate a plea agreement resulting in a life sentence, and he failed to take advantage of petitioner's lesser culpability when compared with his coindictee Stevens. We find that neither argument provides a basis for relief. </s> The notion that the prosecutor would have been receptive to a plea bargain is completely unsupported in the record. The evidence of both defendants' guilt, including their confessions, and eyewitness and tangible evidence, was overwhelming and uncontradicted; the prosecutor had no need [483 U.S. 776, 786] for petitioner's eyewitness testimony to persuade the jury to convict Stevens and to sentence him to death. In these circumstances, there is not the slightest reason for appellate doubt of the veracity of Leaphart's testimony: </s> "Q. Did you ever engage in any plea negotiations in this case? </s> "A. Yes. </s> "Q. Could you tell me the substance of it? </s> "A. Well, we - I constantly all during the time I represented Mr. Burger tried to negotiate a plea with the district attorney for a life sentence. And, he - during the first trial he just flatly refused to even discuss it in any terms. And, then when we got it reversed on the sentence feature I continued to - in that time to try to negotiate with the - with the district attorney about entering a plea, for Mr. Burger to serve a life sentence. And, he insisted on trying it and insisted on seeking the death penalty." App. 74-75. </s> As the District Court found, Leaphart "constantly attempted to plea bargain with the prosecutor," but was rebuffed. 753 F.2d, at 940. "The prosecutor's flat refusal to engage in plea bargaining is not surprising when viewed in light of the strength of the case against Burger." Ibid. </s> The argument that his partner's representation of Stevens inhibited Leaphart from arguing petitioner's lesser culpability because such reliance would be prejudicial to Stevens is also unsupported by the record. Such an argument might have been more persuasive if the two defendants had been tried together. As the State conducted the prosecutions, however, each defendant's confession was used in his trial but neither was used against the coindictee. Because the trials were separate, Leaphart would have had no particular reason for concern about the possible impact of the tactics in petitioner's trial on the outcome of Stevens' trial. Moreover, [483 U.S. 776, 787] in the initial habeas corpus proceeding, the District Court credited Leaphart's uncontradicted testimony that "he in no way tailored his strategy toward protecting Stevens." 513 F. Supp., at 795. The District Court concluded that his "testimony is strongly supported by examination of trial record, which shows considerable effort to gain mercy for petitioner by portraying Stevens as the chief architect of the crime." Ibid. 6 </s> In an effort to bolster his claim that an adverse effect resulted from Leaphart's actual conflict of interest, petitioner [483 U.S. 776, 788] argues that because he was tried in a small community in which the facts of the crime were widely known, "it necessarily follows that the public, and very possibly members of the jury, knew that the cases were being tried on inherently inconsistent theories." Brief for Petitioner 14. But this observation does nothing to establish an actual, deleterious conflict of interest between Leaphart's work for his client and his partner's representation of Stevens. If two unaffiliated lawyers, complete strangers to one another, had represented Burger and Stevens respectively and had advanced the same defenses that were advanced, the community would have had the same awareness that the theories were inherently inconsistent. There was undoubtedly a conflict of interest between Burger and Stevens because of the nature of their defenses. But this inherent conflict between two participants in a single criminal undertaking cannot be transformed into a Sixth Amendment violation simply because the community might be aware that their respective attorneys were law partners. </s> IV </s> The District Court expressed much more concern about petitioner's argument that Leaphart had failed to develop and present mitigating evidence at either of the two sentencing hearings. See 513 F. Supp., at 796. At both hearings Leaphart offered no mitigating evidence at all. A capital sentencing proceeding "is sufficiently like a trial in its adversarial format and in the existence of standards for decision" that counsel's role in the two proceedings is comparable - it is "to ensure that the adversarial testing process works to produce a just result under the standards governing decision." Strickland, 466 U.S., at 686 , 687. We therefore must determine whether Leaphart's performance in evaluating the mitigating evidence available to him, and in deciding not to pursue further mitigating evidence, undermines confidence in the adversarial process of this case. In embarking [483 U.S. 776, 789] on our review of the District Court's conclusions, we are guided by our most recent admonition on this subject: </s> "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. Cf. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133 -134 (1982). A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 689 . </s> The evidence that might have been presented would have disclosed that petitioner had an exceptionally unhappy and unstable childhood. 7 Most of this evidence was described by petitioner's mother, who testified at length at the habeas [483 U.S. 776, 790] corpus hearing. At the age of 14 she married Burger's father, who was 16. She was divorced from petitioner's father when petitioner was nine years old. She remarried twice, and neither of petitioner's stepfathers wanted petitioner in the home; one of them beat his mother in petitioner's presence when he was 11 and the other apparently "got him involved with marijuana, and that was the whole point of his life, where the next bag was coming from, or the next bottle of beer. And, this was the kind of influence that he had." App. 91. When his mother moved from Indiana to Florida, petitioner ran away from his father and hitchhiked to Tampa. After he became involved in an auto accident, she returned him to Indiana where he was placed in a juvenile detention home until he was released to his father's custody. Except for one incident of shoplifting, being absent from school without permission, and being held in juvenile detention - none of which was brought to the jury's attention - petitioner apparently had no criminal record before entering the Army. </s> Leaphart was aware of some, but not all, of this family history prior to petitioner's trial. He talked with petitioner's mother on several occasions, 8 an attorney in Indiana who [483 U.S. 776, 791] had befriended petitioner and his mother, and a psychologist whom Leaphart had employed to conduct an examination of petitioner in preparation for trial. He reviewed psychologists' reports that were obtained with the help of petitioner's mother. Id., at 50-51. He also interviewed Stevens and other men at Fort Stewart. Id., at 51. Based on these interviews, Leaphart made the reasonable decision that his client's interest would not be served by presenting this type of evidence. </s> His own meetings with petitioner, as well as the testimony of the psychologist at the hearing on the admissibility of petitioner's confession, convinced Leaphart that it would be unwise to put petitioner himself on the witness stand. The record indicates that petitioner never expressed any remorse about his crime, and the psychologist's testimony indicates that he might even have bragged about it on the witness stand. 9 Leaphart formed the opinion that Burger enjoyed [483 U.S. 776, 792] talking about the crimes; he was worried that the jury might regard Burger's attitude on the witness stand as indifferent or worse. Id., at 75-76. Quite obviously, as the District Court concluded, an experienced trial lawyer could properly have decided not to put either petitioner or the psychologist who had thus evaluated him in a position where he would be subjected to cross-examination that might be literally fatal. 753 F.2d, at 935-936. </s> The other two witnesses that Leaphart considered using were petitioner's mother and the Indiana lawyer who had acted as petitioner's "big brother." Leaphart talked with the mother on several occasions and concluded that her testimony would not be helpful and might have been counterproductive. As the record stood, there was absolutely no evidence that petitioner had any prior criminal record of any kind. Her testimony indicates that petitioner had committed at least one petty offense. App. 90. The District Judge who heard all of the testimony that she would have given on direct examination at the sentencing hearing was not convinced that it would have aided petitioner's case; it was surely not unreasonable for Leaphart to have concluded that cross-examination might well have revealed matters of historical fact that would have harmed his client's chances for a life sentence. </s> The Indiana lawyer was willing to travel to Georgia to testify on petitioner's behalf, but nothing in the record describes the content of the testimony he might have given. Although Leaphart was unable to recall the details of the background information that he received from the Indiana lawyer, he testified that the information was not helpful to petitioner, id., at 57, and the Indiana lawyer apparently [483 U.S. 776, 793] agreed with that assessment. Id., at 57-58. Consistently with that conclusion, petitioner's present counsel - even with the benefit of hindsight - has submitted no affidavit from that lawyer establishing that he would have offered substantial mitigating evidence if he had testified. Accordingly, while Leaphart's judgment may have been erroneous, the record surely does not permit us to reach that conclusion. </s> Finally, petitioner submitted several affidavits to the court to describe the evidence that Leaphart might have used if he had conducted a more thorough investigation. These affidavits present information about petitioner's troubled family background that could have affected the jury adversely by introducing facts not disclosed by his clean adult criminal record. The affidavits indicate that the affiants, had they testified, might well have referred on direct examination or cross-examination to his encounters with law enforcement authorities. For example, a former neighbor, Phyllis Russell, stated that petitioner's father did not want to associate with him when he "got into trouble and was on juvenile probation." 1 Record 142. Petitioner's uncle, Earnest Holtsclaw, narrated that petitioner "got involved with drugs" while in Florida. Id., at 145. Cathy Russell Ray, petitioner's friend in junior high school, stated that "Chris's father was supposed to go with him to juvenile court to get a release so that he could join the service [Army]." Id., at 149. </s> Even apart from their references to damaging facts, the papers are by no means uniformly helpful to petitioner because they suggest violent tendencies that are at odds with the defense's strategy of portraying petitioner's actions on the night of the murder as the result of Stevens' strong influence upon his will. For example, the District Judge pointed out: </s> "In an affidavit submitted to this Court, petitioner's uncle attests that petitioner came from a broken home and that he was unwanted by his parents. He opined [483 U.S. 776, 794] that Burger had a split personality. `Sometimes [Burger] would be a nice, normal guy, then at times he would flip out and would get violent over nothing.' Affidavit of Earnest R. Holtcsclaw [sic] at 1-2; see also Affidavit of Cathy Russell Ray at 1 (`He had a hairtrigger temper. He would get mad and punch the walls. Once he broke his knuckles he got so ma[d].'). On one hand, a jury could react with sympathy over the tragic childhood Burger endured. On the other hand, since Burger's sanity was not in issue in this case, the prosecution could use this same testimony, after pointing out that petitioner was nevertheless responsible for his acts, to emphasize that it was this same unpredictable propensity for violence which played a prominent role in the death of Burger's victim. See note 6, supra. `[M]itigation . . .,' after all, [m]ay be in the eye of the beholder.' Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 969 & n. 11 (11th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted)." 753 F.2d, at 937-938, n. 7. </s> The record at the habeas corpus hearing does suggest that Leaphart could well have made a more through investigation than he did. Nevertheless, in considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, "[W]e address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 , n. 38 (1984). We have decided that "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690 -691. Applying this standard, we agree with the courts below that counsel's decision not to mount an allout investigation into petitioner's background in search of mitigating circumstances was supported by reasonable professional judgment. It appears that he did interview all potential witnesses who had been called to his attention and [483 U.S. 776, 795] that there was a reasonable basis for his strategic decision that an explanation of petitioner's history would not have minimized the risk of the death penalty. Having made this judgment, he reasonably determined that he need not undertake further investigation to locate witnesses who would make statements about Burger's past. We hold that the Court of Appeals complied with the directives of Strickland: </s> "In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. </s> "The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. For example, when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether. And when a defendant has given counsel reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel's failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable." Id., at 691. </s> V </s> Petitioner has not established that "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions [of counsel] were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id., at 690. He "has made no showing that the justice of his sentence was rendered unreliable by a breakdown [483 U.S. 776, 796] in the adversary process caused by deficiencies in counsel's assistance." Id., at 700. </s> Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is </s> Affirmed. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 In his direct review and collateral proceedings to date, petitioner has not advanced the claim that execution by a State of a person for a murder committed while a minor violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Cf. Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (defendant was 15 years old at time of crime), cert. granted, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987). We have held that a habeas petitioner may "establish cause for a procedural default if his claim is `so novel that its legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel.'" Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 489 -490 (1986) (quoting Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984)). Of course, we do not now determine whether the legal basis for a constitutional claim based on the youth of the defendant was reasonably available to petitioner in 1978. Nor do we rule upon whether refusal to consider such a claim would carry with it "the risk of a manifest miscarriage of justice" and would thus permit a habeas corpus court to address the merits of the claim in a subsequent proceeding. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 -538 (1986). </s> [Footnote 2 "The Court most definitely finds no basis for concluding that Mr. Leaphart's representation was constitutionally inadequate." Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772, 802 (1981). In a footnote, the court added: </s> "This Court is particularly concerned by arguments raised with respect to ineffective assistance of counsel. I certainly do not question the wisdom or the propriety of advancing every legitimate argument on petitioner's behalf. However, many, if not all, the allegations made against Mr. Leaphart are directly contradicted by the record. Thus, they could not possibly be of any benefit to Mr. Burger. On the other hand, the raising of such unfounded charges must have a significant `chilling effect' on the willingness of experienced attorneys, like Mr. Leaphart, to undertake the defense of capital cases. Petitioner's attorneys here might do well to reconsider their apparent policy of routinely attacking the performance of trial counsel in light of this fact." Id., at 802, n. 13. </s> [Footnote 3 Leaphart and Smith were both members of the same professional corporation. The form of their business organization is not relevant to this case and they will be described as partners for the sake of convenience. </s> [Footnote 4 The opinion of the District Court is published as an Appendix to the Court of Appeals' opinion. 753 F.2d, at 932-942. </s> [Footnote 5 Petitioner also argues in this proceeding that the malice charge given to the jury at the guilt or innocence phase of his trial was unconstitutional under Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985). The trial court charged the jury that a "person of sound mind and discretion is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts." The Court of Appeals observed that the jury instruction was "virtually identical to the one held unconstitutional in Franklin," 785 F.2d, at 891, even though the trial court also instructed the jury that a person will not be presumed to act with criminal intent and that a specific intent to commit the crime charged was an essential element of the crime that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals found any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with the Court of Appeals that, pretermitting the inquiry whether the trial judge's charge to the jury impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on the question of petitioner's criminal intent [483 U.S. 776, 783] to commit murder, "`the evidence was so dispositive of intent'" that it can be said beyond a reasonable doubt that "`the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the presumption.'" See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 583 (1986) (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 97 , n. 5 (1983) (POWELL, J., dissenting)). </s> [Footnote 6 We note that Leaphart persisted in this strategy in his closing argument to the jury at the second sentencing hearing. He argued, in part: </s> "Each and every one of these acts, according to this statement which they have introduced into evidence, the initiation of the crime, the act of robbery, the acts of sodomy, the acts of tying him up, the telling him to get in the trunk, the saying let's kill him, telling him where to drive, telling him we must get rid of the car, we must get rid of the fingerprints, who was that? That was all Stevens. Stevens is not on trial here today. </s> "Now, this boy here was seventeen years old at that time, and Stevens was twenty. Now, we all know that the influence that a twenty year old person has over a seventeen year old person who he looks on as his friend and companion. And, all of this bears out that Stevens was the one in control. . . . </s> ". . . You may recommend life imprisonment even though you have found aggravating circumstances, or one or more of the aggravating circumstances given to you in this charge to have existed beyond a reasonable doubt. </s> "Well, why is that the law? That's the law because of the situations such as this where you have a moving force, and you have a person who follows along and does the beating [bidding] of an individual, who gets convicted of murder. And, the person who actually perpetrated the crime was, and actually was the catalyst, the moving force that carried it all about and did all these things even though this person was a part of it, that the punishment of one is different from the punishment of the other, or can be. That was in your discretion. </s> "And, in this particular situation, even though you say under these set of circumstances these things existed, Burger did none of that, except being involved there at that time and going along with Stevens who was the leader." 2 Tr. 252-254 (second sentencing hearing). </s> [Footnote 7 We have no doubt that this potential testimony would have been relevant mitigating evidence that the sentencer could not have refused to consider and could not have been precluded from considering had counsel sought to introduce it. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398 -399 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 -5 (1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 -116 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). In light of petitioner's youth at the time of the offense, evidence of his "neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background" and testimony that his "mental and emotional development were at a level several years below his chronological age" could not have been excluded by the state court. Eddings, 455 U.S., at 116 . It is equally clear, however, that the undisputed relevancy of this information and the trial court's corresponding duty to allow its consideration have no bearing on the quite distinct question before us. That issue is whether counsel acted reasonably in deciding not to introduce the evidence out of apprehension that it would contribute little to his client's chances of obtaining a life sentence while revealing possibly damaging details about his past and allowing foreseeably devastating cross-examination. </s> [Footnote 8 There was a conflict in the testimony with respect to the extent of these conversations which the District Court described in its first treatment of the issue as follows: </s> "Mrs. Foster testified that Mr. Leaphart made only very minimal efforts to discuss petitioner's case with her and to develop possible mitigating factors. Mr. Leaphart's account suggested that he had talked with Mrs. Foster several times and made adequate if hardly ideal inquiries. Mr. Leaphart's account is supported by his bill, which lists two conferences totaling three and a half hours prior to trial and four conferences of unstated duration prior to retrial. Defendant's Exhibits 1, 2. Thus, the Court must conclude that Mr. Leaphart's investigation appears to meet at least minimal professional standards." 513 F. Supp., at 796, n. 6. </s> On remand from the Court of Appeals, the District Court concluded: </s> "Interviews with Burger, Burger's mother, and an attorney who had befriended Burger and his mother, in addition to his consultation with a psychologist, and review of psychologists' reports obtained through Burger's mother convinced Leaphart that a more exhaustive investigation into [483 U.S. 776, 791] Burger's background would not be a profitable pursuit. He also concluded that presenting background and character evidence to the sentencing jury would have been at best unproductive, and at worst, harmful to his client." Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930, 935 (CA11 1985) (footnotes omitted; citations to transcript of second sentencing hearing omitted). </s> [Footnote 9 "Q. Do you have an opinion, based on your examination of Mr. Burger, both your use of Wechsler IQ test and your other examination, and based on your experience as a psychologist, do you have an opinion as to whether or not he could appreciate the consequences of the making of a confession? </s> "A. I would think he would enjoy the idea, frankly. This would be a great opportunity to display his psychopathological behavior. He'd probably shout in the wind as much as he could of all the things he might have done. </s> "Q. But could he appreciate the trouble or the consequences of, or the magnitude of what he was doing? </s> . . . . . </s> "A. His grade of deficiency with a relative IQ of 82 would not [be] beyond the concept of understanding right from wrong. His psychopathology would make him want to do wrong, basically within his structure. He's just as determined to do evil as a preacher is determined to do [good], if I could use that as an illustration. So in the concept of appreciating any [483 U.S. 776, 792] confession he would make, it would be to him almost a compelling need, because any psychopath has no pleasure, has no joy unless he can at some point along the line let the world know of his behavior, which to most of us is very unseemingly." 1 Tr. 249-251 (first sentencing hearing). </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and JUSTICE MARSHALL join, and, as to Part II, JUSTICE POWELL joins, dissenting. </s> In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court set forth the standards that are to govern a court's consideration of a criminal defendant's claims that he has been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner Burger presents two such claims in this case. I believe each claim meets those specified standards for establishing a constitutional violation. Each therefore calls for a grant of the federal habeas corpus relief sought by petitioner. Accordingly, I dissent from the Court's judgment that denies such relief. 1 </s> I </s> A </s> Petitioner's first claim rests on his right to conflict-free assistance of counsel. As long ago as Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), this Court recognized that such assistance is a component of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Id., at 70. This right is so fundamental in our adversarial system of criminal justice that public defender offices in many jurisdictions have rules precluding [483 U.S. 776, 797] representation of more than one of the criminal defendants involved in the same offense. 2 Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 3 and under the rules governing professional responsibility, 4 consent of a criminal defendant [483 U.S. 776, 798] is a necessary prerequisite to joint representation, and trial court inquiry into whether the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to conflict-free representation is strongly encouraged, if not required. 5 I do not read [483 U.S. 776, 799] the majority opinion as departing from the Court's earlier approval of those practices, see Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346 , nn. 10 and 11 (1980), although I believe that in this case it definitely has misapplied the Sixth Amendment standard that is informed by the rules. </s> This Court recognizes the unique nature of claims that arise out of a conflict of interest and does not impose on such claims the two-pronged standard of inadequate performance and prejudice, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 687 , that applies to general claims of ineffective assistance. Instead, prejudice is presumed if a defendant demonstrates that his attorney "`actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'" Id., at 692, quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S., at 350 , 348. 6 </s> [483 U.S. 776, 800] </s> The presumption of prejudice in cases presenting a conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel's performance is warranted because the duty of loyalty to a client is "perhaps the most basic" responsibility of counsel and "it is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 692 . This difficulty in assessing prejudice resulting from a conflict of interest is due in part to the fact that the conflict may affect almost any aspect of the lawyer's preparation and presentation of the case. Because the conflict primarily compels the lawyer not to pursue certain arguments or take certain actions, it is all the more difficult to discern its effect. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) ("[I]n a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil . . . is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process" (emphasis in original)). The presumption of prejudice in conflict-of-interest cases is particularly appropriate because lawyers are charged with the knowledge that they are obliged to avoid such conflict. See n. 4, supra. A judge can avoid the problem by questioning the defendant, at an early stage of the criminal process, in any case presenting a situation that may give rise to conflict, in order to determine whether the defendant is aware of the possible conflict and whether he has waived his right to conflict-free representation. </s> B </s> Although the Court purports to apply this conflict-of-interest ineffectiveness standard in the present case, see ante, at [483 U.S. 776, 801] 783, I cannot agree with its conclusions. Contrary to the Court's reasoning, there simply can be no doubt that petitioner's court-appointed attorney actively represented conflicting interests through his role in the defenses of petitioner and his coindictee, Thomas Stevens. Defense counsel was appointed to represent petitioner, and his partner in their two-partner law firm was appointed to represent Stevens. App. 30-31. The two lawyers interviewed both defendants "from the beginning" and assisted in the preparation of both cases. Id., at 32. The partner "sat in" with counsel at petitioner's trial and "helped" him. Id., at 35. Apparently, others viewed the two lawyers as joint counsel for petitioner at his first trial inasmuch as the prosecutor directed the attention of the prospective jurors during voir dire to both lawyers and asked the jurors whether they ever had been represented by either of them. First Tr. 28, 37, 42, 48. 7 The partner is listed as appearing for petitioner Burger in the transcript of that trial. Id., at 1. While there is no record evidence that petitioner's counsel assisted during Stevens' trial, counsel conceded that, in addition to his assistance in pretrial research, strategy, and interviews of Stevens, he prepared the appellate briefs for both petitioner and Stevens after the second sentencing proceedings. App. 54. See Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930, 941 (CA11 1985) (District Court opinion, adopted by Court of Appeals as its own, noting that "it may be said that the two attorneys at times acted as one while each prepared for trial and appeal"). The facts therefore demonstrate that the two lawyer-partners actively represented both petitioner and Stevens. </s> This active representation of the two coindictees by petitioner's counsel constituted representation of actual conflicting [483 U.S. 776, 802] interests. 8 Petitioner's and Stevens' interest were diametrically opposed on the issue that counsel considered to be crucial to the outcome of petitioner's case - the comparative culpability of petitioner and Stevens. Petitioner confessed to participation in the crime but placed the primary blame on Stevens. Second Tr. 278. In his confession, petitioner stated that he thought they simply would abandon the taxicab. Ibid. Botsford, who had been with petitioner and Stevens in the taxicab for a while, corroborated petitioner's statement in his testimony at both petitioner's and Stevens' trials. When questioned about what petitioner and Stevens had told him they were going to do with the taxicab and its driver, Botsford replied: </s> "Well, Tom Stevens said that he thought they should kill him. And, I told him I thought he was crazy. And, Burger didn't like the idea of killing him either. Burger said that they ought to let him go, that they ought to drive off in the woods somewhere and let him out, and then take the car somewhere and put it like, I think somebody mentioned the ocean." Id., at 112-113; see also First Tr. 100, 111 (Botsford agreeing that petitioner "was just sorta going along, sorta doing sorta like Stevens was telling him to do"). </s> Petitioner stated that after he had checked to see if the driver was all right, Stevens returned to where they had stopped the taxicab and told petitioner to drive the car into the pond. Second Tr. 278. Stevens also confessed, but in [483 U.S. 776, 803] doing so he pointed to petitioner as the more culpable. See Stevens v. State, 242 Ga. 34, 35, 247 S. E. 2d 838, 840 (1978). Stevens stated in his confession that he had not wanted to kill the taxicab driver and had not known that petitioner was planning to drive the automobile into the pond. Ibid. Stevens' attempt to argue his lesser culpability was his "sole mitigatory defense" at his second sentencing trial. See Stevens v. State, 245 Ga. 583, 585, 266 S. E. 2d 194, 197, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). </s> The Court disregards this direct conflict between petitioner's and Stevens' respective interests and, instead, attempts to minimize the active representation of both defendants by the two lawyer-partners. The Court opines that the "overlap of counsel" did not constitute an "active representation of competing interests" by petitioner's counsel. Ante, at 783. The Court supports this assertion by blandly relying on its perception of a shortage of lawyers to handle these cases, on its view of the benefits that defendants may derive from joint representation when there is a common defense, and on the assumption that lawyers are aware of their duty of loyalty to clients. Ante, at 783-784. The Court, however, does not identify any record evidence indicating that there were no other lawyers available for appointment. In addition, the other factors are of questionable relevance in this case which did not involve a common defense for the two coindictees and in which counsel did not even consider that a conflict of interest might exist. </s> The Court also points to the fact that petitioner and Stevens were tried separately and relies on the observation in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S., at 347 , that separate trials in that case had "reduced the potential for a divergence in [the defendants'] interests." Ante, at 784. The separate trials in this case, however, did absolutely nothing to reduce the potential for divergence of interests at the two critical stages that petitioner argues were adversely affected by the [483 U.S. 776, 804] conflict of interest, that is, pretrial plea negotiations and post-trial appeal. 9 </s> The Court's further attempt to disavow the existence of an actual conflict of interest by suggesting strategic reasons for the actions taken by petitioner's counsel on appeal and in pretrial negotiations is, with all respect, not supported by the record. The Court's suggestion that counsel's failure to make a "lesser culpability" argument on appeal was the result of a sound strategic conclusion that the claim was weak, ante, at 784, is sheer speculation. As demonstrated by petitioner's confession and Botsford's testimony, the lesser culpability argument certainly did not lack an evidentiary foundation. This speculation that counsel dropped the claim after trial because it was a weak argument for appeal is counterintuitive. The lesser culpability argument would [483 U.S. 776, 805] have been stronger on appeal than at trial. On appeal, the reviewing court had both cases before it at the same time and thus was in the actual position of being able to compare the cases at the time it reviewed the appropriateness of the sentences imposed. </s> Moreover, the speculation that counsel dropped the argument on appeal because of its weakness ignores the fact that comparative culpability is directly relevant to the statutorily mandated appellate review of capital cases in Georgia. The State's statute specifies that the Georgia Supreme Court's review of capital cases is to include consideration "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." Ga. Code Ann. 17-10-35(c)(3) (1982) (emphasis added). The evidence and argument presented at trial concerning petitioner's role as a follower of Stevens' directions and petitioner's lesser involvement in the assaultive behavior prior to the murder would clearly be relevant on appeal under the terms of the statute. Hence, even if counsel did base his decision on the "strategic" reason suggested by the Court, 10 that decision was based on an erroneous [483 U.S. 776, 806] view of the law and thus could not be reasonable. 11 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986) (counsel's judgment found to be contrary to prevailing professional norms because justifications offered by counsel reflected ignorance of the law or attempt to shift blame for inadequate preparation). </s> Setting aside the speculation as to counsel's motive, it becomes clear that his joint representation of petitioner and Stevens precluded him, as a matter of professional responsibility, from pursuing the lesser culpability argument in petitioner's appellate brief. It would have been inconsistent with his duty of loyalty to Stevens to argue that the Georgia Supreme Court should reduce petitioner's sentence to life imprisonment because Stevens was the more culpable defendant who deserved the death sentence for this heinous murder. </s> It is difficult to imagine a more direct conflict than existed here, where counsel was preparing the appellate brief for petitioner at the same time that he was preparing the appellate brief for Stevens, and where the state statute specifies that one of the roles of that appellate process is to consider the comparative culpability and sentences of defendants involved in similar crimes. Counsel's abandonment of the [483 U.S. 776, 807] lesser culpability argument on appeal, the stage at which the two cases would be reviewed contemporaneously, is indicative of the "`struggle to serve two masters.'" See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S., at 482 , quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S., at 75 . This record compels a finding that counsel's representation of the conflicting interests of petitioner and Stevens had an adverse effect on his performance as petitioner's counsel. </s> Defense counsel's representation of conflicting interests also placed him in an untenable position at an earlier stage of the proceedings - during pretrial plea bargaining. The two partners helped each other during that period with their two cases and, as part of the pretrial preparation, petitioner's counsel talked with both petitioner and Stevens "from the beginning." App. 32. Counsel was not in a position to negotiate with the prosecution to the detriment of Stevens. Although he asserted that he continually attempted to negotiate with the prosecutor on behalf of petitioner for a sentence of life imprisonment, he conceded that he never offered the prosecutor petitioner's testimony against Stevens. Id., at 52, 74-75. Certainly, counsel was not reasonable in expecting a plea bargain if he was not offering the prosecutor the most significant bargaining chip he possessed - petitioner's testimony against Stevens. 12 </s> [483 U.S. 776, 808] </s> C </s> I also disagree with the Court's rejection of petitioner's argument that the actual conflict of interest was aggravated by the widespread knowledge of the cases in the small area from which the jury was drawn. Ante, at 787-788. Juror knowledge that the two cases were being tried by local law partners [483 U.S. 776, 809] on inconsistent theories could create a conflict of interest because, in order to preserve the credibility of their argument in either case, the lawyers would have to deny the validity of their contradictory approach in the other. A crucial feature in any case is the credibility of a defendant's lawyer in the minds of the jury. </s> The Court's observation that "the community would have had the same awareness that the theories were inherently inconsistent" if two unaffiliated lawyers had advanced the inconsistent defenses, ante, at 788, may well be true, but it says nothing of the difference that awareness could make in the community's view of the cooperating lawyer-partners' credibility. The Court fails to recognize that, although the credibility of two unaffiliated attorneys presenting inconsistent arguments would not be questioned, the credibility of two local law partners assisting each other in the two cases could well be questioned if it was known that the lawyers working together presented inconsistent theories in the separate cases. Obviously, a jury might suspect that, in one of the cases, the lawyers were pressing an argument they did not believe to be true. </s> The adverse effect of this conflict on credibility would have been magnified when petitioner's and Stevens' cases were remanded for the second sentencing proceeding and the blameshifting arguments were repeated. By the time of the second sentencing hearing, the verdicts in the original trials and sentencing proceedings had become known to the community. 13 Where, as here, the community was aware that [483 U.S. 776, 810] the same law partners together were representing two defendants in capital cases and that they were arguing inconsistent theories that placed the blame on that defendant who did not happen to be on trial at the moment, the lawyers' credibility and their effectiveness as counsel were significantly undermined. </s> D </s> Finally, I conclude that the trial court in this case erred in failing to inquire into whether petitioner knowingly and voluntarily had waived his constitutional right to conflict-free representation. When this Court, in its opinion in Cuyler v. Sullivan, addressed the question of the state trial court's duty to make such an inquiry, it specified: "Unless the trial court knows or reasonably should know that a particular conflict exists, the court need not initiate an inquiry." 446 U.S., at 347 (emphasis added). Here, the trial judge, who appointed the two defense counsel and who presided over both petitioner's trial and Stevens' trial, should have known of the conflict from the outset inasmuch as the two confessions, given before the two partners were appointed, were in direct conflict on the question as to which defendant was the prime architect of the crime. In any event, by the time the appeal was taken, the trial court, undoubtedly familiar with the role that comparative culpability plays in appellate review of capital cases under the Georgia statute, was well aware that the primary defense of each defendant against the death sentence was that the other was more culpable. It therefore was the court's obligation to inquire whether petitioner had consented to the joint representation with the knowledge of the possible conflicts of interests. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S., at 71 ("The trial court should protect the right of an accused to have the assistance of counsel"). [483 U.S. 776, 811] The court could not properly rely on an assumption that petitioner had given knowing and voluntary consent once the judge became aware of the actual conflict, particularly where he was made aware during the suppression hearing that petitioner was a 17-year-old at the time of the appointment of counsel, had an IQ of 82, functioned at the level of a 12-year-old, and was diagnosed as having psychological problems. First Tr. 244, 245, 247-248. </s> II </s> Even if no conflict of interest existed in this case, I would still dissent from the Court's denial of relief because petitioner was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel in connection with his capital-sentencing proceeding. His counsel failed to investigate mitigating evidence and failed to present any evidence at the sentencing hearing despite the fact that petitioner was an adolescent with psychological problems and apparent diminished mental capabilities. I agree with the Court that the adversarial nature of Georgia's capital-sentencing proceedings is sufficiently similar to a trial that petitioner's claim is governed by the same standards that apply to general claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Ante, at 788; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 686 -687. It is also important to "keep in mind that counsel's function, as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case." Id., at 690. Applying that standard to petitioner's claim in light of the record of this case yields a finding that the inaction by petitioner's lawyer was "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance" and was prejudicial to petitioner. Id., at 690, 692. </s> In Strickland, this Court specifically addressed counsel's duty to investigate. It explained: </s> "[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after [483 U.S. 776, 812] less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Id., at 690-691. </s> See also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986). The limitation counsel placed on his investigation of the evidence of petitioner's mental capabilities and psychological makeup despite the indications that petitioner had problems in these respects was not supported by reasonable professional judgment. </s> Counsel stated that he based his decision not to move the court for a complete psychological examination of petitioner on his prior experience with the mental hospital where, he assumed, petitioner would be sent for the examination. App. 62-63. He stated that "the results I've had with personnel at Central Hospital as far as the defense is concerned . . . hasn't been good at all." Id., at 63. He added that he thought that any further examinations would yield the same psychopathic diagnosis reached by the psychologist who had examined petitioner once briefly and primarily to administer an IQ test for purposes of the hearing on whether petitioner's confession was admissible. Ibid. </s> Counsel's failure to request an examination because of what he considered to be a biased procedure constituted a breakdown in the adversarial process. If in fact the procedure for psychological examinations of an indigent criminal defendant in that jurisdiction was biased, the role of petitioner's counsel at least was to seek an alternative examination process or to challenge the biased procedure. Counsel's decision to forgo the psychological examination imperiled [483 U.S. 776, 813] petitioner's ability to counter the prosecutor's argument that he deserved to be executed for his role in the murder and therefore undermined the reliability of the sentencing proceeding. Moreover, such a decision to proceed without the examination in a case in which an adolescent with indications of significant psychological problems and diminished mental capabilities faces the death penalty is contrary to professional norms of competent assistance. The usefulness of a thorough evaluation in a case where there are indications that the capital defendant has problems of that kind is obvious. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982); cf. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). </s> Counsel's decision not to investigate petitioner's family or childhood background also was not within the range of professionally reasonable judgment. Viewed as of the time he decided not to get in touch with any family member or to investigate any place where petitioner had lived, counsel provided inadequate assistance. He relied on petitioner to suggest possible witnesses or mitigating evidence. But his question to petitioner whether he could produce evidence of "anything good about him," App. 51, hardly could be expected to yield information about petitioner's childhood and broken home. It is unlikely that in response to that question a defendant would volunteer the facts that his father threw him out of the house, that his mother did the same, that his stepfathers beat him and his mother, or that one stepfather involved him in drugs and alcohol at age 11. All this is mitigating evidence that could be highly relevant. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S., at 107 . Furthermore, counsel testified that he spoke with petitioner perhaps "half a dozen times," the longest being "[p]robably about an hour." App. 51. These bare six hours provided counsel little time to discuss possible mitigating evidence for the sentencing proceeding because counsel surely also had to discuss in detail the circumstances surrounding petitioner's confession which he was challenging and all the other features of the [483 U.S. 776, 814] guilt/innocence phase of the trial. Moreover, after petitioner's death sentence was vacated on appeal and the case was remanded, counsel did not perform any further investigation whatsoever during the 9-month period before the second hearing. He simply proceeded in the same manner that had resulted in petitioner's being sentenced to death at the first hearing. Id., at 71. </s> The only reason counsel spoke to petitioner's mother at all was because she sought him out after learning elsewhere that her son was charged with murder. Id., at 83. Even after petitioner's mother initiated the contact, counsel's conduct was inexplicable. He testified that he never explained the penalty phase of the trial to petitioner's mother or what evidence then could be presented. Id., at 50. The Court finds reasonable counsel's decision not to have petitioner's mother testify because he concluded that her testimony might be counterproductive in that it might reveal a petty offense petitioner had committed. Ante, at 792. That decision is a prime example, however, of a strategic choice made after less-than-adequate investigation, which therefore is not supported by informed professional judgment. Counsel could not reasonably determine whether presenting character witnesses would pose a risk of disclosing past criminal behavior by petitioner without first determining whether there was any such criminal behavior. Although there is a reference in the record to an incident of shoplifting a candy bar, App. 90-91, and another reference to an automobile accident, id., at 92-93, there is no indication that counsel ever determined whether petitioner in fact had a prior criminal record. The account provided by petitioner's mother of petitioner's hitchhiking to Florida to be with her after having been thrown out of his father's house and having to sell his shoes during the trip to get food, id., at 92, may well have outweighed the relevance of any earlier petty theft. </s> I also find troubling the fact that defense counsel rejected the assistance of another lawyer (who had known petitioner) [483 U.S. 776, 815] merely on the basis that the lawyer was black. Id., at 57-58. The lawyer offered to come to Georgia at his own expense to provide what assistance he could. Id., at 86. Counsel thought his assistance might have "an ill effect," however, on the trial of petitioner who is white. Counsel testified that he and the lawyer agreed that because of his race it was not wise to have the lawyer testify. Id., at 58. I question whether this is a reasonable professional decision. The adversarial duty of petitioner's counsel was to pursue a means by which to present testimony from such a witness while doing his best to safeguard the trial from racial prejudice. See, e. g., Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986). Counsel apparently made no effort to investigate possible racial bias of petitioner's jury. App. 58-59. Like counsel's abandonment of the psychological investigation because of the suspected unfairness of the examination procedure, his surrender to the perceived risk of racial discrimination without any effort to eliminate that risk is inconsistent with his adversarial role and his responsibility to further the reliability of the court proceeding. </s> Acceptance of the unpleasant likelihood of racial prejudice in such a trial, however, does not justify counsel's failure to accept assistance from the lawyer in any number of ways, such as investigating petitioner's childhood background in Indianapolis where the lawyer had known petitioner. Testimony by petitioner's mother at the federal habeas corpus hearing revealed that when the lawyer was in law school he had worked in a volunteer "big brother" organization for men who spent time with children who did not have a father-son relationship or a big brother. Id., at 85. He was undoubtedly familiar with some of petitioner's friends and family members there. The affidavits submitted at the federal hearing, 1 Record 139-157, indicate that many of those persons still reside in Indianapolis but were never approached by counsel. In sum, I reluctantly conclude that counsel fell short in his "duty to make reasonable investigations or to [483 U.S. 776, 816] make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 691 . Application of the Strickland standard to this case convinces me that further investigation was compelled constitutionally because there was inadequate information on which a reasonable professional judgment to limit the investigation could have been made. 14 </s> Having concluded that the conduct of petitioner's lawyer in failing to pursue an investigation into petitioner's psychological problems or into his family and childhood background was professionally unreasonable, given the circumstances known to counsel at the time, I must also address the question whether this inadequate performance prejudiced petitioner. In my view, if more information about this adolescent's psychological problems, troubled childhood, and unfortunate family history had been available, "there is a reasonable probability that . . . the sentencer - including an appellate court, to the extent it independently reweighs the evidence - would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 695 . </s> I cannot refrain from remarking on the similarities between the evidence of petitioner's childhood and that presented in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S., at 107 . Recognizing there the force of such evidence in a decision whether an individual should be sentenced to die, this Court held that the death sentence had to be vacated and the case remanded for another sentencing proceeding where the sentencing authority would consider the mitigating evidence. Id., at 115-117. Because the decision not to present such [483 U.S. 776, 817] evidence to the sentencing authority in petitioner's case was not supported by reasonable professional judgments, the reliability of the capital-sentencing proceeding was undermined. But for defense counsel's disinterest in developing any mitigating evidence to permit an informed decision, there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome of the sentencing hearing would have been different. Counsel's conduct "so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process" that the sentencing hearing cannot "be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 686 . </s> III </s> Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment due to his trial counsel's active representation of the conflicting interests of his co-indictee. Given the indications of petitioner's psychological problems and diminished mental capabilities known to petitioner's lawyer, counsel's failure to perform an investigation into those problems and into petitioner's background denied petitioner effective assistance of counsel at his capital-sentencing hearing. Petitioner is entitled to a new trial with conflict-free representation by counsel and to a new capital-sentencing hearing with effective assistance of counsel. I respectfully dissent from this Court's judgment denying relief. </s> [Footnote 1 I agree with the Court's conclusion, ante, at 782, n. 5, that the Court of Appeals should be affirmed to the extent it held that any impermissible effect of the jury instruction on malice given at the guilt/innocence phase of trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See 785 F.2d 890 (CA11), clarified, 796 F.2d 1313 (1986). I also agree with the Court's observation, ante, at 779, n. 1, that petitioner has not advanced here the question of the constitutionality of executing a person for a murder committed while he was a minor, and thus there is no need to address the merits of that issue or the availability of the claim to petitioner in a future proceeding. </s> [Footnote 2 In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), this Court noted that the vast majority of public defender offices have a strong policy against multiple representation and that approximately half never undertake such representation. Id., at 346, n. 11; see also Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64 Va. L. Rev. 939, 950, and n. 40 (1978). We further observed in Cuyler that the private bar may be less aware of conflicts of interests in such instances. 446 U.S., at 346 , n. 11. This observation certainly is supported by the testimony of petitioner's attorney in this case that he never even considered that a conflict might arise out of the representation of two defendants facing the death penalty for the commission of the same murder. See App. 32-34. </s> [Footnote 3 Criminal Rule 44(c) provides in relevant part: </s> "Whenever two or more defendants have been jointly charged . . . and are represented by . . . retained or assigned counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including separate representation." </s> [Footnote 4 Ethical Cannon 5-16 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility states: </s> "In those instances in which a lawyer is justified in representing two or more clients having differing interests, it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict and to obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus, before a lawyer may represent multiple clients, he should explain fully to each client the implications of the common representation and should accept or continue employment only if the clients consent." </s> Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) states: </s> "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment." </s> See also ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 and 1.10(a) (1984). The American Bar Association, in its Standards for Criminal Justice, explains: </s> "Except for preliminary matters such as initial hearings or applications for bail, a lawyer or lawyers who are associated in practice should not undertake to defend more than one defendant in the same criminal case if the [483 U.S. 776, 798] duty to one of the defendants may conflict with the duty to another. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to act for more than one of several codefendants except in unusual situations when, after careful investigation, it is clear that: </s> "(i) no conflict is likely to develop; </s> "(ii) the several defendants give an informed consent to such multiple representation; </s> "(iii) the consent of the defendants is made a matter of judicial record. "In determining the presence of consent by the defendants, the trial judge should make appropriate inquiries respecting actual or potential conflicts of interest of counsel and whether the defendants fully comprehend the difficulties that an attorney sometimes encounters in defending multiple clients. </s> "In some instances, accepting or continuing employment by more than one defendant in the same criminal case is unprofessional conduct." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-3.5(b) (2d ed. 1979) (emphases in original). </s> In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court stated that the Sixth Amendment relies upon the "legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the Amendment envisions." Id., at 688. Where, as here, the legal profession's standards were not followed, no such presumption is appropriate. </s> [Footnote 5 Subsequent to petitioner's trial, the Georgia Supreme Court, exercising its supervisory authority, adopted a rule that in capital cases codefendants must be provided with separate and independent counsel. Fleming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 270 S. E. 2d 185, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 904 (1980). The court cited the provision in the Code of Professional Responsibility that requires that any lawyer affiliated in a firm with a lawyer who is disqualified must also be disqualified, and thereby indicated that the rule applies to representation by a single attorney or by members of the same firm. 246 Ga., at 93, n. 7, 270 S. E. 2d, at 188, n. 7. The court explained that a rule of separate and independent representation "is especially necessary where the death penalty is sought, because in these cases even a slight conflict, irrelevant to guilt or innocence, may be important in the sentencing phase." Id., at 93, 270 S. E. 2d, at 188; see also id., at 95, 270 S. E. 2d, at 189 (Bowles, J., concurring) ("No two defendants share [483 U.S. 776, 799] equal responsibility for a crime. Usually one is more culpable than the other or for any number of reasons has a greater degree of responsibility for what occurred. One may also be more entitled to leniency based on such factors as age, intelligence, motive, background, previous conduct or record, etc. Common counsel eliminates any practical possibility of plea bargaining"). But see id., at 95, 97, 270 S. E. 2d, at 189, 191 (Hill, J., concurring specially) (cautioning that although presumption against joint representation is appropriate, a per se rule against joint representation may not be because capital defendants should be able to waive right to conflict-free representation if it would be to their benefit); id., at 98, 270 S. E. 2d, at 191 (Jordan, P. J., dissenting) (arguing that defendant in that case should be permitted opportunity to make informed and voluntary waiver of right to conflict-free representation). </s> What happened in petitioner's case is therefore unlikely to be repeated in Georgia. </s> [Footnote 6 The distinction between a prejudice showing and a showing of adverse effect on an attorney's performance apparently has been difficult for some courts to discern. See generally Note, Conflicts of Interest in the Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Clarifying Cuyler v. Sullivan, 70 Geo. L. J. 1527, 1536-1561 (1982). The Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, made clear, however, that demonstrating that a conflict adversely affected counsel's performance does not equate with the standard applied to general ineffectiveness claims that requires a showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional [483 U.S. 776, 800] errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 466 U.S., at 694 . The adverse-effect standard is necessary in conflict-of-interest cases to trigger the presumption of prejudice because such a presumption in these cases is of a more limited nature than the automatic presumption of prejudice that arises in cases of actual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether and cases of state interference with assistance of counsel. Id., at 692. </s> [Footnote 7 The transcripts of petitioner's first trial, including his first sentencing hearing, and of his second sentencing hearing were submitted as Exhibit A and Exhibit C, respectively, to respondent's answer to petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition in District Court. See 1 Record, pleading 11. Citations to the transcript of the first trial and hearing are designated "First Tr." and citations to the second hearing are designated as "Second Tr." </s> [Footnote 8 The great degree of deference the Court accords the lower courts' conclusions on this matter, ante, at 784-785, and its emphasis on the "heavily fact-based rulings," ante, at 785, appear misplaced in the analysis of this case. The question of multiple representation "is a mixed determination of law and fact that requires the application of legal principles to the historical facts," Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S., at 342 , as are the general ineffectiveness question and the "performance and prejudice components of the ineffectiveness inquiry." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S., at 698 . </s> [Footnote 9 The fact that defendants are given separate trials may eliminate some problems created by a conflict of interest, but severance does not alleviate numerous other dilemmas faced by lawyers representing two or more defendants charged and indicted together. See Developments in the Law, Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1244, 1380 (1981); Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 119, 143-144 (1978). The right to conflict-free representation by counsel in pretrial and appellate proceedings of criminal cases may be as significant as such representation at trial. Id., at 125-127. In an earlier discussion of the hazards of an attorney's representing more than one coindictee, the Court described the very conflicts that present themselves in this case: </s> "Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing. For example, in this case it may well have precluded defense counsel . . . from exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another." Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489 (1978). </s> [Footnote 10 Contrary to the Court's speculation, counsel himself did not claim to have dropped the lesser culpability argument because of its weakness. Rather, he stated that he did not raise the issue of the difference in the culpability of the two coindictees in petitioner's appellate brief because, although he thought it was the key issue at trial, App. 64, he thought "that was a jury decision based on the evidence," id., at 53, and that the only way he could see to raise the issue was on the theory of "lack of evidence to sustain the finding of the jury as to the - what punishment to give." Id., at 54. This basis for the action certainly cannot be considered strategically sound because it reflects an erroneous legal interpretation of appellate review in capital cases in Georgia. By failing to argue on petitioner's behalf that he was less culpable than Stevens, counsel diminished the reliability of the Georgia Supreme Court's proportionality review in this case. This Court has held that proportionality review is an important component of the Georgia capital-sentencing system. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 , 204-206 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.). Therefore, even if counsel's assistance on appeal had not been hindered by [483 U.S. 776, 806] an actual conflict of interest, one may well question whether his conduct in this regard met the minimal level of professional reasonableness. </s> [Footnote 11 Counsel's self-serving declarations that he did not permit his representation of Stevens to affect his representation of petitioner cannot outweigh the conflict revealed by the record itself. Counsel is not a fully disinterested party to this proceeding due to the collateral consequences that could result from a determination that he rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. He certainly has an interest in disavowing any conflict of interest so that he may receive other court appointments that are a source of clients for the criminal defense work of the partners' practice. App. 44. The approximate $9,000 fee that counsel received in this case for his representation of petitioner was the largest the firm had ever received for a criminal case. Ibid. This payment, along with the payment received by the partner for his court appointment in the Stevens case, went into their firm account. Id., at 31. </s> [Footnote 12 The Court discounts counsel's failure to offer the prosecutor petitioner's testimony against Stevens by stating that there is no indication that the prosecutor would have been receptive to the offer. Ante, at 785-786. The Court focuses on the strength of the evidence of petitioner's and Stevens' guilt and concludes that there is no reason to doubt that the prosecutor refused to discuss the matter prior to the first trial and insisted on seeking the death penalty after the remand of the case. Ante, at 786. This reasoning, however, misses the point of petitioner's argument. The question is whether the prosecutor would have insisted on seeking the death penalty against petitioner if counsel had attempted to persuade him otherwise by offering him petitioner's testimony against Stevens. </s> Although it is easy to assume that the prosecutor would not have indulged in plea bargaining in this case because of the significant evidence of [483 U.S. 776, 808] guilt, that approach ignores the reality of bargaining in capital cases. The evidence of guilt is not the only factor prosecutors consider. Rather, the relevant factors include the aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding the case as well as practical considerations such as the cost of pursuing the death penalty. See Gross & Mauro, Patterns of Death, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 27, 106-107 (1984) ("Since death penalty prosecutions require large allocations of scarce prosecutorial resources, prosecutors must choose a small number of cases to receive this expensive treatment"). Such practical considerations might weigh even more heavily prior to a second capital-sentencing trial on remand from the state appellate court's reversal of the first death sentence. Furthermore, there may be collateral evidentiary considerations during the pretrial phase that warrant a plea to life imprisonment for one coindictee in exchange for evidence that will strengthen the other case. For example, in this case, if the prosecutor had thought that there was a likelihood that petitioner's counsel might prevail on his argument that petitioner's confession should be suppressed, and if petitioner's counsel had offered petitioner's testimony against Stevens, the prosecutor might have decided that rather than risk the possibility of his case against petitioner being destroyed by suppression of his confession, he would permit petitioner to plead to a life sentence in exchange for his testimony against Stevens and pursue the death sentence against Stevens. </s> Petitioner's attorney had the duty to serve his role in the adversary system and make an offer on petitioner's behalf to testify against Stevens if petitioner was willing to do so, and thereby avoid the possibility of being executed. Petitioner's burden of showing that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance therefore was met. The Court's suggestion that whether the prosecutor would have accepted such an offer is the determinative factor verges on requiring a showing of prejudice which, of course, is inappropriate in the context of petitioner's conflict-of-interest claim. See n. 6, supra. Counsel's complete failure to offer petitioner's testimony against Stevens in a capital case of this nature where petitioner's lesser culpability was suggested not only by his own confession but was corroborated by testimony of the key witness, has to be below minimal professional standards. </s> [Footnote 13 Counsel testified that there were several newspaper accounts of the proceedings between the first and second sentencing hearings and that he was certain that the people in the community were aware of the sentence received at the first trial. App. 55. The record indicates that 23 out of the 35 persons who were asked during voir dire at the second sentencing hearing whether they had heard about the first trial responded affirmatively. Second Tr. 33-34, 40, 48. Counsel made no effort to question these prospective jurors about the extent of their knowledge of the earlier trials and whether it extended to the theories on which petitioner's and [483 U.S. 776, 810] Stevens' trials had been argued. Counsel also testified, in explanation of his failure to seek a change of venue, that he had expected that the jurors who sat at petitioner's trial would be aware of all the pretrial proceedings, including an unsuccessful effort for change of venue. App. 54-55. </s> [Footnote 14 I agree with the observation in the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals that the defense "strategy" to make the prosecutor "prove his case," see App. 35, "is tantamount to no strategy at all; and reliance upon such a strategy in a capital sentencing proceeding, as an alternative to investigating and presenting available mitigating evidence, is patently unreasonable." Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930, 946 (CA11 1985). </s> JUSTICE POWELL, with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN joins, dissenting. </s> I join Part II of JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on the ground that counsel unreasonably failed to investigate and present to the sentencing jury available mitigating evidence that would have raised a substantial question whether the sentence of death should have been imposed on a seriously backward minor. I therefore do not reach the question whether there was a conflict of interest resulting from the fact that two law partners represented Burger and Stevens [483 U.S. 776, 818] in their separate trials. I write separately to emphasize those aspects of Burger's claim that I find particularly troubling. </s> I </s> When he committed the crime for which he is now to be executed, Burger's physical age was 17 years. He had an IQ of 82, was functioning at the level of a 12-year-old, and possibly had suffered brain damage from beatings when he was younger. See Burger v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 930, 957 (CA11 1985) (Johnson, J., dissenting). Testimony by Burger's mother at the federal habeas corpus hearing confirmed that his childhood was turbulent and filled with violence. App. 88-92; see ante, at 789-790. Affidavits from Burger's childhood friends also attested to his troubled upbringing. See ante, at 793. </s> Defense counsel knew something of these facts, although not the details. App. 51-52. Prior to the sentencing hearing, counsel had interviewed Burger, Burger's mother, and an attorney who had befriended Burger and his mother. He had also reviewed psychologists' reports provided by Burger's mother, and spoken to the psychologist who testified as to Burger's IQ and psychological maturity at the suppression hearing. 753 F.2d, at 935. After this review, counsel made the judgment that presenting any evidence at sentencing in addition to Burger's chronological age and the facts of his degree of participation in the crimes "would not be to [Burger's] benefit." App. 49. See 753 F.2d, at 935. 1 </s> [483 U.S. 776, 819] </s> II </s> In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), this Court held that a "defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction or death sentence has two components." Id., at 687. First, the defendant must show that counsel's errors were so serious that his performance as the "counsel" guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment was deficient. Second, the defendant must show that he suffered prejudice because of counsel's performance. In the context of a capital sentence, the defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death." Id., at 695. </s> A </s> In assessing the adequacy of counsel's performance, "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable." Id., at 690. But "strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." Id., at 690-691. Here, counsel did not believe that evidence of Burger's violent and disturbed family background would benefit his client because Burger "had been involved in a beating and a number of things that indicated violence and stuff at an earlier [age]." App. 49. Counsel's reason for not presenting the sentencing jury with evidence of Burger's mental and emotional immaturity [483 U.S. 776, 820] is ambiguous. 2 It appears that counsel believed that the only relevant testimony in mitigation of a capital sentence could have been "something like he was a good boy and went to church." Id., at 63. Most telling is counsel's explanation of the type of mitigating evidence that would be relevant at the sentencing hearing: "anything good about him, anything - of course, it was my understanding that that is very broad. That you can generally put up anything you can find that is good about anybody in mitigation of the sentence." Id., at 51. </s> Burger's stunted intellectual and emotional growth and the details of his tragic childhood are far from "good," and it is true that background information would have "indicated violence and stuff at an earlier [age]," id., at 49. But this Court's decisions emphasize that mitigating evidence is not necessarily "good." Factors that mitigate an individual defendant's moral culpability "ste[m] from the diverse frailties of humankind." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , [483 U.S. 776, 821] 304 (1976) (plurality opinion of Stewart, POWELL, and STEVENS, JJ.) (emphasis added). In a capital case where the defendant is youthful - in fact, a child, measured by chronological, 3 emotional, or intellectual maturity - evidence of these facts is extraordinarily germane to the individualized inquiry that the sentencing jury constitutionally is required to perform. "[E]vidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance is particularly relevant," Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982), "because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse." California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring). See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983) (defendant's mental illness perhaps should mitigate the penalty). This Court's previous observation bears emphasis: </s> "[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly `during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment' expected of adults. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979)." Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, at 115-116 (footnotes omitted). </s> See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962) (a 14-year-old "cannot be compared with an adult" when assessing the voluntariness of a confession). Where a capital defendant's [483 U.S. 776, 822] chronological immaturity is compounded by "serious emotional problems, . . . a neglectful, sometimes even violent, family background, . . . [and] mental and emotional development . . . at a level several years below his chronological age," id., at 116, the relevance of this information to the defendant's culpability, and thus to the sentencing body, is particularly acute. The Constitution requires that a capital-sentencing system reflect this difference in criminal responsibility between children and adults. </s> Where information at the sentencing stage in a capital case may be highly relevant, counsel's burden of justifying a failure to investigate or present it is similarly heightened. There is no indication that counsel understood the relevance, much less the extraordinary importance, of the facts of Burger's mental and emotional immaturity, and his character and background, that were not investigated or presented in this case. This evidence bears directly on Burger's culpability and responsibility for the murder and in fact directly supports the strategy counsel claimed to have deemed best - to emphasize the difference in criminal responsibility between the two participants in the crime. Absent an explanation that does not appear in this record, counsel's decision not to introduce - or even to discover - this mitigating evidence is unreasonable, and his performance constitutionally deficient. 4 </s> [483 U.S. 776, 823] </s> B </s> Imposing the death penalty on an individual who is not yet legally an adult is unusual and raises special concern. 5 At [483 U.S. 776, 824] least, where a State permits the execution of a minor, great care must be taken to ensure that the minor truly deserves to be treated as an adult. A specific inquiry including "age, actual maturity, family environment, education, emotional and mental stability, and . . . prior record" is particularly relevant when a minor's criminal culpability is at issue. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 734 , n. 4 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting). No such inquiry occurred in this case. In every realistic sense Burger not only was a minor according to law, but clearly his mental capacity was subnormal to the point where a jury reasonably could have believed that death was not an appropriate punishment. Because there is a reasonable probability that the evidence not presented to the sentencing jury in this case would have affected its outcome, Burger has demonstrated prejudice due to counsel's deficient performance. </s> III </s> As I conclude that counsel's performance in this case was deficient, and the deficiency may well have influenced the sentence that Burger received, I would vacate Burger's death sentence and remand for resentencing. </s> [Footnote 1 Counsel testified: </s> "I felt the way to try that case was to take the evidence that was there and try to minimize Mr. Burger's participation in the crime. . . . I felt that case should have been tried on the facts and make the District Attorney - I say make him, use whatever rules of evidence to exclude those harmful facts, and then use the - my opinion in representing Burger was then use those facts to show that he was just there and was not entitled to be treated in the same manner as the person who was - who was the main actor in the thing. That he was a secondary, he was in a secondary position. Since there were two punishments in that particular situation, that he should be [483 U.S. 776, 819] given the lesser of the two. I think that's the way that case should have been tried, and that's the way I tried it. And, I don't know of - today, if I had to go back and try it again I would do it in the same manner - I say in the same manner, much the same manner, using the same thing and hope I got a different jury. That's all. And, that's it." App. 63-64. </s> [Footnote 2 Counsel testified: </s> "The particular psychologist I had was - gave Mr. Burger an I. Q. test and found it to be 82. And, he also was of the opinion that Mr. Burger was a sociopath with a psychopathic personality. And, on cross examination in the confession phase, this attorney asked, he commented to the effect, I can't remember the exact comment, sociopath was not crazy, he didn't belong in an insane asylum, and he wasn't - shouldn't be treated as a criminal because of his compulsive behavior. But, made something - well, you can't put them in an insane asylum because they will let him out. Didn't know what to do with him. I felt that would be - that and related questions would be asked in the presence of the jury, so I decided at that point not to use the testimony of the psychologist in that phase." Id., at 62. </s> When asked whether he considered using a psychologist for something other than showing that Burger's confession was involuntary, counsel responded: </s> "I could have - if he had been of the opinion, you know, question of sanity, I could have used that instance, but he was not of that opinion. I did not see the benefit of going out and trying to find the sociologist, or psychologist to use in that particular trial in that particular place, because I did not think that that would be effective." Id., at 63. </s> [Footnote 3 Although an individual may be held criminally responsible at the age of 13, Ga. Code Ann. 16-3-1 (1984), the age of legal majority in Georgia is 18 years, 39-1-1 (1982). </s> [Footnote 4 As the Court notes, ante, at 779-780, Alvin Leaphart, the appointed counsel who represented petitioner in the state courts, was an experienced and respected lawyer. In concluding there was ineffective assistance in this case, I do not question the Court's view. Any lawyer who has participated in litigation knows that judgment calls - particularly in a trial - cannot always be reasonable or correct. Moreover, this Court has not yet addressed the question presented in Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986), cert. granted, 479 U.S. 1084 (1987), whether the Eighth Amendment imposes an age limitation on the application of the death penalty. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 , n. 5 (1982). </s> I also share the concern expressed by Judge Edenfield in Blake v. Zant, 513 F. Supp. 772, 802, n. 13 (SD Ga. 1981), that the routine raising of charges of ineffective assistance of counsel is likely to have a significant [483 U.S. 776, 823] "chilling effect" on the willingness of experienced lawyers to undertake the defense of capital cases. See ante, at 780, n. 2. In this case, however, I conclude that the facts and circumstances that no one now disputes clearly show that counsel made a serious mistake of judgment in failing fully to develop and introduce mitigating evidence that the Court concedes was "relevant" and that the jury would have been compelled "to consider." See ante, at 789, n. 7. </s> [Footnote 5 We noted in Eddings v. Oklahoma that "[e]very State in the country makes some separate provision for juvenile offenders." 455 U.S., at 116 , n. 12 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967)). Of the 37 States that have enacted capital-punishment statutes since this Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), 11 prohibit the execution of persons under 18 at the time of the offense. Three States impose a prohibition at age 17, and Nevada sets its limit at age 16. Streib, The Eighth Amendment and Capital Punishment of Juveniles, 34 Cleveland State L. Rev. 363, 368-369, and nn. 33-36 (1986). Of the States permitting imposition of the death penalty on juveniles, over half of them explicitly denominate youth as a mitigating factor. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code capital-punishment statute states an exclusion for defendants "under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime." 210.6(1)(d) (1980). The Institute reasons "that civilized societies will not tolerate the spectacle of execution of children, and this opinion is confirmed by the American experience in punishing youthful offenders." Id., Comment, p. 133. In 1983, the American Bar Association adopted a resolution stating that the organization "oppo[ses], in principle, the imposition of capital punishment on any person for an offense committed while that person was under the age of 18." See ABA Opposes Capital Punishment for Persons under 18, 69 A. B. A. J. 1925 (1983). </s> International opinion on the issue is reflected in Article 6 of the International Convenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. See United Nations, Human Rights, A Compilation of International Instruments 9 (1983). See also Weissbrodt, United States Ratification of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 Minn. L. Rev. 35, 40 (1978). Both prohibit the execution of individuals under the age of 18 at the time of their [483 U.S. 776, 824] crime. The United States is not a party to either of these treaties, but at least 73 other nations have signed or ratified the International Covenant. See Weissbrodt, supra. All European countries forbid imposition of the death penalty on those under 18 at the time of their offense. Streib, supra, at 389 (citing Amnesty International, The Death Penalty (1979)). </s> [483 U.S. 776, 825]

United States Supreme Court BULLINGTON v. MISSOURI(1981) No. 79-6740 Argued: January 14, 1981Decided: May 4, 1981 </s> Missouri law provides only two possible sentences for a defendant convicted of capital murder: (a) death, or (b) life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. Under state statutes, a separate presentence hearing, at which additional evidence in mitigation and aggravation of punishment is heard, must be held before the same jury that found the defendant guilty; the prosecution must prove the existence of aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty may be imposed; and a jury that imposes the death penalty must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds beyond a reasonable doubt. The guilt-or-innocence phase of petitioner's state-court trial resulted in a verdict of guilty of capital murder, and his presentence hearing resulted in the jury's additional verdict fixing petitioner's punishment at life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. After granting petitioner's post-trial motion for a new trial because of the intervening decision in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 , which held that Missouri's allowing automatic exemption of women from jury service was unconstitutional, the trial court announced that it would grant petitioner's motion, based on double jeopardy grounds, to strike the prosecution's notice that it intended again to seek the death penalty on the basis of the same aggravating circumstances it had sought to prove at the first trial. The Missouri Court of Appeals denied the State's request for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, but the Missouri Supreme Court ultimately granted a writ of prohibition. </s> Held: </s> Because under Missouri law the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's first trial was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial. The reasoning of Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 , is not controlling. Pp. 437-446. </s> (a) This Court generally has concluded that, because the imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an "acquittal" of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed, the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has succeeded in having his original conviction set aside. See North Carolina v. Pearce, [451 U.S. 430, 431] 395 U.S. 711 ; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 ; Stroud v. United States, supra; United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 . However, in those cases, unlike the present case, the sentencing procedures did not have the hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence. In the first three cases, there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required to prove additional facts in order to justify the particular sentence, and the sentencer's discretion in determining punishment was essentially unfettered. Although United States v. DiFrancesco, supra, involved a separate sentencing procedure, the prosecution was required to prove an additional fact warranting a harsher penalty only by a preponderance of the evidence, and the sentencer's choice of punishment was far broader than the two choices available to petitioner's jury under Missouri law. Pp. 437-441. </s> (b) The rationale of Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 , which held that a defendant may not be retried if he obtains a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict, is relevant here. In the usual sentencing proceeding, it is impossible, because of the absence of sentencing standards, to conclude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum constitutes a decision to the effect that the prosecution has failed to prove its case. But by enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has "proved its case." Petitioner's sentence of life imprisonment at his first trial meant that the jury has already acquitted him of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence. Pp. 441-446. </s> 594 S. W. 2d 908, reversed and remanded. </s> BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. POWELL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 447. </s> Richard H. Sindel argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Gail Gaus. </s> James J. Cook argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), concerned a defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced [451 U.S. 430, 432] to life imprisonment, and who then obtained, upon confession of error by the Solicitor General, a reversal of his conviction and a new trial. This Court, by a unanimous vote in that case, held that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment 1 did not bar the imposition of the death penalty when Stroud at his new trial was again convicted. </s> The issue in the present case is whether the reasoning of Stroud is also to apply under a system where a jury's sentencing decision is made at a bifurcated proceeding's second stage at which the prosecution has the burden of proving certain elements beyond a reasonable doubt before the death penalty may be imposed. </s> I </s> Missouri law provides two, and only two, possible sentences for a defendant convicted of capital murder: 2 (a) death, or (b) life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.008.1 (1978). 3 </s> Like most death penalty legislation enacted after this Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), [451 U.S. 430, 433] the Missouri statutes contain substantive standards to guide the discretion of the sentencer. The statutes also afford procedural safeguards to the convicted defendant. Section 565.006 provides that the trial court shall conduct a separate presentence hearing for the defendant who is convicted by a jury of capital murder. 4 The hearing must be held before [451 U.S. 430, 434] the same jury 5 that found the defendant guilty, and "additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment" shall be heard. "Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible." The jury must consider whether the evidence shows that there exist any of the 10 6 aggravating circumstances or the 7 mitigating circumstances specified by the statute, see 565.012.2 and 565.012.3; whether any other mitigating or aggravating circumstances authorized by law exist; whether any aggravating circumstances that do exist are sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty; and whether any mitigating circumstances that exist outweigh the aggravating circumstances. 565.012.1. A jury that imposes the death penalty must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds beyond a reasonable doubt. 565.012.4. It also must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any aggravating circumstance or circumstances that it finds to exist are sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. Missouri Approved Instructions - Criminal (MAI-Cr) 15.42 (1979). A Missouri jury is instructed that it is not compelled to impose the death [451 U.S. 430, 435] penalty, even if it decides that a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist and that it or they are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. MAI-Cr. 15.46. A jury's decision to impose the death penalty must be unanimous. If the jury is unable to agree, the defendant receives the alternative sentence of life imprisonment described above. 565.006.2; MAI-Cr. 15.48. </s> II </s> In December 1977, petitioner Robert Bullington was indicted in St. Louis County, Mo., for capital murder and other crimes arising out of the abduction of a young woman and her subsequent death by drowning. 7 </s> The Circuit Court of St. Louis County granted petitioner's pretrial motion for a change of venue to Jackson County in the western part of the State. The prosecution, by letter, informed the defense that the State would seek the death penalty if the jury convicted the defendant of capital murder. App. 12. The letter-notice stated that the prosecution would present evidence of two aggravating circumstances specified by the statute: that "[t]he offense was committed by a person . . . who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions," 565.012.2 (1), and that "[t]he offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind," 565.012.2 (7). </s> At the guilt-or-innocence phase of petitioner's trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of capital murder. App. 21. On the following day, the trial court proceeded to hold the presentence hearing required by 565.006.2. Evidence submitted by the prosecution was received. None was offered by the defense. After argument by counsel, instructions from the judge, and deliberation, the jury returned its [451 U.S. 430, 436] additional verdict fixing petitioner's punishment not at death, but at imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. App. 27. </s> Petitioner then moved, on various grounds, for judgment of acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial. While that motion was pending, Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979), was decided. In that case this Court held that Missouri's constitutional and statutory provisions allowing women to claim automatic exemption from jury service deprived a defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. The trial court overruled petitioner's motion for acquittal but, relying upon Duren, granted his motion for a new trial. App. 44. </s> Soon thereafter, the prosecution served and filed a formal "Notice of Evidence in Aggravation," stating that it intended again to seek the death penalty. The notice specified the same aggravating circumstances the State sought to prove at the first trial, see also Tr. of Oral Arg. 36, and asserted that it would introduce the evidence that was previously disclosed to defense counsel. App. 45-46. The defense moved to strike the notice, id., at 47, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment (as made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969)) barred the imposition of the penalty of death when the first jury had declined to impose the death sentence. </s> The trial court announced that it would grant that motion and would not permit the State to seek the death penalty. Before the court issued a formal order to this effect, the prosecution sought a writ of prohibition or mandamus from the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District. After granting a temporary "stop order," App. 56, the Court of Appeals without opinion denied the State's request and dissolved the stop order. Id., at 57. The Supreme Court of Missouri, however, granted the prosecution's motion for [451 U.S. 430, 437] transfer of the case to that court and issued a preliminary writ of prohibition. After argument, the court, sitting en banc and by a divided vote, sustained the State's position and made the writ absolute. State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S. W. 2d 908 (1980). It held that neither the Double Jeopardy Clause, nor the Eighth Amendment, nor the Due Process Clause barred the imposition of the death penalty upon petitioner at his new trial, and that allowing the prosecution to seek capital punishment would not impermissibly chill a defendant's effort to seek redress for any constitutional violation committed at his initial trial. </s> We granted certiorari, 449 U.S. 819 (1980), 8 in order to consider the important issues raised by petitioner regarding the administration of the death penalty. 9 </s> III </s> It is well established that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the retrial of a defendant who has been acquitted of the crime charged. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 129 -130 (1980); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 16 (1978); [451 U.S. 430, 438] United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). This Court, however, has resisted attempts to extend that principle to sentencing. The imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an "acquittal" of any more severe sentence that could have been imposed. The Court generally has concluded, therefore, that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no absolute prohibition against the imposition of a harsher sentence at retrial after a defendant has succeeded in having his original conviction set aside. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969). See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S., at 133 , 137-138; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 23 -24 (1973); Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919). </s> The procedure that resulted in the imposition of the sentence of life imprisonment upon petitioner Bullington at his first trial, however, differs significantly from those employed in any of the Court's cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable to sentencing. The jury in this case was not given unbounded discretion to select an appropriate punishment from a wide range authorized by statute. Rather, a separate hearing was required and was held, and the jury was presented both a choice between two alternatives and standards to guide the making of that choice. Nor did the prosecution simply recommend what it felt to be an appropriate punishment. It undertook the burden of establishing certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt in its quest to obtain the harsher of the two alternative verdicts. The presentence hearing resembled and, indeed, in all relevant respects was like the immediately preceding trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. It was itself a trial on the issue of punishment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes. 10 </s> [451 U.S. 430, 439] </s> In contrast, the sentencing procedures considered in the Court's previous cases did not have the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence. In Pearce, Chaffin, and Stroud, there was no separate sentencing proceeding at which the prosecution was required to prove - beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise - additional facts in order to justify the particular sentence. In each of those cases, moreover, the sentencer's discretion was essentially unfettered. In Stroud, no standards had been enacted to guide the jury's discretion. 11 In Pearce, the judge had a wide range of punishments from which to choose with no explicit standards imposed to guide him. 12 And in Chaffin, the discretion given to the jury was extremely broad. That defendant, convicted in Georgia of [451 U.S. 430, 440] robbery, could have been sentenced to death, to life imprisonment, or to a prison term of between 4 and 20 years. 412 U.S., at 18 , and n. 1. The statute contained no standards to guide the jury's exercise of its discretion. 13 </s> In only one prior case, United States v. DiFrancesco, has this Court considered a separate or bifurcated sentencing procedure at which it was necessary for the prosecution to prove additional facts. The federal statute under consideration there, the "dangerous special offender" provision of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. 3575 and 3576, requires a separate presentence hearing. The Government must prove the additional fact that the defendant is a "dangerous special offender," as defined in the statute, in order for the court to impose an enhanced sentence. But there are highly pertinent differences between the Missouri procedures controlling the present case and those found constitutional in DiFrancesco. The federal procedures at issue in DiFrancesco include appellate review of a sentence "on the record of the sentencing court," 3576, not a de novo proceeding that gives the Government the opportunity to convince a second factfinder of its view of the facts. 14 Moreover, the choice presented to the federal judge under 3575 is far broader than that faced by the state jury at the present petitioner's trial. Bullington's Missouri jury was given - and under the State's statutes could be given - only two choices, death or life imprisonment. On the other hand, if [451 U.S. 430, 441] the Federal Government proves that a person convicted of a felony is a dangerous special offender, the judge may sentence that person to "an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not disproportionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony." 3575 (b). Finally, although the statute requires the Government to prove the additional fact that the defendant is a "dangerous special offender," it need do so only by a preponderance of the evidence. Ibid. This stands in contrast to the reasonable-doubt standard of the Missouri statute, the same standard required to be used at the trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The State's use of this standard indicates that, as has been said generally of the criminal case, "the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that . . . they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment. . . . [O]ur society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 -424 (1979). </s> IV </s> These procedural differences become important when the underlying rationale of the cases is considered. The State here relies principally upon North Carolina v. Pearce. 15 The [451 U.S. 430, 442] Court's starting point in that case, 395 U.S., at 719 -720, was the established rule that there is no double jeopardy bar to retrying a defendant who has succeeded in overturning his conviction. See, e. g., United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896). The Court stated that this rule rests on the premise that the original conviction has been nullified and "the slate wiped clean." 395 U.S., at 721 . Therefore, if the defendant is convicted again, he constitutionally may be subjected to whatever punishment is lawful, subject only to the limitation that he receive credit for time served. </s> There is an important exception, however, to the rule recognized in Pearce. A defendant may not be retried if he obtains a reversal of his conviction on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to convict. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). The reasons for this exception are relevant here: </s> "[R]eversal for trial error, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency, does not constitute a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its cases. As such, it implies nothing with respect to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. . . . </s> "The same cannot be said when a defendant's conviction has been overturned due to a failure of proof at trial, in which case the prosecution cannot complain of prejudice, for it has been given one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it can assemble. . . . Since we necessarily accord absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal - no matter how erroneous its decision - it is difficult to conceive how society has any greater interest [451 U.S. 430, 443] in retrying a defendant when, on review, it is decided as a matter of law that the jury could not properly have returned a verdict of guilty." Id., at 15-16 (emphasis in original). </s> The decision in Burks was foreshadowed by Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957). In that case, the defendant had been indicted for first-degree murder, and the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict him either of that crime or of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The jury convicted him of second-degree murder, but the conviction was reversed on appeal. The Court held that a retrial on the first-degree murder charge was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, because the defendant "was forced to run the gantlet once on that charge and the jury refused to convict him." Id., at 190. See also Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323 (1970). </s> Thus, the "clean slate" rationale recognized in Pearce is inapplicable whenever a jury agrees or an appellate court decides that the prosecution has not proved its case. </s> In the usual sentencing proceeding, however, it is impossible to conclude that a sentence less than the statutory maximum "constitute[s] a decision to the effect that the government has failed to prove its case." 16 In the normal [451 U.S. 430, 444] process of sentencing, "there are virtually no rules or tests or standards - and thus no issues to resolve . . . ." M. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 38 (1973). Thus, "[t]he discretion of the judge . . . in [sentencing] matters is virtually free of substantive control or guidance. Where the judge has power to select a term of imprisonment within a range the exercise of that authority is left fairly at large." Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 904, 916 (1962). </s> The Court's cases that have considered the role of the Double Jeopardy Clause in sentencing have noted this absence of sentencing standards. In DiFrancesco, for example, we observed: "[A] sentence is characteristically determined in large part on the basis of information, such as the presentence report, developed outside the courtroom. It is purely a judicial determination, and much that goes into it is the result of inquiry that is nonadversary in nature." 449 U.S., at 136 -137. And even if it is the jury that imposes the sentence, "[n]ormally, there would be no way for the jury to place on the record the reasons for its collective sentencing determination . . . ." Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S., at 28 , n. 15. </s> By enacting a capital sentencing procedure that resembles a trial on the issue of guilt or innocence, however, Missouri explicitly requires the jury to determine whether the prosecution has "proved its case." Both Burks and Green, as has been noted, state an exception to the general rule relied upon [451 U.S. 430, 445] in North Carolina v. Pearce. That exception is applicable here, and we therefore refrain from extending the rationale of Pearce to the very different facts of the present case. Chief Justice Bardgett, in his dissent from the ruling of the Missouri Supreme Court majority, observed that the sentence of life imprisonment which petitioner received at his first trial meant that "the jury has already acquitted the defendant of whatever was necessary to impose the death sentence." 594 S. W. 2d, at 922. We agree. </s> A verdict of acquittal on the issue of guilt or innocence is, of course, absolutely final. The values that underlie this principle, stated for the Court by Justice Black, are equally applicable when a jury has rejected the State's claim that the defendant deserves to die: </s> "The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green v. United States, 355 U.S., at 187 -188. </s> See also United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S., at 136 . The "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" and the "anxiety and insecurity" faced by a defendant at the penalty phase of a Missouri capital murder trial surely are at least equivalent to that faced by any defendant at the guilt phase of a criminal trial. The "unacceptably high risk that the [prosecution], with its superior resources, would wear down a defendant," id., at 130, thereby leading to an erroneously imposed death sentence, would exist if the State were to have a further opportunity to convince a jury to impose the ultimate punishment. [451 U.S. 430, 446] Missouri's use of the reasonable-doubt standard indicates that in a capital sentencing proceeding, it is the State, not the defendant, that should bear "almost the entire risk of error." Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S., at 424 . Given these considerations, our decision today does not at all depend upon the State's announced intention to rely only upon the same aggravating circumstances it sought to prove at petitioner's first trial or upon its statement that it would introduce no new evidence in support of its contention that petitioner deserves the death penalty. Having received "one fair opportunity to offer whatever proof it could assemble," Burks v. United States, 437 U.S., at 16 , the State is not entitled to another. </s> V </s> The Court already has held that many of the protections available to a defendant at a criminal trial also are available at a sentencing hearing similar to that required by Missouri in a capital case. See, e. g., Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (due process protections such as right to counsel, right to confront witnesses, and right to present favorable evidence are available at hearing at which sentence may be imposed based upon "a new finding of fact . . . that was not an ingredient of the offense charged," id., at 608). Because the sentencing proceeding at petitioner's first trial was like the trial on the question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one acquitted by a jury also is available to him, with respect to the death penalty, at his retrial. 17 We therefore refrain from extending the reasoning of Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), to this very different situation. </s> The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri is reversed, [451 U.S. 430, 447] and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 ". . . nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ." </s> [Footnote 2 The definition of capital murder in Missouri is set forth in Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.001 (1978): </s> "Any person who unlawfully, willfully, knowingly, deliberately, and with premeditation kills or causes the killing of another human being is guilty of the offense of capital murder." </s> [Footnote 3 Section 565.008.1 reads: </s> "Persons convicted of the offense of capital murder shall, if the judge or jury so recommends after complying with the provisions of sections 565.006 and 565.012, be punished by death. If the judge or jury does not recommend the imposition of the death penalty on a finding of guilty of capital murder, the convicted person shall be punished by imprisonment by the division of corrections during his natural life and shall not be eligible for probation or parole until he has served a minimum of fifty years of his sentence." </s> [Footnote 4 At all relevant times, 565.006 read in pertinent part: </s> "1. At the conclusion of all trials upon an indictment or information for capital murder heard by a jury, and after argument of counsel and proper charge from the court, the jury shall retire to consider a verdict of guilty or not guilty without any consideration of punishment, and by their verdict ascertain, whether the defendant is guilty of capital murder, murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, manslaughter, or is not guilty of any offense. . . . </s> "2. Where the jury . . . returns a verdict or finding of guilty as provided in subsection 1 of this section, the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing before the jury . . . at which time the only issue shall be the determination of the punishment to be imposed. In such hearing, subject to the laws of evidence, the jury . . . shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any such prior criminal convictions and pleas. Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The jury . . . shall also hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney regarding the punishment to be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall open and the defendant shall conclude the argument to the jury . . . . Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments, the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions and the jury shall retire to determine the punishment to be imposed. In capital murder cases in which the death penalty may be imposed by a jury . . . the additional procedure provided in section 565.012 shall be followed. The jury . . . shall fix a sentence within the limits prescribed by law. The judge shall impose the sentence fixed by the jury . . . . If the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree to the punishment, the judge shall impose sentence within the limits of the law; except that, the judge shall in no instance impose the death penalty when, in cases tried by a jury, the jury cannot agree upon the punishment. </s> "3. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the [451 U.S. 430, 433] presentence hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punishment." </s> The statute was amended by 1979 Mo. Laws H. B. 251, but the amendment does not affect the present case. </s> [Footnote 5 Because the petitioner in this case was sentenced by a jury at his first trial, we describe only Missouri's procedure for imposition of the death penalty by a jury. </s> [Footnote 6 Section 565.012.2 was amended in 1980 to provide two additional specified aggravating circumstances. Those added were: </s> "(11) The capital murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the perpetration or in the attempt to perpetrate the felony of rape or forcible rape or the felony of sodomy or forcible sodomy; </s> "(12) The capital murder was committed by the defendant for the purpose of preventing the person killed from testifying in any judicial proceeding." Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.012.2 (11) and (12) (Supp. 1980). </s> [Footnote 7 Petitioner also was charged with the state crimes of kidnaping, armed criminal action, burglary, and flourishing a dangerous and deadly weapon. At his trial, petitioner was found guilty of all these charges. </s> [Footnote 8 Although further proceedings are to take place in state court, the judgment rejecting petitioner's double jeopardy claim is "final" within the meaning of the jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. 1257. Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55 (1971). See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). </s> [Footnote 9 Subsequent to this Court's decisions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), courts of at least two States have concluded that a defendant originally sentenced to life imprisonment may not be sentenced to death upon retrial after reversal of his original conviction. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has relied upon this Court's cases construing the Double Jeopardy Clause. Sanne v. State, 609 S. W. 2d 762, 766-767 (1980); Brasfield v. State, 600 S. W. 2d 288, 298 (1980). The Supreme Court of Georgia has concluded that the imposition of a death sentence in these circumstances would violate the state-law requirement, Ga. Code 27-2537 (c) (3) (1979), that the sentence not be "`excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.'" Ward v. State, 239 Ga. 205, 208-209, 236 S. E. 2d 365, 368 (1977). </s> [Footnote 10 At the statutorily prescribed presentence hearing, counsel make opening statements, testimony is taken, evidence is introduced, the jury is instructed, and final arguments are made. The jury then deliberates and [451 U.S. 430, 439] returns its formal punishment verdict. 565.006.2. See n. 4, supra. All these steps were taken at petitioner's presentence hearing following his first trial. </s> We think it not without some significance that the pertinent Missouri statute itself speaks specifically of the presentence hearing in terms of a continuing "trial." Section 565.006.2 states that after the verdict of guilty of capital murder is returned, "the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence hearing." (Emphasis added.) </s> [Footnote 11 In Stroud, the relevant statute provided: "Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall suffer death," but "the jury may qualify their verdict by adding thereto `without capital punishment;' and whenever the jury shall return a verdict qualified as aforesaid, the person convicted shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life." Act of Mar. 4, 1909, 275, 330, 35 Stat. 1143, 1152, codified currently as 18 U.S.C. 1111 (b). </s> At Stroud's retrial, the court essentially repeated the language of this statute to the jury, giving it no further guidance as to the appropriate penalty. Record in Stroud v. United States, O. T. 1919, No. 276, p. 472. At the previous trial, the judge had told the jury that he would not "pretend to tell you the various considerations that come into determining that question [of the proper sentence]." Record in Stroud v. United States, O. T. 1917, No. 694, p. 177. </s> [Footnote 12 Pearce was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape, a state crime punishable by a prison term of between 1 and 15 years. N.C. Gen. Stat. 14-22 (1969), repealed by 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 682, 7, and replaced. </s> [Footnote 13 In discussing the usual attributes of jury sentencing, the Court in Chaffin observed: "Normally, there would be no way for a jury to place on the record the reasons for its collective sentencing determination, and ordinarily the resentencing jury would not be informed of any conduct of the accused unless relevant to the question of guilt." 412 U.S., at 28 , n. 15. This starkly illustrates the significant difference between the sentencing procedure in that case and the procedure now required by Missouri in a capital murder case. </s> [Footnote 14 The statute authorizes "review of whether the procedure employed was lawful, the findings made were clearly erroneous, or the sentencing court's discretion was abused." 18 U.S.C. 3576. </s> [Footnote 15 The other cases that concern the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to sentencing do not add significantly to the State's argument. Chaffin relies primarily upon Pearce. See 412 U.S., at 23 -24. Stroud states only that "[t]he fact that the jury may thus mitigate the punishment to imprisonment for life did not render the conviction less than one for first degree murder." 251 U.S., at 18 . Stroud's jury was not required to find any facts in addition to those necessary for a conviction for first-degree murder in order to sentence him to death. </s> DiFrancesco relies upon "the history of sentencing practices, . . . the pertinent rulings of this Court, [and] considerations of double jeopardy policy . . . ." 449 U.S., at 132 . The history of sentencing practices is of little assistance to Missouri in this case, since the sentencing [451 U.S. 430, 442] procedures for capital cases instituted after the decision in Furman are unique. As we see below, considerations of double jeopardy policy favor petitioner in this case, rather than the State. Missouri, therefore, can rely only upon DiFrancesco's discussion of the Court's prior cases, a discussion that relies chiefly upon Pearce. See 449 U.S., at 134 -136. </s> [Footnote 16 "Sentencing and parole release decisions in this country have largely been left to the unfettered discretion of the officials involved. Legislatures have traditionally set high maximum penalties within which judges must choose specific sentences, but generally have provided little guidance for the exercise of this choice. Although the purposes of sentencing have often been defined as including deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and community condemnation to maintain respect for law, legislatures have been silent regarding which purposes are primary and how conflicts among the purposes are to be resolved. For example, federal law currently requires merely that in determining a sentence, the court consider `in its opinion the ends of justice and best interest of the public.' [18 U.S.C. 4205 (b).] </s> "In effect, sentencing policymaking has traditionally been delegated to a multitude of independent judges to be exercised in the context of individual [451 U.S. 430, 444] cases. There has been no attempt to separate policymaking from individual sentencing determinations. Normally, some type of presentence investigation is available which attempts to provide an informational basis for an intelligent and `individualized' sentencing decision. Yet, which factors should be considered, under what circumstances, and how they are to be weighted are decisions left solely to the unfettered discretion of the individual decisionmakers." Hoffman & Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 Hofstra L. Rev. 89, 96 (1978) (footnotes omitted). </s> [Footnote 17 Because of our conclusion on the Double Jeopardy Clause issue, we have no occasion to address petitioner's claims under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. </s> JUSTICE POWELL, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE WHITE, and JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting. </s> This case concerns the force of the Double Jeopardy Clause after a defendant convicted of a crime and sentenced has succeeded in having his conviction reversed. The Court holds that the jury's decision at petitioner's first trial to sentence him to life imprisonment precludes Missouri from asking the jury at petitioner's second trial to sentence him to death. I consider the Court's opinion irreconcilable in principle with the precedents of this Court. </s> I </s> It is well-established law that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to sentencing decisions after retrial with the same force that it applies to redeterminations of guilt or innocence. Since Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), it has been settled that a defendant whose conviction is reversed may receive a more severe sentence upon retrial than he received at his first trial. The Court followed this principle in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), where it held that a "corollary of the power to retry a defendant is the power, upon the defendant's reconviction, to impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized, whether or not it is greater than the sentence imposed after the first conviction." Id., at 720. In contrast, where the question was whether a defendant could be retried for first-degree murder after the jury at his first trial had found him guilty only of second-degree murder, the Court "regarded the jury's verdict as an implicit acquittal on the charge of first degree murder" and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause therefore barred retrial [451 U.S. 430, 448] on that charge. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957). </s> Although there is some tension between the Green and Pearce opinions, their holdings are not inconsistent. Both have become landmarks in the law of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court has cited each opinion time and time again, and more than once the Court has declined to reexamine Pearce. Indeed, its rationale has been reaffirmed in recent cases. United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 135 -136, n. 14 (1980); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 24 (1973). Earlier this Term, the Court stated without qualification that "the difference in result reached in Green and Pearce can be explained only on the grounds that the imposition of sentence does not operate as an implied acquittal of any greater sentence." United States v. DiFrancesco, supra, at 136, n. 14. 1 Compare ante, at 438 ("The imposition of a particular sentence usually is not regarded as an `acquittal' of any more severe sentence . . . ." (emphasis added)). But today the Court applies Green's principle of "implicit acquittal" to sentencing, despite Pearce and the unqualified statement in DiFrancesco. </s> II </s> The Court justifies applying the implicit-acquittal principle to the sentencing in this case on the ground that Missouri's death penalty statute establishes certain procedures for the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. 2 In the Court's [451 U.S. 430, 449] view, these procedures give the sentencing phase "the hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence," ante, at 439, and require the jury to decide whether the State has proved that the defendant deserves the penalty of death, ante, at 444. The decision at the first trial to impose life imprisonment, the Court reasons, reflects a decision that the State failed to prove that the defendant deserves capital punishment. According to the Court, that decision implies an "acquittal" of the harsher sentence. </s> Having characterized the jury's decision for life imprisonment as an "acquittal" of the death sentence, the Court recites the classic double jeopardy rationale applicable to retrying the issue of guilt or innocence, Green v. United States, supra, at 187-188, and applies it to the reconsideration of an appropriate sentence for one whose guilt is unquestioned. Ante, at 445-446. It states, without documentation in the record, that the expense, ordeal, and anxiety at a resentencing in a capital murder case are as great as would accompany a redetermination of guilt or innocence. Ante, at 445. It also states that Missouri's second attempt to obtain a death sentence might lead to an erroneously imposed death sentence. Ante, at 445-446. The Court therefore concludes that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars Missouri from again seeking the death penalty against petitioner. </s> This is the first time the Court has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies equally to sentencing and to determinations of guilt or innocence. It heretofore has been thought that there is a fundamental difference between the two. Stroud v. United States, supra; North Carolina v. Pearce, supra; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra; United States v. DiFrancesco, supra. I would adhere to these precedents, and think they control this case. [451 U.S. 430, 450] </s> Underlying the question of guilt or innocence is an objective truth: the defendant, in fact, did or did not commit the acts constituting the crime charged. From the time an accused is first suspected to the time the decision on guilt or innocence is made, our criminal justice system is designed to enable the trier of fact to discover that truth according to law. But triers of fact can err, and an innocent person can be pronounced guilty. In contrast, the law provides only limited standards for assessing the validity of a sentencing decision. The sentencer's function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out just deserts as he sees them. Absent a mandatory sentence, there is no objective measure by which the sentencer's decision can be deemed correct or erroneous if it is duly made within the authority conferred by the legislature. 3 </s> In light of this difference in the nature of the decisions, the question in this case is not - as the Court would frame it - whether the procedures by which a sentencing decision is made are similar to the procedures by which a decision on guilt or innocence is made. Rather, the question is whether the reasons for considering an acquittal on guilt or innocence as absolutely final apply equally to a sentencing decision imposing less than the most severe sentence authorized by law. I would have thought that the pertinence of this question was clear, and that the answer consistently given in the past could not have escaped the Court. Earlier this Term, in United States v. DiFrancesco, we stated that "[t]here are . . . fundamental distinctions between a sentence and an acquittal, and to fail to recognize them is to ignore the particular significance of an acquittal." 449 U.S., at 133 . [451 U.S. 430, 451] </s> The reasons for considering an acquittal on guilt or innocence as absolutely final do not apply equally to a sentencing decision for less than the most severe sentence authorized by law. A retrial of a defendant once found to have been innocent "enhanc[es] the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty." Green v. United States, 355 U.S., at 188 . But in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S., at 25 , we held that "[t]he possibility of a higher sentence was recognized and accepted [in Pearce] as a legitimate concomitant of the retrial process." The possibility of a higher sentence is acceptable under the Double Jeopardy Clause, whereas the possibility of error as to guilt or innocence is not, because the second jury's sentencing decision is as "correct" as the first jury's. Similarly, a defendant once found to have been innocent cannot be forced a second time through the ordeal of trial. But when a defendant is found guilty, he must bear the ordeal of being sentenced just as he does the ordeal of serving sentence. </s> In sum, I find wholly unpersuasive the Court's justification for applying the implicit-acquittal principle to sentencing. The Court does not purport to justify its conclusion with the argument that facing the death sentence a second time is more of an ordeal in the legal sense than facing any other sentence a second time. The death sentence, of course, is unlike any other punishment. For that reason, this Court has read the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require that States prescribe unique procedural safeguards to protect against capricious or discriminatory impositions of the death sentence. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (joint opinion). But a death sentence imposed in accord with the strictures of the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment is a lawful sentence, and Missouri provides the requisite procedures. I find no basis under the Double Jeopardy Clause for the Court to single out a sentence which is statutorily authorized, and [451 U.S. 430, 452] otherwise may be imposed constitutionally, as nonetheless one that a guilty defendant may not be required to face twice. Petitioner's ordeal upon retrial would not be different in kind from that of the defendants in Chaffin and Stroud, both of whom faced the possibility of the death sentence upon reconviction. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, at 18-19; Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S., at 17 -18. The Court today simply disregards the principles established by prior cases. 4 </s> III </s> In the course of explaining why the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar retrial after a reversal for trial error, the Court stated: "Corresponding to the right of an accused to be [451 U.S. 430, 453] given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial." United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). Missouri has decided that death is an appropriate punishment for one whose guilt of murder with aggravating circumstances is made clear through special procedures. There is no justification in the Constitution for barring Missouri from exacting that punishment unless Missouri's interest in doing so conflicts with constitutionally protected interests of the defendant. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not protect a guilty defendant's interest in avoiding a harsher sentence upon retrial, even the death sentence. I therefore dissent. </s> [Footnote 1 In Pearce, the Court stated: "The Court's decision in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 , is of no applicability to the present problem. The Green decision was based upon the double jeopardy provision's guarantee against retrial for an offense of which the defendant was acquitted." 395 U.S., at 720 , n. 16 (emphasis in original). </s> [Footnote 2 In the Court's view, these procedures distinguish this case from United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919), where the sentencing decisions were not made pursuant to similar procedures. No one questions [451 U.S. 430, 449] that these procedures, applicable in capital cases, are different. But analytically the difference is immaterial for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. See infra, at 450. </s> [Footnote 3 Of course, a sentence imposed upon one who did not commit the crime is "erroneous," but the error inheres in the decision on guilt or innocence, not in the sentencing decision. Also, a sentence may be called "erroneous" if it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime committed. But in that event, the sentence is "cruel and unusual" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). </s> [Footnote 4 I would have trouble concurring in the Court's judgment even if I agreed with the Court that the procedures of the Missouri death penalty statute distinguish this case from Pearce, Chaffin, and Stroud. In the Court's view, the first jury's decision to sentence petitioner to life imprisonment rather than death reveals that the State failed to "prove its case" that petitioner deserved capital punishment. On this premise the Court concludes that the principle of Green and Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), bars a second attempt by the State to secure a death sentence. </s> Under the Missouri statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. 565.012 (1978), the "case" that the State had to prove was that petitioner committed the murder under circumstances defined as "aggravating" and that these circumstances warranted the imposition of the death penalty. But the trial court expressly instructed the jury that it could choose life imprisonment rather than death even if it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State had proved the existence and gravity of such circumstances. See ante, at 434-435. Thus, the jury's decision for life imprisonment rather than death does not necessarily mean that the State adduced insufficient evidence. To be sure, an acquittal on the question of guilt or innocence does not necessarily mean that the State adduced insufficient evidence, and yet such acquittals are final. But juries instructed on the question of guilt or innocence are not told that they can ignore the State's evidence. Where the jury is so instructed, as in this case, there is significantly less reason to assume that the State failed to prove its case. Accordingly, there is less reason to consider a second attempt to obtain the death penalty an unfair "`second bite at the apple.'" Burks v. United States, supra, at 17. </s> [451 U.S. 430, 454]

United States Supreme Court ARAVE v. CREECH(1993) No. 91-1160 Argued: November 10, 1992Decided: March 30, 1993 </s> After respondent Creech pleaded guilty to first-degree murder for the brutal slaying of a fellow Idaho prison inmate, the state trial judge sentenced him to death based, in part, on the statutory aggravating circumstance that, "[b]y the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life." In affirming, the Idaho Supreme Court, among other things, rejected Creech's argument that this aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, and reaffirmed the limiting construction it had placed on the statutory language in State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 418-419, 631 P.2d 187, 200-201, whereby, inter alia, "`the phrase "utter disregard" . . . is meant to be reflective of . . . the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.'" Although the Federal District Court denied habeas corpus relief, the Court of Appeals found the "utter disregard" circumstance facially invalid, holding, among other things, that the circumstance is unconstitutionally vague and that the Osborn narrowing construction is inadequate to cure the defect under this Court's precedents. </s> Held: </s> 1. In light of the consistent narrowing definition given the "utter disregard" circumstance by the Idaho Supreme Court, the circumstance, on its face, meets constitutional standards. Pp. 470-478. </s> (a) To satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital sentencing scheme must channel the sentencer's discretion by "`clear and objective standards'" that provide specific and detailed guidance and make rationally reviewable the death sentencing process. See, e.g., Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 . In order to decide whether a particular aggravating circumstance meets these requirements, a federal court must determine whether the statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to guide the sentencer; if so, whether the state courts have further defined the vague terms; and, if so, whether those definitions are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide some guidance. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 . However, it is not necessary to decide here whether the statutory phrase "utter disregard for human life" itself passes constitutional muster. The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a limiting construction, and that construction meets constitutional requirements. Pp. 470-471. [507 U.S. 463, 464] </s> (b) The Osborn construction is sufficiently "clear and objective." In ordinary usage, the phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a killer who kills without feeling or sympathy. Thus, the phrase describes the defendant's state of mind: not his mens rea, but his attitude toward his conduct and his victim. The law has long recognized that such state of mind is not a "subjective" matter, but a fact to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Although determining whether a capital defendant killed without feeling or sympathy may be difficult, that does not mean that a State cannot, consistent with the Constitution, authorize sentencing judges to make the inquiry and to take their findings into account when deciding whether capital punishment is warranted. Cf. Walton, supra, at 655. Pp. 471-474. </s> (c) Although the question is close, the Osborn construction satisfies the requirement that a State's capital sentencing scheme "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 . The class of persons so eligible under Idaho law is defined broadly to include all first-degree murderers, a category which is itself broad because it includes a sizable number of second-degree murderers under specified circumstances. Even within these broad definitions, the word "pitiless," standing alone, might not narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, since a sentencing judge might conclude that every first-degree murderer is "pitiless." Given the statutory scheme, however, a sentencing judge reasonably could find that not all Idaho capital defendants are "cold-blooded," since some within the broad class of first-degree murderers do exhibit feeling, for example, anger, jealousy, or revenge. Pp. 474-476. </s> (d) This Court rejects the suggestion of the parties and the dissent that the facial constitutionality of the "utter disregard" circumstance, as construed in Osborn, should be determined by examining for consistency the applications of the circumstance by the state courts in other cases. Although the Court's facial challenge precedents authorize a federal court to consider state court formulations of a limiting construction to ensure that they are consistent, see, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255 , n. 12, those precedents have not authorized review of state court cases to determine whether a limiting construction has been applied consistently. A comparative analysis of state court cases, moreover, would be particularly inappropriate here. None of the cases on which Creech or the dissent relies influenced either his trial judge or the Idaho Supreme Court, which upheld his death sentence before it had applied Osborn to any other set of facts, and thereafter has repeatedly reaffirmed its Osborn interpretation. Pp. 476-478. </s> 2. The Court decides only the foregoing question. The Court of Appeals had no occasion to reach the Jeffers issue - whether the state [507 U.S. 463, 465] courts' application of the "utter disregard" circumstance to the facts of this case violated the Constitution. See 497 U.S., at 783 . Because Creech is already entitled to resentencing in state court on the basis of another of the Court of Appeals' rulings, the posture of the case makes it unnecessary for this Court to reach his remaining arguments. Pp. 478-479. </s> 947 F.2d 873, reversed in part and remanded. </s> O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and THOMAS, JJ, joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS, J., joined. </s> Lynn E. Thomas, Deputy Attorney General of Idaho, argued the cause for petitioner. With her on the briefs was Larry EchoHawk, Attorney General of Idaho. </s> Cliff Gardner argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Claude M. Stern. </s> JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. </s> In 1981, Thomas Eugene Creech beat and kicked to death a fellow inmate at the Idaho State Penitentiary. He pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and was sentenced to death. The sentence was based in part on the statutory aggravating circumstance that "[b]y the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life." Idaho Code 19-2515(g)(6) (1987). The sole question we must decide is whether the "utter disregard" circumstance, as interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court, adequately channels sentencing discretion as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. </s> I </s> The facts underlying this case could not be more chilling. Thomas Creech has admitted to killing or participating in the killing of at least 26 people. The bodies of 11 of his victims - who were shot, stabbed, beaten, or strangled to death - have been recovered in seven States. Creech has [507 U.S. 463, 466] said repeatedly that, unless he is completely isolated from humanity, he likely will continue killing. And he has identified by name three people outside prison walls he intends to kill if given the opportunity. </s> Creech's most recent victim was David Dale Jensen, a fellow inmate in the maximum security unit of the Idaho State Penitentiary. When he killed Jensen, Creech was already serving life sentences for other first-degree murders. Jensen, about seven years Creech's junior, was a nonviolent car thief. He was also physically handicapped. Part of Jensen's brain had been removed prior to his incarceration, and he had a plastic plate in his skull. </s> The circumstances surrounding Jensen's death remain unclear, primarily because Creech has given conflicting accounts of them. In one version, Creech killed Jensen in self-defense. In another - the version that Creech gave at his sentencing hearing - other inmates offered to pay Creech or help him escape if he killed Jensen. Creech, through an intermediary, provided Jensen with makeshift weapons and then arranged for Jensen to attack him, in order to create an excuse for the killing. Whichever of these accounts (if either) is true, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the record supported the following facts: </s> "Jensen approached Creech and swung a weapon at him which consisted of a sock containing batteries. Creech took the weapon away from Jensen, who returned to his cell but emerged with a toothbrush to which had been taped a razor blade. When the two men again met, Jensen made some movement toward Creech, who then struck Jensen between the eyes with the battery laden sock, knocking Jensen to the floor. The fight continued, according to Creech's version, with Jensen swinging the razor blade at Creech and Creech hitting Jensen with the battery filled sock. The plate imbedded in Jensen's skull shattered, and blood from Jensen's skull was splashed on the floor and walls. Finally, the sock broke [507 U.S. 463, 467] and the batteries fell out, and by that time, Jensen was helpless. Creech then commenced kicking Jensen about the throat and head. Sometime later, a guard noticed blood, and Jensen was taken to the hospital, where he died the same day." State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 364, 670 P.2d 463, 465 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984). </s> Creech pleaded guilty to first-degree murder. The trial judge held a sentencing hearing in accordance with Idaho Code 19-2515(d) (1987). After the hearing, the judge issued written findings in the format prescribed by Rule 33.1 of the Idaho Criminal Rules. Under the heading "Facts and Argument Found in Mitigation," he listed that Creech "did not instigate the fight with the victim, but the victim, without provocation, attacked him. [Creech] was initially justified in protecting himself." App. 32. Under the heading "Facts and Argumen[t] Found in Aggravation," the judge stated: </s> "[T]he victim, once the attack commenced, was under the complete domination and control of the defendant. The murder itself was extremely gruesome, evidencing an excessive violent rage. With the victim's attack as an excuse, the . . . murder then took on many aspects of an assassination. These violent actions . . . went well beyond self-defense. </s> * * * * </s> ". . . The murder, once commenced, appears to have been an intentional, calculated act." Id., at 32-33. </s> The judge then found beyond a reasonable doubt five statutory aggravating circumstances, including that Creech, "[b]y the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, . . . exhibited utter disregard for human life." Id., at 34. He observed in this context that, "[a]fter the victim was helpless, [Creech] killed him." Ibid. Next, the judge concluded that the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating [507 U.S. 463, 468] circumstances. Reiterating that Creech "intentionally destroyed another human being at a time when he was completely helpless," ibid., the judge sentenced Creech to death. </s> After temporarily remanding for the trial judge to impose sentence in open court in Creech's presence, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. The court rejected Creech's argument that the "utter disregard" circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, reaffirming the limiting construction it had placed on the statutory language in State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981): </s> "`A . . . limiting construction must be placed upon the aggravating circumstances in I.C. 19-2515[g](6), that "[b]y the murder, or the circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life." To properly define this circumstance, it is important to note the other aggravating circumstances with which this provision overlaps. The second aggravating circumstance, I.C. 19-2515[g](2), that the defendant committed another murder at the time this murder was committed, obviously could show an utter disregard for human life, as could the third aggravating circumstance, I.C. 19-2515[g](3), that the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. The same can be said for the fourth aggravating circumstance, I.C. 19-2515[g](4), that the murder was committed for remuneration. Since we will not presume that the legislative intent was to duplicate any already enumerated circumstance, thus making [the "utter disregard" circumstance] mere surplusage, we hold that the phrase "utter disregard" must be viewed in reference to acts other than those set forth in I.C. 19-2515[g](2), (3), and (4). We conclude instead that the phrase is meant to be reflective of acts or circumstances surrounding the crime which exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.'" Creech, supra, at 370, [507 U.S. 463, 469] 670 P.2d, at 471 (quoting Osborn, supra, at 418-419, 631 P.2d, at 200-201) (citation omitted). </s> After independently reviewing the record, the Idaho Supreme Court also held that the evidence clearly supported the trial judge's findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including the finding that Creech had exhibited "utter disregard for human life." 105 Idaho at 369, 670 P.2d, at 470. Then, as required by Idaho law, see Idaho Code 19-2827(c)(3) (1987), the court compared Creech's case to similar cases in order to determine whether his sentence was excessive or disproportionate. The court emphatically concluded that it was not: "We have examined cases dating back more than 50 years, and our examination fails to disclose that any such remorseless, calculating, cold-blooded multiple murderer has . . . ever been before this Court." 105 Idaho, at 375, 670 P.2d, at 476 (footnote omitted). </s> Creech filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho. The District Court denied relief. See Creech v. Arave, No. 86-1042 (June 18, 1986). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, agreed with Creech that the "utter disregard" circumstance is unconstitutionally vague. 947 F.2d 873 (1991). The court first considered the statutory language itself, and concluded that the phrase "utter disregard" does not adequately channel sentencing discretion. Id., at 882-883. The court then considered the Osborn narrowing construction and found it unsatisfactory as well. Explaining what "utter disregard" does not mean, the Court of Appeals reasoned, does not give the phrase content. 947 F.2d, at 883, n. 12. Nor do the words "`the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life'" clarify the statutory language; they merely emphasize it. Id., at 883-884 (citing Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988)). The phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" also was deemed inadequate. The Court of Appeals construed our precedents, including Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), to [507 U.S. 463, 470] require that a limiting construction "defin[e] the terms of the statutory aggravating circumstance through objective standards." 947 F.2d, at 884. "[C]old-blooded, pitiless slayer" fails, the court said, because it calls for a "subjective determination." Ibid. The court found further evidence of the Osborn construction's infirmity in its application to this case. In the Court of Appeals' view, the trial judge's findings that Jensen attacked Creech "without provocation" and that the murder "`evidenc[ed] an excessive violent rage'" could not be reconciled with the conclusion that Creech was a "cold-blooded, pitiless" killer. 947 F. 2d, at 884. The Court of Appeals therefore found the "utter disregard" circumstance facially invalid. Id., at 884-885. </s> Three judges dissented from an order denying rehearing en banc. The dissenters argued that the panel had misconstrued both the "utter disregard" factor and this Court's prior decisions. Whether a defendant is a "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer," they said, is not a subjective inquiry; it is an evidentiary question to be determined from facts and circumstances. Id., at 890 (Trott, J., dissenting). The dissenters found the Osborn limiting construction indistinguishable from the construction this Court approved in Walton. 947 F.2d, at 890. We granted certiorari, limited to the narrow question whether the "utter disregard" circumstance, as interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Osborn, is unconstitutionally vague. See 504 U.S. 984 (1992). </s> II </s> This case is governed by the standards we articulated in Walton, supra, and Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764 (1990). In Jeffers, we reaffirmed the fundamental principle that, to satisfy the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital sentencing scheme must "`suitably direc[t] and limi[t]'" the sentencer's discretion "`so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.'" Id., at 774 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, [507 U.S. 463, 471] Powell, and STEVENS JJ.)). The State must "`channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.'" 497 U.S., at 774 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted)). </s> In Walton, we set forth the inquiry that a federal court must undertake when asked to decide whether a particular aggravating circumstance meets these standards: </s> "[T]he federal court . . . must first determine whether the statutory language defining the circumstance is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer. If so, then the federal court must attempt to determine whether the state courts have further defined the vague terms, and, if they have done so, whether those definitions are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide some guidance to the sentencer." 497 U.S., at 654 (emphasis in original). </s> Where, as in Idaho, the sentencer is a judge, rather than a jury, the federal court must presume that the judge knew and applied any existing narrowing construction. Id., at 653. </s> Unlike the Court of Appeals, we do not believe it is necessary to decide whether the statutory phrase "utter disregard for human life" itself passes constitutional muster. The Idaho Supreme Court has adopted a limiting construction, and we believe that construction meets constitutional requirements. </s> Contrary to the dissent's assertions, see post, at 481-485, the phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" is not without content. Webster's Dictionary defines "pitiless" to mean devoid of, or unmoved by, mercy or compassion. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1726 (1986). The lead entry for "cold-blooded" gives coordinate definitions. One, [507 U.S. 463, 472] "marked by absence of warm feelings: without consideration, compunction, or clemency," id., at 442, mirrors the definition of "pitiless." The other defines "cold-blooded" to mean "matter of fact, emotionless." Ibid. It is true that "cold-blooded" is sometimes also used to describe "premedita[tion]," Black's Law Dictionary 260 (6th ed. 1990) - a mental state that may coincide with, but is distinct from, a lack of feeling or compassion. But premeditation is clearly not the sense in which the Idaho Supreme Court used the word "cold-blooded" in Osborn. Other terms in the limiting construction - "callous" and "pitiless" - indicate that the court used the word "cold-blooded" in its first sense. "Premedita[tion]," moreover, is specifically addressed elsewhere in the Idaho homicide statutes, Idaho Code 18-4003(a) (1987 (amended version at Supp. 1992)); had the Osborn court meant premeditation, it likely would have used the statutory language. </s> In ordinary usage, then, the phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a killer who kills without feeling or sympathy. We assume that legislators use words in their ordinary, everyday senses, see, e.g., INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984), and there is no reason to suppose that judges do otherwise. The dissent questions our resort to dictionaries for the common meaning of the word "cold-blooded," post, at 482, but offers no persuasive authority to suggest that the word, in its present context, means anything else. </s> The Court of Appeals thought the Osborn limiting construction inadequate not because the phrase "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" lacks meaning, but because it requires the sentencer to make a "subjective determination." We disagree. We are not faced with pejorative adjectives such as "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" or "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" - terms that describe a crime as a whole and that this Court has held to be unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Shell v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 1 (1990) (per curiam); Cartwright, 486 U.S., at 363 -364; [507 U.S. 463, 473] Godfrey, supra, at 428-429. The terms "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" describe the defendant's state of mind: not his mens rea, but his attitude toward his conduct and his victim. The law has long recognized that a defendant's state of mind is not a "subjective" matter, but a fact to be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. See United States Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 -717 (1983) ("`The state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove . . ., but if it can be ascertained, it is as much a fact as anything else'" (quoting Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. Div. 459, 483 (1885))). </s> Determining whether a capital defendant killed without feeling or sympathy is undoubtedly more difficult than, for example, determining whether he "was previously convicted of another murder," Idaho Code 19-2515(g)(1) (1987). But that does not mean that a State cannot, consistent with the Federal Constitution, authorize sentencing judges to make the inquiry and to take their findings into account when deciding whether capital punishment is warranted. This is the import of Walton. In that case, we considered Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved" circumstance. The Arizona Supreme Court had held that a crime is committed in a "depraved" manner when the perpetrator "`relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion,' or `shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure' in the killing." Walton, supra, at 655 (quoting State v. Walton, 159 Ariz. 571, 587, 769 P.d 1017, 1033 (1989)). We concluded that this construction adequately guided sentencing discretion, even though "the proper degree of definition of an aggravating factor of this nature is not susceptible of mathematical precision." 497 U.S., at 655 ; accord, Jeffers, 497 U.S., at 777 ; cf. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (WHITE, J., concurring in judgment) (approving Florida statutory aggravating circumstances that, "although . . . not susceptible of mechanical [507 U.S. 463, 474] application . . . are by no means so vague and overbroad as to leave the discretion of the sentencing authority unfettered"). </s> The language at issue here is no less "clear and objective" than the language sustained in Walton. Whether a defendant "relishes" or derives "pleasure" from his crime arguably may be easier to determine than whether he acts without feeling or sympathy, since enjoyment is an affirmative mental state, whereas the cold-bloodedness inquiry in a sense requires the sentencer to find a negative. But we do not think so subtle a distinction has constitutional significance. The Osborn limiting construction, like the one upheld in Walton, defines a state of mind that is ascertainable from surrounding facts. Accordingly, we decline to invalidate the "utter disregard" circumstance on the ground that the Idaho Supreme Court's limiting construction is insufficiently "objective." </s> Of course, it is not enough for an aggravating circumstance, as construed by the state courts, to be determinate. Our precedents make clear that a State's capital sentencing scheme also must "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). When the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the sentencer to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the circumstance must provide a principled basis for doing so. See Jeffers, supra, at 776; Godfrey, supra, at 433. If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. See Cartwright, supra, at 364 (invalidating aggravating circumstance that "an ordinary person could honestly believe" described every murder); Godfrey, at 428-429 ("A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize every murder as `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman'"). [507 U.S. 463, 475] </s> Although the question is close, we believe the Osborn construction satisfies this narrowing requirement. The class of murderers eligible for capital punishment under Idaho law is defined broadly to include all first-degree murderers. Idaho Code 18-4004 (1987). And the category of first-degree murderers is also broad. It includes premeditated murders and those carried out by means of poison, lying in wait, or certain kinds of torture. 18-4003(a). In addition, murders that otherwise would be classified as second degree, 18-4003(g) - including homicides committed without "considerable provocation" or under circumstances demonstrating "an abandoned and malignant heart" (a term of art that refers to unintentional homicide committed with extreme recklessness, see American Law Institute, Model Penal Code 210.2(1)(b) Comment, n. 4 (1980)), Idaho Code 18-4001, 18-4002 (1987) - become first degree if they are accompanied by one of a number of enumerated circumstances. For example, murders are classified as first degree when the victim is a fellow prison inmate, 18-4003(e), or a law enforcement or judicial officer performing official duties, 18-4003(b); when the defendant is already serving a sentence for murder, 18-4003(c); and when the murder occurs during a prison escape, 18-4003(f), or the commission or attempted commission of arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or mayhem, 18-4003(d). In other words, a sizable class of even those murderers who kill with some provocation or without specific intent may receive the death penalty under Idaho law. </s> We acknowledge that, even within these broad categories, the word "pitiless, " standing alone, might not narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. A sentencing judge might conclude that every first-degree murderer is "pitiless," because it is difficult to imagine how a person with any mercy or compassion could kill another human being without justification. Given the statutory scheme, however, we believe that a sentencing judge [507 U.S. 463, 476] reasonably could find that not all Idaho capital defendants are "cold-blooded." That is because some within the broad class of first-degree murderers do exhibit feeling. Some, for example, kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions. In Walton, we held that Arizona could treat capital defendants who take pleasure in killing as more deserving of the death penalty than those who do not. Idaho similarly has identified the subclass of defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy as more deserving of death. By doing so, it has narrowed in a meaningful way the category of defendants upon whom capital punishment may be imposed. </s> Creech argues that the Idaho courts have not applied the "utter disregard" circumstance consistently. He points out that the courts have found defendants to exhibit "utter disregard" in a wide range of cases. This, he claims, demonstrates that the circumstance is nothing more than a catch-all. The dissent apparently agrees. See post, at 485-487. The State, in turn, offers its own review of the cases and contends that they are consistent. In essence, the parties and the dissent would have us determine the facial constitutionality of the "utter disregard" circumstance, as construed in Osborn, by examining applications of the circumstance in cases not before us. </s> As an initial matter, we do not think the fact that "all kinds of . . . factors," post, at 486, may demonstrate the requisite state of mind renders the Osborn construction facially invalid. That the Idaho courts may find first-degree murderers to be "cold-blooded" and "pitiless" in a wide range of circumstances is unsurprising. It also is irrelevant to the question before us. We did not undertake a comparative analysis of state court decisions in Walton. See 497 U.S., at 655 (construing the argument that the aggravating circumstance "has been applied in an arbitrary manner" as a challenge to the state court's proportionality review). And in Jeffers we stated clearly that the question whether state [507 U.S. 463, 477] courts properly have applied an aggravating circumstance is separate from the question whether the circumstance, as narrowed, is facially valid. See 497 U.S., at 778 -780. To be sure, we previously have examined other state decisions when the construction of an aggravating circumstance has been unclear. In Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527 (1992), for example, the argument was the state courts had not adhered to a single limiting construction of Florida's "heinous, atrocious, or cruel" circumstance. Id., at 536-537; see also Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S., at 255 , n. 12 (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and STEVENS, JJ.) (reviewing other cases to establish that the state courts had construed an aggravating circumstance consistently). Under our precedents, a federal court may consider state court formulations of a limiting construction to ensure that they are consistent. But our decisions do not authorize review of state court cases to determine whether a limiting construction has been applied consistently. </s> A comparative analysis of state court cases, moreover, would be particularly inappropriate here. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld Creech's death sentence in 1983 - before it had applied Osborn to any other set of facts. None of the decisions on which the dissent relies, or upon which Creech asks us to invalidate his death sentence, influenced either the trial judge who sentenced Creech or the appellate judges who upheld the sentence. And there is no question that Idaho's formulation of its limiting construction has been consistent. The Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed its original interpretation of "utter disregard" repeatedly, often reciting the definition given in Osborn verbatim. See, e.g., State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 435-436, 826 P.2d 1081, 1091-1092 (1991) (citing cases), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992). It also has explained that "utter disregard" differs from Idaho's "heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance, Idaho Code 19-2515(g)(5) (1987), because the Osborn construction focuses on the defendant's state of mind. State v. [507 U.S. 463, 478] Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 99, 774 P.2d 252, 269 ("[T]he `utter disregard' factor refers not to the outrageousness of the acts constituting the murder, but to the defendant's lack of conscientious scruples against killing another human being"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989). In light of the consistent narrowing definition given the "utter disregard" circumstance by the Idaho Supreme Court, we are satisfied that the circumstance, on its face, meets constitutional standards. </s> III </s> Creech argues alternatively that the "utter disregard" circumstance, even if facially valid, does not apply to him. He suggests - as did the Court of Appeals and as does the dissent, post, at 488 - that the trial judge's findings that he was provoked and that he exhibited an "excessive violent rage" are irreconcilable with a finding of "utter disregard." The Idaho Supreme Court, Creech claims, did not cure the error on appeal. There also appears to be some question whether the other murders that Creech has committed, and the self-defense explanations he has offered for some of them, bear on the "utter disregard" determination. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 5-7; 18-21; cf. post, at 488, n. 15. </s> These are primarily questions of state law. As we said in Jeffers, a state court's application of a valid aggravating circumstance violates the Constitution only if "no reasonable sentencer" could find the circumstance to exist. 497 U.S., at 783 . The Court of Appeals had no occasion to decide the Jeffers issue in this case, since it found the "utter disregard" circumstance facially vague. The posture of the case, moreover, makes it unnecessary for us to reach the remaining arguments. The Court of Appeals granted Creech relief on two other claims: that the trial judge improperly refused to allow him to present new mitigating evidence when he was resentenced in open court, and that the judge applied two aggravating circumstances without making a finding required under state law. See 947 F.2d, at 881-882. On the [507 U.S. 463, 479] basis of the first claim, Creech is entitled to resentencing in state trial court. Id., at 882. Accordingly, we hold today only that the "utter disregard" circumstance, as defined in Osborn, on its face meets constitutional requirements. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed in part and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. </s> It is so ordered. </s> JUSTICE BLACKMUN, with whom JUSTICE STEVENS joins, dissenting. </s> Confronted with an insupportable limiting construction of an unconstitutionally vague statute, the majority in turn concocts its own limiting construction of the state court's formulation. Like "nonsense upon stilts," 1 however, the majority's reconstruction only highlights the deficient character of the nebulous formulation that it seeks to advance. Because the metaphor "cold-blooded" by which Idaho defines its "utter disregard" circumstance is both vague and unenlightening, and because the majority's recasting of that metaphor is not dictated by common usage, legal usage, or the usage of the Idaho courts, the statute fails to provide meaningful guidance to the sentencer, as required by the Constitution. Accordingly, I dissent. </s> I </s> I discuss the applicable legal standards only briefly, because, for the most part, I agree with the majority about what is required in a case of this kind. As the majority acknowledges, ante, at 474, "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 , [507 U.S. 463, 480] 877 (1983). A state court's limiting construction can save a flawed statute from unconstitutional vagueness, and where the sentencer is a judge, there is nothing wrong with "presum[ing] that the judge knew and applied any existing narrowing construction." Ante, at 471. "The trial judge's familiarity with the State Supreme Court's opinions, however, will serve to narrow his discretion only if that body of case law articulates a construction of the aggravating circumstance that is coherent and consistent, and that meaningfully limits the range of homicides to which the aggravating factor will apply." Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 692 (1990) (dissenting opinion). We have "plainly rejected the submission that a particular set of facts surrounding a murder, however shocking they might be, were enough in themselves, and without some narrowing principle to apply to those facts, to warrant the imposition of the death penalty." Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988). A limiting construction must do more than merely invite the sentencer to assess in some indeterminate way the circumstances of each case. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 757 -761 (1990) (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). The source of this requirement is the paramount need to "`make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.'" Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion), quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303 (1976) (plurality opinion). </s> II </s> The Idaho Supreme Court has determined that, under our cases, Idaho's statutory phrase "utter disregard for human life" requires a limiting construction, see State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 418, 631 P.2d 187, 200 (1981); Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 209, 731 P.2d 192, 204 (1986), and respondent does not challenge the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the phrase, unadorned, fails to meet constitutional standards. This is understandable. Every first-degree murder will demonstrate a lack of regard for human life, and there is no [507 U.S. 463, 481] cause to believe that some murders somehow demonstrate only partial, rather than "utter" disregard. Nor is there any evidence that the phrase is intended to have a specialized meaning - other than that presented by the Idaho Supreme Court in its limiting constructions - that might successfully narrow the eligible class. The question is whether Osborn's limiting construction saves the statute. 2 </s> Under Osborn, an offense demonstrates "utter disregard for human life" when the "acts or circumstances surrounding the crime . . . exhibit the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer." 102 Idaho, at 419, 631 P.2d, at 201. Jettisoning all but the term, "cold-blooded," the majority contends that this cumbersome construction clearly singles out the killing committed "without feeling or sympathy." Ante, at 476. As an initial matter, I fail to see how "without feeling or sympathy" is meaningfully different from "devoid of . . . mercy or compassion" - the definition of "pitiless" that the majority concedes to be constitutionally inadequate. See ante, at 471. </s> Even if there is a distinction, however, the "without feeling or sympathy" test, which never has been articulated by any Idaho Court, does not flow ineluctably from the phrase at issue in this case: "cold-blooded." I must stress in this regard the rather obvious point that a "facial" challenge of this nature - one alleging that a limiting construction provides inadequate guidance - cannot be defeated merely by a demonstration [507 U.S. 463, 482] that there exists a narrowing way to apply the contested language. The entire point of the challenge is that the language's susceptibility to a variety of interpretations is what makes it (facially) unconstitutional. To save the statute, the State must provide a construction that, on its face, reasonably can be expected to be applied in a consistent and meaningful way so as to provide the sentencer with adequate guidance. The metaphor "cold-blooded" does not do this. </s> I begin with "ordinary usage." The majority points out that the first definition in Webster's Dictionary under the entry "cold-blooded" is "marked by absence of warm feelings: without consideration, compunction, or mercy." Ante, at 472, quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 442 (1986). If Webster's rendition of the term's ordinary meaning is to be credited, then Idaho has singled out murderers who act without warm feelings: those who act without consideration, compunction, or clemency. Obviously that definition is no more illuminating than the adjective "pitiless" as defined by the majority. What murderer does act with consideration or compunction or clemency? 3 </s> In its eagerness to boil the phrase down to a serviceable core, the majority virtually ignores the very definition it cites. Instead, the majority comes up with a hybrid all its own - "without feeling or sympathy" - and then goes one step further, asserting that, because the term "cold-blooded" so obviously means "without feeling," it cannot refer as ordinarily understood to murderers who "kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions." Ante, at 476. That is incorrect. In everyday parlance, the term "cold-blooded" routinely is used to describe killings that fall outside the majority's definition. In the first nine weeks of this [507 U.S. 463, 483] year alone, the label "cold-blooded" has been applied to a murder by an ex-spouse angry over visitation rights, 4 a killing by a jealous lover, 5 a revenge killing, 6 an ex-spouse "full of hatred," 7 the close-range assassination of an enemy official by a foe in a bitter ethnic conflict, 8 murder prompted by humiliation and hatred, 9 killings by fanatical cult members, 10 a murderer who enjoyed killing, 11 and, perhaps most appropriately, [507 U.S. 463, 484] all murders. 12 All these killings occurred with "feelings" of one kind or another. All were described as cold-blooded. The majority's assertion that the Idaho construction narrows the class of capital defendants because it rules out those who "kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions" clearly is erroneous, because, in ordinary usage, the nebulous description "cold-blooded" simply is not limited to defendants who kill without emotion. </s> In legal usage, the metaphor "cold blood" does have a specific meaning. "Cold blood" is used "to designate a willful, deliberate, and premeditated homicide." Black's Law Dictionary 260 (6th ed. 1990). As such, the term is used to differentiate between first- and second-degree murders. 13 For example, in United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982), [507 U.S. 463, 485] JUSTICE O'CONNOR, writing for the Court, described the District of Columbia's homicide statute: "`In homespun terminology, intentional murder is in the first degree if committed in cold blood, and is murder in the second degree if committed on impulse or in the sudden heat of passion.'" Id., at 170, n. 18 (1982), quoting Austin v. United States, 127 U.S. App. D.C. 180, 188, 382 F.2d 129, 137 (1967). Murder in cold blood is, in this sense, the opposite of murder in "hot blood." Arguably, then, the Osborn formulation covers every intentional or first-degree murder. An aggravating circumstance so construed would clearly be unconstitutional under Godfrey. </s> Finally, I examine the construction's application by the Idaho courts. The majority acknowledges the appropriateness of examining "other state decisions when the construction of an aggravating circumstance has been unclear," such as where state courts have not adhered to a single limiting construction. Ante, at 477. Here, however, the majority believes such an inquiry is "irrelevant," ante, at 476, because "there is no question that Idaho's formulation of its limiting construction has been consistent," ante, at 477. The majority misses the point. Idaho's application of the Osborn formulation is relevant not because that formulation has been inconsistently invoked, but because the construction has never meant what the majority says it does. In other words, it is the majority's reconstruction of the (unconstitutional) construction that has not been applied consistently (or ever, for that matter). If, for example, a State declared that "jabberwocky" was an aggravating circumstance, and then carefully invoked "jabberwocky" in every one of its capital cases, this Court could not simply decide that "jabberwocky" means "killing a police officer" and then dispense with any inquiry into whether the term ever had been understood in that way by the State's courts, simply because the "jabberwocky" construction consistently had been reaffirmed. </s> An examination of the Idaho cases reveals that the Osborn formulation is not much better than "jabberwocky." As [507 U.S. 463, 486] noted above, the Idaho courts never have articulated anything remotely approaching the majority's novel "those who kill without feeling or sympathy" interpretation. All kinds of other factors, however, have been invoked by Idaho courts applying the circumstance. For example, in State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984), the killer's cold-bloodedness supposedly was demonstrated by his refusal to render aid to his victim and the fact that "[h]is only concern was to cover up his own participation in the incident." Id., at 367, 690 P.2d at 302. In State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 774, 810 P.2d 680, 712 (1991), a finding of "utter disregard" was held to be supported by evidence that the defendant "approached Mr. Herndon with a gun, then made him drop his pants and crawl into the cabin where he proceeded to bludgeon the skulls of both of his victims with a hammer. He then left them lying on the floor to die, and Mr. Herndon was left lying on the floor of the cabin convulsing." And in the present case, the trial judge's determination that Creech exhibited utter disregard for human life appears to have been based primarily on the fact that Creech had "intentionally destroyed another human being at a time when he was completely helpless." App. 34. Each of these characteristics is frightfully deplorable, but what they have to do with a lack of emotion or with each other, for that matter - eludes me. Without some rationalizing principle to connect them, the findings of "cold-bloodedness" stand as nothing more than fact-specific, "gut-reaction" conclusions that are unconstitutional under Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). </s> The futility of the Idaho courts' attempt to bring some rationality to the "utter disregard" circumstance is glaringly evident in the sole post-Osborn case that endeavors to explain the construction in any depth. In State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 774 P.2d 252, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989), the court declared that the "utter disregard" factor refers to "the defendant's lack of conscientious scruples against killing [507 U.S. 463, 487] another human being." Id., at 99, 744 P.2d, at 269. Accord, State v. Card, 121 Idaho, at 436, 825 P.2d, at 1092. Thus, the latest statement from the Idaho Supreme Court on the issue says nothing about emotionless crimes, but, instead, sweepingly includes every murder committed that is without "conscientious scruples against killing." I can imagine no crime that would not fall within that construction. </s> The State in its brief embraces Fain's broad construction. "In every case in which the Idaho Supreme Court has upheld a death sentence based wholly or in part on a finding of utter disregard for human life, the defendant had acted without conscientious scruple against killing." Brief for Petitioner 25. The State cites this reassuring fact as the "best evidence that Idaho's utter disregard factor is not so broad that it operates simply as a catch-all for murders not covered by other aggravating circumstances." Id., at 24. This "best evidence" is not very good evidence, especially when viewed against the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court never has reversed a finding of utter disregard. 14 Equally unsettling is the State's frank admission that the Osborn construction "does not make findings of the aggravating factors depend on the presence of particular facts. Instead, Idaho has chosen to rely on the ability of the sentencing judge to make principled distinctions between capital and non-capital cases [507 U.S. 463, 488] with guidance that is somewhat subjective. . . ." Brief for Petitioner 9. That kind of gestalt approach to capital sentencing is precisely what Cartwright and Godfrey forbid. </s> Ultimately, it hardly seems necessary to look beyond the record of this case to determine that either the majority's construction is inadequate or that there was insufficient evidence to support the "utter disregard" factor here. The record, which the majority takes pains to assure us "could not be more chilling," ante, at 465, 15 includes an explicit finding by the trial judge that Creech was the subject of an unprovoked attack and that the killing took place in an "excessive violent rage." App. 52. If Creech somehow is covered by the "utter disregard" factor as understood by the majority (one who kills not with anger, but indifference, ante, at 476), then there can be no doubt that the factor is so broad as to cover any case. If Creech is not covered, then his sentence was wrongly imposed. </s> III </s> Let me be clear about what the majority would have to show in order to save the Idaho statute: that, on its face, the Osborn construction - "the highest, the utmost, callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer" - refers clearly and exclusively to crimes that occur "without feeling or sympathy," that is, to those that occur [507 U.S. 463, 489] without "anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions." No such showing has been made. </s> There is, of course, something distasteful and absurd in the very project of parsing this lexicon of death. But as long as we are in the death business, we shall be in the parsing business as well. Today's majority stretches the bounds of permissible construction past the breaking point. "`Vague terms do not suddenly become clear when they are defined by reference to other vague terms,'" Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S., at 693 -694, n. 16 (dissenting opinion), quoting Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477, 1489 (CA10 1987), nor do sweeping categories become narrow by mere restatement. The Osborn formulation is worthless, and neither common usage, nor legal terminology, nor the Idaho cases support the majority's attempt to salvage it. The statute is simply unconstitutional, and Idaho should be busy repairing it. </s> I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. </s> Footnotes [Footnote 1 J. Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in 2 Works of Jeremy Bentham 501 (1843). </s> [Footnote 2 Of course, even if the phrase "utter disregard" were narrowing and clear, a purported limiting construction from the State's high court that actually undid any narrowing or clarity would render the statute unconstitutional. For example, if the statute allowed the death sentence where the murder was committed for pay, but an authoritative construction from the State Supreme Court told trial courts that the statute covered every murder committed for "bad reasons," the state scheme would be unconstitutional. In the present case, any clarity that may be imparted, and any channeling that may be done by the phrase "utter disregard for human life," is destroyed by the boundless and vague Osborn construction adopted as the authoritative interpretation of the statute. </s> [Footnote 3 Cf. State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 172, 774 P.2d 299, 342 (1989) (Huntley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("What first degree murderer fails to show `callous disregard for human life'? I suppose this would be the `pitiful' slayer, who, prior to delivering the fatal blow, tells the victim, `Excuse me, pardon me, I know it's inconvenient, but I must now take your life.'"). </s> [Footnote 4 See Kuczka, Self-Defense Claimed in Murder Trial, Chicago Tribune, February 3, 1993, p. 5 ("To prosecutors, Eric Moen is a cold-blooded killer who gunned down his wife's former boyfriend in a Streamwood restaurant parking [lot] during a quarrel over visitation rights to the ex-boyfriend's infant daughter"). </s> [Footnote 5 See Caba, Friedman Prosecutor Rebuffed, Philadelphia Inquirer, February 19, 1993, p. B3 ("The prosecution contends she killed Edwards in cold blood because he was leaving [her] to return to his wife in Texas"). </s> [Footnote 6 See McMahon, Dad Does Everything Right, But Son Goes Wrong, Chicago Tribune, March 7, 1993, p. 1 (youth who, according to charges, killed victim after saying "he was going to kill him in retaliation for something [the victim] had done" is, "the state reminds, a cold-blooded killer"). </s> [Footnote 7 See Gorman, Millionaire Guilty of Killing Ex-Wife, Chicago Tribune, February 3, 1993, p. 1 ("Assistant State's Atty. Robert Egan portrayed Davis as a `manipulative,' cold-blooded killer. . . . Egan depicted Davis as a man so filled with hatred that he killed Diane Davis two weeks after an Illinois Appellate Court had ruled . . . that he must turn over $1.4 million of his inherited money to his former spouse"). </s> [Footnote 8 See Burns, U.N. to Ask NATO to Airdrop Supplies for Bosnians, New York Times, January 12, 1993, p. A10 (shooting of Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister by Serbian soldier was described by State Department spokesman Richard A. Boucher as "cold-blooded" murder). </s> [Footnote 9 See Man Gets Life For Double Murder, Toronto Star, March 4, 1993, p. A12 (the prosecution "called it `a cold-blooded killing' spurred by [the defendant's] `humiliation and hate of these people,' with whom he had squabbled during the 1991 mayoralty campaign"). </s> [Footnote 10 See McKay, Koresh "Smiled Defiantly" Before Ambush, Agent Says, Houston Chronicle, March 5, 1993, p. A1 ("'These people aren't religious. These people are cold-blooded killers who were shooting at us from every window in that place'"). </s> [Footnote 11 See Milling, Man Charged in 2 Slayings, Crime Spree, Houston Chronicle, March 5, 1993, p. A23 ("`I'd describe him as a psychopath who gets his gratification by hurting other people,' Carroll said. `He's not your typical serial killer. He just likes to pull the trigger and watch people die.' . . . `We knew this guy was a cold-blooded killer,' Carroll said"). </s> [Footnote 12 See Longenecker, Penalizing Convicts, Chicago Tribune, March 4, 1993, p. 28 (letter) ("[L]egislation to expand the death penalty to include all convicted murderers is long needed . . . . [I]f an individual commits cold-blooded murder, he should be removed from our society."). </s> [Footnote 13 The line between the "ordinary" and the "legal" meaning of cold-blooded, however, is not always obvious. On the one hand, judges sometimes casually use the phrase in a variety of senses. In those circumstances, contrary to the majority's assumptions, the term regularly is applied to crimes committed "with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety of other emotions." See, e.g., McWilliams v. Estelle, 378 F.Supp. 1380, 1383 (SD Tex. 1974) ("It was the theory of the prosecution that the store owner refused to serve petitioner, that he became angry, went to his hotel room, returned with a pistol, and shot the owner in cold blood"), appeal dism'd, 507 F.2d 1278 (CA5 1975); People v. Sullivan, 183 Ill.App. 3d 175, 180, 131 Ill.Dec. 820, 824, 538 N.E.2d 1376, 1380 (1989) (the defendant "exhibited repeatedly a very jealous, violent nature. . . . The trial court concluded that, if the situation were to arise again, defendant in all probability would kill in cold blood again"); People v. Yates, 65 Ill.App. 3d 319, 325, 22 Ill.Dec. 185, 191, 382 N.E.2d 505, 510 (1978) ("This record reveals a concerted, deliberate attack by Shirley and Emma Yates against their victim, motivated . . . by cold-blooded revenge"). On the other hand, in ordinary parlance, the term "cold-blooded" sometimes is used to mean "premeditated." See, e.g., Reward Offered in Slaying of 2 Women in Shadow Park, Los Angels Times, January 21, 1993, p. J2 (quoting mayor's statement: "`This was one of those in-cold-blood killings, not just a drive-by or random shooting. It was premeditated'"). </s> [Footnote 14 The State suggests in its brief that, on one occasion, the Idaho Supreme Court found that the evidence did not support an utter disregard finding. Brief for Petitioner 27, citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989). It is not at all clear, however, that that is what occurred in Charboneau. The court there vacated a sentence because it was "unclear from the [trial court's] findings whether the trial court would have imposed the death penalty without having [mistakenly] concluded that [the victim] was not mortally wounded until the second volley of shots was fired." Id., at 151, 774 P.2d, at 321. There is no mention in this part of the opinion of the "utter disregard" factor, nor any suggestion that the erroneous finding tainted the "utter disregard" factor, rather than the "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" circumstance that was at issue in that case. </s> [Footnote 15 I note that much of the majority's discussion of the "facts underlying this case" centers on Creech's other crimes - which obviously do not bear on whether, "[b]y the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life" - and on the argument, repeatedly rejected by the state courts, that Creech engineered the fight with Jensen in order to create a pretext for killing him. The Idaho Supreme Court explicitly noted that the trial court did not "find that the murder had been performed on contract or by plan." State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 364, 670 P.2d 463, 465 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051 (1984). In fact, the trial court not only found that Jensen's attack was "unprovoked," but it went further and found that the unprovoked nature of the attack actually constituted a mitigating factor. See App. 52. </s> [507 U.S. 463, 490]